NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2016
(Senate - February 10, 2016)

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[Pages S761-S806]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2016

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
proceed to the consideration of H.R. 757, which the clerk will report.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 757) to improve the enforcement of sanctions 
     against the Government of North Korea, and for other 
     purposes.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, 
which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, with 
an amendment to strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu 
thereof the following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``North 
     Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings; purposes.
Sec. 3. Definitions.

       TITLE I--INVESTIGATIONS, PROHIBITED CONDUCT, AND PENALTIES

Sec. 101. Statement of policy.
Sec. 102. Investigations.
Sec. 103. Reporting requirements.
Sec. 104. Designation of persons.
Sec. 105. Forfeiture of property.

 TITLE II--SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION, HUMAN RIGHTS 
                     ABUSES, AND ILLICIT ACTIVITIES

Sec. 201. Determinations with respect to North Korea as a jurisdiction 
              of primary money laundering concern.
Sec. 202. Ensuring the consistent enforcement of United Nations 
              Security Council resolutions and financial restrictions 
              on North Korea.
Sec. 203. Proliferation prevention sanctions.
Sec. 204. Procurement sanctions.
Sec. 205. Enhanced inspection authorities.
Sec. 206. Travel sanctions.
Sec. 207. Travel recommendations for United States citizens to North 
              Korea.
Sec. 208. Exemptions, waivers, and removals of designation.
Sec. 209. Report on and imposition of sanctions to address persons 
              responsible for knowingly engaging in significant 
              activities undermining cybersecurity.
Sec. 210. Codification of sanctions with respect to North Korean 
              activities undermining cybersecurity.
Sec. 211. Sense of Congress on trilateral cooperation between the 
              United States, South Korea, and Japan.

                  TITLE III--PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Sec. 301. Information technology.
Sec. 302. Strategy to promote North Korean human rights.
Sec. 303. Report on North Korean prison camps.
Sec. 304. Report on and imposition of sanctions with respect to serious 
              human rights abuses or censorship in North Korea.

                     TITLE IV--GENERAL AUTHORITIES

Sec. 401. Suspension of sanctions and other measures.
Sec. 402. Termination of sanctions and other measures.
Sec. 403. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 404. Rulemaking.
Sec. 405. Authority to consolidate reports.
Sec. 406. Effective date.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSES.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) The Government of North Korea--
       (A) has repeatedly violated its commitments to the 
     complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its 
     nuclear weapons programs; and
       (B) has willfully violated multiple United Nations Security 
     Council resolutions calling for North Korea to cease 
     development, testing, and production of weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       (2) Based on its past actions, including the transfer of 
     sensitive nuclear and missile technology to state sponsors of 
     terrorism, North Korea poses a grave risk for the 
     proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       (3) The Government of North Korea has been implicated 
     repeatedly in money laundering and other illicit activities, 
     including--
       (A) prohibited arms sales;
       (B) narcotics trafficking;
       (C) the counterfeiting of United States currency;
       (D) significant activities undermining cybersecurity; and
       (E) the counterfeiting of intellectual property of United 
     States persons.
       (4) North Korea has--
       (A) unilaterally withdrawn from the Agreement Concerning a 
     Military Armistice in Korea, signed at Panmunjom July 27, 
     1953 (commonly referred to as the ``Korean War Armistice 
     Agreement''); and
       (B) committed provocations against South Korea--
       (i) by sinking the warship Cheonan and killing 46 of her 
     crew on March 26, 2010;
       (ii) by shelling Yeonpyeong Island and killing 4 South 
     Korean civilians on November 23, 2010;
       (iii) by its involvement in the ``DarkSeoul'' cyberattacks 
     against the financial and communications interests of South 
     Korea on March 20, 2013; and
       (iv) by planting land mines near a guard post in the South 
     Korean portion of the demilitarized zone that maimed 2 South 
     Korean soldiers on August 4, 2015.
       (5) North Korea maintains a system of brutal political 
     prison camps that contain as many as 200,000 men, women, and 
     children, who are--
       (A) kept in atrocious living conditions with insufficient 
     food, clothing, and medical care; and
       (B) under constant fear of torture or arbitrary execution.
       (6) North Korea has prioritized weapons programs and the 
     procurement of luxury goods--
       (A) in defiance of United Nations Security Council 
     Resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 
     (2013), and 2094 (2013); and
       (B) in gross disregard of the needs of the people of North 
     Korea.
       (7) Persons, including financial institutions, who engage 
     in transactions with, or provide financial services to, the 
     Government of North Korea and its financial institutions 
     without establishing sufficient financial safeguards against 
     North Korea's use of such transactions to promote 
     proliferation, weapons trafficking, human rights violations, 
     illicit activity, and the purchase of luxury goods--
       (A) aid and abet North Korea's misuse of the international 
     financial system; and
       (B) violate the intent of the United Nations Security 
     Council resolutions referred to in paragraph (6)(A).
       (8) The Government of North Korea has provided technical 
     support and conducted destructive and coercive cyberattacks, 
     including against Sony Pictures Entertainment and other 
     United States persons.

[[Page S762]]

       (9) The conduct of the Government of North Korea poses an 
     imminent threat to--
       (A) the security of the United States and its allies;
       (B) the global economy;
       (C) the safety of members of the United States Armed 
     Forces;
       (D) the integrity of the global financial system;
       (E) the integrity of global nonproliferation programs; and
       (F) the people of North Korea.
       (10) The Government of North Korea has sponsored acts of 
     international terrorism, including--
       (A) attempts to assassinate defectors and human rights 
     activists; and
       (B) the shipment of weapons to terrorists and state 
     sponsors of terrorism.
       (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are--
       (1) to use nonmilitary means to address the crisis 
     described in subsection (a);
       (2) to provide diplomatic leverage to negotiate necessary 
     changes in the conduct of the Government of North Korea;
       (3) to ease the suffering of the people of North Korea; and
       (4) to reaffirm the purposes set forth in section 4 of the 
     North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7802).

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Applicable executive order.--The term ``applicable 
     Executive order'' means--
       (A) Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
     blocking property of weapons of mass destruction 
     proliferators and their supporters), Executive Order 13466 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to continuing certain 
     restrictions with respect to North Korea and North Korean 
     nationals), Executive Order 13551 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 
     relating to blocking property of certain persons with respect 
     to North Korea), Executive Order 13570 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 
     relating to prohibiting certain transactions with respect to 
     North Korea), Executive Order 13619 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 
     relating to blocking property of persons threatening the 
     peace, security, or stability of Burma), Executive Order 
     13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional 
     sanctions with respect to North Korea), or Executive Order 
     13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property 
     of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-
     enabled activities), to the extent that such Executive 
     order--
       (i) authorizes the imposition of sanctions on persons for 
     conduct with respect to North Korea;
       (ii) prohibits transactions or activities involving the 
     Government of North Korea; or
       (iii) otherwise imposes sanctions with respect to North 
     Korea; and
       (B) any Executive order adopted on or after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, to the extent that such Executive 
     order--
       (i) authorizes the imposition of sanctions on persons for 
     conduct with respect to North Korea;
       (ii) prohibits transactions or activities involving the 
     Government of North Korea; or
       (iii) otherwise imposes sanctions with respect to North 
     Korea.
       (2) Applicable united nations security council 
     resolution.--The term ``applicable United Nations Security 
     Council resolution'' means--
       (A) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695 (2006), 
     1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or 2094 (2013); and
       (B) any United Nations Security Council resolution adopted 
     on or after the date of the enactment of this Act that--
       (i) authorizes the imposition of sanctions on persons for 
     conduct with respect to North Korea;
       (ii) prohibits transactions or activities involving the 
     Government of North Korea; or
       (iii) otherwise imposes sanctions with respect to North 
     Korea.
       (3) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (4) Designated person.--The term ``designated person'' 
     means a person designated under subsection (a) or (b) of 
     section 104 for purposes of applying 1 or more of the 
     sanctions described in title I or II with respect to the 
     person.
       (5) Government of north korea.--The term ``Government of 
     North Korea'' means the Government of North Korea and its 
     agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities.
       (6) Humanitarian assistance.--The term ``humanitarian 
     assistance'' means assistance to meet humanitarian needs, 
     including needs for food, medicine, medical supplies, 
     clothing, and shelter.
       (7) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
       (8) Luxury goods.--The term ``luxury goods''--
       (A) has the meaning given such term in section 746.4(b)(1) 
     of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; and
       (B) includes the items listed in Supplement No. 1 to part 
     746 of such title, and any similar items.
       (9) Monetary instruments.--The term ``monetary 
     instruments'' has the meaning given such term in section 
     5312(a) of title 31, United States Code.
       (10) North korea.--The term ``North Korea'' means the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
       (11) North korean financial institution.--The term ``North 
     Korean financial institution'' means any financial 
     institution that--
       (A) is organized under the laws of North Korea or any 
     jurisdiction within North Korea (including a foreign branch 
     of such an institution);
       (B) is located in North Korea, except for a financial 
     institution that is excluded by the President in accordance 
     with section 208(c);
       (C) is owned or controlled by the Government of North 
     Korea, regardless of location; or
       (D) is owned or controlled by a financial institution 
     described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C), regardless of 
     location.
       (12) Significant activities undermining cybersecurity.--The 
     term ``significant activities undermining cybersecurity'' 
     includes--
       (A) significant efforts to--
       (i) deny access to or degrade, disrupt, or destroy an 
     information and communications technology system or network; 
     or
       (ii) exfiltrate information from such a system or network 
     without authorization;
       (B) significant destructive malware attacks;
       (C) significant denial of service activities; and
       (D) such other significant activities described in 
     regulations promulgated to implement section 104.
       (13) South korea.--The term ``South Korea'' means the 
     Republic of Korea.
       (14) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence to the United States; or
       (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States 
     or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a 
     foreign branch of such an entity.

       TITLE I--INVESTIGATIONS, PROHIBITED CONDUCT, AND PENALTIES

     SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       In order to achieve the peaceful disarmament of North 
     Korea, Congress finds that it is necessary--
       (1) to encourage all member states of the United Nations to 
     fully and promptly implement United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 2094 (2013);
       (2) to sanction the persons, including financial 
     institutions, that facilitate proliferation, illicit 
     activities, arms trafficking, cyberterrorism, imports of 
     luxury goods, serious human rights abuses, cash smuggling, 
     and censorship by the Government of North Korea;
       (3) to authorize the President to sanction persons who fail 
     to exercise due diligence to ensure that such financial 
     institutions and member states do not facilitate 
     proliferation, arms trafficking, kleptocracy, or imports of 
     luxury goods by the Government of North Korea;
       (4) to deny the Government of North Korea access to the 
     funds it uses to develop or obtain nuclear weapons, ballistic 
     missiles, cyberwarfare capabilities, and luxury goods instead 
     of providing for the needs of the people of North Korea; and
       (5) to enforce sanctions in a manner that does not 
     significantly hinder or delay the efforts of legitimate 
     United States or foreign humanitarian organizations from 
     providing assistance to meet the needs of civilians facing 
     humanitarian crisis, including access to food, health care, 
     shelter, and clean drinking water, to prevent or alleviate 
     human suffering.

     SEC. 102. INVESTIGATIONS.

       (a) Initiation.--The President shall initiate an 
     investigation into the possible designation of a person under 
     section 104(a) upon receipt by the President of credible 
     information indicating that such person has engaged in 
     conduct described in section 104(a).
       (b) Personnel.--The President may direct the Secretary of 
     State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other 
     Federal departments and agencies as may be necessary to 
     assign sufficient experienced and qualified investigators, 
     attorneys, and technical personnel--
       (1) to investigate the conduct described in subsections (a) 
     and (b) of section 104; and
       (2) to coordinate and ensure the effective enforcement of 
     this Act.

     SEC. 103. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Presidential Briefings to Congress.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
     periodically thereafter, the President shall provide a 
     briefing to the appropriate congressional committees on 
     efforts to implement this Act.
       (b) Report From Secretary of State.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary of State shall conduct, coordinate, and submit to 
     Congress a comprehensive report on United States policy 
     towards North Korea that--
       (1) is based on a full and complete interagency review of 
     current policies and possible alternatives, including with 
     respect to North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and 
     missile programs, human rights atrocities, and significant 
     activities undermining cybersecurity; and
       (2) includes recommendations for such legislative or 
     administrative action as the Secretary considers appropriate 
     based on the results of the review.

     SEC. 104. DESIGNATION OF PERSONS.

       (a) Mandatory Designations.--Except as provided in section 
     208, the President shall designate under this subsection any 
     person that the President determines--
       (1) knowingly, directly or indirectly, imports, exports, or 
     reexports to, into, or from North Korea any goods, services, 
     or technology controlled for export by the United States 
     because of the use of such goods, services, or technology

[[Page S763]]

     for weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such 
     weapons and materially contributes to the use, development, 
     production, possession, or acquisition by any person of a 
     nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapon or any 
     device or system designed in whole or in part to deliver such 
     a weapon;
       (2) knowingly, directly or indirectly, provides training, 
     advice, or other services or assistance, or engages in 
     significant financial transactions, relating to the 
     manufacture, maintenance, or use of any such weapon, device, 
     or system to be imported, exported, or reexported to, into, 
     or from North Korea;
       (3) knowingly, directly or indirectly, imports, exports, or 
     reexports luxury goods to or into North Korea;
       (4) knowingly engages in, is responsible for, or 
     facilitates censorship by the Government of North Korea;
       (5) knowingly engages in, is responsible for, or 
     facilitates serious human rights abuses by the Government of 
     North Korea;
       (6) knowingly, directly or indirectly, engages in money 
     laundering, the counterfeiting of goods or currency, bulk 
     cash smuggling, or narcotics trafficking that supports the 
     Government of North Korea or any senior official or person 
     acting for or on behalf of that Government;
       (7) knowingly engages in significant activities undermining 
     cybersecurity through the use of computer networks or systems 
     against foreign persons, governments, or other entities on 
     behalf of the Government of North Korea;
       (8) knowingly, directly or indirectly, sells, supplies, or 
     transfers to or from the Government of North Korea or any 
     person acting for or on behalf of that Government, a 
     significant amount of precious metal, graphite, raw or semi-
     finished metals or aluminum, steel, coal, or software, for 
     use by or in industrial processes directly related to weapons 
     of mass destruction and delivery systems for such weapons, 
     other proliferation activities, the Korean Workers' Party, 
     armed forces, internal security, or intelligence activities, 
     or the operation and maintenance of political prison camps or 
     forced labor camps, including outside of North Korea;
       (9) knowingly, directly or indirectly, imports, exports, or 
     reexports to, into, or from North Korea any arms or related 
     materiel; or
       (10) knowingly attempts to engage in any of the conduct 
     described in paragraphs (1) through (9).
       (b) Additional Discretionary Designations.--
       (1) Prohibited conduct described.--Except as provided in 
     section 208, the President may designate under this 
     subsection any person that the President determines--
       (A) knowingly engages in, contributes to, assists, 
     sponsors, or provides financial, material or technological 
     support for, or goods and services in support of, any person 
     designated pursuant to an applicable United Nations Security 
     Council resolution;
       (B) knowingly contributed to--
       (i) the bribery of an official of the Government of North 
     Korea or any person acting for on behalf of that official;
       (ii) the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public 
     funds by, or for the benefit of, an official of the 
     Government of North Korea or any person acting for or on 
     behalf of that official; or
       (iii) the use of any proceeds of any activity described in 
     clause (i) or (ii); or
       (C) knowingly and materially assisted, sponsored, or 
     provided significant financial, material, or technological 
     support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the 
     activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
       (2) Effect of designation.--With respect to any person 
     designated under this subsection, the President may--
       (A) apply the sanctions described in section 204, 205(c), 
     or 206 to the person to the same extent and in the same 
     manner as if the person were designated under subsection (a);
       (B) apply any applicable special measures described in 
     section 5318A of title 31, United States Code;
       (C) prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange--
       (i) that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
     States; and
       (ii) in which such person has any interest; and
       (D) prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between 
     financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial 
     institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments--
       (i) are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; 
     and
       (ii) involve any interest of such person.
       (c) Asset Blocking.--The President shall exercise all of 
     the powers granted to the President under the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the 
     extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in 
     property and interests in property of a designated person, 
     the Government of North Korea, or the Workers' Party of 
     Korea, if such property and interests in property are in the 
     United States, come within the United States, or are or come 
     within the possession or control of a United States person.
       (d) Application to Subsidiaries and Agents.--The 
     designation of a person under subsection (a) or (b) and the 
     blocking of property and interests in property under 
     subsection (c) shall apply with respect to a person who is 
     determined to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or 
     purported to have acted for or on behalf of, directly or 
     indirectly, any person whose property and interests in 
     property are blocked pursuant to this section.
       (e) Transaction Licensing.--The President shall deny or 
     revoke any license for any transaction that the President 
     determines to lack sufficient financial controls to ensure 
     that such transaction will not facilitate any activity 
     described in subsection (a) or (b).
       (f) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in subsections 
     (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to any 
     person who violates, attempts to violate, conspires to 
     violate, or causes a violation of any prohibition of this 
     section, or an order or regulation prescribed under this 
     section, to the same extent that such penalties apply to a 
     person that commits an unlawful act described in section 
     206(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(a)).

     SEC. 105. FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.

       (a) Amendment to Property Subject to Forfeiture.--Section 
     981(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(I) Any property, real or personal, that is involved in a 
     violation or attempted violation, or which constitutes or is 
     derived from proceeds traceable to a prohibition imposed 
     pursuant to section 104(a) of the North Korea Sanctions and 
     Policy Enhancement Act of 2016.''.
       (b) Amendment to Definition of Civil Forfeiture Statute.--
     Section 983(i)(2)(D) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(D) the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. 4301 et 
     seq.), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), or the North Korea Sanctions 
     Enforcement Act of 2016; or''.
       (c) Amendment to Definition of Specified Unlawful 
     Activity.--Section 1956(c)(7)(D) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``or section 92 of'' and inserting 
     ``section 92 of''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following: ``, or section 
     104(a) of the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2016 
     (relating to prohibited activities with respect to North 
     Korea);''.

 TITLE II--SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION, HUMAN RIGHTS 
                     ABUSES, AND ILLICIT ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 201. DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA AS A 
                   JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING 
                   CONCERN.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and 
     Financial Intelligence, who is responsible for safeguarding 
     the financial system against illicit use, money laundering, 
     terrorist financing, and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction, and has repeatedly expressed concern about North 
     Korea's misuse of the international financial system--
       (A) in 2006--
       (i) stated, ``Given [North Korea's] counterfeiting of U.S. 
     currency, narcotics trafficking and use of accounts world-
     wide to conduct proliferation-related transactions, the line 
     between illicit and licit North Korean money is nearly 
     invisible.''; and
       (ii) urged financial institutions worldwide to ``think 
     carefully about the risks of doing any North Korea-related 
     business'';
       (B) in 2011, stated that North Korea--
       (i) ``remains intent on engaging in proliferation, selling 
     arms as well as bringing in material''; and
       (ii) was ``aggressively pursuing the effort to establish 
     front companies.''; and
       (C) in 2013, stated--
       (i) in reference to North Korea's distribution of high-
     quality counterfeit United States currency, that ``North 
     Korea is continuing to try to pass a supernote into the 
     international financial system''; and
       (ii) the Department of the Treasury would soon introduce 
     new currency with improved security features to protect 
     against counterfeiting by the Government of North Korea.
       (2) The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental 
     body whose purpose is to develop and promote national and 
     international policies to combat money laundering and 
     terrorist financing, has repeatedly--
       (A) expressed concern at deficiencies in North Korea's 
     regimes to combat money laundering and terrorist financing;
       (B) urged North Korea to adopt a plan of action to address 
     significant deficiencies in those regimes and the serious 
     threat those deficiencies pose to the integrity of the 
     international financial system;
       (C) urged all jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to 
     protect the international financial system from ongoing and 
     substantial money laundering and terrorist financing risks 
     emanating from North Korea;
       (D) urged all jurisdictions to advise their financial 
     institutions to give special attention to business 
     relationships and transactions with North Korea, including 
     North Korean companies and financial institutions; and
       (E) called on all jurisdictions--
       (i) to protect against correspondent relationships being 
     used to bypass or evade countermeasures and risk mitigation 
     practices; and
       (ii) to take into account money laundering and terrorist 
     financing risks when considering requests by North Korean 
     financial institutions to open branches and subsidiaries in 
     their respective jurisdictions.
       (3) On March 7, 2013, the United Nations Security Council 
     unanimously adopted Resolution 2094, which--
       (A) welcomed the Financial Action Task Force's--
       (i) recommendation on financial sanctions related to 
     proliferation; and
       (ii) guidance on the implementation of such sanctions;
       (B) decided that United Nations member states should apply 
     enhanced monitoring and other legal measures to prevent the 
     provision of financial services or the transfer of property 
     that

[[Page S764]]

     could contribute to activities prohibited by applicable 
     United Nations Security Council resolutions; and
       (C) called upon United Nations member states to prohibit 
     North Korean financial institutions from establishing or 
     maintaining correspondent relationships with financial 
     institutions in their respective jurisdictions to prevent the 
     provision of financial services if such member states have 
     information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that 
     such activities could contribute to--
       (i) activities prohibited by an applicable United Nations 
     Security Council resolution; or
       (ii) the evasion of such prohibitions.
       (b) Sense of Congress Regarding the Designation of North 
     Korea as a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering 
     Concern.--Congress--
       (1) acknowledges the efforts of the United Nations Security 
     Council to impose limitations on, and to require the enhanced 
     monitoring of, transactions involving North Korean financial 
     institutions that could contribute to sanctioned activities;
       (2) urges the President, in the strongest terms--
       (A) to immediately designate North Korea as a jurisdiction 
     of primary money laundering concern; and
       (B) to adopt stringent special measures to safeguard the 
     financial system against the risks posed by North Korea's 
     willful evasion of sanctions and its illicit activities; and
       (3) urges the President to seek the prompt implementation 
     by other countries of enhanced monitoring and due diligence 
     to prevent North Korea's misuse of the international 
     financial system, including by sharing information about 
     activities, transactions, and property that could contribute 
     to--
       (A) activities sanctioned by applicable United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions; or
       (B) the evasion of such sanctions.
       (c) Determinations Regarding North Korea.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney 
     General, and in accordance with section 5318A of title 31, 
     United States Code, shall determine whether reasonable 
     grounds exist for concluding that North Korea is a 
     jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern.
       (2) Enhanced due diligence and reporting requirements.--If 
     the Secretary of the Treasury determines under paragraph (1) 
     that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that North Korea 
     is a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern, the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Federal functional 
     regulators (as defined in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-
     Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6809)), shall impose 1 or more of the 
     special measures described in section 5318A(b) of title 31, 
     United States Code, with respect to the jurisdiction of North 
     Korea.
       (3) Report required.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date on 
     which the Secretary of the Treasury makes a determination 
     under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that contains 
     the reasons for such determination.
       (B) Form.--The report submitted under subparagraph (A) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 202. ENSURING THE CONSISTENT ENFORCEMENT OF UNITED 
                   NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND 
                   FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) All member states of the United Nations are obligated 
     to implement and enforce applicable United Nations Security 
     Council resolutions fully and promptly, including by blocking 
     the property of, and ensuring that any property is prevented 
     from being made available to, persons designated for the 
     blocking of property by the Security Council under applicable 
     United Nations Security Council resolutions.
       (2) As of May 2015, 158 of the 193 member states of the 
     United Nations had not submitted reports on measures taken to 
     implement North Korea-specific United Nations Security 
     Council resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2094.
       (3) A recent report by the Government Accountability Office 
     (GAO-15-485)--
       (A) finds that officials of the United States and 
     representatives of the United Nations Panel of Experts 
     established pursuant to United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 1874 (2009), which monitors and facilitates 
     implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea, 
     ``agree that the lack of detailed reports from all member 
     states is an impediment to the UN's effective implementation 
     of its sanctions''; and
       (B) notes that ``many member states lack the technical 
     capacity to enforce sanctions and prepare reports'' on the 
     implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
       (4) All member states share a common interest in protecting 
     the international financial system from the risks of money 
     laundering and illicit transactions emanating from North 
     Korea.
       (5) The United States dollar and the euro are the world's 
     principal reserve currencies, and the United States and the 
     European Union are primarily responsible for the protection 
     of the international financial system from the risks 
     described in paragraph (4).
       (6) The cooperation of the People's Republic of China, as 
     North Korea's principal trading partner, is essential to--
       (A) the enforcement of applicable United Nations Security 
     Council resolutions; and
       (B) the protection of the international financial system.
       (7) The report of the Panel of Experts expressed concern 
     about the ability of banks to detect and prevent illicit 
     transfers involving North Korea if such banks are located in 
     member states with less effective regulators or member states 
     that are unable to afford effective compliance.
       (8) North Korea has historically exploited inconsistencies 
     between jurisdictions in the interpretation and enforcement 
     of financial regulations and applicable United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions to circumvent sanctions and 
     launder the proceeds of illicit activities.
       (9) Amroggang Development Bank, Bank of East Land, and 
     Tanchon Commercial Bank have been designated by the Secretary 
     of the Treasury, the United Nations Security Council, and the 
     European Union as having materially contributed to the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
       (10) Korea Daesong Bank and Korea Kwangson Banking 
     Corporation have been designated by the Secretary of the 
     Treasury and the European Union as having materially 
     contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       (11) The Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea has been 
     designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for facilitating 
     transactions on behalf of persons linked to its proliferation 
     network and for serving as ``a key financial node''.
       (12) Daedong Credit Bank has been designated by the 
     Secretary of the Treasury for activities prohibited by 
     applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions, 
     including the use of deceptive financial practices to 
     facilitate transactions on behalf of persons linked to North 
     Korea's proliferation network.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should intensify diplomatic efforts in 
     appropriate international fora, such as the United Nations, 
     and bilaterally, to develop and implement a coordinated, 
     consistent, multilateral strategy for protecting the global 
     financial system against risks emanating from North Korea, 
     including--
       (1) the cessation of any financial services the 
     continuation of which is inconsistent with applicable United 
     Nations Security Council resolutions;
       (2) the cessation of any financial services to persons, 
     including financial institutions, that present unacceptable 
     risks of facilitating money laundering and illicit activity 
     by the Government of North Korea;
       (3) the blocking by all member states, in accordance with 
     the legal process of the state in which the property is held, 
     of any property required to be blocked under applicable 
     United Nations Security Council resolutions;
       (4) the blocking of any property derived from illicit 
     activity, or from the misappropriation, theft, or 
     embezzlement of public funds by, or for the benefit of, 
     officials of the Government of North Korea;
       (5) the blocking of any property involved in significant 
     activities undermining cybersecurity by the Government of 
     North Korea, directly or indirectly, against United States 
     persons, or the theft of intellectual property by the 
     Government of North Korea, directly or indirectly from United 
     States persons; and
       (6) the blocking of any property of persons directly or 
     indirectly involved in censorship or human rights abuses by 
     the Government of North Korea.
       (c) Strategy to Improve International Implementation and 
     Enforcement of United Nations North Korea-specific 
     Sanctions.--The President shall direct the Secretary of 
     State, in coordination with other Federal departments and 
     agencies, as appropriate, to develop a strategy to improve 
     international implementation and enforcement of United 
     Nations North Korea-specific sanctions. The strategy should 
     include elements--
       (1) to increase the number of countries submitting reports 
     to the United Nations Panel of Experts established pursuant 
     to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), 
     including developing a list of targeted countries where 
     effective implementation and enforcement of United Nations 
     sanctions would reduce the threat from North Korea;
       (2) to encourage member states of the United Nations to 
     cooperate and share information with the panel in order to 
     help facilitate investigations;
       (3) to expand cooperation with the Panel of Experts;
       (4) to provide technical assistance to member states to 
     implement United Nations sanctions, including developing the 
     capacity to enforce sanctions through improved export control 
     regulations, border security, and customs systems;
       (5) to harness existing United States Government 
     initiatives and assistance programs, as appropriate, to 
     improve sanctions implementation and enforcement; and
       (6) to increase outreach to the people of North Korea, and 
     to support the engagement of independent, non-governmental 
     journalistic, humanitarian, and other institutions in North 
     Korea.
       (d) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report that describes the actions 
     undertaken to implement the strategy required by subsection 
     (c).

     SEC. 203. PROLIFERATION PREVENTION SANCTIONS.

       (a) Export of Certain Goods or Technology.--A validated 
     license shall be required for the export to North Korea of 
     any goods or technology otherwise covered under section 6(j) 
     of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4605(j)). 
     No defense exports may be approved for the Government of 
     North Korea.
       (b) Transactions in Lethal Military Equipment.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall withhold assistance 
     under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 
     seq.) to the government of any country that provides lethal 
     military equipment to the Government of North Korea.

[[Page S765]]

       (2) Applicability.--The prohibition under paragraph (1) 
     with respect to a government shall terminate on the date that 
     is 1 year after the date on which the prohibition under 
     paragraph (1) is applied to that government.
       (c) Waiver.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Secretary of State may waive the prohibitions under this 
     section with respect to a country if the Secretary--
       (1) determines that such waiver is in the national interest 
     of the United States; and
       (2) submits a written report to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that describes--
       (A) the steps that the relevant agencies are taking to 
     curtail the trade described in subsection (b)(1); and
       (B) why such waiver is in the national interest of the 
     United States.
       (d) Exception.--The prohibitions under this section shall 
     not apply to the provision of assistance for human rights, 
     democracy, rule of law, or emergency humanitarian purposes.

     SEC. 204. PROCUREMENT SANCTIONS.

       (a) In General.--Except as provided in this section, the 
     head of an executive agency may not procure, or enter into 
     any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services 
     from any person designated under section 104(a).
       (b) Federal Acquisition Regulation.--
       (1) In general.--The Federal Acquisition Regulation issued 
     pursuant to section 1303(a)(1) of title 41, United States 
     Code, shall be revised to require that each person that is a 
     prospective contractor submit a certification that such 
     person does not engage in any activity described in section 
     104(a).
       (2) Applicability.--The revision required under paragraph 
     (1) shall apply with respect to contracts for which 
     solicitations are issued on or after the date that is 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Remedies.--
       (1) Inclusion on list.--The Administrator of General 
     Services shall include, on the List of Parties Excluded from 
     Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs maintained by 
     the Administrator under part 9 of the Federal Acquisition 
     Regulation, each person that is debarred, suspended, or 
     proposed for debarment or suspension by the head of an 
     executive agency on the basis of a determination of a false 
     certification under subsection (b).
       (2) Contract termination; suspension.--If the head of an 
     executive agency determines that a person has submitted a 
     false certification under subsection (b) after the date on 
     which the Federal Acquisition Regulation is revised to 
     implement the requirements of this section, the head of such 
     executive agency shall--
       (A) terminate any contract with such person; and
       (B) debar or suspend such person from eligibility for 
     Federal contracts for a period of not longer than 2 years.
       (3) Applicable procedures.--Any debarment or suspension 
     under paragraph (2)(B) shall be subject to the procedures 
     that apply to debarment and suspension under subpart 9.4 of 
     the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
       (d) Clarification Regarding Certain Products.--The remedies 
     specified in subsection (c) shall not apply with respect to 
     the procurement of any eligible product (as defined in 
     section 308(4) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 
     2518(4)) of any foreign country or instrumentality designated 
     under section 301(b) of such Act (19 U.S.C. 2511(b)).
       (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this subsection may 
     be construed to limit the use of other remedies available to 
     the head of an executive agency or any other official of the 
     Federal Government on the basis of a determination of a false 
     certification under subsection (b).
       (f) Executive Agency Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``executive agency'' has the meaning given such term in 
     section 133 of title 41, United States Code.

     SEC. 205. ENHANCED INSPECTION AUTHORITIES.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 
     the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report that identifies foreign ports and 
     airports at which inspections of ships, aircraft, and 
     conveyances originating in North Korea, carrying North Korean 
     property, or operated by the Government of North Korea are 
     not sufficient to effectively prevent the facilitation of any 
     of the activities described in section 104(a).
       (b) Enhanced Customs Inspection Requirements.--The 
     Secretary of Homeland Security may require enhanced 
     inspections of any goods entering the United States that have 
     been transported through a port or airport identified by the 
     President under subsection (a).
       (c) Seizure and Forfeiture.--A vessel, aircraft, or 
     conveyance used to facilitate any of the activities described 
     in section 104(a) under the jurisdiction of the United States 
     may be seized and forfeited under--
       (1) chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code; or
       (2) title V of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1501 et 
     seq.).

     SEC. 206. TRAVEL SANCTIONS.

       The Secretary of State may deny a visa to, and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security may deny entry into the United 
     States of, any alien who is--
       (1) a designated person;
       (2) a corporate officer of a designated person; or
       (3) a principal shareholder with a controlling interest in 
     a designated person.

     SEC. 207. TRAVEL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS 
                   TO NORTH KOREA.

       The Secretary of State shall expand the scope and frequency 
     of issuance of travel warnings for all United States citizens 
     to North Korea. The expanded travel warnings, which should be 
     issued or updated not less frequently than every 90 days, 
     should include--
       (1) publicly released or credible open source information 
     regarding the detention of United States citizens by North 
     Korean authorities, including available information on 
     circumstances of arrest and detention, duration, legal 
     proceedings, and conditions under which a United States 
     citizen has been, or continues to be, detained by North 
     Korean authorities, including present-day cases and cases 
     occurring during the 10-year period ending on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act;
       (2) publicly released or credible open source information 
     on the past and present detention and abduction or alleged 
     abduction of citizens of the United States, South Korea, or 
     Japan by North Korean authorities;
       (3) unclassified information about the nature of the North 
     Korean regime, as described in congressionally mandated 
     reports and annual reports issued by the Department of State 
     and the United Nations, including information about North 
     Korea's weapons of mass destruction programs, illicit 
     activities, international sanctions violations, and human 
     rights situation; and
       (4) any other information that the Secretary deems useful 
     to provide United States citizens with a comprehensive 
     picture of the nature of the North Korean regime.

     SEC. 208. EXEMPTIONS, WAIVERS, AND REMOVALS OF DESIGNATION.

       (a) Exemptions.--The following activities shall be exempt 
     from sanctions under sections 104, 206, 209, and 304:
       (1) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under 
     title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 
     et seq.), or to any authorized intelligence activities of the 
     United States.
       (2) Any transaction necessary to comply with United States 
     obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations 
     and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters 
     of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, 
     and entered into force November 21, 1947, or under the 
     Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 
     1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or under other 
     international agreements.
       (3) Any activities incidental to the POW/MIA accounting 
     mission in North Korea, including activities by the Defense 
     POW/MIA Accounting Agency and other governmental or 
     nongovernmental organizations tasked with identifying or 
     recovering the remains of members of the United States Armed 
     Forces in North Korea.
       (b) Humanitarian Waiver.--
       (1) In general.--The President may waive, for renewable 
     periods of between 30 days and 1 year, the application of the 
     sanctions authorized under section 104, 204, 205, 206, 
     209(b), or 304(b) if the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a written determination that the 
     waiver is necessary for humanitarian assistance or to carry 
     out the humanitarian purposes set forth section 4 of the 
     North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7802).
       (2) Content of written determination.--A written 
     determination submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to a 
     waiver shall include a description of all notification and 
     accountability controls that have been employed in order to 
     ensure that the activities covered by the waiver are 
     humanitarian assistance or are carried out for the purposes 
     set forth in section 4 of the North Korean Human Rights Act 
     of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7802) and do not entail any activities in 
     North Korea or dealings with the Government of North Korea 
     not reasonably related to humanitarian assistance or such 
     purposes.
       (3) Clarification of permitted activities under waiver.--An 
     internationally recognized humanitarian organization shall 
     not be subject to sanctions under section 104, 204, 205, 206, 
     209(b), or 304(b) for--
       (A) engaging in a financial transaction relating to 
     humanitarian assistance or for humanitarian purposes pursuant 
     to a waiver issued under paragraph (1);
       (B) transporting goods or services that are necessary to 
     carry out operations relating to humanitarian assistance or 
     humanitarian purposes pursuant to such a waiver; or
       (C) having merely incidental contact, in the course of 
     providing humanitarian assistance or aid for humanitarian 
     purposes pursuant to such a waiver, with individuals who are 
     under the control of a foreign person subject to sanctions 
     under this Act.
       (c) Waiver.--The President may waive, on a case-by-case 
     basis, for renewable periods of between 30 days and 1 year, 
     the application of the sanctions authorized under section 
     104, 201(c)(2), 204, 205, 206, 209(b), or 304(b) if the 
     President submits to the appropriate congressional committees 
     a written determination that the waiver--
       (1) is important to the national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       (2) will further the enforcement of this Act or is for an 
     important law enforcement purpose.
       (d) Financial Services for Humanitarian and Consular 
     Activities.--The President may promulgate such regulations, 
     rules, and policies as may be necessary to facilitate the 
     provision of financial services by a foreign financial 
     institution that is not a North Korean financial institution 
     in support of activities conducted pursuant to an exemption 
     or waiver under this section.

     SEC. 209. REPORT ON AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS TO ADDRESS 
                   PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR KNOWINGLY ENGAGING IN 
                   SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING 
                   CYBERSECURITY.

       (a) Report Required.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that describes 
     significant activities undermining cybersecurity aimed 
     against the United

[[Page S766]]

     States Government or any United States person and conducted 
     by the Government of North Korea, or a person owned or 
     controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Government of 
     North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that 
     Government.
       (2) Information.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
     shall include--
       (A) the identity and nationality of persons that have 
     knowingly engaged in, directed, or provided material support 
     to conduct significant activities undermining cybersecurity 
     described in paragraph (1);
       (B) a description of the conduct engaged in by each person 
     identified;
       (C) an assessment of the extent to which a foreign 
     government has provided material support to the Government of 
     North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that 
     Government to conduct significant activities undermining 
     cybersecurity; and
       (D) a United States strategy to counter North Korea's 
     efforts to conduct significant activities undermining 
     cybersecurity against the United States, that includes 
     efforts to engage foreign governments to halt the capability 
     of the Government of North Korea and persons acting for or on 
     behalf of that Government to conduct significant activities 
     undermining cybersecurity.
       (3) Submission and form.--
       (A) Submission.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter.
       (B) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (b) Designation of Persons.--The President shall designate 
     under section 104(a) any person identified in the report 
     required under subsection (a)(1) that knowingly engages in 
     significant activities undermining cybersecurity through the 
     use of computer networks or systems against foreign persons, 
     governments, or other entities on behalf of the Government of 
     North Korea.

     SEC. 210. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH 
                   KOREAN ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING CYBERSECURITY.

       (a) In General.--United States sanctions with respect to 
     activities of the Government of North Korea, persons acting 
     for or on behalf of that Government, or persons located in 
     North Korea that undermine cybersecurity provided for in 
     Executive Order 13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
     imposing additional sanctions with respect to North Korea) or 
     Executive Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
     blocking the property of certain persons engaging in 
     significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), as such 
     Executive Orders are in effect on the day before the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, shall remain in effect until the 
     date that is 30 days after the date on which the President 
     submits to Congress a certification that the Government of 
     North Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of that 
     Government, and persons owned or controlled, directly or 
     indirectly, by that Government or persons acting for or on 
     behalf of that Government, are no longer engaged in the 
     illicit activities described in such Executive Orders, 
     including actions in violation of United Nations Security 
     Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 
     and 2094 (2013).
       (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to 
     the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.).

     SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN 
                   THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH KOREA, AND JAPAN.

       (a) In General.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
     President--
       (1) should seek to strengthen high-level trilateral 
     mechanisms for discussion and coordination of policy toward 
     North Korea between the Government of the United States, the 
     Government of South Korea, and the Government of Japan;
       (2) should ensure that the mechanisms specifically address 
     North Korea's nuclear, ballistic, and conventional weapons 
     programs, its human rights record, and cybersecurity threats 
     posed by North Korea;
       (3) should ensure that representatives of the United 
     States, South Korea, and Japan meet on a regular basis and 
     include representatives of the United States Department of 
     State, the United States Department of Defense, the United 
     States intelligence community, and representatives of 
     counterpart agencies in South Korea and Japan; and
       (4) should continue to brief the relevant congressional 
     committees regularly on the status of such discussions.
       (b) Relevant Committees.--The relevant committees referred 
     to in subsection (a)(4) shall include--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

                  TITLE III--PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

     SEC. 301. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.

       Section 104 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 
     (22 U.S.C. 7814) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(d) Information Technology Study.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of the North Korea 
     Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2015, the President 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     classified report that sets forth a detailed plan for making 
     unrestricted, unmonitored, and inexpensive electronic mass 
     communications available to the people of North Korea.''.

     SEC. 302. STRATEGY TO PROMOTE NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and 
     agencies, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
     of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
     House of Representatives a report that details a United 
     States strategy to promote initiatives to enhance 
     international awareness of and to address the human rights 
     situation in North Korea.
       (b) Information.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     should include--
       (1) a list of countries that forcibly repatriate refugees 
     from North Korea; and
       (2) a list of countries where North Korean laborers work, 
     including countries the governments of which have formal 
     arrangements with the Government of North Korea or any person 
     acting for or on behalf of that Government to employ North 
     Korean workers.
       (c) Strategy.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     should include--
       (1) a plan to enhance bilateral and multilateral outreach, 
     including sustained engagement with the governments of 
     partners and allies with overseas posts to routinely demarche 
     or brief those governments on North Korea human rights 
     issues, including forced labor, trafficking, and repatriation 
     of citizens of North Korea;
       (2) public affairs and public diplomacy campaigns, 
     including options to work with news organizations and media 
     outlets to publish opinion pieces and secure public speaking 
     opportunities for United States Government officials on 
     issues related to the human rights situation in North Korea, 
     including forced labor, trafficking, and repatriation of 
     citizens of North Korea; and
       (3) opportunities to coordinate and collaborate with 
     appropriate nongovernmental organizations and private sector 
     entities to raise awareness and provide assistance to North 
     Korean defectors throughout the world.

     SEC. 303. REPORT ON NORTH KOREAN PRISON CAMPS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that describes, 
     with respect to each political prison camp in North Korea, to 
     the extent information is available--
       (1) the camp's estimated prisoner population;
       (2) the camp's geographical coordinates;
       (3) the reasons for the confinement of the prisoners;
       (4) the camp's primary industries and products, and the end 
     users of any goods produced in the camp;
       (5) the individuals and agencies responsible for conditions 
     in the camp;
       (6) the conditions under which prisoners are confined, with 
     respect to the adequacy of food, shelter, medical care, 
     working conditions, and reports of ill-treatment of 
     prisoners; and
       (7) imagery, to include satellite imagery of the camp, in a 
     format that, if published, would not compromise the sources 
     and methods used by the United States intelligence community 
     to capture geospatial imagery.
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) may be 
     included in the first human rights report required to be 
     submitted to Congress after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act under sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(d) and 2304(b)).

     SEC. 304. REPORT ON AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT 
                   TO SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OR CENSORSHIP IN 
                   NORTH KOREA.

       (a) Report Required.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that--
       (A) identifies each person the Secretary determines to be 
     responsible for serious human rights abuses or censorship in 
     North Korea and describes the conduct of that person; and
       (B) describes serious human rights abuses or censorship 
     undertaken by the Government of North Korea or any person 
     acting for or on behalf of that Government in the most recent 
     year ending before the submission of the report.
       (2) Consideration.--In preparing the report required under 
     paragraph (1), the Secretary of State shall--
       (A) give due consideration to the findings of the United 
     Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea; 
     and
       (B) make specific findings with respect to the 
     responsibility of Kim Jong Un, and of each individual who is 
     a member of the National Defense Commission of North Korea or 
     the Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers' 
     Party of Korea, for serious human rights abuses and 
     censorship.
       (3) Submission and form.--
       (A) Submission.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 
     a period not to exceed 3 years, and shall be included in each 
     human rights report required under sections 116(d) and 
     502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
     2151n(d) and 2304(b)).
       (B) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (C) Public availability.--The Secretary of State shall 
     publish the unclassified part of the report required under 
     paragraph (1) on the website of the Department of State.
       (b) Designation of Persons.--The President shall designate 
     under section 104(a) any person listed in the report required 
     under subsection (a)(1) that--
       (1) knowingly engages in, is responsible for, or 
     facilitates censorship by the Government of North Korea; or

[[Page S767]]

       (2) knowingly engages in, is responsible for, or 
     facilitates serious human rights abuses by the Government of 
     North Korea.
       (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should--
       (1) seek the prompt adoption by the United Nations Security 
     Council of a resolution calling for the blocking of the 
     assets of all persons responsible for severe human rights 
     abuses or censorship in North Korea; and
       (2) fully cooperate with the prosecution of any individual 
     listed in the report required under subsection (a)(1) before 
     any international tribunal that may be established to 
     prosecute persons responsible for severe human rights abuses 
     or censorship in North Korea.

                     TITLE IV--GENERAL AUTHORITIES

     SEC. 401. SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER MEASURES.

       (a) In General.--Any sanction or other measure required 
     under title I, II, or III (or any amendment made by such 
     titles) may be suspended for up to 1 year upon certification 
     by the President to the appropriate congressional committees 
     that the Government of North Korea has made progress toward--
       (1) verifiably ceasing its counterfeiting of United States 
     currency, including the surrender or destruction of 
     specialized materials and equipment used or particularly 
     suitable for counterfeiting;
       (2) taking steps toward financial transparency to comply 
     with generally accepted protocols to cease and prevent the 
     laundering of monetary instruments;
       (3) taking steps toward verification of its compliance with 
     applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions;
       (4) taking steps toward accounting for and repatriating the 
     citizens of other countries--
       (A) abducted or unlawfully held captive by the Government 
     of North Korea; or
       (B) detained in violation of the Agreement Concerning a 
     Military Armistice in Korea, signed at Panmunjom July 27, 
     1953 (commonly referred to as the ``Korean War Armistice 
     Agreement'');
       (5) accepting and beginning to abide by internationally 
     recognized standards for the distribution and monitoring of 
     humanitarian aid; and
       (6) taking verified steps to improve living conditions in 
     its political prison camps.
       (b) Renewal of Suspension.--The suspension described in 
     subsection (a) may be renewed for additional, consecutive 
     180-day periods after the President certifies to the 
     appropriate congressional committees that the Government of 
     North Korea has continued to comply with the conditions 
     described in subsection (a) during the previous year.

     SEC. 402. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER MEASURES.

       Any sanction or other measure required under title I, II, 
     or III (or any amendment made by such titles) shall terminate 
     on the date on which the President determines and certifies 
     to the appropriate congressional committees that the 
     Government of North Korea has--
       (1) met the requirements set forth in section 401; and
       (2) made significant progress toward--
       (A) completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantling 
     all of its nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological 
     weapons programs, including all programs for the development 
     of systems designed in whole or in part for the delivery of 
     such weapons;
       (B) releasing all political prisoners, including the 
     citizens of North Korea detained in North Korea's political 
     prison camps;
       (C) ceasing its censorship of peaceful political activity;
       (D) establishing an open, transparent, and representative 
     society; and
       (E) fully accounting for and repatriating United States 
     citizens (including deceased United States citizens)--
       (i) abducted or unlawfully held captive by the Government 
     of North Korea; or
       (ii) detained in violation of the Agreement Concerning a 
     Military Armistice in Korea, signed at Panmunjom July 27, 
     1953 (commonly referred to as the ``Korean War Armistice 
     Agreement'').

     SEC. 403. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
     for each of fiscal years 2017 through 2021--
       (1) $3,000,000 to carry out section 103 of the North Korea 
     Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7813);
       (2) $3,000,000 to carry out subsections (a), (b), and (c) 
     of section 104 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 7814);
       (3) $2,000,000 to carry out subsection (d) of such section 
     104, as add by section 301 of this Act; and
       (4) $2,000,000 to carry out section 203 of the North Korea 
     Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7833).
       (b) Availability of Funds.--Amounts appropriated for each 
     fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a) shall remain available 
     until expended.

     SEC. 404. RULEMAKING.

       (a) In General.--The President is authorized to promulgate 
     such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out 
     the provisions of this Act (which may include regulatory 
     exceptions), including under section 205 of the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1704).
       (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act, or in any 
     amendment made by this Act, may be construed to limit the 
     authority of the President to designate or sanction persons 
     pursuant to an applicable Executive order or otherwise 
     pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

     SEC. 405. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.

       Any and all reports required to be submitted to appropriate 
     congressional committees under this Act or any amendment made 
     by this Act that are subject to a deadline for submission 
     consisting of the same unit of time may be consolidated into 
     a single report that is submitted to appropriate 
     congressional committees pursuant to such deadline. The 
     consolidated reports must contain all information required 
     under this Act or any amendment made by this Act, in addition 
     to all other elements mandated by previous law.

     SEC. 406. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Except as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act and the 
     amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will be up to 
7 hours of debate equally divided in the usual form.
  The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I start by thanking the leader for 
bringing to the floor today the bipartisan North Korea Sanctions and 
Policy Enhancement Act.
  This legislation passed unanimously out of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee to address a critical national security issue--the 
nuclear and ballistic missile threat from North Korea.
  We know all too well that the past two decades of North Korean 
policy, including both Republican and Democratic administrations, have 
been an abject failure. While there is no silver bullet solution, it is 
clear that Congress must play a proactive role in providing a more 
robust policy tool to the executive branch to confront this threat.
  There has been a lot of attention on North Korea in the weeks 
following North Korea's fourth nuclear test, but Senators Cory Gardner 
and Bob Menendez demonstrated leadership on North Korea long before 
recent events, and I thank them personally--Senator Gardner chairing 
the subcommittee that looks after policy relative to North Korea and 
Senator Menendez coming together with a robust piece of legislation. I 
thank Senator Gardner for his leadership. He is new to the committee 
but certainly not new to addressing problems our Nation faces, and I 
thank him for that. I thank them for their efforts over many months to 
focus attention on the threat posed by North Korea and to work with 
Senator Cardin and myself to develop a bipartisan Senate bill.
  I want to single out Senator Cardin and his staff for the 
collaborative and constructive manner in which they worked with my team 
on this important bipartisan piece of legislation. Senators Shaheen and 
Markey also made important contributions as well.
  Senator Cardin just arrived late, but I want the Senator to know I 
was just boasting about his tremendous efforts. If he would please know 
that has occurred.
  This was truly an all-hands-on-deck bipartisan committee effort to 
ensure a piece of legislation that the Senate, the Congress, and the 
country can be proud of.
  Over the past decade, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has 
convened every couple of years at the full committee level to assess 
the state of U.S. policy toward North Korea. There has been 
surprisingly little variation in their overall descriptions of the 
danger and recommended policy prescriptions. Former U.S. officials have 
all characterized North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile 
activities as posing serious and unacceptable risk to U.S. national 
interests. These same officials also all stressed the importance of 
standing with our close regional allies, South Korea and Japan, in the 
face of destabilizing North Korean provocations. In addition, they all 
cited the necessity of cooperating with the international community to 
deter further North Korean provocations and prevent the spread of 
sensitive technologies to and from North Korea. They all noted the 
importance of enforcing U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea, 
specifically the need for China to exercise greater influence over 
Pyongyang.
  Let me say this. I am personally very disappointed at the way the 
U.N. Security Council is functioning--whether it is Iran, where we had 
two ballistic missile tests and yet nothing has been done at the U.N. 
Security Council level. Most recently, China sent a delegation to meet 
with North Korea right before this last test in order to try to 
influence them, and the country of China was embarrassed by the fact 
that

[[Page S768]]

North Korea went ahead with this ballistic test. Yet, in spite of that 
embarrassment, in spite of the fact it is their neighbor on their 
border that is conducting these provocations, they still have not 
agreed to U.N. Security Council resolutions to put into place sanctions 
against North Korea. That is very disappointing.
  In the recent years, U.S. officials have spoken increasingly of the 
deplorable human rights situation in North Korea, including 
highlighting North Korea's notorious prison camps. Of course, there 
have been some differences in approaches toward North Korea over the 
years, particularly with respect to the tactics of engaging North Korea 
and the appropriate balance of carrots and sticks. Yet it is apparent 
that the past several decades of U.S. policy are not working. North 
Korea continues to advance their nuclear and ballistic missile 
capabilities unchecked. They have orchestrated malicious cyber attacks 
that threaten our allies as well as our own national security. 
Meanwhile, the North Korean people remain impoverished and subject to 
brutal treatment at the hands of the Kim regime.
  I appreciate the complexity of risks posed by North Korea and our 
limited options. However, there is certainly more we can and should be 
doing in addressing this issue. Our bill sets precedent and puts in 
place strong mandatory sanctions and establishes for the first time a 
statutory framework for sanctions in response to North Korean cyber 
threats. The President will be required to investigate a wide range of 
sanctionable conduct, including proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, arms-related materials, luxury goods which affect the 
elite in that country, human rights abuses, activities undermining 
cyber security, and provision of industrial inputs such as precious 
metals or coal for use in a tailored set of activities, including WMD, 
proliferation activities, and prison and labor camps. Penalties include 
the seizure of assets, visa bans, and denial of government contracts.
  I am also pleased this bill goes beyond just these sanctions--which, 
by the way, are very strong--and I want to underline the word 
``mandatory.'' It establishes a more robust policy framework, including 
tools to improve enforcement, and shines a brighter spotlight on North 
Korea's abhorrent human rights record, such as their forced labor 
practices. The bill requires a strategy to promote improved 
implementation and enforcement of multilateral sanctions, a strategy to 
combat North Korean cyber activities, and a strategy to promote and 
encourage international engagement on North Korean human rights issues. 
There are reporting requirements related to these strategies as well as 
a report on political prison camps and a feasibility study on providing 
communications equipment to the people of North Korea.
  After the careful work over many months by a bipartisan coalition in 
Congress, we have a piece of legislation that I believe will begin to 
allow our country, working with our allies, to begin seizing the 
initiative in constraining North Korea's ability to threaten its 
neighbors and the world with nuclear weapons while also continuing to 
focus world attention on the plight of the North Korean people.
  I look forward to hearing the perspectives of my colleagues on the 
significance of this legislation that I expect will receive wide 
bipartisan support and eventually become law.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor to my distinguished friend and the 
ranking member, Senator Cardin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, let me first start by thanking Chairman 
Corker.
  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has a proud tradition of 
working on national security and foreign policy issues in the best 
interest of our country and putting partisan differences aside so we 
can speak with a strong voice. Chairman Corker has carried out that 
tradition and has elevated it to a level that I think has been not only 
in the best interest of the Senate but the best interests of our 
country. That is particularly true in the North Korea Sanctions and 
Policy Enhancement Act of 2016. So I thank him for the manner in which 
he brought different views together. We all had the same objectives, 
but as the Presiding Officer knows, when dealing with 100 Members of 
the Senate and the 19 Members of our committee, we each have different 
views, and to try to harmonize that so we can get legislation done in a 
timely way takes a great deal of talent and patience. Senator Corker 
has both talent and patience, and I thank him very much for the way he 
led our committee to bring a bill to the floor of the Senate that I 
think will get overwhelming support, will become law, and will advance 
U.S. national security interests.
  I have my two chairmen here. Senator Gardner is the chairman of the 
East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee in the Foreign Relations Committee. 
He understood the importance of North Korea, its nuclear weapon 
program, its weaponization program, and the impact it has globally. 
That is for sure, but East Asia is a particular concern, and Senator 
Gardner understood that, working with our allies in East Asia to 
develop the right U.S. leadership so we will have an international 
coalition isolating North Korea because of its conduct. So I thank 
Senator Gardner for introducing the original bill in the Senate and 
working with Senator Menendez particularly--who introduced it on our 
side--to bring together legislation that is a proper role for Congress.
  I want to underscore that. This legislation represents what Congress 
needs to do. We are the policymakers of America. We pass the laws. Then 
the executive branch, which is critically important to foreign policy--
don't get me wrong--but we enable the tools to be able to carry out 
this foreign policy. What this legislation shows is Congress speaks 
with a very clear voice, that we will not tolerate North Korea's 
proliferation of weaponry, its intimidation of its neighbors, its human 
rights violations, and that we will use the strongest possible measures 
to ensure that we contain that type of nefarious conduct.
  Quite frankly, the legislation we have before us is similar to the 
approach we took with Iran and the congressionally mandated sanctions 
we had on Iran that made it clear we were going to isolate Iran until 
they changed course on their nuclear weapons program. What this 
legislation does is take the product that came over from the House of 
Representatives--it was a good bill that came over from the House of 
Representatives, but we strengthened it. We made it more effective 
through the input of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. So it is a strong message--unified, bipartisan, working with 
the administration to produce a strong policy.
  North Korea's foreign policy challenges are known by all. It has been 
known by every American President since the start of the Korean war. 
They have tested four nuclear weapons and they tested a long-range 
ballistic missile in defiance of numerous international obligations.
  U.S. leadership is absolutely critical in standing up to North 
Korea's activities. We must isolate North Korea to prevent it from 
getting international help to further its illegal weapons program. That 
is the basic point of sanctions. We want to prevent commercial 
interests anywhere in the world from trying to help North Korea get the 
type of weapons, equipment, and resources it needs in order to further 
its illegal weapon program. The United States must lead in effective 
diplomacy to provide incentives and disincentives toward North Korea's 
conduct. We need to form strong alliances and partnerships in the 
region. We have to work in close coordination with our allies, and 
quite frankly our goal is a peaceful and reunified peninsula. We think 
that is in the best interest of all the Korean people.
  Over the last two decades, the North Korean regime has moved steadily 
forward in their nuclear weapons development program and in the 
production of nuclear material. They have continued to develop this 
ballistic missile program, they possess hundreds of short- and medium-
range missiles, and they are seeking ICBM capabilities. They have 
active uranium and plutonium programs that pose a proliferation threat. 
They have tried in the past to help Syria build a nuclear reactor and 
have been a source of nuclear material

[[Page S769]]

missile technology to rogue states, including terrorists. It is not 
just about one country-state. It is about what they are doing in 
helping other countries that support terrorism and terrorist groups 
itself. It is critically important we act.
  North Korea represents a grave and growing threat to the United 
States, the region, and the international community. To respond to 
North Korea's continued belligerence, the legislation we have before us 
includes mandatory sanctions--and the chairman mentioned that these are 
mandatory sanctions--directed against specific entities that violate 
U.S. law and United Nations Security Council resolutions, including 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms-related materials, 
human rights violations--and we will get to that because it is an 
important part of this legislation--and activities that undermine cyber 
security.
  Our legislation targets for investigation those who support these 
activities by providing the regime with industrial inputs, such as coal 
that provides economic support for North Korea's illicit activities or 
luxury goods that allow the regime to continue to exercise its control.
  We are going after the source of their financing of their illegal 
weapons program. It is not always the direct equipment that goes into 
building the weapons; in many cases, it is the mineral wealth of the 
country that they are using in order to finance that. This legislation 
targets those sectors. The President is mandated to sanction any person 
who has contributed to or engaged in or helped to facilitate these 
actions.
  Even isolated regimes like North Korea are nonetheless tied to the 
global financial order in ways that provide the international community 
with leverage to seek changes in North Korea's behavior.
  This legislation also codifies existing cyber security sanctions in 
response to North Korea's increasing capability and provocations in the 
cyber domain, including the attack on Sony. This is an important step 
in building and enforcing international norms when it comes to cyber 
space. One of the areas that we have strengthened in the House bill is 
to make it clear that our concerns about North Korea go well beyond 
their nuclear weapons tests but also to their cyber attack activities.
  The vast majority of North Koreans endure systematic violations of 
their most basic human rights. Chairman Corker talked about this. Many 
of these violations constitute crimes against humanity. It is a fact 
that is well-documented by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry. 
Widespread malnutrition, torture, and fear have made North Korea one of 
the most egregious human rights violators, unparalleled in the 
contemporary world. They are the worst.
  These crimes by the North Korean regime should shock the conscience 
of humanity. Building on the important work of the U.N. Commission of 
Inquiry, the United Nations Human Rights Commission and General 
Assembly adopted by overwhelming margins resolutions calling for 
accountability for North Korea's human rights abuses. Just last year, 
the United Nations Security Council took up the DPRK's grave human 
rights injustices on their standing agenda for the very first time. 
These multilateral resolutions need to be backed up by appropriate 
action, and that is exactly what we are doing.
  It is well past time to hold North Korea responsible for its human 
rights violations, and this legislation does just that. In response, 
this legislation imposes sanctions not just for North Korea's nuclear 
programs and continued provocative behavior but for the severe human 
rights abuses committed in North Korea as well. This is new and 
necessary policy ground for the United States with regard to North 
Korea.
  Although tough sanctions have worked on North Korea when applied in 
the past--and I think it is important to point out that sanctions do 
work. In 2005 the United States designated Banco Delta Asia, BDA, as a 
money laundering concern for facilitating North Korean illicit 
activities and banned all U.S. financial institutions from dealing with 
that bank. It worked. It had a major impact on North Korea. The problem 
is, that was 2005 and we let up. We didn't keep the pressure on. This 
legislation will correct that oversight and remedy the reasons why 
these sanctions are not effective today.
  This legislation acknowledges that sanctions and diplomacy are the 
most effective way when integrated into a comprehensive strategy that 
engages all of our instruments of national policy. The North Korea 
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 includes instruments to 
improve the enforcement of multilateral sanctions, an overall strategy 
to combat North Korea's cyber activities, and other efforts to address 
human rights abuses. The legislation also protects important 
humanitarian assistance programs.
  This is another point I want to underscore: We have no problem with 
the people of North Korea. It is the government. It is the government 
that is not only threatening its neighbors, it has damaged, threatened, 
and killed its own people. This legislation makes it clear that we will 
continue to try to get humanitarian assistance to the people of North 
Korea.
  Finally, effectively enforcing sanctions against North Korea is not 
something the United States can do alone. It requires our allies, our 
partners, and the rest of the international community to join us in 
this effort. This legislation seeks to create the policy environment 
that makes such a multilateral effort at the United Nations Security 
Council possible.
  The onus is now on China. Chairman Corker is actually right in what 
he said. China is as much a threat as any country in the world as a 
result of North Korea's activities. China can make a huge difference in 
isolating North Korea and changing their behavior to denuclearize the 
Korean Peninsula. That is their objective. China has told us that. They 
need to take action. They shouldn't be blocking U.N. Security Council 
action. They should not only be supporting that, they should be using 
their influence over North Korea to bring about a change of behavior of 
North Korea as it relates to proliferation of weapons. So it is on 
China.
  The United States will do what it must do to safeguard our interests 
and that of our allies. And that, we will do. But we hope China, which 
claims to share our same goals on the denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, will agree on the meaningful steps necessary so that we can 
achieve that goal.
  Let me be clear. The United States and Republic of Korea alliance 
remains as firm and resilient as ever and stands ready to support the 
Korean people against any and all provocations by North Korea. Just 
this weekend, the alliance made a decision to begin formal 
consultations regarding improvements to the THAAD missile defense 
system operated by U.S. Forces Korea. I support this decision, as it is 
both an important element of our extended deterrence architecture and 
it sends the right signal of U.S. resolve to protect our allies and 
partners in the region. We will look for new defense systems to help 
the Republic of Korea and our friends in the Korean Peninsula.
  I also wish to commend President Park for her leadership in 
responding to this growing threat. She has demonstrated the necessary 
political will to strengthen cooperation and consultations within the 
alliance and with partners in the region to forge a united and strong 
international response to North Korea's reckless behavior.
  We must also continue to look for opportunities to enhance trilateral 
cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Japan 
and South Korea are our most important allies in the region, and as we 
approach North Korea, to be most effective, we need to act together.
  Strong, clear-eyed, forward-looking leadership will be necessary if 
we hope to pursue eventual denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. It 
calls for close coordination with our regional allies, South Korea and 
Japan, particularly in the areas of missile defense and information 
sharing. And it calls for U.S. leadership to strengthen the existing 
counterproliferation regime, to ensure that North Korea's most 
dangerous weapons are contained as we work toward their elimination. 
This legislation does that. It strengthens U.S. policy and allows us to 
ensure that North Korea will pay a price for its continued nuclear 
ambitions, while providing the administration with the toolkit it needs 
to develop and implement a more

[[Page S770]]

effective approach to North Korea. I urge all my colleagues to join us 
in supporting this very important legislation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, I want to add to the comments made by 
Chairman Corker, my colleague from Tennessee and chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, as well as Senator Cardin, my colleague on 
the Subcommittee on East Asia, about the work we have done over the 
past year to put this before the Senate today.
  One of the first meetings we held in the office of Chairman Corker 
was to speak with my colleagues on the concern we shared about North 
Korea, the concern that while we have rightfully focused on the Middle 
East and the conflicts that have arisen in Syria and in various places 
around the country, at the same time we cannot take our eyes off of 
North Korea.
  Of course, Senator Cardin from Maryland and I have worked together on 
a variety of committee hearings. The first series of committee hearings 
we held on the East Asia Subcommittee were to address cyber security 
issues, the cyber attacks from North Korea, and the situation in regard 
to security on the North Korean Peninsula. I think the work we have 
laid out over the past year is setting ground for this strong sanctions 
bill today.
  I rise to speak in support of H.R. 757, the North Korea Sanctions and 
Policy Enhancement Act, as amended by the unanimous amendment that came 
out of the Foreign Relations Committee on January 28. This legislation 
is a momentous achievement, and I thank the members of the committee 
and particularly Senator Menendez for working closely with me as we 
came together with a strong bipartisan solution to what is the problem 
with North Korea. I also thank House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman 
Ed Royce, the sponsor of the underlying House legislation, for his 
years of tireless work and dedication on this issue. Having served with 
Chairman Royce in the House for a number of years, I know his passion 
and his dedication and his commitment to bringing peace to the 
peninsula.
  This legislation comes at a critical time. Those of you who had a 
chance to see the news this morning woke up to a story in Reuters where 
yet another top military official in the Kim Jong Un regime was 
assassinated by Kim Jong Un, following a long list of others in his 
administration who have been killed, assassinated, tortured, including 
his own uncle, including those who have been killed by anti-aircraft 
guns.
  North Korea poses a serious and growing threat to its neighbors, our 
allies, South Korea, Japan, and others. It poses a threat to our 
homeland, the United States, and to global security. While the threat 
is growing daily, our policies are failing to deter the forgotten 
maniac in Pyongyang, Kim Jong Un.
  This past weekend, on February 7, North Korea conducted a satellite 
launch, which is essentially a test of an intercontinental ballistic 
missile that would be capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Last 
month, on January 6, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test, 
which is the third such test during the Obama administration. Moreover, 
North Korea has claimed that this test was a test of a thermonuclear 
device, also known as a hydrogen bomb--a vastly more powerful weapon 
than the atomic devices the regime has tested in the past. Regardless 
of whether the claim that it was a hydrogen bomb is true, this test 
represents a significant advancement in North Korea's nuclear weapons 
capability.
  North Korea has violated a series of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions, including Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094--all 
while the regime's stockpile of nuclear weapons continues to grow 
exponentially. Most recently, nuclear experts have reported that North 
Korea may currently have as many as 20 nuclear warheads, with potential 
for over 100 in the next few years.
  Yesterday James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, 
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that North Korea 
has restarted its plutonium reactor at Yongbyon and ``could begin to 
recover plutonium from the reactor's spent fuel within a matter of 
weeks to months.'' The regime's ballistic missile capabilities are 
rapidly advancing. DNI Clapper stated that ``North Korea has also 
expanded the size and sophistication of its ballistic missiles forces--
from close-range ballistic missiles to intercontinental ballistic 
missiles [ICBMs]--and continues to conduct missile test launches. . . . 
Pyongyang is also committed to developing a long-range, nuclear-armed 
missile that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United 
States.''
  ADM Bill Gortney, the head of U.S. Northern Command, NORTHCOM, which 
is based in my home State of Colorado, at Peterson Air Force Base in 
Colorado Springs, has publicly stated that North Korea may have already 
developed the ability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead, mount it on 
their own intercontinental ballistic missile--something called the KN-
08--and ``shoot it at the homeland.'' Those are not the words of a 
committee chairman or the words of a subcommittee chairman; those are 
the words of our commander of NORTHCOM, who believes that they may have 
developed the ability to shoot it at the homeland.
  North Korea has demonstrated time and time again that it is an 
aggressive, ruthless regime that is not afraid to kill innocent people. 
On March 26, 2010, North Korean missiles sank a South Korean ship, 
killing 46 of her own crew, and several months later, North Korea 
shelled a South Korean island, killing 4 more South Korean citizens.
  Pyongyang is also quickly developing its cyber capabilities as 
another dangerous tool of intimidation, as demonstrated by the attack 
on the South Korean financial institutions and communication systems in 
March of 2013 or the Sony Pictures hack attack in November of 2014.
  According to a November 2015 report by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, ``North Korea is emerging as a significant actor 
in cyberspace with both its military and clandestine organizations 
gaining the capability to conduct cyber operations.''
  According to the Heritage Foundation:

       Contrary to perceptions of North Korea as a technically 
     backward nation, the regime has a very robust and active 
     cyber warfare capability. The Reconnaissance General Bureau, 
     North Korea's intelligence agency, oversees 3,000 ``cyber-
     warriors'' dedicated to attacking Pyongyang's enemies. A 
     South Korean cyber expert assessed that North Korea's 
     electronic warfare capabilities were surpassed only by the 
     United States and Russia.

  We should also never forget that this regime remains one of the 
world's foremost abusers of human rights. The North Korean regime 
maintains a vast network of political prison camps where as many as 
200,000 men, women, and children are confined to atrocious living 
conditions and are tortured, maimed, and killed.

  On February 7, 2014, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on 
Human Rights released a groundbreaking report detailing North Korea's 
horrendous record on human rights. The Commission found that North 
Korea's constituted a crime against humanity.
  What then has been this administration's policy to counter the North 
Korean threat? Our policy is something called ``strategic patience,'' 
which started in 2009 under then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. 
The main idea behind strategic patience, it seems, is to patiently wait 
until Kim Jong Un peacefully surrenders.
  The latest developments show that we are reaping the rewards of this 
ill-conceived policy, and it can no longer be allowed to remain in 
effect. The simple fact is that strategic patience has been a strategic 
failure. All that our so-called ``patience'' has done is to allow the 
North Korean regime to continue to test nuclear weapons, to expand its 
testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles, to grow its military 
power, and to develop cyber warfare technologies while systematically 
continuing to torture its own people. We have neither militarily 
deterred this regime nor effectively used our punitive tools.
  Our sanctions policy toward North Korea has been weak. This was noted 
in that same CSIS report:

       The sanctions against North Korea pale in comparison to the 
     level of sanctioning

[[Page S771]]

     against Iran. . . . The number of individuals and entities 
     sanctioned by the U.S. and UN are 843 (U.S.) and 121 (UN) for 
     Iran, but only 100 (U.S.) and 31 (UN) for North Korea.

  When we do impose sanctions against North Korea, they are often 
repetitive or ineffectual. Again, I quote from the Heritage Foundation 
report:

       In response to the North Korean cyberattack on Sony, 
     President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13687, which, 
     though expansive in legal breadth, was only weakly 
     implemented. The Administration targeted 13 North Korean 
     entities, three organizations already on the U.S. sanctions 
     list, and 10 individuals not involved in cyber warfare.

  That was our response to North Korea. To date, we have not imposed 
specific human rights sanctions on a single North Korean individual. 
There are 200,000 men, women, and children in political gulags in North 
Korea, and the United States has not imposed a specific human rights 
sanction on a single North Korean leader. It is a disgrace given the 
gravity of the abuses that have been perpetrated by this regime.
  These policy failures are why a year ago I began working on the 
legislation that is before us today that would reverse course and apply 
the pressure necessary to stop the forgotten maniac in Pyongyang.
  Last August, I had an opportunity to visit South Korea and meet with 
South Korean President Park. We talked about the situation on the 
peninsula, and we agreed that the status quo with North Korea is no 
longer sustainable. To witness the proximity of the threat for our 
South Korean allies, I visited the demilitarized zone, or the DMZ. Only 
days after I departed, North Korea fired artillery across the border, 
further illustrating the danger that South Koreans live under each and 
every day and the danger of armed escalation of this conflict.
  I also traveled to China and met with Foreign Minister Wang as well 
as high-ranking officials of the People's Liberation Army to discuss 
North Korea. From my conversations, however, it became evident that 
although they are growing exasperated with the North Korean regime, 
Beijing has done little with the intention of undertaking meaningful 
action to stop Kim Jong Un.
  Last October, I introduced S. 2144, the North Korea Sanctions and 
Policy Enhancement Act. I thank 17 of my colleagues in this Senate for 
cosponsoring this legislation. The substitute before us today 
represents a slightly modified version of S. 2144. In particular, this 
legislation mandates and not simply authorizes that the President 
impose sanctions against persons who materially contribute to North 
Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile development and who import luxury 
goods into North Korea; mandatory sanctions against perpetrators who 
enable its censorship and human rights abuses, who engage in money 
laundering and manufacture of counterfeit goods and narcotics 
trafficking, who engage in activities undermining cyber security or 
have sold, supplied or transferred to or from North Korea precious 
metals or raw metals, including aluminum, steel, and coal for the 
benefit of North Korea's regime and its illicit activities.
  These sanctions are tough, and we know that a significant portion of 
the foreign currency that North Korea receives is for trade in its 
precious metals, raw materials, aluminum, steel, and coal. We know that 
about 90 percent of North Korea's economy is through its relationship 
with China.
  Senator Cardin previously mentioned that nobody faces a greater 
threat than South Korea's neighbors Japan and China, which border a 
regime that is killing its own people and testing ballistic missiles in 
violation of China's determinations, the United States' determinations, 
and certainly the United Nations determinations.
  I will note that the mandatory sanctions on North Korea's cyber 
activities and the mandatory sanctions on the minerals are unique to 
the Senate legislation. This bill also codifies the Executive orders 
that the President issued last year, 13687 and 13694, regarding cyber 
security as they applied to North Korea, which were enacted last year 
in the wake of the Sony Pictures hack and other cyber incidents. That 
is also a unique feature of the Senate bill.
  Lastly, if enacted and signed into law, the mandatory sanctions on 
cyber violators will break new ground for Congress. It is something 
that we can take as a model and apply to other nations that perpetrate 
against the United States. We need to look for every way to deprive 
Pyongyang of income to build it weapons programs, strengthen its cyber 
capabilities, and abuse its own people.
  We have to send a strong message to China, North Korea's diplomatic 
protector and largest trading partner, that the United States will use 
every economic tool at its disposal to stop Pyongyang.
  Finally, I would like to quote the Washington Post editorial board 
from this past Monday, February 8:

       President Obama's policy since 2009, ``strategic 
     patience,'' has failed. The policy has mostly consisted of 
     ignoring North Korea while mildly cajoling China to pressure 
     the regime.

  The editorial concludes:

       Both China and North Korea must see that they will pay a 
     mounting price for what, to the United States, should be Mr. 
     Kim's intolerable steps toward a nuclear arsenal. ``Strategic 
     patience'' is no longer a viable option.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post 
editorial be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, Feb. 8, 2016]

North Korea's Rocket Launch Shows That Mr. Obama's `Strategic Patience' 
                               Has Failed

                          (By Editorial Board)

       Assessing the behavior of North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un is 
     necessarily a matter of guesswork In light of North Korea's 
     launch Sunday of another long-range rocket, however, our 
     favorite theory is a simple one: Mr. Kim is responding 
     rationally, even shrewdly, to the outside world. The 30-
     something dictator no doubt noticed that after the regime's 
     latest nuclear test, on Jan. 6, there was no response other 
     than rhetoric from the U.N. Security Council, China and the 
     United States. Moreover, he surely observed that his 
     provocation served to widen a rift between Washington and 
     Beijing over how to handle him. So why not double down?
       The three-stage rocket launched Sunday, which supposedly 
     put a satellite into Earth's orbit, could also serve as an 
     intercontinental missile. If North Korea has succeeded, as it 
     claims it has, in miniaturizing a nuclear warhead, Mr. Kim 
     could target Hawaii and Alaska, or perhaps even the western 
     U.S. mainland. The threat is not imminent--and yet it is 
     likely to become so if the United States does not devise a 
     more effective strategy for containing and deterring the Kim 
     regime.
       President Obama's policy since 2009, ``strategic 
     patience,'' has failed. The policy has mostly consisted of 
     ignoring North Korea while mildly cajoling China to pressure 
     the regime. As the supplier of most of the isolated country's 
     energy and food, Beijing has enormous leverage. But Chinese 
     President Xi Jinping appears even more committed than his 
     predecessors to the doctrine that it is preferable to 
     tolerate the Kim regime--and its nuclear proliferation--than 
     do anything that might destabilize it.
       Since the nuclear test, China has been saying that it will 
     support another U.N. resolution on North Korea, but it is 
     balking at significant new sanctions. Instead it calls for 
     ``dialogue,'' by which it means negotiations between North 
     Korea and the United States. This sounds reasonable; the 
     problem is that talks on curbing North Korea's nuclear 
     program and missiles have failed repeatedly, and Mr. Kim is 
     now insisting that the regime be accepted as a nuclear power.
       What is needed is a return to the only non-military 
     strategy that brought results: sanctions that strike at the 
     regime's inner circle. Mr. Kim and his cronies are still 
     managing to import luxury goods from China, in spite of a 
     U.N. ban; they still use Chinese banks to do business with 
     the rest of the world. Those links could be curtailed if 
     China, like Iran before it, were designated as a money 
     launderer and U.S. sanctions were slapped on Chinese banks 
     and other businesses that supply weapons and luxury goods.
       Pending U.S. sanctions legislation, already passed by the 
     House and scheduled for a Senate floor vote this week, would 
     mandate these steps, while providing the administration with 
     some flexibility. It should pass, and Mr. Obama should sign 
     it. The administration and South Korea have taken one 
     positive step, by announcing formal consultations on 
     deploying an advanced missile defense system in South Korea 
     as quickly as possible. That sensible step had been on hold 
     because of China's objections.
       Both China and North Korea must see that they will pay a 
     mounting price for what, to the United States, should be Mr. 
     Kim's intolerable steps toward a nuclear arsenal. ``Strategic 
     patience'' is no longer a viable option.

  Mr. GARDNER. This legislation begins the process of reversing course

[[Page S772]]

from these failed policies toward building the strong policies that we 
need to stop the forgotten maniac.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill--this amendment--which 
passed with unanimous support out of the Foreign Relations Committee. 
We can make a difference today. We can strengthen our partnership among 
South Korea, Japan, and the United States. We can stop the torture of 
the people of North Korea, and we can lift the threat of a nuclearized 
North Korea, which threatens to harm not just its neighbors or our 
allies but the people of this country, our homeland.
  I thank the Presiding Officer and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sullivan). The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I know we have a number of speakers who 
are interested in this legislation. I think they will be coming to the 
floor between now and vote time. I ask that the other Members who wish 
to speak on this legislation come to the floor so we can fill in the 
gaps.
  Again, I thank Senator Gardner and Senator Menendez for their efforts 
on the front end of this legislation. I think this is a meaningful 
piece of legislation. I was with the Presiding Officer yesterday during 
a lunch meeting, and I think he is OK with my sharing the fact that the 
Senate is playing a role in really projecting our strength. We continue 
to do so both through the Armed Services Committee that he serves on 
and also through the Foreign Relations Committee. I think this is a 
very strong piece of legislation.
  A lot of times it is difficult for us to make a difference. Let's 
face it. The Commander in Chief has such powers and such staff at their 
disposal. However this is one of those pieces of legislation where I am 
certain we are going to make a difference.
  Will it end North Korea's activities? It will take collective efforts 
to make that happen, but I think this begins the process of moving that 
along.
  I have to say that I am so disappointed in the way the U.N. Security 
Council is behaving. Again, I don't want to rehash old discussions, but 
I know when we looked at the snapback provisions that were a part of 
the Iran nuclear agreement--when you are dealing with partners like 
China, which wants to buy oil from Iran, and Russia, which wants to 
sell them arms, I hate to say it, but our European friends are just 
dying to do business in the different ways that they are--mean nothing. 
They mean nothing.
  It is the fact that Iran had two ballistic tests that have taken 
place, violating U.N. Security Council resolutions, and nothing has 
happened because Russia and China have blocked those. In many ways that 
means that for us to continue the project to cause change to occur, 
this body itself has to be even more proactive.
  Senator Gardner has visited the DMZ, just as I have, and has seen the 
28,500 troops that we have there. I know Senator Sullivan has done the 
same thing. We understand the constant danger that South Korea and 
Japan face, as well as others. North Korea is right on the border of 
China, and China is the entity that can make the biggest difference. 
Yet China--again, after being embarrassed when North Korea paid no 
attention whatsoever to their reach-out when they tried to keep this 
last test, in particular, from occurring--was unwilling to listen.
  So when we have ``partners'' on the U.N. Security Council unwilling 
to take steps, it means even more so that this body, of probably the 
greatest Nation on Earth, has to be proactive.
  I commend the Senator from Colorado. I commend the Members of this 
body who I think are certainly interested and will pass this piece of 
legislation overwhelmingly.
  Again, I thank Senator McConnell and Senator Reid for allowing this 
legislation to come up in this manner. I too thank Chairman Royce and 
Ranking Member Engle. They have worked well together to cause us to 
project strength in this regard. They sent the base bill over, and it 
is a very good bill and a strong piece of legislation that the Senate, 
by passage later today, will strengthen.
  This is a collaborative effort. I hate to even use words like that, 
but it is a collaborative effort by two bodies of Congress and two 
committees. Ultimately, at the end of the day, I think the two bodies 
will fully pass this legislation and it will become law. This is going 
to begin to make a difference in the way North Korea is behaving.
  What is happening there is important. It is one of the greatest 
humanitarian crises, and this bill also addresses that.
  I thank Senator Gardner for his comments on the floor. More 
importantly, I thank him for his efforts in helping to bring this piece 
of legislation to the floor and for his leadership in the committee in 
helping to design this bill.
  I look forward to our having a successful day in the Senate.
  Mr. GARDNER. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. CORKER. Yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. GARDNER. The Senator from Tennessee talked about his 
disappointment with the United Nations. I want to go back over some of 
the points we talked about earlier today.
  Senator Cardin, our colleague from Maryland, mentioned the fact that 
the United States has very similar approaches to our sanctions that 
brought Iran to the negotiation table in the first place--
sanctions that we levied against Iran brought them to the negotiating 
table--and the fact that the United States has levied almost eight 
times more sanctions against Iran than we have a regime that does 
possess a nuclear weapon.

  I think we have more work to do in the United States. This bill is a 
great step, but also the United Nations--and your expression of 
disappointment with the United Nations is well stated.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I think it is good that the Senator from 
Colorado brings up the fact that when we began putting these sanctions 
in place, there was a lot of push back because, in essence, for these 
things to work properly or make the biggest difference in outcomes, we 
need to have an international effort that takes place. When we began 
the Iran sanctions process, it was unilateral. And while we stressed on 
the front end--I know we passed an amendment in the Banking Committee 
where that one originated--to really put in place efforts to make it 
multilateral, over time it did and, because of that, the world 
community obviously is joining us, so we were able to force a behavior 
change.
  I would have liked to have had a better outcome when they got to the 
table, and I think most people in this body would have. But this bill, 
I would point out, does seek and does push the administration not only 
to implement these by mandatory statements, but it also, again, 
encourages them to work with others.
  I had those same conversations in China that the Senator from 
Colorado had years ago. The Chinese, with such emphasis on stability--
and I understand it is right on their border which, to me, should make 
these provocations even more infuriating and more important, relative 
to the security of their own country. But it just seems that they, too, 
have exercised the patience the Senator spoke about earlier that our 
country has exercised.
  I really do believe that passage of this bill today, and an ultimate 
signature by the President, has the potential to unleash the same chain 
of events that occurred relative to Iran, hopefully with a better 
outcome.
  Again, I thank the Senator for his efforts.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that any time spent in a 
quorum call before the vote in relation to H.R. 757 be charged equally 
against both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. HIRONO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. HIRONO. Mr. President, I rise to speak in strong support of the 
North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act.
  This legislation serves as a critical component of the U.S. response 
to the North Korean regime's dangerous and destabilizing acts. These 
acts are just

[[Page S773]]

the latest in a series of flagrant violations of the U.N. Security 
Council's resolutions against North Korea's use of ballistic missiles 
and nuclear technology.
  North Korea's unpredictable behavior, combined with their commitment 
to advancing their nuclear and missile capability, present a serious 
threat to our country and our allies.
  My support of this bill is grounded in my belief that the United 
States must stand with our allies and lead an international response 
that condemns North Korea's actions and reassures our allies, 
especially Japan and South Korea. Strengthening and expanding sanctions 
demonstrate that North Korea's behavior is unacceptable and that there 
will be consequences.
  The Gardner-Menendez substitute amendment codifies and makes 
mandatory important cyber security sanctions on North Korea that were 
enacted in Executive orders in the wake of the Sony Pictures hacking 
incident. The amendment also requires the President to target 
Pyongyang's trade in key industrial commodities that are used to fund 
its weapons program.
  The bill requires a strategy to promote improved implementation and 
enforcement of multilateral sanctions, a strategy to combat North 
Korea's cyber activities, and a strategy to promote and encourage 
international engagement on North Korean human rights-related issues, 
including forced labor and repatriation.
  While passing this legislation is a critical part of the U.S. 
response, we also must work with our allies, as I mentioned before, to 
stand as a united international community.
  Today, our allies Japan and South Korea took additional measures 
against Pyongyang. Japan declared that all North Korean ships, 
including those for humanitarian purposes, would be banned from coming 
to Japanese ports. Third-country ships that visited North Korea would 
also be banned from entering. South Korea announced it would pull out 
of a joint industrial complex that it ran with North Korea at Kaesong.
  I agree with Secretary Kerry that the U.N. Security Council must act 
swiftly to impose penalties for North Korea's violations of U.N. 
resolutions. China needs to join the international community in 
supporting sanctions against Pyongyang and should use its leverage as 
North Korea's largest trading partner to expand U.S. sanctions.
  This is an opportunity for the U.S. and China to work together toward 
a common goal--a denuclearized Korean peninsula.
  While our country is engaged in the campaign to destroy ISIL, North 
Korea's serious provocations demonstrate that we cannot take our 
attention away from the Asia-Pacific region. The United States has 
longstanding strategic interests and commitments to the security of the 
Asia-Pacific area. It is a priority to maintain stability in the region 
where the United States has five treaty allies and many security 
partnerships. We must ensure that our solid commitment to defend South 
Korea and Japan remains firm.
  While passing this sanctions bill is important to demonstrate our 
resolve and leadership, clearly this is not enough in the face of North 
Korea's provocations. We need to cooperate with our allies on missile 
defense. As the north continues its provocative missile launches, our 
alliance with South Korea means that we must enhance our defenses 
against these threats. Pyongyang's missile capabilities threaten not 
only our allies and our servicemembers stationed in South Korea and 
Japan, but also the U.S. territory of Guam, my home State of Hawaii, 
Alaska, and much of the west coast.
  South Korea's decision yesterday to begin formal talks with the 
United States to deploy a THAAD missile defense system is a major step 
toward this kind of missile defense cooperation. THAAD can target 
short, medium, and intermediate ballistic missiles in flight.
  Again, stability in the Asia-Pacific area with key allies, largest 
and fastest growing economies, and provocative actors like North Korea 
and China, is critical to our national security. We must continue our 
commitment to an all-of-government Asia-Pacific rebalance with 
military, economic, and diplomatic attention and resource priorities to 
this part of the world.
  Since my election to the Senate, I have made it a priority to visit 
this region every year. Most recently, this past summer, I visited 
Japan and Guam. I traveled to South Korea in 2013, and I know that our 
allies are counting on us to keep our focus on the Asia-Pacific and 
work with them to maintain stability and prosperity in this part of the 
world.
  I urge my colleagues to send a strong message to North Korea and our 
allies by not only supporting the North Korean Sanctions Enforcement 
Act, but also by supporting the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COONS. Mr. President, many of my colleagues, both Republicans and 
Democrats, have taken to the floor today in support of the North Korea 
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act. It is a bill that I, too, am 
pleased to support.
  This bill was developed in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
through the same spirit of collaboration and collegiality in America's 
best interests that we have seen in this committee time and again. 
Senators Gardner and Menendez deserve real praise for their work 
together drafting this bill, and I thank and commend Chairman Corker 
and Ranking Member Cardin for leading an open amendment process within 
the committee that strengthened the bill with truly constructive 
changes-- among them an amendment from Senator Markey to crack down on 
transfers of conventional weapons to and from North Korea, and another 
from Senator Shaheen, which makes sure these new sanctions will not 
impede our ability to recover the remains of any lost American 
servicemember in North Korea.

  I want to thank Senators Corker and Cardin not only for advancing 
this bill but, just as importantly, for leading the Foreign Relations 
Committee in a bipartisan spirit that reflects the best of the Senate 
in an uncertain world. This is a strong bill, and I am confident it 
will enhance sanctions against North Korea in response to the regime's 
nuclear test last month and its dangerous nuclear missile launch last 
weekend. It is a clear, direct response that sends an unmistakable 
signal to North Korea and the world that we intend to continue to be 
actively engaged.
  Frankly, the floor debate this week at some moments has not always 
reflected that same bipartisan spirit and the same spirit in which the 
House overwhelmingly passed a similar bill last month. Somehow the 
debate has at times shifted from questions of how best to punish North 
Korea for its illegal actions and how we can pull together in that 
effort to questions about President Obama's broader policy goals and 
motives. Suggestions that the President somehow enabled North Korea to 
engage in this provocative behavior by pursuing a separate nuclear 
agreement with Iran only distract from our shared goal that serves as 
the foundation and bipartisan purpose of this legislation.
  I urge a more constructive course. We should apply the same 
bipartisan spirit in which we developed the North Korea Sanctions and 
Policy Enhancement Act toward passage of the Iran Policy Oversight Act, 
which was led by Ranking Member Cardin and which will ensure that 
Congress can exercise effective oversight of the nuclear agreement with 
Iran.
  Just as members of the Foreign Relations Committee worked together to 
develop a sanctions bill on North Korea, Republicans and Democrats in 
this body should come together to enforce the terms of the nuclear deal 
with Iran and to push back on Iran's support for terrorism in the 
Middle East, its ongoing human rights violations, and its illegal 
ballistic missile tests. The Iran Policy Oversight Act offers us an 
incredible way to accomplish all of these goals.
  When it comes to the recent nuclear agreement with Iran, also known 
as

[[Page S774]]

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or the JCPOA, too often we find 
ourselves distracted from the core question as to whether that deal has 
made Iran less able to pursue development of a nuclear weapon. We are 
seeing the same tendency play out today as some of my colleagues have 
promoted a false comparison between the JCPOA and the 1994 agreed 
framework, which the United States negotiated with North Korea with the 
goal of stopping North Korea from developing a nuclear weapon. These 
comparisons make a false implication that just because the 1994 
framework utterly failed to keep North Korea from pursuing an illicit 
nuclear weapons program, the JCPOA is destined to similarly fail with 
regard to Iran. I will take a moment to explain why this comparison is 
inaccurate at best and dangerously misleading at worst.
  First the 1994 framework with North Korea was just that--a brief 
framework or outline, its text just three pages long. The nuclear 
agreement with Iran, on the other hand, is nearly 160 pages--thorough, 
detailed, and comprehensive, outlining the international community's 
expectations, specifying deadlines of deliverables, and laying out in 
clear terms the consequences for violations of the deal.
  The second difference between the two is just as fundamental. The 
1994 agreed framework with North Korea did not seek to block North 
Korea's plutonium pathway to a nuclear weapon. Not only does it 
eliminate its ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium, but 
international inspectors have recently certified Iran actually did so 
by filling the core of the Arak heavy water reactor with concrete.
  The importance of including this provision in the JCPOA was made even 
clearer yesterday when James Clapper, the U.S. Director of National 
Intelligence, confirmed that North Korea has restarted its plutonium 
production reactor and may begin recovering spent plutonium fuel in a 
matter of weeks. If Iran even attempted to do the same, the 
international community would now know and would be able to take action 
long before it could achieve its objective.
  The third key difference is this. The JCPOA allows the IAEA, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, full access to monitor Iran's 
entire nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mines to mills, to centrifuge 
production workshops, to enrichment facilities. Never before--including 
back in 1994 with North Korea--has a nuclear agreement given 
international inspectors such comprehensive access to monitor and 
inspect compliance. In fact, when I recently visited the IAEA 
headquarters in Vienna, Austria, the head of the agency said the access 
they have gotten to Iran's entire range of nuclear activities goes well 
beyond the access it had in North Korea in the 1990s.
  The fourth difference is just as crucial. The JCPOA requires Iran to 
abide by the so-called Additional Protocol and other additional 
measures, which guarantee the IAEA can seek access to suspicious 
undeclared locations. This Additional Protocol, a key deterrent to 
cheating, didn't even exist in 1994. The nuclear deal with Iran 
contains defined timelines for access to suspect potential nuclear 
sites and a dispute resolution mechanism that will resolve differences 
between Iran and the international community in favor of accessing 
inspection. The 1994 agreed framework didn't include any of these 
protections.
  Fifth, the JCPOA is an agreement between Iran and the international 
community. While the United States maintains its ability to snap back 
international sanctions to punish Iran, the strength of the deal is not 
just from U.S. support but from buy-in from our P5+1 partners--the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China--and we have to 
continue to work together tirelessly on a bipartisan basis to ensure 
that those partners remain partners in enforcement of the deal.
  Sixth, the JCPOA puts incentives in the right place, halting any 
sanctions relief for Iran until after the international community 
verified it had complied with the core terms of the deal. The 1994 
framework allowed North Korea compensation and sanctions relief simply 
for signing up before the agreement was even implemented--clearly a 
fatal flaw.
  Finally, and in some ways most importantly, although Iran and North 
Korea are dangerous, radical regimes--revolutionary regimes--and they 
are both ostensibly led by Supreme Leaders, they exist in different 
regions, have different goals, and exist in different contexts. I do 
think that Iran, rightly or wrongly, seeks and needs integration with 
the world economy, and North Korea continues to be a rogue regime 
isolated from the rest of the world.
  The seven differences this Senator has just briefly outlined show the 
fundamental differences between the 1994 agreed framework with North 
Korea, which failed, and the JCPOA with Iran, which I hope and pray 
will still prove to be successful. We must focus on enforcing 
rigorously the terms of the JCPOA and pushing back on Iran's bad 
behavior in a bipartisan fashion and in the same spirit in which my 
colleagues in the Foreign Relations Committee developed this vital and 
important North Korea bill.
  One way we could do so is to pass the Iran Policy Oversight Act, a 
bill led and developed by Senator Cardin and the members of the Foreign 
Relations Committee who were both supporters and opponents of the 
JCPOA. The Iran Policy Oversight Act would clarify ambiguous provisions 
in the JCPOA, establish in statute our commitment to enforcing the 
deal, engage in comprehensive efforts to counter Iranian activities in 
the Middle East, and provide increased support to our allies in the 
region, especially our vital ally, Israel.
  I commend Senator Cardin for his leadership in drafting a bill strong 
enough to earn the cosponsorship of both supporters and opponents of 
that nuclear deal.
  Even in a dysfunctional Congress, today's debate and passage of the 
North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act shows that we can come 
together to make our country safer in the face of a dangerous world. 
Congress did the same last May when we came together to enact the Iran 
Nuclear Agreement Review Act, which gave Congress a clear and focused 
opportunity to review the terms of the JCPOA before it was finalized. 
We can and must do similar things again.
  We should work together, Republicans and Democrats, in the spirit of 
the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act and the Iran 
Nuclear Review Act to introduce, debate, and pass legislation to show 
Iran and our allies that the United States is serious about continuing 
to hold them accountable for their bad behavior and to continue to 
demonstrate our leadership in the Pacific region and our determination 
to contain North Korea's dangerous nuclear activities.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. PERDUE. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on an amendment I 
submitted to the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act. This bill we 
are considering today will provide a more robust set of tools to 
confront the nuclear threat from Pyongyang by expanding and tightening 
enforcement on North Korea.
  This bill goes beyond sanctions and calls for a more forceful 
response to North Korea's cyber attacks and human rights abuses. We now 
have an opportunity to highlight North Korea's cooperation with Iran on 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development. North Korea's 
nuclear cooperation with Iran is widely suspected, and yet the Obama 
administration has been reluctant to disclose what it knows to 
Congress.
  Last month, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear weapons test. 
Iranian officials reportedly traveled to North Korea to witness its 
three previous nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. Given this trend, 
it would not be surprising at all if Iranians were actually present in 
North Korea's test just last month. Just before North Korea's 2013 
test, a senior American official was quoted as saying ``it's very 
possible that the North Koreans are testing for two countries.''
  Yesterday, the Director of National Intelligence, Jim Clapper, 
provided written testimony to Congress, which stated that Pyongyang's 
``export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several 
countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to

[[Page S775]]

Syria's construction of a nuclear reactor . . . illustrate its 
willingness to proliferate dangerous technologies.''
  We have known that Iran and North Korea have been cooperating on 
ballistic missile technology, and it has been suspected for over a 
decade that they are also working together on nuclear weapons 
development as well as ballistic technology. In the wake of the nuclear 
agreement with Iran, Iran is starting to see a flow of funds from 
sanctions relief of potentially over $100 billion. As Iran gets this 
flow of cash, this Senator is concerned that we will see this illicit 
cooperation increase and that Iran will use some of these funds to pay 
North Korea for further testing and technology.
  This amendment No. 3294 would require a semiannual report to 
Congress; that is all. This report would cover North Korea's 
cooperation with Iran on nuclear weapon and ballistic missile testing, 
development, and research. We have been asking for this information and 
have not received it in a timely fashion.
  The administration would also be required to disclose to Congress the 
identity of individuals who have knowingly engaged in or directed 
material support for or exchanged information between the governments 
of Iran and North Korea for their nuclear programs in this semiannual 
report. In order for us to tackle this problem head-on and to take 
steps to halt this illicit cooperation, we need a full report from the 
administration. It is as simple as that. That is all this amendment 
does.
  I am glad to see this body moving so swiftly to enact punitive 
sanctions on North Korea for its recent actions, and this amendment 
will help further strengthen efforts to punish rogue regimes.
  I would also like to applaud the efforts of my colleagues on the 
Foreign Relations Committee--Senator Gardner, Chairman Corker, and 
Senator Menendez--for their work on getting this bill through committee 
and to the floor. Their leadership on this issue has been tremendous, 
and I look forward to working with them on the floor to see its 
passage.
  Thank you, and I yield back.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, while we are waiting on Senator Peters to 
be here, I wanted to go through some of the history relative to the 
North Korean program. I think sometimes there has been so much focus on 
other countries' programs--I know Senator Gardner alluded to some 
aspects of it in his comments--but North Korea's nuclear program 
actually dates back to the 1950s, when they pursued nuclear energy 
cooperation with the Soviet Union.
  In ensuing years, North Korea acquired a full nuclear fuel cycle, 
including plutonium, reprocessing, and uranium enrichment capabilities. 
So this goes back to the 1950s, but in 2003 North Korea announced its 
withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and conducted four 
nuclear weapons tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016.
  Experts believe the first two nuclear tests were plutonium based, and 
analysts assess the third nuclear test may have used highly enriched 
uranium. So they are on a two-track route. On January 6, 2016, North 
Korea announced that it successfully tested its first hydrogen bomb. We 
don't have verification of that. We don't have intelligence back that 
would verify that was the type of test that took place.
  Today North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, a longstanding plutonium 
nuclear program at Yougbyon, and a uranium enrichment capability which 
it revealed in 2010 after years of denials. Open-source estimates of 
North Korea's nuclear arsenal vary from 10 devices to nearly 100 
weapons, but most experts believe North Korea's nuclear arsenal is 
somewhere in the range of 10 to 20 devices that are made of both 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
  North Korea's weapons of mass destruction extend beyond its nuclear 
capabilities to include biological and chemical weapons programs. It 
also maintains an extensive long-range ballistic missile program which 
poses a direct threat to allies, U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific, and 
the United States.
  The Presiding Officer lives in a part of the world that is most 
directly certainly at threat. North Korea's nuclear program dates back 
to the 1970s. In 1984, North Korea conducted its first ballistic 
missile test of a Scud-B ballistic missile. North Korea's ballistic 
missile arsenal includes shorter range Scud missiles that can travel 
nearly 300 miles, No Dong missiles that can travel upward of 800 miles, 
and several longer range missiles that can travel from 4,000 upward to 
6,000 miles.
  In April 2012, North Korea displayed at a military parade a new long-
range missile variant known as KN-08. The missile was displayed on a 
Chinese-made transporter erector launcher. In the fall of 2015, North 
Korea again displayed, at a military parade, the same missile on a 
Chinese TEL. In December 2012, North Korea successfully launched the 
Unha-3 launch vehicle, placed a satellite into orbit, representing a 
significant advancement in North Korea's missile technology 
capabilities.
  On February 7, 2016, North Korea announced it had successfully 
launched another satellite into orbit using the Unha-3 launch vehicle. 
Although the KN-08 missile has not been tested, it is believed that the 
space launch vehicle technology has some similar technological features 
of an ICBM. The head of the U.S. Northern Command, ADM William Gortney, 
has stated our government assesses that North Korea could miniaturize a 
nuclear weapon and place it on the KN-08, which would reach the U.S. 
homeland. Pretty amazing, really, to think about the progress that has 
occurred without any real actions taking place.
  Again, this has gone through multiple administrations. North Korea 
stands as one of the most foremost proliferators of WMD-related 
materials and ballistic missile technologies. North Korea has engaged 
in WMD-related and missile cooperation with several states, including 
Iran, Pakistan, and Libya.
  North Korea also assisted Syria in the construction of a plutonium-
based nuclear reactor at al-Kibar, until Israel destroyed that facility 
in 2007. In addition, it has been reported that North Korea assisted 
both Iran and Pakistan with nuclear weapons design activities. Again, I 
think it is very timely that we are taking this up--actually beyond 
time--with the most recent activities that have taken place. This is 
timely.
  Obviously, the policy--again, through multiple administrations, 
multiple Congresses--has really been left untouched in a significant 
way. I truly do believe the legislation that hopefully will pass this 
body today with overwhelming support will be the beginning of a 
process. We just have seen, by the way, with it being known that the 
U.S. House and Senate were probably going to pass a very strong piece 
of legislation--we are now seeing other countries in the region 
stepping up.
  Again, it speaks to the power of us speaking in one voice and again 
pushing, as we did on Iran years ago, pushing the international 
community to join in with us. Again, as I said earlier, I am still 
disappointed that the U.N. Security Council cannot function--cannot 
function--in a way to speak more collectively in that way, but I am 
glad to see that countries in the region, as a result of certainly the 
stances being taken here and as a result of their own concerns about 
what is happening with North Korea--I am glad to see it looks as though 
we are beginning to push toward more international efforts against 
North Korea.
  With that, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, one of the things that I think we have to 
continue to reiterate during today's debate is that this debate is not 
about the people of North Korea. It is about the dictator of the 
regime, the forgotten maniac, Kim Jung Un, and his

[[Page S776]]

reign of terror in North Korea, not only with the 200,000 people who 
are subject to imprisonment in political camps--200,000 men, women, and 
children who have been tortured and maimed--but it is about his 
leadership that seems to go along with him, a leadership that would aid 
and abet in the torture and maiming of innocent people.
  I think perhaps this chart, this picture, this satellite image of the 
Korean Peninsula, best illustrates what the people of North Korea are 
subjected to each and every day. You can see North Korea right here, a 
big vast, empty space at night, very little light, maybe Pyongyang, the 
brightest light point compared to Seoul, compared to South Korea, 
compared to their neighbors in the south, their family members in the 
south because they have been deprived of an economy, because they have 
been deprived of an opportunity, and because the people of North Korea 
have been deprived of the freedoms their South Korean neighbors have 
enjoyed.
  Standing on the DMZ--and I know the Presiding Officer has been there 
as well--standing on the DMZ, you can see the differences between the 
development of North Korea and South Korean. In just a few moments--I 
notice my colleague from Michigan is here and is scheduled to speak. In 
just a few minutes I will go into this chart a little bit more about 
how this bill not only creates mandatory sanctions but also will give 
us tolls to help the people of North Korea.
  With that, I will yield the floor to my colleague Senator Peters from 
Michigan, whom I have had great opportunities to work with before on 
legislation from telecommunications to cars that communicate with each 
other. I am grateful he is here to speak on this bill as well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rounds). The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. PETERS. Mr. President, I rise in support of legislation currently 
before the Senate to crack down on the North Korean regime's repeated 
nuclear provocations. I would certainly like to thank my colleague 
Senator Gardner for his leadership on this issue as well.
  Four days ago, on February 6, the world watched North Korea launch a 
rocket into space, in what was clearly an effort to test its advanced 
ballistic missile technology. The North Korean satellite is now 
tumbling in orbit and incapable of functioning in any useful way. Last 
month, the regime announced it had successfully detonated a nuclear 
device as part of its rogue nuclear program, the fourth test we have 
detected in North Korea since 2006.
  This combination of incompetence, aggression, and defiance of the 
international community is dangerous and simply cannot stand.
  Just yesterday, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, 
testified it is likely North Korea has restarted the plutonium reactor 
that has been shuttered since 2007 and could begin to recover fissile 
material within weeks.
  These defiant acts fly in the face of existing international 
sanctions and must be met with a strong and unified response from the 
world community. It is a step in the right direction that the U.N. 
Security Council has strongly condemned North Korea's actions and vowed 
to adopt significant new punitive measures against the regime.
  However, the dangerous path North Korea continues down poses a direct 
threat to the United States and our allies, particularly South Korea 
and Japan. We must go further and take action to punish the North 
Korean regime and those who aid and abet in its provocative actions.
  The legislation before us today would significantly enhance our 
ability to curb the North Korean nuclear program. The bill requires the 
President to sanction anyone who knowingly supports the North Korean 
regime, whether by furnishing materials for North Korean weapons 
programs or by selling luxury goods to corrupt government officials 
while so many North Koreans live in poverty.
  The bill also provides exemptions for humanitarian organizations that 
work to relieve the suffering of millions of North Koreans. We must 
continue to let the people under the rule of this brutal regime know 
that we stand with them in their democratic aspirations, even as their 
government continues to threaten the international community. I commend 
the efforts of the Foreign Relations Committee and particularly 
Senators Menendez and Gardner for their work on this important 
legislation.
  The United States has long led the world in working to curb the 
threat of nuclear proliferation. We lead through sustained commitments 
to securing fissile material, such as spearheading the effort to secure 
loose nukes after the fall of the Soviet Union. We lead through 
precedence set in the bilateral 123 agreements, agreeing to share 
civilian nuclear technology so partner countries can diversify their 
energy mix while explicitly preventing them from enriching uranium on 
their own soil.
  In the years to come, our leadership is necessary to raise this 
global standard even higher for every country regarding the enrichment 
of uranium. We do not aim to deny peaceful nuclear energy to nations 
that seek it, but we must make clear that there is no universal right 
to enrichment. The United States has moral authority on this issue 
because we have led by example, committing to reductions in our own 
nuclear arsenal in the interest of a safer world. We must continue to 
work with unity of purpose and act to stem the spread of nuclear 
materials to rogue states and terrorist organizations.
  Nowhere is American leadership more necessary than in the case of the 
Iranian nuclear program. I was proud to cosponsor the initial effort to 
pass sanctions against Iran in 2009 and help pass additional sanctions 
in the years since. I firmly believe crippling sanctions are what 
brought Iran to the negotiating table and the threat of additional 
sanctions enhanced our bargaining position during the painstaking 
negotiations that led to the JCPOA. Our work to unite world powers 
behind this effort led to an agreement that curbs Iran's nuclear 
program in the short term, but in the longer term we need to stand 
ready to act swiftly and decisively against any Iranian violations of 
the JCPOA, large or small.
  The JCPOA is not the end of our multilateral efforts against Iran and 
its illicit behavior, just as the legislation before us today is not 
the end of our multilateral efforts against the North Korean regime and 
its repeated affronts to international security. We will continue to 
punish regimes that support terrorism, violate human rights, and 
illegally seek nuclear weapons. Surely our response to the North Korean 
provocations will be watched closely by the Iranian regime, which is 
why we must respond swiftly and why we must respond strongly.
  The sanctions bill before us today is not a Democratic issue, it is 
not a Republican issue. The goal of preventing nuclear proliferation 
has been a uniting principle of the American foreign policy for 
decades, and it must continue to be so. We must come together today to 
pass this bill quickly and without opposition to demonstrate in no 
uncertain terms our unity of purpose in preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The assistant majority leader.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Colorado, Mr. 
Gardner, for his leadership on this issue--together with the chairman 
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Senator Corker--for bringing us to 
this moment. This is a rare bipartisan moment, where the Senate has 
come together and agreed to debate, vote, and pass an important bill 
that imposes sanctions on one of the most dangerous regimes in the 
world.
  Recently, I was in Hawaii at the Pacific Command and we asked Admiral 
Harris, a four-star U.S. Navy admiral who heads Pacific Command, to 
rank the areas of the world that he was most concerned about, the 
regimes that he thought represented the biggest danger to peace. He 
listed North Korea as No. 1.
  That may be because of the proximity of his area of responsibility to 
North Korea, but there is no question an unstable leader with nuclear 
weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles is a threat not only to 
the region but to the United States as well.
  We know over the weekend North Korea successfully launched a long-
range rocket and put a satellite into orbit. This was done in defiance 
of sanctions and represents a dangerous

[[Page S777]]

trend of an increasingly hostile and unstable North Korea. It was 
particularly alarming for several reasons.
  First, the same technology that put that satellite in orbit can be 
used to deliver a nuclear weapon. Long-range ballistic missiles have 
the potential to hit the U.S. homeland. That is why North Korea has 
been considered a serious threat to our country, not just the region 
but our country as well. The timing of this launch was also very 
concerning because just last month North Korea claimed it had tested 
the components of a hydrogen bomb, a thermonuclear weapon that is more 
powerful than an atomic bomb--which we knew they had, but this 
represented an escalation, if it is true.
  The idea that North Korea could soon develop advanced nuclear 
weapons, along with intercontinental ballistic missiles, and deliver 
them to our shores is a frightening proposition. Unfortunately, every 
day we grow closer to that reality.
  I will just pause for a minute to say this is another reason why our 
missile defense systems are so important, not just to the safety of our 
friends and allies but also increasingly to the United States. I know 
in Colorado a lot of those efforts are headed up to provide that 
effective deterrent and missile defense system to the threat of the 
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
  I have to be honest with you and say I am puzzled why the President 
hasn't done more on this issue to date, but while the President sits on 
the sidelines--I think somebody called it strategic patience--it has 
been a failure, not just patience. Patience I think of as a virtue but 
certainly not in this context.
  Nevertheless, the Senate will do its part to make sure the regime in 
North Korea feels some consequences for its belligerent, illegal 
actions. Today we will vote on the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 
Enhancement Act. This bill mandates new sanctions on North Korea's 
nuclear and ballistic missile program, and, importantly, it will 
provide an overall strategy to help address North Korea's human rights 
abuses and combat its cyber activities. I don't think most people 
realize that in addition to its belligerence and its violating 
international norms, North Korea is a serial human rights abuser. 
Literally, because of its focus on its finances on military arms and 
its standing army, North Korea has seen many, many, many of its people 
starve to death for lack of an adequate food supply. So this is a rogue 
regime, it is a dangerous regime, and one we need to make sure feels 
the consequences of its actions.
  This bill will help hold North Korea accountable, which is more than 
we have seen from the administration. I want to point out that North 
Korea's provocative actions are just another symptom of the Obama 
doctrine gone wrong. I mentioned strategic patience, which is hardly a 
strategy for keeping the world safe.
  Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident. Through his words 
and deeds, the President continues to discredit and undercut American 
leadership around the world. As a result, the world is even more 
unstable and conflict-ridden than when he assumed office. It is 
absolutely the fact that in the absence of American leadership, 
tyrants, thugs, and bullies feel emboldened, and our friends and allies 
question our loyalty and whether they can rely on us or whether they 
have to go it alone and build the capacity to defend themselves in the 
absence of a strong America.
  Many recall that when he ran for office, the President heavily 
criticized the foreign policy choices of his predecessor, particularly 
the surge in Iraq. I happened to be in the Senate during that time. I 
remember those debates. The Democratic leader, Senator Reid, said the 
surge would never work, and many were skeptical because frankly it 
represented a bold dramatic move.
  Well, not only did President Obama's decision to hastily withdraw in 
Iraq after the successful surge--not only did his decision to hastily 
withdraw from Iraq squander the hard-won progress achieved by the 
surge, that country is now one of a number of countries in the Middle 
East in shambles. We are seeing our friends and our allies--together 
with American advisers on the ground, special operations forces in a 
train-and-assist mission--trying to regain control of cities such as 
Ramadi that were won as a result of the blood and the treasure of the 
United States.
  Let's look at a few things where they stand today. Over the past 2 
years, ISIS has captured city after city where American troops shed 
that blood, sweat, and tears to bring relative peace. The border that 
used to exist between Syria and Iraq is gone. It has literally been 
erased. In spite of President Obama's misguided nuclear deal with Iran, 
Iranian influence in Iraq has grown, not waned. I do find it 
interesting that speaker after speaker--even though we are talking 
about North Korea--is trying to come to the floor and speak about Iran 
after having allowed the President's ill-advised nuclear deal to go 
through, which guarantees a pathway for Iran to acquire nuclear 
weapons.
  As a result of the administration's paralysis, Syria, too, has 
plunged deeper and deeper into chaos. Now we not only have a security 
problem on our hands, we have millions of Syrian and Iraqi refugees 
internally displaced or flooding across international borders into 
places such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Europe. I have visited some 
of those refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan. These people are doing 
what we all would do. They are fleeing for their survival because 
frankly, once the President drew that red line in Syria, when it came 
to the use of illegal weapons, the President never did anything to 
enforce it or make sure that Bashar al-Assad felt or suffered any 
consequences. So the President's inaction, time after time, place after 
place, has real consequences. The vacuum left as a result of the U.S. 
retreat in the Middle East has provided an open door for other 
countries to expand their influence there, as we have seen and as we 
continue to see on a daily basis.
  Russia is the prime example. It continues to extend its influence 
through indiscriminate bombing campaigns that yield little regard for 
civilian lives. The Russian bombing campaign doesn't distinguish 
between combatants and civilians. Russian forces are even actively 
fighting against American-backed groups and working to undermine them 
at every turn.
  Of course this doesn't even touch on Russia's aggressive actions 
along its own border with respect to Ukraine in NATO's 
backyard. Unfortunately, Russia has no reason to believe that the 
United States, under the current leadership of the Commander in Chief, 
will challenge it anywhere--not in the Middle East, not in Europe.

  I could go on and on about other countries that are feeling 
emboldened, like a belligerent China in the South China Sea, or, as I 
mentioned a moment ago, a newly financed and emboldened Iran, the No. 1 
state sponsor of international terrorism. When the administration 
basically wrote a check for $50 billion to Iran, that Secretary Kerry, 
Vice President Biden, and others acknowledged could be used to finance 
international terrorism, it seemed to have no impact whatsoever because 
they were so determined to cut this bad deal with Iran.
  The point is that our retreat and our lack of leadership around the 
world only underscore the President's lack of a larger foreign policy 
strategy. We have asked him time and again: Please tell us what your 
strategy is. The President sends over a proposed authorization for the 
use of military force against ISIS, and we find out the real reason he 
did that is not because he thinks he lacks authority to do what he is 
doing now but because they want to tie the hands of future Presidents 
in terms of what that President could do under that authorization for 
the use of military force. But we keep asking, and all we hear is 
crickets--silence. We keep asking for a serious, comprehensive strategy 
to guide the foreign policy and national security efforts of the United 
States, and the President simply doesn't feel like it is his obligation 
to deliver one, opting instead for tactics that are guaranteed not to 
win, saying: Well, we bombed ISIS.
  Well, that is all well and fine. But at some point, once you bomb 
ISIS, unless you have somebody who can occupy that territory, the 
terrorists are going to come right back in. We have friends and allies, 
such as the Kurds and other countries in the Middle East that have 
said: Well, we will help be the boots on the ground if you will help 
supply us,

[[Page S778]]

to which they are not provided any sort of answer.
  I believe the American people do deserve better, and the men and 
women in uniform who have put their lives on the line deserve better. 
They deserve a strategy. They deserve the support to be able to 
accomplish the mission their country has asked them to accomplish.
  So I am glad that in the absence of leadership from the White House, 
the Congress has decided to take up some of the slack here to fill the 
gap left by the President's inattention to this important issue. If the 
President won't step up to the plate and take these threats seriously 
enough to come up with a strategy to actually defeat them, the American 
people can trust the Senate to address it, and we will do so today on a 
bipartisan basis, insofar as it applies to the threat in North Korea.
  So it is my hope that we will send a strong bipartisan message to 
North Korea that their repeated provocations will not go unanswered.


             Mental Health and Our Criminal Justice System

  Mr. President, I just came from a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, 
which was one of the most unusual hearings I have attended since the 
time I have been in the Senate--certainly on the Judiciary Committee. 
Usually on the Judiciary Committee the habit is for the majority to 
select witnesses and then the minority gets to select witnesses, and 
then witnesses come out and are proxy fighters for the particular 
policy differences that members of the committee have--not today. 
Today, thanks to Chairman Grassley, the senior Senator from Iowa, the 
Judiciary Committee had a consensus panel on the subject of mental 
health and its intersection with our criminal justice system.
  What we heard was that, increasingly, our jails and our prisons, our 
criminal justice system, and the homeless that we see on our streets 
are a product of a failed policy--one that said: Yes, we need to move 
people out of institutions and out of hospitals. But, of course, there 
is the promise--or at least it was the hope--that they would have 
somewhere else to go to get treatment and housing and the like.
  Today what we heard reaffirmed from the sheriff of Bexar County, TX--
San Antonio, my hometown--and from so many of the other witnesses from 
across the country is that now our jails, our prisons, and the criminal 
justice systems have become de facto warehouses for the mentally ill, 
completely ill-suited to deal with what they need, which is treatment, 
supervision, and help--and the families, too, who need additional tools 
available for them to turn to when they need help with a loved one who 
has become mentally ill.
  So I have introduced legislation that we talked about during the 
hearing today called the Mental Health and Safe Communities Act, 
modeled off of successful experiments and programs in places like North 
Carolina, which we heard from before, San Antonio, Virginia, and 
elsewhere. I am sure there are a number of good stories.
  This is the way I think Congress ought to legislate, rather than to 
dream up here behind closed doors some grand scheme--the masters of the 
universe trying to decide what is good for all 320 million of us in a 
one-size-fits-all approach. We have seen the disastrous consequences of 
that sort of thinking. Rather than that, let's look at what has 
actually proven to work in our cities, counties, and our States, and 
then scale that up, where appropriate, to apply more broadly after we 
have proven that it actually works. That is what my legislation, the 
Mental Health and Safe Communities Act, is designed to do.
  As we will look--I believe tomorrow--in the Judiciary Committee at 
the opioid and heroin crisis that is being experienced in so many parts 
of our country and as we look, as we have, at reforming our prison 
systems to provide more incentives for people who are low-risk and mid-
level offenders, if they will accept the opportunity to help themselves 
to deal with their underlying drug or alcohol problem, to learn a 
skill, to get a GED, to better prepare for life on the outside based on 
the experiences in Texas and elsewhere, we can actually lower crime 
rates, lower recidivism rates, and save taxpayers a lot of money.
  So whether it is dealing with the mental health issue and its 
intersection with the criminal justice system or dealing with our 
prison system, which used to believe that rehabilitation was an 
important part of what their obligation was, or dealing with this 
opioid and heroin abuse, we have a lot to do to make sure that our 
criminal justice system is brought into the 21st century and that we no 
longer punish people who mainly need help.
  As somebody who is a recovering member of the Texas judiciary for 13 
years, I certainly believe there are some people whom you can't help 
and whom you must punish. But there is a large segment of people--
whether it is drug or alcohol related, or whether it is mental health 
issues--who will accept our help and will turn their lives around if 
given that opportunity.
  I just wanted to say a few words about that because I feel so 
strongly about the importance of what we talked about at that hearing.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Texas for the work 
he is doing on the Judiciary Committee. I hope we can continue in that 
bipartisan spirit to deal with addiction and, I hope, improvements in 
our criminal justice system, providing resources to people who have 
addiction needs. I know there is a strong bipartisan effort to deal 
with community mental health so we can get services in our community. 
This is not a partisan issue. I am glad to see that the work by the 
Judiciary Committee is productive in trying to lead to those 
conclusions.
  I do want to, though, comment a little bit on what was said in 
regards to the Obama administration. We are here together with a bill 
on North Korea that is not partisan at all. Democrats and Republicans 
are working together. There is no division between Congress and the 
White House. We all believe we have to isolate North Korea and its 
conduct. The administration has been very strong in actions in the 
United Nations, keeping us closely informed, and we very much want to 
work with a strong, united voice. That is how we keep our country the 
strongest, and that is what we should do on national security. So let 
me just try to fill in the record a little bit from the previous 
comments made about the Obama administration.
  Let us remember that the Obama administration took over after, I 
would say, a failed policy in the Middle East in which we went into 
Afghanistan--as we should have because of the attack on our country. 
But before completing Afghanistan, the previous administration went 
into Iraq, using our military first rather than looking for a solution 
that would provide the type of stability in that region to prevent the 
spread of radicalization. Instead, governments were formed that didn't 
represent all of the communities, and we saw splinter groups formed and 
the recruitment for extreme elements.
  President Obama was able to develop international coalitions to work 
together. I think America is always best when we lead and we can be 
joined by the international community. The President also understood 
that it shouldn't be up to America's military to solve all of the 
problems, that there is not a military solution to the spread of 
radicalization, that internal support in the countries must come from 
the countries themselves, that we do not want to be seen as a 
conquering power, and that it is for the region to defend itself. Yes, 
we will help, but we are not going to put our ground troops in a 
situation where they are used as a recruitment for radical forces. We 
also understand that America leads best when we can get our ideals of 
good governance with governments that represent all the communities so 
there is no void. President Obama and his administration have been very 
strong in those areas.
  With regard to dealing with ISIL, the radical forces that exist 
today, a policy is well understood: Cut off their support. Cut off 
their support in regards to recruitment by having representative 
governments. Cut off their support by dealing with their oil supplies 
and their looting and extortion. Cut off their support by taking back 
territory in a way that we can control that territory. That is what we 
have seen happening, certainly in the last several months, as territory 
that was formally

[[Page S779]]

held by ISIL is now being held by the Government of Iraq, particularly, 
but also Syria.
  So I just wanted to correct on this day when we are bringing up the 
North Korea bill, that every President since the Korean War has had 
challenges in dealing with the problems in North Korea and that we are 
together on this issue as a Congress and as a Nation to isolate North 
Korea. It is not just their nuclear weapon program. As I pointed out 
earlier, it is their cyber attacks, their human rights violations, and 
all those issues to which we are speaking with a very strong voice 
today. I hope that as Democrats and Republicans, the House and Senate, 
the President and Congress speak with a strong, unified voice, 
America's national security interests will be better served.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, throughout this debate we continue to 
remind the people around America that this North Korea Sanctions and 
Policy Enhancement Act is not intended to bow to the people of North 
Korea. Rather, our efforts are to try to help ensure that we are doing 
everything we can to help stand up for the people of North Korea, to 
give them the kinds of economic opportunities and freedoms from which 
they have been deprived by this regime under Kim Jong Un.
  Today's sanctions act and the mandatory sanctions that will be levied 
here today by this act, if adopted and signed by the President--which I 
believe it will be with the overwhelming bipartisan support that it 
has--are about the Kim Jong Un regime itself. This is about a forgotten 
maniac in North Korea who has deprived his people of economic 
opportunity, who has imprisoned 200,000 men, women, and children, who 
has tortured his people, and who has assassinated members of his own 
inner circle and leadership. Today in the morning papers, an article 
outlined the death of his chief of staff of the army--again, the 
continued purge of top-level officials under the Kim Jong Un regime.
  You can see the situation the people of North Korea are facing each 
and every day. This is a satellite image of the Korean Peninsula at 
nighttime. You can see the developments in South Korea, and you can see 
Seoul, Korea. There are millions of people who live right across the 
DMZ. And you can see the conditions the people of North Korea are 
suffering under--an economy that has failed, an economy that has failed 
to develop to give them the same kinds of opportunities other people in 
the Korean Peninsula are sharing.
  This bill also promotes human rights. I want to point out section 
301. This section requires the President to study the feasibility of 
bringing unmonitored and inexpensive cellular and Internet 
communications to the people of North Korea and trying to break through 
the emptiness of North Korea--the communication barriers, the 
firewalls--to try to get around the North Korean regime that doesn't 
want the people of North Korea to understand they can live better 
lives.
  Section 302 directs the Secretary of State to develop a comprehensive 
strategy to promote human rights in North Korea and combat its forced 
labor practices, including a diplomatic outreach plan and a public 
diplomacy awareness campaign, what we can do together to try to bring 
awareness to North Koreans. Let them know that if they have family 
members in South Korea--what kind of opportunities people in South 
Korea are sharing.
  It wasn't that long ago--a few decades ago--that North Korea had a 
more vibrant economy than South Korea, but that is certainly not the 
case today. If you stand on this line, if you stand on the DMZ and you 
look north into North Korea, you see the hillsides that have been 
completely deforested and all of the vegetation removed because people 
lacked food in North Korea, so they cut down the trees and created wood 
soup so they would have something to fill their stomachs because the 
North Korean regime of Kim Jong Un failed do so. You look at the south, 
and you can see the hills, vegetation, development, prosperity. We can 
help bring peace to the peninsula with the passage of this act today.
  I know my colleague from New Jersey, Senator Menendez, is coming to 
the floor today. He has been a great leader when it comes to North 
Korea, a great leader when it comes to the issue of human rights, and 
he has worked with me on this legislation. I worked with him to make 
sure we created a bipartisan solution to this great challenge that is 
North Korea today. I commend Senator Menendez for the work and the 
opportunity to present the bipartisan solution before the Senate today.
  I yield back and will listen to the words of Senator Menendez.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, let me first start off by thanking the 
leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Chairman Corker 
and Ranking Member Cardin, for creating the environment to have strong 
bipartisan legislation on a critical issue that affects the national 
interests and security of the United States and beyond that, in 
general, creating a strong bipartisan environment that I think is 
critical to U.S. foreign policy. It is a tone I tried to set when I had 
the privilege of being the chairman and Senator Corker was the ranking 
member, and I appreciate his leadership in continuing in the same 
spirit, and, of course, Senator Cardin, who worked very hard on 
maintaining that environment. I appreciate that they created the 
wherewithal to bring us here today.
  I also thank Senator Gardner, the East Asia Subcommittee chairman, 
for working with me to bring legislation in which we can come together 
in a strong bipartisan voice because when the Nation speaks with one 
voice, it speaks most powerfully to both friends and foes across the 
world. It has been a privilege to work with Senator Gardner and to see 
his vision of how we deal with this and merge my vision of how we deal 
with it, and together I think we have come up with the most 
comprehensive strategic effort to deal with North Korea. I want to 
salute him, and I thank him for working with me.
  Given the North Korean regime's recent test of what most agree is a 
ballistic missile--what U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon 
characterized as ``deeply deplorable'' and in violation of Security 
Council resolutions--one thing is abundantly clear when you look at 
this photograph: It is time to take North Korea seriously.
  For too many years, the standard response of Republican and 
Democratic administrations alike whenever North Korea stages a 
provocation has been to dismiss the seriousness of the threat. We tend 
to see it as a strange regime seemingly disconnected from geopolitical 
reality, something of a parallel universe that doesn't function in the 
same way as the rest of the international community, a strange regime 
run by crazy leaders and certain to collapse any day, that there is no 
need to worry, it will not and it can't survive.
  Well, four nuclear tests, three Kims, two violations of U.N. Security 
Council resolutions, and one attempt by North Korea to transfer nuclear 
technology to Syria later, it is clearly time for the United States to 
start taking the North Korea challenge seriously.
  In fact, today it is estimated that North Korea has accumulated 
enough fissile material for more than a dozen nuclear weapons. It has 
now conducted four nuclear explosive tests, as you can see from this 
chart, starting in October of 2006, and with it, the quake magnitude 
has risen with virtually every test. It has developed a modern gas 
centrifuge uranium enrichment program to go along with its plutonium 
stockpile. It has tested ballistic missiles. It is seeking to develop 
the capability to match a nuclear warhead to an intercontinental 
ballistic missile.
  Kim Jong Un has consolidated his grip on power, and he seems 
determined to proceed on a course of ``byungjin,'' Kim Jong Un's policy 
that strengthens both his military and his economy as opposed to 
strengthening one or the other.
  Taken together, these developments present a growing danger that 
could set North Korea on a path to becoming a small nuclear power. It 
is a scenario which could lead other nations in the region to 
reconsider their own commitments to nonproliferation, and it could 
embolden North Korea in its relations with other bad actors such as 
Syria and Iran.

[[Page S780]]

  I know it has been referenced, but I think it is worthy that when the 
Director of National Intelligence--the person in charge of amassing all 
of our intelligence as a country--James Clapper, in testimony before 
the Armed Services Committee, says the following, it is worth 
repeating:

       North Korea's export of ballistic missiles and associated 
     materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and 
     its assistance to Syria's construction of a nuclear reactor, 
     destroyed in 2007, illustrates its willingness to proliferate 
     dangerous technologies.

  Director Clapper went on to say that following North Korea's third 
nuclear test, Pyongyang said it would ``refurbish and restart'' its 
nuclear facilities, to include the uranium enrichment facility at 
Yongbyon--shut down in 2007--and that it has followed through by 
expanding its Yongbyon enrichment facility and restarting the plutonium 
production reactor which has been online long enough to begin 
recovering plutonium from spent fuels within weeks or maybe months.
  He told the committee:

       Pyongyang is also committed to developing a long-range, 
     nuclear-armed missile that is capable of posing a direct 
     threat to the United States; it has publicly displayed its 
     KN08 road-mobile ICBM on multiple occasions. We assess that 
     North Korea has already taken initial steps toward fielding 
     this system.

  Finally, according to the Director of National Intelligence:

       North Korea probably remains capable and willing to launch 
     disruptive or destructive cyberattacks to support its 
     political objectives.

  Although it hasn't received the attention it deserved during today's 
debate, the Gardner-Menendez substitute addresses the cyber security 
threat with robust sanctions against those who control North Korea's 
cyber warfare apparatus. The adoption of the Gardner-Menendez 
legislation creates a new policy framework that combines effective 
sanctions and effective military countermeasures that can stop North 
Korea's nuclear ambitions, address cyber security issues, and bring 
some sanity back to the political calculus--a new policy framework that 
leaves no doubt about our determination to neutralize any threat North 
Korea may present, with robust, realistic diplomacy toward the clear 
goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.
  This bipartisan bill, approved unanimously by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in January, expands and tightens enforcement of 
sanctions from North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile development 
and other destructive activities of the Kim regime. It requires the 
President to investigate sanctionable conduct, including proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, arms-related materials, luxury goods, 
human rights abuses, activities undermining cyber security, and the 
provision of industrial materials, such as precious metals or coal, for 
use in a tailored set of activities, including weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation activities or for use in prison and labor 
camps.
  Under our substitute, the President is mandated to sanction any 
person found to have materially contributed to, engaged in, or 
facilitated any of those above activities. Penalties would include the 
seizure of assets, visa bans, and denial of government contracts.
  To provide some flexibility, we have ensured that this and future 
administrations retain the discretionary authority to sanction any 
entity or person transferring or facilitating the transfer of financial 
assets and property of the North Korean regime.
  The bill also requires the Secretary of the Treasury to determine 
whether North Korea is a primary money laundering concern, and if such 
a determination is made, assets may be blocked and special measures 
applied against those involved.
  From a strategic perspective, the bill would promote a strategy to 
improve implementation and enforcement of multilateral sanctions, a 
strategy to combat North Korean cyber activities, and a strategy to 
promote and encourage international engagement on North Korean human 
rights-related issues. There are reporting requirements relating to 
these strategies as well as a report on political prison camps and a 
feasibility study on providing communications equipment to the people 
of North Korea so we can permeate the opportunity for information to 
flow to the people of North Korea.
  Last but not least, under the Gardner-Menendez substitute, the State 
Department is required to expand the scope and frequency of travel 
warnings for North Korea.
  That is what we think about most of the time when we think about 
North Korea, but there is another dimension beyond nuclear challenges, 
missile challenges, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
that is the concern that there remain serious, unanswered questions 
about human rights and the lot of the North Korean people. We need only 
read headlines like the ones on this chart: ``Life in a North Korean 
Labor Camp: `No Thinking . . . Just Fear' ''; ``Kim's former bodyguard 
tells of beatings, starvation in North Korean prison camp''; ``North 
Korean prison camp is one of the most evil places on earth--home to 
20,000.''
  Under the rule of Kim Jong Un, North Korea is one of the most harshly 
repressive countries in the world. All basic freedoms have been 
severely restricted under the Kim family's political dynasty. A 2014 
U.N. Commission of Inquiry found that abuses in North Korea were 
without parallel in any other country. Extermination, murder, 
enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions, and 
unspeakable sexual violence are part of the ongoing story of this 
bizarre regime.
  We know that North Korea operates a series of secretive prison camps 
where opponents of the government are sent and are tortured and abused, 
starved on insufficient rations, and forced into hard labor. Collective 
punishment is used to silence dissent and instill fear in the North 
Korean people that they could be next. The country has no independent 
media. It has no functioning civil society, and there is, of course, 
not even a hint of religious freedom except for the bizarre worship of 
the line from which Kim Jong Un hails. That is the reality, making it 
abundantly clear that, though security concerns may be our most 
important priority on the Peninsula, they are not and should not be our 
only priority.

  The legislation we are proposing creates for the first time the basis 
in law to designate and sanction North Korea for its human rights 
violations. Such sanctions would elevate human rights and the 
fundamental issue of human dignity to be as important as nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missiles.
  At the end of the day, there is no basis for successfully dealing 
with the North, absent a solid foundation for a policy that is rooted 
in the U.S.-South Korea alliance. In President Park we have an 
important partner. I have visited South Korea and met with President 
Park. He is someone we can easily consult with and work closely with to 
chart out a future course in dealing with North Korea. Our partnership 
with Japan presents new opportunities for building a more effective 
approach to dealing with Pyongyang.
  Whatever one's views on the various U.S. policy efforts of the past 2 
decades--what has worked, what has not worked, and why--there can be 
little question that these efforts have failed to end North Korea's 
nuclear ambitions or end its missile programs. They have failed to 
reduce the threat posed by North Korea to our allies, failed to 
alleviate the suffering of North Korea's people, and failed to lead to 
greater security in the region.
  Let me be clear. I have no illusions that there are easy answers when 
it comes to dealing with a regime like North Korea. With the passage of 
this legislation, we have acted in concert not only in a bipartisan 
effort but with our values, and we will have established a policy for 
dealing with an unpredictable, rogue regime equal to the challenge. I 
urge this body to have a unanimous vote. It is not enough to condemn 
North Korea's provocation, which is, by all accounts, a violation of 
U.N. Security Council resolutions and international will. It is not 
enough to convene the United Nations Security Council for another round 
of hollow rhetoric that does nothing to the Kim regime but signal a 
lack of international commitment to enforcing international will. It is 
not enough to do what we have always done and minimize the obvious 
threat from a rogue state living in its own false reality.
  As the coauthor of the sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating 
table, I know that the sanctions regime we are structuring here can 
have a real effect.

[[Page S781]]

Those who want to deal with North Korea and North Korea's pursuit of 
missile technology and nuclear weapons will see a consequence to them 
far beyond North Korea. With this bipartisan legislation, we have 
before us a series of meaningful steps that speak the only language 
North Korea's regime can understand: aggressive, material consequences 
for aggressive, reckless provocations.
  This legislation is the most comprehensive strategy to deal with the 
challenge that North Korea presents. The launch over the weekend and 
recent nuclear tests makes it clear that when I introduced this bill 
last year, it was timely then. We didn't get to act on it then, but we 
can do so now.
  I urge the Senate, and I urge my colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle, to unanimously pass the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 
Enhancement Act. I urge my colleagues in the other Chamber to concur, 
and I look forward to the President quickly signing this legislation 
into law.
  If the international community is serious about meeting the threat 
that North Korea poses, we should see measures like this act adopted by 
the United Nations and implemented by all of its member states. The 
international community should stand together with a single voice and 
one clear message: Any provocation will be met with consequences that 
will shake the Kim regime to its foundation. That is the opportunity we 
have to set the course here today in the Senate. I think one of the 
most powerful moments is when the Senate acts in a strong, bipartisan 
fashion that sends a message that will create a ripple effect not only 
here but across the world.
  I look forward to what I hope will be an incredibly robust, if not 
unanimous, vote on this legislation.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. LEE. Mr. President, I thank Senator Gardner and Chairman Corker 
for their leadership and tireless efforts within the Foreign Relations 
Committee in dealing with the national security challenges posed by 
North Korea.
  As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I periodically 
receive intelligence briefings on North Korea's military capacity and 
the political will of North Korea's leaders to threaten the United 
States and our interests abroad. Based on these briefings and the 
extensive intelligence in forming them, I believe we need to embrace an 
``all of the above'' approach to confront North Korea's continued 
development of ballistic missile, nuclear, and cyber technologies. 
These threats have become too serious to ignore and far too complex to 
confront with anything short of a coordinated strategy that is prepared 
to employ the full force of the United States Government, including all 
of our diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and military resources.
  As Americans, it can be easy for us to forget just how lucky we are 
to live in a free and open society. Most of us, myself included, simply 
have no idea of what it is like to live under a totalitarian regime 
like the one that has kept North Koreans in a state of impoverished 
servitude, cut off from the rest of the world for generations. But 
every so often the mask slips, and there is an event that gives the 
world a clue about what can happen when a nation-state operates and 
thrives behind a veil of mystery and secrecy. For me, and many of my 
fellow Utahans, one of these clues came nearly 12 years ago when a 
young man from Utah suddenly went missing in southern China.
  In August 2004, David Louis Sneddon disappeared while hiking in the 
Yunnan Province of China. He was 24 years old at the time and a student 
at Brigham Young University in Provo, UT. Having spent his summer 
studying Mandarin in Beijing, David wrote to his family about his plans 
to hike the scenic Tiger Leaping Gorge along the Jinsha River in 
southern China. That was the last time David's family would ever hear 
from him. His passport and credit cards were never used again; they 
were never seen again. David Sneddon was never seen again.
  What happened to David Sneddon? To my knowledge he is the first 
American since the 1970s to go missing in China without an explanation. 
What happened to him? How can a young man, who is skilled in a 
country's language and knowledgeable of their culture, simply vanish 
without a trace?
  These questions have answers. For more than a decade, David's family 
members, friends, and loved ones, as well as regional experts, 
reporters, and embassy personnel have searched for those answers in 
vain. For their part, local authorities point to the Jinsha River for 
answers. They contend that the lack of physical evidence surrounding 
David's disappearance could indicate that he fell and was swept away by 
the river, despite the fact that his body was never found. Well, it is 
certainly possible for that to happen to an unsuspecting tourist hiking 
on unfamiliar terrain, but David was not a novice outdoorsman by any 
stretch of the word. He was an Eagle Scout and an avid hiker who had 
years of experience trekking over rugged landscapes across the American 
West.
  In recent years investigational reporters and regional experts have 
suggested an alternative explanation of David's disappearance. For 
instance, on April 25, 2013, Melanie Kirkpatrick, a senior fellow at 
the Hudson Institute and a well-regarded expert on North Korea, wrote 
an excellent article in the Wall Street Journal.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

           [From the The Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2013]

         North Korea's Kidnappers and the Fate of David Sneddon

                        (By Melanie Kirkpatrick)

       North Korea's recent bellicosity seems to have subsided for 
     the moment, but the regime's malign practices continue. The 
     United Nations Human Rights Council last month established an 
     international commission of inquiry into what it describes as 
     North Korea's ``systematic, widespread and grave violations 
     of human rights.'' The commission's mandate includes 
     examining North Korea's abductions of foreigners and the 
     likelihood that some victims are imprisoned in the North. 
     Pyongyang is believed to have kidnapped nationals of at least 
     12 countries.
       One such victim may be an American citizen. David Sneddon 
     disappeared in China in August 2004, when he was a 24-year-
     old student at Brigham Young University. He was vacationing 
     in Yunnan Province after completing several months of study 
     at Beijing International University and before returning to 
     the U.S. for his senior year. Speaking in Tokyo last month 
     about Mr. Sneddon's disappearance, Keiji Furuya, Japanese 
     minister of state for the abduction issue, told me: ``It is 
     most probable that a U.S. national has been abducted to North 
     Korea.''
       The charge that an American citizen was likely kidnapped by 
     North Korea is noteworthy in and of itself. It is even more 
     so coming from a cabinet-rank member of the Japanese 
     government about a citizen of another country. The minister 
     added: ``I would not like to speak further about it because 
     it would be an intervention in the domestic affairs of the 
     United States.''
       Japan is in a unique position to evaluate North Korea's 
     kidnapping operation, having investigated it for more than 30 
     years. North Korean agents infiltrated Japan in the 1970s and 
     1980s, snatched Japanese citizens and took them back to North 
     Korea. Japanese traveling in Europe were also kidnapped. 
     North Korea forced the abductees to teach Japanese language 
     and customs at its spy schools so that its agents could 
     travel the world posing as Japanese nationals.
       In 2002, the late dictator Kim Jong II admitted to the 
     visiting Japanese prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, that 
     North Korea had kidnapped 13 Japanese citizens. Kim did so in 
     the expectation that his confession would pave the way for 
     the normalization of relations with Japan. The move could 
     have had the salutary effect for North Korea of attracting 
     Japanese investment and reducing North Korea's economic 
     dependence on China. Instead, Kim's confession inflamed 
     Japanese public opinion and made normalization impossible.
       North Korea allowed five of the abductees to go home. It 
     said the other eight victims had died, but the death 
     certificates supplied by Pyongyang were found to be fake. 
     Japan believes those eight victims--as well as others whom 
     Kim Jong II did not acknowledge--are alive in North Korea.
       In recent years, Pyongyang's kidnappers have turned their 
     attention to China, where they have abducted South Korean 
     humanitarian workers. The South Koreans were targeted because 
     of their work helping North Koreans escape on an underground 
     railroad across China to eventual sanctuary in Seoul.
       This brings us back to David Sneddon. In addition to 
     speaking Chinese, Mr. Sneddon is fluent in Korean, having 
     spent two years in South Korea as a Mormon missionary. This 
     unusual linguistic ability may have thrown suspicion on him. 
     The Sneddon family believes that David was kidnapped by North 
     Korean agents who mistakenly thought he was helping North 
     Korean defectors. Yunnan

[[Page S782]]

     Province, which borders Laos, Burma and Vietnam, is along the 
     underground railroad's usual route out of China. North Korean 
     security agents are known to operate there, apparently with 
     Beijing's permission.
       At the time of David's disappearance in August 2004, China 
     told the Sneddon family that its investigation had concluded 
     that the young man likely had a fatal mishap while hiking 
     through Tiger Leap Gorge. That theory was disproved by facts 
     uncovered by David's father and two of his brothers three 
     weeks after he went missing. The three Sneddons retraced the 
     young man's steps in Yunnan and found witnesses who reported 
     seeing him during and after his hike through the gorge.
       The Sneddons have had their share of frustrations in 
     dealing with the U.S. State Department. A senior diplomat 
     wrote the family last year that ``Under the Privacy Act, we 
     are not permitted to release any information about David's 
     case unless we have his written consent to do so.'' The 
     diplomat noted a health-or-safety exception but only if the 
     family ``has convincing information as to where the U.S. 
     citizen is located or what his/her condition may be.''
       ``We're living a Catch-22,'' says David's brother, Michael 
     Sneddon. ``If our family had `convincing information' as to 
     David's whereabouts, David would no longer be missing. It's 
     absurd.'' The Washington-based Committee for Human Rights in 
     North Korea plans to file a Freedom of Information Act 
     request for information on actions the State Department has 
     taken on the Sneddon case, says executive director Greg 
     Scarlatoiu.
       The Sneddons refute speculation that David may have 
     disappeared voluntarily. He had purchased a plane ticket 
     home, put a down payment on his student housing for the fall 
     semester, and made arrangements to take the LSAT exam for 
     entry to law school. His Beijing roommate, who traveled with 
     him until a few days before his disappearance, says David was 
     planning to go home.
       Last year, a Tokyo-based research organization published a 
     report citing new evidence that North Korea kidnapped Mr. 
     Sneddon. A source in China told the National Association for 
     the Rescue of Japanese Abducted by North Korea that in August 
     2004--the date of his disappearance--Yunnan provincial police 
     arrested an American university student who was helping North 
     Korean refugees. A second Chinese source told the Japanese 
     researchers that the Yunnan police handed over the American 
     to North Korean security agents. In both cases, personal 
     details about the unnamed student correspond with facts known 
     about David Sneddon. Seven Japanese parliamentarians traveled 
     to Washington last May to present this evidence to the State 
     Department and Congress.
       For one former Japanese intelligence official, the Sneddon 
     disappearance is a case of deja vu. The official, who asked 
     not to be identified by name, compares it to the abduction 
     cases he tracked in the 1970s and 1980s. ``The evidence is 
     always fragmented and isolated,'' he says. Until Kim Jong II 
     confessed to kidnapping 13 Japanese citizens, he notes, some 
     in the Japanese government refused to acknowledge the 
     abductions for fear of alienating Pyongyang. The former 
     intelligence official has looked at the Sneddon evidence and 
     believes there is a strong possibility that North Korea 
     kidnapped the American.
       The U.N. commission of inquiry will spend one year 
     gathering and evaluating information on North Korea's 
     abductions. Let's hope it discovers what happened to all 
     those who disappeared--including the American David Sneddon.

  Mr. LEE. Mr. President, Kirkpatrick's research shows that David's 
disappearance in China fits the pattern of foreign national kidnappings 
by North Korea in East Asia since the 1970s. While this might sound 
strange to Americans--because it is indeed strange to us as Americans--
it is an issue with which the people of Japan and South Korea are 
tragically all too familiar.
  The circumstances of David's disappearance add a level of credibility 
to this theory. For instance, the area where David was traveling is a 
well-known thoroughfare on an underground railroad for North Korean 
dissidents trying to escape to Southeast Asia. As a result, this area 
is monitored and patrolled by North Korean Government agents who were 
involved in the capture of a high-level North Korean defector and his 
family in the area only months before August 2004.
  David was fluent in Korean, thanks to having spent 2 years serving a 
mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in South 
Korea. He matched the profile of activists in this area who were 
thought to be assisting North Korean escapees.
  In a coincidental twist of fate, David disappeared only a month after 
Charles Robert Jenkins, an Army deserter, was released by the North 
Korean Government after having spent nearly 40 years imprisoned in the 
totalitarian state, forced to teach English to North Korean 
intelligence agents. An American who spoke fluent Korean would be an 
attractive replacement for Charles Jenkins.
  Three weeks after his disappearance, David's father and two of his 
four brothers traveled to China and retraced David's planned steps 
through the Tiger Leaping Gorge. The results of their factfinding 
mission, including their conversations with local residents, 
businesses, tour guides, and travelers have been shared with the State 
Department and detailed in an excellent piece by Chris Vogel published 
in Outside Magazine in 2014.
  One of the most compelling pieces of evidence discovered by David's 
father and brothers is that several people, including a trail guide who 
had been hiking the Tiger Leaping Gorge around the time of his 
disappearance, remember interacting with a young man fitting David 
Sneddon's description. David's family also met with the owner of a 
small Korean restaurant in the city of Shangri-La, a bustling tourist 
outpost with a convenient access to the Tiger Leaping Gorge. When she 
saw a photograph of David, the young restaurant owner lit up. She 
immediately remembered David, and for good reason. Not only did David 
stand out because of his fluency in Korean, but he reportedly visited 
the restaurant on three separate occasions over the course of 2 days 
while he was in that city.
  Indeed, according to the Outside Magazine article, the last time 
anyone saw David, which was on August 14, 2004, he was reportedly 
leaving a Korean restaurant. At first glance, this may seem like a 
minor detail, but seen in the right light, it is, in fact, an ominous 
clue.
  According to many regional experts, there is a historical pattern of 
North Korean agents using Korean-run restaurants in China, Japan, and 
elsewhere to prey on their targets for kidnapping and abduction. 
Despite these reports, there have been no further or more fruitful 
leads regarding David's whereabouts. People move away or change their 
stories. Embassy and State Department staff move to different 
assignments, and the trail grows cold.
  For nearly 12 years, along with his family, we have been looking for 
David. There are many people who deserve credit for the contributions 
they made to this effort. In particular, I wish to thank Ambassador 
Robert King, the special envoy for North Korean human rights issues and 
a longtime personal friend of mine, as well as his office, for the 
attention they have given to David's case and the good-faith efforts 
they have made over the years to try to find answers. I commend 
Ambassador King for his work on this complex, sensitive, and very 
important issue.
  There is still work yet to be done. An upstanding American citizen is 
still missing, and an aggrieved family--indeed, an entire community--
continues to wait and pray for a resolution, which is what brings us 
here today.
  The first and most important responsibility of the United States 
Government is to ensure the safety and freedom of the American people 
at home and abroad. When American citizens travel overseas, the State 
Department plays a critical role in fulfilling this core constitutional 
duty.

  The amendment I am filing today--which I plan to submit as a stand-
alone resolution with Senators Hatch, Fischer, and Sasse--gives the 
sense of the Senate that the State Department, in conjunction with the 
intelligence community, should continue to fulfill that obligation to 
David Sneddon and his family. A companion bill will be introduced in 
the House of Representatives by my friend Congressman Chris Stewart and 
the rest of the Utah delegation.
  The State Department's responsibilities in this matter include 
investigating all plausible explanations behind David's disappearance 
and leaving no stone unturned in trying to return one of our brothers 
to his family.
  At the time of his disappearance, David had his whole life ahead of 
him. In fact, he was already planning for it. Before setting out to 
hike the Tiger Leaping Gorge on that fateful day in August of 2004, 
David had signed up to take the law school admissions test--the first 
step toward applying to law school, he had arranged business meetings 
back home in Utah to get an early start on pursuing his dreams of 
entrepreneurship, and, eager to get back to

[[Page S783]]

BYU's beautiful campus, he had already paid for his student housing for 
the upcoming fall semester, but he never had the chance to do any of 
those things, and the Sneddon family deserves to know why.
  The greatest threat to totalitarian regimes in any part of the world 
is the truth; that the world may learn of the horrors they perpetrate 
every day against their own people and that their people may learn that 
there is a world full of freedom and opportunity beyond the ironclad 
borders of their enslaved homeland.
  It is in pursuit of the truth--about David Sneddon's whereabouts--
that I file this amendment today.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tillis). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for up to 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.


               Customs and Trade Enforcement Legislation

  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I rise this afternoon to speak about a 
matter that will come before the Senate tomorrow when the Senate votes 
on whether to invoke cloture on the customs and trade enforcement 
conference report.
  Last year, Democrats and Republicans in both Chambers of the Congress 
came together and said it was time for a fresh policy on international 
trade--a fresh, modern policy that I describe as trade done right. At 
the heart of trade done right is a tougher, smarter plan to fight the 
trade cheats who are ripping off American jobs.
  Now, the inventiveness of these ripoff artists takes our breath away. 
It is something I know a fair amount about because a few years back, as 
chairman of the Trade Subcommittee, we put together a sting operation 
and in effect invited those ripoff artists from around the world to 
cheat, and we were just flooded--flooded with those who were interested 
in skirting the laws. They have extraordinarily inventive ways of 
moving their operations, concealing their identities, and shipping 
their products into our country through shadowy, untraceable routes. 
Sometimes sneaking illegal imports into this country is as simple as 
slapping a new label on a box. We call it merchandise laundering, and 
we saw it again and again and again as we conducted this sting 
operation.
  So it is long past time to come up with a new and tough approach to 
enforcing our trade laws. In my view that is what this debate is about 
and that is what the vote will be about tomorrow.
  The lingo of trade policy, as we call it, TPA--the trade promotion 
authority--what are the rules for trade and then the various agreements 
and what, of course, is being considered now, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership--it is hard to keep track of this lingo under the best of 
circumstances. I think in beginning this discussion, what I want to 
note for the Senate is this is not--not--about the consideration of a 
new trade agreement. No trade agreement--no new trade agreement--is 
going to be considered by the Senate this week. What this debate is 
about is whether the Senate is going to put in place tougher, smarter, 
more modern trade enforcement policies, and when we have these 
policies, actually follow up on them and stand up to anybody around the 
world who is trying to figure out a way to get around them. My view is 
that tough, smart trade enforcement ought to be a priority for every 
Senator, no matter how they choose to vote on a particular new trade 
agreement.
  My bottom line is that past trade policies were too old, too slow or 
too weak to keep up with the trade cheats, but that is what this 
legislation is going to change. This legislation says those days are 
over.
  I wish to take just a few minutes to describe why I believe this 
package we will vote on is the strongest set of trade enforcement 
policies the Congress has considered in decades.
  At its core, what trade law enforcement is all about is rooting out 
the universe of scofflaw tactics that the cheats rely on. They use 
fraudulent records and shell games and sophisticated schemes to evade 
duties and undercut our American producers. Foreign governments bully 
American businesses into relocating factories and jobs are turning over 
lucrative intellectual property. They spy on American companies and 
trade enforcers, steal secrets, and then they lie about it in the 
aftermath, and they try to undercut American industries so quickly that 
our Nation has been unable to act before the economic damage is done.
  With the vote we are going to cast this week, we have an opportunity 
to say strongly and loudly that we are done sitting back and just 
watching our companies get their clock cleaned by trade cheats. This 
country is going to take trade enforcement to a new level to protect 
workers and businesses in Oregon and nationwide.
  In my view, the center of this effort is the ENFORCE Act, which goes 
after what I consider to be one of the biggest of the trade loopholes; 
that is, merchandise laundering. This is a proposal that a number of 
Senators have worked for years to get enacted. What it will do is put a 
stop to the evasion of duties that are put in place to protect our 
workers, protect our manufacturers, and particularly when it comes to 
the steel industry, a pillar of American industry. The ENFORCE Act 
ought to be understood to be clearly a priority matter for those who 
work in the steel industry and the companies for which they work.
  Second, the legislation, once and for all, closes a truly offensive 
loophole that allowed products made with slave and child labor to be 
imported to the United States. My friend Senator Brown has championed 
this issue. He and I believe that in 2016 and beyond, the Congress 
cannot allow for the perpetrators of slave or child labor to have any 
place in the American economy. So the old system that leaves the door 
open to child or slave labor, if it is used to make a product that 
isn't made in the United States, that system has to end and with this 
legislation it will. The old system essentially said that when it came 
to child labor, in the past, economics would trump human rights. 
Economics just mattered more than protecting vulnerable children. 
Senator Brown said: No way. That is a grotesque set of priorities. And 
we closed that loophole. It is closed, once and for all.
  Another major upgrade in this trade package is what I call an unfair 
trade alert. I have heard for years and years from union leaders, from 
companies and others that the trade cheats often try to exploit the 
fact that trade law enforcement moves along at a snail's pace. What 
happens is that the rip-off artists break the rules. They hope the 
damage is going to be done before anybody in Washington catches on. 
That way the factory lights go out at the plant, and the plant is 
shuttered before our country does anything about it. What we have done 
with this new unfair trade alert system is to ensure that there are 
going to be warning bells going off long before the damage is done.

  Next, the package includes an important initiative from Senator 
Stabenow to mobilize the institutions of government into a permanent 
ongoing enforcement center so that we have all hands on deck to fight 
the trade cheats. With Senator Stabenow's proposal we are going to make 
sure that when it comes to fighting the trade cheats, the left hand and 
right hand are working in Congress.
  The package creates a new trust fund for trade enforcement developed 
by Senator Cantwell to drive America's investment in fresh ideas and do 
it in a way that will help protect our workers and businesses.
  The proposal also ensures small businesses and their employees are 
going to be able to find an easier path into the winners' circle on 
international trade. It is going to lower the cost for a lot of small 
businesses in Oregon and nationwide that import products into our 
country. For my home State, this effort led by Senator Shaheen, who has 
done great work on the Small Business Committee, is hugely important 
because in my State, when you are done

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counting a handful of big businesses, you have covered the big 
employers in our State. We are overwhelmingly about small business, and 
because of the good work of Senator Shaheen, we are going to give small 
businesses more tools they can use to reach new markets overseas. It is 
going to help guarantee that all our trade agencies are looking for 
opportunities to help small businesses grow.
  I could go on with others. I think Senator Feinstein has done very 
important work. For example, we have been looking for a model for 
trade-based humanitarian assistance. Senator Feinstein's contribution 
has helped us secure that goal, and I appreciate greatly her 
leadership.
  When it comes to trade policies, environmental protections are a 
special priority for me and for Oregonians and for the American people. 
I want one judgment about this bill to be very clear as we start this 
debate. This legislation cannot and will not in any way prevent the 
United States from negotiating a climate agreement. Not only that, the 
package tackles some particularly important environmental issues head-
on. It directs our trade negotiators to act against illegal fishing and 
fishing subsidies that destroy our oceans. It is going to help 
guarantee that the Customs personnel are better trained to fight the 
trade of stolen timber from places like the Amazon. These are big 
improvements over the old playbook of trade enforcement.
  Many Senators on both sides of the aisle are very concerned about 
currency manipulation. In the process of bringing this bipartisan, 
bicameral package together, it was clear that there were some 
differences between the Senate and the other body on this legislation 
and that the other body was willing to go only so far on currency 
questions. When Senators vote--and I know currency is important to 
them--I hope that they will reflect on the view that I am going to 
articulate. This legislation goes further than ever before to fight the 
currency manipulators. One of the major reasons it does is because of 
our colleague Senator Bennet. Senator Bennet has been working with all 
sides diligently on this issue. He has clearly given us a policy that 
we can build on in the years and days ahead. I intend to work with 
Senator Bennet and all of our colleagues on both sides of the aisle at 
every opportunity to head off the currency manipulators, to stop them 
from undercutting American jobs and American businesses. There is no 
question in my mind that this legislation goes significantly further 
than ever before to fight currency abuse and manipulation.
  Now, it has been my judgment for years that a more progressive 
approach to trade and stronger trade enforcement are two sides of the 
same coin. Last year, the Senate said loudly and clearly that future 
trade deals have to raise the bar for American priorities such as labor 
rights and environmental protection. Because of Senator Cardin, we will 
now have a new focus on human rights. Now the Senate has an opportunity 
to stand up for workers and businesses in Oregon and across the country 
by kicking the enforcement of trade law into high gear. This landmark 
trade enforcement proposal ought to have strong bipartisan support.
  Also included in the conference report is a permanent extension of 
one of the most popular economic policies on the books today, the 
Internet Tax Freedom Act. Former Congressman Chris Cox and I introduced 
this bill back in 1998. For nearly two decades, this legislation 
protected working families, especially against regressive taxes on 
Internet access.
  Working families are the focus of this bill. Working families who use 
the Internet, for example, get information about employment 
opportunities and educational opportunities. They shouldn't face a wave 
of new regressive taxes. Clearly, ensuring that they don't get hit by 
these regressive taxes has saved our working families and our small 
businesses hundreds of dollars a year.
  But for all that time, this has been a kind of temporary stop-and-go 
policy that required its being renewed again and again. My hope is 
that, as Senators look at this bill, which in my view is the toughest 
trade enforcement law in decades, and move to the very new approach 
that I call ``trade done right,'' I hope Senators will see that this 
legislation also ensures that working families, senior citizens, and 
others of modest means don't get hit by this big regressive tax simply 
when they want to access the Internet for the kind of information so 
important to them, given a modest income and their desire to get ahead.
  With this legislation and its extension running out this year, it is 
important for the Senate to act now so that you don't have a situation 
again at the end of the year with the prospect of the Internet Tax 
Freedom Act expiring and working families getting hit with these 
regressive taxes.
  I urge Senators to support this proposal. There has been an awful lot 
of work done by Senators on both sides of the aisle to advance this 
legislation. I am particularly grateful to our colleagues on the 
Finance Committee with whom I have the honor to serve.
  I will close simply by saying to colleagues that this is not about a 
new trade agreement. It is not exactly an atomic secret. There are 
pretty strong differences of opinion about new trade agreements here in 
this body. This is about whether we are going to get tough with the 
trade cheats who are ripping off American jobs. This legislation gives 
us the opportunity to do it, and I urge your support.
  I yield back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.


                    Our ``We the People'' Democracy

  Mr. MERKLEY. Mr. President, the most important words in our 
Constitution are the first three words of that document: ``We the 
People.'' These are words that the authors put in supersized print to 
tell us that this is what our government is all about--and also, what 
it is not about.
  They did not start out this document by saying that we are a 
government to serve the ruling elites. They did not establish this 
Constitution to serve the titans of industry and commerce. And they did 
not write our Constitution to serve the best off, the richest in our 
society--quite the contrary. The genius of America was a government 
designed, as President Lincoln so eloquently summarized, to be ``of the 
people, by the people, and for the people.''
  This Senator will be rising periodically to address issues that 
affect Americans across our Nation. It is important to a government of, 
by, and for the people to address issues that we should be addressing 
in this Chamber.
  Today I will use this time to talk about the challenge we face in 
climate change. Last month, scientists reported that 2015 was the 
single hottest year on record. NASA says that this past year was a full 
0.9 degrees centigrade. That is well over 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit hotter 
than the average during the 20th Century. Moreover, it rose 
significantly warmer from 2014, which was the previous hottest year on 
record--0.23 degrees Fahrenheit hotter than 2014. That is an 
unexpectedly massive increase in the challenge of global warming.
  These numbers come from the best scientific analysis. They take the 
combined temperatures from the land, water, and air to get a 
comprehensive picture of what is going on in our beautiful blue green 
planet. In total, 15 of the hottest years our planet has experienced 
while humans have tread this Earth have been in the last 16 years.
  These temperature records send a strong message to us, but there is 
also a message coming from what is happening on the ground--the facts 
on the ground. We see the impact of global warming on our own 
communities. We see the impacts in terms of the pine beetle expansion 
because the winters are not cold enough to kill them off. We see it in 
terms of the red zone that comes from that. We see it in terms of the 
longer fire season--60 days longer in the last 40 years in my home 
State of Oregon. On the Oregon coast we are having trouble with oysters 
reproducing because the first few days it is difficult to form a shell 
with waters 30 percent more acidic than they were before the Industrial 
Revolution. We see it in the Cascade Mountains, where the snowpack has 
been smaller. It affects our winter sports, and it certainly affects 
the runoff that serves our farms. We have had massive, difficult 
droughts in southern Oregon in the Klamath Basin.
  These changes are not just happening in Oregon. They are happening 
across

[[Page S785]]

our Nation. They are happening across the world. This change is driving 
huge costs that can be measured in lost lives, lost homes, lost farms, 
lost businesses, burnt forests, and billions of dollars in disaster 
relief.
  Scientists agree that we must keep the warming of our planet under 2 
degrees Celsius to avoid catastrophic impacts. We are seeing severe 
impacts now, but these will be nothing compared to what is anticipated 
if we allow global warming to continue. At this stage below 2 degrees 
Celsius or 3.5 degrees Fahrenheit, we must pivot off of the fossil 
fuels to a clean energy economy. That means pursuing energy efficiency 
in our vehicles, in our freight transportation, and in our homes. It 
does mean investing in renewable energy, noncarbon electrical energy 
produced by sunlight and by wind.

  The simple, sobering fact is this: Energy efficiency and renewable 
energy will not be enough to stop the warming of our planet unless we 
leave 80 percent of the currently known fossil fuel reserves in the 
ground. That is a powerful statement because there are enormous 
financial forces that seek to extract those proven reserves, to burn 
those proven preserves, and in doing so will destroy our planet.
  You and I, fellow citizens, are owners together of a vast amount of 
fossil fuels, of coal, of natural gas, of oil. This is the oil and gas 
and coal that is underneath our public lands and water. We should use 
our ``We the People'' power to manage these fossil fuel reserves for 
the public good, and the public good is to move away from an era where 
the U.S. Government facilitates the extraction and burning of our 
citizen-owned fossil fuels to a new era where the Federal Government, 
together our ``We the People'' government, leads the transition from 
fossil fuels to a clean energy economy. As we face the threat of 
catastrophic climate change, the public good in regard to these fossil 
fuels is to keep them in the ground.
  When we do a new lease for the extraction of our citizen-owned fossil 
fuels, we lock in carbon extraction for 20 years, 30 years, 40 years, 
even 50 years into the future. That is unacceptable. That is morally 
wrong because that extraction, decades into the future, will do 
enormous damage to our planet, to our forests, to our farming, and to 
our fishing. This is an assault, first and foremost, on rural America, 
and it is our responsibility to stop it.
  That is why I introduced the Keep It in the Ground Act. This 
legislation ends new leases for coal and oil and gas on public lands 
and waters, and it would drive a transition from fossil fuel extraction 
and combustion toward a renewable energy economy.
  Critics might argue that we cannot simply end consumption of fossil 
fuels tomorrow. They might point out that society still depends on 
fossil fuels for electricity and for transportation, and they might 
know the leases that have already been put out there provide extraction 
opportunities decades after this bill is enacted. That being said, it 
is all the more important that we not do new leases, that we not do new 
leases that empower more extraction decades into the future. Time is 
short and public lands and waters are citizen owned. Public lands and 
waters are the right place to start, and it is critical to the future 
of our planet.
  The success of this moment, the ``keep it in the ground'' movement, 
will depend on grassroots organizing. The grassroots stopped the 
Keystone Pipeline, which would have turned on the tap for some of the 
dirtiest fossil fuels in the world. Grassroots organizing has driven 
the administration to suspend and possibly to stop drilling in the 
Arctic waters--drilling, which is the height of irresponsibility in the 
fragile Arctic region, and just recently grassroots organizing and 
energy has encouraged the President to put a pause on coal leasing to 
evaluate its climatic impacts.
  While these are important steps in the right direction, I want to 
encourage our President to go further. Just as he has suspended new 
leases for coal, President Obama has authority to do the same for oil 
and gas. Last week I joined with nine other colleagues in calling on 
the Department of the Interior to strengthen its climate commitments by 
dropping all new fossil fuel leases from the 5-year Outer Continental 
Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program.
  I emphasize grassroots organizing as critical because this building 
on Capitol Hill is full of individuals, such as I, who have been 
elected, and in our elections vast funds from the fossil fuel industry 
are holding sway. So it is going to take citizens and a ``We the 
People'' government--of, by, and for the people--to be able to continue 
to drive what we all know is right. It will be essential to sustain and 
expand the ``keep it in the ground'' movement.
  Not so long ago, when individuals outside of this building were 
talking about ``keep it in the ground,'' and then inside this building 
we started to have that conversation, many said: It is just too much of 
a stretch. It is just too much of a paradigm change from the past, when 
we sought to lease out our fossil fuels, that this wouldn't work.
  Where are we now? Not only did we have success in the Keystone, not 
only did we have success in the Arctic, not only did we have success in 
terms of suspension of coal leases, but we have a broader conversation 
about ending all of these new leases in each of these areas of fossil 
fuels on our citizen-owned property.
  Senator Bernie Sanders, who is a cosponsor of my keep it in the 
ground bill, said in November:

       We cannot continue to extract fossil fuels from Federally 
     owned land.

  He continued and said:

       You can't talk the talk and say I'm concerned about climate 
     change. And at the same time, say we're going to extract a 
     huge amount of oil, coal, and gas from federal land.

  Last Friday Secretary Clinton called for banning fossil fuels or 
banning fossil fuels on public land a ``done deal,'' and she went on to 
say: ``No future extractions, I agree with that.'' That is what she 
said. So we have come a long way in a short period, from action in 
three specific areas to the leading Presidential contenders on the 
Democratic side calling for moral action to take on this threat.
  Moving forward, there are two options before us. Our Federal 
Government can be a government of, by, and for the titans, and it can 
be complicit in digging our carbon hole even deeper and doing more 
damage to the land we love or our Federal Government can be the ``We 
the People'' government that was laid out by our Constitution, and it 
can lead this effort to manage our fossil fuels on public lands for the 
public good and work with our partners around the globe to save our 
planet.
  It has been said we are the first generation to see the impacts of 
global warming and that we are the last generation that can do 
something about it. So the choice is simple. Let's move aggressively 
away from a fossil fuel economy to a clean energy economy. Let's work 
in partnership with the world to take on this worldwide challenge and 
let's do the smart thing. When it comes to our publicly owned fossil 
fuels, let's keep it in the ground.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. SCHATZ. Mr. President I rise to join my colleagues in condemning 
North Korea's belligerence in East Asia.
  For decades North Korea has starved its people, sponsored criminal 
misconduct and cyber attacks, and bullied South Korea. In the last 
month it has violated numerous U.N. resolutions regarding development 
of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. DNI Clapper recently stated 
that the regime is expanding its Yongbyon enrichment facility and 
restarting the plutonium production reactor. These actions are a threat 
to the United States, our allies, to their regional stability, and they 
remind us that the Kim regime has no interest in abiding by 
international rules.
  The continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles 
threatens our military forces in Japan and South Korea and poses a risk 
to Seoul, Tokyo, and other major cities in the region. While North 
Korea regularly exaggerates its capabilities, it is clear that its 
belligerence is unending and its technology is improving.
  This legislation will strengthen and expand the U.S. sanctions 
against North Korea. We should use every tool we have to increase 
pressure on the regime so it dismantles its nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missile programs, but it is not at all clear that they are 
responding to direct pressure from our

[[Page S786]]

own country. If there is going to be meaningful change in the security 
situation on the Korean Peninsula, then China is going to have to exert 
more leverage over its neighbor.
  While we certainly do not see eye-to-eye with China on many things, 
we can and must work together to address our shared concerns. China has 
a tremendous amount at stake too. Unfortunately, Chinese efforts to 
rein in North Korea have so far been underwhelming. In response to 
China's diplomatic overtures to stop the missile launch last Saturday, 
North Korea actually accelerated its plans and launched its missile on 
the eve of the Lunar New Year celebrations in China. If that is how 
North Korea treats its only ally, then we face an uphill battle, 
especially without China recalibrating its approach and increasing its 
pressure.
  China must step up to the plate and recognize that dealing with the 
Kim regime now is better than dealing with it later. China ought to 
communicate to its ally that it is fed up with its belligerence and 
supports stronger U.N. sanctions. This is the way China will 
demonstrate its commitment to international peace and security.
  The goal of this sanctions legislation is not to target the North 
Korean people. They are the victims of the Kim regime. They have borne 
the cost of these ballistic missile launches. One estimate is that it 
cost $1 billion for the most recent launch, which would have fed the 
entire country for a year. Our goal is to convince North Korea that 
working with the international community is preferable to being 
isolated from it.
  Since President Obama took office, the U.N. has adopted three major 
resolutions on North Korea's nuclear program. President Obama has 
signed three major Executive orders, further sanctioning North Korea's 
activities.
  I support these efforts, and we must do more. This sanctions bill 
will give the administration additional tools to squeeze North Korea to 
change its behavior, but sanctions are not going to be enough. We need 
to reassure our allies in the region and provide the necessary 
resources to protect our forces in South Korea and Japan. After all, 
diplomacy is advanced when it is backed up by a strong defense.
  To that end, we need to do three things. First, we must continue 
serious discussions with South Korea about deploying the Terminal High 
Altitude Defense System, or THAAD, to defend against the missile 
threat. This has probably become a necessity because of North Korea's 
recent actions. If it is deployed, we will have to reassure countries 
in the region that THAAD is intended to defend solely against the North 
Korean missile threat to avoid any misperceptions. Second, we need to 
pass a well-funded defense budget that provides for the readiness of 
the forces under Admiral Harris's command at PACOM, through which 
General Scaparrotti at United States Forces Korea can keep our men and 
women ready to ``fight tonight.'' Third, we ought to explore new 
opportunities to strengthen our ballistic missile defense, including 
increasing the protection of our forces in Hawaii and the Western 
Pacific by turning the Aegis Ashore Test Complex on Kauai into an 
operational site, a proposal Representatives Gabbard and Takai are 
working on with the Department of Defense.
  These are preliminary steps we can take to reassure our allies and 
forces in the region that we are committed to their security, and we 
should refine our thinking as the threat evolves. The sanctions bill 
reinforces that commitment and sends a clear message that it is time to 
step up all levels of pressure on North Korea to end its belligerence 
in the region.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. President, recent developments in North Korea should 
have raised serious concern. As we have heard over and over again in 
the Senate from Members of both parties, they have raised serious 
concerns.
  This weekend North Korea launched its latest so-called satellite into 
orbit. We know this was nothing but an attempt to conceal their 
development of ballistic missile programs that would actually check 
launch capability, not really launching a satellite.
  On January 6, North Korea claims to have tested a hydrogen bomb, 
which, if true, would significantly increase and advance its nuclear 
capabilities. Even if not true, they have significant weapons in what 
everyone in the world would understand to be dangerous and even 
unstable hands.
  In October 2014, the senior U.S. commander on the Korean Peninsula 
told reporters that North Korea has the capabilities to put together a 
miniaturized nuclear warhead that can be mounted on a ballistic 
missile. Now we see them continuing to check that launch and missile 
capability. They already tested atomic nuclear weapons in 2006, 2009, 
and in 2013, in all cases in violation of multiple U.N. Security 
Council resolutions and, frankly, in violation of the agreements they 
had made in the early part of 2003 and 2004.
  Nuclear experts have reported that North Korea may currently have as 
many as 20 nuclear warheads and that the capital, Pyongyang, has the 
potential to possess as many as 100 warheads within the next 5 years.
  Combined with what appears to be growing sophistication in their 
missile technology, they have been seeking a way to represent a direct 
threat--something potentially disastrous in a nuclear way--to the 
United States and certainly to our allies in the region.
  They have shown capacity to proliferate nuclear weapons and 
technology to other dangerous regimes and, we have every reason to 
believe, dangerous individuals. U.S. officials recently connected 
Iranian officials to North Korea and specifically mentioned two 
Iranians who, according to the report, ``have been critical to the 
development of the 80-ton rocket booster, and both traveled to 
Pyongyang'' to work on this. According to reports, Iran might 
coincidentally conduct a nuclear launch later this month. Now we see 
Iran doing what it is doing, and we see Korea with the capacity to do 
what it is doing.
  Frankly, what we see in both cases, as well as Russia, are economies 
that are faltering, and people have every reason to wonder about those 
in charge of their government. The more that occurs, the more dangerous 
a government might be in an unstable country, trying to do everything 
they can to enemies they feel they need to defend themselves against 
and people they need to advance against.
  We also know they have significantly increased their cyber 
capabilities. We continually hear from our intelligence community that 
a cyber threat is one of the greatest threats we face. We saw North 
Korea launch a cyber attack on Sony Pictures in 2014, which did 
incredible damage in many ways, including their ability to disrupt the 
critical infrastructure of our country in the same way they were able 
to get involved in the cyber world of one major company.
  According to a November 2015 report by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, ``North Korea is emerging as a significant actor 
in cyberspace with both its military and clandestine organizations 
gaining the ability to conduct cyber operations.'' When we look at 
North Korea's attempts to increase and/or exaggerate the potential they 
have with the weapons they have or their ability to develop those 
weapons and when we look at what North Korea is doing with their cyber 
activities, we see a continually growing threat.
  The bill brought to the floor from Senator Gardner's and Senator 
Corker's committee, the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement 
Act, takes steps by providing the tools necessary to hold North Korea 
and its enablers accountable for what they do. The bill's overall goal 
is to peacefully disarm North Korea through mandatory sanctions that 
would deprive the regime of the means to build its nuclear and 
ballistic missile program and advance its malicious cyber activities. 
Specifically, it mandates sanctions against individuals who have 
materially contributed to North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile 
development; individuals who have engaged in money laundering, the 
manufacture of counterfeit goods, or narcotics trafficking that would 
benefit those programs; and individuals who have engaged in significant 
activities undermining cyber security against the United States or 
foreign individuals.
  In addition to these sanctions, the legislation targets additional 
areas that would deny North Korea the resources it needs to continue 
its malicious activities. For example, the bill

[[Page S787]]

mandates sanctions on individuals involved in trading minerals and 
metals that could be part of a nuclear program.
  This section would send a strong message, certainly to China, North 
Korea's chief diplomatic protector and largest trading partner. The 
things that could be used as sanctions would surely make China think 
twice about what they are doing with North Korea but also think twice 
about what North Korea is doing with the world. China purports to have 
a significant influence in North Korea. China purports to not want to 
see nuclear destabilization occur. This bill would be an incentive for 
China to live up to those claims. It has consistently failed to 
leverage its political or economic influence up until now. If China is 
getting serious about getting North Korea to change its behavior, we 
would like to see that happen.
  In a new view of sanctions, there is a waiver in this bill, as there 
has traditionally been. The President of the United States will have a 
waiver of these penalties. But this waiver is much stronger from the 
legislative perspective in that the President can only use the waiver 
on a specific basis and has to report, as I understand it, what that 
basis is.
  This measure also goes beyond the traditional sanctions regime 
because it requires the administration to put forth a comprehensive 
strategy to promote improved implementation and enforcement of how 
these sanctions would work and what they would do to combat North 
Korea's cyber activities, to promote and encourage international 
engagement on North Korean human rights violations, and to report back 
to Congress on what they found.
  There can be no doubt that other would-be nuclear regimes are going 
to be watching this carefully. We saw the lack of appreciation for U.S. 
commitment in the early weeks and months of the unfortunate Iranian 
deal. Frankly, the Iranians should and will look back at 2003 and 2004 
and wonder why the agreements with North Korea didn't work and wonder 
if we are committed to those agreements and wonder if we still are 
determined to stop North Korea when we see the kind of activities we 
see today. This begins to send that message, but the required 
implementation and reports will send that message in more aggressive 
ways than the Congress and consequently the country have before.
  Finally, we need to ensure that all U.S. forces deployed in the 
region are appropriately equipped with the most up-to-date surveillance 
and counterballistic missile platforms. Our regional allies--
particularly South Korea and Japan--need to be assured that the United 
States is committed to both the stability and defense of all our 
partners and interests in the region. South Korea and Japan should also 
be encouraged to undertake any self-defense measures that are necessary 
to augment American forces already in the region.
  North Korea remains a serious threat to peace and stability in the 
region and the world. North Korea continues to be a bad example of what 
happens when the United States makes agreements and isn't prepared to 
follow through on those agreements.
  The world is watching. I hope my colleagues will join me in sending a 
clear message that North Korea's provocations are not acceptable and 
that its continuing pursuit of illicit nuclear weapons will not be 
tolerated. We will get a chance to vote on that issue today. I hope we 
send a strong message. I hope the administration becomes a stronger 
partner in this message than the messages we are failing to send right 
now on Iran. I think this is an important moment for the country and 
the world.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, we have heard a lot of great discussion 
and debate today about the sanctions bill on North Korea. Of course, 
one of the issues that continue to come up is the lack of response from 
the United Nations. As they are considering and deliberating what 
exactly to do with North Korea, I hope they will hear not only the 
words being discussed here on the floor of the Senate but also the 
actions that are taking place around the globe and particularly in 
South Korea.
  We have long been aware of the Kaesong industrial complex. This is a 
look at it, somewhere just north of Seoul, basically right on the DMZ 
line, right in between North Korea and South Korea. It is actually 
inside North Korea, where this industrial complex is a joint venture, 
so to speak, a number of efforts from South Korea where they are 
funding manufacturing facilities using labor from North Korea.
  The purpose of this manufacturing center, the Kaesong industrial 
complex, was to create additional opportunities for North Korea and 
South Korea to come together economically and for them to perhaps join 
together in unification efforts as they continue to see that they can 
work together economically.
  Earlier this year, in one of the first committee hearings I held in 
the East Asia Subcommittee, we heard testimony from Dr. Victor Cha, a 
professor of government at Georgetown University. He is the senior 
adviser and Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. We had testimony on North Korea several months ago--at the 
beginning of the year--as we focused on how we were going to address 
this challenge and the Kim Jong Un regime.
  In his testimony in the House of Representatives a few weeks ago, Dr. 
Cha talked about some of the steps that could be taken by the United 
States and South Korea to address this North Korea threat. He talked 
about asymmetric pressure points that we have which we can apply to try 
to bring peace to the peninsula.
  In his statement, he said, ``A new approach to North Korea must focus 
on those asymmetric pressure points.'' Then he talked a little bit 
about the Kaesong industrial complex:

       Another useful asymmetric pressure point is the Kaesong 
     Industrial Complex. A legacy of the sunshine policy, this 
     project now provides $90 million in annual wages (around 
     $245.7 million from December 2004 to July 2012) of hard 
     currency to North Korean authorities with little wages 
     actually going to the factory workers. The South Korean 
     government will be opposed to shutting this down, as even 
     conservative governments in South Korea have grown attached 
     to the project as symbolic of the future potential of a 
     unified Korea, but difficult times call for difficult 
     measures.

  Again, this is Dr. Cha's testimony before the House of 
Representatives just a few weeks ago saying that this is an asymmetric 
pressure point and that if we were to address something to Kaesong, 
perhaps that could apply pressure to the North Korea regime to change 
its behavior. But because of the investments, because of the amount of 
work and the opportunities there, closing that wouldn't happen. It is 
not supported by the government.

  This shows you how serious North Korea's recent behavior has become. 
The testing of a fourth nuclear weapon--they claim it is a 
thermonuclear bomb. We don't have evidence yet whether hydrogen was 
there or not, but either way, as we stated before, it significantly 
increases their technical capability, nonetheless, whether it is 
hydrogen based or not.
  We saw recently a missile launch, a satellite launch that they used 
to disguise a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile. South 
Korea believes this is such a serious situation that South Korea has 
now shut down the Joint Factory Park at Kaesong over the nuclear test 
and the rocket. Just a few weeks ago, experts said this wouldn't 
happen, but the severity of North Korea's actions, violations, 
continued infringements on any number of U.S. sanctions and U.N. 
sanctions has forced South Korea to take the very dramatic step of 
closing this facility that they hoped could bring and be a symbol of 
further unification.
  Kim Jong Un and his reckless activities, forgotten maniac of North 
Korea, is now responsible for the loss of employment of 45,000 people 
in North Korea, and we wonder why there is no economic development 
taking place in North Korea. We wonder why there are limited 
activities. Because this regime is willing to put his own totalitarian 
regime ahead of the people of North Korea, placing them in political 
prison camps, torturing them, maiming them--hundreds of thousands of 
men, women, and children.
  So South Korea has taken a very serious step to express their 
displeasure with the actions of North Korea. The United Nations and the 
United States

[[Page S788]]

both continue to discuss and impose sanctions. The U.N. delay is 
disturbing.
  We talk about China. We talk about the impact China could have on 
North Korea and their willingness to change their behavior and to 
denuclearize North Korea. We know China is responsible for somewhere 
around 90 percent of the economic activity of North Korea--right around 
90 percent of the economic activity. We know trade, precious metals, 
coal, and raw metals have resulted in about 70 percent of foreign 
currency in North Korea.
  That is another step this bill takes, a step to assure we are 
addressing any activity such as exports, coal, precious metals if the 
money derived from that goes to the illicit activities. That is why 
Kaesong was closed. That is why it was closed by South Korea, because 
they traced the money back from this industrial facility. The 45,000 
employees who weren't making all the wages they were paying, a lot of 
that money was being siphoned off from the hard-working people of North 
Korea and given to the government and then used to fund weapons of mass 
destruction, nuclear proliferation. This effort that was used to try to 
unify the peninsula, to employ people, to find economic partnerships 
and opportunities was instead used by Kim Jong Un to further the 
building of billion-dollar rockets while his people starved, to further 
the efforts of nuclear tests while his people are tortured.
  This bill attempts to break through that curtain of silence in North 
Korea, providing ways to effectively communicate with the people of 
North Korea, to show them what the outside world has to offer in 
freedom and opportunity if they were to escape the regime in the reign 
of Kim Jung Un. I think the closure of the industrial complex in 
Kaesong is one further example of the steps South Korea is being forced 
to take as a result of these militant activities and provocative 
activities out of North Korea.
  I see Senator Shaheen of the Foreign Relations Committee is joining 
us in this debate today. She was an active member of the sanctions 
debate on North Korea. I thank the Senator for being on the floor 
today, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Flake). The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mrs. SHAHEEN. Mr. President, I am happy to join my colleague, also 
from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Cory Gardner from 
Colorado, in support of the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act. This 
is legislation that will help hold North Korea accountable for its 
dangerous weapons programs.
  I know Senator Gardner talked about today's news, North and South 
Korea, and in the past month we have witnessed a string of actions by 
the North Korean leadership that has demonstrated their determination 
to advance the country's nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic 
missile programs. On January 6, North Korea conducted its fourth 
nuclear test, and just this weekend the country launched another long-
range rocket. North Korea's goal could not be clearer or more serious. 
It is to place a nuclear warhead on an intercontinental ballistic 
missile capable of reaching the United States. Since North Korea's 
nuclear program was first uncovered in the mid-1980s, the United States 
has led the international effort to pressure the regime to abandon its 
nuclear activity. In large part, this pressure has come from the United 
States and United Nations sanctions. Although these sanctions have 
effectively halted most financial transactions between North Korea and 
the rest of the world, the North Korean regime and its benefactors 
continue to obtain hard currency to advance their illicit weapons 
programs.
  One way the North Korean Government finances its nuclear program is 
by laundering money in banks outside of North Korea--banks that until 
this legislation have not been subject to secondary U.S. sanctions. 
This bill will change that situation. It gives the Obama administration 
the ability to effectively cut off offending banks from the 
international financial system. When faced with this prospect, I 
believe prudent actors in China and other parts of the world will cast 
aside those in North Korea who have supported its nuclear activity. I 
certainly hope so.
  Let me also mention a provision I have added during the Foreign 
Relations Committee's consideration of the bill. It is an amendment 
that makes clear that the new and powerful sanctions this bill 
authorizes will not come at the expense of those American families 
still searching for their loved ones who served in the Korean war and 
who have never come home.
  I especially want to thank a New Hampshire advocacy organization--the 
Coalition of Families of Korean and Cold War POW/MIAs--for working with 
me on this important provision. The coalition, led by Portsmouth's Rick 
Downes, expressed concerns that the new sanctions in this legislation 
could inadvertently hinder efforts to find the more than 7,800 
Americans still unaccounted for from the Korean war. Obviously, no one 
here wants to interfere with this mission, and I am happy this final 
bill explicitly exempts POW/MIA accounting efforts from these new 
sanctions.


                       Nomination of Adam Szubin

  Mr. President, I want to raise one concern that I do have as we are 
heading into a vote on this bill; that is, the ability of the Treasury 
Department to identify and target those who should be subject to these 
new sanctions because that is crucial to the success of this 
legislation and to our overall North Korea strategy.
  The debate we are having today provides yet another illustration of 
why it is so essential to confirm Adam Szubin to be Under Secretary for 
Terrorism and Financial Crimes at the Treasury Department. As the Under 
Secretary, Mr. Szubin would lead the Department in identifying and 
disrupting financial support to a range of actors that threaten our 
national security--North Korea as well as ISIS, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, 
and others. Not only would Mr. Szubin be responsible for directly 
implementing a significant portion of the legislation we are expected 
to pass today, but he would also lead the Treasury Department's efforts 
to rally international support for these sanctions.
  I think this last point is critical and sometimes doesn't get a lot 
of attention. Enforcing sanctions requires cooperation. It requires 
often nudging other foreign governments and financial institutions to 
work within the sanctions regime. The lack of a Senate-confirmed 
appointee in this position undermines the Treasury Department and our 
efforts to build international coalitions to target terrorism and 
financial crimes.
  I am pleased the Senate is poised to pass the North Korea Sanctions 
Enforcement Act and increase the pressure on the North Korean regime, 
but I think it would make sense at the same time to confirm the person, 
Adam Szubin, who will be responsible for enforcing those very 
sanctions. Wouldn't it make sense for the Senate to strengthen 
Treasury's hand as they work to make the sanctions as effective as 
possible?
  Adam Szubin was nominated on April 16, 2015--301 days ago. Although 
the Senate Banking Committee held a hearing on his nomination back in 
September, the committee still has not advanced that nomination to the 
Senate floor. No one doubts Mr. Szubin's qualifications for the 
position. At his nomination hearing, Chairman Shelby called him 
eminently qualified.
  Mr. Szubin has served in both Republican and Democratic 
administrations. He has bipartisan support in this body. When we are 
all here--Republicans and Democrats--talking about the need to increase 
the pressure on North Korea in order to deny Pyongyang the resources it 
is using to develop nuclear weapons and the missiles it needs to target 
the United States, shouldn't we be supporting a nominee whose job it is 
to do this exact work?
  I think the Senate needs to vote on Mr. Szubin's nomination without 
further delay. I know he has the support of the chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. As I said, he has bipartisan support in 
this body, and it is very disappointing that we can't move him at the 
same time we are moving this bill. I hope the committee will change 
their minds and they will decide to take up his nomination and move it 
so we can ensure that the important tenets that are in this bill to 
help address what North Korea is doing will actually be enforced.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.

[[Page S789]]

  

  Mr. PAUL. Mr. President, for some time now power has been gravitating 
from the legislature to the President. Many in Congress, including 
myself, have been critical of the President's overreach. However, 
Congress bears some of the responsibility and some of the blame in that 
this body continues to abdicate and transfer our power to the 
President. Nowhere is this more obvious than in foreign policy.
  During the debate over the Iranian agreement to end sanctions, many 
congressional voices lamented that these sanctions were enacted by 
Congress and should not be unilaterally ended by the President without 
congressional approval. As many observers noted, Congress has only 
itself to blame. For decades now, Congress has granted the President 
national security waivers to just about anything. These allow the 
Executive to do what they want, to terminate sanctions or continue 
spending without any new vote of Congress.
  A good example was when Egypt was overtaken by a military regime. 
This was not a democratic government. This became a military junta. Our 
laws on foreign aid said Egypt should no longer receive foreign aid if 
they are not a democratically elected government. Yet the President 
continues to give foreign aid to Egypt because he simply uses a waiver 
we wrote into the legislation.
  It is a mistake to continue to grant so much power to the Presidency, 
and by doing so, we have abdicated our own power. For decades now, 
Congress has granted the President national security waivers on just 
about everything. The waivers are so flimsy and open-ended that all he 
has to do is write a report, claim that it affects national security, 
and then he can do whatever he wants. Congress then complains that the 
President is overreaching. Yet we give him that very power.
  Looking back at the North Korean sanctions, we find that President 
Clinton removed sanctions by using the national security waiver that 
Congress provided him. Furthermore, about a decade later, President 
George W. Bush did the same thing, relieving sanctions against North 
Korea by taking advantage of national security waivers.
  When we jump ahead to the Iran agreement, we find President Obama 
using national security waivers provided by Congress to unilaterally 
repeal Iranian sanctions without congressional authority. In fact, 
President Obama has utilized congressionally provided loopholes 40 
times to remove Iranian sanctions. Everybody complains, and now we are 
going to do the same thing. We are going to write a sanction bill with 
the exact same boilerplate language that we had in previous sanctions 
bills, which will allow the President the leeway to end the sanctions 
if he desires.
  When we fast-forward to these new North Korean sanctions before us, 
the new sanctions bill does exactly what previous sanction bills have 
done; namely, provide the President with the power to simply claim any 
nonspecific national security claim to waive sanctions.
  Congressional critics of the President's use of national security 
waivers to end Iranian sanctions should decide now that they have no 
leg to stand on should a future President do the exact same thing with 
North Korean sanctions and decide to remove them without congressional 
approval. There are two examples of that--Clinton has already done 
this, and so did George W. Bush.
  I propose that Congress take back their power. I propose that 
Congress not cede power to the Presidency, so I therefore ask unanimous 
consent to call up my amendment numbered 3301, which is at the desk. My 
amendment would remove national security waivers and give Congress its 
power back where it belongs.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Ernst). Is there objection?
  Mr. GARDNER. Madam President, reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. GARDNER. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Kentucky for 
his passion on this issue. We took great care in making sure we devised 
a sanctions bill that was strong in terms of its effect on North Korea 
and that it eliminated any of the shortcomings of the sanctions we 
faced when dealing with Iran.
  I certainly agree with the Senator from Kentucky when he said that we 
faced a President willing to grant broad relief from sanctions in terms 
of national security waivers, and that is why we were very careful in 
making sure we constructed case-by-case waivers in this act, the North 
Korea act. The President must investigate and explain to Congress that 
there are no broad grants or wide swaths of discretionary ability to 
waive the sanctions. As I said, there are mandatory investigations with 
mandatory reporting requirements, and so I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. GARDNER. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. HEITKAMP. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. HEITKAMP. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 
up to 10 minutes as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


             National Tribal Colleges and Universities Week

  Ms. HEITKAMP. Madam President, today I rise to honor 37 tribal 
colleges and universities operating across 16 States on more than 85 
campuses, 5 of which are located in North Dakota. Thank you to the more 
than 20 bipartisan Senators, including Indian Affairs Committee 
Chairman Barrasso and Vice Chairman Tester, who joined me in 
introducing a Senate resolution designating this week as National 
Tribal Colleges and Universities Week.
  This resolution received unanimous support in the Senate last week, 
as it should. It shows that Native American issues and the support for 
education are part of this country's treaty and trust responsibilities, 
and it continues to be a bipartisan issue. While we too often hear 
about the hardships Native communities face due to the geographic 
isolation and insufficient access to resources, we should also 
highlight those who are doing great work to build future leaders and a 
future generation of leaders across Indian Country. We see so much of 
that happening today at tribal colleges and universities.
  Tribal colleges and universities act as unique community institutions 
that work to strengthen tribal nations and make lasting differences in 
the lives of American Indians and Alaska Natives. The tribal community 
colleges, technical schools, and 4-year institutions plant resilient 
seeds of hope by sustaining Native languages and building trusting and 
important tribal economies.
  Supporting tribal colleges and universities both upholds our trust 
responsibility and provides much needed resources for students. Signed 
into law in 1978, the Tribally Controlled Community Colleges Assistance 
Act supported tribally chartered institutions of higher education to 
help uphold the Federal Government's unique relationship with federally 
recognized Indian tribes. Today, TCUs like Turtle Mountain Community 
College and Sitting Bull College in my State of North Dakota provide 
educational resources to Native students who otherwise surely would go 
without.
  But tribal colleges and universities don't simply educate Native 
students. The American Indian Higher Education Consortium, a national 
network of this country's TCUs, estimates that because of the schools' 
often rural locations, more than 15 percent of the students attending 
these tribal colleges and universities are also non-Indian.
  Tribal colleges and universities offer students access to a well-
rounded education from an accredited institution that provides 
knowledge and skills grounded in cultural traditions and values, 
including the all-important education in indigenous languages. This 
enhances Native communities and enriches both tribes and the United 
States by preparing students to succeed in their academic pursuits as 
well as to enter a global competitive workforce.
  The results have been telling. In the 2012-2013 school year, 75 
percent of graduates earned degrees, with 22 percent earning 
certificates. But while

[[Page S790]]

this success is admirable, the tribal colleges and universities have 
been hindered by chronic underfunding. Although the Federal Government 
provides funding to some minority-serving institutions at levels equal 
to $30,000 per student, tribal colleges receive literally a third of 
that. When we look at average numbers, it is around $6,700 per student. 
Tribes and tribal colleges and universities have consistently figured 
out how to do more with less, but Congress should not shy away from its 
Federal responsibility.
  I wish to speak about my experience this morning meeting with a 
number of tribal students. We can give all of these numbers and the 
critical importance of making this kind of education accessible, but 
what we will never see is the hope and the opportunity in the eyes of 
these students. I can't do that for my colleagues here. I can only tell 
their stories.
  I met a young woman who served our country in the military and after 
10 years went home and discovered the opportunity to learn more about 
her culture and the opportunity to get an education at the tribal 
colleges. She said she wished she had known earlier. She probably would 
have gone to college at the tribal college at Sitting Bull first before 
she joined the armed services.
  I met another young woman who told me of her early life of abuse and 
neglect. She said that after having two children and really no hope, 
she found a tribal college. In that tribal college she found not only 
an opportunity for advancement and the dream and the hope of becoming a 
lawyer someday, but she found a family. She described the faculty and 
the staff and the other students as the family she had never had.
  I talked to another young woman, who is 18 years old and literally 
homeless. She sleeps on a friend's couch. The only family she has to 
nurture her is her tribe and the tribal college. She tells me--her 
words were this: I will be great. She would not have that hope, she 
would not have that belief, and she would not have that vision if she 
didn't have access to education. She is going to be a nurse. And I can 
tell you she is already great, from what I have heard.
  So the stories go on and on and on.
  Because of the involvement in the tribal college at Spirit Lake 
Reservation, we have a student now, who, for the first time, graduated 
with an engineering degree from one of our 4-year institutions. He 
started out at a tribal college--first engineer ever from that tribe.
  These are messages of hope in a world that all too often is a world 
of despair, a world of neglect, a world of abuse, a world of challenges 
for young people. But a tribal college gave them the foundation, the 
connection to their culture, the connection to a family and a group of 
people who cared about them, and an opportunity for something better--
an opportunity to be great, as the young woman I spoke with earlier 
said.
  So I am very proud of the work we have done to support the tribal 
colleges. We need to do more. If we truly want to change the outcome 
and the paradigm for Indian people and for Indian children, we must 
invest in Indian education, and that goes all the way from our Head 
Start programs all the way up to our programs for higher education.
  I want to give one last story. This past summer I attended the STEM 
education program for Native Americans at the University of North 
Dakota, and I met with a group of young people who talked about the 
difficulty of transitioning from the reservation into a major 
university--talking not so much about the challenges academically but 
about the challenges of loneliness, the challenges of the first time 
leaving what they knew and being the first generation in their families 
to actually attend a 4-year college. One young man said that he was so 
homesick and so shocked by the change in culture that he wanted to go 
home. I said: Well, did you? He said: No, I called my mom to tell her 
that I wanted to go, and she told me she would knock me upside the head 
if I came back. A brave mother--so he said he did what his mother asked 
him to do, and he was graduating with a degree in, I think, geology or 
some applied science.
  That young man had a mother who kept him in that school. Many young 
people in Indian Country today do not have that kind of inspiration, 
and the great distrust people have for the outside world gets embedded. 
So these tribal colleges help prepare these students for the next step. 
They are critical for maintaining the cultural significance, critical 
for maintaining the pride that people have in who they are as a people, 
and then building on that for self-awareness, building on that for 
self-economic opportunity.
  I am proud to represent five great institutions of higher learning in 
my State that are representative of the tribal colleges and 
universities.
  Finally, I wish to talk about the wonderful men and women who run 
those institutions and what they do. These are people with Ph.D.s. 
These are people with amazing degrees who could go anywhere, and they 
continue to provide leadership to their people. Without their 
leadership and their support, these children would not have these 
opportunities. These returning vets would not have these opportunities, 
and these older-than-average students, with the challenges in their 
lives, would not have these opportunities.
  So please join with me in recognizing tribal colleges and 
universities but also to take a look at the disparities in terms of 
reimbursements that these tribal colleges and universities incur, and 
let's make this investment. This is an investment in the lives and the 
changes we need to see in Indian Country.
  Thank you, Madam President.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Ms. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, I wish to comment on the statements 
that have been made by my colleague and friend from North Dakota, who 
has been an amazing leader, a very strong leader here in the Senate 
since she came, trying to shine a spotlight on issues particularly 
surrounding our Native American and Alaska Native children.
  We are working together on a mission that really does help to drill 
down--to find those best supports that we possibly can for these 
children who in so many instances have been left behind.
  The Senator from North Dakota spoke about our tribal institutions and 
our tribal colleges as that next step to launch our young people 
successfully, while recognizing that we have opportunities to grow and 
do better by our tribal colleges. I had an opportunity just yesterday 
to be visited by some students from Ilisagvik College, a small facility 
located in Barrow, AK. I had a chance to meet with two students, Olive 
and Jillian, from a very small village called Atqasuk. One described 
what it was like as a young student who wants that education--but just 
the idea that one would go hundreds of miles away to the big city in 
Fairbanks or Anchorage to pursue an education was simply not possible--
and how these students have been given opportunities in ways that 
perhaps they and their families never dreamed possible.
  So I stand with my colleague, as we have stood shoulder to shoulder 
on so many of these issues that impact our Native children, our young 
people, their futures, and their opportunities, and recognizing that 
education can be that key to a better life and a better path forward.
  Ms. HEITKAMP. Madam President, will the Senator from Alaska yield for 
a question?
  Ms. MURKOWSKI. Certainly.
  Ms. HEITKAMP. Madam President, there is no better partner for me in 
this quest than the great Senator from the State of Alaska. We have 
spent so much time relating and recounting our experiences in visiting 
with Native Alaskans or, in my case, American Indians, talking about 
the challenges and talking about what needs to happen and how we need 
to shed a light on not only the despair, so that we all are motivated 
for change, but how we need to shed a light on the gratefulness and the 
great spirit that is happening. I know that my great friend has had 
those situations where you just wonder how resilient a young girl can 
be who experiences these kinds of challenges and this kind of abuse to 
come back and say: This is going to be a great future.
  So I wanted to thank the Senator from Alaska for her strong and 
abiding

[[Page S791]]

and great commitment to all the people of Alaska, and I want to thank 
her for her partnership.
  Ms. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, I certainly appreciate the value of 
our partnership, and I know that we have a great deal of work ahead of 
us.
  Madam President, I come to the floor today to express my support for 
the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act and the substitute that we 
will be voting on later this afternoon.
  It is fair to say that the people of Alaska take great interest in 
this legislation, and it is not simply an intellectual interest. It 
stems from our geography, quite simply. At its closest point, Alaska is 
3,100 miles from North Korea. Let me put that in context with where we 
are here. The distance between Washington, DC, and my hometown of 
Anchorage is 3,370 miles. So Alaska is actually closer to North Korea 
than I am to my home when I am working here in Washington, DC.
  We are talking about the main population center in Anchorage and in 
the Mat-Su Valley area in south central Alaska, which is about 3,600 
miles from Pyongyang. Perhaps it is a little longer than a North Korean 
missile can travel today or even in the near future, but it seems to me 
that North Korea is committed to advancing its nuclear capabilities. 
Its covert nuclear tests and the so-called satellite launch that we saw 
over the weekend appear to be purposeful steps in that direction.
  Just to give a little vignette about how Alaskans pay attention to 
North Korea--we all go around and visit schools around our respective 
States--I was at a middle school and I had an eighth grader ask me a 
question. When asked what was on anybody's mind, what do you want me to 
know about, and how can I be a better representative for you back in 
Washington, DC, the first eighth grader that raised his hand said to 
me: Senator Murkowski, what are you doing in Washington about this Kim 
Jong Un guy? This is an eighth grader.
  I am not going to suggest to you that perhaps Alaskan eighth graders 
are more attuned to politics around the world. The reason I raise this 
is because around the dinner tables back home, people are talking about 
North Korea because our geography puts us within that range of sight, 
if you will. I use that term loosely, but when looking at the maps and 
understanding where Alaska is and where North Korea is and reading the 
news about what is happening with North Korea's nuclear intentions, it 
causes Alaskans to be worried enough to be discussing it at the dinner 
table, and eighth graders are saying: What is going on? It is real for 
us.
  North Korea's actions demand decisive action here in Washington, DC, 
in Beijing, and at the United Nations. The Washington Post editorial 
just yesterday noted that the Obama doctrine of strategic patience is 
no longer an option. Mr. Kim seems to view that as a sign of weakness. 
He seems to fancy playing Washington off against Beijing, and neither 
capital can afford him that luxury, lest North Korea make fools of 
both.
  China has a major role to play in showing Mr. Kim the light. Mr. Kim 
wants the world to believe that he is smarter than all of us, and I 
would suggest that it is not in Beijing's interest to offer him a 
porous border. The United States and our allies have been patient 
enough with the carrot. We talk a lot about the carrot and stick when 
it comes to engagement. But this Senator suggests that we have been 
patient enough with the carrot, and now it is time to try the stick.
  The sanctions bill that we are considering today is intended as a 
serious wake-up call to Mr. Kim's government. The sanctions are severe 
and they are targeted at those who enable Mr. Kim's regime to conduct 
business abroad. They are also intended as a wake-up call to Mr. Kim's 
advisers, who enjoy a pretty comfortable status quo, thanks to their 
leadership positions. But life is going to be a little bit tougher 
under our sanctions regime, if we advance this--no more luxury goods, 
no more creature comforts, and, if we are successful, no more access to 
hard currency--no exceptions.
  This is an important shift for our government with regards to North 
Korea. As I mentioned, out of geographic necessity I follow 
developments in North Korea very closely, and I have since I came to 
the Senate. I have had the opportunity over the years to spend time 
with U.S. officials who have assumed the very difficult role of trying 
to conduct diplomacy with North Korea. Almost without exception, they 
have advised, when talking about North Korea, to choose respectful 
language, to avoid threats, to find ways to allow one's words and one's 
sincerity to penetrate. We are now at that point where some are saying 
quite strongly that this respectful approach hasn't really gotten us 
anywhere with this regime. This Senator would suggest that we can be 
and must be very firm while at the same time respectful.
  Let me share a couple examples of some things that many of my 
colleagues may not have been aware of. I had an opportunity this past 
September to travel with a couple of my Senate colleagues to Svalbard, 
Norway. Svalbard is where one of the world's global seed vaults is 
located. The seed vault is intended to preserve a wide variety of plant 
seeds from around the world in the event there might be some kind of 
widespread regional or worldwide crisis that would wipe out local crops 
and seed. It is nicknamed ``the doomsday vault.''
  I had an opportunity to go into this vault and just observe what 
various nations have sent to the top of the world up there. In that 
vault we saw one of the few instances of North Korean international 
cooperation. We saw boxes of seeds from North Korea. There was a box 
that came in with over 5,700 plant crop seeds from that hermit kingdom. 
Just last month, North Korea signed the Svalbard Treaty, giving North 
Korea access to the Svalbard Islands.
  We have also heard that North Korea has made use of the Northern Sea 
Route to assist with shipments to Russia. I put this out there because 
whatever reason there may be that North Korea signed on to this 
Svalbard Treaty and whatever the reason may be for its newfound 
interest in the Arctic, the point is that when the regime in North 
Korea sees that it is in its best interests to cooperate 
internationally, there is a willingness to engage. But to this point, 
they have not shown a willingness to engage when it comes to their 
nuclear and ballistic missile programs--at least not to any reasonable 
level of engagement where the terms are not dictated by the North 
Korean regime.
  Here we are today. We have a bill on the floor directed to North 
Korean economic sanctions. It is not about an invasion or the use of 
offensive weapons against the people of North Korea. It is about 
bringing about peaceful change, firmly and respectfully.
  In that vein, let me acknowledge that the people of North Korea are a 
proud, nationalistic people. Like all of the world's peoples, they wish 
to be respected by others. Yet they are governed by an intolerant and a 
very perplexing regime that tolerates hunger and poverty when it is 
clear that there are other choices.
  If the people of North Korea were allowed to look across the border 
they would see an example of prosperity. They would see a strong 
commitment to traditional values. They would see family members with 
whom someday they would hope to reunify.
  None of the world's nations are out to deny North Korea the 
opportunities for that prosperity, traditional values, and the 
reuniting of families. But we do rightly demand--and it is legitimate 
that we demand--that North Korea be a part of the community of nations. 
That means that Mr. Kim must abandon these nuclear ambitions.
  I believe that it is important that our Nation be prepared for 
anything that may come our way. My home State of Alaska is host to our 
Nation's ground-based missile defense capabilities. I was pleased to 
read in yesterday's budget announcement plans to make a $1 billion 
investment in the ground-based missile defense system. Significant 
investments are also made in the Long Range Discrimination Radar, or 
LRDR, which is slated for completion at Clear Air Force Station by the 
year 2020. That radar is exactly what the words imply--a radar that 
will enable our missile defenders to take a really good long look and 
better discriminate between threats and junk. I am also pleased to know 
that the United States is working through the

[[Page S792]]

placement of missile defense batteries in South Korea.
  These investments provide an increment of protection, but the truth 
is that they are second-best to a change in attitude coming out of 
Pyongyang. That is truly what I hope we will achieve through this 
sanctions vote today.
  Thank you, Madam President.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, today I wish to steadfastly support the 
North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016.
  Before I discuss the merits of this critical legislation, however, I 
wish to congratulate the author of the Senate version of this act, the 
junior Senator from Colorado. The bill he crafted will reinvigorate our 
Nation's efforts to thwart North Korea's continued development of 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology. In addition, it seeks 
to further protect our Nation from cyber attack and begin to hold 
responsible those who have committed human rights abuses against the 
people of North Korea.
  I also wish to commend the chairman and the ranking member of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee for working together to shepherd 
this bill through their committee with strong bipartisan support.
  Once again the Senate turns its attention to confront one of the most 
atrocious regimes of the modern era: the so-called Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea--or North Korea. Instead of working to create the 
workers' paradise, which is purported to be one of the autocratic 
regime's primary objectives, millions have starved as part of North 
Korea's policy of placing the military first.
  But make no mistake, the threat posed by North Korea is not an 
inconsequential concern about the domestic affairs of a distant land. 
On January 6, the regime conducted a subterranean nuclear weapons test, 
claiming to have detonated a hydrogen bomb for the first time. Even 
Russia decried the test as ``a flagrant violation of international law 
and existing UN Security Council resolutions.''
  Then, this past weekend, the North Korean satellite launched on 
Sunday passed almost directly over the stadium where the Super Bowl was 
played an hour after the game, according to press reports. This hostile 
act is even more disconcerting when we remember that the technology to 
launch such a satellite into orbit is virtually identical to what is 
required to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile with a 
warhead.
  Unfortunately, these provocative acts are only part of a recurring 
pattern orchestrated by North Korea over the past several years.
  The pattern of closely pairing a nuclear test with rocket launches 
began in 2006, when the regime fired seven ballistic missiles, 
including the long-range Taepo Dong-2. Three months later, North Korea 
conducted its first underground nuclear test.
  These hostile acts prompted the U.N. Security Council to adopt, under 
Chapter VII, Resolution 1695--condemning the missile launch--and 
Resolution 1718--demanding that North Korea refrain from further 
nuclear tests and imposing sanctions on the regime.
  Once again, in 2009, North Korea carried out a virtually identical 
pairing of rocket and nuclear tests. In April of that year, the rogue 
state launched a three-stage Unha-2 rocket. One month later, Pyongyang 
conducted another underground nuclear test. This second round of 
nuclear and rocket tests elicited U.N. Security Council Resolution 
1874, which expanded sanctions, intensified inspections to prevent 
proliferation, and barred further missile tests.
  Unfortunately, Pyongyang was not deterred and repeated its weapon and 
rocket pairing in late 2012 and early 2013. Specifically, in December 
2012, the newly installed Kim Jung-un ordered the launch of another 
Unha-3 rocket. Two months later, North Korea conducted another 
underground nuclear test. The U.N. Security Council responded in kind 
with Resolution 2087--strengthening sanctions related to the missile 
launch--and Resolution 2094--tweaking sanctions related to North 
Korea's nuclear program.
  In addition to the now-cyclical pairing of rocket launches and 
nuclear tests, North Korea has assumed the role of a petulant child in 
a variety of other areas. For example, North Korea has directly 
violated both the Korean Armistice Agreement and article 2 of the U.N. 
Charter by taking kinetic military action against South Korea.
  In 2010 alone, North Korean forces sunk a South Korean patrol ship--
according to a multinational commission that investigated the 
incident--and separately fired artillery rounds at a South Korean 
island, killing two Korean Marines and injuring 17 others.
  North Korea has also been guilty of repeated acts of proliferation to 
rogue states around the world. The Washington Post and the New York 
Times reported that, in 2004, Libya received uranium hexafluoride of 
suspected North Korean origin. Similarly, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence revealed that North Korea assisted the Assad 
regime in constructing a nuclear reactor in northern Syria that Israeli 
forces destroyed in 2007.
  I recite this partial history so that there is no misunderstanding. 
North Korea earned international condemnation not merely for its recent 
transgressions, but for countless bad dealings over the last decade. 
Unfortunately, previous U.N. resolutions and the sanctions imposed by 
our own government have not achieved the desired result of terminating 
North Korea's recalcitrant activity.
  That is why the junior Senator of Colorado's legislation is so 
important. It provides our sanctions with greater teeth. It mandates 
sanctions on individuals who have materially contributed to North 
Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile program.
  I also think it is important to pause here to notice that, unlike 
North Korean autocrats who have imposed their will on the North Korean 
people by sending vast numbers to forced labor camps and early graves, 
the United States' sanctions are directed only at those who facilitate 
violations of international law.
  In sum, North Korea's repression is indiscriminate. Our sanctions are 
focused on punishing the guilty. Accordingly, the junior Senator's 
legislation requires the administration to identify human rights 
abusers in North Korea and direct sanctions against them.
  The bill also addresses one of the growing threats to our nation: 
cyber attack. Therefore, the administration is tasked to devise a 
strategy to confront and counter North Korea's cyber attacks against 
the United States. It also directs the executive branch to designate 
sanctions against those responsible for these belligerent acts.
  This is an important piece of legislation which tightens the ring of 
deterrence against a regime that continues to defy international law. 
This bill's objective is not to needlessly interfere in the affairs of 
a foreign nation; rather, it is to provide a tool to force an aggressor 
into compliance with international law and to deter North Korea from 
committing hostile acts not only against the United States and its 
allies, but also against the North Korean people. I urge the prompt 
passage of this legislation.
  Mr. REED. Madam President, today I join my colleagues in supporting 
the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016. This 
legislation will send a strong message to the North Korean regime that 
there are consequences to its dangerous and destabilizing activities on 
the Korean peninsula. Just in the past month, North Korea has conducted 
its fourth nuclear weapon test and launched a satellite into orbit, 
both of which violate several United Nations Security Council 
resolutions. The bipartisan bill before us makes clear that Congress 
will not tolerate the North Korean regime's continuing and flagrant 
violations of international law.
  This bill is comprehensive and addresses a number of important 
concerns. First, it prohibits defense exports to North Korea and 
withholds foreign assistance to those governments that provide lethal 
military equipment to the government of North Korea. Second, it 
codifies and makes mandatory important cyber security sanctions under 
Executive Orders 13681 and 13694 that are essential to countering North 
Korea's dangerous cyber attacks, like the one perpetrated against Sony 
Pictures Entertainment in November 2014. Third, it includes sanctions 
on individuals who knowingly engage in the serious human rights abuses 
that are perpetuated by the regime against its own people.

[[Page S793]]

  I would like to commend my colleagues from the Banking and Foreign 
Relations Committees who have worked to move this legislation forward. 
It is critical that we use all of our diplomatic and legal resources to 
further restrict North Korea's ability to fund its nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missile programs.
  I urge my colleagues to support adoption of this important 
legislation.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I wish to speak in support of the North 
Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act.
  Last week, North Korea launched a space satellite into orbit in 
direct violation of U.N. sanctions. Last month, North Korea tested its 
fourth nuclear bomb since 2006. North Korea's steady march toward 
expanding its nuclear arsenal continues unabated. Even more troubling 
is North Korea's willingness to sell its nuclear and ballistic missile 
technology to the highest bidder, as demonstrated by its previous 
cooperation with Iran.
  The North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act is an appropriate and 
timely measure to expand U.S. sanctions against not only North Korea, 
but also those that facilitate North Korea's illicit and nefarious 
activities. In doing so, this legislation will deliver the message to 
the North Korean regime that its continued development and 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, material, and delivery systems will 
not be tolerated.
  At the same time, the United Nations Security Council must address 
this issue with the same sense of urgency, unity, and commitment that 
the House has shown and the Senate will demonstrate in passing this 
bill later today.
  First, U.N. member countries must fully understand and implement the 
many existing sanctions against North Korea already on the books. 
Unless they do, the sanctions will never work. The United States has 
minimal trade with North Korea, whereas China, a permanent member of 
the U.N. Security Council, accounts for 70 percent of all of North 
Korea's economic trade.
  Yesterday, a new report released by a panel of U.N. experts found 
that North Korea continues to evade international sanctions because the 
sanctions have been seldom implemented, and some countries do not fully 
understand their obligations under the relevant U.N. Security Council 
resolutions. In other instances, there is simply a lack of political 
will to enforce the sanctions. This has to stop for sanctions to be 
effective against North Korea.
  Second, the U.N. Security Council must adopt new sanctions to 
demonstrate to the North Korean regime that further violations of U.N. 
sanctions will not be tolerated. Even though North Korea has continued 
to evade sanctions for the past decade, the response at the United 
Nations should be to identify the ways to make sanctions more effective 
and targeted rather than to walk away from sanctions entirely.
  We know sanctions can work because they have before. In 2005, the 
U.S. Treasury Department froze $24 million in North Korean accounts 
important to the regime at the Banco Delta Asia bank. As a result of 
this action, which was taken pursuant to authority Congress provided in 
the USA PATRIOT Act, the North Koreans returned to the six-party 
nuclear talks. They stayed at the talks until the frozen assets were 
released 2 years later.
  The bill we are considering today requires the Department of the 
Treasury to reevaluate whether North Korea should be considered a 
primary money-laundering concern, which would permit the President to 
enact the same type of sanctions that brought the North Koreans back to 
the negotiating table 10 years ago. I urge the Treasury Department to 
complete this review as quickly as possible so that the President has 
at his disposal the full array of options to persuade, coerce, and 
effectively contain the dangerous North Korean regime.
  I thank Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Cardin for bringing this 
measure to the floor, and I thank Senator Gardner and Senator Menendez 
as well for their extensive work on this legislation to address the 
nuclear threat posed by the erratic and unstable North Korean regime.
  I urge my colleagues to support this vital, bipartisan legislation.
 Mr. SANDERS. Madam President, the totalitarian state of North 
Korea is becoming more belligerent by the day. In January, the country 
detonated its fourth nuclear bomb since 2006--which the North Korean 
military claims was a small hydrogen bomb. Just last week, the country 
launched a rocket carrying a satellite into space, foreshadowing the 
possible development of a long-range ballistic missile capable of 
delivering a nuclear payload. According to National Intelligence 
Director James Clapper, North Korea recently expanded a uranium 
enrichment facility and restarted a plutonium reactor that could start 
recovering material for nuclear weapons within months or even weeks. I 
am deeply concerned by these actions.
  We must exhaust every diplomatic option we have to pressure North 
Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, halt its aggressive 
military posturing with South Korea, and adhere to the tenets of 
international human rights law. That is why I strongly support the 
bipartisan effort to strengthen sanctions on the rogue North Korean 
regime.
  These sanctions are an important tool in resolving the growing threat 
from Pyongyang. The legislation before the Senate would help prevent 
North Korea from obtaining goods or technology related to nuclear 
weapons, ban foreign assistance to any country that provides lethal 
military equipment to North Korea, and target the country's trade in 
key industrial commodities. These steps are absolutely essential if we 
are to achieve our longstanding mission to end the North's nuclear 
weapons program. Certainly, sanctions are far preferable to preemptive 
military force, which I strongly oppose.
  In addition to sanctions, the U.S. must work with the few nations 
that have diplomatic and economic relationships with North Korea--
namely China--to pressure Kim Jong Un to stop threatening the stability 
of the region and join the community of nations. While China may have 
been a steadfast ally of North Korea's in the past, China now has far 
more shared interests with the U.S. than with Pyongyang. It is time to 
make resolving the Korean peninsula conflict a top diplomatic goal in 
terms of our own relationship with China.
  I am pleased to see that the sanctions bill includes a waiver to 
allow humanitarian organizations to deliver much needed relief to 
ordinary North Korean citizens and authorizes $2 million for 
humanitarian assistance. Sanctions come at a cost, and we must do 
everything possible to make sure the North Korean people--who already 
suffer so much under Kim Jong Un--do not pay an even greater price.
  While I will be necessarily absent for the expected bipartisan 
passage of the bill, I strongly support the North Korea sanctions 
legislation.
  Mr. SULLIVAN. Madam President, today the Senate will vote on the 
North Korean Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act, a bill I am proud to 
cosponsor with my colleague from Colorado, Senator Cory Gardner. This 
legislation mandates new sanctions on North Korea's ballistic missile 
and nuclear program, targets cyber criminals and officials involved in 
censorship, and addresses the regime's long history of human rights 
abuses.
  The recent rocket launch and the fourth nuclear test by North Korea 
last month is a stark reminder that it is a rogue state, under unstable 
leadership that will stop at nothing until it fully realizes its 
nuclear ambitions. The current policy of ``strategic patience'' has 
yielded nothing more than a flagrant testing of American resolve around 
the globe and a weakening of our Nation's credibility. North Korea's 
recent provocations have acknowledged that reality. Congress must act 
and do so loudly. Now, more than ever, we need to send a message to 
North Korea that reassures our allies, forewarns our adversaries, and 
puts the world on notice. This legislation accomplishes that.
  Ms. MURKOWSKI. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, we have a very significant vote coming 
up,

[[Page S794]]

and people are not talking about it as much as they should. We had a 
hearing, and, of course, the Chair was there at the hearing, where we 
had James Clapper talking about the threat that we are faced with here 
in the United States.
  James Clapper--just to remind people--has been around as the chief 
intelligence director or involved with intelligence in hearings in 
Washington for 43 years. This guy knows what he is talking about. He 
made a statement yesterday that we have never been in as high of a 
threat position in all of the 43 years that he has been there.
  In fact, there was an article released yesterday where it was stated 
that ``North Korea had expanded its production of weapons-grade nuclear 
fuel, making clear that the Obama administration now regarded the 
reclusive government in Pyongyang, rather than Iran, as the world's 
most worrisome nuclear threat.''
  That threat is real. We all recall when Kim Jong Un replaced his 
father, and as bad as his father was, he was at least a little more 
dependable in terms of predictability than Kim Jong Un.
  Just yesterday it was reported that he killed the chief of his 
general staff. It was a year ago that he did the same thing. So if 
someone disagrees with him, they execute him.
  Under the leadership of Kim Jong Un, North Korea has repeatedly 
violated Security Council resolutions regarding weapons of mass 
destruction and the means to deliver them. Since assuming power in 
2012, his regime has conducted satellite launches in December 2012, and 
in February 2016 continues to develop it's ballistic missile 
program. It has conducted missile tests from several launched 
locations, and he has conducted nuclear tests in February of 2013 and 
January 2016, so he just continued all the way through it. All of these 
things are in violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions.

  North Korea also continues to be involved in criminal activities 
around the world to include cyber attacks against organizations and 
governments. This bill that we are going to be considering--the passage 
of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act that we will be 
voting on--toughens the sanctions against North Korea by authorizing 
comprehensive sanctions against countries, companies, and individuals 
who engage in certain trade with North Korea.
  This is something that is a fairly recent attempt to get compliance 
with the arrangements that are being made by saying to a country: If 
you continue to do business in North Korea, then we will have sanctions 
against your country.
  This is something that has worked to a degree in Iran. It is a system 
that should be set up, and we will have the opportunity to do that this 
afternoon.
  If anyone engages in trade with North Korea, as well as those 
determined to be responsible for human rights abuses, money laundering, 
counterfeiting, or undermining cyber security, this bill demonstrates 
America's resolve in holding North Korea responsible for its actions, 
along with those countries, organizations, and individuals who are 
assisting them.
  Of course, it is very significant that we go ahead and move forward 
with this, get this passed today, and send a very clear message, not 
just to North Korea but to all of those countries who might be tempted 
to be trading with them that they could be subject to the same 
sanctions.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Toomey). The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I know we have a little shift taking 
place, but I thank Senator Inhofe for his staunch national security 
support and certainly support of this legislation. I appreciate his 
comments, and I think we are going to have a successful day today in 
doing something that is important.
  I think you know the administration has tried to work with the U.N. 
Security Council to get them to impose sanctions, as you would think 
they would wish to do. China has been the holdup there. You would think 
as a next-door neighbor they would be most apt to want sanctions and 
other actions to be put in place to push back against North Korea.
  This is something that is important that we are doing in a proactive 
way, and hopefully it will spur other actions down the road.
  Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. CORKER. I yield to the Senator.
  Mr. INHOFE. It was January 7 of 2013 that I was there on the DMZ. 
That is the largest active DMZ that is out there now--160 miles long, 2 
miles wide. Even at that time, we were talking about the necessity of 
immediately getting sanctions in there to stop the threats. Because our 
intelligence--while it can be good and it cannot be so good, still 
there is speculation that they had that capability, and that capability 
has to be stopped.
  I applaud the Senator and his team for moving forward with this 
issue.
  Mr. CORKER. I thank Senator Inhofe. I think most Americans, unlike my 
colleague, don't realize we still have 28,500 troops there. It is an 
area where easily something can get out of hand. So, again, I thank him 
for his support and for being here today.
  I know Senator Feinstein now has the floor. I yield to our 
distinguished colleague, Senator Feinstein.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the chairman very much. I want 
Senator Corker to know that I fully support his committee's 
recommendation and believe the time has come to enforce and place some 
sanctions against North Korea.
  I think we all judge the world's leaders based on their actions and 
their stated intentions. To me there is no question that Mr. Kim's 
intentions are adverse to the well-being of our country. As a citizen 
of the western United States and a Senator representing nearly 40 
million people in California, this is all very alarming, and it should 
alarm the world.
  If you take stock of North Korea's recent actions and their 
capabilities, the cause for concern is apparent. On January 6 of this 
year, North Korea detonated its fourth nuclear device. Regardless of 
whether it was a hydrogen bomb or not, Mr. Kim's intention is clear: he 
seeks a nuclear arsenal.
  Unfortunately, the measures the international community have adopted 
to date have been insufficient to stop him. In October of 2006, the 
North Koreans first detonated a device which had an estimated yield of 
less than 1 kiloton. In May of 2009, they detonated a second device, 
roughly 2 kilotons. In February 2013, they detonated a third device, 6 
kilotons to 7 kilotons, and the one this year was the fourth. I would 
not be surprised if their most recent test had a greater yield than the 
last.
  Not only have North Korean weapons become more lethal, but their 
stockpile has likely increased over time. According to a February 2015 
analysis by the Institute for Science and International Security, North 
Korea has between 15 and 22 nuclear weapons. By the end of 2014, and 
they could have 20 to 100 nuclear weapons. That is deeply troubling, 
especially as North Korea continues to make advances in their missile 
program.
  Again, experts at the Institute for Science and International 
Security have warned that North Korea likely has the capability to 
mount a nuclear warhead on its medium-range missiles.
  Most of Japan and all of South Korea, each of which hosts tens of 
thousands of U.S. military and civilian personnel, are easily in range. 
And just this past weekend, they again tested an ICBM under the guise 
of placing a satellite in space. According to various reports, North 
Korea tested a three-stage likely Taepodong-2 rocket, which, in fact, 
did place a satellite into orbit.
  Again, to me, the intention is clear. They want to build a missile 
capable of reaching the United States.
  An ICBM on a launch pad is vulnerable to attack. So to evade this 
vulnerability, North Korea appears also to be developing a road-mobile 
ICBM, the KN-08, which it is estimated can reach the United States.
  In April of this past year, ADM Bill Gortney, the head of the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command, said: ``We assess that it [the KN-
08] is operational today'' and that the mobile nature of the KN-08 
makes it a difficult target.
  Gortney also said: ``Our assessment is that they [the North Koreans] 
have the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the 
[U.S.] homeland.''
  It is not just the nuclear weapons and missile program that give me 
pause. In

[[Page S795]]

the last several years, North Korea has committed highly provocative 
acts. North Korea chose to sink a South Korean naval vessel in 2010, 
killing 46 soldiers. It has shelled South Korean islands and planted 
mines along the DMZ that maimed South Korean soldiers. It has 
undertaken sophisticated cyber attacks against U.S. companies, Sony 
Pictures, and South Korean banks.
  Previously, North Korea walked away from the 1994 Agreed Framework 
and withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Most recently, 
it has repeatedly flouted U.N. Security Council resolutions and 
proliferated weapons of mass destruction technologies.
  With respect to its own human rights record, a 2014 United Nations 
Human Rights Council report makes clear that North Korea's leaders 
should be prosecuted for crimes against humanity. The United Nations 
has found that North Korea is committing systematic, widespread and 
gross human rights violations against its own people. The regime 
selectively distributes food to privileged individuals and routinely 
uses starvation to punish dissent. Torture, forced disappearances, and 
inhumane detention conditions are routine. In the past, the regime even 
jailed three generations of dissidents on the concept of guilt by 
association. In its prison camps alone, the United Nations estimates 
that hundreds of thousands of dissidents have died.
  One anecdote from the U.N.'s report demonstrates the total and 
diabolical suffering put upon the North Korean people under this 
regime. Ordinary Koreans must go to extraordinary lengths to survive, 
including prostitution, theft, and smuggling.
  A U.N. investigator was told of an instance when a woman was pulled 
off a train, and a dead, small child--no more than 2 years old--was 
strapped to her back. State security suspected the woman was smuggling 
copper but could find no evidence. After interrogating the woman for 
some time, they asked her to place her child on a desk before them. The 
woman then broke down and began to cry.
  When she finally placed the quiet, dead child on the desk, the 
officials noticed its stomach was red. They then opened the child's 
stomach and found about 2 kilograms of copper inside. To survive, this 
woman was forced to smuggle copper in her own dead child's stomach. No 
mother anywhere on Earth should be forced to such extremes.
  When it comes to the international response to North Korea and its 
provocative behavior, I very much regret that China has not seen fit to 
do more. In my view, China, in its size and capability, has the ability 
to rein in North Korea and is probably the only country in the region 
that can do so.
  North Korea's nuclear test facilities are close to China's border. 
Just like Japan and South Korea, China's security is threatened by an 
unstable nuclear power in its neighborhood. Yet China continues to 
provide the fuel, food, trade, and international protection that 
sustains Mr. Kim's government.
  In my meetings with China's Ambassador Cui in Washington, DC, I have 
expressed to him that China can and must do more. I have tried to 
impress upon him that a nuclear-armed North Korea, with ever-increasing 
weapons, is not in China's security interests.
  The United States cannot sit in silence in the face of North Korea's 
ever-advancing nuclear and missile programs. For some, Iran has been a 
big threat. For me, reading the intelligence and seeing the progress 
over the years of North Korea's nuclear arsenal, I believe North Korea 
is a very serious threat to the well-being of this country. We must 
protect and reassure our allies in the region. That may include placing 
more advanced missile defenses, both in South Korea and Japan, as well 
as closer trilateral military cooperation with these countries.
  The fact that the North Korean Government has resisted international 
overtures and condemnation leaves us little choice. So I come to the 
floor today to support the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enforcement 
Act of 2016. This bill will impose mandatory sanctions against North 
Korean persons and entities involved in weapons of mass destruction 
development, delivery, and proliferation; serious human rights abuses; 
trade in luxury goods; money laundering; smuggling; and narcotics 
trafficking. This legislation alone, though, will not cease North 
Korea's illegal activities. However, it is the beginning of a more 
comprehensive response to North Korea's increasingly dangerous 
behavior.

  I thank the chairman and his committee for bringing forward this 
legislation. I certainly intend to support it. I thank the Senator.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I want to take one moment to thank Senator 
Feinstein, who knows so much about the intelligence around this and has 
spent a great deal of her Senate career making sure she does, and she 
understands China probably as much as any Senator here. She has been 
involved in all kinds of bilateral meetings and discussions and has led 
the Senate in many ways in understanding what is happening within the 
country. So her comments--especially today with this important piece of 
legislation--are certainly well-received and appreciated. Again, we 
thank her for what she does to help keep our country safe and for her 
diligent efforts on the Intelligence Committee.
  I know Senator Markey is next in line to speak. Before he does, I 
wish to thank him for his contributions to making this bill better. He 
amended the bill. I think he has other amendments he would like to see 
happen at some time.
  I would say that there is probably no one here who focuses more on 
proliferation and ensuring that rogue countries--and actually some that 
aren't even so rogue but that have rogue constituents within their 
countries--don't continue to proliferate by sharing information, 
sharing technology, and sharing assets with other countries. So I thank 
him for his contribution in bringing this bill to the floor today, and 
I look forward to his comments.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. President, let me begin by thanking the chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, the gentleman from Tennessee, for the 
focus he has brought to these issues of nuclear proliferation and for 
his great service to our country, having all of our people understand 
the threats that can come from Iran, from North Korea, and from other 
places across our planet. It is the ultimate issue. If we get it wrong, 
the consequences will be catastrophic. So I thank the chairman for 
continuing to have the hearings and continuing to develop legislation 
that focuses our people on this issue. We are the global leader. We 
have to set the example for the rest of the world to follow. I thank 
him for his great leadership on these issues.
  The sanctions in this bill represent a firm response to North Korea's 
latest nuclear test on January 6 and to its launch of a long-range 
rocket last weekend. These brazen actions remind us of the serious 
threat Pyongyang poses to global and regional security and underscore 
the urgency of ending North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.
  Together with our international partners, we must be vigilant against 
North Korea's development of boosted nuclear bombs which would allow 
Kim Jong Un's regime to shrink its weapons and load them onto missiles. 
And we must unequivocally convey to North Korea that any proliferation 
of nuclear technologies to other countries will lead to the gravest of 
consequences.
  North Korea's nuclear and missile programs violate numerous U.N. 
Security Council resolutions. Those include Resolution 2094, which 
required North Korea to abandon ``all nuclear weapons and existing 
nuclear programs'' and imposed sanctions to pressure Kim to return to 
disarmament negotiations. These measures have not yet persuaded Kim to 
abandon his nuclear ambitions, in part because major gaps remain in the 
sanctions regime, particularly its enforcement by China.
  In 2009 the Security Council imposed a conventional arms embargo on 
North Korea, but China insisted on a loophole allowing North Korea to 
import ``small arms and light weapons.'' North Korea has exploited this 
loophole to continue its lucrative international trade in conventional 
arms. According to the U.N.'s own council of experts on North Korea, 
this trade remains ``one of the

[[Page S796]]

country's most profitable revenue sources.'' North Korea is especially 
well known for purchasing light weapons from China, which it then sells 
to other countries for cash.
  Although North Korea's arms exports violate U.N. sanctions, the 
Chinese companies that sell the arms in the first place get off scot-
free. The involvement of Chinese companies in North Korean arms 
smuggling is part of a larger pattern of China's lax enforcement of 
nonproliferation sanctions against North Korea.
  As Assistant Secretary of State Tom Countryman acknowledged in a 
Foreign Relations Committee hearing last May and again in December, 
Chinese entities continue to sell technologies to North Korea that 
could assist in its development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. 
China's efforts to clamp down on these activities remain feeble at 
best.
  If the United States is to continue to provide extensive assistance 
to China's nuclear power industry, China must in return crack down on 
those who enable North Korea's nuclear provocations and its weapons-
smuggling networks.
  The United States must also take action on our own. That is why I 
worked to include an amendment in this bill that will impose sanctions 
on anyone who facilitates North Korea's arms trade, including Chinese 
corporations. My provision will further reduce North Korea's access to 
revenue, undermine its international arms smuggling, and put pressure 
on Kim to return to negotiations.
  We must also put financial pressure on North Korea by designating the 
country as a ``primary money laundering concern.'' This would allow the 
Treasury Department to exclude North Korea from using the dollar-based 
financial system. The use of this designation in 2005 against the Banco 
Delta Asia in Macao disrupted North Korea's access to revenue and led 
one North Korean negotiator to admit that ``you finally found a way to 
hurt us.''
  North Korea is one of the leading counterfeiters of U.S. currency. It 
uses front companies to hide its illicit earnings from trade in 
narcotics, weapons, and proliferation technologies. Although the 
Treasury has designated 18 financial institutions and 4 countries--
including Iran--as primary money laundering concerns, it has never 
designated North Korea. For this reason, I filed an amendment in the 
Foreign Relations Committee--which I will work to include in the final 
version of this bill--that would require the Treasury Secretary to 
determine on an annual basis whether North Korea is a primary money 
laundering concern and to provide Congress with information about that 
determination, as well as any financial restrictions that result from 
it.
  Just as we protect the international financial system from North 
Korea's counterfeit currency and money laundering, we must protect 
American investors who may unknowingly invest their money in companies 
that do business with North Korea. The prospect of American companies 
investing in North Korea is quite real. One American company, Firebird 
Management, has publicly declared its intention to invest in North 
Korea's oil industry.
  That is why I introduced another amendment in committee that would 
require companies that issue securities in the United States to 
annually disclose any investments in North Korea to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. This requirement would not impose any regulatory 
burden on companies that do not invest in North Korea, but those 
companies that do should have that information made public because the 
American people deserve to know which American companies are investing 
in North Korea. Again, I hope to strengthen this bill down the line by 
incorporating that requirement.
  We know that sanctions are not an end in and of themselves; rather, 
they are meant to pressure the Kim regime to return to disarmament 
negotiations. But at the same time, as we pursue that critical goal, we 
must work to reduce the risk that North Korea will use its nuclear 
weapon, whether deliberately or through miscalculation.
  First and foremost, we must make clear to Kim that his regime will 
not survive any use of nuclear weapons. We must also reduce the risk of 
Kim lashing out in desperation. If he comes to believe that we intend 
to destroy his nuclear weapons in a preventive war, he will face 
pressure to ``use them or lose them.'' Thus, even as we work to deter 
Kim, we must establish a means of communicating during crises to avoid 
the risk of accidental nuclear war. Ensuring deescalation at the same 
time as we pursue deterrence and denuclearization will not be easy. 
Nevertheless, given the devastating consequences of nuclear war, it is 
critical that we take a comprehensive approach.
  Without additional sanctions, Kim will never disarm, but without a 
means of controlling escalation, we could one day wake up to a nuclear 
disaster that no one wants and everyone would lament. We should work on 
a continuous basis to make sure that--in the same way the Soviet 
President and the President of the United States were able to 
communicate to reduce the likelihood that we would have an accidental 
nuclear war, we have to make sure we have done everything in our power 
to accomplish the same goal with the North Korean Government, whether 
we like them or not.
  I want to compliment the chairman, the Senator from Colorado, and the 
Senator from New Jersey for their great work on this legislation. It is 
going to be a long struggle to ultimately deal with that regime. I 
think we will have to return to it over and over again, but I think, as 
we are going forward, it is critical--through the Chinese or through 
others--to make sure we have maximum communication. We could have an 
accidental nuclear war. It could happen. We have to make sure that is 
avoided.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I think Senator Capito is on her way down 
and is the next speaker. While we have a moment, I want to thank 
Senator Gardner in his presence. And on an issue that is important to 
not just our security but the world's security, I thank Senator 
Menendez for taking leadership in the way that he has and for working 
with Senator Gardner, Senator Cardin, and me to make sure we ended up 
with something that I believe is going to receive warm support. These 
are issues he has been concerned about for a long time. He has not only 
been concerned about them, he has shown leadership in putting together 
policies to combat them. Senator Gardner knows and said earlier that 
even though this is a step--we all know it is a big step, really, 
especially with the U.N. Security Council unwilling to take actions in 
light of the violations that have occurred. There is going to be a lot 
of diligence that will be necessary to get in what we want to get in, 
but this is certainly a significant step, and I thank him for his 
efforts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I thank the chairman. Earlier when the 
chairman couldn't be on the floor, I thanked him for his leadership in 
the committee, for creating an environment that is bipartisan. At a 
time in which bipartisanship in the Senate is a continuing challenge, 
it is particularly important in foreign relations--something that I 
tried to set out when I was a chairman. I appreciate the way his 
leadership has led the committee so that we could have moments like 
this and of course Senator Gardner, who has very graciously worked 
together with me to bring a moment of what I hope will be an 
overwhelmingly, maybe unanimous vote in the Senate, because when we do 
that we send an incredibly strong message throughout the world. We 
generate leadership, where we may not see the will at the United 
Nations, particularly because of the Security Council's structure and 
the vetoes that exist on things like sanctions. Inevitably, when we 
have led as a country, we often get the world to join us and follow it, 
but sometimes it needs you to lead.

  That is what I believe the Senate is doing today with an incredibly 
strong piece of legislation that, as I said earlier, was the most 
comprehensive strategy set to try to deal with the challenge that is 
North Korea itself. I appreciate the chairman's words and his 
leadership.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.
  Mr. ROUNDS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be allowed to

[[Page S797]]

speak as in morning business for up to 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


             Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Bill

  Mr. ROUNDS. Mr. President, I rise to voice my opposition to an 
upcoming cloture vote on the conference report for the Trade 
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act, commonly known as the Customs 
conference report. This vote is expected tomorrow.
  While I am supportive of the conference report as it relates to the 
Customs legislation, added to the bill at the last minute is a measure 
known as the Internet Tax Freedom Act or ITFA for short. ITFA would put 
in place a moratorium to permanently prevent State and local entities 
from imposing existing sales and use taxes on Internet services.
  In the past, I have expressed my support for ITFA as long as it was 
tied to the Marketplace Fairness Act, or MFA, which would allow State 
and local governments to collect sales and use taxes from online 
retailers without a physical presence within their State.
  In South Dakota, this is a matter of fairness to the families who own 
small businesses and support our local communities. They collect sales 
taxes on their products and on their services. Internet sales providers 
are not required to provide a collection service for those States for 
services or products that are being delivered into those States. It 
requires congressional action in order to allow them to accomplish 
this.
  Pairing these plans would have been a net benefit for States, local 
governments, and small business owners who are already required to 
collect sales and use taxes on their products and services. Together 
they would represent sound tax policy, but that is not what we are 
doing with the Customs conference report by including ITFA and not 
including the Marketplace Fairness Act.
  ITFA, enacted by itself, would put in place a moratorium to 
permanently promote State and local entities from imposing taxes on 
Internet services at the State and local level with no consideration or 
offset for the tax revenue lost by States or local governments that 
already collect many of these taxes.
  I am all for cutting taxes, but I am also a strong proponent for the 
Tenth Amendment and local control and tax fairness for South Dakota 
businesses. In places like South Dakota, we are actually pretty good at 
balancing budgets. In fact, we are required do it every single year. 
Washington has no business telling States or city commissioners how to 
run their books.
  ITFA has zero impact on the Federal budget, but it really impacts 
States and local communities. I believe ITFA paired with the 
Marketplace Fairness Act continues to make sense. One without the other 
does not.
  My opposition is not based on disagreement over Internet access. We 
need it. We should make it available. My opposition is based on the 
principle that we are taking away important revenue sources for State 
and local governments without any means for them to recoup their losses 
so they can continue to provide essential services to our communities.
  Let me explain why sound and comprehensive tax policy is so important 
and why ITFA and MFA should continue to be a package deal. If the 
President signs a Customs conference report into law in its current 
form with ITFA attached to it, municipalities in my home State, South 
Dakota, will lose $4.3 million in revenue annually. That is a revenue 
they rely on to fund essential services, such as training for 
firefighters and police officers, maintenance for parks, upkeep of 
community centers and libraries, and repairs to critical roads and 
bridges.
  Without any way of recouping the loss, local leaders will be forced 
to make a tough decision to cut those important services to the 
community or to raise other taxes. Why is Washington making this 
decision?
  In addition to municipalities losing out on important funds, the 
State of South Dakota would also lose out to the tune of $9.3 million 
annually. Maybe in Washington DC we don't care about $9.3 million, but 
in South Dakota they do. Well, we don't balance our budget, but every 
single State out there or just about every State does.
  When we step back in and we tell them we are going to unilaterally 
take away one source of revenue, but we still expect them to provide 
the services, it seems to me we are moving in the wrong direction. We 
don't have the luxury of South Dakota punting. We are required to 
balance our books every year. At the State and local level, every 
single dollar counts.
  Singled out, it is not right for the Federal Government to dictate 
State and local budgets, as the ITFA part of the conference reports 
attempts to do, to cut a State and local revenue source.
  It is unfair to States like ours, which operate under tight budgets 
and stretch every dollar to the maximum. In fact, in South Dakota we 
aren't overtaxing. Our State burden is the second lowest in the Nation. 
We don't have an income tax. We rely on a very broad sales tax. That is 
the way our people have wanted to do it. That is why conventional 
wisdom in this body and elsewhere has always been the ITFA, which would 
stop taxing the cost of Internet services, would be paired with the 
MFA--the Marketplace Fairness Act--because MFA lets State and local 
governments recover the losses from ITFA.
  MFA would make certain that Main Street businesses aren't at a 
competitive disadvantage to companies that have no physical presence, 
employees or investments in States such as South Dakota because right 
now they don't have to collect that sales tax or the use tax for 
products that are being delivered into the State. Brick-and-mortar 
businesses have that requirement.
  Right now Main Street businesses are operating under a disadvantage. 
MFA would level the playing field. These brick-and-mortar stores are 
the businesses that provide good-paying jobs in South Dakota, pay local 
property taxes, sponsor community baseball leagues, and send their kids 
and grandkids to South Dakota schools and invest in the future of our 
State.
  We have an opportunity to level the playing field for them, rather 
than picking winners and losers so they can continue to be successful 
and enrich the lives of South Dakotans. Let's let the States and local 
governments decide how to manage their finances.
  Under MFA, South Dakota would bring in approximately $25 million in 
new tax revenue, which would more than make up for the losses under 
ITFA. If we pass ITFA without MFA, it dramatically decreases the chance 
of MFA being passed in the years to come, which is a huge blow to the 
mom-and-pop businesses who are struggling to compete with online 
vendors.
  MFA passing the Senate without ITFA is unlikely dead on arrival in 
the House. ITFA would see a similar fate if not dumped into the Customs 
conference report. It would not pass the Senate alone. There is simply 
no evidence to suggest that either measure would pass as stand-alone 
legislation, but together sound tax policy would move.
  That is why it is so important that ITFA not be implemented without 
also implementing the Marketplace Fairness Act. Together the two can 
make a real impact on the lives of South Dakotans and all Americans by 
providing permanent tax relief to South Dakota families, leveling the 
field of play for brick-and-mortar businesses that are contending with 
an increasingly competitive online marketplace and at the same time 
assure State and local governments can continue to provide essential 
services to their constituents while balancing their budgets. That is 
something we could learn a lot about. Because the Customs conference 
report includes only ITFA and fails to address MFA, I will open oppose 
cloture on this legislation, and I encourage my colleagues to join me.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. President, today the Senate will vote on 
legislation to significantly expand sanctions against North Korea in 
response to the country's dangerous provocations in recent months. This 
legislation has my strong support. In light of North Korea's recent 
actions, it is time we act decisively and call on the international 
community, particularly the U.N. Security Council in China, to do the 
same.

[[Page S798]]

  On January 6, North Korea conducted a nuclear test involving the 
underground detonation of a nuclear weapon. One month later, on 
February 7, they effectively conducted a long-range missile test under 
the guise of a satellite launch. Just yesterday in the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper 
testified that North Korea has expanded a uranium enrichment facility 
and restarted a plutonium reactor capable of providing fissile material 
for nuclear weapons.
  Together these actions point to a dangerous trend of advancing and 
expanding North Korea's nuclear weapons program. While the antics of 
Kim Jong Un and his cronies may seem outlandish, the threat posed by 
North Korea should be taken seriously. Though open-source assessments 
cast doubt on Kim Jong Un's claim that he detonated a hydrogen bomb in 
January, the fact remains North Korea tested a nuclear weapon that 
caused a magnitude 5.1 earthquake.
  Though the satellite North Korea fired into space spent yesterday 
tumbling in orbit and it may be unusable, the fact remains that 
according to South Korean officials, if the rocket launched by North 
Korea on Sunday were successfully reconfigured as a missile, it could 
fly more than 7,400 miles. That is far enough to reach the shores of 
the United States.
  Although North Korea has never tested a long-range ballistic missile 
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, there can be no question that 
Kim Jong Un is intent on building up a nuclear arsenal capable of 
striking the United States.
  In my role as ranking member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I 
was in South Korea last July. I listened to the input of General 
Scaparrotti, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea. I heard from our 
servicemembers at Yongsan and Osan, and I sat with South Korea's 
Defense Minister to discuss our shared interests and the importance of 
this critical alliance. I then traveled directly to Beijing to meet 
with Rear Admiral Li Ji of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense. We 
had a frank and meaningful conversation about these topics. Despite our 
many differences, it is not in the interest of either the United States 
or China to have a nuclear-armed North Korea destabilizing Asia and 
destabilizing the globe with irresponsible rhetoric and dangerous 
actions.
  It is my sincere hope that the U.N. Security Council and our 
international partners will follow our lead to expand international 
sanctions against North Korea, applying the lessons we learned in 
blocking Iran's nuclear program. In the meantime, we must continue to 
enhance our missile defense systems both at home and abroad.
  I look forward to working with Senator Sessions to continue our 
bipartisan work on the Armed Services Committee, to provide necessary 
resources to the Missile Defense Agency, and to fulfill our commitment 
to key allies. We must continue to advance MDA's efforts to deploy 
additional sensors and to improve the reliability and effectiveness of 
ground-based interceptors.
  This has the potential to be a pivotal moment for the international 
effort to counter North Korea's nuclear program, but the United States 
must lead the way. Strategic patience has worn thin, and it is time to 
act, by expanding tough sanctions, by strengthening our missile defense 
programs, and by calling on the international community--and especially 
China--to act responsibly and decisively in the face of the threat Kim 
Jong Un poses to global security.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. President, the pending legislation to enact tougher 
sanctions on North Korea is a welcome development as Congress once 
again begins to assert its role in defending national security and 
curtailing the growing number of nuclear weapons around the globe.
  In the decade since North Korea's first successful nuclear test, the 
threat of nuclear proliferation has not diminished. The United States 
concluded an agreement with Iran that leaves its nuclear infrastructure 
in place, causing others in the region to declare their own interest in 
obtaining nuclear weapons.
  Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is the fastest growing in the world, and 
it continues to destabilize the region through its ties to terrorist 
organizations. North Korea continues to build its nuclear stockpile and 
its ability to deliver future weapons.
  In all three of these circumstances, Congress has been the source of 
pressure on these nations by enacting tougher sanctions on Iran, 
placing a hold on security funding for Pakistan, and now this 
legislation today builds on those previous efforts. The results may 
vary, but as I see it, my colleagues in this Chamber and in the House 
have been much more proactive than the administration in imposing costs 
for failing to adhere to international norms.
  President Obama's approach of strategic patience has failed to 
accomplish the objective of bringing North Korea back to the 
negotiating table, and there is certainly no agreement by them to 
dismantle their nuclear arsenal and their nuclear program. North Korea 
has tested three nuclear weapons on the President's watch, and some 
experts believe its stockpile could grow to 100 weapons by 2020--from 
10 to 15 weapons today. In addition to nuclear weapons, the regime is 
believed to possess chemical and biological weapons.
  North Korea is advancing in missile technology and has engaged in 
cyber attacks against South Korea, Japan, and American entities. North 
Korean missiles might not yet be able to reach the continental United 
States, but American servicemembers stationed in South Korea and Japan 
and tens of millions of innocent lives are menaced by the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction in the possession of an aggressive regime 
with little regard for what the world thinks of it.
  The Arms Control Association notes: ``North Korea has been a key 
supplier of missiles and missile technology to countries in the 
developing world, particularly in politically unstable regions such as 
the Middle East and South Asia.'' The recipients of such expertise are 
said to be Pakistan and Iran, among others. In fact, American 
intelligence judged the Syrian nuclear reactor destroyed by the Israeli 
Air Force in 2007 to have been constructed with North Korean 
assistance.
  Equally worthy of attention is the brutal treatment by Kim Jong Un's 
regime of its own people. Just 2 years ago, the U.N. Human Rights 
Council published a report concluding that ``the gravity, scale, and 
nature of these violations reveal a State that does not have any 
parallel in the contemporary world.''
  It would be disingenuous to stand here and place all the blame on the 
President or the administration. North Korea is one of the most 
difficult nations in the world to understand and regional complexities 
make it difficult to find a solution.
  North Korea took advantage of lapses in American resolve during both 
the Clinton and Bush administrations by conducting its first nuclear 
test in 2006. Nevertheless, it is obvious to me that a change in 
approach is necessary. ``Strategic patience'' has been exhausted. 
Stronger measures are necessary. While the ideal approach is to work in 
concert with the U.N. Security Council, we cannot afford to wait for 
consensus on punitive measures from the U.N. that may never come.
  The legislation that the Senate will pass today in a strong, 
bipartisan fashion seeks to compel Kim Jong Un to return to 
negotiations. My colleagues have written legislation that ensures 
sanctions are mandatory--to be waived only on a case-by-case basis that 
requires a written explanation justifying the waiver.
  The secondary sanctions will penalize those outside of North Korea 
who assist in the regime's nefarious behavior. Without China's support 
in restricting North Korea's ambition, America and the world face an 
uphill battle. Up to this point, China has believed that an unstable 
North Korea is more dangerous than a North Korea with an advanced 
nuclear program; therefore, the enforcement of secondary sanctions is a 
necessary step to seek cooperation in dismantling their nuclear 
program.
  I am pleased that the bill includes language to deter and punish 
cyber attacks by codifying sanctions as well as requiring the President 
to offer a counterstrategy to North Korea's cyber

[[Page S799]]

capabilities. The ongoing cyber activities are damaging to our security 
and our economy as well as the economy and security of our friends. The 
bill also attempts to address the deplorable treatment of the North 
Korean people by their own government.
  This legislation is certainly not without risk. China may retaliate 
in some manner, North Korea may become even more bellicose, and it 
could very well fail to pressure Kim's regime to surrender its nuclear 
program. Yet it is painfully clear that the status quo is not working 
and that global security is imperiled as our government stands by.
  Fear of risk and failure will not stop us from exhausting all 
peaceful options to curb nuclear proliferation. Every effort must be 
made to convince North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons. Congress 
is once again doing its part in the fight against proliferation.
  Chairman Corker, Senator Gardner, and the members of the Foreign 
Relations Committee ought to be commended for their leadership on this 
issue, and I look forward to joining them in passing legislation later 
today that will put teeth to American diplomacy.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the pending 
legislation to sanction the regime of North Korea for its belligerent 
behavior toward the United States and its neighbors. Today the Senate 
takes up a bill to increase sanctions on North Korea.
  Most Americans would be surprised, I think, to learn it is still 
possible to increase and strengthen sanctions on North Korea. In fact, 
while we have had certain sanctions on North Korea in place for many 
years, these sanctions have never been as strong as they could be and 
should be, and that is why we are here today.
  We are now dealing with a third generation of dictators in Kim Jong 
Un, who is proving to be as disastrous as his infamous father and 
grandfather, Kim Il-sung, the founder of the Kim regime. The Kim family 
has done whatever it thought necessary to stay in power, including use 
of criminal enterprise to raise revenues and engage in systematic human 
rights abuses against its own people.
  The legislation before us today requires the President to sanction 
anyone contributing to North Korea's weapons program, money laundering 
activities, and human rights abuses. It also requires sanctions on 
anyone helping North Korea raise hard currency through the sale of 
minerals and precious metals.
  Additionally, the bill requires sanctions on anyone engaging in 
activities that would threaten cyber security. Perhaps most 
importantly, the legislation urges the administration to designate 
North Korea as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern--a 
step that would block links between North Korea and the U.S. banking 
system. This is a very powerful sanction. If someone is doing business 
with the Kim regime, they should not be doing business with the United 
States banking system.
  We need to pass this bill and push the administration to leverage the 
power of the Treasury Department to cut North Korea from the 
international banking system. As I have said, this is a very strong and 
powerful sanction. It needs to be put in place and then fully enforced 
by the administration.
  The imposition of sanctions, however, cannot be the end of our North 
Korea policy. As we have seen over the past few months, the Kim regime 
is intent upon disrupting the East Asian security environment, 
threatening both the United States and our allies with ballistic 
missiles and nuclear weapons.
  Sanctions can work, but they must be enforced and they will take 
time. In addition, we need to augment these sanctions with other steps 
to limit the North Korean threat.
  First, we should accelerate efforts to develop missile defenses both 
in East Asia and in the United States. Sanctions can curtail progress 
in North Korea's nuclear and missile programs; however, we must deal 
with the capabilities North Korea already has. We must ensure we are 
prepared for any further advancements North Korea might make before the 
sanctions take hold.
  Second, we need to ensure that we have a credible and reliable 
nuclear force available to deter North Korea and reassure our South 
Korean and Japanese allies. In 2014, and again earlier this year, a 
nuclear-capable B-52 flew over the Korean Peninsula to perform this 
vital deterrence and assurance mission. But to maintain strategic 
credibility, we must modernize our bomber fleet and our nuclear cruise 
missiles.
  To bring the Nation's bombers up to date, the Air Force is embarking 
on plans to develop a new Long Range Strike Bomber capable of 
penetrating advanced enemy air defenses. North Korea's increasingly 
provocative behavior underscores our need for a bomber that can fly 
over any North Korean target. Now is the time to get to work on the 
Long Range Strike Bomber program.
  Similarly, we need to upgrade the nuclear cruise missile carried on 
the B-52 bomber. Cruise missiles fired from a distance allow us the 
option of threatening North Korean targets without flying over North 
Korean airspace. This standoff capability is tremendously important, 
but the existing nuclear cruise missile is based on 1970's technology 
and is well beyond its intended service life. We need to ensure that 
the Air Force has the resources necessary to develop a new cruise 
missile that can defeat modern air defense systems for decades to come.
  We also need to ensure that the National Nuclear Security 
Administration has the resources it needs to refurbish the warhead that 
flies on the cruise missile. Letting our bomber and cruise missile 
capabilities become obsolete would send a disastrous signal to the Kim 
regime that its nuclear program has yielded strategic benefits. On the 
other hand, modernizing our forces shows Mr. Kim that he will never get 
a nuclear upper hand in East Asia.
  The bottom line is that we need a holistic approach to North Korea. 
We need the sanctions that we are considering here today in the Senate. 
We need a strong, strategic deterrent, as I have described.
  I urge my colleagues to support the sanctions in front of us to put 
pressure on North Korea financially. This needs to be a comprehensive, 
ongoing, sustained effort. We have to stand strong against our 
adversaries and stand strong with our allies, we have to do it 
consistently, we have to do it over time, and we have to be steadfast. 
That is the type of foreign policy that can be effective. That is the 
kind of foreign policy we need to undertake. That is what we are trying 
to accomplish with this legislation.
  I commend the sponsors of this legislation who are here on the floor 
today.
  I further hope that my colleagues will support not only this 
legislation but critical investments in our nuclear bombers and cruise 
missile forces when we consider the annual Defense bills later this 
year. I am very familiar with these systems as the B-52s are based on 
Minot Air Force Base in my State. They provide a tremendous deterrent 
and a very important part of the nuclear triad, but we have to continue 
to invest in that nuclear triad--in the bombers, in the ICBM missiles, 
and in our submarine fleet.
  I believe that both sanctions and a strong military are critical to 
our national security and that of our allies, as well as maintaining 
stability in this potentially volatile part of the world. As we have 
said before, the United States is the world's best hope for freedom, 
for peace, and for security.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GARDNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Fischer). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. GARDNER. Madam President, we have heard from a number of 
colleagues who have come to the floor in support of the legislation 
before us today, the North Korea sanctions legislation. Members of both 
sides of the

[[Page S800]]

aisle recognize the need to address the forgotten maniac in North 
Korea.
  We have also heard Members speak about a number of firsts that this 
legislation contemplates--the first time that this would put in place 
mandatory cyber sanctions for cyber attacks. This is something that 
applies, yes, to North Korea today but in the future could apply to any 
nation that wishes to use its means to attack the United States or our 
businesses. So it is critically important, that piece of legislation 
that we are going to pass today that can have a lasting impact on the 
security of this country.
  We have also heard from a number of Members who have spoken about 
their concern with China. This legislation is not targeted at China; 
this legislation is targeted at North Korea. We have talked about how 
it is not targeted at the North Korean people but at the regime of Kim 
Jong Un. The legislation does everything we can to try to give the 
people of North Korea a better way of life; to try to find ways to 
communicate, to break down the silence they are faced with in this 
economic deprivation zone; to give them tools, perhaps radios and cell 
phone technology so they can find out what is happening beyond the 
confines of the torturous regime. But it does have an impact on those 
who try to get around the sanctions and the prohibited activities of 
the legislation--in fact, some of the strongest language in the 
legislation, whether exporting to or from North Korea, whether 
exporting to or importing from North Korea goods, raw metals, precious 
materials that can be funneled--the money from that funneled to weapons 
of mass destruction and other activities prohibited by the legislation. 
So when North Korea is exporting gold or coal--and we know that gold 
and coal are chiefly responsible for the North Korean foreign currency 
reserves--then that could be designated as a sanctioned entity under 
the legislation. Perhaps those entities are in China.
  The fact is, we need cooperation with China. We need cooperation with 
Japan and South Korea. We had that so strongly, and there is a 
possibility we won't. We have an opportunity for trilateral alliance--
that is cooperation between the three nations--and that will allow us 
to work together, to share intelligence, to share the cooperative 
efforts and exercises when it comes to North Korea, and to work with 
China to help make sure that it is sticking by what it says it wants to 
do, which is to denuclearize the North Korean regime peacefully. I 
think it is key to our cooperation with China as we work on any number 
of issues, whether it is trade issues, whether it is issues dealing 
with the Internet, whether it is issues dealing with the South China 
Sea.
  Those are things that we continue to work with China on and are 
working to resolve, but we also have to make sure part of that 
conversation is North Korea. China controls a tremendous number of 
levers and power in North Korea. Ninety percent of their economic 
activities in North Korea can find their way to some way of subsistence 
with China, to create a reliance on China, an economic reliance that 
they have right now.
  So this legislation will target those who are doing too much to 
empower the Kim Jong Un regime and to give them the money they have 
used to develop missiles and to develop weapons of mass destruction.
  Just to give an example of some of the commodity trade that we have 
seen, trade commodity sanctions in this bill would address the issue of 
rare earth minerals and coal and steel and other goods that are 
exported to other countries to earn foreign currencies for the North 
Korea regime. To give people an idea of how much money that is, expert 
estimates put rare earth minerals and steel exports at around $1.8 
billion and $245 million respectively. That is a lot of money that the 
regime is currently getting from outside in trading these goods. But if 
that $1.8 billion and that $245 million goes back to build weapons of 
mass destruction, this act will begin sanctions. The President is 
required to, unless the issue is a very narrow, case-by-case national 
security issue. There is a mandatory investigation into those 
activities. So I think this is a strong step that is receiving 
tremendous bipartisan support.
  With that, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GARDNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GARDNER. Madam President, we have been discussing some of the 
opportunities to strengthen the alliance between Japan and South Korea 
and the United States. In the legislation before us today is language 
that addresses the trilateral cooperation between the United States, 
South Korea, and Japan; that we would seek to strengthen a high level 
of trilateral mechanisms for discussion and coordination of our 
policies toward North Korea; that we would work between the Government 
of the United States, the Government of South Korea, and the Government 
of Japan to meet these goals to ensure that the mechanisms North Korea 
is using when it comes to nuclear, ballistic, and conventional weapons 
programs are addressed by the three nations; that we address together 
in this trilateral alliance the human rights record, the atrocities of 
North Korea, and cyber security threats posed by North Korea.
  It also talks about in the legislation before us that the United 
States, Korea, and Japan will meet on a regular basis. The legislation 
encourages that the United States and the trilateral alliance meet 
together, including the Department of State, the Department of Defense, 
the intelligence community, and representatives of counterpart agencies 
in South Korea and Japan, so that we can continue to focus our efforts 
on the trilateral alliance.
  If you look at the conversations taking place today, we have heard 
our colleague from Hawaii, Senator Schatz, talk about the need for 
cooperation when it comes to THAAD. We talked about the concern that 
our allies, neighbors of North Korea, have when it comes to their air 
defense systems and how they are going to protect themselves from a 
possible missile strike from North Korea. Those conversations are 
continuing. We talked about continued and extraordinary cooperation 
opportunities we have in sharing intelligence among the three nations.
  It all comes on the heels of what has been over the past year--last 
year, in particular, with the 70th anniversary of the end of World War 
II--some recognition of the historical complexity in the relationship 
between Japan and South Korea. Late last year and early this year we 
saw an agreement entered into by Japan and South Korea to address some 
of those historical complexities. That agreement was a new step forward 
in cooperation, in terms of working through these complexities.
  That activity was followed shortly thereafter by North Korea's fourth 
nuclear test. What a great statement it was for Japan and South Korea 
to begin finding solutions to these historical complexities at a time 
that perhaps is needed now more than ever because of the challenges 
that their neighbor in the north poses to them.
  While we work together to find ways to protect our allies and to 
assure them that our alliance and our commitment remains stronger than 
ever, we have to make sure we are continuing to focus on our trilateral 
alliance and on the efforts we have there.
  I know the Senator from Minnesota is on the floor.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Ms. KLOBUCHAR. Madam President, today I join my colleagues in support 
of the North Korean Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act. I commend 
Senator Gardner for his leadership, as well as Senator Menendez, 
Chairman Corker, and Ranking Member Cardin for their leadership on this 
legislation, because protecting the American people and others in the 
region from national security threats like North Korea should, in fact, 
be our top priority.
  The reason there is overwhelming bipartisan support for strong 
sanctions legislation against North Korea is because there is 
absolutely no doubt that North Korea is a well-established threat in 
the region. North Korea threatens global peace and security.

[[Page S801]]

Experts at the United States-Korea Institute estimate that North Korea 
has 20 to 100 nuclear weapons. Since 2006, North Korea has tested four 
nuclear bombs.
  Last month North Korea claims to have tested a hydrogen bomb. While 
our analysts in the United States are skeptical that it was in fact a 
hydrogen bomb, it was a nuclear bomb all the same. With each test, 
North Korea gets closer to testing a nuclear bomb small enough to fit 
on a long-range missile--the very same kind of missile that North Korea 
used over the weekend to launch a satellite into outer space. That 
missile has a range of 5,600 miles. That means that Alaska, California, 
and the rest of the west coast of the United States is actually within 
range of a North Korean bomb. Our European allies and Australia are 
also within range of a North Korean bomb. And, of course, Japan and 
South Korea--two of our key allies in East Asia--are closest to the 
danger North Korea poses. It is in our national security interests to 
protect these vital allies.
  It is not just North Korea's nuclear threat that we need to be 
concerned about. North Korea funds its weapons regime through human 
trafficking--something I care deeply about--through the production of 
illegal drugs and selling counterfeit U.S. currency. North Korea is 
also one of the largest suppliers of the arms trade and has become the 
bargain-basement emporium for old Soviet weapons systems. North Korea 
has a pattern of shipping these illegal weapons on to terrorists in the 
Middle East.
  North Korea also threatens our cyber security. North Korea's cyber 
attack on the Sony Corporation of America in 2014, which leaked private 
communications and destroyed the company's data systems, cost Sony, an 
American company, more than $35 million. Why this company? Because the 
company produced a movie that mocked North Korea's leadership.
  Last summer North Korea pledged to follow up on its attack on Sony 
with more cyber attacks, promising to ``wage a cyber war against the 
U.S. to hasten its ruin.''
  America is not the only target for North Korea's cyber attacks. In 
2013, North Korea launched a cyber attack on three major South Korean 
banks, and two of South Korea's largest broadcasters were temporarily 
shut down after a cyber attack. This cost South Korea an estimated $720 
million. This is real money and real jobs in our own country and in the 
countries of our allies.
  We must take strong action to curb North Korea's nuclear program and 
to address the other threats that it poses to us and our allies. Weak 
sanctions against North Korea have proven unsuccessful. The legislation 
before us today represents the tough response that is necessary to send 
this message directly to North Korean leaders: Disarm or face severe 
economic sanctions.
  This bill puts pressure on North Korea in three important ways. 
First, it requires the President to investigate those that help North 
Korea import goods used to make weapons of mass destruction. All people 
and businesses involved in helping North Korea obtain illicit weapons 
would be banned from doing business with the United States and would 
have their assets and financial operations immediately frozen and their 
travel restricted.
  As we work with our allies to track down and bring to justice those 
who assist North Korea in its effort to harm the United States and our 
allies, we must also hit them financially. This bill will help to cut 
off North Korea's funding and further financially isolate them.
  Second, this bill sanctions those who attack U.S. cyber security. 
This bill is the first piece of legislation to lay out a framework for 
sanctions against the North Korean cyber threat. Combatting cyber 
terrorism is a key national security priority. We must be proactive 
about rooting out those who enable cyber attacks.
  Lastly, this bill addresses a serious human rights crisis in North 
Korea. North Korea is the most isolated economy and society in the 
world. The current regime exerts total control over daily life. Even 
haircuts are controlled--that is right. Women are allowed to pick from 
1 of 14 hairstyles, and men cannot grow their hair longer than 2 
inches. Thirty-two percent of people in North Korea are undernourished, 
and 34 percent of the population receives food aid.
  As a Member who has worked extensively to fight modern-day slavery, I 
am particularly disturbed by the fact that North Korea is also among 
the world's worst human traffickers. The State Department's annual 
report on human trafficking consistently rates North Korea as one of 
the worst human traffickers. The United Nations considers human 
trafficking to be one of the three largest criminal enterprises in the 
world. The first two are illegal drugs and illegal guns.
  Last year I was proud to be the lead Democratic cosponsor of 
legislation with Senator John Cornyn to fight trafficking and help 
trafficking victims that was signed into law by President Obama last 
May. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act tackles trafficking 
head-on. We are doing work in our own country, but we also need to be a 
beacon for those victims abroad.
  Sex and labor traffickers treat North Korean men and women like 
commodities. Yemoni Park, a North Korean woman who escaped after being 
sold into the sex trade and raped at the age of 13, has dedicated her 
life to shining a light on what she calls ``the darkest place on 
Earth''--North Korea.
  This bill calls for harsh sanctions against human rights violators. 
It calls for mandatory investigations into those who bankroll North 
Korean labor prisons and sex trafficking rings. But it also 
acknowledges the important work of human rights organizations that 
provide assistance to those suffering in North Korea and allows them to 
continue their lifesaving work.
  China fuels much of the demand for North Korea's human trafficking, 
and they help fund the North Korean regime. Beyond enacting swift and 
severe sanctions against those associated with North Korea's weapons 
suppliers, hackers, and human rights violators, we must pressure China 
to get serious about sanctioning the North Korean regime. Unless we 
have China's help, the regime will not truly feel the repercussions of 
its actions.
  We have come together today across party lines in a bipartisan effort 
to address the growing threat that North Korea poses to the United 
States and our allies. We are united in our belief that our national 
security--and the security of our allies--requires a swift and strong 
response to North Korea and those who fund its tyrants. We are also 
united in our belief that we must vigorously investigate and sanction 
those who in any way help North Korea develop weapons of mass 
destruction and those who seek to undermine cyber security.
  We must do everything in our power to help improve the lives of 
innocent North Koreans. That is why I am supporting this bill, and I 
thank my colleagues for their leadership--Senator Menendez, Senator 
Gardner, Senator Cardin, and Senator Corker.


                         Ambassador Nominations

  Madam President, I wanted to add one more thing. As I try to do every 
day with Senator Shaheen, I address the issue of the Ambassadors to 
Norway and Sweden. It has been 864 days since we have had an Ambassador 
to Norway. It has been 468 days since the President nominated Azita 
Raji to be Ambassador to Sweden.
  I appreciate Senator Corker's leadership on this issue. We are 
working very hard to get these two Ambassadors confirmed. These 
countries are the 11th and 12th biggest investors in the United States. 
Senator Cruz is the one holding up the vote on these nominations. We 
are hopeful that at some point we will be able to move ahead. This has 
been going on way too long.
  They are some of our best allies in the fight against Russian 
aggression. Norway actually shares a border with Russia. We have to be 
by their side if they take in thousands and thousands of refugees. We 
have talked about the need for a strong Europe. These are the two major 
countries in Europe that don't have Ambassadors from the United States. 
That must change.
  Again, I thank Senator Corker and Senator Cardin for their 
leadership.
  Thank you, Madam President, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. CORKER. Madam President, I think Senator Capito is next to speak, 
but I do want to just mention that I appreciate the way that Senator 
Klobuchar has worked on the issue of the

[[Page S802]]

Ambassadors to Norway and Sweden, and I do think we are on the cusp in 
the next 24 hours of that being resolved. I thank Senator Klobuchar for 
her diligence and patience, and with that I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you, Madam President.
  I rise today in strong support of the North Korean Sanctions and 
Policy Enhancement Act. I commend Senators Corker, Gardner, Menendez, 
and Cardin for their hard work on this bill, and I am proud to be a 
cosponsor.
  North Korea poses a serious threat to the United States. Last month, 
the North Koreans tested a nuclear device as they continue to advance 
their weapons technology. Just this weekend the North Koreans launched 
a satellite as they work to build a ballistic missile program.
  Cyber attacks launched by North Korea have crippled businesses such 
as Sony Pictures and targeted our allies in South Korea and Japan. The 
threats posed by North Korea will only continue to grow, and our 
current policy toward North Korea has failed to protect the safety and 
security of the American people.
  This legislation takes significant steps to deny North Korea's 
capabilities and to limit the nuclear and ballistic missile programs, 
to stop cyber security attacks, and to end North Korea's horrendous 
human rights violations. Mandatory investigations and mandatory 
sanctions are the hallmark of this legislation. Under this bill, the 
administration is required to investigate the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, human rights abuses, and cyber crimes. When 
investigations reveal misconduct related to these activities, sanctions 
are required.
  Importantly, this bill will target minerals and other items that the 
North Korean regime uses to finance its weapons programs at the expense 
of its own people. Sanctions under this bill would also apply to 
businesses or individuals around the world that help North Korea expand 
its nuclear weapons and cyber crime capabilities.
  Similar legislation imposing sanctions targeted towards North Korea 
passed in the House last month with a nearly unanimous vote. That is 
quite an achievement. Today I hope this bill will pass by a similar 
margin and show that the Senate is united in our resolve against the 
security threats posed by North Korea.


                            Clean Power Plan

  Madam President, on another important note, last night the U.S. 
Supreme Court put the Environmental Protection Agency's Clean Power 
Plan on hold. This landmark decision will prevent the Obama 
administration from enforcing this rule until all legal challenges are 
complete.
  West Virginia, my State, has lost nearly 10,000 coal mining jobs 
since 2009. Nearly every week, hundreds of layoffs and more notices 
devastate West Virginia's coalfields, West Virginia families, and 
communities. The impact on State and local budgets has been stark. 
School boards have announced significant cuts to education due to the 
loss of coal severance tax revenue. This is all across the State. As 
bad as the current economic situation is, the Clean Power Plan would 
make things worse for families and communities in my State.
  We know the EPA's playbook. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court 
struck down EPA's mercury rule targeting powerplants since the Agency 
failed to follow the legal requirements, but because the mercury rule 
went into effect years before legal challenges were complete, billions 
of dollars had already been invested and many jobs had already been 
lost.
  My ARENA Act has recognized that the 29 States and hundreds of other 
organizations challenging the President's power grab deserve meaningful 
judicial review. My legislation said this rule could not go into effect 
until the litigation is complete--such common sense. I am very pleased 
the Supreme Court has agreed with this commonsense position and 
recognized the immediate impact of this rule.
  I also want to extend my appreciation to West Virginia's attorney 
general, Patrick Morrisey, for his leading role in this case. On behalf 
of our State, he has headed the legal challenge against this 
administration, and last night's decision is just the latest legal 
setback for an out-of-control EPA.
  Congress has passed legislation disapproving of the Clean Power Plan. 
We sent it to the President and he vetoed it. A majority of our States 
are still challenging this rule, and the judicial branch now seems 
poised to play its role in protecting both the separation of powers and 
the principles of federalism from the administration's power grab.
  Increasingly, this lameduck President stands alone as he attempts to 
further his climate agenda. The American people are not behind him. A 
majority of Congress has come out against his efforts, and now the 
Supreme Court has raised concerns.
  This is an important step toward having the American people--not an 
unchecked bureaucracy--set our energy agenda, and we must continue to 
fight to permanently block this rule.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. KAINE. Madam President, I also rise to support the North Korea 
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016. It is good to see on the 
floor colleagues who have worked on this important legislation from 
Maryland, New Jersey, our committee chair, and the Senator from 
Colorado. I appreciate their efforts and believe this can be a great 
example of bipartisanship and near-unanimous agreement.
  We have witnessed recently many provocations by the North Koreans. 
The ballistic missile test this past weekend violates numerous U.N. 
Security Council resolutions and it threatens both the United States 
and especially our allies in the region. This closely follows a nuclear 
test in January--another deplorable action by North Korea--and missile 
nuclear weapons program proliferation concerns that have been the 
subject of a lot of discussion in this body.
  I appreciate the drafters and the Foreign Relations Committee for 
moving swiftly to deliver a response that includes penalties for the 
missile launch and the nuclear test.
  I will also mention that North Korea's detention of American citizens 
can't be overlooked. This includes the recent detainment in North Korea 
of Otto Frederick Warmbier, who is a third-year college student at the 
University of Virginia. As we move forward with our strategy on North 
Korea, we have to prioritize and ensure the safe return of our citizens 
who are detained there.
  A little bit about how destabilizing North Korea's actions are. This 
recent test was expected, and it is proof of the North Korean grim 
determination to develop nuclear weapons, even if it is hampering and 
hobbling their economy and causing their citizens to suffer. They have 
been given warnings that they shouldn't do it, but they have also been 
giving warnings to the global community that they would.
  This is a country that is determined to defy a host of U.N. Security 
Council resolutions that ban it from conducting nuclear and missile 
tests. The international community has been speaking with clarity about 
what the line is: Don't do this--but North Korea has chosen to proceed.
  Kim Jong Un has once again displayed a willingness to defy the 
international community--and at such a cost to his people. The economy 
there is absolutely hobbled because of his desire to be a militaristic 
leader, but the result is the population of his country is suffering. 
His strategy to have nuclear, military, and economic development for 
his people is not going to work because he can't have both, and the 
legislation demonstrates that these things are impossible by imposing a 
significant economic cost. The legislation shows that the United States 
will hold countries and private entities accountable for compliance 
with rules and law.
  Kim Jong Un's backward calculus has left his country impoverished and 
almost entirely dependent on China for economic trade. Roughly 90 
percent of North Korea's foreign trade is with China, which is why 
China can have significant leverage over North Korea, but the track 
record of China using its leverage to curb North Korean activity is 
very disappointing. We need to continue to pressure China to increase 
sanctions on North Korea and elevate

[[Page S803]]

this issue in bilateral discussions with China. The number of North 
Korean nuclear weapons could soon approach China's within the next 
decade, and that is a direct threat to regional security and global 
security.
  Yesterday, in the Armed Services Committee hearing we attended, DNI 
James Clapper stated that North Korea is expanding its uranium 
enrichment activities, it has restarted plutonium production, and it 
could start extracting plutonium from spent fuel within a matter of 
months.
  China can no longer turn a blind eye to this. As a permanent member 
of the U.N. Security Council, China needs to help foster international 
peace and play the role that an international power on the U.N. 
Security Council needs to play. They need to play the role in 
additionally advancing or pushing for more human rights in North Korea 
because they have the leverage to do so. We don't trade with North 
Korea. Our leverage system is somewhat limited, but China, with a 90-
percent trade share, has that leverage.
  The good thing about these sanctions is that they will sanction the 
activities of Chinese companies and entities that are trading with 
North Korea, and that secondary sanction effect, I think, has the 
ability to work and put pressure on them.
  We have seen recently how sanctions can work in another context, in 
the Iran context. The architects of the sanctions policy with Iran are 
in this room, and they deserve praise because there is no way Iran, a 
rogue nation that was moving forward to develop nuclear weapons, would 
have ever entertained a diplomatic discussion to try to put limits on 
that program had it not been for sanctions that were designed to have a 
strategic and careful effect. So we need to do the same thing here, and 
these sanctions do that.
  In conclusion, the United States has to undertake a more proactive 
approach to North Korea to address the nuclear and ballistic missile 
programs. This legislation is good because it not only puts Congress 
even more firmly on the record in opposition to North Korea's activity, 
but it also provides the executive branch a more robust set of policy 
tools to confront the threat that is posed by Pyongyang.
  This is an example of legislation that came out of the committee--
bipartisan and unanimous. It represents the best of bipartisan foreign 
policy cooperation, and I am strongly in support of the bill.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, I first thank Senator Kaine for his 
input in this legislation and so much other legislation that goes 
through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He is an extremely 
valuable member of our committee, a very good thinker, but more 
importantly he listens to others in the committee and finds a common 
way that we can make important national foreign policy issues 
bipartisan. He has done that and did that with the Iran review act in 
reaching a way that we could bring that together in a bipartisan 
manner. He was very helpful on the North Korean sanction bill that we 
have on the floor, so I thank Senator Kaine for his contributions.
  I say to Senator Corker, I know we are getting near the end of this 
debate. I have been listening to this debate throughout the day, and I 
think it points out the best traditions of the U.S. Senate. So many 
Members have come to the floor in serious debate about the national 
security challenge that North Korea presents--not just, as I said, to 
the Korean Peninsula, not just to our allies in East Asia but 
globally--and how U.S. leadership is going to be vitally important and 
we are going to act.
  The United States is going to act. The Senate tonight is going to 
pass a very strong sanctions bill, a very strong message bill that we 
do not intend to sit back and let North Korea proliferate their weapons 
of mass destruction. We also don't plan to sit back and let them commit 
gross violations of human rights. We will not sit back and allow them 
to attack our intellectual property through cyber security attacks, and 
we are going to act as one, united. We are going to act, Democrats and 
Republicans, House and Senate. We are going to work with the 
administration. We are going to get this done. Then, yes, we are going 
to go to the international community. We are going to put pressure on 
other countries.
  We know the Republic of Korea is with us. We know Japan is with us. 
China needs to be with us, and we are going to go and talk to China, 
explain and work with them so we can get international pressure to 
isolate the North Korean regime until they change their course. It is 
critically important to our security but also to the people of North 
Korea. I thought this debate has been in the best tradition of the U.S. 
Senate.
  Again, we had the architects, as Senator Kaine pointed out, drafting 
this bill. Senator Corker's leadership clearly set the climate in our 
committee so we could have that type of debate. I am sorry no one here 
could sit in on some of Senator Corker and Senator Menendez's meetings 
as they were negotiating the specific terms of the bill. Each had their 
views, but they listened to each other. They recognized that by 
listening to each other they could come out at the end of the day with 
a stronger bill. As a result of our two colleagues, we were able to 
reach that common ground and I think very shortly we are going to be 
able to show the people of in country the best traditions of the U.S. 
Senate on foreign policy issues.
  I am very proud to work with Senator Corker and my colleagues on this 
bill.
  Thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Madam President, obviously I appreciate the comments of 
the distinguished ranking member. Our former chairman, Senator 
Menendez, is here; Senator Gardner, the two of them. We are way ahead 
in the Senate in many ways in addressing this issue prior to these last 
provocations by North Korea. I thank them for that.
  Again, as Senator Kaine mentioned, we are doing it in the best 
fashion of the United States. Where there are differences, we worked 
together to hammer those out and ended up, as Senator Cardin just 
mentioned, with a stronger piece of legislation.
  I also commend the House. They sent over a very good bill. They 
really did. It was strong. Senator Gardner and Senator Menendez, with 
all of us working together, were able to broaden it out and to deal 
with some other issues that were not dealt with in that piece of 
legislation.
  The fact is, things have occurred since that legislation passed that 
have caused people to want to put in place a much stronger, much bolder 
footprint as it relates to North Korea.
  What is amazing--and I appreciated your comments about Senator Kaine. 
I don't think we have a more thoughtful or more principled member on 
our committee, and I don't think there is any way the Iran review act 
would have occurred without him taking the steps that he did to break 
the logjam at that time. Let's face it, with some important 
constituents it mattered, and it allowed us to move ahead with it--
obviously, Senator Menendez on the front end and Senator Cardin as the 
new ranking member.
  What is amazing in many ways is that North Korea has gotten this far 
along. I mean, it has been through multiple administrations, differing 
parties. Over the last 20 years, they have just continued to move 
along. While I think our Nation did a very good job in focusing on the 
problems that Iran was creating, and Senator Menendez, who is sitting 
beside me, certainly led in putting sanctions in place with Senator 
Kirk and others. We moved swiftly to arrest that. Hopefully, while we 
had disagreements over the content of the actual agreement--and that is 
represented by differences in votes on the agreement itself--it did 
bring them to the table. What is amazing is that again they have 
progressed so far along, way beyond where Iran is.
  What is also amazing to me is that China--I am going to be having 
those conversations this weekend with our counterparts in Munich 
regarding this very issue. What is amazing to me is you have right on 
their border this country which is definitely, you have to say, a rogue 
country that is creating provocations in the region.
  We have all visited the DMZ and have seen that we have 28,500 troops 
who are there to keep peace. They have been

[[Page S804]]

there since 1953. So we are right there in the region. We have allies. 
Again, it is amazing that it has gone this far; that China has not been 
willing to take the steps; that, as Senator Kaine mentioned, their 90 
percent trade partner could easily cause this to go in a different 
direction. But even more importantly, here we are taking action that I 
hope will lead to other members of the international community joining 
us in sanctions. But China--the very entity that could do something 
about this--is blocking the U.N. Security Council's action toward this 
being done on a multilateral basis on the front end.
  But this is what happens. In the past, the Senate has taken 
unilateral action. We know we are much better off with multilateral 
sanctions. A lot of times it starts this way. It started this way with 
Iran, and over time we were able to build worldwide support--or mostly 
worldwide support--toward isolating them and causing them to come to 
the table.
  Again, this country is much further along. Hopefully we will have the 
same success. But we have to realize, because of the 20 years of 
efforts that they have underway and especially the bold steps they have 
taken since 2003, as Senator Gardner so aptly outlined in an earlier 
discussion, we are going to have to do far more than this. We need to 
put this in place, but we also have to remain diligent and keep moving 
ahead. It may take additional actions down the road. It is certainly 
going to take tremendous oversight and involvement by the 
administration, and the administration to follow, and the 
administration after them. This is a great step, though, for the 
Senate. It is a great step for our country.
  Again, I thank our House colleagues. My guess is that we will send 
this bill back over this evening at about 5:45, some changes may be 
made, and it will go to the President. We will have spoken with one 
voice in the best way the Senate speaks, and in a strong way. We will 
be doing something that furthers the safety and security of our own 
citizens, which is what we are here about.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, as we are winding down this debate 
that has been extraordinary not only because of its unanimity, which I 
think is incredibly important when we are facing a challenge in the 
national security interests of the United States, but also because of 
the tone it set and the seriousness of the issue with which Members on 
both sides have taken to it--that is incredibly important. I know my 
colleagues--the distinguished chairman and the distinguished ranking 
member--have spoken to this, but it is important to note that when the 
Senate on a bipartisan basis perceives a real threat to the potential 
national security of the United States and of significant allies, it 
can come together and send not just a powerful message but a powerful 
strategy to try to deal with that challenge. So I salute all of my 
colleagues for having engaged in this debate, and I thank the 
leadership of the committee, as well as Senator Gardner, for working 
with me.
  When I introduced this legislation last year, I felt that the time 
for strategic patience--which had been a hallmark of our policy--had 
run its course. We had hoped that patience would have had a unique 
regime in North Korea moving in a different direction. But it came to a 
point where multiple tests of nuclear explosions, each increasing in 
the size of its effectiveness; the attempts to miniaturize those 
efforts; the missile launches they were going through; the terrible 
labor camps and other human rights violations inside of North Korea and 
what is happening to the North Korean people--that strategic patience 
in and of itself was not getting us to the goal. If anything, while we 
were being patient, the North Koreans continued to move in a direction 
for which we needed what I think is a strategic resolve. And that is 
what we have come to here today--a bipartisan effort to have a 
strategic resolve to not only focus on North Korea but also the 
secondary sanctions to say: Those who want to deal with North Korea and 
to help North Korea achieve its goals in violation of international 
norms will have a consequence.
  Right now we have all been focused on North Korea as a government, as 
an entity, but this legislation now broadens that to say to those who 
want to help the North Koreans provide the material wherewithal for 
their nuclear missile and other programs that there is a consequence to 
you. I believe that is an appropriate use of sanctions. So I want to 
close on this question of sanctions.
  For 24 years between the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the last 
10 in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, I have viewed U.S. foreign 
policy in that peaceful diplomacy has an arsenal. That arsenal is in 
part how one can direct international opinion to a country that is 
violating international norms, to the extent that country can really be 
affected by international opinion. North Korea is an example of a 
country that is difficult to affect by international opinion. There is 
the use of aid and the use of trade as inducements to a country to act 
in a certain way and join the international community and follow the 
norms and international will and then the denial of aid or trade and 
other sanctions as a way to get them to move away from the direction in 
which they are violating international norms.
  Outside of that universe--international opinion, use of aid, use of 
trade, denial of aid, denial of trade, and sanctions, particularly that 
we have begun to perfect in the financial sector--which can be a very 
powerful tool. It shouldn't be used bluntly but nonetheless is an 
important tool in an arsenal of peaceful diplomacy in the world.
  Looking aside from the military universe of what is available to us, 
which should be our last resort, when we are talking about peaceful 
diplomacy, there are moments in which sanctions are the last use of our 
peaceful diplomacy and a way to get countries to move in the direction 
we want. This moment, which I think is about strategic resolve, does 
exactly that. It uses sanctions not just against the regime in North 
Korea but against those who would give it the wherewithal to follow its 
illicit pursuits. I think that is what is incredibly powerful about 
this legislation and the appropriate use of our arsenal of peaceful 
diplomacy in the hopes that we can deter the North Koreans from where 
they are and move in a different direction and in the hope that we can 
get other countries in the world--and it will have to be more than 
hope; it will have to be a strategic resolve to get those other 
countries to join us, as we did in the case of Iran. We did not start 
with the world wanting to come together with us because of their 
economic interests and other strategic interests. Through American 
leadership, we ultimately drove the moment in which we had a 
multilateral international effort that brought the Iranians to the 
negotiating table.
  It is my hope that what happens here in the Senate today begins a 
process that can proselytize others in the world to join us so that the 
nuclear nightmare that is potentially North Korea never ever 
materializes.
  With that, I hope we have an overwhelming unanimous vote on this 
legislation. I again thank the leadership for working with us.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, as I listen to my colleagues, I think we 
know how proud we are to serve with people who have such deep knowledge 
and strategic views on how we as a nation can better defend ourselves 
and lead the world.
  To Senator Menendez's comments about America's strength, yes, I think 
everyone understands that we have the greatest arsenal in the world. We 
do. But America also understands the power of diplomacy, and diplomacy 
has to be backed up with incentives and disincentives.
  Incentives, yes. The American taxpayer is generous with development 
assistance and our assistance in helping countries develop into 
stronger democracies in which they can be stronger economies and have a 
better life for their people and, by the way, be better consumers of 
U.S. products. That is what America does--it offers incentives--but we 
also lead the world in saying: If you do not follow the internationally 
acceptable norms, there will be consequences, and those consequences 
mean that we will not let you do commerce to strengthen your

[[Page S805]]

ability to harm your neighbors and to harm global security.
  That is what Senator Menendez was talking about. The sanctions we are 
imposing here are aimed directly at North Korea's ability to compile 
weapons of mass destruction, to harm their own people, and to harm 
others through the use of cyber. That is what these sanctions are aimed 
at. They are aimed at preventing them from being able to do that.
  It also shows U.S. leadership because our allies look to the United 
States first. It is an international financial system, and if the 
United States is not prepared to move forward, we cannot expect the 
rest of our allies to move ahead. So it is a clear signal that we are 
prepared to take these actions. We are taking these actions. We are 
going to take them by ourselves if we have to, but it will be much more 
effective if we can get the international community to support us.
  Senator Menendez is absolutely correct. I remember when we did this 
against the apartheid of South Africa. We were able to get actions 
taken by other countries after we acted. The Senator is absolutely 
correct on Iran. We acted on Iran; we then got other countries to act. 
If the United States had not shown the leadership, they would not have 
acted. That is now true with North Korea. Our actions will help us get 
other countries to act so that we can hopefully accomplish our goal of 
a peaceful North Korea without the use of our military might.
  Let me explain what is at stake here. We all understand the tests 
that are going on with the so-called satellite tests to be able to 
develop a missile that can deliver a weapon well beyond the Republic of 
Korea that could directly attack U.S. interests and certainly our 
allies' interests. That is what they are trying to do with these tests, 
is to develop weapons of mass destruction that could cause unspeakable 
damage. That is what we are trying to prevent. And it is not just the 
direct actions by the North Koreans; they have already shown their 
willingness to work with other rogue states in developing weapons of 
mass destruction. If we allow them to accumulate these weapons, they 
could then transfer them to other rogue countries and they could be 
used against our interests. We also know that North Korea is willing to 
make arrangements with terrorist organizations, and these weapons could 
end up in the hands of terrorists and be used against our interests.
  That is what is at stake. There is a lot at stake, and that is on the 
weapons program. We already saw North Korea act in regard to Sony on 
cyber. We know this is a growing field. If we don't take action now, 
the circumstances are only going to get more damaging to U.S. 
interests.
  The one area that I really congratulate Senator Gardner and Senator 
Menendez for bringing to this bill is the human rights issues, the 
gross violations of human rights. We talked about this. There is no 
country in the world that treats its citizens worse than North Korea 
does. They are literally starving their population. They are starving 
their population. They torture their population. They imprison anyone 
who dares say anything against the government. They do summary 
executions if they don't like you. We know that. It has been documented 
over and over again.
  This legislation speaks to American values. Our strength is in our 
arsenal and our strength is in our universal values; that we won't 
allow that to happen; that, yes, we have an interest in how the people 
of North Korea are treated; that these are international norms that 
have been violated by North Korea.
  I just wanted to follow up with Senator Menendez because I thought he 
articulated so well about America's strength and how we act. It is not 
just because we have the best military in the world; it is because we 
have the will to stand up for values that are important for not only 
our national security but for global security.
  When the United States leads, other countries join us, and we get 
results. Hopefully, we are going to be able to change North Korea's 
conduct through these measures. That is in the best interest of the 
United States, it is in the best interest of our allies, and it is in 
the best interest of North Korea. That is what this legislation speaks 
to.
  I share Senator Menendez's hope that we will see a very strong vote 
in a few minutes, and I know that my colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle have expressed their views on this. I urge everyone to support 
this effort and to show America's resolve in the united policy in this 
regard.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. GARDNER. Madam President, I want to thank all of my colleagues 
for their thoughtful input during this debate. We have had great 
discussions from numerous Members who have come to the floor throughout 
the day to discuss North Korea and the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 
Enhancement Act.
  I want to thank Senator Corker for his leadership on the committee, 
the product of which is a very good bipartisan sanctions action. I hope 
and agree with Senator Menendez, our colleague from New Jersey, that 
this will indeed receive unanimous support.
  I wish to thank Senator Menendez through the Chair for his efforts to 
make this a success, and thanks to the ranking member of the committee 
and ranking member of the Asia subcommittee, as well, for their work. 
We set out a year ago to work on this problem and address this 
challenge.
  The purpose of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act 
is very simple. The purpose of the bill is to peacefully disarm North 
Korea through mandatory sanctions that would deprive the regime of the 
means to build its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, to deprive 
the regime of its means to carry out malicious cyber activities, and to 
deprive the regime of the means to continue its gross abuse of the 
human rights of its own people. That is the purpose of this bill. 
Obviously, there is more work to do.
  The discussions today talk about the work we have to do with our 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, in the other Chamber, and 
the work we have to do around the globe to make sure that the United 
Nations Security Council recognizes this challenge and that China 
understands our basis of cooperation depends on actions against 
something we both agree on, and that is that we shouldn't have a 
nuclear North Korea.
  Let's build that relationship of cooperation with China. Let's build 
that relationship of trilateral alliance among South Korea, Japan, and 
the United States. Those are the things we can begin to accomplish with 
this legislation.
  I had a conversation with Admiral Gortney not too long ago about 
North Korea. He is the head of NORTHCOM, headquartered in Colorado 
Springs, CO. It was a conversation about North Korea and what he sees. 
Through his comments, you can tell he is concerned, and he believes the 
situation in the Korean Peninsula is at its most unstable point since 
the armistice. Over six decades, we today are seeing the most unstable 
point on the Korean Peninsula because of a rogue regime that tortures 
its own people, kills its own leaders, and deprives its citizens of 
human dignity.
  Strategic patience has failed. One expert said we have moved from 
strategic patience to benign neglect. That is not leadership. So today 
we start a new policy based on strength and not patience. This 
legislation would mandate--not simply authorize but mandate--the 
imposition of sanctions against all persons who materially contribute 
to North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile development; import 
luxury goods into North Korea; enable its censorship and human rights 
abuses; engage in money laundering and manufacture of counterfeit goods 
and narcotic trafficking; engage in activities undermining cyber 
security; have sold, supplied or transferred to or from North Korea 
precious metals or raw metals, including aluminum, steel, and coal for 
the benefit of North Korea's regime and its illicit activities; that 
is, $1.8 billion in raw metals, $245 million in other goods that are 
sanctioned under this act, including those entities that decide they 
would import from North Korea if that money they would generate from 
the sale of that import goes to the development of proliferation 
activities.

[[Page S806]]

  The cyber sanctions and strategy that we require are unique to the 
Senate bill. They will be the first mandatory sanctions in history 
passed against cyber criminals. This bill also codifies Executive 
orders 13687 and 13694 regarding cyber security, as they apply to North 
Korea, which were enacted last year in the wake of the Sony Pictures 
hack and other cyber incidents. It is also a unique feature of our 
Senate bill today.
  The mandatory sanctions on metals and minerals are unique to the 
legislation. Expert estimates, as we just said, put North Korea's rare 
metal minerals and steel exports at around $2 billion, so these 
sanctions could have a significant impact in deterring the regime and 
its enablers. The sanctions in this bill are secondary, as we have 
discussed, which means they would be applied to individuals and 
entities, not just in the United States but around the world, who would 
assist the Government of North Korea and the designated entities that 
engage in the activities prohibited by this legislation. It mandates a 
strategy and sanctions against North Korea's human rights abuses.
  You can see what it does on the chart. You can see the opportunity we 
have before us and the American people and our obligation to make sure 
we are doing everything we can to stand up for the people of North 
Korea and stand up to the totalitarian regime of North Korea.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation tonight, this 
bipartisan product of countless hours of debate and discussions and 
negotiations, and to come away with a good product that we can be proud 
of, to work with the House Members so that this is on the President's 
desk. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  I yield my time.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Lee). The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all time be 
yielded back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CORKER. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the committee-
reported amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment was ordered to be engrossed, and the bill to be read a 
third time.
  The bill was read the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the bill having been 
read the third time, the question is, Shall the bill pass?
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. CORNYN. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the 
Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Graham) and the Senator from Alaska 
(Mr. Sullivan).
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Durbin) and 
the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 96, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 20 Leg.]

                                YEAS--96

     Alexander
     Ayotte
     Baldwin
     Barrasso
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Blunt
     Booker
     Boozman
     Boxer
     Brown
     Burr
     Cantwell
     Capito
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Cassidy
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coons
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Cotton
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Donnelly
     Enzi
     Ernst
     Feinstein
     Fischer
     Flake
     Franken
     Gardner
     Gillibrand
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Heinrich
     Heitkamp
     Heller
     Hirono
     Hoeven
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kaine
     King
     Kirk
     Klobuchar
     Lankford
     Leahy
     Lee
     Manchin
     Markey
     McCain
     McCaskill
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Moran
     Murkowski
     Murphy
     Murray
     Nelson
     Paul
     Perdue
     Peters
     Portman
     Reed
     Reid
     Risch
     Roberts
     Rounds
     Rubio
     Sasse
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Scott
     Sessions
     Shaheen
     Shelby
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Thune
     Tillis
     Toomey
     Udall
     Vitter
     Warner
     Warren
     Whitehouse
     Wicker
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Durbin
     Graham
     Sanders
     Sullivan
  The bill (H.R. 757), as amended, was passed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

                          ____________________