SECRET, GOTCHA, MOTIONS TO RECOMMIT; Congressional Record Vol. 165, No. 96
(Extensions of Remarks - June 10, 2019)

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[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E728]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  SECRET, GOTCHA, MOTIONS TO RECOMMIT

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. BRAD SHERMAN

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                         Monday, June 10, 2019

  Mr. SHERMAN. Madam Speaker, the rules of the House normally provide a 
substantial amount of time between when members receive a proposed 
legislative text, and when they are called upon to vote. Ordinary 
process requires that before voting to add any, or subtract any 
language from the statutes of the United States, that a member of 
Congress should review the proposed legislative enactment, its 
implications, and whether the statutory change will actually achieve 
the intended purpose of the legislation.
  It is not enough for a member of Congress to vote for legislation 
because he or she agrees with the purposes, sentiments, and rhetoric of 
its supporters. What matters is the actual effect of the statuary 
language.
  The minority has adopted the tactic of announcing a motion to 
recommit just minutes before members are called upon to vote on it. 
Even when the motion to recommit is only a few pages, it may add or 
subtract a section of law that requires considerable analysis. It 
cannot be presumed that the motion to recommit will achieve its stated 
purpose or will not have unforeseen consequences.
  If the minority is engaged in serious legislating, they would publish 
their proposed motion to recommit (or even publish two possible motions 
to recommit) at least 24 hours before we are expected to vote on final 
passage. Of particular concern to me is proposing legislative language 
and claiming that it will be helpful to strengthen the U.S.-Israel 
alliance. Without a few hours to study a matter, it is difficult to 
determine whether the statutory language will actually achieve that 
objective and avoid unintended consequences.
  Moreover, those seriously interested in improving the U.S.-Israel 
alliance would share their purposed legislative texts a day or two in 
advance (or perhaps a week or two ahead in advance) with the members 
(in my case the co-chair) of the Israel Allies Caucus, and they would 
also share it with other members who have established their dedication 
to the U.S.-Israel relationship.
  Pseudo-Zionists will claim to be supporting the U.S.-Israel alliance 
while instead weakening that alliance through partisan tactics. On 
occasion they will spring a supposedly pro-Israel measure for a vote 
just minutes after it is made available even to the most pro-Israel 
members in Congress.
  If a measure proposed a legislative change and I have not had enough 
time to review its implications, and how the statutory language would 
dovetail with the existing statutory provisions--in such a case I must 
vote ``no''.
  I would hope that the rules of the House would be amended so that 
motions to recommit must be published soon after the rule for the 
consideration of the underlying legislation is published.

                          ____________________