Election Security (Executive Calendar); Congressional Record Vol. 165, No. 98
(Senate - June 12, 2019)

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[Pages S3356-S3357]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                           Election Security

  Mr. LANKFORD. Mr. President, we are 8 months away from the first 
primary of the 2020 election. There is a false belief that the 2020 
election is a year and a half away when it is 8 months away.
  In his May 29 speech, Robert Mueller made the statement that there 
were multiple systematic efforts to interfere in our election. That 
allegation deserves the attention of every American. FBI Director Chris 
Wray made the statement that the 2018 election was a dress rehearsal 
for the big show.
  There are a few statements that we can argue about in this body. I 
find absolutely no one arguing in this body that the Russians didn't 
try to interfere in our election of 2016. If you go all the way back in 
history to 2012, the Russians actively engaged in the Ukrainian 
election. In that election, they found multiple ways to interfere and 
to change the stories on social media. They found multiple ways to 
interfere in their election internally. That interference in 2012 was 
their practice run for what they launched on the United States in 2016.
  It is not just against us. The Russian Federation has attacked every 
single NATO country's election--every one of them. It just happened to 
come to us last. I have no doubt that this will not be the last time 
the Russians will try to interfere in our elections.
  As I walk through the entire first section of it over and over again, 
what is clear from the Mueller report is they repeat what they have 
found and how they went through the process of what the Russians were 
trying to do in working with social media entities to try to create 
fake American accounts in order to put out fake information online and 
in trying to find as many different places as they could in order to 
put out stories to create confusion and chaos.
  I have had multiple folks back in my State who have asked me, why 
would the Russians do this? It is because the Russians cannot match us 
militarily, economically, or culturally, so they use alternative ways 
of doing warfare. For them, their favorite type is just stirring up 
chaos. They look for every time Americans or any free democracy argues 
with another, and when they find democracies arguing with each other, 
they reach in and take both sides and try to elevate the arguments.
  Basically, what I have told folks at home is that it is like two kids 
on the playground who are fighting. There is always a third kid on the 
edge of the playground who screams ``fight, fight, fight'' in trying to 
get as many people as possible to come to the fight. Well, the Russians 
are that other kid on the playground. They are not actually one of the 
kids fighting; they are just trying to make it louder and bigger.
  The Russians have actively engaged in trying to stir up any kind of 
controversy, and elections are just one place in which a democracy has 
controversy. They stir up controversy just as much anywhere else they 
find it, but it is easier at election time when Americans are making 
decisions and taking sides on their own. They do this on social media, 
but we also know from the Senate Intelligence Committee and its 
excellent work in its bipartisan process, as well as from the Mueller 
report, of what they were trying to do in their reaching into election 
systems.
  There were 21 States that had their elections systems probed by the 
Russians. That means, electronically, the Russians went in to see if 
the doors were locked. If they found that a door was locked and they 
couldn't easily get into the system, they would move on to another 
State and see if they could find a way to get into its system. The good 
news in this process is that the Russians were not able to get into a 
single election as far as their affecting any of the votes.
  Through all of the investigations from every single State, from an 
intelligence investigation, from our intelligence community and its 
investigations, from the FBI and its work, and from the Mueller report, 
there were no votes that were changed. We know that. We also know that 
the Russians were looking and what they were trying to find. What they 
did find is access to voter databases. That tells us, for the next 
election, they will be looking to see if they can get to that again. 
This is the lesson we need to learn from this as they do their 
spearfishing--as they reach out to different election systems.

[[Page S3357]]

  Here is what I think we can do in the days ahead and what we can have 
as our basic findings. As a nation, we need to be prepared for this. 
There are a couple of ways we can do it, and we have made very clear 
proposals in order to take this on.
  We need to give security clearances to each and every State so that 
if we discover something on the Federal side and if anyone in the 
intelligence community identifies there is a problem, one can rapidly 
get to a State and ask, are you aware of this? That was not present in 
2016. We didn't have points of contact between the Department of 
Homeland Security and every secretary of state in each State so they 
could also maintain rapid security, not only just normal communication 
but at the classified level as well.
  We need the DHS to voluntarily engage with every single State and 
ask, would you like an additional layer of cyber protection? I can't 
imagine a State would not choose to add an additional layer on top of 
its existing cyber protection.
  We also need to encourage States to be attentive to any 
vulnerabilities they have in their election systems. This is not 
something we can do at the Federal level. At the Federal level, we 
don't tell States and counties and precincts how they should do their 
elections; that is a State's unique responsibility.
  We have a different election system in Oklahoma than what they have 
in Louisiana and in Texas and in Kansas. Although there are border 
States right around us, you would think we would all share and do it 
exactly the same, but we don't. That is actually a strength of our 
system. The Russians can't get into one system, hack into it, and then 
get into our entire election system, because States do it differently 
across the country. Yet we do need to be attentive if any State has a 
vulnerable system.

  Right now, the greatest challenge we have is with the States that 
actually use paperless voting systems, for there is no way to verify 
the accuracy of those votes. If all of the votes are done 
electronically--and there are States that don't do it, like mine. We 
don't do it that way, but some States do. In fact, there are five 
States that do it that way. You are basically walking up to an iPad, 
pushing different buttons, and then walking away. That all looks very 
clean, and there is no threat like there was in 2000 of hanging chads 
because you can see it there. The problem is, if there were a problem 
with that software, there would be no way to verify that vote.
  In my State, you mark on a paper ballot, and you run it through an 
optical scan. At the end of election day, they count up all of the 
things from the optical scan, and the paper ballots are secured away. 
If there is a question about a machine and its count, we can go back 
and verify it.
  In other States, they have systems that are very similar to that of 
an iPad in which you can kind of push your way through the buttons on 
it, do it all electronically, and look at it. When you decide ``this is 
exactly how I voted'' and you push the final button, it prints a paper 
receipt, basically, that is kept there. Then you can verify how you 
voted on the paper, which is stored on the machine, and you can also 
look at it electronically. It is very clean and very easy. There are 
other places that only use paper and count it all by hand because they 
are in the rural areas.
  Any of those systems work. There is no reason for the Federal 
Government to tell each State how to do its local elections, but we do 
need to encourage those States to have systems that allow them to go 
back and audit and verify. We don't need to have anything at the end of 
election day that makes Americans doubt the strength of our democracy 
or the capability of our democracy to hold an election.
  So here are the basic recommendations that are coming from the Senate 
Intelligence Committee and with which I will concur:
  States should continue to run elections. We do not need to federalize 
elections, and we do not need to require that there be Federal 
certifications for election machines. There is no reason to play Mother 
May I? with someone in Washington, DC, on how it works. States need to 
run their elections, but the Federal Government should always be there 
to assist States and to say: If you have a question or if you want a 
second opinion, we can offer that.
  The DHS should continue to create clear channels of communication 
between the Federal Government and appropriate officials at the State 
and local levels. Again, in 2016, when Jeh Johnson contacted State 
officials and said there was a problem with the election that was 
coming, State election officials pushed him away and said: We don't 
know who you are, and we don't know why you are calling us. We can't 
ever have that again.
  The DHS should expedite security clearances for appropriate State and 
local officials.
  The intelligence community should work to declassify information 
quickly. The last time the warnings came out about the Russian 
engagement in our election, it took over a year for States to learn 
that it was the Russians who had been trying to reach into their 
systems. That can never happen again.
  On a national level, we should create voluntary guidelines on cyber 
security, best practices for public awareness campaigns, promote 
election security awareness, and work through the U.S. Election 
Assistance Commission, the National Association of Secretaries of 
State, and the National Association of State Election Directors. All of 
them have a role. We should have active communication among each other 
and among the DHS. States should also rapidly replace outdated, 
vulnerable election systems.
  I have had some folks say to me: Do you know what? Those five States 
that don't have auditable systems are going to need Federal assistance 
because it is going to be expensive. That seems like a great argument 
unless you look at the 45 other States that have figured out how to do 
it without Federal assistance. This argument that it is going to take 
$1 billion to help those last five States do what the other 45 States 
have found a way to do without Federal assistance just doesn't wash 
with me. Those five States can do the same thing that the other 45 
States have done and have auditable, efficient election systems.
  We don't want Russia, Iran, or North Korea to tamper with our 
elections in 2020 or, for that matter, for there to be any domestic 
interference. We need to be able to prove the accuracy of our 
elections, and it shouldn't be a challenge for us in the days ahead. We 
are 8 months away from these elections, and we need to complete what we 
have started.
  I do need to mention one thing. I am exceptionally proud of the DHS 
and the work it did in 2018. There were no grand stories about election 
problems in 2018 because the DHS officials worked tirelessly to help 
States and walk alongside them. State secretaries of state and local 
volunteers all around the country worked exceptionally hard to pay 
attention to the election issues. We cannot stop focusing on that. We 
need to be aware that the Russians don't just do it once; they do it 
over and over again, as every one of our European allies can tell us. 
They will keep coming with misinformation, and they will keep coming to 
try to destabilize. We, as well, can be clear and push back on this in 
the days ahead.
  I have a bill called the Secure Elections Act, which we worked on for 
a couple of years, that answers all of these questions, and I look 
forward to its passage. In the meantime, I am grateful that those at 
the DHS are paying attention to this, and I encourage them to continue 
to not only consider these recommendations but to apply them.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

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