SECURING AMERICA'S FEDERAL ELECTIONS ACT; Congressional Record Vol. 165, No. 109
(House of Representatives - June 27, 2019)

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                SECURING AMERICA'S FEDERAL ELECTIONS ACT

  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 460, I call 
up the bill (H.R. 2722) to protect elections for public office by 
providing financial support and enhanced security for the 
infrastructure used to carry out such elections, and for other 
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 460, in lieu of 
the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the 
Committee on House Administration printed in the bill, an amendment in 
the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee 
Print 116-20, modified by the amendment printed in part A of House 
Report 116-126, is adopted, and the bill, as amended, is considered 
read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 2722

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled.

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Securing 
     America's Federal Elections Act'' or the ``SAFE Act''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

         TITLE I--FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE

         Subtitle A--Voting System Security Improvement Grants

   Part 1--Promoting Accuracy, Integrity, and Security Through Voter-
                    Verified Permanent Paper Ballot

Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Paper ballot and manual counting requirements.
Sec. 103. Accessibility and ballot verification for individuals with 
              disabilities.
Sec. 104. Durability and readability requirements for ballots.
Sec. 105. Paper ballot printing requirements.
Sec. 106. Study and report on optimal ballot design.
Sec. 107. Effective date for new requirements.

                Part 2--Grants to Carry Out Improvements

Sec. 111. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems 
              and carrying out voting system security improvements.
Sec. 112. Coordination of voting system security activities with use of 
              requirements payments and election administration 
              requirements under Help America Vote Act of 2002.
Sec. 113. Incorporation of definitions.

                    Subtitle B--Risk-Limiting Audits

Sec. 121. Risk-limiting audits.
Sec. 122. Funding for conducting post-election risk-limiting audits.
Sec. 123. GAO analysis of effects of audits.

  TITLE II--PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY THROUGH IMPROVEMENTS IN ELECTION 
                             ADMINISTRATION

Sec. 201. Voting system cybersecurity requirements.
Sec. 202. Testing of existing voting systems to ensure compliance with 
              election cybersecurity guidelines and other guidelines.
Sec. 203. Requiring use of software and hardware for which information 
              is disclosed by manufacturer.
Sec. 204. Treatment of electronic poll books as part of voting systems.
Sec. 205. Pre-election reports on voting system usage.
Sec. 206. Streamlining collection of election information.

  TITLE III--USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES

Sec. 301. Use of voting machines manufactured in the United States.

                         TITLE IV--SEVERABILITY

Sec. 401. Severability.

         TITLE I--FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE

         Subtitle A--Voting System Security Improvement Grants

   PART 1--PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-
                    VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT

     SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Voter Confidence and 
     Increased Accessibility Act of 2019''.

     SEC. 102. PAPER BALLOT AND MANUAL COUNTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote 
     Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(2)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(2) Paper ballot requirement.--
       ``(A) Voter-verified paper ballots.--
       ``(i) Paper ballot requirement.--(I) The voting system 
     shall require the use of an individual, durable, voter-
     verified paper ballot of the voter's vote that shall be 
     marked and made available for inspection and verification by 
     the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted, and 
     which shall be counted by hand or read by an optical 
     character recognition device or other counting device. For 
     purposes of this subclause, the term `individual, durable, 
     voter-verified paper ballot' means a paper ballot marked by 
     the voter by hand or a paper ballot marked through the use of 
     a nontabulating ballot marking device or system, so long as 
     the voter shall have the option to mark his or her ballot by 
     hand. The paper ballot shall be printed or marked in such a 
     way that vote selections, including all vote selections 
     scanned by voting systems to tabulate votes, can be inspected 
     and verified by the voter without training or instruction or 
     audited by election officials without the aid of any machine 
     or other equipment.
       ``(II) The voting system shall provide the voter with an 
     opportunity to correct any error on the paper ballot before 
     the permanent voter-verified paper ballot is preserved in 
     accordance with clause (ii).
       ``(III) The voting system shall not preserve the voter-
     verified paper ballots in any manner that makes it possible, 
     at any time after the ballot has been cast, to associate a 
     voter with the record of the voter's vote without the voter's 
     consent.

[[Page H5208]]

       ``(ii) Preservation as official record.--The individual, 
     durable, voter-verified paper ballot used in accordance with 
     clause (i) shall constitute the official ballot and shall be 
     preserved and used as the official ballot for purposes of any 
     recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for 
     Federal office in which the voting system is used.
       ``(iii) Manual counting requirements for recounts and 
     audits.--(I) Each paper ballot used pursuant to clause (i) 
     shall be suitable for a manual audit, and shall be counted by 
     hand in any recount or audit conducted with respect to any 
     election for Federal office.
       ``(II) In the event of any inconsistencies or 
     irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the 
     vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual, 
     durable, voter-verified paper ballots used pursuant to clause 
     (i), and subject to subparagraph (B), the individual, 
     durable, voter-verified paper ballots shall be the true and 
     correct record of the votes cast.
       ``(iv) Application to all ballots.--The requirements of 
     this subparagraph shall apply to all ballots cast in 
     elections for Federal office, including ballots cast by 
     absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters under 
     the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act and 
     other absentee voters.
       ``(B) Special rule for treatment of disputes when paper 
     ballots have been shown to be compromised.--
       ``(i) In general.--In the event that--

       ``(I) there is any inconsistency between any electronic 
     vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by 
     hand the individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots 
     used pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i) with respect to any 
     election for Federal office; and
       ``(II) it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence 
     (as determined in accordance with the applicable standards in 
     the jurisdiction involved) in any recount, audit, or contest 
     of the result of the election that the paper ballots have 
     been compromised (by damage or mischief or otherwise) and 
     that a sufficient number of the ballots have been so 
     compromised that the result of the election could be changed,

     the determination of the appropriate remedy with respect to 
     the election shall be made in accordance with applicable 
     State law, except that the electronic tally shall not be used 
     as the exclusive basis for determining the official certified 
     result.
       ``(ii) Rule for consideration of ballots associated with 
     each voting machine.--For purposes of clause (i), only the 
     paper ballots deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered 
     in the calculation of whether or not the result of the 
     election could be changed due to the compromised paper 
     ballots.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment Clarifying Applicability of 
     Alternative Language Accessibility.--Section 301(a)(4) of 
     such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(4)) is amended by inserting 
     ``(including the paper ballots required to be used under 
     paragraph (2))'' after ``voting system''.
       (c) Other Conforming Amendments.--Section 301(a)(1) of such 
     Act (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(1)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ``counted'' and 
     inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 
     (3)'';
       (2) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``counted'' and 
     inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 
     (3)'';
       (3) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking ``counted'' each 
     place it appears and inserting ``counted, in accordance with 
     paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and
       (4) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``counted'' and 
     inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 
     (3)''.

     SEC. 103. ACCESSIBILITY AND BALLOT VERIFICATION FOR 
                   INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES.

       (a) In General.--Section 301(a)(3)(B) of the Help America 
     Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(3)(B)) is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(B)(i) ensure that individuals with disabilities and 
     others are given an equivalent opportunity to vote, including 
     with privacy and independence, in a manner that produces a 
     voter-verified paper ballot as for other voters;
       ``(ii) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through 
     the use of at least one voting system equipped for 
     individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual and 
     enhanced visual accessibility for the blind and visually 
     impaired, and nonmanual and enhanced manual accessibility for 
     the mobility and dexterity impaired, at each polling place; 
     and
       ``(iii) meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) and 
     paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that--
       ``(I) allows the voter to privately and independently 
     verify the permanent paper ballot through the presentation, 
     in accessible form, of the printed or marked vote selections 
     from the same printed or marked information that would be 
     used for any vote counting or auditing; and
       ``(II) allows the voter to privately and independently 
     verify and cast the permanent paper ballot without requiring 
     the voter to manually handle the paper ballot;''.
       (b) Specific Requirement of Study, Testing, and Development 
     of Accessible Paper Ballot Verification Mechanisms.--
       (1) Study and reporting.--Subtitle C of title II of such 
     Act (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended--
       (A) by redesignating section 247 as section 248; and
       (B) by inserting after section 246 the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE PAPER BALLOT 
                   VERIFICATION MECHANISMS.

       ``(a) Study and Report.--The Director of the National 
     Science Foundation shall make grants to not fewer than 3 
     eligible entities to study, test, and develop accessible 
     paper ballot voting, verification, and casting mechanisms and 
     devices and best practices to enhance the accessibility of 
     paper ballot voting and verification mechanisms for 
     individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary 
     language is not English, and for voters with difficulties in 
     literacy, including best practices for the mechanisms 
     themselves and the processes through which the mechanisms are 
     used.
       ``(b) Eligibility.--An entity is eligible to receive a 
     grant under this part if it submits to the Director (at such 
     time and in such form as the Director may require) an 
     application containing--
       ``(1) certifications that the entity shall specifically 
     investigate enhanced methods or devices, including non-
     electronic devices, that will assist such individuals and 
     voters in marking voter-verified paper ballots and presenting 
     or transmitting the information printed or marked on such 
     ballots back to such individuals and voters, and casting such 
     ballots;
       ``(2) a certification that the entity shall complete the 
     activities carried out with the grant not later than December 
     31, 2020; and
       ``(3) such other information and certifications as the 
     Director may require.
       ``(c) Availability of Technology.--Any technology developed 
     with the grants made under this section shall be treated as 
     non-proprietary and shall be made available to the public, 
     including to manufacturers of voting systems.
       ``(d) Coordination With Grants for Technology 
     Improvements.--The Director shall carry out this section so 
     that the activities carried out with the grants made under 
     subsection (a) are coordinated with the research conducted 
     under the grant program carried out by the Commission under 
     section 271, to the extent that the Director and Commission 
     determine necessary to provide for the advancement of 
     accessible voting technology.
       ``(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $5,000,000, to 
     remain available until expended.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents of such Act 
     is amended--
       (A) by redesignating the item relating to section 247 as 
     relating to section 248; and
       (B) by inserting after the item relating to section 246 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible paper ballot verification 
              mechanisms.''.
       (c) Clarification of Accessibility Standards Under 
     Voluntary Voting System Guidance.--In adopting any voluntary 
     guidance under subtitle B of title III of the Help America 
     Vote Act with respect to the accessibility of the paper 
     ballot verification requirements for individuals with 
     disabilities, the Election Assistance Commission shall 
     include and apply the same accessibility standards applicable 
     under the voluntary guidance adopted for accessible voting 
     systems under such subtitle.
       (d) Permitting Use of Funds for Protection and Advocacy 
     Systems to Support Actions to Enforce Election-related 
     Disability Access.--Section 292(a) of the Help America Vote 
     Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21062(a)) is amended by striking ``; 
     except that'' and all that follows and inserting a period.

     SEC. 104. DURABILITY AND READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
                   BALLOTS.

       Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 
     U.S.C. 21081(a)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new paragraph:
       ``(7) Durability and readability requirements for 
     ballots.--
       ``(A) Durability requirements for paper ballots.--
       ``(i) In general.--All voter-verified paper ballots 
     required to be used under this Act shall be marked or printed 
     on durable paper.
       ``(ii) Definition.--For purposes of this Act, paper is 
     `durable' if it is capable of withstanding multiple counts 
     and recounts by hand without compromising the fundamental 
     integrity of the ballots, and capable of retaining the 
     information marked or printed on them for the full duration 
     of a retention and preservation period of 22 months.
       ``(B) Readability requirements for paper ballots marked by 
     ballot marking device.--All voter-verified paper ballots 
     completed by the voter through the use of a ballot marking 
     device shall be clearly readable by the voter without 
     assistance (other than eyeglasses or other personal vision 
     enhancing devices) and by an optical character recognition 
     device or other device equipped for individuals with 
     disabilities.''.

     SEC. 105. PAPER BALLOT PRINTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Requiring Paper Ballots to Be Printed on Recycled Paper 
     Manufactured in United States.--Section 301(a) of the Help 
     America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by 
     section 104, is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(8) Printing requirements for ballots.--All paper ballots 
     used in an election for Federal office shall be printed in 
     the United States on recycled paper manufactured in the 
     United States.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall apply with respect to elections occurring on or after 
     January 1, 2021.

     SEC. 106. STUDY AND REPORT ON OPTIMAL BALLOT DESIGN.

       (a) Study.--The Election Assistance Commission shall 
     conduct a study of the best ways to design ballots used in 
     elections for public office, including paper ballots and 
     electronic or digital ballots, to minimize confusion and user 
     errors.
       (b) Report.--Not later than January 1, 2020, the Election 
     Assistance Commission shall submit to Congress a report on 
     the study conducted under subsection (a).

     SEC. 107. EFFECTIVE DATE FOR NEW REQUIREMENTS.

       Section 301(d) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 
     U.S.C. 21081(d)) is amended to read as follows:

[[Page H5209]]

       ``(d) Effective Date.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with 
     the requirements of this section on and after January 1, 
     2006.
       ``(2) Special rule for certain requirements.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in section 105(b) of 
     the Securing America's Federal Elections Act and 
     subparagraphs (B) and (C), the requirements of this section 
     which are first imposed on a State and jurisdiction pursuant 
     to the amendments made by the Voter Confidence and Increased 
     Accessibility Act of 2019 shall apply with respect to voting 
     systems used for any election for Federal office held in 2020 
     or any succeeding year.
       ``(B) Delay for jurisdictions using certain paper record 
     printers or certain systems using or producing voter-verified 
     paper records in 2018.--
       ``(i) Delay.--In the case of a jurisdiction described in 
     clause (ii), subparagraph (A) shall apply to a voting system 
     in the jurisdiction as if the reference in such subparagraph 
     to `2020' were a reference to `2022', but only with respect 
     to the following requirements of this section:

       ``(I) Paragraph (2)(A)(i)(I) of subsection (a) (relating to 
     the use of voter-verified paper ballots).
       ``(II) Paragraph (3)(B)(iii)(I) and (II) of subsection (a) 
     (relating to access to verification from and casting of the 
     durable paper ballot).
       ``(III) Paragraph (7) of subsection (a) (relating to 
     durability and readability requirements for ballots).

       ``(ii) Jurisdictions described.--A jurisdiction described 
     in this clause is a jurisdiction--

       ``(I) which used voter-verified paper record printers 
     attached to direct recording electronic voting machines, or 
     which used other voting systems that used or produced paper 
     records of the vote verifiable by voters but that are not in 
     compliance with paragraphs (2)(A)(i)(I), (3)(B)(iii)(I) and 
     (II), and (7) of subsection (a) (as amended or added by the 
     Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019), 
     for the administration of the regularly scheduled general 
     election for Federal office held in November 2018; and
       ``(II) which will continue to use such printers or systems 
     for the administration of elections for Federal office held 
     in years before 2022.

       ``(iii) Mandatory availability of paper ballots at polling 
     places using grandfathered printers and systems.--

       ``(I) Requiring ballots to be offered and provided.--The 
     appropriate election official at each polling place that uses 
     a printer or system described in clause (ii)(I) for the 
     administration of elections for Federal office shall offer 
     each individual who is eligible to cast a vote in the 
     election at the polling place the opportunity to cast the 
     vote using a blank pre-printed paper ballot which the 
     individual may mark by hand and which is not produced by the 
     direct recording electronic voting machine or other such 
     system. The official shall provide the individual with the 
     ballot and the supplies necessary to mark the ballot, and 
     shall ensure (to the greatest extent practicable) that the 
     waiting period for the individual to cast a vote is the 
     lesser of 30 minutes or the average waiting period for an 
     individual who does not agree to cast the vote using such a 
     paper ballot under this clause.
       ``(II) Treatment of ballot.--Any paper ballot which is cast 
     by an individual under this clause shall be counted and 
     otherwise treated as a regular ballot for all purposes 
     (including by incorporating it into the final unofficial vote 
     count (as defined by the State) for the precinct) and not as 
     a provisional ballot, unless the individual casting the 
     ballot would have otherwise been required to cast a 
     provisional ballot.
       ``(III) Posting of notice.--The appropriate election 
     official shall ensure there is prominently displayed at each 
     polling place a notice that describes the obligation of the 
     official to offer individuals the opportunity to cast votes 
     using a pre-printed blank paper ballot.
       ``(IV) Training of election officials.--The chief State 
     election official shall ensure that election officials at 
     polling places in the State are aware of the requirements of 
     this clause, including the requirement to display a notice 
     under subclause (III), and are aware that it is a violation 
     of the requirements of this title for an election official to 
     fail to offer an individual the opportunity to cast a vote 
     using a blank pre-printed paper ballot.
       ``(V) Period of applicability.--The requirements of this 
     clause apply only during the period in which the delay is in 
     effect under clause (i).

       ``(C) Special rule for jurisdictions using certain 
     nontabulating ballot marking devices.--In the case of a 
     jurisdiction which uses a nontabulating ballot marking device 
     which automatically deposits the ballot into a privacy 
     sleeve, subparagraph (A) shall apply to a voting system in 
     the jurisdiction as if the reference in such subparagraph to 
     `any election for Federal office held in 2020 or any 
     succeeding year' were a reference to `elections for Federal 
     office occurring held in 2022 or each succeeding year', but 
     only with respect to paragraph (3)(B)(iii)(II) of subsection 
     (a) (relating to nonmanual casting of the durable paper 
     ballot).''.

                PART 2--GRANTS TO CARRY OUT IMPROVEMENTS

     SEC. 111. GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING 
                   SYSTEMS AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY 
                   IMPROVEMENTS.

       (a) Availability of Grants.--Subtitle D of title II of the 
     Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21001 et seq.) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new part:

 ``PART 7--GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS 
          AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS

     ``SEC. 297. GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT 
                   VOTING SYSTEMS AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM 
                   SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS.

       ``(a) Availability and Use of Grant.--The Commission shall 
     make a grant to each eligible State--
       ``(1) to replace a voting system--
       ``(A) which does not meet the requirements which are first 
     imposed on the State pursuant to the amendments made by the 
     Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019 with 
     a voting system which does meet such requirements, for use in 
     the regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office 
     held in November 2020, or
       ``(B) which does meet such requirements but which is not in 
     compliance with the most recent voluntary voting system 
     guidelines issued by the Commission prior to the regularly 
     scheduled general election for Federal office held in 
     November 2020 with another system which does meet such 
     requirements and is in compliance with such guidelines;
       ``(2) to carry out voting system security improvements 
     described in section 297A with respect to the regularly 
     scheduled general elections for Federal office held in 
     November 2020 and each succeeding election for Federal 
     office; and
       ``(3) to implement and model best practices for ballot 
     design, ballot instructions, and the testing of ballots.
       ``(b) Amount of Grant.--The amount of a grant made to a 
     State under this section shall be such amount as the 
     Commission determines to be appropriate, except that such 
     amount may not be less than the product of $1 and the average 
     of the number of individuals who cast votes in any of the two 
     most recent regularly scheduled general elections for Federal 
     office held in the State.
       ``(c) Pro Rata Reductions.--If the amount of funds 
     appropriated for grants under this part is insufficient to 
     ensure that each State receives the amount of the grant 
     calculated under subsection (b), the Commission shall make 
     such pro rata reductions in such amounts as may be necessary 
     to ensure that the entire amount appropriated under this part 
     is distributed to the States.
       ``(d) Surplus Appropriations.--If the amount of funds 
     appropriated for grants authorized under section 297D(a)(2) 
     exceed the amount necessary to meet the requirements of 
     subsection (b), the Commission shall consider the following 
     in making a determination to award remaining funds to a 
     State:
       ``(1) The record of the State in carrying out the following 
     with respect to the administration of elections for Federal 
     office:
       ``(A) Providing voting machines that are less than 10 years 
     old.
       ``(B) Implementing strong chain of custody procedures for 
     the physical security of voting equipment and paper records 
     at all stages of the process.
       ``(C) Conducting pre-election testing on every voting 
     machine and ensuring that paper ballots are available 
     wherever electronic machines are used.
       ``(D) Maintaining offline backups of voter registration 
     lists.
       ``(E) Providing a secure voter registration database that 
     logs requests submitted to the database.
       ``(F) Publishing and enforcing a policy detailing use 
     limitations and security safeguards to protect the personal 
     information of voters in the voter registration process.
       ``(G) Providing secure processes and procedures for 
     reporting vote tallies.
       ``(H) Providing a secure platform for disseminating vote 
     totals.
       ``(2) Evidence of established conditions of innovation and 
     reform in providing voting system security and the proposed 
     plan of the State for implementing additional conditions.
       ``(3) Evidence of collaboration between relevant 
     stakeholders, including local election officials, in 
     developing the grant implementation plan described in section 
     297B.
       ``(4) The plan of the State to conduct a rigorous 
     evaluation of the effectiveness of the activities carried out 
     with the grant.
       ``(e) Ability of Replacement Systems to Administer Ranked 
     Choice Elections.--To the greatest extent practicable, an 
     eligible State which receives a grant to replace a voting 
     system under this section shall ensure that the replacement 
     system is capable of administering a system of ranked choice 
     voting under which each voter shall rank the candidates for 
     the office in the order of the voter's preference.

     ``SEC. 297A. VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS DESCRIBED.

       ``(a) Permitted Uses.--A voting system security improvement 
     described in this section is any of the following:
       ``(1) The acquisition of goods and services from qualified 
     election infrastructure vendors by purchase, lease, or such 
     other arrangements as may be appropriate.
       ``(2) Cyber and risk mitigation training.
       ``(3) A security risk and vulnerability assessment of the 
     State's election infrastructure which is carried out by a 
     provider of cybersecurity services under a contract entered 
     into between the chief State election official and the 
     provider.
       ``(4) The maintenance of election infrastructure, including 
     addressing risks and vulnerabilities which are identified 
     under either of the security risk and vulnerability 
     assessments described in paragraph (3), except that none of 
     the funds provided under this part may be used to renovate or 
     replace a building or facility which is used primarily for 
     purposes other than the administration of elections for 
     public office.
       ``(5) Providing increased technical support for any 
     information technology infrastructure that the chief State 
     election official deems to be part

[[Page H5210]]

     of the State's election infrastructure or designates as 
     critical to the operation of the State's election 
     infrastructure.
       ``(6) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of the 
     information technology infrastructure described in paragraph 
     (4).
       ``(7) Enhancing the cybersecurity of voter registration 
     systems.
       ``(b) Qualified Election Infrastructure Vendors 
     Described.--
       ``(1) In general.--For purposes of this part, a `qualified 
     election infrastructure vendor' is any person who provides, 
     supports, or maintains, or who seeks to provide, support, or 
     maintain, election infrastructure on behalf of a State, unit 
     of local government, or election agency, who meets the 
     criteria described in paragraph (2).
       ``(2) Criteria.--The criteria described in this paragraph 
     are such criteria as the Chairman, in coordination with the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, shall establish and publish, 
     and shall include each of the following requirements:
       ``(A) The vendor must be owned and controlled by a citizen 
     or permanent resident of the United States.
       ``(B) The vendor must disclose to the Chairman and the 
     Secretary, and to the chief State election official of any 
     State to which the vendor provides any goods and services 
     with funds provided under this part, of any sourcing outside 
     the United States for parts of the election infrastructure.
       ``(C) The vendor agrees to ensure that the election 
     infrastructure will be developed and maintained in a manner 
     that is consistent with the cybersecurity best practices 
     issued by the Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
       ``(D) The vendor agrees to maintain its information 
     technology infrastructure in a manner that is consistent with 
     the cybersecurity best practices issued by the Technical 
     Guidelines Development Committee.
       ``(E) The vendor agrees to meet the requirements of 
     paragraph (3) with respect to any known or suspected 
     cybersecurity incidents involving any of the goods and 
     services provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant under 
     this part.
       ``(F) The vendor agrees to permit independent security 
     testing by the Commission (in accordance with section 231(a)) 
     and by the Secretary of the goods and services provided by 
     the vendor pursuant to a grant under this part.
       ``(3) Cybersecurity incident reporting requirements.--
       ``(A) In general.--A vendor meets the requirements of this 
     paragraph if, upon becoming aware of the possibility that an 
     election cybersecurity incident has occurred involving any of 
     the goods and services provided by the vendor pursuant to a 
     grant under this part--
       ``(i) the vendor promptly assesses whether or not such an 
     incident occurred, and submits a notification meeting the 
     requirements of subparagraph (B) to the Secretary and the 
     Chairman of the assessment as soon as practicable (but in no 
     case later than 3 days after the vendor first becomes aware 
     of the possibility that the incident occurred);
       ``(ii) if the incident involves goods or services provided 
     to an election agency, the vendor submits a notification 
     meeting the requirements of subparagraph (B) to the agency as 
     soon as practicable (but in no case later than 3 days after 
     the vendor first becomes aware of the possibility that the 
     incident occurred), and cooperates with the agency in 
     providing any other necessary notifications relating to the 
     incident; and
       ``(iii) the vendor provides all necessary updates to any 
     notification submitted under clause (i) or clause (ii).
       ``(B) Contents of notifications.--Each notification 
     submitted under clause (i) or clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) 
     shall contain the following information with respect to any 
     election cybersecurity incident covered by the notification:
       ``(i) The date, time, and time zone when the election 
     cybersecurity incident began, if known.
       ``(ii) The date, time, and time zone when the election 
     cybersecurity incident was detected.
       ``(iii) The date, time, and duration of the election 
     cybersecurity incident.
       ``(iv) The circumstances of the election cybersecurity 
     incident, including the specific election infrastructure 
     systems believed to have been accessed and information 
     acquired, if any.
       ``(v) Any planned and implemented technical measures to 
     respond to and recover from the incident.
       ``(vi) In the case of any notification which is an update 
     to a prior notification, any additional material information 
     relating to the incident, including technical data, as it 
     becomes available.

     ``SEC. 297B. ELIGIBILITY OF STATES.

       ``A State is eligible to receive a grant under this part if 
     the State submits to the Commission, at such time and in such 
     form as the Commission may require, an application 
     containing--
       ``(1) a description of how the State will use the grant to 
     carry out the activities authorized under this part;
       ``(2) a certification and assurance that, not later than 5 
     years after receiving the grant, the State will carry out 
     voting system security improvements, as described in section 
     297A; and
       ``(3) such other information and assurances as the 
     Commission may require.

     ``SEC. 297C. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

       ``Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, 
     the Commission shall submit a report to the appropriate 
     congressional committees, including the Committees on 
     Homeland Security, House Administration, and the Judiciary of 
     the House of Representatives and the Committees on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs, the Judiciary, and Rules 
     and Administration of the Senate, on the activities carried 
     out with the funds provided under this part.

     ``SEC. 297D. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       ``(a) Authorization.--There are authorized to be 
     appropriated for grants under this part--
       ``(1) $600,000,000 for fiscal year 2019; and
       ``(2) $175,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2020, 2022, 
     2024, and 2026.
       ``(b) Continuing Availability of Amounts.--Any amounts 
     appropriated pursuant to the authorization of this section 
     shall remain available until expended.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act 
     is amended by adding at the end of the items relating to 
     subtitle D of title II the following:

 ``Part 7--Grants for Obtaining Compliant Paper Ballot Voting Systems 
          and Carrying Out Voting System Security Improvements

``Sec. 297. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems 
              and carrying out voting system security improvements.
``Sec. 297A. Voting system security improvements described.
``Sec. 297B. Eligibility of States.
``Sec. 297C. Reports to Congress.
``Sec. 297D. Authorization of appropriations.

     SEC. 112. COORDINATION OF VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY ACTIVITIES 
                   WITH USE OF REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS AND ELECTION 
                   ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER HELP AMERICA 
                   VOTE ACT OF 2002.

       (a) Duties of Election Assistance Commission.--Section 202 
     of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20922) is 
     amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking 
     ``by'' and inserting ``and the security of election 
     infrastructure by''.
       (b) Membership of Secretary of Homeland Security on Board 
     of Advisors of Election Assistance Commission.--Section 
     214(a) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 20944(a)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``37 members'' and inserting ``38 
     members''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(17) The Secretary of Homeland Security or the 
     Secretary's designee.''.
       (c) Representative of Department of Homeland Security on 
     Technical Guidelines Development Committee.--Section 
     221(c)(1) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 20961(c)(1)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F); 
     and
       (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(E) A representative of the Department of Homeland 
     Security.''.
       (d) Goals of Periodic Studies of Election Administration 
     Issues; Consultation With Secretary of Homeland Security.--
     Section 241(a) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 20981(a)) is amended--
       (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking 
     ``the Commission shall'' and inserting ``the Commission, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security (as 
     appropriate), shall'';
       (2) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (3);
       (3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
       (4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(4) will be secure against attempts to undermine the 
     integrity of election systems by cyber or other means; and''.
       (e) Requirements Payments.--
       (1) Use of payments for voting system security 
     improvements.--Section 251(b) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 
     21001(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(4) Permitting use of payments for voting system security 
     improvements.--A State may use a requirements payment to 
     carry out any of the following activities:
       ``(A) Cyber and risk mitigation training.
       ``(B) Providing increased technical support for any 
     information technology infrastructure that the chief State 
     election official deems to be part of the State's election 
     infrastructure or designates as critical to the operation of 
     the State's election infrastructure.
       ``(C) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of the 
     information technology infrastructure described in 
     subparagraph (B).
       ``(D) Enhancing the security of voter registration 
     databases.''.
       (2) Incorporation of election infrastructure protection in 
     state plans for use of payments.--Section 254(a)(1) of such 
     Act (52 U.S.C. 21004(a)(1)) is amended by striking the period 
     at the end and inserting ``, including the protection of 
     election infrastructure.''.
       (3) Composition of committee responsible for developing 
     state plan for use of payments.--Section 255 of such Act (52 
     U.S.C. 21005) is amended--
       (A) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
       (B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(b) Geographic Representation.--The members of the 
     committee shall be a representative group of individuals from 
     the State's counties, cities, towns, and Indian tribes, and 
     shall represent the needs of rural as well as urban areas of 
     the State, as the case may be.''.
       (f) Ensuring Protection of Computerized Statewide Voter 
     Registration List.--Section 303(a)(3) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 
     21083(a)(3)) is amended by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``, as well as other measures to prevent and deter 
     cybersecurity incidents, as identified by the Commission, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Technical Guidelines 
     Development Committee.''.

     SEC. 113. INCORPORATION OF DEFINITIONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 901 of the Help America Vote Act 
     of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21141) is amended to read as follows:

[[Page H5211]]

  


     ``SEC. 901. DEFINITIONS.

       ``In this Act, the following definitions apply:
       ``(1) The term `cybersecurity incident' has the meaning 
     given the term `incident' in section 227 of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 659).
       ``(2) The term `election agency' means any component of a 
     State, or any component of a unit of local government in a 
     State, which is responsible for the administration of 
     elections for Federal office in the State.
       ``(3) The term `election infrastructure' means storage 
     facilities, polling places, and centralized vote tabulation 
     locations used to support the administration of elections for 
     public office, as well as related information and 
     communications technology (including the technology used by 
     or on behalf of election officials to produce and distribute 
     voter guides to elections), including voter registration 
     databases, voting machines, electronic mail and other 
     communications systems (including electronic mail and other 
     systems of vendors who have entered into contracts with 
     election agencies to support the administration of elections, 
     manage the election process, and report and display election 
     results), and other systems used to manage the election 
     process and to report and display election results on behalf 
     of an election agency.
       ``(4) The term `State' means each of the several States, 
     the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
     Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and 
     the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act 
     is amended by amending the item relating to section 901 to 
     read as follows:

``Sec. 901. Definitions.''.

                    Subtitle B--Risk-Limiting Audits

     SEC. 121. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.

       (a) In General.-- Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 
     2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 303 the following new section:

     ``SEC. 303A. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Risk-limiting audit.--The term `risk-limiting audit' 
     means, with respect to any election contest, a post-election 
     process that--
       ``(A) has a probability of at least 95 percent of 
     correcting the reported outcome if the reported outcome is 
     not the correct outcome;
       ``(B) will not change the outcome if the reported outcome 
     is the correct outcome; and
       ``(C) involves a manual adjudication of voter intent from 
     some or all of the ballots validly cast in the election 
     contest.
       ``(2) Reported outcome; correct outcome; outcome.--
       ``(A) Reported outcome.--The term `reported outcome' means 
     the outcome of an election contest which is determined 
     according to the canvass and which will become the official, 
     certified outcome unless it is revised by an audit, recount, 
     or other legal process.
       ``(B) Correct outcome.--The term `correct outcome' means 
     the outcome that would be determined by a manual adjudication 
     of voter intent for all votes validly cast in the election 
     contest.
       ``(C) Outcome.--The term `outcome' means the winner or set 
     of winners of an election contest.
       ``(3) Manual adjudication of voter intent.--The term 
     `manual adjudication of voter intent' means direct inspection 
     and determination by humans, without assistance from 
     electronic or mechanical tabulation devices, of the ballot 
     choices marked by voters on each voter-verified paper record.
       ``(4) Ballot manifest.--The term `ballot manifest' means a 
     record maintained by each jurisdiction that--
       ``(A) is created without reliance on any part of the voting 
     system used to tabulate votes;
       ``(B) functions as a sampling frame for conducting a risk-
     limiting audit; and
       ``(C) accounts for all ballots validly cast regardless of 
     how they were tabulated and includes a precise description of 
     the manner in which the ballots are physically stored, 
     including the total number of physical groups of ballots, the 
     numbering system for each group, a unique label for each 
     group, and the number of ballots in each such group.
       ``(b) Requirements.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Audits.--
       ``(i) In general.--Each State and jurisdiction shall 
     administer risk-limiting audits of the results of all 
     election contests for Federal office held in the State in 
     accordance with the requirements of paragraph (2).
       ``(ii) Exception.--Clause (i) shall not apply to any 
     election contest for which the State or jurisdiction conducts 
     a full recount through a manual adjudication of voter intent.
       ``(B) Full manual tabulation.--If a risk-limiting audit 
     conducted under subparagraph (A) corrects the reported 
     outcome of an election contest, the State or jurisdiction 
     shall use the results of the manual adjudication of voter 
     intent conducted as part of the risk-limiting audit as the 
     official results of the election contest.
       ``(2) Audit requirements.--
       ``(A) Rules and procedures.--
       ``(i) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this section, the chief State election 
     official of the State shall establish rules and procedures 
     for conducting risk-limiting audits.
       ``(ii) Matters included.--The rules and procedures 
     established under clause (i) shall include the following:

       ``(I) Rules and procedures for ensuring the security of 
     ballots and documenting that prescribed procedures were 
     followed.
       ``(II) Rules and procedures for ensuring the accuracy of 
     ballot manifests produced by jurisdictions.
       ``(III) Rules and procedures for governing the format of 
     ballot manifests and other data involved in risk-limiting 
     audits.
       ``(IV) Methods to ensure that any cast vote records used in 
     a risk-limiting audit are those used by the voting system to 
     tally the results of the election contest sent to the chief 
     State election official of the State and made public.
       ``(V) Rules and procedures for the random selection of 
     ballots to be inspected manually during each audit.
       ``(VI) Rules and procedures for the calculations and other 
     methods to be used in the audit and to determine whether and 
     when the audit of each election contest is complete.
       ``(VII) Rules and procedures for testing any software used 
     to conduct risk-limiting audits.

       ``(B) Public report.--
       ``(i) In general.--After the completion of the risk-
     limiting audit and at least 5 days before the election 
     contest is certified, the State shall publish a report on the 
     results of the audit, together with such information as 
     necessary to confirm that the audit was conducted properly.
       ``(ii) Format of data.--All data published with the report 
     under clause (i) shall be published in machine-readable, open 
     data formats.
       ``(iii) Protection of anonymity of votes.--Information and 
     data published by the State under this subparagraph shall not 
     compromise the anonymity of votes.
       ``(c) Effective Date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be 
     required to comply with the requirements of this section for 
     the first regularly scheduled election for Federal office 
     held more than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the 
     Securing America's Federal Elections Act and for each 
     subsequent election for Federal office.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments Relating to Enforcement.--Section 
     401 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21111) is amended by striking 
     ``sections 301, 302, and 303'' and inserting ``subtitle A of 
     title III''.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for such Act 
     is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
     303 the following new item:

``Sec. 303A. Risk-limiting audits.''.

     SEC. 122. FUNDING FOR CONDUCTING POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING 
                   AUDITS.

       (a) Payments to States.-- Subtitle D of title II of the 
     Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21001 et seq.), as 
     amended by section 111(a), is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new part:

        ``PART 8--FUNDING FOR POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS

     ``SEC. 298. PAYMENTS FOR POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.

       ``(a) In General.--The Commission shall pay to States the 
     amount of eligible post-election audit costs.
       ``(b) Eligible Post-election Audit Costs.--For purposes of 
     this section, the term `eligible post-election audit costs' 
     means, with respect to any State, costs paid or incurred by 
     the State or local government within the State for--
       ``(1) the conduct of any risk-limiting audit (as defined in 
     section 303A) with respect to an election for Federal office 
     occurring after the date of the enactment of this part; and
       ``(2) any equipment, software, or services necessary for 
     the conduct of any such risk-limiting audit.
       ``(c) Special Rules.--
       ``(1) Rules and procedures.--The Commission shall establish 
     rules and procedures for submission of eligible post-election 
     audit costs for payments under this section.
       ``(2) Insufficient funds.--In any case in which the amounts 
     appropriated under subsection (d) are insufficient to pay all 
     eligible post-election audit costs submitted by States with 
     respect to any Federal election, the amount of such costs 
     paid under subsection (a) to any State shall be equal to the 
     amount that bears the same ratio to the amount which would be 
     paid to such State (determined without regard to this 
     paragraph) as--
       ``(A) the number of individuals who voted in such Federal 
     election in such State; bears to
       ``(B) the total number of individuals who voted in such 
     Federal election in all States submitting a claim for 
     eligible post-election audit costs.
       ``(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       ``(1) In general.--There is hereby authorized to be 
     appropriated to the Commission such sums as are necessary to 
     carry out this part.
       ``(2) Availability.--Any amounts appropriated pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) shall remain available without fiscal year 
     limitation until expended.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act, 
     as amended by section 111(b), is further amended by adding at 
     the end of the items relating to subtitle D of title II the 
     following:

        ``Part 8--Funding for Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audits

``Sec. 298. Payments for post-election risk-limiting audits.

     SEC. 123. GAO ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF AUDITS.

       (a) Analysis.--Not later than 6 months after the first 
     elections for Federal office is held for which States must 
     conduct risk-limiting audits under section 303A of the Help 
     America Vote Act of 2002 (as added by section 121), the 
     Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an 
     analysis of the extent to which such audits have improved the 
     administration of such elections and the security of election 
     infrastructure in the States receiving such grants.
       (b) Report.--The Comptroller General of the United States 
     shall submit a report on the analysis conducted under 
     subsection (a) to the Committee on House Administration of 
     the House of Representatives and the Committee on Rules and 
     Administration of the Senate.

[[Page H5212]]

  


  TITLE II--PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY THROUGH IMPROVEMENTS IN ELECTION 
                             ADMINISTRATION

     SEC. 201. VOTING SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Ballot Tabulating Devices.-- Section 301(a) of the Help 
     America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by 
     section 104 and section 105, is further amended by adding at 
     the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(9) Ballot tabulating methods.--
       ``(A) In general.--The voting system tabulates ballots by 
     hand or through the use of an optical scanning device that 
     meets the requirements of subparagraph (B).
       ``(B) Requirements for optical scanning devices.--Except as 
     provided in subparagraph (C), the requirements of this 
     subparagraph are as follows:
       ``(i) The device is designed and built in a manner in which 
     it is mechanically impossible for the device to add or change 
     the vote selections on a printed or marked ballot.
       ``(ii) The device is capable of exporting its data 
     (including vote tally data sets and cast vote records) in a 
     machine-readable, open data standard format required by the 
     Commission, in consultation with the Director of the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology.
       ``(iii) The device consists of hardware that demonstrably 
     conforms to a hardware component manifest describing point-
     of-origin information (including upstream hardware supply 
     chain information for each component) that--

       ``(I) has been provided to the Commission, the Director of 
     Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security, and the chief 
     State election official for each State in which the device is 
     used; and
       ``(II) may be shared by any entity to whom it has been 
     provided under subclause (I) with independent experts for 
     cybersecurity analysis.

       ``(iv) The device utilizes technology that prevents the 
     operation of the device if any hardware components do not 
     meet the requirements of clause (iii).
       ``(v) The device operates using software for which the 
     source code, system build tools, and compilation parameters--

       ``(I) have been provided to the Commission, the Director of 
     Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security, and the chief 
     State election official for each State in which the device is 
     used; and
       ``(II) may be shared by any entity to whom it has been 
     provided under subclause (I) with independent experts for 
     cybersecurity analysis.

       ``(vi) The device utilizes technology that prevents the 
     running of software on the device that does not meet the 
     requirements of clause (v).
       ``(vii) The device utilizes technology that enables 
     election officials, cybersecurity researchers, and voters to 
     verify that the software running on the device--

       ``(I) was built from a specific, untampered version of the 
     code that is described in clause (v); and
       ``(II) uses the system build tools and compilation 
     parameters that are described in clause (v).

       ``(viii) The device contains such other security 
     requirements as the Director of Cybersecurity and 
     Infrastructure Security requires.
       ``(C) Waiver.--
       ``(i) In general.--The Director of Cybersecurity and 
     Infrastructure Security, in consultation with the Director of 
     the National Institute of Standards and Technology, may waive 
     one or more of the requirements of subparagraph (B) (other 
     than the requirement of clause (i) thereof) with respect to 
     any device for a period of not to exceed 2 years.
       ``(ii) Publication.--Information relating to any waiver 
     granted under clause (i) shall be made publicly available on 
     the Internet.
       ``(D) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be 
     required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph 
     for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in 
     November 2024, and for each subsequent election for Federal 
     office.''.
       (b) Other Cybersecurity Requirements.-- Section 301(a) of 
     such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104, 
     section 105, and subsection (a), is further amended by adding 
     at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(10) Prohibition of use of wireless communications 
     devices in systems or devices.--
       ``(A) In general.--No system or device upon which ballot 
     marking devices or optical scanners are configured, upon 
     which ballots are marked by voters (except as necessary for 
     individuals with disabilities to use ballot marking devices 
     that meet the accessibility requirements of paragraph (3)), 
     or upon which votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated shall 
     contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, power-line, 
     or concealed communication device.
       ``(B) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be 
     required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph 
     for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in 
     November 2020, and for each subsequent election for Federal 
     office.
       ``(11) Prohibiting connection of system to the internet.--
       ``(A) In general.--No system or device upon which ballot 
     marking devices or optical scanners are configured, upon 
     which ballots are marked by voters, or upon which votes are 
     cast, tabulated, or aggregated shall be connected to the 
     Internet or any non-local computer system via telephone or 
     other communication network at any time.
       ``(B) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be 
     required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph 
     for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in 
     November 2020, and for each subsequent election for Federal 
     office.''.
       (c) Special Cybersecurity Rules for Certain Ballot Marking 
     Devices.--
       (1) In general.--Section 301(a) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 
     21081(a)), as amended by section 104, section 105, and 
     subsections (a) and (b), is further amended by adding at the 
     end the following new paragraph:
       ``(12) Ballot marking devices.--
       ``(A) In general.--In the case of a voting system that uses 
     a ballot marking device, the ballot marking device shall be a 
     device that--
       ``(i) is not capable of tabulating votes;
       ``(ii) except in the case of a ballot marking device used 
     exclusively to comply with the requirements of paragraph (3), 
     is certified in accordance with section 232 as meeting the 
     requirements of subparagraph (B); and
       ``(iii) meets the requirements of clauses (iii) through 
     (viii) of section 301(a)(9)(B).
       ``(B) Requirements.--
       ``(i) In general.--A ballot marking device meets the 
     requirements of this subparagraph if, during a double-masked 
     test conducted by a qualified independent user experience 
     research laboratory (as defined in section 232(b)(4)) of a 
     simulated election scenario which meets the requirements of 
     clause (ii), there is less than a 5 percent chance that an 
     ordinary voter using the device would not detect and report 
     any difference between the vote selection printed on the 
     ballot by the ballot marking device and the vote selection 
     indicated by the voter.
       ``(ii) Simulated election scenario.--A simulated election 
     scenario meets the requirements of this clause if it is 
     conducted with--

       ``(I) a pool of subjects that are--

       ``(aa) diverse in age, gender, education, and physical 
     limitations; and
       ``(bb) representative of the communities in which the 
     voting system will be used; and

       ``(II) ballots that are representative of ballots 
     ordinarily used in the communities in which the voting system 
     will be used.

       ``(C) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be 
     required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph 
     for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in 
     November 2022, and for each subsequent election for Federal 
     office.''.
       (2) Procedure for testing.--
       (A) In general.--Subtitle B of title II of the Help America 
     Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971 et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 232. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT MARKING 
                   DEVICES.

       ``(a) In General.--Any State or jurisdiction which intends 
     to use a ballot marking device (other than a ballot marking 
     device used exclusively to comply with the requirements of 
     section 301(a)(3)) in an election for Federal office may 
     submit an application to the Commission for testing and 
     certification under this section.
       ``(b) Application, Assignment, and Testing.--
       ``(1) In general.--An application under subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted not later than 18 months before the date 
     of the election for Federal office in which the ballot 
     marking device is intended to be used and shall contain such 
     information as the Commission requires.
       ``(2) Assignment.--Upon receipt of an application for 
     testing under this section, the Commission shall contract 
     with a qualified independent user experience research 
     laboratory for the testing of whether the ballot marking 
     device intended to be used by the State or jurisdiction meets 
     the requirements of section 301(a)(12)(B).
       ``(3) Requirements for testing.--Any contract described in 
     paragraph (2) shall require the qualified independent user 
     experience research laboratory to--
       ``(A) not later than 30 days before testing begins, submit 
     to the Commission for approval the protocol for the simulated 
     election scenario used for testing the ballot marking device;
       ``(B) use only protocols approved by the Commission in 
     conducting such testing; and
       ``(C) submit to the Commission a report on the results of 
     the testing.
       ``(4) Qualified independent user experience research 
     laboratory.--For purposes of this section:
       ``(A) In general.--The term `qualified independent user 
     experience research laboratory' means a laboratory accredited 
     under this subsection by the Election Assistance Commission 
     in accordance with standards determined by the Commission, in 
     consultation with the Director of the National Institute of 
     Standards and Technology and the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security.
       ``(B) Criteria.--A laboratory shall not be accredited under 
     this subsection unless such laboratory demonstrates that--
       ``(i) no employee of, or individual with an ownership in, 
     such laboratory has, or has had during the 5 preceding years, 
     any financial relationship with a manufacturer of voting 
     systems; and
       ``(ii) any group of individuals conducting tests under this 
     section collectively meet the following qualifications:

       ``(I) Experience designing and running user research 
     studies and experiments using both qualitative and 
     quantitative methodologies.
       ``(II) Experience with voting systems.

       ``(c) Review by Independent Board.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Commission shall submit for approval 
     to an independent review board established under paragraph 
     (3) the following:
       ``(A) Any protocol submitted to the Commission under 
     subsection (b)(3)(A).
       ``(B) Any report submitted to the Commission under 
     subsection (b)(3)(C).
       ``(2) Final approval.--Not later than the date that is 12 
     months before the date of the election for Federal office in 
     which a State or jurisdiction intends to use the ballot 
     marking device, the independent review board shall report to 
     the Commission on whether it has approved a report submitted 
     under paragraph (1)(B).
       ``(3) Independent review board.--
       ``(A) In general.--An independent review board established 
     under this paragraph shall be composed of 5 independent 
     scientists appointed by the Commission, in consultation with 
     the Director of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology.

[[Page H5213]]

       ``(B) Qualifications.--The members of the independent 
     review board--
       ``(i) shall have expertise and relevant peer-reviewed 
     publications in the following fields: cognitive psychology, 
     experimental design, statistics, and user experience research 
     and testing; and
       ``(ii) may not have, or have had during the 5 preceding 
     years, any financial relationship with a manufacturer of 
     voting systems.
       ``(4) Publication.--The Commission shall make public--
       ``(A) any protocol approved under this subsection;
       ``(B) any report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(C); and
       ``(C) any determination made by an independent review board 
     under paragraph (2).
       ``(d) Certification.--If--
       ``(1) a ballot marking device is determined by the 
     qualified independent user experience research laboratory to 
     meet the requirements of section 301(a)(12); and
       ``(2) the report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(C) is 
     approved by a majority of the members of the independent 
     review board under subsection (d)(2),

     then the Commission shall certify the ballot marking device.
       ``(e) Prohibition on Fees.--The Commission may not charge 
     any fee to a State or jurisdiction, a developer or 
     manufacturer of a ballot marking device, or any other person 
     in connection with testing and certification under this 
     section.''.
       (B) Conforming amendments.--
       (i) Section 202(2) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 
     U.S.C. 20922(2)) is amended by inserting ``and ballot marking 
     devices'' after ``hardware and software'').
       (ii) The heading for subtitle B of title II of such Act is 
     amended by inserting at the end ``; Ballot Marking Devices''.
       (iii) The table of contents of such Act is amended--

       (I) by inserting ``; Ballot Marking Devices'' at the end of 
     the item relating to subtitle B of title II; and
       (II) by inserting after the item related to section 231 the 
     following:

``Sec. 232. Testing and certification of ballot marking devices.''.

     SEC. 202. TESTING OF EXISTING VOTING SYSTEMS TO ENSURE 
                   COMPLIANCE WITH ELECTION CYBERSECURITY 
                   GUIDELINES AND OTHER GUIDELINES.

       (a) Requiring Testing of Existing Voting Systems.--
       (1) In general.--Section 231(a) of the Help America Vote 
     Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971(a)) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) Testing to ensure compliance with guidelines.--
       ``(A) Testing.--Not later than 9 months before the date of 
     each regularly scheduled general election for Federal office, 
     the Commission shall provide for the testing by accredited 
     laboratories under this section of the voting system hardware 
     and software which was certified for use in the most recent 
     such election, on the basis of the most recent voting system 
     guidelines applicable to such hardware or software (including 
     election cybersecurity guidelines) issued under this Act.
       ``(B) Decertification of hardware or software failing to 
     meet guidelines.--If, on the basis of the testing described 
     in subparagraph (A), the Commission determines that any 
     voting system hardware or software does not meet the most 
     recent guidelines applicable to such hardware or software 
     issued under this Act, the Commission shall decertify such 
     hardware or software.''.
       (2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) 
     shall apply with respect to the regularly scheduled general 
     election for Federal office held in November 2020 and each 
     succeeding regularly scheduled general election for Federal 
     office.
       (b) Issuance of Cybersecurity Guidelines by Technical 
     Guidelines Development Committee.--Section 221(b) of the Help 
     America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20961(b)) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) Election cybersecurity guidelines.--Not later than 6 
     months after the date of the enactment of the Securing 
     America's Federal Elections Act, the Development Committee 
     shall issue election cybersecurity guidelines, including 
     standards and best practices for procuring, maintaining, 
     testing, operating, and updating election systems to prevent 
     and deter cybersecurity incidents.''.

     SEC. 203. REQUIRING USE OF SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE FOR WHICH 
                   INFORMATION IS DISCLOSED BY MANUFACTURER.

       (a) Requirement.--Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote 
     Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by sections 104, 
     105, 201(a), 201(b), and 201(c), is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new paragraph:
       ``(13) Requiring use of software and hardware for which 
     information is disclosed by manufacturer.--
       ``(A) Requiring use of software for which source code is 
     disclosed by manufacturer.--
       ``(i) In general.--In the operation of voting systems in an 
     election for Federal office, a State may only use software 
     for which the manufacturer makes the source code (in the form 
     in which will be used at the time of the election) publicly 
     available online under a license that grants a worldwide, 
     royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable 
     license to all intellectual property rights in such source 
     code, except that the manufacturer may prohibit a person who 
     obtains the software from using the software in a manner that 
     is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial 
     advantage or private monetary compensation that is unrelated 
     to carrying out legitimate research or cybersecurity 
     activity.
       ``(ii) Exceptions.--Clause (i) does not apply with respect 
     to--

       ``(I) widely-used operating system software which is not 
     specific to voting systems and for which the source code or 
     baseline functionality is not altered; or
       ``(II) widely-used cybersecurity software which is not 
     specific to voting systems and for which the source code or 
     baseline functionality is not altered.

       ``(B) Requiring use of hardware for which information is 
     disclosed by manufacturer.--
       ``(i) Requiring disclosure of hardware.--A State may not 
     use a voting system in an election for Federal office unless 
     the manufacturer of the system publicly discloses online the 
     identification of the hardware used to operate the system.
       ``(ii) Additional disclosure requirements for custom or 
     altered hardware.--To the extent that the hardware used to 
     operate a voting system or any component thereof is not 
     widely-used, or is widely-used but is altered, the State may 
     not use the system in an election for Federal office unless--

       ``(I) the manufacturer of the system publicly discloses 
     online the components of the hardware, the design of such 
     components, and how such components are connected in the 
     operation of the system; and
       ``(II) the manufacturer makes the design (in the form which 
     will be used at the time of the election) publicly available 
     online under a license that grants a worldwide, royalty-free, 
     non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable license to all 
     intellectual property rights in the design of the hardware or 
     the component, except that the manufacturer may prohibit a 
     person who obtains the design from using the design in a 
     manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward 
     commercial advantage or private monetary compensation that is 
     unrelated to carrying out legitimate research or 
     cybersecurity activity.''.

       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall apply with respect to elections for Federal office held 
     in 2020 or any succeeding year.

     SEC. 204. TREATMENT OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOKS AS PART OF 
                   VOTING SYSTEMS.

       (a) Inclusion in Definition of Voting System.--Section 
     301(b) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 
     21081(b)) is amended--
       (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking 
     ``this section'' and inserting ``this Act'';
       (2) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1);
       (3) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and
       (4) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(2) any electronic poll book used with respect to the 
     election; and''.
       (b) Definition.--Section 301 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081) 
     is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections 
     (d) and (e); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(c) Electronic Poll Book Defined.--In this Act, the term 
     `electronic poll book' means the total combination of 
     mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment 
     (including the software, firmware, and documentation required 
     to program, control, and support the equipment) that is 
     used--
       ``(1) to retain the list of registered voters at a polling 
     location, or vote center, or other location at which voters 
     cast votes in an election for Federal office; and
       ``(2) to identify registered voters who are eligible to 
     vote in an election.''.
       (c) Effective Date.--Section 301(e) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 
     21081(e)), as amended by section 107 and as redesignated by 
     subsection (b), is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and 
     inserting ``paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) Special rule for electronic poll books.--In the case 
     of the requirements of subsection (c) (relating to electronic 
     poll books), each State and jurisdiction shall be required to 
     comply with such requirements on or after January 1, 2020.''.

     SEC. 205. PRE-ELECTION REPORTS ON VOTING SYSTEM USAGE.

       (a) Requiring States to Submit Reports.--Title III of the 
     Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is 
     amended by inserting after section 301 the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 301A. PRE-ELECTION REPORTS ON VOTING SYSTEM USAGE.

       ``(a) Requiring States to Submit Reports.--Not later than 
     120 days before the date of each regularly scheduled general 
     election for Federal office, the chief State election 
     official of a State shall submit a report to the Commission 
     containing a detailed voting system usage plan for each 
     jurisdiction in the State which will administer the election, 
     including a detailed plan for the usage of electronic poll 
     books and other equipment and components of such system.
       ``(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall apply with 
     respect to the regularly scheduled general election for 
     Federal office held in November 2020 and each succeeding 
     regularly scheduled general election for Federal office.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act 
     is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
     301 the following new item:

``Sec. 301A. Pre-election reports on voting system usage.''.

[[Page H5214]]

  


     SEC. 206. STREAMLINING COLLECTION OF ELECTION INFORMATION.

       Section 202 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 
     20922) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``The Commission'' and inserting ``(a) In 
     General.--The Commission''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(b) Waiver of Certain Requirements.--Subchapter I of 
     chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, shall not apply 
     to the collection of information for purposes of maintaining 
     the clearinghouse described in paragraph (1) of subsection 
     (a).''.

  TITLE III--USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES

     SEC. 301. USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 
     U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104, section 105, 
     section 201(a), 201(b), 201(c), and section 203(a), is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(14) Voting machine requirements.--By not later than the 
     date of the regularly scheduled general election for Federal 
     office occurring in November 2022, each State shall seek to 
     ensure that any voting machine used in such election and in 
     any subsequent election for Federal office is manufactured in 
     the United States.''.

                         TITLE IV--SEVERABILITY

     SEC. 401. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act, 
     or the application of a provision or amendment to any person 
     or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the 
     remainder of this Act and amendments made by this Act, and 
     the application of the provisions and amendment to any person 
     or circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for 
1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority 
member of the Committee on House Administration.
  The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), and the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Rodney Davis) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.


                             General Leave

  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks 
and to insert extraneous material on H.R. 2722.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2722. The SAFE Act is 
critical legislation to invest in and upgrade the machinery of American 
democracy. It will help us combat the national emergency facing our 
country. It will improve the resilience of election infrastructure used 
in Federal elections.
  Aging equipment, under-resourced jurisdictions, and interference by 
foreign entities or non-state actors leaves the system vulnerable to 
exploitation that can undermine confidence in election outcomes. 
Ineffective and vulnerable equipment can also discourage participation 
in Federal elections.
  It comes to the floor after the Committee on House Administration 
held three hearings in the first 6 months of this year that addressed 
the integrity of our elections. In February the committee held the 
``For the People: Our American Democracy'' hearing, where the integrity 
of our democracy--including critical steps to improve the security and 
reliability of our election infrastructure--was addressed.
  On May 8 the committee held an election security hearing where we 
heard testimony about the urgent need to upgrade our election 
infrastructure and the lack of ongoing investment in the wake of new 
threats.
  And on May 21 the committee held an oversight hearing of the Election 
Assistance Commission, an agency that plays a central role in 
supporting election administration in this country.
  I will remind this House that earlier this year, the Director of 
National Intelligence published a report stating that our adversaries 
and strategic competitors ``probably already are looking to the 2020 
U.S. elections as an opportunity to advance their interests.
  ``They may also use cyber means to `directly manipulate or disrupt 
elections systems--such as by tampering with voter registration or 
disrupting the vote tallying process--either to alter data or to call 
into question our voting process.'''
  Last year he said that ``the warning lights are blinking red''. . . .
  Special Counsel Robert Mueller noted in Volume One of his report that 
the Russian military ``targeted individuals and entities involved in 
the administration of the elections. Victims included U.S. State and 
local entities, such as State boards of elections, secretaries of 
State, and county governments, as well as individuals who worked for 
those entities. The GRU also targeted private technology firms 
responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related 
software and hardware, such as voter registration software and 
electronic polling stations.''
  In April, FBI Director Christopher Wray called Russia's interference 
efforts a ``significant counterintelligence threat,'' and said that the 
2018 midterms were a ``dress rehearsal for the big show'' of the 2020 
Presidential elections.
  Early voters in Georgia in 2018 saw machines deleting votes and 
switching them to other candidates. The machines where voters saw this 
occur were purchased in 2002. During early voting in Texas in 2018 some 
electronic voting machines deleted votes and switched them between 
candidates. The machines were used in 78 of 254 Texas counties.
  In June of 2016 the Russian GRU compromised the computer network of 
the Illinois State Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in 
their website. They gained access to a database with information on 
millions of Illinois voters and extracted data on thousands before the 
activity was detected.
  H.R. 2722 responds to this emergency that we find ourselves in as a 
nation. We ought to be doing everything we can to bolster the security 
and integrity of our elections from interference and hacking.
  The bill's section 102 requires that States transition to voting 
systems that use individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots, 
which means a paper ballot marked by the voter by hand or through the 
use of a non-tabulating ballot marking device or system. Voter-verified 
paper ballots are the best way to ensure that a voter's ballot 
accurately reflects their choices and is counted as cast. Paper can be 
audited. In the last Presidential election, approximately 20 percent of 
registered voters cast their ballot on voting machines that do not have 
any kind of paper backup.
  The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 
concluded that paperless systems ``should be removed from service as 
soon as possible.''
  In at least 40 States, elections are carried out using machines that 
are at least a decade old. And like any technology, they are 
susceptible to increasing failure with age. One witness at our election 
security hearing, Lawrence Norden of the Brennan Center for Justice at 
NYU Law School, explained that some State officials have ``had to turn 
to eBay to find critical components like dot-matrix printer ribbons, 
decades old storage devices, and analog modems.'' Aging systems also 
frequently rely on unsupported software like Windows XP and 2000, which 
may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable 
to the latest methods of cyberattack.
  This bill addresses many other cybersecurity best practices besides 
paper-based systems.

  The bill in section 111 authorizes a $600 million Election Assistance 
Commission grant program to assist States in securing election 
infrastructure. States may use the money to replace their aging 
equipment with voter-verified paper ballot voting systems, but also 
ongoing maintenance of election infrastructure, enhanced cybersecurity 
and operations of IT infrastructure, and enhanced cybersecurity of 
voter registration systems.
  Originally, the bill, as introduced, would have authorized $1 billion 
for this initial round of surge funding; however, during the Committee 
on House Administration's markup, the committee approved an amendment 
in the nature of a substitute that authorized $600 million instead. 
Combined with the $380 million that Congress appropriated last year in 
election security grants, this funding reaches the $1 billion that 
experts have said is necessary to implement these necessary 
protections.

[[Page H5215]]

  The bill also provides in section 111 $175 million in biennial 
maintenance funding. Cybersecurity threats will not dissipate, they 
will only evolve. State election officials have told us repeatedly they 
need more funding and a sustainable source of funding.
  Section 103 of the SAFE Act fosters innovation for voters living with 
disabilities. It provides grant funding for the study, development, and 
testing of accessible paper ballot voting, verification, and casting 
mechanisms. It expressly requires States to ensure that individuals 
with disabilities and others are given an equivalent opportunity to 
vote, including with privacy and independence, in a manner that 
produces voter-verified paper ballots as for other voters.
  The bill fosters accountability for election technology vendors. It 
would create a qualified election infrastructure vendor designation 
where the Election Assistance Commission, in coordination with the 
Department of Homeland Security, would craft criteria that vendors 
would follow to receive the qualified designation. This would include 
reporting any known or suspected cybersecurity incidents involving 
election infrastructure to both the EAC and DHS, as well as affected 
election agencies.
  The bill in sections 201 and 203 also includes open-source 
provisions, requiring use of software and hardware for which 
information is disclosed by manufacturers. This will allow 
cybersecurity experts and the public to vet the security of election 
systems regardless of the technology used.
  As amended in the committee, the bill in section 121 requires States 
to adopt risk-limiting audits. Risk-limiting audits are the gold 
standard of post-election audits. They involve hand counting a certain 
number of ballots using advanced statistical methods to determine with 
a high degree of confidence that the reported election outcome is 
accurate. The SAFE Act requires States to implement risk-limiting 
audits because they go hand in hand with paper ballots. We need audits 
to ensure that ballot marking devices or optical scanners were not 
hacked and that the reported results are accurate.
  Second, as amended in committee, the bill in section 201 includes 
specific cybersecurity standards to apply to optical scanner voting 
systems and another set of standards to apply to ballot marking 
devices. These will apply equally to current and future technology. For 
example, H.R. 2722 prohibits the use of wireless communications devices 
and internet connectivity in voting systems upon which ballots are 
marked by voters or that otherwise mark and tabulate ballots.
  Madam Speaker, H.R. 2722 is an essential step forward in shoring up 
our election infrastructure and investing in secure elections. I ask 
the House to pass this legislation and bolster the trust and confidence 
in our system that all Americans expect and deserve.
  Every American--no matter what their choice in politics--should know 
that their vote will be counted as cast.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time 
as I may consume.
  Madam Speaker, in the 2016 election, we saw a very real threat to our 
Nation when Russia interfered in our elections by using a 
misinformation campaign through social media and attacking voter 
registration databases. While this interference from Russia is 
unacceptable, I feel it is necessary to point out that there is no 
evidence that any voting machines were hacked in the 2016 or even in 
the 2018 elections.
  However, this does not mean that there isn't a need for election and 
cybersecurity improvements for State election systems. On this point, I 
know my friends and colleagues on the other side of the aisle, 
including the distinguished chairperson of our Committee on House 
Administration, we all agree that no one--and I mean, no one--should 
interfere with our elections. Every Americans' vote should be counted 
and protected.
  Last Congress $380 million were appropriated to States to upgrade 
their election security. Also, election infrastructure was designated 
as critical infrastructure in response to the U.S. Intelligence 
Community's reports that the Russian Government attacked.

                              {time}  0930

  This allowed the Department of Homeland Security to begin providing 
additional cybersecurity assistance to State and local election 
officials.
  Work has been done to help States improve their election security, 
and more work must be done. This is why our committee Republicans, all 
of us on the House Administration Committee, introduced H.R. 3412, the 
Election Security Assistance Act, to assist States in their election 
security strengthening efforts.
  This realistic legislation provides $380 million in Federal grants to 
States to update their aging and at-risk election infrastructure, while 
also requiring State and local officials to have some skin in the game. 
We require a 25 percent match to ensure that they understand they are 
getting the best equipment that is going to protect their voters' 
rights to have their votes counted and protected.
  In addition, our bill is the only bill that creates the first ever 
Election Cyber Assistance Unit, aimed at connecting our State and local 
election officials with leading election administration and 
cybersecurity experts from across the country.
  Our bill also empowers State officials by providing security 
clearances to our election officials to better facilitate the sharing 
of information and requiring the Department of Homeland Security to 
notify State election officials of cyberattacks and any foreign threats 
within the State.
  It is common sense that if there is an attempt to hack a State 
election, the State election official should be notified, but they are 
currently not able to let a State know if it has been attacked. If DHS 
is the one that sees this attack from a foreign country, they can't 
notify State election officials because, in many cases, they don't have 
security clearance.
  Our bill clears this up. Those State officials deserve the right to 
know who is trying to attack their elections in each State in this 
great Nation.
  My good friend, Congresswoman Torres, stated at the Rules Committee 
hearing on Monday night that she doesn't trust her State election 
officials in California to have security clearances. Personally, I 
don't feel that way, and I think other Members of Congress may agree 
with me.
  State officials should know if there is a threat to their election 
system, and DHS should be the one telling them.
  To sum up the Election Security Assistance Act, our solution provides 
much-needed election security improvements and reinforcements for local 
election officials, without overstepping the States' authority to 
determine and maintain their own elections.
  Unfortunately, I can't say the same for the bill we are voting on 
today.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California (Mrs. Davis), a member of the House Administration 
Committee.
  Mrs. DAVIS of California. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the 
SAFE Act.
  No matter what my colleagues conclude about the Mueller report, I 
think we can all agree it shows our elections are under foreign attack.
  What would happen if a foreign government actually succeeded in 
changing the results of a Federal election?
  All bad actors have to do is break through the defenses of even one--
even one--of the over 10,000 election administration jurisdictions in 
our country.
  As we all know, questionable results in just one county can derail an 
entire Presidential election and throw our country into a tailspin.
  Election security is national security. Election machinery is the 
machinery of democracy.
  The SAFE Act gives States what they need to upgrade and maintain safe 
and resilient election infrastructure.
  In the House Administration Committee, we debated whether paper 
ballots are the safest way to go. It does seem ironic that our answer 
to cybersecurity, in fact, is old school, but we know what works.
  As Oregon's Secretary of State Dennis Richardson said, ``You can't 
hack paper.'' We can recount and audit paper ballots with a certainty 
that we just don't have with machines.
  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to

[[Page H5216]]

the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Baird).
  Mr. BAIRD. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois for 
yielding me time.
  Madam Speaker, keeping our elections safe from cyberattacks and fraud 
is not and should not be a partisan priority.
  H.R. 2722 has been rushed to the House floor without giving the 
Science, Space, and Technology Committee the opportunity to hold even a 
single hearing on the bill or the subject matter.
  The problem with rushing this bill through Congress is that it will 
have a significant negative impact on NIST's ability to work with State 
and local governments to identify standards and best practices for 
election security.
  Our priority in Congress should be to develop useful tools that 
empower States and local officials to ensure their elections are 
secure, accessible, and accurate.
  In fact, our secretary of state in Indiana, Ms. Connie Lawson, has 
done a remarkable job leading the effort to add safeguards to our 
elections process, ensuring it is completed with integrity.
  Given the opportunity, I believe that our committee could come to an 
agreement, in a bipartisan manner, to update NIST's election and 
security activities.
  Congress should focus on legislation that provides much-needed 
improvements and reinforcements for local officials without 
overstepping the States' authority to maintain their elections.
  Madam Speaker, because of the lack of following regular order, the 
committee has never been given the opportunity to ensure those issues 
are addressed.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Raskin), a member of the House Administration Committee.
  Mr. RASKIN. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the SAFE Act because 
Vladimir Putin conducted a sweeping and systematic campaign to disrupt 
and destabilize our Presidential election in 2016.
  Some say we can't pass the SAFE Act to guarantee the security of our 
elections, that because of federalism, we should let the States work it 
out on their own.
  But we are not the fragmented, divided States of America. We are the 
United States of America, and that is the way we were designed.
  Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, Madam Speaker, says 
Congress ``shall guarantee to every State in this union a republican 
form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion.''
  What does it mean by ``republican form of government''? It doesn't 
mean a Republican Party form of government. It means a representative 
form of government. That means we must have a system that accurately 
translates the popular will into the election of a Congress.
  This is a massive technical challenge in a country of hundreds of 
millions of people, 50 States, and thousands of jurisdictions, 
especially in the computer age. We need voter-certified, paper-ballot 
voting systems in every State in the Union. We need risk-reducing 
audits. We need real accountability for election vendors. We need 
voting machines manufactured in the United States, where our democracy 
is created, too.
  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I certainly hope my good 
friend from Maryland (Mr. Raskin) changes his mind and wants more 
Republican governments, but I don't think that is going to happen, even 
today, on the House floor.
  Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Yoho).
  Mr. YOHO. Madam Speaker, I thank my friend from Illinois for 
yielding.
  I rise today as a Member from the great State of Florida. We all 
recall the 2000 Presidential election. What happened in Palm Beach 
County turned into a national punch line, ``the hanging chad.''
  The Democratic bill before us today would mandate paper ballots and 
make our elections a technology-free zone. I, too, am worried about 
malign actors like Russia and China when it comes to our cybersecurity 
network. However, let us not throw out the baby with the bath water.
  Many of my colleagues submitted commonsense amendments that would 
improve the bill, amendments addressing ballot harvesting and ensuring 
State matching funds. Yet, Democrats, under another closed rule, are 
forcing passage on a one-sided bill with no prospect in the Senate and 
no chance of being signed by the President.
  Madam Speaker, I sincerely hope we address these issues in a 
bipartisan manner that reflects well on this body and the American 
people.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from Georgia (Mrs. McBath), a new Member of Congress.
  Mrs. McBATH. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2722. Our 
elections are the foundation of our democracy, but they face increasing 
threats.
  There is bipartisan agreement that we must do more to guard against 
these threats to our most fundamental democratic process. Our elections 
must allow us to truly hear the voices of every American voter.
  My home State of Georgia has recently taken steps to safeguard its 
voting processes from cybersecurity threats, and this bill would 
provide necessary funding to support these efforts in Georgia and 
across our country.
  This legislation will strengthen the partnership of the Election 
Assistance Commission, the Department of Homeland Security, and our 
State election officials.
  Together, we must modernize our election infrastructure and ensure 
the security of our democracy.
  Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this critical measure.
  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Waltz), another good friend of mine from 
the great State of Florida.
  Mr. WALTZ. Madam Speaker, election security is especially significant 
to Floridians. Two Florida counties were breached in the 2016 election 
as a result of Russian spear phishing targeting county election 
officials.
  As Members of Congress, obviously, we are not here to relitigate 2016 
but to work toward bipartisan solutions to defend the 2020 elections 
from foreign intrusion.
  I am disappointed that the majority is rushing this partisan proposal 
to the floor this week and has bypassed Republicans who have shown 
interest in working on election security. Just yesterday, the Science, 
Space, and Technology Committee held a hearing on election 
vulnerabilities and potential solutions. That hearing occurred after--
after--this proposal had been introduced and a day before it will 
receive a vote on the House floor.
  This proposal throws $1.3 billion at the problem without careful 
consideration by the authorizing committees. This proposal also 
excludes bipartisan solutions, like the one I am drafting with 
Representative Stephanie Murphy from Florida.
  Our proposal, the ALERTS Act, would require Federal agencies to 
report to the Department of Homeland Security if an election intrusion 
is identified and require DHS to notify State and local officials of 
the breach, unless the information is deemed to compromise intelligence 
sources.
  Federal, State, and local officials have a duty to notify voters in 
Florida and voters across the country impacted by election attacks, a 
duty that was not upheld by the FBI in the wake of the 2016 elections 
and a duty that the ALERTS Act, this bipartisan proposal, would 
require.
  At yesterday's Science, Space, and Technology Committee hearing, the 
secretary of Oklahoma's State Election Board recommended a State and 
local reporting requirement like the ALERTS Act.

  So, testimony and a recommendation--both--were not considered by the 
authors of this bill.
  Madam Speaker, I request that my colleagues oppose this bill, and 
immediately following this vote, I ask Democrats and Republicans to 
come together to work toward a bipartisan election security package.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Casten).
  Mr. CASTEN of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of 
H.R. 2722, the SAFE Act.
  Among the many disturbing revelations in the Mueller report, we 
learned that Russian intelligence officers successfully infiltrated the 
computer network in my home State at the Illinois

[[Page H5217]]

State Board of Elections. They accessed the personal information of 
millions of voters and stole thousands of voter records before being 
detected.
  As far as we know, this breach has not affected the results of any 
subsequent elections, but it desperately underscores the need for much 
greater election security moving forward.
  Now, officials in my home State and others around the country have 
worked tirelessly to secure these vulnerabilities over the past 3 
years, but without the help of the Federal Government, they can only do 
so much. It is past time that we step up and give States the resources 
they need to ensure our elections and our voters are safe in the 
upcoming election.
  Our democratic system depends on the consent of the governed. That is 
far too fragile to take lightly. And our constituents' trust and the 
independence of our democracy depend on it.
  Madam Speaker, for these reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote for 
the SAFE Act on the floor today.

                              {time}  0945

  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, look, I respect and 
agree with my good friend from Illinois (Mr. Casten), my colleague. We 
want to protect our home State. We saw intrusion into our Illinois 
State Board of Elections voter registration system. It is something 
that had to be addressed.
  I am happy to report, after talking with the State Board of Election 
officials, they have been given resources already appropriated by a 
Republican majority Congress, Republicans in the Senate, and President 
Trump last year to effectively ensure that that information is not 
vulnerable again.
  What we are debating here today is a bill that will put more unfunded 
and underfunded mandates on States like Illinois. That is not what our 
local election officials in my district asked for.
  The reason Illinois was able to protect itself and ensure that it 
didn't happen again in the extremely high, historic turnout of the 2018 
midterm election was because they were given the flexibility to spend 
the HAVA funds that Republicans in Congress ensured that the State of 
Illinois had, leading to a Democratic majority in the midterm 
elections.
  No one is questioning the safety and security of our midterm 
elections. No one has told me that any foreign entity hacked into any 
institution, voter registration system, or machines. Maybe DHS hasn't 
called me, even though I think I have a security clearance, so they 
could.
  But they can't call our local election officials, under this bill, if 
it happens again because they don't have security clearance. That is 
why our bill is a better choice.
  The one that is on the floor today does not address the concerns of 
States like mine, and it certainly does not address the concerns of 
States like California.
  Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Calvert).
  Mr. CALVERT. Madam Speaker, as a Member from California, it is hard 
for me to believe that the majority could possibly propose an election 
security bill that doesn't address the major vulnerabilities related to 
ballot harvesting.
  Ballot harvesting is where paid campaign operatives collect up to 
hundreds or even thousands of ballots and drop them off at polling 
places or an election office. The practice is ripe for fraud and a 
recipe for disaster. Any serious effort to secure elections would 
address it.
  Let's be clear: We want to give people who need it an opportunity to 
vote by mail, and we want to look for ways to make it easier for 
disabled or elderly Americans to participate in our elections. My 
concern is inserting campaign operatives into the ballot-handling 
process without any safeguards.
  In California, paid campaign staff can collect hundreds of ballots 
without having to disclose who they are working for. When they hand 
over those ballots to election officials, there is no requirement to 
even provide their name.
  Some of my friends across the aisle claim that the real problem is 
bad actors committing fraud. But it is the very practice of ballot 
harvesting being the problem. The reality is this process is an open 
invitation for fraud. That is why most States have banned the practice.
  Ignoring the most notable threat to election security is unacceptable 
in a so-called election security bill.
  Madam Speaker, American voters deserve better. I urge my colleagues 
to oppose this bill until we can get serious about real threats to our 
democracy.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Virginia (Ms. Wexton).
  Ms. WEXTON. Madam Speaker, in 2016, Russian hackers tried to break 
into Virginia's election system. In response to this information, 
Virginia took active steps to secure the integrity of our elections. We 
sped up our transition to paper ballots to ensure that our elections 
were secure and the results could be verified and audited.
  But it is not just about any one election or just about any one 
adversary. Passing the SAFE Act is about securing our elections from 
all threats, foreign or otherwise. These threats are coming for us in 
every State, red or blue, rural or urban.
  In 2016, State election websites in Illinois and Arizona were hacked 
by intruders that installed malware and downloaded sensitive voter 
information.
  In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted 
votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to 
another.
  In Johnson County, Indiana, e-poll books failed in 2018, halting 
voting entirely for 4 hours, with no extension of polling hours.
  It is clear that Congress must take action. Passage of the SAFE Act 
will secure our elections by updating our election infrastructure, 
speeding up the transition to paper ballots, and making necessary 
investments in cybersecurity.
  Every Member of Congress took an oath to protect this Nation from 
threats foreign and domestic, and I urge my colleagues to honor that 
oath. Let's protect our democracy while we still have one.
  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Loudermilk), my fellow House Administration 
Committee Republican and one of my good friends here in Congress.
  Mr. LOUDERMILK. Madam Speaker, I thank my good friend from Illinois, 
an exceptional baseball player, as well, for yielding this time.
  Look, this is something I am very passionate about, and I am a bit 
surprised that one of my colleagues from Georgia would speak against 
this bill or even support this bill.
  Let's be frank. Yes, the Russians are bad. They are very bad. They 
seek to do harm to America, and they have been attempting to influence 
our elections for many years.
  Yes, we need to be concerned about election security. But if you want 
to secure our election system, this is the exact opposite of what we 
should be doing.

  The State of Georgia has recognized this. Just this year, our State 
legislature overwhelmingly passed a bill to spend $150 million to 
upgrade our electronic voting machines so that they will produce a 
verifiable ballot that represents the way the person voted at the 
machine.
  This is the direction we should be going, not to eliminate electronic 
ballots, not eliminate the efficiency that you get when you can walk 
in.
  The verifiable aspect of it, a voter is given a card, after it is 
verified who the voter is. When a voter walks into a voting precinct, 
they fill out the paperwork and show their ID, and they are given a 
card that identifies that they have been certified. They insert that 
card and vote electronically, and then it will produce a printed 
receipt that they can verify that this is the way they voted. That 
receipt goes into a box that is used for a recount. That is a secure 
voting system that also embraces technology.
  This bill would take us back decades. It is like when a student takes 
an SAT exam. They fill out the little bubbles, and then it runs through 
an electronic counter.
  Look, even in our own hearing, the chief technologist at the Center 
for Democracy and Technology agreed when I brought this scenario 
forward, that we use the technology of DREs that then will print a 
verifiable ballot or a receipt. He said that those were absolutely 
safe.

[[Page H5218]]

  Now, here is the problem. When we go to paper ballots, and everyone 
is going to fill out these paper ballots, we are talking long lines. We 
are talking about fewer people being able to get to the polls.
  Madam Speaker, when we decide to vote on this bill, the last thing 
you are going to say from that rostrum is Members will cast their votes 
via electronic device. Why? It is efficient. We have a verifiable way 
of making sure that we can see the way we voted on this board up here 
or on a printed piece of paper we can get in the back. This is because 
of efficiency.
  Madam Speaker, can you imagine if we had to do paper ballots or voice 
vote every one of the many amendments we have on these appropriations 
bills? We would never go home. We would be here 24 hours a day.
  The American people expect us to live by the same laws that they have 
to live by. We should embrace technology and make it secure, not revert 
back decades to old technology.
  Look, the reality is, this bill would subject us to the problem of 
people walking up with boxes full of preprinted ballots, all across the 
Nation, and they could drop those in at the last minute. We need to 
verify that people voting are who they are.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), my colleague from the House Judiciary 
Committee and Homeland Security Committee.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from 
California for her leadership.
  There is not a time that I go home that they don't ask me how we will 
secure our elections. I am proudly supporting the Securing America's 
Federal Elections Act, the SAFE Act, and I am asking why our colleagues 
are fighting against Americans having the right to vote.
  The SAFE Act authorizes a $600 million Election Assistance Commission 
grant program. It provides States with $175 million in biannual 
sustainment funding to help maintain election infrastructure.
  Voting machines are required to be manufactured in the United States. 
States are mandated to conduct risk-limiting audits.
  Another very important feature of the SAFE Act is that it requires 
accountability for election technology vendors and sets cybersecurity 
standards.
  As a member of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, recognizing what 
happened in 2016, I want to make sure that the Russian adversaries, the 
Russian military, are not our poll watchers, are not our secretaries of 
states, are not the vendors for our machines.
  I want to make sure for minorities, every vote counts, and for every 
American, every vote counts.
  I want to end voter suppression. The way we do this is to have safe 
elections.
  I am very proud of this legislation, and I am proud of this Speaker, 
proud of the leadership, to say that we are going to be first on the 
line to tell America we believe in safe, equal, and fair elections.
  I ask my friends to support this legislation.
  Madam Speaker, as a senior member of the Committees on the Judiciary 
and Homeland Security, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2722, the 
``Securing America's Federal Elections Act'' or SAFE Act.
  I strongly support this legislation because the linchpin of 
representative democracy is public confidence in the political system, 
regime, and community.
  That confidence in turn rests upon the extent to which the public has 
faith that the system employed to select its leaders accurately 
reflects its preferences.
  At bottom, this means that all citizens casting a vote have a 
fundamental right and reasonable expectation that their votes count and 
are counted.
  This concern is particularly salient because of the unprecedented 
interference by a hostile foreign power to secure victory for its 
preferred candidate in the 2016 presidential election and the 
determination of that hostile power to repeat its success in future 
American elections.
  That is why it is necessary to pass H.R. 2722, the SAFE Act, so 
comprehensive election security reform measures can be implemented.
  Specifically, the SAFE Act authorizes a $600 million Election 
Assistance Commission (EAC) grant program to assist in securing 
election infrastructure and a $5 million grant program to study and 
report on accessible paper ballot voting systems.
  The bill provides grants to State and local election officials to 
replace aging voting machines with voter-verified paper ballot voting 
systems and grants to support hiring IT staff, cybersecurity training, 
security and risk vulnerability assessments, and other activities to 
secure election infrastructure.
  The bill also provides states with $175 million in biannual 
sustainment funding to help maintain election infrastructure and, to 
ensure States can maintain security gains, provides each State with no 
less than $1 per voter who participated in the most recent election to 
maintain election security.
  Under the legislation, voting machines are required to be 
manufactured in the United States and states are mandated to conduct 
risk-limiting audits, a critical tool to ensuring the integrity of 
elections.
  These audits, which involve hand counting a certain number of ballots 
and using statistical methods to determine the accuracy of the original 
vote tally, are effective at detecting any incorrect election outcomes, 
whether caused by a cyberattack or something more mundane like a 
programming error.
  The SAFE Act also directs the National Science Foundation to 
administer a $5 million grant program to study and report on accessible 
paper ballot verification mechanisms, including for individuals with 
disabilities, voters with difficulties in literacy, and voters whose 
primary language is not English.
  Madam Speaker, another salutary feature of the SAFE Act is that it 
requires accountability for election technology vendors and sets 
cybersecurity standards and prohibits wireless and internet 
connectivity on systems that count ballots or upon which voters mark 
their ballots or systems are configured.
  The SAFE Act also limits state expenditures on goods and services 
with grant monies provided under this Act to purchases from ``qualified 
election infrastructure vendors.''
  The EAC, in coordination with DHS, establishes the criteria for 
achieving the status of ``qualified election infrastructure vendor,'' 
which includes maintaining IT infrastructure in a manner consistent 
with the best practices provided by the EAC and agreeing to report any 
known or suspected security incidents involving election 
infrastructure.
  Madam Speaker, there is compelling reason for the Congress to pass 
the SAFE Act by overwhelming margins in the House and Senate because to 
date the President and his Administration has shown little interest or 
inclination in taking effective action to deter and prevent 
interference by foreign powers in American elections.
  Let us remember that the Intelligence Community Assessment (``ICA'') 
of January 2017 assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered 
an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election 
in which Russia's goals were to undermine public faith in the U.S. 
democratic process, denigrate Democratic presidential candidate and 
implacable foe of Vladimir Putin, former Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, facilitate the election of Vladimir Putin's preferred 
candidate, Donald J. Trump.
  Russia's interference in the election processes of democratic 
countries is not new but a continuation of the ``Translator Project,'' 
an ongoing information warfare effort launched by Vladimir Putin in 
2014 to use social media to manipulate public opinion and voters in 
western democracies.
  Instead of supporting the unanimous assessment of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community, the President attacked and sought to discredit 
and undermine the agencies and officials responsible for detecting and 
assessing Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election as 
well as those responsible for investigating and bringing to justice the 
conspirators who committed crimes against the United States our law 
enforcement.
  And to add shame to insult and injury, at a meeting in Helsinki, 
Finland, rather than embracing the conclusions of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, the President of the United States sided with Russian 
President Vladimir Putin in heaping scorn on the IC's assessment 
regarding Russian interference and called the U.S. Justice Department 
investigation into Russia's interference led by Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller ``the greatest political witch hunt in history.''
  As the Mueller Report concluded, ``The Russian government interfered 
in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion.''
  In his only public remarks made since he was appointed Special 
Counsel, Robert Mueller reiterated at his farewell press conference 
held at the Department of Justice on May 29, 2017, the ``central 
allegation of our indictments--that there were multiple, systematic 
efforts to interfere in our election'' and that ``allegation deserves 
the attention of every American.''

[[Page H5219]]

  Madam Speaker, American elections are to be decided by American 
voters free from foreign interference or sabotage, and that is why I 
support and urge all my colleague to vote to pass H.R. 2722, the 
``Securing America's Federal Elections Act'' or SAFE Act.
  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Palmer), our Republican Policy Committee 
chair.
  Mr. PALMER. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois, who 
is also a good friend, for the work he is doing on this, trying to 
bring some transparency to what is really going on here.
  There are numerous reasons that mandating paper ballots isn't 
workable. They are susceptible to fraud; they are inefficient; and they 
are antiquated. I have seen, over the years, where the joke was ``one 
man, one vote,'' where it was ``one suitcase, one vote,'' with people 
bringing in paper ballots. We have seen a situation around the country 
now where that is still a bit of a problem.
  For argument's sake, though, let's just say that paper ballots were 
foolproof and didn't come with their own set of problems or security 
concerns. I would still be concerned about the impact this bill would 
have on the majority of our States.
  The mandate, in and of itself, is troubling. Twenty-nine out of our 
50 States, plus the District of Columbia, would have to completely 
revamp their current election systems. This is both costly and time-
intensive. There is nearly zero chance this can be adopted by the 2020 
elections. The funding in the bill makes it clear that they realize 
this is not enough money to pay for this and, if it is not, it would be 
on a pro rata share. That means it is an unfunded mandate in violation 
of the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act.
  It is easy for Federal lawmakers here in D.C. to gloss over the 
impact this Federal mandate would have, but the numbers don't lie. Only 
18 States currently use a paper-only voting system, as the bill would 
mandate. Not to mention, this bill would also impact those 18 States, 
including my home State of Alabama.
  Just a few days ago, the House Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology held a hearing on ``Election Security: Voting Technology 
Vulnerabilities,'' where Oklahoma's Secretary of the State Election 
Board Ziriax pointed out that this bill would require the use of 
recycled paper, which would be impossible to use with Oklahoma's 
current paper ballot system because the fibers found in recycled paper 
would cause repeated false readings.
  While this may seem like a small or silly detail, this is just one 
example of the great impact this bill will have on all States, with 
many considerations that have yet to be vetted properly.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. I yield the gentleman from Alabama an 
additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. PALMER. My colleagues on the other side continue to offer radical 
and unworkable policies to revamp our election system. Security risks 
do exist within our ballot boxes, but this bill is not the answer. This 
bill will just add to the existing risks, and I cannot support it.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose the bill.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, may I inquire how much time remains on 
each side.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from California has 14 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Illinois has 12\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Sarbanes).

                              {time}  1000

  Mr. SARBANES. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  I very strongly support the SAFE Act. This is something that the 
Democrats have been focused on from day one. Day one meaning, the day 
after the 2016 election, when we saw the attacks that had come in 
against our democracy, we realized we were very exposed, and we needed 
to take action.
  This is our chance to stand up against interference from foreign 
adversaries who are trying to hack in, sow discord, undermine our 
elections, and create havoc here in our own country. This is 
fundamental to protecting our democracy.
  So we were on the case from the beginning. We convened the Election 
Security Task Force, which was led by Zoe Lofgren, Bob Brady, Bennie 
Thompson and others. They looked at all of the best practices that we 
need to put in place to make sure that our elections are strong and 
sturdy, and how do we fortify them, and they produced those 
recommendations.
  We then took those recommendations and we put them into H.R. 1, the 
For the People Act, and we passed those on March 8 of this year, 
because we knew that this was a priority and that there is no time to 
waste.
  Now, our Republican colleagues, unfortunately, did not want to go 
along with those broad, sweeping reforms that were contained in H.R. 1, 
including election security measures. So we made it easy for them, we 
said, ``Okay. We will start to break those things out. We will take the 
election security piece and we will bring it as a separate bill to the 
floor of the House.'' That is the SAFE Act. But we still, apparently, 
don't have their support.
  This is their opportunity, this is their chance to stand up and show 
their patriotism, to defend our democracy, to protect our Constitution, 
to make sure that our elections are going to be safe.
  So let's talk about what is in the SAFE Act, the Safeguarding 
America's Federal Elections Act.
  We have significant resources that are going to be brought to bear to 
build up, to fortify the election security infrastructure of our 
country. This is what the public wants to see. They want to be ready 
for the 2020 election.
  We have risk-limiting audits to make sure that States across the 
country are figuring out what is going on. Where do we make changes? 
How do we protect ourselves?
  Paper ballots. We have had a lot of discussion about that today. 
Paper ballots are incredibly important in terms of boosting the 
confidence of the public that elections will be carried out in a way 
that you can verify the tally, people have the confidence that when 
they go to the ballot box, they put their ballot in there, that that 
vote will be counted.
  We have no time to waste. We need to get this done now if we are 
going to be ready for the 2020 election.
  Bob Mueller came along with his report and he said that the Russian 
interference was sweeping and systematic in 2016.
  Every leader in our intelligence community has also echoed the fact 
that 2016 was a dress rehearsal. They are coming in 2020.
  We need to be ready. We need to protect our elections. Let's support 
the SAFE Act.
  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much 
time as I might consume.
  Madam Speaker, I agree with my good friend from Maryland. We as 
Republicans and Democrats need to do the patriotic thing and make sure 
that our elections are protected.
  And I do agree that the Russians tried to interfere in our election 
process with misinformation campaigns. But I also want to ask my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, if their concentration on 
election security happened the day after the 2016 election, why in the 
world didn't the administration who was in the White House at the time 
when the intelligence analysts were talking about how other foreign 
entities, including Russia, were wanting to interfere in our elections, 
why didn't they do something about it?
  Why are we here today?
  Why didn't it happen before the 2016 election, when our intelligence 
analysts said nefarious activity was moving against the United States 
of America?
  They did nothing. The Obama administration did nothing. They let it 
go.
  Now we are here watching the new Democrat majority that was elected 
in 2018, after explosive turnout in our midterm elections, their first 
bill, H.R. 1, that every member of the Democratic majority cosponsored 
and supported, that is the solution?
  The solution is to add millions of taxpayer dollars and then the 
first ever corporate dollars into their own congressional campaign 
accounts?
  No one has ever said that is the solution to too much money in 
politics or

[[Page H5220]]

to election security. Not one time have I had a constituent say that to 
me.
  Now, we have got to come together and do what is right.
  We have yet to address any of the issues that were laid out in the 
Mueller report. This bill we are debating today does not address any of 
them. This is a discussion about what happened in 2016 without a 
discussion of what is needed in our States and local election 
authorities.
  That is what is wrong with this bill, too. It is hypocrisy at its 
greatest.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi), the Speaker of the House.
  Ms. PELOSI. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding, the 
chair of the House Administration Committee, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, 
of whom we are very proud in California. I thank her for leading us on 
this path of patriotism and respecting the oath of office we take.
  Madam Speaker, it is just a joy to be having this opportunity to 
speak out for the sacred oath to vote, the sacred blessing, the right 
to vote as we leave to go on the Fourth of July break.

  Madam Speaker, I thank the members of the House Administration 
Committee: Mr. Butterfield, whom we heard from yesterday; Mr. Raskin; 
Mr. Aguilar; Congresswoman Susan Davis, who presented to us earlier; 
and to all of you.
  Madam Speaker, I thank Mr. Sarbanes. He has been the face of the 
future. He has been speaking out against the misrepresentations that 
have happened, the propagandizing that has happened by foreign 
governments in our election.
  Yes, we won the election. We won the election because the American 
people were sick and tired of what the Republicans were putting forth. 
We won the election in the most gerrymandered, voter suppressed 
political arena you could imagine, and yet the American people came 
forward.
  One the biggest messages we had in the campaign was H.R. 1, to reduce 
the role of dark, special-interest money in politics, to stop the 
systemic intentional voter suppression by the Republicans across the 
country, to stop political gerrymandering on all sides.
  Let's do it in a nonpartisan way. Let the chips fall where they may, 
and to do so in a way that we are taking a piece of it today to talk 
about protecting our electoral system.
  In a short while, we will take up the Voting Rights Act that is also 
part of H.R. 1.
  So this H.R. 1 was very supported by the Democrats, very publicized 
to the American people, and part of our For the People agenda: lower 
healthcare costs by lowering the cost of prescription drugs and 
protecting the preexisting conditions benefit; bigger paychecks by 
building the infrastructure of America in a green way; cleaner 
government by passing H.R. 1--one of the component parts of what we are 
coming together around today.
  As we approach the Fourth of July, we must remember the oath that we 
take to support and defend the Constitution and to protect the American 
people, which demands that this House of Representatives take urgent 
action.
  We must legislate, we must investigate, and we must litigate to 
protect our national security, defend our democracy for the people.
  Special Counsel Robert Mueller's report revealed an all-out attack on 
our elections by the Russians, concluding that they ``interfered in the 
2016 Presidential election in sweeping and systemic fashion.''
  Top intelligence and security officials have made clear that these 
attacks continue. They are happening, and they are happening now.
  This spring, FBI Director Chris Wray warned of a ``365-day-a-year 
threat'' from the Russians, explaining that their attacks in our 
elections were simply ``a dress rehearsal for the big show in 2020.''
  This House has a patriotic duty to protect our democracy from these 
attacks. This is a matter of national security. That is why the 
Democrats first act in the majority was to advance, as I mentioned, 
H.R. 1, For the People Act, to secure our elections.
  Today we are building on that progress with the Securing America's 
Federal Elections Act, which takes urgently needed action to further 
strengthen America's defenses.
  This bill closes dangerous gaps in our election systems and brings 
our security into the 21st century.
  I know that other Members have spoken about the provisions of the 
bill, but I just would really like to know from my Republican friends 
what is wrong with replacing outdated, vulnerable voting equipment? 
What is wrong with requiring paper ballot voting systems to ensure the 
integrity of our elections? What is wrong with enacting strong 
cybersecurity requirements for elections technology vendors and voting 
systems?
  We must be relentless in the defense of our democracy, fighting on 
all fronts to keep America safe.
  There is a reason why the Russians are interfering in our elections, 
and other countries may be too, but we can document with full 
confidence from the intelligence community that the Russians are. It is 
because they want to affect the outcome of the elections, so they can 
affect the policy.
  I think it was really sad, I was sad to hear, and, hopefully, it will 
be retracted, that the President gave a green light to the Russians to 
do it again. Really? Really?
  This week, we are advancing appropriations legislation that provides 
$600 million for election security grants to States, and increases 
funding for the Election Assistance Commission, which has been starved 
for funding for years, a couple of dollars for every person in our 
country to honor the vision of our Founders of a democracy where 
everyone who is eligible to vote can vote and everyone's vote is 
counted as cast.
  Next month, we will advance further legislation to protect our 
national security and prevent foreign interference in our elections.
  Madam Speaker, I commend the distinguished chairman of the Homeland 
Security Committee, Mr. Bennie Thompson, for the great work that he has 
been doing with his task force and his committee and other members who 
are working with him as we go forward.
  We are pleased that the administration has agreed to provide an all-
Member briefing on election security that will happen in July, so we 
can get the facts. We have been trying to get the facts.
  Some people around here may think that it is okay to just make policy 
without the facts. We are evidence-based, scientifically oriented, 
truth-and-knowledge based on how we go forward, and we look forward to 
that briefing.
  We also look forward to July 17, when Special Counsel Robert Mueller 
will come forward and give testimony.
  Our national security is being threatened, and the American people 
need answers.
  This is not to be fearmongering. This is to be smart and to 
anticipate a known challenge that exists and to do something about it.

  We can't just talk about the Mueller report and saying what it says 
about the Russian interference in our elections, unless we are ready to 
do something about it. Today we are, thanks to our distinguished chair, 
Chairwoman Lofgren.
  There is a need for bipartisan support for our critical commonsense 
action to secure our elections.
  Unfortunately, Senator McConnell, a self-described crepehanger, has 
vowed to kill our bills in the Senate, while the President openly 
declares that he sees no problem with foreign interference in our 
elections.
  The GOP Senate and the White House are giving foreign countries the 
green light to attack our country, but the House will do our patriotic 
duty to protect America.
  Madam Speaker, as we approach the Fourth of July holiday, I urge my 
colleagues to remember the oath we took and the democracy we defend, 
and to join me in a strong bipartisan vote to defend America's 
security.
  This isn't about politics. It is about patriotism. As our Founders 
said at the beginning of the Constitution in its preamble, we do this 
for the people.
  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time 
as I may consume.
  Madam Speaker, I agree with my distinguished colleague from 
California that we do need to have the ability for the Department of 
Homeland Security

[[Page H5221]]

and our intelligence officials to notify our State and local election 
officials if they see nefarious activity, but right now under the bill 
we are debating today, that would not be the case, because in many 
cases, DHS won't talk to local election officials or State election 
officials because they don't have security clearances.
  Our bill, pushed by the Republicans on the House Administration 
Committee, would allow the communication to take place.

                              {time}  1015

  You know, we hear a lot of talk about patriotism coming up on the 
Fourth of July. I believe we are all patriots in this institution, but 
I believe, also, we have to govern together.
  We were working on a bipartisan solution to election security, and 
all of the sudden, we were told no more negotiations. That is not how I 
thought this institution worked. I thought we could work together.
  Well, I do want to respond to a couple of comments that my colleague 
from California made. She may have mentioned H.R. 1. H.R. 1 was the 
Democrats' attempt to address not only too much money in politics, they 
said; they also wanted to address election security.
  Clearly, what H.R. 1 did was do nothing to affect the money that is 
coming into politics, and it is not doing enough to ensure that our 
elections are not impacted by foreign entities with nefarious 
intentions.
  Our bill today that we hoped could have been debated but was voted 
down on a party-line vote in the House Administration Committee earlier 
this week, just a few days ago, we hoped we could have come up with 
that, that is a bipartisan solution that would have worked. What works, 
our last speaker said, was this. Clearly, that is not what works.
  What works isn't voting for a bill like H.R. 1 that votes to put the 
first ever corporate money directly into every Member of Congress' 
campaign accounts. What works, clearly, is not taxpayer money to fix 
that problem when there are not enough corporate malfeasance funds. 
That is not what the American people wanted.
  And what would have worked would have been the last administration, 
the Obama administration, listening to their intelligence agencies and 
doing something about nefarious activities before the 2016 election, 
not the day after, when Democrats decided to take this issue on.
  And then all I ever hear is they are going to blame Mitch McConnell. 
Well, I had no idea, before 2016, that the Obama administration ceded 
Presidential authority to the Senate majority leader. I had no idea 
that happened.
  Everything is Mitch McConnell's fault, right? He is the one who told 
the intelligence agencies to stand down. Are you kidding me?
  And now we hear we should have done something. You are darn right we 
should have done something. You are darn right the Obama administration 
should have done something. You are darn right they should have done it 
when they first heard about it before the 2016 election, and now here 
we are to fix it.
  And today's bill is clearly not a fix.
  We have got some issues, and it is really interesting to see my 
colleagues from California come up and not want to address a practice 
like ballot harvesting that is illegal in the State of North Carolina, 
where a Republican who did it is likely to go to jail for it, but the 
same process is legal in the State of California--disastrous.
  You want to talk about trying to determine the outcome of elections? 
We have put forth amendment after amendment to address ballot 
harvesting, with complete party-line votes against making sure the 
process that is illegal in North Carolina that a Republican operative 
will likely go to jail for is completely legal in States like 
California.
  And you want to talk about determining the outcome of an election? 
Come on.
  I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Loudermilk), my 
good friend.
  Mr. LOUDERMILK. Madam Speaker, I thank my friend from Illinois for 
yielding this minute to me.
  The distinguished Speaker talked about misinformation, and I agree. 
There is a lot of misinformation out there about elections and election 
security and a lot of that that goes on around here. Let's be factual 
here.
  There has been zero solid evidence of voter suppression during the 
last election, which had the largest turnout in the history of this 
Nation. Our own committee held seven field hearings across the Nation, 
with zero solid evidence of voter suppression, but the only acts of 
voter suppression that they tried to bring up had to deal with purging 
voter rolls.
  We actually had one hearing in Broward County. What is Broward County 
known for? Voter irregularities. Why? Many times, why? Because of paper 
ballots.
  But yet this is the direction we are going in, and the distinguished 
Speaker said we are taking it into the 21st century. Show me how. How 
is this taking us into the 21st century? It is taking us back decades.
  Look, if the Russians were actually physically invading our Nation 
with bombers and tanks, this bill would be the equivalent of giving our 
military pellet guns and paper airplanes to thwart the attack. This is 
taking us away from election security.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
North Carolina (Mr. Butterfield), a valued member of the House 
Administration Committee.
  Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Madam Speaker, I thank the chair of our committee 
for yielding me time this morning.
  Madam Speaker, I rise this morning in strong support of H.R. 2722. It 
is past time that this Congress act boldly in response to the foreign 
interference that took place in our 2016 elections, and that is exactly 
what this bill does.
  The gentleman from Ohio, the ranking member of the committee, I say 
to him it is disingenuous to point the finger at the Obama 
administration. That may or may not be accurate, but let us look 
forward.
  This legislation provides $600 million in grants to State and local 
officials to secure election infrastructure and replace aging voting 
machines with voter-verified paper ballot voting systems; $175 million 
to States every 2 years to maintain elections infrastructure. It 
requires States to implement risk-limiting audits; it prohibits 
internet accessibility or connectivity for devices on which ballots are 
marked or tabulated; and it sets long-needed cybersecurity standards 
for vendors.
  I ask my colleagues, let us look forward. Let us protect the right to 
vote. Let us protect the ballot of every American citizen.

  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time 
as I may consume.
  Madam Speaker, I really respect my colleague from North Carolina, and 
I do want to correct him a little bit.
  I am from Illinois, not Ohio. I would never mistake the gentleman 
from North Carolina as being from someplace like South Carolina. But 
the gentleman from North Carolina is a good friend.
  Look, we all have disagreements on this House floor, but that doesn't 
mean we are disagreeable when it comes to having good friendships, and 
I thank him for his courtesies and thank him for his friendship.
  The State of North Carolina is a great example of why we need to do 
better, why we ought to go back to the drawing board.
  Let's take this bill off the floor. Let's get back to bipartisan 
negotiations, because in States like North Carolina and States like 
Illinois where local election officials have bought machines, they 
bought machines, maybe they have current optical scan machines, but the 
requirement in this bill, as the Oklahoma secretary of state said, the 
requirement of this bill to have recycled paper through ballots, many 
of the already purchased optical scan machines that would be required 
for every local and State election official to purchase after the year 
2022 may not be able to read the ballots on recycled paper. So you are 
going to have to reinvest hard-earned tax dollars where many local 
communities in our great States have already invested in updating their 
election security with the most secure election equipment that they 
felt was going to protect them.
  Washington should not be telling our local officials what to buy, 
especially when there are provisions in this bill that make equipment 
that would fit

[[Page H5222]]

those guidelines illegal to use or are inoperable even if they have 
purchased it. We have got to do better.
  We all want to protect this great Nation. We all want free and fair 
elections so that every vote is counted and protected. Let's do it 
together. Let's do it right.
  Let's make sure we address some DHS concerns. Let's put a 
cybersecurity assistance unit together like we have tried to do.
  Let's outlaw ballot harvesting, because I know we have got bipartisan 
support in working together on that issue, especially with my good 
friend from North Carolina, Mr. Butterfield. I look forward to working 
with him on this. I know he and I both have concerns about this 
process, and I thank him for his willingness to sit down and talk.
  We can do better. The bill on the floor today is not better. Let's do 
it. Let's work together. Pull this bill off the floor. We have got a 
lot of other issues to debate today.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, we have no additional speakers, so if the 
gentleman would like to yield back, I will close.
  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, how much time do I have 
left?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. Jackson Lee). The gentleman from 
Illinois has 2\3/4\ minutes remaining. The gentlewoman from California 
has 9 minutes remaining.
  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the 
balance of my time.
  Madam Speaker, well, clearly the timekeeper is wrong. I obviously 
thought I had more, but I am not able to debate that today. I will go 
ahead and close.
  I do want to thank my colleague from California and also the members 
of the House Administration Committee, where we have an opportunity to 
come together, but this bill is just simply another partisan bill by 
the majority aimed at federally mandating election standards, like 
mandating that States exclusively use paper ballots, effectively 
banning any type of digital recording device that would have even a 
verified paper backup.
  The committee even had one hearing on this issue with Commissioners 
from the EAC--remember, that agency that one speaker earlier said was 
getting a pittance of dollars, small amounts of dollars over the last 
few years. Only in this institution is $380 million given by the 
Republican majority here in the House in the last Congress and signed 
into law by the President of the United States, only in this 
institution is $380 million a little bit. A lot of that money still 
hasn't even been spent by our local election officials.
  So here we are today debating a bill that is going to basically 
commit 1.3 billion taxpayer dollars toward so-called election security. 
We still have not addressed the problem that if DHS, if our same 
intelligence officials who told the Obama administration that there was 
foreign interference in our 2016 elections and the Obama administration 
did nothing about it--because, why? Because of Mitch McConnell. It is 
Mitch McConnell's fault.
  Seriously, come on. Get real here. We are legislators. We are an 
equal branch of government. There is absolutely no way any 
administration cedes authority to anybody in this legislative 
institution.
  The Obama administration failed to address the problem of election 
interference in 2016, and here we are today trying to make sure that we 
fix it. This attempt to fix it is a partisan attempt at ensuring that 
our elections authorities and our States and our local election 
officials have a top-down, federally mandated approach that is going to 
potentially cost them millions of taxpayer dollars that they have 
already inserted into their own budgets over the last few years.
  Our local officials have told us they want flexibility. Cybersecurity 
concerns are where they have invested much of the $380 million that we 
put forth in the last Congress.
  Let's make sure we spend the money that we have already appropriated; 
let's make sure we take a commonsense approach; and let's give our 
election officials, Republicans and Democrats from throughout this 
great Nation, the ability to address the concerns they know are weakest 
in their own system. Let's not have some bureaucrat out here in a 
concrete building determining what is going to work best in the State 
of Texas, in the State of Illinois, in the State of California, or 
anywhere else.

  Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I think it is important to address a few of the issues that have been 
raised in the course of this debate.
  First, we are moving forward with the SAFE Act because of a sense of 
urgency that we have about the 2020 election. That sense of urgency was 
fueled by the Director of National Intelligence, and it was fueled by 
the Director of the FBI who told us that red lights, warning lights 
were flashing and that the 2016 election was just a prelude to what the 
Russians were going to do in the 2020 election. We feel a sense of 
urgency.
  As has been mentioned by others, H.R. 1 included provisions about 
ballot security. But I introduced this bill, the SAFE Act, on May 14 
because it was specifically addressing election security, and, also, we 
made some additional enhancements to H.R. 1 relative to cybersecurity 
and the like.

                              {time}  1030

  We drafted the bill with the assistance of the Parliamentarian so 
that it was entirely within the jurisdiction of the House 
Administration Committee, with one exception. There was a line on page 
11 of the committee mark that authorized a study by the NSF. The 
Science, Space, and Technology Committee waived jurisdiction on markup 
because it was just a study, and that was very clear.
  This bill has proceeded in the regular order. It has been noticed 
according to our rules. And it brings us here today to test whether we 
are going to meet the challenge that faces us in ballot security: 
whether we are going to allow the Russians to attack our country by 
trying to steal our election next year or not.
  Mention has been made about the need for bipartisanship. I work often 
on a bipartisan basis with Members of the other party. I will say that 
we have tried in vain to have the Republican Members buy into the need 
to require best practices for next year's election, and we couldn't 
reach agreement.
  We decided that it is our responsibility to move forward, and that is 
why we are here today.
  Just a mention on unfunded mandates, we are authorizing about $1 
billion. $380 million was appropriated last year, and as the Speaker 
mentioned, we are appropriating this year an additional $600 million 
for ballot security.
  This bill authorizes the $600 million that we are appropriating, and 
we think it is important that that money flow to the States to harden 
our systems so the election cannot be stolen by our enemies. It is 
ironic that some on the other side of the aisle have complained about 
unfunded mandates at the same time they tried to impose a 25 percent 
match requirement on States for receiving these funds that they need to 
get to harden our system.
  Just a comment on DREs, DREs are not as unsafe as pure electronic 
voting, but they are not best practices.
  Much has been mentioned about the State of Georgia. It is worth 
noting that the Georgia legislature ignored the advice they got from 
computer scientists that what they were doing did not meet best 
practices for ballot security.
  A study published by Georgia Tech indicated that most voters did not 
actually look at the receipt when it was printed. They also point out 
that even though printed ballots, when voters do look at them, include 
the names of candidates, votes will be encoded in barcodes that humans 
can't authenticate and that are subject to hacking.
  ``There's nothing speculative about these vulnerabilities,'' said a 
Georgia Tech computer professor and former chief technology officer for 
Hewlett-Packard. ``If exploited, it would affect the result of the 
election. It's not a secure system.''
  We need to fix these things not because it is partisan but because we 
need to protect America.
  The idea that we would allow this just to be decided at a local level 
is

[[Page H5223]]

wrongheaded. If the Russians launched missiles at the counties of the 
United States, we wouldn't say, well, that is just a local issue. We 
would say, no, that is an attack on the United States of America.
  We need to harden our systems and protect our country.
  Madam Speaker, I strongly urge the adoption of this measure.
  I would like to read from a letter that we received just yesterday 
from the NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice. In their last 
paragraph, the Catholics say:

       In a secular democracy, elections are the closest thing we 
     have to a sacrament. We know that nefarious foreign and 
     domestic actors continue to meddle in our democratic systems, 
     and we have been put on notice that previous efforts were 
     only trial runs, presumably for our next election in 2020. 
     The NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice considers our 
     elections to be sacrosanct and that Congress must pass the 
     SAFE Act to protect them.

  This bill is supported by a broad sector of civil rights groups, 
including the NAACP and Common Cause. It deserves all of our support.
  I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2722 to ensure the security of 
our Nation's election infrastructure.
  Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 460, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 1(c) of rule XIX, further 
consideration of H.R. 2722 is postponed.

                          ____________________