June 27, 2019 - Issue: Vol. 165, No. 109 — Daily Edition116th Congress (2019 - 2020) - 1st Session

[Pages S4604-S4607]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            MORNING BUSINESS

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
be in a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak 
therein for 10 minutes each.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the escalating 
tensions between the United States and Iran, my concern about the 
administration's current approach--a path that I am worried will lead 
us to war--and my support for the Udall amendment to the NDAA, which 
will be voted on tomorrow.
  I believe that diplomatic efforts, in concert with our international 
partners, should be pursued immediately to avoid another unnecessary 
armed conflict in the Middle East.
  Let me be clear. Iran is a dangerous and destabilizing force in the 
region. It supports terrorist proxies and meddles in the internal 
affairs of other states. Iran continues to pursue ballistic missile 
capabilities in violation of international norms and abuses the rights 
of its own people. Unfortunately, the administration's chosen course of 
action with respect to Iran has isolated the United States from the 
international community and made it more difficult to collectively 
address these issues.
  The administration's actions and rhetoric related to Iran have 
created a credibility deficit. This is a fast-changing and dangerous 
situation, and it is clear that there is not a consensus within the 
international community with respect to Iran's plans and intentions.
  Given these disconnects, it is imperative for the administration to 
provide Congress with current, unvarnished intelligence so that we may 
reach substantiated conclusions.
  Taking a step back, it is important to recount the actions that have 
precipitated the current state of affairs. Current tensions are an 
entirely predictable outcome of the administration's ill-conceived 
approach to Iran.

[[Page S4605]]

Despite then-Candidate Trump's campaign rhetoric, I and others hoped 
that he would heed the advice of the advisers with respect to the Iran 
nuclear agreement, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action, or the JCPOA.
  For example, despite personal concerns about the JCPOA before it was 
signed, former Secretary of Defense Mattis told the Armed Services 
Committee at his confirmation hearing that ``when America gives her 
word, we have to live up to it and work with our allies.''
  In October 2017, Secretary Mattis told the Armed Services Committee 
that he believed it was in our national interest to remain in the 
JCPOA. General Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, echoed 
these sentiments at the time and cautioned that, in his words, ``the 
U.S. will incur damage vis-a-vis our allies if we unilaterally withdraw 
from the JCPOA. Our allies will be less likely to cooperate with us on 
future military action to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon 
and less likely to cooperate with us on countering other destabilizing 
aspects of Iranian behavior that threaten our collective interests.''
  The administration should have sought to work with the international 
community to address the challenges posed by Iran by building upon the 
foundation of the JCPOA rather than squandering that opportunity in 
favor of ``putting Iran on notice'' and other inflammatory rhetoric.
  Just over a year ago, President Trump made the disastrous decision to 
unilaterally withdraw the United States from the JCPOA and reimpose 
nuclear-related sanctions, in violation of previous U.S. commitments 
under the deal. Since withdrawing from the deal, the Trump 
administration has taken a series of additional escalatory actions, 
including the imposition of new sanctions on various aspects of the 
Iranian economy; cancellation of waivers that previously allowed 
importation of Iranian oil by China, India, Japan, South Korea, and 
Turkey; and the designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps--
often referred to as the IRGC--as a foreign terrorist organization.
  The designation of a foreign government entity as a foreign terrorist 
organization was unprecedented, and it is not clear what purpose it 
served other than to unnecessarily raise tensions with Iran. As I 
learned during a recent visit to Iraq and Afghanistan, the IRGC 
designation has significantly complicated our relationships with 
foreign partners who described the action as provocative and 
destabilizing.
  While the JCPOA was not a perfect deal, it was a necessary deal. It 
is important to remember that when the JCPOA was signed, Iran's 
``breakout'' timeline--the amount of time Iran would need to produce 
enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon--was only 2 to 3 months. 
Even by the most conservative estimates, the JCPOA stretched that 
timeline to more than a year.
  By all accounts, the JCPOA has worked as intended. The JCPOA commits 
Iran to never seeking to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon and 
effectively cuts off all pathways for Iran to achieve a nuclear weapon 
until at least 2030. The agreement dramatically reduced Iran's 
stockpile of enriched uranium and the number of installed centrifuges. 
It also prevented Iran from producing weapons-grade plutonium and has 
subjected Iran to the most intrusive monitoring regime in the world to 
ensure it is living up to its commitments.
  The JCPOA was appropriately built upon the concept of ``distrust and 
verify,'' and I support efforts by our European partners, as well as 
Russia and China, to preserve the JCPOA despite challenges the Trump 
administration has put in their way.
  According to General Dunford, in the absence of the JCPOA, Iran would 
likely resume its nuclear weapons program, and, in his words, ``a 
nuclear-armed Iran would likely be more aggressive in its actions and 
more dangerous in its consequences.''
  Unfortunately, the administration's withdrawal from the agreement and 
reimposition of sanctions has left us isolated from our allies and 
partners while emboldening the hardliners in Iran.
  In May of last year, subsequent to the decision to withdraw from the 
JCPOA, Secretary of State Pompeo articulated a set of 12 ``demands'' 
and indicated that ``major changes'' would need to be made by Iran 
before sanctions relief would be provided. The administration has sent 
mixed messages on whether its demands should be viewed as a set of 
preconditions for discussions on sanctions relief. The demands outlined 
by Secretary Pompeo are widely viewed as maximalist and leave little 
room for negotiation, especially given that the administration has 
already reneged on previous diplomatic commitments related to Iran's 
nuclear program.
  Without greater certainty by the administration on what specific 
actions would need to be taken by Iran to relieve U.S. economic 
pressure, I fear that Iran has little incentive to engage in 
negotiations.
  Indeed, the administration has followed that initial set of 12 
demands with a succession of orchestrated steps to force Iran into an 
ever-smaller corner that only serves to increase the odds of 
miscalculation and reduce diplomatic opportunities. The economic 
sanctions by the United States have left the Iranian economy reeling, 
with its gross domestic product shrinking by 5 percent and 
the inflation rate rising by 50 percent.

  As part of this so-called ``Maximum Pressure'' campaign, the 
administration has just announced personal sanctions against Supreme 
Leader Ali Khamenei and other Iranian leadership. The Iranians have 
responded by indicating that these sanctions mean ``the permanent 
closure of the doors of diplomacy.''
  Rather than modifying its behavior, Iran has responded to these 
demands and subsequent escalatory actions by increasing its malign 
activities in the region, including in Yemen and Syria, and announcing 
that it would stop complying with certain aspects of the JCPOA. If Iran 
follows through on threats to completely withdraw from the JCPOA and 
resume nuclear weapons development activities, the United States and 
the international community will be in a much less unified and 
therefore weaker negotiating position than we had leading up to the 
JCPOA.
  As I assess the current state of affairs, I see four potential 
outcomes of the current approach being pursued by the administration.
  First, Iran could bend to the will of the administration and announce 
its compliance with the so-called 12 demands laid out by Secretary 
Pompeo. However, Iran has a long history of struggle against outside 
forces. A notable example is the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. 
Additionally, Iranian capitulation would likely threaten its top 
priority of regime survival, so clearly this is an unrealistic outcome.
  Second, Iran could remain in the JCPOA despite seeing little of the 
economic benefits promised by the deal and hope that a future U.S. 
administration would return to the agreement. Iran's recent 
announcement that it would stop complying with aspects of the JCPOA is 
a signal that it views the current arrangement as unsustainable and is 
willing to abandon the JCPOA completely if its economic situation does 
not improve in the near term.
  Third, Iran could agree to return to the negotiating table, seeking a 
reduction in tensions and easing of sanctions. However, both the 
administration and Iranian leaders have made clear that they are not 
interested in such an approach.
  In announcing the administration's strategy for Iran last May, 
Secretary Pompeo stated that President Trump is ``ready, willing, and 
able to negotiate a new deal'' but also made clear that ``we will not 
renegotiate the JCPOA itself.''
  On May 8, Iranian President Rouhani stated:

       We are ready to negotiate, within the boundaries of JCPOA. 
     . . . It is not us who left the negotiation table.

  These seem to be irreconcilable positions, especially after the 
latest round of sanctions directed at the Iranian leadership.
  Lastly and most significant, I believe, the current approach could 
result in a military conflict between the United States and Iran. The 
destruction of an American unmanned drone flying in international 
airspace by a missile fired from Iran is an example of the potential 
for widespread conflict. Only at the last minute did President

[[Page S4606]]

Trump call off a strike against the Iranian missile sites in 
retaliation. He concluded correctly that such a strike would be 
disproportionate. But the incident underscores the precarious position 
we are in after months of the misguided ``maximum pressure'' campaign.
  Iranian action, either directed by national leadership or mistakenly 
taken by zealous supporters, could put us on an escalatory ladder of 
strike and counterstrike that would involve the entire region from 
Afghanistan to the Levant.
  In addition and equally troubling is that an unarticulated goal of 
this so-called ``Maximum Pressure'' campaign is to prompt Iran to leave 
the JCPOA either officially or by gradually increasing its stock of 
highly enriched uranium or other aspects of its nuclear program. This 
could give advocates for a military strike on Iran increased leverage. 
Again, such a strike, even targeted to nuclear facilities, would likely 
prompt a regional asymmetric response by Iran, with significant 
military as well as economic consequences.
  Like all of my colleagues, I am deeply concerned about Iranian 
threats to U.S. personnel facilities in the Middle East. U.S. forces 
have the unquestioned and inherent right to defend themselves, but 
absent an Iranian directed or sponsored attack or the imminent threat 
of such an attack on U.S. personnel facilities or key strategic 
interests, military actions should be pursued only as a last resort and 
as part of an international coalition, which the administration has so 
far failed to bring together.
  I will be supporting the amendment offered by Senator Udall because 
it would make clear that any offensive military action against Iran 
must be consistent with domestic and international law, including a 
specific authorization for the use of military force, or an AUMF, 
provided by Congress.
  In this context, the President's demonstrated willingness not just to 
bend the facts but to indulge, in certain cases, in fabrications is 
particularly concerning and unacceptable when it may come to deploying 
our troops into harm's way. Congress has the responsibility to demand 
and, if necessary, challenge the basis for unsupported assertions of 
Iranian aggression and provocation that could be used to take this 
country to war.
  Echoing one of the themes used in the Bush administration's 
justification for the 2003 Iraq war, Secretary of State Pompeo 
testified to the Senate in April that ``there's no doubt there is a 
connection between the Islamic Republic of Iran and al Qaeda. Period. 
Full stop.'' And he refused to rule out the use of the 2001 AUMF as a 
means to conduct military action against Iran.
  While Iran is a state sponsor of terror, I am not aware of compelling 
evidence to suggest Iran or Iranian affiliated groups are an 
``associated force'' of al-Qaida for the purposes of the 2001 AUMF.
  In fact, such an arrangement is hard to fathom, given the deep 
religious and ideological differences between the Shia leadership of 
Iran and the Sunni leadership of al-Qaida. The administration must come 
to Congress if it seeks to pursue offensive military action.
  Likewise, any consideration of military action against Iran must 
fully account for the likely cost of such an engagement--in lives, 
resources, potential negative impact on the global economy, disruption 
of U.S. bilateral relationships, and other unintended consequences. The 
administration must provide the American people with a clear-eyed 
assessment of what those costs may be in advance of any contemplated 
military engagement.
  The Trump administration's escalatory attacks may soon place Iran in 
an untenable position. As a result, Iran may seek to change the status 
quo by initiating a limited military conflict with the United States, 
thereby requiring the intervention of the international community. If 
such a scenario comes to pass, our recent efforts to deter Iran through 
the deployment of additional military capabilities to the region will 
have failed, and even a limited conflict would be very difficult to 
manage or to bring to a conclusion.
  The President and others in the administration have consistently 
downplayed the potential costs of conflict with Iran. In fact, just 
yesterday, the President said that ``if something should happen [with 
Iran], we're in a very strong position. It wouldn't last very long.'' 
The President's assessment is undercut by his own Director of National 
Intelligence Dan Coats, who told Congress earlier this year:

       Iran continues to develop and approve a range of new 
     military capabilities to target U.S. and allied military 
     assets in the region, including armed UAVs, ballistic 
     missiles, advanced naval mines, unmanned explosive boats, 
     submarines and advanced torpedoes, and antiship and land-
     attack cruise missiles. Iran has the largest ballistic 
     missile force in the Middle East and can strike targets up to 
     2,000 kilometers from Iran's borders. Russia's delivery of 
     the SA-20c SAM system in 2016 has provided Iran with its most 
     advanced long-range air defense system.

  In addition to the conventional military capabilities laid out by 
Director Coats, Iran maintains a network of proxy forces throughout the 
region, many of whom operate in close proximity to U.S. military 
personnel in Iraq and Syria. They maintain the capability to conduct 
lethal action against our forces and facilities without notice.
  Recently retired commander of the U.S. Central Command, General 
Votel, told the Armed Services Committee in February:

       The Iranian regime masks its malign activities through 
     proxies and surrogates enabled by the Iran Threat Network in 
     Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Iran is also attempting to 
     build ground lines of communication through Iraq and Syria 
     into Lebanon to support its proxy Hezbollah. Iran has gained 
     influence with Iraq's armed forces with the formalization of 
     Popular Mobilization Forces, and also exerted influence in 
     Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, oftentimes affecting established 
     sovereign governments.

  The combination of Iran's known conventional and asymmetric 
capabilities should dispel any notion that conflict with Iran would be 
quick or could be won only through the use of U.S. air power. As former 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reportedly said in a recent speech: 
``If you think the war in Iraq was hard, an attack on Iran would, in my 
opinion, be a catastrophe.''
  He continued: ``[Iranian] capacity to wage a series of terror attacks 
across the Middle East aimed at us and our friends, and dramatically 
worsen the situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and elsewhere is 
hard to overestimate.''
  All of the competent military analysts I have engaged with believe 
that we cannot conduct an effective land campaign in Iran, and an 
extended air and sea campaign will undercut the priorities laid out in 
the national defense strategy, which focuses not on the Middle East but 
on Russia and China.
  Absent the full mobilization of our Armed Forces and those of our 
allies, ground operations in Iran are simply beyond our capacity. The 
last ground war involving Iran, the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, 
resulted in the death of nearly 1 million troops, the majority of whom 
were Iranians who died fighting a superior Iraqi military during a 
brutal and prolonged conflict. There is clearly no widespread U.S. or 
international support for another such military engagement in the 
Middle East.
  Considering the costs associated with ground operations, a more 
limited conflict involving a series of tit-for-tat actions is far more 
likely, with Iran utilizing its asymmetric advantages and proxies in 
response to U.S. precision and standoff strikes.
  It is unlikely that U.S. deterrence could be quickly reestablished 
under such a scenario, and Iran may use the time to restart and advance 
its nuclear weapons efforts, thereby increasing its negotiating 
leverage and also making the situation much more volatile.
  War with Iran is not inevitable. To date, the administration has 
tried to use every instrument of national power to get Iran to change 
its behavior--except diplomacy and negotiations. The administration's 
ill-conceived approach has not worked, and the time has come to try 
real and sustained diplomacy, rather than relying on coercion.
  I urge the President and those in the administration to take this 
moment of high tension to engage with our allies and partners with the 
goal of seeking a diplomatic solution to the current situation. In that 
context and in that spirit, I will support the Udall amendment 
tomorrow.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

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