DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020; Congressional Record Vol. 165, No. 119
(House of Representatives - July 16, 2019)

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DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION 
               ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020


                             General Leave

  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their 
remarks and include extraneous material on the Intelligence 
Authorization Act.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 491 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 3494.
  The Chair appoints the gentleman from California (Mr. Huffman) to 
preside over the Committee of the Whole.

                              {time}  1900


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 3494) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2020 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Huffman in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  General debate shall be confined to the bill and amendments specified 
in the first section of House Resolution 491, and shall not exceed 1 
hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority 
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  The gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Nunes) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consume.
  Along the wall in the upper lobby of the CIA headquarters building is 
a large picture of the head and torch of the Statue of Liberty 
accompanied by the following words: ``We are the Nation's first line of 
defense. We accomplish what others cannot accomplish and go where 
others cannot go.''
  These two sentences distill the essence of America's intelligence 
community and the quiet sense of mission that tens of thousands of our 
fellow citizens bring to their jobs every day.
  H.R. 3494, the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020, 
is our contribution to the work of the IC.
  This is a bipartisan bill, reported unanimously out of the 
Intelligence Committee and embodying the collective efforts of 
Democratic and Republican members.
  Though H.R. 3494 contains many new initiatives authored during my 
chairmanship, it also preserves provisions developed during Ranking 
Member Nunes' tenure as chairman as well.
  Despite disagreements over the Russia investigation, the committee 
has come together to support our intelligence community.
  HPSCI oversees highly sensitive, highly classified activities, and we 
collaborate with the IC to ensure that it has the resources and 
authorities necessary to collect vital intelligence. That won't work, 
however, unless the committee trusts the IC elements it oversees, and 
those same elements trust the committee.
  At the same time, HPSCI must ensure that legal and policy constraints 
are vigorously enforced. That requires us to maintain both a 
professional distance and a healthy skepticism about the activities we 
oversee. When warranted, the committee must impose additional checks 
and limitations, at times over intelligence community objections.
  It is a delicate balance, which HPSCI strikes through use of many 
different oversight tools. The most important by far is our annual 
Intelligence Authorization Act.
  H.R. 3494 gets the balance right. It authorizes funding for the IC at 
roughly 1.4 percent above the President's budget request for the coming 
year. It prioritizes the IC's collection and analytic capabilities 
against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, while sustaining critical 
intelligence capabilities that support counterterrorism and 
counterproliferation.
  The bill also ensures that the men and women of the IC have what they 
need to collect and analyze the intelligence that policymakers require.
  At the same time, H.R. 3494 ensures close oversight by Congress, 
rejecting the funding of legacy IC programs with overseas contingency 
operation resources, or OCO, funding; and requiring, for the first 
time, the submission to the intelligence committees of detailed 
information on unfunded IC programs.
  Another provision authored by Representative Welch calls for more 
information in the IC's budget for counterterrorism matters to be 
released to the public consistent with the protection of national 
security. Still another authorizes the Public Interest Declassification 
Board, which plays a vital role in ensuring that historical documents 
about IC programs are declassified appropriately.
  The legislation is especially strong in three other areas. The first 
has to do with foreign malign activities, including those by Russia. 
The bill calls for extensive IC reporting and creates new notification 
requirements regarding covert or overt efforts by foreign governments 
to undermine trusted institutions or to interfere in the democratic 
process, our own or those of other nations.
  This bill also strongly supports the IC workforce. H.R. 3494 obliges 
the IC elements to offer their employees 12 weeks of paid parental 
leave on top of the unpaid leave already guaranteed to them by law. 
Other language ensures that the families of CIA personnel who are 
killed or injured as a result of wars, hostile acts, or other incidents 
can be appropriately compensated.

  The bill also bolsters the IC's ability to recruit, hire, retain, and 
promote a workforce that represents the diversity of the Nation that it 
serves.
  Lastly, technology. Many have sounded alarms about the rise of so-
called ``deep fake'' algorithms and the transition in our country and 
elsewhere to a fifth-generation telecommunications network. To help the 
IC address both challenges, H.R. 3494 instructs the DNI to hold 
competitions and to award prizes for cutting-edge research into deep 
fake and 5G technologies.
  H.R. 3494 is not perfect; it is the result of negotiation and 
compromise. I am pleased that, despite our public differences, we have 
once again been able to put those aside to focus on the important work 
of overseeing the intelligence community. The result is a strong, 
bipartisan bill, which I am proud to support.
  Mr. Chair, let me conclude by thanking Ranking Member Nunes, my 
committee colleagues, and the entire HPSCI staff for their 
collaborative efforts.
  Mr. Chair, I urge all Members of the House to join me in voting for 
H.R. 3494.
  Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

[[Page H5859]]

  

  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 3494, the Damon Paul 
Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.
  Passing an annual intelligence authorization bill is the most 
important tool Congress has to conduct effective oversight of the 
intelligence activities of the United States.
  Today, Chairman Schiff and I are bringing the tenth consecutive 
intelligence authorization bill to the floor. I am pleased that, as in 
years past, this bill is a bipartisan product that reflects the 
contributions of all the committee's members. It was reported out of 
the committee by a unanimous voice vote.
  This legislation is the product of bipartisan work by the majority 
and the minority and provides the intelligence community the necessary 
resources and authorities to ensure the IC remains capable of 
protecting and defending the United States.
  The bill folds in many priorities from fiscal year 2018 and 2019, 
including the defense of elections from foreign threats, enhanced 
injury benefits to CIA employees, and bolsters intelligence oversight 
by improving the IC accountability to Congress.
  Additionally, the bill protects all CIA covert intelligence officers' 
identities, establishes a paid parental leave program for the IC, and 
it mandates counterintelligence briefings and notifications to the 
intelligence committees by the FBI on a quarterly basis and prompt 
notification when an investigation is carried out regarding a 
counterintelligence risk related to a Federal election or campaign.
  This bill supports critical national security programs, particularly 
those focused on countering threats from hard targets, such as China.
  Lastly, the bill continues to ensure that the dedicated men and women 
of our intelligence community have the funding, authorities, and 
support they need to carry out their mission and to keep us safe.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Quigley).
  Mr. QUIGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I rise in support of H.R. 3494.
  As the United States learned in 2016, there are few things more 
important to our democracy than ensuring that our electoral system is 
kept free from outside interference.
  We also have a responsibility to educate our partners and our allies 
about the threat from foreign interference, as well as share our best 
practices with those nations that face similar threats.
  Taiwan, one of Asia's most vibrant democracies, is acutely aware of 
the risks posed by foreign influence. The Chinese Communist Party, 
angry that another nation has the audacity to prove that a culturally 
Chinese democracy can thrive, will stop at nothing to degrade Taiwan's 
political independence.
  This year's Intelligence Authorization Act requires the Director of 
National Intelligence to report on influence operations China conducts 
to interfere in Taiwan's upcoming 2020 elections and find out what 
assistance the U.S. government provided to counter these operations and 
provide a comprehensive list of the specific organizations that 
conducted these influence operations.
  The U.S. is in a unique position to share the tools and techniques 
with others that we are implementing to safeguard our own democratic 
elections.
  In line with our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, we urge 
the administration to do all it can to assist Taipei with creating 
conditions for a free, fair, and secure election that is free from 
interference.
  This provision brings us one step closer to that goal.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as she may consume to 
the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Stefanik).
  Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Chair, I am proud to rise in support of this year's 
Intelligence Authorization Act.
  After the recent partisan NDAA debate and vote, it is an 
accomplishment that this committee came together to produce a 
bipartisan bill that supports our intelligence community and provides 
the warfighter with the intelligence support needed to protect the 
United States and our allies.

  I am particularly pleased that this bill contains the 
Counterintelligence Accountability Act that I introduced earlier this 
year that I wanted to take a moment to highlight for the American 
public.
  This bill amends the National Security Act by requiring the FBI to 
provide quarterly counterintelligence briefings to the congressional 
intelligence committees, which is not only necessary for us to conduct 
meaningful oversight over the FBI's counterintelligence operations, but 
also provides the American people with the comfort that the FBI is 
subject to the same types of scrutiny as other intelligence agencies.
  Importantly, this bill also mandates that the FBI notify the 
congressional intelligence committees when the FBI has a 
counterintelligence investigation open related to a CI risk to an 
election or campaign for Federal office.
  Given former FBI Director Comey's testimony in 2017, I am still 
deeply concerned that the FBI failed to provide notification to the 
congressional intelligence committees regarding the investigation 
opened into the Trump campaign in 2016 until well after the election.
  This bill ensures that Congress is kept fully and currently informed 
of these types of counterintelligence activities. This is good, 
accountable governance.
  Mr. Chair, I appreciate the chair and ranking member's support in 
adding my legislation into this bill and urge my colleagues to vote 
``yes'' on final passage.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Washington State (Mr. Heck).
  Mr. HECK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chair of the committee for 
yielding.
  Mr. Chair, I rise to strongly support the David Paul Nelson and 
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act.
  In the last year we have made some pretty incredible progress in 
reducing the security clearance backlog, yet, frankly, after all the 
progress we have made, we are still--and you are hearing this number 
correctly--left with nearly a half a million people on the waiting list 
for security clearance.
  Earlier this year, the average wait time for top secret security 
clearance was reduced to 468 days, down from 534 days.
  So, in other words, when we are out there competing for young talent 
to come in and be a member of the intelligence community, say in a 
field such as cyber, we are told we have to tell them, ``Cool your 
jets. We will get back to you in a year, year and a half or so.''
  Indeed, closer to home, my senior military adviser is a distinguished 
graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served 
not one, but two tours in Afghanistan, where he had a security 
clearance, and yet when he joined a staff in the House of 
Representatives, to again earn a security clearance, it took 20 months, 
nearly 2 years.
  We are losing good people when we subject them to that long of a wait 
time.
  This bill makes some progress. It will build on the progress we made 
this year by providing needed reform to this mission. It creates a 
system of accountability and clear goals for how the process should 
run.
  Furthermore, the bill allows for innovation on using digital tools, 
and reciprocity among agencies to improve our efficiencies when 
clearances are needed to be transferred from one agency to another.
  Our government can and must efficiently and effectively review 
security clearance applicants. We owe our national security workforce 
at least that much. This bill will help us to do that, to further 
reduce it, so that the intelligence community can compete for the best 
and the brightest in a timely fashion.
  Mr. Chair, for that reason, among many, I urge Members' support for 
the Intelligence Authorization Act.

                              {time}  1915

  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

[[Page H5860]]

  

  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Alabama (Ms. Sewell).
  Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 3494, 
the Intelligence Authorization Act.
  Mr. Chairman, as the chair of the Defense Intelligence and Warfighter 
Support Subcommittee, I believe this bill will ensure our warfighters 
retain the information and decisionmaking advantages to which we have 
grown accustomed and improve the intelligence community's ability to 
attract and retain a diverse workforce.
  The bill includes provisions that authorize increased intelligence 
funding for combatant commanders and our growing strategic competition 
with China, Russia, and other malign actors; supports the Defense 
Intelligence Agency's ongoing assessment of its roles and missions; and 
provides the Director of National Intelligence with the necessary 
authority to manage intelligence community-wide academic programs.
  This bill also includes language I authored which will improve 
Federal campaign election security. My provision will require the 
Director of National Intelligence to work with the FBI and the 
Department of Homeland Security to make available an advisory report on 
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to those 
campaigns. Additionally, my language requires the Director to publish a 
summary of best practices and provide information to campaigns to help 
thwart these attacks.
  This legislation also continues the committee's longstanding and 
bipartisan work to promote increased diversity within the intelligence 
community's workforce. This bill contains language directing the 
intelligence community to expand its annual demographic hiring report 
by adding grade level, years of service, career categories, gender 
identity, and sexual orientation reporting categories. These changes 
will improve the IC's ability to track how well it retains and promotes 
persons of diverse backgrounds.
  Finally, for the first time in many years, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act will provide significant funding for programs that 
will improve the IC's ability to introduce students from diverse 
backgrounds to its mission.
  Mr. Chairman, I look forward to voting in support of this 
legislation. I commend the chairman and ranking member on working 
together to provide these important authorizations. I encourage my 
colleagues to do the same and vote for this bill.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Swalwell).
  Mr. SWALWELL of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of our 
committee for working with the minority to put together a bipartisan 
piece of legislation that serves our national security purposes.
  I also want to acknowledge both of the individuals for whom the bill 
is named, but particularly Damon Paul Nelson, the former staff director 
for the then-majority at the time, someone whom I and my colleagues saw 
put his heart and soul into the committee and someone who was able to 
keep many lines of communication that were necessary open during some 
of our most trying times. This is a fitting recognition of his service 
to our country.
  As chairman of the Intelligence Modernization and Readiness 
Subcommittee, I celebrate this bipartisan bill and the patriotic young 
people who enter service in the intelligence community, sometimes 
immediately after college, despite extraordinary student debt. For that 
reason, we have included measures to enhance intelligence community-
wide student loan repayment and forgiveness programs.
  Reducing the financial burden on intelligence community workers helps 
us recruit and retain a talented and diverse workforce to remain 
competitive with the private sector. To that aim, we have also included 
a measure to authorize 12 weeks of paid parental leave for intelligence 
community employees in the event of a birth or adoption.
  This authority would supplement the 12 weeks of unpaid leave 
currently afforded to intelligence community employees and other 
government personnel under existing law, sending a strong message to 
the intelligence community workforce that they do not need to choose 
between their career, serving our country, and their family.
  These will help the intelligence community recruit and retain 
individuals capable of meeting the security goals of the United States 
and will set the example for other Federal agencies seeking pro-worker 
policies.
  Our goal on the subcommittee is to anticipate the needs of the 
intelligence community workforce. Reaching across the aisle for our 
intelligence community is how we will secure a next-generation 
intelligence community workforce.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, it is now a pleasure to yield 3 minutes to 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Sean Patrick Maloney).
  Mr. SEAN PATRICK MALONEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I thank the 
chairman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer support for this bill, which 
includes my legislation, the Gregg Wenzel Clandestine Heroes Parity 
Act.
  Mr. Chairman, my bill honors an unsung son of the Hudson Valley, CIA 
Officer Gregg Wenzel, who died in Ethiopia on July 9, 2003. He was only 
33 years old.
  Gregg was inspired to join the Clandestine Service after September 11 
and dedicated his life to making the United States stronger in our 
fight against terrorism. That is what CIA officers do; they put their 
lives on the line for our freedoms. But because of the nature of their 
work, they rarely get the recognition they deserve.
  This bill simply ensures that the families of fallen CIA officers 
receive the death benefits their loved ones earned laying down their 
lives in service of our Nation.

  Gregg was born in the Bronx and graduated from Monroe-Woodbury High 
School in Orange County, New York. He went on to earn degrees from the 
State University of New York at Binghamton and then the University of 
Miami School of Law.
  After joining the CIA, he was assigned his first overseas tour as an 
operations officer in the Horn of Africa. The assignment was 
challenging, but Gregg was known for his grit and good spirit.
  After his death, Gregg was awarded the CIA's Intelligence 
Commendation Medal and the Exceptional Service Medallion. You can find 
his star, number 81, on the CIA Memorial Wall in Langley. And we even 
honored his service in 2015 by renaming the Monroe, New York, post 
office the Gregg David Wenzel Memorial Post Office, which is the first 
such honor ever to be bestowed on a CIA officer.
  But even with these distinctions, Gregg's family was never able to 
access the death benefits he had earned in life. A loophole currently 
blocks benefits for all CIA officers who don't have dependents or who 
are not killed by a known act of terrorism. My bill simply changes that 
and rights this wrong.
  I am so thankful to Gregg's parents, Gladys and Mitch Wenzel, for 
never giving up on this fight. This bill is an opportunity for us, as a 
grateful nation, to honor Gregg and his family and to honor all of our 
fallen CIA officers and the families they have left behind.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge all Members to vote ``yes'' on this bill.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this year's IA is named after Damon Nelson and Matthew 
Pollard, two staffers who passed away unexpectedly last year.
  Matt Pollard was a staffer with the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
and he is remembered fondly by staff and members who had the pleasure 
of working with him.
  Damon Nelson was a former Republican staff director on the House 
Intelligence Committee and a personal friend. Damon would be happy with 
the bill today, and I am happy that this committee was able to produce 
a bipartisan product.
  In closing, I want to take a moment to thank the men and women who 
serve in our intelligence community. I am honored to get to know so 
many of them in the course of the committee's oversight work.
  I also thank my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee for their 
contributions to our oversight over the past year.

[[Page H5861]]

  I also thank all of the staff on the committee for their hard work on 
the bill and their daily oversight of the intelligence community. In 
particular, I thank the professional oversight staff from the minority, 
especially Nick Ciarlante, Laura Casulli, Meghan Green, Andrew House, 
Lisa Major, Bill Flanigan, Steve Keith, Marissa Skaggs, Betsy Hulme, 
Jack Langer, and Allen Souza.
  I would also like to take just a moment to thank our fellow from Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, Scott Miller. Scott joined the committee in 
2016 and, in a few weeks, will be finishing up his midcareer 
educational program with the House and will be returning to New Mexico.
  Mr. Chairman, I wish Scott all the best as he, his wife, Rebecca, and 
daughter, Sarah, return home.
  All the staff members spent long hours working on the legislative 
text and its classified annex, and the bill is stronger for it.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Schiff and all of his staff for the 
bipartisan work product.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of H.R. 3494, as amended, and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I wish to say only a few words of recognition before 
concluding my remarks on the Intelligence Authorization Act.
  First, my HPSCI colleagues and I remember HPSCI's Damon Nelson and 
SSCI's Matthew Pollard, two dedicated staffers and public servants who 
passed away last year. The legislation is named in their honor.
  I also express my tremendous thanks and support to the men and women 
of the intelligence community. They strive quietly and tirelessly every 
day, and their work helps keep the Nation safe.
  I greatly appreciate the work of Ranking Member Nunes, as well as my 
other HPSCI colleagues.
  And I would be remiss if I did not recognize these members of my 
staff who worked tirelessly together with their minority colleagues to 
produce this bipartisan legislation: Wells Bennett, Timothy Bergreen, 
Maher Bitar, Carly Blake, Patrick Boland, Kris Breaux, Linda Cohen, 
Thomas Eager, Will Evans, Patrick Fallon, Daniel Goldman, Abby Grace, 
Nicolas Mitchell, Daniel Noble, Diana Pilipenko, Lucian Sikorskyj, 
Conrad Stosz, Kathy Suber, Amanda Rogers Thorpe, Aaron Thurman, Rheanne 
Wirkkala, Raffaela Wakeman, and William Wu.
  One more personnel note: I want to recognize the exemplary 
contributions of Brandon Smith, who has been a member of HPSCI's staff 
for 18 years. Brandon has announced that he will be leaving HPSCI soon. 
We are deeply grateful for his work and his longstanding and continuing 
service to the Nation.
  Let me conclude by urging all Members of the House to join me in 
voting for H.R. 3494 and in supporting the measure as it proceeds to 
the Senate and, after that, to the President's desk.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment 
under the 5-minute rule.
  In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, 
the amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of 
Rules Committee Print 116-22, modified by the amendment printed in part 
A of House Report 116-154, shall be considered as adopted. The bill, as 
amended, shall be considered as an original bill for purpose of further 
amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered as read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 3494

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Damon Paul Nelson and 
     Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020''.

     SEC. 2. DIVISIONS AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Divisions.--This Act is organized into two divisions as 
     follows:
       (1) Division A--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Year 
     2020.
       (2) Division B--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal 
     Years 2018 and 2019.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Divisions and table of contents.
Sec. 3. Definitions.

      DIVISION A--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence community management account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 303. Paid parental leave.
Sec. 304. Unfunded requirements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 305. Extending the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982.
Sec. 306. Intelligence community public-private talent exchange.
Sec. 307. Assessment of contracting practices to identify certain 
              security and counterintelligence concerns.
Sec. 308. Required counterintelligence briefings and notifications.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Sec. 401. Establishment of Climate Security Advisory Council.
Sec. 402. Transfer of National Intelligence University to the Office of 
              the Director of National Intelligence.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Sec. 501. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the 
              United States by the Communist Party of China.
Sec. 502. Report on repression of ethnic Muslim minorities in the 
              Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 503. Report on efforts by People's Republic of China to influence 
              election in Taiwan.
Sec. 504. Assessment of legitimate and illegitimate financial and other 
              assets of Vladimir Putin.
Sec. 505. Assessments of intentions of political leadership of the 
              Russian Federation.
Sec. 506. Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi.

          TITLE VI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM

Sec. 601. Definitions.
Sec. 602. Annual strategic intelligence assessment of and comprehensive 
              report on domestic terrorism.

                  TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 701. Modification of requirements for submission to Congress of 
              certain reports.
Sec. 702. Increased transparency regarding counterterrorism budget of 
              the United States.
Sec. 703. Task force on illicit financing of espionage and foreign 
              influence operations.
Sec. 704. Study on role of retired and former personnel of intelligence 
              community with respect to certain foreign intelligence 
              operations.
Sec. 705. Report by Director of National Intelligence on fifth-
              generation wireless network technology.
Sec. 706. Establishment of 5G prize competition.
Sec. 707. Establishment of deepfakes prize competition.

 DIVISION B--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019

                   TITLE XXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 2101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 2102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 2103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

   TITLE XXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY 
                                 SYSTEM

Sec. 2201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 2202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.

          TITLE XXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 2301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 2302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 2303. Modification of special pay authority for science, 
              technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and 
              addition of special pay authority for cyber positions.
Sec. 2304. Modification of appointment of Chief Information Officer of 
              the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 2305. Director of National Intelligence review of placement of 
              positions within the intelligence community on the 
              Executive Schedule.
Sec. 2306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task 
              Force.

[[Page H5862]]

Sec. 2307. Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and 
              cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence 
              with foreign governments and entities.
Sec. 2308. Cyber protection support for the personnel of the 
              intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to 
              cyber attack.
Sec. 2309. Elimination of sunset of authority relating to management of 
              supply-chain risk.
Sec. 2310. Limitations on determinations regarding certain security 
              classifications.
Sec. 2311. Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Sec. 2312. Intelligence community information technology environment.
Sec. 2313. Report on development of secure mobile voice solution for 
              intelligence community.
Sec. 2314. Policy on minimum insider threat standards.
Sec. 2315. Submission of intelligence community policies.
Sec. 2316. Expansion of intelligence community recruitment efforts.

 TITLE XXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 2401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of 
              the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 2402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing 
              environment.
Sec. 2403. Technical modification to the executive schedule.
Sec. 2404. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 2405. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 2411. Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for personnel 
              assigned to austere locations.
Sec. 2412. Special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation 
              payments and other payments for Central Intelligence 
              Agency personnel.
Sec. 2413. Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of the 
              Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 2414. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for 
              certain senior level positions in the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.

     Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of 
                          Department of Energy

Sec. 2421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices of 
              Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
Sec. 2422. Establishment of Energy Infrastructure Security Center.
Sec. 2423. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive 
              Committee and budget reporting requirement.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

Sec. 2431. Plan for designation of counterintelligence component of 
              Defense Security Service as an element of intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 2432. Notice not required for private entities.
Sec. 2433. Establishment of advisory board for National Reconnaissance 
              Office.
Sec. 2434. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security 
              personnel at field locations.

                      TITLE XXV--ELECTION MATTERS

Sec. 2501. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against 
              United States election infrastructure.
Sec. 2502. Review of intelligence community's posture to collect 
              against and analyze Russian efforts to influence the 
              Presidential election.
Sec. 2503. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal 
              elections.
Sec. 2504. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United 
              States elections.
Sec. 2505. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns 
              directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 2506. Information sharing with State election officials.
Sec. 2507. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and 
              active measures campaigns directed at elections for 
              Federal offices.
Sec. 2508. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead election 
              security matters.

                    TITLE XXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES

Sec. 2601. Definitions.
Sec. 2602. Reports and plans relating to security clearances and 
              background investigations.
Sec. 2603. Improving the process for security clearances.
Sec. 2604. Goals for promptness of determinations regarding security 
              clearances.
Sec. 2605. Security Executive Agent.
Sec. 2606. Report on unified, simplified, Governmentwide standards for 
              positions of trust and security clearances.
Sec. 2607. Report on clearance in person concept.
Sec. 2608. Reports on reciprocity for security clearances inside of 
              departments and agencies.
Sec. 2609. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 2610. Periodic report on positions in the intelligence community 
              that can be conducted without access to classified 
              information, networks, or facilities.
Sec. 2611. Information sharing program for positions of trust and 
              security clearances.
Sec. 2612. Report on protections for confidentiality of whistleblower-
              related communications.

                 TITLE XXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

    Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers

Sec. 2701. Limitation relating to establishment or support of 
              cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation.
Sec. 2702. Report on returning Russian compounds.
Sec. 2703. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia.
Sec. 2704. Notification of an active measures campaign.
Sec. 2705. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and consular 
              personnel of the Russian Federation in the United States.
Sec. 2706. Report on outreach strategy addressing threats from United 
              States adversaries to the United States technology 
              sector.
Sec. 2707. Report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and 
              Lebanon.
Sec. 2708. Annual report on Iranian expenditures supporting foreign 
              military and terrorist activities.
Sec. 2709. Expansion of scope of committee to counter active measures 
              and report on establishment of Foreign Malign Influence 
              Center.

                          Subtitle B--Reports

Sec. 2711. Technical correction to Inspector General study.
Sec. 2712. Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer of 
              the Department of Homeland Security.
Sec. 2713. Review of intelligence community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 2714. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with 
              respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 2715. Report on surveillance by foreign governments against United 
              States telecommunications networks.
Sec. 2716. Biennial report on foreign investment risks.
Sec. 2717. Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel of 
              foreign diplomats.
Sec. 2718. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized 
              disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 2719. Congressional notification of designation of covered 
              intelligence officer as persona non grata.
Sec. 2720. Reports on intelligence community participation in 
              vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government.
Sec. 2721. Inspectors General reports on classification.
Sec. 2722. Reports on global water insecurity and national security 
              implications and briefing on emerging infectious disease 
              and pandemics.
Sec. 2723. Annual report on memoranda of understanding between elements 
              of intelligence community and other entities of the 
              United States Government regarding significant 
              operational activities or policy.
Sec. 2724. Study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline 
              and wireless telephone calls.
Sec. 2725. Modification of requirement for annual report on hiring and 
              retention of minority employees.
Sec. 2726. Reports on intelligence community loan repayment and related 
              programs.
Sec. 2727. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 2728. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on 
              senior executives of the Office of the Director of 
              National Intelligence.
Sec. 2729. Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation offering 
              permanent residence to sources and cooperators.
Sec. 2730. Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue sources.
Sec. 2731. Report on possible exploitation of virtual currencies by 
              terrorist actors.

                       Subtitle C--Other Matters

Sec. 2741. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 2742. Technical and clerical amendments to the National Security 
              Act of 1947.
Sec. 2743. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.
Sec. 2744. Sense of Congress on notification of certain disclosures of 
              classified information.
Sec. 2745. Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage activities 
              when considering whether or not to provide visas to 
              foreign individuals to be accredited to a United Nations 
              mission in the United States.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning 
     given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

[[Page H5863]]

  


      DIVISION A--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2020 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to 
     be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the 
     intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs 
     (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany 
     this Act.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made 
     available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, 
     within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedule except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     3306(a));
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.

     SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2020 the sum of $565,637,000.
       (b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In 
     addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), 
     there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account for fiscal year 2020 such 
     additional amounts as are specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability fund 
     $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2020.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

     SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 303. PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.

       (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to--
       (1) help the intelligence community recruit and retain a 
     dynamic, multi-talented, and diverse workforce capable of 
     meeting the security goals of the United States; and
       (2) establish best practices and processes for other 
     elements of the Federal Government seeking to pursue similar 
     policies.
       (b) Authorization of Paid Parental Leave for Intelligence 
     Community Employees.--
       (1) In general.--Title III of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 304 the following:

     ``SEC. 305. PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.

       ``(a) Paid Parental Leave.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, a civilian employee of an element of the 
     intelligence community shall have available a total of 12 
     administrative workweeks of paid parental leave in the event 
     of the birth of a child of the employee, or placement of a 
     child with the employee for adoption or foster care in order 
     to care for such son or daughter. Such paid parental leave 
     shall be used during the 12-month period beginning on the 
     date of the birth or placement. Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed to modify or otherwise affect the eligibility of 
     an employee of an element of the intelligence community for 
     benefits relating to leave under any other provision of law.
       ``(b) Treatment of Parental Leave Request.--Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law--
       ``(1) an element of the intelligence community shall 
     accommodate an employee's leave request under subsection (a), 
     including a request to use such leave intermittently or to 
     create a reduced work schedule, to the extent that the 
     requested leave schedule does not unduly disrupt operations; 
     and
       ``(2) to the extent that an employee's requested leave 
     described in paragraph (1) arises out of medical necessity 
     related to a serious health condition connected to the birth 
     of a child, the employing element shall handle the scheduling 
     consistent with the treatment of employees who are using 
     leave under subparagraph (C) or (D) of section 6382(a)(1) of 
     title 5, United States Code.
       ``(c) Rules Relating to Paid Leave.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law--
       ``(1) an employee may not be required to first use all or 
     any portion of any unpaid leave available to the employee 
     before being allowed to use the paid parental leave described 
     in subsection (a); and
       ``(2) paid parental leave under subsection (a)--
       ``(A) shall be payable from any appropriation or fund 
     available for salaries or expenses for positions within the 
     employing element;
       ``(B) may not be considered to be annual or vacation leave 
     for purposes of section 5551 or 5552 of title 5, United 
     States Code, or for any other purpose;
       ``(C) if not used by the employee before the end of the 12-
     month period described in subsection (a) to which the leave 
     relates, may not be available for any subsequent use and may 
     not be converted into a cash payment;
       ``(D) may be granted only to the extent that the employee 
     does not receive a total of more than 12 weeks of paid 
     parental leave in any 12-month period beginning on the date 
     of a birth or placement;
       ``(E) may not be granted--
       ``(i) in excess of a lifetime aggregate total of 30 
     administrative workweeks based on placements of a foster 
     child for any individual employee; or
       ``(ii) in connection with temporary foster care placements 
     expected to last less than 1 year;
       ``(F) may not be granted for a child being placed for 
     foster care or adoption if such leave was previously granted 
     to the same employee when the same child was placed with the 
     employee for foster care in the past;
       ``(G) shall be used in increments of hours (or fractions 
     thereof), with 12 administrative workweeks equal to 480 hours 
     for employees with a regular full-time work schedule and 
     converted to a proportional number of hours for employees 
     with part-time, seasonal, or uncommon tours of duty; and
       ``(H) may not be used during off-season (nonpay status) 
     periods for employees with seasonal work schedules.
       ``(d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 1 year after the 
     date of the enactment of this section, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees an implementation plan that 
     includes--
       ``(1) processes and procedures for implementing the paid 
     parental leave policies under subsections (a) through (c);
       ``(2) an explanation of how the implementation of 
     subsections (a) through (c) will be reconciled with policies 
     of other elements of the Federal Government, including the 
     impact on elements funded by the National Intelligence 
     Program that are housed within agencies outside the 
     intelligence community; and
       ``(3) all costs or operational expenses associated with the 
     implementation of subsections (a) through (c).
       ``(e) Directive.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     Director of National Intelligence submits the implementation 
     plan under subsection (d), the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall issue a written directive to implement 
     this section, which directive shall take effect on the date 
     of issuance.
       ``(f) Annual Report.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an 
     annual report that--
       ``(1) details the number of employees of each element of 
     the intelligence community who applied for and took paid 
     parental leave under subsection (a) during the year covered 
     by the report;
       ``(2) details the number of--
       ``(A) employees of each element of the intelligence 
     community stationed abroad who applied for and took paid 
     parental leave under subsection (a) during the year covered 
     by the report; and
       ``(B) employees of each element of the intelligence 
     community stationed abroad who applied for paid parental 
     leave but such application was not granted because of an 
     undue impact on operations as specified in subsection (b)(1); 
     and
       ``(3) includes updates on major implementation challenges 
     or costs associated with paid parental leave.
       ``(g) Definition of Child.--For purposes of this section, 
     the term `child' means a biological, adopted, or foster 
     child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person in 
     loco parentis, who is--
       ``(1) under 18 years of age; or
       ``(2) 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care 
     because of a mental or physical disability.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     matter preceding section 2 of the

[[Page H5864]]

     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002) is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 304 the 
     following:

``Sec. 305. Paid parental leave.''.

       (c) Applicability.--Section 305 of the National Security 
     Act of 1947, as added by subsection (b), shall apply with 
     respect to leave taken in connection with the birth or 
     placement of a child that occurs on or after the date on 
     which the Director of National Intelligence issues the 
     written directive under subsection (e) of such section 305.

     SEC. 304. UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``SEC. 512. UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       ``(a) Briefings.--Upon the request of an appropriate 
     congressional committee, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall provide to the committee a briefing on the 
     unfunded priorities of an element of the intelligence 
     community.
       ``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     `appropriate congressional committees' means--
       ``(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and
       ``(B) the Committees on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.
       ``(2) Unfunded priority.--The term `unfunded priority', in 
     the case of a fiscal year, means a program, activity, or 
     other initiative of an element of the intelligence community 
     that--
       ``(A) was submitted by the head of the element to the 
     Director of National Intelligence in the budget proposal for 
     the element for that fiscal year, but was not included by the 
     Director in the consolidated budget proposal submitted to the 
     President for that fiscal year; or
       ``(B) was submitted by the Director in the consolidated 
     budget proposal submitted to the President for that fiscal 
     year, but was not included in the budget of the President 
     submitted to Congress for that fiscal year pursuant to 
     section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections in the first 
     section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 511 the following new item:

``Sec. 512. Unfunded priorities of the intelligence community.''.

     SEC. 305. EXTENDING THE INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION 
                   ACT OF 1982.

       Section 605(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3126(4)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) by striking clause (ii);
       (B) in clause (i), by striking ``, and'' and inserting 
     ``;''; and
       (C) by striking ``agency--'' and all that follows through 
     ``whose identity'' and inserting ``agency whose identity''; 
     and
       (2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``resides and acts 
     outside the United States'' and inserting ``acts''.

     SEC. 306. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PUBLIC-PRIVATE TALENT 
                   EXCHANGE.

       (a) Policies, Processes, and Procedures Required.--Not 
     later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop 
     policies, processes, and procedures to facilitate the 
     rotation of personnel of the intelligence community to the 
     private sector, and personnel from the private sector to the 
     intelligence community.
       (b) Detail Authority.--Under policies developed by the 
     Director pursuant to subsection (a), pursuant to a written 
     agreement with a private-sector organization, and with the 
     consent of the employee, a head of an element of the 
     intelligence community may arrange for the temporary detail 
     of an employee of such element to such private-sector 
     organization, or from such private-sector organization to 
     such element under this section.
       (c) Agreements.--
       (1) In general.--A head of an element of the intelligence 
     community exercising the authority of the head under 
     subsection (a) shall provide for a written agreement among 
     the element of the intelligence community, the private-sector 
     organization, and the employee concerned regarding the terms 
     and conditions of the employee's detail under this section. 
     The agreement--
       (A) shall require that the employee of the element, upon 
     completion of the detail, serve in the element, or elsewhere 
     in the civil service if approved by the head of the element, 
     for a period that is at least equal to the length of the 
     detail;
       (B) shall provide that if the employee of the element fails 
     to carry out the agreement, such employee shall be liable to 
     the United States for payment of all non-salary and benefit 
     expenses of the detail, unless that failure was for good and 
     sufficient reason, as determined by the head of the element;
       (C) shall contain language informing such employee of the 
     prohibition on sharing, using, or otherwise improperly 
     handling classified of unclassified non-public information 
     for the benefit or advantage of the private-sector 
     organization;
       (D) shall contain language governing the handling of 
     classified information by such employee during the detail; 
     and
       (E) shall contain language requiring the employee to 
     acknowledge the obligations of the employee under section 
     1905 of title 18, United States Code.
       (2) Amount of liability.--An amount for which an employee 
     is liable under paragraph (1) shall be treated as a debt due 
     the United States.
       (3) Waiver.--The head of an element of the intelligence 
     community may waive, in whole or in part, collection of a 
     debt described in paragraph (2) based on a determination that 
     the collection would be against equity and good conscience 
     and not in the best interests of the United States, after 
     taking into account any indication of fraud, 
     misrepresentation, fault, or lack of good faith on the part 
     of the employee.
       (d) Termination.--A detail under this section may, at any 
     time and for any reason, be terminated by the head of the 
     element of the intelligence community concerned or the 
     private-sector organization concerned.
       (e) Duration.--
       (1) In general.--A detail under this section shall be for a 
     period of not less than 3 months and not more than 2 years, 
     renewable up to a total of 3 years.
       (2) Longer periods.--A detail under this section may be for 
     a period in excess of 2 years, but not more than 3 years, if 
     the head of the element making the detail determines that 
     such detail is necessary to meet critical mission or program 
     requirements.
       (3) Limitation.--No employee of an element of the 
     intelligence community may be detailed under this section for 
     more than a total of 5 years, inclusive of all such details.
       (f) Status of Federal Employees Detailed to Private-sector 
     Organizations.--
       (1) In general.--An employee of an element of the 
     intelligence community who is detailed to a private-sector 
     organization under this section shall be considered, during 
     the period of detail, to be on a regular work assignment in 
     the element. The written agreement established under 
     subsection (c)(1) shall address the specific terms and 
     conditions related to the employee's continued status as a 
     Federal employee.
       (2) Requirements.--In establishing a temporary detail of an 
     employee of an element of the intelligence community to a 
     private-sector organization, the head of the element shall--
       (A) certify that the temporary detail of such employee 
     shall not have an adverse or negative impact on mission 
     attainment or organizational capabilities associated with the 
     detail; and
       (B) in the case of an element of the intelligence community 
     in the Department of Defense, ensure that the normal duties 
     and functions of such employees are not, as a result of and 
     during the course of such temporary detail, performed or 
     augmented by contractor personnel in violation of the 
     provisions of section 2461 of title 10, United States Code.
       (g) Terms and Conditions for Private-sector Employees.--An 
     employee of a private-sector organization who is detailed to 
     an element of the intelligence community under this section--
       (1) shall continue to receive pay and benefits from the 
     private-sector organization from which such employee is 
     detailed and shall not receive pay or benefits from the 
     element, except as provided in paragraph (2);
       (2) is deemed to be an employee of the element for the 
     purposes of--
       (A) chapters 73 and 81 of title 5, United States Code;
       (B) sections 201, 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 603, 606, 607, 
     643, 654, 1905, and 1913 of title 18, United States Code;
       (C) sections 1343, 1344, and 1349(b) of title 31, United 
     States Code;
       (D) chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code (commonly 
     known as the ``Federal Tort Claims Act'') and any other 
     Federal tort liability statute;
       (E) the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.); 
     and
       (F) chapter 21 of title 41, United States Code;
       (3) may perform work that is considered inherently 
     governmental in nature only when requested in writing by the 
     head of the element;
       (4) may not be used to circumvent any limitation or 
     restriction on the size of the workforce of the element;
       (5) shall be subject to the same requirements applicable to 
     an employee performing the same functions and duties proposed 
     for performance by the private sector employee; and
       (6) in the case of an element of the intelligence community 
     in the Department of Defense, may not be used to circumvent 
     the provisions of section 2461 of title 10, United States 
     Code.
       (h) Prohibition Against Charging Certain Costs to the 
     Federal Government.--A private-sector organization may not 
     charge an element of the intelligence community or any other 
     agency of the Federal Government, as direct costs under a 
     Federal contract, the costs of pay or benefits paid by the 
     organization to an employee detailed to an element of the 
     intelligence community under this section for the period of 
     the detail and any subsequent renewal periods.
       (i) Additional Administrative Matters.--In carrying out 
     this section, the Director, pursuant to procedures developed 
     under subsection (a)--
       (1) shall, to the degree practicable, ensure that small 
     business concerns are represented with respect to details 
     authorized by this section;
       (2) may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     establish criteria for elements of the intelligence community 
     to use appropriated funds to reimburse small business 
     concerns for the salaries and benefits of its employees 
     during the periods when the small business concern agrees to 
     detail its employees to the intelligence community under this 
     section;
       (3) shall take into consideration the question of how 
     details under this section might best be used to help meet 
     the needs of the intelligence community, including with 
     respect to the training of employees;
       (4) shall take into consideration areas of private-sector 
     expertise that are critical to the intelligence community; 
     and
       (5) shall establish oversight mechanisms to determine 
     whether the public-private exchange authorized by this 
     section improves the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
     intelligence community.
       (j) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Detail.--The term ``detail'' means, as appropriate in 
     the context in which such term is used--

[[Page H5865]]

       (A) the assignment or loan of an employee of an element of 
     the intelligence community to a private-sector organization 
     without a change of position from the intelligence community 
     element that employs the individual; or
       (B) the assignment or loan of an employee of a private-
     sector organization to an element of the intelligence 
     community without a change of position from the private-
     sector organization that employs the individual.
       (2) Private-sector organization.--The term ``private-sector 
     organization'' means--
       (A) a for-profit organization; or
       (B) a not-for-profit organization.
       (3) Small business concern.--The term ``small business 
     concern'' has the meaning given such term in section 
     3703(e)(2) of title 5, United States Code.

     SEC. 307. ASSESSMENT OF CONTRACTING PRACTICES TO IDENTIFY 
                   CERTAIN SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
                   CONCERNS.

       (a) Assessment.--
       (1) Contracting practices.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall conduct an assessment of the authorities, 
     policies, processes, and standards used by the elements of 
     the intelligence community to ensure that the elements 
     appropriately weigh security and counterintelligence risks in 
     awarding a contract to a contractor that--
       (A) carries out any joint research and development 
     activities with a covered foreign country; or
       (B) performs any contract or other agreement entered into 
     with a covered foreign country.
       (2) Elements.--The assessment under paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) An assessment of whether the authorities, policies, 
     processes, and standards specified in paragraph (1) 
     sufficiently identify security and counterintelligence 
     concerns.
       (B) Identification of any authority gaps in such 
     authorities, policies, processes, and standards that prevent 
     the intelligence community from considering the activities 
     specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) when 
     evaluating offers for a contract.
       (3) Consultation.--In carrying out paragraph (1), the 
     Director shall consult with each head of an element of the 
     intelligence community.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     assessment under subsection (a)(1).
       (2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) The assessment under subsection (a)(1).
       (B) An identification of any known contractors that have--
       (i) carried out activities specified in subparagraphs (A) 
     and (B) of subsection (a)(1); and
       (ii) submitted an offer for a contract with an element of 
     the intelligence community.
       (C) A description of the steps that the Director and the 
     heads of the elements of the intelligence community took to 
     identify contractors under subparagraph (B).
       (3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (c) Covered Foreign Country Defined.--In this section, the 
     term ``covered foreign country'' means the government, or any 
     entity affiliated with the military or intelligence services 
     of, the following foreign countries:
       (1) The People's Republic of China.
       (2) The Russian Federation.
       (3) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
       (4) The Islamic Republic of Iran.

     SEC. 308. REQUIRED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS AND 
                   NOTIFICATIONS.

       (a) Foreign Counterintelligence and Cybersecurity Threats 
     to Federal Election Campaigns.--
       (1) Reports required.--
       (A) In general.--As provided in subparagraph (B), for each 
     Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
     for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an 
     Internet website an advisory report on foreign 
     counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election 
     campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall 
     include, consistent with the protection of sources and 
     methods, each of the following:
       (i) A description of foreign counterintelligence and 
     cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal 
     offices.
       (ii) A summary of best practices that election campaigns 
     for Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such 
     threats.
       (iii) An identification of any publicly available 
     resources, including United States Government resources, for 
     countering such threats.
       (B) Schedule for submittal.--A report under this subsection 
     shall be made available as follows:
       (i) In the case of a report regarding an election held for 
     the office of Senator or Member of the House of 
     Representatives during 2018, not later than the date that is 
     60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (ii) In the case of a report regarding an election for a 
     Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the 
     date that is 1 year before the date of the election.
       (C) Information to be included.--A report under this 
     subsection shall reflect the most current information 
     available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding 
     foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.
       (2) Treatment of campaigns subject to heightened threats.--
     If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
     the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and 
     Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for 
     Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign 
     counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and 
     the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of 
     sources and methods, may make available additional 
     information to the appropriate representatives of such 
     campaign.
       (b) Briefings on Counterintelligence Activities of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation.--
       (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), as amended by section 304, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 513. BRIEFINGS AND NOTIFICATIONS ON 
                   COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL 
                   BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

       ``(a) Quarterly Briefings.--In addition to, and without any 
     derogation of, the requirement under section 501 to keep the 
     congressional intelligence committees fully and currently 
     informed of the intelligence and counterintelligence 
     activities of the United States, not less frequently than 
     once each quarter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall provide to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a briefing on the counterintelligence activities 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such briefings shall 
     include, at a minimum, an overview and update of--
       ``(1) the counterintelligence posture of the Bureau;
       ``(2) counterintelligence investigations; and
       ``(3) any other information relating to the 
     counterintelligence activities of the Bureau that the 
     Director determines necessary.
       ``(b) Notifications.--In addition to the quarterly 
     briefings under subsection (a), the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation shall promptly notify the 
     congressional intelligence committees of any 
     counterintelligence investigation carried out by the Bureau 
     with respect to any counterintelligence risk or threat that 
     is related to an election or campaign for Federal office.
       ``(c) Guidelines.--
       ``(1) Development and consultation.--The Director shall 
     develop guidelines governing the scope of the briefings 
     provided under subsection (a), the notifications provided 
     under subsection (b), and the information required by section 
     308(a)(2) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, 
     and 2020. The Director shall consult the congressional 
     intelligence committees during such development.
       ``(2) Submission.--The Director shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees--
       ``(A) the guidelines under paragraph (1) upon issuance; and
       ``(B) any updates to such guidelines by not later than 15 
     days after making such update.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents at the 
     beginning of such Act, as amended by section 304, is further 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 512 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 513. Briefings and notifications on counterintelligence 
              activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

     SEC. 401. ESTABLISHMENT OF CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.

       (a) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``SEC. 120. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.

       ``(a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall establish a Climate Security Advisory Council for the 
     purpose of--
       ``(1) assisting intelligence analysts of various elements 
     of the intelligence community with respect to analysis of 
     climate security and its impact on the areas of focus of such 
     analysts;
       ``(2) facilitating coordination between the elements of the 
     intelligence community and elements of the Federal Government 
     that are not elements of the intelligence community in 
     collecting data on, and conducting analysis of, climate 
     change and climate security; and
       ``(3) ensuring that the intelligence community is 
     adequately prioritizing climate change in carrying out its 
     activities.
       ``(b) Composition of Council.--
       ``(1) Members.--The Council shall be composed of the 
     following individuals appointed by the Director of National 
     Intelligence:
       ``(A) An appropriate official from the National 
     Intelligence Council, who shall chair the Council.
       ``(B) The lead official with respect to climate and 
     environmental security analysis from--
       ``(i) the Central Intelligence Agency;
       ``(ii) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the 
     Department of State;
       ``(iii) the National Geospacial-Intelligence Agency;
       ``(iv) the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 
     of the Department of Energy;
       ``(v) the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
     Intelligence; and
       ``(vi) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
       ``(C) Three appropriate officials from elements of the 
     Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence 
     community that are responsible for--
       ``(i) providing decision-makers with a predictive 
     understanding of the climate;
       ``(ii) making observations of our Earth system that can be 
     used by the public, policymakers, and to support strategic 
     decisions; or
       ``(iii) coordinating Federal research and investments in 
     understanding the forces shaping the global environment, both 
     human and natural, and their impacts on society.

[[Page H5866]]

       ``(D) Any other officials as the Director of National 
     Intelligence or the chair of the Council may determine 
     appropriate.
       ``(2) Responsibilities of chair.--The chair of the Council 
     shall have responsibility for--
       ``(A) identifying agencies to supply individuals from 
     elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of 
     the intelligence community;
       ``(B) securing the permission of the relevant agency heads 
     for the participation of such individuals on the Council; and
       ``(C) any other duties that the Director of National 
     Intelligence may direct.
       ``(c) Duties and Responsibilities of Council.--The Council 
     shall carry out the following duties and responsibilities:
       ``(1) To meet at least quarterly to--
       ``(A) exchange appropriate data between elements of the 
     intelligence community and elements of the Federal Government 
     that are not elements of the intelligence community;
       ``(B) discuss processes for the routine exchange of such 
     data and implementation of such processes; and
       ``(C) prepare summaries of the business conducted at each 
     meeting.
       ``(2) To assess and determine best practices with respect 
     to the analysis of climate security, including identifying 
     publicly available information and intelligence acquired 
     through clandestine means that enables such analysis.
       ``(3) To assess and identify best practices with respect to 
     prior efforts of the intelligence community to analyze 
     climate security.
       ``(4) To assess and describe best practices for identifying 
     and disseminating climate security indicators and warnings;
       ``(5) To recommend methods of incorporating analysis of 
     climate security and the best practices identified under 
     paragraphs (2) through (4) into existing analytic training 
     programs.
       ``(6) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements of 
     the intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate 
     change or climate security and elements of the Federal 
     Government that are not elements of the intelligence 
     community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate 
     security, for the purpose of sharing information about 
     ongoing efforts and avoiding duplication of existing efforts.
       ``(7) To work with elements of the intelligence community 
     that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security 
     and elements of the Federal Government that are not elements 
     of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of 
     climate change or climate security--
       ``(A) to exchange appropriate data between such elements, 
     establish processes, procedures and practices for the routine 
     exchange of such data, discuss the implementation of such 
     processes; and
       ``(B) to enable and facilitate the sharing of findings and 
     analysis between such elements.
       ``(8) To assess whether the elements of the intelligence 
     community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate 
     security may inform the research direction of academic work 
     and the sponsored work of the United States Government.
       ``(9) At the discretion of the chair of the Council, to 
     convene conferences of analysts and non-intelligence 
     community personnel working on climate change or climate 
     security on subjects that the chair shall direct.
       ``(d) Sunset.--The Council shall terminate on the date that 
     is 4 years after the date of the enactment of this section.
       ``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Climate security.--The term `climate security' means 
     the effects of climate change on the following:
       ``(A) The national security of the United States, including 
     national security infrastructure.
       ``(B) Subnational, national, and regional political 
     stability.
       ``(C) The security of allies and partners of the United 
     States.
       ``(D) Ongoing or potential political violence, including 
     unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, 
     rebellion, revolution, civil war, and interstate war.
       ``(2) Climate intelligence indications and warnings.--The 
     term `climate intelligence indications and warnings' means 
     developments relating to climate security with the potential 
     to--
       ``(A) imminently and substantially alter the political 
     stability or degree of human security in a country or region; 
     or
       ``(B) imminently and substantially threaten--
       ``(i) the national security of the United States;
       ``(ii) the military, political, or economic interests of 
     allies and partners of the United States; or
       ``(iii) citizens of the United States abroad.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 119B the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 120. Climate Security Advisory Council.''.
       (c) Initial Appointments.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall appoint the members of the Council under 
     section 120 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 402. TRANSFER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY TO THE 
                   OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Transfer.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency shall transfer to the Director of 
     National Intelligence the National Intelligence University, 
     including the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities 
     of the University.
       (b) Degree-granting Authority.--
       (1) Regulations.--Under regulations prescribed by the 
     Director of National Intelligence, the President of the 
     National Intelligence University may, upon the recommendation 
     of the faculty of the University, confer appropriate degrees 
     upon graduates who meet the degree requirements.
       (2) Limitation.--A degree may not be conferred under this 
     section unless--
       (A) the appropriate head of a Department of the Federal 
     Government has recommended approval of the degree in 
     accordance with any Federal policy applicable to the granting 
     of academic degrees by departments and agencies of the 
     Federal Government; and
       (B) the University is accredited by the appropriate 
     civilian academic accrediting agency or organization to award 
     the degree, as determined by such appropriate head of a 
     Department.
       (c) Congressional Notification Requirements.--
       (1) Notification.--When seeking to establish degree-
     granting authority under this section, the Director shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees--
       (A) a copy of the self-assessment questionnaire required by 
     the Federal policy specified in subsection (b)(2)(A); and
       (B) any subsequent recommendations and rationale of the 
     appropriate head of a Department specified in such subsection 
     regarding establishing such degree-granting authority.
       (2) Modification.--Upon any modification or redesignation 
     of existing degree-granting authority, the Director shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     containing the rationale for the proposed modification or 
     redesignation and any subsequent recommendation described in 
     paragraph (1)(B) with respect to the proposed modification or 
     redesignation.
       (3) Actions on nonaccreditation.--The Director shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     containing an explanation of any action by the appropriate 
     academic accrediting agency or organization not to accredit 
     the University to award any new or existing degree.
       (d) Conforming Repeal.--Effective 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, section 2161 of title 10, United 
     States Code, is repealed, and the table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 108 of such title is amended by striking 
     the item relating to such section 2161.

     SEC. 403. DEATH BENEFITS FOR SURVIVORS OF CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) officers of the Central Intelligence Agency who die 
     during a period of assignment to a duty station in a foreign 
     country should receive death benefits, regardless of whether 
     the officers--
       (A) were killed on or off duty;
       (B) were killed due to an act of terrorism; or
       (C) have surviving dependents;
       (2) section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3510) has provided the Agency an appropriate 
     authority for compensating officers who die abroad who fall 
     into any gaps in existing death benefit regulations of the 
     Agency, even before the clarifying amendments made by this 
     Act;
       (3) notwithstanding that the improved authority provided by 
     section 11(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3511(c)), as added by 
     subsection (e) of this section, is permissive, the Director 
     of the Agency should promptly use such authority to modify 
     the regulations on death benefits of the Agency to implement 
     such section 11(c);
       (4) the Director should not modify such regulations in a 
     manner that limits or reduces the individuals covered by such 
     regulations as in effect on the day before the date of the 
     enactment of this Act; and
       (5) upon modifying such regulations, the Director should 
     submit such regulations to the congressional intelligence 
     committees pursuant to section 11(b) of such Act.
       (b) Clarification of Current Authority.--Section 8 of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3510) is 
     amended by inserting before ``rental of'' the following: 
     ``payment of death benefits in cases in which the 
     circumstances of the death of an employee of the Agency is 
     not covered by section 11, other similar provisions of 
     Federal law, or any regulation issued by the Director 
     providing death benefits, but that the Director determines 
     such payment appropriate;''.
       (c) Improvements to Benefits.--
       (1) Requirements.--Section 11 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3511) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsections.
       ``(C) Payments.--(1) In carrying out subsection (a), the 
     Director may pay to the survivor of a deceased covered 
     individual an amount equal to one year's salary 5313 of title 
     5, United States Code.
       ``(2) A covered individual may designate one or more 
     persons to receive all or a portion of the amount payable to 
     a survivor under paragraph (1). The designation of a person 
     to receive a portion of the amount shall indicate the 
     percentage of the amount, to be specified only in 10 percent 
     increments, that the designated person may receive. The 
     balance of the amount, if any, shall be paid in accordance 
     with subsection (f)(2)(B).
       ``(d) Exception.--The Director may not make a payment under 
     subsection (a) if the Director determines that the death was 
     by reason of willful misconduct by the decedent.
       ``(e) Finality.--Any determination made by the Director 
     under this section is final and may not be reviewed.
       ``(f) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `covered individual' means any of the 
     following individuals who die during a period of assignment 
     to a duty station in a foreign country, regardless of whether 
     the death is the result of injuries sustained while in the 
     performance of duty:
       ``(A) An employee of the Agency.
       ``(B) An employee of an element of the Federal Government 
     other than the Agency who is detailed or assigned to the 
     Agency at the time of death.

[[Page H5867]]

       ``(C) An individual affiliated with the Agency, as 
     determined by the Director.
       ``(2) The term `State' means each of the several States, 
     the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
     the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any 
     territory or possession of the United States.
       ``(3) The term `survivor' means, with respect to the death 
     of a covered individual--
       ``(A) a person designated by the covered individual under 
     subsection (c)(2); or
       ``(B) if a covered individual does not make such a 
     designation--
       ``(i) the surviving spouse of the covered individual, if 
     any;
       ``(ii) if there is no surviving spouse, any surviving 
     children of the covered individual and the descendants of any 
     deceased children by representation;
       ``(iii) if there is none of the above, the surviving 
     parents of the covered individual or the survivor of the 
     parents.
       ``(iv) if there is none of the above, the duly-appointed 
     executor or administrator of the estate of the covered 
     individual; or
       ``(v) if there is none of the above, other next of kin of 
     the covered individual entitled under the laws of the last 
     State if which the covered individual was domiciled before 
     the covered individual's death.''.
       (2) Application.--Section 11 of such Act, as amended by 
     paragraph (1), shall apply with respect to the following:
       (A) Deaths occurring during the period beginning on 
     September 11, 2001, and ending on the day before the date of 
     the enactment of this Act for which the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency has not paid a death benefit to 
     the survivors of the decedent equal to or greater than the 
     amount specified in subsection (c)(1) of such section 11, 
     except that the total of any such death benefits may not 
     exceed such amount specified in subsection (c)(1) of such 
     section 11.
       (B) Deaths occurring on or after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act.
       (3) Designations.--If the Director carries out subsection 
     (c) of section 11 of such Act, as added by paragraph (1), the 
     Director shall--
       (A) request all covered individuals (as defined in such 
     section 11) to make a designation under paragraph (2) of such 
     subsection (c); and
       (B) ensure that any new covered individual may make such a 
     designation at the time at which the individual becomes a 
     covered individual.
       (d) Briefing on Provision of VA and DOD Health Care 
     Services to CIA Officers.--
       (1) Findings.--Congress finds that officers of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency--
       (A) serve, and have served, overseas in dangerous areas or 
     austere environments;
       (B) may be wounded, incur brain or psychological trauma, or 
     suffer from other chronic injuries as a result of such 
     service; and
       (C) face challenges in getting the expert medical and 
     psychological care the officers need when the officers return 
     to the United States.
       (2) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the General Counsel of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency and the Deputy Director of the Agency for 
     Operations, in coordination with the Under Secretary of 
     Veterans Affairs for Health and the Director of the Defense 
     Health Agency of the Department of the Defense, shall jointly 
     provide to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     briefing on--
       (A) the extent to which the Director of the Agency believes 
     that the officers of the Agency could benefit from health 
     care services provided by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 
     the Secretary of Defense, or both;
       (B) the legal and policy constraints with respect to 
     providing such services to such officers; and
       (C) recommendations with respect to the legislative or 
     regulatory actions that Congress, the Secretary of Veterans 
     Affairs, and the Secretary of Defense could implement to 
     facilitate the provision of such services.
       (3) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
     subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Veterans' Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
       (C) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Veterans' Affairs of the Senate.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

     SEC. 501. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND 
                   CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST 
                   PARTY OF CHINA.

       (a) Reports.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 2718, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 1106. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND 
                   CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST 
                   PARTY OF CHINA.

       ``(a) Requirement.--On an annual basis, consistent with the 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director 
     of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 
     and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report 
     on the influence operations and campaigns in the United 
     States conducted by the Communist Party of China.
       ``(b) Contents.--Each report under subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       ``(1) A description of the organization of the United Front 
     Work Department of the People's Republic of China, or the 
     successors of the United Front Work Department, and the links 
     between the United Front Work Department and the Central 
     Committee of the Communist Party of China.
       ``(2) An assessment of the degree to which organizations 
     that are associated with or receive funding from the United 
     Front Work Department, particularly such entities operating 
     in the United States, are formally tasked by the Chinese 
     Communist Party or the Government of China.
       ``(3) A description of the efforts by the United Front Work 
     Department and subsidiary organizations of the United Front 
     Work Department to target, coerce, and influence foreign 
     populations, particularly those of ethnic Chinese descent.
       ``(4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy, 
     consulates, and organizations affiliated with the Chinese 
     Communist Party (including, at a minimum, the United Front 
     Work Department) to influence the United States-based Chinese 
     Student Scholar Associations.
       ``(5) A description of the evolution of the role of the 
     United Front Work Department under the leadership of the 
     President of China.
       ``(6) An assessment of the activities of the United Front 
     Work Department designed to influence the opinions of elected 
     leaders of the United States, or candidates for elections in 
     the United States, with respect to issues of importance to 
     the Chinese Communist Party.
       ``(7) A listing of all known organizations affiliated with 
     the United Front Work Department that are operating in the 
     United States as of the date of the report.
       ``(8) With respect to reports submitted after the first 
     report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, 
     techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and 
     campaigns conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
       ``(c) Coordination.--In carrying out subsection (a), the 
     Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security 
     Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the 
     intelligence community.
       ``(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by 
     section 2718, is further amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 1105 the following new item:

``Sec. 1106. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in 
              the United States by the Communist Party of China.''.
       (c) Initial Report.--The Director of the National 
     Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the first report 
     under section 1106 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     added by subsection (a), by not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 502. REPORT ON REPRESSION OF ETHNIC MUSLIM MINORITIES IN 
                   THE XINJIANG REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
                   CHINA.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 150 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of 
     intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
     the Senate a report on activity by the People's Republic of 
     China to repress ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang 
     region of China.
       (b) Contents.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) An assessment of the number of individuals detained in 
     ``political reeducation camps'', and the conditions in such 
     camps for detainees, in the Xinjiang region of China, 
     including whether detainees endure torture, forced 
     renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment.
       (2) A description, as possible, of the geographic location 
     of such camps.
       (3) A description, as possible, of the methods used by 
     China to ``reeducate'' detainees and the elements of China 
     responsible for such ``reeducation''.
       (4) A description of any forced labor in such camps, and 
     any labor performed in regional factories for low wages under 
     the threat of being sent back to ``political reeducation 
     camps''.
       (5) An assessment of the level of access China grants to 
     foreign persons observing the situation in Xinjiang and a 
     description of measures used to impede efforts to monitor the 
     conditions in Xinjiang.
       (6) An assessment of the surveillance, detection, and 
     control methods used by China to target ethnic minorities, 
     including new ``high-tech'' policing models and a description 
     of any civil liberties or privacy protections provided under 
     such models.
       (c) Coordination.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall carry out subsection (a) in coordination with the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of 
     the National Security Agency, the Director of the National 
     Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the head of any other 
     agency of the Federal Government that the Director of 
     National Intelligence determines appropriate.
       (d) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 503. REPORT ON EFFORTS BY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO 
                   INFLUENCE ELECTION IN TAIWAN.

       (a) Report.--Consistent with section 3(c) of the Taiwan 
     Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), and 
     consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and 
     methods, not later than 45 days after the date of the 
     election

[[Page H5868]]

     for the President and Vice President of Taiwan in 2020, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on 
     any--
       (1) influence operations conducted by China to interfere in 
     or undermine such election; and
       (2) efforts by the United States to disrupt such 
     operations.
       (b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) A description of any significant efforts by the 
     intelligence community to coordinate technical and material 
     support for Taiwan to identify, disrupt, and combat influence 
     operations specified in subsection (a)(1).
       (2) A description of any efforts by the United States 
     Government to build the capacity of Taiwan to disrupt 
     external efforts that degrade a free and fair election 
     process.
       (3) An assessment of whether and to what extent China 
     conducted influence operations specified in subsection 
     (a)(1), and, if such operations occurred--
       (A) a comprehensive list of specific governmental and 
     nongovernmental entities of China that were involved in 
     supporting such operations and a description of the role of 
     each such entity; and
       (B) an identification of any tactics, techniques, and 
     procedures used in such operations.
       (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.

     SEC. 504. ASSESSMENT OF LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FINANCIAL 
                   AND OTHER ASSETS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States should do more to expose the corruption of 
     Vladimir Putin, whose ill-gotten wealth is perhaps the most 
     powerful global symbol of his dishonesty and his persistent 
     efforts to undermine the rule of law and democracy in the 
     Russian Federation.
       (b) Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of 
     intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees an assessment, based on all sources of 
     intelligence, on the net worth and financial and other 
     assets, legitimate as well as illegitimate, of Russian 
     President Vladimir Putin and his family members, including--
       (1) the estimated net worth of Vladimir Putin and his 
     family members;
       (2) a description of their legitimately and illegitimately 
     obtained assets, including all real, personal, and 
     intellectual property, bank or investment or similar 
     accounts, and any other financial or business interests or 
     holdings, including those outside of Russia;
       (3) the details of the legitimately and illegitimately 
     obtained assets, including real, personal, and intellectual 
     property, bank or investment or similar accounts, and any 
     other financial or business interests or holdings, including 
     those outside of Russia, that are owned or controlled by, 
     accessible to, or otherwise maintained for the benefit of 
     Vladimir Putin, including their nature, location, manner of 
     acquisition, value, and publicly named owner (if other than 
     Vladimir Putin);
       (4) the methods used by Vladimir Putin or others acting at 
     his direction, with his knowledge, or for his benefit, to 
     conceal Putin's interest in his accounts, holdings, or other 
     assets, including the establishment of ``front'' or shell 
     companies and the use of intermediaries; and
       (5) an identification of the most significant senior 
     Russian political figures, oligarchs, and any other persons 
     who have engaged in activity intended to conceal the true 
     financial condition of Vladimir Putin.
       (c) Form.--The assessment required under subsection (b) 
     shall be submitted either--
       (1) in unclassified form to the extent consistent with the 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods, and may 
     include a classified annex; or
       (2) simultaneously as both an unclassified version and a 
     classified version.
       (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
     Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; 
     and
       (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial 
     Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 505. ASSESSMENTS OF INTENTIONS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
                   OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of 
     intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the head of any element of the intelligence 
     community that the Director determines appropriate, shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees each of 
     the assessments described in subsection (b).
       (b) Assessments Described.--The assessments described in 
     this subsection are assessments based on intelligence 
     obtained from all sources that assess the current intentions 
     of the political leadership of the Russian Federation with 
     respect to the following:
       (1) Potential military action against members of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
       (2) Potential responses to an enlarged United States or 
     NATO military presence in eastern Europe or to increased 
     United States military support for allies and partners in the 
     region, such as the provision of additional lethal military 
     equipment to Ukraine or Georgia.
       (3) Potential actions taken for the purpose of exploiting 
     perceived divisions among the governments of Russia's Western 
     adversaries.
       (c) Form.--Each assessment required under subsection (a) 
     may be submitted in classified form but shall also include an 
     unclassified executive summary, consistent with the 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods.
       (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, 
     the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed 
     Services of the House of Representatives; and
       (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate.

     SEC. 506. REPORT ON DEATH OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of 
     intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
     the Senate a report on the death of Jamal Khashoggi. Such 
     report shall include identification of those who carried out, 
     participated in, ordered, or were otherwise complicit in or 
     responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi, to the extent 
     consistent with the protection of sources and methods.
       (b) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form.

          TITLE VI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM

     SEC. 601. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
     Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
       (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the Senate.
       (2) Domestic terrorism.--The term ``domestic terrorism'' 
     has the meaning given that term in section 2331 of title 18, 
     United States Code.
       (3) Hate crime.--The term ``hate crime'' means a criminal 
     offense under--
       (A) sections 241, 245, 247, and 249 of title 18, United 
     States Code; and
       (B) section 3631 of title 42, United States Code.
       (4) International terrorism.--The term ``international 
     terrorism'' has the meaning given that term in section 2331 
     of title 18, United States Code.
       (5) Terms in attorney general's guidelines for domestic fbi 
     operations.--The terms ``assessments'', ``full 
     investigations'', ``enterprise investigations'',``predicated 
     investigations'', and ``preliminary investigations'' have the 
     meanings given those terms in the most recent, approved 
     version of the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI 
     Operations (or successor).
       (6) Terms in fbi budget materials.--The terms 
     ``Consolidated Strategy Guide'', ``Field Office Strategic 
     Plan'', ``Integrated Program Management Process'', and 
     ``Threat Review and Prioritization'' have the meanings given 
     those terms in the materials submitted to Congress by the 
     Attorney General in support of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation budget for fiscal year 2020.
       (7) Terrorism.--The term ``terrorism'' includes domestic 
     terrorism and international terrorism.
       (8) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism 
     information'' has the meaning given that term in section 
     1016(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
     Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485).
       (9) Time utilization and recordkeeping data.--The term 
     ``time utilization and recordkeeping data'' means data 
     collected on resource utilization and workload activity of 
     personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 
     accordance with Federal law.

     SEC. 602. ANNUAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF AND 
                   COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON DOMESTIC TERRORISM.

       (a) Report Required.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 
     2025, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under Secretary 
     of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall 
     jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report on domestic terrorism containing the following:
       (A) Strategic intelligence assessment under subsection (b).
       (B) Discussion of activities under subsection (c).
       (C) Data on domestic terrorism under subsection (d).
       (2) Responsibilities.--
       (A) Coordination of reports and integration of 
     information.--The Director of National Intelligence, acting 
     through the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, 
     shall be the lead official for coordinating the production of 
     and integrating terrorism information into--
       (i) each report under paragraph (1); and
       (ii) each strategic intelligence assessment under 
     subsection (b).
       (B) Information sharing.--The Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall provide to the 
     Director of the National Counterterrorism Center all

[[Page H5869]]

     appropriate information requested by the Director of the 
     National Counterterrorism Center to carry out this section.
       (b) Strategic Intelligence Assessment.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
     for Intelligence and Analysis shall include--
       (1) in the first report under subsection (a)(1), a 
     strategic intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism in 
     the United States during fiscal years 2017, 2018, and 2019; 
     and
       (2) in each subsequent report under such subsection, a 
     strategic intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism in 
     the United States during the prior fiscal year.
       (c) Discussion of Activities.--Each report under subsection 
     (a)(1) shall discuss and compare the following:
       (1) The criteria for opening, managing, and closing 
     domestic and international terrorism investigations by the 
     Federal Government.
       (2) Standards and procedures for the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the 
     Department of Homeland Security, and the National 
     Counterterrorism Center, with respect to the review, 
     prioritization, and mitigation of domestic and international 
     terrorism threats in the United States.
       (3) The planning, development, production, analysis, and 
     evaluation by the United States Government of intelligence 
     products relating to terrorism, including both raw and 
     finished intelligence.
       (4) The sharing of information relating to domestic and 
     international terrorism by and between--
       (A) the Federal Government;
       (B) State, local, Tribal, territorial, and foreign 
     governments;
       (C) the appropriate congressional committees;
       (D) non-governmental organizations; and
       (E) the private sector.
       (5) The criteria and methodology used by the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of 
     the Department of Homeland Security, and the National 
     Counterterrorism Center, to identify or assign terrorism 
     classifications to incidents of terrorism or investigations 
     of terrorism, including--
       (A) a comparison of the criteria and methodology used with 
     respect to domestic terrorism and international terrorism;
       (B) the identification of any changes made to investigative 
     classifications; and
       (C) a discussion of the rationale for any changes 
     identified under subparagraph (B).
       (d) Data on Domestic Terrorism.--
       (1) Data required.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
     the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
     Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and 
     Analysis shall include in each report under subsection (a)(1) 
     the following data:
       (A) For each completed or attempted incident of domestic 
     terrorism that has occurred in the United States during the 
     applicable period--
       (i) a description of such incident;
       (ii) the number and type of completed and attempted Federal 
     non-violent crimes committed during such incident;
       (iii) the number and type of completed and attempted 
     Federal and State property crimes committed during such 
     incident, including an estimate of economic damages resulting 
     from such crimes; and
       (iv) the number and type of completed and attempted Federal 
     violent crimes committed during such incident, including the 
     number of people injured or killed as a result of such 
     crimes.
       (B) For the applicable period--
       (i) an identification of each assessment, preliminary 
     investigation, full investigation, and enterprise 
     investigation with a nexus to domestic terrorism opened, 
     pending, or closed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
       (ii) the number of assessments or investigations identified 
     under clause (i) associated with each domestic terrorism 
     investigative classification (including subcategories);
       (iii) the number and domestic terrorism investigative 
     classification (including subcategories) with respect to such 
     investigations initiated as a result of a referral or 
     investigation by a State, local, Tribal, territorial, or 
     foreign government of a hate crime;
       (iv) the number of Federal criminal charges with a nexus to 
     domestic terrorism, including the number of indictments and 
     complaints associated with each domestic terrorism 
     investigative classification (including subcategories), a 
     summary of the allegations contained in each such indictment, 
     the disposition of the prosecution, and, if applicable, the 
     sentence imposed as a result of a conviction on such charges;
       (v) referrals of incidents of domestic terrorism by State, 
     local, Tribal, or territorial governments to departments or 
     agencies of the Federal Government for investigation or 
     prosecution, including the number of such referrals 
     associated with each domestic terrorism investigation 
     classification (including any subcategories), and a summary 
     of each such referral that includes the rationale for such 
     referral and the disposition of the applicable Federal 
     investigation or prosecution;
       (vi) intelligence products produced by the intelligence 
     community relating to domestic terrorism, including--

       (I) the number of such products associated with each 
     domestic terrorism investigative classification (including 
     any subcategories); and
       (II) with respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
     at a minimum, all relevant data available through the 
     Integrated Program Management Process;

       (vii) with respect to the National Counterterrorism Center, 
     the number of staff (expressed in terms of full-time 
     equivalents and positions) working on matters relating to 
     domestic terrorism described in clauses (i) through (vi); and
       (viii) with respect to the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation--

       (I) the number of staff (expressed in terms of full-time 
     equivalents and positions) working on matters relating to 
     domestic terrorism described in clauses (i) through (vi); and
       (II) a summary of time utilization and recordkeeping data 
     for personnel working on such matters, including the number 
     or percentage of such personnel associated with each domestic 
     terrorism investigative classification (including any 
     subcategories) in the FBI Headquarters Operational Divisions 
     and Field Divisions.

       (2) Applicable period.--For purposes of this subsection, 
     the applicable period is the following:
       (A) For the first report required under subsection (a)(1)--
       (i) with respect to the data described in paragraph (1)(A) 
     of this subsection, the period on or after April 19, 1995; 
     and
       (ii) with respect to the data described in paragraph (1)(B) 
     of this subsection, each of fiscal years 2017, 2018, and 
     2019.
       (B) For each subsequent report required under subsection 
     (a)(1), the prior fiscal year.
       (e) Provision of Other Documents and Materials.--
       (1) In general.--Together with each report under subsection 
     (a)(1), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under 
     Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis 
     shall also submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
     the following documents and materials:
       (A) With respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at 
     a minimum, the most recent, approved versions of--
       (i) the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI 
     Operations (or any successor);
       (ii) the FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 
     (or any successor);
       (iii) the FBI Counterterrorism Policy Guide (or any 
     successor);
       (iv) materials relating to terrorism within the Threat 
     Review and Prioritization process for the headquarters and 
     field divisions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
       (v) the Consolidated Strategy Guide (or any successor); and
       (vi) the Field Office Strategic Plans (or any successor).
       (B) With respect to the intelligence community, each 
     finished intelligence product described in subsection 
     (d)(1)(B)(vi).
       (2) Nonduplication.--If any documents or materials required 
     under paragraph (1) have been previously submitted to the 
     appropriate congressional committees under such paragraph and 
     have not been modified since such submission, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
     for Intelligence and Analysis may provide a list of such 
     documents or materials in lieu of making the submission under 
     paragraph (1) for those documents or materials.
       (f) Format.--The information required under subsection (d) 
     may be provided in a format that uses the marking associated 
     with the Central Records System (or any successor system) of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (g) Classification and Public Release.--Each report under 
     subsection (a) shall be--
       (1) unclassified, but may contain a classified annex;
       (2) with respect to the unclassified portion of the report, 
     made available on the public internet website of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center in an electronic format that is fully 
     indexed and searchable; and
       (3) with respect to a classified annex, submitted to the 
     appropriate congressional committees in an electronic format 
     that is fully indexed and searchable.

                  TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 701. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBMISSION TO 
                   CONGRESS OF CERTAIN REPORTS.

       (a) Modification of Reports Relating to Guantanamo Bay.--
       (1) Modification.--Section 506I(b) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105(b)) is amended by striking ``once 
     every 6 months'' and inserting ``annually''.
       (2) Modification.--Section 319(a) of the Supplemental 
     Appropriations Act, 2009 (10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended by 
     striking ``every 90 days'' and inserting ``annually''.
       (3) Repeal.--Section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115-31; 
     131 Stat. 827) is repealed.
       (b) Modification to Reports on Analytic Integrity.--
     Subsection (c) of section 1019 of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364) is 
     amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``Reports'' and inserting 
     ``Briefings''; and
       (2) by striking ``submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, the heads of the relevant elements of the 
     intelligence community, and the heads of analytic training 
     departments a report containing'' and inserting ``provide to 
     the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the 
     relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the 
     heads of analytic training departments a briefing with''.
       (c) Repeal of Reports Relating to Intelligence Functions.--
     Section 506J of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3105a) is repealed and the table of contents in the first 
     section of such Act is amended by striking the item relating 
     to section 506J.
       (d) Repeal of Reports Relating to Cuba.--Section 108 of the 
     Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 
     1996 (22 U.S.C. 6038) is repealed.
       (e) Repeal of Reports Relating to Entertainment Industry.--
     Section 308 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2017 (50 U.S.C. 3332) is amended--

[[Page H5870]]

       (1) in subsection (b)(2)--
       (A) by striking ``paragraph (1) shall--'' and all that 
     follows through ``permit an element'' and insert ``paragraph 
     (1) shall permit an element'';
       (B) by striking ``approval; and'' and inserting 
     ``approval.''; and
       (C) by striking subparagraph (B); and
       (2) by striking subsection (c).

     SEC. 702. INCREASED TRANSPARENCY REGARDING COUNTERTERRORISM 
                   BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) Consistent with section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     3306(a)), the recent practice of the intelligence community 
     has been to release to the public--
       (A) around the date on which the President submits to 
     Congress a budget for a fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 
     of title 31, United States Code, the ``top-line'' amount of 
     total funding requested for the National Intelligence Program 
     for such fiscal year; and
       (B) the amount of requested and appropriated funds for the 
     National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence 
     Program for certain prior fiscal years, consistent with the 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods.
       (2) The Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning of 
     the National Counterterrorism Center is responsible for 
     producing an annual National Counterterrorism Budget report, 
     which examines the alignment of intelligence and other 
     resources in the applicable fiscal year budget with the 
     counterterrorism goals and areas of focus in the National 
     Strategy for Counterterrorism.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) despite the difficulty of compiling and releasing to 
     the public comprehensive information on the resource 
     commitments of the United States to counterterrorism 
     activities and programs, including with respect to such 
     activities and programs of the intelligence community, the 
     United States Government could take additional steps to 
     enhance the understanding of the public with respect to such 
     resource commitments, in a manner consistent with the 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods and other 
     national security interests; and
       (2) the United States Government should release to the 
     public as much information as possible regarding the funding 
     of counterterrorism activities and programs, including 
     activities and programs of the intelligence community, in a 
     manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
     and methods and other national security interests.
       (c) Briefing on Public Release of Information.--
       (1) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and not later than 90 days after 
     the beginning of each fiscal year thereafter, the President 
     shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees 
     receive a briefing from appropriate personnel of the United 
     States Government on the feasibility of releasing to the 
     public additional information relating to counterterrorism 
     efforts of the intelligence community.
       (2) Elements.--Each briefing required by paragraph (1) 
     shall include a discussion of the feasibility of--
       (A) subject to paragraph (3), releasing to the public the 
     National Counterterrorism Budget report described in 
     subsection (a)(2) for the prior fiscal year; and
       (B) declassifying other reports, documents, or activities 
     of the intelligence community relating to counterterrorism 
     and releasing such information to the public in a manner 
     consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and 
     methods and other national security interests.
       (3) Release of national counterterrorism budget report.--
     The President may satisfy the requirement under paragraph 
     (2)(A) during a fiscal year by, not later than 90 days after 
     the beginning of the fiscal year, releasing to the public the 
     National Counterterrorism Budget report (with any redactions 
     the Director determines necessary to protect intelligence 
     sources and methods and other national security interests) 
     for the prior fiscal year.

     SEC. 703. TASK FORCE ON ILLICIT FINANCING OF ESPIONAGE AND 
                   FOREIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.

       (a) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall establish a task force to study and assess 
     the illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence 
     operations directed at the United States.
       (b) Membership.--The task force shall be composed of the 
     following individuals (or designees of the individual):
       (1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (3) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
     Intelligence and Analysis.
       (4) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
     Research.
       (5) Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence 
     community that the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines appropriate.
       (c) Chairperson; Meetings.--
       (1) Chairperson.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall appoint a senior official within the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence to serve as the chairperson 
     of the task force.
       (2) Meetings.--The task force shall meet regularly but not 
     less frequently than on a quarterly basis.
       (d) Reports.--
       (1) Initial report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the task force shall submit to 
     the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
     illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence 
     operations directed at the United States. The report shall 
     address the following:
       (A) The extent of the collection by the intelligence 
     community, from all sources (including the governments of 
     foreign countries), of intelligence and information relating 
     to illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence 
     operations directed at the United States, and any gaps in 
     such collection.
       (B) Any specific legal, regulatory, policy, or other 
     prohibitions, or financial, human, technical, or other 
     resource limitations or constraints, that have affected the 
     ability of the Director of National Intelligence or other 
     heads of relevant elements of the intelligence community in 
     collecting or analyzing intelligence or information relating 
     to illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence 
     operations directed at the United States.
       (C) The methods, as of the date of the report, by which 
     hostile governments of foreign countries or foreign 
     organizations, and any groups or persons acting on behalf of 
     or with the support of such governments or organizations, 
     seek to disguise or obscure relationships between such 
     governments, organizations, groups, or persons and United 
     States persons, for the purpose of conducting espionage or 
     foreign influence operations directed at the United States, 
     including by exploiting financial laws, systems, or 
     instruments, of the United States.
       (D) The existing practices of the intelligence community 
     for ensuring that intelligence and information relating to 
     the illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence 
     operations is analyzed and shared with other elements of the 
     intelligence community, and any recommendations for improving 
     such analysis and sharing.
       (2) Annual update.--Not later than November 1, 2020, and 
     each year thereafter through the date specified in subsection 
     (e), the task force shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees an update on the report under 
     paragraph (1).
       (3) Form.--Each report submitted under this subsection may 
     be submitted in classified form, but if submitted in such 
     form, shall include an unclassified summary.
       (e) Termination.--The task force shall terminate on January 
     1, 2025.
       (f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
       (2) The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
       (3) The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

     SEC. 704. STUDY ON ROLE OF RETIRED AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

       (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     conduct a study on former intelligence personnel providing 
     covered intelligence assistance.
       (b) Elements.--The study under subsection (a) shall include 
     the following:
       (1) An identification of, and discussion of the 
     effectiveness of, existing laws, policies, procedures, and 
     other measures relevant to the ability of elements of the 
     intelligence community to prevent former intelligence 
     personnel from providing covered intelligence assistance--
       (A) without proper authorization; or
       (B) in a manner that would violate legal or policy controls 
     if the personnel performed such assistance while working for 
     the United States Government; and
       (2) Make recommendations for such legislative, regulatory, 
     policy, or other changes as may be necessary to ensure that 
     the United States consistently meets the objectives described 
     in paragraph (1).
       (c) Report and Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to 
     the congressional intelligence committees--
       (1) a report on the findings of the Director with respect 
     to each element of the study under subsection (a); and
       (2) a plan to implement any recommendations made by the 
     Director that the Director may implement without changes to 
     Federal law.
       (d) Form.--The report and plan under subsection (c) may be 
     submitted in classified form.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Covered intelligence assistance.--The term ``covered 
     intelligence assistance'' means assistance--
       (A) provided by former intelligence personnel directly to, 
     or for the benefit of, the government of a foreign country or 
     indirectly to, or for the benefit of, such a government 
     through a company or other entity; and
       (B) that relates to intelligence or law enforcement 
     activities of a foreign country, including with respect to 
     operations that involve abuses of human rights, violations of 
     the laws of the United States, or infringements on the 
     privacy rights of United States persons.
       (2) Former intelligence personnel.--The term ``former 
     intelligence personnel'' means retired or former personnel of 
     the intelligence community, including civilian employees of 
     elements of the intelligence community, members of the Armed 
     Forces, and contractors of elements of the intelligence 
     community.

     SEC. 705. REPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON 
                   FIFTH-GENERATION WIRELESS NETWORK TECHNOLOGY.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on--
       (1) the threat to the national security of the United 
     States posed by the global and regional adoption of fifth-
     generation wireless network

[[Page H5871]]

     (in this section referred to as ``5G wireless network'') 
     technology built by foreign companies; and
       (2) possible efforts to mitigate the threat.
       (b) Contents.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     include--
       (1) the timeline and scale of global and regional adoption 
     of foreign 5G wireless network technology;
       (2) the implications of such global and regional adoption 
     on the cyber and espionage threat to the United States, the 
     interests of the United States, and the cyber and collection 
     capabilities of the United States; and
       (3) the effect of possible mitigation efforts, including 
     with respect to--
       (A) a policy of the United States Government promoting the 
     use of strong, end-to-end encryption for data transmitted 
     over 5G wireless networks;
       (B) a policy of the United States Government promoting or 
     funding free, open-source implementation of 5G wireless 
     network technology;
       (C) subsidies or incentives provided by the United States 
     Government that could be used to promote the adoption of 
     secure 5G wireless network technology developed by companies 
     of the United States or companies of allies of the United 
     States; and
       (D) a strategy by the United States Government to reduce 
     foreign influence and political pressure in international 
     standard-setting bodies.
       (c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 706. ESTABLISHMENT OF 5G PRIZE COMPETITION.

       (a) Prize Competition.--Pursuant to section 24 of the 
     Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 
     3719), the Director of National Intelligence, acting through 
     the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects 
     Agency, shall carry out a program to award prizes 
     competitively to stimulate research and development relevant 
     to 5G technology.
       (b) Prize Amount.--In carrying out the program under 
     subsection (a), the Director may award not more than a total 
     of $5,000,000 to one or more winners of the prize 
     competition.
       (c) Consultation.--In carrying out the program under 
     subsection (a), the Director may consult with the heads of 
     relevant departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
       (d) 5G Technology Defined.--In this section, the term ``5G 
     technology'' means hardware, software, or other technologies 
     relating to fifth-generation wireless networks.

     SEC. 707. ESTABLISHMENT OF DEEPFAKES PRIZE COMPETITION.

       (a) Prize Competition.--Pursuant to section 24 of the 
     Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 
     3719), the Director of National Intelligence, acting through 
     the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects 
     Agency, shall carry out a program to award prizes 
     competitively to stimulate the research, development, or 
     commercialization of technologies to automatically detect 
     machine-manipulated media.
       (b) Prize Amount.--In carrying out the program under 
     subsection (a), the Director may award not more than a total 
     of $5,000,000 to one or more winners of the prize 
     competition.
       (c) Consultation.--In carrying out the program under 
     subsection (a), the Director may consult with the heads of 
     relevant departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
       (d) Machine-manipulated Media Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``machine-manipulated media'' means video, image, or 
     audio recordings generated or substantially modified using 
     machine-learning techniques in order to falsely depict 
     events, to falsely depict the speech or conduct of an 
     individual, or to depict individuals who do not exist.

 DIVISION B--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019

                   TITLE XXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 2101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) Fiscal Year 2019.--Funds are hereby authorized to be 
     appropriated for fiscal year 2019 for the conduct of the 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     following elements of the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.
       (b) Fiscal Year 2018.--Funds that were appropriated for 
     fiscal year 2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the elements of the United 
     States set forth in subsection (a) are hereby authorized.

     SEC. 2102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to 
     be appropriated under section 2101 for the conduct of the 
     intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs 
     (1) through (16) of section 2101, are those specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany 
     this Act.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made 
     available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, 
     within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedule except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     3306(a));
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.

     SEC. 2103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2019 the sum of $522,424,000.
       (b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In 
     addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), 
     there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account for fiscal year 2019 such 
     additional amounts as are specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 2102(a).

   TITLE XXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY 
                                 SYSTEM

     SEC. 2201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund 
     $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2019.

     SEC. 2202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Computation of Annuities.--
       (1) In general.--Section 221 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the 
     end and inserting ``, as determined by using the annual rate 
     of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in 
     that position.'';
       (B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking ``12-month'' 
     and inserting ``2-year'';
       (C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``one year'' and 
     inserting ``two years'';
       (D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``one year'' each 
     place such term appears and inserting ``two years'';
       (E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and 
     (l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively; 
     and
       (F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
       ``(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor 
     Annuity by Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
       ``(1)  Authority to make designation.--Subject to the 
     rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section 
     222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by 
     the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an 
     annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and 
     designate in writing an individual having an insurable 
     interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the 
     system after the participant's death, except that any such 
     election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to 
     the participant's spouse shall only be effective if the 
     participant's spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor 
     annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be 
     equal to 55 percent of the participant's reduced annuity.
       ``(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity 
     payable to the participant making such election shall be 
     reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection 
     (a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the 
     designated individual is younger than the participant. The 
     total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40 
     percent.
       ``(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity 
     payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day 
     after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last 
     day of the month before the designated individual dies.
       ``(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death of 
     designated individual.--An annuity that is reduced under this 
     subsection shall, effective the first day of the month 
     following the death of the designated individual, be 
     recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not been so 
     reduced.''.
       (2) Conforming amendments.--
       (A) Central intelligence agency retirement act.--The 
     Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et 
     seq.) is amended--
       (i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by 
     striking ``221(h),'' and inserting ``221(i),''; and
       (ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by 
     striking ``221(k)'' and inserting ``221(l)''.
       (B) Central intelligence agency act of 1949.--Subsection 
     (a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking ``221(h)(2), 
     221(i), 221(l),'' and inserting ``221(i)(2), 221(j), 
     221(m),''.

[[Page H5872]]

       (b) Annuities for Former Spouses.--Subparagraph (B) of 
     section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by 
     striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two years''.
       (c) Prior Service Credit.--Subparagraph (A) of section 
     252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``October 1, 
     1990'' both places that term appears and inserting ``March 
     31, 1991''.
       (d) Reemployment Compensation.--Section 273 of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections 
     (c) and (d), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
       ``(b) Part-Time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall 
     have the authority to reemploy an annuitant on a part-time 
     basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United 
     States Code.''.
       (e) Effective Date and Application.--The amendments made by 
     subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as 
     if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to 
     computations or participants, respectively, as of such date.

          TITLE XXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

     SEC. 2301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this division shall 
     not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 2302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 2303. MODIFICATION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR SCIENCE, 
                   TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, OR MATHEMATICS 
                   POSITIONS AND ADDITION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY 
                   FOR CYBER POSITIONS.

       Section 113B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3049a) is amended--
       (1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:
       ``(a) Special Rates of Pay for Positions Requiring 
     Expertise in Science, Technology, Engineering, or 
     Mathematics.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding part III of title 5, 
     United States Code, the head of each element of the 
     intelligence community may, for 1 or more categories of 
     positions in such element that require expertise in science, 
     technology, engineering, or mathematics--
       ``(A) establish higher minimum rates of pay; and
       ``(B) make corresponding increases in all rates of pay of 
     the pay range for each grade or level, subject to subsection 
     (b) or (c), as applicable.
       ``(2) Treatment.--The special rate supplements resulting 
     from the establishment of higher rates under paragraph (1) 
     shall be basic pay for the same or similar purposes as those 
     specified in section 5305(j) of title 5, United States 
     Code.'';
       (2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as 
     subsections (c) through (g), respectively;
       (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
       ``(b) Special Rates of Pay for Cyber Positions.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (c), the 
     Director of the National Security Agency may establish a 
     special rate of pay--
       ``(A) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for level 
     II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5, 
     United States Code, if the Director certifies to the Under 
     Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in consultation with 
     the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
     that the rate of pay is for positions that perform functions 
     that execute the cyber mission of the Agency; or
       ``(B) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for the 
     Vice President of the United States under section 104 of 
     title 3, United States Code, if the Director certifies to the 
     Secretary of Defense, by name, individuals that have advanced 
     skills and competencies and that perform critical functions 
     that execute the cyber mission of the Agency.
       ``(2) Pay limitation.--Employees receiving a special rate 
     under paragraph (1) shall be subject to an aggregate pay 
     limitation that parallels the limitation established in 
     section 5307 of title 5, United States Code, except that--
       ``(A) any allowance, differential, bonus, award, or other 
     similar cash payment in addition to basic pay that is 
     authorized under title 10, United States Code, (or any other 
     applicable law in addition to title 5 of such Code, excluding 
     the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.)) 
     shall also be counted as part of aggregate compensation; and
       ``(B) aggregate compensation may not exceed the rate 
     established for the Vice President of the United States under 
     section 104 of title 3, United States Code.
       ``(3) Limitation on number of recipients.--The number of 
     individuals who receive basic pay established under paragraph 
     (1)(B) may not exceed 100 at any time.
       ``(4) Limitation on use as comparative reference.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, special rates of 
     pay and the limitation established under paragraph (1)(B) may 
     not be used as comparative references for the purpose of 
     fixing the rates of basic pay or maximum pay limitations of 
     qualified positions under section 1599f of title 10, United 
     States Code, or section 226 of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 147).'';
       (4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
     striking ``A minimum'' and inserting ``Except as provided in 
     subsection (b), a minimum'';
       (5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
     inserting ``or (b)'' after ``by subsection (a)''; and
       (6) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (2)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017'' and inserting ``Not 
     later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the 
     Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting ``or (b)'' after 
     ``subsection (a)''.

     SEC. 2304. MODIFICATION OF APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF INFORMATION 
                   OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3032(a)) is amended by striking ``President'' and 
     inserting ``Director''.

     SEC. 2305. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF 
                   PLACEMENT OF POSITIONS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY ON THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

       (a) Review.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
     coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel 
     Management, shall conduct a review of positions within the 
     intelligence community regarding the placement of such 
     positions on the Executive Schedule under subchapter II of 
     chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code. In carrying out 
     such review, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel 
     Management, shall determine--
       (1) the standards under which such review will be 
     conducted;
       (2) which positions should or should not be on the 
     Executive Schedule; and
       (3) for those positions that should be on the Executive 
     Schedule, the level of the Executive Schedule at which such 
     positions should be placed.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date on which 
     the review under subsection (a) is completed, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security 
     and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on 
     Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives an 
     unredacted report describing the standards by which the 
     review was conducted and the outcome of the review.

     SEC. 2306. SUPPLY CHAIN AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RISK 
                   MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE.

       (a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
       (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
       (3) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform 
     of the House of Representatives.
       (b) Requirement to Establish.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall establish a Supply Chain and 
     Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force to standardize 
     information sharing between the intelligence community and 
     the acquisition community of the United States Government 
     with respect to the supply chain and counterintelligence 
     risks.
       (c) Members.--The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk 
     Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall 
     be composed of--
       (1) a representative of the Defense Security Service of the 
     Department of Defense;
       (2) a representative of the General Services 
     Administration;
       (3) a representative of the Office of Federal Procurement 
     Policy of the Office of Management and Budget;
       (4) a representative of the Department of Homeland 
     Security;
       (5) a representative of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation;
       (6) the Director of the National Counterintelligence and 
     Security Center; and
       (7) any other members the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines appropriate.
       (d) Security Clearances.--Each member of the Supply Chain 
     and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force 
     established under subsection (b) shall have a security 
     clearance at the top secret level and be able to access 
     sensitive compartmented information.
       (e) Annual Report.--The Supply Chain and 
     Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established 
     under subsection (b) shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees an annual report that describes the 
     activities of the Task Force during the previous year, 
     including identification of the supply chain and 
     counterintelligence risks shared with the acquisition 
     community of the United States Government by the intelligence 
     community.

     SEC. 2307. CONSIDERATION OF ADVERSARIAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
                   AND CYBERSECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE WHEN SHARING 
                   INTELLIGENCE WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND 
                   ENTITIES.

       Whenever the head of an element of the intelligence 
     community enters into an intelligence sharing agreement with 
     a foreign government or any other foreign entity, the head of 
     the element shall consider the pervasiveness of 
     telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure, 
     equipment, and services provided by adversaries of the United 
     States, particularly China

[[Page H5873]]

     and Russia, or entities of such adversaries in the country or 
     region of the foreign government or other foreign entity 
     entering into the agreement.

     SEC. 2308. CYBER PROTECTION SUPPORT FOR THE PERSONNEL OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN POSITIONS HIGHLY 
                   VULNERABLE TO CYBER ATTACK.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Personal accounts.--The term ``personal accounts'' 
     means accounts for online and telecommunications services, 
     including telephone, residential Internet access, email, text 
     and multimedia messaging, cloud computing, social media, 
     health care, and financial services, used by personnel of the 
     intelligence community outside of the scope of their 
     employment with elements of the intelligence community.
       (2) Personal technology devices.--The term ``personal 
     technology devices'' means technology devices used by 
     personnel of the intelligence community outside of the scope 
     of their employment with elements of the intelligence 
     community, including networks to which such devices connect.
       (b) Authority to Provide Cyber Protection Support.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to a determination by the Director 
     of National Intelligence, the Director may provide cyber 
     protection support for the personal technology devices and 
     personal accounts of the personnel described in paragraph 
     (2).
       (2) At-risk personnel.--The personnel described in this 
     paragraph are personnel of the intelligence community--
       (A) who the Director determines to be highly vulnerable to 
     cyber attacks and hostile information collection activities 
     because of the positions occupied by such personnel in the 
     intelligence community; and
       (B) whose personal technology devices or personal accounts 
     are highly vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile 
     information collection activities.
       (c) Nature of Cyber Protection Support.--Subject to the 
     availability of resources, the cyber protection support 
     provided to personnel under subsection (b) may include 
     training, advice, assistance, and other services relating to 
     cyber attacks and hostile information collection activities.
       (d) Limitation on Support.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed--
       (1) to encourage personnel of the intelligence community to 
     use personal technology devices for official business; or
       (2) to authorize cyber protection support for senior 
     intelligence community personnel using personal devices, 
     networks, and personal accounts in an official capacity.
       (e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     provision of cyber protection support under subsection (b). 
     The report shall include--
       (1) a description of the methodology used to make the 
     determination under subsection (b)(2); and
       (2) guidance for the use of cyber protection support and 
     tracking of support requests for personnel receiving cyber 
     protection support under subsection (b).

     SEC. 2309. ELIMINATION OF SUNSET OF AUTHORITY RELATING TO 
                   MANAGEMENT OF SUPPLY-CHAIN RISK.

       Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-87; 50 U.S.C. 3329 note) is 
     amended by striking subsection (g).

     SEC. 2310. LIMITATIONS ON DETERMINATIONS REGARDING CERTAIN 
                   SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS.

       (a) Prohibition.--An officer of an element of the 
     intelligence community who has been nominated by the 
     President for a position that requires the advice and consent 
     of the Senate may not make a classification decision with 
     respect to information related to such officer's nomination.
       (b) Classification Determinations.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), in a 
     case in which an officer described in subsection (a) has been 
     nominated as described in such subsection and classification 
     authority rests with the officer or another officer who 
     reports directly to such officer, a classification decision 
     with respect to information relating to the officer shall be 
     made by the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) Nominations of director of national intelligence.--In a 
     case described in paragraph (1) in which the officer 
     nominated is the Director of National Intelligence, the 
     classification decision shall be made by the Principal Deputy 
     Director of National Intelligence.
       (c) Reports.--Whenever the Director or the Principal Deputy 
     Director makes a decision under subsection (b), the Director 
     or the Principal Deputy Director, as the case may be, shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     detailing the reasons for the decision.

     SEC. 2311. JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.

       (a) Meetings.--Section 101A(d) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022(d)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``regular''; and
       (2) by inserting ``as the Director considers appropriate'' 
     after ``Council''.
       (b) Report on Function and Utility of the Joint 
     Intelligence Community Council.--
       (1) In general.--No later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with the Executive Office of 
     the President and members of the Joint Intelligence Community 
     Council, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on the function and utility of the Joint 
     Intelligence Community Council.
       (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) The number of physical or virtual meetings held by the 
     Council per year since the Council's inception.
       (B) A description of the effect and accomplishments of the 
     Council.
       (C) An explanation of the unique role of the Council 
     relative to other entities, including with respect to the 
     National Security Council and the Executive Committee of the 
     intelligence community.
       (D) Recommendations for the future role and operation of 
     the Council.
       (E) Such other matters relating to the function and utility 
     of the Council as the Director considers appropriate.
       (3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 2312. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
                   ENVIRONMENT.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Core service.--The term ``core service'' means a 
     capability that is available to multiple elements of the 
     intelligence community and required for consistent operation 
     of the intelligence community information technology 
     environment.
       (2) Intelligence community information technology 
     environment.--The term ``intelligence community information 
     technology environment'' means all of the information 
     technology services across the intelligence community, 
     including the data sharing and protection environment across 
     multiple classification domains.
       (b) Roles and Responsibilities.--
       (1) Director of national intelligence.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating 
     the performance by elements of the intelligence community of 
     the intelligence community information technology 
     environment, including each of the following:
       (A) Ensuring compliance with all applicable environment 
     rules and regulations of such environment.
       (B) Ensuring measurable performance goals exist for such 
     environment.
       (C) Documenting standards and practices of such 
     environment.
       (D) Acting as an arbiter among elements of the intelligence 
     community related to any disagreements arising out of the 
     implementation of such environment.
       (E) Delegating responsibilities to the elements of the 
     intelligence community and carrying out such other 
     responsibilities as are necessary for the effective 
     implementation of such environment.
       (2) Core service providers.--Providers of core services 
     shall be responsible for--
       (A) providing core services, in coordination with the 
     Director of National Intelligence; and
       (B) providing the Director with information requested and 
     required to fulfill the responsibilities of the Director 
     under paragraph (1).
       (3) Use of core services.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     each element of the intelligence community shall use core 
     services when such services are available.
       (B) Exception.--The Director of National Intelligence may 
     provide for a written exception to the requirement under 
     subparagraph (A) if the Director determines there is a 
     compelling financial or mission need for such exception.
       (c) Management Accountability.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall designate and maintain one or 
     more accountable executives of the intelligence community 
     information technology environment to be responsible for--
       (1) management, financial control, and integration of such 
     environment;
       (2) overseeing the performance of each core service, 
     including establishing measurable service requirements and 
     schedules;
       (3) to the degree feasible, ensuring testing of each core 
     service of such environment, including testing by the 
     intended users, to evaluate performance against measurable 
     service requirements and to ensure the capability meets user 
     requirements; and
       (4) coordinate transition or restructuring efforts of such 
     environment, including phaseout of legacy systems.
       (d) Security Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall develop and maintain a security plan for 
     the intelligence community information technology 
     environment.
       (e) Long-term Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and during each of the 
     second and fourth fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a long-term roadmap that shall 
     include each of the following:
       (1) A description of the minimum required and desired core 
     service requirements, including--
       (A) key performance parameters; and
       (B) an assessment of current, measured performance.
       (2) implementation milestones for the intelligence 
     community information technology environment, including each 
     of the following:
       (A) A schedule for expected deliveries of core service 
     capabilities during each of the following phases:
       (i) Concept refinement and technology maturity 
     demonstration.
       (ii) Development, integration, and demonstration.
       (iii) Production, deployment, and sustainment.
       (iv) System retirement.

[[Page H5874]]

       (B) Dependencies of such core service capabilities.
       (C) Plans for the transition or restructuring necessary to 
     incorporate core service capabilities.
       (D) A description of any legacy systems and discontinued 
     capabilities to be phased out.
       (3) Such other matters as the Director determines 
     appropriate.
       (f) Business Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, and during each of the second 
     and fourth fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a business plan that includes each of 
     the following:
       (1) A systematic approach to identify core service funding 
     requests for the intelligence community information 
     technology environment within the proposed budget, including 
     multiyear plans to implement the long-term roadmap required 
     by subsection (e).
       (2) A uniform approach by which each element of the 
     intelligence community shall identify the cost of legacy 
     information technology or alternative capabilities where 
     services of the intelligence community information technology 
     environment will also be available.
       (3) A uniform effort by which each element of the 
     intelligence community shall identify transition and 
     restructuring costs for new, existing, and retiring services 
     of the intelligence community information technology 
     environment, as well as services of such environment that 
     have changed designations as a core service.
       (g) Quarterly Presentations.--Beginning not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the 
     congressional intelligence committees quarterly updates 
     regarding ongoing implementation of the intelligence 
     community information technology environment as compared to 
     the requirements in the most recently submitted security plan 
     required by subsection (d), long-term roadmap required by 
     subsection (e), and business plan required by subsection (f).
       (h) Additional Notifications.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall provide timely notification to the 
     congressional intelligence committees regarding any policy 
     changes related to or affecting the intelligence community 
     information technology environment, new initiatives or 
     strategies related to or impacting such environment, and 
     changes or deficiencies in the execution of the security plan 
     required by subsection (d), long-term roadmap required by 
     subsection (e), and business plan required by subsection (f).
       (i) Sunset.--The section shall have no effect on or after 
     September 30, 2024.

     SEC. 2313. REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE MOBILE VOICE 
                   SOLUTION FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the National 
     Security Agency, shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a classified report on the 
     feasibility, desirability, cost, and required schedule 
     associated with the implementation of a secure mobile voice 
     solution for the intelligence community.
       (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include, at a minimum, the following:
       (1) The benefits and disadvantages of a secure mobile voice 
     solution.
       (2) Whether the intelligence community could leverage 
     commercially available technology for classified voice 
     communications that operates on commercial mobile networks in 
     a secure manner and identifying the accompanying security 
     risks to such networks.
       (3) A description of any policies or community guidance 
     that would be necessary to govern the potential solution, 
     such as a process for determining the appropriate use of a 
     secure mobile telephone and any limitations associated with 
     such use.

     SEC. 2314. POLICY ON MINIMUM INSIDER THREAT STANDARDS.

       (a) Policy Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall establish a policy for minimum insider 
     threat standards that is consistent with the National Insider 
     Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch 
     Insider Threat Programs.
       (b) Implementation.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the 
     intelligence community shall implement the policy established 
     under subsection (a).

     SEC. 2315. SUBMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICIES.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Electronic repository.--The term ``electronic 
     repository'' means the electronic distribution mechanism, in 
     use as of the date of the enactment of this Act, or any 
     successor electronic distribution mechanism, by which the 
     Director of National Intelligence submits to the 
     congressional intelligence committees information.
       (2) Policy.--The term ``policy'', with respect to the 
     intelligence community, includes unclassified or classified--
       (A) directives, policy guidance, and policy memoranda of 
     the intelligence community;
       (B) executive correspondence of the Director of National 
     Intelligence; and
       (C) any equivalent successor policy instruments.
       (b) Submission of Policies.--
       (1) Current policy.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees using the electronic repository all nonpublicly 
     available policies issued by the Director of National 
     Intelligence for the intelligence community that are in 
     effect as of the date of the submission.
       (2) Continuous updates.--Not later than 15 days after the 
     date on which the Director of National Intelligence issues, 
     modifies, or rescinds a policy of the intelligence community, 
     the Director shall--
       (A) notify the congressional intelligence committees of 
     such addition, modification, or removal; and
       (B) update the electronic repository with respect to such 
     addition, modification, or removal.

     SEC. 2316. EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RECRUITMENT 
                   EFFORTS.

       In order to further increase the diversity of the 
     intelligence community workforce, not later than 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, in consultation with heads of elements 
     of the Intelligence Community, shall create, implement, and 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written 
     plan to ensure that rural and underrepresented regions are 
     more fully and consistently represented in such elements' 
     employment recruitment efforts. Upon receipt of the plan, the 
     congressional committees shall have 60 days to submit 
     comments to the Director of National Intelligence before such 
     plan shall be implemented.

 TITLE XXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     SEC. 2401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER 
                   EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``such 
     personnel of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may 
     designate;'' and inserting ``current and former personnel of 
     the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their 
     immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence 
     may designate;''.

     SEC. 2402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION 
                   SHARING ENVIRONMENT.

       (a) Information Sharing Environment.--Section 1016(b) of 
     the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
     (6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``President'' and 
     inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``President'' both places 
     that term appears and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence''.
       (b) Program Manager.--Section 1016(f)(1) of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 
     U.S.C. 485(f)(1)) is amended by striking ``The individual 
     designated as the program manager shall serve as program 
     manager until removed from service or replaced by the 
     President (at the President's sole discretion).'' and 
     inserting ``Beginning on the date of the enactment of the 
     Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019 and 2020, each 
     individual designated as the program manager shall be 
     appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.''.

     SEC. 2403. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

       Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
     Center.''.

     SEC. 2404. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       Section 103I(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3034(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new sentence: ``The Chief Financial Officer shall report 
     directly to the Director of National Intelligence.''.

     SEC. 2405. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3032(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new sentence: ``The Chief Information Officer shall report 
     directly to the Director of National Intelligence.''.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

     SEC. 2411. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SUBSISTENCE FOR 
                   PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO AUSTERE LOCATIONS.

       Subsection (a) of section 5 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a).,'' 
     and inserting ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a),'';
       (2) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (3) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph (8):
       ``(8) Upon the approval of the Director, provide, during 
     any fiscal year, with or without reimbursement, subsistence 
     to any personnel assigned to an overseas location designated 
     by the Agency as an austere location.''.

     SEC. 2412. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN MONTHLY WORKERS' 
                   COMPENSATION PAYMENTS AND OTHER PAYMENTS FOR 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.

       (a) In General.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 19 the following new section:

     ``SEC. 19A. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY 
                   REASON OF WAR, INSURGENCY, HOSTILE ACT, OR 
                   TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Covered dependent.--The term `covered dependent' 
     means a family member (as defined

[[Page H5875]]

     by the Director) of a covered employee who, on or after 
     September 11, 2001--
       ``(A) accompanies the covered employee to an assigned duty 
     station in a foreign country; and
       ``(B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.
       ``(2) Covered employee.--The term `covered employee' means 
     an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured by 
     reason of a qualifying injury.
       ``(3) Covered individual.--The term `covered individual' 
     means an individual who--
       ``(A)(i) is detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency 
     from other agencies of the United States Government or from 
     the Armed Forces; or
       ``(ii) is affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency, 
     as determined by the Director; and
       ``(B) who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured 
     by reason of a qualifying injury.
       ``(4) Qualifying injury.--The term `qualifying injury' 
     means the following:
       ``(A) With respect to a covered dependent, an injury 
     incurred--
       ``(i) during a period in which the covered dependent is 
     accompanying the covered employee to an assigned duty station 
     in a foreign country;
       ``(ii) in connection with war, insurgency, hostile act, 
     terrorist activity, or other incident designated by the 
     Director; and
       ``(iii) that was not the result of the willful misconduct 
     of the covered dependent.
       ``(B) With respect to a covered employee or a covered 
     individual, an injury incurred--
       ``(i) during a period of assignment to a duty station in a 
     foreign country;
       ``(ii) in connection with a war, insurgency, hostile act, 
     terrorist activity, or other incident designated by the 
     Director; and
       ``(iii) that was not the result of the willful misconduct 
     of the covered employee or the covered individual.
       ``(b) Adjustment of Compensation for Certain Injuries.--
       ``(1) Increase.--The Director may increase the amount of 
     monthly compensation paid to a covered employee under section 
     8105 of title 5, United States Code. Subject to paragraph 
     (2), the Director may determine the amount of each such 
     increase by taking into account--
       ``(A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
       ``(B) the circumstances by which the covered employee 
     became injured; and
       ``(C) the seniority of the covered employee.
       ``(2) Maximum.--Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5, 
     United States Code, the total amount of monthly compensation 
     increased under paragraph (1) may not exceed the monthly pay 
     of the maximum rate of basic pay for GS-15 of the General 
     Schedule under section 5332 of such title.
       ``(c) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--The Director 
     may pay the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a 
     covered employee, a covered individual, or a covered 
     dependent, or may reimburse a covered employee, a covered 
     individual, or a covered dependent for such costs, that are 
     not otherwise covered by chapter 81 of title 5, United States 
     Code, or other provision of Federal law.
       ``(d) Treatment of Amounts.--For purposes of section 104 of 
     the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, amounts paid pursuant to 
     this section shall be treated as amounts paid under chapter 
     81 of title 5, United States Code.''.
       (b) Regulations.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall--
       (1) prescribe regulations ensuring the fair and equitable 
     implementation of section 19A of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a); and
       (2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
     such regulations.
       (c) Application.--Section 19A of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a), shall apply 
     with respect to--
       (1) payments made to covered employees (as defined in such 
     section) under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code, 
     beginning on or after the date of the enactment of this Act; 
     and
       (2) treatment described in subsection (b) of such section 
     19A occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.

     SEC. 2413. EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICE 
                   JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY.

       Subsection (a)(1) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``500 feet;'' and 
     inserting ``500 yards;''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``500 feet.'' and 
     inserting ``500 yards.''.

     SEC. 2414. REPEAL OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT 
                   FOR CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Repeal of Foreign Language Proficiency Requirement.--
     Section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3036) is amended by striking subsection (g).
       (b) Conforming Repeal of Report Requirement.--Section 611 
     of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 
     (Public Law 108-487) is amended by striking subsection (c).

     Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of 
                          Department of Energy

     SEC. 2421. CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICES OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

       (a) In General.--Section 215 of the Department of Energy 
     Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended to read as 
     follows:


            ``office of intelligence and counterintelligence

       ``Sec. 215.  (a) Definitions.--In this section, the terms 
     `intelligence community' and `National Intelligence Program' 
     have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
       ``(b) In General.--There is in the Department an Office of 
     Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Such office shall be 
     under the National Intelligence Program.
       ``(c) Director.--(1) The head of the Office shall be the 
     Director of the Office of Intelligence and 
     Counterintelligence, who shall be an employee in the Senior 
     Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the 
     Senior National Intelligence Service, or any other Service 
     that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of 
     National Intelligence, considers appropriate. The Director of 
     the Office shall report directly to the Secretary.
       ``(2) The Secretary shall select an individual to serve as 
     the Director from among individuals who have substantial 
     expertise in matters relating to the intelligence community, 
     including foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
       ``(d) Duties.--(1) Subject to the authority, direction, and 
     control of the Secretary, the Director shall perform such 
     duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary may 
     prescribe.
       ``(2) The Director shall be responsible for establishing 
     policy for intelligence and counterintelligence programs and 
     activities at the Department.''.
       (b) Conforming Repeal.--Section 216 of the Department of 
     Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144c) is hereby repealed.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the 
     beginning of the Department of Energy Organization Act is 
     amended by striking the items relating to sections 215 and 
     216 and inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 215. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.''.

     SEC. 2422. ESTABLISHMENT OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
                   CENTER.

       Section 215 of the Department of Energy Organization Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 7144b), as amended by section 2421, is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(e) Energy Infrastructure Security Center.--(1)(A) The 
     President shall establish an Energy Infrastructure Security 
     Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools 
     to analyze and disseminate intelligence relating to the 
     security of the energy infrastructure of the United States.
       ``(B) The Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 
     shall appoint the head of the Energy Infrastructure Security 
     Center.
       ``(C) The Energy Infrastructure Security Center shall be 
     located within the Office of Intelligence and 
     Counterintelligence.
       ``(2) In establishing the Energy Infrastructure Security 
     Center, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and 
     Counterintelligence shall address the following missions and 
     objectives to coordinate and disseminate intelligence 
     relating to the security of the energy infrastructure of the 
     United States:
       ``(A) Establishing a primary organization within the United 
     States Government for analyzing and integrating all 
     intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States 
     pertaining to the security of the energy infrastructure of 
     the United States.
       ``(B) Ensuring that appropriate departments and agencies 
     have full access to and receive intelligence support needed 
     to execute the plans or activities of the agencies, and 
     perform independent, alternative analyses.
       ``(C) Establishing a central repository on known and 
     suspected foreign threats to the energy infrastructure of the 
     United States, including with respect to any individuals, 
     groups, or entities engaged in activities targeting such 
     infrastructure, and the goals, strategies, capabilities, and 
     networks of such individuals, groups, or entities.
       ``(D) Disseminating intelligence information relating to 
     the security of the energy infrastructure of the United 
     States, including threats and analyses, to the President, to 
     the appropriate departments and agencies, and to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress.
       ``(3) The President may waive the requirements of this 
     subsection, and any parts thereof, if the President 
     determines that such requirements do not materially improve 
     the ability of the United States Government to prevent and 
     halt attacks against the energy infrastructure of the United 
     States. Such waiver shall be made in writing to Congress and 
     shall include a description of how the missions and 
     objectives in paragraph (2) are being met.
       ``(4) If the President decides not to exercise the waiver 
     authority granted by paragraph (3), the President shall 
     submit to Congress from time to time updates and plans 
     regarding the establishment of an Energy Infrastructure 
     Security Center.''.

     SEC. 2423. REPEAL OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE 
                   EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND BUDGET REPORTING 
                   REQUIREMENT.

       Section 214 of the Department of Energy Organization Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 7144a) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``(a)''; and
       (2) by striking subsections (b) and (c).

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

     SEC. 2431. PLAN FOR DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
                   COMPONENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE AS AN 
                   ELEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and Under 
     Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with 
     the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
     Center, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, 
     and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives a plan to designate the counterintelligence 
     component of the Defense Security Service of the Department 
     of Defense as an element of the intelligence community by not 
     later than January 1, 2021. Such plan shall--

[[Page H5876]]

       (1) address the implications of such designation on the 
     authorities, governance, personnel, resources, information 
     technology, collection, analytic products, information 
     sharing, and business processes of the Defense Security 
     Service and the intelligence community; and
       (2) not address the personnel security functions of the 
     Defense Security Service.

     SEC. 2432. NOTICE NOT REQUIRED FOR PRIVATE ENTITIES.

       Section 3553 of title 44, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (i) the following:
       ``(j) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed to require the Secretary to provide notice to 
     any private entity before the Secretary issues a binding 
     operational directive under subsection (b)(2).''.

     SEC. 2433. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADVISORY BOARD FOR NATIONAL 
                   RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

       (a) Establishment.--Section 106A of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Advisory Board.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the National 
     Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in this section 
     referred to as the `Board').
       ``(2) Duties.--The Board shall--
       ``(A) study matters relating to the mission of the National 
     Reconnaissance Office, including with respect to promoting 
     innovation, competition, and resilience in space, overhead 
     reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters; and
       ``(B) advise and report directly to the Director with 
     respect to such matters.
       ``(3) Members.--
       ``(A) Number and appointment.--
       ``(i) In general.--The Board shall be composed of 5 members 
     appointed by the Director from among individuals with 
     demonstrated academic, government, business, or other 
     expertise relevant to the mission and functions of the 
     National Reconnaissance Office.
       ``(ii) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after the date 
     on which the Director appoints a member to the Board, the 
     Director shall notify the congressional intelligence 
     committees and the congressional defense committees (as 
     defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code) of 
     such appointment.
       ``(B) Terms.--Each member shall be appointed for a term of 
     2 years. Except as provided by subparagraph (C), a member may 
     not serve more than 3 terms.
       ``(C) Vacancy.--Any member appointed to fill a vacancy 
     occurring before the expiration of the term for which the 
     member's predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only 
     for the remainder of that term. A member may serve after the 
     expiration of that member's term until a successor has taken 
     office.
       ``(D) Chair.--The Board shall have a Chair, who shall be 
     appointed by the Director from among the members.
       ``(E) Travel expenses.--Each member shall receive travel 
     expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in 
     accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of 
     chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
       ``(F) Executive secretary.--The Director may appoint an 
     executive secretary, who shall be an employee of the National 
     Reconnaissance Office, to support the Board.
       ``(4) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than 
     quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of the 
     Director.
       ``(5) Reports.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the 
     Board shall submit to the Director and to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on the activities and 
     significant findings of the Board during the preceding year.
       ``(6) Nonapplicability of certain requirements.--The 
     Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not 
     apply to the Board.
       ``(7) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the date 
     that is 3 years after the date of the first meeting of the 
     Board.''.
       (b) Initial Appointments.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     National Reconnaissance Office shall appoint the initial 5 
     members to the advisory board under subsection (d) of section 
     106A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a), 
     as added by subsection (a).

     SEC. 2434. COLLOCATION OF CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
                   SECURITY PERSONNEL AT FIELD LOCATIONS.

       (a) Identification of Opportunities for Collocation.--Not 
     later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     Intelligence and Analysis shall identify, in consultation 
     with the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
     the Administrator of the Transportation Security 
     Administration, the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs 
     Enforcement, and the heads of such other elements of the 
     Department of Homeland Security as the Under Secretary 
     considers appropriate, opportunities for collocation of 
     officers of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis in the 
     field outside of the greater Washington, District of 
     Columbia, area in order to support operational units from 
     U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation 
     Security Administration, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
     Enforcement, and other elements of the Department of Homeland 
     Security.
       (b) Plan for Collocation.--Not later than 120 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report that includes a plan for collocation as described in 
     subsection (a).

                      TITLE XXV--ELECTION MATTERS

     SEC. 2501. REPORT ON CYBER ATTACKS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 
                   AGAINST UNITED STATES ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate;
       (C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (D) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
       (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional 
     leadership'' includes the following:
       (A) The majority leader of the Senate.
       (B) The minority leader of the Senate.
       (C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
       (D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
       (3) State.--The term ``State'' means any State of the 
     United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
     Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United 
     States.
       (b) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to 
     congressional leadership and the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report on cyber attacks and attempted cyber 
     attacks by foreign governments on United States election 
     infrastructure in States and localities in connection with 
     the 2016 Presidential election in the United States and such 
     cyber attacks or attempted cyber attacks as the Under 
     Secretary anticipates against such infrastructure. Such 
     report shall identify the States and localities affected and 
     shall include cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks 
     against voter registration databases, voting machines, 
     voting-related computer networks, and the networks of 
     Secretaries of State and other election officials of the 
     various States.
       (c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (b) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 2502. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S POSTURE TO 
                   COLLECT AGAINST AND ANALYZE RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO 
                   INFLUENCE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

       (a) Review Required.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall--
       (1) complete an after action review of the posture of the 
     intelligence community to collect against and analyze efforts 
     of the Government of Russia to interfere in the 2016 
     Presidential election in the United States; and
       (2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the findings of the Director with respect to such 
     review.
       (b) Elements.--The review required by subsection (a) shall 
     include, with respect to the posture and efforts described in 
     paragraph (1) of such subsection, the following:
       (1) An assessment of whether the resources of the 
     intelligence community were properly aligned to detect and 
     respond to the efforts described in subsection (a)(1).
       (2) An assessment of the information sharing that occurred 
     within elements of the intelligence community.
       (3) An assessment of the information sharing that occurred 
     between elements of the intelligence community.
       (4) An assessment of applicable authorities necessary to 
     collect on any such efforts and any deficiencies in those 
     authorities.
       (5) A review of the use of open source material to inform 
     analysis and warning of such efforts.
       (6) A review of the use of alternative and predictive 
     analysis.
       (c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection 
     (a)(2) shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence 
     committees in a classified form.

     SEC. 2503. ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREATS TO 
                   FEDERAL ELECTIONS.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate; and
       (C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional 
     leadership'' includes the following:
       (A) The majority leader of the Senate.
       (B) The minority leader of the Senate.
       (C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
       (D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
       (3) Security vulnerability.--The term ``security 
     vulnerability'' has the meaning given such term in section 
     102 of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 
     U.S.C. 1501).
       (b) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
     coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other 
     relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall--
       (1) commence not later than 1 year before any regularly 
     scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, 
     and complete not later than 180 days before such election, an 
     assessment of security vulnerabilities of State election 
     systems; and
       (2) not later than 180 days before any regularly scheduled 
     Federal election occurring after

[[Page H5877]]

     December 31, 2018, submit a report on such security 
     vulnerabilities and an assessment of foreign intelligence 
     threats to the election to--
       (A) congressional leadership; and
       (B) the appropriate congressional committees.
       (c) Update.--Not later than 90 days before any regularly 
     scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, 
     the Director of National Intelligence shall--
       (1) update the assessment of foreign intelligence threats 
     to that election; and
       (2) submit the updated assessment to--
       (A) congressional leadership; and
       (B) the appropriate congressional committees.

     SEC. 2504. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING RUSSIAN CYBER THREATS TO 
                   UNITED STATES ELECTIONS.

       (a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
       (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
       (3) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
       (4) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
       (5) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (b) Requirement for a Strategy.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and 
     the Secretary of the Treasury, shall develop a whole-of-
     government strategy for countering the threat of Russian 
     cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks against electoral 
     systems and processes in the United States, including 
     Federal, State, and local election systems, voter 
     registration databases, voting tabulation equipment, and 
     equipment and processes for the secure transmission of 
     election results.
       (c) Elements of the Strategy.--The strategy required by 
     subsection (b) shall include the following elements:
       (1) A whole-of-government approach to protecting United 
     States electoral systems and processes that includes the 
     agencies and departments indicated in subsection (b) as well 
     as any other agencies and departments of the United States, 
     as determined appropriate by the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
       (2) Input solicited from Secretaries of State of the 
     various States and the chief election officials of the 
     States.
       (3) Technical security measures, including auditable paper 
     trails for voting machines, securing wireless and Internet 
     connections, and other technical safeguards.
       (4) Detection of cyber threats, including attacks and 
     attempted attacks by Russian government or nongovernment 
     cyber threat actors.
       (5) Improvements in the identification and attribution of 
     Russian government or nongovernment cyber threat actors.
       (6) Deterrence, including actions and measures that could 
     or should be undertaken against or communicated to the 
     Government of Russia or other entities to deter attacks 
     against, or interference with, United States election systems 
     and processes.
       (7) Improvements in Federal Government communications with 
     State and local election officials.
       (8) Public education and communication efforts.
       (9) Benchmarks and milestones to enable the measurement of 
     concrete steps taken and progress made in the implementation 
     of the strategy.
       (d) Congressional Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall jointly brief the appropriate congressional committees 
     on the strategy developed under subsection (b).

     SEC. 2505. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE 
                   CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND 
                   REFERENDA.

       (a) Russian Influence Campaign Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``Russian influence campaign'' means any effort, 
     covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the 
     Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or 
     similar process in a country other than the Russian 
     Federation or the United States.
       (b) Assessment Required.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report containing an analytical assessment of 
     the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any, 
     conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant 
     current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any. 
     Such assessment shall include--
       (1) a summary of such significant Russian influence 
     campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by 
     which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or 
     likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific 
     goal of each such campaign;
       (2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such 
     Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the 
     elections or referenda;
       (3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the 
     intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of 
     assisting the government of such foreign state in defending 
     against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns; 
     and
       (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and 
     responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
       (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) may be 
     submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall 
     contain an unclassified summary.

     SEC. 2506. INFORMATION SHARING WITH STATE ELECTION OFFICIALS.

       (a) State Defined.--In this section, the term ``State'' 
     means any State of the United States, the District of 
     Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory 
     or possession of the United States.
       (b) Security Clearances.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall support the Under Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and any other 
     official of the Department of Homeland Security designated by 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, in sponsoring a security 
     clearance up to the top secret level for each eligible chief 
     election official of a State or the District of Columbia, and 
     additional eligible designees of such election official as 
     appropriate, at the time that such election official assumes 
     such position.
       (2) Interim clearances.--Consistent with applicable 
     policies and directives, the Director of National 
     Intelligence may issue interim clearances, for a period to be 
     determined by the Director, to a chief election official as 
     described in paragraph (1) and up to 1 designee of such 
     official under such paragraph.
       (c) Information Sharing.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall assist the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     Intelligence and Analysis and the Under Secretary responsible 
     for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, 
     cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department 
     (as specified in section 103(a)(1)(H) of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)(1)(H))) with sharing 
     any appropriate classified information related to threats to 
     election systems and to the integrity of the election process 
     with chief election officials and such designees who have 
     received a security clearance under subsection (b).
       (2) Coordination.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
     for Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with the 
     Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary 
     responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure 
     protection, cybersecurity, and other related programs of the 
     Department (as specified in section 103(a)(1)(H) of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)(1)(H))) to 
     facilitate the sharing of information to the affected 
     Secretaries of State or States.

     SEC. 2507. NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER 
                   INTRUSIONS AND ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS 
                   DIRECTED AT ELECTIONS FOR FEDERAL OFFICES.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Active measures campaign.--The term ``active measures 
     campaign'' means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence 
     operation.
       (2) Candidate, election, and political party.--The terms 
     ``candidate'', ``election'', and ``political party'' have the 
     meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal 
     Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
       (3) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional 
     leadership'' includes the following:
       (A) The majority leader of the Senate.
       (B) The minority leader of the Senate.
       (C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
       (D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
       (4) Cyber intrusion.--The term ``cyber intrusion'' means an 
     electronic occurrence that actually or imminently 
     jeopardizes, without lawful authority, electronic election 
     infrastructure, or the integrity, confidentiality, or 
     availability of information within such infrastructure.
       (5) Electronic election infrastructure.--The term 
     ``electronic election infrastructure'' means an electronic 
     information system of any of the following that is related to 
     an election for Federal office:
       (A) The Federal Government.
       (B) A State or local government.
       (C) A political party.
       (D) The election campaign of a candidate.
       (6) Federal office.--The term ``Federal office'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 301 of the Federal 
     Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
       (7) High confidence.--The term ``high confidence'', with 
     respect to a determination, means that the determination is 
     based on high-quality information from multiple sources.
       (8) Moderate confidence.--The term ``moderate confidence'', 
     with respect to a determination, means that a determination 
     is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient 
     quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher 
     level of confidence.
       (9) Other appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``other appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee 
     on Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (b) Determinations of Significant Foreign Cyber Intrusions 
     and Active Measures Campaigns.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     jointly carry out subsection (c) if such Directors and the 
     Secretary jointly determine--
       (1) that on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     a significant foreign cyber intrusion

[[Page H5878]]

     or active measures campaign intended to influence an upcoming 
     election for any Federal office has occurred or is occurring; 
     and
       (2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion 
     or campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a 
     foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity.
       (c) Briefing.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 14 days after making a 
     determination under subsection (b), the Director of National 
     Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership, 
     the congressional intelligence committees and, consistent 
     with the protection of sources and methods, the other 
     appropriate congressional committees. The briefing shall be 
     classified and address, at a minimum, the following:
       (A) A description of the significant foreign cyber 
     intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be, 
     covered by the determination.
       (B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign 
     nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such 
     intrusion or campaign has been attributed.
       (C) The desirability and feasibility of the public release 
     of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures 
     campaign.
       (D) Any other information such Directors and the Secretary 
     jointly determine appropriate.
       (2) Electronic election infrastructure briefings.--With 
     respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a 
     determination under subsection (b), the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation with the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any 
     electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such 
     intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that 
     may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be 
     classified and made available only to individuals with 
     appropriate security clearances.
       (3) Protection of sources and methods.--This subsection 
     shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the 
     protection of sources and methods.

     SEC. 2508. DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO LEAD 
                   ELECTION SECURITY MATTERS.

       (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall designate a national counterintelligence officer within 
     the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, 
     manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating 
     to election security.
       (b) Additional Responsibilities.--The person designated 
     under subsection (a) shall also lead, manage, and coordinate 
     counterintelligence matters relating to risks posed by 
     interference from foreign powers (as defined in section 101 
     of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801)) to the following:
       (1) The Federal Government election security supply chain.
       (2) Election voting systems and software.
       (3) Voter registration databases.
       (4) Critical infrastructure related to elections.
       (5) Such other Government goods and services as the 
     Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.

                    TITLE XXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES

     SEC. 2601. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
       (C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
       (D) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate;
       (E) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (F) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (G) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (H) the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Appropriate industry partners.--The term ``appropriate 
     industry partner'' means a contractor, licensee, or grantee 
     (as defined in section 101(a) of Executive Order 12829 (50 
     U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to National Industrial Security 
     Program)) that is participating in the National Industrial 
     Security Program established by such Executive Order.
       (3) Continuous vetting.--The term ``continuous vetting'' 
     has the meaning given such term in Executive Order 13467 (50 
     U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to reforming processes related to 
     suitability for government employment, fitness for contractor 
     employees, and eligibility for access to classified national 
     security information).
       (4) Council.--The term ``Council'' means the Security, 
     Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability 
     Council established pursuant to such Executive Order, or any 
     successor entity.
       (5) Security executive agent.--The term ``Security 
     Executive Agent'' means the officer serving as the Security 
     Executive Agent pursuant to section 803 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947, as added by section 2605.
       (6) Suitability and credentialing executive agent.--The 
     term ``Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent'' means 
     the Director of the Office of Personnel Management acting as 
     the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent in 
     accordance with Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; 
     relating to reforming processes related to suitability for 
     government employment, fitness for contractor employees, and 
     eligibility for access to classified national security 
     information), or any successor entity.

     SEC. 2602. REPORTS AND PLANS RELATING TO SECURITY CLEARANCES 
                   AND BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) ensuring the trustworthiness and security of the 
     workforce, facilities, and information of the Federal 
     Government is of the highest priority to national security 
     and public safety;
       (2) the President and Congress should prioritize the 
     modernization of the personnel security framework to improve 
     its efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability;
       (3) the current system for security clearance, suitability 
     and fitness for employment, and credentialing lacks 
     efficiencies and capabilities to meet the current threat 
     environment, recruit and retain a trusted workforce, and 
     capitalize on modern technologies; and
       (4) changes to policies or processes to improve this system 
     should be vetted through the Council to ensure 
     standardization, portability, and reciprocity in security 
     clearances across the Federal Government.
       (b) Accountability Plans and Reports.--
       (1) Plans.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees and make available to 
     appropriate industry partners the following:
       (A) A plan, with milestones, to reduce the background 
     investigation inventory to 200,000, or an otherwise 
     sustainable steady-level, by the end of year 2020. Such plan 
     shall include notes of any required changes in investigative 
     and adjudicative standards or resources.
       (B) A plan to consolidate the conduct of background 
     investigations associated with the processing for security 
     clearances in the most effective and efficient manner between 
     the National Background Investigation Bureau and the Defense 
     Security Service, or a successor organization. Such plan 
     shall address required funding, personnel, contracts, 
     information technology, field office structure, policy, 
     governance, schedule, transition costs, and effects on 
     stakeholders.
       (2) Report on the future of personnel security.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Council, in 
     coordination with the members of the Council, shall submit to 
     the appropriate congressional committees and make available 
     to appropriate industry partners a report on the future of 
     personnel security to reflect changes in threats, the 
     workforce, and technology.
       (B) Contents.--The report submitted under subparagraph (A) 
     shall include the following:
       (i) A risk framework for granting and renewing access to 
     classified information.
       (ii) A discussion of the use of technologies to prevent, 
     detect, and monitor threats.
       (iii) A discussion of efforts to address reciprocity and 
     portability.
       (iv) A discussion of the characteristics of effective 
     insider threat programs.
       (v) An analysis of how to integrate data from continuous 
     evaluation, insider threat programs, and human resources 
     data.
       (vi) Recommendations on interagency governance.
       (3) Plan for implementation.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the 
     Council, in coordination with the members of the Council, 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and 
     make available to appropriate industry partners a plan to 
     implement the report's framework and recommendations 
     submitted under paragraph (2)(A).
       (4) Congressional notifications.--Not less frequently than 
     quarterly, the Security Executive Agent shall make available 
     to the public a report regarding the status of the 
     disposition of requests received from departments and 
     agencies of the Federal Government for a change to, or 
     approval under, the Federal investigative standards, the 
     national adjudicative guidelines, continuous evaluation, or 
     other national policy regarding personnel security.

     SEC. 2603. IMPROVING THE PROCESS FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES.

       (a) Reviews.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent, in 
     coordination with the members of the Council, shall submit to 
     the appropriate congressional committees and make available 
     to appropriate industry partners a report that includes the 
     following:
       (1) A review of whether the information requested on the 
     Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Standard Form 
     86) and by the Federal Investigative Standards prescribed by 
     the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence appropriately supports the 
     adjudicative guidelines under Security Executive Agent 
     Directive 4 (known as the ``National Security Adjudicative 
     Guidelines''). Such review shall include identification of 
     whether any such information currently collected is 
     unnecessary to support the adjudicative guidelines.
       (2) An assessment of whether such Questionnaire, Standards, 
     and guidelines should be revised to account for the prospect 
     of a holder of a security clearance becoming an insider 
     threat.
       (3) Recommendations to improve the background investigation 
     process by--
       (A) simplifying the Questionnaire for National Security 
     Positions (Standard Form 86) and increasing customer support 
     to applicants completing such Questionnaire;
       (B) using remote techniques and centralized locations to 
     support or replace field investigation work;
       (C) using secure and reliable digitization of information 
     obtained during the clearance process;
       (D) building the capacity of the background investigation 
     labor sector; and
       (E) replacing periodic reinvestigations with continuous 
     evaluation techniques in all appropriate circumstances.

[[Page H5879]]

       (b) Policy, Strategy, and Implementation.--Not later than 
     180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Security Executive Agent shall, in coordination with the 
     members of the Council, establish the following:
       (1) A policy and implementation plan for the issuance of 
     interim security clearances.
       (2) A policy and implementation plan to ensure contractors 
     are treated consistently in the security clearance process 
     across agencies and departments of the United States as 
     compared to employees of such agencies and departments. Such 
     policy shall address--
       (A) prioritization of processing security clearances based 
     on the mission the contractors will be performing;
       (B) standardization in the forms that agencies issue to 
     initiate the process for a security clearance;
       (C) digitization of background investigation-related forms;
       (D) use of the polygraph;
       (E) the application of the adjudicative guidelines under 
     Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (known as the ``National 
     Security Adjudicative Guidelines'');
       (F) reciprocal recognition of clearances across agencies 
     and departments of the United States, regardless of status of 
     periodic reinvestigation;
       (G) tracking of clearance files as individuals move from 
     employment with an agency or department of the United States 
     to employment in the private sector;
       (H) collection of timelines for movement of contractors 
     across agencies and departments;
       (I) reporting on security incidents and job performance, 
     consistent with section 552a of title 5, United States Code 
     (commonly known as the ``Privacy Act of 1974''), that may 
     affect the ability to hold a security clearance;
       (J) any recommended changes to the Federal Acquisition 
     Regulations (FAR) necessary to ensure that information 
     affecting contractor clearances or suitability is 
     appropriately and expeditiously shared between and among 
     agencies and contractors; and
       (K) portability of contractor security clearances between 
     or among contracts at the same agency and between or among 
     contracts at different agencies that require the same level 
     of clearance.
       (3) A strategy and implementation plan that--
       (A) provides for periodic reinvestigations as part of a 
     security clearance determination only on an as-needed, risk-
     based basis;
       (B) includes actions to assess the extent to which 
     automated records checks and other continuous evaluation 
     methods may be used to expedite or focus reinvestigations; 
     and
       (C) provides an exception for certain populations if the 
     Security Executive Agent--
       (i) determines such populations require reinvestigations at 
     regular intervals; and
       (ii) provides written justification to the appropriate 
     congressional committees for any such determination.
       (4) A policy and implementation plan for agencies and 
     departments of the United States, as a part of the security 
     clearance process, to accept automated records checks 
     generated pursuant to a security clearance applicant's 
     employment with a prior employer.
       (5) A policy for the use of certain background materials on 
     individuals collected by the private sector for background 
     investigation purposes.
       (6) Uniform standards for agency continuous evaluation 
     programs to ensure quality and reciprocity in accepting 
     enrollment in a continuous vetting program as a substitute 
     for a periodic investigation for continued access to 
     classified information.

     SEC. 2604. GOALS FOR PROMPTNESS OF DETERMINATIONS REGARDING 
                   SECURITY CLEARANCES.

       (a) Reciprocity Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``reciprocity'' means reciprocal recognition by Federal 
     departments and agencies of eligibility for access to 
     classified information.
       (b) In General.--The Council shall reform the security 
     clearance process with the objective that, by December 31, 
     2021, 90 percent of all determinations, other than 
     determinations regarding populations identified under section 
     2603(b)(3)(C), regarding--
       (1) security clearances--
       (A) at the secret level are issued in 30 days or fewer; and
       (B) at the top secret level are issued in 90 days or fewer; 
     and
       (2) reciprocity of security clearances at the same level 
     are recognized in 2 weeks or fewer.
       (c) Certain Reinvestigations.--The Council shall reform the 
     security clearance process with the goal that by December 31, 
     2021, reinvestigation on a set periodicity is not required 
     for more than 10 percent of the population that holds a 
     security clearance.
       (d) Equivalent Metrics.--
       (1) In general.--If the Council develops a set of 
     performance metrics that it certifies to the appropriate 
     congressional committees should achieve substantially 
     equivalent outcomes as those outlined in subsections (b) and 
     (c), the Council may use those metrics for purposes of 
     compliance within this provision.
       (2) Notice.--If the Council uses the authority provided by 
     paragraph (1) to use metrics as described in such paragraph, 
     the Council shall, not later than 30 days after communicating 
     such metrics to departments and agencies, notify the 
     appropriate congressional committees that it is using such 
     authority.
       (e) Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees and make available to 
     appropriate industry partners a plan to carry out this 
     section. Such plan shall include recommended interim 
     milestones for the goals set forth in subsections (b) and (c) 
     for 2019, 2020, and 2021.

     SEC. 2605. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.

       (a) In General.--Title VIII of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating sections 803 and 804 as sections 804 
     and 805, respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after section 802 the following:

     ``SEC. 803. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.

       ``(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
     or such other officer of the United States as the President 
     may designate, shall serve as the Security Executive Agent 
     for all departments and agencies of the United States.
       ``(b) Duties.--The duties of the Security Executive Agent 
     are as follows:
       ``(1) To direct the oversight of investigations, 
     reinvestigations, adjudications, and, as applicable, 
     polygraphs for eligibility for access to classified 
     information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position made 
     by any Federal agency.
       ``(2) To review the national security background 
     investigation and adjudication programs of Federal agencies 
     to determine whether such programs are being implemented in 
     accordance with this section.
       ``(3) To develop and issue uniform and consistent policies 
     and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, timely, 
     and secure completion of investigations, polygraphs, and 
     adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for 
     access to classified information or eligibility to hold a 
     sensitive position.
       ``(4) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the 
     final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to 
     conduct investigations of persons who are proposed for access 
     to classified information or for eligibility to hold a 
     sensitive position to ascertain whether such persons satisfy 
     the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to classified 
     information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, as 
     applicable.
       ``(5) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the 
     final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to 
     determine eligibility for access to classified information or 
     eligibility to hold a sensitive position in accordance with 
     Executive Order 12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to 
     access to classified information).
       ``(6) To ensure reciprocal recognition of eligibility for 
     access to classified information or eligibility to hold a 
     sensitive position among Federal agencies, including acting 
     as the final authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes 
     among such agencies involving the reciprocity of 
     investigations and adjudications of eligibility.
       ``(7) To execute all other duties assigned to the Security 
     Executive Agent by law.
       ``(c) Authorities.--The Security Executive Agent shall--
       ``(1) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of 
     Federal agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity, 
     centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, timeliness, and 
     security in processes relating to determinations by such 
     agencies of eligibility for access to classified information 
     or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, including such 
     matters as investigations, polygraphs, adjudications, and 
     reciprocity;
       ``(2) have the authority to grant exceptions to, or waivers 
     of, national security investigative requirements, including 
     issuing implementing or clarifying guidance, as necessary;
       ``(3) have the authority to assign, in whole or in part, to 
     the head of any Federal agency (solely or jointly) any of the 
     duties of the Security Executive Agent described in 
     subsection (b) or the authorities described in paragraphs (1) 
     and (2), provided that the exercise of such assigned duties 
     or authorities is subject to the oversight of the Security 
     Executive Agent, including such terms and conditions 
     (including approval by the Security Executive Agent) as the 
     Security Executive Agent determines appropriate; and
       ``(4) define and set standards for continuous evaluation 
     for continued access to classified information and for 
     eligibility to hold a sensitive position.''.
       (b) Report on Recommendations for Revising Authorities.--
     Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Chairman 
     of the Council submits to the appropriate congressional 
     committees the report required by section 2602(b)(2)(A), the 
     Chairman shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees such recommendations as the Chairman may have for 
     revising the authorities of the Security Executive Agent.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 103H(j)(4)(A) of such 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 3033(j)(4)(A)) is amended by striking ``in 
     section 804'' and inserting ``in section 805''.
       (d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     matter preceding section 2 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3002) is 
     amended by striking the items relating to sections 803 and 
     804 and inserting the following:

``Sec. 803. Security Executive Agent.
``Sec. 804. Exceptions.
``Sec. 805. Definitions.''.

     SEC. 2606. REPORT ON UNIFIED, SIMPLIFIED, GOVERNMENTWIDE 
                   STANDARDS FOR POSITIONS OF TRUST AND SECURITY 
                   CLEARANCES.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability 
     and Credentialing Executive Agent, in coordination with the 
     other members of the Council, shall jointly submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees and make available to 
     appropriate industry partners a report regarding the 
     advisability and the risks, benefits, and costs to the 
     Government and to industry of consolidating to not more than 
     3 tiers for positions of trust and security clearances.

     SEC. 2607. REPORT ON CLEARANCE IN PERSON CONCEPT.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that to 
     reflect the greater mobility of the modern workforce, 
     alternative methodologies merit analysis to allow greater 
     flexibility for individuals moving in and out of positions 
     that require access to classified information, while still 
     preserving security.

[[Page H5880]]

       (b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and 
     make available to appropriate industry partners a report that 
     describes the requirements, feasibility, and advisability of 
     implementing a clearance in person concept described in 
     subsection (c).
       (c) Clearance in Person Concept.--The clearance in person 
     concept--
       (1) permits an individual who once held a security 
     clearance to maintain his or her eligibility for access to 
     classified information, networks, and facilities for up to 3 
     years after the individual's eligibility for access to 
     classified information would otherwise lapse; and
       (2) recognizes, unless otherwise directed by the Security 
     Executive Agent, an individual's security clearance and 
     background investigation as current, regardless of employment 
     status, contingent on enrollment in a continuous vetting 
     program.
       (d) Contents.--The report required under subsection (b) 
     shall address--
       (1) requirements for an individual to voluntarily remain in 
     a continuous evaluation program validated by the Security 
     Executive Agent even if the individual is not in a position 
     requiring access to classified information;
       (2) appropriate safeguards for privacy;
       (3) advantages to government and industry;
       (4) the costs and savings associated with implementation;
       (5) the risks of such implementation, including security 
     and counterintelligence risks;
       (6) an appropriate funding model; and
       (7) fairness to small companies and independent 
     contractors.

     SEC. 2608. REPORTS ON RECIPROCITY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES 
                   INSIDE OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.

       (a) Reciprocally Recognized Defined.--In this section, the 
     term ``reciprocally recognized'' means reciprocal recognition 
     by Federal departments and agencies of eligibility for access 
     to classified information.
       (b) Reports to Security Executive Agent.--The head of each 
     Federal department or agency shall submit an annual report to 
     the Security Executive Agent that--
       (1) identifies the number of individuals whose security 
     clearances take more than 2 weeks to be reciprocally 
     recognized after such individuals move to another part of 
     such department or agency; and
       (2) breaks out the information described in paragraph (1) 
     by type of clearance and the reasons for any delays.
       (c) Annual Report.--Not less frequently than once each 
     year, the Security Executive Agent shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees and make available to 
     industry partners an annual report that summarizes the 
     information received pursuant to subsection (b) during the 
     period covered by such report.

     SEC. 2609. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY 
                   CLEARANCES.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) despite sustained efforts by Congress and the executive 
     branch, an unacceptable backlog in processing and 
     adjudicating security clearances persists, both within 
     elements of the intelligence community and in other 
     departments of the Federal Government, with some processing 
     times exceeding a year or even more;
       (2) the protracted clearance timetable threatens the 
     ability of elements of the intelligence community to hire and 
     retain highly qualified individuals, and thus to fulfill the 
     missions of such elements;
       (3) the prospect of a lengthy clearance process deters some 
     such individuals from seeking employment with the 
     intelligence community in the first place, and, when faced 
     with a long wait time, those with conditional offers of 
     employment may opt to discontinue the security clearance 
     process and pursue different opportunities;
       (4) now more than ever, therefore, the broken security 
     clearance process badly needs fundamental reform; and
       (5) in the meantime, to ensure the ability of elements of 
     the intelligence community to hire and retain highly 
     qualified personnel, elements should consider, to the extent 
     possible and consistent with national security, permitting 
     new employees to enter on duty immediately or nearly so, and 
     to perform, on a temporary basis pending final adjudication 
     of their security clearances, work that either does not 
     require a security clearance or requires only a low-level 
     interim clearance.
       (b) In General.--Section 506H of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``and'' after the 
     semicolon;
       (B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a period; and
       (C) by striking subparagraph (C);
       (2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
       (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
     subsection (b):
       ``(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than 
     March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, 
     the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
     of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives a report on the security clearances 
     processed by each element of the intelligence community 
     during the preceding fiscal year. Each such report shall 
     separately identify security clearances processed for Federal 
     employees and contractor employees sponsored by each such 
     element.
       ``(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
     include each of the following for each element of the 
     intelligence community for the fiscal year covered by the 
     report:
       ``(A) The total number of initial security clearance 
     background investigations sponsored for new applicants.
       ``(B) The total number of security clearance periodic 
     reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.
       ``(C) The total number of initial security clearance 
     background investigations for new applicants that were 
     adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the 
     prospective applicant, including--
       ``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and 
     granted access to classified information; and
       ``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably 
     and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security 
     clearance.
       ``(D) The total number of security clearance periodic 
     background investigations that were adjudicated with notice 
     of a determination provided to the existing employee, 
     including--
       ``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and
       ``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably 
     and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security 
     clearance.
       ``(E) The total number of pending security clearance 
     background investigations, including initial applicant 
     investigations and periodic reinvestigations, that were not 
     adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained 
     pending as follows:
       ``(i) For 180 days or less.
       ``(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.
       ``(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.
       ``(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.
       ``(v) For 24 months or longer.
       ``(F) In the case of security clearance determinations 
     completed or pending during the year preceding the year for 
     which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12 
     months to complete--
       ``(i) an explanation of the causes for the delays incurred 
     during the period covered by the report; and
       ``(ii) the number of such delays involving a polygraph 
     requirement.
       ``(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations, 
     including initial and periodic reinvestigations, that 
     resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
       ``(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations 
     that resulted in incomplete information.
       ``(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations 
     that did not result in enough information to make a decision 
     on potentially adverse information.
       ``(3) The report required under this subsection shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.''; and
       (4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
     striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and inserting ``subsections 
     (a)(1) and (b)''.

     SEC. 2610. PERIODIC REPORT ON POSITIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY THAT CAN BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT ACCESS 
                   TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, NETWORKS, OR 
                   FACILITIES.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act and not less frequently than once every 5 years 
     thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     that reviews the intelligence community for which positions 
     can be conducted without access to classified information, 
     networks, or facilities, or may only require a security 
     clearance at the secret level.

     SEC. 2611. INFORMATION SHARING PROGRAM FOR POSITIONS OF TRUST 
                   AND SECURITY CLEARANCES.

       (a) Program Required.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and 
     the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall 
     establish and implement a program to share between and among 
     agencies of the Federal Government and industry partners of 
     the Federal Government relevant background information 
     regarding individuals applying for and currently occupying 
     national security positions and positions of trust, in order 
     to ensure the Federal Government maintains a trusted 
     workforce.
       (2) Designation.--The program established under paragraph 
     (1) shall be known as the ``Trusted Information Provider 
     Program'' (in this section referred to as the ``Program'').
       (b) Privacy Safeguards.--The Security Executive Agent and 
     the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall 
     ensure that the Program includes such safeguards for privacy 
     as the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and 
     Credentialing Executive Agent consider appropriate.
       (c) Provision of Information to the Federal Government.--
     The Program shall include requirements that enable 
     investigative service providers and agencies of the Federal 
     Government to leverage certain pre-employment information 
     gathered during the employment or military recruiting 
     process, and other relevant security or human resources 
     information obtained during employment with or for the 
     Federal Government, that satisfy Federal investigative 
     standards, while safeguarding personnel privacy.
       (d) Information and Records.--The information and records 
     considered under the Program shall include the following:
       (1) Date and place of birth.
       (2) Citizenship or immigration and naturalization 
     information.
       (3) Education records.
       (4) Employment records.
       (5) Employment or social references.
       (6) Military service records.

[[Page H5881]]

       (7) State and local law enforcement checks.
       (8) Criminal history checks.
       (9) Financial records or information.
       (10) Foreign travel, relatives, or associations.
       (11) Social media checks.
       (12) Such other information or records as may be relevant 
     to obtaining or maintaining national security, suitability, 
     fitness, or credentialing eligibility.
       (e) Implementation Plan.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and 
     the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall 
     jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
     and make available to appropriate industry partners a plan 
     for the implementation of the Program.
       (2) Elements.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) Mechanisms that address privacy, national security, 
     suitability or fitness, credentialing, and human resources or 
     military recruitment processes.
       (B) Such recommendations for legislative or administrative 
     action as the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability 
     and Credentialing Executive Agent consider appropriate to 
     carry out or improve the Program.
       (f) Plan for Pilot Program on Two-way Information 
     Sharing.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and 
     the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall 
     jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
     and make available to appropriate industry partners a plan 
     for the implementation of a pilot program to assess the 
     feasibility and advisability of expanding the Program to 
     include the sharing of information held by the Federal 
     Government related to contract personnel with the security 
     office of the employers of those contractor personnel.
       (2) Elements.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) Mechanisms that address privacy, national security, 
     suitability or fitness, credentialing, and human resources or 
     military recruitment processes.
       (B) Such recommendations for legislative or administrative 
     action as the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability 
     and Credentialing Executive Agent consider appropriate to 
     carry out or improve the pilot program.
       (g) Review.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the 
     Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make 
     available to appropriate industry partners a review of the 
     plans submitted under subsections (e)(1) and (f)(1) and 
     utility and effectiveness of the programs described in such 
     plans.

     SEC. 2612. REPORT ON PROTECTIONS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY OF 
                   WHISTLEBLOWER-RELATED COMMUNICATIONS.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Security Executive Agent shall, in coordination 
     with the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     detailing the controls employed by the intelligence community 
     to ensure that continuous vetting programs, including those 
     involving user activity monitoring, protect the 
     confidentiality of whistleblower-related communications.

                 TITLE XXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

    Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers

     SEC. 2701. LIMITATION RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT OR SUPPORT OF 
                   CYBERSECURITY UNIT WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; 
     and
       (3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
     the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (b) Limitation.--
       (1) In general.--No amount may be expended by the Federal 
     Government, other than the Department of Defense, to enter 
     into or implement any bilateral agreement between the United 
     States and the Russian Federation regarding cybersecurity, 
     including the establishment or support of any cybersecurity 
     unit, unless, at least 30 days prior to the conclusion of any 
     such agreement, the Director of National Intelligence submits 
     to the appropriate congressional committees a report on such 
     agreement that includes the elements required by subsection 
     (c).
       (2) Department of defense agreements.--Any agreement 
     between the Department of Defense and the Russian Federation 
     regarding cybersecurity shall be conducted in accordance with 
     section 1232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328), as amended by section 
     1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91).
       (c) Elements.--If the Director submits a report under 
     subsection (b) with respect to an agreement, such report 
     shall include a description of each of the following:
       (1) The purpose of the agreement.
       (2) The nature of any intelligence to be shared pursuant to 
     the agreement.
       (3) The expected value to national security resulting from 
     the implementation of the agreement.
       (4) Such counterintelligence concerns associated with the 
     agreement as the Director may have and such measures as the 
     Director expects to be taken to mitigate such concerns.
       (d) Rule of Construction.--This section shall not be 
     construed to affect any existing authority of the Director of 
     National Intelligence, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, or another head of an element of the 
     intelligence community, to share or receive foreign 
     intelligence on a case-by-case basis.

     SEC. 2702. REPORT ON RETURNING RUSSIAN COMPOUNDS.

       (a) Covered Compounds Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``covered compounds'' means the real property in New York, 
     the real property in Maryland, and the real property in San 
     Francisco, California, that were under the control of the 
     Government of Russia in 2016 and were removed from such 
     control in response to various transgressions by the 
     Government of Russia, including the interference by the 
     Government of Russia in the 2016 election in the United 
     States.
       (b) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees, and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
     of the House of Representatives (only with respect to the 
     unclassified report), a report on the intelligence risks of 
     returning the covered compounds to Russian control.
       (c) Form of Report.--The report required by this section 
     shall be submitted in classified and unclassified forms.

     SEC. 2703. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO RUSSIA.

       (a) Threat Finance Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``threat finance'' means--
       (1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence 
     campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation, 
     terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;
       (2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move, 
     raise, conceal, or launder money or value, on behalf of 
     threat actors;
       (3) sanctions evasion; and
       (4) other forms of threat finance activity domestically or 
     internationally, as defined by the President.
       (b) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of 
     the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to 
     the congressional intelligence committees a report containing 
     an assessment of Russian threat finance. The assessment shall 
     be based on intelligence from all sources, including from the 
     Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the 
     Department of the Treasury.
       (c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall 
     include each of the following:
       (1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period 
     preceding the date of the submittal of the report of threat 
     finance activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at 
     the behest of--
       (A) officials of the Government of Russia;
       (B) persons subject to sanctions under any provision of law 
     imposing sanctions with respect to Russia;
       (C) Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any other 
     provision of law; or
       (D) Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.
       (2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in 
     threat finance activities relating to Russia, including 
     common methods of conducting such activities and global nodes 
     of money laundering used by Russian threat actors described 
     in paragraph (1) and associated entities.
       (3) An assessment of any connections between Russian 
     individuals involved in money laundering and the Government 
     of Russia.
       (4) A summary of engagement and coordination with 
     international partners on threat finance relating to Russia, 
     especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement 
     and coordination.
       (5) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.
       (6) An identification of--
       (A) entry points of money laundering by Russian and 
     associated entities into the United States;
       (B) any vulnerabilities within the United States legal and 
     financial system, including specific sectors, which have been 
     or could be exploited in connection with Russian threat 
     finance activities; and
       (C) the counterintelligence threat posed by Russian money 
     laundering and other forms of threat finance, as well as the 
     threat to the United States financial system and United 
     States efforts to enforce sanctions and combat organized 
     crime.
       (7) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.
       (d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection 
     (b) may be submitted in classified form.

     SEC. 2704. NOTIFICATION OF AN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; 
     and
       (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
     the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional 
     leadership'' includes the following:
       (A) The majority leader of the Senate.
       (B) The minority leader of the Senate.
       (C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
       (D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

[[Page H5882]]

       (b) Requirement for Notification.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence, in cooperation with the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation and the head of any other relevant 
     agency, shall notify the congressional leadership and the 
     Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of each of the 
     appropriate congressional committees, and of other relevant 
     committees of jurisdiction, each time the Director of 
     National Intelligence determines there is credible 
     information that a foreign power has, is, or will attempt to 
     employ a covert influence or active measures campaign with 
     regard to the modernization, employment, doctrine, or force 
     posture of the nuclear deterrent or missile defense.
       (c) Content of Notification.--Each notification required by 
     subsection (b) shall include information concerning actions 
     taken by the United States to expose or halt an attempt 
     referred to in subsection (b).

     SEC. 2705. NOTIFICATION OF TRAVEL BY ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC 
                   AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL OF THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

       In carrying out the advance notification requirements set 
     out in section 502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115-31; 131 Stat. 
     825; 22 U.S.C. 254a note), the Secretary of State shall--
       (1) ensure that the Russian Federation provides 
     notification to the Secretary of State at least 2 business 
     days in advance of all travel that is subject to such 
     requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel 
     of the Russian Federation in the United States, and take 
     necessary action to secure full compliance by Russian 
     personnel and address any noncompliance; and
       (2) provide notice of travel described in paragraph (1) to 
     the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation within 1 hour of receiving 
     notice of such travel.

     SEC. 2706. REPORT ON OUTREACH STRATEGY ADDRESSING THREATS 
                   FROM UNITED STATES ADVERSARIES TO THE UNITED 
                   STATES TECHNOLOGY SECTOR.

       (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
       (3) the Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Homeland 
     Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress a report detailing outreach by the intelligence 
     community and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to United 
     States industrial, commercial, scientific, technical, and 
     academic communities on matters relating to the efforts of 
     adversaries of the United States to acquire critical United 
     States technology, intellectual property, and research and 
     development information.
       (c) Contents.--The report required by subsection (b) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) A review of the current outreach efforts of the 
     intelligence community and the Defense Intelligence 
     Enterprise described in subsection (b), including the type of 
     information conveyed in the outreach.
       (2) A determination of the appropriate element of the 
     intelligence community to lead such outreach efforts.
       (3) An assessment of potential methods for improving the 
     effectiveness of such outreach, including an assessment of 
     the following:
       (A) Those critical technologies, infrastructure, or related 
     supply chains that are at risk from the efforts of 
     adversaries described in subsection (b).
       (B) The necessity and advisability of granting security 
     clearances to company or community leadership, when necessary 
     and appropriate, to allow for tailored classified briefings 
     on specific targeted threats.
       (C) The advisability of partnering with entities of the 
     Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence 
     community and relevant regulatory and industry groups 
     described in subsection (b), to convey key messages across 
     sectors targeted by United States adversaries.
       (D) Strategies to assist affected elements of the 
     communities described in subparagraph (C) in mitigating, 
     deterring, and protecting against the broad range of threats 
     from the efforts of adversaries described in subsection (b), 
     with focus on producing information that enables private 
     entities to justify business decisions related to national 
     security concerns.
       (E) The advisability of the establishment of a United 
     States Government-wide task force to coordinate outreach and 
     activities to combat the threats from efforts of adversaries 
     described in subsection (b).
       (F) Such other matters as the Director of National 
     Intelligence may consider necessary.
       (d) Consultation Encouraged.--In preparing the report 
     required by subsection (b), the Director is encouraged to 
     consult with other government agencies, think tanks, 
     academia, representatives of the financial industry, or such 
     other entities as the Director considers appropriate.
       (e) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex as necessary.

     SEC. 2707. REPORT ON IRANIAN SUPPORT OF PROXY FORCES IN SYRIA 
                   AND LEBANON.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Arms or related material.--The term ``arms or related 
     material'' means--
       (A) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons 
     or materials or components of such weapons;
       (B) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials or 
     components of such weapons;
       (C) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced 
     conventional weapons;
       (D) defense articles or defense services, as those terms 
     are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively, of 
     section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794);
       (E) defense information, as that term is defined in section 
     644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403); 
     or
       (F) items designated by the President for purposes of the 
     United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the 
     Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
       (b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress a report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria 
     and Lebanon and the threat posed to Israel, other United 
     States regional allies, and other specified interests of the 
     United States as a result of such support.
       (c) Matters for Inclusion.--The report required under 
     subsection (b) shall include information relating to the 
     following matters with respect to both the strategic and 
     tactical implications for the United States and its allies:
       (1) A description of arms or related materiel transferred 
     by Iran to Hizballah since March 2011, including the number 
     of such arms or related materiel and whether such transfer 
     was by land, sea, or air, as well as financial and additional 
     technological capabilities transferred by Iran to Hizballah.
       (2) A description of Iranian and Iranian-controlled 
     personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating within Syria, 
     including the number and geographic distribution of such 
     personnel operating within 30 kilometers of the Israeli 
     borders with Syria and Lebanon.
       (3) An assessment of Hizballah's operational lessons 
     learned based on its recent experiences in Syria.
       (4) A description of any rocket-producing facilities in 
     Lebanon for nonstate actors, including whether such 
     facilities were assessed to be built at the direction of 
     Hizballah leadership, Iranian leadership, or in consultation 
     between Iranian leadership and Hizballah leadership.
       (5) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains 
     that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid 
     Hizballah's acquisition or development of missile production 
     facilities, including the geographic distribution of such 
     foreign and domestic supply chains.
       (6) An assessment of the provision of goods, services, or 
     technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah 
     to indigenously manufacture or otherwise produce missiles.
       (7) An identification of foreign persons that are based on 
     credible information, facilitating the transfer of 
     significant financial support or arms or related materiel to 
     Hizballah.
       (8) A description of the threat posed to Israel and other 
     United States allies in the Middle East by the transfer of 
     arms or related material or other support offered to 
     Hizballah and other proxies from Iran.
       (d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection 
     (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
     a classified annex.

     SEC. 2708. ANNUAL REPORT ON IRANIAN EXPENDITURES SUPPORTING 
                   FOREIGN MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Annual Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently 
     than once each year thereafter, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report describing 
     Iranian expenditures in the previous calendar year on 
     military and terrorist activities outside the country, 
     including each of the following:
       (1) The amount spent in such calendar year on activities by 
     the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including activities 
     providing support for--
       (A) Hizballah;
       (B) Houthi rebels in Yemen;
       (C) Hamas;
       (D) proxy forces in Iraq and Syria; or
       (E) any other entity or country the Director determines to 
     be relevant.
       (2) The amount spent in such calendar year for ballistic 
     missile research and testing or other activities that the 
     Director determines are destabilizing to the Middle East 
     region.
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 2709. EXPANSION OF SCOPE OF COMMITTEE TO COUNTER ACTIVE 
                   MEASURES AND REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN 
                   MALIGN INFLUENCE CENTER.

       (a) Scope of Committee to Counter Active Measures.--
       (1) In general.--Section 501 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 115-31; 50 
     U.S.C. 3001 note) is amended--
       (A) in subsections (a) through (h)--
       (i) by inserting ``, the People's Republic of China, the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea, or other nation state'' after ``Russian Federation'' 
     each place it appears; and

[[Page H5883]]

       (ii) by inserting ``, China, Iran, North Korea, or other 
     nation state'' after ``Russia'' each place it appears; and
       (B) in the section heading, by inserting ``, the people's 
     republic of china, the islamic republic of iran, the 
     democratic people's republic of korea, or other nation 
     state'' after ``russian federation''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to 
     section 501 and inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 501. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian 
              Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic 
              Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of 
              Korea, or other nation states to exert covert influence 
              over peoples and governments.''.

       (b) Report Required.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with such elements of the 
     intelligence community as the Director considers relevant, 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a 
     center, to be known as the ``Foreign Malign Influence 
     Response Center'', that--
       (A) is comprised of analysts from all appropriate elements 
     of the intelligence community, including elements with 
     related diplomatic and law enforcement functions;
       (B) has access to all intelligence and other reporting 
     acquired by the United States Government on foreign efforts 
     to influence, through overt and covert malign activities, 
     United States political processes and elections;
       (C) provides comprehensive assessment, and indications and 
     warning, of such activities; and
       (D) provides for enhanced dissemination of such assessment 
     to United States policy makers.
       (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) A discussion of the desirability of the establishment 
     of such center and any barriers to such establishment.
       (B) Such recommendations and other matters as the Director 
     considers appropriate.

                          Subtitle B--Reports

     SEC. 2711. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO INSPECTOR GENERAL STUDY.

       Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Audit'' and 
     inserting ``Review'';
       (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``audit'' and inserting 
     ``review''; and
       (3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``audit'' and inserting 
     ``review''.

     SEC. 2712. REPORTS ON AUTHORITIES OF THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE 
                   OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate; and
       (C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Homeland security intelligence enterprise.--The term 
     ``Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise'' has the meaning 
     given such term in Department of Homeland Security 
     Instruction Number 264-01-001, or successor authority.
       (b) Report Required.--Not later than 120 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation with the Under Secretary of 
     Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit 
     to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the 
     authorities of the Under Secretary.
       (c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall 
     include each of the following:
       (1) An analysis of whether the Under Secretary has the 
     legal and policy authority necessary to organize and lead the 
     Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise, with respect to 
     intelligence, and, if not, a description of--
       (A) the obstacles to exercising the authorities of the 
     Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department and the Homeland 
     Security Intelligence Council, of which the Chief 
     Intelligence Officer is the chair; and
       (B) the legal and policy changes necessary to effectively 
     coordinate, organize, and lead intelligence activities of the 
     Department of Homeland Security.
       (2) A description of the actions that the Secretary has 
     taken to address the inability of the Under Secretary to 
     require components of the Department, other than the Office 
     of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department to--
       (A) coordinate intelligence programs; and
       (B) integrate and standardize intelligence products 
     produced by such other components.

     SEC. 2713. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER 
                   MATTERS.

       (a) Review of Whistleblower Matters.--The Inspector General 
     of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the 
     inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
     National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
     Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the 
     National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the 
     authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other 
     practices and procedures relating to intelligence community 
     whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors 
     general.
       (b) Objective of Review.--The objective of the review 
     required under subsection (a) is to identify any 
     discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues, which 
     frustrate the timely and effective reporting of intelligence 
     community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors 
     general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and 
     the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such 
     matters.
       (c) Conduct of Review.--The Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the 
     Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure 
     that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an 
     independent and objective fashion.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a written report containing the 
     results of the review required under subsection (a), along 
     with recommendations to improve the timely and effective 
     reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to 
     inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and 
     resolution of such matters.

     SEC. 2714. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN 
                   INVESTMENTS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the heads of the elements of the 
     intelligence community determined appropriate by the 
     Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing 
     analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the 
     Federal Government of national security risks associated with 
     potential foreign investments into the United States.
       (b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     include--
       (1) a description of the current process for the provision 
     of the analytic materials described in subsection (a);
       (2) an identification of the most significant benefits and 
     drawbacks of such process with respect to the role of the 
     Director, including the sufficiency of resources and 
     personnel to prepare such materials; and
       (3) recommendations to improve such process.

     SEC. 2715. REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 
                   AGAINST UNITED STATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
                   NETWORKS.

       (a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
       (2) The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
       (3) The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall, in coordination with the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security 
     Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
     and the Secretary of Homeland Security, submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report describing--
       (1) any attempts known to the intelligence community by 
     foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
     in United States telecommunications networks (including 
     Signaling System No. 7) to target for surveillance United 
     States persons, including employees of the Federal 
     Government; and
       (2) any actions, as of the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, taken by the intelligence community to protect agencies 
     and personnel of the United States Government from 
     surveillance conducted by foreign governments.

     SEC. 2716. BIENNIAL REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISKS.

       (a) Intelligence Community Interagency Working Group.--
       (1) Requirement to establish.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall establish an intelligence community 
     interagency working group to prepare the biennial reports 
     required by subsection (b).
       (2) Chairperson.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall serve as the chairperson of such interagency working 
     group.
       (3) Membership.--Such interagency working group shall be 
     composed of representatives of each element of the 
     intelligence community that the Director of National 
     Intelligence determines appropriate.
       (b) Biennial Report on Foreign Investment Risks.--
       (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently 
     than once every 2 years thereafter, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report on 
     foreign investment risks prepared by the interagency working 
     group established under subsection (a).
       (2) Elements.--Each report required by paragraph (1) shall 
     include identification, analysis, and explanation of the 
     following:
       (A) Any current or projected major threats to the national 
     security of the United States with respect to foreign 
     investment.
       (B) Any strategy used by a foreign country that such 
     interagency working group has identified to be a country of 
     special concern to use foreign investment to target the 
     acquisition of critical technologies, critical materials, or 
     critical infrastructure.
       (C) Any economic espionage efforts directed at the United 
     States by a foreign country, particularly such a country of 
     special concern.

[[Page H5884]]

  


     SEC. 2717. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENT ON 
                   TRAVEL OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS.

       Section 502(d)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 115-31) is amended by striking 
     ``the number'' and inserting ``a best estimate''.

     SEC. 2718. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF 
                   UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF 
                   UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Covered official.--The term `covered official' 
     means--
       ``(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence 
     community; and
       ``(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility 
     for an element of the intelligence community.
       ``(2) Investigation.--The term `investigation' means any 
     inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an 
     unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.
       ``(3) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.--
     The term `unauthorized disclosure of classified information' 
     means any unauthorized disclosure of classified information 
     to any recipient.
       ``(4) Unauthorized public disclosure of classified 
     information.--The term `unauthorized public disclosure of 
     classified information' means the unauthorized disclosure of 
     classified information to a journalist or media organization.
       ``(b) Intelligence Community Reporting.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6 
     months, each covered official shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on 
     investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of 
     classified information.
       ``(2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include, with respect to the preceding 6-month period, 
     the following:
       ``(A) The number of investigations opened by the covered 
     official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of 
     classified information.
       ``(B) The number of investigations completed by the covered 
     official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of 
     classified information.
       ``(C) Of the number of such completed investigations 
     identified under subparagraph (B), the number referred to the 
     Attorney General for criminal investigation.
       ``(c) Department of Justice Reporting.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6 
     months, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security 
     of the Department of Justice, in consultation with the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report on the 
     status of each referral made to the Department of Justice 
     from any element of the intelligence community regarding an 
     unauthorized disclosure of classified information made during 
     the most recent 365-day period or any referral that has not 
     yet been closed, regardless of the date the referral was 
     made.
       ``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include, for each referral covered by the report, at a 
     minimum, the following:
       ``(A) The date the referral was received.
       ``(B) A statement indicating whether the alleged 
     unauthorized disclosure described in the referral was 
     substantiated by the Department of Justice.
       ``(C) A statement indicating the highest level of 
     classification of the information that was revealed in the 
     unauthorized disclosure.
       ``(D) A statement indicating whether an open criminal 
     investigation related to the referral is active.
       ``(E) A statement indicating whether any criminal charges 
     have been filed related to the referral.
       ``(F) A statement indicating whether the Department of 
     Justice has been able to attribute the unauthorized 
     disclosure to a particular entity or individual.
       ``(d) Form of Reports.--Each report submitted under this 
     section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may have 
     a classified annex.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized 
              disclosures of classified information.''.

     SEC. 2719. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATION OF 
                   COVERED INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AS PERSONA NON 
                   GRATA.

       (a) Covered Intelligence Officer Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``covered intelligence officer'' means--
       (1) a United States intelligence officer serving in a post 
     in a foreign country; or
       (2) a known or suspected foreign intelligence officer 
     serving in a United States post.
       (b) Requirement for Reports.--Not later than 72 hours after 
     a covered intelligence officer is designated as a persona non 
     grata, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
     with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives a notification of 
     that designation. Each such notification shall include--
       (1) the date of the designation;
       (2) the basis for the designation; and
       (3) a justification for the expulsion.

     SEC. 2720. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN 
                   VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS OF FEDERAL 
                   GOVERNMENT.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.--
     The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process 
     document'' means the executive branch document entitled 
     ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process'' dated 
     November 15, 2017.
       (2) Vulnerabilities equities process.--The term 
     ``Vulnerabilities Equities Process'' means the interagency 
     review of vulnerabilities, pursuant to the Vulnerabilities 
     Equities Policy and Process document or any successor 
     document.
       (3) Vulnerability.--The term ``vulnerability'' means a 
     weakness in an information system or its components (for 
     example, system security procedures, hardware design, and 
     internal controls) that could be exploited or could affect 
     confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information.
       (b) Reports on Process and Criteria Under Vulnerabilities 
     Equities Policy and Process.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a written report describing--
       (A) with respect to each element of the intelligence 
     community--
       (i) the title of the official or officials responsible for 
     determining whether, pursuant to criteria contained in the 
     Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any 
     successor document, a vulnerability must be submitted for 
     review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
       (ii) the process used by such element to make such 
     determination; and
       (B) the roles or responsibilities of that element during a 
     review of a vulnerability submitted to the Vulnerabilities 
     Equities Process.
       (2) Changes to process or criteria.--Not later than 30 days 
     after any significant change is made to the process and 
     criteria used by any element of the intelligence community 
     for determining whether to submit a vulnerability for review 
     under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, such element 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report describing such change.
       (3) Form of reports.--Each report submitted under this 
     subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
     include a classified annex.
       (c) Annual Reports.--
       (1) In general.--Not less frequently than once each 
     calendar year, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     classified report containing, with respect to the previous 
     year--
       (A) the number of vulnerabilities submitted for review 
     under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process;
       (B) the number of vulnerabilities described in subparagraph 
     (A) disclosed to each vendor responsible for correcting the 
     vulnerability, or to the public, pursuant to the 
     Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
       (C) the aggregate number, by category, of the 
     vulnerabilities excluded from review under the 
     Vulnerabilities Equities Process, as described in paragraph 
     5.4 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process 
     document.
       (2) Unclassified information.--Each report submitted under 
     paragraph (1) shall include an unclassified appendix that 
     contains--
       (A) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to 
     vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities 
     Equities Process; and
       (B) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to 
     vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities 
     Equities Process known to have been patched.
       (3) Non-duplication.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     may forgo submission of an annual report required under this 
     subsection for a calendar year, if the Director notifies the 
     intelligence committees in writing that, with respect to the 
     same calendar year, an annual report required by paragraph 
     4.3 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process 
     document already has been submitted to Congress, and such 
     annual report contains the information that would otherwise 
     be required to be included in an annual report under this 
     subsection.

     SEC. 2721. INSPECTORS GENERAL REPORTS ON CLASSIFICATION.

       (a) Reports Required.--Not later than October 1, 2019, each 
     Inspector General listed in subsection (b) shall submit to 
     the congressional intelligence committees a report that 
     includes, with respect to the department or agency of the 
     Inspector General, analyses of the following:
       (1) The accuracy of the application of classification and 
     handling markers on a representative sample of finished 
     reports, including such reports that are compartmented.
       (2) Compliance with declassification procedures.
       (3) The effectiveness of processes for identifying topics 
     of public or historical importance that merit prioritization 
     for a declassification review.
       (b) Inspectors General Listed.--The Inspectors General 
     listed in this subsection are as follows:
       (1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
       (2) The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency.
       (3) The Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
       (4) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency.
       (5) The Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance 
     Office.

[[Page H5885]]

       (6) The Inspector General of the National Geospatial-
     Intelligence Agency.

     SEC. 2722. REPORTS ON GLOBAL WATER INSECURITY AND NATIONAL 
                   SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND BRIEFING ON EMERGING 
                   INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND PANDEMICS.

       (a) Reports on Global Water Insecurity and National 
     Security Implications.--
       (1) Reports required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently 
     than once every 5 years thereafter, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on the implications of water insecurity 
     on the national security interest of the United States, 
     including consideration of social, economic, agricultural, 
     and environmental factors.
       (2) Assessment scope and focus.--Each report submitted 
     under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of water 
     insecurity described in such subsection with a global scope, 
     but focus on areas of the world--
       (A) of strategic, economic, or humanitarian interest to the 
     United States--
       (i) that are, as of the date of the report, at the greatest 
     risk of instability, conflict, human insecurity, or mass 
     displacement; or
       (ii) where challenges relating to water insecurity are 
     likely to emerge and become significant during the 5-year or 
     the 20-year period beginning on the date of the report; and
       (B) where challenges relating to water insecurity are 
     likely to imperil the national security interests of the 
     United States or allies of the United States.
       (3) Consultation.--In researching a report required by 
     paragraph (1), the Director shall consult with--
       (A) such stakeholders within the intelligence community, 
     the Department of Defense, and the Department of State as the 
     Director considers appropriate; and
       (B) such additional Federal agencies and persons in the 
     private sector as the Director considers appropriate.
       (4) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (b) Briefing on Emerging Infectious Disease and 
     Pandemics.--
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
     subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     House of Representatives; and
       (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     Senate.
       (2) Briefing.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall provide to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a briefing on the anticipated geopolitical effects 
     of emerging infectious disease (including deliberate, 
     accidental, and naturally occurring infectious disease 
     threats) and pandemics, and their implications on the 
     national security of the United States.
       (3) Content.--The briefing under paragraph (2) shall 
     include an assessment of--
       (A) the economic, social, political, and security risks, 
     costs, and impacts of emerging infectious diseases on the 
     United States and the international political and economic 
     system;
       (B) the economic, social, political, and security risks, 
     costs, and impacts of a major transnational pandemic on the 
     United States and the international political and economic 
     system; and
       (C) contributing trends and factors to the matters assessed 
     under subparagraphs (A) and (B).
       (4) Examination of response capacity.--In examining the 
     risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious disease and 
     a possible transnational pandemic under paragraph (3), the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall also examine in the 
     briefing under paragraph (2) the response capacity within 
     affected countries and the international system. In 
     considering response capacity, the Director shall include--
       (A) the ability of affected nations to effectively detect 
     and manage emerging infectious diseases and a possible 
     transnational pandemic;
       (B) the role and capacity of international organizations 
     and nongovernmental organizations to respond to emerging 
     infectious disease and a possible pandemic, and their ability 
     to coordinate with affected and donor nations; and
       (C) the effectiveness of current international frameworks, 
     agreements, and health systems to respond to emerging 
     infectious diseases and a possible transnational pandemic.
       (5) Form.--The briefing under paragraph (2) may be 
     classified.

     SEC. 2723. ANNUAL REPORT ON MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING 
                   BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND 
                   OTHER ENTITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
                   REGARDING SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OR 
                   POLICY.

       Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2017 (50 U.S.C. 3313) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
       (2) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:
       ``(a) In General.--Each year, concurrent with the annual 
     budget request submitted by the President to Congress under 
     section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, each head of an 
     element of the intelligence community shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report that lists 
     each memorandum of understanding or other agreement regarding 
     significant operational activities or policy entered into 
     during the most recently completed fiscal year between or 
     among such element and any other entity of the United States 
     Government.
       ``(b) Provision of Documents.--Each head of an element of 
     an intelligence community who receives a request from the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives for a copy of a memorandum of understanding 
     or other document listed in a report submitted by the head 
     under subsection (a) shall submit to such committee the 
     requested copy as soon as practicable after receiving such 
     request.''.

     SEC. 2724. STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ENCRYPTING 
                   UNCLASSIFIED WIRELINE AND WIRELESS TELEPHONE 
                   CALLS.

       (a) Study Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall complete a study on the feasibility of 
     encrypting unclassified wireline and wireless telephone calls 
     between personnel in the intelligence community.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date on which 
     the Director completes the study required by subsection (a), 
     the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on the Director's findings with respect 
     to such study.

     SEC. 2725. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON 
                   HIRING AND RETENTION OF MINORITY EMPLOYEES.

       (a) Expansion of Period of Report.--Subsection (a) of 
     section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3050) is amended by inserting ``and the preceding 5 fiscal 
     years'' after ``fiscal year''.
       (b) Clarification on Disaggregation of Data.--Subsection 
     (b) of such section is amended, in the matter before 
     paragraph (1), by striking ``disaggregated data by category 
     of covered person from each element of the intelligence 
     community'' and inserting ``data, disaggregated by category 
     of covered person and by element of the intelligence 
     community,''.

     SEC. 2726. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LOAN REPAYMENT 
                   AND RELATED PROGRAMS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) there should be established, through the issuing of an 
     Intelligence Community Directive or otherwise, an 
     intelligence community-wide program for student loan 
     repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling, 
     and related matters, for employees of the intelligence 
     community;
       (2) creating such a program would enhance the ability of 
     the elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire, 
     and retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect 
     to mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions;
       (3) such a program, including with respect to eligibility 
     requirements, should be designed so as to maximize the 
     ability of the elements of the intelligence community to 
     recruit, hire, and retain highly qualified personnel, 
     including with respect to mission-critical and hard-to-fill 
     positions; and
       (4) to the extent possible, such a program should be 
     uniform throughout the intelligence community and publicly 
     promoted by each element of the intelligence community to 
     both current employees of the element as well as to 
     prospective employees of the element.
       (b) Report on Potential Intelligence Community-wide 
     Program.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of the elements 
     of the intelligence community and the heads of any other 
     appropriate department or agency of the Federal Government, 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on potentially establishing and carrying out an 
     intelligence community-wide program for student loan 
     repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling, 
     and related matters, as described in subsection (a).
       (2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall 
     include, at a minimum, the following:
       (A) A description of the financial resources that the 
     elements of the intelligence community would require to 
     establish and initially carry out the program specified in 
     paragraph (1).
       (B) A description of the practical steps to establish and 
     carry out such a program.
       (C) The identification of any legislative action the 
     Director determines necessary to establish and carry out such 
     a program.
       (c) Annual Reports on Established Programs.--
       (1) Covered programs defined.--In this subsection, the term 
     ``covered programs'' means any loan repayment program, loan 
     forgiveness program, financial counseling program, or similar 
     program, established pursuant to title X of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) or any other 
     provision of law that may be administered or used by an 
     element of the intelligence community.
       (2) Annual reports required.--Not less frequently than once 
     each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     covered programs. Each such report shall include, with 
     respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
       (A) The number of personnel from each element of the 
     intelligence community who used each covered program.
       (B) The total amount of funds each element expended for 
     each such program.
       (C) A description of the efforts made by each element to 
     promote each covered program pursuant to both the personnel 
     of the element of the intelligence community and to 
     prospective personnel.

[[Page H5886]]

  


     SEC. 2727. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Correcting Long-standing Material Weaknesses.--Section 
     368 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2010 (Public Law 110-259; 50 U.S.C. 3051 note) is hereby 
     repealed.
       (b) Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group.--
     Section 210D of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
     124k) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (c); and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as 
     subsections (c) through (h), respectively; and
       (3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
       (A) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     period; and
       (B) by striking paragraph (9).
       (c) Inspector General Report.--Section 8H of the Inspector 
     General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (g); and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as subsections 
     (g) and (h), respectively.

     SEC. 2728. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   REPORT ON SENIOR EXECUTIVES OF THE OFFICE OF 
                   THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Senior Executive Service Position Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``Senior Executive Service position'' has 
     the meaning given that term in section 3132(a)(2) of title 5, 
     United States Code, and includes any position above the GS-
     15, step 10, level of the General Schedule under section 5332 
     of such title.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on the number of Senior 
     Executive Service positions in the Office of the Director of 
     National Intelligence.
       (c) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (b) 
     shall include the following:
       (1) The number of required Senior Executive Service 
     positions for the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence.
       (2) Whether such requirements are reasonably based on the 
     mission of the Office.
       (3) A discussion of how the number of the Senior Executive 
     Service positions in the Office compare to the number of 
     senior positions at comparable organizations.
       (d) Cooperation.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall provide to the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community any information requested by the Inspector General 
     of the Intelligence Community that is necessary to carry out 
     this section by not later than 14 calendar days after the 
     date on which the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community makes such request.

     SEC. 2729. BRIEFING ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
                   OFFERING PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO SOURCES AND 
                   COOPERATORS.

       Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     briefing on the ability of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation to offer, as an inducement to assisting the 
     Bureau, permanent residence within the United States to 
     foreign individuals who are sources or cooperators in 
     counterintelligence or other national security-related 
     investigations. The briefing shall address the following:
       (1) The extent to which the Bureau may make such offers, 
     whether independently or in conjunction with other agencies 
     and departments of the United States Government, including a 
     discussion of the authorities provided by section 
     101(a)(15)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(S)), section 7 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act (50 U.S.C. 3508), and any other provision of law 
     under which the Bureau may make such offers.
       (2) An overview of the policies and operational practices 
     of the Bureau with respect to making such offers.
       (3) The sufficiency of such policies and practices with 
     respect to inducing individuals to cooperate with, serve as 
     sources for such investigations, or both.
       (4) Whether the Director recommends any legislative actions 
     to improve such policies and practices, particularly with 
     respect to the counterintelligence efforts of the Bureau.

     SEC. 2730. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF NORTH KOREA REVENUE 
                   SOURCES.

       (a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of 
     State for Intelligence and Research and the Assistant 
     Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, 
     shall produce an intelligence assessment of the revenue 
     sources of the North Korean regime. Such assessment shall 
     include revenue from the following sources:
       (1) Trade in coal, iron, and iron ore.
       (2) The provision of fishing rights to North Korean 
     territorial waters.
       (3) Trade in gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper, 
     silver, nickel, zinc, or rare earth minerals, and other 
     stores of value.
       (4) Trade in textiles.
       (5) Sales of conventional defense articles and services.
       (6) Sales of controlled goods, ballistic missiles, and 
     other associated items.
       (7) Other types of manufacturing for export, as the 
     Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
       (8) The exportation of workers from North Korea in a manner 
     intended to generate significant revenue, directly or 
     indirectly, for use by the government of North Korea.
       (9) The provision of nonhumanitarian goods (such as food, 
     medicine, and medical devices) and services by other 
     countries.
       (10) The provision of services, including banking and other 
     support, including by entities located in the Russian 
     Federation, China, and Iran.
       (11) Online commercial activities of the Government of 
     North Korea, including online gambling.
       (12) Criminal activities, including cyber-enabled crime and 
     counterfeit goods.
       (b) Elements.--The assessment required under subsection (a) 
     shall include an identification of each of the following:
       (1) The sources of North Korea's funding.
       (2) Financial and non-financial networks, including supply 
     chain management, transportation, and facilitation, through 
     which North Korea accesses the United States and 
     international financial systems and repatriates and exports 
     capital, goods, and services; and
       (3) the global financial institutions, money services 
     business, and payment systems that assist North Korea with 
     financial transactions.
       (c) Submittal to Congress.--Upon completion of the 
     assessment required under subsection (a), the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a copy of such assessment.

     SEC. 2731. REPORT ON POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF VIRTUAL 
                   CURRENCIES BY TERRORIST ACTORS.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Stop 
     Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies Act''.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall 
     submit to Congress a report on the possible exploitation of 
     virtual currencies by terrorist actors. Such report shall 
     include the following elements:
       (1) An assessment of the means and methods by which 
     international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of 
     terrorism use virtual currencies.
       (2) An assessment of the use by terrorist organizations and 
     State sponsors of terrorism of virtual currencies compared to 
     the use by such organizations and States of other forms of 
     financing to support operations, including an assessment of 
     the collection posture of the intelligence community on the 
     use of virtual currencies by such organizations and States.
       (3) A description of any existing legal impediments that 
     inhibit or prevent the intelligence community from collecting 
     information on or helping prevent the use of virtual 
     currencies by international terrorist organizations and State 
     sponsors of terrorism and an identification of any gaps in 
     existing law that could be exploited for illicit funding by 
     such organizations and States.
       (c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (b) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

                       Subtitle C--Other Matters

     SEC. 2741. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.

       Section 710(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act 
     of 2000 (Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note) is amended 
     by striking ``December 31, 2018'' and inserting ``December 
     31, 2028''.

     SEC. 2742. TECHNICAL AND CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL 
                   SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

       (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents at the 
     beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3001 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by inserting after the item relating to section 2 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 3. Definitions.'';

       (2) by striking the item relating to section 107;
       (3) by striking the item relating to section 113B and 
     inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology, 
              engineering, or mathematics positions.'';

       (4) by striking the items relating to sections 202, 203, 
     204, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, and 214; and
       (5) by inserting after the item relating to section 311 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 312. Repealing and saving provisions.''.

       (b) Other Technical Corrections.--Such Act is further 
     amended--
       (1) in section 102A--
       (A) in subparagraph (G) of paragraph (1) of subsection (g), 
     by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left; 
     and
       (B) in paragraph (3) of subsection (v), by moving the 
     margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left;
       (2) in section 106--
       (A) by inserting ``sec. 106.'' before ``(a)''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (2) of subsection (b), 
     by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left;
       (3) by striking section 107;
       (4) in section 108(c), by striking ``in both a classified 
     and an unclassified form'' and inserting ``to Congress in 
     classified form, but may include an unclassified summary'';
       (5) in section 112(c)(1), by striking ``section 103(c)(7)'' 
     and inserting ``section 102A(i)'';
       (6) by amending section 201 to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       ``Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of 
     this Act or other provisions of law, the provisions of title 
     5, United States Code, shall be applicable to the Department 
     of Defense.'';
       (7) in section 205, by redesignating subsections (b) and 
     (c) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively;
       (8) in section 206, by striking ``(a)'';
       (9) in section 207, by striking ``(c)'';
       (10) in section 308(a), by striking ``this Act'' and 
     inserting ``sections 2, 101, 102, 103, and 303 of this Act'';
       (11) by redesignating section 411 as section 312;

[[Page H5887]]

       (12) in section 503--
       (A) in paragraph (5) of subsection (c)--
       (i) by moving the margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the 
     left; and
       (ii) by moving the margins of subparagraph (B) of such 
     paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
       (B) in paragraph (2) of subsection (d), by moving the 
     margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
       (13) in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) 
     of section 504, by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 
     ems to the right.

     SEC. 2743. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   ENERGY.

       (a) National Nuclear Security Administration Act.--
       (1) Clarification of functions of the administrator for 
     nuclear security.--Subsection (b) of section 3212 of the 
     National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 
     2402(b)) is amended--
       (A) by striking paragraphs (11) and (12); and
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (13) through (19) as 
     paragraphs (11) through (17), respectively.
       (2) Counterintelligence programs.--Section 3233(b) of the 
     National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 
     2423(b)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``Administration'' and inserting 
     ``Department''; and
       (B) by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``the Office 
     of''.
       (b) Atomic Energy Defense Act.--Section 4524(b)(2) of the 
     Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended 
     by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``The Director of''.
       (c) National Security Act of 1947.--Paragraph (2) of 
     section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and 
     Counterintelligence'' after ``Office of Intelligence'';
       (2) by striking subparagraph (F); and
       (3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as 
     subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively.

     SEC. 2744. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN 
                   DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Adversary foreign government.--The term ``adversary 
     foreign government'' means the government of any of the 
     following foreign countries:
       (A) North Korea.
       (B) Iran.
       (C) China.
       (D) Russia.
       (E) Cuba.
       (2) Covered classified information.--The term ``covered 
     classified information'' means classified information that 
     was--
       (A) collected by an element of the intelligence community; 
     or
       (B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a 
     foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.
       (3) Established intelligence channels.--The term 
     ``established intelligence channels'' means methods to 
     exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign intelligence 
     relationships, as established pursuant to law by the Director 
     of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security 
     Agency, or other head of an element of the intelligence 
     community.
       (4) Individual in the executive branch.--The term 
     ``individual in the executive branch'' means any officer or 
     employee of the executive branch, including individuals--
       (A) occupying a position specified in article II of the 
     Constitution;
       (B) appointed to a position by an individual described in 
     subparagraph (A); or
       (C) serving in the civil service or the Senior Executive 
     Service (or similar service for senior executives of 
     particular departments or agencies).
       (b) Findings.--Congress finds that section 502 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires 
     elements of the intelligence community to keep the 
     congressional intelligence committees ``fully and currently 
     informed'' about all ``intelligence activities'' of the 
     United States, and to ``furnish to the congressional 
     intelligence committees any information or material 
     concerning intelligence activities * * * which is requested 
     by either of the congressional intelligence committees in 
     order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.''.
       (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3092), together with other intelligence community 
     authorities, obligates an element of the intelligence 
     community to submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees written notification, by not later than 7 days 
     after becoming aware, that an individual in the executive 
     branch has disclosed covered classified information to an 
     official of an adversary foreign government using methods 
     other than established intelligence channels; and
       (2) each such notification should include--
       (A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified 
     information covered by the notification;
       (B) a description of such classified information;
       (C) identification of the individual who made such 
     disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was 
     made; and
       (D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.

     SEC. 2745. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONSIDERATION OF ESPIONAGE 
                   ACTIVITIES WHEN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT TO 
                   PROVIDE VISAS TO FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS TO BE 
                   ACCREDITED TO A UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE 
                   UNITED STATES.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of 
     State, in considering whether or not to provide a visa to a 
     foreign individual to be accredited to a United Nations 
     mission in the United States, should consider--
       (1) known and suspected intelligence activities, espionage 
     activities, including activities constituting precursors to 
     espionage, carried out by the individual against the United 
     States, foreign allies of the United States, or foreign 
     partners of the United States; and
       (2) the status of an individual as a known or suspected 
     intelligence officer for a foreign adversary.

  The CHAIR. No further amendment to the bill, as amended, shall be in 
order except those printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Each further amendment printed in part B of the report may be offered 
only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the 
report, shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time 
specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent 
and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be 
subject to a demand for division of the question.


                 Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Stewart

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in 
part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chairman, as the designee of the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Burgess), I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 224, line 15, insert ``the Committee on Energy and 
     Commerce,'' after ``Armed Services,''.
       Page 224, line 19, insert ``the Committee on Health, 
     Education, Labor, and Pensions,'' after ``Armed Services,''.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Utah 
(Mr. Stewart) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Utah.
  Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chairman, my amendment is very simple. It adds the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Senate Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions Committee to the list of committees that will 
receive a briefing from the Director of National Intelligence on 
emerging infectious disease and pandemics.
  The Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health has jurisdiction over 
all public health and quarantine, as well as the Centers for Disease 
Control.
  Given the Energy and Commerce Committee's and the Senate Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee's jurisdiction over the 
Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response, which plays an 
integral role in our Nation's public health and security, it is 
imperative that these committees be included in this briefing.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1930

  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment, 
although I am not opposed.
  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Thompson of Mississippi). Without objection, 
the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, the gentleman from Texas' proposal would allow 
the congressional committees with jurisdiction over public health 
matters the opportunity to receive a briefing about the effects of 
emerging and infectious diseases and pandemics on national security and 
the international political and economic system, along with the 
Intelligence Committee and Armed Services Committee.
  It is critical that Congress be well-informed on the posture of the 
United States and, indeed, the rest of the world to address a public 
health crisis that might arise in the face of a particularly rapidly 
spreading, devastating disease. It is crucial that committees that 
oversee public health responses understand how prepared we may be to 
address such a crisis.
  I support this amendment, and I believe it will be helpful to our 
colleagues on the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Senate 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee to receive this 
briefing and information from the DNI, along with the Intelligence, 
Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Appropriations Committees that are 
already included in the bill text.

[[Page H5888]]

  For that reason, I support the amendment, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chair, I thank the chairman for supporting the 
amendment. I urge adoption of the amendment, and I yield back the 
balance of my time
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Stewart).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Stewart

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chair, again I rise as the designee of Mr. Burgess, 
and I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 7___. REMOVAL AND NEUTRALIZATION OF IMSI CATCHERS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     collaboration with the Director of National Intelligence, the 
     Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and the 
     heads of such other Federal agencies as the Secretary 
     determines appropriate, and following consultation with 
     appropriate private entities, shall--
       (1) undertake an effort to remove or neutralize 
     unauthorized IMSI catchers installed by foreign entities or 
     that have an unknown attribution, with prioritization given 
     to IMSI catchers identified in the National Capital Region; 
     and
       (2) conduct further assessments, not less than once every 
     90 days, to identify new IMSI catchers for removal or 
     neutralization.
       (b) IMSI Catcher Defined.--The term ``IMSI catcher'' means 
     an international mobile subscriber identity-catcher or other 
     device used for intercepting mobile phone identifying 
     information and location data.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Utah (Mr. Stewart) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Utah.
  Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chair, once again, my amendment is simple. It 
directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the 
Director of National Intelligence, Chairman of the Federal 
Communications Commission, and appropriate private entities, to 
undertake an effort to remove or neutralize unauthorized international 
mobile subscriber identity catchers, or cell-site simulators, installed 
by foreign entities or that have an unknown attribution.
  International mobile subscriber identities, IMSI, catchers, or cell-
site simulators, are devices used for intercepting mobile traffic and 
location data. They appear to be legitimate cell phone towers that 
nearby phones may connect to. Once connected, phone locations can be 
tracked.
  Some advanced IMSI catchers can even read content, such as messages 
and cell phone data. Much remains unknown about the proliferation of 
these devices, particularly in the national capital region. However, we 
do know that foreign actors have access to and have used these devices.
  It is imperative that our intelligence community, with the relevant 
agencies and private industry partners, undertake an effort to 
neutralize unauthorized IMSI catchers.
  Mr. Chair, I urge support of this amendment, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Stewart).
  The amendment was agreed to.


            Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Carson of Indiana

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 7__. PLAN FOR STRENGTHENING THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
                   INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National 
     Counterintelligence and Security Center, in coordination with 
     the Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security 
     Agency and other interagency partners, shall submit to 
     Congress a plan for strengthening the supply chain 
     intelligence function.
       (b) Elements.--The plan submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall address the following:
       (1) The appropriate workforce model, including size, mix, 
     and seniority, from the elements of the intelligence 
     community and other interagency partners.
       (2) The budgetary resources necessary to implement the 
     plan.
       (3) The appropriate governance structure within the 
     intelligence community and with interagency partners.
       (4) The authorities necessary to implement the plan.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Indiana (Mr. Carson) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Chair, first, I thank Chairman Schiff and 
Ranking Member Nunes for their work on the Intelligence Authorization 
Act this year. It is always a pleasure to serve under Chairman Schiff's 
leadership. Without it, the Intelligence Committee would not have been 
able to pass such a strong bill out of committee.
  I rise today, Mr. Chair, in support of an amendment that I have 
offered to the underlying bill text. This amendment will help the 
United States protect the integrity of its economic supply chain 
infrastructure. I am pleased that my good friend Representative Elise 
Stefanik has joined me in cosponsoring this amendment.
  Today, businesses and organizations in the United States face an 
array of distinct and stealthy threats. The American supply chain is 
under repeated attack from foreign intelligence services, cyber 
hackers, and sophisticated criminal enterprises.
  Unfortunately, experienced adversaries often exploit vulnerabilities 
in American companies' technological infrastructure or weak links in 
their organizational supply chain so that they can steal their 
intellectual property, co-opt equipment from suppliers, damage 
software, or conduct surveillance. Moving forward, we must be more 
vigilant to stop them.
  The Carson-Stefanik amendment, Mr. Chair, will guard against these 
grave concerns, and it will lead to stronger safeguards for the supply 
chain by mandating the National Counterintelligence and Security Center 
to produce a plan within 6 months to strengthen the supply chain 
intelligence function within the intelligence community.
  The plan, Mr. Chair, will identify personnel with the right expertise 
from the intelligence community workforce, outline budgetary and 
resource needs, and describe the necessary authorities and governance 
structure for future implementation of this plan.
  It will inform both the executive branch and Congress' efforts to 
enhance our defenses against exploitation of the supply chain.
  The United States remains one of the most technologically advanced 
economies in the world. Throughout the past century, America has 
enjoyed unprecedented economic growth because of the ingenuity of our 
people and the technological innovation that undergirds that 
entrepreneurial spirit.
  While that economic growth has not always been evenly distributed, 
and we are still wrestling with debates about economic inequality, 
surrendering our technological edge and innovative advantages to 
strategic rivals would pose a huge risk to America's future prosperity 
and security.
  I believe, Mr. Chair, it is very important to offer this amendment, 
recognizing the evolving and emerging threats to our Nation's supply 
chain infrastructure. In a very rapidly developing global economy, the 
intelligence community must work to safeguard the core of what America 
and her competitive strength is: economic, intellectual, and 
technological ingenuity.
  My amendment proactively works toward that goal, ensuring that we 
stay on top of those varying threats to our supply chain infrastructure 
that emanate from strategic rivals.
  In addition to this amendment, Mr. Chair, I would like to highlight 
another important part of the base bill. This year's Intelligence 
Authorization Act includes an entire section on domestic terrorism. It 
is important that we acknowledge domestic terrorism as a very serious 
threat, and we must do more than just talk about it as a societal 
problem. We must act.

[[Page H5889]]

  Domestic terrorism incidents in the U.S. are on the rise, fueled by 
hatred, stoked by fear, and inspired by dangerous rhetoric. At a time 
when this President is ignoring the truth about domestic terrorism, and 
his administration is concealing and hiding the proliferation of white 
supremacist-inspired incidents, Congress and the public urgently need 
more information to better understand and prevent domestic terrorism.
  Specifically, Mr. Chair, this bill would require the FBI, Department 
of Homeland Security, and NCTC to produce an annual report on domestic 
terrorism. With the reporting that is mandated in the underlying 
intelligence authorization bill, we can better determine how to change 
the law and make the necessary adjustments to procedures and to 
adequately shift current practices in order to fully address the threat 
of domestic terrorism and its root causes.
  Much of the report, Mr. Chair, would be made available to the public, 
increasing transparency, while the full report would be provided to 
oversight committees in greater detail. It would be valuable 
information and would require an annual strategic assessment on trends 
and patterns. Ultimately, it will dramatically expand the information 
on domestic terrorism available to Congress and the public.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Carson-Stefanik amendment and the 
underlying bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Carson).
  The amendment was agreed to.


              Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Hurd of Texas

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. HURD of Texas. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title V, add the following:

     SEC. 5__. ASSESSMENTS REGARDING THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE AND 
                   MEXICO.

       (a) Assessments of Activities by Drug Trafficking 
     Organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico.--
       (1) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in coordination with the Chief of Intelligence of the Drug 
     Enforcement Administration and the Assistant Secretary of 
     State for Intelligence and Research, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report containing an 
     analytical assessment of the activities of drug trafficking 
     organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico. Such 
     assessment shall include, at a minimum--
       (A) an assessment of the effect of drug trafficking 
     organizations on the security and economic situation in the 
     Northern Triangle;
       (B) an assessment of the effect of the activities of drug 
     trafficking organizations on the migration of persons from 
     the Northern Triangle to the United States-Mexico border;
       (C) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the 
     intelligence community in relation to drug trafficking 
     organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico;
       (D) a summary of key methods and routes used by drug 
     trafficking organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico 
     to the United States;
       (E) an assessment of the intersection between the 
     activities of drug trafficking organizations, human 
     traffickers and human smugglers, and other organized criminal 
     groups in the Northern Triangle and Mexico; and
       (F) an assessment of the illicit funds and financial 
     transactions that support the activities of drug trafficking 
     organizations and connected criminal enterprises in the 
     Northern Triangle and Mexico.
       (2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (2) may be 
     submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall 
     contain an unclassified summary.
       (3) Availability.--The report under paragraph (1), or the 
     unclassified summary of the report described in paragraph 
     (2), shall be made publicly available.
       (b) Assessment of Human Trafficking and Smuggling From the 
     Northern Triangle to the United States-Mexico Border.--
       (1) Report required.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of 
     Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the 
     Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report containing an analytical assessment of human 
     trafficking and human smuggling by individuals and 
     organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico. Such 
     assessment shall include, at a minimum--
       (A) an assessment of the effect of human trafficking and 
     human smuggling on the security and economic situation in the 
     Northern Triangle;
       (B) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the 
     intelligence community in relation to human trafficking and 
     human smuggling in the Northern Triangle and Mexico;
       (C) an assessment of the methods and routes used by human 
     traffickers and human smuggler organizations to move persons 
     from the Northern Triangle to the United States-Mexico 
     border;
       (D) an assessment of the intersection between the 
     activities of human traffickers and human smugglers, drug 
     trafficking organizations, and other organized criminal 
     groups in the Northern Triangle and Mexico; and
       (E) an assessment of the illicit funds and financial 
     transactions that support the activities of human traffickers 
     and human smugglers and connected criminal enterprises in the 
     Northern Triangle and Mexico.
       (2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) may be 
     submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall 
     contain an unclassified summary.
       (3) Availability.--The report under paragraph (1), or the 
     unclassified summary of the report described in paragraph 
     (2), shall be made publicly available.
       (c) Prioritization of Intelligence Resources for the 
     Northern Triangle and Mexico.--
       (1) Review of intelligence community efforts in northern 
     triangle and mexico.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
     in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
     for Intelligence and Analysis, the Assistant Secretary of 
     State for Intelligence and Research, the Chief of 
     Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and 
     other appropriate officials in the intelligence community, 
     shall carry out a comprehensive review of the current 
     intelligence collection priorities of the intelligence 
     community for the Northern Triangle and Mexico in order to 
     identify whether such priorities are appropriate and 
     sufficient in light of the threat posed by the activities of 
     drug trafficking organizations and human traffickers and 
     human smugglers to the security of the United States and the 
     Western Hemisphere.
       (2) Report and briefings.--
       (A) Report on initial review.--Not later than 120 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a comprehensive description of the 
     results of the review required by paragraph (1), including 
     whether the priorities described in that paragraph are 
     appropriate and sufficient in light of the threat posed by 
     the activities of drug trafficking organizations and human 
     traffickers and human smugglers to the security of the United 
     States and the Western Hemisphere. If the report concludes 
     that such priorities are not so appropriate and sufficient, 
     the report shall also include a description of the actions to 
     be taken to modify such priorities in order to assure that 
     such priorities are so appropriate and sufficient.
       (B) Quarterly briefings.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date on which the report under subparagraph (A) is submitted, 
     and every 90 days thereafter for a 5-year period, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the 
     intelligence community's collection priorities and activities 
     in the Northern Triangle and Mexico with a focus on the 
     threat posed by the activities of drug trafficking 
     organizations and human traffickers and human smugglers to 
     the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. 
     The first briefing under this subparagraph shall also include 
     a description of the amount of funds expended by the 
     intelligence community to the efforts described in paragraph 
     (1) during each of fiscal years 2018 and 2019.
       (3) Form.--The report and briefings required by paragraph 
     (2) may be submitted or provided in classified form, but if 
     so submitted or provided, shall include an unclassified 
     summary.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) Human trafficking.--The term ``human trafficking'' has 
     the meaning given the term ``severe forms of trafficking in 
     persons'' by section 103 of the Victims of Trafficking and 
     Violence Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102).
       (3) Northern triangle.--The term ``Northern Triangle'' 
     means El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Hurd) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. HURD of Texas. Mr. Chair, I am proud to join my good friend and 
fellow

[[Page H5890]]

former CIA officer, the gentlewoman from the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
to offer this bipartisan amendment that would direct the intelligence 
community to prioritize resources to address the humanitarian crisis at 
the border, in the Northern Triangle, and also in Mexico.
  I represent more of the southern border than any other Member of 
Congress. The root causes of this current crisis are violence, extreme 
poverty, and lack of economic opportunity in the Northern Triangle--El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
  Drug cartels, human traffickers, and human smugglers are making this 
crisis worse and putting innocent lives at risk. They profit while 
people in Central America suffer and entire nations are destabilized.
  Our intelligence community is not maximizing the use of our 
intelligence to deny and disrupt these operations.
  In June, we all know that 104,000 people were detained at our border. 
Almost every one of them had a phone number of a smuggler, a license 
plate of a bus that brought them here, or a pickup location in their 
home country.
  Understanding and disabling these smuggling and trafficking networks 
should be a national intelligence priority. This amendment would 
require the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a review of 
intelligence collection priorities in the Northern Triangle and Mexico 
and then provide quarterly briefings to Congress regarding the 
intelligence community activities in this region.
  These individuals and organizations threaten the security of the 
United States and the Western Hemisphere, and we should be using 
intelligence to stop them.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Ms. SPANBERGER. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment, 
although I am not opposed.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentlewoman from Virginia is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Ms. SPANBERGER. Mr. Chair, I am proud to introduce this amendment 
alongside my colleague, Congressman Hurd from Texas, who is also a 
former CIA case officer.
  Our bipartisan amendment, the Trafficking and Smuggling Intelligence 
Act, comes at a time of great hardship, violence, and heartbreak across 
Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries and at a time of crisis at 
our southern border.
  The volatility in our backyard should be cause for serious concern. 
Here in the United States, we have experienced the devastating effects 
of the drug trade on the health of our citizens. On our southwest 
border, we have witnessed how ongoing violence and instability in 
Central America is a driving factor for increased migration toward the 
United States.
  Our bipartisan amendment would require intelligence assessments of 
drug trafficking organizations, human trafficking organizations, and 
human smugglers across Mexico and the Northern Triangle.

                              {time}  1945

  These would include reports that could be released publicly to the 
American people.
  Our amendment would direct our public servants to use their expertise 
to better understand the root causes of violence, instability, and 
migration. With these improved assessments from DNI, we would be able 
to strengthen our national security in the face of threats from 
traffickers, smugglers, and other criminal organizations.
  Like so many of our colleagues, Congressman Hurd and I recognize that 
if we are to keep Americans safe while also responsibly addressing the 
situation at the border, we must address the conditions at the core of 
the instability we are seeing in Central America.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join 
us in supporting this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. HURD of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to working on 
more pieces of legislation with my friend from the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, and I want to thank both of the gentlemen from California and 
their teams for helping us perfect this to get this important piece of 
legislation onto the floor.
  Again, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hurd).
  The amendment was agreed to.


         Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Thompson of Mississippi

  The Acting CHAIR (Ms. Spanberger). It is now in order to consider 
amendment No. 5 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the 
desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 62, after line 4 insert the following:
       (6) Applicable Federal requirements and compliance by the 
     Federal Government with privacy, civil rights, and civil 
     liberties policies and protections with respect to the 
     production of the report, including protections against the 
     public release of names or other personally identifiable 
     information of individuals involved in incidents, 
     investigations, indictments, prosecutions, or convictions for 
     which data is reported under this section.
       Page 62, after line 16 insert the following (and 
     redesignate the succeeding clauses):
       (ii) the date and location of such incident;
       Page 65, line 18, strike ``and'' at the end.
       Page 66, line 9, strike the period at the end and insert 
     ``; and''.
       Page 66, after line 9 insert the following:
       (ix) with respect to the Office of Intelligence and 
     Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security, the number 
     of staff (expressed in terms of full-time equivalents and 
     positions) working on matters relating to domestic terrorism 
     described in clauses (i) through (vi).
       Page 69, after line 7 insert the following:
       (h) Information Quality.--Each report submitted under 
     subsection (a), to the extent applicable, shall comply with 
     the guidelines issued by the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget pursuant to section 515 of title V of 
     the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 (Public Law 106-
     554; 114 Stat. 2763A-154).

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson) and a Member opposed each will control 
5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as 
I may consume.
  Madam Chair, I rise to offer an amendment to title VI of H.R. 3494 
titled Federal Efforts Against Domestic Terrorism. I am pleased to see 
that this title was significantly informed by my bill, H.R. 3106, the 
Domestic Terrorism DATA Act which the Homeland Security Committee will 
be considering tomorrow.
  I am glad to have the opportunity to work with Chairman Schiff and 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on this text.
  My legislation, which requires the government to produce an annual 
domestic terrorism report, was the product of more than 5 months of 
engagement with outside stakeholders and experts. As a result of that 
consultation process, I included protections for civil rights, civil 
liberties, privacy, and data quality in my bill. These provisions made 
my bill stronger. My amendment to H.R. 3494 would require that these 
very protections are included.
  Madam Chair, my amendment also requires additional information be 
included in the government's domestic terrorism report. Requiring the 
date and location of each incident of terrorism or investigation of 
terrorism will help Congress and the public better understand the 
landscape of domestic terrorism.
  Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support my amendment, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I was going to request the chairman yield me 
1 minute of time.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  The Acting CHAIR (Mrs. Dingell). Does the gentleman seek unanimous 
consent to reclaim his time?
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Yes.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Mississippi 
is recognized for the balance of his time.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I yield such time as he may 
consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).

[[Page H5891]]

  

  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, this amendment clarifies section 602 of the 
bill dealing with domestic terrorism. This section would require the 
FBI, DHS, and the National Counterterrorism Center to produce an annual 
report and joint strategic intelligence assessment on domestic 
terrorism.
  Chairman Thompson's amendment would add safeguards to protect the 
civil liberties and privacy of individuals whose information would be 
contained in the report and mandate compliance with the Data Quality 
Act.
  It also would require DHS to disclose information on the allocation 
of personnel working domestic terrorism matters, enhancing oversight in 
this area.
  I would like to recognize Chairman Thompson for his work that the 
House Homeland Security Committee has done on the issue of domestic 
terrorism. Together we will continue our lines of effort to address 
this significant threat.
  Once again, Madam Chair, I thank my colleague for his work, and I 
urge support for the amendment.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of 
my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson).
  The amendment was agreed to.


              Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Ruppersberger

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 7___. SECURING ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of 
     the Senate; and
       (C) the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on 
     Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means an 
     entity identified pursuant to section 9(a) of Executive Order 
     13636 of February 12, 2013 (78 Fed. Reg. 11742), relating to 
     identification of critical infrastructure where a 
     cybersecurity incident could reasonably result in 
     catastrophic regional or national effects on public health or 
     safety, economic security, or national security.
       (3) Exploit.--The term ``exploit'' means a software tool 
     designed to take advantage of a security vulnerability.
       (4) Industrial control system.--The term ``industrial 
     control system'' means an operational technology used to 
     measure, control, or manage industrial functions, and 
     includes supervisory control and data acquisition systems, 
     distributed control systems, and programmable logic or 
     embedded controllers.
       (5) National laboratory.--The term ``National Laboratory'' 
     has the meaning given the term in section 2 of the Energy 
     Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).
       (6) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the pilot program 
     established under subsection (b).
       (7) Secretary.--Except as otherwise specifically provided, 
     the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Energy.
       (8) Security vulnerability.--The term ``security 
     vulnerability'' means any attribute of hardware, software, 
     process, or procedure that could enable or facilitate the 
     defeat of a security control.
       (b) Pilot Program for Securing Energy Infrastructure.--Not 
     later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary shall establish a 2-year control systems 
     implementation pilot program within the National Laboratories 
     for the purposes of--
       (1) partnering with covered entities in the energy sector 
     (including critical component manufacturers in the supply 
     chain) that voluntarily participate in the Program to 
     identify new classes of security vulnerabilities of the 
     covered entities; and
       (2) evaluating technology and standards, in partnership 
     with covered entities, to isolate and defend industrial 
     control systems of covered entities from security 
     vulnerabilities and exploits in the most critical systems of 
     the covered entities, including--
       (A) analog and nondigital control systems;
       (B) purpose-built control systems; and
       (C) physical controls.
       (c) Working Group to Evaluate Program Standards and Develop 
     Strategy.--
       (1) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish a working 
     group--
       (A) to evaluate the technology and standards used in the 
     Program under subsection (b)(2); and
       (B) to develop a national cyber-informed engineering 
     strategy to isolate and defend covered entities from security 
     vulnerabilities and exploits in the most critical systems of 
     the covered entities.
       (2) Membership.--The working group established under 
     paragraph (1) shall be composed of not fewer than 10 members, 
     to be appointed by the Secretary, at least 1 member of which 
     shall represent each of the following:
       (A) The Department of Energy.
       (B) The energy industry, including electric utilities and 
     manufacturers recommended by the Energy Sector coordinating 
     councils.
       (C)(i) The Department of Homeland Security; or
       (ii) the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency 
     Response Team.
       (D) The North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
       (E) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
       (F)(i) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 
     or
       (ii) the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
       (G)(i) The Department of Defense; or
       (ii) the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
     Security and America's Security Affairs.
       (H) A State or regional energy agency.
       (I) A national research body or academic institution.
       (J) The National Laboratories.
       (d) Reports on the Program.--
       (1) Interim report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     on which funds are first disbursed under the Program, the 
     Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees an interim report that--
       (A) describes the results of the Program;
       (B) includes an analysis of the feasibility of each method 
     studied under the Program; and
       (C) describes the results of the evaluations conducted by 
     the working group established under subsection (c)(1).
       (2) Final report.--Not later than 2 years after the date on 
     which funds are first disbursed under the Program, the 
     Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a final report that--
       (A) describes the results of the Program;
       (B) includes an analysis of the feasibility of each method 
     studied under the Program; and
       (C) describes the results of the evaluations conducted by 
     the working group established under subsection (c)(1).
       (e) Exemption From Disclosure.--Information shared by or 
     with the Federal Government or a State, Tribal, or local 
     government under this section--
       (1) shall be deemed to be voluntarily shared information;
       (2) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of 
     title 5, United States Code, or any provision of any State, 
     Tribal, or local freedom of information law, open government 
     law, open meetings law, open records law, sunshine law, or 
     similar law requiring the disclosure of information or 
     records; and
       (3) shall be withheld from the public, without discretion, 
     under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code, and 
     any provision of any State, Tribal, or local law requiring 
     the disclosure of information or records.
       (f) Protection From Liability.--
       (1) In general.--A cause of action against a covered entity 
     for engaging in the voluntary activities authorized under 
     subsection (b)--
       (A) shall not lie or be maintained in any court; and
       (B) shall be promptly dismissed by the applicable court.
       (2) Voluntary activities.--Nothing in this section subjects 
     any covered entity to liability for not engaging in the 
     voluntary activities authorized under subsection (b).
       (g) No New Regulatory Authority for Federal Agencies.--
     Nothing in this section authorizes the Secretary or the head 
     of any other department or agency of the Federal Government 
     to issue new regulations.
       (h) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) Pilot program.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
     $10,000,000 to carry out subsection (b).
       (2) Working group and report.--There is authorized to be 
     appropriated $1,500,000 to carry out subsections (c) and (d).
       (3) Availability.--Amounts made available under paragraphs 
     (1) and (2) shall remain available until expended.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Chair, I rise today in strong support of my amendment to 
protect the energy grid from cybersecurity threats.
  In the 4 years since the Ukraine power grid attack, our enemies have 
doubled down on their effort to target cybersecurity vulnerabilities in 
our

[[Page H5892]]

Nation's energy infrastructure, especially within industrial control 
systems. The 2015 Ukraine grid intrusion orchestrated by the Russians 
was a turning point in industrial cybersecurity. For the first time, 
hackers penetrated industrial controls of a power plant with the goal 
of causing widespread disruption.
  Both the security and economic consequences of a destructive attack 
on our energy grid cannot be overstated. We can no longer wait to 
address these threats. My amendment will ensure we continue to develop 
the ability to both discover vulnerabilities and keep an eye on 
emerging threats that could disrupt electricity generation or even cost 
lives.
  I want to thank our government partners, including the Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, the intelligence community, 
the Department of Energy, and national labs. I look forward to working 
with all these stakeholders to ensure that we are implementing grid 
security measures in a responsible way consistent with existing law and 
authorities. As a member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on 
Appropriations, I fully intend to help leverage the authorization in 
this amendment to supplement the already great effort underway at CISA 
and other government agencies.
  Also I want to thank the many talented computer scientists, 
cybersecurity experts, and engineers from the private sector, 
especially the team at Dragos, a cybersecurity firm focused on 
industrial controls, located in my district in Hanover, Maryland, for 
all the hard work they do in this space to not only defend against 
threats but to educate others.
  Our amendment is simple and mirrors language already passed by the 
overwhelming bipartisan majority in the Senate's Intelligence 
Authorization Act. Senator King from Maine has been a stalwart force on 
this issue, and none of this would have happened without his 
determination and vision on this issue.
  The amendment sets up a 2-year pilot program to identify the classes 
of security vulnerabilities in the grid. It establishes a working group 
to evaluate the technology solutions proposed by the pilot program. The 
working group would include government agencies, the energy industry, 
and other experts.
  Lastly, it requires the Department of Energy to submit a report to 
the relevant congressional committees describing the results of the 
program.
  Finally, I want to thank Judge Carter from Texas who has led the 
charge on this issue with me in the House since last Congress. Judge 
Carter is a good friend, and I appreciate his help on this important 
issue.
  Madam Chair, this amendment will help the intelligence community and 
the government at large better understand the vulnerabilities to 
certain aspects of our energy grid.
  Madam Chair, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Schiff), who is the distinguished chairman of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I rise in strong support of the amendment offered by my colleagues 
from Maryland and Texas which mirrors language passed in the Senate's 
intelligence authorization bill last month. This provision would bring 
together government entities and the energy sector in a pilot program 
for purposes of evaluating and strengthening industrial control systems 
and related critical infrastructure elements against security 
vulnerabilities and exploits.
  The cyber threats faced by our critical infrastructure remain a 
persistent national security concern, as the former ranking member of 
our committee, the distinguished Mr. Ruppersberger, knows all too well. 
DNI Coats likewise warned in the most recent unclassified Worldwide 
Threat Assessment about the capabilities of our adversaries to hold 
U.S. critical infrastructure at risk.
  This measure is another line of effort toward securing that 
infrastructure against outside cyberattacks and disruptions, and I am 
very proud to support the work of my colleague and friend.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield such time as he may consume 
to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter).
  Mr. CARTER of Texas. Madam Chair, I thank my friend for yielding.
  Madam Chair, today I rise in strong support of the Ruppersberger-
Carter amendment to help secure the energy infrastructure. Now is the 
time to address electrical grid security. Grid attacks are a powerful 
weapon in the cyber toolkit of really bad actors.
  As the two previous speakers said, a cyberattack in Ukraine wiped out 
their power grid, and over 225,000 people were without power. The 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence in their 2019 Worldwide 
Threat Assessment makes numerous mentions of our adversaries' mapping 
out grid systems, identifying our weaknesses, and developing the very 
real and deadly capacity to attack our grid system. A targeted attack 
on our Nation could be devastating.
  Securing our energy infrastructure is especially critical in Texas 
which maintains an independent electric grid.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman from Maryland has 
expired.
  Mr. CARTER of Texas. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to 
the amendment, although I do not oppose the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Texas is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CARTER of Texas. Madam Chair, the Electric Reliability Council of 
Texas is located in Taylor, Texas, which is about 19 miles from my 
house, and it manages 90 percent of my home State's electrical load. 
Understanding where our system's weak spots are will enhance ERCOT's 
work to ensure that we have the most stable and secure energy network 
in the world.
  Our amendment addresses the serious topic of electrical grid security 
by leveraging the unique aspects of national laboratories to establish 
solutions to defend the United States energy grid from attacks and to 
ensure the resiliency of operation during and after an event.
  It establishes a 2-year pilot program to study and identify new 
classes of security vulnerabilities, and research and test technologies 
that could be used to isolate the most critical systems from 
cyberattacks.
  It creates working groups to develop a national cyber-informed 
strategy to protect our energy grids.
  This amendment is a commonsense approach to solving grid security. I 
am proud to work across the aisle with my good friend and colleague, 
Dutch Ruppersberger, on this important issue.
  Madam Chair, I urge support of this amendment, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
  The amendment was agreed to.

                              {time}  2000


                 Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Chabot

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:
       Page 35, strike line 4 through page 42, line 5.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Chabot) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I rise this evening to offer a commonsense 
amendment to H.R. 3494.
  My amendment simply strikes Section 401, which creates the Climate 
Security Advisory Council. And I thank the gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Duncan) for his leadership, and also cosponsoring this 
particular amendment.
  This council is not the most responsible use of the valuable manpower 
and funding of the intelligence community, especially since the 
Director of National Intelligence did not even request that we create 
such an organization. The Federal Government already has vast resources 
devoted to the climate issue.
  Any climate security intelligence work should be in the context of 
larger intelligence matters affecting major regions around the world 
and the U.S. national security infrastructure.

[[Page H5893]]

  Additionally, many of the existing intelligence organizations already 
do much of this work on their own, including the CIA. Section 401 would 
just create unneeded redundancy across the intelligence community.
  If the goal is to ensure that we allocate our resources efficiently, 
we should instead require a report to Congress from the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence outlining the necessity for the 
Climate Security Council before Congress establishes the organization 
or appropriates any funding.
  Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. For what purpose does the gentleman--
  Mr. DUNCAN. Madam Chair, I rise in favor of the Chabot amendment.
  Our country faces serious threats around the globe. We have cyber 
threats coming from China, Russia, and Iran, and others. Iran is also 
pursuing nuclear weapons that threaten our friends and our ally, 
Israel, and indeed the rest of the world.
  While ISIS is defeated and on the run, radical islamic terrorism 
remains one of our Nation's greatest threats, thanks in part to Iran's 
actions as a leading state sponsor of terrorism.
  It is, therefore, extremely irresponsible to take our attention and 
resources off of these known and proven threats to American national 
security and divert those funds and attention to climate change.
  The intelligence community, which is tasked with protecting Americans 
from fiscal and cyberattacks, should not bear the burden of silly, 
politically correct, left-wing social policy. But just as Democrats 
politicized military policy with the NDAA, here they go again with the 
intelligence policy.
  That is a mistake, it is irresponsible, and that is why I support 
this amendment to strip out this silly idea and refocus the 
intelligence community on the actual threats to our national security.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has the only time 
remaining.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment and 
claim time in opposition, therefore.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time in opposition has already been claimed.
  Would the gentleman from Ohio yield to your colleague from--
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, may I inquire as to how much time I have 
remaining?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has 2\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Chair, I want to quote a great American President, Ronald 
Reagan.


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, may I make a parliamentary inquiry?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California will state his 
parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Did the Chair offer time in opposition to the amendment?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from South Carolina claimed the time.
  The Chair looked to see who was seeking recognition, and went to the 
gentleman who was standing.
  Mr. HECK. Madam Chair, I was standing when he was recognized. The 
gentleman from Ohio did not yield to him. And when he asked to claim 
time in opposition, he did not say ``although I am not opposed.'' And 
you did not, therefore, ask if there was no objection.
  He was not legitimately recognized.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman 
be granted 5 minutes in opposition, but I have a little time left.
  Madam Chair, I have no objection to the gentleman offering his 
opposition to this.
  The Acting CHAIR. That unanimous consent request cannot be 
entertained in the Committee of the Whole.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I am sorry. I couldn't hear the ruling of 
the Chair.
  The gentleman asked for unanimous consent.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Parliamentarian advised that the request cannot 
be entertained in the Committee of the Whole.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, well, if my colleagues in the minority--I 
don't know how much time they have both on the amendment and on the 
time in opposition to the amendment--but if they can yield to my 
colleague to make sure that he has time for his remarks out of both of 
their time, I think we can resolve this.
  Mr. CHABOT. There is 2\1/2\ minutes left. Is that correct?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has 2\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, the gentleman offering the amendment has how 
much time? Because they claimed both the time on the amendment--
  The Acting CHAIR. The proponent of the amendment has 2\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. SCHIFF. So no one claimed the time in opposition?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from South Carolina claimed the time 
and yielded back.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Okay. So there should be 5 minutes.
  Mr. HECK. He asked for time in opposition but did not state that he 
was not opposed.
  You did not ask if, therefore, there was no objection. He was not 
legitimately recognized.
  The offerer of the amendment did not yield to him. The gentleman from 
South Carolina claimed time in opposition but did not say ``although I 
am not opposed.'' He supported the amendment. And you did not ask if 
there was no objection.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman will suspend.
  The gentleman claimed the time, and then he yielded back his time.
  Mr. HECK. Madam Chair, you didn't ask if there was no objection, 
which is the customary practice.
  The Acting CHAIR. All time claimed by the gentleman from South 
Carolina has been yielded back.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I still have 2\1/2\ minutes, is that 
correct, because I reserved my time?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has the only time 
remaining.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I would like to make a unanimous consent 
request that there be an opposition that gets 5 minutes and that I can 
close with my 2\1/2\ minutes.
  We are trying to be fair here, and we are happy to give our 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle 5 minutes to offer their 
opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Parliamentarian advises that the request cannot 
be entertained in the Committee of the Whole.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Heck). I will just take 1 minute to wrap up.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I have 2\1/2\ minutes. Is that right?
  The Acting CHAIR. Yes. The gentleman is recognized.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Heck).
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman yields 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Washington?
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, 2 minutes in opposition.
  Mr. SCHIFF. If I could, Madam Chair, through the Chair to my 
colleague, I appreciate that. We will take you up on that. And on the 
next amendment that we have time, I will yield to my colleague, and 
your colleague may yield to you, if you have further comments you want 
to make on this issue.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I have 2\1/2\ minutes. I yield 1\1/2\ 
minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Heck). So I have 1 minute 
left.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman through the Chair.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Washington is recognized for 
1\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. HECK. Madam Chair, I thank very much the graciousness of the 
gentleman from Ohio, although I think his amendment is wrongheaded.
  Here is what is real:
  Climate change is real, number one.
  Number two, it has significant national security implications.
  Number three, the only smart thing to do is to borrow the old motto 
from the Boy Scouts, ``Be prepared.'' Passage of this amendment, which 
would remove the Climate Security Advisory Council, renders us less 
prepared.

[[Page H5894]]

  We all know that the intelligence community and the DOD have, time 
and again, assessed the measurable effects of climate change--rising 
sea levels, higher temperatures, more frequent extreme weather events, 
new stressors on natural resources and agriculture--have tangible 
impacts that exacerbate economic distress, human insecurity, political 
instability, and other humanitarian conditions detrimental to our 
national security.
  The smart thing to do is to be prepared, to have the advisory council 
that can work across the intelligence community, that can collect the 
information, coordinate the information, so that we know what is 
coming, we know what we are being presented with, and we can confront 
it in a smart way.
  Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to please defeat this amendment and 
pass the underlying bill.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I think I have 1 minute left.
  I thought perhaps the gentleman wanted to support my amendment, but 
he called it wrongheaded. I am just shocked.
  Madam Chair, in closing, this council is a redundant, unnecessary use 
of manpower funding. We need our intelligence community focused on the 
most critical threats facing our Nation, specifically, 
counterterrorism, Iran, China, Russia, North Korea.
  If this council is something that the Director of National 
Intelligence believes is critical to our country, he should come to 
Congress and make such a request, and to my knowledge, that has not 
occurred. Madam Chair, until he does, I urge my colleagues to support 
this amendment and remove this provision from the bill.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. All time for debate has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Chabot).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio will be 
postponed.


                 Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Schiff

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I rise to offer this amendment as the 
designee of Representative Green of Texas and Representative Connolly.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 7__. COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION OF 
                   WORKFORCE DATA.

       (a) Initial Reporting.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and subject to paragraph (3), the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the 
     public, the appropriate congressional committees, and the 
     workforce of the intelligence community a report which 
     includes aggregate demographic data and other information 
     regarding the diversity and inclusion efforts of the 
     workforce of the intelligence community.
       (2) Contents.--A report made available under paragraph 
     (1)--
       (A) shall include unclassified reports and barrier analyses 
     relating to diversity and inclusion efforts;
       (B) shall include aggregate demographic data--
       (i) by segment of the workforce of the intelligence 
     community and grade or rank;
       (ii) relating to attrition and promotion rates;
       (iii) that addresses the compliance of the intelligence 
     community with validated inclusion metrics, such as the New 
     Inclusion Quotient index score; and
       (iv) that provides demographic comparisons to the relevant 
     nongovernmental labor force and the relevant civilian labor 
     force;
       (C) shall include an analysis of applicant flow data, 
     including the percentage and level of positions for which 
     data are collected, and a discussion of any resulting policy 
     changes or recommendations;
       (D) shall include demographic data relating to participants 
     in professional development programs of the intelligence 
     community and the rate of placement into senior positions for 
     participants in such programs;
       (E) shall include any voluntarily collected demographic 
     data relating to the membership of any external advisory 
     committee or board to which individuals in senior positions 
     in the intelligence community appoint members; and
       (F) may include data in proportions or percentages to 
     account for concerns relating to the protection of classified 
     information.
       (b) Updates.--After making available a report under 
     subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     annually provide a report (which may be provided as part of 
     an annual report required under another provision of law) to 
     the workforce of the intelligence community (including senior 
     leadership), the public, and the appropriate congressional 
     committees that includes--
       (1) demographic data and information on the status of 
     diversity and inclusion efforts of the intelligence 
     community;
       (2) an analysis of applicant flow data, including the 
     percentage and level of positions for which data are 
     collected, and a discussion of any resulting policy changes 
     or recommendations; and
       (3) demographic data relating to participants in 
     professional development programs of the intelligence 
     community and the rate of placement into senior positions for 
     participants in such programs.
       (c) Expand the Collection and Analysis of Voluntary 
     Applicant Flow Data.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall develop a system to collect and analyze applicant flow 
     data for as many positions within the intelligence community 
     as practicable, in order to identify areas for improvement in 
     attracting diverse talent, with particular attention to 
     senior and management positions.
       (2) Phased implementation.--The collection of applicant 
     flow data may be implemented by the Director of National 
     Intelligence in a phased approach commensurate with the 
     resources available to the intelligence community.
       (d) Identify Additional Categories for Voluntary Data 
     Collection of Current Employees.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence may 
     submit to the Office of Management and Budget and to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a recommendation 
     regarding whether the intelligence community should 
     voluntarily collect more detailed data on demographic 
     categories in addition to the race and ethnicity categories 
     specified in the statistical policy directive issued by the 
     Office of Management and Budget entitled ``Standards for 
     Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race 
     and Ethnicity''.
       (2) Process.--In making a recommendation under paragraph 
     (1), the Director of National Intelligence shall--
       (A) engage in close consultation with internal 
     stakeholders, such as employee resource or affinity groups;
       (B) ensure that there is clear communication with the 
     workforce of the intelligence community--
       (i) to explain the purpose of the potential collection of 
     such data; and
       (ii) regarding legal protections relating to any 
     anticipated use of such data; and
       (C) ensure adherence to relevant standards and guidance 
     issued by the Federal Government.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Applicant flow data.--The term ``applicant flow data'' 
     means data that tracks the rate of applications for job 
     positions among demographic categories.
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs, the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
     and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee 
     on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
       (3) Diversity.--The term ``diversity'' means diversity of 
     persons based on gender, race, ethnicity, disability status, 
     veteran status, sexual orientation, gender identity, national 
     origin, and other demographic categories.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I am happy to support the amendment offered 
by Representative Green and Representative Connolly, which would 
require the Director of National Intelligence to make publicly 
available its annual report that aggregates demographic data and other 
information regarding the diversity and inclusion efforts within the 
intelligence community.
  The amendment would expand the elements that the DNI must report on 
to include grade-level attrition and promotion rates, as well as 
validated metrics, such as New Inclusion Quotient Index scores.
  The IQ initiative is designed to help employees and managers foster 
diversity and inclusion in the workplace.

[[Page H5895]]

This amendment is important as we strive to significantly improve 
hiring and retention in the IC such that the workforce mirrors the 
American population. It is imperative that we have better visibility 
into the demographics of our current workforce to legislate well-
informed change.
  Again, I thank my colleagues for their work, and I am happy to 
support the amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Case

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. CASE. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows
       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 708. REPORT ON BEST PRACTICES TO PROTECT PRIVACY AND 
                   CIVIL LIBERTIES OF CHINESE AMERICANS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the People's Republic of China appears to be 
     specifically targeting the Chinese-American community for 
     intelligence purposes;
       (2) such targeting carries a substantial risk that the 
     loyalty of such Americans may be generally questioned and 
     lead to unacceptable stereotyping, targeting and racial 
     profiling;
       (3) the United States Government has a duty to warn and 
     protect all Americans including those of Chinese descent from 
     these intelligence efforts by the People's Republic of China;
       (4) the broad stereotyping, targeting and racial profiling 
     of Americans of Chinese descent is contrary to the values of 
     the United States and reinforces the flawed narrative 
     perpetuated by the People's Republic of China that ethnically 
     Chinese individuals worldwide have a duty to support the 
     People's Republic of China; and
       (5) the United States efforts to combat the People's 
     Republic of China's intelligence activities should actively 
     safeguard and promote the constitutional rights of all 
     Chinese Americans.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     acting through the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and 
     Transparency, in coordination with the civil liberties and 
     privacy officers of the elements of the intelligence 
     community, shall submit a report to the congressional 
     intelligence committees containing--
       (1) a review of how the policies, procedures, and practices 
     of the intelligence community that govern the intelligence 
     activities and operations targeting the People's Republic of 
     China affect policies, procedures, and practices relating to 
     the privacy and civil liberties of Americans of Chinese 
     descent who may be targets of espionage and influence 
     operations by China; and
       (2) recommendations to ensure that the privacy and civil 
     liberties of Americans of Chinese descent are sufficiently 
     protected.
       (c) Form.--The report under subsection (b) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Hawaii (Mr. Case) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Hawaii.
  Mr. CASE. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Chair, not far from here, on the slopes of Capitol Hill, is a 
small, serene, and unassuming memorial. On its walls are names not now 
known to too many Americans but indelibly etched in a dark chapter of 
our national story.
  Tule Lake, Poston, Manzanar--these are the internment camps where 
120,000 ethnic Japanese, most of them American citizens, were locked up 
in the hysteria of the Second World War just because they were 
Japanese.
  This amendment, proudly sponsored by many of my colleagues in our 
Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus, including our chair, the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Judy Chu), asked us a question that 
must be asked: Are we repeating history or in danger of doing so?

                              {time}  2015

  In these recent years of justifiably heightened scrutiny on the 
intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China, a 
disproportionate number of Americans of Chinese descent have been 
investigated and prosecuted for espionage.
  Those convicted have received disproportionately high sentences, and 
the too many exonerated have had their careers ruined nonetheless.
  No doubt, China seeks to recruit Chinese Americans to its goals, and 
no doubt, our government should and must review specific cases of 
potential espionage by China on specific facts. But have we fallen into 
the same trap all over again of justifying investigations and other 
actions toward the ends of national security by means of general 
profiling and targeting based solely on ethnic identity?
  The Committee of 100, a group of prominent Chinese Americans in 
diverse fields, reviewed the empirical evidence and concluded that 
``Asian Americans, whether immigrant or native-born, may be facing 
unfair and increasing racial prejudice in this era of geopolitical 
competition.''
  It stated, and I believe correctly: ``A definite line can be drawn 
between appropriate prosecution that is based on actual evidence and 
free of bias and overreaching persecution that is triggered by 
unfounded suspicions and tainted by racial prejudice. All Americans, 
regardless of ethnicity, depend on that line.''
  This resolution is a flashing red light to our intelligence 
community: Stop, look, and listen. Take some time to think it through 
to be sure you are staying on the right side of that line, and then 
report back to us here in Congress that you have done so and have the 
procedures and mindset in place to ensure that we won't repeat history 
with Chinese Americans or any other broad ethnic or interest group.
  Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Schiff), the committee chair.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I strongly support the amendment. This amendment expresses the sense 
of Congress that racial profiling of Americans of Chinese descent is 
contrary to the values of the United States and reinforces flawed 
narratives perpetuated by the People's Republic of China that 
ethnically Chinese individuals worldwide have a duty to support the 
People's Republic of China.
  Moreover, the amendment reaffirms that the United States Government 
has a duty to warn and protect all Americans, including those of 
Chinese descent, from intelligence operations executed by the People's 
Republic of China.
  Finally, the amendment requires the ODNI Office of Civil Liberties, 
Privacy, and Transparency, in coordination with civil liberties and 
privacy officers throughout the intelligence community, to submit a 
report to the congressional intelligence committees. This report would 
review how the intelligence community policies that govern 
counterintelligence operations against China impact the civil liberties 
of Americans of Chinese descent who are the targets of Chinese 
espionage and provide recommendations to preserve these liberties and 
privacy interests.
  Mr. Case's important amendment reaffirms that Americans of all 
backgrounds deserve equal protection under the law and reminds our 
intelligence community of its duty to protect the privacy and civil 
liberties of all persons.
  Madam Chair, again, I thank my colleague for his work, and I strongly 
support the amendment.
  Mr. CASE. Madam Chair, I strongly urge adoption of this amendment. It 
is the right amendment. We certainly want our intelligence community to 
do its job, but we also want them to be very conscious of the decisions 
that they are making and are in line with our basic civil liberties.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Case).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 10 Offered by Ms. Frankel

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Ms. FRANKEL. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows
       At the end of title VII, add the follow new section:

[[Page H5896]]

  


     SEC. 708. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
                   WOMEN AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the head of 
     any element of the intelligence community the Director 
     determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees an intelligence assessment on the 
     relationship between women and violent extremism and 
     terrorism throughout the world, including an assessment of--
       (1) the historical trends and current state of women's 
     varied roles worldwide in all aspects of violent extremism 
     and terrorism, including as recruiters, sympathizers, 
     perpetrators, and combatants, as well as peace-builders and 
     preventers;
       (2) how women's roles in all aspects of violent extremism 
     and terrorism are likely to change in the near- and medium-
     term;
       (3) the extent to which the unequal status of women affects 
     the ability of armed combatants and terrorist groups to 
     enlist or conscript women as combatants and perpetrators of 
     violence;
       (4) how terrorist groups violate the rights of women and 
     girls, including child, early, and forced marriage, 
     abduction, sexual violence, and human trafficking, and the 
     extent to which such violations contribute to the spread of 
     conflict and terrorist activities; and
       (5) opportunities to address the security risk posed by 
     female extremists and leverage the roles of women in 
     counterterrorism efforts.
       (b) Form.--The assessment required under subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services, of 
     the Senate; and
       (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed 
     Services, of the House of Representatives.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman 
from Florida (Ms. Frankel) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
  Ms. FRANKEL. Madam Chair, this amendment takes an important step 
toward fighting terrorism. It would require the Director of National 
Intelligence to submit an intelligence assessment on the relationship 
between women and violent extremism and terrorism.
  Madam Chair, to prevent ISIS 2.0 and to improve U.S. counterterrorism 
and peace-building efforts, we need to pay more attention to the roles 
that women play in violent extremism, including as victims, as 
perpetrators, and as preventers.
  First, as victims, women are often the first targets of terrorism. We 
have seen it with the abduction and rape of thousands of women and 
girls by ISIS, the kidnapping of hundreds of girls by Boko Haram in 
Nigeria, and the attack of girls just trying to go to school by the 
Taliban.
  Secondly, Madam Chair, women are not only the victims of terrorism. 
Some are perpetrators. Recent research shows that women are turning to 
terror organizations because of false promises of protection, escape 
from abuse at home, and even, believe it or not, for leadership 
opportunities. As a result, women-led attacks are rising. In fact, now, 
20 to 30 percent of foreign terrorist fighters are women. In sub-
Saharan Africa alone, three out of four child suicide bombers are 
girls.
  Madam Chair, women are not only victims and perpetrators of 
terrorism. They are also preventers, as mothers, wives, and daughters. 
They influence their spouses and children. They are on the front line 
of detecting early signs of radicalization in their families and 
communities.
  Madam Chair, because of gender inequality, their warnings are often 
ignored.
  Let me give you an example. Afghan women saw young men being 
recruited at a wedding, and they shared their concerns with law 
enforcement. They were dismissed. Later, those same recruits went on to 
kill 32 people in a bus attack.
  I conclude, Madam Chair, by saying that understanding women's unique 
roles in terrorism is important to creating more peaceful communities 
around the world, which results in more security for the United States 
of America.
  Madam Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to support this very 
important amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Frankel).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Kennedy

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I wish to speak on behalf of the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title IV add the following new section:

     SEC. 403. FOREIGN THREAT RESPONSE CENTER.

       (a) Establishment.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
     119B the following new section:

     ``SEC. 119C. FOREIGN THREAT RESPONSE CENTER.

       ``(a) Establishment.--There is within the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence a Foreign Threat Response 
     Center (in this section referred to as the `Center').
       ``(b) Mission.--The primary missions of the Center shall be 
     as follows:
       ``(1) To serve as the primary organization in the United 
     States Government for analyzing and integrating all 
     intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States 
     Government pertaining to foreign threats.
       ``(2) To synchronize the efforts of the intelligence 
     community with respect to countering foreign efforts to 
     undermine the national security, political sovereignty, and 
     economic activity of the United States and the allies of the 
     United States, including by--
       ``(A) ensuring that each such element is aware of and 
     coordinating on such efforts; and
       ``(B) overseeing the development and implementation of 
     comprehensive and integrated policy responses to such 
     efforts.
       ``(3) In coordination with the relevant elements of the 
     Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence community, and 
     other departments and agencies of the United States--
       ``(A) to develop policy recommendations for the President 
     to detect, deter, and respond to foreign threats, including 
     with respect to covert activities pursuant to section 503; 
     and
       ``(B) to monitor and assess foreign efforts to carry out 
     such threats.
       ``(4) In coordination with the head of the Global 
     Engagement Center established by section 1287 of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 
     114-328), to examine current and emerging foreign efforts to 
     use propaganda and information operations relating to the 
     threats described in paragraph (1).
       ``(5) To identify and close gaps across the departments and 
     agencies of the Federal Government with respect to expertise, 
     readiness, and planning to address foreign threats.
       ``(c) Director.--
       ``(1) Appointment.--There is a Director of the Center, who 
     shall be the head of the Center, and who shall be appointed 
     by the Director of National Intelligence, with the 
     concurrence of the Secretary of State. The Director may not 
     simultaneously serve in any other capacity in the executive 
     branch.
       ``(2) Reporting.--The Director of the Center shall directly 
     report to the Director of National Intelligence.
       ``(3) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Center shall--
       ``(A) ensure that the relevant departments and agencies of 
     the Federal Government participate in the mission of the 
     Center, including by recruiting detailees from such 
     departments and agencies in accordance with subsection 
     (e)(1); and
       ``(B) have primary responsibility within the United States 
     Government, in coordination with the Director of National 
     Intelligence, for establishing requirements for the 
     collection of intelligence related to, or regarding, foreign 
     threats, in accordance with applicable provisions of law and 
     Executive orders.
       ``(d) Annual Reports.--
       ``(1) In general.--At the direction of the Director of 
     National Intelligence, but not less than once each year, the 
     Director of the Center shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on foreign threats.
       ``(2) Matters included.--Each report under paragraph (1) 
     shall include, with respect to the period covered by the 
     report, a discussion of the following:
       ``(A) The nature of the foreign threats.
       ``(B) The ability of the United States Government to 
     address such threats.
       ``(C) The progress of the Center in achieving its missions.
       ``(D) Recommendations the Director determines necessary for 
     legislative actions to improve the ability of the Center to 
     achieve its missions.
       ``(3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       ``(e) Employees.--

[[Page H5897]]

       ``(1) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be 
     detailed to the Center on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable 
     basis, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss 
     of civil service status or privilege for a period of not more 
     than 8 years.
       ``(2) Personal service contractors.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     State, may hire United States citizens or aliens as personal 
     services contractors for purposes of personnel resources of 
     the Center, if--
       ``(A) the Director of National Intelligence determines that 
     existing personnel resources are insufficient;
       ``(B) the period in which services are provided by a 
     personal services contractor, including options, does not 
     exceed 3 years, unless the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines that exceptional circumstances justify an 
     extension of up to 1 additional year;
       ``(C) not more than 10 United States citizens or aliens are 
     employed as personal services contractors under the authority 
     of this paragraph at any time; and
       ``(D) the authority of this paragraph is only used to 
     obtain specialized skills or experience or to respond to 
     urgent needs.
       ``(3) Security clearances.--Each employee detailed to the 
     Center and contractor of the Center shall have the security 
     clearance appropriate for the assigned duties of the employee 
     or contractor.
       ``(f) Board.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--There is established a Board of the 
     Foreign Threat Response Center (in this section referred to 
     as the `Board').
       ``(2) Functions.--The Board shall conduct oversight of the 
     Center to ensure the Center is achieving the missions of the 
     Center. In conducting such oversight, upon a majority vote of 
     the members of the Board, the Board may recommend to the 
     Director of National Intelligence that the Director of the 
     Center should be removed for failing to achieve such 
     missions.
       ``(3) Membership.--
       ``(A) Appointment.--The Board shall consist of 7 members. 
     The head of each department or agency of the Federal 
     Government specified in subparagraph (B) shall appoint a 
     senior official from that department or agency, who shall be 
     a member of the Senior Executive Service, as a member.
       ``(B) Departments and agencies represented.--The department 
     or agency of the Federal Government specified in this 
     subparagraph are the following:
       ``(i) The Department of State.
       ``(ii) The Department of Defense.
       ``(iii) The Department of Justice.
       ``(iv) The Department of the Treasury.
       ``(v) The Department of Homeland Security.
       ``(vi) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       ``(vii) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       ``(4) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than 
     biannually and shall be convened by the member appointed by 
     the Secretary of State.
       ``(g) International Engagement.--The Director of the Center 
     may convene biannual conferences to coordinate international 
     efforts against foreign threats.
       ``(h) Termination.--The Center shall terminate on the date 
     that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this 
     section.
       ``(i) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--the term 
     `appropriate congressional committees' means--
       ``(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       ``(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
       ``(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee 
     on Armed Services of the Senate.
       ``(2) Foreign threats.--The term `foreign threats' means 
     efforts to influence, through overt or covert malign 
     activities, the national security, political sovereignty, or 
     economic activity of the United States or the allies of the 
     United States, made by the government of any of the following 
     foreign countries:
       ``(A) Russia.
       ``(B) Iran.
       ``(C) North Korea.
       ``(D) China.
       ``(E) Any other foreign country that the Director 
     determines appropriate for purposes of this section.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the 
     beginning of such Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 119B the following new item:

``Sec. 119C. Foreign Threat Response Center.''.

       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 507(a) of such Act (50 
     U.S.C. 3106) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(6) An annual report submitted under section 
     119C(d)(1).''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy) and a Member opposed each will control 
5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I begin by thanking the chairman of the 
committee and his staff for their dedication to getting this amendment 
here today and for their long and strong defense of our electoral 
system from foreign interference.
  Madam Chair, a few weeks ago, Special Counsel Robert Mueller stood 
before the American people and issued a stern warning and an ominous 
challenge. In what he referred to as the central allegation of his 2-
year-long investigation, he told us that there were ``multiple, 
systemic efforts to interfere in our election. That allegation deserves 
the attention of every American.''
  Our democracy was attacked, our government undermined, and our 
election system weakened. We were manipulated.
  A foreign adversary exposed many of our worst impulses as they 
hacked, prodded, forged, stole, lied, and exploited in a coordinated 
and sustained effort to change the trajectory of this country.
  We cannot change what happened in 2016, but we can learn from it 
because our adversaries certainly did. They watched as politicians were 
all too eager to use hacked material. They took notes as social media 
networks were used to inflame racial, geographic, and demographic 
divisions.
  According to the ``Worldwide Threat Assessment'' by the Director of 
National Intelligence, Dan Coats, Russia, China, and Iran already have 
their eyes trained on 2020.
  That is why we must proactively create a foreign threat response 
center tasked with identifying and rejecting any attempts by any 
adversary to influence our political process because we cannot hold 
ourselves up as a beacon of democracy if we are not willing to defend 
the institutions upon which our democratic system rests.
  By removing politics from this response and coordinating it under one 
roof within the intelligence community, we can rebuild that faith in 
our system.
  In this body, we have no greater responsibility than to protect the 
sanctity of our elections, to protect the trust of our citizens, and to 
protect our faith in government. That is what this amendment codifies.
  Madam Chair, I encourage all of my colleagues to support this 
amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Chair, before I get to my objections to the 
amendment, I want to congratulate the chairman, the majority members of 
the committee, as well as the majority staff for the great work they 
did in helping us bring a fully bipartisan bill to the floor, which I 
fully intend to support.
  They also helped us navigate the intricacies of the Rules Committee 
so that what we are debating tonight, with the amendments that were put 
forward, we will be able to support this bill on the floor tomorrow or 
whenever they decide to bring it up. I thank the chairman for the good 
work that they put into it.
  Madam Chair, I do, though, rise in opposition to this amendment. For 
the past several years, the House Intelligence Committee has spent a 
significant amount of time overseeing the intelligence community's 
ongoing efforts to counter foreign malign influence targeting the 
United States. Although Russia gains significant and necessary 
attention given the events of 2016, the committee is also concerned 
about Chinese, Iranian, and other foreign powers that have designs on 
sowing discord in the United States or covertly influencing the 
American populace.
  The amendment today would establish a foreign threat response center 
within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. While I 
believe my colleague from Massachusetts offers this amendment with the 
best of intentions, it is clearly redundant to existing efforts and 
creates an additional and potentially unnecessary bureaucracy within an 
organization that may not be best suited to take the lead on these 
actions.
  This issue is not new. Last Congress, we worked with the gentleman 
from Massachusetts in adding a report to the fiscal 2018 and 2019 IAAs 
that would examine the necessity of a foreign malign influence response 
center. This report remains in the bill, given that it is a 3-year 
bill.

[[Page H5898]]

  I am not convinced of the necessity of such a center, given the 
ongoing efforts by our intelligence community to address this problem. 
However, even assuming its necessity, I am concerned that the ODNI may 
not be the best place for such a center. Based on our ongoing oversight 
efforts, we know that the interagency is taking the threat of foreign 
malign influences very seriously. Given the significant 
counterintelligence impact to the homeland, it may make more sense to 
house such an entity within the FBI.
  I don't believe in putting the cart before the horse. It is important 
for us to collect all the necessary information in order for Congress 
to make an informed decision after significant debate on the merits of 
such a center and whether the ODNI is the right home for it. This 
debate should happen within the Intelligence Committee. To date, that 
debate has not occurred.
  This amendment would also set up a board to oversee the work of the 
Foreign Intelligence Center, which would then be overseen by the House 
and Senate Intelligence Committees. Again, a redundancy that is, in my 
estimation, not necessary.
  Madam Chair, based on these foregoing reasons, I will oppose the 
gentleman's amendment and urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle 
to vote against it, and I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  2030

  Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, may I inquire how much time I have 
remaining?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Massachusetts has 2\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  This amendment directs the intelligence community to expand upon its 
work in identifying and reporting foreign malign influence activity by 
establishing a center responsible for integrating all intelligence 
pertaining to foreign efforts to undermine our democratic institutions.
  The committee and the intelligence community has seen all too clearly 
over the last 3 years that the malign influence threats to U.S. 
sovereignty and security are emerging as a new normal, all the while 
becoming more sophisticated and diverse.
  Identifying and defending against these threats, particularly those 
committed by strategic adversaries of the U.S., requires a dedicated 
whole-of-intelligence-community effort in order to fully understand the 
nature of the threat and identify outstanding intelligence gaps that 
need to be filled.
  In establishing an interagency Foreign Threat Response Center, this 
amendment lays out a framework for accomplishing this challenging task.
  I thank my colleague for his work. I appreciate Mr. Kennedy's 
commitment to this area very much, and I support the amendment.
  Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  In closing, I would like to reiterate that the establishment of such 
a center should be debated properly within the House Intelligence 
Committee. It should also be informed by the report that the gentleman 
was successful in adding to the fiscal 2018 and 2019 Intelligence 
Authorization Acts, and such debate should focus on the merits of the 
center, given existing efforts, as well as whether or not the ODNI 
should house the center.
  Until that report is finished, and then the debate happens, I would 
urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I would just say, in closing, that I appreciate the gentleman's words 
and the work that they did with us to get the report language into the 
version last year. I would point out that much of the intent behind 
this legislation and this amendment is directly related to what the 
gentleman indicated around an ongoing threat assessment from Russia, 
China, and Iran.
  The issue isn't so much, has that threat been identified? It is, what 
has the Intelligence Committee done to ensure the sanctity and the 
purity of those elections?
  I think this amendment speaks for itself. I urge my colleagues to 
adopt it.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Massachusetts will be postponed.


           Amendment No. 12 Offered by Miss Rice of New York

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Miss RICE of New York. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:
         Page 238, line 15, insert ``and the Under Secretary of 
     Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis'' before ``, 
     shall''.
         Page 239, after line 14, insert the following new 
     subsection:
         (d) Dissemination to State and Local Partners.--
     Consistent with the protection of classified and confidential 
     unclassified information, the Under Secretary shall share the 
     report required by subsection (b) with State, local, and 
     regional officials who operate within State, local, and 
     regional fusion centers through the Department of Homeland 
     Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative 
     established in section 210A of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C 124h).

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman 
from New York (Miss Rice) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New York.
  Miss RICE of New York. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I was pleased to see that my bill, the Stop Terrorist Use of Virtual 
Currencies Act, was included in the base text of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act. This bill requires the Director of National 
Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury to develop and submit a 
threat assessment report on the use of virtual currencies by terrorist 
organizations.
  My amendment would simply include the DHS Under Secretary for 
Intelligence and Analysis into this report and require that this report 
be disseminated to State and local law enforcement officials.
  In the 18 years since the deadliest terrorist attack in American 
history, the United States has led the global campaign to combat 
terrorism, thwarting plots and preventing attacks on American soil, 
identifying and disrupting terrorist networks around the world, hunting 
down terrorists wherever they hide, and proving that they can and will 
be brought to justice.
  But we also know that the threat of terrorism is not the same as it 
was 18 years ago; it is a threat that constantly evolves, and we need 
to evolve with it. We need to evolve ahead of it. That is why I have 
offered this amendment.
  In recent years, we have seen instances in which members of terrorist 
groups have turned to virtual currencies to finance and support their 
operations.
  For example, in December of 2017, a woman in New York was arrested 
and pled guilty after she obtained $62,000 in bitcoin and other virtual 
currencies to send to ISIS.
  Using those virtual funds, she was able to send the money via shell 
entities in Pakistan, China, and Turkey that were fronts for ISIS.
  In early 2017, Indonesian authorities reported that a Syria-based 
Indonesian with ties to ISIS used bitcoin and other virtual currencies 
to fund attacks in Indonesia.
  The same things that make virtual currencies appealing to everyday 
consumers, speed and convenience, make these currencies appealing to 
those who want to finance illegal activities.
  And many forms of virtual currencies also offer their users 
anonymity, making them particularly attractive to those seeking to 
circumvent American law enforcement and financial institutions.

[[Page H5899]]

  In order to effectively confront this threat, we need to fully 
understand it. We need a comprehensive assessment of how virtual 
currencies might be abused for illegal and nefarious ends. That is why 
it is critical that we act now to assess and understand this emerging 
threat.
  There is no denying it. Virtual currencies have exposed deep 
vulnerabilities in our counterterrorism efforts. And unfortunately, 
right now, our government lacks a comprehensive response and strategy 
to address this threat.
  Passing this amendment will give counterterrorism and law enforcement 
officials at all levels the information and strategies they desperately 
need to confront this threat head-on with 21st-century solutions.
  This is a commonsense, bipartisan priority, and I urge all my 
colleagues to support this amendment.
  Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  This straightforward amendment adds the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for Intelligence and Analysis to the DNI's consultation 
requirement for its report on possible exploitation of virtual 
currencies by terrorist actors.
  It also requires the report's dissemination to State and local law 
enforcement, consistent with the protection of classified information.
  Ensuring that relevant counterterrorism information is distributed, 
as appropriate, to State and local law enforcement is a key priority 
and a major function of the Department of Homeland Security. Adding 
these entities as recipients of this report through the DHS fusion 
center mechanism improves the bill.
  I want to encourage all my colleagues to support the amendment, as 
well as the underlying bill. I thank my colleague for her work.
  Miss RICE of New York. Madam Chair, I want to thank Chairman Schiff 
and Ranking Member Nunes for supporting the amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from New York (Miss Rice).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 13 Offered by Ms. Jayapal

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Ms. JAYAPAL. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 3__. REPORT ON USE BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF FACIAL 
                   RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the use of facial recognition technology for the 
     purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or 
     for disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, 
     gender, sexual orientation, or religion, is contrary to the 
     values of the United States;
       (2) the United States Government should not engage in the 
     sale or transfer of facial recognition technology to any 
     country that is using such technology for the suppression of 
     human rights; and
       (3) it is incumbent upon the intelligence community to 
     develop clear policies and procedures that prevent the abuse 
     of facial recognition technology.
       (b) Report Required.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on the use of facial recognition 
     technology by the intelligence community. Such report shall 
     include each of the following:
       (1) An analysis of the current use of facial recognition 
     technology by the intelligence community.
       (2) An analysis of the accuracy of facial recognition 
     technology, including a discussion of the appropriate 
     threshold for use, and data disaggregated by race, gender, 
     ethnicity, and age.
       (3) Whether the Government has adequate procedures in place 
     to audit or test technology they purchase to assess its 
     accuracy, including on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, 
     and age.
       (4) The extent to which the intelligence community has 
     codified policies governing the use of facial recognition 
     technology that adequately prevent adverse impacts on 
     privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
       (5) An analysis of the ability of the intelligence 
     community to use facial recognition technology to identify 
     individuals in a way that respects constitutional rights, 
     civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy of such 
     individuals.
       (6) Identification of risks and safeguards to uphold the 
     constitutional rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and 
     privacy of individuals, including for communities of color 
     and religious minorities.
       (7) Whether such technology is deployed in public areas or 
     on photos of public areas in a manner that could raise First 
     Amendment concerns.
       (8) An identification of existing policies, procedures, or 
     practices that permit the sharing of facial recognition data 
     and technology with foreign governments or other non-United 
     States Government entities.
       (9) An identification of measures in place to protect data 
     security.
       (10) An identification of any redress procedures to address 
     complaints in cases where the use of facial recognition 
     resulted in harm to an individual.
       (11) An analysis of existing transparency, oversight, and 
     audits of the use of facial recognition to measure the 
     efficacy of the technology on an ongoing basis, as measured 
     against the cost and impact on individual rights.
       (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (d) Facial Recognition Data Defined.--In this section, the 
     term ``facial recognition data'' means any unique attribute 
     or feature of the face of an end user that is used by facial 
     recognition technology to assign a unique, persistent 
     identifier, or for the unique personal identification of a 
     specific individual.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman 
from Washington (Ms. Jayapal) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Washington.
  Ms. JAYAPAL. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to start by recognizing the work of our chairman, Mr. Schiff, 
on this bill.
  Madam Chair, my amendment would require Congress to provide much-
needed oversight to the intelligence community's use of face 
recognition technology. The amendment does three things.
  First, it requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit a 
report to the Intelligence Committees in both the House and the Senate 
on the use of this new technology. This is a critical step in ensuring 
that there is a deeper understanding of the technology here in Congress 
and also, appropriate transparency.
  Second, the amendment expresses the sense of Congress that using this 
technology to suppress dissent, or to target people based on ethnicity, 
race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion is contrary to our 
Nation's values.
  And finally, it makes clear that Congress believes that the 
government should not sell or transfer face recognition technology to 
any country that is using this technology to suppress human rights.
  I offered this amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act 
because I am concerned that face recognition poses grave privacy 
concerns. As a Nation committed to democratic norms, including 
constitutionally-enshrined rights to freedom of speech and privacy, it 
is critical that we ensure that our national security activities do not 
come at the expense of our individual liberties and our right to 
privacy. And thus, it is critical that this body know exactly how this 
technology is being used.
  In addition to the civil liberties concerns of those in our country, 
the technology does disproportionately impact people of color. The 
technology, unfortunately, misidentifies people of color and women at 
higher rates than Whites and men, which undermines its usefulness to 
the intelligence community, and makes it potentially problematic for 
large-scale use.
  Finally, my amendment makes clear that the United States should not 
be providing this technology to countries who are using it to 
perpetuate human rights abuses. We should not be selling or 
transferring the technologies to countries like China, who are actively 
using this technology to suppress dissent and target minorities, like 
the Uighurs, a Muslim minority group.
  Although this sense of Congress lays down an important marker, we do 
need to continue to work to ensure that there are proper controls on 
the sale and the transfer of this technology, and I look forward to 
doing that with my colleagues.

[[Page H5900]]

  Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff), the chairman of the committee.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  This amendment expresses a sense of Congress that conveys our firm 
opposition to any use of facial recognition technology to suppress 
criticism or dissent, as well as our opposition to the U.S. Government 
sale or transfer of facial recognition technology to countries using 
this technology to suppress human rights.
  Critically, the amendment also acknowledges the IC's unique 
responsibility to develop robust policies and procedures that prevent 
the abuse of this technology.
  To ensure that the intelligence community is held accountable, the 
amendment requires the submission of a comprehensive report analyzing 
any use of facial recognition technology by the IC, and the associated 
implications for privacy and civil liberties, especially among 
marginalized communities.
  Ms. Jayapal's amendment requires the intelligence community to 
establish clear policies and procedures, enhance transparency, and 
increase oversight concerning the applications of these new 
capabilities.
  Her amendment lays the groundwork for a thoughtful U.S. response to 
the emergence of divisive and disruptive technologies and how they 
would fit into existing civil liberties frameworks.
  Again, I want to thank my colleague for her work. I am pleased to 
support Ms. Jayapal's amendment.
  Ms. JAYAPAL. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Garcia).
  Mr. GARCIA of Illinois. Madam Chair, I rise in support of the 
amendment we have filed to study and limit the use of facial 
recognition technology.
  The intelligence community collects large amounts of data with 
limited oversight about how and from whom data is collected. Facial 
recognition technology has shown to be less accurate on nonwhite faces, 
and its use disproportionately hurts communities of color because of 
algorithmic bias.
  This amendment studies the potential for bias and expresses the sense 
that people should not be targeted for their ethnicity, race, or sexual 
orientation, or to suppress dissent. Given the U.S. Government's 
history of tracking protesters and activists, especially in minority 
communities, this is important.
  Congress can and should exercise Federal oversight of emerging 
surveillance technologies. For facial recognition technology, this 
means our work is only just beginning. I urge support for this 
amendment.

                              {time}  2045

  Ms. JAYAPAL. Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this 
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR (Ms. Omar). The question is on the amendment offered 
by the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Jayapal).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mrs. Murphy

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VII, add the following:

     SEC. 708. REPORT ON DEEPFAKE TECHNOLOGY, FOREIGN 
                   WEAPONIZATION OF DEEPFAKES, AND RELATED 
                   NOTIFICATIONS.

       (a) Report on Foreign Weaponization of Deepfakes and 
     Deepfake Technology.--
       (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements 
     of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the 
     Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on--
       (A) the potential national security impacts of machine-
     manipulated media (commonly known as ``deepfakes''); and
       (B) the actual or potential use of machine-manipulated 
     media by foreign governments to spread disinformation or 
     engage in other malign activities.
       (2) Matters to be included.--The report under subsection 
     (a) shall include the following:
       (A) An assessment of the technical capabilities of foreign 
     governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign 
     government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, with 
     respect to machine-manipulated media, machine-generated text, 
     generative adversarial networks, and related machine-learning 
     technologies, including--
       (i) an assessment of the technical capabilities of the 
     People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation with 
     respect to the production and detection of machine-
     manipulated media; and
       (ii) an annex describing those governmental elements within 
     China and Russia known to have supported or facilitated 
     machine-manipulated media research, development, or 
     dissemination, as well as any civil-military fusion, private-
     sector, academic, or non-governmental entities which have 
     meaningfully participated in such activities.
       (B) An updated assessment of how foreign governments, 
     including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-
     affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, could use or 
     are using machine-manipulated media and machine-generated 
     text to harm the national security interests of the United 
     States, including an assessment of the historic, current, or 
     potential future efforts of China and Russia to use machine-
     manipulated media, including with respect to--
       (i) the overseas or domestic dissemination of 
     misinformation;
       (ii) the attempted discrediting of political opponents or 
     disfavored populations; and
       (iii) intelligence or influence operations directed against 
     the United States, allies or partners of the United States, 
     or other jurisdictions believed to be subject to Chinese or 
     Russian interference.
       (C) An updated identification of the counter-technologies 
     that have been or could be developed and deployed by the 
     United States Government, or by the private sector with 
     Government support, to deter, detect, and attribute the use 
     of machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text by 
     foreign governments, foreign-government affiliates, or 
     foreign individuals, along with an analysis of the benefits, 
     limitations and drawbacks of such identified counter-
     technologies, including any emerging concerns related to 
     privacy.
       (D) An identification of the offices within the elements of 
     the intelligence community that have, or should have, lead 
     responsibility for monitoring the development of, use of, and 
     response to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated 
     text, including--
       (i) a description of the coordination of such efforts 
     across the intelligence community;
       (ii) a detailed description of the existing capabilities, 
     tools, and relevant expertise of such elements to determine 
     whether a piece of media has been machine manipulated or 
     machine generated, including the speed at which such 
     determination can be made, the confidence level of the 
     element in the ability to make such a determination 
     accurately, and how increasing volume and improved quality of 
     machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text may 
     negatively impact such capabilities; and
       (iii) a detailed description of planned or ongoing research 
     and development efforts intended to improve the ability of 
     the intelligence community to detect machine-manipulated 
     media and machine-generated text.
       (E) A description of any research and development 
     activities carried out or under consideration to be carried 
     out by the intelligence community, including the Intelligence 
     Advanced Research Projects Activity, relevant to machine-
     manipulated media and machine-generated text detection 
     technologies.
       (F) Updated recommendations regarding whether the 
     intelligence community requires additional legal authorities, 
     financial resources, or specialized personnel to address the 
     national security threat posed by machine-manipulated media 
     and machine generated text.
       (G) Other additional information the Director determines 
     appropriate.
       (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (c) Requirement for Notification.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of any other 
     relevant departments or agencies of the Federal Government, 
     shall notify the congressional intelligence committees each 
     time the Director of National Intelligence determines--
       (1) there is credible information or intelligence that a 
     foreign entity has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt 
     to deploy machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text 
     aimed at the elections or domestic political processes of the 
     United States; and
       (2) that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a 
     foreign government, a foreign government-affiliated entity, 
     or a foreign individual.
       (d) Annual Update.--Upon submission of the report in 
     subsection (a), on an annual basis, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements 
     of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the 
     Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees any significant updates with respect to the 
     matters described in subsection (a).
       (e) Definitions.--
       (1) Machine-generated text.--The term ``machine-generated 
     text'' means text generated using machine-learning techniques 
     in

[[Page H5901]]

     order to resemble writing in natural language.
       (2) Machine-manipulated media.--The term ``machine-
     manipulated media'' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 707.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman 
from Florida (Mrs. Murphy) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
  Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, my amendment, which I am coleading with 
Congresswoman Yvette Clarke of New York, involves a looming threat to 
American security and American democracy from the use of deepfake 
technology by our Nation's adversaries.
  As policymakers, we must understand this challenge and put in place a 
whole-of-government strategy to address it in a way that protects our 
interests and is consistent with our values. The U.S. intelligence 
community has an important role to play in this effort.
  The House Intelligence Committee, led by Chairman Schiff, recently 
held an illuminating and alarming hearing on deepfakes. As the 
witnesses at that hearing testified, technology now enables anyone with 
a computer, internet access, and technical skills to create fabricated 
and relatively convincing video and audio recordings that depict 
individuals doing or saying things that they did not do or say.
  The technology behind deepfakes is rapidly evolving. Soon individuals 
will be able to create highly realistic and difficult to debunk video 
and audio content. At a time when Americans are already being 
inundated, especially online, by a flood of false or misleading 
information, deepfake technology has the potential to make it even 
harder for the American public to trust what it sees and hears.
  It is easy to imagine the different ways in which deepfake technology 
could be exploited by America's foes. Imagine a Russian intelligence 
service creating a video purporting to show an American Presidential 
candidate accepting a bribe or an audio recording purporting to reveal 
an American Secretary of State saying something inflammatory about an 
ally. Or imagine a Chinese-produced video that falsely depicts the 
commander of a U.S. military unit committing a war crime. Such efforts, 
if not quickly exposed as false by the United States, could create 
havoc.
  In today's world, perhaps the biggest national security threat we 
face is not the risk of direct military conflict between the United 
States and Russia, China, Iran, or another adversary. Instead, the 
threat lurks in the gray space short of kinetic action. It is 
illustrated by Russian efforts to intervene in the 2016 Presidential 
election, most notably in my home State of Florida. It is the threat 
from authoritarian governments using new technologies to spread 
disinformation, sow discord, create divisions, and cause the American 
people to lose faith in our democratic form of government.
  To address this threat, our amendment requires the DNI to prepare a 
report for Congress on how foreign countries are using or could use 
deepfake technology to harm the United States and to explain how the 
intelligence community is working to develop appropriate 
countermeasures. This report will help us to understand the problem and 
to combat it more effectively.
  We must get this right because the stakes couldn't be higher. I urge 
my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California 
(Chairman Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding, and I 
rise in strong support of this amendment offered by my colleagues from 
Florida and New York, who have both been leaders in this body focused 
on national security challenges posed by deepfake technologies.
  We in the Intelligence Committee held a hearing on this very topic 
last month, and the rate at which these capabilities are evolving is 
almost as breathtaking as what they can produce, high-quality video and 
other types of media that convincingly portray individuals saying or 
doing things that never happened.
  The potential for a foreign adversary to undermine an election, 
foment chaos, or create a national security crisis with a sophisticated 
digital forgery means that we need to ensure the intelligence community 
is fully considering the wide-ranging implications of deepfakes, 
including the capacity of foreign entities and adversaries to weaponize 
machine-generated media.
  This report will also give us a detailed picture about how the 
intelligence community is coordinating efforts, activities, and 
research surrounding this emerging technology and if there are 
lingering gaps in resources or assignments of responsibility, since we 
need to be clear-eyed about how disruptive and devastating a well-timed 
deep fake could be during an election or a tense diplomatic standoff.
  I want to thank my colleague for her work on this amendment, and I am 
very proud to support it.
  Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, I urge support for this amendment, and I 
yield back the balance of my time
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Murphy).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mrs. Murphy

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title V, add the following new section:

     SEC. 5__. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON IRANIAN EFFORTS IN 
                   SYRIA.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, 
     regardless of the ultimate number of United States military 
     personnel deployed to Syria, it is a vital interest of the 
     United States to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
     Hizbollah, and other Iranian-backed forces from establishing 
     a strong and enduring presence in Syria that can be used to 
     project power in the region and threaten the United States 
     and its allies, including Israel.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and 
     the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report that assesses--
       (A) efforts by Iran to establish long-term influence in 
     Syria through military, political, economic, social, and 
     cultural means; and
       (B) the threat posed by such efforts to United States 
     interests and allies.
       (2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include 
     each of the following:
       (A) An assessment of--
       (i) how Iran and Iranian-backed forces, including the 
     Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hizbollah, have 
     provided or are currently providing manpower, training, 
     weapons, equipment, and funding to the Syrian government led 
     by President Bashar al-Assad;
       (ii) the support provided by Iran and Hizbollah to Shia 
     militias operating in Syria that are composed of domestic 
     fighters from Syria and foreign fighters from countries like 
     Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan;
       (iii) the threat posed by Iran and Iranian-backed forces to 
     the al-Tanf garrison and to areas of northeast Syria that are 
     currently controlled by local partner forces of the United 
     States;
       (iv) the degree to which efforts of the United States to 
     sustain and strengthen Kurdish forces in Syria may undermine 
     the influence of Iran and Iranian-backed forces in Syria;
       (v) how Iran and Iranian-backed forces seek to enhance the 
     long-term influence of such entities in Syria through non-
     military means such as purchasing strategic real estate in 
     Syria, constructing Shia religious centers and schools, 
     securing loyalty from Sunni tribes in exchange for material 
     assistance, and inducing the Assad government to open Farsi-
     language departments at Syrian universities; and
       (vi) whether the prominent role of Iran in Syria, including 
     the influence of Iran over government institutions, may 
     increase the likelihood of the reconstitution of the Islamic 
     State of Iraq and Syria in Syria.
       (B) An analysis of--
       (i) how Iran is working with the Russian Federation, 
     Turkey, and other countries to increase the influence of Iran 
     in Syria; and
       (ii) the goals of Iran in Syria, including, but not limited 
     to, protecting the Assad government, increasing the regional 
     influence of Iran, threatening Israel from a more proximate 
     location, building weapon-production facilities and other 
     military infrastructure, and securing a land bridge to 
     connect Iran through Iraq and Syria to the stronghold of 
     Hizbollah in southern Lebanon.
       (C) A description of--
       (i) how the efforts of Iran to transfer advanced weapons to 
     Hizbollah and to establish a military presence in Syria has 
     led to direct and repeated confrontations with Israel; and
       (ii) the intelligence and military support that the United 
     States provides to Israel to

[[Page H5902]]

     help Israel identify and appropriately address specific 
     threats to Israel from Iran and Iranian-backed forces in 
     Syria.
       (3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman 
from Florida (Mrs. Murphy) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
  Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, our amendment would require the Director of 
National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretaries of State 
and Defense, to prepare a report for Congress on efforts by Iran to 
establish long-term influence in Syria using both hard and soft power 
and the threat that this proposes to U.S. interests and allies, 
including Israel.
  Syria's civil war, which began in 2011, has brought an influx of 
Iranian-backed forces into Syria. Iran and Syria are both designated by 
the United States as state sponsors of terrorism. Their military 
partnership dates back decades, and Iran regards Syria as one of its 
most important allies.
  Iran and Iranian-backed forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps and Hezbollah, have provided manpower, training, weapons, 
and funding to the Syrian Government, led by President Bashar al-Assad. 
This assistance, coupled with support from Russia, has enabled the 
Assad government to retain or regain territory in Syria, and the Assad 
government currently maintains control over roughly two-thirds of the 
country.
  Iran's goals in Syria include protecting the Assad government, 
increasing Iran's regional influence, threatening Israel from a closer 
location, building weapon production facilities and other military 
infrastructure, and securing a land bridge that would connect Iran to 
Hezbollah's stronghold in southern Lebanon via Iraq and Syria.
  It is clear that Iran is seeking long-term influence in Syria and is 
pursuing this objective through military, political, and social means.
  Iran's effort to establish a military presence in Syria has led to 
repeated confrontations with Israel. In February of 2018, Israel shot 
down an Iranian drone flying over Israeli territory and then targeted 
the base in Syria from which the drone was launched. In May 2018, 
Israel launched strikes against Iranian military installations in 
Syria. Iran responded by firing missiles at Israeli positions in the 
Golan Heights, and Israel then targeted nearly all of Iran's military 
infrastructure in Syria.
  Iranian and Iranian-backed forces also seek to enhance their 
influence in Syria through nonmilitary means, such as purchasing 
strategic real estate, constructing Shia religious centers and schools, 
securing loyalty from Sunni tribes, and inducing the Assad government 
to open Farsi language departments at Syrian universities.
  In a startling move, President Trump has proposed to withdraw all or 
most U.S. forces from Syria, a proposal I view as a profound mistake. 
But regardless of the number of U.S. troops deployed to Syria, I 
believe it is a vital U.S. interest to prevent Iran, Hezbollah, and 
other Iranian-backed forces from establishing an enduring presence in 
Syria.
  Our amendment would require the DNI to assess how Iran is using hard 
and soft power to gain long-term influence in Syria. Among other 
things, the IC would examine how U.S. efforts to strengthen Kurdish 
forces in Syria could undermine Iran, how the U.S. helps Israel 
identify threats from Iran and Syria, and how Iran's influence over 
Syrian institutions could increase the likelihood that the Islamic 
State will reconstitute itself inside Syria.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHNEIDER. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, though I am not opposed to it.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Illinois is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SCHNEIDER. Madam Chair, I rise in support of the Murphy-Schneider 
amendment that makes abundantly clear it is of the utmost importance to 
prevent Iran from establishing any enduring presence in Syria.
  The amendment also requires the Director of National Intelligence to 
report on Iran's efforts to establish a foothold in Syria on the threat 
this poses to the United States and our allies, in particular Israel.
  Madam Chair, I stood before Congress in the last Congress urging 
support for my amendment to require a report on Iran's support for 
proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon, and I am pleased that this report 
remains in this bill. Today we are building on this important effort 
with the Murphy-Schneider amendment.
  I thank my good friend from Florida, Stephanie Murphy, for her 
leadership on this issue.
  Iran is a bad actor that has spread its maligned influence and 
continued to engage in destabilizing activities throughout the Middle 
East region, as well as beyond. The Iranian regime has and continues to 
establish deep ties within Syria through military, political, economic, 
social, and cultural means. This is a dangerous behavior that must be 
checked. Iran must not be allowed to maintain a permanent foothold in 
Syria that threatens our allies and stability in the region.
  To stand up to Iran, we must first understand the full extent of 
Iran's activities in Syria, and that is what this amendment does. I 
look forward to seeing this report and engaging on how we can prevent 
Iran from maintaining a permanent presence in Syria.
  I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting this important 
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, I urge support for the amendment, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Murphy).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 16 Offered by Mr. Brindisi

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 16 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. BRINDISI. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 708. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN CRIMES 
                   RELATING TO TERRORISM.

       Nothing in this Act, or the amendments made by this Act, 
     shall be construed to contradict chapter 113B of title 18, 
     United States Code, including with respect to--
       (1) section 2332b (relating to acts of terrorism 
     transcending national boundaries);
       (2) section 2339 (relating to harboring or concealing 
     terrorists); and
       (3) section 2339A (relating to providing material support 
     to terrorists).

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Brindisi) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. BRINDISI. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Chair, I rise today urging adoption of my amendment, which 
makes clear that nothing in the underlying bill contradicts existing 
Federal law regarding acts of international terrorism, providing 
support to terrorists, or aiding terrorists.
  The underlying bill helps keep our country safe by ensuring the 
intelligence community has the resources and authorities it needs to do 
its job. It also makes sure the intelligence community can improve and 
adapt to today's rapidly changing threats and technologies by improving 
the collection and analytic capabilities against our adversaries like 
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
  My amendment makes it crystal clear that our country will remain 
tough on international terrorism.
  Terrorism continues to be a serious threat to our national security. 
This provision strengthens the underlying

[[Page H5903]]

bill by ensuring current law regarding terrorism is not changed, so 
terrorists and those who support them can be brought to justice.
  Madam Chair, again, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I 
urge adoption of the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time

                              {time}  2100

  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Brindisi).
  The amendment was agreed to.


               Amendment No. 17 Offered by Mr. Kinzinger

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 17 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. KINZINGER. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:
       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 7___ REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL MOBILE SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY-
                   CATCHERS AND UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and the heads of other agencies the Director 
     of National Intelligence determines appropriate, shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     describing--
       (1) the threats that international mobile subscriber 
     identity-catchers pose to national security and, 
     specifically, the safety and security of Government 
     personnel;
       (2) the prevalence of international mobile subscriber 
     identity-catchers used by both foreign actors and domestic 
     law enforcement within the United States;
       (3) actions taken by Federal agencies, as of the date of 
     the report, to remove or neutralize international mobile 
     subscriber identity-catchers installed by foreign entities, 
     with a primary focus on the National Capital Region (as 
     defined in section 2674(f) of title 10, United States Code);
       (4) policy recommendations for Congress to consider that 
     would empower law enforcement and the intelligence community 
     to counter such foreign intelligence operations while 
     minimizing interference with legitimate domestic law 
     enforcement operations;
       (5) the extent to which private entities, as well as 
     Federal entities not primarily responsible for national 
     security or homeland security, are able to remove, 
     neutralize, or otherwise render ineffective international 
     mobile subscriber identity-catchers; and
       (6) recommendations for new software programs, or the 
     hardening of existing software programs, to reduce mobile 
     phone susceptibility to international mobile subscriber 
     identity-catchers.
       (b) Form.--To the extent practicable, the report shall be 
     submitted in an unclassified, law enforcement sensitive form 
     for the purposes of distribution to other congressional 
     committees, but may also include a classified annex.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Illinois (Mr. Kinzinger) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. KINZINGER. Madam Chair, my amendment is very simple. It would 
require that the Director of National Intelligence and other relevant 
agencies report to Congress on the threat that international mobile 
subscriber identity catchers, also referred to as ``cell-site 
simulators'' or under the brand name ``StingRay,'' pose to U.S. 
Government personnel and national security.
  In addition to providing this report, the DNI would need to provide 
recommendations to Congress regarding possible policy changes to 
counter these devices.
  IMSI catchers send signals to mobile phones that appear to be coming 
from legitimate mobile networks. Once connected, the phones are used to 
track the locations of the users, which can be seen by whoever is 
controlling the IMSI catcher. The more advanced versions of these cell 
devices allow their owners even to access messages and phone call data.
  Many of us were shocked when a report came out last year that the 
Department of Homeland Security had found these devices around the 
national capital region. Even more concerning was that many of these 
were located around sensitive government buildings.
  My amendment would help Congress understand the proliferation of 
these devices around our Nation, with a focus on their prevalence in 
the national capital region. We need to know which actors, foreign or 
domestic, are deploying them and what Congress can do to ensure the 
safekeeping of our national security apparatus.
  Madam Chair, I urge support for this amendment, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kinzinger).
  The amendment was agreed to.


           Amendment No. 18 Offered by Ms. Hill of California

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 18 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Ms. HILL of California. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 7__. WHISTLEBLOWER DISCLOSURES TO CONGRESS AND 
                   COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.

       Section 2302 of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(8)(B), by inserting ``Congress 
     (including any committee of Congress),'' before ``the Special 
     Counsel''; and
       (2) in subsection (c)(2)(C)(iii)(III), by inserting after 
     ``Congress'' the following: ``(including any committee of 
     Congress)''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Hill) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. HILL of California. Madam Chair, I yield myself as much time as I 
may consume. I rise in support of an amendment to H.R. 3494.
  I believe strongly in the principle of government transparency. It is 
something I ran on and talk about. I have spent my time in Congress 
working to deliver on accountability and transparency as the vice chair 
of the Oversight and Reform Committee and through other legislation.
  Today, I am introducing this amendment to clarify what Congress 
already believes to be the law, that Federal whistleblowers have the 
ability to make protected disclosures to the appropriate congressional 
committee of jurisdiction, not just members of the Intelligence 
Committee.
  At a time like this, we cannot afford ambiguity. This technical 
change will allow congressional committees to conduct their business in 
a more timely and effective manner.
  This amendment is not my first effort to protect whistleblowers, nor 
will it be my last. Those with the courage to stand up and say 
something is not right should have every single protection that we, as 
Congress, can offer to them.
  Madam Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Hill).
  The amendment was agreed to.


           Amendment No. 19 Offered by Mr. Levin of Michigan

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 19 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. LEVIN of Michigan. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:
       Page 68, strike line 24 through page 69, line 3, and insert 
     the following:
       (2) with respect to the unclassified portion of the report, 
     made available on the public internet websites of the 
     National Counterterrorism Center, Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and Department of Homeland Security--
       (A) not later than 30 days after submission to the 
     appropriate congressional committees; and
       (B) in an electronic format that is fully indexed and 
     searchable; and

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Levin) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN of Michigan. Madam Chair, according to the Anti-Defamation 
League, domestic extremists killed at least 50 people in the United 
States in 2018, a sharp increase from

[[Page H5904]]

the 37 extremist-related murders documented in 2017. Indeed, that is a 
26 percent jump in 1 year.
  Given the disturbing rise of plots and incidents of domestic 
terrorism nationwide, I am pleased with the provision in this bill 
requiring that a joint report on domestic terrorism be submitted to 
Congress each year by the DNI, the FBI Director, and the Under 
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis.
  My amendment requires that this comprehensive report on domestic 
terrorism be made available on the public websites not just of the 
National Counterterrorism Center but also of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security.
  The amendment also specifies that the report should be made publicly 
available no later than 30 days after submission to the appropriate 
congressional committees. We can't let something this important be 
delayed over and over again.
  We need to ensure that this report is accessible not just to promote 
transparency but also to help policymakers nationwide recognize the 
scope of the threat that domestic terrorism poses and to encourage 
academic research necessary to understand the scourge of domestic 
terrorism better so that we might bring it to an end once and for all. 
I am talking about policymakers on the local and the State level as 
well as the Federal level.
  Madam Chair, I thank, in particular, Chairman Schiff and his staff 
for their leadership on this bill and for working with me on this and 
other provisions.
  Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I 
yield back the balance of my time
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 20 Offered by Mr. Schiff

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 20 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, as the designee of the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Malinowski), I rise to offer an amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 49, after line 13, insert the following new paragraph:
       (7) An assessment and identification of the technological 
     and financial support provided by United States-based 
     companies, including technological support for the 
     development of facial recognition capabilities or 
     technologies for digital surveillance, social control, or 
     censorship, and financial support, including from financial 
     institutions, investment vehicles, and pension funds, to 
     China-based companies or Chinese government entities 
     providing material support to the digital surveillance or 
     repression of Uyghur and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang 
     by the Xinjiang authorities.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I rise to support this amendment, which adds 
an additional requirement to section 502, a report on the repression of 
ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region of the People's 
Republic of China.
  The human rights crisis underway in Xinjiang is staggering in scale. 
Open-source analysis based on extensive reviews of satellite imagery 
and Chinese Government documents has concluded that as many as 1.5 
million Muslims could be held in internment camps by the Chinese 
Government.
  Despite this body of evidence, the executive branch has rebuffed 
attempts to clearly describe the scope and scale of this crisis.
  H.R. 3494 calls for a comprehensive U.S. Government assessment that 
addresses the number of persons detained, a description of forced labor 
practices in the camps, and an assessment of the surveillance, 
detection, and control methods associated with China's new high-tech 
policing model.
  Mr. Malinowski's amendment adds an additional requirement for the 
intelligence community to assess and identify the technological and 
financial support provided by U.S.-based companies to the Chinese 
Government's repressive operations in Xinjiang.
  In light of the alarming public reports detailing cooperation between 
prominent U.S. companies and foreign companies aiding and abetting the 
Chinese Communist Party's surveillance state, this amendment could not 
be timelier.
  Madam Chair, I thank my colleagues, particularly Mr. Malinowski for 
his tireless work to support human rights.
  Madam Chair, I am happy to support the amendment. I urge support for 
the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 21 Offered by Mr. Schiff

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 21 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, as the designee of the gentlewoman from 
Massachusetts (Ms. Pressley), I rise to offer an amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 62, after line 4 insert the following:
       (6) Information regarding any training or resources 
     provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
     Department of Homeland Security, or the National 
     Counterterrorism Center, to assist Federal, State, local, and 
     Tribal law enforcement agencies in understanding, detecting, 
     deterring, and investigating acts of domestic terrorism, 
     including the date, type, subject, and recipient agencies of 
     such training or resources.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, this amendment clarifies section 602 of the 
bill dealing with domestic terrorism.
  Section 602 would require the FBI, DHS, and the National 
Counterterrorism Center to produce an annual report and strategic 
intelligence assessment on domestic terrorism. Ms. Pressley's amendment 
would require more information regarding any training or resources on 
domestic terrorism provided by the FBI, DHS, and National 
Counterterrorism Center to assist Federal, State, local, and Tribal law 
enforcement agencies.
  This would enhance oversight and transparency in this area and give 
us a better sense of how domestic terrorism training has been provided 
to law enforcement throughout the United States.
  Madam Chair, I thank my colleague for her work, and I urge our 
colleagues to support the amendment and the underlying bill.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  The amendment was agreed to.


            Amendment No. 22 Offered by Mr. Rose of New York

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 22 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. ROSE of New York. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 7___. REPORT CONTAINING THREAT ASSESSMENT ON TERRORIST 
                   USE OF CONVENTIONAL AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL 
                   WEAPONS.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
     for a period of 4 years, the Under Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for Intelligence and Analysis, in coordination with 
     the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall 
     develop and submit to the entities in accordance with 
     subsection (b) a report containing a threat assessment 
     regarding the availability of conventional weapons, including 
     conventional weapons lacking serial numbers, and advanced 
     conventional weapons, for use in furthering acts of 
     terrorism, including the provision of material support or 
     resources to a foreign terrorist organization and to 
     individuals or groups supporting or engaging in domestic 
     terrorism.
       (b) Dissemination of Report.--Consistent with the 
     protection of classified and confidential unclassified 
     information, the Under Secretary shall--
       (1) submit the initial report required under subsection (a) 
     to Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement 
     officials, including officials who operate within State, 
     local, and

[[Page H5905]]

     regional fusion centers under the Department of Homeland 
     Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative 
     established by section 210A of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h); and
       (2) submit each report required under subsection (a) to the 
     appropriate congressional committees.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
     Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
       (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the Senate.
       (2) Domestic terrorism.--The term ``domestic terrorism'' 
     has the meaning given that term in section 2331 of title 18, 
     United States Code.
       (3) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term ``foreign 
     terrorist organization'' means an organization designated as 
     a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Rose) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

                              {time}  2115

  Mr. ROSE of New York. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Chair, I rise in support of my amendment to H.R. 3494.
  Our law enforcement officers stand on the front lines of defending 
the American people from domestic and international terrorist threats. 
It is our job as Congress to make sure that they have the most up-to-
date information about the evolving threats posed by terrorism, 
including the use of advanced conventional weapons.
  One such evolving threat is the danger posed by terrorist use of 
conventional and advanced conventional weapons, including unregistered 
weapons that lack serial numbers.
  To address this issue, my amendment to the Intelligence Authorization 
Act will require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct an 
annual assessment of the domestic and international terrorist threats 
posed by conventional weapons as well as advanced conventional weapons.
  This is a simple, straightforward amendment that seeks to put 
important information about terrorist threats in the hands of our law 
enforcement officers.
  Madam Chair, law enforcement needs to have the information they need 
to understand these threats. The assessment of the terrorist threat 
posed by conventional weapons and advanced conventional weapons that I 
call for in this amendment will do just that.
  Additionally, this assessment will then be shared with Congress and 
with law enforcement so that our frontline officers have the 
information they need to understand these evolving threats.
  Madam Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to support my amendment, and 
I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Rose).
  The amendment was agreed to.


            Amendment No. 23 Offered by Mr. Rose of New York

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 23 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. ROSE of New York. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 79, line 19, insert ``, the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the 
     Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives'' after ``congressional intelligence 
     committees''.
       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 7___. ASSESSMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VULNERABILITIES 
                   ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN RETIRED AND FORMER 
                   PERSONNEL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Assessment Required.--Not later than the date that is 
     120 days after submission of the report required under 
     section 704 of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the 
     Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and 
     Analysis, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, and the Director of the Defense Counterintelligence 
     and Security Agency, shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees an assessment of the homeland 
     security vulnerabilities associated with retired and former 
     personnel of intelligence community providing covered 
     intelligence assistance.
       (b) Form.--The assessment under subsection (a) may be 
     submitted in classified form.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate; and
       (C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Covered intelligence assistance.--The term ``covered 
     intelligence assistance'' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 704 of this Act.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Rose) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. ROSE of New York. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Chair, I rise to offer an amendment to title VII of H.R. 3494, 
entitled, ``Reports and Other Matters.''
  As a combat veteran, I can tell you firsthand that intelligence 
drives operations, and it is imperative to the security of our homeland 
that the U.S. maintains its superiority when it comes to intelligence. 
However, a growing concern I have is when our former or retired 
intelligence professionals choose to later work for a foreign 
government.
  We saw it with former NSA employees working as hackers for the United 
Arab Emirates' Project Raven. Interviews and documents showed that the 
NSA's surveillance techniques were central to the country's monitoring 
efforts.
  Reporting showed that American ex-intelligence personnel would target 
the UAE Government's opponents online. This information, provided to 
them by the country's NSA equivalent, didn't just target terrorists, 
but also human rights activists and journalists, those whom the UAE 
deemed unfavorable.
  It is concerning when our best and brightest go off to conduct or 
advise on intelligence operations for foreign governments that, in some 
cases, are against the very people our American ideals protect. We need 
to understand the nature and impact of this expertise in the hands of a 
foreign government. What are the homeland security implications of 
this?
  My amendment will do just that. It requires the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with other intelligence community 
partners, to conduct an annual assessment of the homeland security 
vulnerabilities associated with former intelligence community employees 
providing intelligence assistance to a foreign government.
  Madam Chair, the invaluable training, tradecraft, and expertise 
developed by former or retired intelligence professionals to keep our 
country safe, to keep Americans safe, now in the hands of a foreign 
government for their benefit is absolutely chilling.
  My amendment will tackle these concerns head-on with an annual 
assessment of any homeland security vulnerabilities that may be 
associated with this capability, cultivated from years of service to 
our country, now being provided to foreign governments.
  Madam Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to support my amendment, and 
I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Rose).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 24 Offered by Mr. Pence

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 24 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. PENCE. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

[[Page H5906]]

  


     SEC. 7___. EXPANSION OF AVAILABILITY OF FINANCIAL ASSETS OF 
                   IRAN TO VICTIMS OF TERRORISM.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) On October 23, 1983, terrorists sponsored by the 
     Government of Iran bombed the United States Marine barracks 
     in Beirut, Lebanon. The terrorists killed 241 servicemen and 
     injured scores more.
       (2) Those servicemen were killed or injured while on a 
     peacekeeping mission.
       (3) Terrorism sponsored by the Government of Iran threatens 
     the national security of the United States.
       (4) The United States has a vital interest in ensuring that 
     members of the Armed Forces killed or injured by such 
     terrorism, and the family members of such members, are able 
     to seek justice.
       (b) Amendments.--Section 502 of the Iran Threat Reduction 
     and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8772) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``in the United 
     States'' the first place it appears and inserting ``by or'';
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, or an asset that 
     would be blocked if the asset were located in the United 
     States,'' after ``unblocked)''; and
       (C) in the flush text at the end--
       (i) by inserting after ``in aid of execution'' the 
     following: ``, or to an order directing that the asset be 
     brought to the State in which the court is located and 
     subsequently to execution or attachment in aid of 
     execution,''; and
       (ii) by inserting ``, without regard to concerns relating 
     to international comity'' after ``resources for such an 
     act''; and
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) by striking ``that are identified'' and inserting the 
     following: ``that are--
       ``(1) identified'';
       (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; 
     and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) identified in and the subject of proceedings in the 
     United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
     York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., 
     Case No. 13 Civ. 9195 (LAP).''.
       (c) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on threats 
     against the United States military and defense interests, 
     personnel, and their families, posed by organizations that 
     are designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign 
     terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) with 
     connections to the Government of Iran, as determined by the 
     Director.
       (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
     annex.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Indiana (Mr. Pence) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. PENCE. Madam Chair, I rise in support of my amendment, which is 
deeply personal.
  Madam Chair, I was assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. In 
1983, my battalion was ordered to Beirut, Lebanon.
  On October 23 of that same year, an Iranian national affiliated with 
Hezbollah, a terror group founded, trained, and financially supported 
by the Iranian regime, drove a truck bomb into the U.S. barracks in 
Beirut, killing 241 servicemen, 220 of which were my fellow marines.
  It is by the grace of God that I am standing here today. My battalion 
shipped out 10 days before the bombing. I was lucky. I was able to come 
home to my wife, who was expecting our first child, and my family in 
Columbus, Indiana.
  As proud U.S. marines, Congressman Gallego and I authored this 
bipartisan, bicameral legislation to provide a sliver of justice for 
the 241 heroes who were not as lucky that day.
  Madam Chair, our amendment is simple. The OORAH Act would allow the 
families of the bombing victims to execute on the $1.6 billion in 
Iranian funds currently held by a European-based firm. These funds were 
laundered through New York before making their way to Europe, where 
they sit just outside the hand of justice.
  Regardless of the party you conference with or the district you 
represent, we can all agree that terrorists and those who support them 
financially must be held accountable for their actions.
  When I joined the Marines in 1979, I made a promise of Semper 
Fidelis. Semper Fi is a lifelong commitment held by every marine for 
the corps and America, a promise reciprocated by the corps to all 
marines.
  Madam Chair, we must uphold this promise. Marines are the first to 
fight, and this time we are fighting for the Gold Star families who 
lost their loved ones.
  Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment and stand 
with Congressman Gallego and me and our colleagues in the Senate to 
honor the faith and loyalty of the 241 American servicemen who made the 
ultimate sacrifice.
  Madam Chair, OORAH stands for Our Obligation to Recognize American 
Heroes, or as the Marines say, OORAH.
  Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GALLEGO. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I 
am not opposed to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Arizona is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GALLEGO. Madam Chair, I rise in proud support of the amendment 
sponsored by fellow marine and public servant, Mr. Pence.
  October 23, 1983, remains seared in the memory of all marines. On 
that day, over 300 innocent people were killed in a surprise terrorist 
attack sponsored by the Government of Iran. Most of the people killed 
36 years ago were my brothers. They were U.S. marines. They were 
serving our country and doing their best to preserve the peace in war-
torn Lebanon.
  We know that the wheels of justice turn slowly, Madam Chair. It took 
over 35 years for victims to get traction in U.S. courts. But now that 
they are getting that traction and winning judgments, marines in 
Congress are here to help to ensure that Iranian funds cannot be hidden 
from them in secret foreign bank accounts.
  This amendment helps the families of those killed and wounded by 
making sure that Iran is held liable for this attack. It makes it 
harder for Iran to hide money in overseas bank accounts when it should 
be paying for the pain and suffering of its victims. It shows that, 
even 36 years after the attack, we have not forgotten, and it once 
again proves that U.S. marines remain ``no better friend, no worse 
enemy.''
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. PENCE. Madam Chair, I thank the chairman and ranking member for 
their leadership and my colleague and fellow marine from Arizona (Mr. 
Gallego) for his faithful service and unwavering support on this 
legislation.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 25 Offered by Mr. Schiff

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 25 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, as the designee of the gentlewoman from 
Michigan (Ms. Slotkin), I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 203, line 1, strike ``Report Required'' and insert 
     ``report on foreign malign influence response''.
       Page 204, after line 10, insert the following new 
     subsection:
       (c) Report on Ability to Identify Foreign Influence 
     Efforts.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report concerning the ability of the 
     intelligence community to--
       (A) identify foreign influence efforts aimed at sowing 
     discord or interfering, or both, in the political processes 
     of the United States; and
       (B) report such efforts to appropriate authorities.
       (2) Contents.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include 
     the following:
       (A) A description of the current level of ongoing 
     communication and coordination across the intelligence 
     community and law enforcement, including the Department of 
     Justice, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland 
     Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with 
     respect to combating foreign influence efforts described in 
     subparagraph (A) of such paragraph.
       (B) Identification of the offices or components of the 
     departments and agencies of the Federal Government that are 
     tasked with any responsibility with respect to combating such 
     foreign influence efforts.
       (C) Identification of the number of personnel within each 
     element of the intelligence community and other elements of

[[Page H5907]]

     the Federal Government that are focused on combating such 
     foreign influence efforts, whether on a temporary or 
     permanent basis.
       (D) Identification of the legal authorities that are most 
     relevant to combating such foreign influence efforts, 
     including--
       (i) which such legal authorities pose challenges or 
     barriers to effectively combat such foreign influence efforts 
     and a description of the reasons for such challenges or 
     barriers; and
       (ii) which such legal authorities pose challenges or 
     barriers with respect to elements of the intelligence 
     community and other elements of the Federal Government 
     working together to combat such foreign influence efforts and 
     a description of the reasons for such challenges or barriers.
       (E) A description of the current level of communication or 
     engagement between the intelligence community and private 
     internet-platforms or social media companies with respect to 
     combating such foreign influence efforts.
       (F) A description of the additional resources the Director 
     determines is necessary to effectively identify such foreign 
     influence efforts, and the roles and responsibilities across 
     the intelligence community that would best support the shared 
     objective of identifying such foreign influence efforts.
       (G) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.
       (3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) may be submitted 
     in classified form.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, the Intelligence Committee has invested 
considerable time and focus the last 3 years to study the painful 
lessons of foreign interference in our democratic system.
  Ms. Slotkin's amendment will enhance the work of the committee by 
compelling the Director of National Intelligence to identify barriers 
that prevent the intelligence community from fully understanding the 
scope and impact of these threats.
  Our adversaries are committed to employing a whole-of-government 
approach to execute their plan to disrupt our democratic system. In 
order to defeat these efforts, we must understand the scope of the 
threat. We must enlist our intelligence community to identify the scope 
of and the means by which our adversaries are attempting to achieve 
their goal.
  This amendment sets forth a framework by which the DNI will report to 
Congress on these threats and identify whether there are gaps in the 
IC's authorities that hinder its ability to find, assess, and enable 
action on foreign influence campaigns.
  Madam Chair, I believe this is an important amendment. I encourage my 
colleagues to support it, as well as the underlying bill, and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  The amendment was agreed to.

                              {time}  2130


                 Amendment No. 26 Offered by Mr. Schiff

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 26 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairwoman, I rise as the designee of Ms. Slotkin 
to offer her second amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title V, add the following new section:

     SEC. 507. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND 
                   CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       (a) Reports.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 501, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 1107. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND 
                   CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       ``(a) Requirement.--On an annual basis, the Director of the 
     National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     influence operations and campaigns in the United States 
     conducted by the Russian Federation.
       ``(b) Contents.--Each report under subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       ``(1) A description and listing of the Russian 
     organizations and persons involved in influence operations 
     and campaigns operating in the United States as of the date 
     of the report.
       ``(2) An assessment of organizations that are associated 
     with or receive funding from organizations and persons 
     identified in paragraph (1), particularly such entities 
     operating in the United States.
       ``(3) A description of the efforts by the organizations and 
     persons identified in paragraph (1) to target, coerce, and 
     influence populations within the United States.
       ``(4) An assessment of the activities of the organizations 
     and persons identified in paragraph (1) designed to influence 
     the opinions of elected leaders of the United States or 
     candidates for election in the United States.
       ``(5) With respect to reports submitted after the first 
     report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, 
     techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and 
     campaigns conducted by the organizations and persons 
     identified in paragraph (1).
       ``(c) Coordination.--In carrying out subsection (a), the 
     Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security 
     Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the 
     intelligence community.
       ``(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by 
     section 501, is further amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 1106 the following new item:
``Sec. 1107. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in 
              the United States by the Russian Federation.' '''.
       (c) Initial Report.--The Director of the National 
     Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees the first report under 
     section 1107 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added 
     by subsection (a), by not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairwoman, we are all too familiar with the 
influence operations perpetrated by the Russian Government during the 
2016 U.S. election.
  As the IC articulated in its January 2017 intelligence community 
assessment, those operations were merely the most recent in a long 
history of efforts to undermine the liberal democratic order. We must 
remain vigilant and fully informed about the operations executed by the 
Government of Russia to influence and undermine our democratic system.
  To that end, this amendment requires an annual report from the 
Director of National Intelligence containing information about the 
influence operations and campaigns in the U.S. by the Russian 
Federation. I support the amendment and urge my colleagues to do the 
same.
  I urge support for the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my 
time
  The Acting CHAIR (Mrs. Murphy). The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 27 Offered by Mr. Yoho

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 27 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. YOHO. Madam Chairwoman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 81, line 12, strike ``and'' at the end.
       Page 81, after line 12 insert the following (and 
     redesignate the succeeding paragraph):
       (2) the threat to the national security of the United 
     States posed by telecommunications companies that are subject 
     to the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary; and
       Page 81, line 22, strike ``and'' at the end.
       Page 81, after line 22 insert the following (and 
     redesignate the succeeding paragraph):
       (3) the threat to the national security of the United 
     States from acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, 
     or use of any communications technology by any person subject 
     to the jurisdiction of the United States that involves 
     communications technology designed, developed, manufactured 
     or supplied by, controlled by, or subject to, the 
     jurisdiction of a foreign adversary; and

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Yoho) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. YOHO. Madam Chairwoman, I stand in support of an amendment I

[[Page H5908]]

have offered to the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act.
  I would like to thank Representative Nunes and Representative Schiff 
for their work on this important legislation.
  My proposed amendment includes within the report on 5G technology, 
the threat to the national security of the United States posed by 
telecommunication companies that are subject to the jurisdiction of a 
foreign adversary; namely, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Syria.
  This will cover threats from acquisitions, importations, transfers, 
or use of communications technology by any person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States that involved technology designed, 
developed or controlled by a foreign adversary.
  As globalization continues to shape the world we live in, it is 
increasingly important that the United States prioritizes the security 
of our cyber networks and infrastructure. Today, China controls over 60 
percent of the 5G networks in the world.
  In 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence deemed 
telecommunication companies, Huawei and ZTE national security threats. 
Seven years later, these companies continue to harm and undermine U.S. 
cybersecurity interests. Should the U.S. continue to let these 
companies and others like them continue to proliferate our networks, we 
are putting the security of our citizens at risk and our national 
security.
  We must continue our maximum pressure campaign on these malicious 
companies until we can ensure that these actors do not pose threats to 
our national security.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Yoho).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 28 Offered by Mr. Yoho

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 28 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. YOHO. Madam Chairwoman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VI, add the following new section:

     SEC. 6__. REPORT CHARACTERIZING DOMESTIC TERRORISM ACTIVITY 
                   WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 150 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, in coordination with the Under Secretary of 
     Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees a report on 
     domestic terrorism activity within the United States.
       (b) Contents.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) Activities conducted by domestic terrorist groups to 
     restrict free speech using violence or intimidation.
       (2) Activities conducted by domestic terrorist groups that 
     are dangerous to human life and are a violation of the 
     criminal laws of the United States or of any State.
       (3) The prevalence of any domestic terrorist group's 
     activities within the United States and abroad.
       (c) Coordination.--The Director shall carry out subsection 
     (a) in coordination with the head of any other agency of the 
     Federal Government that the Director determines appropriate.
       (d) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Yoho) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. YOHO. Madam Chairwoman, I rise today to offer an amendment to 
H.R. 3494. My amendment No. 28 would require the FBI Director, in 
coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
Intelligence and Analysis to submit a report on domestic terrorist 
activity in the United States to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
  The report will detail:
  Activities conducted by domestic terrorist groups that restrict free 
speech using violence or intimidation;
  Activities conducted by domestic terrorist groups that are a danger 
to human life and are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States or any State; and
  The prevalence of any domestic terrorist group within the United 
States and abroad or any group that claimed to be domestic yet have 
ties to foreign groups like al-Qaida or other terrorist organizations.
  There are abhorrent groups of people within the United States today 
whose reasons for existence is violence. They do not respect the rule 
of law or the values of America. Yes, we have the First Amendment that 
allows for freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, but with those 
freedoms, one must exercise responsibility.
  They seek to inflict harm on Americans or specific groups of 
Americans because of their race, religion, personal beliefs, or other 
reasons.
  We have seen this evil in recent years with the deadly attacks on the 
Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, the attack on the Mother Emanuel 
AME Church in Charleston, and, sadly, too many more.
  Moreover, we have seen violence used by groups that restrict free 
speech, most recently with the attack on Andy Ngo in Portland by the 
group Antifa.
  We are the most extraordinary Nation because of our belief in and the 
adherence to the idea ``that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among 
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,'' with the rule 
of law included.
  Groups that threaten these notions threaten our country and our very 
form of government. It is imperative that Congress be informed of 
domestic terrorist activities and understand the prevalence of these 
activities.
  By keeping Congress informed of these activities, we, as legislators, 
may continue to ensure laws are appropriately crafted to protect all 
Americans and safeguard the liberties we hold dear.
  I encourage my colleagues to support this amendment, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Yoho).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 29 Offered by Ms. Omar

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 29 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Ms. OMAR. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 7__. REPORT ON TERRORIST SCREENING DATABASE.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the 
     terrorist screening database of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall identify the following:
       (1) Which foreign countries receive access to the terrorist 
     screening database.
       (2) Which foreign countries have successfully petitioned to 
     add individuals to the terrorist screening database.
       (3) What standards exist for determining which countries 
     get access to the terrorist screening database.
       (4) The extent to which the human rights record of the 
     government of a foreign country is considered in the 
     determination to give the country access to the terrorist 
     screening database.
       (5) What procedures, if any, exist to remove access to the 
     terrorist screening database from a foreign country.
       (6) What procedures, if any, exist to inform an individual, 
     or the legal counsel of an individual, of the placement of 
     the individual on the terrorist screening database.
       (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman 
from Minnesota (Ms. Omar) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Minnesota.
  Ms. OMAR. Madam Chairwoman, my amendment mandates reporting on the 
foreign governments with whom we share access to the Terrorist 
Screening Database. The database is shared with more than 60 foreign 
governments, including countries with appalling human rights records, 
such as Saudi Arabia and China.

[[Page H5909]]

  An FBI official has acknowledged in sworn testimony that it has never 
stopped sharing watch-list information with a foreign government 
because of that government's human rights abuses. Many of the people 
who are included in the database have never been charged with a crime, 
and, yet, we share sensitive information about them with the same 
government that murdered Jamal Khashoggi.
  I have also received credible reports that there have been Uighurs 
added to the database at the request of the Chinese Government. I ask 
the Chair to think about that.
  There is universal outrage in Washington about the treatment of the 
Uighur population in China. What are we talking about?
  Let's be clear. These are the precursors to genocide. And while it is 
happening, while Members of both sides of the aisle and the Secretary 
of State are condemning what is happening, we are allowing the Chinese 
Government to add Uighurs to the Terrorist Screening Database. We are 
allowing them to track Uighurs in the United States.
  This is probably the most appalling aspect of our sharing this 
information with governments that violate human rights, but it is not 
the only appalling aspect. One thing we know for sure in almost two 
decades that we have been fighting the war on terror, is that dictators 
have been more than happy to call whoever opposes them a terrorist.
  The Saudis, whose family has direct, proven, and clear financial 
links to al-Qaida, are given access to this database. The Saudis, who 
have rounded up human rights activists, tortured them, mass executed 
them, and claiming they are terrorists, get to add people on this list. 
It is entirely possible that they get to add American citizens to this 
list.
  This isn't compatible with a free society. It isn't compatible with 
our essential concepts of civil liberties. It is important to note that 
the evidentiary standard for being placed in the database is very low. 
The government only needs reasonable suspicion that someone is involved 
in terrorism, which is not even enough to charge someone with a crime.
  It is also significant that individuals added to this database are 
not informed of their placements and have suffered preventable harms as 
a result.
  So my amendment asks some basic questions, questions that we as 
Members of Congress have not only a right to, but a responsibility to 
ask.
  I ask my colleagues to support this amendment. If they are concerned 
about civil liberties, they should be concerned about this. If they are 
concerned about human rights abroad, they should be concerned about 
this. And no matter how they feel about the database itself, this 
amendment asks that we need answers in order to make informed decisions 
about our national security policy.
  Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Schiff), the chairman.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding to me.
  This amendment requires a report on a number of civil liberties 
questions regarding the Terrorist Screening Database. We need to 
structure our counterterrorism programs by thinking about not only what 
we can do and what is constitutional to do, but what we should be doing 
so that we get the maximum security benefit along with the maximum 
privacy.
  Our aim is a healthy equilibrium between security and privacy. With 
that in mind, I support my colleague's amendment which will assist the 
Intelligence Committee with its oversight and inform the public about 
how the privacy security balance is being struck.
  I want to thank Ms. Omar for her work, and I encourage my colleagues 
to support her amendment.
  Ms. OMAR. Madam Chair, I am thankful to the chairman and ranking 
member for their support, and with that, I yield back the balance of my 
time
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Minnesota (Ms. Omar).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Chair understands that amendment No. 30 will 
not be offered.


                  Amendment No. 31 Offered by Mr. Crow

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 31 
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
  Mr. CROW. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 708. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON AMERICANS AND FOREIGN 
                   INDIVIDUALS WHO CONTRIBUTE TO THE NATIONAL 
                   SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES WHO ARE HELD 
                   CAPTIVE.

       It is the sense of Congress that the United States 
     Government should--
       (1) prioritize the safety and protection for all Americans, 
     including citizens of the United States who are wrongfully 
     detained by foreign governments;
       (2) make every effort to bring these Americans back home; 
     and
       (3) provide assistance to and, as appropriate, advocate on 
     behalf of foreign individuals detained abroad who contributed 
     directly to the national security of the United States.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman 
from Colorado (Mr. Crow) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Colorado.
  Mr. CROW. Madam Chairwoman, I rise today to offer an amendment to 
highlight the importance of honoring our commitments, to keep Americans 
and those who serve our country around the world safe.
  Unfortunately, by virtue of being Americans and representing the 
values of our country, our citizens are sometimes targeted by 
adversarial countries and wrongfully detained. In those situations, we 
must leverage all available tools and resources at our disposal to 
secure their safe return. We must employ a whole-of-government approach 
to return Americans wrongfully detained in foreign countries back to 
their families.

                              {time}  2145

  We are a nation founded on the principle of due process. We must hold 
other countries to the same expectations of equal treatment under the 
law.
  We must also support the foreign nationals who put their lives and 
the lives of their families at risk to contribute to our national 
security. We owe these extraordinary individuals our gratitude for 
their assistance, particularly in light of the dangers that they often 
face. Despite precautions, in some cases, their contributions have led 
to their detainment or imprisonment.
  One of our greatest strengths is the network of individuals and 
nations that want to help us because they can rely on us to keep our 
promises. That is why we must continue to stand by our commitments to 
our partners, particularly when they are persecuted for their 
contributions to the U.S.
  Simply stated, we must honor our commitments to those who have stood 
by us.
  This amendment asserts the importance of this position, not just 
because it is in the best interests of the United States, but because 
it is the right thing to do, and that moral responsibility is an 
essential virtue of being an American.
  Madam Chair, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Securing the safe release of Americans held abroad is a top and 
urgent priority. Congress can play a role in keeping this issue at the 
forefront of public consciousness.
  With that in mind, I salute my colleague for all of his efforts. I 
thank Mr. Crow for drafting this sense of Congress that keeps the 
spotlight on this important issue.
  Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support the amendment and the 
underlying bill.
  Mr. CROW. Madam Chair, in closing, I urge my colleagues to support my 
amendment and uphold our obligations to our fellow Americans and 
partners around the world. We are a country that keeps its promises, 
and we must do so well into the future.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Crow).
  The amendment was agreed to.

[[Page H5910]]

  

  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Ms. 
Omar) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Murphy, Acting Chair of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 3494) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2020 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to 
no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________