REPORT OF THE VETO OF S.J. RES. 37, A JOINT RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED EXPORT TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN...; Congressional Record Vol. 165, No. 125
(Senate - July 24, 2019)

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[Page S5059]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 REPORT OF THE VETO OF S.J. RES. 37, A JOINT RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR 
  CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED EXPORT TO THE UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND 
 THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE OF CERTAIN DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES--PM 24

  The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message 
from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying 
report; which was ordered to be printed in the Record, spread in full 
upon the Journal, and held at the desk:

To the Senate of the United States:
  I am returning herewith without my approval S.J. Res. 37, a joint 
resolution that would prohibit the issuance of export licenses for 
certain defense articles, defense services, and technical data to 
support the transfer of Paveway II kits to the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and 
the Republic of France. This resolution would weaken America's global 
competitiveness and damage the important relationships we share with 
our allies and partners.
  In particular, S.J. Res. 37 would prohibit the issuance of export 
licenses for Paveway II kits to the UAE, the United Kingdom, and 
France. The misguided licensing prohibitions in the joint resolution 
directly conflict with the foreign policy and national security 
objectives of the United States, which include strengthening defense 
alliances with friendly countries throughout the world, deepening 
partnerships that preserve and extend our global influence, and 
enhancing our competitiveness in key markets. Apart from negatively 
affecting our bilateral relationships with the UAE, the United Kingdom, 
and France, the joint resolution would hamper the ability of the United 
States to sustain and shape critical security cooperation activities 
with those partners. S.J. Res. 37 would also damage the credibility of 
the United States as a reliable partner by signaling that we are 
willing to abandon our partners and allies at the very moment when 
threats to them are increasing.
  The United States is providing the licenses that the joint resolution 
seeks to prohibit for many reasons. First and foremost, it is our 
solemn duty to protect the safety of the more than 80,000 United States 
citizens who reside in Saudi Arabia and are imperiled by Houthis 
attacking from Yemen using missiles, armed drones, and explosive boats. 
The UAE is an important part of the Saudi-led Coalition that helps 
protect Americans from these Iranian-supported Houthi attacks on 
civilian and military facilities, including those located in areas 
frequented by United States citizens like the airport in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia. Second, the joint resolution would degrade the UAE's military 
preparedness and ability to protect its sovereignty, directly affecting 
its ability to defend the thousands of United States military personnel 
hosted there. Third, the UAE is a bulwark against the malign activities 
of Iran and its proxies in the region. It is also an active partner 
with the United States in combatting terrorism in Yemen and elsewhere. 
The licenses the joint resolution would prohibit enhance our partner's 
ability to deter and defend against these threats.
  In addition, S.J. Res. 37 would negatively affect our NATO Allies and 
the transatlantic defense industry. It could, for example, produce 
unintended consequences for defense procurement and interoperability 
with and between our partners. It could also create diplomatic and 
security opportunities for our adversaries to exploit.
  Finally, by restricting the ability of our partners to produce and 
purchase precision-guided munitions, S.J. Res. 37 would likely prolong 
the conflict in Yemen and deepen the suffering it causes. By 
undermining bilateral relationships of the United States and impeding 
our ability to support key partners at a critical time, the joint 
resolution would harm--not help--efforts to end the conflict in Yemen. 
And without precision-guided munitions, more--not fewer--civilians are 
likely to become casualties of the conflict. While I share concerns 
that certain Members of Congress have expressed about civilian 
casualties of this conflict, the United States has taken and will 
continue to take action to minimize such casualties, including training 
and advising the Saudi-led Coalition forces to improve their targeting 
processes.
  The United States is very concerned about the conflict's toll on 
innocent civilians and is working to bring the conflict in Yemen to an 
end. But we cannot end it through ill-conceived and time-consuming 
resolutions that fail to address its root causes. Rather than expend 
time and resources on such resolutions, I encourage the Congress to 
direct its efforts toward supporting our work to achieve peace through 
a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Yemen.
  For these reasons, it is my duty to return S.J. Res. 37 to the Senate 
without my approval.
                                                     Donald J. Trump.  
The White House, July 24, 2019.

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