PCAOB WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT OF 2019; Congressional Record Vol. 165, No. 151
(House of Representatives - September 19, 2019)

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[Pages H7800-H7803]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               PCAOB WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT OF 2019

  Ms. WATERS. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 3625) to establish a whistleblower program at the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 3625

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``PCAOB Whistleblower 
     Protection Act of 2019''.

     SEC. 2. WHISTLEBLOWER INCENTIVES AND PROTECTION.

       The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is amended--
       (1) in section 105 (15 U.S.C. 7215) by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``(f) Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.--
       ``(1) Definitions.--In this subsection the following 
     definitions shall apply:
       ``(A) Covered proceeding.--The term `covered proceeding' 
     means any disciplinary proceeding by the Board initiated 
     after the date of the enactment of this subsection that 
     results in monetary sanctions exceeding $250,000.
       ``(B) Original information.--The term `original 
     information' means information that--
       ``(i) is derived from the independent knowledge or analysis 
     of a whistleblower;
       ``(ii) is not known to the Board from any other source, 
     unless the whistleblower is the original source of the 
     information; and
       ``(iii) is not exclusively derived from an allegation made 
     in a disciplinary proceeding, in a judicial or administrative 
     hearing, in a governmental report, hearing, audit, or 
     investigation, or from the news media, unless the 
     whistleblower is a source of the information.
       ``(C) Monetary sanctions.--The term `monetary sanctions' 
     means any civil money penalties imposed by the Board under 
     subsection (c)(4) as modified by the Commission under section 
     107(c)(3).
       ``(D) Whistleblower.--
       ``(i) In general.--The term `whistleblower' means any 
     individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting 
     jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of 
     this Act, the rules of the Board, the provisions of the 
     securities laws relating to the preparation and issuance of 
     audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of 
     accountants with respect thereto, including the rules of the 
     Board issued pursuant to this Act, or professional standards.
       ``(ii) Special rule.--Solely for the purposes of paragraph 
     (7), the term `whistleblower' shall also include any 
     individual who takes an action described in paragraph 7(A), 
     or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who take an action 
     described in paragraph 7(A).
       ``(2) Awards.--
       ``(A) In general.--In any covered disciplinary proceeding, 
     the Board shall pay an award or awards to 1 or more 
     whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information 
     to the Board that resulted in the board imposing monetary 
     sanctions, in an aggregate amount determined in the 
     discretion of the Board but equal to--
       ``(i) not less than 10 percent, in total, of what has been 
     collected of the monetary sanctions imposed; and
       ``(ii) not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been 
     collected of the monetary sanctions.

[[Page H7801]]

       ``(B) Payment of awards.--Any amount paid under this 
     subparagraph shall be paid from any funds generated from the 
     collection of monetary sanctions.
       ``(3) Determination of amount of award; denial of award.--
       ``(A) Determination of amount of award.--
       ``(i) Discretion.--The determination of the amount of an 
     award made under paragraph (2) shall be in the discretion of 
     the Board.
       ``(ii) Criteria.-- In determining the amount of an award 
     made under subparagraph (A), the Board shall take into 
     consideration--

       ``(I) the significance of the information provided by the 
     whistleblower to the success of the disciplinary proceeding;
       ``(II) the degree of assistance provided by the 
     whistleblower and any legal representative of the 
     whistleblower in a disciplinary proceeding; and
       ``(III) the programmatic interest of the Board in deterring 
     violations by making awards to whistleblowers who provide 
     information that lead to successful enforcement.

       ``(B) Denial of award.--No award under subparagraph (A) 
     shall be made--
       ``(i) to any whistleblower who is, or was at the time the 
     whistleblower acquired the original information submitted to 
     the Board, a member, officer, or employee of--

       ``(I) an appropriate regulatory agency (as such term is 
     defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
       ``(II) the Department of Justice;
       ``(III) a self-regulatory organization (as such term is 
     defined in section 34 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
     1934);
       ``(IV) the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; or
       ``(V) a law enforcement organization;

       ``(ii) to any whistleblower who is convicted of a criminal 
     violation related to the Board finding for which the 
     whistleblower otherwise could receive an award under this 
     section;
       ``(iii) to any whistleblower who gains the information 
     through the performance of an audit of financial statements 
     required under the securities laws and for whom such 
     submission would be contrary to the requirements of section 
     10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j-1); 
     and
       ``(iv) to any whistleblower who fails to submit information 
     to the Board in such form as the Board may, by rule, require.
       ``(4) Representation.--
       ``(A) Permitted representation.--Any whistleblower who 
     makes a claim for an award under paragraph (2) may be 
     represented by counsel.
       ``(B) Required representation.--
       ``(i) In general.--Any whistleblower who anonymously makes 
     a claim for an award under paragraph (2) shall be represented 
     by counsel if the whistleblower anonymously submits the 
     information upon which the claim is based.
       ``(ii) Disclosure of identity.--Prior to the payment of an 
     award, a whistleblower shall disclose the identity of the 
     whistleblower and provide such other information as the Board 
     may require, directly or through counsel, for the 
     whistleblower.
       ``(5) No contract necessary.--No contract with the Board is 
     necessary for any whistleblower to receive an award under 
     paragraph (2), unless otherwise required by the Board by 
     rule.
       ``(6) Appeals.--Any determination made under this 
     subsection, including whether, to whom, or in what amount to 
     make awards, shall be in the discretion of the Board. Any 
     such determination, except the determination of the amount of 
     an award if the award was made in accordance with this 
     paragraph, may be appealed to the Commission not more than 30 
     days after the determination is issued by the Board. The 
     Commission shall review the determination made by the Board 
     in accordance with section 107(c).
       ``(7) Protection of whistleblowers.--
       ``(A) Prohibition against retaliation.--No employer may 
     discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or 
     indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a 
     whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment 
     because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower--
       ``(i) in providing information to the Board in accordance 
     with this subsection;
       ``(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any 
     investigation or judicial or administrative action of the 
     Board based upon or related to such information; or
       ``(iii) in making disclosures that are required or 
     protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 
     7201 et seq.), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
     78a et seq.), including section 10A(m) of such Act (15 U.S.C. 
     78f(m)), section 1513(e) of title 18, United States Code, and 
     any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the Securities Exchange Commission.
       ``(iv) in providing information regarding any conduct that 
     the whistleblower reasonably believes constitutes a potential 
     violation of any law, rule, or regulation subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the Board or the Commission (including 
     disclosures that are required or protected under the 
     Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 or the Securities Exchange Act of 
     1934) to--

       ``(I) a person with supervisory authority over the 
     whistleblower at the whistleblower's employer, where such 
     employer is an entity registered with or required to be 
     registered with the Board, the Commission, a self-regulatory 
     organization, or a State securities commission or office 
     performing like functions; or
       ``(II) such other person working for the employer described 
     under subclause (I) who has the authority to investigate, 
     discover, or terminate misconduct.

       ``(B) Enforcement of prohibition against retaliation.--
       ``(i) Cause of action.--An individual who alleges discharge 
     or other discrimination in violation of subparagraph (A) may 
     bring an action under this paragraph in the appropriate 
     district court of the United States for the relief provided 
     in subparagraph (C).
       ``(ii) Subpoenas.--A subpoena requiring the attendance of a 
     witness at a trial or hearing conducted under this subsection 
     may be served at any place in the United States.
       ``(iii) Statute of limitations.--

       ``(I) In general.--An action under this paragraph may not 
     be brought--

       ``(aa) more than 6 years after the date on which the 
     violation of subparagraph (A) occurred; or
       ``(bb) more than 3 years after the date when facts material 
     to the right of action are known or reasonably should have 
     been known by the employee alleging a violation of 
     subparagraph (A).

       ``(II) Required action within 10 years.--Notwithstanding 
     subclause (I), an action under this paragraph may not in any 
     circumstance be brought more than 10 years after the date on 
     which the violation occurs.

       ``(C) Relief.--Relief for an individual prevailing in an 
     action brought under this paragraph shall include--
       ``(i) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the 
     individual would have had, but for the discrimination;
       ``(ii) 2 times the amount of back pay otherwise owed to the 
     individual, with interest; and
       ``(iii) compensation for litigation costs, expert witness 
     fees, and reasonable attorneys' fees.
       ``(D) Confidentiality.--
       ``(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), the 
     Board and any officer or employee of the Board may not 
     disclose any information, including information provided by a 
     whistleblower to the Board, which could reasonably be 
     expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower unless and 
     until required to be disclosed to a defendant or respondent 
     in connection with a public proceeding instituted by the 
     Commission or any entity described in clause (iii).
       ``(ii) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section is 
     intended to limit, or shall be construed to limit, the 
     ability of the Attorney General to present such evidence to a 
     grand jury or to share such evidence with potential witnesses 
     or defendants in the course of an ongoing criminal 
     investigation.
       ``(iii) Availability to government agencies.--

       ``(I) In general.--Without the loss of its status as 
     confidential in the hands of the Board, all information 
     referred to in clause (i) may, in the discretion of the 
     Board, when determined by the Board to be necessary to 
     accomplish the purposes of this Act and to protect investors, 
     be made available to--

       ``(aa) the Attorney General of the United States;
       ``(bb) an appropriate regulatory authority;
       ``(cc) a self-regulatory organization;
       ``(dd) a State attorney general in connection with any 
     criminal investigation;
       ``(ee) any appropriate State regulatory authority;
       ``(ff) the Commission;
       ``(gg) a foreign securities authority; and
       ``(hh) a foreign law enforcement authority.

       ``(II) Confidentiality.--

       ``(aa) In general.--Each of the entities described in items 
     (aa) through (ff) of subclause (I) shall maintain such 
     information as confidential in accordance with the 
     requirements established under clause (i).
       ``(bb) Foreign authorities.-- Each of the entities 
     described in subclauses (gg) and (hh) of subclause (I) shall 
     maintain such information in accordance with such assurances 
     of confidentiality as the Board determines appropriate.
       ``(E) Rights retained.--Nothing in this subsection shall be 
     deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any 
     whistleblower under any Federal or State law, or under any 
     collective bargaining agreement.
       ``(8) Provision of false information.--A whistleblower 
     shall not be entitled to an award under this section if the 
     whistleblower--
       ``(A) knowingly and willfully makes any false, fictitious, 
     or fraudulent statement or representation; or
       ``(B) uses any false writing or document knowing the 
     writing or document contains any false, fictitious, or 
     fraudulent statement or entry.
       ``(9) Rulemaking authority.--The Board shall have the 
     authority to issue such rules and standards as may be 
     necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this 
     section consistent with the purposes of this section.
       ``(10) Coordination.--To the maximum extent practicable, 
     the Board shall coordinate with the Office of the 
     Whistleblower of the Securities Exchange Commission in 
     carrying out this subsection.''; and
       (2) in section 109(c)(2) (15 U.S.C. 7219(c)(2), by striking 
     ``all funds collected'' and inserting ``at least 50 percent 
     of funds collected''.

     SEC. 3. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.

       The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of 
     complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall 
     be determined by reference to the latest statement

[[Page H7802]]

     titled ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation'' for this 
     Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by 
     the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, provided that 
     such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on 
     passage.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Waters) and the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. 
McHenry) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.


                             General Leave

  Ms. WATERS. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their 
remarks on this legislation and to insert extraneous material thereon.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. WATERS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I thank Representative Garcia for this important piece of legislation 
that establishes a whistleblower program at the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board. This program is similar to the program that 
was created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act for the Securities and Exchange Commission.
  At the SEC, this program has proven to be extremely successful and 
has been instrumental in incentivizing whistleblowers to report 
suspected misconduct while protecting them from retaliation by their 
employers. According to the SEC, the SEC's whistleblower program has 
awarded approximately $381 million to 62 individual whistleblowers 
since the program began.
  Given the PCAOB's critical mission to protect investors and further 
the public interest by ensuring informative, accurate, and independent 
audit reports of public companies and SEC-registered brokers and 
dealers, it is vital that PCAOB whistleblowers are incentivized to come 
forward and are protected from employer retaliation.
  Due to the success of this program and its proven track record at the 
SEC, I urge my colleagues to support this commonsense bill. Madam 
Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. McHENRY. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I rise to speak on H.R. 3625, the PCAOB Whistleblower Protection Act. 
I thank the Congresswoman from Texas for her leadership on this bill 
and for her work on the committee.
  Madam Speaker, businesses have a self-interest in detecting and 
eliminating illegal activity as swiftly as possible within their 
organizations. As such, businesses, including audit firms and clients 
of audit firms, generally strive to comply with the law because, 
ultimately, violating the law hurts investors and, thereby, hurts their 
business and hurts their reputation.
  Violating the law is bad for business, right? It hurts the company's 
reputation, its value. It keeps business partners away. It breeds 
distrust in the marketplace. We know all of these things.
  However, sometimes, businesses need someone to call out bad behavior 
or illegal activity. Whistleblowers play an important role in rooting 
out bad behavior that harms the markets, that harms Mr. and Mrs. 
401(k), average, everyday investors, which most of us are.
  Moreover, it is important to appropriately incentivize whistleblowers 
to either report potentially unlawful activity internally or to 
appropriate government authorities. That is why we have whistleblower 
statutes. That is why this is a good piece of legislation.
  To that end, I am glad to see that this bill, which will establish 
rewards for certain whistleblowers whose tips lead to PCAOB--or 
Peekaboo, as we call it on the Financial Services Committee--monetary 
sanctions.
  This builds on the structure of the SEC's whistleblower program in a 
recent bill that we passed out of the House in the month of July that 
protects internal whistleblowers as well.
  Additionally, I want to note that the provision in this bill that 
states that, to the maximum extent possible, the PCAOB shall coordinate 
with the Office of the Whistleblower at the SEC in carrying out the law 
under this bill.
  The SEC whistleblower has been around for quite a while. They have 
the good regard of both parties, I think, in terms of how they respond. 
We want to make sure that experience is well coordinated with this new 
whistleblower authority at PCAOB.
  I hope that, where possible, the SEC's Office of the Whistleblower 
can provide significant assistance to the PCAOB, if not handle all 
these whistleblower claims itself. They have that type of experience. I 
think it would be proper for that agency to do that and to ensure that 
it is done in the most cost-effective manner for the taxpayer and for 
the investors as well.
  This legislation is good, in that it provides flexibility for that 
best delivery system as the SEC and Peekaboo go about this.
  Again, I thank my colleague from Texas for her hard work on this bill 
and for bringing an important piece of legislation that is good for 
taxpayers, good for investors, and really good for the stability of the 
markets and the belief in the stability of the markets. I urge a 
``yes'' vote, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. WATERS. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Garcia).
  Ms. GARCIA of Texas. Madam Speaker, this legislation is very simple. 
It would establish a whistleblower program at the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board based on the program Congress established at 
the Securities and Exchange Commission under Dodd-Frank.
  The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board was originally 
established to ensure proper oversight of audits of public companies. 
This was done after the implosion of Enron and its accounting firm 
Arthur Andersen, something that was very painful to many in my district 
in Houston.
  In the Dodd-Frank Act Congress passed, it expanded the whistleblower 
program at the SEC to both provide individual protections for 
retaliation if they came forward to the Commission and made them 
eligible for monetary awards if their information led to enforcement 
action. Likewise, under my bill, individuals would be eligible for a 
reward program upon the successful completion of disciplinary action. 
Whistleblowers would be incentivized to come forward when they suspect 
violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; the rules of the PCAOB and the 
SEC; and other rules, laws, and professional standards governing audits 
of public companies. Importantly, these whistleblowers would also be 
protected against retaliation from their employers.
  In July, this House overwhelmingly passed the Whistleblower 
Protection Reform Act by a vote of 410-12.

                              {time}  1615

  This bill uses the very same whistleblower protections that the House 
passed in that piece of legislation.
  This legislation would implement a key recommendation that the 
Project on Government Oversight board made in a recent report.
  Madam Speaker, as one can see from that report, it is likely more 
could be done to strengthen this oversight board and its enforcement 
abilities, but I am confident that this bill is a good first step.
  One of the reasons that investors from around the world invest in 
America is the stability and transparency of our public markets. 
Congress, the private sector, and regulators have all worked hard to 
make transparency a selling point around the world. This bill is just 
one small tool in the toolbox of making sure that transparency and the 
investor faith it generates in this country continue.
  Supporters of this bill include the National Whistleblower Center, 
The Institute of Internal Auditors, and Public Citizen. This bill 
passed by voice vote out of committee.
  Madam Speaker, I want to thank Chairwoman Waters and the ranking 
member, Mr. McHenry, and their staffs for working with us to 
incorporate some of the bipartisan suggestions that I believe make this 
bill stronger by ensuring that the SEC and the PCAOB coordinate in 
their whistleblower efforts. Those changes make this bill stronger, and 
I thank them for their bipartisan support.
  Madam Speaker, I will close by simply saying that PCAOB works. Let's

[[Page H7803]]

keep it going. I hope that all my colleagues will join me in supporting 
this legislation, and I ask for their support.
  Mr. McHENRY. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Speaker, I would like to commend my colleague from Texas--
though new to this legislative body, she has shown experience in how 
she has legislated here--and the willingness of the Democrat majority 
staff on the committee to work with my staff to ensure that we have a 
bill that is functional and right and can get wide support, as it 
should. So I thank the gentlewoman for this, which it may be her first 
legislative undertaking through the committee, and I want to commend 
her for the work that she has done.
  I address the Chair in saying that, but I think it is important that 
this body understands that there is good legislating that happens on 
our committee, and bipartisan legislating.
  Madam Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Huizenga), the ranking member of the Investor 
Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets Subcommittee, and my 
friend and colleague.
  Mr. HUIZENGA. Madam Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding.
  I do need to point out, while this bill had passed by a voice vote, 
it does not mean that it did not have opposition, and I rise today to 
express my concern with this bill which would establish this 
whistleblower incentive program at the PCAOB.
  Now, my opposition to this should not be interpreted as opposition to 
a whistleblower--in fact, it is the opposite of that--or a 
whistleblower program, but there are a number of reasons why I believe, 
and I think are clear, that this is a redundant program that is already 
covered in other ways.
  First, the bill is at odds with established principles of 
confidentiality that exist within the auditing profession. State laws 
and professional standards require accounting professionals to maintain 
the confidentiality of client information received in the course of 
performing an audit. This bill purports to exclude from whistleblower 
status any person who gains the information while performing audit 
work.
  However, the exclusion is muddled by an unclear and potentially broad 
exception. As a result, it is very possible that personnel performing 
audits may try to garner bounties by blowing the whistle on their audit 
clients, contrary to their professional obligations.
  By providing monetary incentives for audit personnel to go to the 
PCAOB, the bill inevitably will have harmful effects on the auditor-
audit client relationship, the audit process, and the public's 
confidence in the financial reporting process.
  This bill also raises other significant questions. For example, why 
is a program at the PCAOB even necessary in light of the Security and 
Exchange Commission's already well-established whistleblower program? 
This is a completely redundant function that is being attempted here.
  Additionally, what are the costs associated with setting up a new 
whistleblower program, and will these costs force the PCAOB to divert 
resources from other projects in order to get this duplicative program 
off the ground?
  So, in light of these concerns, I believe that this is a redundant 
and ill-conceived bill that likely has one purpose: to provide another 
avenue for plaintiffs' bar to enrich itself. That is a massive concern 
that I and so many others involved in this have.
  It is incumbent upon those who support this bill to explain why they 
believe that auditors, who play such a critical gatekeeping function in 
our capital markets, should be potentially offered the prospect of 
monetary bounties at the expense of disrupting the effective 
functioning of the audit process as it is today, especially in light of 
the SEC's well-established whistleblower program that would cover all 
of these particular circumstances.
  Madam Speaker, I do appreciate the ranking member yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. McHENRY. Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his comments. 
Certainly, there is a diversity of thought among our colleagues on this 
bill.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. WATERS. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Garcia), who is the author of this legislation, and she will 
sufficiently describe why this bill is not redundant.

  Ms. GARCIA of Texas. Madam Speaker, I will be brief, just two points:
  Number one, it is not redundant. If it were so, the National 
Whistleblower Center and The Institute of Internal Auditors wouldn't 
see a need for it, and neither would the report that we have now placed 
in the Record. It is needed, and certainly we need to support it.
  Secondly, in terms of costs, the cost for implementing this bill will 
be offset by the increase in fees that the board will collect from the 
accounting boards for which they have oversight. So there will be no 
additional costs. It will be offset.
  Madam Speaker, it is needed, and I urge adoption of this bill.
  Mr. McHENRY. Madam Speaker, I am prepared to close.
  Ms. WATERS. Madam Speaker, I have no additional speakers. I reserve 
the right to close.
  Mr. McHENRY. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Whistleblowers provide an important function. We want to make sure 
that there are legal constraints on this, obviously. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission have shown themselves good actors in terms of 
implementing the whistleblower law that we currently have on the books, 
and I anticipate, with the capacity for implementation, that there 
could be that like kind of coordination between PCAOB and the SEC in 
order to implement this bill.
  Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
  Ms. WATERS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  First, Madam Speaker, I congratulate the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. 
Garcia). I am so very proud of the work that she is doing on the 
Financial Services Committee. We are here today on this particular 
legislation, but this particular legislator, who serves on the 
Financial Services Committee, has undertaken to produce legislation 
that is so meaningful, not only for her district and for her State, but 
for this country. I am very pleased about this bill today, and I join 
her in saying it is certainly not redundant.
  Madam Speaker, I think the gentleman on the opposite side of the 
aisle from Michigan almost forgot why he came here, because he used the 
word ``redundant'' at least six or seven times, and he repeated it and 
repeated it because I think it was difficult for him to find other 
words to try and explain why he was on the floor today opposing this 
bill.
  The SEC has demonstrated the value of whistleblowers. And, yes, the 
whistleblowers are compensated, but they save our government money. 
They save the SEC money. They save harm from being done to those 
investors that we should be protecting.
  Madam Speaker, again, I can't say enough about Congresswoman Garcia 
and this bill and the work that she is doing, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters) that the House suspend the 
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3625, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________