WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOES NOT LIMIT THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO ACT WITHOUT CONGRESS; Congressional Record Vol. 166, No. 5
(House of Representatives - January 09, 2020)

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[Pages H68-H69]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




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   WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOES NOT LIMIT THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO ACT 
                            WITHOUT CONGRESS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Kentucky (Mr. Barr) for 5 minutes.
  Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to a 
dangerous and partisan resolution offered by my Democrat colleagues 
designed to handcuff our President and limit his constitutional 
authorities as Commander in Chief to defend our Nation against Iranian 
aggression.
  The resolution before us today needlessly politicizes our national 
security and shows that Democrats have once again put their partisan 
agenda ahead of the American people simply because they do not like 
President Trump.
  Let's be clear. President Trump's decisive and defensive action to 
eliminate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander, 
Qasem Soleimani, is not the reason for the recent escalation between 
the United States and Iran. The President ordered the strike because of 
Iran's own escalation and aggression, for which General Soleimani was 
largely and personally responsible.
  For over 40 years, Iran and it proxies have been attacking U.S. 
interests and our allies, but since the flawed Iran nuclear deal, under 
which the regime received billions of dollars in sanctions relief, the 
Islamic republic has used that economic windfall to accelerate its 
support for terrorist proxies, restart its ballistic missile program--
in violation of U.N. resolutions--and cheat on its denuclearization 
aims.
  My colleagues have heard the quote of the late Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg,

[[Page H69]]

chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that: ``We must stop 
partisan politics at the water's edge.''
  Senator Vandenberg, a Republican, who worked across the aisle with 
Democrat President Truman in the early days of the Cold War was right.
  This resolution is not safeguarding our Constitution, but attacking 
our Constitution by attempting to divest a duly elected President of 
his Commander in Chief powers, and in the process, emboldening our 
enemies.
  In fact, President Trump has demonstrated enormous restraint in his 
targeted action against Soleimani making this vote entirely 
unnecessary. There was no invasion of Iran, but a strike against a 
terrorist in a country we had the legal authority to operate in under 
the 2002 Authorization for the Use of Military Force.
  Mr. Speaker, you have heard many of my colleagues doubt the 
applicability of that AUMF, so for those colleagues who are unconvinced 
that that is a sufficient authority, consider the fact that even in the 
absence of explicit congressional authorization for the Soleimani 
strike, here is a helpful reminder: Article II, Section 2 of the 
Constitution provides that: The President shall be Commander in Chief. 
And it is true that the Constitution gives Congress the sole power to 
declare war and the sole power of the purse to either fund or defund 
military action, but dating back to the Prize cases in 1863, the 
Supreme Court has long held that the President may act without Congress 
to defend the Nation.
  In recent years, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel has 
opined that the Constitution authorizes the President as Commander in 
Chief to order military action without congressional permission if the 
President determines that the action would be anticipatory self-defense 
or otherwise serves the interest of the United States, at least where 
the nature, scope, and duration of the anticipated hostilities are 
limited.
  And that was what was the case here.
  Specifically, the OLC has said the President's inherent 
constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, his broad foreign 
policy powers, and his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, empower him to deplore the armed forces abroad, without a 
declaration of war by Congress or other congressional authorization.
  The courts have generally declined to review the exercise of such 
unilateral executive power.
  The War Powers Resolution does not limit the President's power to act 
without Congress. At most, it imposes a reporting and consultation 
requirement that this President has complied with.
  Furthermore, the War Powers Resolution applies only to the deployment 
of significant bodies of military personnel and would not apply to a 
drone strike.
  Finally, according to OLC, `` . . . if our Armed Forces otherwise 
lawfully stationed in a foreign country were fired upon and defended 
themselves, we doubt that such engagement in hostilities would be 
covered by the consultation and reporting provisions of the War Powers 
Resolution.''
  Of course, that is precisely the scenario here involving the 
President's decisive strike against Soleimani in response to an attack 
on our embassy.
  Thank goodness we have a Commander in Chief who will not allow 
another Benghazi on his watch. Don't forget, the Framers of the 
Constitution specifically rejected a proposal that Congress be 
empowered to ``make war,'' and implied power for the President to 
``repel sudden attacks.''
  This was in recognition of the slow pace and inefficiency of 
legislative proceedings under the Articles of Confederation. As Members 
of Congress, we have a special duty to jealously guard legislative 
prerogatives, including the power to declare war, and to provide a 
check on the executive branch for overreach. But we also must have the 
humility to acknowledge that Congress lacks the power to divest the 
President of his Commander in Chief powers under Article II.

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