THOUSAND TALENTS PLAN; Congressional Record Vol. 166, No. 95
(Senate - May 20, 2020)

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[Pages S2539-S2541]
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                         THOUSAND TALENTS PLAN

  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. President, last week I came to the floor of the 
Senate to talk about how the tragic spread of the coronavirus around 
the world underscored the need for us to focus on the persistent 
challenge of China not playing by the rules.
  In the case of coronavirus, that was about China not telling the 
World Health Organization, not telling other countries, and not telling 
their own people what was happening in terms of the coronavirus and not 
taking steps to stop international travel early on. That wasn't playing 
by the WHO rules--the World Health Organization rules--and the result 
has been devastation. It has meant the spread of the virus. So much of 
that devastation we

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have seen around the globe, in my view, could have been avoided had 
they played by the rules.
  Unfortunately, not playing by the rules applies to China in many 
other areas too. We have talked a lot about trade on the floor of the 
Senate, to be sure that there is a level playing field between China 
and the United States and making sure they play by the international 
trading rules. But here is another one where China and the Chinese 
Communist Party have not played by the rules, and that is with regard 
to obtaining our intellectual property, our innovation, and our 
research.
  In the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which I chair, we 
found not playing by the rules to be the case when we conducted a 
bipartisan, yearlong investigation into how China has used so-called 
talent recruitment programs--most notably its Thousand Talents Plan--to 
steal U.S. taxpayer-funded research to help fuel the rise to both the 
Chinese military and the Chinese economy over the past 20 years. It has 
been going on for two decades.
  You might ask, how has this happened? How could this be possible? 
This is how it happens. Every year, Federal grant-making agencies, like 
the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Energy and their 
National Labs, the National Science Foundation, and others, give out 
more than $150 billion in U.S. taxpayer funds for research. That is 
quite a bit of money.
  For the most part, this system works well. American taxpayers send 
the money to these Federal grant-making agencies here in Washington, 
which then give it out to the best researchers and the best research 
labs in the country. It has resulted in important new breakthroughs in 
science, technology, healthcare, energy, military equipment, and more.
  The NSF helped fund the creation of the internet. The NIH has funded 
research into very successful and innovative treatments for cancer and 
other diseases. So there is a lot of good stuff coming out of these 
research dollars. It has made America really the leader in the world on 
innovation and new ideas.
  For the most part, this Federal research funding has enjoyed broad 
bipartisan support here in the Congress. But guess what. It has also 
attracted interest from researchers around the world who want the 
chance to take a part in this cutting-edge research. That is good, too, 
as long as they play by the rules.
  What we have learned and we proved through our report is that this 
system is very vulnerable to theft by other countries. That is exactly 
what has happened in the case of China.
  China has made no secret that its goal is to surpass the United 
States as the world leader in scientific research. They have seen an 
opportunity to get ahead by exploiting this system of taxpayer-funded 
grants and the open and collaborative research enterprise that we have 
in this country. They have taken advantage of that.
  Specifically, the Chinese Government has systematically targeted the 
most promising U.S. researchers. So they find out somebody is doing 
some research on something interesting to them, and they systematically 
target that person. They have been paying these grant recipients to 
take their research--remember, research paid for by U.S. taxpayer 
dollars--and apply what they have learned here in labs over in China at 
Chinese universities affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party.
  The research they are taking over to China isn't just going toward 
academic purposes. That wouldn't be right, either, because our taxpayer 
dollars are going in to fund this research. They are then leapfrogging 
us by getting that research. But it is not just for academic purposes. 
Often, the research ends up going directly into things like advancing 
China's military, which has made great strides in the last two decades, 
advancing its technological growth, its economy, its manufacturing 
processes, and so on.
  A State Department witness at one of our Senate hearings on our 
report said this: ``The Chinese Communist Party has declared the 
Chinese university system to be on the front line of military-civilian 
fusion efforts for technology acquisition.'' So there is a clear link 
here between the research going to these Chinese university labs and 
that same research being used to allow China to effectively leapfrog us 
in terms of their military improvements and their economic growth.
  Part of the reason it has gone on so long, frankly, is because we 
have been asleep at the switch. We haven't been focused on this. We do 
have an open, collaborative research system in this country, and we 
haven't been effective at cracking down on this intellectual property 
theft. That is starting to change, and I am appreciative of that.
  It started to change, frankly, in the wake of our subcommittee 
investigation. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearings 
also helped. Our report also helped. During one of our hearings, the 
FBI actually acknowledged what has been happening. This is what the FBI 
said: ``With our present-day knowledge of the threat from Chinese 
talent plans, we wish we had taken more rapid and comprehensive action 
in the past, and the time to make up for that is now.'' I appreciate 
the candor. I appreciate the fact that the FBI was willing to say: Now 
that we have learned all of this, we should have been acting on this a 
long time ago. We are going to do it now and make up for lost time.

  They have been much more aggressive. Since our hearing and detailed 
report last November, we have seen a number of high-profile arrests of 
academics in this country who have consistently hidden their 
participation in China's Thousand Talents program and have taken 
research over to China.
  You may remember hearing about this issue earlier this week when a 
Harvard professor named Dr. Charles Lieber, who was the chair of 
Harvard University's chemistry department, was accused of secretly 
taking money from China and sharing his U.S. taxpayer-funded research 
with the Chinese Government. It was really a shocking example of this.
  But he is not the only case. In March, we received news of another 
arrest of a professor who used to work at West Virginia University who 
participated in Thousand Talents. In this case, the Justice Department 
found that he had convinced his employer--a U.S. public university--to 
give him paid parental leave funded by American taxpayers while he went 
to China to work at a university there to continue his work on 
specializing molecular reactions used in coal conversion technologies. 
This is from West Virginia University.
  These two cases would be bad enough on their own, but since the start 
of this month, we have actually had three more cases announced by the 
Department of Justice and the FBI in relation to this Thousand Talents 
program. I commend the DOJ and the FBI for their work to continue to 
crack down on this program and to go after these problems, but they 
need better tools to do it.
  About 2 weeks ago, a former Emory University professor pled guilty to 
falsifying his tax returns to conceal his work for the Chinese 
Government. The professor worked simultaneously and secretly for 6 
years for both Emory University and overseas for Chinese universities 
affiliated with the Communist Party of China, conducting similar 
research projects at both institutions. Despite this clear conflict of 
interest, he failed to report any of his at least $500,000 in foreign 
income on his Federal tax returns.
  That very same day, a professor at the University of Arkansas was 
arrested on charges of wire fraud for allegedly failing to disclose his 
ties to the Chinese Government, despite being required to do so as a 
grant recipient of money from NASA--NASA.
  Just this past week, we found out that this problem had reached my 
home State of Ohio when the Department of Justice announced the arrest 
of a researcher previously affiliated with the world-renowned Cleveland 
Clinic. This researcher had received more than $3.6 million in 
taxpayer-funded grants from the National Institutions of Health--again, 
taxpayer dollars. To secure that grant, he is accused of lying to hide 
the fact that he was given a deanship at the university in Wuhan, 
China.
  He is also accused of lying about his Chinese Government-funded 
research directly overlapping with his NIH-funded research. According 
to the criminal complaint, he received $3 million in funding from China 
to run a shadow lab in Wuhan to replicate his Cleveland Clinic 
research, along with free travel and free lodging funded by the Chinese 
Government. It says he even admitted

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that he hand-carried samples of biological material from Cleveland, OH, 
to Wuhan. Those samples are still stored, by the way, in China.
  It also states that he did not disclose that one of his Chinese 
grants required that he be in Wuhan for 10 months of the year at the 
same time he was also employed full time at the Cleveland Clinic, 
again, working on NIH-funded research.
  I commend the Cleveland Clinic for working with the FBI and the U.S. 
Attorney's Office to ensure that we were able to stop this from 
happening.
  As a Thousand Talents member, the criminal complaint also alleges 
that this individual recruited around 40 to 50 other U.S.-based 
researchers for his Chinese university by hosting events at Harvard and 
other schools in the United States.
  This is a big deal, and it needs to stop. I commend the Assistant 
Attorney General for National Security, John Demers, for his work on 
this and other cases and also U.S. Attorney Justin Herdman of the 
Northern District of Ohio, FBI Special Agent in Charge Eric Smith, and 
all the members of their team for their work on this Cleveland Clinic 
case.
  Again, these cases are all positive steps in the right direction, but 
the problem, as you might notice, is that none of these criminal 
charges and arrests were actually based on participating in a Thousand 
Talents program or even hiding that from the U.S. Government research 
institutions or universities. The criminal charges and arrests were all 
for other crimes, like perjury, wire fraud, and tax evasion. That is 
because, amazingly, failing to disclose on a grant application to 
receive U.S.-taxpayer funds that you are receiving compensation--clear 
conflict of interest--from a foreign government and giving them your 
research is not currently a crime. That needs to change.
  One example: The Emory University professor, according to the law, 
only committed tax fraud, while the Arkansas professor only committed 
wire fraud. The fact that these are technically only financial crimes 
show that we are still just nibbling around the edges of this problem. 
It is time for us to get at the underlying flaw in our research 
enterprise of talent programs enticing researchers here in the United 
States to steal for other countries. We are going to need targeted 
legislation that will take direct action against this practice, and 
that is exactly what we have done.
  Along with a group of colleagues, including Democrat Tom Carper, the 
ranking member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, we are 
introducing the Safeguarding American Innovation Act, which is going to 
build on the recommendations made in our PSI report and address some of 
these root causes of the ongoing IP theft that is currently going on.
  First and foremost, our bill is going to help the Department of 
Justice go after the Thousand Talents participants by allowing DOJ to 
hold Federal grant recipients accountable for failing to disclose their 
foreign ties on Federal grant applications. This isn't just about more 
arrests, either. We should all agree that transparency and honesty in 
grant applications are critical to the integrity of U.S. research, and 
this provision will help to promote those principles.
  Our bill makes other important changes, as well, based on the 
recommendations in our report. It requires the Office of Management and 
Budget, or OMB, to streamline and coordinate grant-making between these 
Federal agencies, so there is needed accountability and transparency 
when it comes to tracking the billions of dollars of taxpayer funds in 
grant money that is being distributed.
  We have worked closely with NSF, NIH, Department of Energy, and 
others on this important piece of legislation. They agree it is 
important. It allows the State Department to deny visas to foreign 
researchers who are seeking to access sensitive U.S. research when 
there is a threat to our economic or our national security. This may 
surprise you, but they can't do that now. Career Foreign Service 
officers and employees of the State Department have begged us for that 
authority.
  Our bill also requires research institutions to have safeguards in 
place to prohibit unauthorized access to sensitive research because we 
found that to be a serious problem. And our bill ensures transparency 
by requiring universities to report any foreign gift of $50,000 or 
more, and it empowers the Department of Education to fine universities 
that repeatedly fail to disclose these gifts.
  Right now, our No. 1 priority is and should be solving the 
coronavirus crisis. I get that. By the way, the FBI sent a notice 
around last week to universities and research institutions saying: 
Watch out because there are actually Chinese hackers trying to get your 
research on coronavirus. It just happened last week.
  I have to tell you that in the context of this crisis, we have to 
reevaluate how we do business with China. We have to look at this with 
fresh eyes and realize that in many areas China has not been playing by 
the same set of rules as the rest of the world.
  We talked about that earlier, with regard to trade and with regard to 
reporting on the coronavirus. I think in a fair and straightforward 
manner, we have to lead in insisting that there be a level playing 
field, whether it is the WHO or whether it is transparency with 
coronavirus or trade policy or how research is acquired.
  My hope is that our PSI report and the legislation we are introducing 
will let us reset the way we conduct our research. Our goal should be 
to continue to reward those who come to our shores and discover new 
breakthroughs in science and technology. We want that. We are very 
proud of the fact that we are the most innovative country in the world 
and we are known for our research enterprise. We want to continue that, 
but we want to do it in a smart way. We want to be sure that we are 
keeping China and other nations and competitors from stealing that 
research for its own purposes. I know we can achieve that balance. Our 
legislation does that.
  I look forward to getting support from both sides of the aisle 
because this is a problem we should all be concerned about.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.

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