June 17, 2020 - Issue: Vol. 166, No. 112 — Daily Edition116th Congress (2019 - 2020) - 2nd Session

[Pages S3057-S3059]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     THE DECLINE OF U.S. LEADERSHIP

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I would like to call the Senate's attention 
to a letter published by my friend Sir Peter

[[Page S3058]]

Westmacott, on the occasion of what would have been the meeting of the 
G7 at Camp David. Peter is the former U.K. ambassador to the United 
States and a thoughtful diplomat if there ever was one. He previously 
served as ambassador to France and ambassador to Turkey. Unburdened by 
the self-consciousness that sometimes plagues American policymakers 
critical of the Trump administration, he writes honestly and 
insightfully to a British Prime Minister of the ways President Trump 
has weakened America's standing as an international leader and how 
others stand to capitalize from our diminished role. In the midst of a 
global pandemic compounded by climate change, multiple armed conflicts 
and humanitarian crises, Russian aggression and expanding Chinese 
influence, when global leadership and cooperation are needed more than 
ever, the incoherence and isolationism of this White House are 
appalling.
  Over many years, I have worked with Senators of both parties, with 
Republican and Democratic administrations, and with foreign leaders. I 
disagreed with, as well as those with whom we have much in common. The 
most successful makers of foreign policy share an adherence to the 
truth, objectively and uniformly acknowledged; a recognition of the 
importance of engagement with the rest of the world; and the goal of 
seeking common ground to make progress on shared interests.
  Unfortunately, President Trump fails on each of these counts. As Sir 
Peter describes, he disregards facts for his preferred fictitious 
narratives. He turns away from our allies and picks fights with our 
trading partners. He impulsively withdraws from international 
agreements that took years to negotiate because he does not stand to 
benefit personally or politically from them. He has abandoned our role 
as a moral and strategic leader. He crafts foreign policy by tweet. It 
is a disgrace, and foreign diplomats and heads of state, with the 
exception of our adversaries and autocrats who stand to benefit by 
mimicking President Trump, are confused, worried, and appalled.
  Sir Peter aptly describes this sorry state of affairs and what it 
means for our country and the world.
  I ask unanimous consent that Sir Peter Westmacott's letter be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                            [June 10, 2020]

    An Ex-Ambassador's View of a World Without Political Leadership

                         (By Peter Westmacott)

       Dear Prime Minister: This week you should have been meeting 
     up with your G7 colleagues at Camp David. Covid-19 has 
     stopped that happening but there is so much going on that I 
     thought I should send you my briefing note anyway.
       President Trump was delighted to be host. He always likes 
     to be centre stage but the summit would have been a welcome 
     distraction from his slow and confused response to the 
     pandemic and from how, in marked contrast to his predecessor, 
     he made things worse not better when Americans took the 
     streets following the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. 
     Every judgement he makes from now until 3 November will be 
     viewed through the prism of whether it helps him win a second 
     term.
       That is currently looking less likely than before the 
     pandemic. Trump's base is holding up--he has delivered 
     hundreds of conservative judges, sided with white 
     supremacists, stood up for the gun lobby and given tax cuts 
     to the wealthy. His attempts to smear his opponent Joe Biden 
     don't currently seem to be working but much will depend on 
     whether there are signs of an economic bounce-back before 
     election day; and on turn-out, especially in the six critical 
     swing states of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin where 
     Trump sealed it last time, plus Florida, North Carolina and 
     Arizona. Democrats I talk to currently point to the betting 
     spreads--not just the polls--slightly favouring Biden and 
     dare to hope for a clean sweep of White House and Senate (not 
     even Republicans expect the Democrats to lose the House).
       The summit would have taken place against a background of 
     failure of the global institutions, including the G7--to 
     organise a meaningful collective response to the C19 crisis. 
     Everyone knows that the WHO chose to praise rather than 
     lambast China for its performance in the early stages of the 
     outbreak, in the hope of eliciting a more honest and 
     transparent response. But your counterparts are clear that 
     Trump's decision to walk away from the WHO had more to do 
     with pointing the finger of blame before the US elections 
     than with improving our ability to act collectively.
       This is symptomatic of a wider problem--the disappearance 
     of US moral and strategic leadership under Trump. The causes 
     are legion: take for example his protectionist focus on 
     `America First', the trade wars with China and the EU, the 
     undermining of NATO, the renunciation of international arms 
     control agreements, of the Iran nuclear deal, his trashing of 
     the Middle East Peace Process, his vainglorious but failed 
     attempt to denuclearise North Korea, his abandonment of the 
     Paris climate accords, and his unique contribution to the 
     creation of a posttruth world in which the West has largely 
     forfeited the right to call out others for bad behaviour.
       Crises accelerate trends more than they create new ones. 
     When Covid-19 hit us, the free world was already rethinking 
     its attitude towards the rise of a China more interested in 
     consolidating the power of the communist party and its 
     leader, Xi Jinping, than in the welfare of its people or 
     engagement with the rest of the world on any other than its 
     own terms.
       You will recall coming under heavy US pressure in January 
     to exclude Huawei from Britain's 5G telecoms infrastructure. 
     Allies and friends in South East Asia were already very 
     exercised about China's militarisation programme and 
     disregard of the findings of the UN Law of the Sea Convention 
     rejecting its territorial claims. Taiwan was feeling 
     threatened while China's attempt last year to impose an 
     extradition treaty on Hong Kong was a foretaste of its 
     attempt now, under cover of the pandemic crisis, further 
     to undermine ``one country, two systems'' with new 
     national security laws jeopardising the territory's 
     fundamental freedoms.
       Covid-19 has also accelerated the concern of China's 
     trading partners about the resilience of their supply chains. 
     Early in the crisis, Jaguar Land Rover had to halt production 
     because of a lack of components made in Wuhan. Companies the 
     world over are now looking again at whether `just-in-time' 
     deliveries from far away Chinese suppliers need supplementing 
     with `just-in-case' arrangements nearer home.
       Your own launch of Project Defend designed to improve the 
     resilience of strategically important firms is being matched 
     by similar rethinking elsewhere in Europe, where Macron and 
     Merkel have joined forces to press for greater EU 
     sovereignty. That in turn followed the EU's decision last 
     year to designate China as ``a systemic rival promoting 
     alternative systems of governance'', as concern has grown 
     around China's increasingly apparent agenda of seeing the 
     Western model of individual liberty, freedom of expression 
     and democracy replaced by acceptance of authoritarianism and 
     the party-state.
       China likes to pick off individual countries, as we in the 
     UK have seen in the past. After Australia called for an 
     independent investigation of the Covid-19 outbreak, China 
     imposed an 80% tariff on its imports of Australian barley. So 
     it will be important to forge a common approach. It was 
     unfortunate that in March US Secretary of State Pompeo 
     blocked a G-7 statement on the pandemic because other 
     governments would not agree to describing it as ``the Wuhan 
     virus''. But Dominic Raab's call with the foreign ministers 
     of our Five Eyes intelligence partners on 2 June to discuss 
     Hong Kong was a good start.
       As far as possible, however, we should aim to work with 
     rather than against China. It is heavily invested in the 
     global economy and has vast trade surpluses with the rest of 
     the world. It has also begun to move in the right direction 
     on imports and inward investment--if not yet on protection of 
     intellectual property. But as you have made clear with your 
     offer of a path to citizenship for Hong Kong's British 
     passport holders, that cannot be at the cost of surrendering 
     fundamental principles or reneging on our international 
     commitments.
       Trump has said he thinks Putin should be invited to the 
     next G7 summit, whenever it takes place. You have said firmly 
     that you don't agree, for the very good reason that there has 
     not been the improvement in Russian behaviour in Ukraine 
     required by the Minsk agreements. Trump is close to Putin, 
     and his business dealings with Russia go back many years. So 
     he may try again, perhaps with the support of Macron who 
     wants to ``re-engage'' with Russia.
       In Putin's playbook, compromise is weakness so you may need 
     to remind your colleagues of his mission to recover the 
     ground he thinks Russia lost in what he has called the 
     ``greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th Century'' when 
     the Soviet Union imploded; of Russia's role in systematically 
     undermining elections in free countries; and of the Kremlin's 
     nasty habit of trying to murder its critics and opponents on 
     the streets of British cities.
       Your European counterparts are likely to raise their 
     concerns at the current state of Brexit negotiations. They 
     have understood that you won't be asking to extend the 
     transition period beyond the end of the year. They would like 
     a deal to be reached in the remaining six months since they 
     too will be losers if there isn't one. But just as your team 
     argue that the Commission are being unreasonable, and have 
     moved the goalposts, so Barnier & Co think we have changed 
     our position since you concluded the Withdrawal Agreement and 
     political declaration last year and that the bespoke 
     arrangement we are asking for is much more than the simple 
     Canada-style agreement we say we want. Waiting for, or 
     provoking, a breakdown, in

[[Page S3059]]

     the hope that political leaders will come to the rescue is 
     unlikely to work: we should be preparing for either stop-the-
     clock at the end of December while a last-minute fudge is 
     worked out, or no deal at all.
       Beyond those detailed negotiations lie some big issues 
     related to Britain's place in the world and our global 
     influence. The E3 arrangement between France, Germany and the 
     UK still functions, and is helping to manage the fall-out 
     from Trump's abandonment of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. 
     More generally, on many of the big international issues the 
     UK is more naturally aligned these days with its European 
     partners than with the US. But there is still a sense that we 
     currently have little bandwidth or inclination to play the 
     kind of substantive foreign policy role we have played in the 
     past, and disappointment in EU capitals that we don't want to 
     include foreign and security policy in the structure of our 
     new post-Brexit relationship. I would say this, wouldn't I, 
     but we need to guard against the risk that, despite the talk 
     of Global Britain, we find ourselves unable to exercise as 
     much influence outside the EU as we did inside it--a concern 
     shared by foreign policy experts in Washington.
       So at some point you might want to consider boosting our 
     soft and hard power alike by bringing together the 
     substantial resources of our defence, international 
     development, international trade and foreign ministries in 
     more joined-up fashion to restore the UK's global 
     credibility, trust and diplomatic clout. Our friends feel we 
     have left the stage and want us back. We have in the past 
     come up with original ideas, built bridges and helped solve 
     problems. We should aspire to do so again.
           Yours,
     Peter.

                          ____________________