February 13, 2020 - Issue: Vol. 166, No. 30 — Daily Edition116th Congress (2019 - 2020) - 2nd Session
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SOUTH SUDAN; Congressional Record Vol. 166, No. 30
(Senate - February 13, 2020)
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[Pages S1068-S1069] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] SOUTH SUDAN Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise to express strong concern about the situation in South Sudan and to call on the administration to step up its diplomatic efforts to avert a return to conflict and help achieve a lasting peace. For 6 years, the people of South Sudan have suffered the effects of a brutal civil war. International efforts to find a diplomatic solution have failed, and the humanitarian situation in South Sudan remains one of the worst in the world. In September 2018, President Salva Kiir and his main political opponent, [[Page S1069]] former Vice President Riek Machar, agreed to form a unity government in the capital, Juba, by March of 2019. Though this so called ``revitalized agreement'' is not perfect, it is what we have to work with. The ceasefire between Kiir and Machar that was part of it has largely held, sparing the South Sudanese from the violence and brutality so many experienced at the height of the civil war. I am also encouraged that the government and political opposition groups that had refused to sign the 2018 revitalized peace deal reached an accord last month. However, two successive delays in the establishment of the unity government have made me skeptical about the chances that the latest deadline, February 22, will be met. While both parties have stated their commitment to it, they have yet to effectively address two fundamental sticking points: the boundaries of South Sudan's states, and the formation of an inclusive national army. Absent an agreement on these two issues, lasting peace may prove elusive. At the end of the day, Kiir, Machar, and others who claim to represent the South Sudanese people are responsible for peace in their country. However, given our historical role in South Sudan, the United States has a significant role to play. I would like to remind my colleagues that the United States was heavily involved in brokering the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which helped create the conditions for South Sudan's independence. Since independence, the United States has provided nearly $3.8 billion in emergency humanitarian assistance since the outbreak of civil war. We have supported the UN peacekeeping force in South Sudan, UNMISS, which is protecting 200,000 civilians sheltering in or near its bases, investing more than $342 million last fiscal year. These dollars are and have contributed to keeping thousands of people alive. But the South Sudanese deserve more than mere life support. They deserve to live in peace. We have influence with all of the key actors in the region, yet the administration has failed to use it. The administration must effectively use its influence to help the millions of South Sudanese who aspired to liberty but found misery instead. Previous administrations made South Sudan a priority in their foreign policy. The Bush administration helped negotiate the aforementioned Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Obama administration help shepherd the country to independence and remained actively engaged as the security and humanitarian situation devolved. At his confirmation hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Tibor Nagy promised that under his leadership, ``The South Sudanese will realize just how involved the United States is.'' However, administration engagement has been weak and inconsistent, and it is not guided by a clearly articulated strategy. In May 2018, the White House announced it was conducting a review of our assistance programs to South Sudan. In a statement, it expressed frustration that, ``the leaders of this country have squandered this partnership, pilfered the wealth of South Sudan, killed their own people, and repeatedly demonstrated their inability and unwillingness to live up to their commitments to end the country's civil war''--a bold statement but it has been more than a year and a half since the review was announced, and it remains incomplete. Since that time, what has the administration done? Well, 3 years into the administration, it has finally designated a special envoy, something for which I have been advocating for years, but the envoy will not answer directly to the President or the Secretary of State, which I fear may limit his stature and, therefore, his effectiveness. Additionally, the administration has imposed targeted sanctions. Last year, the Treasury Department sanctioned two Cabinet ministers, Elia Lomuro and Kuol Manyang Juuk. Last month, they also sanctioned South Sudan's First Vice President Taban Deng Gai. Deng is credibly accused of influencing the government to execute to dissidents; he should be sanctioned for human rights abuses. But, as I have said many times before, sanctions are not a strategy. Sanctions are a tool to be used selectively to apply pressure towards a specific political goal. In this case, support for a comprehensive and durable peace agreement. Last month, a year and a half since his confirmation, Ambassador Nagy visited Juba. While I applaud Ambassador Nagy's trip--I believe that the U.S. should be increasing its diplomatic engagement--one visit does not a policy make. It is unclear what the trip was meant to accomplish in the absence of a comprehensive strategy. At this critical juncture, I am still hard pressed to understand the administration's approach towards South Sudan, and I am worried that we do not have a plan of action should this latest deadline not be met. Time is of the essence; I urge the administration to take several actions. First, ensure that Special Envoy Symington has the appropriate staff and resources to effectively undertake his responsibilities. The administration has moved from no envoys for Sudan and South Sudan to two envoys. While the challenges in the two countries are different, the fates of the two countries remain intertwined. Coordination is critical, as is support for both of their offices. Second, we must have a sound strategy for supporting a viable peace agreement. I call upon Special Envoy Symington to take immediate steps to develop an interagency strategy, in consultation with our Ambassadors in the region, aimed at uniting the region to apply pressure to the parties to address outstanding obstacles to the formation of a unity government. In the short term, the strategy should focus on developing benchmarks and milestones towards formation of a unity government, and steps--to include punitive measures--the United States will take to encourage regional partners to apply consistent pressure on the parties to the conflict to move towards peace. Longer term, it should lead towards supporting conditions that support a sustainable peace and credible elections. The strategy should also include actions to support grassroots reconciliation and restorative justice, as well as accountability for war crimes and human rights abuses. Finally, the administration must conclude its review of assistance to South Sudan and be transparent to the South Sudanese, members of the diplomatic community, and the American people about exactly what the next steps will be relative to its findings and how those steps fit into a broader strategy. Whatever these steps are, they should be aimed towards cementing peace, and continuing strong support for development and humanitarian assistance to the people of South Sudan. If past is prologue, South Sudan's leaders may well once again fail their people. The stakes for the formation of a unity government--one that can implement a durable peace--are perilously high. If the current negotiations collapse, millions will suffer. We must do all we can to ensure that the South Sudanese are able to move forward with this agreement, flawed though it may well be, and we must be prepared to help it succeed. ____________________
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