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104th Congress                                             Rept. 104-18
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 1st Session                                                     Part 2
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                  NATIONAL SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT

                                _______


                February 6, 1995.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


 Mr. Gilman, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted 
                             the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                     ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

                         [To accompany H.R. 7]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on International Relations, to whom was 
referred titles I, III, V, and VI, and sections 401 and 402 of 
the bill (H.R. 7) to revitalize the national security of the 
United States, having considered the same, report favorably 
thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as 
amended do pass.
    The amendment is as follows:
    Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu 
thereof the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``National Security 
Revitalization Act''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                TITLE I--FINDINGS, POLICY, AND PURPOSES

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Policy.
Sec. 103. Purposes.

                       TITLE II--MISSILE DEFENSE

Sec. 201. Policy.
Sec. 202. Actions of the Secretary of Defense.
Sec. 203. Report to Congress.

       TITLE III--REVITALIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION

Sec. 301. Establishment.
Sec. 302. Composition.
Sec. 303. Duties.
Sec. 304. Reports.
Sec. 305. Powers.
Sec. 306. Commission procedures.
Sec. 307. Personnel matters.
Sec. 308. Termination of the commission.
Sec. 309. Funding.

               TITLE IV--COMMAND OF UNITED STATES FORCES

Sec. 401. Limitation on expenditure of Department of Defense funds for 
United States forces placed under command or operational control of a 
foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations.
Sec. 402. Limitation on placement of United States Armed Forces under 
foreign control for a United Nations peacekeeping activity.

                        TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 501. Credit against assessment for United States expenditures in 
support of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 502. Codification of required notice to Congress of proposed 
United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 503. Notice to Congress regarding United States contributions for 
United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 504. Revised notice to Congress regarding United States assistance 
for United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 505. United States contributions to United Nations peacekeeping 
activities.
Sec. 506. Reimbursement to the United States for in-kind contributions 
to United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 507. Prohibition on use of funds to pay United States assessed or 
voluntary contributions for United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 508. Limitation on use of Department of Defense funds for United 
States share of costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 509. Codification of limitation on amount of United States 
assessed contributions for United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 510. Buy American requirement.
Sec. 511. United Nations budgetary and management reform.
Sec. 512. Conditions on provision of intelligence to the United 
Nations.

     TITLE VI--EXPANSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Sec. 601. Short title.
Sec. 602. Findings.
Sec. 603. United States policy.
Sec. 604. Revisions to program to facilitate transition to NATO 
membership.

                      TITLE VII--BUDGET FIREWALLS

Sec. 701. Restoration of budget firewalls for defense spending.

                TITLE I--FINDINGS, POLICY, AND PURPOSES

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

  The Congress finds the following:
          (1) Since January 1993, presidential budgets and budget plans 
        have set forth a reduction in defense spending of 
        $156,000,000,000 through fiscal year 1999.
          (2) The fiscal year 1995 budget is the 10th consecutive year 
        of reductions in real defense spending and, with the exception 
        of fiscal year 1948, represents the lowest percentage of gross 
        domestic product for any defense budget since World War II.
          (3) During fiscal year 1995, the number of active duty, 
        reserve component, and civilian personnel of the Department of 
        Defense will be reduced by 182,000, a rate of over 15,000 per 
        month or over 500 per day. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
        estimates that 1,200,000 defense-related private sector jobs 
        will be lost by 1997.
          (4) Despite severe reductions and shortfalls in defense 
        funding and force structure, since 1993 United States military 
        forces have been deployed more often and committed to more 
        peacetime missions per year than ever before. Most of these 
        missions involve United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian 
        efforts. At the end of fiscal year 1994, over 70,000 United 
        States personnel were serving in such regions as Iraq, Bosnia, 
        Macedonia, the Adriatic Sea, Rwanda, and the Caribbean Sea for 
        missions involving Haiti and Cuba.
          (5) United Nations assessments to the United States for 
        peacekeeping missions totaled over $1,000,000,000 in 1994. The 
        United States is assessed 31.7 percent of annual United Nations 
        costs for peacekeeping. The next highest contributor, Japan, 
        only pays 12.5 percent of such costs. The Department of Defense 
        also incurs hundreds of millions of dollars in costs every year 
        for United States military participation in United Nations 
        peacekeeping or humanitarian missions, most of which are not 
        reimbursed by the United Nations. For fiscal year 1994, these 
        Department of Defense costs totaled over $1,721,000,000.
          (6) Credible and effective collective action on international 
        security concerns, through the United Nations and regional 
        organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
        can, in appropriate cases, advance world peace, strengthen the 
        national security of the United States, and foster more 
        equitable burden-sharing with friends and allies of the United 
        States in military, political, and financial terms.
          (7) A return to the ``hollow forces'' of the 1970s has 
        already begun. At the end of fiscal year 1994, one-third of the 
        units in the Army contingency force and all of the forward-
        deployed and follow-on Army divisions were reporting a reduced 
        state of military readiness. During fiscal year 1994, training 
        readiness declined for the Navy's Atlantic and Pacific fleets. 
        Funding shortfalls for that fiscal year resulted in a grounding 
        of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft squadrons and cancellation 
        and curtailment of Army training exercises. Marine and naval 
        personnel are not maintaining the standard 12- to 18-month 
        respite between six-month deployments away from home. Marine 
        Corps units are spending up to two of their first four years 
        away from their base camps. The significantly increased pace of 
        Department of Defense operations has United States forces over 
        deployed.
          (8) As of January 1, 1995, military pay is approximately 12.8 
        percent below comparable civilian levels. As a result, it is 
        estimated that close to 17,000 junior enlisted personnel have 
        to rely on food stamps and the Department of Defense will soon 
        begin providing supplementary food benefits to an estimated 
        11,000 military personnel and dependents living overseas.
          (9) Defense modernization programs to maintain the 
        battlefield technology edge of the United States over other 
        nations are being delayed or canceled in an attempt to prevent 
        the further erosion of military force readiness.
          (10) The centerpiece of the Administration's defense 
        strategy, the Bottom Up Review, reduces Navy ships by one-
        third, Air Force wings by almost one-half, and funding for 
        missile defenses by over 50 percent, and the General Accounting 
        Office has reported that even the restrictive Bottom Up Review 
        could be underfunded by $150,000,000,000.
          (11) The Administration has initially agreed to or proposed 
        treaty limitations, or has unilaterally adopted positions, that 
        prohibit the United States from testing or deploying effective 
        missile defense systems.

SEC. 102. POLICY.

  The Congress is committed to providing adequate resources to protect 
the national security interests of the United States.

SEC. 103. PURPOSES.

  The purposes of this Act are--
          (1) to establish a commission to reassess United States 
        military needs and reverse the continuing downward spiral of 
        defense spending;
          (2) to commit the United States to accelerate the development 
        and deployment of theater and national ballistic missile 
        defense capabilities;
          (3) to restrict deployment of United States forces to 
        missions that are in the national security interest of the 
        United States;
          (4) to maintain command and control by United States 
        personnel of United States forces participating in United 
        Nations peacekeeping operations;
          (5) to reduce the cost to the United States of United Nations 
        peacekeeping activities and to press for reforms in the United 
        Nations management practices; and
          (6) to reemphasize the commitment of the United States to a 
        strong and viable North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

                       TITLE II--MISSILE DEFENSE

SEC. 201. POLICY.

  It shall be the policy of the United States to--
          (1) deploy at the earliest possible date an antiballistic 
        missile system that is capable of providing a highly effective 
        defense of the United States against ballistic missile attacks; 
        and
          (2) provide at the earliest possible date highly effective 
        theater missile defenses (TMDs) to forward-deployed and 
        expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United States 
        and to friendly forces and allies of the United States.

SEC. 202. ACTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

  (a) ABM Systems.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop for 
deployment at the earliest possible date a cost-effective, 
operationally effective antiballistic missile system designed to 
protect the United States against ballistic missile attacks.
  (b) Advanced Theater Missile Defenses.--The Secretary of Defense 
shall develop for deployment at the earliest possible date advanced 
theater missile defense systems.

SEC. 203. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

  (a) Requirement.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a plan for the deployment of an 
antiballistic missile system pursuant to section 202(a) and for the 
deployment of theater missile defense systems pursuant to section 
202(b).
  (b) Congressional Defense Committees.--For purposes of this section, 
the term ``congressional defense committees'' means--
          (1) the Committee on National Security and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
          (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate.

       TITLE III--REVITALIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION

SEC. 301. ESTABLISHMENT.

  There is hereby established a commission to be known as the 
``Revitalization of National Security Commission'' (hereinafter in this 
title referred to as the ``Commission'').

SEC. 302. COMPOSITION.

  (a) Appointment.--The Commission shall be composed of 12 members, 
appointed as follows:
          (1) Four members shall be appointed by the President.
          (2) Four members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the 
        House of Representatives in consultation with the minority 
        leader of the House of Representatives.
          (3) Four members shall be appointed by the President pro 
        tempore of the Senate upon the recommendation of the majority 
        leader and the minority leader of the Senate.
  (b) Qualifications.--The members of the Commission shall be appointed 
from among persons having knowledge and experience in defense and 
foreign policy.
  (c) Term of Members; Vacancies.--Members of the Commission shall be 
appointed for the life of the Commission. A vacancy on the Commission 
shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner as 
the original appointment was made.
  (d) Commencement.--The members of the Commission shall be appointed 
not later than 21 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. The 
Commission shall convene its first meeting to carry out its duties 
under this section 14 days after seven members of the Commission have 
been appointed.
  (e) Chairman.--The chairman of the Commission shall be designated 
jointly by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the majority 
leader of the Senate from among members of the Commission appointed 
under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3).

SEC. 303. DUTIES.

  (a) Comprehensive Review.--The Commission shall conduct a 
comprehensive review of the long-term national security needs of the 
United States. The review shall include the following:
          (1) An assessment of the need for a new national security 
        strategy and, if it is determined that such a new strategy is 
        needed, identification of such a strategy.
          (2) An assessment of the need for a new national military 
        strategy and, if it is determined that such a new strategy is 
        needed, identification of such a strategy.
          (3) An assessment of the military force structure necessary 
        to support the new strategies identified under paragraphs (1) 
        and (2).
          (4) An assessment of force modernization requirements 
        necessary to support the new strategies identified under 
        paragraphs (1) and (2).
          (5) An assessment of military infrastructure requirements 
        necessary to support the new strategies identified under 
        paragraphs (1) and (2).
          (6) An assessment of the funding needs of the Department of 
        Defense necessary to support the long-term national security 
        requirements of the United States.
          (7) An assessment of the adequacy of the force structure 
        recommended in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review in executing the 
        national military strategy.
          (8) An assessment of the adequacy of the current future-years 
        defense plan in fully funding the Bottom-Up Review force 
        structure while maintaining adequate force modernization and 
        military readiness objectives.
          (9) An assessment of the level of defense funds expended on 
        non-defense programs.
          (10) An assessment of the costs to the United States of 
        expanding the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization.
  (b)  Matters To Be Considered.--In carrying out the review, the 
Commission shall develop specific recommendations to accomplish each of 
the following:
          (1) Provide members of the Armed Forces with annual pay 
        raises and other compensation at levels sufficient to begin 
        closing the gap with comparable civilian pay levels.
          (2) Fully fund cost-effective missile defense systems that 
        are deployable at the earliest possible date following 
        enactment of this Act.
          (3) Maintain adequate funding for military readiness accounts 
        without sacrificing modernization programs.
          (4) Provide a stronger role for Guard and Reserve forces.
          (5) Provide a new funding system to avoid diversions from 
        military readiness accounts to pay for peacekeeping and 
        humanitarian deployments such as Haiti and Rwanda.
          (6) Support security enhancing measures in the Asia-Pacific, 
        including support for the Association of Southeast Asian 
        Nations (``ASEAN'') Regional Forum, which is a regionwide 
        security dialogue encompassing the major Asia-Pacific nations.

SEC. 304. REPORTS.

  (a) Final Report.--The Commission shall submit to the President and 
the designated congressional committees a report on the assessments and 
recommendations referred to in section 303 not later than January 1, 
1996. The report shall be submitted in unclassified and classified 
versions.
  (b) Interim Report.--The Commission shall submit to the President and 
the designated congressional committees an interim report describing 
the Commission's progress in fulfilling its duties under section 303. 
The interim report shall include any preliminary recommendations the 
Commission may have reached and shall be submitted not later than 
October 1, 1995.
  (c) Designated Congressional Committees.--For purposes of this 
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' means--
          (1) the Committee on National Security, the Committee on 
        International Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
        the House of Representatives; and
          (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

SEC. 305. POWERS.

  (a) Hearings.--The Commission may, for the purpose of carrying out 
this section, conduct such hearings, sit and act at such times, take 
such testimony, and receive such evidence, as the Commission considers 
appropriate.
  (b) Assistance From Other Agencies.--The Commission may secure 
directly from any department or agency of the Federal Government such 
information, relevant to its duties under this title, as may be 
necessary to carry out such duties. Upon request of the chairman of the 
Commission, the head of the department or agency shall, to the extent 
permitted by law, furnish such information to the Commission.
  (c) Mail.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same 
manner and under the same conditions as the departments and agencies of 
the Federal Government.
  (d) Assistance From Secretary of Defense.--The Secretary of Defense 
shall provide to the Commission such reasonable administrative and 
support services as the Commission may request.

SEC. 306. COMMISSION PROCEDURES.

  (a) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet on a regular basis (as 
determined by the chairman) and at the call of the chairman or a 
majority of its members.
  (b) Quorum.--A majority of the members of the Commission shall 
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.

SEC. 307. PERSONNEL MATTERS.

  (a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission shall serve without 
compensation, but shall be allowed travel expenses including per diem 
in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, 
United States Code, when engaged in the performance of Commission 
duties.
  (b) Staff.--The Commission shall appoint a staff director, who shall 
be paid at a rate not to exceed the maximum rate of basic pay under 
section 5376 of title 5, United States Code, and such professional and 
clerical personnel as may be reasonable and necessary to enable the 
Commission to carry out its duties under this title without regard to 
the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments 
in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of 
chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title, or any other 
provision of law, relating to the number, classification, and General 
Schedule rates. No employee appointed under this subsection (other than 
the staff director) may be compensated at a rate to exceed the maximum 
rate applicable to level 15 of the General Schedule.
  (c) Detailed Personnel.--Upon request of the chairman of the 
Commission, the head of any department or agency of the Federal 
Government is authorized to detail, without reimbursement, any 
personnel of such department or agency to the Commission to assist the 
Commission in carrying out its duties under this section. The detail of 
any such personnel may not result in the interruption or loss of civil 
service status or privilege of such personnel.

SEC. 308. TERMINATION OF THE COMMISSION.

  The Commission shall terminate upon submission of the final report 
required by section 303.

SEC. 309. FUNDING.

  Of the funds available to the Department of Defense, $1,500,000 shall 
be made available to the Commission to carry out the provisions of this 
title.

               TITLE IV--COMMAND OF UNITED STATES FORCES

SEC. 401. LIMITATION ON EXPENDITURE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS FOR 
                    UNITED STATES FORCES PLACED UNDER COMMAND OR 
                    OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL ACTING ON 
                    BEHALF OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

  (a) In General.--(1) Chapter 20 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after section 404 the following new section:

``Sec. 405. Placement of United States forces under command or 
                    operational control of foreign nationals acting on 
                    behalf of the United Nations: limitation

  ``(a) Limitation.--(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), 
funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of 
Defense may not be obligated or expended for activities of any element 
of the armed forces that after the date of the enactment of this 
section is placed under the command or operational control of a foreign 
national acting on behalf of the United Nations for the purpose of 
international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar 
activity that is authorized by the Security Council under chapter VI or 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
  ``(2) For purposes of this section, elements of the armed forces 
shall not be considered to be placed under the command or operational 
control of a foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations in 
any case in which the senior military commander of the United Nations 
force or operation is a United States military officer who has the 
authority to dismiss subordinates in the command chain, establish 
appropriate rules of engagement for United States forces involved, and 
establish criteria governing the operational employment of such United 
States forces.
  ``(b) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) Subsection (a) 
shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of 
the armed forces under such command or operational control if the 
President, not less than 15 days before the date on which such command 
or operational control is to become effective (or as provided in 
paragraph (2)), meets the requirements of subsection (d).
  ``(2) If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency exists 
that precludes the President from meeting the requirements of 
subsection (d) 15 days before placing any element of the armed forces 
under such command or operational control, the President may place such 
forces under such command or operational control and meet the 
requirements of subsection (d) in a timely manner, but in no event 
later than 48 hours after such command or operational control becomes 
effective.
  ``(c) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (a) shall not 
apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of the armed 
forces under such command or operational control if the Congress 
specifically authorizes by law that particular placement of United 
States forces under such command or operational control.
  ``(d) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred to in 
subsection (b)(1) are that the President submit to Congress the 
following:
          ``(1) Certification by the President that--
                  ``(A) such a command or operational control 
                arrangement is necessary to protect national security 
                interests of the United States;
                  ``(B) the commander of any unit of the armed forces 
                proposed for placement under the command or operational 
                control of a foreign national acting directly on behalf 
                of the United Nations will at all times retain the 
                right--
                          ``(i) to report independently to superior 
                        United States military authorities; and
                          ``(ii) to decline to comply with orders 
                        judged by the commander to be illegal, 
                        militarily imprudent, or beyond the mandate of 
                        the mission to which the United States agreed 
                        with the United Nations, until such time as 
                        that commander receives direction from superior 
                        United States military authorities with respect 
                        to the orders that the commander has declined 
                        to comply with;
                  ``(C) any element of the armed forces proposed for 
                placement under the command or operational control of a 
                foreign national acting directly on behalf of the 
                United Nations will at all times remain under United 
                States administrative command for such purposes as 
                discipline and evaluation; and
                  ``(D) the United States will retain the authority to 
                withdraw any element of the armed forces from the 
                proposed operation at any time and to take any action 
                it considers necessary to protect those forces if they 
                are engaged.
          ``(2) A report setting forth the following:
                  ``(A) A description of the national security 
                interests that require the placement of United States 
                forces under the command or operational control of a 
                foreign national acting directly on behalf of the 
                United Nations.
                  ``(B) The mission of the United States forces 
                involved.
                  ``(C) The expected size and composition of the United 
                States forces involved.
                  ``(D) The incremental cost to the United States of 
                participation in the United Nations operation by the 
                United States forces which are proposed to be placed 
                under the command or operational control of a foreign 
                national.
                  ``(E) The precise command and control relationship 
                between the United States forces involved and the 
                United Nations command structure.
                  ``(F) The precise command and control relationship 
                between the United States forces involved and the 
                commander of the United States unified command for the 
                region in which those United States forces are to 
                operate.
                  ``(G) The extent to which the United States forces 
                involved will rely on non-United States forces for 
                security and self-defense and an assessment on the 
                ability of those non-United States forces to provide 
                adequate security to the United States forces involved.
                  ``(H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of the 
                United States forces involved.
  ``(e) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection (c) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form and, if necessary, in classified 
form.
  ``(f) Interpretation.--(1) This section is a limitation on the 
expenditure of Department of Defense funds for any element of the armed 
forces placed under the command or operational control of a foreign 
national acting on behalf of the United Nations and is not to be 
construed as an authorization--
          ``(A) for the President to use any element of the armed 
        forces in any operation; or
          ``(B) for the President to place any element of the armed 
        forces under the command or operational control of a foreign 
        national.
  ``(2) Subject to the power of the Congress to declare war under 
article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution, nothing in this 
section shall be construed to derogate or limit the authority of the 
President as commander-in-chief of the armed forces under article II, 
section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution.''.
  (2) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I of such 
chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``405. Placement of United States forces under command or operational 
control of foreign nationals acting on behalf of the United Nations: 
limitation.''.

  (b) Report Relating to Constitutionality.--No certification may be 
submitted by the President under section 405(d)(1) of title 10, United 
States Code, as added by subsection (a), until the President has 
submitted to the Congress (after the date of the enactment of this Act) 
a memorandum of legal points and authorities explaining why the 
placement of elements of United States Armed Forces under the command 
or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf of the 
United Nations does not violate the Constitution.
  (c) Exception for Ongoing Operations in Macedonia and Croatia.--
Section 405 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection 
(a), does not apply in the case of activities of the Armed Forces in 
Macedonia authorized pursuant to United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 795, adopted December 11, 1992, and subsequent 
reauthorization Resolutions, and in the case of activities of the Armed 
Forces in Croatia authorized pursuant to United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 743, adopted February 21, 1992, and subsequent 
reauthorization Resolutions, as part of the United Nations force 
designated as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

SEC. 402. LIMITATION ON PLACEMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES UNDER 
                    FOREIGN CONTROL FOR A UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
                    ACTIVITY.

  (a) In General.--Section 6 of the United Nations Participation Act of 
1945 (22 U.S.C. 287d) is amended to read as follows:
  ``Sec. 6. (a) Agreements With Security Council.--(1) Any special 
agreement described in paragraph (2) that is concluded by the President 
with the Security Council shall not be effective unless approved by the 
Congress by law.
  ``(2) An agreement referred to in paragraph (1) is an agreement 
providing for the numbers and types of United States Armed Forces, 
their degree of readiness and general locations, or the nature of 
facilities and assistance, including rights of passage, to be made 
available to the Security Council for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security in accordance with Article 43 of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
  ``(b) Limitation.--(1) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), 
the President may not place any element of the Armed Forces under the 
command or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf 
of the United Nations for the purpose of international peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar activity that is authorized by 
the Security Council under chapter VI or VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations.
  ``(2) For purposes of this section, elements of the Armed Forces 
shall not be considered to be placed under the command or operational 
control of a foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations in 
any case in which the senior military commander of the United Nations 
force or operation is a United States military officer who has the 
authority to dismiss subordinates in the command chain, establish 
appropriate rules of engagement for United States forces involved, and 
establish criteria governing the operational employment of such United 
States forces.
  ``(c) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) Subsection (b) 
shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of 
the Armed Forces under such command or operational control if the 
President, not less than 15 days before the date on which such command 
or operational control is to become effective (or as provided in 
paragraph (2)), meets the requirements of subsection (e).
  ``(2) If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency exists 
that precludes the President from meeting the requirements of 
subsection (e) 15 days before placing any element of the Armed Forces 
under such command or operational control, the President may place such 
forces under such command or operational control and meet the 
requirements of subsection (e) in a timely manner, but in no event 
later than 48 hours after such command or operational control becomes 
effective.
  ``(d) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (b) shall not 
apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of the Armed 
Forces under such command or operational control if the Congress 
specifically authorizes by law that particular placement of United 
States forces under such command or operational control.
  ``(e) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred to in 
subsection (c)(1) are that the President submit to Congress the 
following:
          ``(1) Certification by the President that--
                  ``(A) such a command or operational control 
                arrangement is necessary to protect national security 
                interests of the United States;
                  ``(B) the commander of any unit of the Armed Forces 
                proposed for placement under the command or operational 
                control of a foreign national acting directly on behalf 
                of the United Nations will at all times retain the 
                right--
                          ``(i) to report independently to superior 
                        United States military authorities; and
                          ``(ii) to decline to comply with orders 
                        judged by the commander to be illegal, 
                        militarily imprudent, or beyond the mandate of 
                        the mission to which the United States agreed 
                        with the United Nations, until such time as 
                        that commander receives direction from superior 
                        United States military authorities with respect 
                        to the orders that the commander has declined 
                        to comply with;
                  ``(C) any element of the Armed Forces proposed for 
                placement under the command or operational control of a 
                foreign national acting directly on behalf of the 
                United Nations will at all times remain under United 
                States administrative command for such purposes as 
                discipline and evaluation; and
                  ``(D) the United States will retain the authority to 
                withdraw any element of the Armed Forces from the 
                proposed operation at any time and to take any action 
                it considers necessary to protect those forces if they 
                are engaged.
          ``(2) A report setting forth the following:
                  ``(A) A description of the national security 
                interests that require the placement of United States 
                forces under the command or operational control of a 
                foreign national acting directly on behalf of the 
                United Nations.
                  ``(B) The mission of the United States forces 
                involved.
                  ``(C) The expected size and composition of the United 
                States forces involved.
                  ``(D) The incremental cost to the United States of 
                participation in the United Nations operation by the 
                United States forces which are proposed to be placed 
                under the command or operational control of a foreign 
                national.
                  ``(E) The precise command and control relationship 
                between the United States forces involved and the 
                United Nations command structure.
                  ``(F) The precise command and control relationship 
                between the United States forces involved and the 
                commander of the United States unified command for the 
                region in which those United States forces are to 
                operate.
                  ``(G) The extent to which the United States forces 
                involved will rely on non-United States forces for 
                security and self-defense and an assessment on the 
                ability of those non-United States forces to provide 
                adequate security to the United States forces involved.
                  ``(H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of the 
                United States forces involved.
  ``(f) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection (e) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form and, if necessary, in classified 
form.
  ``(g) Interpretation.--Except as authorized in section 7 of this Act, 
nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as an authorization to 
the President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council 
United States Armed Forces, facilities, or assistance.''.
  (b) Report Relating to Constitutionality.--No certification may be 
submitted by the President under section 6(e)(1) of the United Nations 
Participation Act of 1945, as amended by subsection (a), until the 
President has submitted to the Congress (after the date of the 
enactment of this Act) a memorandum of legal points and authorities 
explaining why the placement of elements of United States Armed Forces 
under the command or operational control of a foreign national acting 
on behalf of the United Nations does not violate the Constitution.
  (c) Exception for Ongoing Operations in Macedonia and Croatia.--
Section 6 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended 
by subsection (a), does not apply in the case of activities of the 
Armed Forces in Macedonia authorized pursuant to United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 795, adopted December 11, 1992, and 
subsequent reauthorization Resolutions, and in the case of activities 
of the Armed Forces in Croatia authorized pursuant to United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 743, adopted February 21, 1992, and 
subsequent reauthorization Resolutions, as part of the United Nations 
force designated as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

                        TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 501. CREDIT AGAINST ASSESSMENT FOR UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES IN 
                    SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

  (a) In General.--The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 
U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:
  ``Sec. 10. (a) Credit Against Assessment for Expenditures in Support 
of Peacekeeping Operations.--
          ``(1) Limitation.--Funds may be obligated for payment to the 
        United Nations of the United States assessed share of 
        peacekeeping operations for a fiscal year only to the extent 
        that--
                  ``(A) the amount of such assessed share exceeds--
                  ``(B) the amount equal to--
                          ``(i) the total amount identified in the 
                        report submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) for 
                        the preceding fiscal year, reduced by
                          ``(ii) the amount of any reimbursement or 
                        credit to the United States by the United 
                        Nations for the costs of United States support 
                        for, or participation in, United Nations 
                        peacekeeping activities for that preceding 
                        fiscal year.
          ``(2) Annual report.--The President shall, at the time of 
        submission of the budget to the Congress for any fiscal year, 
        submit to the designated congressional committees a report on 
        the total amount of incremental costs incurred by the 
        Department of Defense during the preceding fiscal year to 
        support or participate in, directly or indirectly, United 
        Nations peacekeeping activities. Such report shall include a 
        separate listing by United Nations peacekeeping operation of 
        the amount of incremental costs incurred to support or 
        participate in each such operation.
          ``(3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection:
                  ``(A) United nations peacekeeping activities.--The 
                term `United Nations peacekeeping activities' means any 
                international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-
                enforcing, or similar activity that is authorized by 
                the United Nations Security Council under chapter VI or 
                VII of the Charter of the United Nations, except that 
                such term does not include any such activity authorized 
                under chapter VII of such Charter with respect to which 
                the President has certified to the Congress that the 
                activity is of such importance to the national security 
                of the United States that the United States would 
                undertake the activity unilaterally if it were not 
                authorized by the United Nations Security Council.
                  ``(B) Designated congressional committees.--The term 
                `designated congressional committees' includes the 
                Committee on National Security of the House of 
                Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of 
                the Senate.''.
  (b) Effective Date.--The limitation contained in section 10(a)(1) of 
the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection 
(a), shall apply only with respect to United Nations assessments for 
peacekeeping operations after fiscal year 1995.

SEC. 502. CODIFICATION OF REQUIRED NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF PROPOSED 
                    UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

  (a) Required Notice.--Section 4 of the United Nations Participation 
Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287b) is amended--
          (1) by striking the second sentence of subsection (a);
          (2) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
          (3) by inserting after subsection (d) a new subsection (e) 
        consisting of the text of subsection (a) of section 407 of the 
        Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 
        (Public Law 103-236), revised--
                  (A) in paragraph (2)--
                          (i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), 
                        by inserting ``in written form not later than 
                        the 10th day of'' after ``shall be provided'';
                          (ii) in subparagraph (A)(iv), by inserting 
                        ``(including facilities, training, 
                        transportation, communication, intelligence, 
                        and logistical support)'' after ``covered by 
                        the resolution''; and
                          (iii) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the 
                        end the following new clause:
                          ``(iv) A description of any other United 
                        States assistance to or support for the 
                        operation (including facilities, training, 
                        transportation, communication, intelligence, 
                        and logistical support), and an estimate of the 
                        cost to the United States of such assistance or 
                        support.'';
                  (B) by striking paragraph (3);
                  (C) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3) 
                and in the last sentence of subparagraph (A) of that 
                paragraph by striking ``and (ii)'' and inserting 
                ``through (iv)'';
                  (D) by inserting after paragraph (3) (as so 
                redesignated) the following new paragraph:
          ``(4) New united nations peacekeeping operation defined.--As 
        used in paragraphs (2) (B) and (3), the term `new United 
        Nations peacekeeping operation' includes any existing or 
        otherwise ongoing United Nations peacekeeping operation--
                  ``(A) that is to be expanded by more than 25 percent 
                during the period covered by the Security Council 
                resolution, as measured by either the number of 
                personnel participating (or authorized to participate) 
                in the operation or the budget of the operation; or
                  ``(B) that is to be authorized to operate in a 
                country in which it was not previously authorized to 
                operate.''; and
                  (E) in paragraph (5)--
                          (i) by striking ``(5) Notification'' and all 
                        that follows through ``(B) The President'' and 
                        inserting ``(5) Quarterly reports.--The 
                        President''; and
                          (ii) by striking ``section 4(d)'' and all 
                        that follows through ``of this section)'' and 
                        inserting ``subsection (d)''.
  (b) Conforming Repeal.--Subsection (a) of section 407 of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 
103-236), is repealed.
  (c) Designated Congressional Committees.--Subsection (f) of section 4 
of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287b(f)), as 
redesignated by subsection (a), is amended to read as follows:
  ``(f) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this section, 
the term `designated congressional committees' has the meaning given 
such term in section 10(f).''.

SEC. 503. NOTICE TO CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS FOR 
                    UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

  Section 10 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 is amended 
by adding after subsection (a), as added by section 501, the following 
new subsection:
  ``(b) Notice to Congress Regarding Contributions for Peacekeeping 
Activities.--
          ``(1) Notice regarding united nations billing request.--Not 
        later than 15 days after the date on which the United States 
        receives from the United Nations a billing requesting a payment 
        by the United States of any contribution for United Nations 
        peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify the 
        designated congressional committees.
          ``(2) Notice regarding proposed obligation of funds.--The 
        President shall notify the designated congressional committees 
        at least 15 days before the United States obligates funds for 
        any assessed or voluntary contribution for United Nations 
        peacekeeping activities, except that if the President 
        determines that an emergency exists which prevents compliance 
        with the requirement that such notification be provided 15 days 
        in advance and that such contribution is in the national 
        security interests of the United States, such notification 
        shall be provided in a timely manner but no later than 48 hours 
        after such obligation.''.

SEC. 504. REVISED NOTICE TO CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE 
                    FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

  Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 
287d-1) is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``other than subsection 
        (e)(1)'' after ``any other law''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), at least 15 
days before any agency or entity of the United States Government makes 
available to the United Nations any assistance or facility to support 
or facilitate United Nations peacekeeping activities, the President 
shall so notify the designated congressional committees.
  ``(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to--
          ``(A) assistance having a value of less than $1,000,000 in 
        the case of nonreimbursable assistance or less than $5,000,000 
        in the case of reimbursable assistance; or
          ``(B) assistance provided under the emergency drawdown 
        authority contained in sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(1), 
        2348a(c)(2)).
  ``(3) If the President determines that an emergency exists which 
prevents compliance with the requirement in paragraph (1) that 
notification be provided 15 days in advance and that the contribution 
of any such assistance or facility is in the national security 
interests of the United States, such notification shall be provided in 
a timely manner but not later than 48 hours after such assistance or 
facility is made available to the United Nations.
  ``(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term `assistance'--
          ``(A) means assistance of any kind, including logistical 
        support, supplies, goods, or services (including command, 
        control, communications or intelligence assistance and 
        training), and the grant of rights of passage; and
          ``(B) includes assistance provided through in-kind 
        contributions or through the provision of support, supplies, 
        goods, or services on any terms, including on a grant, lease, 
        loan, or reimbursable basis; but
          ``(C) does not include the payment of assessed or voluntary 
        contributions.''.

SEC. 505. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
                    ACTIVITIES.

  Section 4(d)(1) of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 
U.S.C. 287b(d)(1)) is amended--
          (1) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E); 
        and
          (2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new 
        subparagraph:
                  ``(D) A description of the anticipated budget for the 
                next fiscal year for United States participation in 
                United Nations peacekeeping activities, including a 
                statement of--
                          ``(i) the aggregate amount of funds available 
                        to the United Nations for that fiscal year, 
                        including assessed and voluntary contributions, 
                        which may be made available for United Nations 
                        peacekeeping activities; and
                          ``(ii) the aggregate amount of funds (from 
                        all accounts) and the aggregate costs of in-
                        kind contributions that the United States 
                        proposes to make available to the United 
                        Nations for that fiscal year for United Nations 
                        peacekeeping activities.''.

SEC. 506. REIMBURSEMENT TO THE UNITED STATES FOR IN-KIND CONTRIBUTIONS 
                    TO PUNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

  (a) In General.--Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act of 
1945 (22 U.S.C. 287d-1), as amended by section 504, is further 
amended--
          (1) in subsection (b)--
                  (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)'';
                  (B) by striking ``United States: Provided,'' through 
                ``Provided further, That when'' and inserting ``United 
                States. When''; and
                  (C) by adding at the end the following:
  ``(2) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for 
reimbursement under paragraph (1) if the Secretary, after consultation 
with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, determines that an emergency exists which 
justifies waiver of that requirement. Any such waiver shall be 
submitted to the designated congressional committees, as defined in 
section 10(a)(3)(B), at least 15 days before it takes effect, except 
that if the President determines that an emergency exists which 
prevents compliance with the requirement that the notification be 
provided 15 days in advance and that the provision under subsection 
(a)(1) or (a)(2) of personnel or assistance on a nonreimbursable basis 
is in the national security interests of the United States, such 
notification shall be provided in a timely manner but no later than 48 
hours after such waiver takes effect.''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(f) The Secretary of State shall ensure that goods and services 
provided on a reimbursable basis by the Department of Defense to the 
United Nations for United Nations peacekeeping operations under this 
section or any other provision of law are reimbursed at the appropriate 
value, as determined by the Secretary of Defense.''.
  (b) Initial Report.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Representative of the United 
        States to the United Nations shall submit to the designated 
        congressional committees a report on all actions taken by the 
        United States mission to the United Nations to achieve the 
        objective described in section 7(f) of the United Nations 
        Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection (a)(2).
          (2) Designated congressional committees defined.--As used in 
        this subsection, the term ``designated congressional 
        committees'' has the meaning given such term in section 
        10(a)(3)(B) of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as 
        added by section 501.

SEC. 507. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO PAY UNITED STATES ASSESSED OR 
                    VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS 
                    PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

  (a) In General.--Section 10 of the United Nations Participation Act 
of 1945 is amended by adding after subsection (b), as added by section 
503, the following new subsection:
  ``(c) Prohibition on Use of Funds To Pay Assessed or Voluntary 
Contributions for Peacekeeping Activities.--
          ``(1) In general.--Appropriated funds may not be used to pay 
        any United States assessed or voluntary contribution during any 
        fiscal year for United Nations peacekeeping activities until 
        the Secretary of Defense certifies to the designated 
        congressional committees that the United Nations has reimbursed 
        the Department of Defense directly for all goods and services 
        that were provided to the United Nations by the Department of 
        Defense on a reimbursable basis during the preceding fiscal 
        year for United Nations peacekeeping activities, including 
        personnel and assistance provided under section 7 (except to 
        the extent that the authority of subsection (b)(2) of such 
        section to waive the reimbursement requirement was exercised 
        with respect to such personnel or assistance).
          ``(2) Exception.--The prohibition contained in paragraph (1) 
        shall not apply when the Department of Defense has failed to 
        submit its bills in a timely manner for goods and services that 
        were provided to the United Nations.''.
  (b) Effective Date.--The prohibition contained in section 10(c) of 
the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection 
(a), shall apply only with respect to fiscal years after fiscal year 
1995.

SEC. 508. LIMITATION ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS FOR UNITED 
                    STATES SHARE OF COSTS OF UNITED NATIONS 
                    PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

  (a) In General.--(1) Chapter 20 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after section 405, as added by section 401 of this 
Act, the following new section:

``Sec. 406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share 
                    of costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: 
                    limitation

  ``(a) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Payment of Assessment.--No 
funds available to the Department of Defense shall be available for 
payment of any United States assessed or voluntary contribution for 
United Nations peacekeeping activities.
  ``(b) Limitation on Use of Funds for Participation in Peacekeeping 
Activities.--Funds available to the Department of Defense may be used 
for payment of the incremental costs associated with the participation 
of elements of the armed forces in United Nations peacekeeping 
activities only to the extent that Congress has by law specifically 
authorized the use of those funds for such purposes.''.
  (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended 
by adding at the end the following new item:

``406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of 
costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: limitation.''.

  (b) Effective Date.--Section 406 of title 10, United States Code, as 
added by subsection (a), shall take effect on October 1, 1995.

SEC. 509. CODIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON AMOUNT OF UNITED STATES 
                    ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS 
                    PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

  (a) In General.--Section 10 of the United Nations Participation Act 
of 1945 is amended by adding after subsection (c), as added by section 
507, the following new subsection:
  ``(d) Limitation on Assessed Contribution With Respect to a 
Peacekeeping Operation.--Funds authorized to be appropriated for 
`Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities' for any 
fiscal year shall not be available for the payment of the United States 
assessed contribution for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in an 
amount which is greater than 25 percent of the total amount of all 
assessed contributions for that operation, and any arrearages that 
accumulate as a result of assessments in excess of 25 percent of the 
total amount of all assessed contributions for any United Nations 
peacekeeping operation shall not be recognized or paid by the United 
States.''.
  (b) Effective Date.--The limitation contained in section 10(d) of the 
United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection (a), 
shall apply only with respect to funds authorized to be appropriated 
for ``Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities'' for 
fiscal years after fiscal year 1995.
  (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 404(b) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236) is 
amended by striking paragraph (2).

SEC. 510. BUY AMERICAN REQUIREMENT.

  Section 10 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 is amended 
by adding after subsection (d), as added by section 509, the following 
new subsections:
  ``(e) Buy American Requirement.--No funds may be obligated or 
expended to pay any United States assessed or voluntary contribution 
for United Nations peacekeeping activities unless the Secretary of 
State determines and certifies to the designated congressional 
committees that United States manufacturers and suppliers are being 
given opportunities to provide equipment, services, and material for 
such activities equal to those being given to foreign manufacturers and 
suppliers.
  ``(f) Designated Congressional Committees Defined.--As used in this 
section, the term `designated congressional committees' means--
          ``(1) the Committee on International Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; 
        and
          ``(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate.''.

SEC. 511. UNITED NATIONS BUDGETARY AND MANAGEMENT REFORM.

  (a) In General.--The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 
U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end the 
following new section:
  ``Sec. 11. (a) Withholding of Contributions.--
          ``(1) Assessed contributions for regular united nations 
        budget.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 20 percent of 
        the amount of funds made available for that fiscal year for 
        United States assessed contributions for the regular United 
        Nations budget shall be withheld from obligation and 
        expenditure unless a certification for that fiscal year has 
        been made under subsection (b).
          ``(2) Assessed contributions for united nations 
        peacekeeping.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 50 percent 
        of the amount of funds made available for that fiscal year for 
        United States assessed contributions for United Nations 
        peacekeeping activities shall be withheld from obligation and 
        expenditure unless a certification for that fiscal year has 
        been made under subsection (b).
          ``(3) Voluntary contributions for united nations 
        peacekeeping.--The United States may not during any fiscal year 
        pay any voluntary contribution to the United Nations for 
        international peacekeeping activities unless a certification 
        for that fiscal year has been made under subsection (b).
  ``(b) Certification.--The certification referred to in subsection (a) 
for any fiscal year is a certification by the President to the 
Congress, submitted on or after the beginning of that fiscal year, of 
each of the following:
          ``(1) The United Nations has an independent office of 
        Inspector General to conduct and supervise objective audits, 
        inspections, and investigations relating to programs and 
        operations of the United Nations.
          ``(2) The United Nations has an Inspector General who was 
        appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the 
        General Assembly and whose appointment was made principally on 
        the basis of the appointee's integrity and demonstrated ability 
        in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management 
        analysis, public administration, or investigation.
          ``(3) The Inspector General is authorized to--
                  ``(A) make investigations and reports relating to the 
                administration of the programs and operations of the 
                United Nations;
                  ``(B) have access to all records, documents, and 
                other available materials relating to those programs 
                and operations;
                  ``(C) have direct and prompt access to any official 
                of the United Nations; and
                  ``(D) have access to all records and officials of the 
                specialized agencies of the United Nations.
          ``(4) The United Nations has fully implemented, and made 
        available to all member states, procedures that effectively 
        protect the identity of, and prevent reprisals against, any 
        staff member of the United Nations making a complaint or 
        disclosing information to, or cooperating in any investigation 
        or inspection by, the United Nations Inspector General.
          ``(5) The United Nations has fully implemented procedures 
        that ensure compliance with recommendations of the United 
        Nations Inspector General.
          ``(6) The United Nations has required the United Nations 
        Inspector General to issue an annual report and has ensured 
        that the annual report and all other reports of the Inspector 
        General are made available to the General Assembly without 
        modification.
          ``(7) The United Nations has provided, and is committed to 
        providing, sufficient budgetary resources to ensure the 
        effective operation of the United Nations Inspector General.''.
  (b) Effective Date.--Section 11 of the United Nations Participation 
Act of 1945, as added by subsection (a), shall apply only with respect 
to fiscal years after fiscal year 1995.

SEC. 512. CONDITIONS ON PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE UNITED 
                    NATIONS.

  (a) In General.--The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 
U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end the 
following new section:
  ``Sec. 12. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to the United 
Nations.--Before intelligence information is provided by the United 
States to the United Nations, the President shall ensure that the 
Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State and the Secretary of Defense, has established guidelines 
governing the provision of intelligence information to the United 
Nations which shall protect intelligence sources and methods from 
unauthorized disclosure in accordance with section 103(c)(5) of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
  ``(b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall 
periodically report, but not less frequently than semiannually, to the 
Committee on International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate on the types of intelligence provided to the United Nations and 
the purposes for which it was provided during the period covered by the 
report. The President shall also report to the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, within 15 days after it 
becomes known to him, any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence 
provided to the United Nations.
  ``(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first sentence 
of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to the provision of 
intelligence that is provided only to, and for the use of, United 
States Government personnel serving with the United Nations.
  ``(c) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or assign 
the duties of the President under this section.
  ``(d) Improved Handling of Intelligence Information by the United 
Nations.--The Secretary of State (or the designee of the Secretary), in 
consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the 
Secretary of Defense, shall work with the United Nations to improve the 
handling, processing, dissemination, and management of all intelligence 
information provided to it by its members.
  ``(e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to--
          ``(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the 
        Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence 
        sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to 
        section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
        U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); or
          ``(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title V 
        of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413-415).''.
  (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take 
effect 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     TITLE VI--EXPANSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``NATO Expansion Act of 1995''.

SEC. 602. FINDINGS.

  The Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) Since 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
        has helped to guarantee the security, freedom, and prosperity 
        of the United States and its partners in the alliance.
          (2) NATO has expanded its membership on three different 
        occasions since its founding in 1949.
          (3) The steadfast and sustained commitment of the member 
        countries of NATO to mutual defense against the threat of 
        communist domination played a significant role in precipitating 
        the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the demise of the Soviet 
        Union.
          (4) Although new threats are more geographically and 
        functionally diverse and less predictable, they still imperil 
        shared interests of the United States and its NATO allies.
          (5) Western interests must be protected on a cooperative 
        basis without an undue burden falling upon the United States.
          (6) NATO is the only multilateral organization that is 
        capable of conducting effective military operations to protect 
        Western interests.
          (7) The valuable experience gained from ongoing military 
        cooperation within NATO was critical to the success of joint 
        military operations in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait.
          (8) NATO is an important diplomatic forum for discussion of 
        issues of concern to its member states and for the peaceful 
        resolution of disputes.
          (9) Admission of Central and East European countries that 
        have recently been freed from Communist domination to NATO 
        could contribute to international peace and enhance the 
        security of those countries.
          (10) By joining the Partnership for Peace, a number of 
        countries have expressed interest in NATO membership.
          (11) The Partnership for Peace program is creating new 
        political and military ties with countries in Central and 
        Eastern Europe and provides the basis for joint action to deal 
        with common security problems. Active participation in the 
        Partnership for Peace will also play an important role in the 
        evolutionary process of NATO expansion.
          (12) In particular, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
        Slovakia have made significant progress toward establishing 
        democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian 
        control of their armed forces, police, and intelligence 
        services, and the rule of law since the fall of their previous 
        Communist governments.

SEC. 603. UNITED STATES POLICY.

  It should be the policy of the United States--
          (1) to continue the Nation's commitment to an active 
        leadership role in NATO;
          (2) to join with the Nation's NATO allies to redefine the 
        role of the alliance in the post-Cold War world, taking into 
        account--
                  (A) the fundamentally changed security environment of 
                Central and Eastern Europe;
                  (B) the need to assure all countries of the defensive 
                nature of the alliance and the desire of its members to 
                work cooperatively with all former adversaries;
                  (C) the emerging security threats posed by the 
                proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
                weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver 
                them;
                  (D) the continuing challenges to the interests of all 
                NATO member countries posed by unstable and 
                undemocratic regimes harboring hostile intentions; and
                  (E) the dependence of the global economy on a stable 
                energy supply and the free flow of commerce;
          (3) to affirm that NATO military planning should include 
        joint military operations beyond the geographic bounds of the 
        alliance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty when the 
        shared interests of the United States and other member 
        countries require such action to defend vital interests;
          (4) to expeditiously pursue joint cooperation agreements for 
        the acquisition of essential systems to significantly increase 
        the crisis management capability of NATO;
          (5) that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia 
        should be in a position to further the principles of the North 
        Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
        Atlantic area in the near future, and, in accordance with 
        Article 10 of such Treaty, should be invited to become full 
        NATO members, provided these countries--
                  (A) meet appropriate standards, including--
                          (i) shared values and interests;
                          (ii) democratic governments;
                          (iii) free market economies;
                          (iv) civilian control of the military, of the 
                        police, and of the intelligence and other 
                        security services, so that these organizations 
                        do not pose a threat to democratic 
                        institutions, neighboring countries, or the 
                        security of NATO or the United States;
                          (v) adherence to the rule of law and to the 
                        values, principles, and political commitments 
                        set forth in the Helsinki Final Act and other 
                        declarations by the members of the Organization 
                        on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
                          (vi) commitment to further the principles of 
                        NATO and to contribute to the security of the 
                        North Atlantic area;
                          (vii) commitment and ability to accept the 
                        obligations, responsibilities, and costs of 
                        NATO membership; and
                          (viii) commitment and ability to implement 
                        infrastructure development activities that will 
                        facilitate participation in and support for 
                        NATO military activities; and
                  (B) remain committed to protecting the rights of all 
                their citizens and respecting the territorial integrity 
                of their neighbors;
          (6) that the United States, other NATO member nations, and 
        NATO itself should furnish appropriate assistance to facilitate 
        the transition of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
        Slovakia to full NATO membership;
          (7) to reaffirm article X of the North Atlantic Treaty and 
        the policy decision of the North Atlantic Council on December 
        1, 1994, that--
                  (A) each new member nation may be admitted to NATO 
                only by amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty; and
                  (B) each current NATO member nation will have to 
                complete the treaty amendment ratification process for 
                the admission of each new member nation to NATO, 
                subject to the internal legal processes of each current 
                NATO member nation, and that in the case of the United 
                States, the treaty amendment ratification process will 
                require advice and consent of two-thirds of the members 
                of the United States Senate present and voting;
          (8) that the expansion of NATO should be defensive in nature 
        and should occur in a manner that increases stability for all 
        nations of Europe, including both NATO member nations and non-
        NATO member nations;
          (9) that NATO and its member nations should cooperate closely 
        with Russia on security issues and work to strengthen other 
        structures of security cooperation in Europe, including the 
        Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and
          (10) that other European countries emerging from communist 
        domination may be in a position at a future date to further the 
        principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to 
        the security of the North Atlantic area, and at the appropriate 
        time they should receive assistance to facilitate their 
        transition to full NATO membership and should be invited to 
        become full NATO members.

SEC. 604. REVISIONS TO PROGRAM TO FACILITATE TRANSITION TO NATO 
                    MEMBERSHIP.

  (a) Establishment of Program.--Subsection (a) of section 203 of the 
NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of Public Law 103-447; 22 
U.S.C. 1928 note) is amended to read as follows:
  ``(a) Establishment of Program.--The President shall establish a 
program to assist in the transition to full NATO membership of Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia and any other European 
country emerging from communist domination that is designated by the 
President under subsection (d)(2).''.
  (b) Eligible Countries.--
          (1) Designated countries.--Subsection (d) of such section is 
        amended to read as follows:
  ``(d) Designation of Eligible Countries.--
          ``(1) Specified countries.--The following countries are 
        hereby designated for purposes of this title: Poland, Hungary, 
        the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
          ``(2) Authority for president to designate other european 
        countries emerging from communist domination.--The President 
        may designate other European countries emerging from communist 
        domination (as defined in section 206) to receive assistance 
        under the program established under subsection (a). The 
        President may make such a designation in the case of any such 
        country only if the President determines, and reports to the 
        designated congressional committees, that such country--
                  ``(A) has made significant progress toward 
                establishing--
                          ``(i) shared values and interests;
                          ``(ii) democratic governments;
                          ``(iii) free market economies;
                          ``(iv) civilian control of the military, of 
                        the police, and of the intelligence and other 
                        security services, so that these organizations 
                        do not pose a threat to democratic 
                        institutions, neighboring countries, or the 
                        security of NATO or the United States;
                          ``(v) adherence to the rule of law and to the 
                        values, principles, and political commitments 
                        set forth in the Helsinki Final Act and other 
                        declarations by the members of the Organization 
                        on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
                          ``(vi) commitment to further the principles 
                        of NATO and to contribute to the security of 
                        the North Atlantic area;
                          ``(vii) commitment and ability to accept the 
                        obligations, responsibilities, and costs of 
                        NATO membership; and
                          ``(viii) commitment and ability to implement 
                        infrastructure development activities that will 
                        facilitate participation in and support for 
                        NATO military activities; and
                  ``(B) is likely, within five years of such 
                determination, to be in a position to further the 
                principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to 
                contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
                area.''.
          (2) Conforming amendments.--
                  (A) Subsections (b) and (c) of such section are 
                amended by striking ``countries described in such 
                subsection'' and inserting ``countries designated under 
                subsection (d)''.
                  (B) Subsection (e) of such section is amended--
                          (i) by striking ``subsection (d)'' and 
                        inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''; and
                          (ii) by inserting ``(22 U.S.C. 2394)'' before 
                        the period at the end.
                  (C) Section 204(c) of such Act is amended by striking 
                ``any other Partnership for Peace country designated 
                under section 203(d) of this title'' and inserting 
                ``any country designated under section 203(d)(2)''.
  (c) Types of Assistance.--
          (1) Economic support assistance.--Subsection (c) of section 
        203 of such Act is amended--
                  (A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as 
                paragraphs (4) and (5), respectively; and
                  (B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following 
                new paragraph (3):
          ``(3) Assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to the Economic Support 
        Fund).''.
          (2) Additional assistance.--
                  (A) In general.--Subsection (f) of such section is 
                amended to read as follows:
  ``(f) Additional Assistance.--In carrying out the program established 
under subsection (a), the President may, in addition to the security 
assistance authorized to be provided under subsection (c), provide 
assistance to countries designated under subsection (d) from funds 
appropriated under the `Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund' 
account.''.
                  (B) Effective date.--The amendment made by 
                subparagraph (A) does not apply with respect to funds 
                appropriated before the date of the enactment of this 
                Act.
  (d) Disqualification From Assistance for Support of Terrorism.--
Section 203 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection:
  ``(g) Prohibition on Providing Assistance to Countries That Provide 
Defense Articles to Countries Supporting International Terrorism.--The 
President may not provide assistance to a country under the program 
established under subsection (a) if such country is selling or 
transferring defense articles to a state that has repeatedly provided 
support for acts of international terrorism, as determined by the 
Secretary of State under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979.''.
  (e) Report Prior to Obligation or Expenditure of Funds.--Section 203 
of such Act (as amended by subsection (d)) is further amended by adding 
at the end the following:
  ``(h) Report Prior to Obligation or Expenditure of Funds.--Prior to 
providing assistance to a country for the first time through the 
program established under subsection (a), the President shall transmit 
to the designated congressional committees a report with respect to 
that country that contains a description of the following:
          ``(1) The cost of membership in NATO for the country and the 
        amount that the country is prepared to contribute to NATO to 
        pay for such cost of membership.
          ``(2) The amount that the United States will contribute to 
        facilitate transition to full NATO membership for the country.
          ``(3) The extent to which the admission to NATO of the 
        country would contribute to the security of the United States.
          ``(4) The views of other NATO member nations regarding the 
        admission to NATO of the country and the amounts that such 
        other NATO member nations will contribute to facilitate 
        transition to full NATO membership for the country.''.
  (f) Annual Report.--Section 205 of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 
(title II of Public Law 103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note) is amended--
          (1) by inserting ``annual'' in the section heading 
        before the first word;
          (2) by inserting ``annual'' after ``include in the'' in the 
        matter preceding paragraph (1); and
          (3) in paragraphs (1) and (2), by striking ``and other'' and 
        all that follows through the period at the end and inserting 
        ``and any country designated by the President pursuant to 
        section 203(d)(2).''.
  (g) Definitions.--The NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of 
Public Law 103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note) is amended by adding at the 
end the following new section:

``SEC. 206. DEFINITIONS.

  ``For purposes of this title:
          ``(1) NATO.--The term `NATO' means the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization.
          ``(2) Other european countries emerging from communist 
        domination.--The term `other European countries emerging from 
        communist domination' means any full and active participant in 
        the Partnership for Peace that--
                  ``(A) is located--
                          ``(i) in the territory of the former Union of 
                        Soviet Socialist Republics; or
                          ``(ii) in the territory of the former 
                        Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; or
                  ``(B) is among the following countries: Estonia, 
                Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, or Albania.
          ``(3) Designated congressional committees.--The term 
        `designated congressional committees' means--
                  ``(A) the Committee on International Relations, the 
                Committee on National Security, and the Committee on 
                Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
                  ``(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
                Appropriations of the Senate.''.

                      TITLE VII--BUDGET FIREWALLS

SEC. 701. RESTORATION OF BUDGET FIREWALLS FOR DEFENSE SPENDING.

  It is the sense of the Congress that so-called ``budget firewalls'' 
between defense and domestic discretionary spending should be 
established for each of fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998.

                         Background and Purpose

    H.R. 7, the ``National Security Revitalization Act'', is 
intended to address serious national security issues requiring 
attention during the 104th Congress.
    With respect to the U.N. peacekeeping provisions contained 
in H.R. 7, the bill is meant to strengthen the ability of the 
United States to protect its security and financial interests 
in all U.N. peacekeeping activities. Suggestions that this bill 
undermines U.N. peacekeeping are simply unfounded.
    Provisions of the bill within the primary jurisdiction of 
the Committee on International Relations include title IV, 
limiting the subordination of U.S. armed forces to the command 
or operational control of foreign nationals acting on behalf of 
the United Nations in peacekeeping operations; title V, 
limiting the financial obligations imposed upon the United 
States by United Nations peacekeeping operations and seeking to 
promote management reform within the United Nations; and title 
VI, endorsing and seeking to facilitate the expansion of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Provisions of the bill 
within the primary jurisdiction of the Committee on National 
Security include title II, regarding defense against ballistic 
missile attacks; and title III, establishing a ``Revitalization 
of National Security Commission'' to conduct a comprehensive 
review of the long-term national security needs of the United 
States.
    A primary concern underlying the provisions of H.R. 7 
within the jurisdiction of the Committee on International 
Relations is the need to reassert the primacy of United States 
national interests in conduct of United States foreign policy, 
in the use of United States armed forces, and in the 
expenditure of resources of the Department of Defense. This 
concern is particularly acute with regard to United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.
    The bitter experience of the United States in the failed 
United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia demonstrates 
that such operations are not necessarily a low-cost means of 
exerting United States influence in troubled parts of the 
world. To the contrary, such operations can entangle the United 
States in costly and ultimately futile efforts with little or 
no connection to the national interests of the United States. 
In a world in which serious threats remain to vital U.S. 
national security interests, the United States cannot afford to 
squander its resources on peacekeeping operations unconnected 
to its national interests. The provisions of titles IV and V of 
H.R. 7 are intended to ensure that future U.S. involvement in 
United Nations peacekeeping operations advances U.S. national 
security interests and does not detract from those interests.
    Critics of Title V of H.R. 7, in particular critics of 
section 501, argue that it will destroy U.S. peacekeeping and 
eliminate peacekeeping as an option of U.S. foreign policy. 
Nothing could be farther from the truth. Section 501 simply 
requires that the U.S. will be reimbursed for our own military 
expenditures in support of peacekeeping operations. With the 
addition of the Presidential certification provision for 
Chapter 7 operations, the total of our in-kind credits which 
would have to be credited in FY 94 under this provision would 
have been about one quarter of our total FY 94 peacekeeping 
budget.
    An additional concern underlying H.R. 7 is the need to 
adapt the most successful collective security institution in 
history--the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--to the 
security requirements of the post-Cold War era. NATO can and 
must play a central role in addressing the uncertainty in 
Central and Eastern Europe that has developed since the end of 
the Cold War. The United States should take the lead in making 
clear to the countries emerging from communist domination in 
Central and Eastern Europe that the door to the West will 
remain open to them if they persist in the political and 
economic reforms they have undertaken.
    The process of NATO expansion endorsed by title VI of H.R. 
7 is not intended to draw new lines across Europe or to 
identify any country or group of countries as a threat to 
others. Rather, the process of NATO expansion as endorsed by 
H.R. 7 is a dynamic one that will begin with those countries 
furthest along the path of reform but is intended to include 
others over time as circumstances warrant. The ultimate goal is 
not a redivided Europe, but rather a Europe whole and free, in 
which all members of the Cold War alliance structures are 
integrated into a new security architecture.

                            Committee Action

    Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman Floyd Spence, 
Representative Ed Bryant and Representative James A. Hayes 
introduced H.R. 7, the National Security Revitalization Act, on 
January 4, 1995, the first day of the 104th Congress.
    On January 24, 1995, the full Committee held a hearing on 
H.R. 7, during which testimony was given by the Honorable Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, former Permanent U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations and Dr. Barry Blechman, Chairman of the Henry L. 
Stimson Center.
    In January the full Committee also held a three-part series 
of hearings on evaluating U.S. foreign policy. H.R. 7 was 
discussed extensively during these hearings. The first of these 
hearings was held on January 12, 1995, with the Honorable James 
A. Baker, III former Secretary of State, as the witness. The 
second hearing took place on January 19, 1995, during which 
testimony was presented by the Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
former National Security Advisor to President Carter, and the 
Honorable Charles William Maynes, Editor, Foreign Policy. The 
third hearing was held on January 26, 1995, with the Honorable 
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State.
    In addition, the Committee held a closed briefing on 
January 20, 1995, with the Honorable Madeleine Albright, 
Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations. During 
this briefing, Ambassador Albright outlined Administration 
concerns with portions of H.R. 7 concerning United Nation 
peacekeeping issues.

         Roll Call Votes on Amendments; Final Committee Action

    In compliance with clause (2)(l)(2)(B) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the record of committee 
roll call votes taken on final passage or amendments during the 
committee's consideration of H.R. 7 is set out below, as is a 
report of the committee's final action on the bill.
    On January 27, 30, and 31, the committee met to consider 
H.R. 7, the required quorum being present at all times when the 
committee conducted legislative business.

Janaury 27, 1995

    By unanimous consent, the committee ordered that an 
amendment in the nature of substitute offered by Chairman 
Gilman be considered as original text for the purpose of 
amendment, and that each section of the amendment in the nature 
of a substitute be considered as having been read when 
designated by the Chief of Staff.
    The following amendments were the subject of roll-call 
votes, and the disposition of those amendments is reported 
here, as required by clause (2)(l)(2)(B) of rule XI:
    Mr. Menendez offered an amendment to strike section 103(1) 
of the amendment in the nature of a substitute. Section 103(1) 
set out, as one of the purposes of H.R. 7, the establishment of 
a commission to reassess United States military needs and 
reverse the continuing downward spiral of defense spending. The 
Mendendez amendment was defeated by a 17-21 roll-call vote, as 
follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Hamilton                        Mr. Gilman
Mr. Gejdenson                       Mr. Goodling
Mr. Lantos                          Mr. Leach
Mr. Torricelli                      Mr. Roth
Mr. Ackerman                        Mr. Hyde
Mr. Johnston                        Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Engel                           Mr. Smith
Mr. Martinez                        Mr. Burton
Mr. Payne                           Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Andrews                         Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Menendez                        Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Brown                           Mr. Rohrabacker
Ms. McKinney                        Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Hastings                        Mr. Royce
Mr. Wynn                            Mr. King
Mr. McNulty                         Mr. Kim
Mr. Moran                           Mr. Brownback
                                    Mr. Funderburk
                                    Mr. Chabot
                                    Mr. Sanford
                                    Mr. Salmon

    Mr. Menendez offered an amendment to strike Title III of 
the amendment in the nature of a substitute. Title III of the 
amendment in the nature of a substitute provides for the 
Establishment of a Revitalization of National Security 
Commission. The Menendez amendment was defeated by a 16-22 
roll-call vote, as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Hamilton                        Mr. Gilman
Mr. Gejdension                      Mr. Goodling
Mr. Lantos                          Mr. Leach
Mr. Torricelli                      Mr. Roth
Mr. Ackerman                        Mr. Hyde
Mr. Johnston                        Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Engel                           Mr. Smith
Mr. Martinez                        Mr. Burton
Mr. Payne                           Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Andrews                         Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Menendez                        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Brown                           Mr. Ballenger
Mr. McKinney                        Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. Hastings                        Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Wynn                            Mr. Royce
Mr. McNulty                         Mr. King
                                    Mr. Kim
                                    Mr. Brownback
                                    Mr. Funderburk
                                    Mr. Chabort
                                    Mr. Sanford
                                    Mr. Salmon

    Mr. Ackerman offered an en bloc amendment to Title IV of 
the amendment in the nature of a substitute. The Ackerman 
amendment would have provided for the non-application of 
certain sections of the bill in a case in which fewer than 50 
members of the armed forces are participating in a particular 
United Nations operation or activity. The Ackerman amendment 
was defeated by a 14-22 roll-call vote, as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Leach                           Mr. Gilman
Mr. Hamilton                        Mr. Goodling
Mr. Gejdenson                       Mr. Roth
Mr. Lantos                          Mr. Hyde
Mr. Berman                          Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Ackerman                        Mr. Smith
Mr. Engel                           Mr. Burton
Mr. Martinez                        Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Payne                           Mr. Ballegly
Mr. Andrews                         Mrs. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Menendez                        Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Brown                           Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. Hastings                        Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Wynn                            Mr. Royce
                                    Mr. King
                                    Mr. Kim
                                    Mr. Brownback
                                    Mr. Funderburk
                                    Mr. Chabot
                                    Mr. Sanford
                                    Mr. Salmon
                                    Mr. McNulty

    Mr. Engel offered an en bloc amendment to sections 401 and 
402 of the amendment in the nature of a substitute. Section 401 
and 402 of the amendment in the nature of a substitute contain 
limitations on the placement of United States armed forces 
under foreign control for a United Nations peacekeeping 
actitity. The Engel amendment would have provided for an 
exception the limitations set out those sections in the case of 
a proposed placement of any element of the Armed Forces under 
the command or operational control of a military officer of a 
NATO member state. The Engel amendment was defeated by a 14-20 
roll-call vote, as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Leach                           Mr. Gilman
Mr. Hamilton                        Mr. Goodling
Mr. Genjdenson                      Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Lantos                          Mr. Smith
Mr. Torricelli                      Mr. Burton
Mr. Berman                          Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Ackerman                        Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Engel                           Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Menendez                        Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Brown                           Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. McKinney                        Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Hastings                        Mr. Royce
Mr. Wynn                            Mr. King
Mr. Moran                           Mr. Kim
                                    Mr. Brownback
                                    Mr. Funderburk
                                    Mr. Chabot
                                    Mr. Sanford
                                    Mr. Salmon
                                    Mr. Andrews

January 30, 1995

    Mr. Hastings moved to amend the amendment in the nature of 
a substitute by striking section 501 thereof and inserting a 
new section 501. The Hastings amendment would have provided 
that the United States would receive credit for its costs in 
support of peacekeeping to the degree that other nations 
receive credit from the United Nations for their costs incurred 
in support of peacekeeping. The Hastings amendment was defeated 
by a 14-22 roll-call vote, as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Hamilton                        Mr. Gilman
Mr. Gejdenson                       Mr. Goodling
Mr. Lantos                          Mr. Hyde
Mr. Torricelli                      Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Ackerman                        Mr. Smith
Mr. Johnston                        Mr. Burton
Mr. Menendez                        Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Brown                           Mr. Gallegly
Ms. McKinney                        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Hastings                        Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Wynn                            Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. McNulty                         Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Moran                           Mr. Royce
Mr. Frazer                          Mr. King
                                    Mr. Kim
                                    Mr. Brownback
                                    Mr. Funderburk
                                    Mr. Chabot
                                    Mr. Sanford
                                    Mr. Salmon
                                    Mr. Houghton
                                    Mr. Andrews


    Mr. Torricelli was granted unanimous consent to offer an 
amendment en bloc to several sections of Title VI. 
Subsequently, Mr. Goodling asked unanimous consent to divide 
the motion, and by unanimous consent the consideration of the 
amendment was divided.
    The first part of the Torricelli amendment, among other 
things, deleted the policy language setting out a five year 
time frame for the expansion of NATO and replaced that time 
frame with the words ``in the near future.'' The first part of 
the Torricelli amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.
    Mr. Smith moved to reconsider the vote by which the first 
part of the Torricelli amendment was agreed to. The motion to 
reconsider the vote was defeated by a 15-25 roll-call vote, as 
follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Gilman                          Mr. Goodling
Mr. Roth                            Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Hyde                            Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Smith                           Mr. Kim
Mr. Burton                          Mr. Brownback
Mrs. Meyers                         Mr. Funderburk
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen                    Mr. Sanford
Mr. Ballenger                       Mr. Hamilton
Mr. Rohrabacher                     Mr. Gejdenson
Mr. Manzullo                        Mr. Lantos
Mr. Royce                           Mr. Torricelli
Mr. King                            Mr. Berman
Mr. Chabot                          Mr. Ackerman
Mr. Salmon                          Mr. Johnston
Mr. Houghton                        Mr. Engel
                                    Mr. Martinez
                                    Mr. Andrews
                                    Mr. Menendez
                                    Mr. Brown
                                    Ms. McKinney
                                    Mr. Hastings
                                    Mr. Wynn
                                    Mr. McNulty
                                    Mr. Moran
                                    Mr. Frazer


    The second part of the Torricelli amendment would have 
amended the amendment in the nature of a substitute by deleting 
language directing the President to establish an assistance 
program for certain countries eligible for participation in the 
Partnership for Peace program, and instead made the 
establishment of the program discretionary. The second part of 
the Torricelli amendment also would have deleted the 
designation of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia as eligible for assistance under the program.
    The second part of the Torricelli amendment was defeated by 
a 16-23 roll-call vote, as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Hamilton                        Mr. Gilman
Mr. Gejdenson                       Mr. Goodling
Mr. Lantos                          Mr. Roth
Mr. Torricelli                      Mr. Hyde
Mr. Berman                          Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Ackerman                        Mr. Smith
Mr. Johnston                        Mr. Burton
Mr. Martinez                        Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Andrews                         Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Brown                           Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Ms. McKinney                        Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Hastings                        Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. Wynn                            Mr. Manzullo
Mr. McNulty                         Mr. Royce
Mr. Moran                           Mr. King
Mr. Frazer                          Mr. Kim
                                    Mr. Brownback
                                    Mr. Funderburk
                                    Mr. Chabot
                                    Mr. Sanford
                                    Mr. Salmon
                                    Mr. Houghton
                                    Mr. Engel

January 31, 1995

    Mr. Berman offered an amendment to the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute. The Berman amendment provided for a new 
section of the bill which would have authorized the President, 
subject to the power of the Congress to declare war, to deploy 
``any member of the United States Armed Forces for 
participation in support of peacekeeping activities authorized 
by United Nations Security Council resolutions.'' The Berman 
amendment was agreed to by a vote of 23-18, as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Goodling                        Mr. Gilman
Mr. Leach                           Mr. Roth
Mr. Chabot                          Mr. Hyde
Mr. Sanford                         Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Houghton                        Mr. Smith
Mr. Hamilton                        Mr. Burton
Mr. Gejdenson                       Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Lantos                          Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Berman                          Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Ackerman                        Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Johnston                        Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. Engel                           Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Faleomavaega                    Mr. Royce
Mr. Martinez                        Mr. King
Mr. Payne                           Mr. Kim
Mr. Menendez                        Mr. Brownback
Mr. Brown                           Mr. Funderburk
Ms. McKinney                        Mr. Andrews
Mr. Hastings
Mr. Wynn
Mr. McNulty
Mr. Moran
Mr. Frazer


    Note.--A motion to reconsider the vote by which the Berman 
amendment was agreed to was subsequently offered, and agreed 
to, and on reconsideration the amendment was defeated. See 
below.
    Mr. Hastings offered an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to the Gilman amendment in the nature of a 
substitute. The Hastings amendment was the text of an earlier 
version of H.R. 7. The Hastings amendment was defeated by a 
vote of 0-40, as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
                                    Mr. Gilman
                                    Mr. Goodling
                                    Mr. Roth
                                    Mr. Hyde
                                    Mr. Bereuter
                                    Mr. Smith
                                    Mr. Burton
                                    Mrs. Meyers
                                    Mr. Gallegly
                                    Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
                                    Mr. Ballenger
                                    Mr. Rohrabacher
                                    Mr. Manzullo
                                    Mr. Royce
                                    Mr. King
                                    Mr. Kim
                                    Mr. Brownback
                                    Mr. Funderburk
                                    Mr. Chabot
                                    Mr. Sanford
                                    Mr. Salmon
                                    Mr. Houghton
                                    Mr. Hamilton
                                    Mr. Gejdenson
                                    Mr. Lantos
                                    Mr. Berman
                                    Mr. Ackerman
                                    Mr. Johnston
                                    Mr. Engel
                                    Mr. Faleomavaega
                                    Mr. Martinez
                                    Mr. Payne
                                    Mr. Andrews
                                    Mr. Menendez
                                    Mr. Brown
                                    Ms. McKinney
                                    Mr. Wynn
                                    Mr. McNulty
                                    Mr. Moran
                                    Mr. Frazer

    Note.--Mr. Hastings answered ``present''.
    Note.--The following vote, although not required by the 
Rules to be included in this Report, is provided for the 
purpose of clarifying the record of the committee's action on 
the Berman amendment.
    Mr. Goodling, who had voted on the prevailing side on the 
roll-call vote on the Berman amendment to the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute, moved to reconsider the vote by which 
the Berman amendment was agreed to. The motion to reconsider 
the vote on the Berman amendment was agreed to by a roll-call 
vote of 22-18, as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Gilman                          Mr. Hamilton
Mr. Goodling                        Mr. Gejdenson
Mr. Roth                            Mr. Lantos
Mr. Hyde                            Mr. Berman
Mr. Bereuter                        Mr. Ackerman
Mr. Smith                           Mr. Johnston
Mr. Burton                          Mr. Engel
Mrs. Meyers                         Mr. Faleomavaega
Mr. Gallegly                        Mr. Martinez
Ms. Ros-Lethtinen                   Mr. Payne
Mr. Ballenger                       Mr. Andrews
Mr. Rohrabacher                     Mr. Menendez
Mr. Manzullo                        Mr. Brown
Mr. Royce                           Ms. McKinney
Mr. King                            Mr. Hastings
Mr. Kim                             Mr. Wynn
Mr. Brownback                       Mr. McNulty
Mr. Funderburk                      Mr. Moran
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Sanford
Mr. Salmon
Mr. Houghton

    The Goodling motion to reconsider the Berman amendment to 
the amendment in the nature of a substitute having been agreed 
to, the Chair put the question on agreeing to the Berman 
amendment. On reconsideration, the Berman amendment was 
defeated by a roll-call vote of 20-21, as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Chabot                          Mr. Gilman
Mr. Hamilton                        Mr. Goodling
Mr. Gejdenson                       Mr. Roth
Mr. Lantos                          Mr. Hyde
Mr. Torriceli                       Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Berman                          Mr. Smith
Mr. Ackerman                        Mr. Burton
Mr. Johnston                        Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Engel                           Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Faleomavaega                    Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Martinez                        Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Payne                           Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. Menendez                        Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Brown                           Mr. Royce
Ms. McKinney                        Mr. King
Mr. Hastings                        Mr. Kim
Mr. Wynn                            Mr. Brownback
Mr. McNulty                         Mr. Funderburk
Mr. Moran                           Mr. Sanford
Mr. Frazer                          Mr. Salmon
                                    Mr. Houghton

    Note.--Mr. Andrews answered ``present''.
    The Chair put the question on agreeing to the amendment in 
the nature of a substitute, which passed by a roll-call vote of 
23-18, as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Gilman                          Mr. Hamilton
Mr. Goodling                        Mr. Gejdenson
Mr. Roth                            Mr. Lantos
Mr. Hyde                            Mr. Torricelli
Mr. Bereuter                        Mr. Berman
Mr. Smith                           Mr. Ackerman
Mr. Burton                          Mr. Johnston
Mrs. Meyers                         Mr. Engel
Mr. Gallegly                        Mr. Faleomavaega
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen                    Mr. Payne
Mr. Ballenger                       Mr. Menedez
Mr. Rohrabacher                     Mr. Bown
Mr. Manzullo                        Ms. McKinney
Mr. Royce                           Mr. Hastings
Mr. King                            Mr. Wynn
Mr. Kim                             Mr. McNulty
Mr. Brownbck                        Mr. Noran
Mr. Funderburk                      Mr. Frazer
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Sanford
Mr. Salmon
Mr. Houghton
Mr. Andrews

    Note.--Immediately following the vote recorded above, the 
following ensued:
    Mr. Goodling moved that the Chief of Staff be authorized to 
make technical and conforming amendments to the bill, that the 
committee report the bill as amended to the House with the 
recommendation that the bill, as amended, do pass, and that the 
Chairman be authorized to take any other necessary steps 
required to bring the bill before the House for consideration. 
The motion was agreed to without objection, the requisite 
quorum (majority of the full committee) being present. Mr. 
Hamilton requested that the Minority be accorded three days to 
file dissenting views.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

               section 1--short title; table of contents

    Section 1 provides the short title for the Act, the 
``National Security Revitalization Act,'' and sets out a table 
of contents for the Act.

                TITLE I--FINDINGS, POLICY, AND PURPOSES

                         section 101--findings

    Section 101 sets forth congressional findings relevant to 
the Act.

                          section 102--policy

    Section 102 declares the commitment of the Congress to 
providing adequate resources to protect the national security 
interests of the United States.

                         section 103--purposes

    Section 103 sets forth the purposes of the Act, including, 
inter alia, restricting deployments of U.S. forces to missions 
that are in the national security interest of the United 
States, maintaining command and control by U.S. personnel of 
U.S. forces participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations, 
reducing the cost of U.N. peacekeeping activities to the United 
States, pressing for reforms in U.N. management practices, and 
reemphasizing the commitment of the United States to a strong 
and viable North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

                       TITLE II--MISSILE DEFENSE

              sections 201, 202, and 203--missile defense

    Sections 201, 202, and 203 contain provisions regarding 
defense against missile attacks. These sections are outside the 
jurisdiction of the Committee on International Relations.

       TITLE III--REVITALIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION

                       section 301--establishment

    Section 301 establishes the ``Revitalization of National 
Security Commission''.

                        section 302--composition

    Section 302 provides for, inter alia, the appointment, 
qualifications, and term of service of members of the 
Commission.

                          section 303--duties

    Section 303 directs the Commission to conduct a 
comprehensive review of the long-term national security needs 
of the United States. It further specifies issues to be 
assessed in the comprehensive review and matters to be 
considered. Among the issues to be assessed is the costs to the 
United States of expanding the membership of NATO. Among the 
matters to be considered and addressed in the Commission's 
specific recommendations are providing a new funding system for 
peacekeeping and humanitarian deployments such as Haiti and 
Rwanda that will avoid diversions from military readiness 
accounts, and supporting security-enhancing measures in the 
Asia-Pacific region, including the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations Regional Forum.

                          section 304--reports

    Section 304 establishes a timetable for submission by the 
Commission to designated congressional committees of an interim 
and a final report.

                          section 305--powers

    Section 305 specifies the powers of the Commission to 
conduct hearings, secure assistance from Federal departments 
and agencies, use the United States mails, and receive 
assistance from the Secretary of Defense.

                   section 306--commission procedures

    Section 306 provides procedures for the convening of 
Commission meetings and establishes a quorum requirement for 
the transaction of business by the Commission.

                     section 307--personnel matters

    Section 307 provides for the appointment of Commission 
staff, the detail of personnel to the Commission from Federal 
departments and agencies, and payment to Commission members of 
travel expenses including per diem in lieu of subsistence.

               section 308--termination of the commission

    Section 308 provides that the Commission shall terminate 
upon submission of this final report.

                          section 309--funding

    Section 309 provides that of the funds available to the 
Department of Defense, $1.5 million shall be made available to 
the Commission.

               TITLE IV--COMMAND OF UNITED STATES FORCES

 section 401--limitation on expenditure of Department of Defense Funds 
for United States Forces Placed Under Command or Operational Control of 
       a Foreign National Acting on Behalf of the United Nations

    Section 401(a) amends title 10 of the United States Code to 
add a new section 405 entitled ``Placement of United States 
forces under command or operational control of foreign 
nationals acting on behalf of the United Nations: limitation''.
    The new section 405(a) of title 10 provides that funds 
appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of 
Defense may not be obligated or expended for activities of any 
element of the U.S. armed forces that after the date of 
enactment is placed under the command or operational control of 
a foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations for 
purposes of international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-
enforcing, or similar activity.
    The new section 405(a) further provides that U.S. forces 
shall not be considered to be under the command or operational 
control of a foreign national in any case in which the senior 
military commander of the United Nations force is a United 
States military officer who has the authority to dismiss 
subordinates in the command chain, establish appropriate rules 
of engagement for the U.S. forces involved, and establish 
criteria governing the operational employment of such U.S. 
forces. This proviso is intended to address situations in which 
foreign nationals may be placed in the chain of command between 
a senior military commander of a U.N. operation who is a U.S. 
national and a U.S. military unit.
    The new section 405(c) provides an exception to the 
restrictions of the new section 405(a) for instances in which 
Congress has specifically authorized by law the placement of 
U.S. armed forces under the command or operational of a foreign 
national acting on behalf of the United Nations. The new 
section 405(b) provides an exception to the restrictions of the 
new section 405(a) for cases in which the President submits a 
certification and report to Congress meeting requirements 
specified in section 405(d) not less than 15 days before 
placing U.S. forces under such command or operational control.
    The new section 405(d) provides that a certification under 
section 405(b) is required to contain the President's 
certification to Congress of the following: (1) The foreign 
command or operational control arrangement is necessary to 
protect national security interests of the United States; (2) 
the U.S. commander of any U.S. unit proposed for placement 
under the command or operational control of a foreign national 
acting on behalf of the United Nations will at all times retain 
the right to report independently to superior U.S. military 
authorities, and to decline to comply with orders judged by 
such commander to be illegal, militarily imprudent, or beyond 
the mandate of the mission to which the United States agreed 
with the United Nations, until such time as that commander 
receives direction from superior U.S. military authorities; (3) 
the U.S. forces will at all times remain under U.S. 
administrative command for such purposes as discipline and 
evaluation; and (4) the United States will retain the authority 
to withdraw any U.S. forces from the proposed operation at any 
time and to take any action it considers necessary to protect 
those forces if they are engaged.
    Any such presidential certification must be accompanied by 
a report from the President to Congress setting forth 
additional details regarding the proposed foreign command or 
operational control arrangement.
    If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency 
exists that prevents the President from submitting the 
certification and report described above to Congress 15 days 
before placing U.S. armed forces under foreign command or 
operational control, the President may submit such 
certification and report to Congress in a timely manner, but in 
no event later than 48 hours after such command or operational 
control becomes effective.
    The new section 405(f) is an interpretation provision 
clarifying that nothing in the section is to be construed as 
providing statutory authorization for the President to use U.S. 
armed forces in any operation or to place any element of the 
U.S. armed forces under the command or operational control of a 
foreign national. Section 405(f) further clarifies that nothing 
in the section is to be construed to derogate or limit the 
President's constitutional authority as commander in chief.
    Section 401 of the Act contains two additional provisions 
that are not incorporated into the new section 405 of title 10.
    Section 401(b) provides that no presidential certification 
may be submitted under the new section 405(d)(1) of title 10 
with respect to any proposed foreign command or operational 
control arrangement until the President has submitted to the 
Congress a memorandum of legal points and authorities 
explaining why the placement of U.S. forces under the command 
or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf 
of the United Nations does not violate the United States 
Constitution. This section is intended to address the concern 
that any subordination of United States armed forces to the 
command or operational control of foreign nationals may violate 
the Constitution, including the Appointments Clause (Article 
II, section 2, paragraph 2) and the Oaths Clause (Article VI, 
paragraph 3).
    Section 401(c) excepts from the restrictions of the new 
section 405 of title 10 participation of U.S. armed forces in 
the ongoing United Nations operations in Macedonia and Croatia 
on terms substantially similar to those on which U.S. armed 
forces are currently participating in those operations.

  section 402--limitation on placement of united states armed forces 
    under foreign control for a united nations peacekeeping activity

    Section 402(a) amends section 6 of the United Nations 
Participation Act (section 287d of title 22, United States 
Code) to remove the grant of authority from Congress to the 
President currently contained in section 6 to negotiate a 
special agreement or agreements with the Security Council in 
accordance with article 43 of the PUnited Nations Charter. 
Section 6 as revised will retain the requirement of the current 
section 6 that any agreement with the Security Council in 
accordance with article 43 of the United Nations Charter be 
approved by Congress by law before taking effect.
    The new subsection 6(b) of the United Nations Participation 
Act provides that the President may not place any element of 
the U.S. armed forces under the command or operational control 
of a foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations 
for purposes of international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-
enforcing, or similar activity.
    The new section 6(b) further provides that U.S. forces 
shall not be considered to be under the command or operational 
control of a foreign national in any case in which the senior 
military commander of the United Nations force is a United 
States military officer who has the authority to dismiss 
subordinates in the command chain, establish appropriate rules 
of engagement for the U.S. forces involved, and establish 
criteria governing the operational employment of such U.S. 
forces. This proviso is intended to address situations in which 
foreign nationals may be placed in the chain of command between 
a senior military commander of a U.N. operation who is a U.S. 
national and a U.S. military unit.
    The new section 6(d) provides an exception to the 
restrictions of the new section 6(b) for instances in which 
Congress has specifically authorized by law the placement of 
U.S. armed forces under the command or operational of a foreign 
national acting on behalf of the United Nations. The new 
section 6(c) provides an exception to the restrictions of the 
new section 6(b) for cases in which the President submits a 
certification and report to Congress meeting requirements 
specified in section 6(e) not less than 15 days before placing 
U.S. forces under such command or operational control.
    The new section 6(e) provides that a certification under 
section 6(c) is required to contain the President's 
certification to Congress of the following: (1) The foreign 
command or operational control arrangement is necessary to 
protect national security interests of the United States; (2) 
the U.S. commander of any U.S. unit proposed for placement 
under the command or operational control of a foreign national 
acting on behalf of the United Nations will at all times retain 
the right to report independently to superior U.S. military 
authorities, and to decline to comply with orders judged by 
such commander to be illegal, militarily imprudent, or beyond 
the mandate of the mission to which the United States agreed 
with the United Nations, until such time as that commander 
receives direction from superior U.S. military authorities; (3) 
the U.S. forces will at all times remain under U.S. 
administrative command for such purposes as discipline and 
evaluation; and (4) the United States will retain the authority 
to withdraw any U.S. forces from the proposed operation at any 
time and to take any action it considers necessary to protect 
those forces if they are engaged.
    Any such presidential certification must be accompanied by 
a report from the President to Congress setting forth 
additional details regarding the proposed foreign command or 
operational control arrangement.
    If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency 
exists that prevents the President from submitting the 
certification and report described above to Congress 15 days 
before placing U.S. armed forces under foreign command or 
operational control, the President may submit such 
certification and report to Congress in a timely manner, but in 
no event later than 48 hours after such command or operational 
control becomes effective.
    The new section 6(g) is an interpretation provision 
clarifying that, except as authorized in section 7 of the 
United Nations Participation Act, nothing in that Act is to be 
construed as providing statutory authorization for the 
President to make available to the Security Council United 
States Armed forces, facilities, or assistance.
    Section 402 of the Act contains two additional provisions 
that are not incorporated into the new section 6 of the United 
Nations Participation Act.
    Section 402(b) provides that no presidential certification 
may be submitted under the new section 6(e)(1) of the United 
Nations Participation Act with respect to any proposed foreign 
command or operational control arrangement until the President 
has submitted to the Congress a memorandum of legal points and 
authorities explaining why the placement of U.S. forces under 
the command or operational control of a foreign national acting 
on behalf of the United Nations does not violate the United 
States Constitution. This section is intended to address the 
concern that any subordination of United States armed forces to 
the command or operational control of foreign nationals may 
violate the Constitution, including the Appointments Clause 
(Article II, section 2, paragraph 2) and the Oaths Clause 
(Article VI, paragraph 3).
    Section 402(c) excepts from the restrictions of the new 
section 6 of the United Nations Participation Act participation 
of the U.S. armed forces in the ongoing United Nations 
operations in Macedonia and Croatia on terms substantially 
similar to those on which U.S. armed forces are currently 
participating in those operations.

                        TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS

 section 501--credit against assessment for united states expenditures 
          in support of united nations peacekeeping operations

    Section 501 amends the United Nations Participation Act to 
add a new section 10(a) entitled ``Credit Against Assessment 
for Expenditures in Support of Peacekeeping Operations''.
    The new section 10(a)(2) of the United Nations 
Participation Act requires the President's annual budget 
submission to Congress to include a report on the total amount 
of incremental costs incurred by the Department of Defense 
during the preceding year to support or participate in, 
directly or indirectly, United Nations peacekeeping activities.
    For purposes of the new section 10(a), the term ``United 
Nations peacekeeping activities'' is defined to mean any 
peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar activity 
authorized by the Security Council under chapter VI or VII of 
the United Nations Charter, except that such term does not 
include any such activity authorized under chapter VII of such 
Charter with respect to which the President has certified to 
the Congress that the activity is of such importance to the 
national security of the United States that the United States 
would undertake the activity unilaterally if it were not 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council.
    The new section 10(a)(1) provides that funds may be 
obligated for payment to the United Nations of the United 
States assessed share of peacekeeping operations for a fiscal 
year only to the extent that the amount of such assessed share 
exceeds the total amount of incremental costs identified in the 
report submitted pursuant to section 10(a)(2), as reduced by 
any amount reimbursed or credited to the United States by the 
United Nations. The effect of the provision is to permit the 
United States to pay United Nations peacekeeping assessments 
only to the extent that such assessments exceed the 
unreimbursed incremental costs to the Department of Defense 
during the preceding year for direct or indirect U.S. 
participation in or support to certain U.N. peacekeeping 
operations.

 section 502--codification of required notice to congress of proposed 
                 united nations peacekeeping activities

    Section 502 amends section 4 of the United Nations 
Participation Act to clarify and tighten existing requirements 
for notice to Congress regarding the authorization of new and 
the reauthorization of existing United Nations peacekeeping 
operations.
    Section 4 as amended will require that all such notice be 
provided in writing. Section 4 as amended will further require 
that any significant expansion of an existing peacekeeping 
operation (defined as expansion by more than 25% as measured by 
either the number of personnel participating (or authorized to 
participate) in the operation or the budget of the operation) 
be treated as authorization of a new peacekeeping operation for 
purposes of the reporting requirements.

 section 503--notice to congress regarding united states contributions 
               for united nations peacekeeping activities

    Section 503 amends the United Nations Participation Act to 
add a new section 10(b) entitled ``Notice to Congress Regarding 
Contributions for Peacekeeping Activities''.
    The new section 10(b) requires the President to notify 
designated congressional committees within 15 days of the 
receipt of a billing request from the United Nations for 
payment of U.S. assessments for U.N. peacekeeping activities.
    The new section 10(b) further requires the President to 
notify the designated committees at least 15 days before the 
U.S. funds are obligated to pay assessed or voluntary U.S. 
contributions to U.N. peacekeeping activities, except that if 
the President determines that an emergency exists and that such 
contribution is in the national security interests of the 
United States, such notification shall be provided in a timely 
manner but no later than 48 hours after such obligation.

    section 504--revised notice to congress regarding united states 
         assistance for united nations peacekeeping activities

    Section 504 amends the United Nations Participation Act to 
add a new section 7(e).
    The new section 7(e) requires the President to notify 
designated congressional committees 15 days in advance of the 
provision by any agency or entity of the United States 
Government of any assistance or facility to support or 
facilitate United Nations peacekeeping activities. The 
President may notify the designated committees up to 48 hours 
after providing assistance or facility in situations in which 
the President determines that an emergency exists and that 
providing such assistance or facility is in the national 
security interests of the United States.
    No notice to the designated committees is required with 
respect to (1) assistance having a value less than $1 million 
in the case of nonreimbursable assistance, or less than $5 
million in the case of reimbursable assistance, or (2) 
assistance provided under the emergency drawdown authority 
contained in sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961. The payment of assessed and voluntary 
contributions to the United Nations is not considered 
assistance for purposes of the new section 7(e).

section 505--united states contributions to united nations peacekeeping 
                               activities

    Section 505 amends section 4(d)(1) of the United Nations 
Participation Act to require the President to include in his 
annual budget submission to the Congress a description of the 
anticipated budget for the next fiscal year for United States 
participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities. Included in this 
report shall be a statement of the aggregate amount of funds 
available to the United Nations for that fiscal year that may 
be made available for United Nations peacekeeping activities, 
and the aggregate amount of funds and the aggregate cost of in-
kind contributions that the United States proposes to make 
available to the United Nations for that fiscal year for U.N. 
peacekeeping activities.

      section 506--reimbursement to the united states for in-kind 
        contributions to united nations peacekeeping activities

    Section 506(a) amends the United Nations Participation Act 
to add a new section 7(b)(2) and a new section 7(f).
    The new section 7(b)(2) revises existing law regarding 
waiver of the requirement that the United Nations reimburse the 
United States for assistance provided to U.N. peacekeeping 
activities. Under the new section 7(b)(2), the waiver authority 
currently vested in the President would be vested instead in 
the Secretary of Defense. The standard for exercising the 
waiver would be modified from ``exceptional circumstances, or 
when the President finds it to be in the national interest'' to 
situations where the Secretary of Defense, after consultation 
with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget ``determines that an emergency exists 
which justifies waiver'' of reimbursement.
    The new section 7(b)(2 requires that any such waiver be 
notified to designated congressional committees at least 15 
days after the waiver takes effect. If the President determines 
that an emergency exists and that providing assistance to the 
United Nations on a nonreimbursable basis is in the national 
interests of the United States, the designated committees may 
be notified of the waiver in a timely manner, but no later than 
48 hours after such waiver takes effect.
    The new section 7(f) requires the Secretary of State to 
ensure that the United Nations reimburses the United States for 
goods and services provided on a reimbursable basis under any 
provision of law for U.N. peacekeeping activities at the 
appropriate value, as determined by the Secretary of Defense.
    Section 506(b) requires the representative of the United 
States to the United Nations to submit to designated 
congressional committees not later than one year after the date 
of enactment a report on all actions taken to achieve the 
objective of the new section 7(f) of the United Nations 
Participation Act.

section 507--prohibition on use of funds to pay united states assessed 
 or voluntary contributions for united nations peacekeeping activities

    Section 507 amends the United Nations Participation Act to 
add a new section 10(c) entitled ``Prohibition on Use of Funds 
to Pay Assessed or Voluntary Contributions for Peacekeeping 
Activities''.
    The new section 10(c) prohibits payment of assessed and 
voluntary U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping activities 
during any fiscal year until the Secretary of Defense certifies 
to Congress that the United Nations has reimbursed the 
Department of Defense directly for all goods and services 
provided on a reimbursable basis by that Department for United 
Nations peacekeeping activities during the preceding year. This 
prohibition would not apply to the extent that the Department 
of Defense has failed to submit its bills for goods and 
services provided to the United Nations in a timely manner.

   Section 508--Limitation on Use of Department of Defense Funds for 
 United States Share of Costs of United Nations Peacekeeping Activities

    Section 508 contains an amendment to title 10 of the United 
States Code establishing a limitation on the use of funds 
available to the Department of Defense for peacekeeping 
activities. As a limitation on the expenditure of Department of 
Defense funds, this section is outside the jurisdiction of the 
Committee on International Relations.

  Section 509--Codification of Limitation on Amount of United States 
   Assessed Contributions for United Nations Peacekeeping Activities

    Section 509 amends the United Nations Participation Act to 
add a new section 10(d) entitled ``Limitation on Assessed 
Contribution with Respect to a Peacekeeping Operation''.
    The new section 10(d) prohibits payment by the United 
States of assessed contributions for U.N. peacekeeping in an 
amount which is greater than 25 percent of the total amount of 
all assessments. The section further provides that any 
arrearages that accumulate as a result of United Nations 
assessments in excess of 25 percent of the total amount of all 
assessed contributions for any peacekeeping operation shall not 
be recognized or paid by the United States.

                 Section 510--Buy American Requirement

    Section 510 amends the United Nations Participation Act to 
add a new section 10(e) and a new section 10(f).
    The new section 10(e) prohibits obligation or expenditure 
of assessed or voluntary U.S. contributions to U.N. 
peacekeeping activities until the Secretary of State certifies 
to designated congressional committees that U.S. manufacturers 
and suppliers are being given opportunities to provide 
equipment, services, and material for U.N. peacekeeping 
activities equal to the opportunities being given to foreign 
manufacturers and suppliers.
    The new section 10(f) defines ``designated congressional 
committees'' for purposes of the new section 10 as the 
Committee on International Relations and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate.

      Section 511--United Nations Budgetary and Management Reform

    Section 511 amends the United Nations Participation Act to 
add a new section 11.
    The new section 11(a) requires withholding at the beginning 
of each fiscal year of 10% of the amounts made available for 
assessed U.S. contributions to the regular U.N. budget, 50% of 
the amounts made available for assessed U.S. contributions to 
U.N. peacekeeping, and all voluntary U.S. contributions to U.N. 
peacekeeping, until the President submits an annual 
certification to Congress in accordance with section 11(b).
    The new section 11(b) provides for an annual certification 
by the President regarding the U.N. office of Inspector 
General. In general terms, each such certification must include 
the following elements: (1) The U.N. has an independent Office 
of Inspector General; (2) the U.N. Inspector General was 
appointed principally on the basis of the appointee's integrity 
and demonstrated ability; (3) the Inspector General is 
authorized to, inter alia, have access to all records and 
officials of the United Nations and its specialized agencies; 
(4) the United Nations has fully implemented procedures that 
effectively protect the identity of, and prevent reprisals 
against, United Nations staff members who complain to or 
cooperate with the inspector General; (5) the United Nations 
has fully implemented procedures that ensure compliance with 
the recommendations of the Inspector General; (6) the United 
Nations has ensured that the annual and all other reports of 
the Inspector General are made available to the General 
Assembly without modification; and (7) the United Nations has 
provided, and is committed to providing, sufficient budgetary 
resources to ensure the effective operation of the Office of 
Inspector General.

  Section 512--Conditions on Provision of Intelligence to the United 
                                Nations

    Section 512 amends the United Nations Participation Act to 
add a new section 12.
    The new section 12(a) provides that the President shall 
ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Defense, has established guidelines governing the provision of 
intelligence information to the United Nations which shall 
protect U.S. intelligence sources and methods before any such 
information is provided to the United Nations.
    The new section 12(b) provides that the President shall 
report not less frequently than semiannually to designated 
congressional committees on the types of intelligence provided 
to the United Nations and the purposes for which it was 
provided during the period covered by the report. This section 
further requires the President to report to the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees within 15 days after he learns 
of any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided to the 
United Nations.
    The new section 12(c) provides that the President may not 
delegate the duties vested in him under section 12.
    The new section 12(d) directs the Secretary of State or his 
designee to work with the United Nations to improve its 
handling of all intelligence information provided it by its 
members.

     TITLE VI--EXPANSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

                        section 601--short title

    Section 601 provides the short title for this title of the 
Act, the ``NATO Expansion Act of 1995''.

                         section 602--findings

    Section 602 contains congressional findings relevant to the 
NATO Expansion Act of 1995.

                   section 603--united states policy

    Section 603 declares that it should be the policy of the 
United States that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia should be in a position to become full NATO members in 
the near future, provided they satisfy criteria related to 
democratization and readiness to joint NATO set forth in the 
section. Section 603 also declares that the United States, 
other NATO members, and NATO itself should furnish appropriate 
assistance to facilitate the transition of Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, and Slovakia to full NATO membership.
    Section 603 further declares that other European countries 
emerging from communist domination may be in a position to join 
NATO at a future date and should be assisted in doing so at 
that time.

  section 604--revisions to program to facilitate transition to nato 
                               membership

    Section 604 amends the NATO Participation Act (title II of 
Public Law 103-447) to enhance in a number of key respects the 
program authorized by that Act to facilitate the transition to 
full NATO membership of European countries emerging from 
communism.
    Section 604 makes the establishment of the transition 
assistance program authorized by Public Law 103-447 mandatory 
rather than discretionary. In addition, section 604 designates 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia as 
immediately eligible to participate in the transition 
assistance program by eliminating the requirement that they be 
designated by the President to participate. Section 604 adds 
economic support fund assistance and assistance from the 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament fund account to the types of 
assistance that may be provided to eligible countries through 
the transition assistance program.

                      TITLE VII--BUDGET FIREWALLS

   section 701--restoration of budget firewalls for defense spending

    Section 701 contains an expression of the sense of the 
Congress regarding the restoration of budget firewalls between 
defense and domestic discretionary spending for fiscal years 
1966, 1997, and 1998. This section is outside he jurisdiction 
of the Committee on International Relations

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports 
that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based 
on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

         Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Findings

    No findings or recommendations of the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight were received as referred to in 
clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is inapplicable because H.R. 7 does not provide 
new budget authority, new spending authority, new credit 
authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax 
expenditures.

                     Inflationary Impact Statement

    In compliance with clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee estimates that 
H.R. 7 will have no significant inflationary impact on prices 
and costs in the operation of the national economy.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth 
with respect to H.R. 7 the following estimate and comparison 
prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Offices 
under section 403 of the Budget Act of 1974:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                  Washington, DC, February 3, 1995.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
reviewed the amendments to H.R. 7, National Security 
Revitalization Act, as ordered reported by the House Committee 
on International Relations on January 31, 1995. Neither the 
Committee's amendments nor the bill as introduced would have 
pay-as-you-go implications. They would not explicitly authorize 
appropriations nor would they have an impact on the budget of 
state and local governments.
    A few provisions of H.R. 7 could imply changes in the 
authorization of discretionary appropriations--particularly, 
Title II (Missile Defense), Title V (United Nations), and Title 
VI (Revitalization and Expansion of NATO). The attachment 
discusses these implications of H.R. 7 as introduced. The costs 
discussed in the attachment would come to bear only if 
subsequent legislation explicitly authorizes appropriations.
    The Committee's amendment to section 501 changes H.R. 7 as 
introduced in two main ways. First, the amendment would lower 
payments for peacekeeping assessments by the incremental costs 
of using U.S. forces in U.N.-authorized peacekeeping operations 
unless the Department of Defense (DoD) has been reimbursed for 
those costs. In H.R. 7 as introduced, payments would be lowered 
by the total (not incremental) costs of those operations. The 
amendment does not change the budgetary impact of H.R. 7 
because both incremental and total costs are expected to exceed 
U.S. assessments.
    The Committee's amendment would allow the President to 
waive the provisions of section 501 if he certifies that the 
United States would have undertaken the operation unilaterally 
if it were not authorized by the U.N. This change could lessen 
the budgetary impact of section 501 if the President makes one 
or more certifications. The size of the budgetary impact would 
depend on the number of certifications and the cost of the 
related operations.
    If you would like further details on this estimate, we will 
be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Kent 
Christensen, Raymond Hall, and Michael Miller.
            Sincerely,
                                    Robert D. Reischauer, Director.
    Attachment.

 budgetary implications of h.r. 7, national security revitalization act

    This document considers the budgetary implications of H.R. 
7 as introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on January 
4, 1995. It serves as a basis for understanding the budgetary 
impacts of any Committee on floor amendments.
    Strictly speaking, H.R. 7 has no direct budgetary impact. 
It has no pay-as-you-go implications nor does it explicitly 
authorize appropriations. Nevertheless, some provisions of H.R. 
7 could imply changes in the authorization of discretionary 
appropriations--particularly, Title II (Missile Defense), Title 
V (United Nations), and Title VI (Revitalization and Expansion 
of NATO.) These implications would come to bear only if 
subsequent legislation explicitly authorizes appropriations.
    Title II--Missile Defense. H.R. 7 calls on the Secretary of 
Defense to develop national and theater missile defenses, but 
it is silent on how much funding would be available for this 
purpose. The cost of such a system could total $29 billion to 
$30 billion over the next five years, or about $10 billion to 
$11 billion more than is currently programmed for missile 
defense.
    In 1992, the Department of Defense planned to deploy a 
national missile defense (NMD) system at an initial site by 
2004 and at multiple sites soon thereafter. This plan called 
for deploying both ground-based systems and space-based sensors 
commonly referred to as Brilliant Eyes. These two components of 
the 1992 plan are the basis for our current estimate for the 
costs of NMD system. The current estimate does not, however, 
embrace the component of the 1992 plan calling for space-based 
interceptors (commonly known as Brilliant Pebbles). An 
enhancement to NMD, Brilliant Pebbles raises more concerns 
about violating the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Defense Treaty 
than do other elements of NMD.
    Deploying a ground-based system of radars, interceptors, 
and command and control at an initial site by 2006 would cost 
about $10 billion. This sum would also support eventual 
deployment at multiple sites. Finally, the additional funding 
would support research and development into technologies that 
would enable the system to counter emerging threats.
    For about $1 billion more this system could be expanded to 
accelerate the deployment of space-based sensors. With this 
additional funding, some sensors could be deployed by 2002 to 
provide cuing and initial targeting data. This sensor 
capability is supposed to permit the ground-based interceptors 
at the initial site to protect the entire continental United 
States against limited missile attacks from the north.
    As for theater missile defense, this estimate assumes that 
the current plan for theater missile defense is consistent with 
the aims of H.R. 7. That plan would deploy groundbased radars 
and missiles with forward-deployed elements of the Army and 
Marine Corps by the end of the century. Eventually more capable 
systems such as the Navy's sea-based vertical launch systems, 
the Air Force's boost-phase interceptors, or the Army's mobile 
air and missile defenses would be deployed.
    Under these assumptions H.R. 7 would add $10 billion to $11 
billion to missile defense costs and bring the total budget for 
these capabilities to $29 billion or $30 billion. But the 
ultimate costs are quite uncertain. These estimates assume that 
the 1992 plan is technically feasible, that the financial plan 
matched the real components of the system, and that the plan 
could be resumed after a two-year hiatus with costs rising only 
for inflation.
    Title III--Revitalization of National Security Commission. 
The bill would establish a commission to conduct a 
comprehensive review of defense strategy, force structure, 
modernization, readiness, infrastructure, and funding. Of the 
funds otherwise available to DoD, $1.5 million would be 
available to carry out the provisions of the title.
    Title IV--Command of United States Forces. H.R. 7 would 
amend title 10 of the U.S. Code and the United Nations 
Participation Act to prohibit a foreign national from 
commanding U.S. forces unless the President makes certain 
certifications. Neither change would have a significant 
budgetary impact.
    Title IV would also require the Congress to approve in law 
any agreement between the President and the U.N. Security 
Council for the use of U.S. forces in maintaining international 
peace and security. CBO cannot predict the extent of U.S. 
involvement in peacekeeping activities. Nevertheless, if 
Congress denied U.S. participation in some peacekeeping 
activities the budgetary savings would likely be no more than a 
few hundred million dollars per year based on recent 
experience. For example, if the United States had not used its 
forces in Bosnia it would not have incurred expenses of about 
$300 million a year in 1994 and 1995. Similarly for U.S. 
expenses in Somalia, the average savings would have been about 
$700 million a year in 1993 and 1994. Aside from deployments to 
Southwest Asia, the deployments to Bosnia and Somalia have been 
the most costly contingencies of recent years.
    Title V--United Nations. Title V addresses U.S. financial 
responsibilities to the U.N. in support of international 
peacekeeping Enactment of Title V could:
          lower payments of assessed and voluntary 
        contributions that help fund U.N. peacekeeping 
        activities;
          lower payments of assessed contributions that help 
        fund the U.N. operating budget; and
          limit DoD's involvement in U.N.-sponsored 
        peacekeeping activities.
    Certain sections of Title V would have overlapping effects. 
For example, sections 501 and 507 could reduce assessed 
payments to the United Nations for peacekeeping--currently 
about $1.0 billion a year--for fiscal years after 1995. 
Similarly sections 507 and 511 could reduce the assessments and 
voluntary contributions totalling about $0.1 billion a year. 
Thus, the potential budgetary effects of these sections were 
not additive.
    Section 501 would probably lower or eliminate the payment 
of assessed peacekeeping contributions, which will total about 
$1.0 billion in 1995 if the President's supplemental request if 
fully funded by the Congress. Under section 501, payments would 
be lowered by the total cost of using Forces in peacekeeping 
activities that are authorized by the U.N. unless the U.N. has 
reimbursed DoD for those costs.
    DoD currently is incurring incremental peacekeeping costs 
from U.N. authorized operations in Haiti, the former 
Yugoslavia, and elsewhere that will total about $2 billion in 
1995. Total costs could be much higher. If DoD continues its 
current level of peacekeeping activity, section 501 would 
eliminate the payment of U.S. contributions because DoD's total 
costs could far exceed peacekeeping assessments. If, however, 
DoD dramatically scales back its peacekeeping activities, and 
if payments for assessed contributions remain at about $1.0 
billion annually, section 501 could lower U.S. contributions by 
hundreds of millions of dollars.
    Similarly, section 507 would deny assessed and voluntary 
contributions for unreimbursed costs, but section 507 focuses 
more on noncombat operations while section 501 would affect all 
types of U.N.-authorized peacekeeping operations. The Secretary 
of Defense however, may waive this provision if he determines 
that an emergency exists. This provision could lower annual 
payments for assessments by the same $1.0 billion targeted by 
section 501, and voluntary payments by about $0.1 billion 
annually.
    Section 511 would reduce payments to the U.N. unless the 
U.N. has appointed an Inspector General (IG) and has 
established an operational IG office that could investigate the 
U.N. and its specialized agencies. Under section 511, 50 
percent of the peacekeeping assessments, 20 percent of the 
payments in support of the U.N. operating budget, and all 
payments from voluntary contributions would be withheld unless 
the President certifies that the IG provisions have been met. 
Thus, section 511 could reduce payments for peacekeeping 
assessments (like sections 501 and 507) by about $0.5 billion, 
payments for the U.N. operating budget by about $0.05 billion, 
and voluntary payments (like section 507) by $0.1 billion 
unless the President makes the certification.
    Section 508 would prohibit DoD from participating in 
peacekeeping activities sponsored by the U.N. unless Congress 
has authorized it to use funds for such purposes. Peacekeeping 
activities sponsored by the U.N. typically have far less U.S. 
involvement than activities authorized by the U.N. The 
incremental cost to the United States of a large U.N.-sponsored 
peacekeeping operation historically has been less than $50 
million annually. Thus, if the Congress denied U.S. 
participation in any one operation, savings could total up to 
$50 million a year.
    Section 508 would also prohibit DoD funds from being used 
to pay U.N. peacekeeping assessments. Compared with current 
law, this provision would not have any budget impact because 
DoD is not authorized to use funds for such purposes.
    Title VI--Revitalization and Expansion of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. H.R. 7 would reaffirm the United 
States' commitment to NATO and support the expansion of NATO to 
include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
other countries designated by the President. The bill would 
authorize the use of economic support assistance and 
nonproliferation and disarmament assistance to facilitate the 
transition to NATO membership. Any implicit authorization of 
appropriations is open-ended. For 1995, the Economic Support 
Fund (ESF) is funded at roughly $2.4, billion with about $2.0 
billion of that going to Egypt and Israel and about $0.4 
billion going to about 20 other countries. Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament funding is now $10 million.
    Title VII--Budget Firewalls. This title expresses a sense 
of Congress that there should be firewalls between defense and 
nondefense discretionary spending for 1996, 1997, 1998. This 
title would affect only the distribution, not the level, of 
spending under the caps on discretionary spending that were 
established under the Budget Enforcement Act.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
titles I, III, V, and VI, and sections 401 and 402 of the bill, 
as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be 
omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in 
italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 
roman):

                      TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

          * * * * * * *

             CHAPTER 20--HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE

     * * * * * * *

                  SUBCHAPTER I--HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Sec.
401.  Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with 
          military operations.
     * * * * * * *
405.  Placement of United States forces under command or operational 
          control of foreign nationals acting on behalf of the United 
          Nations: limitation.
406.  Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of 
          costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: limitation.
     * * * * * * *

Sec. 405. Placement of United States forces under command or 
                    operational control of foreign nationals acting on 
                    behalf of the United Nations: limitation

  (a) Limitation.--(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) 
and (c), funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the 
Department of Defense may not be obligated or expended for 
activities of any element of the armed forces that after the 
date of the enactment of this section is placed under the 
command or operational control of a foreign national acting on 
behalf of the United Nations for the purpose of international 
peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar activity 
that is authorized by the Security Council under chapter VI or 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
  (2) For purposes of this section, elements of the armed 
forces shall not be considered to be placed under the command 
or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf 
of the United Nations in any case in which the senior military 
commander of the United Nations force or operation is a United 
States military officer who has the authority to dismiss 
subordinates in the command chain, establish appropriate rules 
of engagement for United States forces involved, and establish 
criteria governing the operational employment of such United 
States forces.
  (b) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) Subsection 
(a) shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any 
element of the armed forces under such command or operational 
control if the President, not less than 15 days before the date 
on which such command or operational control is to become 
effective (or as provided in paragraph (2)), meets the 
requirements of subsection (d).
  (2) If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency 
exists that precludes the President from meeting the 
requirements of subsection (d) 15 days before placing any 
element of the armed forces under such command or operational 
control, the President may place such forces under such command 
or operational control and meet the requirements of subsection 
(d) in a timely manner, but in no event later than 48 hours 
after such command or operational control becomes effective.
  (c) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (a) shall 
not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of 
the armed forces under such command or operational control if 
the Congress specifically authorizes by law that particular 
placement of United States forces under such command or 
operational control.
  (d) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred 
to in subsection (b)(1) are that the President submit to 
Congress the following:
          (1) Certification by the President that--
                  (A) such a command or operational control 
                arrangement is necessary to protect national 
                security interests of the United States;
                  (B) the commander of any unit of the armed 
                forces proposed for placement under the command 
                or operational control of a foreign national 
                acting directly on behalf of the United Nations 
                will at all times retain the right--
                          (i) to report independently to 
                        superior United States military 
                        authorities; and
                          (ii) to decline to comply with orders 
                        judged by the commander to be illegal, 
                        militarily imprudent, or beyond the 
                        mandate of the mission to which the 
                        United States agreed with the United 
                        Nations, until such time as that 
                        commander receives direction from 
                        superior United States military 
                        authorities with respect to the orders 
                        that the commander has declined to 
                        comply with;
                  (C) any element of the armed forces proposed 
                for placement under the command or operational 
                control of a foreign national acting directly 
                on behalf of the United Nations will at all 
                times remain under United States administrative 
                command for such purposes as discipline and 
                evaluation; and
                  (D) the United States will retain the 
                authority to withdraw any element of the armed 
                forces from the proposed operation at any time 
                and to take any action it considers necessary 
                to protect those forces if they are engaged.
          (2) A report setting forth the following:
                  (A) A description of the national security 
                interests that require the placement of United 
                States forces under the command or operational 
                control of a foreign national acting directly 
                on behalf of the United Nations.
                  (B) The mission of the United States forces 
                involved.
                  (C) The expected size and composition of the 
                United States forces involved.
                  (D) The incremental cost to the United States 
                of participation in the United Nations 
                operation by the United States forces which are 
                proposed to be placed under the command or 
                operational control of a foreign national.
                  (E) The precise command and control 
                relationship between the United States forces 
                involved and the United Nations command 
                structure.
                  (F) The precise command and control 
                relationship between the United States forces 
                involved and the commander of the United States 
                unified command for the region in which those 
                United States forces are to operate.
                  (G) The extent to which the United States 
                forces involved will rely on non-United States 
                forces for security and self-defense and an 
                assessment on the ability of those non-United 
                States forces to provide adequate security to 
                the United States forces involved.
                  (H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of 
                the United States forces involved.
  (e) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection (c) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form and, if necessary, in 
classified form.
  (f) Interpretation.--(1) This section is a limitation on the 
expenditure of Department of Defense funds for any element of 
the armed forces placed under the command or operational 
control of a foreign national acting on behalf of the United 
Nations and is not to be construed as an authorization--
          (A) for the President to use any element of the armed 
        forces in any operation; or
          (B) for the President to place any element of the 
        armed forces under the command or operational control 
        of a foreign national.
  (2) Subject to the power of the Congress to declare war under 
article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution, nothing in 
this section shall be construed to derogate or limit the 
authority of the President as commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces under article II, section 2, clause 1 of the 
Constitution.

Sec. 406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of 
                    costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: 
                    limitation

  (a) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Payment of Assessment.--
No funds available to the Department of Defense shall be 
available for payment of any United States assessed or 
voluntary contribution for United Nations peacekeeping 
activities.
  (b) Limitation on Use of Funds for Participation in 
Peacekeeping Activities.--Funds available to the Department of 
Defense may be used for payment of the incremental costs 
associated with the participation of elements of the armed 
forces in United Nations peacekeeping activities only to the 
extent that Congress has by law specifically authorized the use 
of those funds for such purposes.
          * * * * * * *
                              ----------                              


                UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945

          * * * * * * *
  Sec. 4. (a) Periodic Reports.--The President shall, from time 
to time as occasion may require, but not less than once each 
year, make reports to the Congress of the activities of the 
United Nations and of the participation of the United States 
therein. [He shall make special current reports on decisions of 
the Security Council to take enforcement measures under the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and on the 
participation therein, under his instructions, of the 
representative of the United States.]
          * * * * * * *
  (d) Annual Report.--In addition to the report required by 
subsection (a), the President, at the time of submission of the 
annual budget request to the Congress, shall submit to the 
designated congressional committees a report that includes the 
following:
          (1) Costs of peacekeeping operations.--
                  (A) * * *
          * * * * * * *
                  (D) A description of the anticipated budget 
                for the next fiscal year for United States 
                participation in United Nations peacekeeping 
                activities, including a statement of--
                          (i) the aggregate amount of funds 
                        available to the United Nations for 
                        that fiscal year, including assessed 
                        and voluntary contributions, which may 
                        be made available for United Nations 
                        peacekeeping activities; and
                          (ii) the aggregate amount of funds 
                        (from all accounts) and the aggregate 
                        costs of in-kind contributions that the 
                        United States proposes to make 
                        available to the United Nations for 
                        that fiscal year for United Nations 
                        peacekeeping activities.
                  [(D)](E) In the case of the first 2 reports 
                submitted pursuant to this subsection, a 
                projection of all United States costs for 
                United Nations peacekeeping operations during 
                each of the next 2 fiscal years, including 
                assessed and voluntary contributions.
          * * * * * * *
  (e) Consultations and Reports on U.N. Peacekeeping 
Operations.--
          (1) Consultations.--Each month the President shall 
        consult with the Congress on the status of United 
        Nations peacekeeping operations.
          (2) Information to be provided.--In connection with 
        these consultations, the following information shall be 
        provided in written form not later than the 10th day of 
        each month to the designated congressional committees:
                  (A) With respect to ongoing United Nations 
                peacekeeping operations, the following:
                          (i) A list of all resolutions of the 
                        United Nations Security Council 
                        anticipated to be voted on during such 
                        month that would extend or change the 
                        mandate of any United Nations 
                        peacekeeping operation.
                          (ii) For each such operation, any 
                        changes in the duration, mandate, and 
                        command and control arrangements that 
                        are anticipated as a result of the 
                        adoption of the resolution.
                          (iii) An estimate of the total cost 
                        to the United Nations of each such 
                        operation for the period covered by the 
                        resolution, and an estimate of the 
                        amount of that cost that will be 
                        assessed to the United States.
                          (iv) Any anticipated significant 
                        changes in United States participation 
                        in or support for each such operation 
                        during the period covered by the 
                        resolution (including facilities, 
                        training, transportation, 
                        communication, intelligence, and 
                        logistical support), and the estimated 
                        costs to the United States of such 
                        changes.
                  (B) With respect to each new United Nations 
                peacekeeping operation that is anticipated to 
                be authorized by a Security Council resolution 
                during such month, the following information 
                for the period covered by the resolution:
                          (i) The anticipated duration, 
                        mandate, and command and control 
                        arrangements of such operation.
                          (ii) An estimate of the total cost to 
                        the United Nations of the operation, 
                        and an estimate of the amount of that 
                        cost that will be assessed to the 
                        United States.
                          (iii) A description of the functions 
                        that would be performed by any United 
                        States Armed Forces participating in or 
                        otherwise operating in support of the 
                        operation, an estimate of the number of 
                        members of the Armed Forces that will 
                        participate in or otherwise operate in 
                        support of the operation, and an 
                        estimate of the cost to the United 
                        States of such participation or 
                        support.
                          (iv) A description of any other 
                        United States assistance to or support 
                        for the operation (including 
                        facilities, training, transportation, 
                        communication, intelligence, and 
                        logistical support), and an estimate of 
                        the cost to the United States of such 
                        assistance or support.
          (3) Interim information.--(A) The President shall 
        submit to the designated congressional committees a 
        written interim report if, during the period between 
        the monthly consultations required by paragraph (1), 
        the United States learns that the United Nations 
        Security Council is likely, before the next such 
        consultation, to vote on a resolution that would 
        authorize a new United Nations peacekeeping operation 
        and that resolution was not previously reported on 
        pursuant to paragraph (2)(B). Each interim report shall 
        include the information described in clauses (i) 
        through (iv) of paragraph (2)(B).
          (B) Any such interim report shall be submitted not 
        less than 5 days before the vote of the United Nations 
        Security Council, unless the President determines that 
        exceptional circumstances prevented compliance with the 
        requirement to report 5 days in advance. If the 
        President makes such a determination, the interim 
        report shall be submitted promptly (but in no case 
        later than 3 days after the vote) and shall include a 
        copy of the determination and a description of the 
        exceptional circumstances which were the basis for that 
        determination.
          (4) New united nations peacekeeping operation 
        defined.--As used in paragraphs (2) (B) and (3), the 
        term ``new United Nations peacekeeping operation'' 
        includes any existing or otherwise ongoing United 
        Nations peacekeeping operation--
                  (A) that is to be expanded by more than 25 
                percent during the period covered by the 
                Security Council resolution, as measured by 
                either the number of personnel participating 
                (or authorized to participate) in the operation 
                or the budget of the operation; or
                  (B) that is to be authorized to operate in a 
                country in which it was not previously 
                authorized to operate.
          (5) Quarterly reports.--The President shall submit 
        quarterly reports to the designated congressional 
        committees on all assistance provided by the United 
        States during the preceding calendar quarter to the 
        United Nations to support peacekeeping operations. Each 
        report shall describe the assistance provided for each 
        such operation, listed by category of assistance. The 
        report for the fourth calendar quarter of each year 
        shall be submitted as part of the annual report 
        required by subsection (d) and shall include cumulative 
        information for the preceding calendar year.
  [(e) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this 
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' has 
the meaning given that term by section 415 of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995.]
  (f) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this 
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' has 
the meaning given such term in section 10(f).
          * * * * * * *
  [Sec. 6. The President is authorized to negotiate a special 
agreement or agreements with the Security Council which shall 
be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act 
or joint resolution, providing for the numbers and types of 
armed forces, their degree of readiness and general locations, 
and the nature of facilities and assistance, including rights 
of passage, to be made available to the Security Council on its 
call for the purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security in accordance with article 43 of said Charter. The 
President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of 
the Congress to make available to the Security Council on its 
call in order to take action under article 42 of said Charter 
and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the Armed 
Forces, facilities, or assistance provided for therein: 
Provided, That, except as authorized in section 7 of this Act, 
nothing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization 
to the President by the Congress to make available to the 
Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or 
assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and 
assistance provided for in such special agreement or 
agreements.]
  Sec. 6. (a) Agreements With Security Council.--(1) Any 
special agreement described in paragraph (2) that is concluded 
by the President with the Security Council shall not be 
effective unless approved by the Congress by law.
  (2) An agreement referred to in paragraph (1) is an agreement 
providing for the numbers and types of United States Armed 
Forces, their degree of readiness and general locations, or the 
nature of facilities and assistance, including rights of 
passage, to be made available to the Security Council for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security in 
accordance with Article 43 of the Charter of the United 
Nations.
  (b) Limitation.--(1) Except as provided in subsections (c) 
and (d), the President may not place any element of the Armed 
Forces under the command or operational control of a foreign 
national acting on behalf of the United Nations for the purpose 
of international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or 
similar activity that is authorized by the Security Council 
under chapter VI or VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
  (2) For purposes of this section, elements of the Armed 
Forces shall not be considered to be placed under the command 
or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf 
of the United Nations in any case in which the senior military 
commander of the United Nations force or operation is a United 
States military officer who has the authority to dismiss 
subordinates in the command chain, establish appropriate rules 
of engagement for United States forces involved, and establish 
criteria governing the operational employment of such United 
States forces.
  (c) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) Subsection 
(b) shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any 
element of the Armed Forces under such command or operational 
control if the President, not less than 15 days before the date 
on which such command or operational control is to become 
effective (or as provided in paragraph (2)), meets the 
requirements of subsection (e).
  (2) If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency 
exists that precludes the President from meeting the 
requirements of subsection (e) 15 days before placing any 
element of the Armed Forces under such command or operational 
control, the President may place such forces under such command 
or operational control and meet the requirements of subsection 
(e) in a timely manner, but in no event later than 48 hours 
after such command or operational control becomes effective.
  (d) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (b) shall 
not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of 
the Armed Forces under such command or operational control if 
the Congress specifically authorizes by law that particular 
placement of United States forces under such command or 
operational control.
  (e) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred 
to in subsection (c)(1) are that the President submit to 
Congress the following:
          (1) Certification by the President that--
                  (A) such a command or operational control 
                arrangement is necessary to protect national 
                security interests of the United States;
                  (B) the commander of any unit of the Armed 
                Forces proposed for placement under the command 
                or operational control of a foreign national 
                acting directly on behalf of the United Nations 
                will at all times retain the right--
                          (i) to report independently to 
                        superior United States military 
                        authorities; and
                          (ii) to decline to comply with orders 
                        judged by the commander to be illegal, 
                        militarily imprudent, or beyond the 
                        mandate of the mission to which the 
                        United States agreed with the United 
                        Nations, until such time as that 
                        commander receives direction from 
                        superior United States military 
                        authorities with respect to the orders 
                        that the commander has declined to 
                        comply with;
                  (C) any element of the Armed Forces proposed 
                for placement under the command or operational 
                control of a foreign national acting directly 
                on behalf of the United Nations will at all 
                times remain under United States administrative 
                command for such purposes as discipline and 
                evaluation; and
                  (D) the United States will retain the 
                authority to withdraw any element of the Armed 
                Forces from the proposed operation at any time 
                and to take any action it considers necessary 
                to protect those forces if they are engaged.
          (2) A report setting forth the following:
                  (A) A description of the national security 
                interests that require the placement of United 
                States forces under the command or operational 
                control of a foreign national acting directly 
                on behalf of the United Nations.
                  (B) The mission of the United States forces 
                involved.
                  (C) The expected size and composition of the 
                United States forces involved.
                  (D) The incremental cost to the United States 
                of participation in the United Nations 
                operation by the United States forces which are 
                proposed to be placed under the command or 
                operational control of a foreign national.
                  (E) The precise command and control 
                relationship between the United States forces 
                involved and the United Nations command 
                structure.
                  (F) The precise command and control 
                relationship between the United States forces 
                involved and the commander of the United States 
                unified command for the region in which those 
                United States forces are to operate.
                  (G) The extent to which the United States 
                forces involved will rely on non-United States 
                forces for security and self-defense and an 
                assessment on the ability of those non-PUnited 
                States forces to provide adequate security to 
                the United States forces involved.
                  (H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of 
                the United States forces involved.
  (f) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection (e) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form and, if necessary, in 
classified form.
  (g) Interpretation.--Except as authorized in section 7 of 
this Act, nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as 
an authorization to the President by the Congress to make 
available to the Security Council United States Armed Forces, 
facilities, or assistance.

  Sec. 7. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law 
other than subsection (e)(1), the President, upon the request 
by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent 
that he finds that it is consistent with the national interest 
to comply with such request, may authorize, in support of such 
activities of the United Nations as are specifically directed 
to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not involving the 
employment of armed forces contemplated by chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter--
          (1) * * *
          * * * * * * *
  (b)(1) Whenever personnel or assistance is made available 
pursuant to the authority contained in subsection (a) (1) and 
(2) of this section, the President shall require reimbursement 
from the United Nations for the expense thereby incurred by the 
[United States: Provided, That in exceptional circumstances, or 
when the President finds it to be in the national interest, he 
may waive, in whole or in part, the requirement of such 
reimbursement: Provided further, That when] United States. When 
any such reimbursement is made, it shall be credited, at the 
option of the appropriate department of the Department of 
Defense, either to the appropriation, fund, or account utilized 
in incurring the obligation, or to an appropriate 
appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the 
purposes for which expenditures were made.
  (2) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for 
reimbursement under paragraph (1) if the Secretary, after 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, determines that an 
emergency exists which justifies waiver of that requirement. 
Any such waiver shall be submitted to the designated 
congressional committees, as defined in section 10(a)(3)(B), at 
least 15 days before it takes effect, except that if the 
President determines that an emergency exists which prevents 
compliance with the requirement that the notification be 
provided 15 days in advance and that the provision under 
subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of personnel or assistance on a 
nonreimbursable basis is in the national security interests of 
the United States, such notification shall be provided in a 
timely manner but no later than 48 hours after such waiver 
takes effect.
          * * * * * * *
  (e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), at least 
15 days before any agency or entity of the United States 
Government makes available to the United Nations any assistance 
or facility to support or facilitate United Nations 
peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify the 
designated congressional committees.
  (2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to--
          (A) assistance having a value of less than $1,000,000 
        in the case of nonreimbursable assistance or less than 
        $5,000,000 in the case of reimbursable assistance; or
          (B) assistance provided under the emergency drawdown 
        authority contained in sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) 
        of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
        2318(a)(1), 2348a(c)(2)).
  (3) If the President determines that an emergency exists 
which prevents compliance with the requirement in paragraph (1) 
that notification be provided 15 days in advance and that the 
contribution of any such assistance or facility is in the 
national security interests of the United States, such 
notification shall be provided in a timely manner but not later 
than 48 hours after such assistance or facility is made 
available to the United Nations.
  (4) For purposes of this subsection, the term 
``assistance''--
          (A) means assistance of any kind, including 
        logistical support, supplies, goods, or services 
        (including command, control, communications or 
        intelligence assistance and training), and the grant of 
        rights of passage; and
          (B) includes assistance provided through in-kind 
        contributions or through the provision of support, 
        supplies, goods, or services on any terms, including on 
        a grant, lease, loan, or reimbursable basis; but
          (C) does not include the payment of assessed or 
        voluntary contributions.
  (f) The Secretary of State shall ensure that goods and 
services provided on a reimbursable basis by the Department of 
Defense to the United Nations for United Nations peacekeeping 
operations under this section or any other provision of law are 
reimbursed at the appropriate value, as determined by the 
Secretary of Defense.
          * * * * * * *
  Sec. 10. (a) Credit Against Assessment for Expenditures in 
Support of Peacekeeping Operations.--
          (1) Limitation.--Funds may be obligated for payment 
        to the United Nations of the United States assessed 
        share of peacekeeping operations for a fiscal year only 
        to the extent that--
                  (A) the amount of such assessed share 
                exceeds--
                  (B) the amount equal to--
                          (i) the total amount identified in 
                        the report submitted pursuant to 
                        paragraph (2) for the preceding fiscal 
                        year, reduced by
                          (ii) the amount of any reimbursement 
                        or credit to the United States by the 
                        United Nations for the costs of United 
                        States support for, or participation 
                        in, United Nations peacekeeping 
                        activities for that preceding fiscal 
                        year.
          (2) Annual report.--The President shall, at the time 
        of submission of the budget to the Congress for any 
        fiscal year, submit to the designated congressional 
        committees a report on the total amount of incremental 
        costs incurred by the Department of Defense during the 
        preceding fiscal year to support or participate in, 
        directly or indirectly, United Nations peacekeeping 
        activities. Such report shall include a separate 
        listing by United Nations peacekeeping operation of the 
        amount of incremental costs incurred to support or 
        participate in each such operation.
          (3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection:
                  (A) United nations peacekeeping activities.--
                The term ``United Nations peacekeeping 
                activities'' means any international 
                peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or 
                similar activity that is authorized by the 
                United Nations Security Council under chapter 
                VI or VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
                except that such term does not include any such 
                activity authorized under chapter VII of such 
                Charter with respect to which the President has 
                certified to the Congress that the activity is 
                of such importance to the national security of 
                the United States that the United States would 
                undertake the activity unilaterally if it were 
                not authorized by the United Nations Security 
                Council.
                  (B) Designated congressional committees.--The 
                term ``designated congressional committees'' 
                includes the Committee on National Security of 
                the House of Representatives and the Committee 
                on Armed Services of the Senate.
  (b) Notice to Congress Regarding Contributions for 
Peacekeeping Activities.--
          (1) Notice regarding united nations billing 
        request.--Not later than 15 days after the date on 
        which the United States receives from the United 
        Nations a billing requesting a payment by the United 
        States of any contribution for United Nations 
        peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify 
        the designated congressional committees.
          (2) Notice regarding proposed obligation of funds.--
        The President shall notify the designated congressional 
        committees at least 15 days before the United States 
        obligates funds for any assessed or voluntary 
        contribution for United Nations peacekeeping 
        activities, except that if the President determines 
        that an emergency exists which prevents compliance with 
        the requirement that such notification be provided 15 
        days in advance and that such contribution is in the 
        national security interests of the United States, such 
        notification shall be provided in a timely manner but 
        no later than 48 hours after such obligation.
  (c) Prohibition on Use of Funds To Pay Assessed or Voluntary 
Contributions for Peacekeeping Activities.--
          (1) In general.--Appropriated funds may not be used 
        to pay any United States assessed or voluntary 
        contribution during any fiscal year for United Nations 
        peacekeeping activities until the Secretary of Defense 
        certifies to the designated congressional committees 
        that the United Nations has reimbursed the Department 
        of Defense directly for all goods and services that 
        were provided to the United Nations by the Department 
        of Defense on a reimbursable basis during the preceding 
        fiscal year for United Nations peacekeeping activities, 
        including personnel and assistance provided under 
        section 7 (except to the extent that the authority of 
        subsection (b)(2) of such section to waive the 
        reimbursement requirement was exercised with respect to 
        such personnel or assistance).
          (2) Exception.--The prohibition contained in 
        paragraph (1) shall not apply when the Department of 
        Defense has failed to submit its bills in a timely 
        manner for goods and services that were provided to the 
        United Nations.
  (d) Limitation on Assessed Contribution With Respect to a 
Peacekeeping Operation.--Funds authorized to be appropriated 
for ``Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities'' 
for any fiscal year shall not be available for the payment of 
the United States assessed contribution for a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation in an amount which is greater than 25 
percent of the total amount of all assessed contributions for 
that operation, and any arrearages that accumulate as a result 
of assessments in excess of 25 percent of the total amount of 
all assessed contributions for any United Nations peacekeeping 
operation shall not be recognized or paid by the United States.
  (e) Buy American Requirement.--No funds may be obligated or 
expended to pay any United States assessed or voluntary 
contribution for United Nations peacekeeping activities unless 
the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the 
designated congressional committees that United States 
manufacturers and suppliers are being given opportunities to 
provide equipment, services, and material for such activities 
equal to those being given to foreign manufacturers and 
suppliers.
  (f) Designated Congressional Committees Defined.--As used in 
this section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' 
means--
          (1) the Committee on International Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives; and
          (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
  Sec. 11. (a) Withholding of Contributions.--
          (1) Assessed contributions for regular united nations 
        budget.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 20 
        percent of the amount of funds made available for that 
        fiscal year for United States assessed contributions 
        for the regular United Nations budget shall be withheld 
        from obligation and expenditure unless a certification 
        for that fiscal year has been made under subsection 
        (b).
          (2) Assessed contributions for united nations 
        peacekeeping.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 50 
        percent of the amount of funds made available for that 
        fiscal year for United States assessed contributions 
        for United Nations peacekeeping activities shall be 
        withheld from obligation and expenditure unless a 
        certification for that fiscal year has been made under 
        subsection (b).
          (3) Voluntary contributions for united nations 
        peacekeeping.--The United States may not during any 
        fiscal year pay any voluntary contribution to the 
        United Nations for international peacekeeping 
        activities unless a certification for that fiscal year 
        has been made under subsection (b).
  (b) Certification.--The certification referred to in 
subsection (a) for any fiscal year is a certification by the 
President to the Congress, submitted on or after the beginning 
of that fiscal year, of each of the following:
          (1) The United Nations has an independent office of 
        Inspector General to conduct and supervise objective 
        audits, inspections, and investigations relating to 
        programs and operations of the United Nations.
          (2) The United Nations has an Inspector General who 
        was appointed by the Secretary General with the 
        approval of the General Assembly and whose appointment 
        was made principally on the basis of the appointee's 
        integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, 
        auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, 
        public administration, or investigation.
          (3) The Inspector General is authorized to--
                  (A) make investigations and reports relating 
                to the administration of the programs and 
                operations of the United Nations;
                  (B) have access to all records, documents, 
                and other available materials relating to those 
                programs and operations;
                  (C) have direct and prompt access to any 
                official of the United Nations; and
                  (D) have access to all records and officials 
                of the specialized agencies of the United 
                Nations.
          (4) The United Nations has fully implemented, and 
        made available to all member states, procedures that 
        effectively protect the identity of, and prevent 
        reprisals against, any staff member of the United 
        Nations making a complaint or disclosing information 
        to, or cooperating in any investigation or inspection 
        by, the United Nations Inspector General.
          (5) The United Nations has fully implemented 
        procedures that ensure compliance with recommendations 
        of the United Nations Inspector General.
          (6) The United Nations has required the United 
        Nations Inspector General to issue an annual report and 
        has ensured that the annual report and all other 
        reports of the Inspector General are made available to 
        the General Assembly without modification.
          (7) The United Nations has provided, and is committed 
        to providing, sufficient budgetary resources to ensure 
        the effective operation of the United Nations Inspector 
        General.
  Sec. 12. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to the 
United Nations.--Before intelligence information is provided by 
the United States to the United Nations, the President shall 
ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Defense, has established guidelines governing the provision of 
intelligence information to the United Nations which shall 
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure in accordance with section 103(c)(5) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
  (b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall 
periodically report, but not less frequently than semiannually, 
to the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on the types of 
intelligence provided to the United Nations and the purposes 
for which it was provided during the period covered by the 
report. The President shall also report to the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, within 15 
days after it becomes known to him, any unauthorized disclosure 
of intelligence provided to the United Nations.
  (2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first 
sentence of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to 
the provision of intelligence that is provided only to, and for 
the use of, United States Government personnel serving with the 
United Nations.
  (c) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or 
assign the duties of the President under this section.
  (d) Improved Handling of Intelligence Information by the 
United Nations.--The Secretary of State (or the designee of the 
Secretary), in consultation with the Director of Central 
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall work with the 
United Nations to improve the handling, processing, 
dissemination, and management of all intelligence information 
provided to it by its members.
  (e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to--
          (1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the 
        Director of Central Intelligence to protect 
        intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
        disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); 
        or
          (2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of 
        title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
        413-415).
                              ----------                              


                    FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION

                     ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1994 AND 1995

          * * * * * * *

                 TITLE IV--INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

       PART A--UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

          * * * * * * *

SEC. 404. ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
                    OPERATIONS.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Limitation on United States Contributions.--
          (1) * * *
          [(2) Subsequent fiscal years.--Funds authorized to be 
        appropriated for ``Contributions for International 
        Peacekeeping Activities'' for any fiscal year after 
        fiscal year 1995 shall not be available for the payment 
        of the United States assessed contribution for a United 
        Nations peacekeeping operation in an amount which is 
        greater than 25 percent of the total of all assessed 
        contributions for that operation.]
          * * * * * * *

SEC. 407. CONSULTATIONS AND REPORTS.

  [(a) Consultations and Reports on U.N. Peacekeeping 
Operations.--
          [(1) Consultations.--Each month the President shall 
        consult with the Congress on the status of United 
        Nations peacekeeping operations.
          [(2) Information to be provided.--In connection with 
        these consultations, the following information shall be 
        provided each month to the designated congressional 
        committees:
                  [(A) With respect to ongoing United Nations 
                peacekeeping operations, the following:
                          [(i) A list of all resolutions of the 
                        United Nations Security Council 
                        anticipated to be voted on during such 
                        month that would extend or change the 
                        mandate of any United Nations 
                        peacekeeping operation.
                          [(ii) For each such operation, any 
                        changes in the duration, mandate, and 
                        command and control arrangements that 
                        are anticipated as a result of the 
                        adoption of the resolution.
                          [(iii) An estimate of the total cost 
                        to the United Nations of each such 
                        operation for the period covered by the 
                        resolution, and an estimate of the 
                        amount of that cost that will be 
                        assessed to the United States.
                          [(iv) Any anticipated significant 
                        changes in United States participation 
                        in or support for each such operation 
                        during the period covered by the 
                        resolution, and the estimated costs to 
                        the United States of such changes.
                  [(B) With respect to each new United Nations 
                peacekeeping operation that is anticipated to 
                be authorized by a Security Council resolution 
                during such month, the following information 
                for the period covered by the resolution:
                          [(i) The anticipated duration, 
                        mandate, and command and control 
                        arrangements of such operation.
                          [(ii) An estimate of the total cost 
                        to the United Nations of the operation, 
                        and an estimate of the amount of that 
                        cost that will be assessed to the 
                        United States.
                          [(iii) A description of the functions 
                        that would be performed by any United 
                        States Armed Forces participating in or 
                        otherwise operating in support of the 
                        operation, an estimate of the number of 
                        members of the Armed Forces that will 
                        participate in or otherwise operate in 
                        support of the operation, and an 
                        estimate of the cost to the United 
                        States of such participation or 
                        support.
          [(3) Written information.--The information described 
        in clauses (i) and (iii) of paragraph (2)(A) and the 
        information described in clauses (i) and (ii) of 
        paragraph (2)(B) shall be provided each month to the 
        designated congressional committees in written form not 
        later than the 10th day of that month.
          [(4) Interim information.--(A) The President shall 
        submit to the designated congressional committees a 
        written interim report if, during the period between 
        the monthly consultations required by paragraph (1), 
        the United States learns that the United Nations 
        Security Council is likely, before the next such 
        consultation, to vote on a resolution that would 
        authorize a new United Nations peacekeeping operation 
        and that resolution was not previously reported on 
        pursuant to paragraph (2)(B). Each interim report shall 
        include the information described in clauses (i) and 
        (ii) of paragraph (2)(B).
          [(B) Any such interim report shall be submitted not 
        less than 5 days before the vote of the United Nations 
        Security Council, unless the President determines that 
        exceptional circumstances prevented compliance with the 
        requirement to report 5 days in advance. If the 
        President makes such a determination, the interim 
        report shall be submitted promptly (but in no case 
        later than 3 days after the vote) and shall include a 
        copy of the determination and a description of the 
        exceptional circumstances which were the basis for that 
        determination.
          [(5) Notification and quarterly reports regarding 
        united states assistance.--(A) The President shall 
        notify the designated congressional committees at least 
        15 days before the United States provides any 
        assistance to the United Nations to support 
        peacekeeping operations. This subparagraph does not 
        apply to--
                  [(i) assistance having a value of less than 
                $3,000,000 in the case of nonreimburseable 
                assistance or less than $14,000,000 in the case 
                of reimburseable assistance, or
                  [(ii) assistance provided under the emergency 
                drawdown authority of sections 506(a)(1) and 
                552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
                (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(1) and 2348a(c)(2)).
          [(B) The President shall submit quarterly reports to 
        the designated congressional committees on all 
        assistance provided by the United States during the 
        preceding calendar quarter to the United Nations to 
        support peacekeeping operations. Each report shall 
        describe the assistance provided for each such 
        operation, listed by category of assistance. The report 
        for the fourth calendar quarter of each year shall be 
        submitted as part of the annual report required by 
        section 4(d) of the United Nations Participation Act of 
        1945 (as added by subsection (b) of this section) and 
        shall include cumulative information for the preceding 
        calendar year.]
          * * * * * * *
                              ----------                              


                     NATO PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1994

          * * * * * * *

SEC. 203. AUTHORITY FOR PROGRAM TO FACILITATE TRANSITION TO NATO 
                    MEMBERSHIP.

  [(a) In General.--The President may establish a program to 
assist the transition to full NATO membership of Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and other Partnership 
for Peace countries emerging from communist domination 
designated pursuant to subsection (d).]
  (a) Establishment of Program.--The President shall establish 
a program to assist in the transition to full NATO membership 
of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia and any 
other European country emerging from communist domination that 
is designated by the President under subsection (d)(2).
  (b) Conduct of Program.--The program established under 
subsection (a) shall facilitate the transition to full NATO 
membership of the [countries described in such subsection] 
countries designated under subsection (d) by supporting and 
encouraging, inter alia--
          (1) * * *
          * * * * * * *
  (c) Type of Assistance.--In carrying out the program 
established under subsection (a), the President may provide to 
the [countries described in such subsection] countries 
designated under subsection (d) the following types of security 
assistance:
          (1) * * *
          * * * * * * *
          (3) Assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to the 
        Economic Support Fund).
          [(3)](4) Assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to 
        international military education and training).
          [(4)](5) Assistance under section 23 of the Arms 
        Export Control Act (relating to the ``Foreign Military 
        Financing Program'').
  [(d) Designation of Partnership for Peace Countries Emerging 
From Communist Domination.--The President may designate 
countries emerging from communism and participating in the 
Partnership for Peace, especially Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, and Slovakia, to receive assistance under the program 
established under subsection (a) if the President determines 
and reports to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate that such countries--
          [(1) are full and active participants in the 
        Partnership for Peace;
          [(2) have made significant progress toward 
        establishing democratic institutions, a free market 
        economy, civilian control of their armed forces, and 
        the rule of law;
          [(3) are likely in the near future to be in a 
        position to further the principles of the North 
        Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of 
        the North Atlantic area; and
          [(4) are not selling or transferring defense articles 
        to a state that has repeatedly provided support for 
        acts of international terrorism, as determined by the 
        Secretary of State under section 6(j) of the Export 
        Administration Act of 1979.]
  (d) Designation of Eligible Countries.--
          (1) Specified countries.--The following countries are 
        hereby designated for purposes of this title: Poland, 
        Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
          (2) Authority for president to designate other 
        european countries emerging from communist 
        domination.--The President may designate other European 
        countries emerging from communist domination (as 
        defined in section 206) to receive assistance under the 
        program established under subsection (a). The President 
        may make such a designation in the case of any such 
        country only if the President determines, and reports 
        to the designated congressional committees, that such 
        country--
                  (A) has made significant progress toward 
                establishing--
                          (i) shared values and interests;
                          (ii) democratic governments;
                          (iii) free market economies;
                          (iv) civilian control of the 
                        military, of the police, and of the 
                        intelligence and other security 
                        services, so that these organizations 
                        do not pose a threat to democratic 
                        institutions, neighboring countries, or 
                        the security of NATO or the United 
                        States;
                          (v) adherence to the rule of law and 
                        to the values, principles, and 
                        political commitments set forth in the 
                        Helsinki Final Act and other 
                        declarations by the members of the 
                        Organization on Security and 
                        Cooperation in Europe;
                          (vi) commitment to further the 
                        principles of NATO and to contribute to 
                        the security of the North Atlantic 
                        area;
                          (vii) commitment and ability to 
                        accept the obligations, 
                        responsibilities, and costs of NATO 
                        membership; and
                          (viii) commitment and ability to 
                        implement infrastructure development 
                        activities that will facilitate 
                        participation in and support for NATO 
                        military activities; and
                  (B) is likely, within five years of such 
                determination, to be in a position to further 
                the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and 
                to contribute to the security of the North 
                Atlantic area.
  (e) Notification.--At least 15 days before designating any 
country pursuant to [subsection (d)] subsection (d)(2), the 
President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees 
in accordance with the procedures applicable under section 634A 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394).
  [(f) Determination.--It is hereby determined that Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia meet the criteria 
required in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (d).]
  (f) Additional Assistance.--In carrying out the program 
established under subsection (a), the President may, in 
addition to the security assistance authorized to be provided 
under subsection (c), provide assistance to countries 
designated under subsection (d) from funds appropriated under 
the ``Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund'' account.
  (g) Prohibition on Providing Assistance to Countries That 
Provide Defense Articles to Countries Supporting International 
Terrorism.--The President may not provide assistance to a 
country under the program established under subsection (a) if 
such country is selling or transferring defense articles to a 
state that has repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of 
State under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
1979.
  (h) Report Prior to Obligation or Expenditure of Funds.--
Prior to providing assistance to a country for the first time 
through the program established under subsection (a), the 
President shall transmit to the designated congressional 
committees a report with respect to that country that contains 
a description of the following:
          (1) The cost of membership in NATO for the country 
        and the amount that the country is prepared to 
        contribute to NATO to pay for such cost of membership.
          (2) The amount that the United States will contribute 
        to facilitate transition to full NATO membership for 
        the country.
          (3) The extent to which the admission to NATO of the 
        country would contribute to the security of the United 
        States.
          (4) The views of other NATO member nations regarding 
        the admission to NATO of the country and the amounts 
        that such other NATO member nations will contribute to 
        facilitate transition to full NATO membership for the 
        country.

SEC. 204. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES.

  (a) * * *
          * * * * * * *
  (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, in 
the interest of maintaining stability and promoting democracy 
in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and [any 
other Partnership for Peace country designated under section 
203(d) of this title] any country designated under section 
203(d)(2), those countries should be included in all activities 
under section 2457 of title 10, United States Code, related to 
the increased standardization and enhanced interoperability of 
equipment and weapons systems, through coordinated training and 
procurement activities, as well as other means, undertaken by 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members and other allied 
countries.

SEC. 205. ANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

  The President shall include in the annual report required by 
section 514(a) of Public Law 103-236 (22 U.S.C. 1928 note) the 
following:
          (1) A description of all assistance provided under 
        the program established under section 203(a), or 
        otherwise provided by the United States Government to 
        facilitate the transition to full NATO membership of 
        Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, [and 
        other Partnership for Peace countries emerging from 
        communist domination designated pursuant to section 
        203(d).] and any country designated by the President 
        pursuant to section 203(d)(2).
          (2) A description, on the basis of information 
        received from the recipients and from NATO, of all 
        assistance provided by other NATO member nations or 
        NATO itself to facilitate the transition to full NATO 
        membership of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
        Slovakia, [and other Partnership for Peace countries 
        emerging from communist domination designated pursuant 
        to section 203(d).] and any country designated by the 
        President pursuant to section 203(d)(2).

SEC. 206. DEFINITIONS.

  For purposes of this title:
          (1) NATO.--The term ``NATO'' means the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization.
          (2) Other european countries emerging from communist 
        domination.--The term ``other European countries 
        emerging from communist domination'' means any full and 
        active participant in the Partnership for Peace that--
                  (A) is located--
                          (i) in the territory of the former 
                        Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; or
                          (ii) in the territory of the former 
                        Socialist Federal Republic of 
                        Yugoslavia; or
                  (B) is among the following countries: 
                Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, 
                or Albania.
          (3) Designated congressional committees.--The term 
        ``designated congressional committees'' means--
                  (A) the Committee on International Relations, 
                the Committee on National Security, and the 
                Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                  (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
                on Appropriations of the Senate.
   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE ELIOT L. ENGEL, REPRESENTATIVE 
           SHERROD BROWN, AND REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT MENENDEZ

    The minority views relating to H.R. 7 fully and clearly 
express the problems H.R. 7 will pose for American foreign 
policy in the future and the serious flaws with the Committee's 
deliberative process. This bill micromanages foreign policy and 
our military relations with NATO governments, will destroy U.N. 
peacekeeping, and represents a profound assault upon the 
President's constitutional authority as commander in chief.
    We would, however, like to distinguish ourselves from one 
portion of the minority views. While we must not act in haste 
without objective standards in adding new countries to NATO, 
the Alliance--and its expansion--represents the best guarantee 
for the freedom of the West. Bearing in mind that other Central 
and East European countries have taken significant strides 
toward meeting the criteria necessary for NATO membership, 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have reached 
the point where they may soon be ready to join the Alliance. 
Title VI of H.R. 7 embodies the notion that early accession to 
NATO by these four countries is in the interest of the United 
States. We agree.

                                   Eliot L. Engel.
                                   Robert Menendez.
                                   Sherrod Brown.
           ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT MENENDEZ

    The proposed ``National Security Revitalization 
Commission'' in Title III of H.R. 7 is ill-advised and 
unnecessary for national security and fiscal reasons. The 
Commission also would interfere with the Legislative and 
Executive Branch's prerogatives in safeguarding the national 
security of the United States. Secretary of Defense William 
Perry has eloquently testified before the House of 
Representatives to the needless and obtrusive nature of this 
proposed commission.
    The stated legislative purpose of the commission, to 
``reassess United States military needs and reverse the 
continuing downward spiral of defense spending,'' places an 
unwise and inappropriate conclusory directive upon the 
commission's findings. The $1.5 million cost is further reason 
that the Congress ought not to establish this commission. It is 
difficult to reconcile the expenditure of $1.5 million of 
America's taxpayers' money on this needless commission at a 
time of sparse budgetary resources that we have mandated with 
the passage in the House of Representatives of a Balanced 
Budget Amendment to the Constitution.
    Furthermore, the partisan composition of the commission 
would be an intrusion by the Congress into the duly constituted 
authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces of the United States. The commission's prefatory charge 
to ``reverse the continuing downward spiral of defense 
spending,'' precludes any objective conclusions regarding 
national security and ensures that the taxpayers' money is 
wasted.
    The Congress already has at least seven committees with 
jurisdiction over issues affecting the national security of the 
United States. These committees have the requisite competence 
and expertise to reassess United States military needs.
    Adding a new layer of bureaucracy in this case is clearly 
unwarranted, unless it is the view of the Majority on this 
committee that the relevant committees of jurisdiction of the 
House and Senate are not sufficiently expert to assess, or to 
reassess, America's military needs. Unfortunately, the Majority 
in the House International Relations Committee, in voting 
unanimously, 22 to 16, to defeat an amendment I authored to 
eliminate this commission, has expressed a profound lack of 
confidence in the competence of congressional committees to 
safeguard the U.S. national security.
    Secretary of Defense William Perry, in testimony on January 
27 before the House National Security Committee, stated 
eloquently that the proposed commission was unnecessary and 
obtrusive:

          * * *I find it deeply disturbing that it is now 
        proposed that we change that relationship, that we 
        interpose a commission between the Secretary of Defense 
        and this committee, a commission which effectively is 
        authorized to do both our jobs * * *
          You are my commission. I do not need an independent 
        commission interposing itself between myself and you, 
        and you do not need an independent commission 
        interposing itself * * *
          You should not dilute the responsibilities of the 
        Secretary of Defense by trying to turn a key part of 
        them over to an independent commission. Rather, you 
        should hold me accountable for meeting those 
        responsibilities. And if you find that I'm incapable or 
        unwilling to meet those responsibilities, you should 
        ask me to step down as the Secretary of Defense.
          * * *I feel strongly that the proposed commission 
        usurps the responsibilities of the Secretary of 
        Defense. At the same time, I believe that this 
        independent commission would interfere with the ability 
        of this committee to fulfill its responsibilities, by 
        interposing itself between the committee and the 
        Secretary of Defense * * *
          * * *Preventing a return of the nuclear threat, 
        managing the defense drawdown, and making the right 
        decisions about the use of military force. These are 
        the three big issues, the three big challenges, which I 
        face every day as the Secretary of Defense, and which 
        you as a committee face. How do we maintain a stable, 
        peaceful world in which economies and democracies 
        prosper without becoming the world's policemen?
          * * *I believe that the answer is to get these on the 
        table, debate them openly in the proper context, with 
        the full policy and budgetary implications, on the 
        table and understood. This is our job, your job and my 
        job, not the job of the commission.

Unfortunately, the Majority strongly disagrees with the 
Secretary of Defense. For all the above reasons, I urge my 
colleagues on the Majority to reconsider the inclusion of Title 
III to H.R. 7.

                                   Robert Menendez.
 MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. LEE H. HAMILTON, HON. SAM GEJDENSON, HON. TOM 
LANTOS, HON. ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, HON. HOWARD L. BERMAN, HON. GARY L. 
   ACKERMAN, HON. HARRY JOHNSTON, HON. ELIOT L. ENGEL, HON. ENI F.H. 
  FALEOMAVAEGA, HON. MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, HON. DONALD M. PAYNE, HON. 
  ROBERT MENENDEZ, HON. SHERROD BROWN, HON. CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, HON. 
 ALCEE L. HASTINGS, HON. ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, HON. JAMES P. MORAN, AND 
                         HON. VICTOR O. FRAZER

    We strongly oppose H.R. 7, the National Security 
Revitalization Act, as ordered reported by the Committee on 
International Relations. We believe it cripples U.N. 
peacekeeping, puts excessive conditions and restrictions on the 
President's conduct of national security affairs, and moves the 
United States toward new security commitments in Eastern and 
Central Europe at a time of declining resources. Rather than 
revitalize U.S. national security, we believe the cumulative 
effect of H.R. 7 would be to undermine our foreign policy and 
damage our national security.
    H.R. 7 is the most far-reaching foreign policy legislation 
to come before the House of Representatives in several years. 
As Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified before the 
committee, had H.R. 7 been law in 1990, President Bush would 
not have been able to deploy troops and ships to Operation 
Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. H.R. 7 would have 
blocked President Clinton from deploying 30,000 troops to 
Kuwait in 1994. It would even have blocked President Truman 
from deploying troops to Korea in 1950.
    H.R. 7 is bad foreign policy. It torpedoes the concept of 
collective security that has been at the heart of postwar peace 
and security. It is a political document based on the Contract 
with America. We prefer the Constitution.

              h.r. 7 micromanages american foreign policy

    A disturbing aspect of H.R. 7 is that it micromanages U.S. 
foreign policy. It is intrusive in the extreme. It dictates how 
the President should conduct U.S. foreign policy.
    In testimony before the Committee, Secretary of State 
Christopher and former Secretary of State James Baker warned of 
the dangers of micromanagement. As Secretary Baker stated: 
``Attempts at congressional micromanagement were a bad idea 
when the Democrats were in control. And they remain a bad idea 
today.'' Yet the committee paid no heed.
    Several examples illustrate this excessive micromanagement. 
In the area of peacekeeping, H.R. 7:
          Requires an Act of Congress before the President 
        could send a single U.S. military observer to join a 
        U.N. force--yet Congress has never authorized a U.N. 
        peacekeeping effort;
          Requires the President to give 15 days' prior notice 
        to Congress before the United States participates in, 
        or contributes to, a U.N. peacekeeping operation--yet 
        the world will not wait for Congress in a crisis; and
          Dictates the terms and conditions of U.S. military 
        command and control arrangements, requiring detailed 
        reports, certifications, and legal memoranda from the 
        President on his constitutional authorities.
    As John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State during the 
Reagan Administration, stated:

          * * * the required reports and certifications serve 
        only to prevent the United States and others from using 
        the United Nations to contain conflict. At worst, they 
        may prevent the United States from doing any thing 
        other than acting unilaterally.

    H.R. 7 also micromanages U.S. policy with respect to the 
future expansion of NATO. The bill:
          Mandates the creation of a new foreign assistance 
        program for NATO transition assistance--without 
        authorizing new assistance resources;
          Dictates which countries must receive NATO transition 
        assistance--removing the executive branch's discretion 
        to judge whether their internal and external records 
        warrant such assistance; and
          Picks winners and losers for future NATO membership--
        discouraging reformers in countries not named, and 
        irritating U.S. friends and allies, thereby making more 
        difficult the President's ability to manage the complex 
        process of NATO expansion involving 16 NATO member 
        governments.

              h.r. 7 destroys united nations peacekeeping

    The cumulative impact of sections 501 and 508 of H.R. 7 
would be to gut, if not kill, U.N. peacekeeping, and destroy 
the concept of collective security.
Section 501
    Section 501 requires that the United States offset against 
its U.N. peacekeeping assessment all costs incurred by the 
Department of Defense in support of operations authorized by 
the United Nations Security Council, even when those operations 
are conducted unilaterally by the United States, with U.S. 
forces under U.S. command and control.
    Testimony from the Department of Defense indicates that in 
fiscal year 1994, such DOD costs were estimated to total some 
$1.7 billion, plus an additional $850 million in costs for U.S. 
troops in South Korea still deployed under a U.N. Security 
Council resolution. Under H.R. 7, the $1 billion annual U.S. 
peacekeeping assessment to the United Nations would be more 
than offset by this $2.55 billion, effectively cancelling out 
the U.S. contribution.
    If section 501 were enacted, we would expect other 
countries to adopt similar measures. For example, it would 
encourage Russia to demand offsets for its military cost in 
deploying peacekeepers in the former Soviet Union. France would 
likely claim offsets for its costs in deploying its military to 
Rwanda in 1994. Other nations would follow suit. Collective 
security, the cornerstone of the United Nations, would become 
financial anarchy.
    Section 501 permits an exemption from the offset 
requirement for U.N. Chapter VII (enforcement) operations if 
the President certifies to the Congress that the operation is 
important to U.S. national security and that the United States 
would undertake the operation unilaterally. this does not 
mitigate the negative consequences of section 501 because the 
President would be required to make endless hypothetical 
certifications to Congress that we would be willing to 
undertake on our own actions in which we ask other countries to 
share the burden. Such certification would undermine the 
ability of the President to encourage other countries to 
participate in multilateral operations.
    Democrats are working hard to reform the United Nations 
because we believe much more needs to be done. We believe our 
U.N. peacekeeping assessment is too high, so last year we 
enacted into law language that prohibits the United States from 
paying more than 25% of total peacekeeping costs. We believe 
the United Nations must improve its financial management, so 
last year we enacted into law a provision mandating the 
establishment of an Inspector General at the United Nations. We 
will continue to press for additional U.N. reforms.
    But we seek to reform the United Nations, not destroy it. 
Section 501 would present the United States with an 
unacceptable choice: either kill U.N. peacekeeping by 
eliminating our assessment, or prohibit the Department of 
Defense from undertaking costly operations such as the 
deployment to Rwanda in 1994, which saved hundreds of thousands 
of lives but which would have more than offset our assessment.
    We believe we need to keep U.N. peacekeeping as an option 
in U.S. foreign policy. Section 501 removes that option.

Section 508

    Section 508 provides, first, that no Department of Defense 
funds can be used to pay U.S. peacekeeping expenses. Second, it 
prohibits the use of DOD funds to pay the incremental costs of 
U.S. forces in U.N. peacekeeping operations unless the Congress 
has authorized such specific use in advance.
    This is an unprecedented assault on the President's 
authority as Commander-in-Chief and on U.N. peacekeeping.
    Section 508 would prohibit the President from deploying a 
single U.S. soldier to a U.N.-authroized operation without an 
Act of Congress. Section 508, had it been law, would have 
prohibited President Bush's deployment of U.S. troops and ships 
in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. It would have 
blocked President Clinton from deploying 30,000 U.S troops to 
Kuwait in 1994 to counter Saddam Hussein's renewed threats of 
aggression against that country. It would have prevented the 
successful deployment of U.S. troops to Rwanda to save hundreds 
of thousands of lives last year.
    If enacted, section 508 would require the withdrawal of 
U.S. troops currently deployed in Jerusalem, Kuwait, the 
Western Sahara, Mozambique, and the Republic of Georgia until 
Congress passed laws authorizing their deployment. Congress has 
never authorized such activities in advance.
    Section 508 would also require U.S. troops to cease 
enforcement of sanctions against Iraq, and stop the 
humanitarian air lift to starving people in Bosnia in the dead 
of winter--again, because Congress has not authorized those 
actions.
    As we interpret section 508, it could also require the 
withdrawal of all U.S. troops from South Korea because Congress 
has never specifically authorized that deployment. We doubt 
that the authors of this legislation intended to require a U.S. 
withdrawal from South Korea at this delicate time. The fact 
that section 508 might require that action testifies to the 
dangers of Congress trying to write iron-clad rules to cover a 
wide range of complex situations.

                H.R. 7 Undermines Presidential Authority

    H.R. 7, as ordered reported, seriously undermines the 
ability of the President to act as Commander-in-Chief. H.R. 7, 
in order to be consistent with the Contract with America, 
hamstrings the President. We choose to be consistent with the 
Constitution.
    Sections 401 and 402 prohibit the President from placing 
U.S. troops under foreign command without specific 
congressional authorization unless he first reports to Congress 
that such action is not unconstitutional and then certifies 
that the action meets a series of requirements, detailed in 
five pages in the bill, is necessary to protect U.S. national 
security. This represents a significant restriction on the 
President's ability to command and control U.S. troops.
    Section 508, while technically not within the jurisdiction 
of the Committee on International Relations, reaches the same 
constitutional issue. It would effectively prohibit the 
president from sending a single soldier to participate in any 
U.N. peacekeeping activity--even as part of a medical team to 
help in Croatia--without specific congressional authorization.
    As Democrats, we believe that Congress should set 
guidelines for U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping 
operations, including guidelines relating to foreign command 
and control. We believe it is best to keep U.S. troops under 
U.S. command and control, particularly when in combat. But 
Congress should not mandate to the President precisely how he 
commands U.S. troops, or try to micromanage our military 
relationships, even with NATO governments. That is a serious 
overreach of congressional war powers authority.
    Congress shares with the President responsibility for 
deploying troops abroad for combat purposes, whether they are 
operating under a U.N. Security Council resolution, 
unilaterally, or in some other multilateral context. But this 
general principal cannot reasonably be applied to each 
deployment of a single soldier, airman, or sailor without 
infringing on the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief.
    We are puzzled that Republicans, who have spent many years 
defending the President's prerogatives, have chosen to tie the 
President's hands. Initially, the committee adopted a new 
section reaffirming both congressional war powers authority and 
the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief under the 
Constitution. Several Republican Members of the committee voted 
for the amendment. Upon reconsideration of the amendment, 
however, all but one of those Members either changed their vote 
or were absent, and the amendment was not adopted.

         h.r. 7 tries to dictate the process of nato expansion

    Title VI of H.R. 7 sets out U.S. policy to extend NATO 
membership to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
and mandates an assistance program to help these countries 
become NATO members.
    We support the concept of NATO expansion. The question is 
whether Congress, through its attempts to dictate the pace and 
direction of NATO expansion, helps or hinders that process. The 
executive branch, together with the other 15 NATO members, is 
in the process of determining the proper framework and 
timetable for NATO expansion. The Partnership for Peace 
initiative allows the process to evolve without preconditions 
or preconceptions about the outcome of that process.
    H.R. 7 interferes with that process and therefore is 
harmful to eventual NATO expansion--and harmful to U.S. 
national interests.
    First, H.R. 7 prejudges and dictates the pace and direction 
of NATO expansion. Attempts by the Congress to force premature 
decisionmaking will hinder the process of NATO expansion. The 
enlargement of NATO is a consensual, diplomatic process 
involving the governments and Parliaments of the sixteen 
sovereign countries of NATO. It cannot be dictated by statute.
    Second, H.R. 7 short circuits the Partnership for Peace 
initiative. This program is an important first step in 
establishing closer military and political ties between NATO 
and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in order to 
prepare these nations for possible NATO membership. It offers a 
practical means to build political and military cooperation. 
Decisions on NATO expansion should evolve from the Partnership 
for Peace, and from the ability of states to assume the 
responsibilities of NATO membership. NATO expansion should not 
be dictated by legislative fiat.
    Third, H.R. 7 mandates an ambitious program of military and 
economic assistance for four countries--Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia--without authorizing funding. The 
Congress should not hamstring the President by forcing him to 
create new, costly, country-specific assistance programs when 
resources for foreign assistance are shrinking. We believe the 
President must have the flexibility to adapt existing 
assistance programs to the complex, fluid situation in Central 
and Eastern Europe.
    Fourth, it is unwise for Congress to spell out a hierarchy 
of prospective NATO states in which some are picked as winners 
and the rest as losers. Such an approach would foster 
complacency in some states and demoralize reformers in others. 
It should create instability and tensions in the region, and 
threaten to draw dangerous new lines in Europe which could once 
again force Europe into two hostile camps. This would hardly 
serve U.S. national security interests and would place new 
pressures and responsibilities on NATO.
    Fifth, H.R. 7 would create a dangerous gulf between our 
commitments in Europe and the resources required to meet them. 
U.S. force levels in Europe have declined by two-thirds since 
1990. Because of declining force levels, it is difficult to 
foresee how the United States would be able to meet expanded 
NATO security commitments in Central and Eastern Europe by any 
means other than a nuclear commitment.
    Finally, there is no immediate security threat in Europe. 
That is the judgment of the last two Administrations, and every 
government in Europe--all are cutting defense spending. There 
is no reason to rush the process of NATO expansion. Before we 
take on commitments of such magnitude and significance we must 
be sure the American people are ready for them.

       h.r. 7 short-circuited the deliberative committee process

    We must register our concerns about the entire process 
through which the committee considered H.R. 7. We will not 
detail here every procedural transgression of the majority in 
the course of the markup. But we disagree in the strongest 
terms with Republican decisions that limited debate, silenced 
executive branch testimony, prohibited appeals to rulings of 
the Chair, and otherwise prevented a full and fair deliberative 
process on legislation that goes to the heart of U.S. national 
security policy and the responsibilities of this committee.
    We want to be very clear about the reason for our repeated 
requests for executive branch views and questions about the 
intent of Members of the Majority in particular sections of the 
bill. H.R. 7 has extraordinarily far-reaching foreign policy 
implications. It deserved serious and careful scrutiny. Having 
received a final draft of the Chairman's mark one full hour 
after the bill was originally scheduled for markup, and less 
than 24 hours before markup actually commenced, we sought to 
raise pertinent questions and offer amendments to the most 
problematic sections of the draft bill. Only through this means 
could we illuminate the merits of the bill before the committee 
acted.
    Deliberative effort to shed light on substantive issues of 
great import should not be characterized as attempts to delay. 
Members should be able to address questions to and receive 
responses directly from other Members who are the authors of 
various provisions. Such effort is consistent with the 
responsibility of every Member of the committee on any bill of 
such significance.
    We note in particular the multiple instances in which 
Members of the Majority moved the previous question or 
otherwise moved to limit debate. One such instance occurred 
during debate on what was arguably the most important amendment 
to the bill: an amendment to section 501, which sought to 
prevent the complete destruction of financing for international 
peacekeeping.
    We also are deeply disturbed about the lack of respect and 
courtesy accorded witnesses from the executive branch. On 
several occasions, administration witnesses were cut off while 
responding to a question from a Democratic Member of the 
committee. In one instance, a Member of the Majority moved the 
previous question while the Ranking Democratic Member was 
posing a question to a uniformed military officer from the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    We select these examples to illustrate the flawed process 
that characterized committee consideration of H.R. 7. We 
believe that a bipartisan process could have been achieved 
during markup of H.R.7. At several points, a handful of 
amendments received bipartisan support. We hope that 
highlighting problems will prevent their recurrence, and 
increase the chance for bipartisanship in future committee 
deliberations.

                                   Sam Gejdenson.
                                   Eliot L. Engel.
                                   Jim Moran.
                                   Cynthia A. McKinney.
                                   Eni Faleomavaega.
                                   Harry Johnston.
                                   Victor O. Frazer.
                                   Robert Torricelli.
                                   M.G. Martinez.
                                   Alcee L. Hastings.
                                   Gary Ackerman.
                                   Howard L. Berman.
                                   Albert R. Wynn.
                                   Lee H. Hamilton.
                                   Donald M. Payne.
                                   Bob Menendez.
                                   Tom Lantos.
                                   Sherrod Brown.