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104th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 1st Session                                                    104-220
_______________________________________________________________________


 
   DISAPPROVING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND 
                         REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

                                _______


 August 1, 1995.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


  Mr. Spence, from the Committee on National Security, submitted the 
                               following

                       A D V E R S E R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                      [To accompany H.J. Res. 102]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
    The Committee on National Security, to whom was referred 
the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 102) disapproving the 
recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission, having considered the same, reports unfavorably 
thereon and recommends that the joint resolution do not pass.

                                Purpose

    The purpose of House Joint Resolution 102 is to disapprove 
the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission.

                            Committee Action

    House Joint Resolution 102 was introduced by Representative 
Frank Tejeda of Texas (for himself, Mr. Bonilla, Mr. Gonzalez, 
and Mr. Smith of Texas) on July 18, 1995 and was referred to 
the Committee on National Security. The resolution meets the 
requirements for a resolution of disapproval as provided in 
section 2908(a) of Public Law 101-510, the Defense Base Closure 
and Realignment Act of 1990 (Title XXIX of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991).
    On July 26, 1995 the committee considered House Joint 
Resolution 102 and, a quorum being present, voted 43-10 to 
report the resolution adversely to the House.

                               Discussion

Department of Defense procedures to develop recommended list

    On February 28, 1995, following an extensive review of 
Department of Defense military installations, Secretary of 
Defense William J. Perry presented to Congress and the Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Commission his list of recommended 
actions affecting 146 domestic military installations, 
including 33 major bases recommended for closure, 26 major 
bases recommended for realignment, and an additional 27 changes 
to prior base closure round decisions, or ``redirects''.
    As provided by law, the selection process for bases to be 
included on the DOD list was built around the following 
standards: (1) the force-structure plan submitted to Congress 
with the DOD budget request for fiscal year 1996; and (2) the 
selection criteria finalized by DOD after public comment. Of 
the following eight criteria, the first four concerned military 
value and were to receive preference:
          (1) The current and future mission requirements and 
        the impact on operational readiness of the Department 
        of Defense's total force;
          (2) The availability and condition of land, 
        facilities, and associated air space at both the 
        existing and potential receiving locations;
          (3) The ability to accommodate contingency, 
        mobilization, and future total force requirements at 
        both the existing and potential receiving locations;
          (4) The cost and manpower implications;
          (5) The extent and timing of potential costs and 
        savings, including the number of years, beginning with 
        the date of completion of the closure or realignment, 
        for the savings to exceed the costs;
          (6) The economic impact on communities;
          (7) The ability of both the existing and potential 
        receiving communities' infrastructure to support 
        forces, missions, and personnel; and
          (8) The environmental impact.

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

    The commission charged with reviewing and revising the DOD 
list included Chairman Alan J. Dixon; Alton W. Cornella; 
Rebecca G. Cox; Gen. James B. Davis, USAF (Ret.); S. Lee Kling; 
Rear Adm. Benjamin F. Montoya, USN (Ret.); Maj. Gen. Josue 
Robles, Jr., USA (Ret.); and Wendi L. Steele.
    The statutory test applied by the commission in justifying 
modifications to DOD's list involves a finding of ``substantial 
deviation'' from the force-structure plan and selection 
criteria. The commission could recommend changes for those 
bases where it could establish a substantial deviation.
    In keeping with this test and with the mandate of Public 
Law 101-510 ``to provide a fair process that will result in the 
timely closure and realignment of military installations inside 
the United States,'' the commission on July 1, 1995 submitted 
to the President a recommendation to close or realign 132 
military installations in the United States, including 123 of 
the 146 closure or realignment recommendations of the Secretary 
of Defense, and 9 of the 36 military installations identified 
by the commission as candidates for consideration during its 
deliberations. According to the commission, these actions would 
result in one-time costs of approximately $3.6 billion. The 
commission expects $1.6 billion in annual savings and net 
present value savings of $19.3 billion over the next 20 years 
to result from the 1995 base closure recommendations.
    The final closure and realignment list was the culmination 
of 167 visits to military installations and 16 hearings held 
across the United States. The effort produced thousands of 
pages of oral testimony and written documentation from Members 
of Congress, officials representing the affected communities, 
the Pentagon, the General Accounting Office, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency; all of this material was 
reviewed by the commission.

Overview of congressional defense base closure and realignment process

    Under the provisions of Public Law 101-510, congressional 
consideration of the base closure recommendations must be 
carried out on an expedited basis. The commission's 
recommendations will automatically go into effect unless both 
houses of Congress pass a resolution of disapproval rejecting 
the package in its entirety. The law does not permit additions, 
deletions, or amendments to the recommendations affecting 
installations on the list.
    The procedures also provide that in considering a 
resolution to disapprove the commission's recommendations, the 
committee after the President transmits the list to Congress or 
be discharged from further consideration.
    On or after the third day after the committee has reported 
the resolution, or has been discharged from further 
consideration, any Member of Congress can move to proceed to 
the consideration of the resolution, after giving notice the 
preceding calendar day.
    The period established for congressional disapproval ends 
at: (1) the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date on 
which the President transmits the report, excluding any recess 
period of more than three days (the period expires on September 
27); or (2) the adjournment sine die of Congress for the 
session, whichever comes first.

                         departmental position

    The Department of Defense opposes passage of House Joint 
Resolution 102.

                           committee position

    The committee recommends that the resolution to disapprove 
the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission should be rejected.
    On July 26, 1995 the committee considered House Joint 
Resolution 102 and, a quorum being present, voted 43-10 to 
report the resolution adversely to the House.

                              fiscal data

    Pursuant to clause 7 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 
of Representatives, the committee attempted to ascertain annual 
outlays resulting from the joint resolution during fiscal year 
1996 and the four following fiscal years. The results of such 
efforts are reflected in the cost estimate prepared by the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which is included in 
this report pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(C) of House rule XI.

                             cost estimate

Congressional Budget Office cost estimate
                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, July 28, 1995.
Hon. Floyd Spence,
Chairman, Committee on National Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
examined H.J. Res. 102, a resolution disapproving the 
recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission, as ordered reported by the House National Security 
Committee on July 26, 1995.
    The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 set up 
a process by which military installations would be recommended 
for closure or realignment by an independent commission. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) would implement the recommendations 
unless the Congress were to enact a joint resolution 
disapproving them.
    On July 1, 1995, the Commission released its 
recommendations, which called for closing or realigning the 
activities at 132 installations. When measured in 1996 dollars, 
the Commission's analysis indicates that these actions would 
save $3.9 billion between 1996 and 2001, and $1.6 billion 
annually after that, assuming that appropriations are reduced 
accordingly.
    Under current law, if no action is taken by the Congress, 
DoD will begin closing and realigning the affected bases in 
1996. Therefore, enactment of H.J. Res. 102 would cost money 
relative to current law because savings from the base closures 
would be forgone. CBO has not prepared an independent estimate 
of the magnitude of the costs involved.
    We expect the enactment of the resolution would not have a 
significant direct impact on the budgets of state and local 
governments. By preventing bases from being closed or 
realigned, the resolution could affect economic conditions in 
particular states and localities, but any such impacts would be 
considered indirect.
    This resolution would not affect direct spending or 
receipts of the federal government; therefore, it has no pay-
as-you-go implications.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Kent 
Christensen.
            Sincerely,
                                              James L. Blum
                                   (For June E. O'Neill, Director).

                        committee cost estimate

    The committee concurs with the estimate of the 
Congressional Budget Office.

                       inflation impact statement

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the committee believes that 
disapproval of the resolution will have no measurable 
inflationary impact.

                           oversight findings

    With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, this legislation results from 
statutory requirements governing the base closure and 
realignment process.
    With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, this legislation does not 
include any new budget, spending, or credit authority.
    With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the committee has not received 
a report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
pertaining to the subject matter of H.J. Res. 102.
                             rollcall vote

    In accordance with clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, a rollcall vote was 
taken with respect to H.J. Res. 102. This vote is attached to 
this report.
    H.J. Res. 102 was ordered adversely reported to the House, 
a quorum being present, by a vote of 43-10.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Representative          Aye       Nay     Present        Representative          Aye       Nay     Present 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Spence..............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Dellums.............        X   ........  .........
Mr. Stump...............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Montgomery..........        X   ........  .........
Mr. Hunter..............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Schroeder...........  ........        X   .........
Mr. Kasich..............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Skelton.............        X   ........  .........
Mr. Bateman.............  ........  ........  .........  Mr. Sisisky.............        X   ........  .........
Mr. Hansen..............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Spratt..............        X   ........  .........
Mr. Weldon..............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Ortiz...............  ........        X   .........
Mr. Dornan..............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Pickett.............        X   ........  .........
Mr. Hefley..............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Evans...............  ........        X   .........
Mr. Saxton..............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Tanner..............        X   ........  .........
Mr. Cunningham..........        X   ........  .........  Mr. Browder.............  ........        x   .........
Mr. Buyer...............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Taylor..............        X   ........  .........
Mr. Torkildsen..........        X   ........  .........  Mr. Abercrombie.........  ........        x   .........
Mrs. Fowler.............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Edwards.............  ........        x   .........
Mr. McHugh..............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Tejeda..............  ........        x   .........
Mr. Talent..............  ........        X   .........  Mr. Meehan..............        X   ........  .........
Mr. Everett.............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Underwood...........  ........        x   .........
Mr. Bartlett............        X   ........  .........  Ms. Harman..............        X   ........  .........
Mr. McKeon..............        X   ........  .........  Mr. McHale..............        X   ........  .........
Mr. Lewis...............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Geren...............        X   ........  .........
Mr. Watts...............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Peterson............        X   ........  .........
Mr. Thornberry..........        X   ........  .........  Mr. Jefferson...........  ........  ........  .........
Mr. Hostettler..........        X   ........  .........  Ms. DeLauro.............  ........        X   .........
Mr. Chambliss...........        X   ........  .........  Mr. Ward................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Hilleary............        X   ........  .........  Mr. Kennedy.............        X   ........  .........
Mr. Scarborough.........        X                                                                               
Mr. Jones...............        X                                                                               
Mr. Longley.............        X                                                                               
Mr. Tiahrt..............        X                                                                               
Mr. Hastings............        X                                                                               
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MAC THORNBERRY

    The ability to train top-quality pilots for service in our 
military is a key component of our nation's defense 
capabilities. The decision to close Reese Air Force Base was 
made with outdated information that mistakenly led both the Air 
Force and the Base Closure and Realignment Commission to 
believe that adequate capacity would remain if Reese was 
closed. I believe this decision is ill advised and I fear that 
it will result in a capacity shortage to train pilots within 
the next five years. Similarly, I disagree with some of the 
Commission's other recommendations, including the closing of 
Kelly Air Force Base. However, I am committed to reducing our 
nation's defense infrastructure to a level appropriate for our 
post-Cold War military forces. The closure of bases is a 
difficult but necessary decision that must be made so that we 
may better allocate limited defense funds to meet the important 
modernization needs of future years. Therefore, despite my 
serious reservations about some of the recommendations, I voted 
to effectively support the recommendation as a whole.

                                                    Mac Thornberry.
                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. MONTGOMERY

    Since the enactment of the Base Closure and Realignment Act 
of 1990, three rounds of base closure proceedings have passed. 
With the final round complete, I feel it is now time to allow 
the Department of Defense an opportunity to adjusts to the 
changes that have been made and posture our military facilities 
in a way that provides the highest state of readiness.
    The third and final Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission, chaired by former Senator Alan J. Dixon, was 
comprised of commissioners representing a broad cross section 
of our country. These commissioners were retired military flag 
officers, successful business people and individuals who had 
worked in the legislative process. The staff was of the highest 
caliber with some having worked for the Commission for six 
years. The military personnel assigned to the Commission were 
equally as dedicated. They all worked extremely hard to get the 
facts about each installation on the list and judge the 
facility on its merits even when it meant going against the 
Department of Defense recommendation. The commissioners and 
staff traveled relentlessly to make personal visits to the 
installations and to hear the communities' views on the 
proposed recommendations. I salute them for their diligence and 
fairness in reaching their decisions.

                                                   G.V. Montgomery.
         STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY HON. JOHN TANNER

    In this time of shrinking budgets and with consideration 
for our constantly changing world situation, it is increasingly 
important that we keep our defense expenditures balanced. 
Understanding that as we shrink our personnel numbers and 
reduce our weapons purchases, it is important to keep in mind 
that our infrastructure should be reduced as well. Despite 
knowing that we must reduce our infrastructure, these decisions 
are still extremely painful. No one wants the closures to be 
made in their district. And, that is why we created the BRAC 
commission--to take the politics out of the base closure 
decision process. West Tennessee has taken big hit in this 
round of closures. But, before I speak to this disappointment, 
let me preface my remarks with the effect of the events of BRAC 
93 on West Tennessee.
    In the BRAC 93 process in West Tennessee, we fought the 
BRAC decision because they decided to relocate the Naval Air 
Technical Training Center Naval Air Station Memphis to Naval 
Air Station Pensacola. However, despite my fight to illustrate 
the costly mistake that the commission had made, I understood 
that after the commission's final rulings, we had to allow the 
commission independence from parochial interests. Despite our 
well-fought loss, we have since worked with the Navy, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Labor, and many other 
agencies to develop a positive action plan for our base. We 
have a joint use plan, two new commands, the Bureau of Naval 
Personnel and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
Centers are both moving to NSA Memphis. In fact, if the BRAC 95 
decision becomes law, then we will receive two new Navy 
commands including the Navy Recruiting Command and the Navy 
Personnel Research and Development Center.
    I wanted to temper my disappointment with the BRAC decision 
regarding the depot in Memphis with the events at Naval Air 
Station Memphis (soon to be Naval Support Activity Memphis). 
The Defense Depot Memphis, Tennessee received instructions for 
full closure. Since, Memphis is the civilian distribution 
center of the United States and knowing that the workers at the 
Depot are first class, this determination was a great 
disappointment. There are several reasons that depot in Memphis 
should not have been closed. Accordingly, I wanted my concerns 
about DDMT on record.
    First, Memphis should have been considered as a Primary 
Distribution Site in the Defense Logistics Agency system. 
Substantial capital investments in mechanization consolidation 
and containerization and storage thruput capacity--all key 
characteristics of a PDS have been made at the depot in recent 
years. In fact, DDMT was designated as a PDS in 1992, but was 
subsequently stripped of such designation by DLA. These 
benefits should have been realized and I believe could have 
significantly changed Memphis's ranking in the process. Second, 
Memphis has over 200 truck lines, 44 air carriers, 9 airlines, 
2 military air terminals, 6 commercial barge lines, and 6 class 
1 railroads. It is clear that if the military was to move 
toward privatization of distribution functions, that Memphis 
would be the ideal location for distribution of any materiel 
that the military has to offer. And lastly, the cost to move 
DDMT is going to be prohibitive, and as I felt when we faced 
the move of the NATTC, the costs are not always adequately 
gauged, when decisions to move commands are made.
    Regardless of my personal contention with this decision, we 
have to work within the process. It would be nearly impossible 
to close any bases in the United States if members of Congress 
were required to close bases in their district and eliminate 
the jobs of their constituents, no matter how much we need to 
close a facility. We must shrink the infrastructure and save 
defense dollars for readiness. That is the most important goal 
that we face. I stand with my fellow West Tennesseans ready to 
work to make the depot a benefit to the Memphis community. It 
is a good facility and will be a benefit to Memphis.

                                                       John Tanner.
            ADDITIONAL REMARKS SUBMITTED BY JAMES V. HANSEN

    I am deeply concerned over the administration's unfortunate 
decision to interject presidential politics into the apolitical 
BRAC process. President Clinton's unprecedented direction to 
the Pentagon to ``privatize in place'' the majority of the jobs 
at the McClellan and Kelly Air Logistics Centers is nothing 
more than an attempt to circumvent the independent BRAC process 
for the political expediency of guaranteed jobs in northern 
California. The administration's defense of this plan, most 
recently by the Deputy Secretary of Defense John White, has 
been misleading and disingenuous. As the Washington Post 
correctly pointed out in a July 4th editorial, ``if the 
privatization is real, it will merely perpetuate the expensive 
overcapacity that the base closing is supposed to reduce.'' 
This position is strongly supported by the General Accounting 
Office's Analysis of DoD's Process and Recommendations for 
Closure and Realignment. That report stated the Air Force's 
recommendation not to close any maintenance depots ``did not 
appear to be well thought out or adequately supported.'' And, 
that they ``do not fully address the problem of significant 
excess capacity in the depot system.''
    Deputy Secretary White has suggested the Pentagon plan will 
``cut costs through elimination of excess facilities.'' 
Privatization in-place will actually be more expensive because 
the Department of Defense will still be responsible for 
guaranteeing, and paying for, work completed by the least cost 
effective depots, and will not reap the savings the BRAC 
Commission projected by shedding significant overhead and 
consolidating workloads to the remaining depots. Both Mr. White 
and the President point to the privatization of logistics 
functions at the Newark Air Force Base as their model for 
``privatization in-place.'' The General Accounting Office has 
characterized this experiment as a failure. Specifically, the 
GAO noted ``one time closure costs have doubled in the past 
year and may still be underestimated. As a result, the payback 
period has increased to at least 17 years and as much as over 
100 years. Moreover, projected costs of conducting post-
privatization operations could exceed the cost of current Air 
Force operations and reduce or eliminate projected savings.'' 
One of the primary factors cited for this problem is the 
failure of the closure/privatization to reduce excess capacity.
    Although the administration raised the spector of combat 
readiness and national security, the fact is the Air Force 
refused to support rejection of the BRAC recommendations on 
these grounds. What will have a disastrous effect on our 
national security is a policy that will waste precious defense 
dollars on excess capacity while abrogating the Department's 
commitment to a ready and controlled source of quality depot 
maintenance.
    The administration's compromise rests on the promise of 
jobs and the false assertion that BRAC did not consider 
cumulative economic impact in its deliberations. The fact is, 
BRAC did consider economic impact and California only tied as 
the fourth hardest hit state; with Alabama, Alaska, Guam, North 
Dakota, and Connecticut being hit proportionately harder. I 
find it the height of hypocrisy that a President who has 
supported billions of dollars in defense cuts did not think 
those cuts would equate to job losses. Interestingly enough, 
even the people this meddling was designed to protect do not 
support the privatization proposal. While the workers at Kelly 
and McClellan proudly supported their depots, many of them now 
want the option to relocate with the workload and not face the 
uncertainty of a shaky economic experiment.
    I also want to address the administration's claim that the 
BRAC Commission somehow overstepped their mandate. This is 
simply not true. This Commission, as Chairman Dixon stated in 
his new conference on June 30th, concurred with a greater 
percentage of Pentagon recommendations than either of the 
previous three rounds. This Commission was also the first BRAC 
Commission whose list of recommendations will save more money 
than the administration's list. The only person who has played 
outside of the rules in this process is the President. I do not 
consider the President's letter to Chairman Dixon of July 13, 
1995 as a legally bind part of the BRAC recommendations. I was 
particularly troubled by the letter's characterization of any 
legislative action taken by the Congress in this matter as a 
violation of Public Law. When the fact is, the President's 
direction to ``privatize in-place,'' and the Pentagon's plan 
for implementation, appear to be in violation of several 
sections of current law.
    Simply stated, the President's direction to privatize in-
place is a bad one. It will result in dramatically reduced 
savings and increased maintenance costs for the Air Force. It 
will deny depot workers the option of keeping their jobs and 
moving to one of the remaining depots. And most importantly, it 
will call into question the integrity of the entire BRAC 
process. I believe we should not allow President Clinton to 
undermine our national security by turning our Armed Forces 
into a laboratory for economic and social experimentation.

                                                   James V. Hansen.
                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

    We supported the motion to report H.J. Res. 102 adversely 
to the House. We believe that the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission did an admirable job in balancing the 
recommendations of the Department of Defense with its statutory 
charter to provide an independent assessment of current and 
future base infrastructure requirements. While we do not 
necessarily agree with each of the recommendations contained in 
the report of the Commission, we recognize that further 
infrastructure reductions are important if we are to accrue the 
savings necessary to provide for future modernization of the 
armed forces.
    At the same time, we are seriously concerned about the 
handling of the Commission's recommendations by the President. 
As members of the House, we are well aware of the significant 
local economic impact a base closure or major realignment can 
have on a local community. We are dismayed by the interjection 
of political considerations into the deliberations within the 
Execution Branch over the disposition of the Commission's 
recommendations. While the President ultimately accepted the 
base closure recommendations produced by the Commission, he did 
so with a significant caveat concerning the implementation of 
the recommendations to close McClellan Air Force Base and 
realign Kelly Air Force Base.
    In our judgment, the letter of the President of July 13, 
1995, communicating his approval of the recommendations of the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has no standing 
beyond such certification. Public Law 101-510 does not provide 
for any such communication to contain assumptions about the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Commission. 
Privatization of workloads at those particular installations 
was but one option in the recommendation to close them. Should 
Congress prohibit or restrict the privatization of depot 
workloads, it is our view that such legislative authority 
remains within the clear purview of the Congress. The executive 
may not, by fiat, prohibit the Congress from taking such an 
action.

                                   Ron Lewis.
                                   J.C. Watts, Jr.
                                   ``Duke'' Cunningham.
                                   Joel Hefley.
                                   Curt Weldon.
                                   Saxby Chambliss.
                                   John M. McHugh.
                                   Bob Stump.
                                   Tillie K. Fowler.
                                   James V. Hansen.