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104th Congress                                            Rept. 104-583
                      HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES                         
 2nd Session                                                   Part 1  
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                     THE DEFEND AMERICA ACT OF 1996

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                   ON

                               H.R. 3144

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                                     


                                     

  May 16, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed


                  HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
                      One Hundred Fourth Congress

 FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, 
             Chairman
RONALD V. DELLUMS, California        BOB STUMP, Arizona
G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, Mississippi DUNCAN HUNTER, California
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado         JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio
IKE SKELTON, Missouri                HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia
NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia             JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah
JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina  CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas              ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
OWEN PICKETT, Virginia               JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado
LANE EVANS, Illinois                 JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN TANNER, Tennessee               RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM, 
GLEN BROWDER, Alabama                California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi             STEVE BUYER, Indiana
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii             PETER G. TORKILDSEN, Massachusetts
CHET EDWARDS, Texas                  TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida
FRANK TEJEDA, Texas                  JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts      JAMES TALENT, Missouri
ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam            TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
JANE HARMAN, California              ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania            HOWARD ``BUCK'' McKEON, California
PETE GEREN, Texas                    RON LEWIS, Kentucky
PETE PETERSON, Florida               J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma
WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana      MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut         JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
MIKE WARD, Kentucky                  SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island     VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee
                                     JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
                                     WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North 
                                     Carolina
                                     JAMES B. LONGLEY, Jr., Maine
                                     TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
                                     RICHARD `DOC' HASTINGS, Washington
  Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Purpose and Background...........................................     1
Legislative History..............................................     6
Section-By-Section Analysis......................................     7
    Section 1--Short Title.......................................     7
    Section 2--Findings..........................................     7
    Section 3--National Missile Defense Policy...................     7
    Section 4--National Missile Defense System Architecture......     7
    Section 5--Implementation of National Missile Defense System.     8
    Section 6--Report on Plan for NMD Development and Deployment.     8
    Section 7--Policy Regarding the ABM Treaty...................     8
Communication From Other Committees..............................     8
Committee Position...............................................     9
Fiscal Data......................................................     9
    Congressional Budget Office Estimate.........................     9
    Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate....................    10
    Committee Cost Estimate......................................    12
    Inflation-Impact Statement...................................    14
Oversight Findings...............................................    14
Statement of Federal Mandates....................................    14
Rollcall Votes...................................................    14
Dissenting Views.................................................    17



104th Congress                                            Rept. 104-583
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 2d Session                                                      Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________



                       DEFEND AMERICA ACT OF 1996

                                _______


  May 16, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


  Mr. Spence,  from the Committee on National Security, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 3144]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on National Security, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 3144) to establish a United States policy for 
the deployment of a national missile defense system, and for 
other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably 
thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.

                         PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

    The proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction poses a significant threat to the United States, 
U.S. military forces, and U.S. global interests. The committee 
is concerned, however, that current Department of Defense (DOD) 
policies and programs are not sufficiently aggressive in 
responding to this threat.
    The threat to United States military forces abroad has been 
recognized by the Administration. The March 1996 Annual Report 
of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress 
notes that ``the threat of ballistic missile use in regional 
conflicts has grown substantially, and the potential 
combination of [weapons of mass destruction] with theater 
ballistic missiles poses serious dangers and complications to 
the management of regional crises and the prosecution of U.S. 
strategy for major regional conflicts.'' The Secretary of 
Defense has also referred to the threat posed by shorter-range 
ballistic missiles as ``here and now.'' Nevertheless, the 
committee judges the Administration's program for dealing with 
these shorter-range ballistic missile threats inadequate. Not 
only has the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) budget request been 
significantly reduced in recent years, but several of the most 
promising TMD concepts, such as the Navy's Upper Tier or Wide 
Area theater defense and the Army's Theater High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) system, have been delayed, most recently as a 
result of the Administration's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
Program Review. Moreover, the committee believes that the 
Administration's position in the TMD demarcation negotiations 
with the Russians will further restrict the U.S. ability to 
deploy advanced TMD systems. Consequently, the committee is 
increasingly concerned with the Administration's commitment, 
expressed by President Clinton at the Nuclear Safety Summit in 
Moscow last month, to conclude such an agreement by June.
    The Administration's program for National Missile Defense 
(NMD)--a defense of the American homeland--is even more 
worrisome. There is currently no commitment to deploy a 
national missile defense. The Administration's change in name 
of the national missile defense program from ``technology 
readiness'' to ``deployment readiness'' is nothing more than 
cosmetic. It provides the illusion of progress toward eventual 
deployment, without the political commitment, fiscal 
investments, or disciplined programmatic efforts necessary to 
achieve it. In reality, the Department of Defense plans to 
spend over eighty percent less for national missile defense 
programs than the spending levels recommended by the previous 
Administration--approximately $500 million per year over the 
next five years. Moreover, according to the March 6, 1996 
testimony of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, ``the department plans to spend the additional $375 
million added by the Congress in the fiscal year 1996 
appropriation over two years.* * *'' This funding stretch-out 
subverts the clearly expressed will of Congress.
    In his December, 1995 veto of H.R. 1530, the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, the President 
stated that the proposed requirement for a national missile 
defense system addresses a long-range missile threat ``that our 
Intelligence Community does not foresee in the coming decade.'' 
The Administration's position is largely based on a November, 
1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on ``Emerging Missile 
Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years.'' However, 
as the President's first Director of Central Intelligence, R. 
James Woolsey, has stated, the NIE's estimate of ballistic 
missile threats to the United States focused on ``a sub-set, 
and not a particularly useful sub-set, of the strategic 
problems that are posed for us by other countries' possession 
of ballistic missiles in the post-Cold War era.'' In testimony 
before the committee on March 14, 1996, Mr. Woolsey noted that 
the intelligence community's focus on missile threats to the 
continental United States, excluding Alaska and Hawaii, ``can 
lead to a badly distorted and minimized perception of the 
serious threats we face from ballistic missiles now and in the 
very near future.* * *'' Drawing broad conclusions about the 
ballistic missile threat to the United States from an 
assessment ``of such limited scope,'' he testified, ``would be 
a serious error.''
    The Administration's decision to abandon plans to deploy a 
national missile defense is particularly disturbing in light of 
the range of present and potential missile threats to the 
United States. Both Russia and China today maintain and are 
aggressively modernizing nuclear forces capable of destroying 
American cities. For Russia this includes production of follow-
ons to the SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and 
SS-N-20 sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). China is 
producing two types of long-range ICBMs with ranges of 
approximately 7,000 kilometers and 10,000 kilometers 
respectively, as well as other strategic systems. Moreover, 
various ``rogue regimes'' are seeking a capability to attack 
the United States using ballistic missiles.
    Indeed, senior U.S. intelligence officials have declared 
that it may not take long for an outlaw regime to acquire the 
capability to place U.S. targets at risk from ballistic 
missiles. For instance, on January 10, 1995, the Director of 
the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General James 
Clapper, testified that North Korean missiles now under 
development probably have sufficient range to reach targets in 
Alaska. On January 18, 1995, the then-Acting Director of 
Central Intelligence, Admiral William Studeman, testified that 
the proliferation of technology will lead to missiles ``that 
can reach the United States toward the end of this decade and 
the beginning of [the next] century.'' Former Director of 
Central Intelligence Woolsey has also testified that the covert 
purchase of missiles would provide a ``shortcut approach'' that 
may lessen the time it takes to place the United States 
directly at risk. In addition, he stated that ``the acquisition 
of key production technologies and technical expertise would 
speed up ICBM development.''
    Today, as the Secretary of Defense's March 1996 Annual 
Report to the President and the Congress makes clear, more than 
20 countries have or are developing weapons of mass 
destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons. A similar number now possess ballistic missiles, which 
can be used to deliver these weapons to their targets hundreds 
or thousands of miles away. Yet, as the Secretary testified 
before the committee on March 6, 1996, ``we have no capability 
to shoot down any ballistic missiles fired at the United 
States.''
    There are numerous reasons why a growing number of nations 
seek to acquire ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction. Such weapons provide a military edge against 
regional adversaries and serve as symbols of national power and 
prestige. Ballistic missiles offer small and medium powers--for 
the first time--a strategic weapon potentially capable of 
deterring or inflicting tremendous military and political 
damage on great powers. An adversary armed with ballistic 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction may deter the United 
States from undertaking certain actions for fear of retaliation 
against U.S. regional assets or allies. Long-range ICBMs are 
even more attractive assets for hostile powers wishing to deter 
the United States from exercising its power projection 
capabilities by placing U.S. territory directly at risk and 
threatening our most valued asset: the American people. This 
was demonstrated most recently when China warned the United 
States not to interfere with its policy of intimidation toward 
Taiwan, telling a former U.S. defense official that American 
leaders ``care more about Los Angeles than they do about 
Taiwan.'' This implicit threat to use nuclear weapons against 
the United States could have a chilling effect on the future 
conduct of American foreign and security policy.
    The proliferation of these weapons heightens the risk that 
adversaries will seek to use them or threaten their use against 
the United States or U.S. allies and interests. For instance, 
in the Gulf War, Iraq used ballistic missiles against Israel as 
political weapons in an attempt to draw Israel into the 
conflict and fracture the allied coalition. Libya recently 
declared its willingness to fire ballistic missiles at Naples, 
Italy, the home of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. In fact, Libya 
launched ballistic missiles against a NATO base in Italy in 
1986. Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has spoken of his desire to 
acquire ``a deterrent--missiles that can reach New York,'' and 
has stated, ``We should build this force so that they [the 
United States] and others will no longer think about an 
attack.'' Palestine Liberation Front leader Abu Abbas warned 
ominously in 1990 that ``some day we will have missiles that 
can reach New York.'' And Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani 
has called missiles ``the most important and the most essential 
weapons of the world.''
    In his April 1996 report on ``Proliferation: Threat and 
Response,'' the Secretary of Defense noted that ``the threat of 
the use of ballistic missiles has grown enormously over the 
past two decades,'' and that the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and the missiles that can be used to deliver 
them ``presents a grave and urgent risk to the United States 
and our citizens, allies, and troops abroad.'' The committee is 
disturbed that the report makes no mention of the role that 
national missile defense can play in combating this threat to 
the United States and its citizens. Moreover, the committee is 
troubled by the fact that the same week this report was 
released, the Administration declared its intent to use the 
line-item veto against any effort by Congress to remedy the 
vulnerability of the American people to ballistic missile 
attack.
    Importantly, the lack of any effective defenses against 
ballistic missiles may actually serve to encourage hostile 
states to acquire missile capabilities and makes them the 
weapon of choice for nations seeking to threaten others. As the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London has 
concluded, ``the ballistic missile, mainly on account of its 
range, speed and cost relative to that of a manned aircraft, is 
a favored delivery means for proliferating states and is likely 
to remain so until a proven anti-ballistic missile defense 
system has been deployed.''
    Because of their perceived military and political 
importance, ballistic missiles are also becoming a valuable 
export commodity. However, effective ballistic missile defenses 
can raise the cost and lower the attraction of ballistic 
missiles to a would-be proliferant by reducing their 
effectiveness. Missile defenses also provide a hedge against 
the use of such weapons in the event traditional 
nonproliferation efforts (e.g., arms control, export controls, 
sanctions) fail to prevent proliferation. By providing an 
insurance policy against the use of these weapons, missile 
defenses could dampen incentives to act (or react) 
precipitously in a crisis and could promote the formation of 
regional defensive alliances that reduce the risk that 
individual member states will be held hostage to attack.
    In addition, the committee is concerned about the possible 
indigenous development or sale to third parties of space launch 
vehicles, which can be rapidly converted with little or no 
warning and only minor modifications to ICBMs capable of 
delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads against 
American cities. According to a 1992 statement by Lawrence 
Gershwin, CIA national intelligence officer for strategic 
programs, ``India, Israel, and Japan have developed space 
launch vehicles that, if converted to surface-to-surface 
missiles, are capable of reaching targets in the United 
States.''
    Several independent assessments have noted that space 
launch vehicles could be converted into ICBMs in reasonably 
short order. For example, a 1993 report of the Proliferation 
Study Team, chaired by former National Security Director 
Lieutenant General William Odom (USA, Ret.), concluded that 
this conversion would require ``relatively modest effort'' and 
noted that ``the conclusion that the probability is quite low 
for the emergence of new ballistic missile threats to the 
United States during this decade or early in the next decade 
can be sustained only if plausible but unpredictable 
developments, such as the transfer and conversion of [space 
launch vehicles], are dismissed or considered of negligible 
consequence.'' The System Planning Corporation found in a 1992 
report that conversion of space launch vehicles to military 
ballistic missiles would be ``fairly straightforward'' and that 
extending the range of missiles had already been achieved by 
China, North Korea, Iraq, and Israel. Moreover, a 1992 report 
prepared by Science Applications International Corporation 
concluded that ``the increasing availability of space launch 
vehicles and space launch services could result in the ability 
of certain Third World countries to threaten the continental 
U.S. with ICBMs carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological 
payloads in the mid- to late-1990s.''
    Any booster with the capability to lift a payload into 
orbit can also be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction 
on targets thousands of miles away. Thus, through the purchase 
of space launch vehicles, a nation can acquire a threatening 
ballistic missile capability under the guise of peaceful 
activity. In this regard, the committee notes with concern 
continuing reports that Russia is attempting to market its 
START-I and START-II systems, which are modified versions of 
the SS-25 ICBM, as space launch vehicles. The purchase of space 
launch vehicles is one route by which proliferant states may 
seek to circumvent existing controls on the transfer of missile 
technology.
    Given the growing ballistic missile threat to the United 
States, the committee is convinced that the deployment of an 
affordable and effective national missile defense system is an 
essential objective of a defense modernization program that 
adequately supports the requirements of the national military 
strategy. The committee believes that this Act, the provisions 
of which are summarized below, is an appropriate response to 
these concerns and is a responsible and prudent first step 
toward defending all Americans from the threat of ballistic 
missile attack.

                          LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

    H.R. 3144, the ``Defend America Act of 1996,'' was 
introduced on March 21, 1996. The bill was referred to the 
Committee on National Security and the Committee on 
International Relations.
    Although the Committee on National Security did not hold 
any hearings specifically on H.R. 3144, several hearings were 
held this year on the ballistic missile defense issues that are 
the subject of H.R. 3144. These included two full committee 
hearings--on February 28, 1996, and March 14, 1996--and three 
subcommittee hearings (Military Research and Development and 
Military Procurement)--on February 29, March 7, and March 21.
    The committee's February 28 hearing examined the long-range 
ballistic missile threat to the United States and the 
requirement for a national missile defense system. Testimony 
was taken from a panel of outside witnesses, and the chairman 
of the National Intelligence Council. On March 14, the 
committee explored issues related to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty, including its relevance and utility in 
the post-Cold War world and its present and projected impact on 
U.S. ballistic missile defense programs. The committee heard 
testimony from another panel of outside witnesses, including 
the Administration's first Director of Central Intelligence.
    The Military Research and Development subcommittee hearings 
and the joint Military Research and Development and Military 
Procurement subcommittee hearing focused on the 
Administration's plans and programs for ballistic missile 
defense. Witnesses included the Director of the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization, officials from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, service representatives responsible for 
missile defense programs, and former government officials with 
experience in ballistic missile defense and ABM Treaty issues.
    The hearings conducted in 1996 supplemented an extensive 
series of hearings the previous year, which culminated in 
inclusion of similar national missile defense policy guidance 
in the conference report on H.R. 1530, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (H. Rept. 104-406). The 
incorporation of this provision was one of the principal 
reasons cited by the President for his veto of H.R. 1530 on 
December 28, 1995. A revised version of this bill, S. 1124, 
excluding the provision on national missile defense, was 
subsequently approved by the Congress and submitted to the 
President, who signed it into law on February 10, 1996.
    The aforementioned series of hearings on ballistic missile 
defense provided the committee with a rich background of 
information that framed its consideration of H.R. 3144. The 
bill was marked up on May 1, 1996 and, a quorum being present, 
reported favorably by a rollcall vote of 31 to 22. One 
amendment in the nature of a substitute was offered by Mr. 
Spratt and was defeated by a rollcall vote of 24-29. The 
individual rollcall results are placed at the end of this 
report.

                      SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

                         Section 1--Short Title

    This section would identify the legislation as the ``Defend 
America Act of 1996.''

                          Section 2--Findings

    This section would establish the rationale for the policy 
established in the Act. It would note that the threat posed to 
the United States by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is 
growing and that the trend is toward longer range missiles, 
including those with intercontinental reach. It would also find 
that the United States has the technical capability to develop 
and deploy a national missile defense system and that such a 
deployment will help deter countries from seeking long-range 
missiles. Moreover, it would note that there are ways for 
determined countries to acquire intercontinental ballistic 
missiles by means other than indigenous development. This 
section would also recognize that the danger of an accidental 
missile launch has not disappeared and that deployment of a 
national missile defense system will reduce concerns about this 
threat. It would note that the deployment of a national missile 
defense system can enhance stability in the post-Cold War era 
and that the United States and Russia should welcome the 
opportunity to reduce reliance on threats of nuclear 
retaliation as the sole basis of stability. Finally, this 
section would note that the authors of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty envisioned the need to change the Treaty as 
circumstances changed, and they provided the mechanisms to do 
so in the Treaty. The United States and Russia previously 
considered such changes and should do so again.

               Section 3--National Missile Defense Policy

    This section would establish U.S. missile defense policy in 
two areas. It would call for deployment by the end of 2003 of a 
national missile defense system capable of providing a highly 
effective defense of U.S. territory against limited, 
unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks, which 
will be augmented to a layered defense as larger and more 
sophisticated threats emerge. It would also call for a 
cooperative transition to a regime that is not based on an 
offensive-only form of strategic stability.

        Section 4--National Missile Defense System Architecture

    This section would specify the components of the national 
missile defense system that are to be developed for deployment, 
including an interceptor system that optimizes defensive 
coverage of the United States (either ground-based, sea-based, 
or space-based, or any combination of these basing modes); 
fixed ground-based radars; space-based sensors, including the 
Space and Missile Tracking System (formerly known as Brilliant 
Eyes); and battle management, command, control, and 
communications.

      Section 5--Implementation of National Missile Defense System

    This section would specify certain actions that the 
Secretary of Defense must take in implementing the national 
missile defense policy. This would include initiating actions 
necessary to meet the deployment goal; conducting by the end of 
1998 an integrated systems test; using streamlined acquisition 
procedures; and developing a follow-on national missile defense 
program.

      Section 6--Report on Plan for NMD Development and Deployment

    This section would require the Secretary of Defense to 
submit a report to Congress by March 15, 1997, which addresses 
the Secretary's plan for implementing the national missile 
defense policy, including a discussion of the NMD architecture 
selected; the Secretary's estimate of the cost associated with 
development and deployment of the NMD system; an analysis of 
follow-on options; and a determination of the point at which 
NMD development would conflict with the ABM Treaty.

               Section 7--Policy Regarding the ABM Treaty

    This section would establish policy for amending and 
otherwise dealing with the ABM Treaty. It would urge the 
President to pursue high-level discussions with Russia to amend 
the Treaty and stipulates that any amendment must be submitted 
for advice and consent. It would also call for the President 
and Congress to consider U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty if 
amendments are not produced within one year.

                  COMMUNICATIONS FROM OTHER COMMITTEES

                          House of Representatives,
                      Committee on International Relations,
                                       Washington, DC, May 1, 1996.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: I write with regard to H.R. 3144, the 
Defend America Act of 1996. H.R. 3144 was introduced on March 
21, 1996, and was referred to the Committee on National 
Security, and in addition, the Committee on International 
Relations. I understand the Committee on National Security 
intends to mark up H.R. 3144 on Wednesday, May 1.
    The purpose of H.R. 3144 is to establish a U.S. policy for 
the deployment by the end of 2003 a national missile defense 
system that is capable of providing a highly-effective defense 
of the territory of the U.S. against limited, unauthorized or 
accidental ballistic missile attacks.
    The Committee on International Relations has closely 
reviewed H.R. 3144 and in order to expedite consideration of 
this measure in the House, the Committee waives its right to 
take up the bill. I therefore ask that the Committee be 
discharged from further consideration.
    The Committee on International Relations wishes to make 
clear that the foregoing waiver should not be construed as a 
waiver of the Committee's jurisdiction with respect to any of 
the legislative provisions in H.R. 3144 that fall within its 
jurisdiction. The Committee also wishes to preserve its 
prerogatives with respect to any House-Senate conference on 
this bill and any Senate amendments thereto, including the 
appointment of an equal number of conferees to those appointed 
for any other House committee with respect to the provisions of 
H.R. 3144 which fall within this committee's jurisdiction.
    Thank you for your attention to this matter, and I look 
forward to strongly supporting H.R. 3144 on the House floor.
            Sincerely,
                                              Ben Gilman, Chairman.

                           COMMITTEE POSITION

    On May 1, 1996, the Committee on National Security, a 
quorum being present, approved H.R. 3144, as amended, by a vote 
of 31 to 22.

                              FISCAL DATA

    Pursuant to clause 7 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 
of Representatives, the committee attempted to ascertain annual 
outlays resulting from the bill during fiscal year 1997 and the 
four following fiscal years. The results of such efforts are 
reflected in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which is included in this 
report pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(C) of House rule XI.

                  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

    In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the cost estimate 
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office and submitted 
pursuant to section 403(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974 is as follows:

                                                      May 15, 1996.
Hon. Floyd Spence,
Chairman, Committee on National Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman:  The Congressional Budget Office has 
reviewed H.R. 3144, the Defend America Act of 1996, as ordered 
reported by the House Committee on National Security on May 1, 
1996. The bill calls for deployment by 2003 of a system to 
defend the nation against an attack by ballistic missiles, but 
does not specify how much funding would be available for this 
purpose. Based on plans and estimates of the Department of 
Defense, the costs of complying with the bill would total $10 
billion over the next five years, or about $7 billion more than 
is currently programmed for national missile defense.
    Through 2010, total acquisition costs would range from $31 
billion to $60 billion for a layered defense that would include 
both ground- and space-based weapons. The wide range in the 
estimate reflects uncertainty about two factors--the type and 
capability of a defensive system that would satisfy the terms 
of the bill, and the costs of each component of that system. 
These figures do not include the cost to operate and support 
the defense after it is deployed. The attachment provides 
additional details on these estimates.
    Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1996 
excludes from the application of that bill legislative 
provisions that are necessary for the national security or the 
ratification or implementation of international treaty 
obligations. CBO has determined that the provisions of H.R. 
3144 fit within that exclusion.
    H.R. 3144 would not affect direct spending or receipts and 
thus would not be subject to pay-as-you-go procedures under 
section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Raymond 
Hall and David Mosher.
            Sincerely,
                                         June E. O'Neill, Director.

 Congressional Budget Office, Budgetary Implications of H.R. 3144, The 
                       Defend America Act of 1996

    This document addresses the budgetary implications of H.R. 
3144, as ordered reported by the House Committee on National 
Security on May 1, 1996. The Defend America Act of 1996 would 
require the United States to deploy a national missile defense 
by the end of 2003 that provides ``a highly effective defense 
of all 50 states against limited, unauthorized and accidental 
attacks * * * [that would be] augmented over time to provide a 
layered defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic 
missile threats as they emerge.'' Those two requirements form 
the basis of CBO's estimate. According to the bill the initial 
defense must include interceptors, ground-based radar, space-
based sensors including the Space and Missile Tracking System 
(SMTS), and a battle management and command and control system 
to tie the components together. The interceptors can be ground-
, sea-, or spacebased. The space-based weapons could be lasers 
or kinetic energy interceptors (also known as Brilliant 
Pebbles). The layered defense that would eventually follow, 
according to the bill's second requirement, would likely be 
achieved by adding space-based weapons to the ground-based 
system.
    CBO estimates that H.R. 3144 would cost nearly $10 billion 
over the next five years, or about $7 billion more than is 
currently programmed for national missile defense. Through 
2010, the system would cost between $31 billion and $60 
billion. None of the estimates include the cost to operate and 
support the defense after it is deployed. Our estimates are 
derived from data provided by the military services and the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). While we have 
been unable to review many of the details behind those 
estimates, we believe that they are the best that are currently 
available. In some cases, though, we adjusted the Department of 
Defense's (DoD) estimates to better reflect procurement costs 
and potential risks. For example, we added about $3 billion to 
hedge against technical and schedule risks in the development 
programs. We also reduced the estimated cost of deploying 500 
space-based interceptors by $6 billion. We did not however, 
adjust the estimates to reflect cost increases that typically 
occur in developing systems that advance the state of the art.
    Minimum Requirements and Costs. The low end of the range of 
estimates reflects what we believe would be the smallest system 
that would meet both of the bill's principal requirements. As 
proposed by the Army, the initial defense would consist of 100 
interceptors based at Grand Forks, South Dakota. Combined with 
SMTS, this system would be able to defend all 50 states against 
an unsophisticated attack of up to 20 warheads under many 
scenarios, according to BMDO. The interceptors would be armed 
with the Army's Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). To track 
incoming warheads, four new phased-array radars would be 
deployed, one each in Grand Forks, Alaska, Hawaii, and New 
England.
    This initial defense would cost $14 billion--about $8.5 
billion for the ground-based system and $5 billion for the SMTS 
space-based sensors. (The ground-based system could cost 
roughly $4 billion less if the Air Force's proposal for a 
Minuteman-based system was adopted.) The upper layer, which 
would be added sometime after 2006, would employ 500 space-
based interceptors similar to Brilliant Pebbles--the less 
expensive of the two types of space-based weapons. It would 
make the defense capable of protecting the United States from a 
more sophisticated attack of up to 60 warheads according to 
BMDO, and would cost an additional $14 billion. CBO adds 
another $3 billion to these estimates to hedge against 
potential risks associated with the development program. Thus, 
the total cost of the layered defense would be about $31 
billion.
    Potential Increases in Requirements and Costs. The bill 
specifies that the defense shall protect the United States 
against limited or unauthorized attacks, but does not specify 
how big the attack might be. The high end of the range reflects 
the costs of a system to protect the United States against a 
more potent threat--for example, an attack that could have 200 
warheads accompanied by sophisticated countermeasures. DoD 
bases its operational requirement for a national missile 
defense on such a threat.
    CBO assumes that the ground-based layer would include 300 
interceptors deployed at 3 sites and would cost $13 billion, or 
about $4.5 billion more than the costs of meeting the minimum 
requirements. SMTS satellites would be deployed at a cost of $5 
billion. The space-based layer would include a combination of 
500 space-based interceptors ($14 billion) and 20 space-based 
lasers ($25 billion) for maximum effectiveness. Again, $3 
billion is added in anticipation of technological and 
integration problems. The total cost of this high-end layered 
defense would be about $60 billion. Except for the lasers, this 
system would be similar to the Global Protection Against 
Limited Strikes (GPALS) system proposed by past 
administrations.
    Cost Comparison. The estimate for the ground-based systems 
described above is about two thirds less than previous 
estimates associated with earlier proposals, for example the 
GPALS system. The earlier proposals focused on the challenging 
threat of an unauthorized attack by the Soviet Union. Today the 
focus is on smaller and less capable threats--as a result the 
defines components may be somewhat less capable. Past proposals 
also called for a robust program that included substantial 
efforts to test the systems and to reduce and manage the 
technical and schedule risks associated with such an ambitious 
development effort. It is unclear how much these efforts can be 
reduced without increasing risk to unacceptable levels. But if 
current plans must be revised to include more thorough testing 
and larger efforts to reduce risks, and if the purpose of the 
defense evolves into protecting against larger and more 
sophisticated threats, costs of the ground-based systems could 
approach those developed for systems like GPALS--thus, costs of 
the high-end system could greatly exceed $60 billion by 2010.

                        COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the committee takes exception with 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cost estimate for this 
bill and offers the following specific points of disagreement 
and clarification.
    First, the CBO estimate fails to account for the fact that 
H.R. 3144 would not require the acquisition or deployment of a 
specific National Missile Defense (NMD) architecture. Instead, 
it would direct the Secretary of Defense to develop an 
affordable and operationally effective NMD system to defend 
against limited missile attacks; prescribe and use streamlined 
acquisition policies and procedures in the procurement of the 
system; and submit a report to Congress not later than March 
15, 1997, on the Secretary's plan for developing and deploying 
such a system.
    In this regard, the committee notes that in testimony 
before the Committee on National Security in February, 1995, 
the Secretary of Defense stated that an NMD system capable of 
defending against limited ballistic missile attacks could be 
deployed within five years for $5 billion. Yet, the CBO 
estimate claims that an initial NMD system would cost more than 
twice that amount. Similarly, the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization has proposed an NMD system architecture that could 
be deployed in about four years for slightly less than $5 
billion. The Air Force has also proposed an NMD system 
architecture which it believes can be deployed in four years 
for $2 to $4 billion. Lastly, independent experts believe an 
NMD system based on upgrades to the Navy's Aegis fleet can be 
deployed several years for under $5 billion. Therefore, the 
committee believes that a more appropriate estimate of the 
likely cost associated with the mandated actions required by 
H.R. 3144 would approximate those estimates already provided by 
the Department of Defense.
    Further, the CBO estimate provides a cost estimate through 
the year 2010 for a specific system architecture that includes 
the most expensive, technologically challenging approach to 
performing the NMD mission. In fact, no such architecture is 
mandated by the bill. Instead, the bill grants the Secretary 
flexibility in determining the appropriate architecture and 
proposing such to a subsequent Congress. The committee fully 
expects such a proposal to receive the necessary and 
appropriate Congressional budgetary scrutiny to ensure that all 
cost-benefit tradeoffs are properly explored and understood. 
Therefore, the committee finds the assumption that the 
Department of Defense would propose and pursue an architecture 
option that would pose serious affordability concerns and run 
directly counter to section 4 of the bill to be without basis 
or logic.
    Second, the CBO estimate assumes a ``business as usual'' 
approach to the acquisition of an NMD system. This assumption 
fails to give appropriate weight to section 5 of the bill which 
directs the Secretary of Defense to ``prescribe and use 
streamlined acquisition policies and procedures'' in the 
procurement of such an NMD system. The Secretary of Defense has 
testified before the Committee on National Security about the 
success in using such procedures to dramatically reduce the 
cost of several new weapons systems, most notably the Joint 
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The committee believes that the 
aggressive use of streamlined acquisition procedures and 
commercial practices should produce significantly lower NMD 
system acquisition costs.
    Third, the committee believes that proper consideration of 
any such estimate must take into account the broader budgetary 
context. As such, the CBO estimate contains no discussion of 
the estimated costs for deployment of a NMD system in the 
context of projected defense spending over the same time 
period. Such a comparison would indicate that any NMD system, 
whether it costs $5 billion or $30 billion, would represent a 
small fraction of the total amount of the funding that will be 
available for national defense over the deployment period. In 
fact, deployment of an NMD system would almost certainly 
require less than one percent of total defense spending over 
the next five years, irrespective of whether one uses the 
President's budget or the most recent Concurrent Resolution on 
the Budget as a basis for comparison. Indeed, the long term 
acquisition cost for any NMD system is overshadowed by that of 
many future conventional systems such as the Joint Strike 
Fighter ($301 billion) or the F-18E/F Super Hornet Strike 
Fighter ($81 billion). Therefore, the committee believes that 
when viewed within a broader context, the projected cost of an 
NMD system becomes less of an issue.
    Fourth, the committee believes that any presentation of a 
cost estimate must recognize that the funds required to deploy 
an NMD system are already available within the limits 
established for the national defense budget function contained 
in the most recent Concurrent Resolution on the Budget. In 
short, no increase in top-line defense spending would be 
necessary to field an NMD system. The committee believes that 
the issue is more appropriately one of determining priorities 
within existing budgets, not one of adding new spending.
    Therefore, the committee believes that the CBO cost 
estimate inadequately addresses the numerous complex issues 
associated with estimating the costs associated with this 
legislation. The committee recognizes that given that this 
legislation does not authorize or appropriate any funds, the 
estimation of cost impacts of legislation that merely provides 
policy direction is inherently difficult. However, the 
committee believes that the margin for error associated with 
such estimates is dramatically compounded when they involve 
hypothetical excursions beyond the actual requirements of the 
legislation.

                       INFLATION-IMPACT STATEMENT

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the committee concludes that the bill 
would have no significant inflationary impact.

                           OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

    With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, this legislation results from 
hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the 
committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.
    With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not 
include any new spending or credit authority, nor does it 
provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or 
expenditures. The fiscal features of this legislation are 
addressed in the estimate prepared by the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
    With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the committee has not received 
a report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
pertaining to the subject matter of H.R. 3144.

                     STATEMENT OF FEDERAL MANDATES

    Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104-4, this 
legislation contains no federal mandates with respect to state, 
local, and tribal governments, nor with respect to the private 
sector. Similarly, the bill provides no unfunded federal 
intergovernmental mandates.

                             ROLLCALL VOTES

    In accordance with clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, rollcall votes were 
taken with respect to the committee's consideration of H.R. 
3144. The record of these votes is attached to this report.
    The committee ordered H.R. 3144 reported to the House with 
a favorable recommendation by a vote of 31-22, a quorum being 
present.


               DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS

    I offer dissenting views on the committee recommendation 
and report of H.R. 3144, a national missile defense program 
guideline clearly calculated to breach the ABM Treaty and 
return the United States to pursuit of a ``star wars'' missile 
defense program.
    A less extreme formulation for missile defense program 
activity was met with a Presidential veto on last year's 
defense authorization bill. The ballistic missile defense issue 
is also embedded in the committee recommendation and report on 
H.R. 3230 and I have noted my dissenting views in that report 
as well.
    Despite all of the political rhetoric, there is much more 
commonality between the administration and the Congress on this 
issue than the conflict would suggest. Many of the differences 
between the two approaches are rooted in a perception of the 
timing of the appearance of a threat to which we would need 
such a response. This is essentially a function of risk 
management, and how to determine what type of ``insurance 
policy'' we wish to purchase against such a future contingency. 
What is less focused on but should be very central to the 
debate, is the cost and character of the alternative 
``insurance policies'' that are available to the Nation. And 
this is where the parties diverge.
    The administration's current ballistic missile defense plan 
can provide for an affordable defense against limited ballistic 
missile threats before those threats will emerge. It does so in 
a way that anticipates likely changes in the threat from 
today's estimates. It also does so in a way that avoids 
becoming trapped in a technological cul-de-sac by a premature 
deployment of a potentially misdirected system.
    The committee recommendation and its report would unfocus 
U.S. efforts by pursuing space-based interceptors without 
regard to ABM Treaty requirements, START treaty considerations 
and the threat reduction and strategic stability goals that the 
treaties promise.
    The known stockpiles held by Russia and China which have 
been deterred for years by our strategy of mutual assured 
deterrence, and they will continue to be so deterred. Nothing 
has changed in the strategic environment that would suggest 
that the basic understanding that led both superpowers to 
conclude that the ABM Treaty served their security interests 
has changed. And, as I have pointed out above, the 
administration's plans will lead us to a deployable plan before 
any other threat will reasonably emerge.
    This recommendation commits us to an incredibly expensive 
and ultimately unaffordable path. Both the department's 3+3 
program and the Spratt substitute provide for a more capable 
missile defense system when deployed, and one that is 
affordable within current budget projections. It blends arms 
control and counterproliferation activities with deterrence and 
missile intercept capabilities. It thus pursues the most 
effective approach to missile defense, preventing missiles from 
being deployed at all, while providing a prudent ``insurance 
policy'' against limited but as of yet non-existent threats.
    The overreliance by the committee recommendation on a 
``hardware'' solution to intercept incoming missiles in the 
final minutes of their flight time, risks constructing a very 
expensive 21st Century Maginot Line. Such a defense strategy 
may well prove as ineffective to the 21st Century threats we 
might face, as the original Maginot Line was in defending 
France during World War II.
    Therefore, I urge my colleagues to support the Spratt 
substitute and oppose the committee recommendation.

                                                 Ronald V. Dellums.
                  DISSENTING VIEW OF HON. JOHN SPRATT

    Before stating why I dissent, I want to emphasize the 
commonality between H.R. 3144 and the substitute I offered. 
Both call for a national missile defense system that can be 
deployed by the year 2003. Both see the potential threat to the 
United States posed by intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 
both stress the importance of defending against such a threat. 
-
    The operative sentence in my substitute is in Section 3: 
``It is the policy of the United States to develop by the year 
2000 a National Missile Defense System that can be deployed in 
2003.'' -
    This objective does not differ much from H.R. 3144. My 
substitute is preferable because it comes closer to achieving 
the stated purpose of both bills.-
    We are not without national missile defenses today because 
of a lack of funding. More than $35 billion has been pumped 
into strategic defense since President Reagan's speech on March 
23, 1983. The problem has been a lack of focus more than a lack 
of funding. My substitute to H.R. 3144 focuses national missile 
defense on the one system attainable in the near-term: a system 
of ground-based, treaty-compliant interceptors. H.R. 3144, on 
the other hand, sends the Secretary of Defense in pursuit of 
four different systems: ground-based interceptors, sea-based 
interceptors, space-based kinetic energy interceptors, and 
space-based directed energy systems. This diffuses scarce 
dollars, and wastes money on futuristic technologies (such as 
space-based lasers and ``Brilliant Pebbles'') that are not 
attainable in the near-term, if ever. It also siphons 
development money off the most feasible system: ground-based 
interceptors.-
    By focusing on a single architecture--ground-based 
interceptors--my substitute ensures that we will have the most 
effective system possible by the year 2000. If the system 
developed proves its mettle in testing, and if the threat 
warrants, this system can be deployed by 2003, the same date 
set by H.R. 3144. -
    If in the year 2000 we decide not to work toward deployment 
in the year 2003, my substitute directs that we not quit, but 
keep on upgrading the system with new technology and rigorous 
testing. This will ensure that we can have the best possible 
system ready to build and deploy whenever we perceive the need. 
-
    Right now, the most effective step we can take toward 
reducing the threat of missile attack is to implement START I 
and START II. While the findings of H.R. 3144 refer to START I, 
there is no reference to START II and the importance of 
lowering the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union by 66% 
from the levels during the Cold War. -
    The arsenal of the former Soviet Union still poses the 
greatest danger to this country, whether by premeditated attack 
from a hostile Russian government, or by an accidental or 
unauthorized launch, or by spread of Russian nuclear materials, 
weapons, or missile components to nations hostile to the United 
States. We will not reduce this threat if we broadcast our 
intent to abandon the ABM Treaty before START II is ratified 
and on its way to being implemented. H.R. 3144 is littered with 
provisions inconsistent with the ABM Treaty and unnecessarily 
risks START II ratification.
                                                       John Spratt.