Report text available as:

  • TXT
  • PDF   (PDF provides a complete and accurate display of this text.) Tip ?

   104th Congress 1st            SENATE                 Report
         Session
                                                        104-9
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

 
                     LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT
                                OF 1995

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                        COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                                   on

                                  S. 4

                             together with

                     ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS




   February 27 (legislative day, February 22), 1995.--Ordered to be 
                                printed
                        COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

  PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, 
             Chairman
                                     CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
                                     DON NICKLES, Oklahoma
                                     PHIL GRAMM, Texas
                                     CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
                                     TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
                                     HANK BROWN, Colorado
                                     SLADE GORTON, Washington
                                     JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
                                     OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
                                     SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan
J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska              BILL FRIST, Tennessee
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, Louisiana
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PAUL SIMON, Illinois
KENT CONRAD, North Dakota
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
BARBARA BOXER, California
PATTY MURRAY, Washington
    G. William Hoagland, Staff 
             Director
  William G. Dauster, Democratic 
 Chief of Staff and Chief Counsel


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose..........................................................1
 II. Background.......................................................2
III. Legislative History..............................................7
 IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................8
  V. Cost Estimate...................................................11
 VI. Regulatory Impact Statement.....................................12
VII. Committee Votes.................................................12
VIII.
     Additional and Minority Views...................................14
 IX. Changes to Existing Law.........................................21

                                 (iii)
104th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE

 1st Session                                                      104-9
_______________________________________________________________________


                 LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT OF 1995

                                _______


   February 27 (legislative day, February 22), 1995.--Ordered to be 
                                printed

_______________________________________________________________________


Mr. Domenici, from the Committee on the Budget, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                     ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

                          [To accompany S. 4]

    The Committee on Budget, to which was referred the bill (S. 
4) A bill to grant the power to the President to reduce budget 
authority, having considered the same, reports thereon with 
amendments and without recommendation.

                               I. Purpose

    The purpose of S. 4, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act, is 
to delegate to the President the authority to rescind all or 
part of budget authority provided in certain Acts. The 
President's rescissions would remain in effect unless Congress 
passed a disapproval bill rejecting the President's rescissions 
and overcame the President's veto of that disapproval bill.
    While title X the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 provided legislative procedures for the 
consideration rescissions proposed by the President, Congress 
has routinely ignored these procedures. Many charge that the 
President's control over spending decisions was weakened by 
title X, which delineated the President's authority to propose 
rescissions of budget authority or defer the obligation of 
budget authority.
    S. 4 would expand the President's power to reduce 
discretionary spending by giving him the authority to cancel 
budget authority without any other action required by Congress.
    The major provisions of S. 4, as reported by the Committee, 
are as follows:
          Within 20 days of the enactment of an appropriations 
        bill, the President can rescind in whole or in part 
        budget authority provided in that Act;
          The rescission is effective unless Congress passes a 
        disapproval bill and overrides the President's veto of 
        the disapproval bill within 35 days; and
          If the President rescinds budget authority under this 
        procedure, a lock box provides that any savings be 
        devoted to deficit reduction by lowering the caps on 
        discretionary spending.

                             II. Background

                                overview

    The United States Constitution entrusts the ``power of the 
purse'' to the Legislative Branch of the United States. 
Pursuant to article I, section 8 Congress is empowered ``[t]o 
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports, and Excises to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defense and General Welfare of 
the United States.'' The power of the purse is made more clear 
by Article I, Section 9 which provides that ``[n]o money shall 
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law.''
    However, the expenditure of funds pursuant to Congressional 
authorization is an executive function, consistent with the 
President's obligation under Article II, Section 3, that he 
``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed''. Presidents, 
at least since Thomas Jefferson, have asserted that the 
executive has some discretion in the expenditure of monies 
appropriated by Congress. This tug-of-war goes to the most 
basic tenet of the American democratic system of government--
the balance of powers between the executive and the legislative 
branches of government--the power of the purse versus the 
impoundment power.
    A review of writings on this subject shows that this 
conflict dates back to the earliest days of the Republic. The 
conflict has been made manifest through executive action, 
congressional legislation, and decisions of federal courts, 
including the United States Supreme Court.
    The first significant impoundment of appropriated funds, 
was made by the third President, Thomas Jefferson, who in 1803 
refused to spend $50,000 appropriated by Congress to provide 
gun boats to operate on the Mississippi River. The conflict 
came to a head in the early 1970's when the 37th President, 
Richard Nixon, withheld from expenditure over $12 billion for 
highway, water, and sewer projects, and millions of dollars in 
appropriated funds for housing, education, and health programs.
    It was President Nixon's challenge to Congress' power of 
the purse that was a major impetus to the enactment of the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Title 
X of this Act, the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, limited the 
President's management of appropriated funding by establishing 
procedures for the deferral or rescission of budget authority. 
In addition, title X provided legislative procedures for 
congressional action on these proposals.

                    pre-1970 impoundment actions \1\

    Following President Jefferson's withholding of $50,000 for 
Mississippi river gun boats because he thought their use 
unnecessary, the next major action on impoundment authority did 
not occur until the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case entitled 
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 
(1838). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the President 
could not withhold payment of a contract for delivery of the 
mail which Congress had authorized. The court saw this as a 
``ministerial'' function which the President could not refuse 
in the faithful execution of the law. Just two years later in 
Decatur v. Pauling, 39 U.S. (12 Pet.) 497 (1840), the Court 
upheld a decision by the Secretary of the Navy to refuse 
payment to a widow whose claim was based on a congressional 
resolution. The Court found that the Secretary of the Navy's 
duty in this case was not merely ministerial but required 
discretion and judgment and, so, the court refused the writ of 
mandamus.
    \1\ The documentation for this section is largely taken from an 
article entitled ``History and Practice of Executive Impoundment of 
Appropriated Funds,'' by Niles Stanton, printed in the Nebraska Law 
Review, v. 53, no. 1, 1974, pp. 1-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1876 President Grant took up the impoundment mantle when 
he notified Congress that he did not intend to spend the total 
amount appropriated for harbor and river improvement projects 
because they were of a private or local interest rather than in 
the national interest. This mirrors the current debate over 
line item veto because proposed Presidential rescissions are 
often targeted to funding provided by Congress for specific 
projects (i.e. ``pork barrel'' projects) or for funding added 
by Congress above amounts requested by the Administration. 
However, Congress did not challenge Grant's action.
    In the years following Grant's impoundment, U.S. Attorneys 
General stated in formal opinions that congressional intent had 
to be considered, and not just statutory language, in 
determining whether the Congress was mandating an expenditure 
of funds or simply permitting the President to spend these 
funds.
    The executive impoundment of funds gained some legal status 
with the enactment of the Anti-Deficiency Acts of 1905 and 
1906. In addition to providing a method to prevent excessive 
expenditures that could necessitate supplemental funding later 
in the fiscal year, these Acts allowed the waiver of spending 
appropriated funds in cases of unforeseen emergencies. 
President Roosevelt used this authority during the Great 
Depression and World War II. He also impounded flood control 
funding,which did evoke a legislative response from Congress in 
1943 to prohibit any agency or official (other than the 
Commissioner of Public Roads) from impounding funds 
appropriated for highway construction. Although limited in 
scope, Congress had responded to executive impoundment of 
congressionally provided funding.
    In the 1960s, Presidential impoundment of funds were 
largely limited to defense programs and projects as the 
President exercised his authority as ``Commander in Chief'' of 
the armed forces. However, President Johnson did withhold 
billions of dollars in funding for highway projects, which 
Congress had no mechanism to address.

                           nixon impoundments

    President Richard Nixon brought the impoundment issued to 
the fore by withholding congressionally appropriated funds and 
claiming that historic precedent affirmed this authority.
    Two court cases in 1973 addressed the impoundment of 
highway funds and water pollution control funds, but did not 
settle the legal question about the President's authority to 
impound funds. In Missouri Highway Commission v. Volpe, 479 
F.2d 1099 (8th Cir 1973), affirmed 347 F. Supp. (W.D. Mo. 
1972), the court of appeals held that highway funds could not 
be impounded for the stated purpose of trying to control 
inflationary pressures on the economy. In City of New York v. 
Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), the court held 
that the Nixon Administration had no authority to direct the 
Environmental Protection Agency not to allocate appropriated 
funds to the states because this was determined to be 
ministerial duty.
    The Administration and Congress again came to conflict when 
the President targeted rural loan and grant programs for 
termination through the mechanism of impounding the funds. 
Congress acted legislatively to thwart these actions but left 
the impoundment issue squarely before Congress for further 
action.

                        Impoundment Control Act

    The 1974 Impoundment Control Act was preceded by the 1972 
Federal Impoundment and Information Act, which required the 
President to submit reports to Congress and the General 
Accounting Office on funding which had been withheld. Such 
information, however, did not address what was perceived as a 
misuse of executive authority in refusing to spend funds 
appropriated by the Congress. Congress addressed this issue by 
establishing the current impoundment control procedures.
    Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974 requires that the President submit messages to the 
Congress if he proposes to defer (temporary withhold) or 
rescind (permanently cancel) appropriated funds. A reading of 
the general history shows that executive impoundments have 
largely been undertaken to establish spending priorities. 
Presidents have tended to impound funds appropriated for 
programs that exceed his budget request or that represent 
specific projects of interest to Congress. With the exception 
of President Nixon's actions, the impoundment of funds has not 
traditionally been viewed as a significant tool to reduce 
federal spending.

Deferrals

    The President can temporarily withhold from expenditure or 
delay the obligation of funds that are not currently needed. 
Congress can disapprove the deferral of funds through enactment 
of an impoundment resolution. However, since deferrals are now 
made largely for management rather than policy reasons, it is 
unusual for Congress to act to disapprove deferrals, and the 
funds are generally released for expenditure.

Rescissions

    The President can propose to rescind (permanently cancel) 
budget authority. In the case of rescissions, Congress has 45 
calendar days (of continuous session excluding 3-day recess 
periods) within which to approve these rescissions. If Congress 
does not enact legislation to approve the proposed rescissions, 
in whole or in part, the President must make the funds 
available for expenditure. The Congress can substitute its own 
rescissions for the President's proposal, and often has. Under 
this process, there is no requirement that Congress consider 
and vote on the President's proposed rescissions.
    The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently reported that 
since enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act in 1974 through October 7, 1994, U.S. Presidents 
have officially proposed 1,084 rescissions of budget authority 
totaling $72.8 billion. Congress has adopted only 399, or 37 
percent, of the proposed rescissions in the amount of $22.9 
billion. Congress has also initiated 649 rescissions totaling 
$70.1 billion, largely in response to the President's proposals 
and often to pay for other federal spending. In total, over the 
twenty years of the current budget process, Congress has 
enacted 1,048 rescissions totaling $92.9 billion.

                             Line-Item Veto

    The current debate over the legislative line-item veto 
proposals transcends the historical context of executive 
impoundment of funds to set spending priorities other than 
those approved by Congress. The debate has now centered on the 
granting of additional authority to the President to reduce 
federal spending as Congress seeks to balance the federal 
budget.
    According to the Congressional Research Service of the 
Library of Congress, at least ten Presidents since the Civil 
War have stated support for the line-item veto, including 
President's Grant, Hayes, Arthur, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, 
Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush. More recently, 
President Clinton campaigned on a line item veto, claiming that 
he could reduce spending by $9.8 billion over four years, and 
urged Congress again in this year's State of the Union address 
to give him the line item veto. Two Presidents--Taft and 
Carter--opposed the line-item veto authority for the President. 
It is also documented that the Governors of 43 of the 50 states 
have some form of line item veto authority (see table I).
    Congress has stopped short of considering a constitutional 
amendment to grant the President this authority, and has chosen 
to address the line-item veto authority by statute. During the 
1980s three statutory approaches developed on the line-item 
veto.
    Separate enrollment legislation would require each item in 
an appropriations or tax bill be enrolled as a separate Act, 
allowing the President to veto these individual items.
    Enhanced rescission legislation, such a S. 4, would 
delegate to the President unilateral authority to rescind 
budget authority provided in appropriations Acts or to repeal 
tax expenditures in revenue acts. The President's rescissions 
or repeals could only be overturned by passage of a separate 
law. Assuming the President's veto of a law overturning his own 
rescissions or repeals, it would take a two-thirds vote of each 
House to overturn his actions.
    Expedited rescission legislation would establish fast-track 
procedures for the consideration of the President's proposals 
to rescind budget authority provided in an appropriations act 
or to repeal tax expenditures in revenue acts. These proposals 
would only go into effect if passed by a majority of each House 
and signed into law.
    Table II shows Senate action over the past 12 years on 
these three approaches to the line item veto. Even the 
legislative granting of such authority puts issues of the power 
of the purse and the balance of powers between the Congress and 
the President squarely before the Congress.

                   TABLE I.--GOVERNORS' VETO AUTHORITY                  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          State              Item veto        No Veto      No item veto 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama.................               X                                
Alaska..................               X                                
Arizona.................               X                                
Arkansas................               X                                
California..............               X                                
Colorado................               X                                
Connecticut.............               X                                
Delaware................               X                                
Florida.................               X                                
Georgia.................               X                                
Hawaii..................               X                                
Idaho...................               X                                
Illinois................               X                                
Indiana.................  ..............  ..............               X
Iowa....................               X                                
Kansas..................               X                                
Kentucky................               X                                
Louisiana...............  ..............  ..............               X
Maine...................  ..............  ..............               X
Maryland................               X                                
Massachusetts...........               X                                
Michigan................               X                                
Minnesota...............               X                                
Mississippi.............               X                                
Missouri................               X                                
Montana.................               X                                
Nebraska................               X                                
Nevada..................  ..............  ..............               X
New Hampshire...........  ..............  ..............               X
New Jersey..............               X                                
New Mexico..............               X                                
New York................               X                                
North Carolina..........  ..............               X                
North Dakota............               X                                
Ohio....................               X                                
Oklahoma................               X                                
Oregon..................               X                                
Pennsylvania............               X                                
Rhode Island............  ..............  ..............               X
South Carolina..........               X                                
South Dakota............               X                                
Tennessee...............               X                                
Texas...................               X                                
Utah....................               X                                
Vermont.................  ..............  ..............               X
Virginia................               X                                
Washington..............               X                                
West Virginia...........               X                                
Wisconsin...............               X                                
Wyoming.................               X                                
      Total.............              43               1               6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Senate Budget Committee. Compiled from information in House     
  Committee on Rules, 99th Cong., 2d Session, Item Veto: State          
  Experience and Its Application to the Federal Situation, Appendix C-1 
  (Comm. Print 1986), and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental      
  Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, Vol. 1, p. 12,  
  June 1994.                                                            


  TABLE II.--SELECTED SENATE FLOOR VOTES ON OR RELATING TO MEASURES TO PROVIDE EXPANDED RESCISSION AUTHORITY OR 
                       SEPARATE ENROLLMENT SINCE ENACTMENT OF THE IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT                       
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Congress                Measure                  Sponsor      Date/Chamber        Vote        Type of proposal
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
103rd.......  Amendment 542 to S. 1134......  Bradley.........  6/24/93.....  53-45...........  Separate        
                                                                Senate.       (Budget Act       enrollment.     
                                                                               waiver).                         
103rd.......  Amendment 264 to S. Con. Res.   Bradley.........  3/25/93.....  73-24...........  Separate        
               18.                                              Senate.                         enrollment.     
103rd.......  Amendment 200 to S. Con. Res.   Cohen...........  3/25/93.....  Voice Vote......  Expedited       
               18.                                              Senate.                         rescission.     
103rd.......  Amendment 200 to S. Con. Res.   Cohen...........  3/25/93.....  34-65...........  Expedited       
               18.                                              Senate.       (to table)        rescission.     
103rd.......  Amendment 73 to S. 460........  McCain..........  3/10/93.....  45-52...........  Enhanced        
                                                                Senate.       (Budget Act       rescission.     
                                                                               waiver)                          
102nd.......  Amendment 3013 to H.R. 5677...  McCain/Coats....  9/17/92.....  40-56...........  Enhanced        
                                                                Senate        (Budget Act       rescission.     
                                                                               waiver).                         
102nd.......  Amendment 1698 to S. 479......  McCain..........  2/27/92.....  44-54...........  Enhanced        
                                                                Senate.       (Budget Act       rescission.     
                                                                               waiver).                         
101st.......  Amendment 1955 to S. 341......  McCain..........  6/6/90......  43-50...........  Enhanced        
                                                                Senate.       (Budget Act       rescission.     
                                                                               waiver).                         
101st.......  Amendment 1092 to H.R. 3015...  Coats et al.....  11/9/89.....  40-51...........  Enhanced        
                                                                Senate.       (Budget Act       rescission.     
                                                                               waiver).                         
100th.......  Amendment 650 to H.J. Res. 324  Evans...........  7/31/87.....  41-48...........  Separate        
                                                                Senate.                         enrollment.     
100th.......  Amendment 1294 to H.J. Res.     Evans...........  12/11/87....  44-51...........  Separate        
               395.                                             Senate.                         enrollment.     
99th........  S. 43.........................  Mattingly et al.  7/18/85.....  57-42...........  Separate        
                                                                Senate.       (cloture)         enrollment.     
99th........  S. 43.........................  Mattingly et al.  7/24/85.....  58-40...........  Separate        
                                                                Senate.       (cloture).        enrollment.     
99th........  Amendment 2853 to S. 2706.....  Quayle/Exon.....  9/19/86.....  34-62...........  Expedited       
                                                                Senate.       (Budget Act       rescission.     
                                                                               waiver).                         
98th........  Amendment 2625 to H.J. Res.     Armstrong.......  11/16/83....  49-46...........  Enhanced        
               308.                                             Senate.       (to table)        rescission.     
98th........  Amendment 3045 to H.R. 2163...  Mattingly.......  5/3/84......  56-34...........  Separate        
                                                                Senate.       (out of order)    enrollment.     
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Memorandum to the Senate Budget Committee on the Line Item Veto, Virginia McMurtry, Specialist in       
  American National Government, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, February 14, 1995.         

                        III. Legislative History

    Senator Dole introduced S. 4, the Legislative Line Item 
Veto Act of 1995, on January 4, 1995. S. 4 is similar to 
legislation introduced by Senator McCain for the past four 
Congresses. The bill has 28 cosponsors.
    The Senate Budget Committee first took action on line item 
veto legislation in 1990. During the markup of budget process 
reform legislation, the Committee defeated two proposals 
proposed by Senator Armstrong to grant the President enhanced 
rescission authority. The Committee did approve legislation put 
forward by the Senator Hollings and reported S. 3181, the 
Legislative Line Item Veto Separate Enrollment Authority Act, 
on October 10, 1990 (Report No. 101-518).
    During the 103d Congress, the House passed two bills that 
provided expedited procedures for the consideration of the 
President's proposed rescissions. On April 29, 1993, the House 
passed H.R. 1578, the Expedited Rescissions Act of 1993. A 
little over a year later the House passed a stronger expedited 
rescission bill, H.R. 4600, on July 14, 1994.
    Although both House-passed bills were referred to the 
Senate Budget Committee, the committee did not take action on 
the legislation. The Committee did hold a hearing on line item 
veto legislation on October 5, 1994, 3 days prior to the date 
the Senate adjourned, essentially, to end the 103d Congress. 
(The Senate did return on November 30 and December 1, but only 
for the purposes of consideration of legislation on the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
    The 104th Congress saw immediate action on line item veto 
legislation. On January 18, 1995, the Senate Budget Committee 
held hearings on line item veto legislation. The House passed 
H.R. 2, legislation that is similar to S. 4, on February 6, 
1995.
    The Senate Budget Committee marked up S. 4 and ordered it 
reported without recommendation on February 14. The Committee 
adopted two amendments: an amendment by Senator Domenici to 
sunset the provisions of the bill on September 30, 2002 and an 
amendment by Senators Conrad and Snowe establishing a ``lock 
box'' to assure any savings from Presidential rescissions are 
devoted to deficit reduction.

                    IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

                         section 1. short title

    This Act may be cited as the ``Legislative Line Item Veto 
Act of 1995''.

         section 2. enhanced spending control by the president

    Adds a new title, Title XI--to the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974. This new title sets forth new 
procedures under which the President rescinds budget authority 
and Congress may consider a bill disapproving such rescission.

       TITLE XI--LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO RESCISSION AUTHORITY

        Part A--Legislative Line Item Veto Rescission Authority

              section 1101 of title xi. grant of authority

Subsection (a) in general

    Authorizes the President to rescind all or part of any 
budget authority if he makes certain determinations concerning 
the effect of the rescission on the budget or deficit and if he 
determines that the rescission will not impair an essential 
government function or harm the national interest.
    The President may rescind budget authority if he notifies 
Congress of such rescission by special message not later than 
20 days after enactment of a regular or supplemental 
appropriations Act or a joint resolution making continuing 
appropriations that provides such budget authority. Or the 
President may notify Congress of such rescission by special 
message accompanying the submission of his budget if the 
rescission had not been proposed for rescission previously for 
that fiscal year.
    The President is required to submit a separate rescission 
message for each appropriations act when he notifies Congress 
within the 20-day limit.
    The 20 day limit is calendar days and does not include 
Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays. The President's 
authority to rescind budget authority under this subsection is 
not limited to discretionary budget authority, and would seem 
to permit the President to rescind mandatory appropriations. 
Also, the bill appears to provide the President with authority 
to rescind budget authority in other than appropriations Acts 
if these rescissions are submitted with the budget request.

Subsection (b) Rescission Effective Unless Disapproved

    Provides that any amount rescinded under this title is 
deemed canceled unless a rescission disapproval bill is enacted 
into law within the following time limits:
          (1) A congressional review period of 20 calendar days 
        of session during which Congress must pass and present 
        a disapproval bill to the President;
          (2) An additional 10 days during which the President 
        may exercise his authority to veto the disapproval 
        bill. The 10 days here do not include Sundays and are, 
        presumably, calendar days;
          (3) If the President vetoes the bill, Congress has an 
        additional 5 calendar days of session after the date of 
        the veto to override.
    A rescission in a special message transmitted by the 
President shall not take effect if Congress adjourns sine die 
to end a Congress before the expiration of the time periods 
noted above. The message is deemed to be retransmitted on the 
first day of the next Congress and the time periods begin to 
run anew beginning after such first day.

                       section 1102. definitions

    Defines the term ``rescission disapproval bill'' to be a 
bill or joint resolution which only disapproves the full 
rescission of budget authority in a special message transmitted 
by the President under this title.

                    section 1103. deficit reduction

    One of the committee amendments establishes a ``lockbox''. 
On the day following Congressional failure to disapprove a 
rescission within the period of review, the President is 
required to reduce the discretionary spending limits under 
section 601 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 or to 
adjust the balances of the pay-go scorecard under section 
252(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
to reflect the savings resulting from that rescission. The 
Chairmen of the Senate and House Budget Committees are also 
required to adjust appropriate allocations under sections 
311(a) and 602(a) to reflect that rescission.

   Part B--Congressional Consideration of Legislative Line Item Veto 
                              Rescissions

               section 1111. presidential special message

    When the President rescinds budget authority under this 
title, he must transmit a special message specifying 1) the 
amount proposed for rescission, 2) the account, department, 
project, or function for which the budget authority was 
available, 3) the reasons and justifications for the 
determinations required under section 1101, 4) the fiscal, 
economic, and budgetary effects of such rescission, and 5) all 
such other information relating to or bearing on the proposed 
rescission.

          section 1112. transmission of messages; publications

    Subsection (a) requires the special message to be 
transmitted to the House and Senate on the same day and 
provides that delivery shall be to the Clerk of the House and 
the Secretary of the Senate when either of those Houses is not 
in session. Each special message is to be referred to the 
appropriate committees of each House and shall be printed as a 
document of each House.
    Subsection (b) requires that the special message be printed 
in the Federal Register.

                 section 1113. procedure in the senate

    Subsection (a) provides that any disapproval bill 
introduced with respect to a special message shall be referred 
to the appropriation committees of the House or Senate. A 
rescission disapproval bill received in the Senate from the 
House is required to be considered in the Senate under the 
procedures set forth in this section.
    Subsection (b) limits debate in the Senate on any 
rescission disapproval bill, debatable motions or appeals, to 
not more than ten hours, with the time equally divided and 
controlled by the majority leader and the minority leader, or 
their designees. Debate on debatable motions or appeals is 
limited to one hour. A motion to further limit debate is in 
order and is not debatable, while a motion to recommit is not 
in order, unless to report back within not more than one day. 
For purposes of the motion to recommit, the one-day limit does 
not count days on which the Senate is not in session.
    Subsection (c) provides a point of order against a 
rescission disapproval bill that relates to any matter other 
than the rescission of budget authority transmitted by the 
President. A point of order is also provided against the 
consideration of any amendment to a rescission disapproval 
bill. Both of these prohibitions may be waived in the Senate on 
an affirmative vote of 60 Senators.

                          Section 1114. Sunset

    The other committee amendment sunsets the new Title XI on 
September 30, 2002.

                            V. Cost Estimate

    Paragraph 11 of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate require reports accompanying measures to include an 
estimate of the costs that would be incurred in carrying out 
that measure. In accordance with that rule, the Congressional 
Budget Office has submitted the following cost estimate to the 
committee:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                 Washington, DC, February 22, 1995.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on the Budget,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
reviewed S. 4, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 1995, as 
ordered reported without recommendation by the Senate Committee 
on the Budget on February 14, 1996.
    S. 4 would grant the President the authority to rescind all 
or part of any budget authority. To exercise this authority, 
the President must transmit a special message to both houses of 
Congress specifying each amount rescinded from appropriations 
within a particular bill that has just been enacted. 
Furthermore, the message must include the governmental 
functions involved, the reasons for the veto, and--to the 
extent practicable--the estimated fiscal, economic, and 
budgetary effect of the action. This message must be 
transmitted within 20 calendar days (excluding Saturdays, 
Sundays, and holidays) of enactment of the legislation 
containing the rescinded appropriations. All budget authority 
rescinded would be cancelled unless Congress, within 20 working 
days, passes a rescission disapproval bill to restore the 
appropriations. Those disapproval bills would themselves be 
subject to veto, with the usual two-thirds vote in each house 
required to override. In addition, if Congress does not 
disapprove the President's message, the President shall reduce 
the discretionary spending caps for all affected years to 
reflect the rescissions. The provisions of this bill would be 
effective through September 30, 2002.
    The budgetary impact of this bill is uncertain, because it 
would depend on the manner in which the line item veto is used 
by the President and the success of the Congress in overriding 
vetoes; however, potential savings or costs are likely to be 
relatively small. Discretionary spending currently accounts for 
only one-third of total outlays and is already tightly 
controlled. While the bill, as reported, also allows the 
President to rescind an appropriation for a mandatory program, 
such a rescission would have no effect on the underlying laws 
that govern the operations and determine the costs of the 
program.
    By itself, this bill would not affect direct spending or 
receipts, so there would be no pay-as-you-go scoring under 
section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985.
    Enactment of this legislation would not directly affect the 
budgets of state and local governments. However, the exercise 
of line item veto authority could affect federal grants to 
states, federal contributions towards shared programs or 
projects, and the demand for state and local programs for 
increases or reductions in federal programs.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact on this issue is 
Jeffrey Holland.
            Sincerely,
                                              James L. Blum
                              (For Robert D. Reischauer, Director.)

                    VI. Regulatory Impact Statement

    Paragraph 11(b) of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate requires the committee report accompanying each reported 
bill to include an evaluation of the regulatory impact of the 
legislation. That evaluation is to include an estimate of the 
economic, paperwork, and privacy impact on individuals, 
businesses, and consumers.
    S. 4 provides for the direct rescission of budget authority 
by the President and possible consideration by Congress of a 
bill disapproving such rescission. The legislation addresses 
Federal legislative process and will affect only that process.
    The legislation has no direct economic, paperwork, or 
privacy impact on individuals, businesses, or consumers. These 
groups are not involved in the processes covered by the 
legislation's requirements.
    S. 4 could have a regulatory or paperwork impact only to 
the extent that its process authorizes the President to rescind 
budget authority that resulted in such a regulatory or 
paperwork impact.

                          VII. Committee Votes

    Paragraph 7(b) of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate requires the committee report accompanying a measure 
reported from the committee to include the results of each roll 
call vote taken on the measure and any amendments thereto. In 
addition, paragraph 7(c) requires the report to include a 
tabulation of the vote cast by each member of the committee on 
the question of reporting the measure.
    In accordance with the Standing Rules of the Senate, the 
following are roll call votes taken during the Senate Budget 
Committee mark-up of S. 4, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act 
of 1995, held on Tuesday, February 14, 1995.
    (1) Motion to report S. 4, as amended, without 
recommendation.
    Motion adopted by: Yeas 12 Nays 10.
        Yeas                          Nays
Domenici                            Exon
Grassley \1\                        Hollings \1\
Nickles                             Johnston \1\
Gramm \1\                           Lautenberg \1\
Bond \1\                            Simon \1\
Lott                                Conrad
Brown                               Dodd
Gorton                              Sarbanes
Gregg                               Boxer
Snowe \1\                           Murray
Abraham
Frist

    \1\ Indicates vote by proxy.

                  VIII. ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

                              ----------                              


              ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI

    I have serious reservations about S. 4, Senator McCain's 
enhanced rescission authority bill, and will not support the 
bill absent major modifications. I voted in favor of a motion 
to report S. 4, without recommendation, in order to get line 
item veto legislation before the Senate.
    If the Senate Budget Committee did not report line item 
veto legislation, under section 306 of the Budget Act it would 
be out of order to consider such legislation in the Senate. I 
support strengthening procedures to give the President a vote 
on his proposed rescissions and in this spirit I voted in favor 
of motions to report S. 4, Senator McCain's bill, and S. 14, my 
legislative line item veto legislation.
    I do not support S. 4 because I believe it will delegate 
too much authority to the President over the control of the 
budget. The issue is as old as the republic and indeed goes to 
one of the fundamental precepts of our constitutional form of 
government--the power of the purse. As James Madison wrote in 
Federalist Paper No. 58:

          This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded 
        as the most complete and effectual weapon with which 
        any constitution can arm the immediate representatives 
        of the people, for obtaining a redress of every 
        grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and 
        salutary measure.

    I strongly believe that once we, the Congress, concede this 
power to the executive branch, it will never be restored. 
Senator McCain's bill, S. 4, would grant the President 
unilateral authority to rescind monies appropriated by 
Congress. S. 4 presumes the executive is omniscient on matters 
of spending priorities.
    In order to overturn a Presidential rescission under the 
McCain bill, the Congress would have to overcome two hurdles. 
First, each House of Congress would have to pass a bill of 
disapproval limited to the entire rescission package. Congress 
could not eliminate individual items in the President's 
proposed rescission package. Moreover, Congress may never get 
to vote on an override under the McCain bill. There is no 
requirement for the Committee to report the disapproval bill 
and the motion to proceed in the Senate to the disapproval bill 
is fully debateable.
    Even if the Congress managed to pass the disapproval bill 
within the narrow time frame established by the bill, the 
President would veto this disapproval resolution and Congress 
would have to overcome the second hurdle. Each House of 
Congress would have to override his veto with a two-thirds 
vote.
    A true line item veto only would allow a President to 
delete funding for broad programs and activities as provided in 
Appropriation Acts. The McCain bill is much more than a line 
item veto because it would allow the President to reach well 
beyond the amounts appropriated in law. Under current law, the 
President can propose rescinding funding for individual 
programs, projects, and activities, from aircraft carriers down 
to paper clips, but Congress can, and usually does, ignore the 
President's proposals and they never take effect. The McCain 
bill would make the President's rescissions effective with no 
action required by Congress.
    I am particularly concerned about what the McCain bill 
means for defense funding and foreign policy. As Commander in 
Chief, the President already has a great deal of discretion 
over defense and foreign policy, as we saw in Haiti last year 
and more recently with the Mexican financial crisis. Congress' 
ability to influence foreign and national security policy is 
largely limited to our control over the budget, which we will 
lose with the McCain bill.
    For example, if the President included the termination of 
the National Missile Defense program, M-1 Tank, funding for 
weapons testing, or the B-2 bomber as part of a large 
rescission package for the entire defense appropriations bill, 
Congress would have to pass a bill, disapproving of all the 
rescissions including these items. The President would veto 
this disapproval bill. Items first adopted by a majority vote 
could only be reinstated by 67 votes in the Senate.
    I support an alternative legislative line-item veto, S. 14 
as reported by the Committee, that guarantees the President a 
vote on his rescission proposals while maintaining the delicate 
balance of power between the two branches on spending 
authority. Under my bill, the President would propose spending 
reductions and Congress would have to vote within 10 days on 
them. The proposed rescission would only take effect if the 
Congress passed legislation under these expedited procedures 
and the President signed the legislation into law. A majority 
would continue to rule.
    I do not think it is necessary to give as much power to the 
President as the McCain bill provides. What infuriates the 
American people are those instances in which the Congress funds 
activities that they think are a ludicrous waste of the 
taxpayers' money. Since Congress can ignore the President's 
proposed rescissions under current law, there is no direct 
accountability on the part of the Congress for these individual 
projects. My bill would require Congress to go on record and 
vote on the repeal of these projects without ceding control 
over spending decisions to the President.
    Some have suggested the McCain bill simply returns Congress 
and the President to the relationship that existed before 
enactment of the 1974 Impoundment Control Act. This clearly is 
not the case. Prior to 1974, Presidents had asserted their 
authority to impound or delay spending, citing both statutory 
and Constitutional authority. According to the Congressional 
Research Service, Presidential impoundments have been vitiated 
in more than 50 cases by the courts and upheld in only 4. The 
McCain bill would delegate to the President broader authority 
than impoundment--the authority to permanently cancel any 
funding.
    Some characterize the McCain bill as the real ``line-item 
veto'' bill. It is impossible for Congress to give the 
President a true line item veto by statute, either under the 
McCain bill or my bill. Only a Constitutional amendment can 
give the President the authority to delete items in spending 
bills and the Judiciary Committee has jurisdiction over the 
line item veto constitutional amendment.
    This is much more than an issue about wasteful spending. it 
is an issue of the appropriate balance of powers between the 
Congress and the President. I hope we can agree on an approach 
that gets a bill on the President's desk and signed into law 
without unduly disrupting this delicate balance of powers.
                   MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR JIM EXON

    By any standard or measurement, S. 4 falls short of 
comprehensive and pragmatic line-item veto legislation. It is 
dogmatic, imprecise, and inadequate for the task at hand.
    First and foremost, is the question of S. 4's super-
majority to override a Presidential line-item veto. As I have 
stated on many occasions, I do not believe that a legislative 
line-item veto with a two-thirds super-majority has any chance 
to pass the Senate. We have gone down that road many times 
before and it invariably leads to a dead end. S. 4 is heading 
in the same destination: disillusionment, dismay, and utter 
failure.
    If we keep appealing to a narrow constituency, we will not 
get a line-item veto bill to the President's desk. S. 4 is the 
legislative equivalent of shooting oneself in the foot. I see 
no reason to inflict this type of ideological purity and 
correctness upon the Senate and the American people.
    Many of our colleagues also are concerned that the super-
majority rule is a boomerang that could come back and hit us 
when we least expect it. Under S. 4, the President needs a mere 
34 percent of one House of Congress to rescind an appropriation 
that the Majority of Congress voted to approve. Therefore, S. 4 
could unwittingly create a tyranny by the Minority. The Senate 
certainly does not need any further cause for gridlock.
    I had originally co-sponsored legislation, some of which is 
contained in the substitute S. 14, which forces Congress to 
vote on the cancellation of a budget item proposed by the 
President. However, it requires only the approval of a simple 
majority of both Houses of Congress to put the President's 
proposed cancellation into effect. That is the right course to 
take.
    Second, S. 4's sponsors claim that the bill deals only with 
appropriations. If so, then it does not deal with the real 
culprits that bust the budget, such as tax expenditures and 
direct entitlement spending.
    At the Budget Committee hearing of January 18, 1995, on the 
line-item veto, Senator Bradley pointed out the need to make 
tax expenditures subject to the line-item veto. Tax 
expenditures cost the Treasury billions of dollars every year. 
They are the ``stealth'' entitlements that slip under our radar 
screens.
    In his testimony, Senator Bradley correctly observed: ``Any 
line item veto bill that fails to give the President the 
ability to prevent additional loopholes from entering the tax 
code only does half the job.'' S. 4 is blind to the issue of 
tax expenditures. It shirks responsibility on this critical 
component of deficit reduction, as well as the yeast of rising 
deficits--entitlements.
    In spite of the pay-as-you-go provisions of the 1990 Budget 
Enforcement Act, entitlement spending is the largest and 
fastest growing part of the Federal budget. The terrible truth 
is that mandatory spending is projected to grow from about 55 
percent of Federal spending in the current fiscal year to 62 
percent in 2005.
    The real surge occurs in Federal health care programs. They 
are the only programs that will grow at a rate significantly 
faster than the economy, increasing from 3.8 percent of GDP in 
Fiscal Year 1995 to 6 percent of GDP in 2005.
    On the other hand, discretionary spending, which currently 
makes up only about one-third of all Federal spending, has been 
significantly curbed and is expected to decline as a percent of 
the economy over the same time period.
    However, we cannot take much comfort in this success story. 
As much as we strip and shave away the fat and waste in 
appropriated spending, we get to a point of diminishing 
returns. The numbers tell us that we can only harvest so much 
deficit reduction from this field. We will not be able to 
balance the budget if we rely strictly on appropriated 
spending, and I would vigorously oppose greater cuts in defense 
spending, which could jeopardize our readiness.
    We have to look to other pastures--greener pastures for 
deficit reduction--and direct spending is one of them. Facts 
are facts. Sooner or later, we will have to look the deficit 
squarely in the eye and make some tough and painful choices. 
Entitlement spending and tax expenditures are two we can no 
longer afford to avoid.
    Third, S. 4 is riddled with holes and loose ends. The 
following are just a few examples. There is no provision for 
floor consideration in the House. The bill is not limited to 
discretionary spending, so all current appropriated 
entitlements would be subject to rescission. S. 4 also allows 
non-appropriated entitlements to be rescinded, but there is no 
provision to take away the legal rights to these entitlements. 
So beneficiaries could still win their benefits in court. There 
is no definition of the term ``essential government 
functions.'' There is no provision for bills received in the 
House by the Senate. There is no provision for discharge from 
Committee. There is no provision for conference. The upshot is 
that the House and Senate could pass differing rescission 
disapproval bills, yet the Presidential rescission would still 
take effect because there was no framework for a House-Senate 
conference.
    The list of failings and deficiencies goes on and on. Yet, 
despite these flaws, the Republican majority voted on a party 
line to report out this terribly flawed, inexact, and 
ineffective measure. I had hoped for better.
    After all due consideration, S. 4 does not pass muster. It 
has a narrow vision that does not take into account many of the 
real problems that contribute to the deficit. It has a limited 
vision that will not bring together Republicans and Democrats 
to deal with wasteful spending. It is not the legislative line-
item veto vehicle that the Senate should approve. We can do 
better, and we will do better than S. 4.

                                                          Jim Exon.
                MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

    I believe that the ``enhanced rescissions'' and ``expedited 
rescissions'' proposals voted out of this Committee create a 
dangerous shift of power from the Legislative to the Executive 
branch. The Constitution provides that Congress has the ``power 
of the purse.'' Under Article I, Section 9, ``No Money shall be 
drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations 
made by Law.'' In Federalist No. 48, James Madison stated that 
``the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of 
the people.''
    The power of the purse, Madison said in Federalist No. 58, 
represents the ``most complete and effectual weapon with which 
any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the 
people for obtaining a redress of every grievance and for 
carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.'' Through 
this power, Congress--as the directly elected representatives 
of the people--can serve as a check on the Executive branch.
    These expedited and enhanced rescissions proposals would 
dilute this power. The President would have the power to pick 
and choose which programs he likes and which he does not. This 
power could be used for political retribution or for political 
reward. For instance, will a state that traditionally votes 
Democratic see more of its programs in a Republican President's 
rescissions request? Will a state that is traditionally 
Republican face an overwhelming number of cuts under a 
Democratic President?
    Under both of these proposals, Congress would have an 
opportunity to vote on the President's proposed rescissions, 
but neither the enhanced rescissions nor the expedited 
rescissions proposals would allow Congress to substitute its 
spending cuts for those proposed by the President. In effect, 
part of the power of the purse is being handed over to the 
President.
    The goal of these process changes is to bring us closer to 
a balanced budget. I support this goal. But, no ``expedited'' 
or ``enhanced'' process change will serve as a substitute for 
changing spending priorities and making the tough choices. No 
amount of process change will reduce the pain of tough budget 
cuts.
    The implication of these proposals is much broader than 
simply stemming the flow of federal red ink. They undermine our 
constitutional balance of powers. For this reason, I oppose 
these expedited and enhanced rescissions proposals.

                                                     Barbara Boxer.
                 MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

                   line-item veto legislation mark-up

    I oppose both S. 4 and S. 14, to bills that grant the 
President line-item veto authority. I have read these bills and 
am convinced that they will achieve little to put this 
country's fiscal house in order.
    I have experiences with line-item veto authority. I served 
in my State legislature and saw first-hand the kind of horse-
trading that can occur when the Executive has this power.
    I came to the United States Senate as a representative of 
the people of my home State of Washington. They elected me to 
be their voice on a wide array of issues--from funding the 
Hanford clean-up to providing economic relief to our hard-hit 
timber communities. Under no circumstances do I want to 
transfer my power to fight for the people of Washington State 
to any administration. That is precisely what these bills would 
do.
    Reducing our deficit takes courage. We must take tough 
votes. There is no assurance these bills will reduce the 
deficit. However, they definitely will just turn over more 
power to the White House. I say this at a time when the 
President is my friend and a member of my party.
    Line-item veto authority for the President is not what the 
framers of our Constitution envisaged. These bills go against 
the grain of our traditional balance of power.
    A number of amendments which would have gone a long way to 
improve these bills are voted down--largely on party lines--in 
this Committee. For that and all the abovementioned reasons, I 
voted against these bills in Committee.

                                                      Patty Murray.
                      IX. Changes to Existing Law

    Paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate requires the report to accompany a bill repealing or 
amending a statute to include a comparative print showing the 
proposed changes to existing law. Existing law proposed to be 
omitted is enclosed in black brackets while existing law to 
which no change is proposed is shown in roman. New matter is 
shown in italic.

      THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974

          * * * * * * *

                      TITLE X--IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL

                       Part A--General Provisions

          * * * * * * *

    Part B--Congressional Consideration of Proposed Rescis- sions, 
            Reservations, and Deferrals of Budget Authority

          * * * * * * *

       TITLE XI--LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO RESCISSION AUTHORITY

        Part A--Legislative Line Item Veto Rescission Authority


                   grant of authority and conditions


    Sec.  1101. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding the provisions 
of part B of title X and subject to the provisions of part B of 
this title, the president may rescind all or part of any budget 
authority, if the President--
          (1) determines that--
                  (A) such rescission would help balance the 
                Federal budget, reduce the Federal budget 
                deficit, or reduce the public debt;
                  (B) such rescission will not impair any 
                essential Government functions; and
                  (C) such rescission will not harm the 
                national interest; and
          (2)(A) notifies the Congress of such rescission by a 
        special message not later than twenty calendar days 
        (not including Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays) after 
        the date of enactment of a regular or supplemental 
        appropriations Act or a joint resolution making 
        continuing appropriations providing such budget 
        authority; or
          (B) notifies the Congress of such rescission by 
        special message accompanying the submission of the 
        President's budget to Congress and such rescissions 
        have not been proposed previously for that fiscal year.
    The President shall submit a separate rescission message 
for each appropriations bill under paragraph (2)(A).
    (b) Rescission Effective Unless Diapproved.--(1)(A) Any 
amount of budget authority rescinded under this title as set 
forth in a special message by the President shall be deemed 
canceled unless during the period described in subparagraph 
(B), a rescission disapproval bill making available all of the 
amount rescinded is enacted into law.
    (B) The period referred to in subparagraph (A) is--
          (i) a congressional review period of twenty calendar 
        days of session under part B, during which Congress 
        must complete action on the rescission disapproval bill 
        and present such bill to the President for approval or 
        disapproval;
          (ii) after the period provided in clause (i), an 
        additional ten days (not including Sundays) during 
        which the president may exercise his authority to sign 
        or veto the rescission disapproval bill; and
          (iii) if the President vetoes the rescission 
        disapproval bill during the period provided in clause 
        (ii), an additional five calendar days of session after 
        the date of the veto.
    (2) If a special message is transmitted by the President 
under this section during any Congress and the last session of 
such Congress adjourns sine die before the expiration of the 
period described in paragraph (1)(B), the rescission shall not 
take effect. The message shall be deemed to have been 
retransmitted on the first day of the succeeding Congress and 
the review period referred to in paragraph (1)(B) (with respect 
to such message) shall run beginning after such first day.


                              definitions


    Sec. 1102. For purposes of this title the term ``rescission 
disapproval bill'' means a bill or joint resolution which only 
disapproves a rescission of budget authority, in whole, 
rescinded in a special message transmitted by the President 
under section 1101.


                           deficit reduction


    Sec. 1103. (a) If Congress fails to disapprove a rescission 
of discretionary spending under this part within the period of 
review provided under this part, the President shall, on the 
day after the period has expired, reduce the discretionary 
spending limits under section 601 of the Congressional Budget 
Act of 1974 for the budget year and any outyear affected by the 
rescissions to reflect the amount of the rescission.
    (b) If Congress fails to disapprove a rescission of 
discretionary spending under this part within the period of 
review provided under this part, the chairs of the Committees 
on the Budget of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
shall, on the day after the period has expired, revise levels 
under section 311(a) and adjust the committee allocations under 
section 602(a) to reflect the amount of the rescission.
    (c) If Congress fails to disapprove a rescission of direct 
spending under this part within the period of review provided 
under this part, the President shall, on the day after the 
period has expired, adjust the balances for the budget year and 
each outyear under section 252(b) of the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 to reflect the amount of 
the rescission.

   Part B--Congressional Consideration of Legislative Line Item Veto 
                              Rescissions


                      presidential special message


    Sec. 1111. Whenever the President rescinds any budget 
authority as provided in section 1101, the President shall 
transmit to both Houses of Congress a special message 
specifying--
           (1) the amount of budget authority rescinded;
           (2) any account, department, or establishment of the 
        Government to which such budget authority is available 
        for obligation, and the specific project or 
        governmental functions involved;
           (3) the reasons and justifications for the 
        determination to rescind budget authority pursuant to 
        section 1101(a)(1);
           (4) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated 
        fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect of the 
        rescission; and
           (5) all facts, circumstances, and considerations 
        relating to or bearing upon the rescission and the 
        decision of effect the rescission, and to the maximum 
        extent practicable, the estimated effect of the 
        rescission upon the objects, purposes, and programs for 
        which the budget authority is provided.


                 transmission of messages; publication


    Sec. 1112. (a) Delivery to House and Senate.--Each special 
message transmitted under sections 1101 and 1111 shall be 
transmitted to the House of Representatives and the Senate on 
the same day, and shall be delivered to the Clerk of the House 
of Representatives if the House is not in sessions, and to the 
Secretary of the Senate if the Senate is not in session. Each 
special message so transmitted shall be referred to the 
appropriate committees of the House of Representative and the 
Senate. Each such message shall be printed as a document of 
each House.
    (b) Printing in Federal Register.--Any special message 
transmitted under sections 1101 and 1111 shall be printed in 
the first issue of the Federal Register published after such 
transmittal.


                          procedure in senate


    Sec. 1113. (a) Referral.--(1) Any rescission disapproval 
bill introduced with respect to a special message shall be 
referred to the appropriate committees of the House of 
Representatives or the Senate, as the case may be.
    (2) Any rescission disapproval bill received in the Senate 
from the House shall be considered in the Senate pursuant to 
the provisions of this section.
    (b) Floor consideration in the Senate.--
          (1) Debate in the Senate on any rescission 
        disapproval bill and debatable motions and appeals in 
        convention therewith, shall be limited to not more than 
        ten hours. the time shall be equally divided between, 
        and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority 
        leader or their designees.
          (2) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motion or 
        appeal in connection with such a bill shall be limited 
        to one hour, to be equally divided between, and 
        controlled by, the mover and the manager of the bill, 
        except that in the event the manager of the bills is in 
        favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in 
        opposition thereto shall be controlled by the minority 
        leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either of 
        them, may, from the time under their control on the 
        passage of the bill, allot additional time to any 
        Senator during the consideration of any debatable 
        motion or appeal.
          (3) A motion to further limit debate is not 
        debatable. A motion to recommit (except a motion to 
        recommit with instructions to report back within a 
        specified number of days, not to exceed one, not 
        counting any day on which the Senate is not in session) 
        is not in order.
    (c) Point of Order.--(1) It shall not be in order in the 
Senate of the House of Representatives to consider any 
rescission disapproval bill that relates to any matter other 
than the rescission of budget authority transmitted by the 
President under section 1101.
    (2) It shall not be in order in the Senate or the House of 
Representatives to consider any amendment to a rescission 
disapproval bill.
    (3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) may be waived or suspended in 
the Senate only by a vote of three-fifths of the members duly 
chosen and sworn.
    Sec. 1114. This title shall cease to be effective on 
September 30, 2002.