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                              CHAPTER VII




                               I. Budget

    The Committee on Government Reform and Oversight was 
allocated funds from the Reserve Fund established by the House 
of Representatives to carry out its additional responsibilities 
entailed in the campaign finance investigation. These funds 
were used to hire additional staff, purchase additional 
equipment, and pay for travel associated with the 
    In 1997, the first year of the investigation, the Committee 
was allocated $3.8 million from the House Reserve Fund. The 
Committee spent approximately $2.4 million on the 
investigation.\1\ In 1998, the Committee was allocated an 
additional $1.8 million from the Reserve Fund, and it expects 
to spend approximately two-thirds of that amount.\2\ The 
minority was allocated 25 percent of the Committee's 
investigative funds and permanent funds.
    \1\ See Letter from Chairman Dan Burton to Congressman Henry 
Waxman, May 11, 1998.
    \2\ See Letter from Chairman Bill Thomas to Chairman Dan Burton, 
Mar. 25, 1998.
    The Ranking Minority Member has made a number of public 
statements regarding the amount of money spent by the Committee 
on the investigation. Congressman Waxman stated on several 
occasions that the Committee spent $6 million on the campaign 
finance investigation. The Chairman has publicly corrected the 
Ranking Member, and pointed out that less than $4 million was 
spent on the investigation by the majority and minority staff 

                           II. Subpoena Power

    Throughout the 105th Congress, the Chairman has had the 
power to issue subpoenas pursuant to Committee Rule 18, which 
reads in relevant part as follows:

          The chairman of the full committee shall:

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (d) Authorize and issue subpoenas as provided in 
        House Rule XI, clause 2(m), in the conduct of any 
        investigation or activity or series of investigations 
        or activities within the jurisdiction of the committee. 
        . . .\3\
    \3\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Rule 18.

House Rules XI, clause 2(m), in turn, states:

          The power to authorize and issue subpoenas under 
        subparagraph (1)(B) may be delegated to the chairman of 
        the committee pursuant to such rules and under such 
        limitations as the committee may prescribe.\4\
    \4\ House Rule XI(2)(m)(2)(A).

    The Committee rule was adopted at the Committee's first 
organizational meeting of the 105th Congress, on February 12, 
1997. The rules, including the subpoena rule, were adopted by 
unanimous voice vote.\5\ No Democrat objected to the Committee 
rules, and only one amendment to the rules was offered by 
Congressman Waxman. His amendment was accepted by unanimous 
voice vote.\6\ Congressman Waxman took notice of the subpoena 
provision in the Committee rules, but did not object to it. 
Rather, he asked that the Chairman consult with the minority a 
sufficient period of time before the issuance of the subpoena, 
stating that ``I assume that in order for consultation with the 
minority to be a real opportunity, that you will try to contact 
us in sufficient time so we can have an opportunity to discuss 
it.'' \7\ The Chairman indicated that he intended to inform the 
minority in advance of his intent to issue a subpoena, and has 
done so throughout the course of the investigation.\8\
    \5\ Organizational Meeting, House Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight, Feb. 12, 1997, at 23.
    \6\ Id. at 22.
    \7\ Id. at 17.
    \8\ Id. at 16-17.
    The power delegated to the Chairman by the Committee is 
consistent with the past practices of the Government Reform and 
Oversight Committee, as well as a number of other House 
committees. For example, in the 105th Congress, the Committee 
on International Relations and the Committee on Small Business 
both had substantially similar rules.
    In April 1997, the Committee approved a Document Protocol. 
The Protocol established procedures for maintaining documents 
as well as rules for the issuance of subpoenas, and created a 
working group to review the release of documents. The Document 
Protocol made clear that the Committee minority would be 
consulted prior to the issuance of all subpoenas, unless they 
were issued on an emergency basis.\9\ Although the Document 
Protocol merely codified the practices that had been agreed to 
at the February business meeting, Congressman Waxman changed 
his position and at that time objected to the Chairman's power 
to issue subpoenas. During the April 10, 1997, business 
meeting, Congressman Waxman claimed that if the protocol were 
adopted, it would:
    \9\ Protocol for Documents, Apr. 10, 1997, at (A)(2) (Exhibit 1).

        Give Chairman Burton unprecedented power that no Member 
        of Congress has ever had; and, in fact, nobody in the 
        country has had the power that he would have invested 
        in him. . . . I want to emphasize that no other 
        investigation by a committee of the Congress has ever 
        had such powers in its chairman.\10\
    \10\ Business Meeting, House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, Apr. 10, 1997, at 10-11.

Congressman Waxman then offered an amendment to the Document 
Protocol that would require a Committee vote on any disputed 
    Congressman Waxman's arguments regarding the nature of the 
Chairman's power to issue subpoenas were false. Not only did a 
number of other Committees in the 105th congress have the same 
power, but past congressional committees conducting 
investigation had the same power. The committees conducting the 
Iran-Contra, October Surprise, Filegate, and Travelgate 
investigations all had this same subpoena power.
    Under the procedures established by the April 10, 1997, 
Document Protocol, the Chairman provided notice to the minority 
when he intended to issue a subpoena.\11\ Within a 24-hour 
period, the minority was to provide the Chairman with any 
suggestions regarding how it sought to improve or modify the 
subpoena.\12\ After that 24-hour period, the Chairman could 
issue the subpoena.\13\ The Protocol also allowed the Chairman 
to issue subpoenas without prior notice if delay would hinder 
the Committee's ability to obtain certain documents or 
testimony.\14\ This authority was rarely used by the Chairman.
    \11\ Protocol for Documents, Apr. 10, 1997, at (A)(2)(a) Exhibit A.
    \12\ Id.
    \13\ Id.
    \14\ Id. at (A)(2)(b).
    The Committee operated under this procedure until June 
1998. At that time, the minority insisted upon a change in 
Committee rules as a condition for voting in support of 
granting immunity to four witnesses. The Chairman, after 
consultation with several members, offered a compromise package 
of rules changes, and on June 23, 1998, the Committee adopted 
them. With regard to subpoenas, these provisions similarly 
required the Chairman to provide subpoenas to the minority for 
a 24-hour period during which the minority could suggest 
modifications or object to the subpoenas.\15\ If the minority 
objected to a subpoena, the Chairman was required either to 
convene a meeting of the Subpoena Working Group, or bring the 
subpoena to a vote of the Committee.\16\ The Subpoena Working 
Group was a group composed of the Chairman, the Ranking 
Minority Member, the Vice Chairman, a member selected by the 
Chairman, and a member selected by the Ranking Minority 
Member.\17\ The Working Group was to discuss subpoenas before 
it, and, if it was unable to reach consensus, hold a vote on 
whether the Chairman should issue the subpoena.\18\ The 
Chairman agreed to be bound by the decision of the Working 
Group.\19\ This procedure has been used by the Committee since 
June 23, 1998.
    \15\ Protocol for Documents, June 23, 1998, at (A)(2)(a) (Exhibit 
    \16\ Id.
    \17\ Id.
    \18\ Id.
    \19\ Id.

                         III. Document Protocol

    The April 10, 1997, Document Protocol also addressed the 
procedures used by the Committee to store and release documents 
obtained by the Committee in the course of the campaign finance 
investigation. The Protocol was later changed in June 1998 in 
such a way as to modify the document release provisions.
    As initially adopted, the Protocol allowed the release of 
nonpublic documents through one of three means: (1) agreement 
between the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member; (2) agreement 
or vote of the Document Working Group; or (3) vote of the full 
Committee.\20\ Under the first provision, the Chairman could 
notify the Ranking Minority Member of his intent to release 
documents, and if the Chairman and Ranking Member agreed, the 
documents could be released.\21\ If the Chairman and Ranking 
Minority Member could not agree on the release of documents, 
the Chairman could convene a meeting of the Document Working 
Group to consider the release.\22\ The Working Group was 
composed of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the Ranking 
Minority Member, and two members selected by the Chairman and 
Ranking Minority Member, respectively.\23\ The Working Group 
was to consider the release of documents, and attempt to reach 
consensus about the release of documents.\24\ If it was unable 
to reach consensus, the Chairman could request the Working 
Group to render a vote regarding the release of documents.\25\ 
This vote was to be binding upon the Chairman.\26\
    \20\ Protocol for Documents, Apr. 10, 1997, at (C)(3).
    \21\ Id. at (C)(3)(a).
    \22\ Id. at (C)(3)(b).
    \23\ Id.
    \24\ Id.
    \25\ Id.
    \26\ Id.
    The procedure outlined in the April 10, 1997, Document 
Protocol was used successfully by the Committee for over 1 
year, until it was modified by the Committee on June 23, 
1998.\27\ The vote of the Committee on June 23, 1998, modified 
the Protocol to eliminate the Document Working Group, and to 
allow only two means of document release: (1) agreement between 
the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member; or (2) vote by the 
full Committee.\28\
    \27\ See Business Meeting, House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, June 23, 1998.
    \28\ See Protocol for Documents, June 23, 1998, at (C).

                        IV. Deposition Authority

    On June 20, 1997, the House of Representatives passed H. 
Res. 167 to provide special investigative authorities for the 
Committee's campaign finance investigation. This resolution 
provided the Committee with the power to take depositions and 
interrogatories from witnesses in the investigation. Chairman 
Burton requested this authority to assist the Committee in its 
work of gathering information relevant to the campaign finance 
inquiry. The powers granted to the Committee by the House of 
Representatives were consistent with investigative authorities 
granted to investigative committees in the past.
    The Committee met on June 18, 1997, to adopt Committee 
rules 20 and 21, which governed the taking of depositions, 
interrogatories and letters rogatory.\29\ The Committee passed 
the new rules by a vote of 22 to 17.\30\ Later on June 18, 
Chairman Burton and Congressman Waxman testified before the 
Rules Committee on H. Res. 167. The Rules Committee then passed 
H. Res. 167, which was considered on the House floor on June 
20, 1997. H. Res. 167 passed the House by a vote of 216 to 
    \29\ See Business Meeting, House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, June 18, 1997.
    \30\ Id. at 234.
    \31\ Congressional Record, June 20, 1997, at H4091.
    The major power granted to the Committee by H. Res. 167 was 
to conduct staff depositions. Under the procedures established 
by H. Res. 167 and Committee Rule 20, the Chairman had the 
authority to order the taking of depositions of witnesses after 
consulting with the Ranking Minority Member.\32\ This power was 
consistent with the power granted to chairmen in the 
congressional investigations relating to the Assassinations 
Investigation, Iran-Contra, and October Surprise.\33\ The 
resolution also authorized the Chairman to issue 
interrogatories to witnesses, to be answered under oath.\34\ 
Finally, it authorized the Committee to apply for the issuance 
of letters rogatory and other forms of international 
    \32\ House Resolution 167 at 2; House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight Rule 20.
    \33\ See Hearing, House Committee on Rules, June 18, 1997, at 8-11 
(testimony of Chairman Dan Burton).
    \34\ House Resolution 167 at 2.
    \35\ Id.

                         V. Rules Requirements

                      A. Committee Action and Vote

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(2) (A) and (B) of House Rule XI, a 
majority of the Committee having been present, the resolution 
recommended in this report was approved by voice vote.

    B. Statement of Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of House Rule XI and clause 
2(b)(1) of House Rule X, the findings and recommendations of 
the Committee are contained in the foregoing chapters of this 

         C. Statement on New Budget Authority and Related Items

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(B) of House Rule XI and Section 
308(a)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the 
Committee finds that no new budget authority, new spending 
authority, new credit authority, or an increase or decrease in 
revenues or tax expenditures result from an enactment of this 

            D. Statement of CBO Cost Estimate and Comparison

    Pursuant to House Rule XI(2)(l)(3)(C) and Section 403(a) of 
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee finds that 
a statement of Congressional Budget Office cost estimate is not 
required as this resolution is not of a public character.

                E. Statement of Constitutional Authority

    Pursuant to House Rule XI(2)(l)(4), the Committee finds 
that a statement of Constitutional authority to enact is not 
required as this resolution is not of a public character.

                       F. Changes in Existing Law

    Pursuant to House Rule XIII(3), the Committee finds that a 
statement of changes in existing law is not necessary, as the 
resolution does not alter existing law.

                G. Statement of Committee Cost Estimate

    Pursuant to House Rule XIII(7)(a), the Committee finds that 
a statement of Committee cost estimate is not necessary as this 
resolution is not of a public character.

                    H. Statement of Federal Mandates

    Pursuant to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and Section 
423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee 
finds that a statement of Federal mandates is not necessary as 
this resolution is not of a public character.
    [Supporting documentation follows:]



    Throughout the Committee's investigation into illegal 
campaign fundraising, the Committee's Democratic minority has 
engaged in a pattern of making public statements that are 
purposefully misleading. The ``Preliminary Minority Views on 
the Campaign Finance Investigation,'' handed out to reporters 
at the Committee's business meeting on Thursday, October 8, are 
rife with assertions that are misleading at best and 
deliberately false at worst.
    As Chairman of a committee conducting an investigation of 
the Clinton Administration, I expected that the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight--and myself personally--would 
be subjected to unfair and partisan attacks. Many chairmen of 
prior committee investigations have learned that it comes with 
the territory. This is, after all, the same Administration 
which attacked its own FBI Director when it became known that 
he endorsed an independent counsel for the campaign finance 
investigation. And a member of the minority, Mr. Lantos, even 
resorted to attacking a Committee witness, Independent Counsel 
Donald Smaltz, by comparing him to a Nazi.\1\
    \1\ Representative Lantos was roundly criticized for his highly 
inappropriate comments in numerous editorials including the Washington 
Post, ``. . . And the Assault on Mr. Smaltz,'' Dec. 14, 1997; and the 
Wall Street Journal, ``Ms. Reno's Carapace,'' Dec. 12, 1997.
    I cannot help but recall earlier broadsides leveled at my 
predecessor, Congressman Bill Clinger of Pennsylvania, as 
honorable and statesmanlike a figure as one could hope to find 
in the Congress. I remember the parting comments Mr. Waxman had 
for the gentlemanly Chairman Clinger 2 years ago: ``I leave 
this committee with absolute disgust for it and its Chairman.'' 
    \2\ Nancy E. Roman, ``GOP feels bite of `bulldog' Waxman,'' the 
Washington Times, May 6, 1998.
    One of the more disappointing legacies of this Committee's 
investigation has been the failure of even one member of the 
minority party to stand up and challenge the wrongdoing and 
excesses of its own party. Despite the fact that over 120 
people connected with fundraising for the President's campaign 
either took the Fifth or fled the country, and despite the 
Committee's receipt of volumes of evidence of illegal 
contributions and stunning access to the White House by people 
who went on to be indicted, not a single Member of President 
Clinton's party on the Committee rose to the occasion in the 
tradition of Howard Baker in the Watergate hearings or Warren 
Rudman during the Iran/Contra hearings. To the contrary, 
Members of the minority party in this investigation often acted 
more like defense attorneys rather than investigators on the 
chief oversight committee in the U.S. House of Representatives.
    A broad look at the minority's preliminary views 
distributed on October 8, 1998, makes an important statement 
about the priorities of the Democratic minority in this 
investigation. The minority devotes 80 pages and 366 footnotes 
to partisan attacks against the majority. In most cases, the 
criticisms are blatantly false, intentionally misleading, or 
petty in nature.
    As for charges of illegal campaign activities by the 
Clinton Administration, the Democratic National Committee, and 
high-level Democratic donors accused of funneling foreign money 
into Democratic campaigns--the substance of the investigation--
the Democrats devoted only 12 pages with a sparse 8 footnotes. 
The implications are clear: despite the mountains of 
documentary evidence, and the existence of a list of 120 people 
connected with fundraising for Democratic campaigns who either 
took the Fifth or left the country, the Democratic minority 
chose to devote the lion's share of its resources to political 
attacks against the Republican majority. This sets a poor 
precedent for the conduct of the minority party in future 
Congressional investigations.
    The frequency with which the truth is stretched in the 
minority's preliminary views makes it nearly impossible to 
respond fully to all of the distortions. The Committee's 
majority report sets out in detail the fundraising 
improprieties by the key DNC fundraisers and is backed up by 
extensive documentation. Given the lack of seriousness with 
which the minority's criticisms seem likely to be treated, a 
point-by-point refutation seems unnecessary. In the interest of 
brevity, I will only respond here to some of the more egregious 
assaults on the truth.

 I. The Democrats Acted as Defense Counsel for the DNC and Key Foreign 
                             Money Figures

    In its initial response to the Committee report on campaign 
finance matters, the minority wrote extensively on the lack of 
bipartisanship on the part of the majority. Congressman Waxman 
cited the Watergate and Iran-Contra investigations as models of 
bipartisanship. Yet what Congressman Waxman failed to mention 
is that it was a cooperative Republican minority examining its 
own party which made the previous investigations bipartisan. 
Frequently minority members and staff during the campaign 
finance investigation have employed tactics more typical of an 
aggressive defense attorney rather than serious Congressional 
investigators with important Congressional oversight 
responsibilities. The following examples illustrate this point.

 a. the minority's preliminary response to chapter 3 of the committee 
  interim report defends democratic retention of illegal and suspect 
                  contributions and ignores the facts

    The minority's response to chapter 3 of the Committee's 
Interim Report can be summed up by the following statement (in 
their own words): ``The DNC has returned contributions when it 
has had a good faith basis to believe that the contributions 
are illegal or otherwise inappropriate.'' The facts tell a 
different story as the majority outlined in extensive detail in 
Chapter 3 of the Committee's Interim Report. The minority's 
preliminary views had no credible defense for the continued 
retention by the DNC and Democratic entities of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in illegal and/or suspect contributions.
    The minority states that ``perhaps around $100,000'' of the 
$1.8 million in suspect or illegal contributions appear to 
warrant further scrutiny by the DNC. While $100,000 is a start, 
the facts show the figure to be approximately 18 times that 
amount. In fact, K&L; International's$150,000 contribution to 
the DNC alone surpasses the minority's figure. The majority concluded 
that K&L;'s contribution was illegal after interviewing witnesses, 
reviewing checking account records, wire transfer information, 
cashier's check information, and publicly available corporate 
information. The minority simply ignores the evidence.
    Furthermore, on several occasions the majority 
characterized contributions as ``suspect'' instead of 
``illegal'' because the Committee lacked the information 
necessary to conclude without hestitation that the contribution 
was illegal. One such example was the three $15,000 
contributions made by Lippo subsidiaries Hip Hing Holdings, San 
Jose Holdings, and Toy Center Holdings. In the case of the 
subsidiaries' 1993 contributions totaling $45,000, the DNC has 
retained them based upon the fact that the subsidiaries were 
not reimbursed for the contributions by a foreign source, 
namely the Lippo Group. At the time the Committee's Interim 
Report was released, the minority report and the DNC position 
may have been tortured, but arguable.
    However, documents produced to the Committee the day after 
the Interim Report was released indicate that shortly after 
their contributions were made, all three subsidiaries were 
reimbursed $15,000 each--the full amount of their 
contributions--with funds originating from the Lippo Group of 
Jakarta, Indonesia. This evidence validates the work of the 
majority investigators and serves to confirm what the majority 
believed: the three $15,000 contributions were made illegally.
    Despite the fact that many of the contributors whose 
contributions have been questioned have either left the country 
or taken the Fifth Amendment, there should be little doubt that 
evidence will continue to emerge that will enable the Committee 
to shift contributions from the suspect category to the illegal 

 B. The Minority Repeatedly Defended Major DNC Fundraiser Charlie Trie

    The preliminary minority views released by the ranking 
minority member are consistent with the minority's position 
throughout this investigation. The minority has continually 
tried to minimize Trie's offenses. However, even the minority 
did not attempt to defend Trie against the conclusive evidence 
offered in the Committee's report detailing Trie's central role 
in making and orchestrating conduit contributions to the DNC.
    Oddly, the minority faults the Committee's report for 
failing to prove that Trie was a Chinese spy.\3\ However, few 
have ever alleged that Trie was a spy. Rather, allegations have 
been made, and substantial evidence has been uncovered, showing 
that Trie received large amounts of money from sources 
connected to communist China. Trie then used this money to 
funnel political contributions to the DNC. There is also strong 
evidence indicating that Trie and his associate Antonio Pan may 
have received funds from the Lippo Group to funnel political 
contributions to the DNC. These are the allegations that have 
been made against Trie, and they have been corroborated by the 
Committee's investigation.
    \3\ Preliminary Minority Views on the Campaign Finance 
Investigation, Oct. 8, 1998, (``Preliminary Minority Views'') at 86.
    The Committee has also uncovered substantial evidence 
indicating that Trie did attempt to influence United States 
foreign policy to benefit the PRC. This evidence was detailed 
in the Committee's report, and was conveniently ignored in the 
minority's preliminary views.\4\ While it is unknown if Trie 
was acting as an agent for the Chinese government, Trie's 
statements at meetings of the Bingaman Commission and written 
statements indicate that he was attempting to influence the 
United States to treat the PRC more favorably.
    \4\ See Preliminary Minority Views at 86-87.

       C. The Minority Defended Major DNC Fundraiser Ernie Green

    The minority's preliminary report again came to the defense 
of another figure in the campaign finance scandal, Ernie Green. 
The minority claimed that ``speculation'' was the sole basis 
for the allegations against Green, and that the report 
presented ``no evidence'' to rebut Green's denials of 
wrongdoing.\5\ Again, the minority has ignored the substantial 
evidence of wrongdoing detailed in the Committee's report. The 
report contains extensive evidence relating to Mr. Green's 
highly unusual financial transactions that coincided with his 
efforts, and those of Charlie Trie, to have the Chairman of 
CITIC, Wang Jun, invited to a White House coffee. Green 
deposited over $38,000 in cash into his bank in a number of 
small deposits, and has not offered any definitive explanation 
for the source of these deposits, despite repeated invitations 
to do so by the Committee.
    \5\ Preliminary Minority Views at 87.
    The minority also ignored the fact that Green likely 
offered false testimony before the Committee. Green recieved 
$11,500 from Charles Trie, despite his sworn statements that he 
never recieved money from Charlie Trie. Evidence received since 
the Committee approved its report proves that at least $9,500 
of the money that Trie gave to Green originated with Chun Hua 
Yeh, a Chinese businessman with extensive ties to the Chinese 
    \6\ See NationsBank wire transfer report (Exhibit 1) (showing 
transfer of $9,500 from Manlin Foung to the Green/McKenzie Group); 
Account Statement of Manlin Foung, January 1996 (Exhibit 2) (showing 
deposit of $30,000 before wire transfer to Green/McKenzie); Cashier's 
Check for $30,000 to Yah Lin Trie (Exhibit 3) (showing that the $30,000 
cashier's check came from Trie); Cashier's Check for $30,000 (Exhibit 
4) (showing that the cashier's check was drawn on American 
International Bank account 008453489); signature card for American 
International Bank account of Chun Hua Yeh (Exhibit 5).
    The minority report makes it clear that they accept Green's 
denials at face value, despite the fact that Green has 
repeatedly misled the Committee. They also ignore the facts 
regarding Green's unusual financial transactions and summarily 
dismiss questions about whether these transactions may have 
been connected in any way with his political contributions. The 
minority relies primarily on two facts to support this 
conclusion: first, that Green could afford to make sizable 
political contributions; and second, that Green has ``a history 
of making political contributions.'' \7\ Both of these claims 
are misleading. First, it is true that Green does have 
substantial assets. However, many individuals proven to be 
conduit contributors in this investigation have had adequate 
assets to cover their contribution--they have simply opted not 
to use those resources to make their contribution. The 
minority's reliance on Green's ``history of contributions'' is 
also misleading. While Green had raised hundreds of thousands 
of dollars for the DNC from other donors, he had never made a 
contribution greater than $3,700 before he met Charlie Trie.\8\ 
Then, after he met Trie, he gave two contributions totaling 
$56,000. There are a number of disturbing inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies in Green's testimony regarding these 
contributions that have not been explained. It is disappointing 
that the minority has shown no desire to ask the serious 
questions that are raised by the activities of this long-time 
Democratic party supporter.
    \7\ Preliminary Minority Views at 87.
    \8\ See FEC Records of Contributions of Ernest G. Green,

     D. The Minority Defended Major DNC Fundraiser Charles Intriago

    Ever since the Committee began investigating the illegal 
campaign contributions made by the Castro family of Venezuela 
in 1992, the Committee minority has attempted to defend the 
major Democratic figure implicated by the Castros, Charles 
Intriago. Intriago is a prominent Florida attorney, and a major 
supporter of the Democratic party. Despite the evidence against 
Mr. Intriago, who took the Fifth before the Committee, the 
Democrats defended him vigorously. In this case, the defense 
offered by Congressman Waxman and his staff has been valuable 
to Mr. Intriago, since he has taken the Fifth, and has remained 
silent since the Committee's investigation began.
    At the Committee's hearing on the Castro contributions on 
April 30, 1998, Congressman Waxman introduced into the record a 
statement by Robert Plotkin, counsel for Mr. Intriago.\9\ In 
this statement, Plotkin denied any wrongdoing by his client. 
Congressman Waxman also defended Intriago's decision to take 
the Fifth: ``Mr. Intriago didn't come here because he didn't 
think it would do him any good. Mr. Castro is here because he 
thinks this might do him a lot of good.'' \10\ Apparently, 
Congressman Waxman thinks that witnesses are justified in not 
cooperating with Congressional investigations if it doesn't 
``do them any good.''
    \9\ Venezuelan Money and the Presidential Election, Hearing, 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Apr. 30, 1998, (``Castro 
Hearing'') at 35.
    \10\ Castro Hearing at 44.
    In addition to its heavy reliance on the self-serving 
statements of Intriago's lawyer, the minority repeatedly 
attacked Jorge Castro, who offered substantial evidence 
implicating Intriago in illegal activity.\11\ At the hearing, 
and again in their preliminary views, the minority has attacked 
Castro's credibility, and clearly taken sides with Charles 
Intriago. In doing so, Congressman Waxman and many other 
Democrats have ignored substantial documentary evidence that 
confirms Jorge Castro's account. They have also ignored the 
sworn testimony of two career prosecutors from the New York 
District Attorney Robert Morgenthau's office, who testified 
that Castro's testimony was consistent with everything that 
Castro had always told them, and that Castro had never told 
them anything about his political contributions that later 
proved to be false.\12\
    \11\ Castro Hearing at 38-55.
    \12\ Castro Hearing at 82.
    The minority's preliminary views make the claim that the 
Castro family received no special treatment in return for their 
illegal contributions to the DNC.\13\ However, the record shows 
that Charles Intriago set up a meeting between the patriarch of 
the Castro family and two high-level State Department officials 
at the time that the Castros were under investigation for 
involvement in money laundering. The Castros took advantage of 
this meeting to promote themselves with the U.S. Government and 
discredit allegations of money laundering which were plaguing 
them at the time. The minority refers to this visit as a 
``courtesy meeting,'' vastly understating the importance of 
this meeting to the Castros.\14\
    \13\ Preliminary Minority Views at 90-91.
    \14\ Id. at 91.
    Finally, the minority's preliminary report claims that the 
Department of Justice is still investigating the allegations 
made by Castro against Intriago.\15\ While it may be true that 
the Justice Department is investigating Mr. Intriago for a 
number of potentially illegal acts, it is not clear that his 
role in arranging Jorge Castro's illegal political 
contributions is among them. The statute of limitations for 
such a prosecution has passed, and if the Justice Department is 
still investigating Castro's allegations against Intriago, it 
merely provides further evidence of the disorganized state of 
the Justice Department's campaign finance investigation.
    \15\ Id.

  e. the minority employed questionable tactics against a witness who 
          testified unfavorably about dnc official john huang

    During the campaign fundraising investigation the minority 
attacked a witness whose testimony was not favorable to the DNC 
or the White House. David Wang was a witness at the Committee's 
first hearing. Under a grant of immunity, Wang testified that 
he made two conduit contributions at the request of John 
Huang--one from his own bank account and one from the bank 
account of his friend, Daniel Wu, who lived in Taiwan.\16\
    \16\ David Wang testified that he was solicited by John Huang and 
Antonio Pan to make $10,000 in contributions to the DNC in his and his 
associate's name. Wang was then reimbursed by Pan with $10,000 cash, 
making the transaction a conduit contribution. ``Conduit Payments to 
the Democratic National Committee: Hearing Before the House Committee 
on Government Reform and Oversight,'' 105th Cong., 1st sess. (1997).
    In an attempt to discredit Mr. Wang, the minority placed in 
the Committee record what purported to be a summary of an 
interview with David Wang's father, James Wang, conducted by 
two minority counsel. David Wang had testified in his 
deposition that his father was with him when John Huang came to 
his house and asked for the contributions. As Mr. Wang's father 
did not speak English well, minority counsel attempted to 
communicate with him in broken Mandarin Chinese. The staff 
summary said in part, ``James Wang told us that he was neither 
present at any meetings nor aware of any conversations in which 
John Huang asked David Wang to make a campaign contribution.'' 
    \17\ Id., Exhibit 128, p. 354.
    What the minority did not inform the majority members of 
the Committee or the public was that they had faxed a similar 
statement to James Wang and asked him to sign it. David Wang's 
lawyer informed the Committee that James Wang refused to do so 
because it was not correct. Subsequently, David Wang's attorney 
submitted a handwritten statement from James Wang confirming 
that he was at the meeting with John Huang, and that John Huang 
did ask David Wang to make the contributions in question.\18\ 
It is disappointing that the minority would submit a statement 
for the record that they knew was disputed by the witness 
without informing the Committee of that fact. Furthermore, it 
is disturbing that minority counsel attempted to intimidate Mr. 
Wang to sign the minority affidavit even after he told the 
committee it was inaccurate.
    \18\ Id., Exhibit 127, p. 353.
    The minority insisted that it was impossible that John 
Huang met with and solicited David Wang in Los Angeles on the 
date about which Wang testified, August 16, 1996. The minority 
then distributed several statements and receipts allegedly 
indicating that John Huang was in New York between August 10-
19, 1996. These statements were not sworn testimony before the 
Committee. In fact, John Huang's attorney assisted the 
Democrats in gathering the statements. John Huang refused to 
personally refute Wang's testimony, as Huang had asserted his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
    Mr. Wang's attorney addressed the Committee regarding the 
minority's assertions:

        First, the notion that Mr. Wang would perjure himself 
        on this question seems to me so facially implausible as 
        not to be seriously entertained.

        To say that somebody would falsely say that he was a 
        conduit for John Huang is absurd. I can't think of any 
        person in the world that you would want to associate 
        yourself with less that John Huang.

        If Mr. Wang could have possibly said that he didn't 
        know Mr. Huang and had not engaged in illegal 
        transactions with him, I assure you, he would have done 
        so. He would not be here today. He would not be in 
        front of the grand jury, and he would not be in the 
        largest problem he has ever faced.\19\
    \19\ ``Conduit Payments to the Democratic National Committee: 
Hearing Before the House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight,'' 105th Cong., 1st sess. 276 (1997) (Statement of Michael 
Carvin, attorney for David Wang.)

Although the minority might have argued that Wang was mistaken 
about the dates, as Wang's attorney argued, it is beyond 
comprehension that Wang would lie when he was already admitting 
to illegal acts. In any event, all the records show that the 
money given to the DNC was illegal, a fact from which the 
minority sought to divert attention.

II. The Democrats Defended Sioeng Family Contributions to the DNC While 
 Engaging in a Blatantly Partisan Attack on Senate Candidate Matt Fong

    During the course of the Committee's investigation of Ted 
Sioeng, 28 people either asserted their Fifth Amendment rights, 
fled the country, or refused to testify. During that time the 
minority made little or no effort to participate in the 
investigation of Sioeng.
    The minority has alleged that ``. . . Chairman Burton 
ignored Republican abuses even while investigating parallel 
allegations against Democrats.'' \20\ This statement overlooks 
the fact that during the course of the majority's investigation 
of Ted Sioeng several Republican entities and candidates were 
either deposed, interviewed, or had their bank records 
subpoenaed. The majority staff deposed or interviewed, with the 
minority, several witnesses with connections to the Republican 
party. These included Matt Fong, the current Republican 
candidate for Senate in California, Steven Walker, Jr., former 
Comptroller of the National Policy Forum, Daniel Wong, former 
Republican mayor of Cerritos, California, and Julia Wu, a 
Republican from southern California with connections to Matt 
    \20\ Preliminary Minority Views on the Campaign Finance 
Investigation, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight at 5.
    The minority has continually attempted to minimize the 
efforts of the Committee in order to further its own political 
purposes. At times, the minority has contradicted itself in 
obvious ways. One of the most glaring examples involves 
Representative Waxman's comments concerning the testimony of 
Kent La, a key figure in the Sioeng investigation. In a floor 
statement made on May 19, 1998, Representative Waxman stated 
the following:

        The Department of Justice does have serious 
        reservations about immunizing Kent La. In a letter 
        dated April 22, 1998, the Department of Justice 
        expressed its view that ``if Mr. La were to testify 
        publicly at this time, the Department's criminal 
        investigation could in fact be compromised. Even if Mr. 
        La were to testify in a closed session, any disclosure 
        or leak of that testimony, whether intentional or 
        inadvertent, could seriously compromise the 
        investigation and any subsequent prosecutions.'' The 
        numerous leaks of information during the course of 
        Committee's investigation suggests that the 
        confidentiality that the Department of Justice has 
        requested could not be maintained.\21\
    \21\ 144 Congressional Record H3452-02.

    The Department of Justice has requested that the Committee 
not release the deposition of Kent La, for fear that doing so 
would compromise an ongoing criminal investigation.\22\ Yet, 
despite Mr. Waxman's protests concerning leaks and the 
Department of Justice's concerns, it was Mr. Waxman himself who 
violated that agreement when he characterized Mr. La's 
testimony during a Committee hearing. Mr. Waxman, who at the 
time had not read or heard Mr. La's testimony, stated that 
there was nothing relevant in the testimony,\23\ which appears 
inconsistent with the position of the Department of Justice and 
violates the terms of the Committee's agreement.
    \22\ Letter from L. Anthony Sutin to Chairman Burton, Aug. 28, 
    \23\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, ``Hearings 
on the Need for an Independent Counsel in the Campaign Finance 
Investigation,'' 105th Cong., 2d sess., 67 (Aug. 4, 1998).
    The minority's preliminary report states that ``none of the 
12 witnesses whose depositions have been made public provided 
testimony supporting the allegations that Mr. Sioeng was an 
agent of the Chinese government, engaged in lobbying for the 
Chinese government, or made political contributions on behalf 
of the Chinese government.'' \24\ This statement completely 
ignores many aspects of the testimony gathered by the majority 
staff. In fact, several witnesses testified about Mr. Sioeng's 
connections to officials at the PRC embassy, consulate and 
central government.\25\
    \24\ Preliminary Minority Views on the Campaign Finance 
Investigation, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight at 89.
    \25\ See Deposition of Daniel K. Wong, 3/12/98; Deposition of 
Robert Prins, 1/27/98; Deposition of Johnny Ma, 2/12/98.
    The minority also ignores Mr. Sioeng's strong connections 
to the PRC government through his business ventures. The 
majority has documented that Mr. Sioeng operates a cigarette 
distribution and production network in Singapore in partnership 
with the PRC government. Sioeng and his partner, the PRC's 
largest tobacco company, produce and export Hongtashan (Red 
Pagoda Mountain) cigarettes.

  a. democrats mount a partisan defense of sioeng's dnc contributions

    The majority report presented a cogent and thorough 
analysis of the $400,000 in foreign and other questionable 
contributions made to the DNC by Ted Sioeng, his family, and 
his business associates. The minority response entirely 
sidestepped the majority's analysis. In response, the minority 
retreats behind issues of fact it knows the Committee cannot 
conclusively resolve due to the stonewalling campaign waged by 
Ted Sioeng's family and its attorneys and business associates. 
But the Potemkin village created by the minority cannot obscure 
the results of the Committee's painstaking investigation, which 
determined that $310,000 of the $400,000 contributed by Sioeng 
to the DNC appears to have been funded from bank accounts in 
Hong Kong and Indonesia.
    The minority's tortured struggle to defend the DNC is 
evident in its inconsistent stances on the foreign money Sioeng 
funneled into the political system. First, the minority writes, 
``there is not evidence in the record indicating that the 
Sioeng-related contributions to the DNC were illegal.'' Later, 
the minority backs away from this blanket assertion and 
acknowledges that foreign money transferred into Sioeng-family 
accounts ultimately funded contributions to the DNC. The 
minority's preliminary report states, ``Although the U.S. bank 
accounts of Ms. Elnitiarta and the Panda companies received 
foreign wire transfers, this does not necessarily mean that 
political contributions drawn from these accounts are 
    In distilled form, the minority's position is that 
demonstrating the DNC contributions were funded by transfers 
from Hong Kong and Indonesia is not enough to prove they are 
illegal, or even that they should be returned by the DNC. This 
argument misses the mark for several reasons. First, the 
Committee has shown that under FEC regulations and practice, 
the $100,000 contributed to the DNC by Panda Estates is illegal 
because it was funded with foreign money, not domestic 
receipts. The minority has not and cannot challenge this point 
directly. Second, as explained in the Committee report, the 
$250,000 in DNC contributions made or directed by Sioeng's 
daughter Jessica are likely illegal due to Ted Sioeng's 
probable involvement in the decisionmaking process.\26\ This 
point, as well, is unchallenged by the minority. Third, the 
contention that Sioeng's DNC contributions are ``not 
necessarily'' illegal is unfair. The reason the Committee 
cannot ascertain for certain whether some of the contributions 
are illegal is that the information needed to make such 
determination is being fiercely guarded by Sioeng, his family, 
and their lawyers. All of this is spelled out in great detail 
in the Committee's report--the 28 persons who asserted their 
privileges against self-incrimination, fled the country, or 
otherwise refused to speak to the Committee, the promises of 
cooperation made and broken by the family's lawyers--and stands 
    \26\ See The Sioeng Family's Contributions and Foreign Ties, 
Section VII. Note that the $250,000 figure includes the $100,000 
contributed to the DNC by Panda Estates.

B. The Minority Engaged in Transparent and Unfair Attack of Matt Fong, 
 who in contrast to the Democats promptly returned money linked to Ted 

    In contrast to the vigorous defense the minority mounts of 
the Sioeng contributions to the DNC, the minority spends 
considerable time attempting to smear Republican Senate 
candidate Matt Fong. In its preliminary report and an article 
in the October 22, 1998 issue of Roll Call, the minority 
accuses Mr. Fong of providing conflicting testimony to the 
House and Senate and concludes the Sioeng-related contributions 
he received were illegal.\27\
    \27\ Amy Keller, ``House Democratic Report Targets Fong,'' Roll 
Call, Oct. 22, 1998, p. 3.
    Not once does the minority report mention that Mr. Fong 
returned all of the $100,000 in contributions he received from 
Sioeng and Panda Estates and that he did so a year-and-a-half 
ago--almost immediately upon learning of the questionable 
nature of Sioeng's contributions. Nor does the minority point 
out that the DNC has kept all $400,000 in Sioeng-related 
contributions it received during the 1996 election cycle, 
including $150,000 from the same Sioeng company from which Matt 
Fong received funds, Panda Estates. Nor does it mention that 
California law contains no prohibition on receiving 
contributions from foreign nationals and that, hence, Mr. 
Fong--in stark contrast to the DNC--returned money he legally 
may have been able to keep.
    Instead, the minority attempts to divine inconsistencies 
from the testimony of a Senate candidate, locked in an 
extremely close race, and who voluntarily agreed to be deposed 
on three separate occasions by the House and Senate and 
returned all of the Sioeng money in stark contrast to the DNC. 
What the minority has not done is spell out any supposed 
``inconsistencies'' or explain their significance.
    The minority report refers to a supposed inconsistency 
relating to ``how [Mr. Fong's] campaign came to receive a 
second contribution from Mr. Sioeng.'' In both his Senate and 
House depositions, Mr. Fong stated clearly that he did not know 
how the second check made its way to his campaign offices. He 
testified that it may have been messengered or dropped off, or 
in it may have been in the sealed envelope Sioeng handed Fong 
when he went to pick up the first check.\28\ Moreover, the 
Committee sees no significance in how the check ended up in Mr. 
Fong's campaign offices given that his testimony is abundantly 
clear on the point that he never saw it.
    \28\ Compare House Fong Depo., Vol. I, at 32; 11-14 & 35; 10-17 
with Senate Fong Depo., at 37; 6-9 & 40: 13-15.

   C. The Minority Mischaracterizes Sioeng's Contribution to the Non-
                Profit National Policy Forum as Illegal

    The minority alleges that federal law bars foreign 
nationals from contributing to ``any campaign for elected 
office, state or federal.'' \29\ In addition, the minority 
implies that a $50,000 contribution from Panda Industries, 
Inc., to the National Policy Forum was somehow disbursed to the 
Republican National Committee.\30\ As a result, the minority 
contends that the ``NPF contribution is another example of a 
foreign contribution to the RNC.'' \31\
    \29\ Preliminary Minority Views on the Campaign Finance 
Investigation, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, at 115.
    \30\ Id. at 116.
    \31\ Id.
    Nothing could be further from the truth. The comments are a 
clumsy attempt to shift the focus from wrongdoing by the 
Democratic National Committee and the Clinton-Gore campaign. 
Moreover, they are again calculated politically to damage Matt 
Fong, who is running for a U.S. Senate seat in California.
    The Committee notes that ranking minority member Waxman 
made numerous comments decrying the investigation as a waste of 
time, money, and resources since--in his view--the Committee 
was duplicating the work of the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee's Special Investigation. Nevertheless, Mr. Waxman 
chooses to respond to the interim report by rehashing 
discredited allegations against the National Policy Forum first 
aired during 3 full days of Senate hearings over a year ago. 
The Thompson Committee also conducted more than a dozen 
depositions on the topic, and reviewed literally thousands of 
pages of documents.
    Aside from the partisan bent, there are several problems 
with the minority's views regarding the NPF. First and 
foremost, there is ample evidence and testimony that the NPF 
was separate and distinct from the RNC. Haley Barbour, who 
served as NPF chairman, addressed that very point in testimony 
before the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Special 
Investigation. Mr. Barbour stated that NPF had ``its own 
separate board of directors . . . its own separate management, 
its own separate staff, its own separate offices, had its own 
separate bank accounts, had filed its own separate tax returns, 
[and] had its own separate books.'' \32\ Mr. Barbour is 
supported by both witness testimony and the documentary record. 
For example, the former Comptroller of the NPF, under 
questioning from minority counsel in his House deposition, 
discussed in detail the great lengths to which NPF went to 
ensure a separation from the RNC.\33\
    \32\ S. Hrg. 105-300, Part III at 156.
    \33\ See Deposition of Stephen A. Walker.
    Also rebutting the minority's contention is the fact that 
NPF was a non-profit corporation established under Section 
501(c)(4) of the U.S. Tax Code.\34\ Such entities can legally 
accept donations, gifts, and loans from U.S. persons, foreign 
nationals, domestic corporations, and foreign corporations.\35\ 
If, as the minority alleges, it was illegal for the NPF to 
accept $50,000 from Panda Industries, it was equally unlawful 
for Vote Now '96, a non-profit group linked to the Clinton-Gore 
campaign,\36\ to accept $100,000 from a Philippine 
national.\37\ However, the minority made no such demands about 
Vote Now '96, a group which directed funds that ultimately 
helped Democratic candidates.
    \34\ S. Hrg. 105-300, Part III at 215.
    \35\ Section 501(c)(4) of U.S. Tax Code.
    \36\ Deposition of Harold Ickes conducted by the U.S. Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee, Special Investigation, June 27, 1997, 
at 39.
    \37\ S. Rept. 105-167, Vol. 3, at 3666.
    Finally, three sections from two congressional reports find 
no evidence that the Panda Industries' contribution to the NPF 
was made with foreign funds.\38\ One of those sections was 
written by minority members of the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee. An obvious question is whether the minority is 
ignoring the views of their Senate colleagues in an effort to 
score political points against Mr. Fong.
    \38\ See S. Rept. 105-167, Vol. I, at 972; S. Rept. 106-167, Vol. 
4, at 5573; See Chapter 4D, ``The Sioeng Family's Contributions and 
Foreign Ties.''

                             d. conclusion

    The minority's attempt to tar Matt Fong is a transparent 
attempt to assist the campaign of his opponent, Senator Barbara 
Boxer. The minority's unsubstantiated attack against a 
Republican candidate who promptly returned questionable Sioeng-
related contributions and cooperated with the Committee stands 
in stark contrast to their refusal to question the DNC's 
indefensible decision to keep more than $300,000 in clearly 
illegal contributions from Sioeng's family and friends--all of 
whom have refused to cooperate with the Committee's 

 III. The Hudson Casino Rejection--Misrepresentations by the Democrats

    Committee Democrats argue that because the central figures 
in the Hudson casino rejection tell us that they acted 
appropriately, then surely it must be so. This Luddite 
application of Congressional oversight is consistent with the 
minority practice of taking all denials of impropriety by 
Democrats at face value, changing the subject and putting up 
roadblocks. It is also consistent with the minority tactic of 
sweeping under the carpet that which begs legitimate inquiry.
    In its interim report, the majority points to significant 
problems with the Department of the Interior decisionmaking 
process over the Hudson casino application. At the very least, 
these problems stand for the proposition that the process was 
unfair to the applicants, that the decisionmakers failed to 
follow Department of the Interior policy and that the Secretary 
ignored a Presidential directive. At their worst, they stand 
for the proposition that Department of the Interior personnel 
were involved in illegal conduct. In either case--whether the 
government is being unfair to citizens or whether the law was 
broken--there is no doubt that Congress has a reason to 
exercise its oversight authority.
    The Democratic minority has apparently decided to ignore 
the problems identified by this Committee's investigation. For 
the record, it is worth reviewing the ``Preliminary Minority 
Views'' section on the Hudson casino decision in order to point 
out what the minority Democrats chose to ignore and what they 
chose to misstate.

  a. what the minority failed to mention regarding the hudson casino 

    First. The Democratic minority appears unconcerned that 
Paul Eckstein has testified that Secretary of the Interior 
Bruce Babbitt told him that Harold Ickes was responsible for 
the timing of the rejection. Eckstein is a man whose life-long 
ties of personal friendship to Secretary Babbitt would normally 
make him privy to candid observations and whose reputation for 
veracity has never been questioned.
    Second. The Democratic minority finds it unremarkable that 
the Secretary of the Interior allegedly referred to large 
campaign contributions to Democratic interests during a meeting 
on the Hudson matter.
    Third. The Democratic minority ignores the fact that 
wealthy contributors, led by a lobbyist who had once been the 
Democratic National Committee's top money man, were given an 
unfair advantage over the Hudson applicants. They find it 
unremarkable that the Secretary of the Interior's Counsel would 
reopen a comment period for opponents of the application--who 
also happened to be significant political contributors--and not 
even inform the applicants.
    Fourth. The Democratic minority, whose preliminary views 
are infused with references to imaginary examples of unfairness 
to witnesses, fails to comment on the fact that the policy used 
to make the Hudson decision had never been used before and had 
never been articulated prior to the decision. The fact that the 
three poor tribes involved in the Hudson application were not 
advised of the decisionmaking criteria is disturbing, and goes 
against principles of fundamental fairness. Indeed, the 
Department of the Interior's own lawyers recognize that ``the 
administrative record, as far as we can tell, contains no 
record of Department meeting or communications with the 
applicant tribes in which the Department's concerns were 
expressed to the plaintiffs.'' \39\ This is inexcusable. Even 
George Skibine--the man described by the minority as ``the 
career civil servant who recommended that the application be 
rejected'' \40\--admitted that the Department failed to tell 
the applicants why the Department had concerns with the 
    \39\ Letter from David Jones to Scott Keep, Feb. 14, 1996.
    \40\ Preliminary Minority Views on the Campaign Finance 
Investigations, p. 67.
    \41\ Deposition of George Skibine, Jan. 13, 1998, p. 61.
    It is hard to fathom how the minority, so concerned about 
``fairness'' in its preliminary views, would be so eager to 
participate in the cover-up of the Department of the Interior's 
conduct in the Hudson matter.
    Fifth. The fact that the Department of the Interior failed 
to give the applicant tribes an opportunity to remedy the 
perceived deficiencies in their application is also of little 
consequence to the minority Democrats. Other Native American 
tribes who were large contributors to the DNC were given 
opportunities to cure problems. Therefore, it is curious that 
the Interior Department did not at any stage give the 
applicants an opportunity to cure perceived deficiencies. The 
failure to provide an opportunity to cure can only reasonably 
be explained in the context of improper motive.
    Sixth. The fact that the Department of the Interior planned 
in advance to reject the application ``without offering much 
explanation''--and that they shared this intelligence with 
Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes's office--also proved to be 
unremarkable to the Democratic minority. Given the obvious need 
for agencies to avoid charges that they have acted in an 
arbitrary fashion, and given the dictates of fundamental 
fairness that agencies provide an indication of the criteria 
upon which decisions are based, it is hard to understand why 
the minority would not be troubled by this fact.
    Seventh. The Democratic minority argues simplistically that 
``local officials from the Hudson town council up to the 
Republican Governor Tommy Thompson opposed [the application], 
as did the local congressman, Republican Steve Gunderson.'' 
This ignores the reality that George Skibine admitted that ``it 
is true that extensive factual findings supporting the local 
communities' objections are nowhere to be found.'' \42\ It 
ignores the fact that Representative Gunderson was provided 
erroneous information provided to him by the Secretary of the 
Interior's office. It misstates Governor Thompson's position. 
It ignores the fact that a Hudson referendum had supported the 
application. It ignores that fact that the Town of Hudson had 
even entered into a contract for services in the expectation 
that the application would be approved. It even ignores the 
fact that the witness who testified about the community 
opposition had herself attempted to get a contract to run a 
concession at the proposed casino.
    \42\ Memorandum from George Skibine to Scott Keep, Aug. 5, 1996.
    Most important, the minority ignores the extraordinary 
revelation by George Skibine that he sensed ``that even if the 
Town of Hudson and the Town of Troy embrace the proposal, we 
may still not change our position because of political 
opposition on the Hill, largely generated by the Minnesota and 
Wisconsin Tribes who oppose this acquisition.'' \43\ This 
observation provides an indication of what is most obviously 
wrong with the Department of the Interior's conduct. The 
failure to tell the applicants that the perceived opposition 
was to be the determinative factor--particularly when the only 
Interior employees to ever visit Hudson had come to a different 
conclusion--coupled with the admission that the Department was 
willing to disregard support from local citizens, makes a 
mockery of everything the Department has said about this 
matter. How could it be the ``right decision . . . made in the 
right way and for the right reasons'' as Secretary Babbitt has 
argued,\44\ if the Department was unwilling to treat the 
applicants fairly?
    \43\ E-mail from George Skibine to Heather Sibbison, Paula Hart, 
Tom Hartman, Troy Woodward and Kevin Meisner, June 30, 1995.
    \44\ Testimony of Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, Jan. 9, 
1998, p. 769.
    Consider the words of Secretary Babbitt's Special 
Assistant, Heather Sibbison:

        [W]e may not want to include in our rationale the 
        opposition of the other tribes, because I think it is 
        possible that if the three Tribes came back with 
        stellar support from their local towns and Congressman, 
        we might look at the proposition in a new light--but 
        even in that case, the Minnesota tribes will still be 
        against it. And also, I agree with Collier's [Chief of 
        Staff to Secretary Bruce Babbitt] uneasiness about some 
        tribes getting all the goodies at the expense of other 
        tribes--theoretically they all should have equal 
    \45\ E-mail from Heather Sibbison to George Skibine and Troy 
Woodward, June 30, 1995.

    The minority is not troubled by this admission that the 
Hudson applicants were not given the same opportunities as 
other tribes. An admission that this Administration gives 
wealthy DNC contributors better opportunities and that the 
contributors to the DNC are ``getting all of the goodies'' 
would normally be of interest to Congressional investigators.
    Eighth. There is an allegation in the record that local 
opposition to the application was being financially 
underwritten by wealthy contributors to the DNC. Even though 
George Skibine admitted that this would be relevant to 
determining how to weigh community support or opposition, the 
Department of the Interior failed to investigate this charge. 
As with other significant matters, the Democratic minority 
failed to find fault with the Department. Indeed, they fail to 
comment on this matter.
    The list of problems in the decisionmaking process could be 
extended for many pages. As is clear in the Majority interim 
report, these problems would suggest to a non-partisan observer 
that something was seriously amiss at the Department of the 
Interior. As Judge Barbara Crabb noted in the section of a 
published opinion that discussed actions taken by the Secretary 
of the Interior's Special Assistant, Heather Sibbison, the 
action ``suggests that the department was aware of the need for 
some subterfuge in the process to allow Ickes to advance 
personal ends.'' \46\ As might be expected, the minority 
Democrats failed to refer to this observation by a Federal 
judge appointed by President Jimmy Carter.
    \46\ Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Bruce Babbitt, 961 F. Supp, 
1276, 1283 (W.D. Wis. 1997).
    Overall, the problems identified lend support to the sworn 
testimony of Paul Eckstein that the Secretary of the Interior 
said he was influenced by the White House, and that he was 
thinking about campaign contributions when he was involved in 
the decisionmaking process.

        B. Distortions and Incorrect Statements by the Democrats

    The minority Democrats made a number of statements in their 
preliminary views that simply are not true. The following are 
some of the attempts to mislead.
    First. The minority states that depositions taken 
``established that the decision was based on the merits.'' This 
is a ludicrous reading of the depositions which, overall, lend 
support to the concern that there was something grievously 
wrong in the Department's decisionmaking. Taken together, the 
depositions provide support for Secretary Babbitt's statement 
to Paul Eckstein that the White House was involved in the 
decisionmaking and that campaign contributions were a factor.
    Second. The minority states that ``the evidence showed that 
the Department had sound reasons for rejecting the casino 
application.'' In fact, the evidence shows the reasons 
articulated for the rejection were not supported by the record. 
It further shows that the Department of the Interior gave 
advantages to wealthy contributors that were not given to non-
contributors, misled at least one Congressman, and failed to 
notify anyone that the Department was changing its 
decisionmaking criteria just for the Hudson case. The record 
also shows that the Department misled a Federal court in 
    Third. The minority states that Governor Thompson of 
Wisconsin opposed the application. In making this claim, they 
ignore Governor Thompson's own statement--made in Hudson to 
Hudson residents--that he would not stop the application.
    Fourth. The minority states categorically that ``the land 
would have been used for casino gambling, which is illegal 
under Wisconsin law.'' However, there are numerous casino 
gambling venues in Wisconsin, and such a blatant attempt to 
mislead can only be understood in terms of the need to bend the 
truth for partisan purposes.
    Fifth. The minority states that the majority conceded that 
``the decision was correct on the merits.'' This is simply not 
true. Many members noted their opposition to gambling, and 
indicated that they might not have been supportive of the 
application because of their opposition to gambling. The same 
members, however, recognized that state and Federal laws permit 
gambling in some areas, and that the issue before the Committee 
was whether the Department of the Interior had followed the 
law, its own regulations, and its own past practices. The 
failure to grasp the difference between opposition to gambling 
and the duty of legislators to uphold the law is stunning.
    Sixth. In its constant attempt to marginalize evidence, the 
minority states that Fred Havenick's allegation that George 
Skibine once stated that the Hudson application was killed 
because of politics was supported ``by affidavits from two 
officials of the disgruntled applicant tribes.'' In fact, there 
were seven affidavits, not two.

                             C. Conclusion

    The Attorney General of the United States felt compelled to 
appoint an Independent Counsel to examine Secretary Babbitt's 
statements and the Hudson matter in general. Given the Attorney 
General's aversion to appointing Independent Counsels--seen so 
clearly in the campaign finance scandal--it is difficult to see 
why minority Democrats expend so much time and effort defending 
the indefensible. If even Attorney General Reno recognized that 
an Independent Counsel might have to investigate the Department 
of the Interior conduct surrounding the Hudson rejection, then 
surely the Democratic minority could at least follow her lead 
and maintain a semblance of objectivity.

IV. The Democrats Engaged in a Pattern of Making False Statements About 
    the Majority's Investigation and Mischaracterizations About the 
                           Majority's Actions

            A. False Statements About the Committee's Budget

    The false statements that the minority has made about the 
Committee's budget are a case study of how the minority has 
manufactured information in order to advance partisan 
interests. At a March 31, 1998 hearing, ranking member Henry 
Waxman asserted that the Committee had spent $5 million over 
the first year of the investigation.\47\ At a subsequent 
hearing on April 30, Mr. Waxman inflated his figure, accusing 
the majority of having spent $6 million on the 
    \47\ Hearing on FEC Enforcement Actions, Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, Mar. 31, 1998, p. 16.
    \48\ Hearing on Venezuelan Money and the Presidential Election, 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Apr. 30, 1998, p. 11.
    Both figures grossly overstated the funds spent by the 
Committee. Congressman Waxman's repeated mischaracterizations 
caused reporters to use erroneous figures in news articles. The 
Wall Street Journal reported, ``Democrats estimate that, 
overall, Mr. Burton has spent more than $5 million on the 
investigation . . .'' \49\ Along the same lines, Roll Call 
Newspaper printed a chart in its July 13, 1998 edition, listing 
Mr. Waxman's estimate of $6 million for the Committee's 
expenditures on the investigation.\50\
    \49\ Jeanne Cummings, ``Burton's Campaign-Finance Probe is Drawing 
Criticism for Mounting Costs and Slow Progress,'' the Wall Street 
Journal, Mar. 27, 1998.
    \50\ Rashidah Goodwin and Jim Vanderhei, ``Democrats' Report 
Doesn't Add Up,'' Roll Call, July 13, 1998.
    However, Roll Call, in an article entitled ``Democrats' 
Report Doesn't Add Up,'' lampooned Democrat generated cost 
estimates for Congressional investigations included in a 
partisan report produced by House Minority Whip Richard 
Gephardt. The article stated, in part:

        The Democratic price tag ignores committee funds 
        allocated to Democrats (typically one-quarter to one-
        third of each panel's budget); assumes incorrectly that 
        some GOP staffers are spending 100 percent of their 
        time working on investigations; and includes millions 
        of dollars that Republicans have not spent, according 
        to a review of the report.'' \51\
    \51\ Id.

    Mr. Waxman's efforts were clearly part of a larger 
Democratic leadership effort to spread disinformation about 
legitimate investigations into an Administration which already 
has had seven Independent Counsels appointed by its own 
Attorney General. Mr. Waxman even had the General Accounting 
Office waste $300,000 to determine how much it cost for 
agencies to respond to appropriate oversight requests from 
    \52\ Letter to the Honorable Dan Burton from Theodore C. Barreaux, 
Associate Director, General Accounting Office, Oct. 23, 1998.
    Even after the majority provided a detailed accounting of 
the Committee's expenditures, Congressman Waxman continued to 
misstate the amount of money the Committee had spent. On May 
11, 1998, Chairman Burton wrote a letter to Congressman Waxman 
providing him with an itemized accounting of the Committee's 
investigative expenditures for 1997--$2.4 million.\53\ The 
figure included the salaries of all Committee staff who worked 
on the investigation, both from the Committee's permanent 
budget and its separate investigative budget. It also broke 
down the spending into nine separate categories, including 
equipment, overtime, travel, consultants, and supplies.
    \53\ Letter to Congressman Waxman from Chairman Burton, May 11, 
    Even after receiving the detailed accounting he had 
requested earlier, Mr. Waxman and his staff continued to 
mislead the public about the Committee's expenses. The 
minority's preliminary views, prepared by Mr. Waxman's staff 
for the Committee's October 8 meeting, stated that the 
Committee had spent $7.4 million on the illegal fundraising 
investigation,\54\ a figure that is wildly exaggerated and 
misses the mark by more than $3 million. The minority report 
incorrectly asserted that $5.7 million had been expended on 
staff salaries alone. This figure was apparently based on an 
estimate that the majority had 50 staff working on the 
investigation at any given time \55\--a number that was 
provided without attribution and apparently made up out of 
whole cloth.
    \54\ ``Preliminary Minority Views on the Campaign Finance 
Investigation,'' Oct. 8, 1998, p. 44.
    \55\ Id. p. 45.
    In fact, at its peak, the majority had no more than 35 
staff working on the investigation. At the beginning of 1997, 
and following the August recess of 1998, the number of majority 
staff was significantly lower. For instance, in 1997, the 
Committee's investigative budget of $3.8 million was not 
approved by the Committee on House Oversight until March 25, 
1997. Prior to this, the investigative staff numbered less than 
one dozen. The investigative staff was gradually augmented 
through the spring and summer, and did not reach its peak of 35 
until the fall.
    The accurate figures for investigative staff salaries and 
overtime are:
          1997: $1.56 million
          1998: $1.33 million \56\
    \56\ Committee payroll records through August 1998.
    The combined total through August 1998 equals $2.9 million, 
a far cry from the minority's estimate of $5.7 million. What is 
more, 25 percent of those funds were set aside for minority 
staff. Only 75 percent of those funds were expended for 
majority staff.
    The minority also neglected to state instances in which the 
Committee did not spend or returned significant amounts of 
money allocated to the investigation. For instance, in 1997, $1 
million of the Committee's $3.8 million investigative budget 
was allocated for investigative detailees. Most of these funds 
were left unspent after Congressman Waxman blocked the 
Committee from obtaining FBI detailees.\57\ In 1998, the 
Committee was allocated $1.8 million from the House Oversight 
Committee's Reserve Fund. Of that amount, the Committee 
returned $500,000 in unused funds to the House Oversight 
    \57\ Letter from Representative Waxman to Chairman Burton, July 18, 
1997. In most instances, Federal agencies require a Memorandum of 
Understanding signed by both the chairman and the ranking member before 
detailing personnel to congressional committees.
    \58\ Letter from Chairman Burton to Chairman Thomas, Oct. 8, 1998.
    In total, the Committee spent approximately $2.4 million on 
its investigation into illegal fundraising activities in 1997. 
While it is difficult to determine an exact amount spent to 
date in 1998 because recording and payment of official expenses 
are typically delayed by several months, the Committee expects 
to spend less in 1998 than it did in 1997. A reasonable 
estimate of the Committee's total investigative expenditures 
for the 2 year period would not exceed $4 million to $4.25 
    It is hard to understand why the Committee's ranking member 
would continue to publicize false estimates of the Committee's 
expenditures, even after being notified in May of this year 
that his figures were inaccurate. This is an example of the 
purposeful use of falsehoods to deflect attention from the 
campaign finance scandal and the facts uncovered by the 

             B. False Statements About the Committee's Work

    The minority views published by Congressman Waxman did not 
stop at trying to deceive the American people about the 
Committee's expenses. They also tried to deceive the public 
about the Committee's work. For instance, the minority played 
elaborate word games to try to make it appear that the 
Committee had held fewer hearings than it had. In listing the 
number of hearings held by other investigative committees, the 
minority listed ``days of hearings held.'' For instance, the 
minority report states that the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee held 33 days of public hearings.\59\ However, when 
describing the number of hearings held by the House Government 
Reform and Oversight Committee, the minority report states that 
only 9 hearings were held.\60\ It neglects to explain that the 
Committee's hearings on Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt and 
allegations of corruption at the Interior Department lasted 4 
days, or that hearings into Johnny Chung's unusual access to 
the White House lasted 2 days.
    \59\ ``Preliminary Minority Views on the Campaign Finance 
Investigation,'' Oct. 8, 1998, p. 45-46.
    \60\ Id.
    Along the same lines, the minority views were misleading 
about the subject matter of the hearings. For instance, the 
minority report states that, ``in 1998, the Committee did not 
hold a single day of investigative hearings on the role of 
foreign contributions in the 1996 campaign.'' \61\ The wording 
of this sentence was carefully crafted to avoid recognizing 
hearings the Committee held on foreign money in the 1992 and 
1994 campaigns.\62\ Furthermore, the minority fails to 
recognize the numerous instances in which the Committee 
released documents or other information to the public when 
hearings could not be held because witnesses had either 
asserted their Fifth Amendment rights not to incriminate 
themselves or fled the country.
    \61\ Id.
    \62\ The Committee held hearings on Mar. 31, 1998 and Apr. 30, 1998 
regarding foreign money in the political system.
    It is disappointing that the minority would feel compelled 
to use such petty tactics in an investigation into a matter as 
important as the role of illegal foreign money in our 

                    C. False Statements About Leaks

    The Democratic minority has also falsely accused the 
majority of leaking. At the Committee's August 6, 1998 meeting, 
Congressman John Tierney inserted a document into the Committee 
record titled, ``History of Committee Leaks.'' \63\ The 
document, prepared by Congressman Waxman's staff, was 
circulated to reporters attending the meeting.
    \63\ Hearing on Whether to Hold the Attorney General in Contempt of 
Congress, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Aug. 6, 1998, 
p. 120 of the committee transcript.
    However, not a single instance cited in the two-page 
document was actually a Committee leak. For instance, the first 
incident cited in the document occurred on another Committee 
during a previous Congress. Congressman Burton had not yet been 
elected Chairman of the Government Reform and Oversight 
Committee, and the Committee had not yet commenced its 
investigation of campaign finance improprieties and possible 
violations of law. What is more, the documents in question, 
John Huang's phone logs from the Commerce Department, were not 
classified or covered under any protocol or confidentiality 
    The minority similarly mischaracterized other incidents 
they defined as leaks. For instance, Congressman Waxman accused 
the majority of leaking information from staff interviews. 
However, it is a well-established principle that staff notes of 
informal interviews are considered staff work-product and are 
not covered under the Committee's document protocol. Chairman 
Burton informed Congressman Waxman of this fact in writing in 
March 1998.\64\ It is profoundly disappointing that the 
minority would persist in promulgating false and misleading 
information months after being informed in a clear and 
unambiguous way that their facts were wrong.
    \64\ Letter from Chairman Burton to Congressman Waxman, Mar. 27, 
    In another instance, the ``Talking Points'' handed out by 
the minority on August 6, 1998, asserted:

        The most repugnant leak occurred when Chairman Burton 
        leaked subpoenaed Bureau of Prisons tape recordings of 
        Webster Hubbell's private phone conversations with his 
        wife and others.\65\
    \65\ Hearing on Whether to Hold the Attorney General in Contempt of 
Congress, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Aug. 6, 1998, 
p. 120 of the committee transcript.

    However, the Hubbell prison tape recordings were not 
leaked. Two prison tape recordings of Mr. Hubbell's 
conversations were entered into the Committee record and made 
public on December 9, 1997.\66\ Chairman Burton informed 
Congressman Waxman of this fact by letter on March 27, 1998 
after Congressman Waxman publicly accused him of leaking the 
tapes.\67\ Additional tapes were made public by a vote of the 
Committee's 5-person working group on April 15, 1998, as 
authorized by the Committee's document protocol.
    \66\ Hearing on the Current Implementation of the Independent 
Counsel Act, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Dec. 9, 
1997, p. 212-213.
    \67\ Letter from Congressman Waxman to Chairman Burton, Mar. 20, 
1998; Letter from Chairman Burton to Congressman Waxman, Mar. 27, 1998.
    Mr. Hubbell, who resigned under a cloud from the Justice 
Department in March 1994, received hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in fees from friends and supporters of the President at 
a time that he was under criminal investigation and his 
testimony was being sought in the Whitewater matter. Among the 
lucrative arrangements Hubbell secured was a $100,000 
consulting fee from the Lippo Group in June 1994. This fee was 
paid at a time when James Riady and John Huang had numerous 
meetings at the White House, including a visit with the 
President. At the same time, James Riady also met with Webster 
    \68\ See Chapter 4A of the Committee majority report for further 
discussion of the connections between the Riadys, John Huang and 
Webster Hubbell.
    Mr. Hubbell was one of the first witnesses called by the 
Committee, and among the first to assert the Fifth Amendment in 
refusing to cooperate. His refusal to cooperate led the 
Committee to seek other avenues to determine why the Riady 
family paid Hubbell, who asked them to do so, and what they 
sought in return. One source of information to which the 
Committee turned were hundreds of hours of tape recordings of 
Mr. Hubbell's telephone conversations from prison. The tapes 
included discussions Hubbell had about his contacts with John 
Huang and discussions he had with White House official Marsha 
Scott. Mr. Hubbell also discussed factual matters related to 
his legal case with his wife throughout the tape recordings. As 
in all Federal penal institutions, prisoners are made aware by 
large signs that their conversations are being recorded.\69\ 
The Committee's subpoena for these tapes was lawful and 
warranted and the public release of the documents was done 
through proper committee procedures.
    \69\ Mr. Hubbell himself acknowledged that he knew he was being 
taped when in a Mar. 25, 1996 tape recording, Mr. Hubbell specifically 
reminded his wife that they were on a ``recorded phone.'' Mr. Hubbell 
also cautioned one of his benefactors, Bernard Rapoport, in an Oct. 13, 
1995 letter about his calls: ``You can't call, but I can call you if 
you are willing to take a collect call. . . . Also understand that all 
my calls are monitored and recorded.''
    The mischaracterizations and misinformation about the 
release of the tapes were again, in large part a partisan 
distraction to run from troubling facts. Once questions arose 
about the informal transcript logs provided by the Committee as 
a guide for the press when the tapes were released, the 
Committee released the tapes in their entirety when questions 
arose in order to clear up any misunderstandings. There was 
never any intent or effort to omit any information for 
political purposes. In fact, from the first days the tapes were 
released, reporters were encouraged to listen to the prison 
tapes themselves. Inadvertent errors on the committee's 
informal logs should not minimize the importance of the 
information in the tapes themselves. While the Washington Post 
raised questions about the release of the tapes and the 
editing, the editorial board still acknowledged the importance 
of the tapes to the public debate:

        Still, with all the caveats, the tapes appear to raise 
        questions both about Mr. Hubbell's conduct and about 
        the White House's behavior toward the former associate 
        attorney general while he was in prison.\70\
    \70\ ``The Hubbell Tapes,'' the Washington Post, May 3, 1998.

Again on May 6, the Washington Post editorialized:

        The White House spin--that the errors in the 
        transcripts somehow render the tapes themselves 
        insignificant--is unconvincing.\71\
    \71\ ``Mr. Burton's Transcripts,'' the Washington Post, May 6, 

    In a May 5, 1998 appearance on ``Nightline,'' even 
Congressman Waxman was compelled to admit that, ``there are 
things in those tapes that are disturbing to me, but I don't 
know the answer to them.'' \72\ However, to date, the serious 
questions about payments to Mr. Hubbell remain unanswered by 
Mr. Hubbell, the Riadys, and John Huang--all key players in a 
highly questionable $100,000 payment to Mr. Hubbell when he was 
a target in a serious criminal investigation related to the 
President and First Lady.
    \72\ ``Nightline,'' ABC News, May 5, 1998.
    The Democrats did not just erroneously claim that the 
Hubbell prison tape recordings were ``leaked,'' they also 
falsely claimed the tapes themselves were ``doctored.'' This 
falsehood was routinely repeated by Democrats. The minority had 
their own copies of the actual tapes for months and knew that 
no physical alterations were ever made to any tape recordings. 
Unfortunately, the false accusation that the tapes were 
``doctored'' continues to be perpetuated by Democrats. For 
example, Judiciary ranking Democrat John Conyers perpetuated 
this falsehood in a May 10, 1998 appearance on ``Fox News 

          Brit Hume. Congressman Conyers, what do you think 
        that Webb Hubbell meant when he said on a conversation 
        he knew was being taped that I guess I'll have to--I 
        think the quote was ``roll over again.'' What do you 
        think he meant by roll over again?
          Rep. Conyers. Sir, the tapes that were released by 
        the Chairman Dan Burton, my friend from Indiana, were 
          Mr. Hume. There was no doctoring of any tapes, sir. 
        There was an edited transcript. The tapes were released 
        in full. My question to you is what do you think he 
        meant by roll over again?
          Rep. Conyers. I said--I said the tapes were doctored.
          Mr. Hume. Yes, you were incorrect about that. They 
        were released in their entirety. What was edited were 
        the transcripts. My question for you, what do you think 
        he meant when he said roll over again?
          Rep. Conyers. I have absolutely no idea.
          Mr. Hume. Would you like----
          Rep. Conyers. What do you think he means?
          Mr. Hume. Would you like to find out sir?
          Rep. Conyers. Well I don't have any reason to find 
        out. I mean, what do I need to know for? \73\
    \73\ ``Fox News Sunday,'' May 10, 1998.

    As was often the case with the Democrats, their zeal for 
avoiding the facts, made them less than active participants in 
any real search for the truth. As for other misrepresentations 
about supposed ``leaks,'' in their preliminary minority views 
issued on October 8, the Democrats made a tacit admission that 
many of their earlier accusations of leaks were false. Many of 
the same incidents labeled leaks in the August 6 document 
released by the minority were reclassified under a more 
ambiguous heading in the minority views of October 8. However, 
the minority persisted in classifying several authorized 
releases of information which served the public's right to know 
the facts as leaks,\74\ in the face of all of the evidence to 
the contrary.
    \74\ ``Preliminary Minority Views on the Campaign Finance 
Investigation,'' Oct. 8, 1998, p. 40-41.

             D. False Accusations About Abuse of Witnesses

    The Democratic minority's accusations about abuse of 
witnesses have bordered on the absurd. At one point in its 
minority views, the minority complains that the Committee 
deposed an Interior Department employee who is a diabetic. The 
minority had the audacity to suggest that the deposition 
interfered with the employee's ability to monitor his insulin 
with absolutely no basis in fact.\75\
    \75\ Id. p. 30-31.
    Obviously, the deposition posed no risk to the health of 
the employee, George Skibine, who was afforded frequent 
opportunities to take breaks. For the minority to suggest that 
someone who suffers from diabetes is physically incapable of 
participating in a deposition is an insult to people who cope 
with diabetes on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, the fact of 
the medical condition was not brought to majority counsel's 
attention until the proceeding was well underway. As soon as 
the condition was disclosed, Mr. Skibine was offered any 
accommodation that he considered necessary.
    Along the same lines, after an investigative trip to Los 
Angeles in August 1997, Congressman Waxman attacked the 
majority investigators for knocking too loudly on people's 
doors, wearing suits and ties, and ``sitting in a full-sized 
Chevrolet'' as they waited for an individual to return home 
from work.\76\ It is unclear to this day whether Mr. Waxman's 
objections rested on the size of the car or its make and model.
    \76\ Letter from Congressman Waxman to Chairman Burton, Sept. 4, 
    During this same trip, Congressman Waxman accused majority 
staff of ``bullying,'' ``staking out,'' ``accosting,'' and 
``interrogating'' Felix Ma.\77\ Of course, this description 
does not bear even the faintest resemblance to what actually 
happened. In reality, Committee staff had a brief and cordial 
discussion with Mr. Ma outside his house when he arrived home. 
Mr. Ma told the staff that he wished he could introduce them to 
his wife, and he did so when she arrived home a few minutes 
later. Mr. Ma also told the investigators that he was happy to 
have the opportunity to clear up the fact that he was not the 
Felix Ma who worked for the Lippo Group and contributed $25,000 
to the DNC. Mr. Ma explained that he had also been contacted by 
numerous reporters and Democratic fundraisers seeking 
additional contributions.\78\
    \77\ ``Preliminary Minority Views on the Campaign Finance 
Investigation,'' Oct. 8, 1998, p. 18-19.
    \78\ Letter from Chairman Burton to Congressman Waxman, Sept. 30, 
    The minority also accused the majority of ``squandering 
taxpayer dollars'' by sending three Committee staff to Florida 
``to retrieve a computer disk that could have been mailed to 
the Committee for the cost of first-class postage.'' \79\ What 
the minority failed to mention was that the primary purpose of 
the trip was to interview the individual who had possession of 
the disk, something which obviously could not be done through 
the mail. To compound the problem, after his staff supported 
making the trip and agreed to keep the trip confidential, 
Congressman Waxman held a press conference to criticize it.\80\
    \79\ ``Preliminary Minority Views on the Campaign Finance 
Investigation,'' Oct. 8, 1998, p. 47.
    \80\ Letter from Chairman Burton to Congressman Waxman, July 23, 
    Following this series of irresponsible, misleading and 
highly partisan attacks, it should come as little surprise that 
the majority decided to conduct separate investigative travel 
and interviews.

  E. False Statements about the Committee's Vote Holding the Attorney 
                          General in Contempt

    The minority has made repeated false claims about the 
Committee's efforts to compel the production of documents from 
the Justice Department. In July 1998, the Committee issued a 
subpoena calling for production of both the Freeh and La Bella 
memoranda which advised the Attorney General that the law 
required the appointment of an independent counsel in the 
campaign finance investigation. The minority has consistently 
opposed the Committee's efforts to conduct legitimate oversight 
of the Department of Justice and has misrepresented key facts 
and the law throughout the Committee's oversight process. The 
Committee has had a number of concerns about the Justice 
Department's campaign finance investigation, and has held two 
hearings about that investigation.
    The Attorney General has never complied with the 
Committee's subpoena for the Freeh and La Bella memoranda. She 
has never raised any claim of privilege to justify her failure 
to comply with the Committee's subpoena. Rather, she has simply 
refused to produce the required documents, citing various false 
rationales that compliance with the subpoena would jeopardize 
the Justice Department's investigation. The Committee's 
subpoena specifically called for grand jury information to be 
    In their preliminary report, the minority claims that the 
Attorney General's refusal to comply with the Committee's 
subpoena was ``consistent with 100 years of precedent.'' \81\ 
This claim is yet another example of the type of misleading 
statement that the minority is willing to make to serve their 
political purposes. Documents such as the memoranda subpoenaed 
by the committee have been produced to investigative committees 
repeatedly throughout the last 80 years. The details of these 
cases have been discussed extensively at Committee business 
meetings, and in the Committee's contempt report.\82\
    \81\ Preliminary Minority Views at 35.
    \82\ See ``Report by the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight together with Additional Views, Minority Views, and 
Additional Minority Views on the Refusal of Attorney General Janet Reno 
to Produce Documents Subpoenaed by the Government Reform and Oversight 
Committee,'' Sept. 17, 1998, H. Rept. 105-728, 105th Cong., 2d sess.
    While the minority's misrepresentations are disturbing, it 
is the minority's complete lack of interest in overseeing the 
Justice Department that is more troubling. The Committee has 
uncovered substantial evidence indicating that the Justice 
Department is not thoroughly investigating the campaign finance 
scandal. Furthermore, at least one senior official at the 
Department of Justice has shown a clear disdain for the law and 
the campaign finance investigation. On October 2, 1998, the 
Washington Post reported the following:

        A Senior Justice Department official said that some 
        investigators have concluded that Huang does not have 
        information that would support the prosecution of the 
        Democratic officials who received and spent the funds 
        he raised or the White House officials who promoted his 
        career in Washington.\83\
    \83\ Roberto Suro, ``Prosecutor's Approach to Huang Signals Shift 
in Campaign Probe,'' the Washington Post, Oct. 2, 1998, A17.

    Given that the Department has apparently not even talked to 
John Huang according to news reports, it is troubling that 
statements such as this are attributed to the Department of 
Justice. Although General Reno has recently informed the 
Committee that an Office of Professional Responsibility 
investigation has been opened over this statement, this is not 
reassuring given the fact that the target of the investigation 
may be one of the key decisionmakers when the Department 
decides whether to appeal recent rulings regarding criminal 
indictments of DNC fundraisers Charlie Trie and Maria Hsia. 
Given these facts, it is disturbing that, rather than be part 
of a bipartisan effort to ensure that the executive branch does 
what it is trusted to do, the minority has attempted to impede 
the Committee's work.

    V. Democrats Made Tortured Arguments Alleging ``Asian Bashing''

    The Democratic minority makes a tortured argument that the 
investigation of illegal campaign contributions is insensitive 
``to the concerns of Asian-Americans.'' This is consistent with 
their failure to focus on the people who put so many in legal 
jeopardy. According to Representative Lantos, ``there is a 
grave danger that stereotyping and Asian bashing will become 
and, in many instances, have become part and parcel of this 
investigation.'' \84\ The Committee, however, focused on 
illegal conduct and those who attempted to break the law. While 
it is regrettable that so many Democratic operatives exploited 
Asian-Americans, it is certainly not the fault of Republicans 
on this Committee.
    \84\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Committee 
Vote on Immunity, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 18-19 (1997) (quoted in 
Preliminary Minority Views on the Campaign Finance Investigation, p. 
    In their cynical effort to characterize this Committee's 
work as racist, minority Democrats also quoted Francey Lim 
Youngberg. However, the minority failed to point out that 
Youngberg is hardly a disinterested party--the group she 
headed, the Congressional Asian-Pacific American Caucus 
Institute--received $35,000 from Charlie Trie, one of the 
central figures in the campaign finance scandal.
    During the course of the investigation, the minority also 
made harsh allegations of racial impropriety against the 
Committee's inquiry into a $10,000 contribution made on August 
18, 1996, by Helen Chien. On Sunday, October 5, 1997, a 
reporter on the television program ``Face the Nation'' 
commented on this Committee's concern over the Chien 
contribution: ``Committee Democrats are in a furor about this, 
because they say all of it took place after the Democrats 
checked out the couple and found they had done nothing wrong; 
their contribution was perfectly proper. Committee Democrat Tom 
Lantos says the couple was subjected to abusive questioning 
just because they had Asian surnames[.]'' Representative Lantos 
continued to assert that the majority was acting improperly in 
a ``Dear Colleague'' letter dated October 9, 1997: ``We must 
all take the experience of this couple--who gave a perfectly 
legal donation--to heart. This couple have [sic] been subjected 
to repeated interviews and abusive questioning by investigators 
working for Dan Burton.''
    Notwithstanding the overwrought protestations of minority 
Democrats, on March 25, 1998, the DNC in a letter to the FEC 
acknowledged that the $10,000 contribution from Helen Chien was 
in fact returned for cause:

        Based on our analysis of allegations contained in the 
        indictments returned in the cases of United States v. 
        Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie et al, U.S. District Court for 
        the District of Columbia, Jan. 28, 1998, and United 
        States v. Maria Hsia, U.S. District Court for the 
        District of Columbia, Feb. 18, 1998, the DNC has 
        determined that it now has information suggesting that 
        certain contributions that at the time they were 
        received, did not appear to be unlawful, were in fact 
        contributions made in the name of another . . . A list 
        of these contributions is attached.\85\

    \85\ Letter from Joseph E. Sandler, Esq., to Lawrence Noble, Esq., 
Mar. 25, 1998; see also Federal Grand Jury Indictment of Yah Lin 
``Charlie'' Trie, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 
Jan. 28, 1998; Federal Grand Jury Indictment of Maria Hsia, U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, Feb. 28, 1998.

    The list of contributions included that of Helen Chien in 
the amount of $10,000. The majority has not heard from Mr. 
Lantos regarding the DNC's action in this regard. Aside from 
the inappropriate and partisan zeal to play the race card to 
discredit a legitimate investigation, there is no reason to 
have made the race-baiting accusations against the majority 
when we raised questions about contributions which the DNC has 
itself now deemed necessary to return. Such conduct has been an 
extremely disappointing aspect of the minority's participation 
in this investigation.
    The minority also failed to take into account a comment by 
former White House Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes:

        I think this current flap is very, very minor. What you 
        basically have is a group of people, Asians, who are 
        just beginning to participate in the political system, 
        who are not fully aware of all the rules. They are used 
        to doing business in a different way in their 

    \86\ An Insider Looks Back--Harold Ickes Faces Uncertainty, 
Newsday, Dec. 26, 1996.

Such self-serving and patronizing comments ignore the fact that 
those who encouraged the giving were certainly in a position to 
know what was right and what was wrong. John Huang, for 
example, is a highly educated individual who was placed in a 
senior Commerce Department position. He had direct access to 
the President of the United States. Other fundraisers under 
scrutiny--Charlie Trie, Maria Hsia, Charles Intriago, Howard 
Glicken, Marvin Rosen, Johnny Chung, Gene and Nora Lum, to name 
but a few--are also for the most part highly educated and 
politically savvy. The only ``homeland'' they are used to doing 
business in is the United States, and it is absurd to say that 
they were just beginning to participate in the political 
process. John Huang had been very active in fundraising in 
1992, and others had been involved years earlier. Charlie Trie, 
for example, began contributing to Bill Clinton's campaigns in 
the 1980s. These individuals used others for their own improper 
ends, and for anyone to be cynical enough to blame those who 
were exploited as conduits is patronizing and indicative of the 
blame-everyone-else-and-cover-your-tracks mindset that the 
Committee has been faced with.
    Those who would attempt to distract would do well to take a 
look at a document produced by the Democratic National 
Committee (``DNC''). Generated by the DNC's office of Asian 
Pacific Affairs, it is titled ``Affinity Group Endorsement 
Project (Slice & Dice).'' \87\ Here is how the ``Slice and 
Dice'' program characterized the ``special interests'' of 
various ethnic groups: Hmong--Bungee Jumpers, Japanese--
Golfers, Hawaiian--Cigar Smokers, Chinese--Senior Citizens, 
Korean--Gay/Lesbian. The apparent stereotyping of ethnic groups 
by special interests along the lines envisioned by the DNC 
would appear to be a far more fruitful avenue for an 
investigation of racial insensitivity than the Committee's 
efforts to determine whether there were illegal efforts to 
influence U.S. elections. Rather than defend those who point to 
how Asian-Americans ``are used to doing business in a different 
way in their homeland,'' the scrutiny should properly be on how 
Harold Ickes and the DNC did business in their homeland.
    \87\ DNC Document F 0047206 (Exhibit 6).
    It is disappointing that the Minority would attempt to 
exploit race, while at the same time cover up the DNC's sordid 
efforts to ``Slice & Dice'' American citizens into absurd 
special interest groups.

                                                        Dan Burton.
    [Supporting documentation follows:]


    Mr. Chairman, in a desperate attempt to focus attention 
away from the Clinton foreign money scandal, the Democratic 
minority is attempting to find a scandal where none exists.
    Representative Henry Waxman alleges that House Majority 
Whip Tom DeLay was involved in a scheme to raise illegal 
campaign funds for the congressional campaign of Brian Babin in 
Texas. Mr. Waxman bases this contention on the credibility and 
charges of one Peter Cloeron.
    Mr. Cloeron claims that at a Babin campaign event in 1996 
that Representative DeLay was present, DeLay and his staff in a 
lunch meeting encouraged him to undertake an illegal campaign 
to fund the election efforts of Brian Babin.
    Representative DeLay has repeatedly and unambiguously 
denied these outrageous claims. DeLay has said that he has 
never encouraged, solicited or proposed any effort to 
circumvent Federal campaign laws, and he never would.
    Peter Cloeron's claim is false, unsubstantiated, and 
potentially libelous--and the minority knows it. His claims 
against Congressman DeLay are nothing more than an attempt to 
inflict the maximum political damage possible to the campaign 
of Brian Babin.
    A quick scan of Mr. Cloeron's public statements about this 
affair demonstrates his lack of credibility.
    It should be known that Mr. Cloeron has been convicted of 
criminal violations of Federal law. He admitted multiple 
violations of the Campaign Finance Reform Act, and has been 
subject to civil penalties by the Federal Election Commission. 
He is looking for someone, besides himself, to blame for his 
illegal activities.
    Mr. Cloeron's own contradictory statements raise further 
questions about his credibility. For example, on November 1, 
1997, the Houston Chronicle reported that Mr. Cloeron said that 
he was contacted directly by ``Triad officials,'' rather than 
by Mr. DeLay or his staff, with respect to making illegal 
contributions to organizations that would, in turn, make 
contributions to the Babin campaign.
    In the same article, Mr. Cloeron indicated that he was 
``contacted by Triad officials because he was a conservative 
who had given to a number of Republican campaigns, including 
that of Majority Whip Tom DeLay.'' As FEC records clearly 
indicate, Mr. Cloeron is not now, nor has ever been, a 
contributor to DeLay. It appears that the truth is not an 
obstacle in Cloeron's campaign of deceit and destruction.
    Similarly, in an August 6, 1998 article in the Houston 
Chronicle, Mr. Cloeron modified his earlier allegation and was 
now saying that his alleged discussion with Congressman DeLay 
was not as specific as he earlier suggested. According to 
Cloeron, ``my discussion with DeLay on this, over lunch, lasted 
two or three minutes. It was not like we spent a lunch hour.''
    Indeed, in this article, Mr. Cloeron indicated that ``it 
wasn't like [DeLay] was saying `Hey, you were up against the 
wall (having given the maximum contribution), but we've got a 
different way to do this and here's the way you do it.' It was 
more a statement to the effect of Babin being outspent by his 
    Now Cloeron has changed his story again and Mr. Waxman 
doesn't seem to care.
    Given the contradictory public statements made by Mr. 
Cloeron in the media, his motivations, and the efforts of the 
minority to desperately change the subject from the Clinton 
scandals, it becomes apparent that the minority is attempting 
to engage the American people in a rouse. The American people 
won't fall for it. These charges appear baseless.

                                                     Pete Sessions.