House Report 105-829, Part 4 - 105th Congress (1997-1998)
November 05, 1998, As Reported by the Government Reform Committee

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House Report 105-829 - INVESTIGATION OF POLITICAL FUNDRAISING IMPROPRIETIES AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF LAW INTERIM REPORT




[House Report 105-829]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]



                                                 Union Calendar No. 471
105th Congress, 2d Session  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - House Report 105-829


 
         INVESTIGATION OF POLITICAL FUNDRAISING IMPROPRIETIES AND
               POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF LAW INTERIM REPORT

                               ----------    

                              SIXTH REPORT

                                 by the

                        COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
                          REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                             together with

                     ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
                             Volume 4 of 4


<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>


November 5, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed



   INVESTIGATION OF POLITICAL FUNDRAISING IMPROPRIETIES AND POSSIBLE 
                    VIOLATIONS OF LAW--VOLUME 4 OF 4



                                                 Union Calendar No. 471
105th Congress, 2d Session  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - House Report 105-829


                      INVESTIGATION OF POLITICAL

                     FUNDRAISING IMPROPRIETIES AND

                      POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF LAW

                             INTERIM REPORT

                               __________

                              SIXTH REPORT

                                 by the

                        COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT

                          REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                             together with

                     ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

                             Volume 4 of 4


<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>


November 5, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed


              COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                     DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York        HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois         TOM LANTOS, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland      ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut      MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
CHRISTOPHER COX, California         EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida        PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York            GARY A. CONDIT, California
STEPHEN HORN, California            CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida               THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia           ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, 
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana              DC
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana             CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida            ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona            DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio          ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    Carolina                        JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire       JIM TURNER, Texas
PETE SESSIONS, Texas                THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey          HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas                        ------
BOB BARR, Georgia                   BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 
DAN MILLER, Florida                     (Independent) 
RON LEWIS, Kentucky

                        Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                     Barbara J. Comstock, Chief Counsel
              David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
                   Lisa Smith Arafune, Deputy Chief Clerk
                Philip M. Schiliro, Minority Staff Director

                              -----------

          MINORITY STAFF                       MAJORITY STAFF
Kevin Binger, Staff Director        Kristin L. Amerling, Minority 
Barbara Jean Comstock, Chief            Counsel
    Counsel                         Kenneth M. Ballen, Minority Chief 
James C. Wilson, Chief                  Investigative Counsel
    Investigative Counsel           Philip S. Barnett, Minority Chief 
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and       Counsel
    Parliamentarian                 Courtney A. Cook, Minority Staff 
Michael Bopp, Senior Investigative      Assistant
    Counsel                         Sarah Despres, Minority Counsel
J. Timothy Griffin, Senior          Jonathan M. Frenkel, Minority 
    Investigative Counsel               Counsel
Kristi L. Remington, Senior         Harold W. Gossett, Minority 
    Investigative Counsel               Professional Staff Member
Elliot S. Berke, Investigative      Christopher P. Lu, Minority 
    Counsel                             Counsel
Robert J. Dold, Investigative       Michael J. Raphael, Minority 
    Counsel                             Counsel
Jason Hopfer, Investigative Counsel Ellen P. Rayner, Minority Chief 
John Irving, Investigative Counsel      Clerk
Rae Oliver, Investigative Counsel   Jessica R. Robinson, Minority 
Jim Schumann, Investigative Counsel     Staff Assistant
Michelle E. White, Investigative    David Sadkin, Minority Counsel
    Counsel                         Philip M. Schiliro, Minority Staff 
Dudley Hodgson, Chief Investigator      Director
Milt Copulos, Investigator          Andrew H. Su, Minority Research 
Kevin Davis, Investigator               Assistant
G. Andrew Macklin, Investigator     Amy R. Wendt, Minority Staff 
John T. Mastranadi, Investigator        Assistant
Matt Tallmer, Investigator          Barbara A. Wentworth, Minority 
Thomas P. Bossert, Assistant to         Research Assistant
    Chief Counsel                   Michael T. Yang, Minority Counsel
Jason Foster, Assistant Systems     Michael J. Yeager, Minority 
    Administrator                       Counsel 
Laurel Grover, Staff Assistant 
Kenneth Feng, GAO Detailee  
Roger Stoltz, GAO Detailee  
Richard D. Bennett, Special Counsel 
    to the Committee 



                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------   

                                  House of Representatives,
                                  Washington, DC, November 5, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, I submit herewith the 
committee's sixth report to the 105th Congress.
                                                Dan Burton,
                                                          Chairman.



                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Preface..........................................................     1
Chapter I: Introduction..........................................     5
Chapter II: Unprecedented Obstacles to the Committee's 
  Investigation..................................................    47
Chapter III: The Democrats' Failure to Return Illegal Campaign 
  Contributions..................................................   149
Chapter IV: Unprecedented Infusion of Foreign Money Into the 
  American Political System......................................  1185
    Part A: The Riady Family and John Huang: Access and Influence 
      with the Clinton White House...............................  1185
    Part B: Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie and His Relationship with 
      the Clinton Administration.................................  1347
    Part C: Johnny Chung: His Unusual Access to the White House 
      and His Political Donations................................  1671
    Part D: The Sioeng Family's Contributions and Foreign Ties...  2131
Chapter V: The Failure of Government Agencies to Vigorously 
  Pursue Campaign Violations.....................................  2933
    Part A: Jorge Castro's Illegal Campaign Contributions, and 
      Why They Were Never Prosecuted.............................  2933
    Part B: FEC Enforcement Practices and the Case Against 
      Foreign National Thomas Kramer: Did Prominent DNC 
      Fundraisers Receive Special Treatment?.....................  2983
Chapter VI: The Hudson Casino Rejection..........................  3111
Chapter VII: Procedural Background of the Campaign Finance 
  Investigation..................................................  3863

                                 VIEWS

Additional views of Hon. Dan Burton..............................  3881
Additional views of Hon. Pete Sessions...........................  3920
Minority views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. 
  Robert E. Wise, Jr., Hon. Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, 
  Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, Hon. Gary A. Condit, Hon. Bernard 
  Sanders, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, 
  Hon. Chaka Fattah, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis J. 
  Kucinich, Hon. Rod R. Blagojevich, Hon. Danny K. Davis, Hon. 
  Thomas H. Allen, and Hon. Harold E. Ford, Jr...................  3923
Additional views of Hon. Thomas M. Barrett.......................  4878



                                                 Union Calendar No. 471
105th Congress                                            Rept. 105-829
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 2d Session                                                 Vol. 4 of 4
_______________________________________________________________________


   INVESTIGATION OF POLITICAL FUNDRAISING IMPROPRIETIES AND POSSIBLE 
                           VIOLATIONS OF LAW

                                ______
                                

November 5, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


  Mr. Burton, from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
                        submitted the following

                              SIXTH REPORT

                             together with

                     ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

    On October 8, 1998, the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight approved and adopted a report entitled, 
``Investigation of Political Fundraising Improprieties and 
Possible Violations of Law.'' The chairman was directed to 
transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. TOM LANTOS, HON. ROBERT E. 
   WISE, JR., HON. MAJOR R. OWENS, HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS, HON. PAUL E. 
 KANJORSKI, HON. GARY A. CONDIT, HON. BERNARD SANDERS, HON. CAROLYN B. 
MALONEY, HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. CHAKA FATTAH, HON. ELIJAH E. 
CUMMINGS, HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH, HON. ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, HON. DANNY 
        K. DAVIS, HON. THOMAS H. ALLEN, HON. HAROLD E. FORD, JR.


                                CONTENTS                                
INTRODUCTION                                                            
I. The Investigation was Characterized by Partisanship, Mishaps, Abuses 
 of Power, and Waste                                                    
    A. The Investigation Was Partisan                                   
        1. Chairman Burton Promised to Conduct a Fair Investigation     
        2. Chairman Burton Later Admitted that He Is ``After'' the      
         President                                                      
        3. Over Ninety-Nine Percent of Subpoenas and Other Information  
         Requests Targeted Democrats                                    
        4. Republican Campaign Finance Abuses Have Been Routinely       
         Ignored                                                        
            a. Republican Favors for the Tobacco Industry               
            b. Republican Conduit Contributions                         
            c. Republican Fundraising on Federal Property               
            d. Illegal Foreign Contributions to Republicans             
            e. The Activities of Triad Management Services              
        5. The Majority Doctored Evidence and Suppressed Testimony to   
         Make Democrats Appear Culpable                                 
            a. The Webster Hubbell Tapes                                
            b. Other Examples of the Selective Use of Evidence          
    B. The Investigation Was Plagued by Mishaps                         
        1. Subpoenas Issued to the Wrong Individuals                    
        2. The Committee's ``Stake Out'' of Felix Ma                    
        3. The Committee's Release of the President's Private Fax Number
        4. The Committee's Actions in Taiwan                            
        5. Insensitivity to the Concerns of Asian-Americans             
        6. Republican Acknowledgment of the Committee's Incompetence    
    C. The Committee Abused Its Powers                                  
        1. The Committee Abused the Subpoena Power                      
        2. The Committee Abused the Deposition Power                    
        3. The Committee Abused the Immunity Power                      
        4. The Committee Abused the Contempt Power                      
        5. The Committee Abused the Power to Release Documents          
        6. The Committee Leaked Confidential Information                
        7. The Committee Excluded the Minority from Witness Interviews  
        8. The Committee Violated its Own Budget Rules                  
    D. The Committee Wasted Taxpayer Dollars                            
        1. The Committee Has the Largest Budget of Any Committee in the 
         History of Congress                                            
        2. The Committee Spent Over $7.4 Million on the Campaign Finance
         Investigation                                                  
        3. The Investigation Is the Most Expensive and Least Productive 
         Congressional Investigation in History                         
        4. The Investigation Squandered Taxpayer Dollars                
        5. The Investigation Duplicated the Senate Investigation        
        6. The Investigation Duplicated Other House Investigations      
        7. The Investigation Imposed Large Costs on Federal Agencies    
        8. The Total Costs to the Taxpayer from Congressional Campaign  
         Finance Investigations Exceed $23 Million                      
        9. The Investigation Imposed Large Costs on the DNC and Other   
         Private Parties                                                
    E. The Investigation Was Widely Criticized                          
        1. The Views of Editorial Boards                                
        2. The Views of Columnists and Commentators                     
II. The Majority Repeatedly Made Sensational Allegations That Were False
 or Unsubstantiated                                                     
    A. John Huang Did Not ``Launder Money'' through David Wang          
    B. The White House Videotapes Were Not ``Cut Off Intentionally'' or 
     ``Altered''                                                        
    C. The Hudson Casino Decision Was Not a ``Political Payoff''        
    D. There Is No Evidence That the President Created a National       
     Monument in Utah ``in Exchange for Money from Indonesia's Lippo    
     Group''                                                            
    E. The Hubbell Tapes Did Not Show a ``Payoff'' to Webster Hubbell   
    F. The Immunized Witnesses Did Not have ``Direct Knowledge About How
     the Chinese Government Made Illegal Campaign Contributions''       
    G. President Clinton Did Not ``Endorse'' the Candidacy of a Foreign 
     Leader in Exchange for Campaign Contributions                      
    H. The Committee Failed to Substantiate the Existence of a ``Massive
     Scheme'' to Funnel Foreign Contributions into the U.S              
    I. Other Unsubstantiated Republican Allegations                     
III. The Majority Report Contains Little New Information                
    A. Introduction                                                     
    B. Evaluation of Chapter II of the Majority Report                  
    C. Evaluation of Chapter III of the Majority Report                 
    D. Evaluation of Chapter IV of the Majority Report                  
        1. Allegations Relating to the Riady Family and John Huang      
        2. Allegations Relating to Charlie Trie                         
        3. Allegations Relating to Johnny Chung                         
        4. Allegations Relating to Ted Sioeng                           
    E. Evaluation of Chapter V of the Majority Report                   
        1. Allegations Relating to Jorge Castro Barredo and Charles     
         Intriago                                                       
        2. Allegations Relating to Thomas Kramer and Howard Glicken     
    F. Evaluation of Chapter VI of the Majority Report                  
IV. A Review of Questionable Republican Campaign Finance Practices      
    A. Conduit Contribution Schemes and Republican Campaigns            
        1. The Prohibition on Conduit Contributions                     
        2. Conduit Contribution Scheme Involving Majority Whip DeLay,   
         Peter Cloeren, and Brian Babin                                 
        3. Conduit Contribution Scheme Involving Thomas Stewart         
        4. Conduit Contribution Scheme Involving Simon Fireman and Aqua-
         Leisure Industries, Inc                                        
        5. Conduit Contribution Scheme Involving Empire Sanitary        
         Landfill                                                       
        6. Conduit Contribution Scheme Involving DeLuca Liquor & Wine   
         Ltd                                                            
    B. Republicans Have Received Foreign Campaign Contributions         
        1. Foreign Contributions Solicited by Rep. Jay Kim              
        2. Foreign Contributions Solicited by Haley Barbour             
        3. Additional Foreign Contributions Solicited by the NPF        
        4. Contributions to Republicans from Ted Sioeng                 
            a. Ted Sioeng's Relationship with Matt Fong                 
            b. Ted Sioeng's Relationship with Speaker Gingrich          
            c. Unanswered Questions Regarding Mr. Sioeng's Relationship 
             with Matt Fong and Speaker Gingrich                        
        5. Other Foreign Contributions to Republicans                   
        6. Contributions to Republicans from U.S. Subsidiaries of       
         Foreign Companies                                              
    C. The Relationship between Access to Republican Leaders and        
     Campaign Contributions                                             
        1. The Sale of Access by Republican Congressional Leaders       
        2. The Sale of Access by Prior Republican Administrations       
        3. Contributions That May Have Influenced Policy Decisions      
    D. Triad Management Services Engaged in Questionable Practices to   
     Support Republican Candidates                                      
        1. Background on Triad                                          
        2. Triad's Alleged Illegal Corporate Contributions              
        3. Triad's Alleged Schemes to Evade Contribution Limits         
        4. Triad's Possible Improper Coordination on Political          
         Advertisements                                                 
V. The Republican Congress has Blocked Campaign Finance Reform and      
 Played Politics with the Federal Election Commission                   
    A. The Republican Leadership Defeated Campaign Finance Reform       
     Legislation                                                        
        1. The Campaign Finance Reform Legislation                      
        2. Republican Efforts to Thwart Campaign Finance Reform         
        3. How Committee Members Voted                                  
    B. The Republican Leadership Sought to Hamstring the FEC            
        1. Efforts to Remove the FEC's General Counsel                  
        2. Efforts to Defund the FEC                                    
                                                                        
                                APPENDIX                                
Exhibit 1: Correspondence                                               
Exhibit 2: Minority Staff Reports                                       
Exhibit 3: Editorials                                                   
Exhibit 4: Columns and Opinions                                         
Exhibit 5: News Articles                                                
Exhibit 6: Cloeren Affidavit                                            
Exhibit 7: Documents Relating to Alleged Obstacles to the Committee's   
 Investigation                                                          
Exhibit 8: Documents Relating to Contributions to the Democratic Party  
Exhibit 9: Documents Relating to Charlie Trie                           
Exhibit 10: Documents Relating to Johnny Chung                          
Exhibit 11: Documents Relating to Ted Sioeng                            
Exhibit 12: Documents Relating to the National Policy Forum             
Exhibit 13: Documents Relating to the Republican National Committee     
                                                                        

                              INTRODUCTION

    Last year, House Speaker Newt Gingrich said that the 
Committee's campaign finance investigation ``may be the most 
historic investigation in the history of the United States.'' 
1 The investigation may be historic, but for all the 
wrong reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Speaker Ties Cash Scandal to Clinton, Gore, Washington Times 
(June 9, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As described in detail in Part I of these minority views, 
the Committee's campaign finance investigation has been the 
most partisan, unfair, and abusive investigation since the 
McCarthy hearings in the 1950s. It has also been the most 
expensive congressional investigation in history.
    Chairman Burton alleged at the outset of the investigation 
that ``this thing could end up being bigger than Watergate ever 
was'' and that he would prove the existence of a ``massive'' 
Chinese conspiracy to violate our campaign finance laws. But as 
described in Part II, Chairman Burton never substantiated these 
and many other well-publicized allegations. Unfortunately, the 
pattern of ``accuse first, investigate later'' became a 
hallmark of the investigation.
    Part III of these views responds to the major findings in 
the majority report. The Committee spent over $7 million on the 
campaign finance investigation, issued 1,285 subpoenas and 
information requests, took 161 depositions, and received 1.5 
million pages of documents, but found virtually no new 
information.
    The majority's investigation ignored Republican campaign 
finance abuses, targeting alleged Democratic violations in over 
99% of the subpoenas and document requests issued by Chairman 
Burton. In fact, campaign finance abuses are bipartisan. As 
documented in Part IV, some of the most serious allegations of 
campaign finance abuses involve Republicans, such as the 
substantial and credible evidence that Majority Whip Tom DeLay 
participated in an illegal conduit contribution scheme.
    The ultimate irony of the investigation may be that at the 
same time that the Committee spent millions of dollars 
investigating alleged Democratic campaign finance abuses, the 
majority of Committee Republicans supported the efforts of the 
Republican leadership to defeat campaign finance reform 
legislation and to hamstring the federal agency that is charged 
with enforcing campaign finance laws. Part V describes these 
efforts.

I. The Investigation Was Characterized by Partisanship, Mishaps, Abuses 
                          of Power, and Waste

    The Government Reform and Oversight Committee's campaign 
finance investigation was the most partisan, inept, abusive, 
and wasteful congressional investigation since the McCarthy 
hearings in the 1950s. According to Norman Ornstein, a 
congressional expert at the conservative American Enterprise 
Institute, ``the Burton investigation is going to be remembered 
as a case study in how not to do a congressional investigation 
and as a prime example of investigation as farce.'' 
2 According to the New York Times, the Committee's 
efforts are a ``House investigation travesty'' and a ``parody 
of a reputable investigation.'' 3 The Washington 
Post called the investigation ``its own cartoon, a joke and a 
deserved embarrassment.'' 4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ House Probe of Campaign Fund-Raising Uncovers Little, Los 
Angeles Times (May 2, 1998). This article and other news stories 
related to the campaign finance investigation are attached to this 
report as Exhibit 5.
    \3\ A House Investigation Travesty, New York Times (Apr. 12, 1997).
    \4\ Mr. Burton Should Step Aside, Washington Post (Mar. 20, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This section of the minority report describes the systemic 
problems that characterized the investigation since its 
beginning. It reviews the partisan motives that fueled the 
investigation, the majority's mishaps and mistakes, the 
persistent abuses of power that plagued the investigation, and 
the Committee's wasteful use of tax dollars.

                   A. The Investigation Was Partisan

1. Chairman Burton Promised to Conduct a Fair Investigation
    Even before Chairman Burton officially began his campaign 
finance investigation, serious questions were raised by others 
in the Republican party as to whether the probe would be 
partisan and unfair.5 Aware of these concerns, 
Chairman Burton pledged to conduct a fair and bipartisan 
investigation. Chairman Burton told the Capitol Hill newspaper 
Roll Call, ``As chairman I have to be as non-partisan as 
possible. I have to be as fair as humanly possible.'' 
6 He was later quoted in the New York Daily News as 
saying, ``I look at myself as in a quasi-judicial position, and 
I think it's important that I appear as fair as possible.'' 
7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ See, e.g., The Wrong Man for a Sensitive Job, New York Times 
(Nov. 20, 1996).
    \6\ Burton Promises to Put Partisanship Aside in Role as Oversight 
Chairman, Roll Call (Nov. 14, 1996).
    \7\ Even GOP Wary of Burton, New York Daily News (June 8, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In an attempt to appear fair, Chairman Burton promised to 
look into allegations of both Republican and Democratic abuses. 
At the April 10, 1997, Committee meeting, Chairman Burton 
stated that ``substantial evidence of improprieties will be 
pursued wherever it leads. . . . [T]he Committee's current 
protocol does not . . . limit the Committee from taking 
investigative leads whenever they go wherever they go within 
the Committee's jurisdiction.'' 8 Similarly, as the 
first hearings approached, Chairman Burton said, ``Well, I'm a 
partisan Republican, but I will tell you, we're going to be 
very fair and judicial in our approach to handling this whole 
scandal. And where Republicans have made mistakes and broken 
the law, we're going to try to get at that as well.'' 
9 In his opening statement at the first hearing, 
Chairman Burton added, ``the committee also is examining 
matters relating to the Republican National Committee and will 
continue to follow the facts wherever they lead us, in either 
party.'' 10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Chairman Burton, House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, Business Meeting (Apr. 10, 1997).
    \9\ NBC's Meet the Press (Sept. 14, 1997).
    \10\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing on 
Campaign Finance Improprieties and Possible Violations of Law, 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (Oct. 8, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A number of other Republican Committee members also assured 
the public that the investigation would look into all 
allegations of campaign finance abuses, including possible 
abuses by members of Congress. Rep. Christopher Shays noted, 
``our Chairman said that we have the right to look at 
wrongdoing wherever we find it. . . . It is so clear that even 
an idiot would understand we have jurisdiction over the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branch. . . . This 
Committee has 360 degrees [of] jurisdiction.'' 11 
Rep. Connie Morella added, ``the wording in the protocol that 
we have before us is the kind of scope that allows us . . . to 
go beyond the executive branch and beyond government agencies. 
So if it is congressional, so be it, it is congressional.'' 
12
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Rep. Shays, House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, Business Meeting (Apr. 10, 1997).
    \12\ Rep. Morella, House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, Business Meeting (Apr. 10, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Chairman Burton Later Admitted That He Is ``After'' the President

    Despite the public pronouncements of Chairman Burton and 
other Republican Committee members that the investigation would 
be fair and nonpartisan, the Chairman eventually admitted that 
his goal was to remove the President and damage the Democratic 
party. In an April 1998 interview discussing President Clinton 
with the Indianapolis Star newspaper, Chairman Burton said, 
``If I could prove 10 percent of what I believe happened, he'd 
be gone. This guy's a scumbag. That's why I'm after him.'' 
13 After the interview, the paper reported that 
Chairman Burton ``is a man on a mission: to link the president 
of the United States to an indictable offense.'' 14
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Burton's Pursuit of President, Indianapolis Star (Apr. 16, 
1998).
    \14\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton reportedly expressed similar views at a 
1997 luncheon hosted by GOPAC, the Republican political action 
committee formerly headed by House Speaker Newt Gingrich. 
According to a report in Esquire magazine:

        Brashly acknowledging his own partisan motives during 
        this closed meeting of political allies, Burton tells 
        the GOPAC crowd that the current fundraising scandal 
        will turn out to be the Democrats' Watergate, resulting 
        in a net gain of ``twenty to twenty-four seats'' for 
        the GOP in next year's congressional elections. ``It's 
        over!'' he hollers.15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ All the President's Menaces, Esquire (August 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Over Ninety-Nine Percent of Subpoenas and Other Information Requests 
        Targeted Democrats

    The number of subpoenas and information requests issued to 
investigate allegations of Democratic fundraising abuses and 
the number of subpoenas and information requests issued to 
investigate allegations of Republican fundraising abuses are 
not a matter of subjective dispute. These statistics show that 
Chairman Burton used his unilateral subpoena power to target 
Democrats almost exclusively. Out of the 1,285 information 
requests, depositions, or interviews issued or taken by 
Chairman Burton through September 30, 1998, 1,272--over 99%--
targeted allegations of Democratic fundraising abuses. This 
statistic includes 674 out of 684 subpoenas for documents, 159 
out of 161 depositions, all 18 formal interviews, 294 out of 
295 document requests and interrogatories, and all 118 
outstanding deposition requests and all 9 outstanding interview 
requests.
    Objective sources recognized the unfairness of such a 
focus. Congressional Quarterly (CQ) observed, ``Unlike 
[Senator] Thompson, who sought a degree of evenhandedness, the 
more partisan House is looking almost exclusively at Democratic 
abuses, avoiding inquiries into questionable practices employed 
by Republicans to raise record-shattering amounts of money in 
1996.'' 16 According to CQ, ``[e]ven some 
Republicans concede that the probe's credibility is on the line 
because of its one-party focus.'' 17
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ House GOP Casts Wide Net in Renewed Scandal Hunt, 
Congressional Quarterly (Jan. 17, 1998).
    \17\ Burton Panel Faces Tough Fight Over Scope, Procedures, 
Congressional Quarterly (Apr. 5, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the statistics from the Committee's investigation 
might suggest that wrongdoing has been committed by only the 
Democratic party, statistics from the nonpartisan Federal 
ElectionCommission paint the opposite picture. At the March 31, 
1998, Committee hearing, both FEC Vice Chairman Scott E. Thomas and 
General Counsel Lawrence Noble testified that FEC investigations of 
campaign finance violations are almost equally divided between 
Republicans and Democrats:

          Mr. Waxman. Based on your experience at the Federal 
        Election Commission, are Democrats responsible for 99 
        percent of the campaign finance abuses?
          Mr. Noble. Not based on my experience. I think it's 
        spread pretty evenly.
          Mr. Waxman. It's what?
          Mr. Noble. It's spread pretty evenly, I think.
          Mr. Waxman. Spread pretty evenly. Can you estimate 
        what percentage of the violations you investigate are 
        Democratic, and what percentage are Republican?
          Mr. Noble. I don't have that. Our office does not 
        keep figures in that regard.
          Mr. Thomas. Mr. Chairman, I might be able to help you 
        there. I have been sensitive to this kind of criticism 
        since a recent Wall Street Journal article came out a 
        while back, wherein it suggested that someone was under 
        the impression 9 out of 10 of our cases were against 
        Republicans. And I had my assistant go back and look at 
        what the status was at the beginning of 1995 and again 
        at the beginning of 1998. Of the active cases that we 
        had going back in the beginning of 1995, as I strike 
        the percentages of the cases involving Republicans 
        versus Democrats, 53 percent were involving Democrats; 
        the remaining percentage, out of 100 percent, would 
        have involved Republicans, roughly the same percentage 
        in the beginning of 1998.18
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing on 
Federal Election Commission Enforcement Actions: Foreign Campaign 
Contributions and Other FECA Violations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 108-109 
(Mar. 31, 1998).

    It is wrong to use taxpayer funds to engage in partisan 
political activities. Yet the one-sided focus of the 
investigation shows that this is exactly what transpired. The 
Committee's extensive powers and resources were used virtually 
exclusively to target Democrats for partisan advantage. As the 
statistics and a review of the record make clear, substantial 
evidence of Republican abuses was simply ignored.

4. Republican Campaign Finance Abuses Have Been Routinely Ignored

    Although Chairman Burton promised that ``substantial 
evidence of improprieties will be pursued wherever it leads,'' 
the Chairman routinely ignored substantial evidence of 
Republican campaign finance improprieties. In fact, Chairman 
Burton ignored Republican abuses even while investigating 
parallel allegations against Democrats. Examples of these 
Republican campaign finance abuses are summarized below and are 
discussed in more detail in part IV.
            a. Republican Favors for the Tobacco Industry
    Chairman Burton held four days of hearings in January 1998 
investigating the alleged influence campaign contributions to 
the Democratic Party had on an Interior Department decision to 
deny an Indian casino application in Hudson, 
Wisconsin.19 Foreign campaign contributions were not 
at issue in this inquiry. Specifically, Chairman Burton 
investigated whether a former Democratic National Committee 
treasurer used his influence to advance the decision, and 
whether then-DNC chairman Don Fowler called the Interior 
Department on behalf of DNC contributors who opposed the 
casino. Yet despite numerous requests from the minority, 
Chairman Burton refused to investigate similar allegations 
involving Republicans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on the Department of the Interior's Denial of the Wisconsin Chippewa's 
Casino Application, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., v. 1 (Jan. 21, 22, 28, 29, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, it was widely reported that the Republican 
leadership included a $50 billion tax credit for the tobacco 
industry in the 1997 balanced budget legislation after the 
Republican National Committee received $8.8 million in 
contributions from the industry. The Washington Post reported 
that during the budget negotiations, House Speaker Gingrich and 
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott ``insisted on a provision 
that would give tobacco companies a $50 billion credit against 
the sum they had pledged to settle anti-tobacco litigation.'' 
20 According to the Post, Republican leaders ``were 
among Congress's top recipients of tobacco industry funds,'' 
and the tax credit was ``pushed'' by former RNC Chairman Haley 
Barbour, who became a tobacco industry lobbyist.21 
Nonetheless, Chairman Burton denied written requests made by 
the minority on June 10, 1997, August 29, 1997, and January 13, 
1998,22 as well as a request at the January 21, 
1998, Committee hearing,23 to investigate evidence 
of possible Republican favors in return for tobacco industry 
contributions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ How a $50 Billion ``Orphan'' Was Adopted, Washington Post 
(Aug. 17, 1997).
    \21\ Id.
    \22\ Letters from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (June 10, 1997; 
Aug. 29, 1997; and Jan. 13, 1998). A complete set of correspondence 
between Rep. Waxman and Chairman Burton (comprising 143 letters from 
Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton and 44 letters from Chairman Burton to 
Rep. Waxman), and other correspondence related to the investigation, is 
attached to this report as Exhibit 1.
    \23\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on the Department of the Interior's Denial of the Wisconsin Chippewa's 
Casino Application, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (Jan. 21, 22, 28, 29, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the January 21, 1998, hearing, Chairman Burton used a 
chart to explain why theCommittee was investigating the Hudson 
casino matter. Chairman Burton's chart read as follows:



                              Hudson Facts

        1. Law requires consultation with tribes
        2. Lobbyists were hired to stop progress
        3. Tribal meetings with big contributors: $400,000 
        (opponents) vs. $6,000 (proponents)
         4. $350,000 of contributions to Democrats
        5. Duffy and Collier leave Interior to work for 
        Shakopees
        6. Collier carried $50,000 check to DNC on behalf of 
        Shakopees 24
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Id. at 105.

    At the same hearing, Rep. Waxman used a similar chart to 
explain why the Republican ties to the tobacco industry should 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
be investigated. Rep. Waxman's chart read as follows:



                             Tobacco Facts

        1. Tobacco industry hires former RNC Chairman Haley 
        Barbour as their lobbyist.
        2. Tobacco industry gives $8.8 million to Republican 
        party since 1995; the three biggest contributors to the 
        Republican party were all tobacco companies.
        3. Speaker Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Lott 
        insert a secret provision into the budget bill that 
        gives the tobacco industry a $50 billion tax break.
        4. With no discussion on the merits, the largest 
        special interest tax break in history is 
        passed.25
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Id. at 167.

    As Rep. Waxman noted in his opening statement at the 
January 21 hearing, ``The $50 billion giveaway to the tobacco 
industry is indistinguishable from today's hearing. In fact, 
the only difference in the matter is the industry's 
contributions and the benefit they received dwarf today's 
subject.'' 26 Of course, a second distinction is 
that the Hudson casino matter involved contributions to 
Democrats while the tobacco industry tax break involved 
contributions to Republicans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Id. at 13-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This was not the only questionable activity involving the 
Republican leadership and the tobacco industry that the 
Committee failed to investigate. On July 20, 1998, the minority 
staff released a report entitled, ``Air Tobacco: Campaign 
Travel on Tobacco Industry Jets,'' 27 which analyzed 
the tobacco industry's practice of providing its corporate 
aircraft to congressional leaders and political parties for 
campaign activities. The report found that (1) the tobacco 
industry provides more subsidized campaign travel to 
congressional leaders and political parties than any other 
corporate special interest and (2) the beneficiary of 
subsidized campaign travel from the tobacco industry is the 
Republican congressional leadership and Republican party 
organizations. In total, the report found that the Republican 
leadership and Republican organizations reported 84 separate 
disbursements totaling as much as $244,000 to the tobacco 
industry for campaign travel from January 1, 1997, through May 
31, 1998. The tobacco industry was reimbursed only for the cost 
of first class travel--far below the actual cost of flying on 
corporate jets--resulting in a subsidy to the recipients 15 to 
45 times greater than the amount of the disbursements. Reports 
by Democratic campaign organizations, meanwhile, indicated no 
disbursements to the tobacco industry for travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Minority 
Staff Report, Air Tobacco: Campaign Travel on Tobacco Industry Jets 
(July 20, 1998). This staff report and other campaign finance reports 
issued by the minority are attached to this report as Exhibit 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As reported in the Washington Post, ``The nation's leading 
tobacco companies made their corporate jets available to 
Republican lawmakers and GOP committees for dozens of flights 
in the past year. . . . Much of the travel occurred as the 
tobacco companies were trying at first to get Congress to 
approve legislation to give them some protection from mounting 
lawsuits, and later as the companies successfully lobbied 
Republican senators to kill that legislation after the lawsuit 
protection was removed.'' 28 Rep. John Linder, 
chairman of the National Republican Congressional Committee, 
responded that he sees ``nothing wrong'' with the travel. It is 
``another big perk we get,'' he said, ``I don't apologize for 
it.'' 29
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Tobacco's Influence Takes Flight in GOP, Washington Post (July 
20, 1998).
    \29\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Republican Conduit Contributions
    Chairman Burton held a hearing to investigate allegations 
that the DNC received illegal conduit contributions made by 
Charlie Trie through Manlin Foung, Joseph Landon, and David 
Wang.\30\ He also held separate hearings on alleged conduit 
contributions to Democrats involving German businessman Thomas 
Kramer \31\ and a Venezuelan banking family.\32\ Yet Chairman 
Burton refused to investigate evidence that Republicans 
received similar conduit contributions.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing on 
Conduit Payments to the Democratic National Committee, 105th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (Oct. 9, 1997).
    \31\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing on 
Federal Election Commission Enforcement Actions: Foreign Campaign 
Contributions and Other FECA Violations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 108-109 
(Mar. 31, 1998).
    \32\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing on 
Venezuelan Money and the Presidential Election, 105 Cong., 2d. Sess. 
(Apr. 30, 1988).
    \33\ See, e.g., letters from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Apr. 
29, 1997 and May 8, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, on August 6, 1998, the minority members of the 
Committee (with the exception of Rep. Turner who recused 
himself from the issue) requested that Chairman Burton schedule 
hearings to investigate an allegation that the third-ranking 
Republican in the House, Majority Whip Tom DeLay, orchestrated 
conduit contributions to the campaign of Brian Babin, a 
Republican congressional candidate in Texas in 1996.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Letter from Reps. Waxman, Lantos, et al. to Chairman Burton 
(Aug. 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to an affidavit from Republican contributor Peter 
F. Cloeren, Jr., Rep. DeLay advised Mr. Cloeren on ways to 
funnel illegal campaign contributions to the Babin 
campaign.\35\ Although Mr. Cloeren already contributed the 
maximum amount allowed by law, Mr. Cloeren stated that Rep. 
DeLay advised him that ``additional vehicles'' could be used to 
send money to Mr. Babin, including Triad Management Services 
and the campaigns of other Republican candidates. Mr. Cloeren 
also admitted that he contributed $37,000 to Mr. Babin through 
employees, who contributed $1,000 each with the understanding 
that Mr. Cloeren would reimburse them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Affidavit of Peter F. Cloeren (Aug. 6, 1998). This affidavit 
is attached to this report as Exhibit 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These allegations clearly warrant further investigation. 
Not only do they involve the House Majority Whip, a high-
ranking elected official, but they offer an unusual potential 
for illuminating hearings because the source of the conduit 
contributions appears to be willing to talk about the 
contributions voluntarily. Nevertheless, Chairman Burton has 
not even responded to the minority's request for an 
investigation.
    The Cloeren contributions were not the only conduit 
contributions to Republican candidates. During the October 9, 
1997, Committee hearing, Rep. Waxman noted, ``Conduit payments 
are, of course, illegal; unfortunately, they've also become 
much too common. . . . The Federal Election Commission is 
currently investigating 27 conduit payments involving 214 
individuals.'' \36\ Yet despite minority requests, Chairman 
Burton refused to investigate any conduit contributions 
involving Republicans, including: Simon Fireman, the former 
vice chairman of the Dole campaign's finance committee, who 
pled guilty to making more than $100,000 in illegal conduit 
contributions; \37\ Nevada-based Deluca Liquor & Wine, Ltd. and 
its vice president, Ray Norvell, who pleaded guilty to making 
$10,000 in illegal conduit contributions to the Dole campaign; 
\38\ and Pennsylvania-based Empire Sanitary Landfill, which 
pleaded guilty to funneling $129,000 in corporate funds to 
campaigns through its employees, including $80,000 to the Dole 
campaign.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing on 
Conduit Payments to the Democratic National Committee, 105th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (Oct. 9, 1997).
    \37\ See Ex-Dole Finance Official Is Fined for Illegal Gifts, 
Washington Post (Oct. 24, 1996).
    \38\ See LV Executive Admits Dole Contribution, Las Vegas Review-
Journal (June 6, 1998).
    \39\ See Firm to Pay $8 Million Fine for Illegal Campaign Gifts, 
Washington Post (Oct. 9, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. Republican Fundraising on Federal Property
    Chairman Burton extensively investigated allegations that 
President Clinton and Vice President Gore used the White House 
and other federal property, such as Air Force I, to solicit 
campaign contributions.\40\ Yet at the same time he was 
investigating fundraising by Democrats on federal property, 
Chairman Burton refused requests from the minority to 
investigate evidence that Republicans have used federal 
property for fundraising.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ See, e.g., Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight to the Executive Office of the President (Mar. 4, 1997) 
(The subpoena included 45 separate requests for ``all records relating 
to'' over 200 different entities, persons, and executive branch 
functions, including all official delegation trips abroad, fundraising 
events and activities, and guest lists for various official and party 
activities).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, although White House videotapes clearly show 
that events were held for major Republican contributors in the 
Reagan White House,\41\ Chairman Burton denied minority 
requests to investigate these events.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas, 105th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 163 (Nov. 6, 7, 1997).
    \42\ See e.g., Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (June 10, 
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additionally, Republicans in Congress--led by Speaker 
Gingrich--have used federal property for fundraising purposes. 
Invitations to the 1995 Republican House-Senate dinner put a 
price tag on access to the Republican leadership in federal 
buildings: $15,000 contributors were invited to a ``Senate 
Majority Leader's Breakfast'' hosted by Senator Bob Dole in the 
``Senate Caucus Room,'' and $45,000 contributors were invited 
to a luncheon hosted by Speaker Gingrich in the ``Great Hall of 
the Library of Congress.'' \43\ Nevertheless, despite the 
similarities between the Republican practices in Congress and 
the Democratic practices in the White House, Chairman Burton 
refused to respond to minority requests to investigate the 
congressional practices.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Waxman Cites Republicans for ``Selling Access,'' Washington 
Post (Mar. 11, 1997). See also Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman 
Burton (Mar. 13, 1997).
    \44\ See Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (June 10, 
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. Illegal Foreign Contributions to Republicans
    One major focus of Chairman Burton's investigation was to 
determine whether there was a concerted effort by the White 
House or the DNC to solicit illegal foreign campaign 
contributions. Yet Chairman Burton was reluctant to investigate 
significant evidence that Speaker Gingrich and other Republican 
leaders may have solicited illegal foreign contributions.
    One of the primary figures investigated by Chairman Burton 
was Ted Sioeng, who was described by the Chairman as ``an 
Indonesian-born businessman who travels on a Belize passport, 
suspected by committee members of working along with his 
family, on behalf of the Chinese Government interests in the 
United States.'' \45\ According to Chairman Burton, Mr. Sioeng 
``has a major stake'' in Red Pagoda cigarettes, which `` is 
owned by the Chinese Government, and it is a convenient way to 
funnel money into campaigns in the United States by Ted 
Sioeng.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ Congressional Record, H4545 (June 11, 1998).
    \46\ Congressional Record, H3058 (May 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the course of the Committee's investigation, 
evidence emerged that linked Mr. Sioeng to Speaker Gingrich. At 
his deposition, for example, California State Treasurer Matt 
Fong, a Republican, testified that he arranged for Mr. Sioeng 
to meet privately with Speaker Gingrich in the Speaker's 
office.\47\ According to press accounts, days after this 
meeting Mr. Sioeng contributed $50,000 through his daughter's 
company, Panda Industries, to the National Policy Forum, a 
subsidiary of the RNC,\48\ and ``sat in a place of honor next 
to Gingrich . . . [at a] reception for Gingrich at a Beverly 
Hills hotel.'' \49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Deposition of Matthew K. Fong, House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, 66-68 (Mar. 2, 1998). All depositions referenced 
in this section, unless otherwise noted, were taken by the House 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.
    \48\ State Treasurer Linked to Asian Funds, Los Angeles Times (Feb. 
25, 1998).
    \49\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rep. Waxman repeatedly wrote Chairman Burton to request 
further investigation of the ties between Mr. Sioeng and 
Speaker Gingrich.\50\ On June 11, 1998, for example, Rep. 
Waxman wrote Chairman Burton to request that Chairman Burton 
fulfill the commitment he made at the April 30, 1998, Committee 
meeting when he pledged that ``our entire investigation 
involving Ted Sioeng and the foreign money he gave the 
campaigns is exploring both Democrat and Republican 
contributions.'' \51\ Chairman Burton, however, never responded 
to these requests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ See, e.g., Letters from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Mar. 
20, 1998 and June 11, 1998).
    \51\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (June 11, 1998) 
(quoting Apr. 30, 1998, Committee meeting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton also refused to investigate properly 
evidence that former RNC Chairman Haley Barbour used the 
National Policy Forum to solicit foreign contributions from 
Hong Kong businessman Ambrous Young. According to news reports 
and the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee investigation, 
the RNC received millions of dollars in last-minute campaign 
funds in 1994 after Mr. Barbour secured $2.2 million in loan 
guarantees from Mr. Young.\52\ Although Chairman Burton at 
first agreed to minority requests to investigate the NPF 
allegations (and even sent subpoenas to the NPF, Ambrous Young, 
and others involved in the transaction),\53\ Chairman Burton 
dropped the investigation as soon as it became clear that the 
continued investigation of this issue would require Chairman 
Burton to issue a subpoena to Mr. Barbour. In fact, Chairman 
Burton never even responded to Rep. Waxman's June 17, 1997, 
letter requesting that Chairman Burton issue a subpoena to Mr. 
Barbour.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ The G.O.P.'s Own China Connection, Time (May 5, 1997).
    \53\ Subpoenas from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to: Benton L. Becker (June 5, 1997); NPF (June 5, 1997); 
Richard Richards (July 31, 1997); Signet Bank (June 5, 1997); Ambrous 
Young (June 5, 1997); Young Brothers Development (USA), Inc. (June 5, 
1997); Young Brothers Development Co., Ltd. (June 5, 1997); and 
Committee document request to the RNC (June 6, 1997).
    \54\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (June 17, 1997) 
(quoting Letter from Richard Richards to Haley Barbour (Sept. 17, 
1996)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There also were a number of allegations involving Chairman 
Burton's relationships with foreign governments and entities 
that were not investigated by the Committee. These were 
described in news articles in the Washington Post, New York 
Times, and many other papers.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ See, e.g., Pakistan Lobbyist's Memo Alleges Shakedown by House 
Probe Leader, Washington Post (Mar. 19, 1997); Representative Is 
Accused of Pressuring a Lobbyist, New York Times (Mar. 19, 1997); FBI 
Probes Funds Charge Against Burton, Washington Post (Mar. 22, 1997); 
House Chairman Linked to Lobbyist for Mobutu, New York Times (May 15, 
1997); Burton, Others, Accepted Illegal Funds, The Hill (Apr. 16, 
1997); Education Dept. Official Says Burton Pressured Him On Behalf of 
Contributor Who Runs Caribbean School, Roll Call (May 12, 1997); Burton 
Echoed Turkish Line After Interest Group Donations, The Hill (May 28, 
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            e. The Activities of Triad Management Services
    Even when Chairman Burton publicly promised in Committee 
meetings that the Committee would investigate allegations of 
Republican abuses, he later refused to fulfill these promises. 
One noteworthy example is the activities of Triad Management 
Services.
    According to news reports and evidence uncovered during the 
Senate investigation, Triad is a for-profit political 
consulting group founded by former Oliver North fundraiser 
Carolyn Malenick to serve as a ``rapid-fire'' attack mechanism 
for Republican candidates.\56\ The Wall Street Journal reported 
that Triad advised Republican contributors on ways to 
circumvent federal contribution limits to individual candidates 
by laundering funds through other candidates and PACs who would 
then make a contribution to the contributor's candidate of 
choice.\57\ According to Triad's attorney, Mark Braden, Triad 
spent over $3 million on ads against Democratic candidates in 
about 40 races across the country. The ads were paid for by two 
non-profit groups, Citizens for Reform and Citizens for the 
Republic Education Fund, funded by Triad.\58\ Triad was 
especially active in Kansas, where it spent over $1 million to 
assist Senator Sam Brownback and Reps. Vince Snowbarger, Todd 
Tiahrt, and Jim Ryun.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ For Their Targets, Mystery Groups' Ads Hit Like Attacks From 
Nowhere, Washington Post (Mar. 9, 1997).
    \57\ Adviser Helps Political Donors Spread Their Wealth, Wall 
Street Journal (Apr. 10, 1997).
    \58\ Bank Records Provide Insights into Triad Funding; Firm Put $1 
Million into Kansas Races, Kansas City Star (Oct. 31, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The minority repeatedly urged Chairman Burton to 
investigate these allegations. At the November 7, 1997, 
Committee hearing, Rep. Carolyn Maloney asked Chairman Burton, 
``I would like to know when you are going to issue subpoenas to 
the groups and individuals involved in the Triad Management 
scheme to violate or evade the campaign finance laws?'' 
Chairman Burton responded, ``We are looking at it. And we very 
well may do that.'' \59\ At the following hearing, Rep. Thomas 
Barrett asked Chairman Burton, ``What about the Triad 
Management? Are we looking at that, Mr. Chairman?'' Chairman 
Burton replied, ``I am going to send a subpoena to Triad. Does 
that satisfy you?'' \60\ One month later at another Committee 
hearing, Rep. Tom Lantos asked FBI Director Louis Freeh to look 
into Triad's activities. Following this request, Chairman 
Burton stated, ``There will be, as I said before, an 
investigation into the Triad matter.'' \61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on White House Compliance with Committee Subpoenas, 105th Cong., 1st 
sess., 204 (Nov. 6, 7, 1997).
    \60\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on Johnny Chung: His Unusual Access to the White House, His Political 
Donations and Related Matters, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 (Nov. 13, 14, 
1997).
    \61\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on the Current Implementation of the Independent Counsel Act, 105th 
Cong., 1st. Sess., v. 2, 47-49 (Dec. 9, 10, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite this pledge, Chairman Burton never investigated 
Triad's activities. Chairman Burton did not issue any subpoenas 
to Triad, Citizens for Reform, or Citizens for the Republic 
Education Fund; and no depositions were taken of Ms. Malenick, 
Mr. Braden, or any Triad employee.
    Ironically, at the same time he was refusing to investigate 
Triad for alleged federal elections law abuses, Chairman Burton 
was issuing 14 subpoenas to investigate allegations that the 
Kansas Democratic party evaded Kansas state elections law.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Subpoenas from the House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to: Richard Alldritt, Tom Beall, Steve Boyda, Micheline Z. 
Burger, Dorothy Davis, Henry Helgerson, Jerry Karr, Dennis Langley, 
Marge Petty, Doug Walker, and Constance Wray (Feb. 17, 1998). Tom Beall 
and Dennis Langley (Mar. 17, 1998); and the Kansas Democratic Party 
(Mar. 19, 1998). Several of these individuals first learned that they 
were subject to this investigation through press reports rather than 
from the Committee. See e.g., House Inquiry Turns to Kansas, Kansas 
City Star (Nov. 18, 1997); Fund-Raising Probe Heads for Kansas, Wichita 
Eagle (Nov. 19, 1997); Deposition of Douglas Walker, 44-45 (Feb. 23, 
1998); and Deposition of Senator Marge Petty, 39-40 (Feb. 24, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. The Majority Doctored Evidence and Suppressed Testimony to Make 
        Democrats Appear Culpable

    The partisanship that plagued the Committee's investigation 
went beyond targeting Democrats and ignoring Republican abuses. 
Chairman Burton also engaged in the practice of providing the 
public with selective evidence that implicated Democrats in 
wrongdoing while withholding exculpatory evidence. The most 
egregious example of this practice involved the selective 
release of edited transcripts of Webster Hubbell's prison phone 
recordings.
            a. The Webster Hubbell Tapes
    On April 30, 1998, Chairman Burton released to the media 
edited transcripts of 54 tapes of Mr. Hubbell's prison 
telephone conversations subpoenaed from the Bureau of 
Prisons.\63\ On May 3, Rep. Waxman wrote Chairman Burton to 
protest the release of the transcripts and to complain that 
Chairman Burton's ``distortion in both words and meaning is 
inexcusable.'' \64\ The following day, after reviewing the 
transcripts and the tapes, the minority staff issued a report 
detailing the ``numerous alterations and omissions in the 
Master Log released by Mr. Burton.'' \65\ This prompted Rep. 
Waxman to write to Chairman Burton, ``It now appears that it is 
you or your staff who have intentionally altered the 
transcripts of tapes. . . . [A]s far as I am aware, [this 
action] is without precedent in the history of the U.S. House 
of Representatives.'' \66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to Federal Prison Camp, Cumberland, Maryland (May 8, 1997).
    \64\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (May 8, 1998).
    \65\ Memorandum Re: Analysis of Hubbell Master Tape Log, Government 
Reform and Oversight Committee Minority Staff (May 4, 1998).
    \66\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (May 4, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Following Chairman Burton's release of the transcripts, it 
was widely reported that the transcripts omitted crucial 
portions of the conversations that contained exculpatory 
information.\67\ The Washington Post found, for example, that 
``the excerpts left out a statement by Hubbell that First Lady 
Hillary Rodham Clinton has `no idea' of billing irregularities 
at the Little Rock law firm where they both worked. Also 
deleted was an assertion by Hubbell that he was not being paid 
hush money to keep him from cooperating with independent 
counsel Kenneth W. Starr's Whitewater investigation.'' \68\ 
Side-by-side comparisons in the Washington Post and other 
newspapers of Chairman Burton's transcripts with what was 
actually said on the tapes revealed large discrepancies.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ See, e.g., Bridling G.O.P. Leader Says Tapes Speak for 
Themselves, New York Times (May 5, 1998); Burton Defends Hubbell 
Transcript Actions, Washington Post (May 5, 1998); Portions of Hubbell 
Prison Tapes Released, Los Angeles Times (May 5, 1998). See also 
letters from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (May 3, 1998 and May 4, 
1998): letters from Chairman Burton to Rep. Waxman (May 4, 1998); 
Memorandum Re: Analysis of Hubbell Master Tape Log, Government Reform 
and Oversight Committee Minority Staff (May 4, 1998).
    \68\ Democrats Hit Burton Over Tapes of Hubbell, Washington Post 
(May 4, 1998).
    \69\ See, e.g., Burton Defends Hubbell Transcript Actions, 
Washington Post (May 5, 1998); Excerpts from Prison Conversations With 
Hubbell, New York Times (May 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton's response to this criticism was to release 
the tapes in their entirety, without regard for Mr. Hubbell's 
legitimate privacy interests. As described by the Los Angeles 
Times, ``The tapes released Monday--or, more accurately, tossed 
through the air by a Burton aide to a horde of reporters in a 
House committee room--cover several months' worth of 
conversations `Inmate Hubbell,' as prison officials called him, 
had with his wife, sister, attorneys and daughters in 1996.'' 
\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ Portions of Hubbell Prison Tapes Released, Los Angeles Times 
(May 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the following days, even Republican members criticized 
Chairman Burton's actions. Ata closed Republican conference 
meeting, Speaker Gingrich told Chairman Burton, ``I'm embarrassed for 
you, I'm embarrassed for myself, and I'm embarrassed for the conference 
at the circus that went on at your committee.'' \71\ And Committee 
Republican Christopher Shays said that the release ``calls into 
question our investigation. It reduces credibility when these kinds of 
things happen.'' \72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ Burton Apologizes to GOP, Washington Post (May 7, 1998).
    \72\ Newt Defends Rep. In Tape Release, Associated Press (May 6, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, scores of newspaper editorials chastised 
Chairman Burton's conduct with headlines such as ``Tale of the 
Tapes--Rep. Dan Burton Brings a Serious Inquiry Into 
Disrepute'';\73\ ``Congressman Plays Dirty With Tapes'';\74\ 
and ``Abuse of Privacy; Burton Should Be Censured for Leaking 
Excerpts from Hubbell's Jail Conversations.'' \75\ The 
Washington Post editorialized, ``Dan Burton was every bit as 
irresponsible and ham-handed as has been charged in releasing, 
as he did, doctored transcripts of the former associate 
attorney general's prison phone conversations.'' \76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (May 8, 1998).
    \74\ Allentown Morning Call (May 5, 1998).
    \75\ Harrisburg Patriot (May 5, 1998).
    \76\ Mr. Burton's Transcripts, Washington Post (May 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Other Examples of the Selective Use of Evidence
    The Hubbell tapes were not the only instance in which 
Chairman Burton refused to present exonerating evidence. 
Chairman Burton rejected the minority's request to call a 
number of key witnesses to testify at the Hudson casino 
hearings in January 1998.\77\ For example, Chairman Burton 
rejected the minority's request to call to testify locally 
elected officials who were on the record against the proposal, 
including former Republican representative Steve Gunderson, 
Republican state representative Sheila Harsdorf, and Republican 
governor Tommy Thompson.\78\ These witnesses would have 
corroborated the Interior Department's contention that there 
was strong local opposition to the casino, which, rather than 
political contributions, was the crucial factor in the 
Department's decision to deny the casino application.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Jan. 
16, 1998).
    \78\ Letters from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Jan. 12, 1998 and 
Jan. 16, 1998).
    \79\ The majority also rejected the minority's request to call 
Deputy Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Hilda Manuel, to 
testify. Ms. Manuel is the top-ranking career civil servant at the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs and played a key role in the Department's 
decision to deny the application. She would have told the Committee 
about a conversation with Secretary Babbitt in which he said he did not 
want a role in deciding the outcome of the application--evidence that 
directly refuted the majority's allegations. Deposition of Hilda 
Manuel, 98 (Jan. 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, at the April 30, 1998, hearing on Venezuelan 
money in the 1992 campaign, Chairman Burton called two 
Assistant District Attorneys from Manhattan to testify about 
evidence they uncovered of foreign conduit contributions, which 
they had provided to the Department of Justice. The majority 
alleged that the Department of Justice failed to properly 
investigate the matter because it involved a Democratic 
fundraiser. Chairman Burton, however, did not include 
representatives of the Department of Justice at the hearing. In 
response to the minority's concerns that the hearing was one-
sided, Chairman Burton promised ``we will have the Justice 
Department up here. It's now 4 o'clock, and we didn't want to 
run this thing on into the late night hours, but we will have 
the Justice Department up here and we will ask them the 
questions that were raised today.'' \80\ Chairman Burton never 
in fact allowed the Justice Department to respond to the 
allegations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing on 
Venezuelan Money and Presidential Election, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 109 
(Apr. 30, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This pattern was repeated when Chairman Burton refused to 
allow Attorney General Janet Reno to testify at the August 4, 
1998, hearing on her decision not to appoint an independent 
counsel to investigate campaign finance violations. The 
independent counsel statute grants the authority to appoint an 
independent counsel solely to the Attorney General. Yet 
Chairman Burton allowed only the testimony of Department of 
Justice officials who recommended the appointment of an 
independent counsel. He refused to allow Attorney General Reno 
the opportunity to present the other side of the issue.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing on 
the Need for an Independent Counsel in the Campaign Finance 
Investigation, 105th Cong., 2d. Sess., 66-67 (Aug. 4, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              B. The Investigation Was Plagued by Mishaps

    From the outset of the investigation in January 1997, the 
Committee's investigation was characterized by mishaps and 
mistakes. The Committee issued subpoenas to the wrong 
witnesses, staked out the home of an innocent individual, 
released the President's private fax number, and caused an 
international incident on a trip to Taiwan. As the Atlanta 
Constitution commented in an editorial, ``These fellows make 
Inspector Clouseau look like Sherlock Holmes.'' \82\ The 
Committee's problems were summed up in one news article 
headline which read, ``Burton's fund-raising probe efforts 
seems jinxed.'' \83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ Clinton's Foes Bungle Again, Atlanta Constitution (May 5, 
1998).
    \83\ Burton's Fund-Raising Probe Effort Seems Jinxed, Associated 
Press (Sept. 17, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Subpoenas Issued to the Wrong Individuals

    On at least three separate occasions, Chairman Burton 
issued subpoenas to individuals with no connection to the 
campaign finance investigation. On April 3, 1997, the majority 
issued a subpoena for the bank records of Georgetown University 
history professor Chi Wang instead of Los Angeles DNC 
contributor Chi Ruan Wang.\84\ The 65-year-old professor told 
the Los Angeles Times, ``This is unbelievable. . . . I have no 
idea why they have my name.'' \85\ The Committee withdrew the 
subpoena, but rather than apologizing to Mr. Wang, a majority 
investigator implied to the Los Angeles Times that Professor 
Wang may have still been under investigation and refused to 
acknowledge that the majority had made a mistake, stating: 
``Whether [Professor Wang] deserves a subpoena or not, we 
haven't decided, We've put it on hold . . . we're not sure we 
made [a mistake].'' \86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to Chevy Chase Bank F.S.B. and the National Capital Bank of 
Washington (Apr. 3, 1997).
    \85\ Investigators Mistakenly Issue Subpoena to Wrong DNC Donor, 
Los Angeles Times (Apr. 15, 1997).
    \86\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In September 1997, the Committee issued a subpoena to Brian 
Kim, a mail carrier from Downey, California.\87\ A U.S. marshal 
tried to serve the subpoena on Mr. Kim at the U.S. Post Office. 
Unfortunately, the majority had identified the wrong Brian Kim. 
Mr. Kim said he was ``scared'' and ``embarrassed'' by the 
incident because his supervisor thought he had done something 
wrong. Mr. Kim called the majority and told them that they had 
the wrong person. He was told to write a letter to the majority 
confirming that fact, which he did. He never received any 
apology from the majority.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\ Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to Brian Kim (Sept. 2, 1997).
    \88\ Minority counsel phone interview of Brian Kim (Sept. 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On month later, in October 1997, the majority subpoenaed 
the phone records of LiPing Chen Hudson of Virginia.\89\ Mrs. 
Hudson and her husband became aware of the subpoena only after 
they received notice from their local phone carrier that the 
documents had been subpoenaed. The Hudsons have not been 
involved in any political campaign this decade, raising their 
concerns that Mrs. Hudson was targeted because of her ethnic 
background.\90\ In response to the error, majority spokesman 
told the Wall Street Journal, ``To err is human''; he then 
passed the blame onto the telephone company for not double-
checking with the majority before producing the records.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\ Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Inc. re: LiPing Chen Hudson (Sept. 
19, 1997).
    \90\ Letter from Rep. James P. Moran to Chairman Burton (Oct. 28, 
1997).
    \91\ House Panel's Campaign-Finance Probe Promises to be More 
Militant Than Senate's Investigation, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 5, 
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The Committee's ``Stake Out'' of Felix Ma

    As discussed below, the majority's practice is to conceal 
its domestic investigative travel from the minority. On a few 
occasions when minority staff was permitted to travel with the 
majority staff, however, the minority observed the majority 
staff use inappropriate and inept investigative techniques.
    For example, during a nine-day investigative trip to Los 
Angeles in August 1997, Committee staff conspicuously ``staked 
out'' the residence of Felix Ma, whom the Committee hoped to 
interview. As CBS reported on Face the Nation, when Mr. Ma 
returned home, the investigators ``became a virtual SWAT team, 
accosting him as he left his car.'' \92\ It turned out that the 
Committee staff was interrogating the wrong Felix Ma. 
Afterwards, Mr. Ma introduced the investigators to his wife as 
the ``political police.'' \93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ CBS's Face the Nation (Sept. 14, 1997).
    \93\ Burton's Men Nailed Wrong Ma, Washington Post (Sept. 12, 
1997). On the same trip, majority staff also snuck into and disrupted a 
condominium complex in a futile effort to locate a witness known as 
``Mr. Negara.'' In this instance, the majority staff rang the doorbell 
of a condominium unit occupied by a person with the last name Negara 
without knowing whether he was the ``Mr. Negara'' for whom they were 
looking. There was no answer. Despite the uncertainty that this was the 
correct individual, the staff trespassed onto the property by slipping 
into the building behind another individual. After knocking loudly and 
persistently on Mr. Negara's door and receiving no answer, the majority 
counsel knocked on neighboring doors, asked passersby if they knew Mr. 
Negara, and contacted the building manager and questioned her about Mr. 
Negara. The manager complained that these men had entered the building 
without permission from the residents or the management. Id.
    Also on the trip, the majority staff attempted to contact Cindy 
Tashima. Ms. Tashima, who is a ``diminutive'' woman and was home alone, 
was intimidated by the large men in dark suits repeatedly pounding on 
her door, who she later described as ``look[ing] like the Men in 
Black,'' Id.; CBS's Face the Nation (Sept. 14, 1997). Ms. Tashima's 
only connection to the investigation was that in 1990 she worked for 
less than one year at a company listed in 1991 as the employer of an 
individual who had made a suspect contribution. Letter from Rep. Waxman 
to Chairman Burton (Sept. 4, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The Committee's Release of the President's Private Fax Number

    Another mishap involved the accidental release of the 
President's private fax number. As the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution reported, ``The House committee investigating 
campaign fundraising briefly posted President Clinton's 
personal fax number on the Internet . . . despite a request 
that it keep the number private.'' \94\ The Committee obtained 
the fax number during a deposition and failed to redact the 
number before posting the deposition on its web page.\95\ As a 
result of this mistake, the President was forced to change the 
fax number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\ Clinton's Private Fax Number Put on Web in ``Lapse,'' Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution (Nov. 22, 1997).
    \95\ Deposition of Dick Morris, 90 (Aug. 21, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. The Committee Actions in Taiwan

    Chairman Burton sent five investigators to Taiwan in March 
1998 to interrogate high-level Taiwanese officials and 
businessmen about campaign contributions.\96\ The questioning 
enraged members of the Taiwanese Parliament who ``claimed that 
the dignity and judicial sovereignty of the nation has been 
infringed upon.'' \97\ According to a Taiwanese newspaper, the 
lawmakers ``condemned'' the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
allowing the investigators into the country and said ``that 
Taiwan's international image had been damaged,'' thus setting 
off an international diplomatic incident.\98\ As a result, 
``[t]he investigators left with little more than a long list of 
canceled meetings.'' \99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ Burton's Campaign-Finance Probe Is Drawing Criticism for 
Mounting Costs and Slow Progress, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 27, 1998).
    \97\ Visit by US Aides Sparks Controversy, Free China Journal (Mar. 
20, 1998).
    \98\ MOFA Rebuked Over Handling of Probe, China News (Mar. 19, 
1998).
    \99\ Burton's Campaign-Finance Probe Is Drawing Criticism for 
Mounting Costs and Slow Progress, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 27, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Insensitivity to the Concerns of Asian-Americans

    Unfortunately, many of the victims of the Committee's 
improper conduct were Asian-Americans who were subject to 
highly intrusive subpoenas seeking their personal banking 
records, credit card records, phone records, and travel 
records. In total, 423 out of the Committee's 684 documents 
subpoenas sought information relating to individuals with Asian 
surnames. The Committee also sought INS records for many Asian-
Americans, even though, in many instances, this information was 
decades old and had no relevance to this investigation.\100\ 
This raises serious questions of whether the investigation 
unfairly targeted Asian-Americans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ See, e.g., Committee document request to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (Aug. 13, 1997) (Committee requested that INS 
``provide the Committee with a copy of any I94 records and the entire 
contents of the alien registration a.k.a. `A' files'' for 47 
individuals).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the House and Senate campaign finance 
investigations, Asian-American activists expressed their 
concern that their political participation was being unfairly 
scrutinized. Karen Narasaki of the National Asian Pacific 
American Legal Consortium said that the investigations imposed 
``a chilling impact on Asian-American political involvement.'' 
\101\ Francey Lim Youngberg of the Asian Pacific American 
Institute for Congressional Studies commented, ``We don't 
condone any illegal activities, but we don't want the actions 
of a few individuals to taint a whole community.'' \102\ As a 
result of these concerns, a coalition of Asian-American civil 
rights groups filed a complaint with the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights in September 1997, alleging that public officials, 
the two political parties, and the media have ``engaged in a 
pattern of bias based on race and national origin.'' According 
to the complaint, there is a clear pattern of ``bias and 
unequal treatment destructive of the rights and interests of 
Asian-Pacific Americans and legal immigrants.'' \103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\ Asian-Americans See Rising Racism, USA Today (July 15, 1997).
    \102\ Asian American Donors Feel Stigmatized: DNC Puts Unwanted 
Focus on Growing Political Group, Washington Post (Sept. 8, 1997).
    \103\ Asian Pacific American Petition to the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights (Sept. 11, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the Committee's September 24, 1997, business meeting, 
Rep. Tom Lantos spoke about the harmful perceptions created by 
this investigation:

        I believe that there is a grave danger that 
        stereotyping and Asian bashing will become and, in many 
        instances, have become part and parcel of this 
        investigation. . . . This investigation, perhaps 
        inadvertently, has clearly contributed to stereotyping 
        and racebaiting. As one who is singularly conscious of 
        this issue, I want to call attention to this issue 
        because Asian-Americans have as much right to 
        participate in the political process as do Americans of 
        any other origin. Deliberately or otherwise, Asian-
        Americans have been the target of both of these 
        investigations to an unacceptable and overwhelming 
        degree . . . The last thing this country needs at this 
        stage is an attempt to whip up racial tensions and 
        Asian bashing. These hearings clearly have contributed 
        to a climate of xenophobia, which we ought to 
        avoid.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \104\ Rep. Lantos, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
Business Meeting (Sept. 27, 1997).

    This insensitivity to the concerns of Asian-Americans 
regarding the investigation was also evident in the full House. 
On July 22, 1997, Rep. Jack Kingston went to the House floor 
and stated that the illegal donations were ``only the tip of 
the egg roll.'' \105\ Majority Whip Tom DeLay of Texas mocked 
the DNC in a floor speech in July for accepting contributions 
from people with foreign-sounding names:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \105\ Rep. Kingston, Congressional Record, H5500 (July 22, 1997).

        If you have a friend by the name of Arief and Soraya, 
        and I cannot even pronounce the last name, Wiriadinata, 
        something like that, who donated $450,000 to the DNC 
        and was friends with a guy named Johnny Huang, and 
        later returned it because Wiriadinata could not explain 
        where it came from, then probably there is a high 
        probability that it's money from foreign nationals . . 
        .  I could go on with John Lee and Cheong Am, Yogesh 
        Ghandi, Ng Lap Seng, Supreme Master Suma Ching Hai and 
        George Psaltis.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ Rep. DeLay, Congressional Record, H5485 (July 14, 1998). 
After being criticized for his floor statement, however, Rep. DeLay 
said, ``In no way did I mean to suggest that Asian-Americans should not 
participate in our democracy,'' House GOP Whip Assailed Over Remarks on 
Foreign-Sounding Names, Apologizes, Boston Globe (July 18, 1998).

    Regrettably, this insensitivity reinforced the views of 
many who saw a racial bias in the Committee's investigation of 
alleged campaign finance abuses.

6. Republican Acknowledgment of the Committee's Incompetence

    These mishaps and mistakes have embarrassed even Republican 
members and staff. They have called the investigation ``a big 
disaster,'' \107\ ``incompetent,'' \108\ ``unprofessional,'' 
\109\ and ``[a]n embarrassment, like Keystone Cops.'' \110\ 
According to one former senior Republican investigator, Charles 
Little, ``[n]inety percent of the staff doesn't have a clue as 
to how to conduct an investigation.'' \111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \107\ GOP Memo Targets 3 N.E. Congressmen to Co-Opt Democrats, 
Boston Globe (May 6, 1998).
    \108\ Cox Leads Defeat of Burton, Waxman Agreement, Roll Call 
(Sept. 29, 1997).
    \109\ Burton Tape Fiasco Pitted Panel's Pros Vs. Pols, The Hill 
(May 13, 1998).
    \110\ CNN's Inside Politics (Sept. 16, 1997).
    \111\ Burton Tape Fiasco Pitted Panel's Pros Vs. Pols, The Hill 
(May 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority's first chief counsel, John Rowley, resigned 
in protest over the Committee's abuses. In his letter of 
resignation, Mr. Rowley stated that he had ``been unable to 
implement the standards of professional conduct I have been 
accustomed to at the U.S. Attorney's office.'' \112\ The 
Washington Times reported that Mr. Rowley was concerned that 
David Bossie, Chairman Burton's chief investigator, ``was 
trying to use the probe to `slime' the Democrats, while Mr. 
Rowley wanted `to follow where the evidence leads.' '' \113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \112\ Letter from John P. Rowley III to Chairman Burton (July 1, 
1997).
    \113\ Administration Dismisses Finance Probes as `Politics,' 
Washington Times (July 3, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ten months later, in May 1998, Speaker Newt Gingrich forced 
Chairman Burton to fire Mr. Bossie after the release of the 
Hubbell tapes.\114\ At a closed-door meeting of the Republican 
Conference at which Chairman Burton refused to apologize for 
the release of the tapes, Speaker Gingrich told Chairman 
Burton, ``You should be embarrassed.'' \115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \114\ Burton Apologizes to GOP, Washington Post (May 7, 1998).
    \115\ Gingrich Blasts Burton in Hubbell Tapes Furor, Roll Call (May 
7, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As a result of these mishaps, Speaker Gingrich began to 
consider plans to remove the campaign finance investigation 
from Chairman Burton's jurisdiction. According to a report in 
the Los Angeles Times in May 1998, ``House Republican leaders 
decided . . . to shift at least part of the troubled 16-month 
investigation of Democratic campaign fund-raising out of the 
hands of Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.), who has directed an inquiry 
beset by partisanship and personal rancor.'' \116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \116\ Gingrich to Place Donor Inquiry in New Hands, Los Angeles 
Times (May 14, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Among the options considered were transferring the 
investigation to another committee or creating a special select 
committee. Roll Call reported at the time that ``[t]he Speaker 
is prepared . . . [to move] the multimillion-dollar campaign 
probe to the House Oversight Committee.'' \117\ Later it was 
reported that Speaker Gingrich ``floated the idea of creating a 
special committee to handle the campaign finance 
investigation.'' \118\ Ultimately, the Speaker decided to 
appoint Rep. Christopher Cox as chairman of the Select 
Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial 
Concerns with the People's Republic of China which was 
authorized to investigate allegations that the Clinton 
administration allowed the transfer of missile technology to 
China in exchange for campaign contributions.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\ House Democrats and Republicans Set for Scandal-Driven, 
Contentious Week, Roll Call (May 4, 1998). See also Burton Fires Aid 
Over Tapes Fiasco, Washington Times (May 7, 1998).
    \118\ Gingrich Discusses Burton Ouster With Gephardt But Chairman 
Insists He Still Has Control, Roll Call (May 14, 1998).
    \119\ Cox Pledges Small Staff Despite Near-Record Budget 
Authorization, The Hill (July 1, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   c. the committee abused its powers

    Successful congressional investigations have always been 
conducted on a fair and bi-partisan basis. The best 
investigations have gone to great lengths to involve the 
minority and protect the rights of minority members. The House 
Watergate investigation, for example, gave both the chairman 
and the ranking minority member identical authority regarding 
the issuance of subpoenas and the release of documents.\120\ 
Similarly, in the Iran-Contra investigation, the majority and 
minority jointly made all procedural decisions.\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \120\ H. Res. 803, sec. 2(b), Rpt. 93-774 (Feb. 1, 1974).
    \121\ Letter from Rep. Lee H. Hamilton to Rep. Waxman (June 16, 
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton's campaign finance investigation abandoned 
these procedural safeguards and vested unprecedented powers in 
Chairman Burton, who, in turn, trampled the rights of 
individuals and the minority members. A commentary in the Los 
Angeles Times described the conduct of the majority as follows:

        In the year or so since the House Government Reform and 
        Oversight Committee began its wide-ranging probe into 
        Democratic fund-raising practices . . . [t]hose forced 
        to appear are grilled in private, sometimes for hours 
        at a stretch, with few of the protections from 
        badgering that shield witnesses in the real world. . . 
        . This would be funny if it were not redolent of a 
        mentality that Washington has not seen for some 
        decades. The term `McCarthyism' is used too often and 
        too loosely, but there are times when it is useful, and 
        one of those is now.

        What made the McCarthy phenomenon so sinister was . . . 
        several grotesque characteristics of the investigations 
        themselves. First, the investigations could be 
        triggered by legal political conduct. Second, they 
        probed broadly, even indiscriminately, on the ground 
        that some people actually turn out to be guilty. Third, 
        anything you said to one investigation could be used 
        against you in another, creating boundless jeopardy for 
        anybody questioned. Fourth,merely being investigated 
could ruin honest and dishonest alike. All those things are happening 
now.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \122\ Jonathan Rauch, In the Loop of McCarthyite Investigations, 
Los Angeles Times (Mar. 15, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. The Committee Abused the Subpoena Power

    The subpoena power is one of the most coercive powers of 
Congress. The issuance of a subpoena compels an individual to 
appear before, or submit documents to, a congressional 
committee against his or her will. For this reason, the 
issuance of a subpoena in past investigations was regarded as a 
serious step that was taken only with (1) the concurrence of 
the ranking minority member or (2) a committee vote. These 
safeguards provided minimal checks and balances that sought to 
insure that the subpoena power was not abused for partisan 
political advantage. Even when Democratic chairmen had the 
power to issue subpoenas unilaterally, they refrained from 
exercising this power. In fact, since the McCarthy hearings in 
the 1950s, no Democratic chairman of a committee ever issued a 
subpoena unilaterally, without either minority consent or a 
committee vote.
    In the Iran-Contra investigation, for example, Democratic 
Chairman Lee Hamilton had the authority to issue subpoenas 
after ``consultation'' with the ranking minority member,\123\ 
but he never used this authority unilaterally. Rep. Hamilton 
described the subpoena procedures he used during the Iran-
Contra and other investigations as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \123\ House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran, Committee rule 4, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1987).

        As a matter of practice in the Iran-Contra 
        investigation, the four Congressional leaders of the 
        Select Committee--Senators Inouye and Rudman, 
        Representative Cheney and I--made decisions jointly on 
        all matters of procedural issues, including the 
        issuance of subpoenas and the taking of depositions. I 
        do not recall a single instance in which the majority 
        acted unilaterally. In fact, I do not recall a single 
        instance in which our decisions were not unanimous. 
        With respect to the October Surprise Task Force, I 
        followed a similar approach with Henry Hyde.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \124\ Letter from Rep. Hamilton to Rep. Waxman (June 16, 1997).

    This practice of obtaining either minority concurrence or a 
committee vote was also followed in the Senate Whitewater 
investigation \125\ and the Senate campaign finance 
investigation.\126\ It was even followed in the Government 
Reform and Oversight Committee during the 104th Congress under 
Chairman William Clinger. In a letter to Rep. Cardiss Collins 
stating how he intended to interpret the Committee rules, 
Chairman Clinger wrote, ``I shall not authorize such subpoenas 
without your concurrence or the vote of the committee. I 
believe that this new rule memorializes the long-standing 
practice of this committee to seek a consensus on the issuance 
of a subpoena.'' \127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \125\ S. Res. 20 (May 17, 1995).
    \126\ Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Investigation of 
Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election 
Campaigns, S. Rpt. No. 167, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., v. 6, 8687 (1998) 
(hereafter ``Senate Report'').
    \127\ Letter from Chairman Clinger to Rep. Cardiss Collins (Mar. 6, 
1996). But see Letter from Rep. Cardiss Collins to Chairman Clinger 
(Aug. 2, 1996) (Despite this commitment, Chairman Clinger unilaterally 
issued four subpoenas relating to the Travel Office-FBI file 
acquisition investigation during the August 1996 recess).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton, however, shunned this longstanding 
precedent. In the Committee rules adopted on February 12, 1997, 
and in the investigation's document protocol adopted on April 
10, 1997, Chairman Burton sought and obtained the power to 
issue subpoenas unilaterally, without minority consent or a 
Committee vote.128 He then proceeded to issue 758 
unilateral subpoenas. These subpoenas were for both documents 
(684 subpoenas) and witnesses (74 subpoenas).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \128\ Committee rule 18(d) and Document Protocol Sec. A.2(a) (Apr. 
10, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Near the end of the investigation, after the minority 
members refused to support additional immunity requests without 
procedural reforms, the Committee's document protocol was 
amended to provide for a vote of a five-member working group, 
consisting of three Republicans and two Democrats, in the event 
that the minority objected to the issuance of a 
subpoena.129 Even this limited safeguard, however, 
was shown to be a sham procedure when Chairman Burton denied 
the minority an opportunity to present its objections to each 
of the majority members before seeking working group approval 
for a subpoena to Attorney General Reno.130
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \129\ Committee Document Protocol Sec. A.2(a) (June 23, 1998).
    \130\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Aug. 24, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton's unilateral subpoena power led to many 
abuses. As discussed above, he issued subpoenas to the wrong 
witnesses. He also issued many subpoenas that did not meet the 
requirements of relevancy, admissibility, and specificity that 
apply in a judicial context. Forexample, Chairman Burton 
subpoenaed all DNC records relating to its senior staff.\131\ This 
request covered matters relating to the DNC's internal budgeting, 
campaign strategies, and political activities unrelated to fundraising. 
The subpoena also demanded all DNC records relating to high-level White 
House contact with the DNC and all DNC phone records from January 20, 
1993, forward without limiting the request to fundraising.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \131\ Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to the Democratic National Committee (Mar. 4, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton also issued a broad subpoena to the White 
House for all phone records from Air Force I and Air Force II 
and all records of visitors to the White House residence since 
1993, among other things.\132\ The subpoena was issued without 
regard for its impact on national security or the Clinton 
family's privacy. For example, the request for all visitors to 
the White House made no exception for Chelsea Clinton's 
friends, relatives of the First Family, or visits by doctors or 
clergy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \132\ Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to the Executive Office of the President (Mar. 4, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In another example, Chairman Burton abused the subpoena 
power by ordering a private citizen to violate the law. 
Chairman Burton subpoenaed accountant Donald Lam for all tax 
preparation material related to Ted Sioeng, his family, or 
their businesses.\133\ Mr. Sioeng objected to disclosure of 
this information. As a result of the client's objection, 
federal law prevented Mr. Lam from providing the material 
without a court order.\134\ Specifically, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7216 
prohibits someone ``engaged in the business of preparing . . . 
[tax] returns'' from ``disclos[ing] any information furnished 
to him for, or in connection with, the preparation of any such 
return.'' Violating the statute subjects the accountant to 
criminal penalties including a fine and imprisonment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to Donald Lam (Jan. 30, 1998).
    \134\ Letter from Mark MacDougall, et al., to Chairman Burton (Feb. 
13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Notwithstanding Mr. Lam's obligations under federal law, 
Chairman Burton ruled in a February 20, 1998, letter that Mr. 
Lam must provide the information to the Committee or risk being 
held in contempt of Congress.\135\ Not only did this action 
unilaterally compel a private citizen to commit a federal 
crime, it also circumvented 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6103, which provides 
that tax records can be obtained only by the House Ways and 
Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, or the Joint 
Committee on Taxation, absent special authorization from the 
House. In effect, Mr. Lam was put in the position of having to 
choose between violating the tax code, which would subject him 
to a possible fine or imprisonment, or facing congressional 
contempt.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \135\ Letter from Chairman Burton to Steven R. Ross, et al. (Feb. 
20, 1998).
    \136\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Feb. 27, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unfortunately, Mr. Lam was not the only accountant to be 
subpoenaed for tax preparation materials. Chairman Burton also 
subpoenaed Michael C. Schaufele for tax preparation materials 
related to Webster Hubbell.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \137\ See Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to Michael Schaufele (Feb. 4. 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In contrast to Chairman Burton's approach, former House 
Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell followed the proper 
course in attempting to obtain tax records of junk bond 
financier Michael Milken during a 1990 investigation of Mr. 
Milken and his firm, Drexel Burnham Lambert. Once it was 
determined that a request for these records would violate 26 
U.S.C. Sec. 7216, Chairman Dingell applied to the court for an 
order to obtain the documents.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \138\ See Application for Order for Providing Tax Preparer 
Information, Misc. No. 90-231 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton also unilaterally issued subpoenas that 
appeared to be politically motivated and were unrelated to the 
campaign finance investigation, including a number of requests 
related to the matter of the President's relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky. For example, Chairman Burton subpoenaed the 
Investigative Group, Inc. (IGI), the company run by long-time 
Washington detective Terry Lenzner, for any documents relating 
to Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's investigation or members 
of Congress.\139\ According to George:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \139\ Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to Investigative Group, Inc. (Mar. 30, 1998).

        Burton assumed he would be handed a treasure trove of 
        documents that would embarrass the Democrats. But when 
        Lenzner and his lawyers searched their files, they made 
        a startling discovery: The investigator known for 
        digging dirt for Clinton had actually done more 
        snooping for Republicans than Democrats. When Lenzner's 
        lawyers made that fact known to Burton's staff, the 
        request was quickly withdrawn.\140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \140\ George Magazine (Aug. 1998). In addition to subpoenas, 
Chairman Burton also sent interrogatories related to the Lewinsky 
matter. For example, on Apr. 1, 1998, Chairman Burton sent 
interrogatories to Democratic fundraiser Nathan Landow. The 
interrogatories were issued only after the press reported that Kathleen 
Willey, who accused President Clinton of making an unwanted sexual 
advance, alleged that Mr. Landow tried to influence her testimony in 
the Paula Jones lawsuit. Although Chairman Burton said he would not 
investigate the President's sexual conduct, request 27 of the 
interrogatories asked Mr. Landow to ``[d]escribe any conversation or 
contact you have knowledge of regarding making a suggestion to any 
potential witness before . . . a grand jury or other legal 
proceeding.'' Chairman Burton also sent interrogatories to the White 
House for information about its assertions of executive privilege in 
the Lewinsky matter, the White House Counsel's office debriefings of 
witnesses appearing before Mr. Starr's grand jury, and information 
about White House attorney work-product that was shared with the 
President's personal attorney in the Jones and Lewinsky matters.

    Chairman Burton also subpoenaed the White House for all 
records relating to the White House Counsel's office and First 
Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton concerning the acquisition of FBI 
background files by the White House.\141\ This subpoena was 
issued despite the fact that the FBI file issue was thoroughly 
investigated by the Committee during the 104th Congress.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \141\ Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to the Executive Office of the President (Jan. 28, 1998).
    \142\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
Investigation Into the White House and Department of Justice on 
Security of FBI Background Investigation Files, H. Rpt. No. 104-862, 
104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The Committee Abused the Deposition Power

    In June 1997, the House voted along party lines to give 
Chairman Burton authority to conduct staff depositions for the 
campaign finance investigation.\143\ This special power is 
granted only rarely by the House. According to the House Rules 
Committee, the House is ``generally reluctant to report 
resolutions granting staff deposition authority . . . and 
believes that such special investigative authority should not 
be necessary.''\144\ In fact, the only previous time that this 
power was granted to this Committee was in the 104th Congress 
to conduct the travel office and FBI file investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \143\ See H. Res. 167, sec. 3, H. Rpt. 105-139 (June 20, 1997).
    \144\ House Committee on Rules, Providing Special Authorities to 
the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight to Obtain Testimony on 
the White House Travel Office Matter, H. Rpt. No 104-472, 104th Cong., 
2d Sess., 10 (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The deposition power is disfavored because it delegates 
from the Committee members to staff the power to gather 
testimony, under oath, outside the public's view. According to 
the Rules Committee, the normal hearing procedure, which 
requires two members to be present to take sworn testimony, was 
adopted to `` `abolish[] the custom of one-man subcommittees'--
one of the major abuses of the McCarthy era.'' \145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \145\ Id. at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After receiving deposition authority, the Committee deposed 
161 people--over more than 650 hours--in connection with this 
investigation. Of these 161 individuals, only 15 were ever 
called to testify at a hearing. Most of the depositions were 
used by Committee staff to conduct a wide-ranging fishing 
expedition rather than to pursue legitimate investigative 
leads. Only two of these witnesses were deposed to investigate 
Republican fundraising abuses.
    These depositions were extremely burdensome on individuals. 
Legal representation for a deponent often costs over $300 per 
hour. It is estimated that costs incurred for a deponent, 
including time spent traveling, missed work, preparation time, 
and legal representation averages $10,000 for a day of 
deposition testimony. According to the attorney for one life-
long government employee, this individual alone incurred 
$50,000 in legal bills related to congressional 
investigations.\146\ Even an unpaid White House intern was 
forced to obtain an attorney to represent her at a deposition 
relating to the White House Database (WhoDB).\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \146\ Minority conversation with Martin Lobel, attorney for Export-
Import Bank Director Maria Haley (Oct. 16, 1997).
    \147\ Deposition of Jacqueline Bellanti, 62-63 (Oct. 7, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The resolution giving the Committee deposition power, H. 
Res. 167, authorized the Committee to take depositions to 
investigate ``political fundraising improprieties and possible 
violations of law.''\148\ Over the objections of the minority, 
however, Chairman Burton's staff repeatedly pursued questions 
that did not fall within this scope. The overall approach of 
the majority with respect to the scope of the depositions was 
best summarized by one attorney working for the majority, who 
told the minority staff that they had been instructed to ``blow 
off'' minority objections to questions because witnesses will 
almost always answer questions in order to finish the 
deposition.\149\ In the Charles Duncan deposition, majority 
counsel even asserted that H. Res. 167 should ``be read in the 
disjunctive,'' thereby authorizing the majority to investigate 
any ``possible violation of law'' regardless of its 
relationship with political fundraising.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \148\ H. Res. 167, sec. 1 and sec. 3(1) (June 20, 1997).
    \149\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Sept. 10, 1997).
    \150\ Deposition of Charles Duncan, 8 (Aug. 29, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Throughout the investigation, Committee depositions were 
conducted haphazardly, without any discernible investigative 
strategy or plan. In the first three months that depositions 
were taken,the majority asked questions on over 36 unrelated 
topics.151 To take one example of how far afield the 
depositions strayed, Dick Morris was asked under oath, ``Did there come 
a time when Mr. Stephanopoulus told you about the discovery of life on 
Mars?'' 152 On several occasions, the majority staff asked 
deponents for information about their private lives: A former White 
House intern was asked the name of his girlfriend; 153 one 
White House employee was asked, ``Did you ever receive a drug test?'; 
154 and another former White House staffer was asked what 
type of car she drives.155
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \151\ See letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Sept. 10, 
1997).
    \152\ Deposition of Dick Morris, 174 (Aug. 21, 1997).
    \153\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Sept. 10, 1997).
    \154\ Deposition of Karen Hancox, 17 (Aug. 28, 1997).
    \155\ Deposition of Janice Enright, 58 (Aug. 19, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other witnesses were unfairly harassed during their 
depositions. George Skibine, for example, is a 17-year career 
civil servant at the Department of the Interior. The majority 
insisted on forcing Mr. Skibine to sit through two days of 
deposition testimony even though he had been previously deposed 
by the Senate on the same topic and is a diabetic who needs to 
monitor his insulin carefully. At one point during the 
deposition, Rep. Horn even accused Mr. Skibine of providing 
false testimony because he did not like the answers Mr. Skibine 
was providing, stating: ``Isn't it a fact that no matter what 
question we raise, we're wasting our time because you were 
given an order as to how to come out on this?'' 156
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \156\ Deposition of George Skibine, 164 (Jan. 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another deponent, Charles Intriago, was forced to travel 
from Miami to Washington, at taxpayers expense, even after his 
attorney informed the Committee that Mr. Intriago would assert 
his Fifth Amendment privilege and not testify. Although Mr. 
Intriago was concerned about testifying because it had recently 
been reported in at least two major newspapers that Mr. 
Intriago was under investigation by the Department of 
Justice,157 the majority responded that Mr. Intriago 
did not need to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege because 
the applicable statute of limitations had run. The majority 
also threatened to hold Mr. Intriago in contempt if he chose to 
assert his constitutional right.158 This advice was 
termed ``ludicrous at best'' by Steve Ryan, a professor at 
Georgetown University Law Center who teaches a course on 
congressional investigations.159 It also conflicted 
with a D.C. Bar Association ethics opinion, which advises that 
it is unethical for congressional counsel to require a witness 
to appear after being advised that the witness will invoke a 
Fifth Amendment privilege.160 A Department of 
Justice regulation establishes a similar standard for federal 
prosecutors.161
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \157\ Letter from Robert Plotkin to Majority Counsel Richard 
Bennett (Feb. 18, 1998).
    \158\ Id.
    \159\ Burton Team Threatens Contempt for Witness, The Hill (Feb. 
25, 1998).
    \160\ District of Columbia Bar Association Ethics Opinion No. 31 
(Mar. 29, 1977).
    \161\ Letter from Robert Plotkin to Richard Bennett (Feb. 18, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority's actions relating to the deposition of Marsha 
Scott also typify the unreasonable and harassing approach 
employed by the majority staff.162 Ms. Scott is the 
deputy director of the White House Office of Personnel. She was 
a cooperative witness, and she had never been accused of 
wrongdoing. Nevertheless, Ms. Scott was forced to provide three 
days of deposition testimony over 18 hours before the Senate, 
and an additional five days of deposition testimony over 20 
more hours before this Committee.163 Despite these 
eight days of deposition testimony, Ms. Scott was never called 
as a substantive witness at a hearing and had little 
information relevant to the Committee's investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \162\ See Letters from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Apr. 1, 
1998, and Apr. 3, 1998).
    \163\ At one point, counsel for Ms. Scott tried to protect his 
client from further harassment by the Committee. After three days of 
deposition testimony, the majority staff insisted that Ms. Scott appear 
for a fourth day to answer questions about her conversations with the 
White House Counsel's office about a memorandum she had written which 
she had originally declined to answer out of concerns about the 
attorney-client privilege. Ms. Scott's attorney suggested that Ms. 
Scott provide the Committee with a sworn affidavit about that 
conversation. The majority staff rejected this offer and insisted that 
she appear for more testimony.
    Since Ms. Scott had already provided three days of testimony, Ms. 
Scott's attorney attempted to restrict the additional testimony to 
questions about the conversations regarding the memo. At the 
deposition, taken on Apr. 1, 1998, the majority began asking questions 
on other topics. In response, her attorney stated, ``This harassment is 
going to end. . . . If you do not have more questions about the 
substance and the conversations--about the substance of the June memo, 
then we are going to leave.'' After responding to a number of 
additional questions unrelated to the privilege issue, the attorney 
advised Ms. Scott to end the deposition.
    Hours later, National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and 
Regulatory Affairs Subcommittee Chairman David McIntosh called a 
hearing for 8:00 p.m. that night, and Chairman Burton subpoenaed Ms. 
Scott to testify. This action violated Committee rules and precedent. 
The Committee's document protocol required 24-hours notice to the 
minority before the chairman can issue a subpoena, absent exigent 
circumstances that did not apply in that case. Furthermore, House and 
Committee rules require the majority to give the minority seven days 
notice of hearings. This rule can be waived by the Committee only for 
``good cause.'' This provision, however, was never used before in the 
Government Reform and Oversight Committee without the consent of the 
minority. Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Apr. 3, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The procedures adopted by the Committee for the taking of 
depositions effectively prevented the minority from any 
meaningful participation. The rules allowed the majority ``as 
much time as is necessary to ask all pending questions'' before 
the minority had an opportunity to ask its first 
question.164 The practical effect of this rule was 
that the majority asked hours--if not days--of questions before 
the minority was allowed to ask questions. Former DNC finance 
director Richard Sullivan, for example, was deposed by the 
majority for 18 hours over four days before the minority was 
allowed to ask its first round of questions.165
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \164\ Committee Rule 20 (Apr. 10, 1997). This rule differed 
dramatically from the rule used by the Committee during the 104th 
Congress. During the Travel Office-FBI File investigation, questioning 
was conducted in one-hour rounds, alternating between the majority and 
the minority, until both sides gathered the necessary information. See 
Committee Rule 19(e) (104th Cong). At the June 23, 1998, Committee 
meeting, Chairman Burton agreed to amend this rule to provide for 
alternating one-hour rounds of questions as part of a compromise to get 
minority support for immunity for four witnesses. This change, however, 
did not occur until after the Committee had already taken 153 
depositions.
    \165\ Deposition of Richard Sullivan (Mar. 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The Committee Abused the Immunity Power

    A grant of immunity is one of the most significant actions 
an investigative committee can take. Since immunity shields the 
witness from criminal prosecution, it is ordinarily given only 
for testimony that is accurate and important and that cannot be 
secured through other means. The committee proposing immunity 
also usually takes prudent steps to insure that the witness 
being granted immunity does not take an ``immunity bath'' to 
protect him or herself from prosecution for unrelated offenses.
    Unfortunately, the majority did not take such precautions. 
At the first campaign finance hearing on October 9, 1997, the 
Committee heard testimony from David Wang. The majority had 
requested that the minority join with them to vote to give Mr. 
Wang immunity for his testimony about illegal conduit 
contributions. The minority agreed--only to find out that the 
majority had obtained unreliable testimony and given a witness 
inappropriate immunity.
    Mr. Wang testified that John Huang visited him at his place 
of business in Los Angeles on August 16, 1996, to solicit 
campaign contributions for the DNC. Mr. Wang testified that Mr. 
Huang indicated that he would be reimbursed for his 
contribution. Mr. Wang proceeded to write two $5,000 checks on 
behalf of himself and his friend, Daniel Wu.166
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \166\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on Conduit Payments to the Democratic National Committee, 105th 
Congress, 1st Sess. 272 (Oct. 9, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This testimony was demonstrably inaccurate. At the hearing, 
the minority released a staff report which detailed documentary 
evidence that ``the meeting that Mr. Wang testified about could 
not have occurred because John Huang was in New York City--not 
Los Angeles--from at least August 15, 1996 through at least 
August 18, 1996.'' 167 The evidence included Mr. 
Huang's hotel receipts, eyewitness statements, and news 
reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \167\ Id. at 306-356 (Minority Staff Report entitled Evidence that 
John Huang Was in New York City on August 15, 16, 17, and 18 (Oct. 9, 
1997)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Not only was Mr. Wang's testimony inaccurate, the majority 
also failed to properly investigate Mr. Wang's other activities 
before proposing that he be given immunity. The result was a 
major embarrassment for the Committee: Mr. Wang received 
immunity for potentially serious immigration and tax violations 
unrelated to the campaign finance investigation that were 
unknown to members of the Committee.168
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \168\ See letter from Rep. Waxman to Attorney General Janet Reno 
(Oct. 20, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At his deposition, Mr. Wang testified that he had power of 
attorney over the bank account of Daniel Wu, a U.S. green card 
holder and businessman who resides in Taiwan. According to Mr. 
Wang, two companies--Ji Tai International and Bao Li Hang 
International--wrote payroll checks to Mr. Wu each month, which 
Mr. Wang deposited into Mr. Wu's account. Mr. Wang testified 
that he then wrote checks back to those companies in the same 
amounts as the payroll checks.169 Mr. Wang 
explained, ``The reason being that for immigration purposes, it 
would show that Mr. Wu was here in the States physically. . . . 
And on the part of the two companies, it was to show they had 
an employee on the payroll which might give them a tax credit 
or a tax break. So it was for tax purposes.'' 170
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \169\ Deposition of David Wang, 72-76 (Oct. 6, 1997).
    \170\ Id. at 94.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These actions may have violated several federal statutes. 
If false statements were made to the INS about Mr. Wu's 
residency, these would appear to violate 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. Sec. 1001, 1015. If the two companies named by Mr. Wu 
evaded or attempted to evade paying taxes, this would appear to 
violate 26 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 7206, 7215. Moreover, if the 
companies, Mr. Wu, and Mr. Wang conspired to commit these 
violations, as suggested by Mr. Wang's testimony, this would 
appear to be an illegal conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371. 
The result of the grant of immunity is that Mr. Wang cannot be 
prosecuted for this potentially fraudulent activity, even 
though it is unrelated to the campaign finance investigation.

4. The Committee Abused the Contempt Power

    The contempt power is the most potent and rarely invoked 
authority of Congress. Under thispower, Congress can punish an 
individual for failure to cooperate or comply with a compulsory 
directive with imprisonment of up to one year.171
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \171\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 192, 194.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 6, 1998, the Committee voted along party lines 
(24 to 19) to cite Attorney General Janet Reno for contempt of 
Congress. As described in detail in the minority views filed 
with the Committee's contempt report, this action constituted 
an abuse of the contempt power.172
    There was no reasonable basis for proceeding with the 
contempt citation. The Attorney General was cited for contempt 
because she did not give the Committee two memoranda written by 
Louis B. Freeh, the Director of the FBI, and Charles G. La 
Bella, the former head of the Department of Justice's 
investigative task force on campaign finance. These memoranda 
contained prosecution recommendations and other sensitive and 
detailed information regarding the Department's largest ongoing 
criminal investigation. The Attorney General's refusal to turn 
over this information was consistent with 100 years of 
precedent in which both Republican and Democratic 
administrations have refused to provide Congress with 
prosecution memoranda in ongoing criminal investigations. The 
Committee's contempt vote occurred just two days after Director 
Freeh, Mr. La Bella, and the lead FBI agent in the 
investigation, James V. Desarno, Jr., testified that releasing 
the memoranda would provide a ``road map'' of the investigation 
to criminal defendants and would be ``devastating'' to future 
prosecutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \172\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Contempt 
of Congress, H. Rpt. No. 105-728, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 134-135 
(1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     The Attorney General made every effort to reach an 
accommodation with the Committee, including offering to brief 
the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member on the contents of the 
memoranda and testify before the full Committee at a public 
hearing. She requested only that before taking these steps, she 
be given three weeks to complete her review of the memorandum 
and make her decisions free of political influence. The 
Chairman rejected every attempt at accommodation.
     The Committee proceeded with the contempt citation in an 
apparent effort to intimidate the Attorney General. The goal 
appeared to be to force the Attorney General to choose between 
seeking the appointment of an independent counsel to 
investigate the President or going to prison for contempt of 
Congress. In fact, in a meeting with the Attorney General in 
his office on July 31, 1998, Chairman Burton explicitly told 
the Attorney General that he would not insist on seeing the 
memoranda and would not seek a House vote on contempt if the 
Attorney General decided to seek appointment of an Independent 
Counsel.173 Chairman Burton's spokesman confirmed 
this when he told the Washington Post, ``[T]he only one real 
objective here is getting an independent counsel. . . . If she 
follows that advice, there will be no need for the documents.'' 
174 As the Washington Post wrote in an editorial 
after the Committee vote, ``Mr. Burton's approach to the matter 
has been nothing less than thuggish. . . . [Ms. Reno] is right 
in her refusal to be bullied.'' 175
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \173\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Attorney General Reno (July 31, 
1998).
    \174\ Democrats Say Burton Made Threat Against Reno, Washington 
Post (Aug. 1, 1998).
    \175\ Mr. Burton and Ms. Reno, Washington Post (Aug. 7, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the immunity vote, Attorney General Reno continued to 
make every effort to accommodate Chairman Burton. On August 24, 
1998, for example, the Department of Justice offered to conduct 
a staff briefing on the memoranda for Chairman Burton. Chairman 
Burton responded that this was a ``disingenuous offer.'' 
176 Then, at the suggestion of House Judiciary 
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde,177 Attorney General 
Reno allowed Chairman Burton ``and a few other senior lawmakers 
in the House and Senate . . . to read edited copies of the 
reports.'' 178 In a further attempt to reach a 
compromise, Attorney General Reno agreed to allow a small 
delegation of Committee members to review the memoranda 
provided that Chairman Burton withdraw his contempt 
threat.179 Chairman Burton refused and proceeded to 
file the Committee's contempt resolution with the 
House.180
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \176\ Letter from Chairman Burton to Attorney General Reno (Aug. 
24, 1998).
    \177\ Letter from Chairman Hyde to Attorney General Reno (Aug. 27, 
1998).
    \178\ Lawmaker Seeks Vote on Contempt Resolution Against Reno, New 
York Times (Sept. 18, 1998).
    \179\ Id.
    \180\ Burton Wants House to Find Reno in Contempt, Washington Post 
(Sept. 18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton's efforts to hold the Attorney General in 
contempt were widely criticized. The following are a few 
excerpts from newspaper editorials across the country:

        
 The Contempt Citation, Washington Post (Sept. 
        22, 1998): ``It is bad enough that Mr. Burton has 
        extorted from the attorney general a look at even an 
        edited version of a prosecutor's thoughts on an ongoing 
        criminal investigation. But his continuing to push this 
        matter after Ms. Reno has obliged him as she has is a 
        gross abuse of his powers as chairman of the committee. 
        . . . [I]t reflects poorly on the leadership that it is 
        even tolerating Mr. Burton's antics.''
        
 Buck Stops With Reno, Los Angeles Times (Aug. 
        6, 1998): ``Congress has no business threatening Reno 
        with contempt charges. . . . [T]he panel should reject 
        the request if Burton insists on putting the issue to a 
        vote today. Better yet would be for Burton to 
        acknowledge the idea is wrongheaded and drop it 
        altogether.''
        
 Tell Him No, Ms. Reno! Don't Yield to Burton, 
        Miami Herald (Aug. 6, 1998): ``If you want to rid your 
        house of rats, one extremely effective way is to burn 
        down the house. That's essentially what U.S. Rep. Dan 
        Burton . . . seems willing to do by threatening 
        Attorney General Janet Reno with contempt of Congress. 
        . . . Mr. Burton's request is dangerous. It's more than 
        laced with his palpable political motives. Worse, it's 
        also bereft of any sign that he has weighed what these 
        memos, if leaked, could do to the Department of 
        Justice's own investigation.''
        
 The Foolish Threat Against Reno, Chicago 
        Tribune (Aug. 6, 1998): ``Given their professed desire 
        to see that the law is enforced, you would think Burton 
        and his GOP colleagues would be leery of any step that 
        might hinder prosecutors. The threat of contempt 
        citation makes sense only if their real purpose is to 
        embarrass the administration.''
        
 Do It Justice, New York Newsday (Aug. 6, 
        1998): ``[N]obody deserves the kind of treatment Reno 
        has been getting from Rep. Dan Burton. . . . Burton 
        should back off.''
        
 Give Reno Some Room, St. Petersburg Times 
        (Aug. 6, 1998): ``The integrity of the investigations 
        is more important than a few congressional Republicans 
        grabbing some headlines. Burton should stop this 
        showboating and follow the lead of his more temperate 
        colleagues.''

5. The Committee Abused the Power to Release Documents

    As in the case of subpoena authority, past congressional 
investigations have prohibited a committee chairman from 
unilaterally releasing documents. In some investigations, 
documents could be released only during committee meetings and 
hearings. In other investigations, documents could not be 
released without the concurrence of the ranking minority member 
or a vote of the committee. These procedures provided a minimal 
check on the power of any individual to release potentially 
confidential documents.
    The resolution authorizing the House Watergate 
investigation, for example, stated that ``[n]o member shall 
make any of that testimony or those papers or things [obtained 
by the committee] public unless authorized by a majority vote 
of the committee.'' 181 The rules of the Senate 
Whitewater investigation similarly provided that ``[n]o member 
of the special committee or the staff . . . shall disclose . . 
. any confidential materials or information, unless authorized 
by the special committee or the chairman in concurrence with 
the ranking member.'' 182 The Iran-Contra 
investigation rules provided that ``[u]nless otherwise directed 
by the committee, all depositions, affidavits, and other 
materials received in the investigation shall be considered 
nonpublic. . . . All such material shall, unless otherwise 
directed by the committee, be available for use by the members 
of the select committee in open session.'' 183
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \181\ House Committee on the Judiciary, Procedures for Handling 
Impeachment Inquiry Material, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 1974).
    \182\ S. Res. 120, Sec. 6 (May 17, 1995).
    \183\ House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran, Rule 7.6, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These practices notwithstanding, the Committee adopted a 
document protocol on April 10, 1997, that gave the chairman 
unilateral ``discretion'' to release the documents, including 
privileged and confidential documents, ``to the media . . . or 
to any other person'' without the prior consent of the 
Committee or the ranking minority member.184 A 
former Republican staff member called the document protocol 
``unprecedented.'' 185
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \184\ Protocol for Documents, Clause C (Apr. 10, 1997).
    \185\ Burton's Proposed Rules on Probe Documents Criticized, 
National Journal's Congress Daily (Apr. 3, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The protocol established a working group to advise the 
chairman in cases where the minority objected to the public 
release of certain documents. In these situations, ``the 
Chairman shall present the matter to the Working Group for non-
binding decision regarding the advisability of the proposed 
release.'' 186 The chairman, however, retained the 
authority to release these documents without the consent of the 
minority or the working group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \186\ Protocol for Documents, Clause C(b) (Apr. 10, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton and his staff abused this authority to 
release Committee documents to the press. The most egregious 
example of Chairman Burton's unilateral power to release 
documents was the Chairman's release of subpoenaed Bureau of 
Prisons tape recordings of Webster Hubbell's phone 
conversations with his wife.187
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \187\ Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to Federal Prison Camp, Cumberland, Maryland (May 8, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The first release of the Hubbell tapes occurred when the 
Wall Street Journal was given access to these private telephone 
calls for an article that was published on March 19, 
1998.188 In a letter to Rep. Waxman, Chairman Burton 
stated that the tapes were given to the Journal because the 
tapes ``were considered relevant'' to the Committee's 
investigation.189 Chairman Burton also acknowledged 
that he was the source of the release, arguing that the tapes 
``were entered into the Committee record on December 10, 
1997.''190 These tapes, however, were never publicly 
released at that hearing or any other,191 and they 
did not relate to the campaign finance investigation. The tape 
described in the Wall Street Journal article concerned what 
Mrs. Hubbell should cook her family for dinner. The sole effect 
of releasing the recordings of these private conversations was 
to embarrass and demean Mr. Hubbell.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \188\ As He Wasted Away, the Prisoner Had But One Thing on His 
Mind, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 19, 1998).
    \189\ Letter from Chairman Burton to Rep. Waxman (Mar. 27, 1998).
    \190\ Id.
    \191\ See letter from Reps. Waxman and Lantos to Chairman Burton 
(Apr. 27, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton released additional transcripts of the 
Hubbell tapes on April 30, 1998. Although the minority objected 
in advance to this release, Chairman Burton did not even 
convene the working group to consider the minority's objections 
in violation of his own document protocol.192 As 
discussed above, the transcripts released by Chairman Burton 
were selectively edited to remove exculpatory passages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \192\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (May 3, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In another example, on February 27, 1998, Chairman Burton 
released his staff's notes of an interview with Steven Clemons, 
a former aide to Senator Bingaman, related to Charlie Trie's 
involvement with a trade commission. Chairman Burton released 
the notes even though he was forced to cancel a scheduled 
hearing on the topic after Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott 
and Minority Leader Tom Daschle objected that Mr. Clemons's 
testimony would jeopardize the Senate's independence. Not only 
did the release of the notes disregard the Senate's concerns 
about Mr. Clemons's testimony,193 Mr. Clemons 
himself disputed the accuracy of the staff notes and claimed 
they did not represent his views.194
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \193\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to House Speaker Newt Gingrich (Feb. 
27, 1998).
    \194\ Statement of Steven C. Clemons (Feb. 25, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After months of minority protests about these unilateral 
powers and the subsequent abuses, Chairman Burton finally 
agreed to revise the Committee rules and document protocol 
regarding the release of documents, issuance of subpoenas, and 
rounds of questioning in depositions.195 Under the 
revisions, the Chairman could no longer release documents 
unilaterally but needed to obtain either the concurrence of the 
ranking minority member or a vote of the Committee. The new 
protocol also required the Chairman to notify the minority at 
least 24 hours before the intended release in order to give the 
minority adequate opportunity to review the documents and make 
an objection.196 These concessions were made only 
after the minority refused to agree to grant immunity to 
witnesses without reforms to the Committee's procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \195\ Letter from Chairman Burton to Rep. Waxman (June 18, 1998).
    \196\ Document Protocol, Sec. C.3 (June 23, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the June 23, 1998, meeting at which the revisions were 
adopted, Chairman Burton assured the minority that the new 
rules were ``not cosmetic changes.''197 Despite that 
assurance, Chairman Burton continued to release documents 
without regard to the new rules. At the August 4, 1998, 
Committee hearing, Chairman Burton made a motion to release 
certain documents even though the minority was not notified of 
the proposed release until after 3:00 p.m. on August 3--less 
than 24 hours earlier. Furthermore, at no time did Chairman 
Burton attempt to reach consensus with the minority on the 
document release.198
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \197\ Chairman Burton, Committee Meeting (June 23, 1998).
    \198\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Aug. 24, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee also released confidential documents over the 
objections of law enforcement and other executive agencies. On 
September 2, 1998, the Committee released the deposition of 
Larry Wong without first redacting confidential FBI and 
Commerce Department Inspector General materials included in the 
deposition transcript.199 The minority was not 
consulted nor given an opportunity to review the majority's 
redactions prior to the release.200 The information 
included memos written by FBI agents summing up information 
provided to the FBI from confidential sources and a report by 
agents in the Commerce Department Inspector General's office 
summarizing a confidential witness interview in an active 
investigation. The FBI had requested that ``[o]ut of a concern 
for the privacy interests of those individuals mentioned in 
these documents and the sensitive nature of the information 
involved, we request that the Committee confer with us prior to 
publicly disseminating any of this material.'' 201 
The Commerce Department made a similar request.202 
Nevertheless, the material was included as an exhibit to the 
deposition and sensitive portions were read into the record and 
published on the majority's Internet site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \199\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Sept. 9, 1998).
    \200\ Id.
    \201\ Letter from FBI Assistant Director John E. Collingwood to 
Chairman Burton (Jan. 17, 1998).
    \202\ Letter from Commerce Department Inspector General Francis D. 
DeGeorge to Chairman Burton (Sept. 12, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, the Committee also ignored the Department of 
Justice's objection to the release of documents relating to 
travelers checks from Charlie Trie, which were the subject of 
an ongoing criminal investigation. In a July 30, 1998, letter 
to Chairman Burton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark M. 
Richard wrote:

        Certain facts surrounding the travelers checks are 
        under active investigation and are crucial to our 
        determination whether additional crimes are charged. 
        The FBI is pursuing leads both here and abroad. Release 
        of the checks now would inevitably compromise our 
        ability to develop new evidence by alerting witnesses 
        and conspirators about the nature and direction of the 
        investigation. (Indeed, because of these concerns the 
        checks have not yet been released to the defendant in 
        the Trie case.) 203
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \203\ Letter from Mark M. Richard to Chairman Burton (July 30, 
1998).

    Despite these concerns, on August 4, 1998, the majority 
voted at a Committee meeting to release the travelers checks, 
leading to exactly the type of press coverage that the Justice 
Department hoped to avoid.204
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \204\ After the release of the travelers checks, several stories 
appeared in major newspaper. See Campaign Finance's Parallel Probes, 
Washington Post (Aug. 6, 1998); GOP Probers Report $50,000 in Illegal 
Donations Via Trie, Washington Times (Aug. 5, 1998); House Committee 
Threatens Reno, New York Times (Aug. 5, 1998); Bank Data Link Trie, 
Democrats to Foreign $50,000, Arkansas Democrat-Gaxette (Aug. 5, 1998); 
Reno Defies GOP Pressure on Donor Probe, Los Angeles Times (Aug. 5, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. The Committee Leaked Confidential Information

    Since the beginning of the campaign finance investigation, 
the Committee leaked many documents, without regard for the 
impact of those leaks on the Committee, criminal 
investigations, or the rights of private citizens.
    In November 1996, shortly after Mr. Burton was selected 
chairman, it was reported that ``[o]ne of his top aides 
improperly leaked the confidential phone logs of former 
Commerce Department official John Huang. Burton confirmed . . . 
that [his aide] had leaked the records to the 
media.''205
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \205\ Burton Admits Aide Leaked Huang Record, Roll Call (Nov. 25, 
1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Following that incident, two senior majority staff 
interviewed businesswoman Vivian Mannerud on February 27, 1997, 
at her place of business and without her counsel present. The 
staff assured her that her interview would be used only for 
official business. On April 4, 1997, however, the New York 
Times, citing ``congressional investigators,'' published a 
front-page story about contributions Ms. Mannerud allegedly 
solicited for Democrats.206
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \206\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (June 4, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton or his staff also appear to have leaked 
documents subpoenaed by the Committee to the plaintiffs suing 
the federal government to overturn the Interior Department's 
decision to deny a casino application in Hudson, Wisconsin. DNC 
employee David Mercer testified under oath at his deposition 
that he was contacted by a Milwaukee reporter and asked about 
certaindocuments in the Committee's possession. When Mr. Mercer 
asked how the reporter got the documents, the reporter told him that 
``investigators had released documents from the House committee to 
lawyers in the litigation, and then the lawyers in the litigation 
released it to the press.'' 207
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \207\ Deposition of David Mercer, 150 (Aug. 26, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In another example, Florida attorney Charles Intriago was 
deposed by the Committee on February 20, 1998. Mr. Intriago 
agreed to appear only after being assured by the majority's 
chief counsel that the deposition would be taken in executive 
session and would not be leaked to the press. Despite those 
assurances, Mr. Intriago was contacted by a reporter for the 
Miami Herald about the deposition ``within an hour of leaving 
the deposition.'' 208
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \208\ Letter from Robert Plotkin to majority Chief Counsel Richard 
Bennett (Feb. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. The Committee Excluded the Minority From Witness Interviews

    Prior investigations have followed a bipartisan approach 
and included the minority in witness interviews. In the 104th 
Congress, for example, Chairman Hyde specifically provided that 
all witness interviews conducted by the Select Subcommittee on 
the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and 
Bosnia be jointly conducted with majority and minority 
staff.209 Similar policies were followed during the 
Watergate, Iran-Contra, Senate Whitewater, and Senate Campaign 
Finance investigations.210 In the 105th Congress, 
the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/
Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China chaired 
by Rep. Christopher Cox followed the same precedent, even 
hiring a bipartisan investigative staff to conduct 
interviews.211
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \209\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (June 4, 1997).
    \210\ Id.
    \211\ Cox Pledges Small Staff Despite Near-Record Budget 
Authorization, The Hill (July 1, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton rejected minority requests to follow this 
precedent and conduct joint witness interviews.212 
In fact, the majority did not even give notice to the minority 
when they planned to conduct interviews. According to Committee 
activity reports, the majority made at least 50 investigative 
trips without notice to the minority, including trips to Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Chicago, Miami, Orlando, 
Milwaukee, Detroit, Houston, Little Rock, Oklahoma City, and 
Columbus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \212\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (June 4, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. The Committee Violated Its Own Budget Rules

    Finally, the majority even denied the minority a fair 
allocation of Committee resources. At the beginning of the 
104th Congress, House Oversight Chairman Thomas stated, ``To 
ensure fairness to all Members, the Republicans, when they were 
in the minority, argued that all committees should allocate at 
least one-third of resources to the minority. As the new 
majority, Republicans remain committed to achieving that 
goal.'' 213 Despite this pledge, the minority 
received less than 25% of the Committee's budget. In fact, 
although the Government Reform and Oversight Committee was 
given the single-largest budget in the House, the Republicans 
gave the minority the smallest share of any committee in the 
House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \213\ Committee on House Oversight's Funding Resolution Report for 
the 104th Congress, Rpt. 104-74, 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee's actions also violated Committee rule 18(e), 
which requires that the Chairman prepare a budget in 
consultation with the minority. The minority was not consulted 
on the Committee's budget and, in fact, was not provided a copy 
of the budget until two weeks after it was submitted to the 
House Oversight Committee.214 Chairman Burton also 
did not consult with the minority on his request for an 
additional $1.8 million from the Oversight Committee's reserve 
fund in 1998.215
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \214\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Feb. 26, 1997); 
Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Thomas and Rep. Gejdenson (Feb. 28, 
1997).
    \215\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Thomas and Rep. Gejdenson 
(Feb. 3, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In another example of budgetary unfairness, the majority 
rejected the minority's request to hire an outside consultant 
even after approving four consultant contracts for the 
majority. The Committee's budget provided funds for both the 
majority and the minority to retain consultants. The majority 
used these funds to hire former chief counsel Richard Bennett 
as well as three other consultants.216 After the 
minority raised concerns that, as a consultant, Mr. Bennett 
would not be required to comply with House ethics 
rules,217 Mr. Bennett agreed to ``comply with the 
House's code of official conduct.'' 218 The 
majority, however, rejected the minority's request for a 
consultant even after the proposed consultant provided the 
Committee with a letter in which it agreed to adhere to the 
same standards being followed by Mr. Bennett.219
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \216\ The three consultants hired for the investigation were 
Charles Little, Phillip Larsen, and Ward Warren.
    \217\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Aug. 28, 1998).
    \218\ Letter from Richard Bennett to Chairman Burton (Sept. 4, 
1998).
    \219\ Committee Meeting (Sept. 24, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                D. The Committee Wasted Taxpayer Dollars

    Early in the investigation, the Committee's inflated budget 
led the Wall Street Journal's Al Hunt to remark, ``The biggest 
losers will be taxpayers. The Burton-led circus . . . could 
cost between $6 million and $12 million.'' 220 
Unfortunately, Mr. Hunt's prediction appears to have come true. 
The minority estimates that the cost of the investigation has 
already surpassed $7.4 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \220\ Albert R. Hunt, The Witch Hunt in the House, Wall Street 
Journal (Apr. 10, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. The Committee Has the Largest Budget of Any Committee in the History 
        of Congress

    Chairman Burton's original budget request for the Committee 
for the 105th Congress was $16.2 million. He then called this 
budget request ``totally inadequate'' to conduct the campaign 
finance investigation,221 prompting the House to 
approve a $3.8 million supplemental appropriation for the 
investigation for 1997.222 The result was an overall 
budget for the Committee of $20 million.223 This was 
an increase of $6.5 million--nearly 50%--from the Committee's 
budget in the 104th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \221\ Burton: Democrats Won't Get One-Third of Budget for Probe, CQ 
Monitor (Feb. 27, 1997).
    \222\ H. Res. 91 (Mar. 21, 1997).
    \223\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1998, Chairman Burton requested additional funds from 
the House ``reserve'' fund to continue the investigation. He 
received $1.8 million from this fund for the investigation 
224 and an additional $1.15 million from the reserve 
fund to fund the newly created Census Subcommittee for 11 
months.225 This brought the total budget for the 
Committee for the 105th Congress to $23 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \224\ Dems Blast GOP Over Expansion of Clinton Probe, Roll Call 
(Mar. 26, 1998).
    \225\ Approved by the Committee on House Oversight on Feb. 24, 
1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This budget was nearly ten times larger than the $2.4 
million budget the Republican leadership gave to the House 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (the ``Ethics 
Committee'') to investigate misconduct by 
members.226 It was also 50% larger than the $14.6 
million budget for the House Commerce Committee, which had the 
second largest committee budget in the House.227
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \226\ H. Res. 62 (Feb. 13, 1997).
    \227\ H. Res. 74 (Feb. 25, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The Committee Spent Over $7.4 Million on the Campaign Finance 
        Investigation

    The minority estimates that the House Government Reform and 
Oversight Committee's campaign finance investigation has cost 
the taxpayers in excess of $7.4 million through August 31, 
1998.
    The minority's estimate is based on a review of expenses 
associated with the investigation reported in the House Chief 
Administrative Officer's reports and the Committee's monthly 
activity reports for the 105th Congress.228 The 
minority staff estimates that the Committee spent over $5.7 
million in taxpayer dollars on staff salaries and overtime; 
over $120,000 on domestic travel; and over $80,000 for foreign 
travel paid for by the State Department. The Committee 
transcribed over 24,000 pages of testimony and statements taken 
in depositions, hearings, and meetings at an estimated cost to 
the taxpayer of $70,000 to $140,000 and spent over $300,000 
paid for by the Government Printing Office to reproduce this 
material for public distribution. Some of the other categories 
of Committee expenses estimated by the minority staff include 
expenses for consultants (over $200,000); executive agency 
personnel detailed to the investigation (over $100,000); and 
equipment and supplies (over $500,000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \228\ House CAO reports were received through June 1998; Committee 
activities reports were reviewed through August 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority disputed previous minority staff estimates of 
the cost of the investigation. On May 11, 1998, after several 
requests from minority members to account for the Committee's 
expenses, Chairman Burton wrote Rep. Waxman that the Committee 
spent less than $2.5 million on the investigation in 
1997.229 Chairman Burton's figures, however, were 
substantially understated. According to a Roll Call analysis 
published in July 1998, ``Chairman Dan Burton's (R-Ind.) staff 
provided numbers that do not accurately reflect the actual cost 
of his investigation into fundraising abuses. . . . Burton does 
not include the salaries and expenses for investigators . . . 
who spent virtually all of their time on the investigation but 
were paid with money from the committee's general budget.'' 
230 Chairman Burton's figures also excluded the 
costs of transcribing Committee depositions, hearings, and 
meetings; GPO printing costs; and the cost of foreign travel. 
The Roll Call analysis found that ``the actual number is much 
closer to the Democrats' figure.'' 231
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \229\ Letter from Chairman Burton to Rep. Waxman (May 11, 1998).
    \230\ Democrats' Report Doesn't Add Up; Republican Numbers Aren't 
Any More Precise, Roll Call (July 13, 1998).
    \231\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The Investigation is the Most Expensive and Least Productive 
        Congressional Investigation in History

    Chairman Burton's campaign finance investigation has been 
the most expensive congressional investigation in history. The 
costs of this investigation far exceed the $1.9 million spent 
on the Senate Whitewater investigation and the $5 million spent 
on the House and Senate Iran-Contra investigations. They also 
exceed the $7 million spent on the Senate Watergate 
investigation. These figures are adjusted for inflation.\232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \232\ Whitewater: Comparison of Cost and Other Selected Data with 
Previous Investigations, CRS Report for Congress (Feb. 9, 1998) (98-101 
GOV).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Republican leadership even devoted more resources to 
the Burton investigation than it allocated to the Federal 
Election Commission for compliance and enforcement of federal 
election law. The FEC enforcement staff consists of 24 staff 
attorneys, 12 paralegals, and 2 investigators. Even including 
the FEC General Counsel and 5 Assistant General Counsels, who 
spend a portion of their time supervising enforcement actions, 
the FEC enforcement division has a staff of only 43.\233\ This 
is significantly fewer than the estimated 50 majority staff and 
19 minority staff actually working on the Burton investigation 
at any given time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \233\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on Federal Election Commission Enforcement Actions: Foreign Campaign 
Contributions and Other FECA Violations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 
31, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The investigation also was far less productive than these 
other investigations. The Senate Whitewater investigation held 
66 days of public hearings, the Iran-Contra investigation held 
40 days of public hearings, and the Senate Watergate 
investigation held 53 days of public hearings.\234\ The Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee campaign finance investigation 
held 33 days of hearings and published a 1,100-page report 
while spending less than $3.5 million.\235\ On the other hand, 
as reported in the Wall Street Journal, the Committee's 
investigation ``conducted just a handful of hearings that 
disclosed no major new evidence.'' \236\ It held only nine 
public hearings over 15 days.\237\ In fact, in 1998, the 
Committee did not hold a single day of investigative hearings 
on the role of foreign contributions in the 1996 campaign, 
which was supposed to be the primary focus of the 
investigation. Even Republicans commented on the Committee's 
lack of productivity. One senior Republican leadership aide 
observed, ``It's been very expensive, and it hasn't amounted to 
much.'' \238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \234\ Id.
    \235\ Senate Report, v. 6, 8687.
    \236\ Burton's Campaign-Finance Probe Is Drawing Criticism for 
Mounting Costs and Slow Progress, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 27, 1998).
    \237\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. Hearings 
on Campaign Finance Improprieties and Possible Violations of Law. 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (Oct. 8, 1997); House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, Hearings on Conduit Payments to the Democratic 
National Committee, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 9, 1997); House 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings on White House 
Compliance with Committee Subpoenas, 204 (Nov. 6, 7, 1997); House 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings on Johnny Chung: 
His Unusual Access to the White House, His Political Donations and 
Related Matters, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 (Nov. 13, 14, 1997); House 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Current Implementation of 
the Independent Counsel Act, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 9, 10, 1997); 
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings on the 
Department of the Interior's Denial of the Wisconsin Chippewa's Casino 
Application, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., v. 1 (Jan. 21, 22, 28, 29, 1998); 
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing on Federal 
Election Commission Enforcement Actions: Foreign Campaign Contributions 
and Other FECA Violations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 108-109 (Mar. 31, 
1998); House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing on 
Venezuelan Money and the Presidential Election, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(Apr. 30, 1998); House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
Hearing on the Need for an Independent Counsel in the Campaign Finance 
Investigation, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 66-67 (Aug. 4, 1998).
    \238\ Burton's Request for Funds Stalls as Investigation Fatigue 
Hits GOP, CQ's Inside Congress (Mar. 21, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. The Investigation Squandered Taxpayer Dollars

    Not only did the Committee receive an enormous budget for 
the investigation, the Committee squandered this money in a 
wasteful fashion with no accountability to the taxpayers. For 
example, in early March 1997, the minority learned that the 
majority was planning to spend thousands of dollars to create a 
computer database for the storage of the hundreds of thousands 
of pages of documents obtained by the Committee over the course 
of the investigation. The minority requested that this database 
be shared, as has been the practice in other major 
investigations such as Watergate and Iran-Contra.\239\ This 
would allow both the majority and the minority to search and 
retrieve documents, and create a common index for use during 
hearings. Chairman Burton rejected the minority's proposal to 
share the database, forcing the minority to waste thousands of 
dollars on duplicate systems.\240\ The original estimate for 
the cost of the majority's database was $40,000; it is now 
estimated to have cost the taxpayers $60,000.\241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \239\ See Senate Report, v. 6, 8687 (1998).
    \240\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (May 15, 1997).
    \241\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (May 15, 1997); 
Gingrich, Hyde Will Tap Clinton Scandal Database, Roll Call (Mar. 23, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In another example of waste, the Committee took two trips 
to Asia at a very high cost and with no benefit. In December 
1997, the Committee sent four staff members to Asia for a 19-
day investigative trip. In total, the staff spent only two days 
investigating in Thailand, only three days in Indonesia, and 
only an hour in Singapore. The investigation consisted of eight 
interviews in Bangkok, four interviews in Jakarta, and 
``observing'' a private residence in Jakarta and an office 
building in Singapore. The trip was carelessly planned to 
coincide with two national holidays in Thailand and five 
weekend days. It is estimated that this trip alone cost the 
taxpayers over $40,000.
    Despite this experience, the majority conducted another 
foreign trip to Asia in March 1998. This trip was equally 
wasteful and resulted in no new information. The 15-day trip 
included 2 days in Singapore with 4 interviews, and 7 days in 
Taiwan with 7 interviews. In the Wall Street Journal, Chairman 
Burton's staff director justified the trip by stating, ``Not 
every trip is going to be productive, but you don't know until 
you try.'' \242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \242\ Burton's Campaign-Finance Probe is Drawing Criticism for 
Mounting Costs and Slow Progress, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 27, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority also insisted on sending senior staff to 
Florida to retrieve a computer disk that could have been mailed 
to the Committee for the cost of first-class 
postage.243 On June 23, 1997, the Committee sent 
three staff members (including the majority chief investigative 
counsel) to Miami to retrieve a computer disk that was alleged 
to contain information relevant to the Committee's 
investigation. This two-day trip wasted thousands of dollars 
and a total of six working days of staff time. The disk 
ultimately provided the Committee with little useful 
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \243\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Speaker Gingrich (July 7, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee's frivolous expenses were also exemplified by 
Chairman Burton's ``wall of shame.'' At the April 23, 1998, 
Committee meeting, Chairman Burton unveiled a ``mock stone wall 
measuring six feet by 20 feet.'' 244 Attached to the 
corkboard were ``big glossy shots of Democratic contributors . 
. . and a special spot for the biggest photo, a picture of 
President Clinton.'' 245 Rep. Robert Wise observed, 
``When I visit my children's school, I see things like this up 
on the wall. It's childish and unprofessional for this 
committee.'' 246 According to one journalist, ``in 
the light of day, it seemed more like something from an Ed Wood 
set.'' 247 Despite requests from the Committee's 
minority members, Chairman Burton refused to disclose the cost 
of the collage.248
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \244\ David Grann, Housebroken, The New Republic (May 18, 1998).
    \245\ Id.
    \246\ Angry House Democrats Derail GOP Donor Probe Tactic, Los 
Angeles Times (Apr. 24, 1998).
    \247\ David Grann, Housebroken, The New Republic (May 18, 1998).
    \248\ See House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
Business Meeting (May 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. The Investigation Duplicated the Senate Investigation

    Since the beginning of the campaign finance controversy, 
minority Committee members have supported efforts to conduct 
one coordinated congressional inquiry, rather than the two 
duplicative investigations actually conducted by the House 
Government Reform and Oversight Committee and the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee. In an op-ed published in the 
New York Times on February 28, 1997, Rep. Waxman noted, ``This 
waste of tax dollars makes no sense--identical multimillion-
dollar Senate and House investigations are redundant. They 
should be merged into one comprehensive effort.'' 
249
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \249\ Rep. Waxman, Campaign Reform Made Whole, New York Times (Feb. 
28, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, on March 6, 1997, over 100 minority members, led 
by Reps. Gary Condit, Ed Towns, and John Tierney wrote Speaker 
Gingrich to request one consolidated 
investigation.250 The letter stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \250\ Letter from Rep. Gephardt, et al. to Speaker Gingrich (Mar. 
6, 1997).

          We support a thorough and comprehensive investigation 
        into all alleged campaign finance abuses. But it makes 
        no sense to direct multiple congressional committees to 
        investigate the very same alleged abuses. Multiple 
        investigations are duplicative and wasteful. . . . To 
        avoid this needless waste of taxpayer dollars, the 
        congressional investigation into alleged campaign 
        finance abuses should be consolidated into one thorough 
        investigation.251
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \251\ Id.

    Six months later, Rep. Waxman again asked Speaker Gingrich 
to avoid redundant investigations. In a July 7, 1997, letter, 
Rep. Waxman wrote that since the ``Committee is doing nothing 
more than duplicating the Senate's work, I believe the House 
should defer to Senator Thompson . . . instead of wasting 
millions of taxpayer dollars on an identical but mistake-
plagued House investigation.'' 252
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \252\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Speaker Gingrich (July 7, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Speaker Gingrich never responded to either of these 
letters. Instead, the Committee continued to spend millions of 
dollars duplicating the work of the Senate investigation. 
Chairman Burton issued 307 document subpoenas to individuals or 
entities that were subpoenaed by the Senate.253 
Similarly, the Committee deposed 44 witnesses who were deposed 
by the Senate.254 In total, almost one-half of the 
document subpoenas issued by Chairman Burton and one-quarter of 
the depositions taken by the Committee duplicated the subpoenas 
and depositions in the Senate campaign finance investigation. 
Furthermore, the Committee's hearings on conduit contributions, 
White House compliance with Committee subpoenas, and the 
Interior Department's decision to deny the Hudson casino 
application duplicated hearings already held by the 
Senate.255
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \253\ List of Senate subpoenas provided by Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee.
    \254\ List of Senate depositions provided by the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee. At one point during the investigation, 
Rep. Gary Condit offered an amendment to the Committee rules that would 
have required the Chairman to consult with the chairman of the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee to attempt to avoid duplication of 
depositions. The amendment was defeated. Congressional Record, H4094 
(June 20, 1997).
    \255\ On Oct. 9, 1997, the Committee held hearings on conduit 
contributions made to the DNC by Charlie Trie. House Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings on Conduit Payments to the 
Democratic National Committee, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 9, 1997). 
This hearing covered the same issues examined in a Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee hearing on July 29, 1997. On Nov. 6 and 7, 1997, the 
Committee held hearings on White House compliance with congressional 
subpoenas, including the delayed production of videotapes of 
fundraising events. House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
Hearings on White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas, 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 163 (Nov. 6, 7, 1997). These hearings covered the 
same issues covered in a Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing 
on Oct. 23, 1997. Similarly, on Jan. 21, 22, 28, 29, 1998, the 
Committee held hearings on the Department of the Interior's decision to 
deny an application for an off-reservation Indian Casino in Hudson, 
Wisconsin. House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on the Department of the Interior's Denial of the Wisconsin Chippewa's 
Casino Applications, 105th Cong., 2d. Sess., v. 1 (Jan. 21, 22, 28, 29, 
1998). This same issue was examined in a Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee hearing on Oct. 30, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton and other majority members were concerned 
about the cost of this duplication to the taxpayers when the 
allegations involved Republican campaign finance abuses, 
however.256 At the October 8, 1998, Committee 
meeting, for example, Chairman Burton said that the Committee 
did not investigate allegations of Republican fundraising 
abuses related to Triad Management Services because ``[i]t was 
thoroughly investigated by the Senate . . . and there was no 
need to duplicate their efforts.'' 257 Not only was 
this another example of a double standard, Chairman Burton's 
statement was also factually inaccurate. As described in Part 
IV, the Senate investigation into Triad was thwarted by Triad's 
lack of cooperation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \256\ These allegations are discussed in detail in Part IV of this 
report.
    \257\ Chairman Dan Burton, House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, Business Meeting (Oct. 8, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. The Investigation Duplicated Other House Investigations

    In addition to duplicating the Senate's investigation, the 
Committee duplicated other House investigations. At least 14 
other House committees investigated campaign finance issues in 
the 105th Congress. These committees were: Committee on 
Appropriations; Committee on Banking and Financial Services; 
Committee on the Budget; Committee on Commerce; Committee on 
House Oversight; Committee on International Relations; 
Committee on the Judiciary; Committee on National Security; 
Committee on Resources; Committee on Rules; Committee on Small 
Business; Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (``Ethics 
Committee''); Committee on Ways and Means; and the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence.258
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \258\ Federal agencies reported to the GAO that they received 
campaign finance inquiries from these committees. See Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, Minority Staff Report, The Cost of 
Congressional Campaign Finance Investigations to the U.S. Taxpayers 
(Oct. 7, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee's investigation often simply replicated work 
being done by these other committees. For example, the 
Committee duplicated much of the investigation being conducted 
by the House Education and the Workforce Committee into the 
nullified Teamsters elections. Chairman Burton subpoenaed the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Ron Carey campaign, 
and Citizen Action for information related to the union 
election even though the Education and the Workforce Committee 
had retained outside counsel and held hearings on that 
issue.259
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \259\ Subpoenas from the Government Reform and Oversight Committee 
to: the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Oct. 23, 1997); the Ron 
Carey Campaign (Oct. 23, 1997); Citizen Action (Nov. 12, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee also duplicated the House Resources 
Committee's investigation into the Interior Department's 
decision to deny the Hudson casino application. On December 18, 
1997, the Resources Committee issued a subpoena to the 
Democratic National Committee for all recordsrelating to the 
Hudson casino. This Committee then issued six subpoenas on the same 
matter.260
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \260\ Subpoenas from House Government Reform and Oversight 
Committee to: White House (Aug. 21, 1997); Patrick O'Connor (Oct. 27, 
1997); O'Connor & Hannan (Oct. 27, 1997); Franklin Ducheneaux (Oct. 27, 
1997); Ducheneaux, Taylor & Associates (Oct. 27, 1997); and the 
Department of the Interior (Dec. 12, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The full Committee even duplicated the investigations of 
its own subcommittees. On March 5, 1998, Government 
Information, Management, and Technology Subcommittee Chairman 
Steve Horn held a Federal Election Commission oversight 
hearing. The Subcommittee heard testimony from Lawrence Noble, 
the FEC general counsel, who was questioned in detail about the 
FEC's decision not to take action against DNC contributor 
Howard Glicken. Mr. Noble answered these questions fully and 
explained the FEC's decision thoroughly.261 Despite 
this testimony, Chairman Burton scheduled a full Committee 
hearing on the same issue for March 31, 1998. The primary 
witness was Mr. Noble, who was asked identical questions to 
those posed at the Subcommittee hearing.262
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \261\ Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and 
Technology, Hearings on Oversight of the Federal Election Commission, 
105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 5, 1998).
    \262\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on Federal Election Commission Enforcement Actions: Foreign Campaign 
Contributions and Other FECA Violations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 108-109 
(Mar. 31, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In another example of the intra-Committee duplication, the 
full Committee and the Subcommittee on National Economic 
Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs both issued 
requests for identical information from the DNC.263 
For example, on February 2, 1998, Rep. McIntosh, the 
Subcommittee chairman, issued a formal document request to the 
DNC for ``all computer entries from the computer files of Ann 
Braziel reflecting DNC-Finance sponsored coffees'' even though 
Chairman Burton had subpoenaed ``[a]ll records relating to the 
meetings generally known as White House coffees'' less than a 
year earlier.264
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \263\ Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to the DNC (Mar. 4, 1997); Letter from Rep. McIntosh to Judah 
Best (Feb. 2, 1998).
    \264\ Letter from Rep. McIntosh to Judah Best (Feb. 2, 1998); 
Subpoena from House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight to the 
DNC (Mar. 4, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. The Investigation Imposed Large Costs on Federal Agencies

    The congressional investigations into campaign finance 
abuses have placed a heavy burden on the federal government. In 
an effort to determine the costs and burdens of the campaign 
finance investigation, Rep. Henry Waxman and Rep. Gary Condit 
asked the General Accounting Office toconduct a survey of the 
executive agencies.\265\ The request asked GAO to ``identify the number 
of Congressional inquires made and the related costs incurred by those 
agencies.'' \266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \265\ Letter from Reps. Henry Waxman and Gary Condit to Acting 
Comptroller General of the United States James F. Hinchman (Feb. 3, 
1998).
    \266\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The GAO survey asked 148 executive agencies to provide 
information on campaign finance inquiries received from October 
1, 1996--the time the first allegations of campaign finance 
abuses arose--through March 31, 1998.\267\ The agencies were 
asked the following questions about the congressional campaign 
finance requests: how many written inquiries were received from 
Congress; how many agency officials testified before Congress; 
how many additional oral communications the agency had with 
Congress; actual or estimated personnel costs associated with 
responding to the congressional inquiries; actual or estimated 
pages of documents submitted in response to the congressional 
inquires and the reproduction and delivery costs; the cost of 
any outside contractors used to respond to the congressional 
inquiries; and to what extent the agency encountered 
duplication among the congressional requests. The survey also 
gave the agencies the opportunity to describe any problems or 
other comments regarding the inquiries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \267\ GAO Survey of Executive Branch Cost to Respond to 
Congressional Campaign Finance Inquiries (June 23, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    GAO found that 21 executive agencies reported receiving 
1,156 campaign finance inquiries from Congress during those 18 
months.\268\ This means that federal agencies received, on 
average, three congressional inquiries each working day during 
the period surveyed by GAO. The costs of responding to these 
requests reported by the agencies totaled $8,767,753.36.\269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \268\ Letter from Associate Director, Audit Oversight and Liaison, 
Theodore C. Barreaux to Rep. Waxman and Rep. Condit (Sept. 29, 1998).
    \269\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The actual costs, however, are likely to be even higher 
than the figure reported by GAO, because the GAO figure does 
not include costs incurred for requests received after March 
31, 1998, and does not include various personnel costs, 
document reproduction costs, or delivery costs not reported by 
certain agencies.\270\ The minority staff analyzed the 
responses to the GAO survey filed by the federal agencies. 
These responses showed that (1) the federal agencies spent over 
150,000 hours responding to congressional campaign finance 
inquires; (2) the federal agencies provided over 2.1 million 
pages of documents to Congress in response to these inquiries; 
and (3) 18 of the 21 agencies reported that the congressional 
inquiries were duplicative.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \270\ Id. at Enclosure 1 (footnotes). For example, the Department 
of Energy, which received 47 congressional requests and produced 43,340 
pages of documents, did not provide GAO with personnel costs, document 
reproduction costs, or document delivery costs related to those 
requests. Similarly, the State Department, which reported spending 
3,386 hours responding to 65 requests, did not provide GAO with its 
personnel costs.
    \271\ Minority Staff Report, Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, The Cost of Congressional Campaign Finance Investigations to 
the U.S. Taxpayer (Oct. 7, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. The Total Costs to the Taxpayer from Congressional Campaign Finance 
        Investigations Exceed $23 Million

    The Government Reform and Oversight Committee minority 
staff estimates that the cost to taxpayers of the congressional 
campaign finance investigations conducted during the 105th 
Congress totals more than $23 million. As noted above, 
according to GAO, federal agencies reported spending at least 
$8.7 million responding to congressional inquiries for 
information related to campaign finance.\272\ In addition to 
these federal agency costs, the minority staff estimates that 
Congress has spent at least $14.6 million conducting multiple 
campaign finance investigations. This includes this Committee's 
$7.4 million investigation \273\ and the Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee's $3.5 million campaign finance 
investigation.\274\ The House also authorized $1.2 million for 
the Education and the Workforce Committee's inquiry into 
campaign finance abuses related to the Teamsters \275\ and $2.5 
million for a select committee to investigate allegations that 
the Clinton administration gave missile technology to China in 
exchange for campaign contributions.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \272\ Id.
    \273\ Id.
    \274\ Burton's Campaign-Finance Probe Is Drawing Criticism for 
Mounting Costs and Slow Progress, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 27, 1998).
    \275\ The House Oversight Committee appropriated $747,274.75 at the 
Mar. 4, 1998, committee meeting and an additional $296,543 at the Oct. 
2, 1998, committee meeting. The Education and the Workforce Committee 
also approved a $150,000 consultant contract for outside counsel for 
the Teamsters investigation out of the committee's regular budget. 
Leaders Seek Subpoena Power for Investigation of Teamsters, Roll Call 
(Mar. 23, 1998).
    \276\ H. Res. 463 (June 18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As noted above, these four congressional committees--the 
House Government Reform Committee, the Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee, the House Education and the Workforce 
Committee, and the Select Committee on U.S. National Security 
and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of 
China--are not the only congressional committees that have 
investigated alleged campaign finance abuses in the 105th 
Congress. This report, however, does not estimate the cost to 
the taxpayers of the investigations by the other committees. If 
these additionalcosts were included, the total congressional 
costs would undoubtedly far exceed $14.6 million and the total cost to 
taxpayers would far exceed $23 million.

9. The Investigation Imposed Large Costs on the DNC and Other Private 
        Parties

    The Committee's investigation also imposed large and 
unnecessary costs on private parties, including individual 
citizens. One of the main targets of the investigation was the 
DNC. In total, Chairman Burton issued 18 information requests 
to the DNC, including six subpoenas, ten document requests, and 
two sets of interrogatories in connection with the campaign 
finance investigation. \277\ The Committee also deposed 23 DNC 
employees and heard public testimony from one other DNC 
employee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \277\ See, e.g., Subpoenas from House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight to the DNC (Mar. 4, 1997; Aug. 22, 1997; Sept. 17, 
1997; Jan. 22, 1998; and Mar. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to attorneys for the DNC, in order to comply with 
the Committee's subpoenas, the DNC was forced to use 22 
employees, including 10 attorneys, solely to search and prepare 
documents for production. The DNC estimates that it had to 
search nearly 10 million pages of materials to find responsive 
documents. The DNC produced over 600,000 pages of documents at 
a cost of more than $6.1 million to this Committee. The DNC 
also incurred $8.8 million in legal fees.\278\ Thus, the total 
cost to the DNC was nearly $15 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \278\ Minority staff phone interview of Paul Palmer, Debevois & 
Plimpton (Sept. 23, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The investigation also imposed substantial and unnecessary 
costs on private businesses. For example, CommerceCorp--a small 
business with just a few employees headed by former White House 
aide Mark Middleton--spent approximately $100,000 and 3\1/2\ 
full days going through documents to comply with the 
Committee's subpoena. According to one of the company's 
employees, the cost of the investigation put the company's 
future in jeopardy.\279\ PRC, Inc., which was under contract 
with the White House to provide computer services, spent more 
money responding to document requests and attending depositions 
related to the WhoDB investigation than it did fulfilling the 
terms of its White House contract.\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \279\ Minority staff conversation with Robert Luskin, attorney for 
CommerceCorp employee Holli Weymouth (July 1997).
    \280\ Deposition of Donald Upson, 61 (Aug. 7, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The greatest costs were often borne by individuals. Maggie 
Williams, for example, the former chief of staff to the First 
Lady, incurred over $350,000 in legal fees in connection with 
the congressional investigations.\281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \281\ In the Loop, Washington Post (July 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               E. The Investigation Was Widely Criticized

1. The Views of Editorial Boards

    Over the past 20 months, Chairman Burton's actions have 
undercut the credibility of the Committee's campaign finance 
investigation. As a result of these actions, editorial boards 
around the country have concluded that Chairman Burton's 
investigation lost all credibility.
    In total, at least 40 newspapers have criticized the 
Committee's investigation in over 60 editorials. The editorials 
include the following: \282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \282\ These editorials are attached to this report as Exhibit 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Ethically Compromised Inquisitor'' \283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \283\ Hartford Courant (Mar. 11, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Reining In Dan Burton'' \284\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \284\ New York Times (Mar. 20, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Mr. Burton Should Step Aside'' \285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \285\ Washington Post (Mar. 20, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Millstone of Partisanship; House's Campaign Finance 
        Inquiry Appears Short on Credibility'' \286\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \286\ Los Angeles Times (Apr. 11, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``A House Investigation Travesty'' \287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \287\ New York Times (Apr. 12, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``A Chairman Without Credibility'' \288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \288\ San Francisco Chronicle (Apr. 14, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``A Disintegrating House Inquiry'' \289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \289\ New York Times (July 12, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Reno Roast Embarrasses Nobody But Congress; 
        Grilling Of Attorney General Is A Sorry Partisan 
        Spectacle'' \290\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \290\ Los Angeles Times (Dec. 10, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Soap Opera'' 291
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \291\ Roll Call (Apr. 27, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``A Chairman Out of Control'' 292
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \292\ The Hill (Apr. 29, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Dan, Go to Your Room'' 293
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \293\ Boston Herald (May 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Burton's Vendetta'' 294
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \294\ Boston Globe (May 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Dan Burton Is a Loose Cannon'' 295
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \295\ Hartford Courant (May 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Abuse of Privacy; Burton Should Be Censured'' 
        296
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \296\ Harrisburg Patriot-News (May 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Rep. Burton Goes Too Far'' 297
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \297\ Times Union (Albany, New York) (May 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Congressman Plays Dirty with Tapes'' 298
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \298\ Allentown Morning Call (May 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``The Hubbell Tapes; What Is Dan Burton Thinking?'' 
        299
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \299\ Minneapolis Star Tribune (May 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Clinton's Foes Bungle Again'' 300
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \300\ Atlanta Constitution (May 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Give Dan Burton the Gate'' 301
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \301\ Chicago Tribune (May 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Headcase'' 302
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \302\ New York Daily News (May 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Wild Card: Chairman's Rampage Demeans Entire 
        House'' 303
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \303\ Fayetteville Observer-Times (May 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Burton Bumbles In Bad Faith'' 304
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \304\ San Antonio Express-News (May 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Remove Burton from Money Probe'' 305
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \305\ Seattle Post-Intelligencer (May 7, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``The Dan Burton Problem'' 306
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \306\ New York Times (May 8, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Out of Control'' 307
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \307\ Roll Call (May 7, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Burton Unfit to Lead Clinton Probe'' 308
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \308\ Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel (May 9, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Mistakes Were Made: Burton Inquiry Can't Reach a 
        Credible Conclusion'' 309
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \309\ Sacramento Bee (May 11, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The Views of Columnists and Commentators

    Columnists and commentators have been equally critical of 
Chairman Burton's investigation. The columns include the 
following: 310
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \310\ These columns are attached to this report as Exhibit 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``The Wrong Man for a Sensitive Job'' 311
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \311\ Laura Ingraham, New York Times (Nov. 20, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``The Witch Hunt in the House'' 312
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \312\ Albert R. Hunt, Wall Street Journal (Apr. 10, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``A Wacky Politico Invades Privacy to Get at 
        Clinton'' 313
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \313\ Lars-Erik Nelson, New York Daily News (Apr. 22, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``An Abuse of Power'' 314
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \314\ Richard Cohen, Washington Post (Apr. 28, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Slime on the Right'' 315
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \315\ Anthony Lewis, New York Times (May 4, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``House Probe of Campaign Fund-Raising Uncovers 
        Little, Piles Up Partisan Ill Will'' 316
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \316\ Marc Lacey, Los Angeles Times (May 4, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Rules of Congress, Truth Be Damned'' 317
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \317\ Robert Scheer, Los Angeles Times (May 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``It's Time to Say, `Bye-Bye, Rep. Burton' '' 
        318
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \318\ Marianne Means, Fort Worth Star-Telegram (May 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``He Takes a Cue from McCarthy'' 319
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \319\ Sandy Grady, Newark Star-Ledger (May 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``The Republicans' Loose Cannon'' 320
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \320\ John Farmer, Newark Star-Ledger (May 7, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Accuser Caught In His Own Trap'' 321
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \321\ Stephen Winn, Kansas City Star (May 9, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``You Want a Non-Partisan Investigation? Don't Get 
        Burton'' 322
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \322\ Robert G. Beckel, Los Angeles Times (May 10, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Another Bump In Burton Panel's Road'' 
        323
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \323\ Norman Ornstein, Washington Post (May 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``Housebroken'' 324
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \324\ David Grann, The New Republic (May 18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  II. The Majority Repeatedly Made Sensational Allegations That Were 
                        False or Unsubstantiated

    On February 25, 1997, at the outset of the Committee's 
investigation, Chairman Burton appeared on national television 
to discuss the Committee's campaign finance investigation. 
During the interview, he noted that ``this thing could end up 
being much bigger than Watergate ever was.'' 325 He 
reiterated this allegation to the Washington Post a few weeks 
later, stating: ``This could end up being a Watergate type of 
thing. . . . This is big, big stuff. Every day it's getting 
bigger and bigger.'' 326
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \325\ PBS's The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (Feb. 25, 1997).
    \326\ ``Pit Bull'' in the Chair; Rep. Burton Known as Tenacious 
Crusader, Washington Post (Mar. 19, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Chairman's accusations generated headlines but were 
never substantiated. Over a year later, after hundreds of 
subpoenas and depositions, a senior Republican leadership aide 
had this to say about the Committee's investigation: ``It's 
been very expensive, and it hasn't amounted tomuch.'' 
327 Similarly, the Wall Street Journal reported: ``the panel 
. . . has conducted just a handful of hearings that disclosed no major 
new evidence against the White House.'' 328
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \327\ Burton's Request for Funds Stalls as Investigation Fatigue 
Hits GOP, CQ's Inside Congress (Mar. 21, 1998).
    \328\ Burton's Campaign-Finance Probe Is Drawing Criticism for 
Mounting Costs and Slow Progress, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 27, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unfortunately, the pattern of ``accuse first, investigate 
later'' became a hallmark of the Committee's investigation. As 
one editorial observed, Chairman Burton has ``variously accused 
the President of lying, covering up, obstructing justice and 
buying off witnesses--and proved not a one of his 
accusations.'' 329
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \329\ Chairman's Rampage Demeans Entire House, Fayetteville 
Observer-Times (May 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This tactic may have succeeded as a partisan political 
strategy. The majority's unsubstantiated allegations regularly 
received more media coverage than the actual facts. But as 
responsible congressional oversight, the approach was 
fundamentally flawed. It was unfair to those whose reputations 
were falsely maligned, misleading to the public, and a 
discredit to the House.

       A. John Huang Did Not ``Launder Money'' through David Wang

    The Committee's first campaign finance hearing, held on 
October 9, 1997, was based on an unsubstantiated allegation. 
The star witness at that hearing was supposed to be David Wang, 
a used car salesman from Southern California. The majority 
alleged that Mr. Wang's testimony would prove that DNC 
fundraiser John Huang had met with Mr. Wang in Los Angeles on 
August 16, 1996, to solicit and receive conduit contributions 
from Mr. Wang. Before the hearing, Chairman Burton claimed: 
``This is the first time we have found an active person at the 
DNC who was involved in money laundering. So Mr. Huang, while 
he was an executive at the DNC in the finance area, was 
laundering money and we will be able to prove that.'' 
330 In his opening statement, Chairman Burton stated 
that Mr. Wang's testimony was ``the first time in my memory 
that we have seen evidence of such blatantly illegal activity 
by a senior national party official.'' 331
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \330\ Burton Says Testimony Will Show Illegal Donation, Associated 
Press (Sept. 27, 1997).
    \331\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on Conduit Payments to the Democratic National Committee, 105th 
Congress, 1st Sess., 7 (Oct. 9, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These allegations, however, turned out to be false. Using 
evidence submitted to the Committee, as well as information 
available in the public record, a minority staff report 
demonstrated that the Chairman's allegations were untrue. 
332 Mr. Huang's credit card records showed that Mr. 
Huang was in New York--not Los Angeles--on the day that Mr. 
Wang made the conduit contributions and allegedly met with John 
Huang. Moreover, affidavits and statements from witnesses who 
met and worked with Mr. Huang demonstrated that he was in New 
York during the period in question, including on the specific 
day Mr. Wang claimed to have met with Mr. Huang in Los Angeles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \332\ Minority Staff Report, Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, Evidence that John Huang Was in New York City on August 15, 
16, 17, and 18 (Oct. 9, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Remarkably, the hearing was held even though the majority 
had received advance notice of the problems with Mr. Wang's 
testimony. Majority chief counsel Richard Bennett admitted 
during his questioning of Mr. Wang that ``the day after your 
deposition, I was visited by John Huang's attorney . . . who 
insisted that his client was not with you in California on that 
particular day.'' 333 Chairman Burton and his staff, 
however, never investigated this exculpatory evidence. Nor has 
Chairman Burton retracted the allegation, clarified the public 
record, or apologized for his mistakes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \333\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on Conduit Payments to the Democratic National Committee, 105th 
Congress, 1st Sess., 257 (Oct. 9, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  B. The White House Videotapes Were Not ``Cut Off Intentionally'' or 
                              ``Altered''

    Less than a month later, Chairman Burton appeared as a 
guest on CBS's ``Face the Nation'' to accuse the White House of 
doctoring videotapes of White House coffees and other events. 
Chairman Burton stated: ``Some of the tapes were cut off very 
abruptly and then you go to another tape. We think . . . maybe 
some of those tapes may have been cut off intentionally, 
they've been--been, you know, altered in some way.'' 
334
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \334\ CBS's Face the Nation (Oct. 19, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton's allegation of tape alteration received 
substantial press coverage in the days following his 
appearance. Articles about his allegation appeared in the 
Washington Post,335 the Los Angeles 
Times,336 and in wire stories.337 
However, the allegation ultimately proved to be baseless. 
Investigations by both this Committee and the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee failed to produce any evidence 
of tape alteration. In fact, the investigations produced 
compelling evidence that the tapes had not been altered in any 
way.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \335\ Tapes May Have Been Altered, Rep. Burton Says, Washington 
Post (Oct. 20, 1997).
    \336\ Altering of Clinton Tapes Alleged, Los Angeles Times (Oct. 
20, 1997).
    \337\ Carter Says Fund-Raising Back and Forth Are Hurting Country, 
Associated Press (Oct. 19, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, on October 23, 1997, Chief Petty Officer 
Charles McGrath, the career military officer in charge of the 
White House Communications Agency (WHCA) Audiovisual Unit, 
engaged in the following dialogue with Senator Levin at a 
Senate hearing:

          Mr. Levin. Now, the allegation has been made here 
        that these tapes have been altered in some way. Have 
        they been?
          Mr. McGrath. Not at all.
          Mr. Levin. Well, we had Congressman Burton here make 
        this allegation on Face the Nation last Sunday. Did you 
        hear that allegation?
          Mr. McGrath. I did not see that, but I did hear that 
        he made the allegation.
          Mr. Levin. And you know that it's not true?
          Mr. McGrath. I know that for a fact.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \338\ Hearing before Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (Oct. 
23, 1997).

    Mr. McGrath's testimony before the Senate was echoed by 
other witnesses who testified before this Committee. For 
example, Steven Smith, a career Defense Department employee who 
worked in WHCA, was asked: ``And you also said that you knew of 
no instance during your time where a tape was altered, 
doctored, edited, whatever words you want to use?'' He replied, 
``That's correct.'' \339\ Similarly, Colonel Joseph Simmons 
(Ret.), the commander of the career military employees at WHCA, 
testified as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \339\ Deposition of Steven Smith, House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, 99 (Oct. 18, 1997). All depositions referenced in 
this section, unless otherwise noted, were taken by the House Committee 
on Government Reform and Oversight.

          Minority Counsel. Are you aware of any effort by any 
        White House personnel to doctor or alter the tapes?
          Mr. Simmons. No.
          Minority Counsel. Do you believe that your men would 
        have [per]mitted such an effort to take place or 
        succeed, had they become aware of it?
          Mr. Simmons. Absolutely not.
          Minority Counsel. Do you believe they would have 
        informed you . . . of any efforts to doctor, alter, or 
        otherwise edit the tapes?
          Mr. Simmons. I know they would have.\340\

    \340\ Deposition of Joseph Simmons, 149 (Oct. 18, 1997.)

    The Senate Committee even hired an independent expert, Paul 
Ginsburg, to review the videotapes. This expert also 
``determined . . . that there was no suspicious trickery.'' 
\341\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \341\ Burton's Hearings Resume Where Thompson's Ended, Roll Call 
(Nov. 6, 1997) (quoting a ``Senate GOP source''). See also Expert: 
Coffee Tapes Are Clean, Newsday (Nov. 8, 1997) (``Paul Ginsburg, an 
expert hired by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee to study the 
tapes for signs of doctoring, has `found no evidence of improper 
alteration,' a committee staffer said.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ultimately, the evidence that the videotapes were not 
altered received far less attention than Chairman Burton's 
initial allegations. Ranking Minority Member Waxman pointed 
this out at a hearing on November 6, 1997, and requested that 
Chairman Burton at least acknowledge his mistake and correct 
the public record.\342\ Chairman Burton has refused to retract 
this false accusation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \342\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas, 105th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 43 (Nov. 6, 1997). As noted by the Hartford Courant, ``The 
Chairman of the House committee probing possible campaign finance 
abuses Thursday offered no proof to protesting Democrats of his 
allegation that White House coffee videotapes had been altered.'' No 
Proof Offered of Tape Tampering, Hartford Courant (Nov. 7, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      C. The Hudson Casino Decision Was Not a ``Political Payoff''

    In late 1997, the Committee commenced an extensive 
investigation into whether a decision by the Department of the 
Interior to deny an off-reservation Indian casino application 
was influenced by contributions made to the DNC by local tribes 
opposed to the application. Committee investigators took 18 
depositions regarding the decision, including the depositions 
of ten Interior Department employees involved in the 
decision.\343\ Although these depositions established that the 
decision was based on the merits--and not the influence of 
campaign contributions--Chairman Burton and other Republican 
members persisted in making unsubstantiated, but widely 
reported, allegations of political corruption during four days 
of Committee hearings in January 1998.\344\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \343\ The Interior Department employees deposed were: Michael 
Anderson (Jan. 14, 1998); Michael Chapman (Jan. 9, 1998); Ada Deer 
(Jan. 12, 1998); John Duffy (Jan. 26, 1998); Tom Hartman (Dec. 8, 
1997); Robert Jaeger (Dec. 11, 1997); Hilda Manuel (Jan. 6, 1998); 
Kevin Meisner (Jan. 16, 1998); Heather Sibbison (Jan. 15, 1998); and 
George Skibine (Jan. 13-14, 1998). The other individuals deposed 
concerning the Hudson decision were: Loretta Avent (Dec. 5, 1997); 
Thomas Corcoran (Dec. 10, 1997); Franklin Ducheneaux (Dec. 4, 1997); 
Ann Jablonski (Jan. 20, 1998); Jennifer O'Connor (Sept. 15, 1997); 
Patrick O'Donnell (Dec. 9 1997); Michael Schmidt (Jan. 8, 1998); and 
Tom Schneider (Dec. 10, 1997).
    \344\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on the Department of the Interior's Denial of the Wisconsin Chippewa's 
Casino Applications, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 21, 22, 28, and 29, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton, for example, alleged that the Department's 
decision was a ``political payoff.'' He summarized his core 
allegations during the first day of the Committee's hearings as 
follows:

          $350,000 was given, which appears to be a political 
        payoff; and then after that Mr. Duffy and Mr. Collier, 
        two top executives at the Interior, go to work for the 
        rich tribe. And then after that, Mr. Collier carries a 
        $50 to $100,000 check to the DNC from the Shakopees. 
        Now I don't know how anybody, even if they are blind, 
        could not see these facts. . . . What we are talking 
        about is whether or not the law was complied with, No. 
        1, whether or not campaign contributions were used to 
        exert influence on people in the White House and at the 
        Department of [the] Interior to kill this project. I 
        think it is pretty clear, at least from my perspective 
        it is pretty clear, that that's what happened.\345\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \345\ Id. at v. 1, 106.

    The Chairman's allegations were echoed by other Committee 
Republicans, who claimed that the tribes contributing to the 
DNC were ``successfully buying influence'' \346\ and that 
``[t]his is an inquiry into whether corruption went to the 
highest levels of this Government.'' \347\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \346\ Id. at v. 1, 164 (Statement of Rep. Souder).
    \347\ Id. at v. 1, 195 (Statement of Rep. Shadegg).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These allegations, however, were not supported by the 
evidence. The evidence showed that the Department had sound 
reasons for rejecting the casino application. Approval of the 
application would have permitted the federal government to 
remove the land from local control for the benefit of distant 
Indian tribes. Not surprisingly, local officials from the 
Hudson town council to Wisconsin Republican Governor Tommy 
Thompson opposed such a move, as did the local congressman, 
Republican Rep. Steve Gunderson.\348\ Also, the land would have 
been used for casino gambling, which is illegal under Wisconsin 
law. In essence, the application would have allowed distant 
Indian tribes to impose casino gambling on an unwilling 
locality.\349\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \348\ See Resolution opposing casino gambling at St. Croix Meadows, 
Resolution No. 2-95 (Feb. 6, 1995); Letter from 29 Wisconsin state 
legislators to Secretary Babbitt (Mar. 28, 1995); Letter from Rep. 
Steve Gunderson to Secretary Babbitt (Apr. 28, 1995); Letter from Sen. 
Russ Feingold to Secretary Babbitt (June 29, 1995); Letter from Gov. 
Tommy Thompson to William Cranmer (June 9, 1995).
    \349\ The proposed casino also would have increased parking 
congestion in the area and impacted a nearby scenic riverway. See House 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings on The 
Department of the Interior's Denial of the Wisconsin Chippewa's Casino 
Applications, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 21, 22, 28, and 29, 1998), v. 
1, 356; 396.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These facts led some Republican Committee members to 
concede that the decision was correct on the merits. Rep. 
Christopher Cox, for example, acknowledged that ``if I were 
making the decision with a view to vindicating the interests of 
the community that I represented, I might have gone the same 
way. I might have said no dog track.'' \350\ Other Republican 
members also expressed their opposition to casino 
gambling.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \350\ Id. at v. 1, 16.
    \351\ Rep. Mark Souder: ``I believe gambling is a mortal sin, and I 
believe you're wrong to pursue the casinos . . . And I don't like this 
manipulation of going off the reservations.'' Id. at v. 1, 96. Rep. 
John Mica: ``I don't support casino gambling.'' Id. at v. 1, 158. Rep. 
Vince Snowbarger: ``I am no proponent of gambling.'' Id. at v. 1, 174. 
Rep. John Shadegg: ``I have grave reservations about Indian gaming.'' 
Id. at v. 1, 178.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Indeed, the majority's frequently stated opposition to 
gambling led Rep. Robert Wise to observe that the opposite 
decision would have subjected the Department to a firestorm of 
criticism:

          [H]ad you ruled the opposite way in the face of 
        intense opposition from the State house on down in 
        Wisconsin, basically Republican, much of it Republican 
        dominated . . . we would be here today . . . conducting 
        the same hearing, but it would be reversed. It would be 
        . . . Why did you ignore the overwhelming local 
        opposition in Wisconsin? \352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \352\ Id.  at v. 1, 863.

    Moreover, the evidence showed that the decision to reject 
the application was made exclusively on the merits. Every 
Department employee who testified before the Committee denied 
that the Department's decision had been influenced--directly or 
indirectly--by campaign contributions. George Skibine, the 
career civil servant who recommended that the application be 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
rejected, categorically denied the majority's allegations:

          I was not pressured in any way by anyone to reach a 
        particular recommendation in this matter. You may 
        choose to question the wisdom of my professional 
        judgment in this matter, and reasonable people may 
        disagree on the merits of my recommendation; however, 
        it was made solely on the merits. Throughout this 
        investigation I have always tried to tell the truth as 
        I know it. I am a civil servant of two decades' 
        standing who has chosen a career in public service 
        because I believe it is a high calling. My integrity, 
        honesty, and good faith have never before been 
        challenged.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \353\ Id. at v. 1, 205.

    Hilda Manuel, deputy commissioner of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs and Mr. Skibine'ssupervisor, also denied that any 
improper influence had been brought to bear on the Department:

          Minority Counsel. Were you ever contacted by the 
        White House or the DNC about this project, the Hudson 
        project?
          Ms. Manuel. Never.
          Minority Counsel. And at the time of the decision, 
        did you feel like the White House or the DNC tried to 
        improperly influence the outcome?
          Ms. Manuel. No.
          Minority Counsel. Do you think the decision was based 
        on the record?
          Ms. Manuel. Yes.354
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \354\ Deposition of Hilda Manuel, 98 (Jan. 6, 1998).

    Similarly, Deputy Assistant Secretary Michael Anderson, the 
final decision maker, testified that ``I have absolutely no 
knowledge of any improper political influence or even, for that 
matter, from the DNC any rumors or suggestions that there was 
political corruption going on in this decision.'' 
355
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \355\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on the Department of the Interior's Denial of the Wisconsin Chippewa's 
Casino Applications, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 21, 22, 28, and 29, 
1998), v. 1, 369.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, the majority was never able to establish any 
connection between the Department's decision and subsequent 
legal work done by two senior Department employees for the 
tribes opposed to the application. One of those employees, Tom 
Collier, testified that he was not even working at the 
Department at the time the decision was made:

          I want to reiterate that there is no connection 
        whatsoever to any work I ever did at the Department of 
        the Interior and my representation of the Shakopees. . 
        . . I was not involved in this decision at the 
        Department of [the] Interior. I had left the Department 
        when this decision was made.356

    \356\ Id. at v. 1, 721. The other employee, John Duffy, similarly 
denied any connection between the decision and his subsequent work. He 
noted that he played no role whatsoever in seeking out the opposing 
tribe as clients: ``Let me make sure we understand this. I am not 
working on any issue for the Shakopees that I worked on at the 
Department of [the] Interior. . . . I mean, the connection that is 
trying to be made here, with improper conduct on my part, which I 
frankly am strongly upset about, is that I joined a law firm which 
already had a client, which, at some point in time, was interested in a 
decision that I participated in but didn't make. Now, with great 
respect, Congressman, I don't see the appearance of impropriety here.'' 
Id. at v. 1, 760.

    At the conclusion of the third day of hearings, it was 
apparent that the evidence before the Committee fundamentally 
conflicted with the majority's allegations.357 
Rather than acknowledging this conflict, however, Chairman 
Burton continued to assert that the Department's decision 
``stinks'' and ``smells'' based on the circumstantial evidence 
that the decision favored the tribes that had made 
contributions to the DNC.358
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \357\ The principal testimony supporting the majority's allegations 
was the testimony of Fred Havenick, the owner of the proposed casino 
site. Mr. Havenick was the prime mover behind the casino application 
because he believed a casino would salvage a failed dog track he had 
built at the site, an investment that was incurring multi-million 
dollar losses annually. Mr. Havenick alleged that at a meeting with Mr. 
Skibine, Mr. Skibine had explained that the application was killed 
because of ``politics.'' Mr. Havenick's allegation was supported by 
affidavits from two officials of the disgruntled applicant tribes. Mr. 
Havenick also alleged that at a Democratic fundraising event, Terry 
McAuliffe, a prominent Democratic fundraiser, had boasted that he had 
killed the application.
    There was considerable evidence that conflicted with Mr. Havenick's 
testimony, however. First, Mr. Skibine vehemently denied saying that 
the application was killed because of ``politics,'' and his denial was 
supported by the affidavits of five Interior Department employees who 
attended the meeting. Similarly, Mr. McAuliffe submitted a statement to 
the Committee denying Mr. Havenick's allegation. Statement of Terence 
McAuliffe (Jan. 28, 1998). Moreover, the Committee's hearing was the 
first time Mr. Havenick made his allegation against Mr. McAuliffe, 
despite having litigated the Department's decision for more than two 
years on the basis of improper political influence. As Rep. Kucinich 
noted, ``I find it very unusual that this story about Mr. McAuliffe 
surfaces today even though it never came up in what can only be 
described as very contentious litigation with the Department.'' House 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings on the 
Department of the Interior's Denial of the Wisconsin Chippewa's Casino 
Applications, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 21, 22, 28, and 29, 1998), v. 
1, 173.
    \358\ Id. at v. 1, 340.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On February 11, 1998, Attorney General Reno recommended 
that an independent counsel be appointed to investigate 
possible false statements to Congress by Secretary Babbitt 
relating to the Hudson casino decision. While the appointment 
of an independent counsel is a serious matter, the Attorney 
General's recommendation does not substantiate the majority's 
allegations. In fact, in the independent counsel application, 
Attorney General Reno stated that she ``did not have specific 
and credible evidence to suggest that Secretary Babbitt had 
participated in any criminal activity to corrupt the decision 
making process.'' 359 The independent counsel was 
appointed solely to investigate the truthfulness of Secretary 
Babbitt's statements concerning a meeting he had with a 
lobbyist on the Hudson casino application.360
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \359\ See Application to the Court Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
Sec. 592(e)(1) for the Appointment of an Independent Counsel, 8 (Feb. 
11, 1998).
    \360\ Id. at 2. The controversy involved the conflicting testimony 
of Secretary Babbitt and Paul Eckstein, a lobbyist working for the 
applicant tribes. According to Mr. Eckstein, Mr. Babbitt told Mr. 
Eckstein that then-White House Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes had 
called Mr. Babbitt and directed him to make a decision on the casino 
application. In a July 14, 1995, letter to Senator McCain, Secretary 
Babbitt denied telling Mr. Eckstein that he had spoken to Mr. Ickes. 
Secretary Babbitt later testified that he did not tell Mr. Eckstein 
that Mr. Ickes told him to make a decision. In his testimony before the 
Committee, Secretary Babbitt said that he told Mr. Eckstein that ``Mr. 
Ickes, the Department's point of contact on many Interior matters, 
wanted or expected the Department to decide the matter promptly.'' Mr. 
Babbitt explained, ``It was just an awkward effort to terminate an 
uncomfortable meeting on a personally sympathetic note. But . . . I had 
no such communication with Mr. Ickes or anyone else from the White 
House.'' Testimony of Secretary Babbitt before the Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee (Oct. 30, 1997).
    In the application for the appointment of the independent counsel, 
Attorney General Reno did not reach a conclusion on whether Mr. Babbitt 
made a false statement. She noted, ``It must be decided by an 
Independent Counsel whether the evidence of falsity . . . is sufficient 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Secretary Babbitt's testimony 
was untrue, and if so, whether prosecution is warranted as an exercise 
of discretion.'' Application to the Court Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
Sec. 592(e)(1) for the Appointment of an Independent Counsel, at 5. In 
fact, the Attorney General found ``evidence suggesting that Secretary 
Babbitt lacked criminal intent'' when he made those statements. Id. at 
7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. There Is No Evidence That the President Created a National Monument 
     in Utah ``in Exchange for Money from Indonesia's Lippo Group''

    Chairman Burton also alleged that President Clinton created 
a national monument in Utah in order to benefit the Lippo 
Group. For example, on April 16, 1998, the Indianapolis Star 
reported: ``Although he is not yet able to prove his 
suspicions, Burton's chief concern is that U.S. policies were 
compromised in exchange for campaign contributions. Among the 
possibilities: that Clinton declared 1.8 million acres of coal-
rich southern Utah as a national park in exchange for money 
from Indonesia's Lippo Group. Indonesia is the chief competitor 
to Utah for low-polluting coal.'' 361
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \361\ Burton's Pursuit of President, Indianapolis Star (Apr. 16, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On June 11, 1998, Chairman Burton restated his allegation 
on the House floor:

          Who would benefit from turning that into a national 
        park so you cannot mine there? The Riady group, the 
        Lippo Group, and Indonesia has the largest clean-
        burning coal facility, in southeast Asia. They were one 
        of the largest contributors. . . . Could there be a 
        connection there? We need to know. The American people 
        have a right to know, but we do not know.362
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \362\ Congressional Record, H4544 (June 11, 1998).

    After nearly two years of investigation, however, the 
Committee has produced no evidence supporting the Chairman's 
allegations. To the contrary, as the Washington Times has 
reported, ``hundreds of pages of administration documents 
turned over to congressional investigators show no Lippo 
connection.'' 363
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \363\ Congress Checks Lippo Link to ``Clean Coal'' Closure, 
Washington Times (July 24, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   E. The Hubbell Tapes Did Not Show a ``Payoff'' to Webster Hubbell

    On April 30, 1998, Chairman Burton unilaterally released 
tapes of Webster Hubbell's prison conversations. According to 
the Chairman, these tapes proved that Mr. Hubbell had been paid 
to protect the President and the First Lady. Appearing on NBC's 
``Meet the Press,'' Chairman Burton alleged that the tapes 
showed that ``it appears to be a payoff--it looks like the 
White House was trying to keep Webb Hubbell quiet and they've 
been successful.'' 364
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \364\ NBC's Meet the Press (May 3, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It was subsequently revealed, however, that the tape 
transcripts released by Chairman Burton omitted exculpatory 
statements by Mr. Hubbell that contradicted the Chairman's 
allegation. For example, Chairman Burton omitted a passage 
where Mr. Hubbell tells his wife that ``most of the articles 
are presupposing that . . . my silence is being bought. We know 
that's not true.'' 365
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \365\ Production from the Department of Justice to the House 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Tape 100A (July 2, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, the Chairman's allegation of a ``payoff'' was not 
supported by the evidence before the Committee. The majority 
devoted a substantial portion of the Committee's investigative 
resources to examining, in exhaustive detail, Mr. Hubbell's 
activities. Although there was little apparent connection to 
campaign finance issues, the majority investigated numerous 
subjects relating to Mr. Hubbell, including: Mr. Hubbell's 
discussions in 1993 with partners at the Rose Law 
Firm,366 whether Mr. Hubbell maintained documents 
relating to the ``Whitewater'' land deal,367 whether 
there were discussions at the White House about subpoenas from 
Independent Counsels Robert Fiske or Kenneth Starr to Mr. 
Hubbell,368 whether persons close to the President 
hired Mr. Hubbell in 1994 to obstruct Independent Counsel 
Starr's investigation,369 what income Mr. Hubbell 
reported on his tax returns,370 the circumstances 
surrounding Mr. Hubbell's resignation from the Department of 
Justice,371 contacts with Mr. Hubbell after his 
resignation from the Department of Justice,372 
contacts with Mr. Hubbell while he was 
incarcerated,373 contacts with Mr. Hubbell's wife 
while Mr. Hubbell was incarcerated,374 the trust 
funds set up for Mr. Hubbell's children and legal expenses when 
he went to prison,375 and Mr. Hubbell's reasons for 
asserting his Fifth Amendment rights.376
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \366\ See, e.g., Deposition of Marsha Scott, 25-28 (Sept. 10, 
1997).
    \367\ See, e.g., Deposition of Michael Kantor, 30-31 (Aug. 8, 
1997).
    \368\ See, e.g., Deposition of Mack McLarty, 36, 44, 104-05 (Sept. 
5, 1997).
    \369\ See, e.g., Deposition of Michael Kantor, 54-55 (Aug. 8, 
1997).
    \370\ See, e.g., Deposition of Michael Schaufele, 88-89 (Aug. 29, 
1997).
    \371\ See, e.g., Deposition of James Blair, 33-42 (July 23, 1997).
    \372\ See, e.g., Interrogatories from House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight to Erskine Bowles, No. 6 (Apr. 20, 1998).
    \373\ See, e.g., Interrogatories from House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight to John Richardson, No. 28 (Dec. 8, 1997).
    \374\ See, e.g., Interrogatories from House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight to Nathan Landow, No. 16 (Apr. 1, 1998).
    \375\ See, e.g., Deposition of Michael Schaufele, 51-66 (Aug. 29, 
1997).
    \376\ See, e.g., Id. at 67-68 (Aug. 29, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In investigating these various topics, the majority deposed 
42 people, took testimony through written interrogatories from 
17 others, and requested documents from 96 companies and 
individuals. This extensive record shows that the witnesses who 
hired Mr. Hubbell did so because they had legitimate work for 
him to do,377 because he had valuable connections in 
the government,378 or out of compassion for a friend 
379--not as a ``payoff'' to obstruct justice. In 
fact, there is so little evidence of a ``payoff'' that the 
majority report is completely silent on this issue and the 
majority never held a single day of hearings on Mr. Hubbell.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \377\ See, e.g., Deposition of Bernard Rapoport, 41, 49-50, Ex. 7 
(Aug. 19, 1997) (testifying that Mr. Hubbell was hired to lobby and 
consult and that Mr. Hubbell, in fact, did legitimate work).
    \378\ See, e.g., Deposition of Jim Lewin, 34-50 (Aug. 21, 1997) 
(testifying that U.S. Sprint hired Mr. Hubbell because he was a highly 
connected individual who could help counter AT&T in lobbying).
    \379\ See, e.g., Deposition of John Phillips, 43-53 (July 31, 1997) 
(testifying that he was a close friend of Mr. Hubbell and helped him 
obtain a grant).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During his appearance on ``Meet the Press'' on May 3, 1998, 
Chairman Burton also alleged that a taped discussion between 
Mr. Hubbell and his attorney about ``a move that moots 
everything'' indicated that the President was considering a 
presidential pardon for Mr. Hubbell. According to Chairman 
Burton, the taped conversation ``means that they thought the 
president might pardon Webb Hubbell right after the election 
and get him off the hook.'' This assertion also proved to be 
completely erroneous. On May 3, 1998, Mr. Hubbell's attorney, 
John Nields, appeared on ABC's ``This Week'' and explained that 
the conversation related to obtaining a grant of immunity from 
the Independent Counsel's office, which ultimately did 
happen.380
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \380\ ABC's This Week (May 3, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rather than acknowledging that his allegations could not be 
substantiated, Chairman Burton actually claimed that the public 
criticism caused by the release of the doctored transcripts 
validated his allegations of wrongdoing. As he put it, ``When 
you hear the other side squealing like a bunch of pigs, then 
you understand you're getting somewhere near the truth.'' 
381
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \381\ CNN's Inside Politics (May 4, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 F. The Immunized Witnesses Did Not Have ``Direct Knowledge About How 
      the Chinese Government Made Illegal Campaign Contributions''

    On April 23, 1998, Chairman Burton scheduled a Committee 
meeting to seek immunity for four witnesses: Nancy Lee, Irene 
Wu, Kent La, and Larry Wong. These witnesses were individuals 
with varying degrees of relationship to individuals being 
investigated by the Committee. Ms. Lee and Ms. Wu were former 
employees of Johnny Chung. Mr. La was a business associate of 
Ted Sioeng, and Mr. Wong was a former employee of Nora Lum.
    Committee Democrats objected. One week before the scheduled 
meeting, Chairman Burton had called the president a ``scumbag'' 
and said that he was ``after'' the President.382 
These remarks caused the Democratic members of the Committee to 
oppose immunity. As Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \382\ Burton's Pursuit of President, Indianapolis Star (Apr. 16, 
1998).

          I regret and protest that I have been forced to vote 
        against immunity in order to protest rank unfairness in 
        this committee. I have been driven, as has every Member 
        on my side been driven, to vote against what they 
        wanted to vote for.383
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \383\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Business 
Meeting (Apr. 23, 1998).

    Moreover, several Committee members expressed concern that 
the Committee had not obtained proffers from the witnesses 
explaining what their testimony might be if granted immunity. 
Rep. Paul Kanjorski observed, ``The Chair should have provided 
written proffers so that we could accurately ascertain whether 
the information to be derived by these witnesses is reasonable 
in terms of offering immunity.'' 384
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \384\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, Committee Democrats noted that Chairman Burton had 
not yet responded to their letter of October 22, 1997, asking 
for changes in the Committee's approach to 
immunity.385 That letter was written shortly after 
the Committee's October 9, 1997, hearing where the Committee 
had given a witness (David Wang) immunity for tax and 
immigration fraud in return for demonstrably false testimony. 
In the letter, Committee Democrats asked that the Chairman's 
unilateral powers be returned to the Committee before any 
additional witnesses were granted immunity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \385\ Letter from Rep. Waxman to Chairman Burton (Oct. 22, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton and many other Republican members and 
leaders responded to the minority's reluctance to support 
immunity by accusing the Democratic Committee members of 
obstructing the Committee's investigation. According to 
Republicans, Democrats voted against immunity to prevent the 
four witnesses from providing essential information about 
Chinese influence in the 1996 Presidential campaign. In a floor 
statement, Speaker Gingrich alleged that:

          [A]t a time when the American people could have 
        learned the truth from eyewitnesses who participated in 
        laundering foreign illegal money, a threat to the 
        entire fabric of our political system, for some reason 
        the Democrats voted 19-0 against allowing immunity. 
        That means they voted 19-0 to cover up this testimony, 
        to block it from getting to the American people, and to 
        prevent the Congress from being informed.386
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \386\ Congressional Record, H2336 (Apr. 28, 1998).

    To support their claims of Democratic obstruction, 
Republican members of Congress repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of the four witnesses. For example, Rep. John 
Boehner, Republican Conference Chair, stated that the witnesses 
``have direct knowledge about how the Chinese government made 
illegal campaign contributions in an apparent attempt to 
influence our foreign policy'' and opined that granting 
immunity ``is about determining whether American lives have 
been put at risk.'' 387 Similarly, Committee 
Republican Rep. Steven Horn expressed his belief that 
immunization of the four witnesses was ``absolutely 
essential.'' 388 Chairman Burton stated that the 
witnesses would be ``very knowledgeable'' about contributions 
made by Nora and Gene Lum 389 and would ``shed the 
light'' on the activities of Johnny Chung and Ted 
Sioeng.390
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \387\ Congressional Record, H3453 (May 19, 1998).
    \388\ Rep. Horn, House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, Business Meeting (May 13, 1998).
    \389\ Opening Statement by Chairman Burton, House Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, Business Meeting (Apr. 23, 1998).
    \390\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    All of these allegations turned out to be wrong. On June 
23, 1998, after Chairman Burton agreed to some changes to the 
Committee rules relating to subpoenas, document release, and 
depositions, the Democratic members agreed to support immunity 
for the four witnesses. The testimony that the Committee 
subsequently obtained from the witnesses showed that they had 
no knowledge--direct or indirect--about illegal Chinese 
campaign contributions.391
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \391\ The four witnesses were not the first witnesses given 
immunity by the Committee who had little or no information to 
contribute to the Committee's investigation. The Committee's first 
hearing featured two immunized witnesses, Manlin Foung and Joseph 
Landon, who testified to being unwittingly involved in making conduit 
contributions to the DNC. Those conduit contributions had been 
disclosed by the DNC to the Justice Department seven weeks before the 
hearing. Minority staff interview with Judah Best (Sept. 18, 1997). Ms. 
Foung, who is Charlie Trie's sister, had no knowledge about her 
brother's businesses, political activities, or contacts with the 
Chinese government. Mr. Landon made his contribution at Ms. Foung's 
request, and had no other relevant information to share with the 
Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, during the deposition of Nancy Lee, the 
Committee learned that for most of Ms. Lee's tenure as an 
employee of Mr. Chung's company, she worked part-time between 
the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 12 midnight and rarely saw Mr. 
Chung.392 Ms. Lee's lack of knowledge about Johnny 
Chung's political activities was demonstrated during the 
minority counsel's questioning:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \392\ Deposition of Nancy Lee, 68 (July 29, 1998).

          Minority Counsel. Your lawyer said that you had no 
        knowledge about Johnny Chung's source of funds, where 
        he got his money from. Is that true?
          Ms. Lee. Yes.

           *         *         *         *         *

          Minority Counsel. And that you don't--do you know 
        about whether Johnny Chung got any money from any 
        citizen of China or any business from China for a 
        political contribution here in the United States?
          Ms. Lee. I don't know.
          Minority Counsel. Do you know whether there was any 
        plan by the Chinese government to influence the 1996 
        American election? Do you know anything about that?
          Ms. Lee. No idea.393
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \393\ Id. at 54-55.

    Similarly, Irene Wu had no ``direct knowledge''--or even 
indirect knowledge--regarding any Chinese efforts to influence 
the 1996 elections. She did not provide the Committee with any 
information on whether Johnny Chung received money from the 
Chinese government, whether there was a Chinese plan to 
influence the 1996 elections, or whether Mr. Chung received any 
money from Chinese businesses unrelated to legitimate business 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
transactions. In fact, she testified as follows:

          Minority Counsel. Do you have any knowledge whether 
        the Chinese government ever reimbursed Johnny Chung for 
        a political contribution?
          Ms. Wu. I don't.

           *         *         *         *         *

          Minority Counsel. Do you know whether Johnny Chung 
        ever received any money from any Chinese citizen or 
        business in order to make a political contribution?
          Ms. Wu. I don't know.

           *         *         *         *         *

          Minority Counsel. Do you know whether there was a 
        plan by the Chinese government to influence the 1996 
        American election through political contributions?
          Ms. Wu. I don't know.394
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \394\ Deposition of Irene Wu, 86-88 (July 28, 1998).

    Republican allegations concerning Larry Wong's knowledge 
also proved to be baseless. At an April 23, 1998, Committee 
meeting, Rep. John Shadegg stated that Larry Wong ``is believed 
to have relevant information regarding the conduit for 
contributions made by the Lums and others in the 1992 fund-
raising by John Huang and James Riady.'' 395 The 
reality, however, was that Mr. Wong's primary responsibilities 
were to register voters and serve as a volunteer cook. The sum 
total of his testimony regarding James Riady is as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \395\ Rep. Shadegg, House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, Business Meeting (Apr. 23, 1998). Nora and Gene Lum are 
Democratic fundraisers convicted of making conduit contributions to 
various Democratic campaigns. They also ran the Asian Pacific Advisory 
Council, an organization supportive of the 1992 Clinton/Gore campaign, 
and appear to have mishandled funds raised by that organization.

          Minority Counsel. Did Nora ever discuss meeting James 
        Riady?
          Mr. Wong. James who?

           *         *         *         *         *

          Minority Counsel. James Riady.
          Mr. Wong. No.396
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \396\ Deposition of Larry Wong, 85 (July 27, 1998).

  Mr. Wong also provided minimal information to the Committee 
concerning John Huang.397
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \397\ Mr. Wong's testimony concerning John Huang was limited to his 
knowledge that Mr. Huang was employed at the Department of Commerce, 
and that he had never spoken with Nora Lum about any meetings she had 
with Mr. Huang at the Department of Commerce. Id. at 102-103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The last immunized witness was Kent La, a business 
associate of Ted Sioeng. An agreement with the Justice 
Department has prevented the Committee from releasing the 
transcript of Mr. La's deposition. At a Committee hearing, 
however, Rep. Waxman stated: ``The four witnesses . . . don't 
know anything about transferring technology to China. They 
don't know anything about possible campaign contributions from 
the Chinese Government.'' 398
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \398\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing 
on the Need for an Independent Counsel in the Campaign Finance 
Investigation, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 67 (Aug. 4, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ironically, after insisting on the importance of the 
immunized witnesses, the majority substantially delayed public 
access to their testimony. At a Committee hearing on August 4, 
1998, Democratic Rep. Jim Turner moved to make public the 
depositions of Ms. Lee, Ms. Wu, and Mr. Wong. Chairman Burton 
initially opposed this motion, stating his view that ``it is 
premature to release those [depositions] right now.'' 
399 Shortly thereafter, he reversed himself and 
agreed to release the depositions on August 14, 1998. The 
depositions, however, were not released until nearly a month 
later. Moreover, the majority abruptly and without explanation 
canceled the hearing scheduled for September 10, 1998, at which 
Ms. Wu was supposed to testify.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \399\ Id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  G. President Clinton Did Not ``Endorse'' the Candidacy of a Foreign 
             Leader in Exchange for Campaign Contributions

    At a Committee hearing on October 8, 1997, Chairman Burton 
released a ``proffer'' his staff had obtained from Nora and 
Gene Lum, two Democratic fundraisers who pled guilty to 
facilitating illegal conduit contributions in 1994 and 1995. 
Chairman Burton alleged that if immunized, the Lums' testimony 
would show that ``there was real corruption in the financing of 
campaigns in this country and that this corruption may have 
affected our foreign policy andpossibly our national 
security.'' 400 Specifically, the Lums' proffer suggested 
that during the 1992 campaign, then-candidate Clinton ``endorsed'' the 
candidacy of a foreign leader in exchange for a campaign 
contribution.401 This proffer was widely reported in the 
press.402
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \400\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on Campaign Finance Improprieties and Possible Violations of Law, 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (Oct. 8, 1997).
    \401\ Proffer of Nora and Gene Lum to the Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight (Aug. 22, 1997).
    \402\ Story of a Foreign Donor's Deal with '92 Clinton Camp 
Outlined, Washington Post (Oct. 9, 1997); Robert Novak, . . . And Next 
Up, the Bean-Spillers, Washington Post (Oct. 13, 1997); Hawaiian Couple 
to Get Immunity for Testimony before Burton Panel, Roll Call (Oct. 9, 
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To investigate this allegation and other allegations 
involving the Lums, the Committee sent out almost 200 
information requests--close to one-sixth of the total 
information requests for the entire investigation. The 
Committee's sprawling inquiry into the Lums resulted in the 
receipt of over 40,000 pages of documents, 50 audiotapes, and a 
videotape, and involved numerous depositions.
    This extensive investigation, however, uncovered no 
evidence to substantiate the proffer's dramatic allegations. In 
fact, the investigation uncovered so little evidence to 
corroborate the allegations that the majority's final report 
does not even discuss the Lums. There has been no public 
acknowledgment by Chairman Burton of his failure to 
substantiate the well-publicized proffer.

 H. The Committee Failed to Substantiate the Existence of a ``Massive 
         Scheme'' to Funnel Foreign Contributions into the U.S.

    Perhaps the most significant allegation made during the 
campaign finance investigation was the allegation that there 
was a conspiracy between the Chinese government and the Clinton 
Administration to violate federal campaign finance laws and 
improperly influence the outcome of the 1996 presidential 
election. At the outset of the investigation, Chairman Burton 
raised the possibility of such a conspiracy, stating:

          If the White House or anybody connected with the 
        White House was selling or giving information to the 
        Chinese in exchange for political contributions, then 
        we have to look into it because that's a felony, and 
        you're selling this country's security--economic 
        security or whatever to a communist 
        power.403
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \403\ CNN's Late Edition with Frank Sesno (Feb. 16, 1997).

    A few months later, Chairman Burton alleged the existence 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of a ``massive'' Chinese conspiracy:

          We are investigating a possible massive scheme . . . 
        of funneling millions of dollars in foreign money into 
        the U.S. electoral system. We are investigating 
        allegations that the Chinese government at the highest 
        levels decided to infiltrate our political 
        system.404
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \404\ Congressional Record, H4097 (June 20, 1997).

    Although the Committee's investigation veered off in many 
different directions, the allegation of a Chinese conspiracy 
remained the Committee's primary focus. To prove this 
allegation, the Committee subpoenaed over 1.5 million pages of 
documents, took hundreds of hours of depositions, and spent 
millions of taxpayer dollars. None of the witnesses deposed by 
the Committee, however, corroborated the existence of such a 
conspiracy. In fact, as discussed above, even the witnesses who 
the majority alleged would have ``direct knowledge'' of a 
Chinese conspiracy, such as Irene Wu and Nancy Lee, turned out 
to have no such knowledge. Not one of the over 1.5 million 
pages of documents subpoenaed by the Committee provided 
evidence of a Chinese conspiracy.
    It is, of course, nearly impossible to prove a negative. In 
this case, the minority cannot prove that there was not a 
secret conspiracy between the Chinese government and the 
Clinton Administration to violate federal campaign finance 
laws. Nonetheless, no evidence provided to the Committee 
substantiates the claim that the Administration was ``selling 
or giving information to the Chinese in exchange for political 
contributions.'' If there was a ``massive'' Chinese conspiracy 
to influence American elections, it eluded detection by the 
Committee.

            I. Other Unsubstantiated Republican Allegations

    There were many other unsubstantiated allegations made by 
Republican leaders during the course of the Committee's 
campaign finance investigation. These include:
    
 The Allegation That the Clinton Administration Was 
Selling Burial Plots in Arlington National Cemetery. In 
November 1997, numerous Republican leaders drew on 
unsubstantiated reports by conservative radio talk shows and 
publications to accuse the Clinton Administration of selling 
burial plots in Arlington National Cemetery for campaign 
contributions. Speaker Gingrich, Sen. Arlen Specter, and other 
Republicans called for an immediate investigation, 
405 and Chairman Burton declared his intention to 
investigate the matter.406 These allegations, 
however, turned out to lack any foundation in fact. An 
independent investigation by the GAO determined that political 
contributions played no role whatsoever in the granting of 
Arlington Cemetery waivers.407
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \405\ West Denies He Broke Any Rules on Arlington Cemetery Waivers, 
Washington Times (Nov. 21, 1997).
    \406\ Burton to Probe Plots-for-Politics Allegations, Indianapolis 
Star News (Nov. 21, 1997).
    \407\ General Accounting Office, Arlington National Cemetery: 
Authority, Process, and Criteria for Burial Waivers, GAO/T-HEHS-98-81 
(Jan. 28, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 The Allegation That Secretary of Energy Hazel 
O'Leary Sold Access to a Meeting. In August 1998, several 
Republican leaders called for an independent counsel to 
investigate allegations that former Energy Secretary Hazel 
O'Leary had, in effect, ``shaken down'' Johnny Chung by 
requiring him to make a donation to the charity Africare as a 
precondition to a meeting with her. For example, Rep. Gerald 
Solomon, the Chairman of the House Rules Committee, criticized 
the Attorney General for being ``intransigent'' in refusing to 
appoint an independent counsel.408 An investigation 
by the Department of Justice, however, found ``no evidence that 
Mrs. O'Leary had anything to do with the solicitation of the 
charitable donation.'' 409 In fact, it turned out 
that Secretary O'Leary's first contact with Mr. Chung occurred 
after Mr. Chung had made his contribution, making the 
allegation factually impossible.410
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \408\ GOP Lawmaker Seeks Counsel to Probe O'Leary-Chung Tie, 
Buffalo News (Aug. 22, 1997).
    \409\ Notification to the Court Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(b) 
of Results of Preliminary Investigation (Dec. 2, 1997).
    \410\ Id. This fact was also discovered by the Committee's own 
investigation. Shortly after the allegations against Secretary O'Leary 
became public, Chairman Burton appeared on national television to 
announce his intent to investigate the charges. CBS's Face the Nation 
(Aug. 24, 1997). Ultimately, the Committee deposed several individuals, 
including Secretary O'Leary, and scheduled a hearing into the matter. 
Upon discovering that the allegations were false, the majority canceled 
the hearings but never publicly cleared Secretary O'Leary of 
wrongdoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 The Allegation That the President and the First 
Lady Conspired with the DNC to Steal the President's Christmas 
Card List. After an extensive investigation by the Committee 
and the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural 
Resources and Regulatory Affairs, Rep. David McIntosh alleged 
that he had evidence that the President, the FirstLady, and 
other individuals were involved in the ``theft'' of government property 
and resources, specifically the President's Christmas card list and 
other information from the White House database. According to the 
majority report on the matter, the Committee acted to ``expose the 
evidence of the President's possible involvement in the theft of 
government property and his abuse of power.'' 411 In fact, 
as documented in detail in the minority views, not one witness deposed 
or interviewed by the Committee supported Rep. McIntosh's 
allegations.412
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \411\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
Investigation of the Conversion of the $1.7 Million Centralized White 
House Computer System, Known as the White House Database, and Related 
Matters, H. Rpt. No. 105-828, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1998).
    \412\ Id. at 556 (Minority Views).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 The Allegation That the Justice Department 
Retaliated Against Chairman Burton. On September 14, 1997, 
Chairman Burton alleged on national television that the Justice 
Department was investigating him for possible campaign 
fundraising violations in retaliation for his efforts to 
investigate President Clinton. Chairman Burton stated that 
``it's kind of sad and scary . . . that you're having agencies 
of the federal government going after almost anybody who's 
looking into allegations against this president and this 
administration.'' 413 Although it is true that the 
Justice Department is investigating Chairman Burton's 
fundraising practices, the Department's investigation was 
triggered by allegations by lobbyist Mark Siegel that Chairman 
Burton had pressured him for campaign 
contributions.414
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \413\ NBC's Meet the Press (Sept. 14, 1997).
    \414\ Pakistan Lobbyist's Memo Alleges Shakedown by House Probe 
Leader, Washington Post (Mar. 19, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many other sensational but unsubstantiated allegations 
regarding the Clinton Administration were made by Committee 
Republicans in the 104th Congress. These allegations included 
the following:
    
 The Allegation That the White House Directed the 
IRS and FBI to Investigate Political Enemies. Numerous 
Republicans alleged that the White House misused the IRS and 
the FBI to investigate and harass the White House travel office 
employees. For example, Rep. John Mica charged that the travel 
office firings ``involved the abuse of the FBI and the IRS.'' 
415 Rep. Dan Burton claimed that ``somebody at the 
White House was talking to the IRS about an investigation. That 
is illegal.'' 416 Rep. Christopher Shays alleged 
that ``the White House misused the FBI and the Justice 
Department to go after an innocent man.'' 417
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \415\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on Security of FBI Background Files, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., 103 (June 
19, 1996).
    \416\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on White House Travel Office, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., 110 (Jan. 24, 
1996).
    \417\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on Security of FBI Background Files, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., 459 (June 
26, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These allegations were not supported by the evidence. The 
General Accounting Office determined that ``FBI and IRS 
officials' actions during the period . . . were reasonable and 
consistent with the agencies'' normal procedures'' and that 
there was ``no evidence that White House staff made any contact 
with IRS about the Travel Office matter.'' 418 The 
Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility 
found that the FBI acted properly throughout the travel office 
investigation.419 The Department of the Treasury 
Inspector General also determined that there was no contact 
between the White House and the IRS.420
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \418\ General Accounting Office, Report to Congress on the White 
House Travel Office Operations, GAO/GCD-94-132, 5 (May 2, 1994).
    \419\ U.S. Department of Justice Office of Professional 
Responsibility, Report of OPR's Review of the Conduct of the FBI in 
Connection with Its Contacts with the White House in the Travel Office 
Matter (Mar. 18, 1994).
    \420\ General Accounting Office, Report to Congress on the White 
House Travel Office Operations, GAO/GGD-94-132, 64 (May 2, 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 The Allegation That the White House Illegally 
Fired the Travel Office Employees. Republicans also alleged 
that the White House fired the employees of the White House 
travel office so that White House travel business would be 
given to Harry Thomason, a Clinton political supporter. For 
example, the Committee report concluded that ``the motive for 
the firings was political cronyism: the President sought to 
reward his friend, Harry Thomason, with the spoils of the White 
House travel business.'' 421 Similarly, Chairman 
Clinger alleged, ``When the White House wanted to find a base 
for political friends seeking further business with the Federal 
Government, they chose the White House Travel Office.'' 
422
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \421\ Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Investigation 
of the While House Travel Office Firings and Related Matters, 104th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., H. Rpt. 104-849, 2 (1996).
    \422\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on White House Travel Office, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., 645 (Oct. 25, 
1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These allegations were not supported by the evidence. The 
FBI and the Department of Justice determined that there was 
substantial evidence of financial mismanagement in the travel 
office, including the deposit of approximately $54,000 in 
checks and $14,000 in cash into the travel office director's 
personal bank account.423 This finding was supported 
by an independent review conducted by KPMG Peat 
Marwick.424 The allegations were also reviewed by a 
federal grand jury, which found sufficient evidence to indict 
the travel office director.425
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \423\ See Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
Investigation of the White House Travel Office Firings and Related 
Matters, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Rpt. 104-849, 894 (1996) (reprinted 
Department of Justice prosecution memorandum).
    \424\ Letter from KPMG Peat Marwick to Associate Counsel to the 
President William H. Kennedy III (May 17, 1993) (reprinted in Commitee 
hearing transcript, 631 (Oct. 25, 1995)).
    \425\ Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Investigation 
of the White House Travel Office Firings and Related Matters, 104th 
Cong., 2d Sess., H. Rpt. 104-849, 924 (1996) (reprinted indictment).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 The Allegation That the White House Collected FBI 
Files for an ``Enemies List.'' During the Filegate 
investigation, many Republicans alleged that the White House 
acquired the FBI files of former employees to create a list of 
political enemies. The Committee report, for example, found 
that ``many of the individuals were political appointees of the 
Reagan and Bush administrations. This leads to the possibility 
that the Clinton administration was attempting to prepare a 
political `hit list' or `enemies list' with the most sensitive 
and private information.'' 426 Rep. Dan Burton 
charged that one ``could only deduct [sic] that they were going 
to be used for political purposes.'' 427 Despite 
these allegations and four days of hearings on the FBI file 
issue, however, the Committee uncovered no evidence that these 
files were ever used for any political purpose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \426\ Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Investigation 
of the White House and Department of Justice on Security of FBI 
Background Investigation Files, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Rpt. 104-862, 
16 (1996).
    \427\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on Security of FBI Background Files, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 44 (June 
19, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 The Allegation That Vince Foster Was Murdered. In 
a floor speech on November 20, 1995, Chairman Burton revealed 
that he and other Republican members had conducted their own 
investigation into the death of Deputy White House Counsel 
Vincent Foster. According to Chairman Burton, this 
investigation raised the possibility that Mr. Foster had been 
murdered.428 In fact, however, independent 
investigations by the Federal Park Police, Independent Counsel 
Robert Fiske, and Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr all 
concluded that there was no evidence of any wrongdoing in 
connection with Mr. Foster's tragic suicide.429
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \428\ Congressional Record, H13636 (Nov. 20, 1995).
    \429\ Attention Conspiracy Theorists! Hartford Courant (July 18, 
1997); Fiske Won't Bring Charges Over High-Level Contacts; Report 
Clears Ways for Hill Hearing on Whitewater, Washington Post (July 1, 
1994); Starr Report Rules Out Foul Play in Foster Death, Los Angeles 
Times (Feb. 23, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unfortunately, these unsubstantiated allegations have been 
given legitimacy by the irresponsible use of the congressional 
oversight process. As Rep. Waxman stated at one Committee 
hearing, ``Our committee has been the leader in creating a new 
species of congressional oversight. The basis for an accusation 
is no longer limited to whether something actually happened; 
the new standard is that it could have happened. Then the 
burden shifts to the accused to disprove it.'' 430
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \430\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on the Department of the Interior's Denial of the Wisconsin Chippewa's 
Casino Applications, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., 10 (Jan. 21, 22, 28, and 29, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        III. The Majority Report Contains Little New Information

                            A. Introduction

    After two years and $7.4 million, the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight has issued a lengthy majority 
report that includes virtually no new information.
    At the outset of the investigation, Chairman Burton 
predicted that this investigation would be ``much bigger than 
Watergate was'' 431 and alleged that the Committee's 
investigation would disclose a ``massive scheme of funneling 
millions of dollars in foreign money into the U.S. electoral 
system'' that was orchestrated by the ``Chinese Government at 
the highest levels.'' 432 Two years later--after 
issuing 1,285 information requests, taking 161 depositions, and 
receiving 1.5 million pages of documents--Chairman Burton is 
unable to substantiate these allegations. Indeed, the majority 
report does not demonstrate that even one official of the White 
House knowingly participated in a scheme to solicit illegal 
campaign contributions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \431\ PBS's The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, (Feb. 25, 1997).
    \432\ Chairman Burton, Congressional Record, H4097 (June 20, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority report's only fresh allegation is its claim 
that the DNC and other Democratic organizations have accepted 
$1.8 million in additional questionable contributions. Of the 
$1.8 million, however, only a small portion seems genuinely 
suspect. The genuinely suspect DNC contributions are far less 
than the $1.1 million in suspect contributions from foreign 
sources that Republicans have yet to return.
    The majority blames its lack of success on alleged White 
House and DNC stonewalling. But while the White House and DNC 
may have been slow in producing some documents, the majority 
ultimately received every White House and DNC document and took 
every deposition of White House or DNC officials that the 
majority sought.
    The following discussion is the minority's evaluation of 
the majority report. The primary allegations in each chapter in 
the majority report are contrasted with the facts in the record 
before the Committee.

           B. Evaluation of Chapter II of the Majority Report

    Majority Allegation: One hundred and twenty witnesses have 
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights, fled the country, or 
otherwise refused to cooperate with this 
Committee.433
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \433\ The list of these 120 witnesses can be found on the 
majority's webpage at http://www.house.gov/reform/oversight/finance/
fled.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Facts: It is true that many witnesses refused to 
cooperate with the Committee's investigation, but the 
majority's estimate overstates the numbers. For example, the 
majority's list includes 14 witnesses who have cooperated fully 
with congressional investigations after receiving immunity from 
the Congress. Seven of these witnesses on the list--David Wang, 
Joseph Landon, Manlin Foung, Kent La, Irene Wu, Larry Wong, and 
Nancy Lee--were granted immunity by this 
Committee,434 and they have provided sworn testimony 
to this Committee.435 Seven other witnesses on the 
list--Zie Pan Huang,436 Siuw Moi Lian, Man Ya Shih, 
Yi Chu, Man Ho, Huetsan Huang, and Yue Chu--were granted 
immunity by and cooperated with the Senate.437 At 
least three other witnesses the majority claims failed to 
cooperate have, in fact, been interviewed by the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee or this Committee, including 
Johnny Chung,438 Jessica Elnitiarta,439 
and Charlie Chiang.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \434\ See House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
Markup on Granting Congressional Immunity, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (May 
13, 1998); House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Business 
Meeting, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 24, 1997).
    \435\ Deposition of David Wang, House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight (Oct. 6, 1997). All depositions referenced in this 
section, unless otherwise noted, were taken by the House Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight. Deposition of Joseph Landon (Sept. 29, 
1997); Deposition of Manlin Foung (Sept. 29, 1997); Deposition of Nancy 
Lee (July 29, 1998); Deposition of Kent La (July 22, 1998); Deposition 
of Irene Wu (July 28, 1998); Deposition of Larry Wong (July 27, 1998).
    \436\ The majority notes on its website that this witness was given 
immunity by the Senate. According to Senate hearing testimony, this 
witness's name is actually Xiping Wang. Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee, Hearing on Campaign Fund-raising, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(July 29, 1997).
    \437\ Huetsan Huang, Siuw Moi Lian, Xiping Wang, and Yue Chu were 
given immunity by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on June 27, 
1997. Donor Probe Veers Toward Bipartisanship, Los Angeles Times (June 
28, 1997). Man Ho, Yi Chu, Su Jen Wu, and Man Ya Shih were given 
immunity in a Senate committee vote on July 23, 1997. 5 Granted 
Immunity in Donor Probe, Los Angeles Times (July 24, 1997). The 
deposition testimony of these witnesses is publicly available. See 
Deposition of Siuw Moi Lian, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
(Aug. 20, 1997) (depositions taken by the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs will hereafter be referred to as ``Senate 
Deposition''); Senate Deposition of Huetsan Huang (Aug. 20, 1997); 
Senate Deposition of ManYa Shih (Aug. 20, 1997); Senate Deposition of 
Yi Chu (Aug. 7, 1997); Senate Deposition of Man Ho (Aug. 6, 1997); 
Senate Deposition of Yue Chu (July 9, 1997); Senate Deposition of 
Xiping Wang (July 9, 1997).
    \438\ Committee interview of Johnny Chung (Nov. 14, 1997).
    \439\ Senate Report, v. 1, 965, n.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority lists 18 individuals as having ``left the 
country.'' This is also misleading. In fact, some of those 
people actually live abroad for legitimate reasons and did not 
leave the country to avoid the campaign finance inquiry. For 
example, Ming Chen, a Beijing restaurateur, appears on the 
majority list even though he has resided abroad since before 
the campaign finance controversy began.440
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \440\ Yue Chu, Ming Chen's wife, testified in the Senate that her 
husband has been employed in Beijing since October 1995. Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee, Hearing on Campaign Fund-raising, 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (July 29, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As another example, the majority lists Lei Chu, Laureen 
Elnitiarta, Sandra Elnitiarta, Sundari Elnitiarta, Yopie 
Elnitiarta, Didi Kurniawan, John H.K. Lee, Felix Ma, Agus 
Setiawan, Subandi Tanuwidjaja, Suryanti Tanuwidjaja, Susanto 
Tanuwidjaja, and Dewi Tirto as having left the country. While 
these individuals apparently reside outside of the United 
States, there is noevidence that they have left the country to 
flee this Committee's investigation. In fact, according to deposition 
testimony, many reside abroad for legitimate business 
purposes.441
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \441\ For example, three of Ted Sioeng's children who appear on the 
list live abroad running the family business: Sandra Elnitiarta in Hong 
Kong; Laureen Elnitiarta in Jakarta; and Yopie Elnitiarta in China. 
Deposition of Robert Prins, 96 (Jan. 27, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority implies that the inability to interview or 
depose the listed individuals has severely hampered its 
investigation. There is little evidence, however, that many of 
the 120 witnesses would have any significant information to 
contribute. The majority claimed that four of the immunized 
witnesses--Irene Wu, Nancy Lee, Larry Wong, and Kent La--had 
essential information,442 but when their depositions 
were taken, the Committee learned that they had virtually no 
significant information.443 Many of the other 
witnesses listed by the majority are also likely to be 
unimportant. For example, 11 individuals listed by the majority 
are Buddhist nuns who were reimbursed for campaign 
contributions they made to the DNC. Three of these nuns 
444 testified before the Senate. The other eight 
445 would have no new information about the conduit 
scheme in which they unwittingly participated.446
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \442\ See, e.g., House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
Opening Statement by Chairman Burton, Business Meeting (June 23, 1998); 
Opening Statement by Chairman Burton, House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, Business Meeting (Apr. 23, 1998).
    \443\ See Part II.F of this report.
    \444\ Man Ho; Man Ya Shih; and Yi Chu.
    \445\ Seow Fong Ooi; Hsiu Chu Lin; Jie Chi Rung Wang; Judy Hsu; Jie 
Su Hsiao; Hsiu Juan Tseng; Hsin Chen Shih; Yumei Yang.
    \446\ According to Michael Madigan, Senator Thompson's chief 
counsel during the Senate campaign finance investigation, the three 
nuns who testified were the nuns who ``would be the best able to tell 
the story as to what happened that day at the Apr. 29, 1996 
fundraiser.'' Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Hearing on 
Immunity for Witnesses in Hearings on Campaign Fund-Raising, 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (July 18, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: The White House has intentionally 
sought to delay this Committee's investigation by refusing to 
turn over documents and by asserting frivolous privileges.
    The Facts: While it is true that there are instances in 
which the White House has been slow to turn over materials 
subpoenaed by this Committee, such as the videotapes made by 
the White House Communications Agency, there is no evidence 
that the White House has intentionally sought to obstruct the 
Committee's investigation. To the contrary, the White House has 
produced over 70,000 pages of documents to the Committee; 49 
present and former White House employees and volunteers have 
provided deposition testimony to this Committee; 447 
and nine present and past White House employees have testified 
publicly at Committee hearings.448 According to a 
GAO survey, White House personnel spent a total of 55,106 hours 
responding to congressional campaign finance investigations at 
a cost of over $2 million dollars.449
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \447\ Loretta T. Avent; Brian Bailey; Mark Bartholomew; Charles 
Benjamin; Jackie Bellanti; Erskine Bowles; Lanny Breuer; Jerry Carlsen; 
Kelly Ann Crawford; Jim Dorskind; Charles Duncan; Donald Dunn; John 
Emerson; Janice Enright; Karen Hancox; Karl Heissner; Harold Ickes; 
Michael Imbroscio; Ben Johnson; Yusuf Khapra; Tracy LaBrecque-Davis; 
Phil Lader; Evelyn Lieberman; Bruce Lindsey; Ranelle Lopez; Mack 
McLarty; Cheryl D. Mills; Bob Nash; Dimitri Nionakis; Jennifer 
O'Connor; Alice Pushkar; Jack Quinn; Gina Ratliffe; Frank Reeder; Evan 
Ryan; Michael Schmidt; Marsha Scott; Joseph Simmons; Doug Sosnik; Ann 
Stock; David Strauss; Alan Sullivan; Patsy Thomasson; Jodie R. 
Torkelson; Laura Tayman; Erich Vaden; Kim Widdess; Margaret Williams; 
James B. Wright.
    \448\ Lanny Breuer; Kelly Crawford; Brooke Darby; Nancy Hernreich; 
Cheryl D. Mills; Dimitri Nionakis; Charles F.C. Ruff; Robert 
Suettinger; Margaret Williams.
    \449\ General Accounting Office, Survey of Executive Branch Cost to 
Respond to Congressional Campaign Finance Inquiries, Enclosure 1 
(1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are currently no outstanding disputes over document 
production issues between the White House and this Committee. 
Thus, contrary to the majority's claim of obstruction, the 
majority has, in fact, received every document it sought. 
Moreover, contrary to the majority report, the White House 
never invoked executive privilege over either documents or 
testimony.450
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \450\ The issue of executive privilege did arise during Bruce 
Lindsey's deposition when Mr. Lindsey was asked about a conversation he 
had had with the President. See Deposition of Bruce Lindsey, 53-55 
(Sept. 8, 1997). During the deposition, Mr. Lindsey telephoned White 
House Counsel Charles Ruff, who advised Mr. Lindsey not to answer the 
question at that time. The White House later determined that it would 
not invoke executive privilege in this matter. When the Committee 
continued Mr. Lindsey's deposition, he answered all of the Committee's 
questions and did not assert executive privilege. See Deposition of 
Bruce Lindsey, 3-12 (Apr. 29, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: The Democratic National Committee's 
document production has been slow and disorganized, thus 
hampering the Committee's investigation.
    The Facts: The DNC produced an extraordinary amount of 
information to Congress. In the last two years, the DNC 
received subpoenas from six separate congressional committees. 
To respond to the requests from campaign finance 
investigations, the DNC spent over $6 millionon document 
production, as well as an additional $8.8 million on legal 
fees.451 The DNC examined more than nine million pages of 
documents,452 and produced over 600,000 pages of documents 
to the Committee, including some of the DNC's most sensitive documents 
such as donor lists. Moreover, 24 current and former DNC employees 
provided either deposition or hearing testimony to this 
Committee.453
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \451\ Minority staff phone interview of Paul Palmer (Debevoise & 
Plimpton) (Sept. 23, 1998).
    \452\ Letter from Judah Best to Chairman Burton (July 23, 1997). 
This document and other documents related to this subsection are 
attached to this report as Exhibit 7.
    \453\ Truman Arnold; Joseph Birkenstock; Ann Braziel; Cheri Carter; 
Alejandra Castillo; Bryan Daines; Al Hurst; Carol Khare; Susan Lavine; 
Richard Mays; David Mercer; Minyon Moore; Melissa Moss; Kimberly Ray; 
Linda Rotunno; Joseph Sandler; Ceandra Scott; Lottie Shackleford; Eric 
Sildon; Karen Sternfeld; Brooke Stroud; Richard Sullivan; Ari Swiller; 
and B.J. Thornberry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This Committee's document requests to the DNC were 
particularly burdensome. The Committee's first subpoena alone 
included 69 different requests with more than 290 different 
subparts and demanded that the DNC produce in less than three 
weeks all documents on these subjects from time periods dating 
as far back as 1991.454 The Committee also served 
five different sets of interrogatories on the DNC, all with 
similarly short and arbitrary deadlines.455 For 
example, the Committee's fifth set of interrogatories included 
approximately 572 different inquiries and document 
requests.456
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \454\ Subpoena from the House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight to the Democratic National Committee (Mar. 4, 1997).
    \455\ See Interrogatories from the House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight to the Democratic National Committee (July 15, 
1998); Interrogatories to the Democratic National Committee (June 23, 
1998); Interrogatories to the Democratic National Committee (Feb. 12, 
1998); Interrogatories to the Democratic National Committee (Oct. 6, 
1997); Interrogatories to the Democratic National Committee (Sept. 8, 
1997).
    \456\ Interrogatories from the House Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight to the Democratic National Committee (June 23, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In contrast to the inordinate burden placed on the DNC by 
Committee subpoenas, interrogatories, and document requests, 
the Republican National Committee received only a single, 
narrowly drafted document request from the 
Committee.457 This resulted in the production of 
only 18,695 pages of documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \457\ Letter from Chairman Burton to Mike Grebe (RNC general 
counsel) (June 6, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          C. Evaluation of Chapter III of the Majority Report

    The majority report purports to identify $1.8 million in 
``illegal'' or ``suspect'' contributions that it asserts should 
be disgorged by the DNC and various Democratic state parties. 
As detailed below, the majority's primary legal theory has been 
undermined by a recent federal court opinion, and the 
majority's $1.8 million estimate is substantially inflated. 
Even under the majority's legal theory, only a small portion of 
the $1.8 million seems genuinely suspect. These possibly 
suspect DNC contributions are far less than the $1.1 million in 
suspect contributions from foreign sources that the RNC has yet 
to return.
    Majority Allegation: The DNC consistently fails to return 
inappropriate contributions.
    The Facts: The DNC has returned contributions when it has 
had a good faith basis to believe that the contributions are 
illegal or otherwise inappropriate. In fact, the DNC returned 
over $3 million in suspect contributions received during the 
1996 election cycle. The DNC returned over $1.2 million because 
either the DNC determined after its own internal review of the 
contributions that it lacked sufficient information to evaluate 
the propriety of the contribution or the DNC considered the 
contribution to be inappropriate.458 For example, 
the DNC refunded $366,000 in soft money contributions from 
Johnny Chung and companies associated with Mr. Chung and 
$253,000 from Pauline Kanchanalak long before the Justice 
Department began to investigate either Mr. Chung or Ms. 
Kanchanalak.459
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \458\ Press Release, DNC Refunds Contributions, Democratic National 
Committee (June 27, 1997). This document and other documents related to 
this subsection are attached to this report as Exhibit 8. As explained 
in Part V of this report, the minority members of the Committee believe 
that the campaign finance laws should be reformed in order to render 
foreign soft money illegal.
    \459\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: It is illegal for the DNC to accept 
soft money contributions from foreign sources.
    The Facts: The legal cornerstone of the majority's claim 
that the DNC must return $1.8 million in suspect contributions 
is the majority's assertion that it is illegal to accept ``soft 
money'' contributions from foreign sources. A recent federal 
district court decision, United States v. Trie, however, has 
called this assertion into doubt.460
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \460\ United States v. Trie, Crim. No. 98-0029, Slip. Op. (D.D.C. 
Oct. 9, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The court in Trie ruled that the restrictions in the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (``FECA'') apply only to ``hard 
money.'' ``Hard money'' is money that has been donated 
exclusively to finance a federal election campaign and is 
subject to the provisions of FECA.461 All other 
money donated to a political party is known as ``soft money.'' 
Soft money is deposited by a political party in a 
``nonfederal'' account and can be used to pay for state and 
local campaigns, as well as party building activities and 
generic issue advertising.462 According to the Trie 
decision, soft money donations are not subject to FECA's annual 
contribution limits or to FECA's other prohibitions, including 
its prohibition on foreign contributions and conduit 
contributions.463
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \461\ United States v. Hsia,  Crim. No. 98-0057, Slip. Op. (D.D.C. 
Sept. 10, 1998).
    \462\ Id.
    \463\ United States v. Trie, Crim. No. 98-0029, Slip. Op. (D.D.C. 
Oct. 9, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The overwhelming majority of the $1.8 million identified in 
the majority report as suspect foreign contributions is soft 
money, not hard money.464 Thus, if the holding in 
the Trie decision is correct, most of the DNC contributions 
that the majority asserts should be returned are in fact legal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \464\ Minority staff interview of Joseph Sandler (DNC general 
counsel) (Oct. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: The DNC has retained $1.8 million in 
contributions from foreign sources.
    The Facts: Even if the majority's legal theory is correct, 
its conclusion that the DNC should return $1.8 million is 
unfounded. There is simply insufficient factual evidence to 
call most of the contributions identified by the majority into 
question.
    Examples of specific contributions that the majority 
contends should be returned are discussed below.
    1992 Contributions from James and Aileen Riady. The 
majority states that $450,000 in contributions made by James 
and Aileen Riady during the 1992 election cycle are ``suspect'' 
and should be returned. This $450,000 represents 25% of all the 
contributions the majority argues should be returned or 
disgorged. As the majority report concedes, however, James and 
Aileen Riady ``were permanent residents at the time of their 
contributions.'' 465 They were therefore legally 
entitled to contribute to political campaigns. Section 441e of 
FECA, which prohibits contributions from ``foreign nationals,'' 
specifically excludes persons lawfully admitted as ``permanent 
residents'' from the definition of ``foreign national.'' 
466 Thus, U.S. ``permanent residents'' like the 
Riadys could lawfully make campaign contributions to the DNC in 
1992.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \465\ Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Investigation 
of Political Fundraising and Proprieties and Possible Violations of 
Law, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at Ch. III (1998).
    \466\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 441e(b)(2). FECA's definition of ``permanent 
resident'' is the same as ``permanent resident'' is defined under the 
provisions of the United States Code governing immigration and 
nationality. For immigration and naturalization purposes, a ``permanent 
resident'' is defined as: ``the status of having been lawfully accorded 
the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an 
immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not 
having changed.'' 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(20).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority argues that instead of following the provision 
of FECA that allows permanent residents to contribute, the DNC 
should be governed by the definition of a different term, 
``foreign principal,'' which is defined in a federal law 
governing the registration of ``foreign propagandists.'' This 
is an argument that has never been adopted by a court or by the 
Federal Election Commission.
    1992 Contributions from John and Jane Huang. The majority 
asserts that John Huang and his wife Jane contributed $35,800 
in ``suspect'' monies to the DNC, the DSCC, and a Democratic 
state party in 1992. The majority has no direct evidence 
suggesting that the Huangs' 1992 contributions are illegal. 
Instead, the majority argues that since Mr. Huang is under 
investigation for his role in soliciting potentially improper 
contributions in the 1996 elections, the DNC must return 
contributions made by Mr. Huang and his wife in prior election 
cycles.
    This reasoning is not persuasive. Mr. and Mrs. Huang were 
American citizens with significant assets at the time their 
1992 contributions were made.467 Mr. Huang has not 
been convicted of any illegal activities. The fact that Mr. 
Huang is under investigation for his role in raising money in 
the 1996 campaign does not prove that contributions he and his 
wife made four years earlier are illegal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \467\ For Huang, a Changed Lifestyle, Los Angeles Times (Aug. 3, 
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Contributions from Kent La. The majority's assertion that 
the DNC should return a $50,000 contribution from Kent La, who 
is president of a Los Angeles-based import company, is simply 
unfair. The majority has selectively and unfairly cited only 
certain evidence to conclude that Mr. La illegally contributed 
to the DNC. This conclusion--and the evidence on which it is 
based--are specifically refuted in Mr. La's sworn deposition, 
which the majority knows cannot be released under an agreement 
with the Department of Justice.
    Contributions from the Sioeng Family. The majority report 
states that the DNC should return $300,000 in contributions to 
the DNC made by relatives of Ted Sioeng and businesses owned by 
members of the Sioeng family. As the majority report concedes, 
each member of the Sioeng family who contributed to the DNC is 
a legal permanent resident who was lawfullypermitted to make 
the contribution. The family is wealthy, has substantial business 
interests in the United States, and appears to possess sufficient 
assets to make each of the contributions.468 Moreover, the 
majority is applying a double standard to contributions from the Sioeng 
family. The majority asserts that the DNC should return its 
contributions from Mr. Sioeng's relatives and Sioeng-related 
businesses, but finds nothing improper with the $50,000 contribution 
that a Sioeng-related company gave to the National Policy Forum, a 
subsidiary of the RNC.469
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \468\ See discussion at Part III.D.4 of this report.
    \469\ Sioeng family contributions to Republicans are discussed 
further in Part IV.B.3 and Part IV.B.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Contributions from Lippo Employees. The majority labels as 
``suspect'' $160,000 in contributions made to the DNC in 1992 
by various American employees of companies affiliated with the 
Lippo Group and those employees' spouses.470 In each 
instance, the nub of the majority's analysis is that: (1) each 
of the individuals is described as a ``Lippo Executive''; and 
(2) the majority cannot identify the ultimate source of the 
funds used to make the contributions. Employment by the Lippo 
Group, however, does not disqualify an American citizen from 
making a political contribution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \470\ The individuals accused by virtue of their association with 
the Lippo Group are: Joseph and Donna Chiang; Ricor and Brenda Da 
Silveira; David and Christina Yeh; Felix and Mary Ma; and Joseph Sund.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Contributions from Pauline Kanchanalak and Duagnet 
Kronenberg. The majority states that $374,000 in contributions 
to Democrats from Pauline Kanchanalak and Duagnet Kronenberg 
should be returned. What the majority neglects to mention, 
however, is that most of this money has already been returned 
or, in the case of certain state parties, has already been 
committed to be returned. The DNC refunded $253,500 to Ms. 
Kanchanalak in November 1996, when news of possible campaign 
fundraising improprieties appeared. The DNC returned $114,000 
to Ms. Kronenberg in July 1998 following her 
indictment.471 Of the $290,000 contributed to state 
Democratic parties, most has already been returned, while the 
remainder is in the process of being returned.472
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \471\ DNC Returns Third Contribution Linked to Fired Fund-raiser, 
Minneapolis-St. Paul Star-Tribune (Nov. 21, 1996); Michael Fletcher and 
Thomas Edsall, DNC to Return $100,000, Washington Post (July 21, 1998).
    \472\ Minority staff interview of Joseph Sandler (DNC general 
counsel) (Oct. 7, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Contributions That Warrant Further Investigation. About 5 
percent of the contributions identified in the majority report 
do appear to be questionable. While some of these contributions 
may be legal under the Trie decision, these contributions 
warrant additional scrutiny by the DNC in light of the evidence 
presented in the majority report. These contributions include 
the contributions of Lei Chu, J & M International (Jack Ho), 
Chee Kein Koh, Hsiao Jie Su, Sy Zuan Pan, and the American 
Great Ground Group.
    Majority Allegation: The Republican party has returned all 
suspect foreign contributions it has received.
    The Facts: Contrary to the majority's assertion, the 
Republican party has not returned all suspect foreign 
contributions. In fact, of the $2.8 million in foreign 
contributions accepted by Republicans, more than $1.1 million 
has not been returned. Suspect foreign funds that Republican 
campaign organizations have not returned include:
          
 $782,460 of a $2.1 million contribution from 
        Hong Kong businessman Ambrous Young to the National 
        Policy Forum (NPF), a subsidiary of the RNC;
          
 a $25,000 contribution from the Pacific 
        Cultural Foundation, which is affiliated with the 
        Taiwanese government, to the NPF;
          
 $95,000 of $205,000 in contributions from 
        German citizen Thomas Kramer to the Florida Republican 
        party;
          
 $215,000 of $500,000 in foreign 
        contributions funneled to the RNC through Michael 
        Kojima.
    In addition to these suspect foreign contributions, the RNC 
has not returned a $50,000 contribution by a Sioeng family 
company to the NPF. Using the standards the Chairman has 
applied to the DNC, this contribution should also be returned.
    The evidence that Republicans accepted foreign 
contributions is discussed in detail in Part IV.B of this 
report.

           D. Evaluation of Chapter IV of the Majority Report

1. Allegations Relating to the Riady Family and John Huang

    The discussion of the Riady family and John Huang in the 
majority report largely rehashes, without adding significant 
new evidence, the allegations made against the Riadys and John 
Huang two years ago when the Committee's investigation first 
began. Despite extensive efforts, the Committee has uncovered 
no significant evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the Riady 
family or John Huang.
    Majority Allegation: The Clinton administration changed 
major U.S. policies to benefit the Riadys.
    The Facts: Without evidentiary support, the majority 
reaches the conclusion that the Riadys may have influenced U.S. 
policies, such as ``MFN . . . and access to Vietnam.''
    In fact, however, the Clinton administration's decision to 
grant most-favored nation (MFN) status to China, which each 
year has been supported by congressional majorities, and to 
reopen diplomatic relations with Vietnam were based on 
important economic, national security, and foreign policy 
considerations. It may be true, as the majority notes, that 
``the ethnic-Chinese Riady family's business was very closely 
tied to the MFN trading privilege for China, and the 
development of the Asian markets generally.'' But this does not 
mean that the Riadys influenced the Administration's decisions. 
There are many American corporations that support MFN and 
contribute soft money to both the Republican and Democratic 
parties, but that does not mean that the politicians who 
support MFN were illegally influenced by the corporation's 
donations.
    Majority Allegation: There was impropriety in the Lippo 
Group's hiring of two officials who left the Administration.
    The Facts: The majority provides an extensive discussion of 
the Lippo Group's hiring of Mark Middleton and Webster 
Hubbell--each of whom was hired under a consulting contract--
but fails to describe how their hiring has any bearing on 
campaign fundraising improprieties. The majority report 
speculates that improper factors underlay the Lippo Group's 
hiring of Mr. Middleton and Mr. Hubbell. The evidence, however, 
suggests that the Lippo Group had legitimate business reasons 
to hire both individuals, and the majority has failed to 
produce any evidence demonstrating that the hires were 
improper.
    A native Arkansan, Mr. Middleton became acquainted with the 
Riadys through family and friends well before the President 
Clinton was elected.473 In 1992, Mr. Middleton 
worked on the Clinton campaign, and from 1992 to 1995 Mr. 
Middleton served as an aide to former White House Chief of 
Staff Mack McLarty.474 One of his primary 
responsibilities was to serve as Mr. McLarty's liaison to the 
business community.475 By the time Mr. Middleton 
left the Administration, he had developed contacts throughout 
Washington and Asia.476 It is not surprising, and 
certainly not illegal, that the Lippo Group would hire a well-
connected individual with whom the Riadys were previously 
acquainted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \473\ James Riady was a prominent member of the Arkansas business 
community. In the 1980s, the Riadys teamed up with a prominent Arkansas 
investment firm Stephens, Inc. to purchase a Little Rock bank, Worthen 
Bank International. Mr. Middleton's brother Larry works for Stephens, 
Inc. Blind Ambition, National Journal (June 7, 1997); see also 
Deposition of Douglas Buford, 64 (Oct 23, 1997) (testimony that Mark 
Middleton knew the Riadys).
    \474\ Id.
    \475\ Id.
    \476\ Id. (``Middleton was adept at parlaying his White House 
connections into private work . . . Middleton's White House job made 
for an easy transition into the private sector'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, the majority has been unable to produce any 
evidence to support Chairman Burton's frequent allegations that 
the Lippo Group's hiring of Webster Hubbell was improper or 
illegal. From what the Committee has learned, it appears that 
the Riadys, like other Hubbell friends and associates, hired 
Mr. Hubbell in 1994 to perform legitimate contract work, rather 
than for some illegitimate purpose.477
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \477\ Because key witnesses are unavailable, the Committee has not 
been able to determine precisely what work Mr. Hubbell was hired to 
perform for the Riadys or subsidiaries of their company, the Lippo 
Group. There are indications that Mr. Hubbell may have performed actual 
work for the Riadys in 1994; for example, he traveled to Indonesia at 
least once.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Hubbell was a lawyer for the Riadys in the 1980s, and 
he represented their company very successfully in a multi-
million dollar dispute. In the mid-1980s, James Riady was a 
permanent resident of the U.S. living in Little Rock and was 
president of a banking company, Worthen Bank International. Mr. 
Hubbell was a litigation partner at the Rose Law Firm in the 
same city. In 1985, Worthen lost over $50 million in the 
collapse of a New Jersey-based government securities firm, 
Bevill, Bresler, & Schulman.478 This was a 
devastating percentage of Worthen's capital, and it hired the 
Rose Law Firm to recollateralize the company and to recover the 
lost money through litigation.479 Mr. Hubbell 
spearheaded the litigation, and eventually recovered nearly the 
full amount lost.480 Given this history, it is not 
surprising that, after Mr. Hubbell resigned from the Justice 
Department and was looking for work, he would seek out the 
Riadys or that they would offer to contract with him for 
consulting work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \478\ See, e.g., Arkansas Bank May Have Lost $52 Million: Losses 
from Bevill Failure Continue to Escalate, American Banker (Apr. 15, 
1985).
    \479\ Minority staff interview of C. Joseph Giroir (Apr. 30, 1997).
    \480\ See, e.g., Worthen Banking Corp.: Bank Receives $2.1 Million 
from Bankruptcy Estate, Wall Street Journal (Dec. 11, 1989) (stating 
that Worthen had recovered a total of $32.8 million from the bankrupt 
estate of Bevill, Bresler, and Schulman, as well as $20 million from 
insurance companies); Minority staff interview of C. Joseph Giroir 
(Apr. 30, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The testimony of Douglas Buford, an Arkansas lawyer who has 
represented the Lippo Group, sheds additional light on the 
hiring of Mr. Hubbell. Mr. Buford has been a friend of Mr. 
Hubbell's since the two were undergraduates and then law 
students together at the University ofArkansas.481 
Mr. Buford testified that Mr. Hubbell called him after leaving the 
Department of Justice, told Mr. Buford he was doing consulting work, 
and asked Mr. Buford whether the Lippo Group would be able to hire 
him.482 Mr. Buford passed Mr. Hubbell's request on to the 
Lippo Group by calling John Huang (then a top Lippo employee in Los 
Angeles).483 When Mr. Buford called Mr. Huang, he 
specifically said that he was communicating on behalf of Mr. Hubbell 
and not the White House or anyone else.484
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \481\ Deposition of Douglas Buford, 55.
    \482\ Id. at 51.
    \483\ Id.
    \484\ Id. at 53-54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: John Huang engaged in suspicious 
political fundraising activities.
    The Facts: The majority report describes in great detail 
the fundraising activities of John Huang during the 1996 
election cycle, including an event-by-event description of Mr. 
Huang's attendance at various fundraising events with the 
President. Nearly all the information provided in the majority 
report, however, has been reported on extensively by the press, 
beginning two years ago. The report also details many of the 
foreign nationals who attended fundraising events with Mr. 
Huang. That information has also been extensively covered by 
the press,485 and is also discussed in great detail 
in the report of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee's 
campaign finance investigation, which was concluded at the 
beginning of this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \485\ See, e.g., What Clinton Knew: How a Push for New Fundraising 
Led to Foreign Access, Bad Money and Questionable Ties, Los Angeles 
Times (Dec. 21, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are some important questions about John Huang that 
need to be addressed. However, these questions are not answered 
in the majority report, and this Committee's record indicates 
it is not the right body to address them.

2. Allegations Relating to Charlie Trie

    Between 1994 and 1996, Charlie Trie, his family, and his 
businesses contributed a total of $220,000 to the DNC. As a 
volunteer fundraiser, Mr. Trie is also credited with raising 
approximately $500,000. Following the appearance of press 
stories in the fall of 1996, these Trie-related contributions 
came under scrutiny by the DNC, the Department of Justice, and 
congressional investigators. Independently, as a result of an 
internal audit, the DNC decided to return all of Mr. Trie's 
contributions and many of the contributions raised by 
him.486
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \486}\Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Minority Views, 
Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 
Federal Election Campaigns, S. Rpt. No. 167, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., v. 
6, 8687 (1998) (hereafter Senate Minority Report).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: Charlie Trie made conduit 
contributions to the DNC.
    The Facts: There is substantial evidence that Charlie Trie 
and Antonio Pan made conduit contributions. These allegations 
were first investigated and disclosed by the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee. In fact, the Senate held a 
hearing on this topic on July 29, 1997, during which Yue Chu 
and Xiping Wang, two acquaintances of Mr. Trie's, testified 
that they had made conduit contributions at the behest of one 
of Mr. Trie's employees, Keshi Zhan. Moreover, on January 28, 
1998, the Department of Justice indicted Mr. Trie and Mr. Pan 
for defrauding the DNC and the Federal Election Commission 
through illegal contributions.487
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \487\ Indictment, United States v. Trie and Pan (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 
1998). This document and other documents related to Charlie Trie are 
attached to this report as Exhibit 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority report adds little to what is already known 
about Mr. Trie's activities. The report contains no evidence 
indicating that the DNC engaged in a conspiracy with Trie to 
collect conduit campaign contributions. Moreover, the Justice 
Department indictment of Mr. Trie indicated that the DNC was a 
victim of Mr. Trie's fraudulent schemes, not a participant in 
them.488
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \488\ Id. at 6 (Trie and Pan ``[d]evise[d] and intend[ed] to devise 
a scheme and artifice to defraud the DNC and to obtain property from 
the DNC by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and 
promises''); see also Senate Minority Report, at 5270 (``There is no 
evidence before the Committee that any DNC officials were knowingly 
involved in Trie's misdeeds'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: Charlie Trie's political contributions 
were funded by the Chinese government.
    The Facts: The Committee's investigation uncovered no 
information to support Chairman Burton's allegation that 
Charlie Trie made conduit contributions on behalf of the 
Chinese government.489 The majority's main evidence 
that Mr. Trie might have been funneling money from the Chinese 
government is the fact that some of the money wired into Mr. 
Trie's accounts originated from accounts at the Bank of 
China.490 These transfers are not new news and were 
investigated extensively by the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee.491
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \489\ On June 20, 1997, Chairman Burton alleged that there was a 
``massive scheme . . . of funneling millions of dollars in foreign 
money into the U.S. electoral system'' that may have been perpetrated 
by ``the Chinese Government at the highest levels.'' Chairman Burton, 
Congressional Record, H4097 (June 20, 1997). The Chairman had earlier 
suggested that Charlie Trie was part of a ``cast of characters'' who 
might have put ``America's national security . . . in jeopardy by 
foreign money that may have found its way into the Democratic National 
Committee's campaign coffers.'' Chairman Burton, Congressional Record, 
H1913 (Apr. 29, 1997). The Senate Minority Report found no evidence 
that Mr. Trie might have been working for the Chinese government. See 
Senate Minority Report, 270 (``The evidence before the Committee does 
not establish that the government of the People's Republic of China 
provided money to Trie or directed Trie's actions'').
    \490\ Rep. Barr stated on a news program that ``communist Chinese 
money was funneled into DNC coffers'' through ``Bank of China accounts 
in Macao through John Huang and David Wang.'' Transcript from CNN 
Crossfire (Dec. 3, 1997).
    \491\ Senate Majority Report, 2525-27; Senate Minority Report, 
5272-73, 5293-94.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By themselves, these foreign bank funds do not demonstrate 
that Mr. Trie received money from the Chinese or any other 
foreign government; it is equally, if not more, likely that 
these funds came from an individual account holder at the Bank 
of China. As Rep. Barrett stated at a Committee hearing: ``It 
is wonderful to put the innuendo on the table that . . . money 
came from the Bank of China, but that doesn't mean that it is 
necessarily Chinese government money. But that is what these 
hearings are. They are innuendo after innuendo.''492
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \492\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Johnny 
Chung: His Unusual Access to the White House, His Political Donations 
and Related Matters, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (Nov. 13, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the Bank of China is owned by the Chinese 
government, the Bank's U.S. counsel explained: ``The fact that 
a Chinese company is state-owned does not mean that it is 
state-run, and in the Bank's case, it has always strongly 
maintained its independent status and avoided political 
involvement, both in China and around the world.'' 
493 The Bank has conducted business with major 
American corporations such as Visa International, Inc., Price 
Waterhouse, and Morgan Stanley. Moreover, ``[m]ost U.S. firms 
with a presence in China routinely open an account with the 
Bank of China.'' 494 There is simply no reason to 
believe that an account at the Bank of China--even if the 
account is at the Beijing branch office--is substantially 
different from an account at Citibank or Chase Manhattan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \493\ Letter from Christopher Brady (counsel to Bank of China) to 
Christopher Lu (minority counsel) (Oct. 9, 1997).
    \494\ Letter from Barry Naughton (professor, Univ. of California, 
San Diego) to Rep. Waxman (Oct. 8, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Manlin Foung, Mr. Trie's sister, was asked about the 
allegations that Mr. Trie was an agent of the Chinese 
government. She called the allegations ``ridiculous.'' 
495 She also explained that her brother would make a 
very unlikely spy: ``Ninety percent of the time he left the 
house, he couldn't even find his key. He is not a spy material, 
I guarantee you.'' 496
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \495\ Deposition of Manlin Foung, 122 (Sept. 29, 1997).
    \496\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing 
on Conduit Payments to the Democratic National Committee, 105th Cong., 
1st Sess. 125 (Oct. 9, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: Charlie Trie's political contributions 
were funded by the Lippo Group.
    The Facts: Sometime in 1995 or early 1996, approximately 
two hundred $1,000 travelers checks ($200,000 in total) were 
purchased from Bank Central Asia (BCA) in Jakarta, 
Indonesia.497 The checks appear to have been 
purchased by someone associated with Charlie Trie and were 
deposited in numerous persons' accounts during the spring of 
1996; some of the checks may have been used for conduit 
contributions.498 The majority has suggested that 
Charlie Trie and Antonio Pan may have received this money from 
the Lippo Group.499
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \497\ See Letter from Chairman Burton to Dibyo Widodo (Indonesian 
chairman of police) (July 29, 1998).
    \498\ See Letter from Mark M. Richard (deputy asst. attorney 
general) to Chairman Burton (July 30, 1998).
    \499\ See Campaign Finance's Parallel Probes, Washington Post (Aug. 
6, 1998) (Majority Staff Director Kevin Binger stated that the 
travelers checks suggest ``the extent of cooperation between Trie and 
people at the Lippo Group''); GOP Probers Report $50,000 in Illegal 
Donations to Democrats Via Trie, Washington Times (Aug. 5, 1998) 
(Chairman Burton stated that the travelers checks are ``the first time 
that this committee has traced funds used for conduit contributions 
directly back to Indonesia''); Statement of Chairman Burton, Conduit 
Payments to the Democratic National Committee, 7 (Antonio Pan ``is a 
rather mysterious figure who had ties to Charlie Trie, the Lippo Group, 
and John Huang'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Like the wire transfers from the Bank of China, however, 
there is no evidence that these travelers checks came from the 
Lippo Group or the Indonesian government. Indeed, there is no 
evidence to this point that the checks were even paid for with 
foreign funds. Presumably, any individual could walk into a 
Bank Central Asia branch--whether or not the individual had an 
account at the bank--and purchase travelers checks.
    Majority Allegation: Charlie Trie was appointed to the 
Bingaman Commission to reward him for his fundraising.
    The Facts: In the case of Mr. Trie's appointment to the 
Bingaman Commission, the Committee uncovered no evidence of any 
illegal or unethical activity. Rather, the depositions of 
persons involved in the appointment process established that 
Mr. Trie's appointment occurred for the same reasons that 
numerous other persons are named to presidential commissions: 
Mr. Trie appeared to fit the qualifications that the 
Administration was seeking; Mr. Trie was known to persons close 
to President Clinton; and Mr. Trie had long supported the 
President.
    In past administrations, many prominent supporters and 
contributors of the President were appointed to advisory 
committees. For instance, during the Bush administration, 
dozens of ``Team 100'' members--individuals who contributed at 
least $100,000 to the Republican National Committee--were 
appointed to commerce and trade panels.500 At least 
six Team 100 members served on the President's Export Council, 
which advised the President on trade matters.501 At 
least three others were appointed to the Advisory Committee for 
Trade and Policy Negotiations, which advised the United States 
Trade Representative.502
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \500\ Bush's Ruling Class, Common Cause Magazine (April/May/June 
1992).
    \501\ Id. These Team 100 members included: manufacturer Donald 
Bollinger; developer Max Fisher; investor Robert W. Johnson IV; 
financier Henry Travis; and corporate lawyer Gerald Parsky.
    \502\ These Team 100 members included: Brown-Forman CEO W.L. Lyons 
Brown; developer Trammell Crow; and Goodyear Chairman Stan Gault.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To support its theory about Charlie Trie, the majority 
relies almost exclusively on notes from its interviews of Steve 
Clemons, a former aide to Senator Bingaman, who formulated the 
idea for the Commission. What the majority report fails to 
note, however, is that: (1) Mr. Clemons himself publicly 
repudiated the statements attributed to him by the majority; 
503 and (2) the statements that Mr. Clemons 
supposedly made during the majority's interviews are 
contradicted by more than ten witnesses who provided sworn 
testimony to this Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \503\ After the majority's interview notes of Mr. Clemons were made 
public in February 1998, Mr. Clemons stated that ``the notes have 
significant inaccuracies and misrepresentations about the important 
matters which were discussed.'' Statement of Steven C. Clemons (Feb. 
25, 1998). Because the minority was not invited to the interviews of 
Mr. Clemons, it cannot confirm the accuracy of the majority's notes. 
The majority's decision to make the notes public also violates the 
spirit of an agreement reached with the Senate in February. See Letter 
from Rep. Waxman to Speaker Gingrich (Feb. 27, 1998). At that time, the 
majority had sought to call Mr. Clemons as a hearing witness but was 
prevented from doing so by Senator Lott and Senator Daschle. Although 
Chairman Burton said he agreed with the Senate's decision, his staff 
subsequently released its interview notes of Mr. Clemons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    All witnesses deposed by the Committee denied that the 
appointment was intended to reward Mr. Trie for his 
fundraising. The most important testimony on this matter came 
from Charles Duncan, associate director of the White House 
Office of Presidential Personnel (OPP), and Phyllis Jones, 
former assistant United States Trade Representative for 
intergovernmental affairs and public liaison, both of whom were 
involved in the selection of commissioners. Mr. Duncan and Ms. 
Jones testified that Administration officials wanted to form a 
group of qualified commissioners that were diverse in their 
viewpoints, ethnicities and party affiliation.504 
Both testified that they had thought Mr. Trie was ``qualified'' 
for the position because he was both an Asian American and a 
small businessman who had experience in Asian 
trade.505
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \504\ See, e.g., Deposition of Phyllis Jones, 21-22 (Feb. 11, 1998) 
(USTR always tried to form committees with members from diverse 
backgrounds, including ethnicity and business size).
    \505\ Deposition of Charles Duncan, 90-91 (Aug. 29, 1997) (``I felt 
at that time Mr. Trie did have knowledge [of trade barriers with Asian 
countries]. . . . This President has been very strong on having an 
administration and appointments as diverse as America. Mr. Trie, I 
thought, added diversity to it, also. And I thought it was also 
important to have small business people on this commission, and Mr. 
Trie would have been a small business person''); Deposition of Phyllis 
Jones, 60 (``it was because he was a small business person and he was 
Asian American and that we needed some more Asian Americans on the 
committee, because in order to study about Asia you would think you 
would want to have some Asian Americans on there to help with that 
perspective'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This Committee also deposed three friends of the President 
with whom Mr. Duncan spoke about Mr. Trie's appointment: Bob 
Nash (OPP director); Ernest Green (investment banker and 
prominent recommender of minority candidates to the 
Administration); and Lottie Shackleford (an Arkansas resident 
and DNC official). All three of these deponents testified that 
there was nothing unusual about Mr. Trie's 
appointment.506
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \506\ See Deposition of Bob Nash, 91-92 (Sept. 4, 1997) (said he 
knew Mr. Trie was involved in the restaurant business, in international 
trade, and was ``a very competent business person''); Deposition of 
Ernest Green, v.1, 127 (Dec. 17, 1997) (recalled recommending Mr. Trie 
to Mr. Duncan); Deposition of Lottie Shackleford, 51-53 (Apr. 14, 1998) 
(recalled saying something positive about Mr. Trie to Mr. Duncan).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: Democratic contributor and fundraiser 
Ernest Green (1) may have made a $50,000 contribution in 
February 1996 to assist Wang Jun, the head of a large Chinese 
conglomerate, in attending a White House coffee; (2) may have 
been reimbursed by Mr. Trie for this contribution; and (3) may 
have deposited this money into his bank accounts in a way to 
avoid filing currency transaction reports.
    The Facts: Speculation is the sole basis for this 
allegation. The majority's allegations about Mr. Green are 
unsubstantiated and appear calculated to impugn his reputation.
    Mr. Green is a prominent figure in the civil rights 
community and a distinguished African American leader. As one 
of the ``Little Rock Nine,'' Mr. Green helped integrate 
Arkansas public schools in the 1950s.\507\ In three days of 
sworn deposition testimony before both this Committee and the 
Senate, Mr. Green repeatedly denied the many allegations made 
in the majority report.508 Although the majority 
discounts Mr. Green's testimony, it offers no concrete evidence 
to the contrary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \507\ Along with the other members of the ``Little Rock Nine,'' Mr. 
Green was awarded a congressional gold medal, pursuant to a bill 
approved by the full House on Oct. 9, 1998. The bill had 302 co-
sponsors, including 11 majority members of this Committee.
    \508\ See, e.g., Deposition of Ernest Green, v. 1, 296 (no 
connection between $50,000 contribution and Wang Jun attendance at 
White House coffee); Senate Deposition of Ernest Green, 183 (June 18, 
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority's suggestion that Mr. Trie reimbursed Mr. 
Green for his $50,000 contribution to the DNC in February 1996 
has no factual foundation.509 The majority claims 
that Mr. Green made $38,000 in ``mysterious cash deposits,'' 
510 on top of $11,500 he acknowledged receiving from 
Mr. Trie. Because this $49,500 closely approximates the $50,000 
that Mr. Green contributed, the majority report jumps to the 
conclusion that the two are related.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \509\ In his two depositions before this Committee, Mr. Green 
adamantly denied that he was ever reimbursed by anyone for any 
political contributions. See Deposition of Ernest Green, v. 2, 15, 18, 
20, 23, 26, 30-31, 32, 76 (Sept. 25, 1998), Deposition of Ernest Green, 
v. 1, 222.
    \510\ In fact, there is nothing mysterious about these cash 
deposits. Mr. Green testified that, as a civil rights leader, he was 
paid to make many speeches during January 1996 (to commemorate the 
birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr.) and February 1996 (to commemorate 
Black History Month). Deposition of Ernest Green, vol. 2, 16-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In fact, the majority report overlooks several important 
facts. First, the $38,000 in cash deposits identified by the 
majority is based on the majority's arbitrary decision to 
analyze only deposits made between December 15, 1995, and 
February 28, 1996. When one examines Mr. Green's bank account 
statements beyond this two and a half month window, one sees a 
consistent pattern of Mr. Green making large cash 
deposits.511 The majority conveniently overlooks 
these deposits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \511\ For example, in March 1996, Mr. Green made cash deposits of 
$2,000, $3,200, and $2,000 into his NationsBank account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, Mr. Green is a prominent investment banker with 
Lehman Brothers and possesses ample assets to make his own 
campaign contributions. In 1995 alone, Mr. Green's bonus was 
$350,000.512 The majority also overlooks the fact 
that five days before Mr. Green made his $50,000 contribution, 
he received $114,961.70 from Lehman Brothers as the first 
installment of his 1995 bonus.513
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \512\ Deposition of Ernest Green, v. 1, 307.
    \513\ Deposition of Ernest Green, 195 (June 18, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, Mr. Green had a long history of contributing to 
political campaigns. In fact, Mr. Green was a political 
appointee in the Carter Administration, a managing trustee of 
the DNC, and a close friend of President Clinton.514 
Mr. Green also began contributing to the Democratic party and 
Democratic candidates well before he ever met Mr. Trie in the 
Fall of 1994. According to FEC records, Mr. Green's history of 
making political contributions dates back to at least December 
1979.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \514\ Deposition of Ernest Green, v. 1, 21, 25, 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is also no support for the allegation that Mr. Green 
structured cash deposits he made into his account in order to 
avoid filing currency transaction reports. Mr. Green denied 
this allegation during his deposition,515 and the 
majority report presents no concrete evidence to the contrary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \515\ Id. at v. 2, 24, 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Allegations Relating to Johnny Chung

    Johnny Chung, a Taiwanese-born American citizen, 
contributed $366,000 to the Democratic National Committee 
during the 1996 election cycle, directly and through his 
California-based company Automated Intelligent Systems Inc. 
(AISI), a California-based fax broadcasting 
company.516 In the mid-1990s, Mr. Chung actively 
began to expand his business interests to include ventures with 
business people from China and other Asian countries. Also in 
the mid-1990s, Mr. Chung began making political contributions, 
and he began bringing his actual and prospective business 
partners to political events. In March 1998, Mr. Chung pled 
guilty to illegally contributing about $28,000 to two 
Democratic political campaigns through his employees and their 
associates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \516\ See, e.g., Deposition of Nancy Lee, 21-22 (July 29, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: Johnny Chung made conduit 
contributions to the DNC.
    The Facts: It is true that Mr. Chung broke the law on two 
occasions by using other persons as donors (or ``conduits'') 
for his money. Through conduits, Mr. Chung donated about$20,000 
to Clinton/Gore '96 and about $8,000 to Senator Kerry's campaign. 
However, it appears that the campaign committees that received these 
contributions had no knowledge that Mr. Chung was violating the law.
    The Committee discovered no significant information about 
Mr. Chung's conduit contributions that was not uncovered by the 
Department of Justice or by the press. On March 16, 1998, the 
Department of Justice filed a criminal information against Mr. 
Chung describing Mr. Chung's conduit contributions to Clinton/
Gore and Senator Kerry.\517\ Mr. Chung pled guilty to the 
charges. The key facts charged in the criminal information were 
as follows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \517\ Criminal information filed against Johnny Chung (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 16, 1998). This exhibit is attached to this report as Exhibit 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        
 Mr. Chung came to a September 21, 1995, 
        Clinton/Gore event with approximately twenty guests. 
        The next day, in order to pay for his guests, Mr. Chung 
        caused $20,000 of his own money to be contributed to 
        Clinton/Gore, disguised as $1,000 checks from twenty 
        separate people.\518\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \518\ Id. at Count Three, para. 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        
 Mr. Chung instructed one of his employees, 
        Irene Wu, to recruit conduit contributors by asking 
        them to write individual checks for $1,000 from their 
        own accounts. Mr. Chung then directed that cash be 
        withdrawn from his own account, and he had Ms. Wu 
        reimburse each of the conduit contributors with $1,000 
        in cash.\519\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \519\ Id. at Count Three, para. 7-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        
 Mr. Chung then directed Ms. Wu to deliver the 
        conduit checks to Clinton/Gore representatives.\520\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \520\ Id. at Count Three, para. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        
 Mr. Chung also made $8,000 in conduit 
        contributions to Senator Kerry's campaign through his 
        company's employees in September 1996.\521\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \521\ Id. at Count Three, para. 1-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Between March and August 1998--after Mr. Chung was charged 
by the Justice Department--the Committee deposed four people on 
the subject of the conduit contributions that Mr. Chung had 
been charged with and admitted. Two of these people--Kimberley 
Ray and Karen Sternfeld--were employees of the Clinton/Gore '96 
campaign at the time Mr. Chung made his conduit 
contributions.\522\ Two others--Irene Wu and Nancy Lee--were 
employees of Mr. Chung at this time.\523\ None of these 
witnesses added any significant information to the publicly 
reported accounts of what Mr. Chung did. The witnesses provided 
no evidence that Clinton/Gore '96 or the DNC knew that these 
contributions were illegal. They also knew nothing about the 
source of Mr. Chung's money.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \522\  Deposition of Kimberly Ray (July 30, 1998); Deposition of 
Karen Sternfeld (Mar. 10, 1998).
    \523\ Deposition of Irene Wu (July 28, 1998); Deposition of Nancy 
Lee (July 29, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: Johnny Chung had ``unusual access'' to 
the Clinton administration.
    The Facts: Mr. Chung made approximately 50 visits to the 
White House. This is a level of access that would surprise and 
disturb most Americans. From 1994-1996, Mr. Chung was able to 
visit officials at the White House, the Department of Energy, 
the Department of Treasury, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Department of Education, as well as an 
official at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York.\524\ Mr. 
Chung aggressively sought such visits, and in one case was 
persistent enough to cause an official to hang up the phone on 
him.\525\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \524\ Mr. Chung also appears to have arranged additional meetings 
at the Department of Commerce and with the U.S. Ambassador to China, 
which were not explored in detail in Committee depositions. A private 
citizen and Democratic activist helped Mr. Chung arrange these two 
meetings. See, e.g., Deposition of Lynn Cutler, 50-65, Exhibit 12 (Dec. 
2, 1997).
    \525\ Deposition of Corlis Moody, 83 (Dec. 5, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is, however, no evidence in the record suggesting 
that Mr. Chung received any government contracts or grants or 
asked for any changes in law or policy. Rather, Mr. Chung's 
visits to Administration offices were either photo 
opportunities or instances where Mr. Chung and guests received 
public information.\526\ As one witness testified, it appeared 
that ``he was showing off for the guests that he brought.'' 
\527\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \526\ For example, Mr. Chung's half-hour meeting at the Securities 
and Exchange Commission was a routine one at which agency 
representatives provided information they routinely provide to the 
public in person and over the telephone. Deposition of Brian J. Lane, 
18-19, 28-29 (Jan. 20, 1998).
    \527\ Deposition of Sandra Rinck, 67 (Sept. 3, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, the record before the Committee establishes that 
Mr. Chung also had occasional access to high-ranking Republican 
officials. Photographs were presented to theCommittee that 
showed Mr. Chung with Speaker Newt Gingrich, former Senator Bob Dole, 
New Jersey Governor Christine Whitman, California Governor Pete Wilson, 
Virginia Governor George Allen, and Illinois Governor Jim Edgar.\528\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \528\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Hearings 
on Johnny Chung: His Unusual Access to the White House, His Political 
Donations, and Related Matters, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 67-73 (Nov. 13, 
14, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: Johnny Chung used foreign money to 
make political contributions.
    The Facts: As discussed above, Johnny Chung has pled guilty 
to making almost $30,000 in illegal conduit contributions. 
There is no evidence in the record to this point, however, 
linking these contributions to foreign sources.
    Mr. Chung, who is an American citizen, also made over 
$300,000 in contributions to the DNC. These contributions were 
returned by the DNC in early 1997, before the Committee began 
to seriously investigate Mr. Chung.\529\ Mr. Chung's bank 
records show that on several occasions the funds used to cover 
these contributions were wired into his bank account from 
foreign banks.\530\ The evidence in the record to this point, 
however, does not establish that these were foreign funds. If 
Mr. Chung legitimately earned the money that was wired into his 
account, he would lawfully be able to contribute it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \529\ DNC press release (June 27, 1997); Senate Majority Report, 
783.
    \530\ Senate Majority Report, 786.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: Johnny Chung received money from Chao-
Ying Liu, the daughter of a retired Chinese general, that was 
intended for political contributions.
    The Facts: This allegation comes from press reports stating 
that in the course of cooperating with the Department of 
Justice prior to sentencing, Mr. Chung told the Justice 
Department that Ms. Liu gave him $300,000 for campaign 
contributions.\531\ The Committee has obtained no evidence to 
this point confirming Mr. Chung's assertions. To the contrary, 
when Mr. Chung and his attorney met with Committee members in 
November 1997, Mr. Chung provided an account of his activities 
that differs significantly from what he reportedly told the 
Department. Unfortunately, a confidentiality agreement that Mr. 
Chung has refused to waive prevents Committee members from 
discussing what Mr. Chung and his attorney told them in 
November 1997.\532\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \531\ See, e.g., Chung Alleges DNC South Illegal Funds: Justice 
Dept. Probe Enters New Phase, Washington Post (June 20, 1998).
    \532\ At a May 21, 1998, Committee meeting, Rep. Waxman offered a 
motion that the Chairman contact Mr. Chung and his attorney and ask 
them to waive the confidentiality agreement. The Committee approved 
this motion, but, after Mr. Chung's attorney was contacted, he stated 
that Mr. Chung refused to waive the confidentiality agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The credibility of Mr. Chung's allegations should also be 
viewed in the context of his August 1997 claim that former 
Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary conditioned a meeting with Mr. 
Chung on his willingness to make a $25,000 contribution to one 
of her favorite charities. As discussed in Part II.H, 
subsequent investigations by the Attorney General and this 
Committee revealed that Mr. Chung's claim was erroneous.
    Majority Allegation: DNC officials knew or should have 
known that Mr. Chung's contributions were suspect.
    The Facts: Mr. Chung is an American citizen who ran a 
legitimate U.S. business. There was no reason for the DNC to be 
suspicious of the initial contributions he made in 1994. After 
Mr. Chung began to bring Chinese foreign nationals to DNC 
events, there were warning signals that the DNC should have 
recognized. For example, the DNC could have been more vigilant 
in examining the possible connection between Mr. Chung's 
$50,000 contribution to the DNC in March 1995 and the foreign 
guests with whom he attended a presidential radio address that 
month.\533\ There is no evidence in the record, however, 
indicating that the DNC affirmatively encouraged Mr. Chung to 
violate any federal campaign laws--or even had knowledge that 
he was violating these laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \533\ See Senate Majority Report, 786-79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: Johnny Chung may have committed 
immigration fraud.
    The Facts: The majority report alleges that Mr. Chung may 
have defrauded the federal government with respect to 
immigration matters. The deposition testimony of Mr. Chung's 
assistant Irene Wu does provide limited support for this 
allegation. Ms. Wu testified that Mr. Chung set up the 
companies for three reasons: to make it easier for his Chinese 
partners to visit the U.S., to better enable them to eventually 
get residency, and to explore business opportunities.\534\ 
There is, however, no evidence that any of Mr. Chung's partners 
actually became U.S. citizens or permanent residents. Moreover, 
any sort of fraud on the INS, even if established, would appear 
to have no significant relationship to the Committee's campaign 
finance investigation. In fact, if Mr. Chung formed companies 
with Chinese nationals to help them with visas and eventual 
U.S. residence, that may explain why Mr. Chung had contact with 
and received money from these Chinese citizens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \534\ Deposition of Irene Wu, 220.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Allegations Relating to Ted Sioeng

    Ted Sioeng (also known as Sioeng San Wong) was a central 
figure in the campaign fundraising investigation because of his 
close ties to the Chinese government and the substantial 
contributions made by his family and businesses to the 
Democratic National Committee (DNC), the Republican-affiliated 
National Policy Forum (``NPF'') and California Treasurer Matt 
Fong, who is also the Republican Senatorial nominee in 
California. Mr. Sioeng's relationship with Matt Fong and the 
NPF is dealt with in Part IV.B.4.
    Majority Allegation: Ted Sioeng worked, and perhaps still 
works, on behalf of the Chinese government.
    The Facts: According to press accounts, U.S. intelligence 
agencies have developed ``credible'' information that Mr. 
Sioeng ``acted on behalf of China to influence U.S. elections 
with campaign contributions.'' \535\ According to one account: 
``The FBI suspects the Chinese may have used Sioeng as a 
`cutout'--a front man to make illegal contributions appear 
legitimate: the Feds traced the [Matt] Fong money from Chinese 
sources into Sioeng-controlled businesses.'' \536\ Federal 
investigators have also ``focus[ed] intensively on Sioeng's 
cigarette business and whether it might have been used as a 
conduit for Chinese government funds to U.S. political 
campaigns.'' \537\ These press stories note, however, that 
there is ``no information showing Sioeng, his family or 
companies received any benefit from political parties or 
officials as a result of their donations.'' \538\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \535\ Senate Panel is Briefed on China Probe Figure; Officials Say 
Evidence May Link L.A. Businessman to Election Plan, Washington Post 
(Sept. 12, 1997). Through his attorneys, Mr. Sioeng has adamantly 
denied these allegations. See Attorney Statement on Behalf of Jessica 
Elnitiarta and Ted Sioeng (May 23, 1997) (``Mr. Sioeng is not, and has 
not been, a political agent of the Chinese or any other government'').
    \536\ The FBI Zeros in on Exactly How China Secretly Funneled Money 
into American Politics, Newsweek (May 19, 1997).
    \537\ Senate Panel is Briefed on China Probe Figure, Washington 
Post (Sept. 12, 1997).
    \538\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the record before the Committee does not refute these 
press reports, the record to this point also does not support 
the assertion that such close ties exist between Mr. Sioeng and 
the Chinese government. Similarly, the evidence uncovered by 
this Committee does not support the majority's assertion that 
Ted Sioeng ``worked, and perhaps still works, on behalf of the 
Chinese government.'' During the course of its investigation 
into Ted Sioeng, the majority deposed 13 witnesses familiar 
with Mr. Sioeng's business and political activities. None of 
the 12 witnesses whose depositions have been made public 
provided testimony that supports the allegations that Mr. 
Sioeng is an agent of the Chinese government.\539\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \539\ The thirteenth witness is Kent La, a business associate of 
Mr. Sioeng. The Department of Justice has objected to releasing his 
deposition transcript.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most of the witnesses deposed by the Committee had little 
relevant information about Mr. Sioeng or his business or 
political activities. To the extent that these witnesses had 
first-hand knowledge of Mr. Sioeng's activities, they testified 
as follows:
    
 No witness had any knowledge as to whether Mr. 
Sioeng or any member of his family was an agent of the Chinese 
government or was acting at the direction of the Chinese 
government.\540\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \540\ See, e.g., Deposition of Cary Ching, 116 (Feb. 11, 1998); 
Deposition of Lily Wong, 44 (Feb. 11, 1998) (Wong said she would be 
``surprised to learn'' that Mr. Sioeng worked for the Chinese 
government because ``[h]e's a businessman and he's independently 
wealthy''); Deposition of Daniel Wong, 127-35 (Mar. 12, 1998); 
Deposition of Robert Prins, 93 (Jan. 27, 1998) (``Q: Do you have any 
reason to believe whatsoever that Mr. Sioeng is an agent of the Chinese 
government or any other government? A: No, I would have no reason''); 
Deposition of Haddi Kurniawan, 85 (Apr. 14, 1998); Deposition of Boa 
Bang Hunyh, 49 (Apr. 15, 1998); Deposition of Gary Locke, 65 (July 7, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 No witness had any knowledge about Mr. Sioeng 
engaging, either directly or indirectly, in political lobbying 
efforts in the U.S. on behalf of the Chinese or any other 
government.\541\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \541\ See, e.g., Deposition of Daniel Wong, 140 (Mar. 12, 1998); 
Deposition of Robert Prins, 96-97 (Jan. 27, 1998) (``I don't think Ted 
is that political. . . . I think Ted was looking out for how could he 
perhaps buy a future favor from [two Cambodian politicians], not from 
us'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 No witness had any knowledge about the Chinese 
government trying to funnel money into the U.S. through any of 
Mr. Sioeng's companies.\542\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \542\ See, e.g., Deposition of Glenville Stuart, 119 (Feb. 18, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 Several witnesses testified that Mr. Sioeng's 
desire to cultivate good relations with local Chinese 
government officials was driven by economic, and not political, 
reasons.\543\ No witness thought that Mr. Sioeng's connections 
to the Chinese government were unusual for a businessman with 
substantial business interests in China.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \543\ See, e.g., Deposition of Daniel Wong, 126 (Mar. 12, 1998); 
Deposition of Robert Prins, 94 (Jan. 27, 1998) (``Q: Do you find Mr. 
Sioeng's support of the Beijing government unusual for a businessman 
who has substantial business interests in China? A: Not really'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 No witness questioned the legitimacy of Mr. 
Sioeng's businesses.\544\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \544\ See, e.g., Deposition of Robert Prins, 93-94 (Jan. 27, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although Mr. Sioeng appears to have some relationships with 
Chinese government officials, the testimony suggests that these 
connections are at the local and provincial level, rather than 
at the national level. For instance, Johnny Ma, a sometime-
business associate of Mr. Sioeng's, testified that Mr. Sioeng 
was an ``honorary'' advisor to two provinces but that such a 
connection was not unusual for a entrepreneur doing business in 
China.\545\ As Mr. Ma explained, ``[w]hoever has business 
there, almost everyone has some relationship with the 
government.''\546\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \545\ Deposition of Johnny Ma, 71-72 (Feb. 12, 1998). Mr. Ma also 
testified that he thought Mr. Sioeng had a connection with the national 
government in Beijing because Mr. Sioeng ``quite often traveled to 
Beijing'' and ``[o]therwise why would he travel to Beijing?'' Id. at 
87-88. Even assuming that only people with government connections 
travel to Beijing--a highly questionable assumption--Mr. Ma later 
conceded that he had no first-hand knowledge of Mr. Sioeng's 
relationship with the national government. Id., 104 (``Q: Do you have 
any firsthand knowledge . . . of his connection to the Beijing 
government? . . . A: No, I do not'').
    \546\ Deposition of Johnny Ma, 72-73 (Feb. 12, 1998); see also 
Letter from N.T. Wang (senior research scholar at Columbia Univ.) to 
Rep. Waxman, Nov. 10, 1997 (``[S]ince China is still in a transitional 
period, communication with Chinese government officials is a routine 
business matter and is totally unrelated to a business person's 
ideological or political inclination''). This document and other 
documents related to Ted Sioeng are attached to this report as Exhibit 
11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several witnesses contradicted the majority's allegation 
that Mr. Sioeng acted as an agent of the Chinese government. 
Cary Ching, the president of Grand National Bank, testified: 
``[I]t's kind of unthinkable for me personally to think 
[Sioeng] would act in the capacity of an agent. . . . I would 
be very surprised for people as outspoken as Mr. Sioeng would 
serve best in the capacity of a secret agent.''\547\ Glenville 
Stuart, a business associate, called these allegations 
``ridiculous'' and ``preposterous'' and stated that ``knowing 
[Sioeng], he would be a very poor agent.''\548\ Daniel Wong, 
the former mayor of Cerritos, CA, was adamant in his belief 
that Mr. Sioeng was not a Chinese agent:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \547\ Deposition of Gary Ching, 116, 131-32 (Feb. 11, 1998).
    \548\ Deposition of Glenville Stuart, 118, (Feb. 18, 1998).

        Ted Sioeng doesn't campaign. He's not doing any 
        political thing. He doesn't even speak English well 
        enough to influence any senator or congressman. . . . 
        That means that he was not working for the Chinese 
        government as an agent, as a spy, like 007, to get the 
        documents or important stuff. If anything, he was 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        lobbying China for his own good.

    Similarly, Johnny Ma testified: ``I don't think that 
Chinese Government would hire him as a spy or person like him 
because that would seem to be--Chinese Government would be 
quite stupid to hire him . . . [b]ecause, from my knowledge, it 
seem to me Mr. Sioeng's intention was to try to make money off 
from Chinese Government, try to make money from China.''\549\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \549\ Deposition of Johnny Ma, 79 (Feb. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There also was no evidence to support the majority's 
allegations that Mr. Sioeng organized charitable activities in 
the Los Angeles Asian American community at the behest of the 
Chinese consulate in Los Angeles. None of the witnesses deposed 
was able to provide first-hand testimony on this connection. 
However, several witnesses thought that Mr. Sioeng's activities 
were not unusual for a businessman trying to cultivate business 
contacts in China. According to Daniel Wong, Mr. Sioeng, like 
other Chinese entrepreneurs, was motivated to undertake such 
charity efforts for economic reasons: ``He was doing that so he 
gain his influence in these smaller or poorer state or 
provinces so they can get his business deal.''\550\ Johnny Ma 
expressed a similar opinion: ``Everybody wants to have some 
kind of relationship with the consulate so that they can go 
into China and to do business in China.''\551\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \550\ Deposition of Daniel Wong, 36 (Mar. 12, 1998).
    \551\ Deposition of Johnny Ma, 94 (Feb. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If indeed Mr. Sioeng does work for the Chinese government, 
the only high-level U.S. government official with whom he had a 
substantive policy discussion was Speaker Gingrich. As the 
majority report notes, Mr. Sioeng and the Speaker ``talked 
generally about the relationship between the United States and 
the PRC'' at a July 1996 meeting.\552\ In contrast, there is no 
evidence that Mr. Sioeng had any comparable discussions with 
either President Clinton or Vice President Gore at any of the 
DNC functions that Mr. Sioeng attended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \552\ Majority Report Chapter IV, Part D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: Contributions made to the DNC by Ted 
Sioeng's family and businesses are illegal because they were 
either funded from foreign sources or directed by Mr. Sioeng.
    The Facts: In making these allegations, the majority is 
clearly applying a double standard. The majority asserts that 
the Sioeng-related contributions to the DNC are illegal and 
should be returned, but that the Sioeng-related contributions 
to the National Policy Forum, a subsidiary of the RNC, are 
lawful and need not be returned. In fact, the only Sioeng-
related contribution that clearly came from a foreign source is 
the $50,000 contribution that Mr. Sioeng personally gave to 
Matt Fong, when Mr. Fong was seeking to retire his campaign 
debt from his1994 race to become California state treasurer. 
Mr. Sioeng's contributions to Republicans are discussed in detail in 
Part IV.B.4 of the minority report.
    The Sioeng-related contributions to the DNC were made by: 
(1) Mr. Sioeng's daughter Jessica Elnitiarta, who is a legal 
resident and allowed to make campaign contributions; and (2) 
the family's U.S. companies, Panda Estates and Panda 
Industries, which are allowed to make soft money contributions. 
These contributions totaled $250,000. There is no evidence in 
the record that demonstrates that any of these contributions 
were illegal.
    The Sioeng family enterprise 553 has sizeable 
assets in the U.S., including several companies and a large 
hotel in Hollywood.554 These companies and real 
estate holdings appear to generate more than enough income in 
the U.S. to support the $150,000 in contributions made by Panda 
Industries and Panda Estates to the DNC in July 1996. Ms. 
Elnitiarta also apparently has substantial personal assets to 
support her $100,000 contribution to the DNC in February 
1996.555 Indeed, one witness, Daniel Wong, testified 
he had no doubt that Ms. Elnitiarta and the companies made the 
political contributions with their own funds.556 The 
majority speculates that money was transferred from overseas 
accounts into the Sioeng family's U.S. accounts for the purpose 
of making political contributions. These allegations, however, 
appear to be based on pure conjecture.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \553\ Robert Prins testified that four of Mr. Sioeng's five 
children are involved in the family's business, with each child 
handling operations in a different country. Deposition of Robert Prins, 
96 (Jan. 27, 1998).
    \554\ According to one witness, Daniel Wong, Mr. Sioeng claimed to 
have $3 billion in assets in 1992. Deposition of Daniel Wong, 46 (Mar. 
12, 1998). Although that claim is probably an exaggeration, it is clear 
that Mr. Sioeng and his family have substantial assets.
    \555\ In 1994, Jessica Elnitiarta stated in a loan document that 
she had a net worth of $8.3 million, with an annual income of $200,000. 
Personal Financial Statement of Jessica Elnitiarta (July 26, 1994); see 
also Letter from Judah Best to Richard D. Bennett (Mar. 24, 1998) 
(``Additional inquiry has shown that both Ms. Elnitiarta and Panda 
Estates Investments Inc. have substantial assets in the United 
States''). Attorney Statement on Behalf of Jessica Elnitiarta and Ted 
Sioeng (May 23, 1997) (``All of [Elnitiarta's] contributions have been 
lawful and properly documented''); Deposition of Glenville Stuart, 120 
(Feb. 18, 1998) (testified that he thought the Metropolitan Hotel, 
which is owned by the Sioeng family, was ``profitable'').
    \556\ Deposition of Daniel Wong, 115 (Mar. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is also no evidence to support the allegation that 
political contributions made by Ms. Elnitiarta or the family's 
companies were in fact directed by Mr. Sioeng. None of the 
depositions provided any evidence to support the allegation 
that Mr. Sioeng was directing the political contributions of 
either his daughter or the companies. To the contrary, 
according to the deponents, Ms. Elnitiarta, while only in her 
early thirties, is a competent businesswoman who ably handles 
the family businesses, including Panda Estates and Panda 
Industries.557 She is responsible for the day-to-day 
decisions of the family's American operations and has been 
known to overrule her father. One business associate Glenville 
Stuart stated: ``Jessica is like the big boss. She runs 
everything I'm sure.'' 558 According to Robert 
Prins, the president of Iowa Wesleyan College, Ms. Elnitiarta 
controls the family's ``California West Coast 
responsibilities'' and is involved in all of the family's 
business decisions.559 Ms. Elnitiarta's control over 
the companies has apparently increased in recent 
years.560
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \557\ Deposition of Matt Fong, v. 1, 63 (Mar. 2, 1998) (Sioeng 
``was very proud that his children were independent business owners and 
partners of his and they were operating their own enterprises; that 
Jessica ran a hotel . . .''); Deposition of Cary Ching, 118 (Feb. 11, 
1998) (Jessica operates ``pretty independently'' of father); Deposition 
of Lily Wong, 77 (Feb. 11, 1998) (Jessica is in charge of Panda 
Estates); Deposition of Daniel Wong, 60 (Mar. 12, 1998) (``Q: It was 
your impression that [Jessica] was in charge of Ted Sioeng's business 
here in the U.S.? A: Yes, and his son''); Deposition of Johnny Ma, 78 
(Feb. 12, 1998) (``Q: Do you know who runs his businesses here in the 
United States? A: Probably Jessica, his daughter.''); Deposition of 
Haddi Kurniawan, 53 (Apr. 14, 1998) (``Q: Do you know who runs [Panda 
Industries]? A: Jessica''); Deposition of Robert Prins, 95-96 (Jan. 27, 
1998).
    \558\ Deposition of Glenville Stuart, 114 (Feb. 18, 1998).
    \559\ Deposition of Robert Prins, 96 (Jan. 27, 1998).
    \560\ Deposition of Haddi Kurniawan, 93 (Apr. 14, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Robert Prins also testified that on at least two occasions, 
he observed Ms. Elnitiarta overruling her father's decisions to 
provide financial assistance to the college.561 
Glenville Stuart similarly testified that Ms. Elnitiarta has 
``veto power'' over her father's decisions.562 In 
sum, based on the depositions conducted by this Committee, 
there appears to be no support for the majority's suggestion 
that Ms. Elnitiarta made political contributions at her 
father's directions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \561\ Deposition of Robert Prins, 95-96 (Jan. 27, 1998).
    \562\ Deposition of Glenville Stuart, 115-16 (Feb. 18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           E. Evaluation of Chapter V of the Majority Report

    Chapter V of the majority's report alleges that the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Election Commission 
failed to vigorously pursue campaign finance violations. The 
facts, however, show that the Department of Justice's Campaign 
Finance Task Force has actively investigated and prosecuted 
campaign finance violations. Similarly, given its limited 
resources, the FEC has also done its best to enforce federal 
election laws.
    The Justice Department Task Force, organized in late 1996, 
is comprised of over 120 staff including over 20 attorneys and 
45 FBI agents.563 At the December 9, 1997, Committee 
meeting, Attorney General Reno described the Task Force's 
accomplishments to date: ``More than 1 million pages of 
documents have been obtained, hundreds of interviews have been 
conducted, and agents have been dispatched across the country 
and around the world to track down leads.'' 564 As 
of October 1, 1998, the Task Force obtained six guilty pleas 
565 and had indicted seven others in connection with 
its investigation.566
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \563\ Statistics provided by the Department of Justice Office of 
Legislative Affairs.
    \564\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on the Current Implementation of the Independent Counsel Act, 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess., v. 1 (Dec. 9, 10, 1997).
    \565\ Guilty pleas included: Nora and Gene Lum, Trisha Lum, Michael 
Brown, Johnny Chung, and Howard Glicken.
    \566\ Indictments included: Maria Hsia, Charlie Trie, Antonio Pan, 
Pauline Kanchanalak, Georgie Kronenberg, Mark Jimenez, and Yogesh 
Gandhi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FEC has had between 200 and 400 enforcement cases 
pending at any given time over the last five years. Its 
compliance budget from Congress, however, was only $10.5 
million for fiscal year 1998 and its enforcement staff was 
limited to 24 staff attorneys, 5 assistant general counsels, 12 
paralegals, and 2 investigators.567 This has forced 
the FEC to dismiss or take no action on 77% of all the cases it 
received over the past three years.568 The recent 
efforts of Congress to hamstring the FEC are discussed in more 
detail in Part V of this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \567\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing 
on Federal Election Commission Enforcement Actions: Foreign Campaign 
Contributions and Other FECA Violations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 65, 66 
(Mar. 31, 1998).
    \568\ Statistics provided by the Federal Election Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority's allegations of malfeasance at the Department 
of Justice and the FEC do not concern the 1996 election 
campaign. Rather, they arise from activities in the 1994 and 
1992 election campaigns. This retreat in time caused Rep. 
Waxman to observe, ``it seemed to me, that what we were 
supposed to be investigating are abuses from the 1996 election. 
. . . At this rate, Mr. Chairman, it will probably be some time 
in June, I expect, that we'll be focusing on the 1960 election, 
and I suppose the topic will be whether President Kennedy stole 
that election.'' 569
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \569\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing 
on Venezuelan Money and the Presidential Election, 105th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 8 (Apr. 30, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Allegations Relating to Jorge Castro Barredo and Charles Intriago

    Majority Allegation: Jorge Castro made foreign conduit 
contributions to the DNC in the 1992 campaign.
    The Facts: On April 30, 1998, the Committee held a hearing 
entitled, ``Venezuelan Money and the Presidential Election.'' 
At the hearing, the Committee heard evidence that in 1992, two 
U.S. citizens acted as conduits for $50,000 in campaign 
contributions from a Venezuelan company. The Committee's first 
witness, Jorge Castro, testified that he and his aunt, Maria 
Sire Castro, each contributed $20,000 to the Democratic 
National Committee and $5,000 to two separate state Democratic 
parties in 1992. Mr. Castro and Ms. Sire Castro are both U.S. 
citizens. Mr. Castro further testified that he and Ms. Sire 
Castro were reimbursed for the contributions by a Venezuelan 
company owned by Mr. Castro's grandfather, Orlando Castro 
Llanes.
    The next witnesses, Assistant Manhattan District Attorneys 
Richard Preiss and Joseph Dawson, testified that, while 
investigating the Castro family for bank fraud, they uncovered 
bank records and canceled checks that showed that Mr. Castro 
and Ms. Sire Castro received wire transfers in amounts equal to 
the contributions from a Venezuelan company owned by Mr. Castro 
Llanes in the days following the contributions. Mr. Castro 
Llanes, through his attorney, disputes that he made conduit 
contributions.570
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \570\ Minority staff phone interview of Richard Sharpstein (Feb. 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the evidence is not conclusive, it supports Mr. 
Preiss and Mr. Dawson's conclusion that Mr. Castro and Ms. Sire 
Castro were reimbursed for their contributions through Mr. 
Castro Llanes's Venezuelan company. Thus, it appears that 
conduit contributions were made during the 1992 Presidential 
campaign.
    Majority Allegation: Charles Intriago, the attorney who 
solicited the contributions from Mr. Castro, knew that the 
contributors would be reimbursed from foreign funds.
    The Facts: Charles Intriago, a Miami attorney, former 
congressional staffer, and assistant U.S. attorney, has 
acknowledged that he solicited the contributions from Mr. 
Castro, but maintains that he did not know that the 
contributions were going to be reimbursed from foreign funds. 
According to his attorney, ``Charles Intriago . . . solicited 
contributions from a number of well-off American citizens with 
whom he was acquainted, and who he believed had the personal 
financial capability to make such contributions.'' 
571
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \571\ Statement of Robert Plotkin (counsel for Charles A. Intriago) 
(Reprinted in Hearing on Venezuelan Money and the Presidential 
Election, 35-37).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is evidence in the record that supports Mr. 
Intriago's position. At the hearing, Mr.Castro acknowledged 
that the conduit scheme was designed to make the contributions appear 
legal. According to the hearing testimony:

          Mr. Waxman. Well, it would appear to the Democratic 
        party, to President Clinton, the Clinton-Gore campaign, 
        or anybody who got your money that you are a U.S. 
        citizen writing a check to the Democratic party.
          Mr. Castro. That is correct.
          Mr. Waxman. On the surface, to them, it would appear 
        to be legal.
          Mr. Castro. That is correct.\572\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \572\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Hearing on 
Venezuelan Money and the Presidential Election, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., 
41, Apr. 30, 1998.

    Furthermore, by his own admission, Mr. Castro had the 
financial resources to make the contributions. In other words, 
no one would have any reason to suspect that the contributions 
came from a foreign source.\573\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \573\ Majority counsel Richard Bennett asked Mr. Castro: ``In terms 
of your own personal financial situation in 1992, were you in a 
financial position to make contributions totaling $25,000 in September 
1992?'' Mr. Castro replied, ``I was.'' Id. at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority's ``evidence'' that Mr. Intriago knew that the 
contributions were illegal was limited to the testimony of Mr. 
Castro and a fax from Mr. Intriago found by Mr. Dawson in Mr. 
Castro's office ``instructing Castro Barredo to make conduit 
contributions.'' \574\ This characterization of the fax, 
however, is factually inaccurate. The fax only specified the 
names of campaign committees and amounts of money to be 
contributed to each; it did not refer in any way to Mr. Castro 
being reimbursed through his grandfather's company. In fact, 
Mr. Castro testified that he asked Mr. Intriago to send the fax 
with the exact instructions on where Mr. Castro should direct 
his contributions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \574\ Majority Report, Chapter V, Part A, Section III.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The most persuasive evidence implicating Mr. Intriago is 
Mr. Castro's testimony. Mr. Castro, however, is not necessarily 
a credible witness. In February 1997, Mr. Castro, his 
grandfather, and his uncle were convicted of bank fraud and 
larceny which cheated depositors out of approximately $55 
million. Mr. Castro had used the bank's assets to purchase 
sports cars, an airplane, a yacht, and other luxuries. At the 
trial, Assistant District Attorney Preiss described Mr. Castro 
as someone ``who thought [he] could fool other people.'' \575\ 
Moreover, Mr. Castro's motives could be suspect because he did 
not ``volunteer'' information about the conduit contributions 
until after his conviction. Mr. Castro brought up the 
contributions at a debriefing with prosecutors at which he 
attempted to show that he wanted to cooperate with prosecutors. 
In return, at his sentencing on December 15, 1997, Assistant 
District Attorney Dawson told that court that Mr. Castro had 
provided the prosecutors with useful information. This led the 
judge to give Mr. Castro a reduced sentence of only 3\1/2\ 
years in prison instead of the possible maximum sentence of 40 
years. Mr. Castro also testified that he was appearing at the 
Committee's hearing because the majority promised to write a 
letter on Mr. Castro's behalf to the New York State Department 
of Correctional Services in an effort to get Mr. Castro into a 
work release program. Mr. Castro testified at the hearing as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \575\ Trial Transcript, New York v. Jorge Barredo Castro, Ind. 
#2459-96, 14 (NY Sup. CT. Nov. 21, 1996).

          Mr. Barrett. The reason you are here today is you 
        want to get out of jail, isn't it?
          Mr. Castro. The reason I'm here today is?
          Mr. Barrett. You want to get out of jail.
          Mr. Castro. Correct.
          Mr. Barrett. There's really no other reason other 
        than that.
          Mr. Castro. Go down deep, that's the reason.\576\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \576\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Hearing on 
Venezuelan Money and the Presidential Election, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., 
52 (Apr. 30, 1998). See also Letter from Chairman Burton to 
Commissioner Glenn S. Goord (New York State Department of Correctional 
Services) (May 1, 1998).

    Majority Allegation: The Castro family received ``red 
carpet treatment'' from the Clinton Administration.
    The Facts: According to the majority report, Orlando Castro 
Llanes ``received red carpet treatment from the Clinton 
Administration over the coming year,'' including attending 
President Clinton's inauguration in 1993, a White House 
reception for DNC donors, and a meeting with the State 
Department regarding Mr. Castro Llanes' business 
interests.\577\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \577\ Majority Report, Ch. V, Part A, Section II (A). The report 
also alleges that Mr. Castro Llanes was ``seeking to have Intriago 
appointed U.S. ambassador to Venezuela,'' Majority Report, Ch. V, Part 
A, Section I(A). There was no evidence presented to show that Mr. 
Intriago either sought, or was considered for, this position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The evidence, however, does not support the accusation that 
Mr. Castro Llanes received any special treatment from the 
Clinton administration as a result of his grandson's campaign 
contributions. In fact, Mr. Castro testified that the Castro 
family did not receive any special treatment at the 
inauguration. When asked by majority counsel if he and his 
family attended one of the inaugural balls, Mr. Castro replied, 
``Not the inaugural ball. It was the big--the small gathering 
in front of the Capitol Hill with about 3 million other 
people.'' \578\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \578\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Hearing on 
Venezuelan Money and the Presidential Election, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., 
29 (Apr. 30, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, it appears that Mr. Castro Llanes's visit to the 
White House was limited to a large reception attended by 
hundreds of people.\579\ The State Department meeting also 
appears to be nothing more than a courtesy meeting arranged 
through Mr. Intriago's connections.\580\ There is no evidence 
that the meeting was related to the Castro contributions or 
that the State Department took any action in response to that 
meeting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \579\ Id.
    \580\ Id. at 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: The Justice Department ignored the 
evidence of the illegal conduit contribution scheme involving 
Mr. Castro.
    The Facts: The facts show that the Justice Department did 
investigate the evidence gathered by the Manhattan District 
Attorney and, at the time of the Committee hearing, the Justice 
Department's investigation had not been closed.
    In May 1997, an assistant U.S. attorney and agents from the 
FBI and the IRS met with Mr. Preiss and Mr. Dawson from the 
Manhattan District Attorney's office in New York. That summer, 
the case was transferred to the Justice Department Task Force 
and assigned to another attorney, who also met with Mr. Preiss 
and Mr. Dawson about the case. More recently, the Justice 
Department sent FBI agents to interview Mr. Intriago and his 
former assistant, Wendy Brown, and interviewed members of the 
Castro family.\581\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \581\ Minority staff phone interview of Robert Plotkin (April 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority's allegations are based on a letter from the 
Justice Department to the Manhattan District Attorney which 
said that the Justice Department ``had concluded that there is 
at this time no further role for [Mr. Castro] to play in 
matters under investigation by the Task Force.'' \582\ The 
letter was a response to a call from Mr. Preiss to the Justice 
Department asking if the Justice Department wanted the 
Manhattan District Attorney to request the trial judge to delay 
Mr. Castro's sentencing and was not indicative of the Justice 
Department's interest in pursuing the case. In fact, according 
to the Justice Department, the case is still under 
investigation. It is not unusual for the Justice Department to 
take considerable time to build a strong case or to decide that 
the evidence against certain individuals is insufficient. For 
example, there was evidence that Charlie Trie had made illegal 
contributions during the 1996 campaign as early as October 
1996, yet Mr. Trie was not indicted until January 28, 1998--15 
months after the allegations surfaced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \582\ Letter from Lee Radek (Justice Department public integrity 
section chief) to Robert Morgenthau (Manhattan district attorney) (Oct. 
17, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regrettably, Chairman Burton never gave the Justice 
Department an opportunity to respond to his accusations and 
clarify the record. When asked at the hearing why the Justice 
Department was not invited to testify, Chairman Burton assured 
the Committee that the Justice Department would be invited to a 
subsequent hearing.\583\ The Justice Department, however, was 
never given an opportunity to respond to these accusations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \583\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Hearing on 
Venezuelan Money and the Presidential Election, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., 
69 (Apr. 30, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority Allegation: The contributions were made from 
``drug money'' and Jorge Castro was in danger of physical harm 
for his testimony.
    The Facts: Chairman Burton made additional unsubstantiated 
allegations the night before the April 30, 1998, hearing on 
CNN's Larry King Live. On that program, Chairman Burton stated, 
``Tomorrow we're going to have a hearing. We're bringing in a 
fellow who laundered $50,000 from Venezuela. We think part of 
it might have been drug money. Mr. Morgenthau, the district 
attorney in New York--a Democrat--referred some of this 
information to us. We finally got this fellow in a safe prison 
so he wouldn't be stabbed or hurt when he testified.'' \584\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \584\ Chairman Burton, CNN's Larry King Live (Apr. 29, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These accusations were discredited at the hearing. When 
asked about the accusation that the contributions may have come 
from drug money, Mr. Preiss, the assistant Manhattan district 
attorney, testified that ``there was nothing at all that was 
related to that.'' \585\ Similarly, Mr. Preiss testified that 
Mr. Castro never expressed any concerns about his safety other 
than general concerns about being a cooperating witness while 
in prison.\586\ In fact, when Mr. Castro was asked if someone 
had attempted to stab him while in prison, he replied, ``That's 
incorrect.'' \587\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \585\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Hearing on 
Venezuelan Money and the Presidential Election, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., 
93 (Apr. 30, 1998).
    \586\ Id.
    \587\ Id. at 74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Allegations Relating to Thomas Kramer and Howard Glicken

    Howard Glicken is a Democratic fundraiser from Florida. Mr. 
Glicken was investigated by the FEC for his role in soliciting 
illegal foreign campaign contributions from German national 
Thomas Kramer. Ultimately, the FEC decided not to pursue any 
action against Mr. Glicken, primarily because of a lack of 
resources and the fact that the statute of limitations was 
about to expire on his violations. The Department of Justice 
campaign finance task force obtained a guilty plea from Mr. 
Glicken in July 1998.
    Majority Allegation: The FEC decided not to proceed against 
Mr. Glicken because of his ties to the Vice President.
    The Facts: The overwhelming weight of the evidence produced 
at a Committee hearing on March 31, 1998, indicated that the 
FEC's decision not to proceed against Mr. Glicken was not the 
result of improper political influence.\588\ In fact, FEC 
General Counsel Larry Noble testified that the decision not to 
proceed against Mr. Glicken was approved by a unanimous vote of 
the Commission's Republican and Democratic commissioners.\589\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \588\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing 
on Federal Election Commission Enforcement Actions: Foreign Campaign 
Contributions and Other FECA Violations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 
31, 1998).
    \589\ Id. at 81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In this case, the FEC had already obtained major fines 
against the contributors (Mr. Kramer and his secretary, Terri 
Bradley), the only recipient of the illegal contributions that 
refused to return the improper funds (the Republican party of 
Florida), and the law firm that represented Mr. Kramer in 
immigration matters (Greenberg, Traurig, et al.). Mr. Noble 
testified that, faced with a large caseload and few resources 
to handle that caseload, he decided to recommend that the FEC 
not pursue any of the solicitors of Mr. Kramer's contributions 
to both Democrats and Republicans:

        If you look at the file on this case, we did not search 
        out any of the other solicitors. There were a lot of 
        contributions made here. We can assume that there were 
        a lot of solicitors, both on the Democratic and the 
        Republican side, who solicited contributions from Mr. 
        Kramer. We don't have the resources to go after every 
        one of those. We had to make a decision early on in the 
        case of what we were going to do, and you have to take 
        it at the time of that case of what we were dealing 
        with. In terms of just resources, we were averaging 319 
        cases in any given month from that year . . . of which 
        we activated only about a third.\590\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \590\ Id. at 40.

    According to Mr. Noble, part of the reason resources were 
not available to pursue Mr. Glicken was the Commission's 
determination to address allegations of wrongdoing in the 1996 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
election cycle:

        When we discuss how to proceed on these cases, we're 
        aware that we can only handle a very limited amount--a 
        very limited number of investigations, and, frankly, at 
        the time this came up last summer, we knew that we are 
        already dealing with large cases coming in from the 
        1996 election. Remember, these contributions are from 
        1993, 1994. We are trying to get out of the 1993, 1994 
        cycle and we have to look at where the resources are 
        going to go.\591\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \591\ Id. at 63-64.

    Mr. Noble also explained why the Commission would be unable 
to complete its investigation into Mr. Glicken before the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
expiration of the statute of limitations:

        If you look at the procedures in the statute that we 
        have to follow, we have figured out that not counting 
        any work the FEC does, we have to take approximately 
        120 to 130 days to get a case through. That's not 
        counting any investigation, any writing of reports. We 
        know, as a practical matter, based on our experience, 
        that it would take us a long time to get that case [the 
        Glicken case] through, unless it was going to settle 
        early.\592\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \592\ Id. at 80.

    Finally, Mr. Noble explained why reference had been made to 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Glicken's relationship with the Vice President:

          Mr. Waxman. Your statement said that this man was, 
        ``a prominent Democratic fundraiser including his 
        potential fundraising involvement in support of Vice 
        President Gore's expected Presidential campaign, it is 
        unclear that this individual would agree to settle this 
        matter short of litigation.'' Now that's all one 
        sentence, but do you think he's not going to settle the 
        litigation because he's a friend of Gore's?
          Mr. Noble. Our experience has been that the more 
        prominent somebody is, the higher the profile that he 
        is, that they are going to fight you more.\593\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \593\ Id. at 101-102.

    No evidence was produced at the hearing calling into 
question Mr. Noble's assurances that no improper factors had 
been taken into account in the decision not to proceed against 
Mr. Glicken.
    Majority Allegation: The FEC was negligent in failing to 
refer the Glicken matter to the Department of Justice.
    The Facts: Federal law prohibits the FEC from referring any 
matter to the Department of Justice without first conducting 
its own investigation. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 437g (a)(5)(c) prohibits a 
referral to the Justice Department absent a ``finding of 
probable case'' by the Commission. A ``finding of probable 
cause'' by the Commission can only occur after a lengthy 
administrative procedure, including an investigation, mandated 
by the FEC's authorizing statute.\594\ As explained by the 
witnesses at the Committee's hearing into the matter, such an 
investigation could not have been completed before the statute 
of limitations had run.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \594\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 437g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the Committee's hearing on March 31, 1998, Mr. Noble 
and Lois Lerner, associate general counsel at the FEC, 
testified as follows:

          Mr. Burton. If it's a criminal activity involving 
        campaign contributions of this type, it should have 
        been referred to the Justice Department for action, and 
        you didn't do it.
          Ms. Lerner. We can't do it under the statute. We can 
        only do what the statute allows us to.
          Mr. Noble. Mr. Chairman, we would've violated our law 
        had we referred Mr. Glicken over without finding 
        probable cause to believe.
          Mr. Burton. But the probable cause, you know----
          Mr. Noble. It's a formal finding by the Commission. 
        This is not just something we decide is probable cause. 
        We have to put a case before the Commission and we have 
        to put the evidence before the Commission and say 
        there's probable cause. And they have to vote by four 
        votes that there's probable cause.\595\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \595\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Hearing on 
Federal Election Commission Enforcement Actions, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 
100 (Mar. 31, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           F. EVALUATION OF CHAPTER VI OF THE MAJORITY REPORT

    The minority's discussion of the controversy surrounding 
the Department of Interior's denial of the Hudson casino 
application is discussed in Part II.C of the minority report.

   IV. A Review of Questionable Republican Campaign Finance Practices

    The majority report describes in detail allegations 
relating to conduit contributions to the Democratic Party, 
foreign contributions to the Democratic Party, Democratic 
contribution-for-access incidents, and other purported 
Democratic campaign finance improprieties. There is no question 
that the major political parties have exploited a campaign 
finance system riddled with loopholes. And there is no question 
that Democrats have received illegal campaign contributions.
    Unfortunately, the majority report addresses only one side 
of the story. It fails to discuss the many serious allegations 
of questionable campaign finance practices by Republicans. This 
section of the minority report discusses several examples of 
Republican abuses: conduit contributions; foreign 
contributions; enhanced access derived from contributions; 
policy benefits that may be a result of campaign contributions; 
and other questionable campaign practices.

        A. CONDUIT CONTRIBUTION SCHEMES AND REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGNS

    Although the Committee's investigation focused on conduit 
contributions to Democratic candidates and campaigns, one of 
the most serious allegations involving illegal conduit 
contributions in the 1996 campaign actually involves 
Republicans. In the case of the conduit contribution schemes 
involving Charlie Trie and Johnny Chung, there is little 
evidence that the candidates and parties receiving the 
contributions were aware of the conduit scheme. There is, 
however, specific and credible evidence that a senior 
Republican member of Congress, Majority Whip Tom DeLay, and a 
Republican congressional candidate, Brian Babin, knowingly 
participated in a scheme to funnel illegal conduit 
contributions to Mr. Babin's campaign.
    The allegations involving Mr. DeLay and Mr. Babin, as well 
as evidence of four other conduit contribution schemes 
involving Republicans, are discussed below.

1. The Prohibition on Conduit Contributions

    The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) limits the amount 
that an individual can give to a candidate in any federal 
election to $1,000.\596\ To prohibit wealthy individuals from 
circumventing this limitation, FECA prohibits persons from 
contributing money through others:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \596\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 441a.

        No person shall make a contribution in the name of 
        another person or knowingly permit his name to be used 
        to effect such a contribution, and no person shall 
        knowingly accept a contribution made by one person in 
        the name of another person.\597\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \597\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 441f.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FECA also states in pertinent part:

        For purposes of the limitations imposed by this 
        section, all contributions made by a person, either 
        directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular 
        candidate, including contributions which are in any way 
        earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary 
        or conduit to such candidate, shall be treated as 
        contributions from such person to such candidate. The 
        intermediary or conduit shall report the original 
        source and the intended recipient of such contribution 
        to the Commission and to the intended recipient.\598\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \598\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 441a (a)(8).

    Both Republicans and Democrats have violated the conduit 
contribution provisions of FECA. As Rep. Waxman noted, 
``Conduit payments are, of course, illegal; unfortunately, 
they've also become much too common.'' 599 In the 
fall of 1997, the Federal Election Commission was investigating 
27 conduit payments involving 214 individuals. The FEC had also 
assessed fines in 21 other conduit contribution cases involving 
the 1992, 1994, and 1996 election campaigns. The total fines 
assessed by the FEC against the 108 participants in the 21 
completed cases was $335,000.600
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \599\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing 
on Conduit Payments to the Democratic National Committee, 105th Cong., 
1st Sess., 12 (Oct. 9, 1997).
    \600\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Conduit Contribution Scheme Involving Majority Whip DeLay, Peter 
        Cloeren, and Brian Babin

    In the typical conduit contribution scheme, the organizers 
of the scheme and the participants know that it is occurring, 
but the candidate may be unaware that the contributions the 
campaign is receiving may be illegal. The Committee learned of 
only one instance where there is specific and credible evidence 
that the candidate knew that he was receiving illegal conduit 
contributions. This episode concerns Brian Babin, the 
Republican congressional candidate in the Second District of 
Texas in 1996, and Peter Cloeren, the organizer of the scheme 
who acknowledged his responsibility and was fined $200,000. Mr. 
Babin is also alleged to have enlisted Majority Whip Tom 
DeLay's help to facilitate Mr. Cloeren's illegal conduit scheme 
and to encourage the scheme's participants to continue to 
violate federal election laws.
    The allegations concerning Rep. DeLay, Mr. Babin, and Mr. 
Cloeren were the focus of a front page story in the August 5, 
1998, edition of The Hill.601 Citing a complaint 
filed with the FEC, The Hill reported that Rep. DeLay and his 
staff had advised Mr. Cloeren on ways to funnel illegal 
campaign contributions to Mr. Babin's campaign through 
``additional vehicles.'' 602 These additional 
vehicles allegedly included Triad Management Services, Inc., an 
organization that has previously been accused of illegally 
earmarking contributions to Republican 
candidates.603 According to The Hill article, Mr. 
Cloeren followed Rep. DeLay's advice and suggestions, and 
contributed monies to Triad, Triad-related entities, and other 
Republican candidates with the full knowledge that those 
entities would give the money Mr. Cloeren contributed to them 
to Mr. Babin's congressional campaign.604
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \601\ Texas Donor: GOP Evaded Law, The Hill (Aug. 5, 1998).
    \602\ Id.
    \603\ Id.
    \604\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 6, 1998, all the Democratic members of the 
Committee (with the exception of Rep. Jim Turner, who recused 
himself) wrote to Chairman Burton to request that Chairman 
Burton schedule hearings in September 1998 to investigate the 
allegations that Majority Whip DeLay, the third-ranking 
Republican in the House, may have advised Mr. Cloeren on how to 
funnel illegal conduit contributions to Mr. Babin's campaign 
and to investigate substantial evidence of improprieties 
relating to Triad.605
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \605\ Letter from Reps. Waxman, Lantos, et al. to Chairman Burton 
(Aug. 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Burton did not schedule the hearing requested by 
the Democratic members. In fact, he did not even respond to the 
letter of August 6, 1998. As a result, the minority staff made 
its own attempt to investigate these serious allegations. 
According to press accounts, these allegations concerning Rep. 
DeLay are also currently the subject of an ongoing criminal 
investigation by the Department of Justice Campaign Finance 
Task Force.606
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \606\ Justice Department Probes DeLay, The Hill (Sept. 30, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As part of its investigative efforts, the minority staff 
obtained an affidavit from Mr. Cloeren that provides 
considerable additional detail about his dealings with Mr. 
Babin, Rep. DeLay, and others. In this sworn affidavit, Mr. 
Cloeren states that in late 1995, Mr. Babin asked him to raise 
$50,000 to help finance Mr. Babin's primary campaign in Orange 
County, Texas--a rural area consisting primarily of Democratic 
voters and blue-collar workers.607 Mr. Cloeren 
states that he told Mr. Babin that he could give Mr. Babin a 
corporate check.608 According to Mr. Cloeren, Mr. 
Babin responded that he did not care where the money came from 
as long as the money came from individuals, and that Mr. 
Cloeren should ``work with loyal employees'' to contribute 
money to the Babin campaign.609 Mr. Cloeren says 
that he agreed to do so and asked various employees and their 
families to contribute $1,000 to Mr. Babin with the 
understanding that Mr. Cloeren would reimburse 
them.610
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \607\ Affidavit of Peter F. Cloeren, House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight (Aug. 6, 1998), para. 4-5 (hereafter ``Cloeren 
Aff.'') (attached as Exhibit 6).
    \608\ Id. at para. 6.
    \609\ Id.
    \610\ Id. at para. 6-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to Mr. Cloeren's affidavit, Mr. Babin asked Mr. 
Cloeren to find additional donors to fund Mr. Babin's run-off 
and general election campaigns.611 Mr. Cloeren says 
he discussed the legality of the corporate reimbursement scheme 
with Mr. Babin, and Mr. Babin told him that ``everyone'' raised 
campaign money this way and that neither Mr. Cloeren nor Mr. 
Babin ``would get caught.'' 612 Mr. Cloeren then 
raised $58,000 for Mr. Babin's campaign through this conduit 
contribution scheme from his employees.613
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \611\ Id. at para. 8, 11, 13.
    \612}\Id. at para. 12.
    \613\ This amount was determined by examining the FEC's List of 
Receipts and Expenditures for the Babin campaign. As part of his 
cooperation with the government, the government agreed to hold Mr. 
Cloeren responsible for $37,000 of the $58,000. Press accounts 
uniformly attribute this lower total as the amount of the illegal 
conduit contributions Mr. Cloeren funneled to the Babin campaign. See, 
e.g., Questions for Tom DeLay, The Hill (Aug. 12, 1998); Dems Call for 
Probe of Charge that GOP Laundered Funds, The Hill (Aug. 12, 1998); 
Phone Tapes Implicate Candidate, FEC Witness Says, Houston Chronicle, 
A37 (Aug. 7, 1998); Texas Donor: GOP Evaded Law--House Leader Among 
Those Said to Have Advised Exceeding Limits, The Hill (Aug. 5, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Cloeren states that Majority Whip Tom DeLay came to 
campaign for Mr. Babin in August 1996, and personally urged Mr. 
Cloeren to raise more money for Mr. Babin's 
campaign.614 According to Mr. Cloeren's affidavit, 
on August 29, 1996, following a Babin campaign event, Rep. 
DeLay sat next to Mr. Cloeren at a country club luncheon. Mr. 
Cloeren states that during the lunch, Rep. DeLay told Mr. 
Cloeren that Mr. Babin's campaign needed additional money 
because Mr. Babin's Democratic opponent (now Representative Jim 
Turner) was receiving money from ``liberal interest groups'' 
such as labor unions and trial lawyers.615 Mr. 
Cloeren says that he replied that he could not raise more money 
for Mr. Babin because he, Cloeren, had ``run out of vehicles.'' 
616 According to Mr. Cloeren, Rep. DeLay responded 
specifically that ``it would not be a problem'' for Rep. DeLay 
``to find additional vehicles'' for Mr. Cloeren since Rep. 
DeLay knew of some organizations and campaigns which could 
serve as these vehicles.617
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \614\ Cloren Aff. at para. 17. At Mr. Babin's request, Mr. Cloeren 
paid the $1,320 cost of Rep. DeLay's transportation to and from the 
August 29, 1996, Babin campaign event. Mr. Cloeren paid for the travel 
with corporate monies which constituted an in-kind contribution to Mr. 
Babin's campaign under Federal election law. Neither Mr. Babin nor Rep. 
DeLay reported this contribution on their respective FEC disclosure 
reports, which constitutes a separate violation of the campaign finance 
laws and regulations. Almost two years later, Mr. Babin wrote Mr. 
Cloeren to say that it ``has come to [my campaign's] attention'' that 
Mr. Cloeren has paid for the air charter for Rep. DeLay and reimbursed 
Mr. Cloeren for the cost of Rep. DeLay's travel. See id. at para. 14-
15, and Exs. C, D.
    \615\ Id. at para. 17.
    \616\ Id.
    \617\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Cloeren states in his affidavit that Rep. DeLay then 
turned to his campaign manager, Robert Mills, and stated that 
additional money could be funneled to Mr. Babin's campaign 
through Triad and other congressional campaigns.618 
Mr. Cloeren states that Rep. DeLay told Mr. Cloeren that his 
aide, Mr. Mills, would follow-up with Mr. Cloeren on the 
details.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \618\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Cloeren states that others present at this lunch also 
heard Rep. DeLay discuss with Mr. Cloeren and Mr. Mills how Mr. 
Cloeren could use ``additional vehicles'' to funnel even more 
money to Mr. Babin's campaign.619 Minority staff 
investigators learned that two of Mr. Cloeren's employees, Paul 
Peveto and Mike Lucia, were present at the lunch, and at least 
one of them told Mr. Cloeren that he heard the ``vehicle'' 
discussion between Rep. DeLay, Mr. Cloeren, and Mr. Mills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \619\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Cloeren says that he received a call from Robert Mills 
the day after the August 1996 lunch to follow up on Rep. 
DeLay's suggestions.620 According to Mr. Cloeren, 
Mr. Mills gave Mr. Cloeren the names of two campaigns to which 
he could contribute.621 Mr. Cloeren states that Mr. 
Mills told Mr. Cloeren that these campaigns, in turn, would 
make matching donations to Mr. Babin's campaign.622 
Mr. Cloeren states that the two campaigns Mr. Mills identified 
for Mr. Cloeren were those of Senator Strom Thurmond and 
Stephen Gill, a candidate for Congress in 
Tennessee.623
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \620\ Id. at para. 20.
    \621\ Id.
    \622\ Id. at para. 20-21.
    \623\ Id. at para. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FEC records substantiate Mr. Cloeren's statements. They 
show that on September 30, 1996, Thurmond donor Gayle O. Averyt 
made a $1,000 contribution to the Babin campaign, and during 
October 1996, several Gill campaign donors with close links to 
Triad contributed $1,000to the Babin campaign.624 
Then, on November 1, 1996, Mr. Cloeren contributed $1,000 to the Gill 
campaign and on November 5, 1996, he contributed $1,000 to the Thurmond 
campaign.625
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \624\ On Oct. 23, 1996, Gill donors Floyd and Anne Coates made 
$1,000 contributions to the Babin campaign and Gill donors Robert L. 
Cone and Dawn M. Cone each contributed $500 to the Babin campaign. Each 
of these Gill donors is associated with Triad. Floyd and Anne Coates 
contributed $15,000 to Triad-supported candidates in the final two 
weeks of the 1996 election, and Mr. Coates has admitted making PAC 
contributions at Triad's suggestion. Minority Report of the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, Investigation of Illegal or Improper 
Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns, Rpt. 
105-167, at 6293 (hereafter ``Senate Minority Report.'') As discussed 
more fully in the Senate minority report, Robert Cone provided over 
$1.5 million to Triad and its related entities. Id. at 6293-94.
    \625\ FEC Records.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to Mr. Cloeren, Mr. Mills also told Mr. Cloeren 
in their telephone call following the August 1996 lunch meeting 
that an additional way Mr. Cloeren could get money to Mr. 
Babin's campaign was to give money to certain groups who would 
then turn around and contribute matching donations to Mr. 
Babin's campaign. Mr. Cloeren says that Mr. Mills specifically 
told Mr. Cloeren that Mr. Mills knew of certain organizations 
which would agree to take any contribution Mr. Cloeren made and 
then earmark Mr. Cloeren's money for Mr. Babin's 
campaign.626
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \626\ Cloeren Aff., para. 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After his telephone conversation with Mr. Mills about how 
to give additional money to Mr. Babin's campaign without 
appearing to give money directly to Mr. Babin, Mr. Cloeren says 
that he received further telephone calls to pressure him to 
contribute money to groups that would agree to give Mr. Babin's 
campaign the identical amount that Mr. Cloeren donated to the 
groups. Mr. Cloeren states that he received these follow-up 
calls from Mr. Babin, Carolyn Malenick--who identified herself 
to Mr. Cloeren as the head of Triad Management Services, Inc.--
and Walter Whetsell, a Babin campaign consultant.627
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \627\ Id. at para. 22, 23, 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Cloeren recalls one phone call where Mr. Whetsell told 
him that a Triad affiliate, Citizens for Reform, had already 
made its ``pre-arranged contributions'' to Mr. Babin's 
campaign.628 Based on this phone call, Mr. Cloeren 
says that he and his wife each donated $10,000 to Citizens for 
Reform on November 1, 1996.629 According to his 
affidavit, the only reason that Mr. Cloeren made these 
contributions was to benefit the Babin campaign. Mr. Cloeren 
states that Mr. Babin, Carolyn Malenick, and Mr. Whetsell each 
told Mr. Cloeren that the entire $20,000 contribution Mr. 
Cloeren and his wife made to Citizens for Reform would go to 
help the Babin campaign.630 Mr. Cloeren also states 
that Triad President Carolyn Malenick specifically told him 
that his contributions to Citizens for Reform would be used 
exclusively to produce campaign commercials to help Mr. Babin's 
campaign, and that Mr. Babin's campaign knew that the monies 
Mr. Cloeren donated to Citizens for Reform would be used for 
this purpose.631
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \628\ Id. at para. 23.
    \629\ Id.
    \630\ Id.
    \631\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In search of even more ``vehicles'' to funnel money to his 
campaign, Mr. Babin personally solicited Mr. Cloeren for a 
$5,000 contribution to a PAC named Citizens United Political 
Victory Fund (``Citizens United''), according to Mr. 
Cloeren.632 Mr. Cloeren says that Mr. Babin told Mr. 
Cloeren that Citizens United would send $5,000 to Mr. Babin's 
campaign if Mr. Cloeren donated $5,000 to Citizens 
United.633 Mr. Cloeren says that he made a $5,000 
donation to Citizens United on October 14, 1996, with the 
intent of benefitting Mr. Babin's campaign for 
Congress.634 FEC records show that Citizens United 
contributed $5,000 to Mr. Babin's campaign on the same day that 
Mr. Cloeren says that he made his $5,000 donation to Citizens 
United.635
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \632\ Id. at para. 24.
    \633\ Id.
    \634\ Id.
    \635\ FEC Disclosure Reports of Brian Babin for Congress '96 and 
Citizens United Political Victory Fund.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to Mr. Cloeren's affidavit, Mr. Babin, Ms. 
Malenick, and Mr. Whetsell all used the names Citizens for 
Reform, Citizens United, and Triad 
interchangeably.636 Mr. Cloeren says that Ms. 
Malenick, Mr. Babin, and others led Mr. Cloeren to believe that 
Triad was the umbrella name for all these different 
groups.637 Mr. Cloeren states that Mr. Babin also 
told Mr. Cloeren that Triad and Citizens for Reform were the 
same entity, and that the various other non-campaign 
organizations which could send money to Mr. Babin that the two 
had discussed ``all ran together.'' 638
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \636\ Cloeren Aff., para. 25.
    \637\ Id. at para. 25.
    \638\ Id. at para. 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Cloeren says that he had never before made a financial 
contribution to a Congressional campaign and had virtually no 
knowledge of the campaign finance laws before becoming involved 
in the Babin campaign.639 Mr. Cloeren states in his 
affidavit:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \639\ Id. at para. 1-2.

        I would not have participated in the conduit 
        contributions scheme if Mr. Babin had not suggested it 
        to me. I would not have given any of my money to the 
        Triad entity Citizens for Reform, Citizens United, or 
        to the campaigns of Senator Thurmond and Mr. Gill if I 
        had not been told that these groups would effectively 
        use every dollar I gave them for the Babin 
        campaign.640
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \640\ Id. at para. 31.

    Rep. DeLay, Mr. Babin, and others implicated by Mr. Cloeren 
have specifically denied these allegations.641 
Because Chairman Burton has refused to investigate these 
issues, the members of the Committee are not in a position to 
evaluate all the facts. Nonetheless, it is clear that Mr. 
Cloeren's allegations provide specific and credible evidence of 
wrongdoing by Rep. DeLay. A full and fair examination is needed 
to learn what Rep. DeLay and his staff knew about the role of 
Triad and other groups who violated federal election laws, and 
whether the Majority Whip and his staff counseled and 
facilitated others to evade the strictures of the election law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \641\ See, e.g., Texas Donor: GOP Evaded Law--House Leader Among 
Those Said to Have Advised Exceeding Limits, The Hill (Aug. 5, 1998); 
Phone Tapes Implicate Candidate, FEC Witness Says, Houston Chronicle, 
A37 (Aug. 7, 1998); Dems Call for Probe of Charge that GOP Laundered 
Funds, The Hill (Aug. 12, 1998); Questions for Mr. DeLay, The Hill 
(Aug. 12 1998); Justice Department Probes Delay, The Hill (Sept. 30, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Conduit Contribution Scheme Involving Thomas Stewart

    Thomas J. Stewart, the Chief Executive Officer of the 
multi-billion dollar Services Group of America company 
organized and participated in another conduit scheme that 
benefitted Republicans. This multi-year scheme funneled 
$120,000 to ten Republican candidates between 1990 and 
1996.642 Similar to the other conduit contribution 
schemes discussed in this section, the Stewart/Services Group 
conduit contribution scheme involved illegally reimbursing 
employees and their spouses and family members for 
contributions they made to candidates and to political action 
committees. Unlike the alleged conduit contribution scheme 
involving Rep. DeLay, Mr. Cloeren, and Mr. Babin, however, 
there is no evidence that any of the candidates who received 
the illegal contributions knew that the monies they received 
were illegal conduit contributions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \642\ Tycoon Fined $5 Million for Illegal GOP Gifts, Portland 
Oregonian (Mar. 18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Stewart devised the illegal conduit contribution scheme 
with Dennis J. Specht, the Chief Financial Officer of Food 
Services of America (FSA). FSA is a subsidiary of the Services 
Group of America.643 Press reports quote federal 
investigators as saying that Mr. Stewart and Mr. Specht 
arranged for FSA employees to receive bonuses with the 
understanding that this money would be contributed to specific 
candidates or to the company's own political action 
committee,644 which would then itself direct the 
money to the candidates. Mr. Specht also served as treasurer of 
Service Group of America's PAC.645 One FSA employee 
confirmed at a deposition that he had received a $1,000 bonus 
in 1990, but had been required to send that $1,000 to Service 
Group's PAC.646
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \643\ Businessman Gets $5 Million Fine for Fund-raising Fraud, 
Baltimore Sun (Mar. 19, 1998).
    \644\ Id.
    \645\ Id.
    \646\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Stewart, Mr. Specht, and FSA all pled guilty on March 
18, 1998, to the criminal charges filed against them relating 
to this conduit contribution scheme. FSA pled guilty to 24 
misdemeanor counts of federal election law violations, and was 
fined $4.8 million for its participation in the conduit 
contribution scheme.647 Mr. Stewart and Mr. Specht 
each pled guilty to one count of violating the federal election 
laws; each was fined $100,000, ordered to serve a 60-day 
sentence of home confinement, ordered to perform 160 hours of 
community service at soup kitchens and homeless shelters, and 
placed on probation for one year.648 Mr. Stewart 
also agreed to pay a fine to Washington State for his violation 
of state election laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \647\ Id.
    \648\ Seattle Man Pleads Guilty to Illegal Donations He Reportedly 
Contributed to Republican Candidates, Causes through Employees, 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (Mar. 19, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Less than six months after Mr. Stewart pled guilty to his 
criminal violation of the federal election laws, Speaker Newt 
Gingrich and other politicians attended a GOP picnic at Mr. 
Stewart's home.649 Speaker Gingrich refused to 
provide the press with his views about the propriety of holding 
a Republican fund raiser at Mr. Stewart's island home, and 
``walled himself off from reporters after arriving by private 
helicopter.'' 650
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \649\ Gingrich Unruffled at GOP Fund-raiser: Democrats in 
Washington, State Fumed that the Host Once Violated Campaign Finance 
Laws, but Republicans Laughed Them Off as Hypocrites, Atlanta Journal/
Atlanta Constitution (Aug. 23, 1998).
    \650\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 4. Conduit Contribution Scheme Involving Simon Fireman and Aqua-
        Leisure Industries, Inc.

    In a conduit contribution scheme that began in 1991 and 
lasted into 1995, Republican activist Simon Fireman provided 
approximately $94,000 in conduit contributions to Republicans. 
Mr. Fireman founded a company called Aqua-Leisure in 1970, and 
succeeded in turning it into one of the world's largest 
distributors of aquatic sports equipment.651 Mr. 
Fireman became an active Republican during the Reagan 
administration, and was appointed to the Board of Directors of 
the Export-Import Bank both by Presidents Reagan and 
Bush.652
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \651\ Senate Minority Report, 7375.
    \652\ Id. Mr. Fireman had originally been a Democrat and was 
appointed to several Presidential trade committees by President Carter 
and President Reagan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Fireman first began funneling conduit contributions 
during the 1992 election cycle. During that election cycle, Mr. 
Fireman committed to raise money for the Bush-Quayle campaign. 
According to Carol A. Nichols, Mr. Fireman's executive 
assistant, when Mr. Fireman found it difficult to meet the fund 
raising amounts he had promised, he devised a scheme to solicit 
Aqua-Leisure employees and to reimburse them for the 
contributions they would make to the Bush-Quayle 
campaign.653 Under this scheme, Mr. Fireman provided 
approximately $21,000 to his employees at Aqua-Leisure 
Industries, Inc., so that the employees could contribute to the 
1992 campaign of President Bush and Vice President 
Quayle.654 Ms. Nichols stated that Mr. Fireman met 
with her to discuss which Aqua-Leisure employees could be 
solicited to make contributions.655 Once an employee 
agreed to participate, Ms. Nichols collected a personal check 
from the individual and reimbursed them with cash from an 
account Mr. Fireman controlled.656 Mr. Fireman also 
loaned money from Aqua-Leisure's corporate account to a 
nonemployee who, in turn, gave that money to a separate set of 
contributors to make contributions to the Bush-Quayle 
campaign.657 Mr. Fireman also funneled $24,000 to 
the RNC in 1992 by giving Aqua-Leisure money to six individuals 
who used the money to make separate $4,000 contributions to the 
RNC.658
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \653\ July 23, 1997 FBI Memorandum of Interview with Carol A. 
Nichols, printed in Senate Minority Report, 7397-99.
    \654\ Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Hearings on 
Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 
Federal Election Campaigns 105th Cong., 1st Sess., (1997). See also 
Criminal Information, United States v. Simon Fireman, Carol Nichols, 
and Aqua-Leisure Industries, Inc. (D. Mass. 1996), reprinted in Senate 
Minority Report, 7401-23.
    \655\Id.
    \656\ Id.
    \657\ Id.
    \658\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Fireman continued to funnel conduit contributions to 
Republicans in the 1996 election cycle. In 1995, Mr. Fireman 
became a national vice chairman of Senator Bob Dole's 
presidential campaign finance committee. During the time he 
served as a Dole finance committee vice chair, Mr. Fireman was 
also orchestrating a scheme to funnel $69,000 to the Dole 
campaign through conduit contributors. Mr. Fireman also loaned 
additional money to an unidentified individual, so that the 
individual could recruit additional persons to participate in 
the illegal conduit contribution scheme.659 Mr. 
Fireman hoped that he would obtain a position in a Dole 
administration as a reward for his largesse. The criminal 
information to which Mr. Fireman pled guilty stated that ``one 
goal and objective, among others, of Simon C. Fireman's secret 
scheme to funnel money to the Presidential campaign of Robert 
C. Dole was to obtain . . . a position with the United States 
government.'' 660
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \659\ Id. The information identified the outside individual as ``an 
individual known to the United States Attorney.''
    \660\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Fireman entered a guilty plea to 11 counts of the 
criminal information, and he and his company agreed to pay a $6 
million fine. Aqua-Leisure Industries pled guilty to 70 counts 
concerning the scheme, and Carol Nichols pled guilty to one 
count of conspiracy relating to the scheme.661
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \661\ Id. at 7375.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Senate minority report noted that the criminal 
investigation of Mr. Fireman revealed that Mr. Fireman may have 
funneled some foreign money to the Dole campaign through his 
conduit contribution scheme. Mr. Fireman formed a trust in Hong 
Kong, known as Rickwood Ltd. in 1985. Mr. Fireman acknowledged 
in his guilty plea that he used the trust to conceal certain 
expenditures that he wished to make.662 The criminal 
information recited that the Rickwood trust maintained a U.S. 
bank account, but received wire transfers from Hong 
Kong.663 The Hong Kong funds originated from 
Greyland Trading Company, a Hong Kong-based company which Mr. 
Fireman had acquired in 1988.664 All of the money 
used to reimburse the Aqua-Leisure conduit contributors came 
from the Rickwood trust bank account,665 and was 
withdrawn in a way to avoid detection and reporting by the bank 
where the account was maintained.666
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \662\ Criminal Information, United States v. Simon Fireman, Carol 
Nichols, and Aqua-Leisure Industries, Inc. (D. Mass. 1996), reprinted 
in Senate Minority Report, 7401-23.
    \663\ Id.
    \664\ July 23, 1997, FBI Memorandum of Interview with Carol A. 
Nichols, reprinted in Senate Minority Report, 7397-99.
    \665\ Id.; Criminal Information, United States v. Simon Fireman, 
Carol Nichols, and Aqua-Leisure Industries, Inc. (D. Mass. 1996) 
reprinted in Senate Minority Report, 7401-23.
    \666\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The criminal investigation of Mr. Fireman's conduit 
contributions to the Dole campaign produced no evidence that 
anyone at the Dole campaign knew that Mr. Fireman may have been 
contributing foreign money to the campaign and no evidence that 
the Dole campaign knew that the contributions from the Aqua-
Leisure Industries employees were illegal conduit 
contributions.667 Indeed, Senator Dole disclaimed 
any knowledge that the contributions had been illegal and 
stated, ``[i]n this business, you don't know who's giving you 
money. . . . We turned it over to the FEC.'' 668
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \667\ Senate Minority Report, 7376. The Dole campaign placed all 
the donations involving Fireman into an escrow account pending the 
outcome of the criminal investigation, and turned the contributions 
over to the U.S. Treasury following Fireman's guilty plea.
    \668\ Common Cause Joins Dole's Call for Inquiry Senator's Campaign 
Has Requested the FEC Check into Donations, Kansas City Star (Apr. 24, 
1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Conduit Contribution Scheme Involving Empire Sanitary Landfill

    The Dole campaign and other 1996 and 1994 Republican 
campaigns--including the campaigns of Representatives Bill 
Paxon and Jon Fox--received illegal conduit contributions from 
Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc., in Scranton, 
Pennsylvania.669 The upper management of the company 
solicited campaign contributions from Empire Sanitary's 
employees, family members, and business associates in addition 
to contributing monies themselves.670 Management 
reimbursed themselves and the donors they had solicited with 
corporate funds, thereby disguising from the various campaigns 
that Empire Sanitary was the true source of the donated 
monies.671 These actions violated the federal law 
that bars corporations from donating money to a political 
campaign, 672 as well as the law that bars 
individuals from contributing to a campaign in the name of 
another person. Empire Sanitary pled guilty to a 40-count 
criminal information relating to the illegal conduit 
contribution schemes on October 7, 1997.673 As part 
of its plea agreement, Empire Sanitary agreed to pay an $8 
million fine.674
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \669\ Empire Sanitary Landfill made illegal conduit contributions 
to the following campaigns: the 1996 Dole campaign ($80,000), Senator 
Arlen Specter's 1996 campaign ($10,000), Senator Rick Santorum's 1994 
campaign ($6,000), then National Republican Congressional Committee 
Chairman Representative Bill Paxon's 1996 campaign ($1,000), 
Representative Jon Fox's 1994 campaign ($3,000), Representative Frank 
Pallone's 1994 campaign ($3,000), 1994 New Jersey Republican Senate 
candidate Chuck Haytaian's campaign ($10,000), 1996 New Jersey 
Republican Senate candidate Richard Duhaime's campaign ($5,000), the 
Clinton/Gore `96 Primary Committee ($10,000), and Senator Max Baucus's 
1996 campaign ($1,000). Indictment, United States v. Renato P. Mariani, 
Michael L. Serafini, Leo R. Del Serra, Alan W. Stephens, Robert Giglio, 
and Frank Serafini, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, reprinted in Senate Minority Report 7439-7498.
    \670\ Senate Minority Report, 7377.
    \671\ Id. Just as with the Fireman/Aqua-Leisure Industries illegal 
conduit contributions discussed in this section, there is no evidence 
that any of the campaigns receiving illegal contributions from Empire 
Sanitary knew that the contributions were problematic. Id., 7377.
    \672\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 441b(a).
    \673\ Plea Agreement, United States v. Empire Sanitary Landfill, 
Inc., U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
reprinted in Senate Minority Report, 7425-7431.
    \674\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The alleged principals of the Empire Sanitary conduit 
contribution scheme were named in a 140-count indictment 
relating to the contribution scheme, and are still awaiting 
trial.675
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \675\ Also named in the indictment were business associates of 
Empire Sanitary and a Pennsylvania state representative in whose 
district Empire Sanitary did business. See, Indictment, United States 
v. Renato P. Mariani, Michael L. Serafini, Leo R. Del Serra, Alan W. 
Stephens, Robert Giglio, and Frank Serafini, U.S. District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania, reprinted in Senate Minority 
Report, 7439-7498.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Conduit Contribution Scheme Involving DeLuca Liquor & Wine Ltd.

    Ray Norvell, the vice president in charge of Nevada 
operations for DeLuca Liquor & Wine, Ltd., orchestrated another 
scheme to funnel illegal conduit contributions to the Dole 
campaign.676 DeLuca Liquor & Wine, Ltd., is a Las 
Vegas company which is one of Nevada's largest distributors of 
liquor, wine, and beer.677 Five DeLuca employees and 
their spouses contributed a total of $10,000 to the Dole 
campaign during a three-day period in May 1995. According to 
press accounts, at least two of the contributors admitted that 
DeLuca had given them the money to make the 
contributions.678
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \676\ Exec Pays $100,000 Fine in Dole Contribution, Las Vegas 
Review-Journal (Sept. 22, 1998).
    \577\ Senate Minority Report, 7378-79.
    \678\ More Donations to Dole Campaign Possibly Illegal: Candidate 
Was Not Aware of Company's Actions, Aide Says, Kansas City Star (Sept. 
29, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Norvell pled guilty in June 1998 to two misdemeanor 
counts of violating the federal election laws: one count for 
making an illegal campaign contribution and one for causing the 
name of another person to be used in connection with a campaign 
contribution.679 Mr. Norvell was fined $100,000, and 
his plea agreement provided that DeLuca would not be prosecuted 
for reimbursing Mr. Norvell and the other DeLuca employees for 
their illegal conduit contributions to the Dole 
campaign.680 At the time he devised the criminal 
conduit contribution scheme, Mr. Norvell thought that he had 
merely been clever. Mr. Norvell told a newspaper reporter that 
he knew federal election law prohibited corporate 
contributions, so he devised a scheme that he believed 
circumvented the law. ``I gave them $5,000 extra salary to give 
to political campaigns and also charities. . . . It's not 
illegal, I hope. . . . I know you can't give company checks.'' 
681
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \679\ Exec Pays $100,000 Fine in Dole Contribution, Las Vegas 
Review-Journal (Sept. 22, 1998).
    \680\ Id.
    \681\ More Donations to Dole Campaign Possibly Illegal, Kansas City 
Star (Sept. 29, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Senate minority report analyzed documents subpoenaed by 
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee which showed that 
DeLuca had issued checks for $2,000 each to five of its 
employees on May 18, 1995. The corporate payment stub for one 
of the checks contained the notation ``Campaign-Dole.'' 
682 Between May 19 and May 22, 1995, each of the 
five employees 683 who had received the checks, and 
their spouses, contributed $1,000 to the Dole 
campaign.684 Thus, within four days, the $10,000 
that DeLuca had issued to its employees had made its way to the 
Dole campaign.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \682\ Senate Minority Report, 7379. Four of the checks--including 
the check with the ``Campaign-Dole'' notation--were consecutively 
numbered. Id., 7499-7502.
    \683\ The five DeLuca employees were: Ray E. Norvell, Dale 
McIntire, Kenneth W. Leslie, Bruce Kobrin, and James P. O'Connor. Id., 
7379.
    \684\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Michelle McIntire, the spouse of a DeLuca employee who 
contributed to the Dole campaign, told reporters that she would 
not have given money to the Dole campaign if DeLuca had not 
paid for the donation.685 Ms. McIntire stated, 
``[DeLuca] gave us the money. That was something the company 
wanted [my husband] to do, and so that's what we did. It's not 
anything that is uncommon.'' 686
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \685\ More Donations to Dole Campaign Possibly Illegal: Candidate 
Was Not Aware of Company's Actions, Aide Says, Kansas City Star (Sept. 
29, 1996).
    \686\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Senate minority report did not uncover any evidence 
that anyone from the Dole campaign knew that DeLuca had 
illegally reimbursed its employees for the political 
contributions they made to the Dole campaign.687
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \687\ Senate Minority Report, 7379. When it learned that the DeLuca 
campaign contributions might be illegal conduit contributions, a 
spokesperson for the Dole campaign commented, ``the campaign has been 
most vigilant in our fund-raising efforts and we're completely unaware 
of DeLuca's procedures and actions.'' Some Las Vegas Contributions to 
Dole Campaign May Be Illegal, Fort Worth Star-Telegram (Oct. 2, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      B. Republicans Have Received Foreign Campaign Contributions

    The majority report extensively discusses various 
allegations of foreign contributions to Democratic campaign 
committees. There is, however, extensive evidence that 
Republicans have also received foreign campaign contributions. 
Indeed, to the extent that it is illegal to receive foreign 
campaign contributions, the evidence of Republican wrongdoing 
is in important respects more serious than the evidence of 
Democratic wrongdoing.688 Republican Congressman Jay 
Kim is the only elected official to be convicted of knowingly 
soliciting illegal foreign campaign contributions. 
Additionally, the only specific and credible evidence 
implicating the head of a political party in a scheme to 
solicit contributions from foreign sources involves Haley 
Barbour, the former Chairman of the Republican National 
Committee (RNC). This evidence suggests that Chairman Barbour 
personally solicited a $2.1 million loan guarantee from 
billionaire Hong Kong industrialist Ambrous Tung Young for the 
benefit of the RNC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \688\ A recent federal court decision has held that it is not 
illegal to accept soft-money contributions from foreign sources. See 
United States v. Trie, Crim. No. 98-0029, Slip. Op. (D.D.C Oct. 9, 
1998). The implications of this decision are discussed in Part III and 
V of this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is also substantial evidence that of the $2.8 million 
in foreign contributions accepted by Republicans, approximately 
$1.1 million has not been returned. Foreign funds that appear 
to remain in Republican coffers include:
          
 $782,460 of a $2.1 million contribution from 
        Hong Kong businessman Ambrous Young to the National 
        Policy Forum (NPF), a subsidiary of the RNC; 
        689
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \689\ The NPF defaulted on approximately $1.6 million of the $2.1 
million loan guaranteed by Mr. Young. Later, the RNC returned 
approximately $700,000 to Mr. Young, but kept the remainder. The money 
to pay Mr. Young was wired directly from RNC accounts to Hong Kong. 
Senate Minority Report, 4670-4671.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          
 a $25,000 contribution from the Pacific 
        Cultural Foundation, a group affiliated with the 
        Taiwanese government, to the NPF; 690
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \690\ Letter from John R. Bolton to Michael Hsu (Aug. 7, 1996) (NPF 
003200, 003204) (attached as Exhibit 12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          
 $95,000 of $205,000 in contributions from 
        German citizen Thomas Kramer to the Florida Republican 
        Party; 691
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \691\ $323,000 Fine Levied for Foreign Contributions, Washington 
Post (July 19, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          
 $215,000 of $500,000 in apparently foreign 
        contributions funneled to the RNC through Michael 
        Kojima.692
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \692\ Senate Minority Report, 5414.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The RNC has also not returned a $50,000 contribution from 
Panda Industries, Inc., a company associated with Ted Sioeng, 
to the NPF. The majority report asserts that the DNC must 
return all Sioeng-related contributions.693 Under 
the standard applied by the majority report, this $50,000 
contribution to the NPF should be returned as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \693\ Majority Report, Chapter III: The Democrats' Failure to 
Return Illegal Campaign Contributions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The evidence implicating Rep. Kim, Chairman Barbour, and 
other Republican leaders in foreign contribution schemes is 
discussed below.

1. Foreign Contributions Solicited by Rep. Jay Kim

    On August 11, 1997, Rep. Jay Kim (R-CA) and his wife pled 
guilty to knowingly accepting more than $230,000 in illegal 
contributions from corporations and foreign donors. Those 
guilty pleas marked the conclusion of an extensive 
investigation into the financing of Rep. Kim's campaigns. This 
investigation also obtained guilty pleas against five South 
Korean conglomerates for funneling foreign contributions to the 
Kim campaign.
    A detailed discussion of the convictions obtained against 
Rep. Kim, his wife, and the South Korean companies can be found 
in the minority report of the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee.694 As part of the plea agreement, Rep. 
Kim admitted to knowingly violating several campaign finance 
laws, including the ban on foreign contributions.695 
In addition, there was substantial evidence that Rep. Kim 
attempted to obstruct the FBI's investigation into his 
campaign.696 Furthermore, the evidence showed that 
he knowingly violated campaign laws even after he knew that he 
was under investigation.697
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \694\ Id. at 5683.
    \695\ United States v. Jay Kim, et al., Plea Agreement (July 31, 
1997).
    \696\ The Senate minority report notes that Rep. Kim contacted a 
potential witness against him and encouraged him to describe an illegal 
contribution as a ``personal loan.'' Senate Minority Report, 5685.
    \697\ Id. at 5686 (describing how Rep. Kim's campaign continued to 
accept illegal corporate contributions in October of 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the substantial evidence of serious wrongdoing, 
Rep. Kim received little criticism and no punishment from 
Republicans. In 1996, he played a substantial role in the Dole/
Kemp presidential campaign.698 Even after his 
conviction, however, the House Ethics Committee has not taken 
any disciplinary action against him, and he has been permitted 
to retain his chairmanship of a House 
subcommittee.699 Republican silence and inaction 
regarding Rep. Kim's crimes provides a sharp contrast to the 
vocal criticism and vigorous investigation that has been 
directed at Democrats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \698\ Shop Talk, Roll Call (Oct. 17, 1996) (``Sophomore Rep. Jay 
Kim has found his place in Bob Dole's campaign. The Congressman 
appeared . . . in Chicago . . . to announce those who have been named 
`Asian-Americans for Bob Dole Ethnic Coalition Co-chairs.' . . . A 
press release issued by the Dole campaign described Kim's `stunning 
historic victory' [and] cast [Kim] as the `role model' for American 
immigrants'').
    \699\ On Oct. 9, 1998, the House Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct released a final report on its investigation into Rep. Kim. 
That report found that in addition to violating House rules in 
accepting illegal campaign contributions, Rep. Kim has also violated 
House gift rules. The Committee, however, decided to take no further 
action against Rep. Kim because he lost his election and will leave 
Congress in 1999. Ethics Panel Ends Rep. Kim Case, Despite New $63,640 
Gift Charges, Roll Call (Oct. 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Foreign Contributions Solicited by Haley Barbour

    The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee uncovered 
substantial evidence suggestingthat RNC Chairman Haley Barbour 
developed and implemented a plan to funnel foreign contributions to the 
RNC through the National Policy Forum, a subsidiary of the RNC. As 
stated in the minority report of the Committee:

        Starting in 1993, Haley Barbour . . . carried out a 
        scheme to collect foreign money by channeling the funds 
        through the National Policy Forum. . . . The RNC did 
        this by arranging for a foreign businessman to put up 
        collateral for a bank loan to the NPF. Shortly after 
        the NPF received the loan, it transferred more than $2 
        million to the RNC which, in turn, channeled the money 
        into the 1994 congressional races around the country. 
        700
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \700\ Senate Minority Report, 4657.

    While Mr. Barbour denies any wrongdoing in connection with 
the NPF, the Senate minority report sets forth considerable 
evidence showing Mr. Barbour's heavy personal involvement in 
the planning and execution of the funneling scheme. 
Specifically, the Senate minority report notes that:
    (1) Mr. Barbour was heavily involved in the formation of 
the NPF, and subsequently established himself as chairman of 
the NPF while simultaneously serving as Chairman of the 
RNC.701
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \701\ Id. at 4660.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) Mr. Barbour pushed the idea of soliciting foreign 
contributions for the NPF over the objections of the NPF's 
president, Michael Baroody, who later resigned.702 
In a confidential memo explaining his resignation, Mr. Baroody 
criticized Mr. Barbour's ``fascination'' with foreign money and 
called the ostensible legal separation between the NPF and the 
RNC a ``fiction.'' 703
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \702\ Id. at 4661.
    \703\ Id. at 4662-4663.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (3) Mr. Barbour personally solicited Hong Kong businessman 
Ambrous Young to provide collateral for the NPF's loan. 
704
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \704\ Id. at 4665-4666.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (4) Mr. Barbour personally raised with Mr. Young the 
possibility of having the NPF default on the loan so that Mr. 
Young's collateral could be used to pay the RNC. 705
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \705\ Id. at 4669.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Senate minority report also finds that Mr. Barbour's 
testimony denying any wrongdoing ``is riddled with 
inconsistencies and contradicted by virtually every other 
witness with knowledge of the loan transaction.'' 
706 Specifically, the report notes that Mr. 
Barbour's claim that he was ignorant of the foreign source of 
the funds is contradicted by several witnesses, including 
several high-profile Republicans. 707
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \706\ Id. at 4673.
    \707\ Id. at 4673. Mr. Barbour's associate Fred Volcansek testified 
at his Senate deposition that he personally informed Mr. Barbour that 
the true source of the loan guaranty money was a Hong Kong company 
before the loan guaranty transaction was finalized:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          Q: Prior to October 13, 1994, did you make Haley Barbour 
        aware that Mr. Young would be transferring monies from Hong 
        Kong that would be used to support the collateral used in the 
        loan guarantee made to the National Policy Forum?
          A: Yes, I did. . . . 
          Q: Do you recall the context in which you made Mr. Barbour 
        aware of that?
          A: I believe that it was in a meeting with Mr. [Donald] 
        Fierce and Mr. Barbour and Mr. [Dan] Denning discussing this 
        issue.
          Q: Do you recall where that meeting took place?
          A: At the Republican National Committee headquarters.
Senate Deposition of Fred Volcansek, 108-09 (July 21, 1997). Hereafter, 
citations to Senate depositions refer to depositions conducted by the 
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee.
    There is compelling evidence that Mr. Barbour and his 
associates intended that the RNC would use the foreign money 
contributed to the NPF in the 1994 mid-term elections. The 
RNC's chief political strategist, Donald Fierce, told Fred 
Volcansek, the NPF fundraiser who solicited the contribution 
from Mr. Young, that the RNC would use the monies in the fall 
elections.708 Mr. Volcansek repeated this 
information to the U.S. representatives of Mr. Young and 
directly to Mr. Young himself. According to Mr. Volcansek, he 
told Mr. Young that ``his guarantee would allow for the loan to 
be made and that then the National Policy Forum would be 
allowed to be in a position to repay the RNC and the RNC would 
be able to use that money in the '94 election cycle.'' 
709
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \708\ Id. Mr. Volcansek testified that Mr. Fierce told him that 
``they [the RNC] were going to use the money in the '94 election 
process in which there were numerous races that they thought they had 
an opportunity for and they needed the money back from the NPF that had 
been lent to the NPF.'' Id.
    \709\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Barbour and the NPF maintain that the NPF is legally 
permitted to accept foreign contributions because it is 
independent of the RNC. Their position, however, is 
contradicted by the overwhelming weight of the evidence. In 
February 1997, the Internal Revenue Service denied the NPF's 
tax-exempt organization application because the NPF was a 
``partisan'' organization ``designed to promote the Republican 
Party and politicians affiliated with the Republican Party.'' 
710 In addition, the bank utilized by the NPF noted 
that the NPF was ``an off-shoot of the Republican National 
Committee''; 711 Republican fundraisers and donors 
viewed the NPF and RNC interchangeably; 712 and 
there were significant irregularities in the RNC's financial 
dealings with the NPF. 713 The NPF's 
``independence'' was thus, at best, a dubious legal fiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \710\ Letter from Edward R. Karcher, Internal Revenue Service, to 
the National Policy Forum (Feb. 21, 1997) (reprinted in Senate Minority 
Report, 4707-19).
    \711\ Deposition of Steven S. Walker, Jr., House Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, Ex. 26 (July 1, 1998). All references 
to depositions, unless otherwise noted, will be to depositions 
conducted by the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. 
The bank noted that the NPF and RNC shared top-level management and 
recommended that the loan guaranty transaction be approved, in part, 
``because of the close relationship between the [NPF] and the 
Republican National Committee.'' Id.
    \712\ Id. at Ex. 24 (letters from Philip T. Cavannaugh to Haley 
Barbour) (attached as Exhibit 13); Ex. 23 (1996 Memorandum from Kevin 
Kellum (Team 100) to Haley Barbour) (reprinted in Senate Minority 
Report, 4700). As late as 1996, Republican donors and fundraisers 
treated contributions to the NPF as tantamount to contributions to the 
Republican Party. Kevin Kellum, one of the heads of the RNC's Team 100 
fundraising program, sent Mr. Barbour a memorandum in late February 
1996 about how best to apportion among various Republican groups--
including the NPF--a $1 million donation from Nevada casino operator 
Stephen Wynn. Mr. Kellum's memo proposed three possible ways to divide 
the $1 million to various Republican entities. Two of the options 
included having Mr. Wynn contribute at least $250,000 to the NPF. The 
memo noted that there would be ``less reported'' by the RNC to the FEC 
if Mr. Wynn donated money to the NPF rather than more directly to the 
RNC. It thus appears that senior Republican fund raisers believed that 
a donation to the NPF was equivalent to making a donation to the RNC.
    RNC donors also appear to have been told by high-ranking RNC 
officials that a contribution to the NPF would benefit the RNC. The 
vice president of federal relations for the Chevron Oil Company seems 
to have heard this point directly from Mr. Barbour. The Chevron 
executive wrote Mr. Barbour in May 1996 as follows: ``I certainly 
appreciated the opportunity to visit with you recently and discuss 
Chevron's contributions to the Republicans Party and related 
organizations. Pursuant to that discussion, I have enclosed checks [of] 
$25,000 for the National Policy Forum and $15,000 for the remainder of 
the funds for the RNC that we agreed to.'' Deposition of Steven S. 
Walker, Jr., 146-48 and Ex. 24 (July 1, 1998). The Chevron letter to 
Barbour closed with the Chevron executive thanking Mr. Barbour for 
``your willingness to recognize the totality of our efforts on behalf 
of the Party.'' Id.
    \713\ The RNC and the NPF did not maintain an arms-length financial 
relationship, but instead behaved like a single entity. Unexplained 
commercial irregularities surround the RNC's initial funding of the NPF 
in May 1993, and the NPF never followed ordinary commercial practices 
when it borrowed approximately $2.5 million from the RNC over a 15-
month period.
    For example, the NPF and RNC signed and executed documents both on 
May 1, 1993, and May 11, 1993, to reflect the initial $100,000 loan 
from the RNC to the NPF. Each document appears to reflect that it is 
the original loan agreement, and there is no indication that the May 
11, 1993, documents supersede the May 1 documents. Even though it is a 
highly unusual commercial practice to have signed documents from 
different dates reflect the exact same transaction, no NPF witness 
could explain why the RNC and the NPF executed both documents just 10 
days apart. Deposition of Steven S. Walker, Jr., 89-102 and Exs. 15-16 
(July 1, 1998). See also Senate Deposition of Kenneth J. Hill, 68, 77-
83 (July 11, 1997). It also appears that the NPF violated the 
conditions of the initial $100,000 loan agreement whether the documents 
were signed on May 1 or May 11, 1993. The RNC-NPF loan documents 
required the NPF to provide the RNC with copies of the NPF's 
certificate of incorporation, articles of incorporation, bylaws, and a 
resolution of the NPF's board of directors authorizing the NPF to enter 
into the loan agreement before the RNC signed and executed the loan 
agreement. Since the NPF was not incorporated until May 24, 1993, the 
NPF failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreement. Again, NPF 
witnesses were unable to offer any explanation for why the NPF received 
$100,000 from the RNC in apparent violation of the terms of the loan 
agreement and prior to the legal existence of the NPF. Deposition of 
Steven S. Walker, Jr., 91, 98-100 and Exs. 15-16 (July 1, 1998); Senate 
Deposition of Kenneth J. Hill, 68-70 (July 11, 1997). Mr. Hill 
testified that he had ``absolutely no idea'' how the NPF could have 
provided documents to the RNC before the NPF came into existence.
    Additionally, the NPF made no written requests for any of the $2.5 
million in loans from the RNC, did not provide the RNC with any written 
explanation for how the NPF would use the money, and did not explain to 
the RNC how the NPF would repay the loan amounts. Deposition of Steven 
S. Walker, Jr., 100-101, 110 (July 1, 1998). The lack of such basic 
formalities strongly suggests that the loan transactions between the 
RNC and the NPF were not commercial arms-length transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Press accounts indicate that Mr. Barbour is currently under 
investigation by the Department of Justice for possible perjury 
before the Senate.714 Those same accounts also 
indicate that the Department is investigating the underlying 
funneling scheme developed by Mr. Barbour.715
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \714\ Ex-RNC Chairman Denounces News Leaks, Washington Post (Feb. 
28, 1998).
    \715\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Additional Foreign Contributions Solicited by the NPF

    The minority has received evidence that the NPF solicited 
additional contributions that it knew--or had strong reason to 
believe--were from a foreign source. This evidence shows that 
in August 1996, the NPF received a $25,000 contribution from 
the Pacific Cultural Foundation (PCF), a group affiliated with 
the Taiwanese government.716
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \716\ Ex. 12, Letter from John R. Bolton to Michael Hsu (Aug. 7, 
1996) (NPF 003200, 003204).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PCF contribution is significant because it is the only 
example of a foreign government contributing to an American 
political party. Indeed, documents produced to this Committee 
indicate that NPF officials understood the contribution to be 
from the Taiwanese government. For example, NPF President John 
Bolton acknowledged receipt of the contribution in two letters 
to Michael Hsu, a special assistant at the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), which functions as 
Taiwan's unofficial embassy in the U.S.717 
Similarly, RNC Chairman Haley Barbour wrote to Jason Hu, 
Taiwan's representative to the U.S., and thanked him for the 
contribution.718 In his letter to ``Ambassador Hu,'' 
Mr. Barbour wrote that PCF's ``willingness to underwrite our 
Member Trade Briefing is greatly appreciated and enables NPF to 
continue to develop and advocate good international policy.'' 
719
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \717\ Id. One of the letters states: ``Thank you so much for your 
generous contribution.''
    \718\ Letter from Haley Barbour to Jason Hu (Aug. 22, 1996) (NPF 
003203) (printed in Senate Minority Report, 4772).
    \719\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The combined evidence developed by the Senate investigation 
and this Committee's investigation makes the activities of the 
NPF perhaps the most serious example of potentially illegal 
foreign contributions making their way into the U.S. electoral 
system. Unlike the allegations involving the DNC, the evidence 
involving the NPF directly implicates a national political 
party, the RNC, and its Chairman, Haley Barbour, in a scheme to 
solicit foreign campaign contributions.

4. Contributions to Republicans from Ted Sioeng

    A major figure in the Committee's investigation into 
possible foreign contributions is Ted Sioeng. Chairman Burton 
has described Mr. Sioeng as ``an Indonesian-born businessman 
who travels on a Belize passport, suspected by committee 
members of working, along with his family, on behalf of the 
Chinese Government interests in the United States.'' 
720 Mr. Sioeng's business interests include the 
export of cigarettes manufactured by the Red Pagoda company, 
which is owned by the Chinese government, to the United States 
and other countries. According to Chairman Burton, Red Pagoda 
cigarettes are ``a convenient way to get money into this 
country'' 721 and could be ``used as a vehicle for 
the Chinese government to funnel money into the United 
States.'' 722
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \720\ Rep. Dan Burton, Congressional Record, H3054 (May 12, 1998).
    \721\ Id.
    \722\ Statement of Chairman Burton, House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, Business Meeting (May 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    News reports have suggested that law enforcement 
authorities suspect that Mr. Sioeng may have ties to the 
Chinese government. For example, Newsweek reported that ``The 
FBI suspects that Chinese may have used Sioeng as a `cutout'--a 
front man to make illegal contributions appear legitimate.'' 
723 Similarly, the Washington Post reported that law 
enforcement authorities ``had credible intelligence information 
indicating [Sioeng] acted on behalf of China to influence U.S. 
elections with campaign contributions.'' 724
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \723\ A Break in the Case, Newsweek (May 19, 1997).
    \724\ Senate Panel is Briefed on China Probe Figure; Officials Say 
Evidence May Link L.A. Businessman to Election Plan, Washington Post 
(Sept. 12, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As discussed in Part III, the Committee's investigation 
into Mr. Sioeng was inconclusive. The investigation did not 
substantiate the allegations that Mr. Sioeng is an agent of the 
Chinese government. At the same time, the investigation did not 
conclusively exonerate Mr. Sioeng.
    The Committee's investigation did demonstrate, however, 
that it was Republicans--not Democrats--who had the closest 
personal and political ties to Mr. Sioeng. Although Chairman 
Burton repeatedly denied minority requests to fully investigate 
the links between Mr. Sioeng and senior Republican leaders, 
enough evidence was obtained by the Committee to show that Mr. 
Sioeng has ties to major Republican leaders, candidates, and 
organizations.
    Most of these ties centered around Mr. Sioeng's 
relationship with California State Treasurer Matthew K. Fong, a 
Republican who is currently running for the United States 
Senate. The Committee's investigation revealed that Mr. Sioeng 
and his family were major financial supporters of Mr. Fong's 
campaigns, as well as family friends and acquaintances. Indeed, 
the only contributions made by Mr. Sioeng personally were 
$50,000 in contributions he made to Mr. Fong. The Committee's 
investigation also revealed that Mr. Sioeng enjoyed personal 
access to Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich.
    The majority report concludes that ``many fundamental 
questions remain unanswered'' in the Committee's investigation. 
The minority agrees that Mr. Sioeng's activities merit further 
investigation, but it is his ties to Republicans--not 
Democrats--that would seem to warrant the closest scrutiny.
            a. Ted Sioeng's Relationship with Matt Fong
    The elected official with the closest relationship with Ted 
Sioeng is California State Treasurer Matt Fong, who is 
currently the Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate in 
California. No other elected official--either Democratic or 
Republican--had a personal relationship with Mr. Sioeng as 
close as Mr. Fong's. Moreover, Mr. Fong was the single largest 
individual recipient of Mr. Sioeng's campaign contributions.
    The Committee took the deposition of Mr. Fong on March 2 
and April 9 of 1998. Mr. Fong's deposition was also taken by 
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on September 19, 
1997. According to Mr. Fong, he first met Mr. Sioeng in 1988, 
at a Republican rally held in Los Angeles.725 After 
their initial meeting, the two developed a friendship based on 
regular contact at Asian-American community events. Mr. Fong 
told the Committee that the Sioeng family was very active in 
Chinese community activities and charities, and that he would 
frequently see them at various community events.726 
In September 1994, the Sioeng family made its first 
contribution to Mr. Fong when Jessica Elnitiarta, Ted Sioeng's 
oldest daughter, contributed $2,000 to Mr. Fong's campaign for 
State Treasurer.727
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \725\ Deposition of Matthew K. Fong, v. 1, 15 (Mar. 2, 1998).
    \726\ Id. at v. 1, 16.
    \727\ Id. at v. 1, 18-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In November 1994, Mr. Fong was elected California State 
Treasurer. After the election, Mr. Fong's campaign suffered 
from a debt of several hundred thousand dollars.728 
As a result, Mr. Fong continued fundraising after the election, 
soliciting Mr. Sioeng and his family for 
contributions.729 His appeal to the Sioeng family 
centered around two $100,000 contributions he received in late 
1994 from San Diego Chargers owner Alex Spanos. Mr. Spanos, who 
is of Greek-American descent, had urged Mr. Fong to challenge 
the Chinese-American community to match the large 
contributions.730 At the end of 1994 and beginning 
of 1995, Mr. Fong conveyed that challenge to Mr. Sioeng and his 
family whenever he saw them.731
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \728\ Id. at v. 1, 21.
    \729\ Id. at v. 1, 22.
    \730\ Id. at v. 1, 26.
    \731\ Id. at v. 1, 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In April 1995, Mr. Fong visited Mr. Sioeng's 
office.732 As discussed below, Mr. Fong gave 
conflicting testimony concerning this April meeting with Mr. 
Sioeng. It is undisputed, however, that the meeting resulted in 
$50,000 in contributions to Mr. Fong's campaign by Mr. Sioeng. 
Those contributions came in the form of two checks drawn on the 
account of Sioeng San Wong, which is Ted Sioeng's Chinese name.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \732\ Id. at v. 1, 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These contributions appear to be illegal under federal law, 
which provides that it is illegal for a foreign national ``to 
make any contribution of money or other thing of value . . . in 
connection with an election to any political office.'' 
733
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \733\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 441e; 11 CFR 110.4(a) (``A foreign national 
shall not directly or through any other person make a contribution . . 
. in connection with any local, State, or Federal office''). The recent 
decision by the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, finding that it is legal for a foreign national to contribute 
``soft money'' to a political party, concerned contributions to a 
national party committee. See United States v. Trie, Crim. No. 98-0029-
1, Slip. Op. (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 1998). The opinion, however, does not 
address contributions to state candidates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Sioeng family's final contribution to Mr. Fong's 
campaign was a $50,000 contribution on December 14, 1995, from 
a Sioeng family company, Panda Estates Investment, Inc. Four 
days later, Mr. Fong wrote a letter of welcome for an 
international badminton tournament being hosted and organized 
by the Sioeng family. Mr. Fong denied that there was any 
connection between the $50,000 contribution and his 
letter.734
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \734\ Deposition of Matthew K. Fong, v. 2, 107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The $102,000 in total campaign contributions made by the 
Sioeng family to Mr. Fong's campaigns make Mr. Fong the largest 
individual beneficiary of the Sioeng family's political 
donations. The relationship between Mr. Fong and the Sioeng 
family, however, extends beyond the family's support for Mr. 
Fong's political career. The evidence shows that Mr. Fong also 
maintained a personal relationship with the family. He attended 
the weddings of two of Mr. Sioeng's daughters and gave a toast 
at one of those weddings.735 Indeed, Mr. Fong once 
told the San Francisco Chronicle that Mr. Sioeng was ``an old 
friend.'' 736
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \735\ Deposition of Glenville Stuart, 94 (Feb. 18, 1998); 
Deposition of Matthew K. Fong, v. 1, 16; Treasurer May Return 
Contribution, San Francisco Chronicle (Apr. 22, 1997).
    \736\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In April 1997, Mr. Sioeng's political contributions to Mr. 
Fong's campaign began to receive significant press scrutiny. 
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Fong's campaign returned the 
contributions.
            b. Ted Sioeng's Relationship with Speaker Gingrich
    Evidence developed by the Committee demonstrates that 
through his relationship with Mr. Fong, Mr. Sioeng gained 
personal access to Speaker Gingrich. In July of 1995, 
approximately three months after accepting $50,000 from Mr. 
Sioeng, Mr. Fong invited Mr. Sioeng to a private meeting with 
Speaker Gingrich in the Speaker's Capitol office.\737\ Mr. 
Sioeng's initial reaction was ``Who's Speaker Gingrich and 
what's a Speaker?'' \738\ Mr. Fong explained who Speaker 
Gingrich was and Mr. Sioeng called back a short time later to 
ask if his son could also attend the meeting.\739\ When Mr. 
Fong indicated that his son could attend, Mr. Sioeng accepted 
the invitation.\740\ Mr. Fong testified that he extended this 
invitation to Mr. Sioeng out of gratitude for the large 
contributions he had received.\741\ He also acknowledged his 
hope that the invitation would make Mr. Sioeng more willing to 
make contributions in the future.\742\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \737\ Deposition of Matthew K. Fong, v. 1, 65.
    \738\ Id. at v. 1, 68.
    \739\ Id. at v. 1, 68-69; the ``son'' who attended the meeting was 
actually a son-in-law.
    \740\ Id. at v. 1, 68; v. 2,145.
    \741\ Id. at v. 1, 68; v. 2,145.
    \742\ Id. at v. 2,145.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The meeting with the Speaker occurred on July 12, 
1995.\743\ Mr. Fong testified that he had an open invitation to 
stop by the Speaker's office and bring guests.\744\ The actual 
scheduling of the visit, however, was arranged by Steve 
Kinney.\745\ Mr. Kinney served as chief strategist, fundraiser, 
and pollster for Mr. Fong's 1994 campaign.\746\ Mr. Kinney had 
also previously done fundraising and advance work for Speaker 
Gingrich.\747\ After the meeting, Mr. Fong went to dinner with 
Mr. Sioeng and his son-in-law.\748\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \743\ Id. at v. 1, 65.
    \744\ Id. at v. 1, 6-7.
    \745\ Id. at v. 1, 71-72.
    \746\ Id. at v. 19-20; v. 2, 147 (``Steve Kinney was responsible 
for my entire fundraising for State Treasurer . . .'').
    \747\ Id. at v. 1, 72, 75 Deposition of Steven Kinney, Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 7-8 (Sept. 23, 1997).
    \748\ Deposition of Matthew K. Fong, v. 1, 76.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to Mr. Fong, ``shortly after'' the meeting in the 
Speaker's office, Mr. Kinney asked for, and received, 
permission from Mr. Fong to approach Fong campaign donors and 
invite them to events involving the Speaker.\749\ Later that 
month, Mr. Fong was contacted by a member of the Sioeng family, 
who told him that they had been solicited for contributions by 
Steve Kinney on behalf of Speaker Gingrich.\750\ Mr. Fong 
indicated that he felt that supporting the Speaker was a good 
idea.\751\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \749\ Id. at v. 1, 75.
    \750\ Id. at v. 1, 77. 
    \751\ Id. at v. 1, 77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 18, 1995, less than one week after the meeting with 
Speaker Gingrich, a Sioeng family corporation, Panda 
Industries, Inc., made a $50,000 contribution to the National 
Policy Forum, a subsidiary of the Republican National 
Committee. The day after the contribution, at Mr. Fong's 
suggestion, Mr. Sioeng was seated next to the Speaker at an 
Asian-American ``outreach event'' held in Beverly Hills, 
California.\752\ According to the Chinese language newspaper, 
the China Press, the central topic of discussion at the event 
was Sino-U.S. relations, and Mr. Sioeng gave the Speaker a 
lengthy explanation of his views on U.S. China policy.\753\ 
Whether Mr. Sioeng had a similar discussion with the Speaker 
during their private meeting remains unknown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \752\ State Treasurer Linked to Asian Funds, Records Show, Los 
Angeles Times (Feb. 25, 1998).
    \753\ China Press (July 22, 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Fong insisted that Mr. Sioeng's attendance at the 
Beverly Hills event was ``unrelated'' to fundraising.\754\ 
Instead, he testified that the invitation was based on a list 
of about 20 Asian-American community leaders he provided to the 
Speaker's office at their request.\755\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \754\ Deposition of Matthew K. Fong, v. 1, 82.
    \755\ Id. at v. 1, 82.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Fong acknowledged, however, that his wife Paula 
received a 10% commission from the NPF for the Sioeng family's 
contribution.\756\ Documents obtained by the Committee show 
that Mrs. Fong requested the commission on July 28, 1995, in an 
invoice sent to Joe Gaylord at the Republican National 
Committee. Mr. Gaylord previously served as one of Speaker 
Gingrich's most senior aides.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \756\ Id. at v. 1, 89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In December 1995, Speaker Gingrich wrote a letter welcoming 
participants to an international badminton tournament organized 
by the Sioeng family.\757\ This letter immediately preceded a 
$50,000 contribution by a Sioeng family company to the Fong 
campaign.\758\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \757\ Id. at v. 2, ex. 8.
    \758\ Although the Speaker's letter is not dated, Mr. Fong 
testified that he helped the Sioeng family obtain welcome letters from 
the Speaker and California Governor Pete Wilson prior to the 
Contribution. Id. at v. 2, 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. Unanswered Questions Regarding Mr. Sioeng's Relationship 
                    With Matt Fong and Speaker Gingrich
    Although the Committee took Mr. Fong's deposition, Chairman 
Burton refused to pursue the investigation of Mr. Sioeng's 
relationship with Mr. Fong and Speaker Gingrich any further. On 
March 20, 1998, Rep. Waxman wrote Chairman Burton to request 
that information about Mr. Sioeng be obtained from the 
Speaker's office, Mr. Kinney, and Mr. Gaylord. Chairman Burton, 
however, did not respond to Rep. Waxman's request. Rep. Waxman 
also wrote Chairman Burton on June 11, 1998, June 16, 1998, and 
August 26, 1998, to request a further investigation into Mr. 
Sioeng's ties with Speaker Gingrich. Rep. Waxman wrote: ``To 
conduct a fair and impartial investigation into all of Mr. 
Sioeng's potentially improper contributions, the Committee must 
investigate Mr. Barbour, Mr. Gaylord, Mr. Kinney, and others to 
ascertain their first-hand knowledge of Mr. Sioeng and the 
nature of the monies they solicited from Mr. Sioeng.'' \759\ 
Chairman Burton again did not respond to these requests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \759\Letter from Rep. Henry Waxman to Chairman Dan Burton (Aug. 26, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As a result of Chairman Burton's refusal to investigate, 
many important questions remain unanswered. For example, 
without obtaining information from the Speaker's office and Mr. 
Kinney, the Committee cannot determine whether the Speaker knew 
of Mr. Sioeng's foreign nationality and his ties to the Chinese 
government prior to their meeting in the Speaker's office. 
Similarly, without obtaining testimony from Mr. Gaylord, Mr. 
Kinney, and members of the Speaker's staff, the Committee 
cannot determine if the Speaker or the RNC knew of Mr. Sioeng's 
nationality or his ties to the Chinese government when the NPF 
accepted the $50,000 contribution from Panda Industries, a 
Sioeng family company.
    The Committee also cannot determine without further 
investigation whether Mr. Fong testified truthfully about his 
relationship with Mr. Sioeng. There are several troubling 
aspects of Mr. Fong's testimony that merit further 
investigation. For example, Mr. Fong testified that he did not 
become aware of the $50,000 contribution from one of the Sioeng 
family's businesses to the NPF until it was reported in the 
press approximately two years after it was made.\760\ This 
seems implausible, given that (1) his wife received a $5,000 
commission on the contribution, (2) the contribution was 
solicited by his chief fundraiser, Steve Kinney, and (3) Mr. 
Fong himself was involved in the solicitation of the 
contribution.\761\ Without deposing Mr. Kinney, Mrs. Fong, and 
others, the Committee cannot assess the credibility of Mr. 
Fong's denial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \760\ Deposition of Matthew K. Fong, v. 1, 87; Senate Deposition of 
Matthew K. Fong, 49.
    \761\ Mr. Fong testified that he gave Mr. Kinney permission to 
solicit the Sioeng family for the contribution, and that when contacted 
by the Sioeng family, he encouraged them to contribute to the Speaker. 
Id. at 75-77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are also substantial discrepancies in Mr. Fong's 
testimony that deserve further investigation. One area of Mr. 
Fong's testimony which involves a clear and unambiguous 
contradiction is his testimony as to whether he saw a $20,000 
contribution check when it was handed to him by Mr. Sioeng. In 
his Senate testimony, Mr. Fong denied ever seeing the check, 
stating that it was given to him in a sealed envelope which he 
gave unopened to his staff.\762\ In his House testimony, 
however, Mr. Fong contradicted his Senate testimony and 
acknowledged seeing the check.\763\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \762\ Senate deposition of Matthew K. Fong, 40 (Sept. 19, 1997).
    \763\ Deposition of Matthew K. Fong, v. 1, 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This changing testimony raises the possibility that Mr. 
Fong has testified falsely to conform his testimony to his 
legal defense. It is undisputed that Mr. Fong accepted a 
contribution from a foreign national. When questioned by Senate 
investigators, Mr. Fong asserted that he did not knowingly 
accept a contribution from a foreign national because he 
thought the contribution came from Mr. Sioeng's son or son-in-
law.\764\ This defense is called into question, however, by the 
fact the Mr. Fong personally solicited Mr. Sioeng, not his son 
or son-in-law, for the contribution; accepted the contribution 
from Mr. Sioeng, not his son or son-in-law; and thanked Mr. 
Sioeng, not his son or son-in-law, for the contribution.\765\ 
Mr. Fong's new House testimony allows him to claim that he saw 
an unfamiliar name, Sioeng San Wong, on the check. According to 
this version, Mr. Fong can claim that the unfamiliar name led 
him to the conclusion that the contribution was not from Mr. 
Sioeng personally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \764\ Senate deposition of Matthew K. Fong, 23.
    \765\ Senate Minority Report, 5577-5578 (Mar. 10, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Other areas of Mr. Fong's testimony also raise questions 
as to the veracity of Mr. Fong's account. In the Senate, Mr. 
Fong testified that he informed Mr. Sioeng about restrictions 
on foreign contributions in response to Mr. Sioeng's confusion 
as to contribution limits in different 
jurisdictions.766 Mr. Fong's testimony before the 
House on the subject is quite confused. After initially 
reiterating his Senate testimony that Mr. Sioeng inquired as to 
the differences in contribution limits between different 
jurisdictions,767 Mr. Fong later testified that he 
shared the rules when Mr. Sioeng raised the possibility of 
obtaining contributions from his business partners 
overseas.768 When pressed about his inconsistent 
testimony, Mr. Fong ultimately admitted that he could not 
recall the specifics of the conversation beyond having shared 
restrictions on foreign contributions with Mr. 
Sioeng.769
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \766\ Senate deposition of Matthew K. Fong, 34.
    \767\ Deposition of Matthew K. Fong, v. 1, 24.
    \768\ Id. at v. 1, 24.
    \769\ Id. at v. 1, 57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, Mr. Fong first told House investigators that his 
meeting with Mr. Sioeng at which he received the $50,000 
contribution was unscheduled;770 then he reversed 
himself and stated that he had called ahead to schedule the 
appointment.771
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \770\ Id. at v. 1, 28.
    \771\ Id. at v. 1, 49-50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In sum, although the majority refused to thoroughly 
investigate the contributions Mr. Fong received from Mr. 
Sioeng, the information the Committee did receive raises 
serious questions and does not support the majority's premature 
conclusion that Mr. Fong did not knowingly accept foreign 
contributions from Mr. Sioeng. The record is clear that:
    
 Mr. Fong and Mr. Sioeng had a close personal 
relationship and that Mr. Fong was the only elected official to 
receive a personal contribution from Mr. Sioeng. In total, the 
Sioeng family contributed $102,000 to the Fong campaign over a 
15-month period.
    
 Mr. Fong's testimony to House investigators 
fundamentally conflicts with his previous Senate deposition. On 
basic facts--such as whether he actually saw Mr. Sioeng's check 
and the circumstances of his meeting with Mr. Sioeng--Mr. Fong 
has given different answers under oath to identical questions.
    In light of the inconsistent and implausible aspects of Mr. 
Fong's testimony, it is a possibility he has made false 
statements under oath. Further investigation is clearly 
warranted in this matter.

5. Other Foreign Contributions to Republicans

    Additional examples of foreign contributions to 
Republicans, including contributions from foreign governments, 
have been reported in the press and documented in the Senate 
minority report. The majority turned a blind eye to this 
conduct, however, and instead focused solely on foreign 
contributions to Democratic entities.
    Examples of foreign contributions to Republicans which were 
largely ignored by the Committee include:
    
 Contributions from Thomas Kramer. On July 18, 
1997, German national Thomas Kramer was fined $323,000 by the 
FEC for making illegal foreign campaign contributions. This was 
the largest fine ever imposed by the FEC on an individual. Mr. 
Kramer contributed more than $400,000 to federal, state, and 
local campaigns during the 1994 election cycle, including 
$205,000 to the Florida Republican party. The Florida 
Republicans were fined $82,000 by the FEC for accepting Mr. 
Kramer's contribution, but still refuse to return $95,000 of 
the contribution.772 Although the Committee held a 
hearing on Mr. Kramer's contributions, that hearing focused 
almost exclusively on his links to Howard Glicken, a Democratic 
fundraiser.773
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \772\ See, e.g., $323,000 Fine Levied for Foreign Contributions, 
Washington Post (July 19, 1997); Sen. Mack Returned Money to German 
Businessman Two Years Ago, Gannett News Service (July 18, 1997).
    \773\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearing 
on Federal Election Commission Enforcement Actions: Foreign Campaign 
Contributions and other FECA Violations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 
31, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 Contributions from Michael Kojima. Michael Kojima 
was called ``America's worst deadbeat dad'' by the Los Angeles 
District Attorney's office.774 He contributed 
$598,770 to the Republican party during the 1992 election 
cycle, including $500,000 to the President's Dinner which 
bought him a seat at President Bush's table. The money for one 
$100,000 contribution was written on an account that would have 
had insufficient funds but for a wire transfer from a foreign 
corporation that was received before the check cleared. Mr. 
Kojima brought five Japanese businessmen to the dinner. It has 
been reported that these businessmen paid Mr. Kojima as much as 
$175,000 each to attend the event. In return for Mr. Kojima's 
contributions, the RNC arranged for 10 meetings between Mr. 
Kojima and U.S. Embassy personnel in Asia, and wrote at least 
15 letters on Mr. Kojima's behalf. At the time of the 
contribution, Mr. Kojima was almost a million dollars in debt 
for failure to pay child support or his business 
creditors.775
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \774\ Funds Not by the (Bank) Book: GOP, New York Daily News (Oct. 
15, 1996).
    \775\ Senate Minority Report, 5413-5572.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 Contributions to the Jesse Helms Center. The Jesse 
Helms Center, which was established to honor Sen. Helms, house 
his archives, and host conservative speakers, solicited at 
least $325,000 from foreign governments, including a $225,000 
contribution from the government of Taiwan in 1993 and $100,000 
from the government of Kuwait following the Persian Gulf war in 
1991. The Taiwanese contribution followed a conversation 
between Sen. Helms and a high-ranking Taiwanese official. At 
the time, Sen. Helms was the ranking minority member of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.776 Because the 
Center is a charitable foundation, foreign governments can make 
contributions that may be prohibited under federal election 
law, the donors are not subject to federal contribution limits, 
and the donations are not required to be publicly disclosed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \776\ See, e.g. Foundation for Special Interests: Sen. Helms's 
Charity Gets Large Gifts From Taiwan, Kuwait, Tobacco, Washington Post 
(Oct. 26, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Contributions to Republicans from U.S. Subsidiaries of Foreign 
        Companies

    The controversy over fundraising during the 1996 elections 
began in September 1996, after newspapers reported that Cheong 
Am America, a U.S. subsidiary of a South Korean company, 
contributed $250,000 to the DNC. After the discovery of this 
and other contributions that were subsequently returned by the 
DNC, RNC Chairman Haley Barbour said, ``I'll tell you right 
now, you won't find any contribution like this in our 
records.'' 777 In fact, during the 1996 election 
cycle, the Republican party received far more contributions 
($8.4 million) from American subsidiaries of foreign companies 
than did the Democratic party ($4.1 million). 778 
Some of the largest contributions to Republicans from foreign 
corporations include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \777\ Republicans Return Illegal $15,000 Donation from Canadian 
Company, Roll Call (Oct. 21, 1996).
    \778\ Subsidiaries of Foreign Corporations Big Political Donors, 
Associated Press (May 20, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. Brown and 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., a cigarette manufacturer, is the U.S. 
subsidiary of British-owned B.A.T. Industries. The company 
contributed $1 million during the 1996 election cycle, all but 
$83,000 of it to Republicans.779
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \779\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 News Corp. News Corp. is a foreign media 
conglomerate owned by Rupert Murdoch. Four subsidiaries of News 
Corp. contributed almost $1 million during the 1996 election 
cycle, all but $94,000 of it to Republicans.780
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \780\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 Glaxo Wellcome Inc. Glaxo Wellcome is a U.S. 
subsidiary of the British pharmaceutical company of the same 
name. The company contributed $898,954 in the 1996 elections, 
including $772,729 to Republicans.781
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \781\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 C. The Relationship between Access to Republican Leaders and Campaign 
                             Contributions

    Political contributions to both the Democratic and 
Republican Party have substantially increased access for 
wealthy individuals and organizations to government officials. 
The practice of providing political contributors special access 
skews our democratic process. It means that well-funded special 
interests have more opportunity than the average citizen to 
make their views known to decision makers and to exert 
influence on government operations. It is also clearly a 
bipartisan practice.

1. The Sale of Access by Republican Congressional Leaders

    In 1997, even as congressional Republicans leveled public 
criticism at President Clinton and the Democratic Party 
regarding contribution-for-access allegations, the Republican 
Party provided big donors with special access to members of 
Congress. For example:
    
 In February 1997, the RNC rewarded individuals and 
companies that had contributed $175,000 or more over four years 
to the RNC with a three-day gathering involving elected 
Republican leaders. This event, held at the Breakers Hotel in 
Florida, featured briefings and speeches. Policy makers that 
attended included Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, Speaker 
Gingrich, and House Appropriations Committee Chairman Bob 
Livingston, among others.782
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \782\ Republican Leaders Entertain Party's Big Donors at Luxurious 
Florida Resort, Washington Post (Feb. 21, 1997); GOP's Reward for Top 
Donors: 3 Days With Party Leaders, New York Times (Feb. 20, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 In April 1997, Senate Republicans offered $5,000 
tickets to a ``policy forum'' withMajority Leader Lott and 
other Republican colleagues.783
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \783\ $5,000 Donors Invited to GOP `Forum,' Washington Post (Mar. 
12, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 In May 1997, the Republican National Committee 
promised contributors who donated or raised $250,000 breakfast 
and photographs with Speaker Gingrich and Majority Leader Trent 
Lott.784
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \784\ GOP Seeks $250,000 Contributors, St. Louis Post-Disptach 
(Apr. 20, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 In June 1997, the annual fund-raising dinner of 
the National Republican Senatorial Committee and the National 
Republican Congressional Committee offered $100,000 
contributors a long list of special benefits, including ``a 
breakfast with the House Republican leadership; a luncheon with 
the Senate GOP leaders; an `afternoon forum' with Senate 
Majority Leader Trent Lott . . . and Speaker Newt Gingrich''; 
and ``a predinner reception with congressional GOP leaders.'' 
785
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \785\ A Hot Meal Ticket, National Journal (May 17, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are many other examples of Republican members of 
Congress providing special attention and access to big 
Republican contributors, including some occasions where 
congressional buildings were used to solicit campaign 
contributions. For example, as discussed in Part I.A.4.c, the 
1995 Republican Senate House Dinner invitation promised 
contributors direct access to Republican Party leaders in 
buildings owned by Congress.786 Speaker Gingrich has 
even allegedly sold access to the State of the Union address to 
Congress. In January 1991, according to media reports, members 
of his political action committee, GOPAC, were invited to drink 
champagne in his office in the Capitol as President Bush 
delivered the State of the Union address. These GOPAC members 
later received a tour of the Capitol.787
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \786\ Invitation from the Republican members of the United States 
Senate and House of Representatives to the 1995 Republican Senate House 
Dinner.
    \787\ Gingrich Traded Access for Funds--`Pot Calling Kettle Black,' 
Atlanta Constitution (March 6, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One of the most blatant access-for-contributions schemes is 
the so-called ``season-ticket'' program established by the 
Republican Party for donors who contribute at least $250,000. 
According to the New York Times, the Republican Party not only 
offered these contributors ``the smorgasbord of perks, like 
access to the party's private skybox and a photo session with 
the Republican nominees'' at the Republican convention, but 
also provided them with special ``staff members to help with 
problems in Washington.'' 788 A senior executive 
whose corporation was a ``season ticket holder'' reportedly 
stated that the $250,000 season ticket ``was pitched as an 
entree . . . to `the best access to Congress.' '' 
789 As the New York Times reported, donors 
understood the purpose of the special staff to be ``to arrange 
meetings with members of Congress and help them find their way 
around Washington.'' 790
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \788\ $250,000 Buys Donors `Best Access to Congress,' New York 
Times (Jan. 27, 1997).
    \789\ Id.
    \790\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The Sale of Access by Prior Republican Administrations

    The sale of access to big political donors was also common 
in past Republican administrations. As described in the 
minority report in the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee's 
recent campaign finance investigation, for example, dozens of 
meetings, dinners, and receptions were held at the White House 
for big Republican donors during the Ford, Reagan, and Bush 
administrations.791
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \791\ Senate Minority Report, 7968-77, 8053-56 (appendix to Chapter 
28).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One prominent example involves ``Team 100'' members, the 
wealthy individuals that donated over $100,000 to help elect 
President Bush. Team 100 members consistently received special 
attention from the Bush Administration. Common Cause magazine, 
which chronicled the substantial access provided to Team 100 
members, concluded: ``Team 100 has ensured access and influence 
in the executive branch while seeking and obtaining executive-
branch pork barrel hand-outs; vigorous import-export 
assistance, high-level intervention on regulatory and other 
matters; appointments to ambassadorships and federal advisory 
commissions; [and] broad national policies for wealthy Wall 
Street, oil, real estate, cable television and other 
interests.'' 792
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \792\ Bush's Ruling Class, Common Cause Magazine (April/May/June 
1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Contributions That May Have Influenced Policy Decisions

    Selling access for political contributions is unseemly. 
Even more disturbing, however, is the fact that special 
interests, by virtue of their political contributions, have 
been able to influence and sometimes change public policy 
decisions. There have been numerous allegations of Republican 
policy favors in exchange for political contributions in recent 
years.
    One of the most serious examples of an alleged quid pro quo 
is the $50 billion tax break that Speaker Gingrich and Majority 
Leader Lott reportedly included in the 1997 budget deal after 
the RNC received $8.8 million in contributions from the tobacco 
industry.793 This example is discussed in detail in 
Part I.A.4.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \793\ Donors to Campaigns Fared Well in Budget, Washington Post, 
(Aug. 22, 1997); FEC Records.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unfortunately, there are many other examples of the 
Republican Congress granting policy favors to big contributors. 
For instance, since 1994, Amway Corporation has contributed 
over $3 million to Republican committees, including $1.7 
million in 1994. Amway founder Richard DeVos and his wife also 
gave $1 million to the RNC in April 1997. According to media 
reports, these contributions coincided with significant policy 
decisions. During congressional consideration of the 1997 
budget legislation, Speaker Gingrich worked to secure tax 
breaks that some estimated ``could be worth $268 million over 
the next several years'' for Amway subsidiaries.794
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \794\ Clinton to Test Veto Power; Congress Nurtured Special 
Interests in Tax, Spending Bills, New Orleans Times-Picayune, (Aug. 7, 
1997); FEC Records.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other examples include:
    
 Oil, energy, and natural resources industries 
contributed $18.3 million to political parties since the 
beginning of the 104th Congress; $9.7 million (73%) to 
Republicans. The 1997 budget deal included a provision to 
benefit many oil, energy, and natural resources companies by 
reducing the amount of alternative minimum tax that these 
companies have to pay by 75% or more. The provision is worth an 
estimated $18 billion.795
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \795\ Tilting the Balance, Citizen Action (1997); FEC Records.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 Texas businessman Harold Simmons and his family 
contributed at least $1.5 million to Republican candidates and 
committees since 1980. The 1997 budget deal included a 
provision that would primarily benefit the sale of sugar beet 
processing plants by Mr. Simmons's company. Tax experts 
estimated that $60 million of the provision's $84 million tax 
benefit would go to his firm. President Clinton exercised the 
line-item veto to strike the tax break.796
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \796\ President to Use New Veto, Washington Post (Aug. 11, 1997); 
Tilting the Balance, Citizen Action (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
 Golden Rule Financial Corporation was the top 
proponent and beneficiary of Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) as 
an alternative to the current Medicare system. During the 1994 
election cycle, Golden Rule contributed $620,775 to Republican 
committees, and its chairman and president contributed over 
$152,000 to GOPAC. Following these contributions, Speaker 
Gingrich supported MSAs as a part of the 1995 Medicare 
legislation. MSAs also became a prominent feature of the 1996 
Republican platform.797
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \797\ Congressional Record, H62989 (June 13, 1996); Highlights from 
the 1996 Republican Platform, Boston Globe (Aug. 13, 1996); Favored Few 
Stand to Gain from Republican Tax Cuts, Washington Post (Dec. 24, 
1995); FEC Records.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the Bush Administration, many policy favors to 
contributors reportedly were dispensed by the White House 
Council on Competitiveness.798 Operating without 
public notice or record, under an unwritten ``no appeal'' rule 
regarding its decisions, the Council on Competitiveness 
reviewed numerous federal rules and regulations. According to 
Bob Woodward and David Broder of the Washington Post, Vice 
President Quayle and his small council staff changed or 
attempted to change federal regulations on a range of matters, 
while ``leaving what vice presidential aides call `no 
fingerprints' on the results of its interventions.'' 
799
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \798\ One of the Council's staff members then was current Rep. 
David McIntosh, who is now a member of the House Government Reform and 
Oversight Committee.
    \799\ Quayle's Quest: Curb Rules, Leave `No Fingerprints,' 
Washington Post (Jan. 9, 1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Major Republican contributors reportedly had tremendous 
access to the council. According to the Washington Post, Vice 
President Quayle and council staff held ``closed-door 
roundtables with business people who [had] made sizable 
contributions to the local or national GOP'' during campaign 
visits to various cities around the country.800 One 
sample six-month period reviewed by the media showed that each 
of the 24 petitioners granted a meeting with the Council on 
Competitiveness had made significant contributions to the RNC, 
the Bush-Quayle campaign, or both.801
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \800\ Id.
    \801\ They Can't Compete, Legal Times (Sept. 7, 1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Council on Competitiveness compiled an extensive record 
of intervention in federal regulations to benefit major 
contributors. An article in the Wall Street Journal in October 
1992 was titled Many of Competitiveness Council's Beneficiaries 
Are Firms That Make Big Donations to the GOP. The article 
described how oil industry interests that had donated hundreds 
of thousands of dollars to the Republican Party worked with the 
Competitiveness Council to weaken regulations on handling used 
motor and lubricating oil.802 The article also 
reported that Indiana pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly & Co. 
contributed thousands of dollars to the Bush-Quayle campaign 
and appeared to have ``an inside track at the council.'' The 
article noted that, in 1991, ``the council asked Lilly to 
review the council's plan to revamp the Food and Drug 
Administration's drug-approval policy--which would greatly 
benefit Lilly--before the policy was made public.'' Also in 
1991, the council ``asked the EPA to make changes in proposed 
air-pollution permit rules that jibed almost exactly with 
requests Lilly had previously made of the EPA.'' 803
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \802\ Many of Competitiveness Council's Beneficiaries Are Firms 
That Make Big Donations to the GOP, Wall Street Journal (Oct. 13, 
1992).
    \803\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, an article in Time described how the council 
intervened with the Environmental Protection Agency to narrow 
the definition of ``wetlands,'' thereby ``satisfying a powerful 
coalition of farmers and builders and reducing America's 
wetlands by as much as 30 million acres.'' The article stated: 
``The council is potentially a political gold mine for Quayle, 
who often refers businesspeople with complaints about 
government meddling to his eager staff of deregulators.'' 
804
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \804\ Need Friends in High Places? Time (Nov. 4, 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   D. Triad Management Services Engaged in Questionable Practices to 
                     Support Republican Candidates

    Triad Management Services, Inc., is a corporation formed in 
1996 which purportedly provided political consulting advice and 
services with the intent of maximizing the effectiveness of 
contributions from political conservatives.805 The 
minority report in the Senate campaign finance investigation, 
as well as numerous media accounts, suggests that, through 
Triad, a few wealthy individuals spent millions of dollars to 
influence and perhaps even change the outcome of certain 1996 
federal elections, without disclosing their identities. The 
Senate minority report concluded that this type of secret 
effort ``fundamentally undermines the spirit and letter of 
current campaign finance laws.'' 806 Triad's 
activities were undertaken exclusively to benefit Republicans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \805\ National Journal (Sept. 28, 1996).
    \806\ Senate Minority Report, 6290.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As discussed in Part I.A.4.e, the minority has repeatedly 
requested that the Committee investigate Triad, and the 
Chairman has repeatedly promised to do so. At the November 6, 
1997, Committee meeting, Rep. Maloney asked Chairman Burton, 
``I would like to know when you are going to issue subpoenas to 
the groups and individuals involved in the Triad Management 
scheme to violate or evade the campaign finance laws?'' 
Chairman Burton responded, ``We are looking at it. And we very 
well may do that.'' 807 At the following hearing, 
Rep. Barrett asked Chairman Burton, ``What about the Triad 
Management? Are we looking at that, Mr. Chairman?'' Chairman 
Burton replied, ``I am going to send a subpoena to Triad. Does 
that satisfy you?'' 808 One month later at another 
Committee hearing, Rep. Lantos asked FBI Director Louis Freeh 
to look into Triad's activities. In response, Chairman Burton 
stated, ``There will be, as I said before, an investigation 
into the Triad matter.'' 809
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \807\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on White House Compliance with Committee Subpoenas, 105th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 204 (Nov. 7, 1997).
    \808\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on Johnny Chung: His Unusual Access to the White House, His Political 
Donations and Related Matters, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (Nov. 13, 
1997).
    \809\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Hearings 
on The Current Implementation of the Independent Counsel Act, 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 2, 47, 49 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nevertheless, despite the Chairman's promises and the 
substantial evidence of campaign finance improprieties, the 
Committee has not issued one document subpoena or requested any 
depositions related to Triad.
    At the October 8, 1998 Committee meeting, Chairman Burton 
attempted to explain the Committee's lack of action on Triad. 
He stated:

        The minority in the Senate worked very hard on the 
        Triad issue. And we received all of the information 
        after the Thompson Committee concluded its 
        investigation. And we received the information on 
        Triad. It was thoroughly investigated by the Senate 
        Oversight Committee. And they found no illegal 
        activities. . . . After you raised the issue before 
        this committee, we did take a thorough look at the 
        report that the Senate sent over to us, and there was 
        no need to duplicate their efforts.810
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \810\ Statement of Chairman Burton, Meeting of the House Committee 
on Government Reform and Oversight, unofficial transcript, 64-65 (Oct. 
8, 1998).

    The Chairman's statement, however, is in conflict with the 
facts. The Senate minority report provided substantial evidence 
indicating that Triad may have engaged in a range of possibly 
improper or illegal activities, including participating in 
schemes to evade campaign contribution limits and disclosure 
requirements, and coordinating with campaigns on political 
advertising. Moreover, Triad, its affiliates, and other 
associated persons and entities did not make available to the 
Senate the information necessary to resolve the serious 
questions surrounding Triad's activities. For example, persons 
with important roles in Triad activities, including Triad 
president Carolyn Malenick, either refused to be deposed or 
appeared but would not answer substantive questions. The Senate 
Committee did not issue orders to enforce Triad subpoenas and 
did not subpoena a key Triad-related entity.811
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \811\ Senate Minority Report, 6291-93.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, contrary to Chairman Burton's October 8 remarks, the 
Senate did not have the opportunity to ``thoroughly 
investigate'' Triad, and an investigation of Triad by this 
Committeewould not ``duplicate'' the work of the Senate. In 
fact, further investigation is absolutely necessary to fill important 
gaps that remained when the Senate investigation shut down.

1. Background on Triad

    Triad's purported purpose is to advise clients on making 
contributions.812 However, evidence indicates that 
Triad was focused on influencing congressional races. Senator 
Nickles, appearing in a Triad promotional video, described 
Triad as follows: ``[T]his is a very effective organization 
that is going in and helping us, in those races that are close, 
those races that are targeted.'' 813 In that same 
video, Ms. Malenick states, ``If we need to move, or have 
$100,000 put in a congressional race tomorrow, where are we 
going to find it?'' 814 The Senate minority report 
concluded that ``Triad exists for the sole purpose of 
influencing federal elections.'' 815
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \812\ National Journal (Sept. 28, 1996).
    \813\ See GOP Critic of Clinton Filmed Promo, Arizona Republic 
(Nov. 4, 1997).
    \814\ See Web of GOP Donors Studied: Senate Looks into 
Interconnected Nonprofit Groups That Spent Millions on Election Ads in 
1996, Austin-American Statesman (Nov. 2, 1997).
    \815\ Senate Minority Report, 6289.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Triad and its affiliates were apparently funded primarily 
by a few wealthy individuals. The Senate minority report states 
that Pennsylvania businessman Robert Cone provided a 
substantial amount of Triad's funding, in payments totaling at 
least several hundred thousand dollars.816 Triad 
also is affiliated with two ``non-profit'' organizations, 
Citizens for Reform and Citizens for the Republic Education 
Fund,817 which, according to the Senate minority 
report, were simply shell companies that have been essentially 
run by Triad.818 Two secret trusts, the Personal 
Trust and the Economic Education Trust, provided the majority 
of the total contributions received by these 
groups.819 The Senate minority report suggests that 
Mr. Cone funded the Personal Trust, while Charles and David 
Koch, brothers who control Koch Industries of Wichita, Kansas, 
funded the Economic Education Trust.820
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \816\ Id. at 6293-94.
    \817\ According to the Senate minority report, Citizens for Reform 
and Citizens for the Republic Education Fund claimed tax-exempt status 
in 1996 under section 501(c)(4) of the tax code, which applies to 
groups whose primary activity is not lobbying and campaign activities. 
These groups, however, have apparently conceded that they may not have 
fit the 501(c)(4) criteria. Senate Minority Report, 6301-02.
    \818\ Id.
    \819\ Id. at 6309.
    \820\ Id. at 6309-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Triad's Alleged Illegal Corporate Contributions

    Campaign finance laws prohibit corporations from making 
contributions, including providing in-kind services, to 
political candidates.821 The Senate minority report 
found that Triad may have violated these prohibitions. The 
report asserts that ``Triad provided political consulting 
services to numerous Republican campaigns free of charge,'' 
including conducting fundraising and advising campaigns on 
strategy and fundraising.822 For example, after his 
pre-primary visit with one Republican campaign, a Triad 
representative noted: ``In response to their request, I gave 
them a plan to work out with regards to fundraising, 
establishing specific financial goals and programs to achieve 
those objectives.'' 823 Further, on at least two 
occasions a Triad employee, Meredith O'Rourke, reportedly 
helped then-Senatorial candidate Sam Brownback make fundraising 
calls at the NRCC offices.824 Senate investigators 
were unable to find evidence that any of the campaigns paid 
Triad for these services.825
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \821\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 441b.
    \822\ Senate Minority Report, 6294-97.
    \823\ Id. at 6352-53, document entitled, ``Vince Snowbarger KS03.'' 
Rep. Snowbarger's chief of staff stated that Mr. Snowbarger also met 
with Triad officers after the primary election to discuss fundraising. 
James Kuhnhenn, Political Funds for Kansan Examined, Democrats Attack 
Role of GOP Consultants in Snowbarger Campaign, Kansas City Star (Oct. 
4, 1997).
    \824\ Senate Minority Report, 6296.
    \825\ Id. at 6294.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Triad also may have illegally facilitated fundraising and 
advocated the election or defeat of candidates through faxes to 
its clients. For example, one fax describes ``Top Tier Races in 
Need of Cash'' and asks for checks payable to committees 
affiliated with the candidates.826 Another fax 
stated that Sheila Frahm, Senator Brownback's primary opponent, 
``must be defeated.'' 827 If Triad provided free 
consulting services to campaigns and advocated for 
candidates,828 Triad would appear to have made 
illegal corporate contributions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \826\ Id. at 6296, 6367-68.
    \827\ Id. at 6296, 6369-70.
    \828\ The Senate minority report also suggests that Triad may have 
provided consulting services to the campaigns of Christian Leinbach, 
Jim Ryun, Steve Stockman, Mark Sharpe, and Jay Mathis. Id. at 6295-96.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Triad's Alleged Schemes to Evade Contribution Limits

    According to the Senate minority report, evidence suggests 
that Triad was involved with schemes to route contributions to 
campaigns through PACs from individuals who had contributed the 
legal maximum. As part of these schemes, Triad apparently 
encouraged campaigns to provide Triad with the names of ``maxed 
out donors.'' \829\ A number of individuals may have 
participated in schemes with Triad that enabled them to 
contribute to candidates to whom they had ``maxed out.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \829\ For example, the Triad memo describing its consultant's visit 
to the campaign for Rep. Pete Sessions, who is now a member of the 
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, notes that the 
campaign ``will have a list of their maxed out donors for our 
inspection as soon as there is a call from Washington.'' Id. at 6299. 
Triad memos for visits to the campaigns of Gary Nodler and Ed Merritt 
also note that those campaigns have ``maxed out'' donors. In addition, 
the Senate minority report notes that candidates who provided Triad 
with the names of potential contributors included Rep. Riley and Rep. 
Gutknecht. Id. at 6297-301, 6702, 6727-28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, in the 1996 election cycle, Robert Riley, Jr., 
contributed the maximum amount allowed to the campaign of his 
father, Rep. Robert Riley.\830\ Between May 9 and May 23, 1996, 
the junior Mr. Riley also made separate contributions of $1,000 
to four PACs that are on an internal Triad list, and these PACs 
soon thereafter made contributions to his father's 
campaign.\831\ The younger Mr. Riley told Senate investigators 
that he ``made his contributions on the advice of [Triad 
president] Malenick.'' \832\ The Senate minority report 
discusses numerous other examples involving other individuals. 
The campaigns that allegedly may have benefited from 
contribution routing schemes include the Steve Stockman 
campaign, the Ray Clatworthy campaign, the Brian Babin 
campaign, and the campaigns of Rep. J.C. Watts and Senator 
Brownback.\833\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \830\ Gerald F. Seib and Glenn R. Simpson, Adviser Helps Political 
Donors Spread Their Wealth, Wall Street Journal (Apr. 10, 1997).
    \831\ Senate Minority Report, 6297.
    \832\ Id. at 6298.
    \833\ Id. at 6297-301.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Triad's Possible Improper Coordination on Political Advertisements

    At a conference in early 1998, Dick Dresner, a consultant 
who worked with Triad in 1996, reportedly described how 
individuals can secretly funnel their money into the election 
process:

        Republican consultant Dick Dresner . . . said some very 
        wealthy donors, who want to remain completely 
        anonymous, can establish trusts to distribute their 
        money anonymously to any number of issue-advocacy 
        organizations. Consultants for these organizations then 
        steer this money into very close races, where ``your 
        money can be pivotal and the election is just two weeks 
        away.'' Even if the anonymous donor's name emerges once 
        or twice during the campaign, Dresner said, ``His role 
        is greatly underestimated.'' \834\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \834\ Outside Interest Groups Get Inside Clout With Voters, 
Sacramento Bee, (Feb. 3, 1998).

Mr. Dresner's comments appear to describe the approach that 
Triad used in funding 1996 political advertisements.
    The Senate minority report states that Triad affiliates 
Citizens for Reform and Citizens for the Republic Education 
Fund spent between $3 and $4 million on advertising in House 
and Senate races, including over $1 million on Kansas 
races.\835\ As noted above, the Economic Education Trust and 
the Personal Trust provided the majority of funding for 
Citizens for Reform and Citizens for the Republic Education 
Fund. According to the Senate minority report, evidence 
indicates that production of at least some of the 
advertisements involved Triad or its affiliates, in conjunction 
with vendors, including Mr. Dresner, that were retained by the 
Economic Education Trust.\836\ The donors behind the trust also 
appear to have provided input into the preparation of these 
ads. Senate investigators were unable to discern the exact 
nature of these arrangements, as Mr. Dresner, Triad attorney 
Mark Braden, and Ms. Malenick refused to appear for depositions 
or answer substantive questions.\837\ However, based on the 
existing evidence, the Senate minority report suggests that 
Triad enabled contributors to fund political advertising 
without having to disclose their identities.\838\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \835\ Senate Minority Report at 6304, 6312. The Kansas races were 
the contest that resulted in the election of Sen. Sam Brownback, Rep. 
Snowbarger, Rep. Jim Ryun and Rep. Todd Tiahrt.
    \836\ Id. at 6309-13.
    \837\ Id. at 6311.
    \838\ Id. at 6309-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Evidence also suggests that Triad and its affiliates 
collaborated with campaigns in thepreparation of some, if not 
all, of the advertisements it funded.\839\ The Senate minority report 
asserts that, because of the level of collaboration that occurred and 
the content of the ads, ``Triad's advertising expenditures constituted 
disguised contributions to the candidates.'' \840\ If this is the case, 
then Triad helped contributors support advertisements while evading 
contribution limitations and disclosure requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \839\ Id. at 6304-06. For example, according to the Senate minority 
report, in the race between Bill Yellowtail and Rep. Rick Hill, Triad 
sponsored television ads attacking Yellowtail in a way that 
corresponded to notes in Triad's report on its visit with the Hill 
campaign a few weeks before the ads ran.
    \840\ Id. at 6306.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Triad's advertising effort in Kansas, in particular, 
deserves examination by the Committee, since the Committee has 
an ongoing investigation of alleged conduit payments to the 
Kansas Democratic Party in 1996. The Senate minority report 
states that Triad and its affiliates allegedly spent close to 
$1 million on four of the six Kansas federal races in 1996, and 
that it is likely a few wealthy individuals funded most if not 
all of that effort. According to the Senate minority report, 
one of the three House candidates on whom Triad spent money won 
by less than 2% of the vote; the others won by less than 
5%.\841\ Further, while the Kansas Senate race between Jill 
Docking and Sam Brownback was close in October 1996, Senator 
Brownback won by a 54% to 43% margin after Triad's last-minute, 
$400,000 advertising campaign criticizing Docking.\842\ Thus, 
through Triad, a few individuals may have played a significant 
role in determining the composition of the Kansas delegation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \841\ Id. at 6312.
    \842\ The Secret of a Senator's Success?, Washington Post (Dec. 12, 
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Senate investigation did not have the opportunity to 
determine definitively the sources of Triad funding and the 
nature of interaction between Triad and Republican campaigns. 
It also did not have access to statements that Texas 
businessman Peter Cloeren made regarding Triad, as discussed 
above in Part IV.A. Given the serious possible violations that 
may have occurred involving Triad, and the substantial 
foundation of evidence already established by the Senate 
investigation, the Committee's refusal to pursue these issues 
is unjustified. The lack of interest by Committee Republicans 
in issues involving Triad underscores the partisan nature of 
the Committee's investigation.

  V. THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESS HAS BLOCKED CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND 
          PLAYED POLITICS WITH THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

    Our current political landscape is rife with unappealing 
campaign finance practices. As these views have demonstrated, 
both Democrats and Republicans have pled guilty to making or 
arranging illegal conduit contributions. Both Democrats and 
Republicans have received questionable foreign contributions. 
And both Democrats and Republicans have provided special access 
to large contributors in federal buildings.
    Unfortunately, many of the most abusive campaign finance 
practices may not be covered by existing law. As Rep. Waxman 
wrote in an op-ed at the outset of the campaign finance 
investigation:

        The real scandal is what's legal and common. It is 
        especially important that we stop the explosive growth 
        of soft money and that we shed light on the new 
        strategies the parties use to get around campaign-
        finance laws, such as having nonprofit groups finance 
        clearly partisan activities. Our goal should be to 
        understand how the process functions at every step, to 
        expose its flaws and to get rid of the loopholes. This 
        approach may not be popular in Congress, but leaders of 
        both parties must realize that the situation has to 
        change.\843\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \843\ Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Campaign Reform Made Whole, New York 
Times (Feb. 28, 1997).

    One dramatic illustration of the deficiencies in existing 
law is the recent decision of the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia on the legality of foreign ``soft 
money'' contributions. The court determined that, under current 
campaign finance laws, it is legal for a foreign national to 
contribute ``soft money'' to a political party.\844\ ``Soft 
money'' includes donations for generic party-building 
activities, get-out-the-vote activities, and issue advocacy 
ads, among other activities. Ironically, the district court 
decision means that most of the allegedly foreign contributions 
to Democrats that the majority has spent millions investigating 
may not even be illegal, even if they were contributed by 
foreign nationals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \844\ United States v. Trie, Crim. No. 98-00291, Slip. Op. (D.D.C. 
Oct. 9, 1998), 7-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In fact, soft money donations are completely exempt from 
almost all of the provisions of federal election law. As the 
court stated, ``it could not be more apparent that . . . 
Congress intended the proscriptions of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act to apply only to `hard money' contributions.'' 
845 Thus, for example, FECA's limitation on the size 
of campaign contributions and its prohibition on corporate 
contributions do not apply to soft money 
contributions.846 More than any other factor, it is 
this exemption for soft money that has tainted our campaign 
finance system. As the Washington Post has editorialized, 
``[t]he fundraising excesses of the last campaign almost all 
had to do with soft money.'' 847
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \845\ Id.
    \846\ With respect to contributions to candidates for federal 
office and to political committees seeking to influence elections at 
the federal level, FECA imposes the following limits: $1,000 per 
election to a candidate for federal office; $20,000 per calendar year 
to a national committee of a political party; $5,000 per calendar year 
to any other political committee; and $25,000 aggregate limit per 
calendar year for all federal candidates and committees. 2 U.S.C. 
Sec. Sec. 431, 441a(a). While FECA does not impose a cap on 
contributions to political parties for other purposes--known as ``soft 
money''--these donations may nevertheless end up indirectly influencing 
Federal elections.
    \847\ Back to Campaign Finance, Washington Post (July 27, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regrettably, despite the Committee's investment of two 
years and over $7 million of taxpayer resources in the campaign 
finance investigation, the Committee failed to even hold one 
hearing on soft money or the other evident loopholes in our 
campaign finance laws, and did not propose even minimal 
legislation correcting the obvious deficiencies in the current 
law. Moreover, most Republicans on the Committee voted against 
meaningful campaign finance reform legislation. They also voted 
against an effort to strengthen the Federal Election 
Commission, the entity charged with enforcing campaign finance 
laws.

     a. the republican leadership defeated campaign finance reform 
                              legislation

    At the same time that the Committee was spending millions 
of taxpayer dollars to focus attention on alleged campaign 
finance abuses, Republican leaders in Congress worked 
vigorously to prevent passage of campaign finance reform. The 
majority of Republican members on this Committee joined their 
Republican leaders in this effort to defeat reform. 
Unfortunately, the effort succeeded on September 10, 1998, 
when, through a procedural vote, the Senate destroyed any 
remaining chance of passing reform legislation.848
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \848\ Congressional Quarterly Weekly, Senate Vote 264, 2429 (Sept. 
12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. The Campaign Finance Reform Legislation

    The two major comprehensive campaign finance reform bills 
introduced in this Congress were H.R. 3526, the House 
legislation known as the ``Shays-Meehan'' bill, and S. 25, the 
Senate legislation known as the ``McCain-Feingold'' 
bill.849 One of the main components of both of these 
bills was a measure to ensure that soft money contributions 
were subject to FECA restrictions.850 A third 
leading bill, crafted by House freshmen, was introduced by 
Reps. Thomas Allen and Asa Hutchinson.851 The Allen-
Hutchinson bill would restrict soft money and increase 
disclosure requirements for candidates and groups that run 
issue advertisements, among other provisions. Passage of soft 
money restrictions, and the other reform measures contained in 
these bills, should have been a top priority of this Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \849\ The most recent version of the McCain-Feingold bill was 
Senate Amendment 3554 to S. 2237 (reprinted in the Sept. 8, 1998 
Congressional Record). The Shays-Meehan bill was introduced as H.R. 
493, but ultimately was considered as a substitute to H.R. 2183. 
Therefore, references in this report to provisions of the Shays-Meehan 
bill will cite to H.R. 2183.
    \850\ H.R. 2183, Sec. 101; Senate Amendment 3554 to S. 2237, Sec. 
101.
    \851\ H.R. 2183.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Republican Efforts to Thwart Campaign Finance Reform

    Consideration of campaign finance reform legislation began 
in the Senate. Supporters of the McCain-Feingold bill first 
attempted to pass the legislation in the Senate in September 
and October 1997. After these efforts were rebuffed by Majority 
Leader Trent Lott, supporters of the McCain-Feingold measure 
reached an agreement with Senator Lott that the legislation 
would be brought up by March 6, 1998.852 In late 
February 1998, the Senate took up the bill again. However, a 
filibuster spearheaded by the Republican leadership, ended 
consideration of the matter, after a 51-48 vote on February 26 
fell shy of the 60 votes required to end debate.853
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \852\ Joseph E. Cantor, Campaign Financing, Congressional Research 
Service Issue Brief No. 87020 (Updated Sept. 10, 1998) (hereafter the 
``Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No. 87020'').
    \853\ Id.; Campaign Reform Likely Dead in This Congress, New York 
Times (Feb. 27, 1998); Campaign Finance Bill Dies in Senate, Washington 
Post (Feb. 27, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Senate vote demonstrated that the majority of the 
Senate favored comprehensive reform. As a result, the actions 
of the Senate Republican leadership to stop consideration of 
the legislation received widespread criticism. For example, the 
Washington Post commented:

        The defeat of campaign finance reform in the Senate . . 
        . was a failure of the legislative process. . . . The 
        defeat in the Senate . . . was not the process at its 
        best but a charade in which the Republicans sought to 
        kill the bill but escape the blame.854
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \854\ The Wit But Not the Will, Washington Post (Mar. 1, 1998).

    The House proceeded on a slower track. Speaker Newt 
Gingrich stated on November 13, 1997, that he hoped ``to have a 
fair, bipartisan process for voting'' on campaign finance 
legislation and that House GOP leaders were ``committed to 
having a vote some time in March.'' 855 However, on 
March 26, the Republican leadership postponed floor action on 
campaign finance legislation. Republicans reportedly were 
``concerned they might lose control on the House floor,'' and 
would not be able to gain support for Republican-sponsored 
legislative alternatives to the Shays-Meehan 
proposal.856 House Majority Leader Dick Armey 
stated, ``If our guys won't commit to us on the procedural 
votes, we're not putting it (the bill) on the floor.'' 
857
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \855\ House GOP May Try to Tackle Reform One Bill at a Time, 
CongressDaily (Nov. 13, 1997).
    \856\ House Republicans Postpone Campaign Finance Debate, 
Associated Press (Mar. 26, 1998).
    \857\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Instead of considering the Shays-Meehan legislation, the 
Republican leadership scheduled floor action on March 30 for 
alternative legislation under a procedure known as ``suspension 
of the rules.'' 858 This procedure is not commonly 
used for consideration of controversial measures, as it does 
not allow for amendments, and it requires two-thirds of a 
majority for passage of legislation. The vote on the 
alternative legislation fell far short of the two-thirds 
majority.859 This scheduling scheme, however, 
enabled the Republican leadership to prevent serious discussion 
of meaningful campaign finance reform while giving the 
appearance of considering campaign finance legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \858\ Congressional Research Service Brief No. 87020.
    \859\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The March actions by the House Republican leadership drew 
sharp public criticism. For example, the Washington Post 
stated:

        The House Republican leaders have followed the 
        unfortunate example of their Senate counterparts on 
        campaign finance reform, only even more clumsily. Their 
        goal was to kill the bill but avoid the blame. . . . 
        Republicans have spent a year and a half claiming to be 
        indignant about the fund-raising abuses in the last 
        campaign, which were considerable, and on the part of 
        both parties. But given the chance to change the law to 
        ban the principal abuse, having to do with the raising 
        and spending of so-called soft money, they flinch. . . 
        . The tactic has been to offer up mock reform bills 
        that they could be pretty sure (a) wouldn't pass, in 
        part because they were written to be offensive to 
        Democrats, and (b) wouldn't achieve reform if they did 
        pass.860
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \860\ Hypocrisy on Campaign Funds, Washington Post (Apr. 1, 1998).

    Despite the March setback, House supporters of 
comprehensive campaign finance legislation pressed forward by 
circulating a ``discharge petition'' to force the House 
Republican leadership to take up the legislation on the House 
floor. Such a petition needs the signatures of 218 House 
members--the majority of the House. By April 22, the petition 
had garnered 204 members, including 12 Republicans, and Speaker 
Gingrich agreed to allow debate on campaign finance reform in 
May.861
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \861\ Veterans, Freshmen Shook Campaign Finance Reform Loose for 
House Vote, Washington Post (Apr. 25, 1998); Gingrich Agrees to Open 
Debate on Campaign Money, Atlanta Journal (Apr. 23, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The discharge petition indicated that a clear majority of 
the House was likely to support meaningful campaign finance 
reform. As a result, when the Republican leadership took up the 
campaign finance legislation in May, the leadership attempted 
to structure the debate in a manner that would frustrate 
efforts to pass effective legislation. The Republican 
leadership allowed debate on comprehensive campaign finance 
legislation, but at the same time made in order 11 substitutes, 
a constitutional amendment, and 258 other amendments, and 
allowed for consideration of additional amendments on the 
floor, a schedule that promised extended and complicated 
consideration of the matter.862 The Los Angeles 
Times described the Republican leadership's maneuvering as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \862\ Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No. 87020.

        Speaker Newt Gingrich and Majority Leader Dick Armey, 
        the Republican chieftains who tried to bury campaign 
        finance reform earlier this year, are at it again. Last 
        week they outlined a cynical plan to deny what the 
        clear majority of House members want: serious 
        consideration of a reform bill sponsored by Reps. 
        Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) and Martin T. Meehan (D-
        Mass.), the only viable reform legislation before the 
        House at this time. . . . Gingrich and Armey have 
        deviated from the usual House rules to allow debate on 
        unlimited amendments being tacked onto the bill in a 
        blatant attempt to sow confusion among legislators. 
        Incredibly, House Republican leaders all but admit to 
        the subterfuge. Armey, for instance, says he wants 
        campaign reform ``out of my life by July 4th,'' and 
        Rep. Ray LaHood (R-Ill.) said of his party's strategy: 
        ``We tried squelching it first. Now we're trying to 
        talk it to death.'' 863
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \863\ Dirty Ploy on Campaign Reform, Los Angeles Times (June 9, 
1998).

    The effort to kill campaign finance reform through endless 
debate persisted throughout the summer. In late July 1998, the 
Washington Post described the delaying tactics of the House 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
leadership as follows:

        The House is scheduled this week to resume the bizarre 
        debate in which the leadership for two months has tried 
        and failed to kill campaign finance reform, only to 
        come back a week later and try again. . . . It is long 
        past time to allow the vote the leadership has sought 
        to prevent. Majority Leader Richard Armey says he will 
        allow it--next week, after the Senate is safely out of 
        town for the August recess. Then House leaders will 
        only have to stall the bill another month until 
        adjournment. They can stall anything for a month. 
        That's the plan.864
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \864\ Back to Campaign Finance, Washington Post (July 27, 1998).

    A final vote on the Shays-Meehan bill did not occur until 
August 6, 1998. The bill passed by a strong majority, 252-
179.865 All but 15 of the 205 Democrats that voted 
supported the legislation, while the vast majority of 
Republicans (164 out of 225) voted against the bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \865\ House Votes, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 2206 (Aug. 8, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At this point, however, there was little time left in the 
session to achieve Senate passage necessary for enactment of 
the bill. On September 10, hope for comprehensive campaign 
finance reform legislation in the 105th Congress ended, when 
the Senate failed to overcome procedural blocks to considering 
comprehensive campaign finance reform 
legislation.866 On this vote, all 45 Democratic 
Senators voted to end the leadership's filibuster. Because they 
were joined by only 7 Republican Senators, campaign finance 
reform did not receive the 60 votes needed to proceed with 
consideration of the legislation.867
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \866\ Congressional Quarterly Weekly, Senate Vote 264, 2429 (Sept. 
12, 1998).
    \867\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Commentator David Broder succinctly summarized the 
Republican leadership conduct on the reform legislation:

        It was the adamant opposition of the Republican 
        congressional leadership that ultimately stalled 
        campaign finance legislation. Tactics employed by 
        Speaker Newt Gingrich delayed passage of any bill on 
        that side of the Capitol until there were fewer than 
        four workweeks left in this session. That made it easy 
        for a Republican filibuster to stymie action in the 
        Senate.868
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \868\ David Broder, Renew Efforts on Campaign Finance Reform, Star-
Ledger Newark, NJ (Sept. 30, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. How Committee Members Voted

    All of the Democrats and the one Independent on the 
Committee voted for the Shays-Meehan legislation in the House. 
However, even after two years of rhetoric by Committee 
Republicans about campaign finance abuses, only seven of the 24 
Committee Republicans voted in favor of the bill. Those who 
voted against campaign finance reform were Chairman Burton and 
Reps. Hastert, Cox, Ros-Lehtinen, Mica, Davis, McIntosh, 
Souder, Scarborough, Shadegg, Sununu, Sessions, Pappas, 
Snowbarger, Barr, Miller, and Lewis. Republicans voting for the 
measure were Reps. Shays, Gilman, Morella, McHugh, Horn, 
LaTourette, and Sanford.869
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \869\ House Votes, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 2206 (Aug. 8, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The purpose of congressional investigations should be to 
illuminate where reforms in government policies are needed. The 
Committee's investigation and investigative reporting by the 
media have amply demonstrated the need for far-reaching 
campaign finance reform. Sadly, the votes against campaign 
finance reform by most of the Republican members of the 
Committee is another demonstration that the goal of the 
Committee's campaign finance investigation has been to 
embarrass Democrats--not to improve our campaign financing 
system.

        b. the republican leadership sought to hamstring the fec

    In the face of criticism for their opposition to campaign 
finance reform, Republican leaders such as Speaker Gingrich 
have claimed ``the problem is lawbreakers, not the campaign 
finance law.'' 870 Yet, despite their professed 
outrage at ``lawbreakers,'' Republican leaders have not sought 
to strengthen FEC enforcement of campaign finance laws. To the 
contrary, the Republican leadership has sought to hamstring the 
FEC through removal of the agency's chief law enforcement 
official and through inadequate funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \870\ Gingrich Assails Democrats for ``Illegitimate'' Campaign, 
Atlanta Journal (Sept. 28, 1997). See also Democrats and Clinton, in 
Surprise Move, Curb Contributions, Vow to Refuse Aliens' Donations, 
Wall Street Journal (Jan. 22, 1997) (quoting spokesperson for House 
Majority Leader Richard Armey as stating that campaign finance abuses 
``don't require changing the law'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Efforts to Remove the FEC's General Counsel

    Republican leaders have worked to pass legislation that 
would effectively remove FEC general counsel Lawrence Noble 
from his job. According to media accounts, Mr. Noble is opposed 
by Republicans because he has encouraged the investigation of 
Republican fundraising groups that include GOPAC (a political 
action committee formerly affiliated with Newt Gingrich), the 
Christian Coalition, and the weekly meeting of business leaders 
known as the ``Thursday Group'' that is hosted by House 
Republican conference chairman John Boehner.871 He 
also reportedly has antagonized Republicans by defending FEC 
efforts to impose restrictions on the use of soft money in 
national campaigns.872
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \871\ See, e.g., Panel Votes Term Limits for Top FEC Staffers, The 
Hill (Sept. 30, 1998); Campaign Reformer Under Attack, New York Times 
(Sept. 17, 1998); Noble's Cause, The New Republic (July 20/27, 1998); 
The FEC v. the GOP, National Journal, Inc. (July 11, 1998).
    \872\ See, e.g., Editorial, Campaign Reformer Under Attack, New 
York Times (Sept. 17, 1998); The FEC v. the GOP, National Journal (July 
11, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FEC is comprised of three Republican and three 
Democratic commissioners. Under current law, the FEC staff 
director and general counsel can only be removed if four of the 
six commissioners approve removal. Republican leaders, however, 
introduced legislation that would limit the terms of the FEC 
staff director and general counsel to four years unless at 
least four of the six FEC commissioners vote to reappoint 
them.873 Under the scheme set forth by the 
legislation, three commissioners could band together on party 
lines to force the ouster of a general counsel or staff 
director who took actions that were unappealing to one party or 
the other.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \873\ See, e.g., H.R. 3748; Senate Amendment No. 3379.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the House, the legislation was proposed by House 
Oversight Committee Chairman Bill Thomas.874 The 
House Appropriations Committee Republicans, led by Chairman Bob 
Livingston, added this provision to the Treasury-Postal 
appropriations bill in June on a party-line vote.875 
The language was removed, however, during House floor 
consideration of the bill in July on a point of order raised by 
Rep. Carolyn Maloney on the grounds that this language 
inappropriately legislated in a general appropriations 
bill.876
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \874\ H.R. 3748; Punishing Competence at the F.E.C., New York Times 
(June 11, 1998).
    \875\ The FEC v. the GOP, National Journal (July 11, 1998); GOP 
Targets Election Commission's Staff, Wall Street Journal (June 12, 
1998).
    \876\ Congressional Record, H5675 (July 16, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the Senate, the legislation was spearheaded by Sen. 
McConnell, head of the National Republican Senatorial 
Committee. The Senate considered the measure in July as an 
amendment to S. 2312, the Treasury-Postal appropriations 
legislation. The Senate voted on party lines against tabling 
the amendment, but the bill and amendments were set aside until 
after the August recess.877 In September, when the 
Senate again took up Treasury-Postal appropriations 
legislation, Sen. McConnell dropped much of the controversial 
language from the amendment, and the bill passed.878
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \877\ Action on Treasury-Postal Bill Is Suddenly Halted after 
Dispute over Term Limits at FEC, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 2111 
(Aug. 1, 1998); Congressional Quarterly Weekly, Senate Vote 246, 2122 
(Aug. 1, 1998).
    \878\ Senate Passes Treasury-Postal Bill after GOP Postpones Debate 
on Term Limits for FEC Staff, Congressional Quarterly, 2345 (Sept. 5, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the rejection of the FEC legislation in both the 
House and Senate versions of the Treasury-Postal appropriations 
bill, Republicans in the House-Senate conference on the bill 
revived the FEC legislation on a party-line vote.879 
When the measure was brought to the floor in early October, the 
House once again voted to block the provision, this time by 
preventing the bill's consideration through a procedural 
vote.880
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \879\ GOP Passes Contentious Bill, Associated Press (Sept. 29, 
1998).
    \880\ Congressional Quarterly Weekly, House Vote 475, 2690 (Oct. 3, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Proponents of the measure to limit the general counsel's 
term have denied that the FEC legislation targets Mr. Noble. 
However, GOP sources have acknowledged that they are ``hoping 
to send a serious message'' to the FEC.881 One 
Republican source reportedly stated ``It's not targeted at 
someone they dislike, but at an enforcement program they don't 
like that has been fairly aggressive with important 
constituencies of the leadership.'' 882
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \881\ FEC Counsel Tries to Prevent His Ouster, Roll Call (Oct. 1, 
1998).
    \882\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the professed goal of the Republican leadership is 
to strengthen FEC enforcement, the repeated attempts to remove 
Mr. Noble are designed to have the opposite effect. As the New 
York Times wrote in an editorial, ``At a time when Congress 
should be moving aggressively to strengthen the Federal 
Election Commission's ability to enforce the nation's campaign 
finance laws, House Republicans are racing headlong in the 
opposite direction. . . . The [measure] is nothing more than an 
attempt to install a do-nothing enforcement staff.'' 
883
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \883\ Punishing Competence at the F.E.C., New York Times (June 11, 
1998). See also, Housing Lawrence Noble, New York Times (Oct. 2, 1998); 
A Law-and-Order Issue, Washington Post (Sept. 28, 1998); Micro-
Muzzling, Roll Call (June 11, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Efforts to Defund the FEC

    In addition to efforts to remove the FEC general counsel, 
the Republican leadership also has opposed providing the FEC 
with the financial resources the FEC has requested over the 
past few years. For example, the FEC asked for $6.6 million in 
additional funds for FY 1997 and 1998 to hire staff for the 
heavy caseload resulting from the 1996 election, but 
congressional appropriators refused this request.884 
Appropriators provided a funding increase to the FEC for FY 
1998, but required that the majority of this amount go toward 
computer modernization, instead of staffing 
needs.885 Rep. Robert Livingston, chairman of the 
House Appropriations Committee, explained his position on 
funding the FEC as follows: ``I see no reason to increase their 
revenue. . . . I think they have become a political 
organization, they perpetuate their own base, and they don't do 
the job they were intended to do. I just don't believe in these 
guys.'' 886
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \884\ Money Woes Leave FEC Watchdog with More Bark Than Bite, 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 469-70 (Feb. 28, 1998).
    \885\ Id.
    \886\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During consideration of the fiscal year 1999 appropriations 
legislation that funded the FEC, House appropriators again did 
not provide the full amount requested by the FEC. When the 
funding measure reached the full House, however, $2.8 million 
was added to the FEC funds through an amendment sponsored by 
Reps. Carolyn Maloney and Vince Snowbarger. Only 27 of 223 
Republican members that voted supported this amendment, while 
186 of 200 Democratic members that voted supported this 
amendment.887
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \887\ Congressional Quarterly Weekly, House Vote 287, 1970 (July 
18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unfortunately, the vast majority of the Committee 
Republicans did not support providing the funding requested by 
the FEC. Only seven of the 24 Republicans on the Committee 
voted for the amendment to the Treasury-Postal appropriations 
bill that provided the FEC with an additional $2.8 million. All 
of the Democrats and the one Independent on the Committee voted 
in favor of the amendment.888 It is an ultimate 
irony that at the same time that Committee Republicans have 
spent millions of dollars investigating alleged Democratic 
campaign finance abuses, they refuse to provide proper support 
to the very agency that is charged with enforcing our campaign 
finance laws and preventing further abuses.

                                   Henry A. Waxman.
                                   Tom Lantos.
                                   Robert E. Wise, Jr.
                                   Major R. Owens.
                                   Edolphus Towns.
                                   Paul E. Kanjorski.
                                   Gary A. Condit.
                                   Bernard Sanders.
                                   Carolyn B. Maloney.
                                   Eleanor Holmes Norton.
                                   Chaka Fattah.
                                   Elijah E. Cummings.
                                   Dennis J. Kucinich.
                                   Rod R. Blagojevich.
                                   Danny K. Davis.
                                   Thomas H. Allen.
                                   Harold E. Ford, Jr.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \888\ Congressional Record, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 287 
(July 16, 1998).


<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>


               ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. THOMAS M. BARRETT

    I agree with chapters I, IV, and V of the minority views.

                                                 Thomas M. Barrett.