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105th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE

 1st Session                                                     105-72
_______________________________________________________________________


 
               BIENNIAL BUDGETING AND APPROPRIATIONS ACT

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                   COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                              TO ACCOMPANY

                                 S. 261

 TO PROVIDE FOR BIENNIAL BUDGET PROCESS AND A BIENNIAL APPROPRIATIONS 
  PROCESS AND TO ENHANCE OVERSIGHT AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FEDERAL 
                               GOVERNMENT


 


                September 4 1997.--Ordered to be printed


                   COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine                 JOHN GLENN, Ohio
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico         JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi            DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma                RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire             MAX CLELAND, Georgia
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
          Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
                Susanne T. Marshall, Professional Staff
                 Leonard Weiss, Minority Staff Director
                    Michal Sue Prosser, Chief Clerk



                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
   I. Purpose.........................................................1
  II. Summary.........................................................1
 III. Need for Legislation............................................2
  IV. Legislative History of Biennial Budgeting......................16
   V. Legislative History of S. 261..................................18
  VI. Committee Action...............................................20
 VII. Section-by-Section Analysis....................................21
VIII. Regulatory Impact Statement....................................24
  IX. Cost Estimate..................................................25
   X. Minority Views of Senator Durbin...............................28
  XI. Changes in Existing Law........................................30



105th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE

 1st Session                                                     105-72
_______________________________________________________________________


               BIENNIAL BUDGETING AND APPROPRIATIONS ACT

                                _______
                                

               September 4, 1997.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


Mr. Thompson, from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 261]

    The Committee on Governmental Affairs, to which was 
referred the bill (S. 261) to provide for a two-year Federal 
budget cycle, and for other purposes, having considered the 
same, reports favorably on the bill as amended in the nature of 
a substitute and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

                               I. Purpose

    The purpose of S. 261, the Biennial Budget and 
Appropriations Act, is to increase Congressional control of the 
budget process by reducing the amount of time spent on budget 
matters while improving the quality of those deliberations by 
providing time for long-term planning and careful oversight and 
to provide stability and coherence in the collection and 
disbursement of Federal funds by establishing a two-year 
Federal budget cycle.

                         II. Summary of S. 261

    S. 261 converts the annual budget, appropriations, and 
authorization process to a biennial or two-year cycle. Under 
the bill, the timetable for the two years is as follows:

First year: Budget and appropriations

    Requires the President to submit a two-year budget at the 
beginning of the first session of Congress. The President's 
budget would cover each year in the biennium and planning 
levels for the four out-years. Converts the ``Mid-session 
Review'' into a ``Mid-biennium Review.'' The President would 
submit his ``Mid-biennium Review'' at the beginning of the 
second year.
    Requires Congress to adopt a two-year budget resolution and 
a two-year reconciliation bill (if necessary). Instead of 
enforcing the first fiscal year and the sum of the five years 
set out in the budget resolution, the bill provides that the 
budget resolution establish binding levels for each year in the 
biennium and the sum of the six-year period. The bill modifies 
the time frames in the Senate ten-year pay-as-you-go point of 
order to provide that legislation could not increase the 
deficit for the biennium, the sum of the first six years, and 
the sum of the last 4 years.
    Requires Congress to enact a two-year appropriations bill 
during the first session of each Congress. The bill provides a 
new majority point of order against appropriations bills that 
fail to cover two years. This point of order would not apply to 
supplemental appropriations bills to fund unanticipated needs 
such as emergencies.
    Makes budgeting and appropriating the priority for the 
first session of a Congress. The bill provides a majority point 
of order against consideration of authorization and revenue 
legislation until the completion of the biennial budget 
resolution, reconciliation legislation (if necessary) and the 
thirteen biennial appropriations bills. An exception is made 
for certain ``must do'' measures.

Second year: Authorization legislation and enhanced oversight

    Devotes the second session of a Congress to consideration 
of biennial or multi-year authorization bills and oversight of 
federal programs. The bill provides a majority point of order 
against authorization and revenue legislation that cover less 
than two years except those measures limited to temporary 
programs or activities lasting less than two years.
    Modifies the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) 
to fit the government performance planning and reporting 
process into the two-year budget cycle to enhance oversight of 
federal programs.

                       III. Need for Legislation

    The current congressional budget process is rooted in the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 
(Public Law 93-344, Title 2 of U.S. Code). While the 1974 
reforms have enabled the Congress to participate more fully in 
the development of fiscal policy, the design of the current 
process has led to a situation in which repetitive votes on the 
budget consume a large percentage of the Congress' time. This 
has had two negative results: a decrease in the time available 
for systematic oversight of federal programs and delays in 
legislation necessary to fund the government. Since 1974, the 
Congress has consistently failed to complete action on the 
Federal budget before the start of the fiscal year. The failure 
to enact regular appropriation bills prior to the beginning of 
the fiscal year results in the need for the Congress and the 
President to agree on a continuing resolution to fund the 
Federal government's operations.

             TABLE l.--APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1974-97             
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Regular                   
                                           appropriation    Continuing  
                                           bills enacted    resolution  
                                           by the start     enacted for 
                                           of the fiscal    the fiscal  
                                               year            year     
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year:                                                            
    1974................................               3               2
    1975................................               7               4
    1976................................               2               3
    1977................................            1 13               2
    1978................................               9               3
    1979................................               5               1
    1980................................               3               2
    1981................................               1               2
    1982................................               0               5
    1983................................               1               2
    1984................................               4               4
    1985................................               4               4
    1986................................               0               5
    1987................................               0               5
    1988................................               0               5
    1989................................            2 13               0
    1990................................               1               3
    1991................................               0               5
    1992................................               3               4
    1993................................               1               1
    1994................................               2               3
    1995................................              13               0
    1996................................               0               5
    1997................................            1 13               0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 While 13 bills were enacted, certain health programs were not funded  
  and required a continuing resolution.                                 
2 Six bills were enacted on October 1.                                  
3 Six bills were enacted as one Omnibus bill on September 30. In effect,
  this omnibus bill served as a Continuing Resolution.                  
                                                                        
Sources.--Congressional Research Service (Reports 96-224 GOV and 94-799 
  GOV).                                                                 

    As Table 1 illustrates, only two times since the enactment 
of the Budget Act in 1974 has the Congress completed action on 
all 13 regular appropriations bills to fully fund the 
government by the beginning of the fiscal year. In addition, 
the Committee believes that the success in 1989 strengthens the 
case for a shift to biennial budgeting because it can be 
attributed in large part to the foundation laid by the Budget 
Summit Agreement between the Congressional leadership and the 
President which covered two years.
    While policy disagreements between Congress and the 
Executive Branch have contributed to the budgetary delays 
evidenced in Table 1, the complexity of the congressional 
budget process is also a contributing factor. The Committee 
believes that a biennial budget cycle will greatly improve the 
budget process by reducing multiple decisions on individual 
budget items. This, in turn, would greatly increase the 
likelihood that deadlines will be met and provide stability to 
Federal activities. Providing agencies with this increased 
predictability is especially important at a time when Congress 
and the taxpayers are demanding that agencies provide strategic 
and annual performance plans and more systematically link 
resources to results. Additionally, for agencies which are 
downsizing, multi-year planning increases the probability that 
downsizing will be well managed and reduces the negative impact 
on the quality of those programs remaining.
    The repetitive nature of budget votes and the amount of 
time consumed by them has also served to reduce the time 
available for members to spend on systematic oversight of the 
design and implementation of federal programs. Such oversight 
has always been important, but a number of Members have 
suggested that the requirements of the Government Performance 
and Results Act and the pressure placed on resources by the 
need to achieve a balanced budget make oversight even more 
critical. Further, the kind of oversight needed requires the 
investment of Members' time to look below the surface and see 
what is really happening. Members need to consider whether and 
what legislative changes might be required to improve the 
functioning of federal programs or, when warranted, to 
discontinue them. This kind of time is in increasingly short 
supply.
    In reporting S. 261, it is the Committee's view that while 
biennial budgeting will not solve all of the problems which 
have developed relating to the budget process, it will 
substantially improve the process, and will create a greater 
presumption in favor of carefully considered, timely decisions 
and of careful, systematic program oversight.

                         the budget act of 1974

    Currently, Congress completes at least four separate budget 
processes annually following Presidential submission of the 
Administration's budget: (1) the concurrent budget resolution, 
(2) program authorizations, (3) budget reconciliation, and (4) 
consideration of 13 individual appropriation bills. This multi-
layered approach to budgeting is further complicated by the 
addition of the Budget Enforcement Act.
    S. 261 would not eliminate any of these processes, but it 
would require their consideration biennially instead of 
annually. S. 261 would divide the process into two separate 
stages over a two year Congress: (1) consideration of the 
concurrent budget resolution, reconciliation and all 13 
individual two-year appropriation bills in the first year; and 
(2) consideration of multi-year authorizing legislation and 
program oversight in the second year.
    As such, S. 261 builds upon the Budget Act of 1974. That 
Act completely overhauled the Congressional budget process, 
asserting the legislative branch's participation in the fiscal 
policy of the nation. Battles with President Nixon over the 
impoundment of funds in the early 1970's, combined with the 
lack of an institutional system for developing budget policy, 
prompted the Congress to enact these reforms.
    The Budget Act established budget committees in the House 
and in the Senate, created the Congressional Budget Office to 
provide independent budget information and analysis to the 
Congress, and established a timetable for the consideration of 
the Federal budget and procedures for consideration of 
presidential rescissions and impoundments.
    The 1974 reforms also established the concurrent budget 
resolution which serves as a blueprint for spending and tax 
policy for the next fiscal year--a statement of the Congress' 
fiscal policy and priorities. Prior to the Budget Act, Members 
of Congress expressed great frustration with congressional 
inability to determine the impact of individual appropriation 
bills within the framework of the entire Federal budget. The 
budget resolution satisfies this concern by providing a means 
for Congress to formulate a fiscal blueprint, which is then 
used as a tool for measuring the impact of individual spending 
bills on the overall Federal budget.
    The former Chairman and Ranking Republican member of the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Senator William Roth, 
summarized the benefits and detriments of the Budget Act in 
testimony before the Committee on June 7, 1988:

          There's no question that the Budget Act of 1974 was a 
        major improvement over what had been virtually 
        uncontrollable and haphazard process. The 1974 Act 
        provided the Congress with a mechanism to formulate and 
        evaluate an overall fiscal strategy. It helped put 
        individual appropriations bills into perspective 
        regarding the entire budget. Yet, while it strengthened 
        the Congress' hand in making budget decisions, it has 
        weakened the ability of the Congress to get its work 
        done efficiently and effectively.

    While the 1974 reforms greatly enhanced the role of the 
Congress in forming national fiscal policy, the complexity of 
the budget process has contributed to missed deadlines and 
inefficient decision making. This problem has grown as the 
complexity of the process has grown. For example, in the 
original budget act reconciliation was not envisioned as a 
major part of the process. Then in 1980, Congress first used 
reconciliation to make major changes in the Federal budget. The 
reconciliation process directs the authorizing committees of 
the Congress to change existing entitlement and revenue laws 
for deficit reduction purposes, and is initiated through 
instructions in the budget resolution. Reconciliation has now 
become a regular part of the process: the Congress has 
considered a reconciliation measure eleven times over the 
sixteen years from 1981-1997.
    Rapidly escalating Federal budget deficits in the mid-
1980's led Congress to add a fifth step to the budget process. 
In 1985, the Congress passed the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act, and in 1987, the Congress passed the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Reduction Reaffirmation 
Act of 1987. These laws sought to establish procedures for 
enforcing maximum deficit amounts for fiscal years 1988 through 
1993. In 1987, the Congress and the President added another, 
albeit non-statutory, layer of budget procedure--the summit. 
The Congress and the administration agreed to a two-year Budget 
Summit Agreement, which set enforceable spending and tax 
guidelines for fiscal year 1988 and 1989. The Budget Summit 
approach was also adopted during the start of the 101st 
Congress, but produced spending and tax guidelines for only one 
fiscal year.
    In 1990 it was clear that achieving the fiscal year 1991 
deficit targets would be nearly impossible. Again the President 
and the Congress turned to a Budget Summit. Out of this summit 
came both a deficit reduction package and a process for 
enforcing budget agreements--The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 
(BEA). The Budget Enforcement Act represented a shift from 
regulating the only effect of governmental actions to 
regulating the actions themselves. It contained real 
expenditure limits: a series of limits on annual appropriated 
spending enforceable by sequesters. Direct spending (i.e. 
spending not regulated by the appropriations process) was 
governed by new pay-as-you-go rules. These required that the 
total of all new spending or taxlegislation from authorizing 
committees could not increase the deficit. The Budget Enforcement Act 
also extended the time horizon of the budget process: coverage of the 
budget resolution was lengthened from 3 to 5 years and the basis of 
several enforcement points of order was expanded from one year to 5 
fiscal years.
    The original BEA set discretionary spending limits through 
1995. These limits were extended in 1993 to go through 1998. 
The 1997 Bipartisan Budget agreement would further extend the 
limits to 2002.

          BENEFITS OF BIENNIAL BUDGETING--REDUCING REPETITION

    Although each step of the budget process was designed to 
make the allocation of Federal resources more efficient and 
effective, the combined result has been frequently missed 
budget deadlines and repetitive roll call votes on budget 
issues. The congressional response to the increasingly complex 
process has been to budget year round. Furthermore, these 
repetitive votes are extremely confusing to the public which 
seeks to understand the actions of their elected 
representatives.
    While budget delays are frequently the consequence of 
policy differences between the Executive branch and Congress or 
between two Parties within the Congress, the ability of the 
Congress to execute a fiscal plan is unnecessarily slowed by 
the existing process. It is the Committee's view that two-year 
budgeting can be a successful tool to assist both the Congress 
and the Executive branch in more efficiently managing the 
budget.
    At the June 7, 1988 Committee hearing, Comptroller General 
Charles Bowsher said:

          I do not think we can devise new procedures that will 
        completely overcome the delays and inefficiencies of 
        the current budget process. To a large extent, the 
        difficulties our elected officials experience in 
        reaching consensus on budget matters reflects 
        underlying divisions and uncertainties in the American 
        public about policy choices and priorities. 
        Nevertheless, I think that there are changes that could 
        help. To the extent that we can make the budget process 
        and documents less complex and more understandable, we 
        will have taken a step forward.

    The Committee believes S. 261 could help achieve this. By 
dedicating an entire year to the authorization and oversight 
process, the Congress will have much more time to consider 
underlying authorizations carefully. Members should be free 
from congressional action on the budget, except for action on 
supplemental appropriation bills or revised concurrent 
resolutions, during the second session of each Congress, 
enabling them to focus on the work of the authorizing 
committees. On June 24, 1988, Senator Wendell Ford addressed 
this issue on the Senate floor:

          A two-year budget, with one session reserved 
        specifically for oversight and authorizations, will 
        give Congress the time to enact responsible spending 
        proposals before the adoption of a budget resolution 
        and appropriation bills. A two year cycle will give the 
        executive branch and State and local governments two 
        years to plan for the most efficient use of Federal 
        dollars. * * * Congress simply needs more time to 
        review existing spending programs to determine whether 
        they should be modified, expanded, or replaced.

    In 1993 both the House and Senate members of the Joint 
Committee on the Organization of Congress made similar 
arguments in recommending a shift to biennial budgeting. The 
report of the House members said, ``The move to biennial 
budgeting will reduce the number of redundant budget-related 
votes during each Congress * * *.'' The report of the Senate 
members was as forceful:

          With biennial budgeting, the budget process should be 
        less complicated, less repetitious, and instead be more 
        understandable and meaningful. The Congress is now 
        dominated by budget activity. But for all the time 
        spent on the budget, Members complain that their votes 
        are redundant and meaningless. And, it is a process the 
        public cannot readily comprehend.

    The Committee views as a principal benefit of biennial 
budgeting the reduction in the repetitive nature of the current 
budget process. Each year the Congress considers the budget 
resolution, annual authorizations, reconciliation, and 
appropriations. Lastly, the need to extend the public debt 
limit usually attracts other legislative and budget items.
    Former Representative and ranking Republican member of the 
House Committee on the Budget James Rhodes testified at the 
June 7, 1988 Committee hearing that two year budgeting would 
reduce the repetitive nature of the current budget process:

          There is no reason to revisit each and every decision 
        necessary to run a trillion dollar enterprise each and 
        every year. Biennial budgets and biennial 
        appropriations would provide a longer and more certain 
        planning horizon. They should lead to increased 
        efficiency in government. They certainly would help 
        rationalize congressional decision-making. They should 
        provide a better basis for evaluation of the 
        effectiveness of Government services and programs. * * 
        * (It) could improve substantially the quality of 
        congressional oversight and might once again lead to a 
        meaningful authorization process.

    As Table 2 indicates, during the 1980's the percentage of 
budget related votes in the United States Senate increased 
dramatically over levels between 1955-1980. This increase can 
be tied to the increase in the number of layers in the budget 
process.

                         TABLE 2.--BUDGET RELATED ROLLCALL VOTES IN THE SENATE, 1955-96                         
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                  Budget related
                                                                  Budget related  Total rollcall    votes as a  
                                                                  rollcall votes       votes        percent of  
                                                                                                       total    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year:                                                                                                    
    1955........................................................              33              87              38
    1960........................................................              86             207              42
    1965........................................................             108             258              42
    1970........................................................             189             418              45
    1975........................................................             254             602              42
    1980........................................................             280             531              53
    1981........................................................             335             483              69
    1982........................................................             286             465              62
    1983........................................................             244             371              66
    1984........................................................             164             275              60
    1985........................................................             230             381              60
    1986........................................................             189             354              53
    1987........................................................             185             420              44
    1988........................................................             124             379              33
    1989........................................................             148             312              47
    1990........................................................             123             326              38
    1991........................................................             134             280              48
    1992........................................................             162             270              60
    1993........................................................             252             395              64
    1994........................................................             165             329              50
    1995........................................................             328             613              54
    1996........................................................             222             306              73
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source.--Congressional Quarterly Almanacs, 1955-1996, and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, 1987 and 1996.

    In 1988, the Congress debated the level of defense spending 
five different times during consideration of the budget 
resolution, the defense authorization bill, defense 
appropriations, the revision in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
sequestration procedures, and the Budget Summit Agreement. 
Splitting the process over a two year period could reduce this 
repetition. S. 261 does not eliminate any of the processes as 
each serves a significant role in the Congress' deliberations. 
However, by making decisions once every two years instead of 
twice, the burden should be reduced.
    Providing this extra time will also promote a smoother 
appropriations process, one which is more accountable to the 
American people. At the October 18, 1989 joint Governmental 
Affairs and Budget Committees hearing, Senator Roth testified:

          A two year budget would create an orderly, 
        predictable process for consideration of spending 
        decisions responsive to policy priorities and improve 
        congressional control over the Federal budget. Equally 
        important, it would allow sufficient time for the 
        fulfillment by the Congress of its legislative and 
        oversight responsibilities.

           benefits of biennial budgeting--improved oversight

    The Committee views one of the major benefits of reducing 
the number of repetitious budget-related votes will be the 
freeing up of time for systematic program oversight.
    Senator Fred Thompson in his opening statement at the July 
24, 1996, hearing commented:

          What a biennial budget can do is give us time for the 
        important tasks that often get short shrift these days, 
        such as conducting oversight and long-range planning, 
        and spending more time at home. * * *

    Program oversight was one of the benefits cited by both the 
House and Senate members of the Joint Committee on the 
Organization of the Congress in 1993. The report of the Senate 
members proposed that ``In even-numbered years, Congress should 
consider substantive legislative proposals, conduct meaningful 
oversight, monitor and evaluate legislation. * * *'' They noted 
further that ``although a great deal of time is spent on the 
budget, little time is spent in long-term planning, overseeing 
programs, and finding waste and abuse. In short, the Congress 
spends too much time on budgetary issues that do not matter and 
not enough time on those that do.'' A 2-year cycle, they argued 
could permit Members to ``spend more time overseeing programs 
to make certain that taxpayer money is spent wisely.''
    The House report linked the biennial cycle to its 
recommendation for a formal oversight schedule and plan by each 
committee.
    Members of the Committee noted that they--and their 
colleagues--feel there is inadequate time available for serious 
examination of how federal programs function and how policy is 
implemented. Congress and the President have put in place a 
legislative framework--the Government Performance and Results 
Act--requiring strategic plans and annual performance plans and 
reports. Congress must have the time to be involved actively in 
the development of strategic plans and in oversight of the 
plans for this Act to offer the American people the kind of 
government they deserve.

BENEFITS OF BIENNIAL BUDGETING--GREATER STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY IN 
                            FEDERAL FUNDING

    The Committee believes that by providing funds for a two 
year period, recipients of these funds will be better able to 
plan and administer their funds. Senator Pete Domenici, as 
Chairman of the Budget Committee, stated in a December 8, 1996, 
Washington Post editorial:

         By moving to a two-year budget and appropriations 
        cycle, Congress can inject stability in a sometimes 
        chaotic system, strengthen congressional oversight and 
        watchdog functions, improve the efficiency of 
        government agencies and--finally, it is hoped--increase 
        the public's confidence that the achievement of a 
        balanced budget has been done intelligently, 
        deliberatively and fairly.

    Mr. Richard Helm, then the Comptroller of the Department of 
Defense, testified at the June 7, 1988 Committee hearing on the 
Defense Department's experience with biennial budgeting. Mr. 
Helm highlighted the management benefits of biennial budgeting, 
especially for procurement, ``for being able to give program 
managers their funding up front so that they can pursue, in the 
most efficient fashion, the best type of defense procurement 
management that we should all expect for taxpayers money.'' The 
annual process, Mr. Helm testified, is inefficient from the 
managers' perspective because of the delays in obligating 
funds.
    The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute and The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies completed a joint study 
in 1989 entitled, ``Making Defense Reform Work,'' which 
strongly endorsed the concept of two year budgeting. This study 
highlighted the notion that a two-year process would not only 
improve management of the nation's defense spending, but 
efficiencies would apply to all aspects of Federal spending:

          The substantive arguments for two-year budgets are 
        compelling. The longer term focus could help to force 
        hard choices; it is too easy to defer difficult choices 
        when the field of view is limited to a single year. One 
        year budgets contribute to the excessive focus in both 
        the Pentagon and the Congress on the near term. With 
        every program up for review every year, it is little 
        wonder that few people in either branch take long term 
        planning seriously. A biennial budget also would impart 
        greater stability to the defense program; there simply 
        is too much turmoil in government programs when every 
        item in the budget can be adjusted every year. And the 
        burden of annual budgets on both branches of government 
        is too great, for domestic programs as well as defense 
        programs. An annual budget process leaves too little 
        time in either branch for serious policy planning and 
        evaluation, and defending each year's budget.

    The study suggests that the Federal budget process be 
structured along the lines set forth in S. 261, with budget 
activity concentrated in the first session of each Congress and 
oversight activities in the second session. The Committee 
believes that oversight and authorization activities should be 
viewed as a continuum across sessions of Congress in order to 
promote the most efficient use of Federal spending.
    Senator Wendell Ford testified at the October 18, 1989 
hearing that two year budgeting ``is a management tool for 
Congress to use to make our work on the deficit and federal 
budget more efficient and effective.'' The Committee notes the 
Senate Committee on Rules successful experiment with two year 
budgeting for Senate Committees. Senator Ford, the Chairman of 
the Committee on Rules when this reform was first implemented, 
expressed his continued enthusiasm for the shift in Senate 
Committee budget authorizations from an annual to biennial 
basis during the October 18 hearing.
    The report of the Senate members of the Joint Committee on 
the Organization of Congress noted this point in their support 
for biennial budgeting:

          Two-year cycles will also permit executive branch 
        agencies to plan for the longer term, a failure of the 
        current system. * * * The 2-year funding cycle gives 
        agencies degree of certainty in policy planning that 
        they have never had, and will minimize the constant 
        budget planning process that has accompanied the 2-year 
        appropriations cycle.

    Senator Collins, who heard testimony at the April 23, 1997 
Committee on S. 261, stated:

          A Federal Biennial Budget would eliminate much of the 
        procedural repetition and give the executive branch 
        more time to manage and Congress more time to conduct 
        effective oversight of Federal agencies.

    The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
Franklin D. Raines, testified at that hearing regarding the 
many potential benefits of S. 261. He noted that:

          Biennial budgeting also makes it possible for the 
        Executive Branch and Congress to better utilize time 
        and resources. * * * Even if biennial budgeting 
        generated a greater need for supplementals, the total 
        expenditure of time and resources on budgeting probably 
        still would decline. * * * By concentrating budget 
        decisions in the first year of each biennium, biennial 
        budgeting also could free up time for more 
        congressional oversight and agency management 
        activities. * * * I would expect that a biennial cycle 
        would free up some time in the second year for program 
        managers to increase their efforts on management and 
        long-range planning.

    Two-year appropriations bills offer those depending on 
federal funds--both federal agencies and, increasingly, 
activities run by state and local governments--a longer 
planning horizon. If agencies know their funding for two years 
rather than for a single year, they can plan better; and they 
can make more efficient use of resources. For an agency that is 
downsizing, a two-year time period can reduce the disruption to 
both personnel and taxpayers who deal with that agency. For a 
state or local government seeking to create well-designed 
programs, even a two-year time period may seem too short; but 
it is infinitely preferable to a single year. Indeed, for both 
federal agencies and other levels of government the improvement 
could be even greater since the Committee belies the 
appropriate comparison is between a one-year appropriation 
enacted late and biennial appropriations enacted timely.
    As Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
Franklin Raines, said before the Committee on April 23, 1997:

          One of the more compelling advantages of biennial 
        appropriations is that it could provide greater 
        stability and predictability for those served and 
        involved in Federal Government programs, such as 
        individuals receiving Federal benefits or State and 
        non-profits receiving Federal grants.

    1987 BUDGET SUMMIT AGREEMENT PROVIDED TEST OF TWO YEAR BUDGETING

    The two year Budget Summit Agreement between President 
Reagan and the Congressional leadership on November 20, 1987 
provides the compelling evidence that substantial improvements 
are possible in the budget process. The Budget Summit Agreement 
set forth the spending and tax guidelines for a two year 
period. This included funding levels for defense and domestic 
discretionary categories and international affairs programs.
    These overall totals helped the Congress move briskly with 
enactment of individual appropriation bills for fiscal year 
1989. The House of Representatives completed initial action on 
all thirteen appropriations bills by June 30. This was the 
first time since 1960 that the House finished this stage of the 
process prior to June 30, and in 1960 the fiscal year started 
July 1. The Senate followed this action and all thirteen 
individual appropriation bills were enacted by the start of 
fiscal year 1989--for the first time in more than a decade.
    During the June 7, 1988 Committee hearing, Senators Ford, 
Roth, Nickles, and Domenici all noted the value of the Budget 
Summit Agreement for laying the foundation of a multi-year 
budget and helping expedite fiscal year 1989 appropriation 
bills. Senator Nickles said:

          It was the Budget Summit Agreement last year (1987) 
        that technically gave us our first two year budget. We 
        now find ourselves nearly on schedule with the budget 
        process. This is due to the fact that we arrived at set 
        spending levels a year in advance.

    In response to a question from former Chairman Glenn during 
the June 7, 1988 Committee hearing, then Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) Director James Miller III responded that the 
experience of the Budget Summit Agreement demonstrated that the 
Federal government and Congress are capable of ``putting 
together a two-year budget and carry through reasonably on it. 
I think this is something we should emulate.''
    The former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, Senator Sam Nunn, and the former ranking Republican 
member, Senator John Warner, praised the Budget Summit 
Agreement in the transmittal of their Committee's views and 
estimates to the Committee on the Budget for the Fiscal Year 
1989 Concurrent Resolution on the Budget, ``* * * we would like 
to note that last fall's Deficit Reduction Agreement is an 
excellent example of the benefits of a two year budget cycle. 
Because of this Agreement, we start this year with a consensus 
on the overall level of National Defense spending for the next 
fiscal year. This agreement will allow the authorization and 
appropriations processes to proceed in a more orderly and 
timely fashion this year.

                SUPPORT FOR THE BIENNIAL BUDGET PROPOSAL

    The Committee believes that a biennial budget would create 
greater opportunities for careful consideration of 
authorizations underlying appropriations bills and would help 
Congress operate more effectively. At the June 7, 1988 
Committee hearing, Senator Ford testified:

          Biennial budgeting is not a panacea for our Federal 
        budgetary problems. But it is a tool which can make the 
        Federal government operate more efficiently and allow 
        Congress the time to make considered and informed 
        budgetary decisions. Biennial budgeting will provide 
        greater funding stability and certainty for our elected 
        counterparts in state and local governments and for the 
        numerous beneficiaries of Federal funds.

    The first biennial budgeting bill was introduced in 1977 by 
then-Congressman Leon Panetta. When Mr. Panetta became OMB 
Director in 1993 he retained his support for biennial 
budgeting.
    President Bush, in the fiscal year 1991 Budget also 
recommended biennial budgeting as a reform of the budget 
process. ``If the budget process could cover two years instead 
of one, there would be large saving of congressional time and 
better opportunities for improved program management in the 
executive branch.'' While the President's budget endorsed two 
year appropriations, it suggested that a reform that stopped 
short of biennial appropriations could still be useful.
    As noted above, biennial budgeting was again recommended in 
1993 by both the House and Senate members of the Joint 
Committee on the Organization of Congress and by the Vice 
President's National Performance Review.
    Senator Domenici urging the shift to biennial budgeting in 
his 1996 Washington Post article, ``Make It A Two-Year 
Budget,'' stated:

          We should begin by abandoning the outmoded and 
        disorderly annual budget and appropriations process and 
        move to biennial budgeting and appropriating to 
        stabilize our budget decisions. This is the most 
        important reform we can adopt to improve the process, 
        provide for oversight and careful deliberation, and 
        make us more accountable to the American people.

    In addition to the congressional and executive branch 
support, numerous state officials have urged the federal 
government to shift to a biennial budget cycle.

                STATE EXPERIENCE WITH BIENNIAL BUDGETING

    Although there are significant differences between State 
budgets and that of the Federal government, the Committee still 
believes that an examination of state experiences could prove 
useful.
    In her opening statement on the April 23, 1997 Committee 
hearing on S. 261, Senator Collins addressed the States use of 
biennial budgeting by stating:

          Many State Governments, including my own State of 
        Maine, use a 2-year budget very successfully. As a 
        former cabinet member in Maine, I speak from direct 
        experience in working in a 2-year budget cycle. It is 
        far more efficient, far more cost effective than our 
        current Federal budget process.

    On July 15, 1987 the General Accounting Office published a 
survey of biennial budgeting trends, practices, and experiences 
in the 50 states. The data were updated in later GAO testimony 
in 1996 and 1997. Eight states have biennial legislatures and 
hence of necessity biennial appropriations cycles. Of the 42 
states with annual legislative cycles, 12 have biennial budget 
cycles and 27 have annual ones. Three states describe their 
budget cycles as ``mixed'' in which the budget is divided into 
two categories: that for which budgeting is annual and that for 
which it is biennial. These states placed agencies with 
relatively predictable needs on a biennial cycle and those with 
more volatility on an annual cycle. The Committee believes that 
a major contributor to volatility perceived by the states is 
the federal government's annual cycle.
    In the last three decades, 11 states switched from biennial 
to annual and three from annual to biennial. One state switched 
from biennial to annual and back to biennial. Then-Comptroller 
General Bowsher testified at the June 7, 1990 Committee hearing 
that one of the factors contributing to the states' shift to 
annual budgeting was the annual Federal process.
    Senator Richard Finan, President Pro Tem of the Ohio 
Senate, testified biennial budgeting has worked well: budgets 
are completed on time; staff and members have time to do other 
things; and ``agencies are in a better position to plan.'' In 
addition, Senator Finan noted that shifting the Federal 
government to a biennial budget cycle would be helpful to the 
states. As he explained, ``As you know, Congress is very 
involved in our spending in our State programs and when you 
take things like Medicaid and AFDC which can get to 40 percent 
of our budget, just imagine, after we have done a biennial 
budget, if you vary 1 percent or 2 percent on those kinds of 
numbers, you can be a disaster to us in that second year of the 
budgeting process. It would be extremely helpful to us to have 
a biennial budget here in Washington, D.C.''
    John Keel, Director of the Texas Legislative Budget Board, 
echoed Senator Finan's statements. He noted that a two-year 
budget cycle increases planning stability and certainty not 
only for state agencies but also for other governmental 
jurisdictions. In addition, he felt that it permitted the state 
to ``more effectively monitor * * * expenditures and * * * more 
effectively assess the performance of agencies and programs.''

                           ADDITIONAL ISSUES

    A number of issues with regard to biennial budgeting have 
been raised during the Committee's consideration. These issues 
include: (1) whether biennial budgeting would lead to greater 
use of supplemental spending; (2) whether the uncertainty of 
economic projections would make it very difficult to budget two 
years in advance; (3) how the Congress would respond to new 
national needs or emergencies; (4) the timing of authorizations 
in a biennial budget; and (5) the transition to biennial 
budgeting.
    First, concern was expressed about the impact of biennial 
budgeting in creating an incentive for more supplemental 
appropriations. In particular, some noted that the stability 
and predictability of funding cited as a major benefit of 
biennial appropriations would be lessened if major adjustments 
became routine in the ``off years.'' As Table 3 indicates, the 
Congress already enacts at least one supplemental each fiscal 
year. In 1978, the Congress enacted nine supplemental 
appropriations. In 1989, the Congress enacted three.

       TABLE 3.--SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1974-96      
                      [Dollar amounts in millions]                      
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Number of       Amount of  
                                           supplemental       budget    
                                               bills         authority  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year:                                                            
    1974................................               5         $14,796
    1975................................               7          27,587
    1976................................               5          24,636
    1977................................               5          49,482
    1978................................               8           8,219
    1979................................               2          13,784
    1980................................               5          19,575
    1981................................               3          12,461
    1982................................               4          21,020
    1983................................               2          22,654
    1984................................               4          16,357
    1985................................               3          14,804
    1986................................               3           8,191
    1987................................               2           9,370
    1988................................               2           1,310
    1989................................               1           3,295
    1990................................               2           2,039
    1991................................               3          19,786
    1992................................               1           2,806
    1993................................               3           9,848
    1994................................               2           7,822
    1995................................               2          -9,847
    1996................................               0  ..............
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source.--U.S. Congress, Senate, Appropriations, Budget Estimates, Etc., 
  S Doc., 94th Cong., 2nd sess.--103rd Cong., 1st sess., prepared by    
  Senate and House Appropriations Committees, (Washington: GPO, 1976-   
  1993); House Appropriations Committee data, 1994-1996.                

     The Committee believes that it would be easier to consider 
several supplementals annually than to go through the entire 
budget process as the Congress does currently. By retaining the 
enforcement mechanisms set forth in the Budget Enforcement Act 
as amended (commonly referred to as BEA), the Congress can 
assure that supplementals do not break budget discipline. The 
Committee believes that supplementals should and can continue 
to be seen as exceptions considered when changes in condition 
warrant a change in spending decisions. While it is possible 
that in the early years some agencies may seek changes in the 
funding provided in the biennial appropriation bill, the 
Committee believes that the attitude of the OMB and the 
Congress can prevent such attempts from becoming routine. In 
addition, all decisions would still have to comply with the 
spending limits established in the BEA.
    Second, concern was expressed about the uncertainty of 
economic assumptions which would be required for two years in 
advance instead of one. Several witnesses noted the problems in 
forecasting economic performance, and the dependence of the 
current process on accurate assumptions.
    However, the Committee noted that the Congressional Budget 
Office and the Office of Management and Budget currently 
project economic assumptions for the budget year and the 
following five years. Further, the Committee notes that nothing 
in this legislation prevents consideration of a revised budget 
resolution if the changes in the underlying economic 
assumptions are great enough to demand it. The budget process 
will be neither more nor less dependent on accurate forecasting 
under biennial budgeting. This is especially the case since the 
enactment of binding discretionary spending limits for a multi-
year period already binds the appropriations process.
    Third, concern was also expressed regarding the need for 
congressional flexibility to react to emergencies like 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the 1997 floods in North Dakota or 
to the rise of new issues. The Committee believes that S. 261 
should have no impact on the ability of the Congress to deal 
with emergencies--which, even under the current annual cycle 
require mid-cycle adjustments. Although the Committee believes 
that the benefits of a biennial cycle will be the greatest if 
mid-cycle adjustments are the exception rather than the rule, 
S. 261 does not limit the Congress' ability either to respond 
to emergencies or to make adjustments were Congress believes a 
new issue demands a mid-cycle reallocation of funds.
    Fourth, concern was expressed about the timing of 
authorizations and appropriations in a two year budget process. 
Some experts have suggested that authorizations should be in 
the first session of the Congress, with the budget resolution 
and appropriation bills in the second session of each Congress. 
At the June 7, 1988 Committee hearing, Senator Ford testified 
that this approach would ``have meant that a newly elected 
Congress and a newly elected President would have to wait a 
full year before they could start to work their will on the 
budget.'' The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress 
accepted this argument--also made by other observers including 
the General Accounting Office--and recommended that each 
Congress appropriate in its first year. Even though building 
that kind of learning period into the process has its desirable 
aspects, we concluded, that it was unrealistic and opted for 
budgeting in the first session.
    Fifth, concern was expressed about effective date of the 
legislation, and the transition to biennial budgeting. Under 
the provisions of S. 261, biennial budgeting will be phased in. 
Effective October 1, 1998 authorizations would have to cover at 
least two years. The first two-year budget resolution and 
appropriations bills would cover the biennium with Fiscal Year 
2000--beginning October 1, 1999. The Committee notes that in 
recent fiscal years, excluding the Department of Defense, less 
than five percent of all Federal spending has been authorized 
on an annual basis. Including the Department of Defense, 
roughly 20 to 25 percent of all Federal spending has been 
authorized on an annual basis. However, considering the 
Committee on Armed Services willingness to move to a two year 
authorization under certain conditions, the Committee notes 
that Congress has the capacity to authorize most programs on a 
multi-year basis. Since a large percentage of Federal spending 
is already authorized on other than an annual basis, the 
Committee concludes that the transition to multi-year 
authorizations for the entire government would not constitute 
an undue burden on either Congress or the Executive.

             IV. Legislative History of Biennial Budgeting

    1974 (93rd Congress).--The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
required the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to issue a 
report on the ``feasibility and advisability'' of budgeting and 
appropriating a full year in advance.
    1977 (95th Congress).--In response to 1974 directive, CBO 
issued ``Advance Budgeting: A Report to Congress.'' This 
included a study of two-year appropriations, and concluded that 
if ``committees did not have to spend so much time each year on 
routine `budgetary' matters, they would in fact have more time 
for their oversight work * * *''.
    A parallel report made in 1977 by the Office of Management 
and Budget, entitled ``A Study of the Advisability of 
Submitting the President's Budget and Enacting Budget Authority 
in Advance of the Current Timetable,'' also advocated the 
concept of multi-year budgeting, on the grounds that, ``Both 
the President and Congress will reap significantly greater 
benefits from multiyear budgeting * * *.''
    Also in 1977, Representative Panetta introduced the first 
legislation to establish a biennial budget process. Panetta's 
legislation, the Biennial Budget Act, sought to create a two-
year budget process devoted in the first year to oversight of 
Executive branch agencies.
    1979 (96th Congress).--Representative Panetta again 
introduced a biennial budget bill. In the Senate, Senator 
Bumpers introduced a resolution directing a study of the 
feasibility of a biennial budget. No action was taken on either 
bill.
    1981-82 (97th Congress).--Four bills (Ford, Roth, Cochran, 
and Quayle) to establish a biennial budget process were 
introduced in the Senate. Representative Panetta again 
sponsored a House bill. In 1981, biennial budgeting was 
discussed during Governmental Affairs Committee hearings on the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974. Separate 
hearings on Senator Roth's biennial budget bill also were held 
by the Committee.
    1983-84 (98th Congress).--Several biennial budget bills 
were again introduced. Governmental Affairs held hearings on 
Senator Roth's bill.
    1984.--The Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate 
Committee System recommended that a select committee be 
established to study the feasibility of biennial budgeting. No 
committee was formed.
    1985-86 (99th Congress).--The FY 1986 Defense Authorization 
bill included an amendment proposed by Senator Nunn to, among 
other things, require the President to submit two-year budget 
proposals for the Defense Department. The provision was 
maintained, and the conferees for the bill expressed their 
belief that a biennial budget would ``substantially improve DOD 
management and congressional oversight.'' They further 
indicated that it was preferable for all Federal spending to be 
under a two-year system. While DOD submits a two-year budget, 
Congress continues to with the annual cycle--so the long-term 
planning benefit is still not realized.
    1987-88 (100th Congress).--President Reagan and 
congressional leadership approved the Budget Summit Agreement, 
setting specific funding totals for domestic, international, 
and defense discretionary spending for FY 1988 and FY 1989. 
Longstanding supporters of biennial budgeting note that the 
``biennial character'' of the summit agreement demonstrates 
that the time had come to move to a two-year budget cycle. The 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1987 
directed the appropriate congressional committees to develop a 
plan to experiment with multi-year authorization and 
appropriations.
    1989-90 (101st Congress).--As Chairman of the Governmental 
Affairs Committee, Senator John Glenn held hearings and ordered 
favorably reported S. 29 (sponsored by Senators Ford, Roth and 
Domenici) providing for a two-year budget resolution and 
appropriations. The bill was not taken up by the full Senate.
    1993-94 (103rd Congress).--Senators Boren and Domenici in 
1994 introduced S. 1824 to implement the recommendations of the 
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, which included 
a provision to shift to a biennial budget cycle. The bill 
reported by the Rules Committee as an outgrowth of the Joint 
Committee's included the provision for biennial budget and 
appropriations. Senator Domenici offered the Joint Committee's 
legislative recommendations as an amendment to the District of 
Columbia Appropriations bill. Senator Byrd raised a point of 
order under section 306 of the Budget Act, and the Senate voted 
58-41 in favor of the motion to waive the Budget Act with 
respect to consideration of the amendment. Since the motion did 
not gain the 60 votes necessary, the amendment failed.
    1995-96 (104th Congress).--Four bills providing for a 
biennial cycle were introduced. In July 1996, Senator Fred 
Thompson, Chairman of the Financial Management and 
Accountability Subcommittee of the Governmental Affairs 
Committee, held a hearing on biennial budgeting. In September 
1996, Senator Thompson introduced a biennial budget bill (S. 
2049), emphasizing the need to provide Members of Congress with 
time for increased legislative oversight and time at home.

                    V. Legislative History of S. 261

1997 (105th Congress)

    Senator Domenici introduced S. 261 on February 4, 1997. The 
bill provides for a two-year budget and appropriations process. 
There were 25 original cosponsors.

February 13, 1997.--Budget Committee

    Senator Domenici chaired a Budget Committee hearing on the 
issue.
    Although it was cut short, testimony was received from:
          (1) Senators Thomas and Ford, as sponsors and 
        proponents;
          (2) the National Conference of State Legislatures, 
        addressing the state experience,
          (3) the Congressional Research Service, giving an 
        overview of the institutional impact on the internal 
        operations of Congress and the relationship between the 
        executive and legislative branches, and
          (4) the Ford Motor Company, which cited the 
        advantages of multi-year funding for federal research 
        investments in science and technology.

April 23, 1997.--Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing

    The hearing chaired by Senator Thompson on Wednesday, April 
23, was designed to focus specifically on S. 261. There were 
two panels:
            Panel I
    Frank Raines, OMB Director, on behalf of the 
Administration. The Clinton Administration supports biennial 
budgeting which was recommended in the report of the Vice 
President's National Performance Review (NPR). The two previous 
Clinton OMB Directors, Leon Panetta and Alice Rivlin, both 
supported biennial budgeting. During the Carter Administration 
then-Congressman Panetta had been the first to introduce 
legislation establishing a biennial budget process.
            Panel II
    The second panel consisted of three witnesses:
          (1) Charles Whalen, Cornell University, who had 
        recently published an article on biennial budgeting and 
        lessons from the states.
          (2) Susan Irving, GAO, who summarized previous 
        testimony on state experiences and other issues 
        regarding congressional oversight and the 
        appropriations process specifically a section of the 
        original bill dealing with GAO and how S. 261 as 
        drafted interacts with the Government Performance and 
        Results Act.
          (3) Louis Fisher, CRS, who discussed advantages and 
        disadvantages for Congress as an institution.
          (4) CBO provided a written statement updating its 
        earlier testimony on biennial budgeting.
          (5) The Senior Executives Association submitted a 
        written statement on behalf of senior and career 
        federal executives in support of biennial budgeting, 
        believing it would save both time and money, as well as 
        provide benefits in long-range planning.
    OMB Director Raines supported S. 261, with the exception of 
some substantive changes that it would make to the Government 
Performance and Results Act (the Results Act). He commended the 
bill for making biennial budgeting comprehensive, stating that 
for biennial budgeting to work, it must cover each phase of the 
budget process--the President's budget, the congressional 
budget resolution, and appropriations. He expressed his 
beliefthat biennial budgeting gives us some interesting possibilities 
for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Federal 
government. He indicated that a change to biennial budgeting would 
allow OMB to devote more time to budget execution, financial 
accounting, and performance reporting.
    Dr. Whalen supported S. 261 and cited state experience with 
biennial budgeting as indicating that there can be significant 
benefits if the practice were adopted at the federal level. In 
his view, three advantages would result from a biennial budget 
and appropriations cycle--(1) it would streamline the budget 
process, (2) enable federal officials to make policies more 
effective, and (3) promote economic stability.
    Dr. Irving noted that the decision to change the entire 
budget process to a biennial one is fundamentally a decision 
about the nature of congressional oversight. Biennial 
appropriations would be neither the end of congressional 
control nor the solution to many budget problems. Whether a 
biennial cycle would reduce congressional workload and increase 
time for oversight is unclear. Many policy issues present 
themselves in a budget context. While pleased to see so much 
thought go into the integration of the Government Performance 
and Results Act into the process, Dr. Irving did agree with 
Director Raines regarding substantive changes to the Results 
Act at this time. She also agreed with the Chairman that the 
provision in S. 261 regarding GAO assistance with 
authorizations and oversight was unnecessary since GAO would 
and did provide such assistance under its existing authorities.
    Dr. Fisher commented on the bill's likely effect on the 
operations of the Congress and the relationship between the 
executive and legislative branches. He expressed concern that 
it might lead to a further loss of the congressional power of 
the purse and a decline in legislative control that would 
result by giving the executive branch a longer leash with two 
years of money. In his view, biennial budgeting might permit 
the Congress to more closely oversee the activities of the 
executive branch, but he was concerned regarding the loss of 
oversight through annual appropriations. He thought that 
biennial budgeting would bring modest workload relief to the 
Congress and create a new set of problems. He suggesting 
undertaking biennial budgeting on a pilot basis, in carefully 
selected areas, before deciding on full-scale implementation.
    CBO's written statement for the record noted that most 
spending and revenues flow from permanent law or cover multi-
year periods. Thus, biennial budgeting would be more 
significant for its effect on the cycle of budget action than 
for its effect on the duration of budget laws. The CBO 
statement said that the Committee should weigh the potential 
gains from more time for planning, program evaluation, and 
oversight against a potential loss of budget control and 
accountability. It further noted that S. 261's specific 
procedures to maintain separate budgetary and nonbudgetary 
congressional sessions would make the legislative and budget 
process more rigid.

                          VI. Committee Action

    On May 22, 1997 the Committee held a business meeting at 
which S. 261, the Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act, 
was considered. Chairman Thompson offered an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute, which was approved by voice vote.
    Senator Durbin offered three amendments to S. 261 as 
amended. The first amendment would have retained the annual 
appropriations cycle in the budget process. The amendment 
failed on a roll call vote of 4 Yeas (Cochran, Akaka, Durbin, 
and Cleland) and 11 Nays (Collins, Brownback, Domenici by 
proxy, Nickles, Specter, Smith, Bennett, Glenn, Levin, 
Lieberman, and Thompson).
    Senator Durbin's second amendment would have provided for a 
joint resolution on the budget that required the President's 
signature, rather than a concurrent resolution. The amendment 
failed on a roll call vote of 3 Yeas (Akaka, Durbin, and 
Cleland) and 12 Nays (Collins, Brownback, Domenici by proxy, 
Cochran, Nickles, Specter, Smith, Bennett, Glenn, Levin, 
Lieberman, and Thompson).
    Senator Durbin's third amendment would have created a new 
point of order precluding final action on the regular 
Legislative Branch appropriations bill if all other 
appropriations bills for the fiscal year have not already been 
enacted into law. After some discussion, Senator Durbin 
withdrew the amendment.
    With no other amendments being offered, Chairman Thompson 
moved adoption of S. 261 as amended. The bill was ordered 
favorably reported by a vote of 13 Yeas (Collins, Brownback, 
Cochran, Nickles, Specter, Glenn, Levin, Lieberman, Akaka, 
Cleland, Thompson, Smith, and Bennett) and 1 Nay (Durbin). 
Senator Domenici voted Aye by proxy.

                    VII. Section-by-Section Analysis

    Section 1 states the title of the legislation--the 
``Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act''.
    Section 2 amends section 300 of the Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to revise the timetable to 
reflect a biennial budget process. In general, the revised 
timetable is similar to the current timetable except that most 
of the milestones only apply to the first session of a 
Congress. The timetable is modified to extend the deadline for 
completionof the budget resolution to May 15th and to extend 
the deadline for completion of reconciliation legislation to August 
1st. The revised timetable contains two milestones in the second 
session: a February 15th reporting requirement for the CBO annual 
report on the budget and an end-of-session deadline for completion of 
action on authorization legislation. This section also amends the 
timetable to provide a special schedule in years a new President is 
elected. Generally, deadlines are extended by 6 weeks to give a new 
President more time to prepare and submit his budget.
    Section 3 includes most of the other amendments made to the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act.
    Section 3(a) amends section 2 of the Act to make a 
conforming change to the statement of the purposes of the Act. 
Section 3(b) adds a definition for ``biennium'' and makes a 
conforming change to the definition of ``concurrent resolution 
on the budget.''
    Section 3(c) amends section 301 to require the Congress to 
complete action on a biennial budget resolution by May 15th of 
each odd-numbered year; to require the budget resolution to 
cover the biennium, and each of the ensuing four years; to make 
conforming changes regarding requirements for hearings and 
reports on budgets; to make other conforming changes to the 
section; and, to make conforming changes to the section heading 
and the table of contents of the Act.
    Section 3(d) amends section 302 of the Budget Act, 
regarding committee allocations, to require the joint 
explanatory statement accompanying the conference report on a 
budget resolution to include for the Senate an allocation of 
budget authority and outlays to each committee for each year in 
the biennium and the total of the biennium and the four 
succeeding fiscal years. This subsection also makes conforming 
changes to section 302(f).
    Section 3(e) amends section 303 of the Budget Act, 
regarding the point of order against spending and revenue 
legislation affecting future fiscal years, to make a conforming 
change to provide that such legislation cannot be considered 
until the budget resolution for a biennium is adopted. This 
subsection also drops an exception to this point of order in 
the Senate for appropriations measures providing an advance 
appropriation for the two fiscal years following the budget 
year.
    Section 3(f) makes conforming changes to section 304 of the 
Budget Act, regarding revisions of budget resolutions. 
Maintains current law that allows Congress to revise the budget 
resolution at any time.
    Section 3(g) amends section 305 to make a conforming change 
regarding a reference to the budget resolution.
    Section 3 (h) and (i) amend sections 307 and 309 to make 
conforming changes regarding the deadlines for completion of 
appropriations bills.
    Section 3(j) amends section 310 to make conforming changes 
regarding reconciliation.
    Section 3(k) would conform section 311 of the Act to the 
biennial budget process. Section 311 currently makes 
legislation subject to a point of order if it would cause total 
new budget authority or total budget outlays to exceed levels 
agreed to in the most recent budget resolution. As amended, 
Section 311 would authorize a point of order if pertinent 
budget levels were exceeded in either fiscal year in the 
biennium.
    Section 3(l) amends section 401(b)(2) to make a conforming 
change regarding the referral of certain entitlement 
legislation to the Appropriations Committee.
    Section 3(m) amends section 603 to make a conforming change 
regarding automatic allocations to the House Appropriations 
Committee if the budget resolution is not adopted by a certain 
date.
    Section 4 amends the Senate pay-as-you-go point of order to 
conform to a biennial cycle.
    Section 5 amends the relevant sections of Title 31 of the 
U.S. Code regarding materials the President's budget submission 
and related documents.
    Section 5(a) amends section 1101 to add a definition of 
``biennium.''
    Section 5(b) amends section 1105 to require the President 
to submit the budget by the first Monday of February for every 
odd- numbered year (except when the schedule in section 300(b) 
of the Budget Act applies) Section 5(b) also amends a number of 
requirements in section 1105 to conform the President's budget 
to a biennial budget. Among these changes, the President's 
budget would have to propose levels for each fiscal year in the 
biennium and projections for the four succeeding years.
    Section 5(c) amends section 1105(b), regarding estimated 
expenditures and proposed appropriations for the legislative 
and judicial branches, to require the submittal of these 
proposals to the President before October 16th of even-numbered 
years.
    Subsections (d) and (e) of section 5 make conforming 
changes to section 1105 regarding the President's 
recommendations if there is a proposed deficit or surplus and 
capital investment analyses.
    Section 5(f) amends section 1106 to change the requirements 
regarding the President's ``Mid-session Review.'' Current law 
requires the President to submit the Mid-session Review before 
July 16 of each year. Section 5(f) requires the President to 
submit a ``Mid-biennium Review'' before February 15 of each 
even-numbered year. With this modification, the President will 
submit his biennial budget at the beginning of each odd-
numbered year and provide updated information on the budget at 
the beginning of each even-numbered year.
    Section 5(g) amends section 1109 to make conforming changes 
to require the President to submit current services estimates 
for the upcoming biennium and to require the Joint Economic 
Committee to submit an economic evaluation to the Budget 
Committee as part of its views and estimates report. This 
subsection also makes two technical corrections to require the 
President to submit the current services information with his 
budget submission and to require the Joint Economic Committee 
to submit its economic evaluation within 6 weeks of the 
President's budget submission.
    Section 5(h) makes amendments to section 1110 regarding 
year ahead requests on authorization legislation to require the 
President to submit requests for authorization legislation by 
March 31st of even-numbered years.
    Section 6 amends section 105 of Title I of the U.S. Code 
regarding the form and style of appropriations Acts to require 
that they cover two years.
    Section 7 adds a new section 314 to the Budget Act that 
establishes two new points of order in the Congress against 
authorization legislation. The first point of order prohibits 
consideration of authorization legislation that covers less 
than 2 years except for temporary activities. The second point 
order prohibits consideration of authorization or revenue 
legislation until the Congress has completed action on the 
biennial budget resolution, biennial appropriations bills, and 
all reconciliation bills. These two points of order do not 
apply to appropriations measures, reconciliation bills, 
privileged matters, or matters considered in Executive Session 
such as treaties, or nominations. This point of order can be 
waived by a simple majority.
    Section 8 amends the Government and Performance and Results 
Act of 1993 (GPRA) to incorporate GPRA into the biennial budget 
cycle.
    The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) 
requires federal agencies to develop strategic plans, 
performance plans, and performance reports. Strategic plans set 
out the agencies' missions and general goals. Performance plans 
lay out the specific quantifiable goals and measures. 
Performance reports compare actual performance with the goals 
of past performance plans.
    GPRA requires federal agencies to consult with 
congressional committees as they develop their strategic plans 
and to submit the first strategic plans to the Office of 
Management and Budget and to the Congress, by September 30 of 
this year; the plans are to cover at least 6 years (i.e., the 
current year plus 5 years into the future) and be updated at 
least every three years. Annual performance plans delineating 
agency goals in objective and measurable form are to cover each 
program activity described annually in the agencies' budget 
requests, with the first of these plans due in February 1998 
with the fiscal year 1999 budget. GPRA also requires the 
President to include a performance plan for the entire 
government, beginning with the fiscal year 1999 budget. 
Finally, the first annual performance report, comparing actual 
performance for fiscal year 1999 to the performance goals 
stated in the annual plan, are to be submitted by March 2000.
    Section 8(a) amends section 306 of title 5 to require 
agencies to prepare strategic plans, beginning no later than 
September 30, 2000, which cover the year of submission plus six 
years, and requires that the plans be updated at least every 
four years.
    Section 8(b) amends section 1105(a)(28) of title 31 to 
require the President's budget to include a biennial government 
wide performance plan beginning with fiscal year 2000.
    Subsection 8(c) amends section 1115 of title 31, to conform 
required performance plans to a biennial period and to require 
that the plans cover each program activity of both years of the 
biennial budget submission.
    Subsection 8(d) amends section 9703 of title 31, regarding 
managerial accountability and flexibility waivers, to conform 
that section to the biennial budget process. Under this 
amendment, waivers of ``procedural requirements or controls'' 
shall be for a two-year period.
    Subsection 8(e) amends section 1119 of title 31, to require 
that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
include in his report regarding performance budgeting pilot 
projects authorized under GPRA the feasibility of including a 
performance budget as part of a biennial budget process.
    Subsection 8(f) amends section 2802 of title 39, to require 
the Postal Service to prepare strategic plans, beginning no 
later than September 30, 2000, which cover the year of 
submission plus six years, and requires that the plans be 
updated at least every four years. This amendment is comparable 
to the amendment made to section 306 of title 5 by section 8(a) 
of the bill.
    Section 8(g) amends section 2803 of title 39 to require 
that the Postal Service prepare performance plans for a 
biennial period.
    Section 8(h) amends section 301(d) of the Budget Act to 
require Congressional committees to review the strategic plans, 
performance plans, and performance reports of agencies in their 
jurisdiction. Committees may then provide their views on the 
plans or reports to the Budget Committee as part of their views 
and estimates report.
    Section 8(i) provides that the amendments in section 8 
shall take effect on March 31, 1998.
    Section 9 amends the Budget Act to add a new section 315 
that provides a majority point of order against consideration 
in any odd-numbered year of a regular appropriations bill that 
fails to fund both years of the biennium except for temporary 
activities. This point of order does not apply to supplementals 
or continuing resolutions.
    Section 10 requires OMB to conduct a study within 180 days 
of enactment of the feasibility of converting the fiscal year 
to a two year period.
    Section 11 provides an effective date for the Act and a 
transition period. Subsection (a) generally provides that the 
Act takes effect on January 1, 1998. Section 11(b) provides a 
transition year to the biennial cycle by requiring the 
authorizing committees to start consideration of two-year 
authorization legislation in 1998.

                 VIII. Regulatory Impact of Legislation

    Paragraph 11(b)(1) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of 
the Senate requires that each report accompanying a bill 
evaluate ``the regulatory impact which would be incurred in 
carrying out this bill.''
    The enactment of this legislation will not have significant 
regulatory impact.

                  IX. Cost Estimate of the Legislation

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                       Washington DC, June 3, 1997.
Hon. Fred D. Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, 
        DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 261, the Biennial 
Budgeting and Appropriations Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mary 
Maginniss.
            Sincerely,
                                          June E. O'Neil, Director.
    Enclosure.

               congressional budget office cost estimate

S. 261--Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act

    Summary: CBO estimates that shifting the federal budgetary 
and appropriations process from an annual to a biennial cycle, 
as required by S. 261, would not result in any significant cost 
or savings to the federal government. Because the bill would 
not affect direct spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go 
procedures would not apply. S. 261 contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) and would have no 
impact on state, local or tribal governments.
    Description of the bill's major provisions: Under S. 261, 
the Congress and the President would act on budgetary matters 
every other year. The first session of each Congress would be 
devoted to budgetary actions--the President's budget, the 
budget resolution, and appropriation and reconciliation acts--
under a schedule that parallels the current annual timetable. 
The second session would generally be reserved for nonbudgetary 
activities, including planning, oversight, and authorizing 
legislation, and for any needed adjustments in budget laws 
enacted in the first session or in earlier years. CBO and the 
Office of Management and Budget would be required to prepare 
reports of updated budget estimates during this second session.
    A biennium composed of two separate fiscal years would 
become the standard fiscal period. The fiscal biennium would 
begin on October 1 each odd-numbered year, and end on September 
30 two years later. The first beinnium would begin October 1, 
1999 (the start of fiscal year 2000). Budgets would cover two-
year periods. The President's budget and the Congressional 
budget resolution would cover three successive bienniums (a 
six-year period), and regular appropriation acts would be 
required to provide funds for a full biennium. Various rules 
and procedures in the Senate and the House would be established 
to enforcethe biennial budget process. S. 261 also would 
conform the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 to the two-
year budget cycle.
    In many respects, the proposed budget process would not 
differ significantly from current practice. The President now 
prepares multiyear revenue and spending estimates in his annual 
budget. The current budget resolution includes recommended 
levels for fiscal years through 2002. Further, most revenue and 
spending law is permanent and would not be affected by any 
changes that S. 261 would trigger in the annual appropriations 
process. Relative to current law and practices, it is the 
annual appropriation process--in which lawmakers both act on 
and provide funds one year at a time--that biennial budgeting 
would affect most significantly.
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: Biennial 
budgeting has the potential to streamline the budget process, 
thereby freeing up time for the Congress to conduct oversight 
reviews of programs and for executive branch agencies to focus 
more on long-range planning and program management. Over time, 
some funds now spent to pay for staff and other resources used 
to prepare an annual budget might decrease by moving to a 
biennial cycle. Initially, however, S. 261 would likely 
increase federal costs. In fiscal year 2000, preparing precise 
budget estimates for two years instead of one would probably 
necessitate an increase in agency effort. Although the first 
year of the biennium would be expected to continue to consume 
the larger portion of the workload associated with budget 
preparation, costs in the first year of the biennium should 
decline somewhat after 2000.
    In the second year of the biennium, Congressional and 
federal agencies would continue to monitor, and in some cases, 
revise budgetary estimates and requests in order to respond to 
changes in the economy and to fund emergencies and other 
unanticipated events. Based on a recent study analyzing the 
experience in states with biennial budgeting, concrete 
estimates of time savings in the second year are hard to 
substantiate. CBO is unable to quantify the precise budgetary 
impact of adopting biennial budgeting at the federal level, but 
we expect that any such impact would not be significant.
    CBO assumes that enacting S. 261 would not change the 
period of availability or the amount of appropriated funds. 
Under current law, annual appropriations already include 
multiple-year or no-year funding for about two-thirds of the 
accounts within the jurisdiction of the appropriations 
committees. In some cases, advance appropriations are made 
available. If the Congress were to change its procedures to 
allow agencies to use funds not spent in the first year of the 
biennium in the second year, total spending could increase, and 
the timing of outlays could shift. However, we have no basis 
for assuming that the Congress would change the period of time 
for which funds would be made available to agencies under the 
biennial budgeting process. If discretionary spending caps are 
extended as assumed in the budget resolution for fiscal year 
1998 (currently under consideration by the Congress), such 
controls would effectively limit the total of any such 
spending, regardless of the year in which the authority was 
provided.
    Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 261 
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as 
defined in UMRA and would have no impact on state, local, or 
tribal governments.
    Estimate prepared by: Mary Maginniss.
    Estimate approved by: Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                  X. Minority Views of Senator Durbin

    To the extent that this bill would replace the present 
annual appropriations cycle with a biennial process, I must 
respectfully state my objections.
    This bill aims to reduce the amount of time spent on the 
budget process and provide more time for evaluation and review 
of Federal agency program performance. The budget process is 
complex and time-consuming, and it is important that we 
scrutinize Federal programs to ensure that they are effective 
and that Federal funds are being spent properly.
    Yet, by limiting the frequency of the appropriations 
process, this measure would sacrifice one of the most valuable 
oversight mechanisms we have available.
    There is no more effective way to focus the attention of 
Federal program administrators than to have their budgets at 
stake. Requiring agencies to justify and defend their programs 
and budgets every year is a critical element of our effort to 
evaluate how Federal programs are functioning and how funds are 
expended. Under the existing annual structure, if agency 
expenditures are inconsistent with Congressional intent, 
Congress can address the situation within the year in the next 
appropriation. Under biennial appropriations, Congress would 
frequently have to do without its strongest tool.
    Why would we want to diminish our authority to control 
spending? Curtailing the amount and frequency of oversight by 
appropriators directly contradicts one of the declared 
objectives of this bill--to increase opportunities for agency 
oversight.
    The ultimate oversight is the power of the purse. To 
restrain and weaken that process under the guise of expanding 
oversight misapprehends the critical role that appropriations 
committees play in oversight. Cutting back on that control of 
spending, in my estimation, would be a serious mistake.
    Some proponents suggest that a biennial appropriations 
process would offer greater flexibility in fund availability. 
Congress already has and routinely exercises its authority to 
provide multi-year money or advance money where the program 
cycle requires or where it is sensible to do so. Use of this 
authority is demonstrated in a host of program accounts, 
including Title I and other education programs, the Corporation 
for Public Broadcasting, the Low Income Home Energy Assistance 
Program, State grants for Medicaid, and various defense 
procurement programs. The fact that Congress currently 
accommodates needs in this way, and could broaden its use of 
that authority where appropriate, underscores that it is not 
necessary to change the decision cycle in order to change how 
long money is available.
    Even under an annual appropriations system, making precise 
projections about agency needs is difficult. Under the current 
annual cycle, the formulation of the President's budget begins 
15 to 18 months prior to the beginning of the fiscal year for 
which funding decisions will be made. In its Economic and 
Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1998-2007, the Congressional 
Budget Office compares actual budget totals and the first 
budget resolution estimates. The discrepancies between these 
figures clearly illustrate how, even on an annual basis, 
projections of outlays, revenues, and estimates can miss the 
mark.
    Since the time lag between initial forecasts and actual 
budget execution creates difficulties even in an annual 
environment, it is hard to conceive how extending the budget 
lead time to 27 or 30 months would enhance the reliability or 
quality of the estimates, improve the capacity of the executive 
branch to foresee future needs, or eliminate unanticipated 
funding requirements. Increased difficulty in forecasting was a 
primary reason several States gave for switching from biennial 
to annual budget cycles. The federal government is not immune 
from this problem.
    Advocates suggest that biennial appropriations could 
provide agencies with greater stability and certainty about the 
level of available resources. However, as OMB Director Franklin 
Raines noted in his testimony, the potential for that stability 
is dependent on whether second year appropriations remain 
unchanged by supplemental bills.
    Many proponents of comprehensive biennial budgeting 
acknowledge that an increase in supplementals can be expected 
under a biennial environment. Given that supplemental spending 
bills have already become almost routine under the present 
appropriations process, it appears clear that we would 
ultimately be engaged in appropriation decisions annually even 
if Congress adopted a biennial appropriations process. However, 
the supplemental bills would become more elaborate and 
comprehensive, and the ``biennial'' nature of the 
appropriations cycle would be, for all practical purposes, one 
in name only.
    I am skeptical that a shift to biennial appropriations 
would actually reduce the time and attention Congress would 
need to devote to spending decisions. In fact, it is possible 
that the appropriations process would become more contentious 
and protracted as Congress fought over what programs should be 
cut--despite their biennial appropriation--to offset 
unanticipated spending increases needed in the so-called ``off-
year.''
    Finally, it is not necessary to abandon annual 
appropriations in order to invigorate the authorizing 
committees and help them engage in more focused and 
deliberative oversight. Retaining annual appropriations will 
not interfere with more intensive oversight by the authorizing 
committees. In fact, the oversight function will be more 
effective if the regular annual appropriations process remains 
available to accommodate the needs identified through enhanced 
oversight by authorizing committees.
    Biennial budgeting may have its merits, but those merits do 
not extend to the appropriations process. I hope my colleagues 
will recognize the distinctions, and leave the annual 
appropriations process intact.
                                                       Dick Durbin.

                      XI. Changes in Existing Law

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law with no change 
proposed is shown in roman):

        Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974

                    short titles; table of contents

    Sec. 1(a). * * *
    (b) Table of Contents.--
          * * * * * * *
    Sec. 300. Timetable.
    Sec. 301. [Annual] Biennial adoption of concurrent 
resolution on the budget.
          * * * * * * *
    Sec. 314. Authorizations of appropriations.
    Sec. 315. Consideration of two year appropriations bills.
          * * * * * * *

                        DECLARATION OF PURPOSES

    Sec. 2. The Congress declares that it is essential--
          (1) to assure effective congressional control over 
        the budgetary process;
          (2) to provide for the congressional determination 
        [each year] biennially of the appropriate level of 
        Federal revenues and expenditures;
          * * * * * * *

                              DEFINITIONS

    Sec. 3. In General.--For purposes of this Act--
          * * * * * * *
          (4) The term ``concurrent resolution on the budget'' 
        means
                  (A) a concurrent resolution setting forth the 
                congressional budget for the United States 
                Government for a [fiscal year] biennium as 
                provided in section 301; and
                  (B) any other concurrent resolution revising 
                the congressional budget for the United States 
                Government for a [fiscal year] biennium as 
                described in section 304.
          * * * * * * *
    (11) The term ``biennium'' means the period of 2 
consecutive fiscal years beginning on October 1 of any odd-
numbered year.
          * * * * * * *

                Title III--Congressional Budget Process

                               [TIMETABLE

    [Sec. 300. The timetable with respect to the congressional 
budget process for any fiscal year is as follows:


[On or before:                             Action to be completed:      
[First Monday in February................  President submits his budget.
[February 15.............................  Congressional Budget Office  
                                            submits report to Budget    
                                            Committees.                 
[February 25.............................  Committees submit views and  
                                            estimates to Budget         
                                            Committees.                 
[April 1.................................  Senate Budget Committee      
                                            reports concurrent          
                                            resolution on the budget.   
[April 15................................  Congress completes action on 
                                            concurrent resolution on the
                                            budget.                     
[May 15..................................  Annual appropriation bills   
                                            may be considered in the    
                                            House.                      
[June 10.................................  House Appropriations         
                                            Committee reports last      
                                            annual appropriation bill.  
[June 15.................................  Congress completes action on 
                                            reconciliation legislation. 
[June 30.................................  House completes action on    
                                            annual appropriation bills. 
[October 1...............................  Fiscal year begins.]         
                                                                        

                               timetable


    Sec. 300. (a) In General.--Except as provided by subsection 
(b), the timetable with respect to the congressional budget 
process for any Congress (beginning with the One Hundred Sixth 
Congress) is as follows:

                              First Session                             
On or before:                              Action to be completed:      
First Monday in February.................  President submits budget     
                                            recommendations.            
February 15..............................  Congressional Budget Office  
                                            submits report to Budget    
                                            Committees.                 
Within 6 weeks after budget submission...  Committees submit views and  
                                            estimates to Budget         
                                            Committees.                 
April 1..................................  Budget Committees report     
                                            concurrent resolution on the
                                            biennial budget.            
May 15...................................  Congress completes action on 
                                            concurrent resolution on the
                                            biennial budget.            
May 15...................................  Biennial appropriation bills 
                                            may be considered in the    
                                            House.                      
June 10..................................  House Appropriations         
                                            Committee reports last      
                                            biennial appropriation bill.
June 30..................................  Congress completes action on 
                                            biennial appropriation      
                                            bills.                      
August 1.................................  House completes action on    
                                            reconciliation legislation. 
October 1................................  Biennium begins.             
                                                                        
                             Second Session                             
                                                                        
On or before:                              Action to be completed:      
February 15..............................  Congressional Budget Office  
                                            submits report to Budget    
                                            Committees                  
The last day of the session..............  Congress completes action on 
                                            bills and resolutions       
                                            authorizing new budget      
                                            authority for the succeeding
                                            biennium.                   
                                                                        

    (b) Special Rule.--In the case of any first session of 
Congress that begins in any year immediately following a leap 
year and during which the term of a President (except a 
President who succeeds himself) begins, the following dates 
shall supersede those set forth in subsection (a):


                              First Session                             
On or before:                              Action to be completed:      
First Monday in April....................  President submits budget     
                                            recommendations.            
April 20.................................  Committees submit views and  
                                            estimates to Budget         
                                            Committees.                 
May 15...................................  Budget Committees report     
                                            concurrent resolution on the
                                            biennial budget.            
June 1...................................  Congress completes action on 
                                            concurrent resolution on the
                                            biennial budget.            
July 1...................................  Biennial appropriation bills 
                                            may be considered in the    
                                            House.                      
July 20..................................  House Appropriations         
                                            Committee reports last      
                                            biennial appropriation bill.
                                                                        

   [ANNUAL] BIENNIAL ADOPTION OF CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET

    Sec. 301. (a) Content of Concurrent Resolution on the 
Budget.--On or before [April 15 of each year] May 15 of each 
odd-numbered year, the Congress shall complete action on a 
concurrent resolution on the budget for [the fiscal year 
beginning on October 1 of such year] the biennium beginning on 
October 1 of such year. The concurrent resolution shall set 
forth appropriate levels for [the fiscal year beginning on 
October 1 of such year] each fiscal year in such period, [and 
planning levels for each of the two ensuing fiscal years] and 
the appropriate levels for each of the 4 ensuing fiscal years, 
for the following--
          (1) totals of new budget authority, budget outlays, 
        direct loan obligations, and primary loan guarantee 
        commitments;
          (2) total Federal revenues and the amount, if any, by 
        which the aggregate level of Federal revenues should be 
        increased or decreased by bills and resolutions to be 
        reported by the appropriate committees;
          (3) the surplus or deficit in the budget;
          (4) new budget authority, budget outlays, direct loan 
        obligations, and primary loan guarantee commitments for 
        each major functional category, based on allocations of 
        the total levels set forth pursuant to paragraph (1);
          (5) the public debt;
          (6) For purposes of Senate enforcement under this 
        title, outlays of the old-age, survivors, and 
        disability insurance program established under title II 
        of the Social Security Act [for the fiscal year] for 
        each fiscal year in the biennium of the resolution and 
        for each of the 4 succeeding fiscal years; and
          (7) For purposes of Senate enforcement under this 
        title, revenues of the old-age, survivors, and 
        disability insurance program established under title II 
        of the Social Security Act (and the related provisions 
        of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) [for the fiscal 
        year] for each fiscal year in the biennium of the 
        resolution and for each of the 4 succeeding fiscal 
        years.
    The concurrent resolution shall not include the outlays and 
revenue totals of the old age, survivors, and disability 
insurance program established under title II of the Social 
Security Act or the related provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 in the surplus or deficit totals required by this 
subsection or in any other surplus or deficit totals required 
by this title.
    (b) Additional Matters in Concurrent Resolution.--The 
concurrent resolution on the budget for a biennium may--
          (1) set forth, if required by subsection (f), the 
        calendar year in which, in the opinion of the Congress, 
        the goals for reducing unemployment set forth in 
        section 4(b) of the Employment Act of 1946 should be 
        achieved;
          (2) include reconciliation directives described in 
        section 310;
          (3) require a procedure under which all or certain 
        bills or resolutions providing new budget authority or 
        new entitlement authority [for such fiscal year] for 
        either fiscal year in such biennium shall not be 
        enrolled until the Congress has completed action on any 
        reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution or 
        both required by such concurrent resolution to be 
        reported in accordance with section 310(b);
          * * * * * * *
    (d) Views and Estimates of Other Committees.--Within 6 
weeks after the President submits a budget under section 
1105(a) of title 31, United States Code (or, if applicable, as 
provided by section 300(b)) each committee of the House of 
Representatives having legislative jurisdiction shall submit to 
the Committee on the Budget of the House and each committee of 
the Senate having legislative jurisdiction shall submit to the 
Committee on the Budget of the Senate its views and estimates 
(as determined by the committee making such submission) with 
respect to all matters set forth in subsections (a) and (b) 
which relate to matters within the jurisdiction or functions of 
such committee. The Joint Economic Committee shall submit to 
the Committees on the Budget of both Houses its recommendations 
as to the fiscal policy appropriate to the goals of the 
Employment Act of 1946. Any other committee of the House of 
Representatives or the Senate may submit to the Committee on 
the Budget of its House, and any joint committee of the 
Congress may submit to the Committees on the Budget of both 
Houses, its views and estimates with respect to all matters set 
forth in subsections (a) and (b) which relate to matters within 
its jurisdiction or functions. Any Committee of the House of 
Representatives or the Senate that anticipates that the 
committee will consider any proposed legislation establishing, 
amending, or reauthorizing any Federal program likely to have a 
significant budgetary impact on any State, local, or tribal 
government, or likely to have a significant financial impact on 
the private sector, including any legislative proposal 
submitted by the executive branch likely to have such a 
budgetary or financial impact, shall include its views and 
estimates on that proposal to the Committee on the Budget of 
the applicable House. Each committee of the Senate or the House 
of Representatives shall review the strategic plans, 
performance plans, and performance reports, required under 
section 306 of title 5, United States Code, and sections 1115 
and 1116 of title 31, United States Code, of all agencies under 
the jurisdiction of the committee. Each committee may provide 
its views on such plans or reports to the Committee on the 
budget of the applicable House.
    (e) Hearings and Report.--In developing the concurrent 
resolution on the budget referred to in subsection (a) for each 
[fiscal year] biennium, the Committee on the Budget of each 
House shall hold hearings and shall receive testimony from 
Members of Congress and such appropriate representatives of 
Federal departments and agencies, the general public, and 
national organizations as the committee deems desirable. Each 
of the recommendations as to short-term and medium-term goal 
set forth in the report submitted by the members of the Joint 
Economic Committee under subsection (d) may be considered by 
the Committee on the Budget of each House as part of its 
consideration of such concurrent resolution, and its report may 
reflect its views thereon, including its views on how the 
estimates of revenues and levels of budget authority and 
outlays set forth in such concurrent resolution are designed to 
achieve any goals it is recommending. On or before April 1 of 
each odd-numbered year (or, if applicable, as provided by 
section 300(b)), the Committee on the Budget of each House 
shall report to its House the concurrent resolution on the 
budget referred to in subsection (a) for the biennium beginning 
on October 1 of that year. The report accompanying such 
concurrent resolution shall include, but not be limited to--
          * * * * * * *
          (6) projections (not limited to the following), for 
        the period of [five fiscal years beginning with such 
        fiscal year] six fiscal years beginning with the first 
        fiscal year of such biennium, of the estimated levels 
        of total budget outlays and total new budget authority, 
        the estimated revenues to be received, and the 
        estimated surplus or deficit, if any, for each fiscal 
        year in such period, and the estimated levels of tax 
        expenditures (the tax expenditures budget) by major 
        functional categories;
          * * * * * * *
    (f) Achievement of Goals for Reducing Unemployment.--
          (1) If, pursuant to section 4(c) of the Employment 
        Act of 1946, the President recommends in the Economic 
        Report that the goals for reducing unemployment set 
        forth in section 4(b) of such Act be achieved in a year 
        after the close of the five-year period prescribed by 
        such subsection, the concurrent resolution on the 
        budget for the [fiscal year] biennium beginning after 
        the date on which such Economic Report is received by 
        the Congress may set forth the year in which, in the 
        opinion of the Congress, such goals can be achieved.
          (2) After the Congress has expressed its opinion 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) as to the year in which the 
        goals for reducing unemployment set forth in section 
        4(b) of the Employment Act of 1946 can be achieved, if, 
        pursuant to section 4(e) of such Act, the President 
        recommends in the Economic Report that such goals be 
        achieved in a year which is different from the year in 
        which the Congress has expressed its opinion that such 
        goals should be achieved, either in its action pursuant 
        to paragraph (1) or in its most recent action pursuant 
        to this paragraph, the concurrent resolution on the 
        budget for the [fiscal year] biennium beginning after 
        the date on which such Economic Report is received by 
        the Congress may set forth the year in which, in the 
        opinion of the Congress, such goals can be achieved.
          * * * * * * *
    (g) Economic Assumptions.--
          (1) It shall not be in order in the Senate to 
        consider any concurrent resolution on the budget [for a 
        fiscal year] for a biennium, or any amendment thereto, 
        or any conference report thereon, that sets forth 
        amounts and levels that are determined on the basis of 
        more than one set of economic and technical 
        assumptions.
          * * * * * * *

                         committee allocations

    Sec. 302. (a) Allocation of Totals.--
          (1) For the House of Representatives, the joint 
        explanatory statement accompanying a conference report 
        on a concurrent resolution on the budget shall include 
        an estimated allocation, based upon such concurrent 
        resolution as recommended in such conference report, of 
        the appropriate levels of total budget outlays, total 
        new budget authority, and total entitlement authority 
        among each committee of the House of Representatives 
        which has jurisdiction over laws, bills and resolutions 
        providing such new budget authority, or such 
        entitlement authority. The allocation shall, for each 
        committee, divide new budget authority, and entitlement 
        authority between amounts provided or required by law 
        on the date of such conference report (mandatory or 
        uncontrollable amounts), and amounts not so provided or 
        required (discretionary or controllable amounts), and 
        shall make the same division for estimated outlays that 
        would result from such new budget authority.
          [(2) For the Senate, the joint explanatory statement 
        accompanying a conference report on a concurrent 
        resolution on the budget shall include an estimated 
        allocation, based upon such concurrent resolution as 
        recommended in such conference report, of the 
        appropriate levels of social security outlays for the 
        fiscal year of the resolution and for each of the 4 
        succeeding fiscal years, total budget outlays and total 
        new budget authority among each committee of the Senate 
        which has jurisdiction over bills and resolutions 
        providing such new budget authority.]
          (2)(A) For the Senate, the joint explanatory 
        statement accompanying a conference report on a 
        concurrent resolution on the budget shall include an 
        estimated allocation of the appropriate levels of total 
        new budget authority, total outlays, and social 
        security outlays, based upon the concurrent resolution 
        as recommended in the conference report, to each 
        committee of the Senate which has jurisdiction over 
        bills and resolutions providing budget authority.
          (B) For all committees except the Committee on 
        Appropriations, the allocations under subparagraph (A) 
        shall include the appropriate levels of budget 
        authority, outlays, and social security outlays for 
        each fiscal year in the biennium and the total of the 
        biennium and the 4 succeeding fiscal years.
          (C) For the Committee on Appropriations, the 
        allocation under subparagraph (a) shall include the 
        appropriate levels of budget authority, outlays, and 
        social security outlays for each fiscal year in the 
        biennium.
          * * * * * * *
    (f) Legislation Subject to Point of Order.--
          (1) In the house of representatives.--After the 
        Congress has completed action on a concurrent 
        resolution on the budget [for a fiscal year], it shall 
        not be in order in the House of Representatives to 
        consider any bill, joint resolution, or amendment 
        providing new budget authority [for such fiscal year] 
        or new entitlement authority [effective during such 
        fiscal year], or any conference report on any such bill 
        or joint resolution, if--
                  (A) the enactment of such bill or resolution 
                as reported;
                  (B) the adoption and enactment of such 
                amendment; or
                  (C) the enactment of such bill or resolution 
                in the form recommended in such conference 
                report,
        would cause the appropriate allocation made pursuant to 
        subsection (b) [for such fiscal year] of new 
        discretionary budget authority or new entitlement 
        authority to be exceeded.
          (2) In the senate.--[At any time after the Congress 
        has completed action on the concurrent resolution on 
        the budget required to be reported under section 301(a) 
        for a fiscal year, it shall not be in order in the 
        Senate to consider any bill, joint resolution, 
        amendment, motion, or conference report, that provides 
        for budget outlays, new budget authority, or new 
        spending authority (as defined in section 401(c)(2)) in 
        excess of (A) the appropriate allocation of such 
        outlays or authority reported under subsection (a), or 
        (B) the appropriate allocation (if any) of such outlays 
        or authority reported under subsection (b) in 
        connection with the most recently agreed to concurrent 
        resolution on the budget for such fiscal year or 
        provides for social security outlays in excess of the 
        appropriate allocation of social security outlays under 
        subsection (a) for the fiscal year of the resolution or 
        for the total of that year and the 4 succeeding fiscal 
        years.] At any time after Congress has completed action 
        on a concurrent resolution on the budget required to be 
        reported under section 301(a), it shall not be in order 
        to consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, 
        motion, or conference report, that provides new budget 
        authority, outlays, new spending authority (as defined 
        in section 401(c)(2)), or social security outlays in 
        excess of allocations made pursuant to subsection (a) 
        and (b). [Subparagraph (A)] The requirement of this 
        paragraph to comply with allocations made pursuant to 
        section 302(a) shall not apply to any bill, resolution, 
        amendment, motion, or conference report that is within 
        the jurisdiction of the Committee on Appropriations. In 
        applying this paragraph--
          * * * * * * *

concurrent resolution on the budget must be adopted before legislation 
  providing new budget authority, new spending authority, new credit 
     authority, or changes in revenues or the public debt limit is 
                               considered

    Sec. 303. (a) In General.--It shall not be in order in 
either the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider 
any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference 
report as reported to the House or Senate which provides--
          (1) new budget authority for a fiscal year;
          (2) an increase or decrease in revenues to become 
        effective during a fiscal year;
          (3) an increase or decrease in the public debt limit 
        to become effective during a fiscal year;
          (4) new entitlement authority to become effective 
        during a fiscal year;
          (5) in the Senate only, new spending authority (as 
        defined in section 401(c)(2)) for a fiscal year; or
          (6) in the Senate only, outlays,
until the concurrent resolution on the budget for such [fiscal 
year] biennium (or, in the Senate, a concurrent resolution on 
the budget covering such fiscal year) has been agreed to 
pursuant to section 301.
    (b) Exceptions.--[(1)] In the House of Representatives, 
subsection (a) does not apply to any bill or resolution--
          [(A)] (1) providing new budget authority which first 
        becomes available in a fiscal year following [the 
        fiscal year] biennium to which the concurrent 
        resolution applies; or
          [(B)] (2) increasing or decreasing revenues which 
        first become effective in a fiscal year following [the 
        fiscal year] biennium to which the concurrent 
        resolution applies.
After May 15 of [any calendar year] any odd-numbered calendar 
year (or, if applicable, as provided by section 300(b)), 
subsection (a) does not apply in the House of Representatives 
to any general appropriation bill, or amendment thereto, which 
provides new budget authority for the fiscal year beginning in 
such calendar year.
    [(2) In the Senate, subsection (a) does not apply to any 
bill or resolution making advance appropriations for the fiscal 
year to which the concurrent resolution applies and the two 
succeeding fiscal years.]
          * * * * * * *

      permissible revisions of concurrent resolution on the budget

    Sec. 304. (a) In General.--At any time after the concurrent 
resolution on the budget for a [fiscal year] biennium has been 
agreed to pursuant to section 301, and before the end of such 
[fiscal year] biennium, the two Houses may adopt a concurrent 
resolution on the budget which revises or reaffirms the 
concurrent resolution on the budget [for such fiscal year] most 
recently agreed to for such biennium.
          * * * * * * *

 provisions relating to consideration of concurrent resolution on the 
                                 budget

    Sec. 305. (a) * * *
          * * * * * * *
          (3) Following the presentation of opening statements 
        on the concurrent resolution on the budget for a 
        [fiscal year] biennium by the chairman and ranking 
        minority member of the Committee on the Budget of the 
        House, there shall be a period of up to four hours for 
        debate on economic goals and policies.
          * * * * * * *

 house committee action on all appropriation bills to be completed by 
                                june 10

    Sec. 307. On or before June 10 of each year, the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives shall report 
annual appropriation bills providing new budget authority under 
the jurisdiction of all of its subcommittees for the [fiscal 
year] biennium which begins on October 1 of [that year] each 
odd-numbered year.
          * * * * * * *

             house approval of regular appropriations bills

    Sec. 309. It shall not be in order in the House of 
Representatives to consider any resolution providing for an 
adjournment period of more than three calendar days during the 
month of July of any odd-numbered calendar year until the House 
of Representatives has approved [annual] biennial appropriation 
bills providing new budget authority under the jurisdiction of 
all the subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations for 
the fiscal year beginning on October 1 of such year. For 
purposes of this section, the chairman of the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives shall 
periodically advise the Speaker as to changes in jurisdiction 
among its various subcommittees.

                             reconciliation

    Sec. 310. (a) Inclusion of Reconciliation Directives in 
Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget.--A concurrent resolution 
on the budget for [any fiscal year] any biennium, to the extent 
necessary to effectuate the provisions and requirements of such 
resolution, shall--
          (1) specify the total amount by which--
                  (A) new budget authority for [such fiscal 
                year] any fiscal year covered by such 
                resolution;
                  (B) budget authority initially provided for 
                prior fiscal years;
                  (C) new entitlement authority which is to 
                become effective during [such fiscal year] any 
                fiscal year covered by such resolution; and
                  (D) credit authority for such fiscal year any 
                fiscal year covered by such resolution,
        contained in laws, bills, and resolutions within the 
        jurisdiction of a committee is to be changed and direct 
        that committee to determine and recommend changes to 
        accomplish a change of such total amount;
          * * * * * * *

 new budget authority, new spending authority, and revenue legislation 
                   must be within appropriate levels

    Sec. 311. (a)(1) Legislation Subject to Point of Order.--
Except as provided by subsection (b), after the Congress has 
completed action on a concurrent resolution on the budget [for 
a fiscal year] for a biennium, it shall not be in order in 
either the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider 
any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference 
report providing new budget authority for [such fiscal year] 
either fiscal year in such biennium, providing new entitlement 
authority effective [during such fiscal year] during either 
fiscal year in such biennium, or reducing [revenues for such 
fiscal year] revenues for a fiscal year, if--
          (A) the enactment of such bill or resolution as 
        reported;
          (B) the adoption and enactment of such amendment; or
          (C) the enactment of such bill or resolution in the 
        form recommended in such conference report;
would cause the appropriate level of total new budget authority 
or total budget outlays set forth in the most recently agreed 
to concurrent resolution on the [budget for such fiscal year] 
budget for either fiscal year in such biennium to be exceeded, 
or would cause revenues to be less than the appropriate level 
of total revenues set forth in such concurrent resolution 
except in the case that a declaration of war by the Congress is 
in effect.
    (2)(A) After the Congress has completed action on a 
concurrent resolution on the budget, it shall not be in order 
in the Senate to consider any bill, resolution, amendment, 
motion, or conference report that would cause the appropriate 
level of total new budget authority or total budget outlays or 
social security outlays set forth [for the first] for either 
fiscal year in the most recently agreed to concurrent 
resolution on the budget [covering such fiscal year] covering 
the biennium to be exceeded, or would cause revenues to be less 
than the appropriate level of total revenues (or social 
security revenues to be less than the appropriate level of 
social security revenues) set forth for [the first fiscal year 
covered] either fiscal year in the biennium covered by the 
resolution and for the period including [the first fiscal year 
plus] the biennium plus the following 4 fiscal years in such 
concurrent resolution.
    (b) Exception in the House of Representatives.--Subsection 
(a) shall not apply in the House of Representatives to any 
bill, resolution, or amendment which provides new budget 
authority or new entitlement authority effective during such 
fiscal year, or to any conference report on any such bill or 
resolution, if--
          (1) the enactment of such bill or resolution as 
        reported;
          (2) the adoption and enactment of such amendment; or
          (3) the enactment of such bill or resolution in the 
        form recommended in such conference report,
would not cause the appropriate allocation of new discretionary 
budget authority or new entitlement authority made pursuant to 
section 302(a) for [such fiscal year] either fiscal year in 
such biennium, for the committee within whose jurisdiction such 
bill, resolution, or amendment falls, to be exceeded.
          * * * * * * *


                    authorizations of appropriations


    Sec. 314. (a) Point of Order.--It shall not be in order in 
the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider--
          (1) any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or 
        conference report that authorizes appropriations for a 
        period of less than 2 fiscal years, unless the program, 
        project, or activity for which the appropriations are 
        authorized will require no further appropriations and 
        will be completed or terminated after the 
        appropriations have been expended; and
          (2) in any odd-numbered year, any authorization or 
        revenue bill or joint resolution until Congress 
        completes action on the biennial budget resolution, all 
        regular biennial appropriations bills, and all 
        reconciliation bills.
    (b) Applicability.--In the Senate, subsection (a) shall not 
apply to--
          (1) any measure that is privileged for consideration 
        pursuant to a rule or statute;
          (2) any matter considered in Executive Session; or
          (3) an appropriations measure or reconciliation bill.


             consideration of two-year appropriations bills


    Sec. 315. It shall not be in order in the House of 
Representatives or the Senate in any odd-numbered year to 
consider any regular bill providing new budget authority or a 
limitation on obligations under the jurisdiction of any of the 
subcommittees of the Committees on Appropriations for only the 
first fiscal year of a biennium, unless the program, project, 
or activity for which the new budget authority or obligation 
limitation is provided will require no additional authority 
beyond 1 year and will be completed or terminated after the 
amount provided has been expended.

      Title IV--Additional Provisions To Improve Fiscal Procedures

    Sec. 401. (a) * * *
          * * * * * * *
     (b)(1) * * *
          * * * * * * *
     (2) If any committee of the House of Representatives or 
the Senate reports any bill or resolution which provides new 
spending authority described in subsection (c)(2)(C) which is 
to become effective during a fiscal year and the amount of new 
budget authority which will be required for such fiscal year if 
such bill or resolution is enacted as so reported exceeds the 
appropriate allocation of new budget authority reported under 
section 302(b) in connection with the most recently agreed to 
concurrent resolution on the budget [for such fiscal year] for 
the biennium in which such fiscal year occurs, such bill or 
resolution shall then be referred to the Committee on 
Appropriations of that House with instructions to report it, 
with the committee's recommendations, within 15 calendar days 
(not counting any day on which that House is not in session) 
beginning with the day following the day on which it is so 
referred. If the Committee on Appropriations of either House 
fails to report a bill or resolution referred to it under this 
paragraph within such 15-day period, the committee shall 
automatically be discharged from further consideration of such 
bill or resolution and such bill or resolution shall be placed 
on the appropriate calendar.
          * * * * * * *

           Title VI--Budget Agreement Enforcement Provisions

          * * * * * * *

   Sec. 603. Consideration of Legislation Before Adoption of Budget 
                    Resolution For That Fiscal Year

    Sec. 603. (a) Adjusting Section Allocation of Discretionary 
Spending.--If a concurrent resolution on the budget is not 
adopted by April 15, (or if section 300(b) applies by June 
15th), the chairman of the Committee on the Budget of the House 
of Representatives shall submit to the House, as soon as 
practicable, a section 602(a) allocation to the Committee on 
Appropriations consistent with the discretionary spending 
limits contained in the most recent budget submitted by the 
President under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States 
Code. Such allocation shall include the full allowance 
specified under section 251(b)(2)(E)(i) of the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
          * * * * * * *

      House Concurrent Resolution 67--One Hundred Fourth Congress

          * * * * * * *
    Sec. 202. Extension of Pay-As-You-Go Point of Order.--(a) 
Purpose.--The Senate declares that it is essential to--
          (1) ensure continued compliance with the balanced 
        budget plan set forth in this resolution; and
          (2) continue the pay-as-you-go enforcement system.
    (b) Point of Order.--
          (1) In general.--It shall not be in order in the 
        Senate to consider any direct spending or revenue 
        legislation that would increase the deficit for any one 
        of the three applicable time periods as measured in 
        paragraphs (5) and (6).
          (2) Applicable time periods.--For purposes of this 
        subsection the term ``applicable time period'' means 
        any one of the three following periods:
                  [(A) The first year covered by the most 
                recently adopted concurrent resolution on the 
                budget.
                  [(B) The period of the first five fiscal 
                years covered by the most recently adopted 
                concurrent resolution on the budget.
                  [(C) The period of the five fiscal years 
                following the first five fiscal years covered 
                in the most recently adopted concurrent 
                resolution on the budget.]
                  (A) The period of the biennium covered by the 
                most recently adopted concurrent resolution on 
                the budget.
                  (B) The period of the first six fiscal years 
                covered by the most recently adopted concurrent 
                resolution on the budget.
                  (C) The period of the four fiscal years 
                following the first six fiscal years covered by 
                the most recently adopted concurrent resolution 
                on the budget.
          * * * * * * *

                           UNITED STATES CODE

                      TITLE 31, MONEY AND FINANCE

                    Subtitle II--The Budget Process

   CHAPTER 11--THE BUDGET AND FISCAL, BUDGET, AND PROGRAM INFORMATION

Sec. 1101. Definitions

    In this chapter--
          * * * * * * *
          (3) ``biennium'' has the meaning given to such term 
        in paragraph (11) of section 3 of the Congressional 
        Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 
        622(11)).
          * * * * * * *

Sec. 1105. Budget contents and submission to Congress

    (a) [On or after the first Monday in January but not later 
than the first Monday in February of each year, the President 
shall submit a budget of the United States Government for the 
following fiscal year. Each budget shall include a budget 
message and summary and supporting information. The President 
shall include in each budget the following:] On or before the 
first Monday in February of each odd-numbered year (or, if 
applicable, as provided by section 300(b) of the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974), beginning with the One Hundred Sixth 
Congress, the President shall transmit to the Congress, the 
budget for the biennium beginning on October 1 of such calendar 
year. The budget transmitted under this subsection shall 
include a budget message and summary and supporting 
information. The President shall include in each budget the 
following:
          (1) information on activities and functions of the 
        Government.
          (2) when practicable, information on costs and 
        achievements of Government programs.
          (3) other desirable classifications of information.
          (4) a reconciliation of the summary information on 
        expenditures with proposed appropriations.
          (5) except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
        section, estimated expenditures and proposed 
        appropriations the President decides are necessary to 
        support the Government in [the fiscal year for which 
        the budget is submitted and the 4 fiscal years after 
        that year] each fiscal year in the biennium for which 
        the budget is submitted and in the succeeding 4 years.
          (6) estimated receipts of the Government in [the 
        fiscal year for which the budget is submitted and the 4 
        fiscal years after that year] each fiscal year in the 
        biennium for which the budget is submitted and in the 
        succeeding 4 years under--
                  (A) laws in effect when the budget is 
                submitted; and
                  (B) proposals in the budget to increase 
                revenues.
          (7) appropriations, expenditures, and receipts of the 
        Government in the prior fiscal year.
          (8) estimated expenditures and receipts, and 
        appropriations and proposed appropriations, of the 
        Government for the current fiscal year.
          (9) balanced statements of the--
                  (A) condition of the Treasury at the end of 
                the prior fiscal year;
                  (B) estimated condition of the Treasury at 
                the end of the current fiscal year; and
                  (C) estimated condition of the Treasury at 
                the end of [the fiscal year] each fiscal year 
                in the biennium for which the budget is 
                submitted if financial proposals in the budget 
                are adopted.
          (10) essential information about the debt of the 
        Government.
          (11) other financial information the President 
        decides is desirable to explain in practicable detail 
        the financial condition of the Government.
          (12) for each proposal in the budget for legislation 
        that would establish or expand a Government activity or 
        function, a table showing--
                  (A) the amount proposed in the budget for 
                appropriation and for expenditure because of 
                the proposal in [the fiscal year] each fiscal 
                year in the biennium for which the budget is 
                submitted; and
                  (B) the estimated appropriation required 
                because of the proposal for each of the [4 
                fiscal years after that year] 4 fiscal years 
                immediately following the second fiscal year in 
                such biennium that the proposal will be in 
                effect.
          (13) an allowance for additional estimated 
        expenditures and proposed appropriations for [the 
        fiscal year] each fiscal year in the biennium for which 
        the budget is submitted.
          (14) an allowance for unanticipated uncontrollable 
        expenditures for [that year] each fiscal year in the 
        biennium for which the budget is submitted.
          (15) a separate statement on each of the items 
        referred to in section 301(a) (1)-(5) of the 
        Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(a) (1)-
        (5)).
          (16) the level of tax expenditures under existing law 
        in the tax expenditures budget (as defined in section 
        3(a)(3) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 
        U.S.C. 622(a)(3)) for [the fiscal year] each fiscal 
        year in the biennium for which the budget is submitted, 
        considering projected economic factors and changes in 
        the existing levels based on proposals in the budget.
          (17) information on estimates of appropriations for 
        [the fiscal year following the fiscal year] each fiscal 
        year in the biennium following the biennium for which 
        the budget is submitted for grants, contracts, and 
        other payments under each program for which there is an 
        authorization of appropriations for [that following 
        fiscal year] each such fiscal year when the 
        appropriations are authorized to be included in an 
        appropriation law for the [fiscal year before the 
        fiscal year] biennium before the biennium in which the 
        appropriation is to be available for obligation.
          (18) a comparison of the total amount of budget 
        outlays for [the prior fiscal year] each of the 2 most 
        recently completed fiscal years, estimated in the 
        budget submitted [for that year] with respect to those 
        fiscal years, for each major program having relatively 
        uncontrollable outlays with the total amount of outlays 
        for that program [in that year] in those fiscal years.
          (19) a comparison of the total amount of receipts for 
        [the prior fiscal year] each of the 2 most recently 
        completed fiscal years, estimated in the budget 
        submitted [for that year] with respect to those fiscal 
        years, with receipts received [in that year] in those 
        fiscal years, and for each major source of receipts, a 
        comparison of the amount of receipts estimated in that 
        budget with the amount of receipts from that source in 
        that year.
          (20) an analysis and explanation of the differences 
        between each amount compared under clauses (18) and 
        (19) of this subsection.
          (21) a horizontal budget showing--
                  (A) the programs for meteorology and of the 
                National Climate Program established under 
                section 5 of the National Climate Program Act 
                (15 U.S.C. 2904);
                  (B) specific aspects of the program of, and 
                appropriations for, each agency; and
                  (C) estimated goals and financial 
                requirements.
          (22) a statement of budget authority, proposed budget 
        authority, budget outlays, and proposed budget outlays, 
        and descriptive information in terms of--
                  (A) a detailed structure of national needs 
                that refers to the missions and programs of 
                agencies (as defined in section 101 of this 
                title); and
                  (B) the missions and basic programs.
          (23) separate appropriation accounts for 
        appropriations under the Occupational Safety and Health 
        Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.) and the Federal 
        Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (30 U.S.C. 801 et 
        seq.).
          (24) recommendations on the return of Government 
        capital to the Treasury by a mixed-ownership 
        corporation (as defined in section 9101(2) of this 
        title) that the President decides are desirable.
          (25) a separate appropriation account for 
        appropriations for each Office of Inspector General of 
        an establishment defined under section 11(2) of the 
        Inspector General Act of 1978.
          (26) a separate statement of the amount of 
        appropriations requested for the Office of National 
        Drug Control Policy and each program of the National 
        Drug Control Program.
          (27) a separate statement of the amount of 
        appropriations requested for the Office of Federal 
        Financial Management.
          (28) [beginning with] for fiscal year 1999, a Federal 
        Government performance plan, and beginning with fiscal 
        year 2000, a biennial Federal Government performance 
        plan for the overall budget as provided for under 
        section 1115.
          (29) information about the Violent Crime Reduction 
        Trust Fund, including a separate statement of amounts 
        in that Trust Fund.
          (30) an analysis displaying, by agency, proposed 
        reductions in full-time equivalent positions compared 
        to the current year's level in order to comply with 
        section 5 of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 
        1994.
    (b) Estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for 
the legislative branch and the judicial branch to be included 
in each budget under subsection (a)(5) of this section shall be 
submitted to the President before October 16 of [each year] 
each even numbered year and included in the budget by the 
President without change.
    (c) The President shall recommend in the budget appropriate 
action to meet an estimated deficiency when the estimated 
receipts for the [fiscal year for] biennium for which the 
budget is submitted (under laws in effect when the budget is 
submitted) and the estimated amounts in the Treasury at the end 
of the current fiscal year or current biennium, as the case may 
be, available for expenditure in the fiscal year for which the 
budget is submitted, are less than the estimated expenditures 
for [that year] that period. The President shall make 
recommendations required by the public interest when the 
estimated receipts and estimated amounts in the Treasury are 
more than the estimated expenditures.
    (d) When the President submits a budget or supporting 
information about a budget, the President shall include a 
statement on all changes about the current fiscal year that 
were made before the budget or information was submitted.
    (e)(1) The President shall submit with materials related to 
each budget transmitted under subsection (a) on or after 
January 1, 1985, an analysis for the [ensuing fiscal year] 
biennium to which such budget relates that shall identify 
requested appropriations or new obligational authority and 
outlays for each major program that may be classified as a 
public civilian capital investment program and for each major 
program that may be classified as a military capital investment 
program, and shall contain summaries of the total amount of 
such appropriations or new obligational authority and outlays 
for public civilian capital investment programs and summaries 
of the total amount of such appropriations or new obligational 
authority and outlays for military capital investment programs. 
In addition, the analysis under this paragraph shall contain--
          * * * * * * *

Sec. 1106. Supplemental budget estimates and changes

    (a) [Before July 16 of each year,] Before February 15 of 
each even-numbered year, the President shall submit to Congress 
a supplemental summary of the budget for the [fiscal year] 
biennium for which the budget is submitted under section 
1105(a) of this title. The summary shall include--
          (1) for [that fiscal year] each fiscal year in such 
        biennium--
                  (A) substantial changes in or reappraisals of 
                estimates of expenditures and receipts;
                  (B) substantial obligations imposed on the 
                budget after its submission;
                  (C) current information on matters referred 
                to in sections 1105(a) (8) and (9) (B) and (C) 
                of this title; and
                  (D) additional information the President 
                decides is advisable to provide Congress with 
                complete and current information about the 
                budget and current estimates of the functions, 
                obligations, requirements, and financial 
                condition of the United States Government[.]; 
                and
          (2) for the [4 fiscal years following the fiscal 
        year] four fiscal years following the biennium for 
        which the budget is submitted, information on estimated 
        expenditures for programs authorized to continue in 
        future years, or that are considered mandatory, under 
        law[;].
          [(3) for future fiscal years, information on 
        estimated expenditures of balances carried over from 
        the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted.]
    (b) Before [July 16 of each year] February 15 of each even-
numbered year, the President shall submit to Congress a 
statement of changes in budget authority requested, estimated 
budget outlays, and estimated receipts for [the fiscal year] 
each fiscal year in the biennium for which the budget is 
submitted (including prior changes proposed for the executive 
branch of the Government) that the President decides are 
necessary and appropriate based on current information. The 
statement shall include the effect of those changes on the 
information submitted under section 1105(a) (1)-(14) and (b) of 
this title and shall include supporting information as 
practicable. The statement submitted before [July 16] February 
15 of each even-numbered year may be included in the 
information submitted under subsection (a)(1) of this section.
          * * * * * * *

Sec. 1109. Current programs and activities estimates

    (a) [On or before the first Monday after January 3 of each 
year (on or before February 5 in 1986)] At the same time the 
budget required by section 1105 is submitted for a biennium, 
the President shall submit to both Houses of Congress the 
estimated budget outlays and proposed budget authority that 
would be included in the budget for [the following fiscal year] 
each fiscal year of such period if programs and activities of 
the United States Government were carried on during that year 
at the same level as the current fiscal year without a change 
in policy. The President shall state the estimated budget 
outlays and proposed budget authority by function and 
subfunction under the classifications in the budget summary 
table under the heading ``Budget Authority and Outlays by 
Function and Agency'', by major programs in each function, and 
by agency. The President shall also include a statement of the 
economic and program assumptions on which those budget outlays 
and budget authority are based, including inflation, real 
economic growth, and unemployment rates, program caseloads, and 
pay increases.
    (b) The Joint Economic Committee shall review the estimated 
budget outlays and proposed budget authority and submit an 
economic evaluation of the budget outlays and budget authority 
to the Committees on the Budget of both Houses [before March 1 
of each year] within 6 weeks of the President's budget 
submission for each odd-numbered year (or, if applicable, as 
provided by section 300(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974.

Sec. 1110. Year-ahead requests for authorizing legislation

    A request to enact legislation authorizing new budget 
authority to continue a program or activity for a [fiscal year] 
biennium (beginning on or after October 1, 1999) shall be 
submitted to Congress before [May 16] March 31 of the [year 
before the year in which the fiscal year begins] calendar year 
preceding the calendar year in which the biennium begins. If a 
new program or activity will continue for more than one year, 
the request must be submitted for at least the first and 2d 
fiscal years.
          * * * * * * *

Sec. 1115. Performance plans

    (a) In carrying out the provisions of [section 1105(a)(29)] 
section 1105(a)(28), the Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget shall require each agency to prepare [an annual] a 
biennial performance plan covering each program activity set 
forth in the budget of such agency. Such plan shall--
          (1) establish performance goals to define the level 
        of performance to be achieved by a program activity for 
        both years 1 and 2 of the biennial plan;
          (2) express such goals in an objective, quantifiable, 
        and measurable form unless authorized to be in an 
        alternative form under subsection (b);
          (3) briefly describe the operational processes, 
        skills and technology, and the human, capital, 
        information, or other resources required to meet the 
        performance goals;
          (4) establish performance indicators to be used in 
        measuring or assessing the relevant outputs, service 
        levels, and outcomes of each program activity;
          (5) provide a basis for comparing actual program 
        results with the established performance goals; [and]
          (6) describe the means to be used to verify and 
        validate measured values[.]; and
          (7) cover a 2-year period beginning with the first 
        fiscal year of the next biennial budget cycle.
          * * * * * * *
    (d) An agency may submit with its [annual] biennial 
performance plan an appendix covering any portion of the plan 
that--
          (1) is specifically authorized under criteria 
        established by an Executive order to be kept secret in 
        the interest of national defense or foreign policy; and
          (2) is properly classified pursuant to such Executive 
        order.
    (e) The functions and activities of this section shall be 
considered to be inherently Governmental functions. The 
drafting of performance plans under this section shall be 
performed only by Federal employees.
    (f) For purposes of this section and sections 1116 through 
1119, and sections 9703 and 9704 the term--
          * * * * * * *
          (6) ``program activity'' means a specific activity or 
        project as listed in the program and financing 
        schedules of the [annual] biennial budget of the United 
        States Government; and
          * * * * * * *

Sec. 1119. Pilot projects for performance budgeting

    (a) * * *
          * * * * * * *
    (d) No later than March 31, 2001, the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget shall transmit a report to the 
President and to the Congress on the performance budgeting 
pilot projects which shall--
          (1) assess the feasibility and advisability of 
        including a performance budget as part of the [annual] 
        biennial budget submitted under section 1105;
          (2) describe any difficulties encountered by the 
        pilot agencies in preparing a performance budget;
          (3) recommend whether legislation requiring 
        performance budgets should be proposed and the general 
        provisions of any legislation; and
          (4) set forth any recommended changes in the other 
        requirements of the Government Performance and Results 
        Act of 1993, section 306 of title 5, sections 1105, 
        1115, 1116, 1117, and 9703 of this title, and this 
        section.
    (e) After receipt of the report required under subsection 
(d), the Congress may specify that a performance budget be 
submitted as part of the [annual] biennial budget submitted 
under section 1105.
          * * * * * * *

                           UNITED STATES CODE

                      TITLE 31, MONEY AND FINANCE

                       Subtitle VI--Miscellaneous

                       CHAPTER 97--MISCELLANEOUS

Sec. 9703. Managerial accountability and flexibility

    (a) Beginning with fiscal year 1999, the performance plans 
required under section 1115 may include proposals to waive 
administrative procedural requirements and controls, including 
specification of personnel staffing levels, limitations on 
compensation or remuneration, and prohibitions or restrictions 
on funding transfers among budget object classification 20 and 
subclassifications 11, 12, 31, and 32 of each [annual] budget 
submitted under section 1105, in return for specific individual 
or organization accountability to achieve a performance goal. 
In preparing and submitting the performance plan under [section 
1105(a)(29)] section 1105(a)(28), the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget shall review and may approve any proposed 
waivers. A waiver shall take effect at the beginning of the 
fiscal year for which the waiver is approved.
          * * * * * * *
    (e) A waiver shall be in effect for [one or] two years as 
specified by the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget in approving the waiver. A waiver may be renewed for [a 
subsequent year] for a subsequent 2-year period. After a waiver 
has been in effect for [three] four consecutive years, the 
performance plan prepared under section 1115 may propose that a 
waiver, other than a waiver of limitations on compensation or 
remuneration, be made permanent.
          * * * * * * *

                      TITLE 39, UNITED STATES CODE

                             POSTAL SERVICE

       CHAPTER 28, STRATEGIC PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

          * * * * * * *

Sec. 2802. Strategic Plans

    (a) No later than [September 30, 1997] September 30, 2000 
the Postal Service shall submit to the President and the 
Congress a strategic plan for its program activities. Such plan 
shall contain--
          * * * * * * *
    (b) The strategic plan shall cover a period of not less 
than [five years forward] six years forward from the fiscal 
year in which it is submitted, and shall be updated and revised 
[at least every three years] at least every 4 years.
    (c) The performance plan required under section 2803 shall 
be consistent with the Postal Service's strategic plan. A 
performance plan may not be submitted for a fiscal year not 
covered by a current strategic plan under this section, 
including a strategic plan submitted by September 30, 1997 
meeting the requirements of subsection (a).
          * * * * * * *

Sec. 2303. Performance plans

    (a) The Postal Service shall prepare [an annual] a 
performance plan covering each program activity set forth in 
the Postal Service budget, which shall be included in the 
comprehensive statement presented under section 2401(g) of this 
title. Such plan shall--
          * * * * * * *

                      TITLE 1, UNITED STATES CODE

  CHAPTER 2--ACTS AND RESOLUTIONS; FORMALITIES OF ENACTMENT; REPEALS; 
                         SEALING OF INSTRUMENTS

          * * * * * * *

[Sec. 105. Title of appropriations Acts

    [The style and title of all Acts making appropriations for 
the support of Government shall be as follows: ``An Act making 
appropriations (here insert the object) for the year ending 
September 30 (here insert the calendar year).'']

Sec. 105. Title and style of appropriations Acts

    (a) The style and title of all Acts making appropriations 
for the support of the Government shall be as follows: ``An Act 
making appropriations (here insert the object) for each fiscal 
year in the biennium of fiscal years (here insert the fiscal 
years of the biennium).''.
    (b) All Acts making regular appropriations for the support 
of the Government shall be enacted for a biennium and shall 
specify the amount of appropriations provided for each fiscal 
year in such period.
    (c) For purposes of this section, the term ``biennium'' has 
the same meaning as in section 3(11) of the Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(11)).
          * * * * * * *

                           UNITED STATES CODE

             TITLE 5, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES

                     PART I--THE AGENCIES GENERALLY

                           CHAPTER 3--POWERS

          * * * * * * *

Sec. 306. Strategic plans

    (a) No later than [September 30, 1997] September 30, 2000, 
the head of each agency shall submit to the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget and to the Congress a strategic 
plan for program activities. Such plan shall contain--
          * * * * * * *
    (b) The strategic plan shall cover a period of not less 
than [five years forward] six years forward from the fiscal 
year in which it is submitted, and shall be updated and revised 
[at least every three years] at least every 4 years.
    (c) The performance plan required by section 1115 of title 
31 shall be consistent with the agency's strategic plan. A 
performance plan may not be submitted for a fiscal year not 
covered by a current strategic plan under this section, 
including a strategic plan submitted by September 30, 1997 
meeting the requirements of subsection (a).
          * * * * * * *