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106th Congress                                            Rept. 106-117
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                     Part 3

======================================================================



 
           SECURITY AND FREEDOM THROUGH ENCRYPTION (SAFE) ACT
                                _______

                 July 19, 1999.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Gilman, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted 
                             the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 850]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on International Relations, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 850) to amend title 18, United States 
Code, to affirm the rights of United States persons to use and 
sell encryption and to relax export controls on encryption, 
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu 
thereof the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Security And Freedom through 
Encryption (SAFE) Act''.

SEC. 2. SALE AND USE OF ENCRYPTION.

  (a) In General.--Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
by inserting after chapter 123 the following new chapter:

        ``CHAPTER 125--ENCRYPTED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC INFORMATION

``2801. Definitions.
``2802. Freedom to use encryption.
``2803. Freedom to sell encryption.
``2804. Prohibition on mandatory key escrow.
``2805. Unlawful use of encryption in furtherance of a criminal act.

``Sec. 2801. Definitions

  ``As used in this chapter--
          ``(1) the terms `person', `State', `wire communication', 
        `electronic communication', `investigative or law enforcement 
        officer', and `judge of competent jurisdiction' have the 
        meanings given those terms in section 2510 of this title;
          ``(2) the term `decrypt' means to retransform or unscramble 
        encrypted data, including communications, to its readable form;
          ``(3) the terms `encrypt', `encrypted', and `encryption' mean 
        the scrambling of wire communications, electronic 
        communications, or electronically stored information, using 
        mathematical formulas or algorithms in order to preserve the 
        confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of, and prevent 
        unauthorized recipients from accessing or altering, such 
        communications or information;
          ``(4) the term `key' means the variable information used in a 
        mathematical formula, code, or algorithm, or any component 
        thereof, used to decrypt wire communications, electronic 
        communications, or electronically stored information, that has 
        been encrypted; and
          ``(5) the term `key recovery information' means information 
        that would enable obtaining the key of a user of encryption;
          ``(6) the term `plaintext access capability' means any method 
        or mechanism which would provide information in readable form 
        prior to its being encrypted or after it has been decrypted;
          ``(7) the term `United States person' means--
                  ``(A) any United States citizen;
                  ``(B) any other person organized under the laws of 
                any State, the District of Columbia, or any 
                commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United 
                States; and
                  ``(C) any person organized under the laws of any 
                foreign country who is owned or controlled by 
                individuals or persons described in subparagraphs (A) 
                and (B).

``Sec. 2802. Freedom to use encryption

  ``Subject to section 2805, it shall be lawful for any person within 
any State, and for any United States person in a foreign country, to 
use any encryption, regardless of the encryption algorithm selected, 
encryption key length chosen, or implementation technique or medium 
used.

``Sec. 2803. Freedom to sell encryption

  ``Subject to section 2805, it shall be lawful for any person within 
any State to sell in interstate commerce any encryption, regardless of 
the encryption algorithm selected, encryption key length chosen, or 
implementation technique or medium used.

``Sec. 2804. Prohibition on mandatory key escrow

  ``(a) General Prohibition.--Neither the Federal Government nor a 
State may require that, or condition any approval on a requirement 
that, a key, access to a key, key recovery information, or any other 
plaintext access capability be--
          ``(1) built into computer hardware or software for any 
        purpose;
          ``(2) given to any other person, including a Federal 
        Government agency or an entity in the private sector that may 
        be certified or approved by the Federal Government or a State 
        to receive it; or
          ``(3) retained by the owner or user of an encryption key or 
        any other person, other than for encryption products for use by 
        the Federal Government or a State.
  ``(b) Exception for Government National Security and Law Enforcement 
Purposes.--The prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall not apply 
to any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States, or 
to any department, agency, or political subdivision of a State, that 
has a valid contract with a nongovernmental entity that is assisting in 
the performance of national security or law enforcement activity.
  ``(c) Exception for Access for Law Enforcement Purposes.--Subsection 
(a) shall not affect the authority of any investigative or law 
enforcement officer, or any member of the intelligence community as 
defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
401a), acting under any law in effect on the effective date of this 
chapter, to gain access to encrypted communications or information.

``Sec. 2805. Unlawful use of encryption in furtherance of a criminal 
                    act

  ``(a) Encryption of Incriminating Communications or Information 
Unlawful.--Any person who, in the commission of a felony under a 
criminal statute of the United States, knowingly and willfully encrypts 
incriminating communications or information relating to that felony 
with the intent to conceal such communications or information for the 
purpose of avoiding detection by law enforcement agencies or 
prosecution--
          ``(1) in the case of a first offense under this section, 
        shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined in the 
        amount set forth in this title, or both; and
          ``(2) in the case of a second or subsequent offense under 
        this section, shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years, 
        or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both.
  ``(b) Use of Encryption Not a Basis for Probable Cause.--The use of 
encryption by any person shall not be the sole basis for establishing 
probable cause with respect to a criminal offense or a search 
warrant.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of chapters for part I of title 
18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating 
to chapter 123 the following new item:

``125. Encrypted wire and electronic information............    2801''.

SEC. 3. EXPORTS OF ENCRYPTION.

  (a) Amendment to Export Administration Act of 1979.--Section 17 of 
the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2416) is amended 
by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
  ``(g) Certain Consumer Products, Computers, and Related Equipment.--
          ``(1) General rule.--Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the 
        Secretary shall have exclusive authority to control exports of 
        all computer hardware, software, computing devices, customer 
        premises equipment, communications network equipment, and 
        technology for information security (including encryption), 
        except that which is specifically designed or modified for 
        military use, including command, control, and intelligence 
        applications.
          ``(2) Items not requiring licenses.--After a 1-time technical 
        review by the Secretary, which shall be completed not later 
        than 30 working days after submission of the product concerned 
        for such technical review, no export license may be required, 
        except pursuant to the Trading with the enemy Act or the 
        International Emergency Economic Powers Act (but only to the 
        extent that the authority of such Act is not exercised to 
        extend controls imposed under this Act), for the export or 
        reexport of--
                  ``(A) any computer hardware or software or computing 
                device, including computer hardware or software or 
                computing devices with encryption capabilities--
                          ``(i) that is generally available;
                          ``(ii) that is in the public domain for which 
                        copyright or other protection is not available 
                        under title 17, United States Code, or that is 
                        available to the public because it is generally 
                        accessible to the interested public in any 
                        form; or
                          ``(iii) that is used in a commercial, off-
                        the-shelf, consumer product or any component or 
                        subassembly designed for use in such a consumer 
                        product available within the United States or 
                        abroad which--
                                  ``(I) includes encryption 
                                capabilities which are inaccessible to 
                                the end user; and
                                  ``(II) is not designed for military 
                                or intelligence end use;
                  ``(B) any computing device solely because it 
                incorporates or employs in any form--
                          ``(i) computer hardware or software 
                        (including computer hardware or software with 
                        encryption capabilities) that is exempted from 
                        any requirement for a license under 
                        subparagraph (A); or
                          ``(ii) computer hardware or software that is 
                        no more technically complex in its encryption 
                        capabilities than computer hardware or software 
                        that is exempted from any requirement for a 
                        license under subparagraph (A) but is not 
                        designed for installation by the purchaser;
                  ``(C) any computer hardware or software or computing 
                device solely on the basis that it incorporates or 
                employs in any form interface mechanisms for 
                interaction with other computer hardware or software or 
                computing devices, including computer hardware and 
                software and computing devices with encryption 
                capabilities;
                  ``(D) any computing or telecommunication device which 
                incorporates or employs in any form computer hardware 
                or software encryption capabilities which--
                          ``(i) are not directly available to the end 
                        user; or
                          ``(ii) limit the encryption to be point-to-
                        point from the user to a central communications 
                        point or link and does not enable end-to-end 
                        user encryption;
                  ``(E) technical assistance and technical data used 
                for the installation or maintenance of computer 
                hardware or software or computing devices with 
                encryption capabilities covered under this subsection; 
                or
                  ``(F) any encryption hardware or software or 
                computing device not used for confidentiality purposes, 
                such as authentication, integrity, electronic 
                signatures, nonrepudiation, or copy protection.
          ``(3) Computer hardware or software or computing devices with 
        encryption capabilities.--After a 1-time technical review by 
        the Secretary, which shall be completed not later than 30 
        working days after submission of the product concerned for such 
        technical review, the Secretary shall authorize the export or 
        reexport of computer hardware or software or computing devices 
        with encryption capabilities for nonmilitary end uses in any 
        country--
                  ``(A) to which exports of computer hardware or 
                software or computing devices of comparable strength 
                are permitted for use by financial institutions not 
                controlled in fact by United States persons, unless 
                there is credible evidence that such computer hardware 
                or software or computing devices will be--
                          ``(i) diverted to a military end use or an 
                        end use supporting international terrorism;
                          ``(ii) modified for military or terrorist end 
                        use; or
                          ``(iii) reexported without any authorization 
                        by the United States that may be required under 
                        this Act; or
                  ``(B) if the Secretary determines that a computer 
                hardware or software or computing device offering 
                comparable security is commercially available outside 
                the United States from a foreign supplier, without 
                effective restrictions.
          ``(4) Exports to major drug-transit and illicit drug 
        producing countries.--The Secretary, before approving any 
        export or reexport of encryption products to any major drug-
        transit country or major illicit drug producing country 
        identified under section 490(h) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
        of 1961, shall consult with the Attorney General of the United 
        States, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
        and the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration on 
        the potential impact of such export or reexport on the flow of 
        illicit drugs into the United States. This paragraph shall not 
        authorize the denial of an export of an encryption product, or 
        of the issuance of a specific export license, for which such 
        denial is not otherwise appropriate, solely because the country 
        of destination is a major drug-transit country or major illicit 
        drug producing country.
          ``(5) Definitions.--As used in this subsection--
                  ``(A)(i) the term `encryption' means the scrambling 
                of wire communications, electronic communications, or 
                electronically stored information, using mathematical 
                formulas or algorithms in order to preserve the 
                confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of, and 
                prevent unauthorized recipients from accessing or 
                altering, such communications or information;
                  ``(ii) the terms `wire communication' and `electronic 
                communication' have the meanings given those terms in 
                section 2510 of title 18, United States Code;
                  ``(B) the term `generally available' means, in the 
                case of computer hardware or computer software 
                (including computer hardware or computer software with 
                encryption capabilities)--
                          ``(i) computer hardware or computer software 
                        that is--
                                  ``(I) distributed through the 
                                Internet;
                                  ``(II) offered for sale, license, or 
                                transfer to any person without 
                                restriction, whether or not for 
                                consideration, including, but not 
                                limited to, over-the-counter retail 
                                sales, mail order transactions, phone 
                                order transactions, electronic 
                                distribution, or sale on approval;
                                  ``(III) preloaded on computer 
                                hardware or computing devices that are 
                                widely available for sale to the 
                                public; or
                                  ``(IV) assembled from computer 
                                hardware or computer software 
                                components that are widely available 
                                for sale to the public;
                          ``(ii) not designed, developed, or tailored 
                        by the manufacturer for specific purchasers or 
                        users, except that any such purchaser or user 
                        may--
                                  ``(I) supply certain installation 
                                parameters needed by the computer 
                                hardware or software to function 
                                properly with the computer system of 
                                the user or purchaser; or
                                  ``(II) select from among options 
                                contained in the computer hardware or 
                                computer software;
                          ``(iii) with respect to which the 
                        manufacturer of that computer hardware or 
                        computer software--
                                  ``(I) intended for the user or 
                                purchaser, including any licensee or 
                                transferee, to install the computer 
                                hardware or software and has supplied 
                                the necessary instructions to do so, 
                                except that the manufacturer of the 
                                computer hardware or software, or any 
                                agent of such manufacturer, may also 
                                provide telephone or electronic mail 
                                help line services for installation, 
                                electronic transmission, or basic 
                                operations; and
                                  ``(II) the computer hardware or 
                                software is designed for such 
                                installation by the user or purchaser 
                                without further substantial support by 
                                the manufacturer; and
                          ``(iv) offered for sale, license, or transfer 
                        to any person without restriction, whether or 
                        not for consideration, including, but not 
                        limited to, over-the-counter retail sales, mail 
                        order transactions, phone order transactions, 
                        electronic distribution, or sale on approval;
                  ``(C) the term `computing device' means a device 
                which incorporates one or more microprocessor-based 
                central processing units that can accept, store, 
                process, or provide output of data;
                  ``(D) the term `computer hardware' includes, but is 
                not limited to, computer systems, equipment, 
                application-specific assemblies, smart cards, modules, 
                integrated circuits, and printed circuit board 
                assemblies;
                  ``(E) the term `customer premises equipment' means 
                equipment employed on the premises of a person to 
                originate, route, or terminate communications;
                  ``(F) the term `technical assistance' includes 
                instruction, skills training, working knowledge, 
                consulting services, and the transfer of technical 
                data;
                  ``(G) the term `technical data' includes blueprints, 
                plans, diagrams, models, formulas, tables, engineering 
                designs and specifications, and manuals and 
                instructions written or recorded on other media or 
                devices such as disks, tapes, or read-only memories; 
                and
                  ``(H) the term `technical review' means a review by 
                the Secretary of computer hardware or software or 
                computing devices with encryption capabilities, based 
                on information about the product's encryption 
                capabilities supplied by the manufacturer, that the 
                computer hardware or software or computing device works 
                as represented.''.
  (b) No Reinstatement of Export Controls on Previously Decontrolled 
Products.--Any encryption product not requiring an export license as of 
the date of enactment of this Act, as a result of administrative 
decision or rulemaking, shall not require an export license on or after 
such date of enactment.
  (c) Applicability of Certain Export Controls.--
          (1) In general.--Nothing in this Act shall limit the 
        authority of the President under the International Emergency 
        Economic Powers Act, the Trading with the enemy Act, or the 
        Export Administration Act of 1979, to--
                  (A) prohibit the export of encryption products to 
                countries that have been determined to repeatedly 
                provide support for acts of international terrorism;
                  (B) prohibit the export or reexport of any encryption 
                product with an encryption strength of more than 56 
                bits to any military unit of the People's Republic of 
                China, including the People's Liberation Army (as 
                defined in section 1237(c) of the Strom Thurmond 
                National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 
                (50 U.S.C. 1701 note)); or
                  (C) impose an embargo on exports to, and imports 
                from, a specific country.
          (2) Specific denials.--The Secretary of Commerce may prohibit 
        the export of specific encryption products to an individual or 
        organization in a specific foreign country or countries 
        identified by the Secretary, if the Secretary, in consultation 
        with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the 
        Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
        Administration, and the Director of Central Intelligence, 
        determines that there is credible evidence that such encryption 
        products will be used--
                  (A) for military or terrorist end-use;
                  (B) to facilitate the import of illicit drugs into 
                the United States;
                  (C) in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction 
                or otherwise to assist in the proliferation of weapons 
                of mass destruction; or
                  (D) for illegal activities involving the sexual 
                exploitation of, abuse of, or sexually explicit conduct 
                with minors.
          (3) Other export controls.--Any encryption product is subject 
        to export controls for any reason other than the existence of 
        encryption capability, including export controls imposed on 
        high performance computers. Nothing in this Act or the 
        amendments made by this Act alters the ability of the Secretary 
        of Commerce to control exports for reasons other than 
        encryption capabilities.
          (4) Definition.--As used in this subsection and subsection 
        (b), the term ``encryption'' has the meaning given that term in 
        section 17(g)(5)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 
        as added by subsection (a) of this section.
  (d) Continuation of Export Administration Act.--For purposes of 
carrying out the amendment made by subsection (a), the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 shall be deemed to be in effect.

SEC. 4. EFFECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.

  (a) Collection of Information by Attorney General.--The Attorney 
General shall compile, and maintain in classified form, data on the 
instances in which encryption (as defined in section 2801 of title 18, 
United States Code) has interfered with, impeded, or obstructed the 
ability of the Department of Justice to enforce the criminal laws of 
the United States.
  (b) Availability of Information to the Congress.--The information 
compiled under subsection (a), including an unclassified summary 
thereof, shall be made available, upon request, to any Member of 
Congress.

                         Background and Purpose

    H.R. 850, the Security And Freedom through Encryption 
(SAFE) Act, represents a strong bipartisan effort to bring U.S. 
laws on the export of encryption technology in line with 
international realities. The SAFE Act enjoys strong support in 
the House as reflected by the overwhelming number of 
cosponsors, including the majority of the Members of the 
International Relations Committee.
    While differences still remain and the debate continues 
between U.S. economic and commercial priorities and individual 
civil liberties, on the one hand, and the needs and concerns of 
law enforcement and national security agencies, the SAFE Act is 
generating the political will to reform the existing regulatory 
process to meet today's realities.
    Encryption has been defined as referring to the use of 
software or hardware to scramble wire or electronic information 
using mathematical formulas or algorithms in order to preserve 
the confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of, and prevent 
unauthorized recipients from accessing or altering such 
information. While anyone can encrypt a message, only an 
authorized person can convert a scrambled message back into its 
original form.
    The basic idea of modern encryption, or cryptography, is 
that any message can be represented as a set of numbers (the 
plaintext) used to transform the plaintext into a different set 
of numbers (the ciphertext.) Simply stated, keys consist of a 
series of ones and zeros (called bits), and are described in 
terms of their ``length'', which corresponds to the number of 
possible combinations of ones and zeros equals 2 to the 40th 
power. It then follows that a 56-bit key is 2 to the 56th 
power, which means that it is 2 to the 16th power stronger than 
a 40-bit key.
    Once the exclusive domain of the national security and 
intelligence sectors, encryption now has an expanded 
application, impacting the everyday lives of millions of 
Americans. Today, banking systems, stock markets, air traffic 
control systems, credit bureaus, telephone networks, civilian 
and government payrolls, and the Internet are all directly 
affected by a flow of data managed by countless computers and 
telecommunications networks around the world. Computer 
technology now serves as the nervous system of modern 
technology.
    It is increasingly difficult to protect the privacy and 
confidentiality of transactions at all levels, and increasingly 
important to do so. The Justice Department has estimated that 
annual losses related to computer security breaches could be as 
high as $7 billion. If this were adjusted to include the number 
of undocumented cases by companies reluctant to report such 
intrusions, the figure could be even higher. The National 
Counterintelligence Center in their ``Annual Report to Congress 
on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage'' 
concluded that such ``specialized technical operations 
(including computer intrusion, telecommunications targeting and 
intercept, and private sector encryption weaknesses) account 
for the largest portion of economic and industrial information 
lost by corporations.''
    Therefore, stronger encryption tools are widely viewed as 
the key to providing security and privacy for the information 
superhighway.
    Current U.S. policy restricts the export of ``strong'' 
encryption hardware or software products with keys greater than 
56-bits long-determined to be gravely inadequate by numerous 
experts. The current Administration policy is viewed as not 
meeting the needs of U.S. companies to conduct business in a 
secure manner with their suppliers, their business partners, 
their customers, and even their affiliated companies outside 
the United States.
    Supporting the need for higher encryption standards is the 
fact that a group of independent programmers and researchers 
cracked a 56-bit code in less than 24 hours using computers 
linked across the Internet. This successful breaking of 56-bit 
encryption clearly demonstrates the anachronistic nature of 
current U.S. law and reflects how out-of-touch the 
Administration's policy is with regard the needs of the global 
marketplace.
    As predicted, the Administration's policy can not 
realistically enforce its ban on exports of encryption over 56 
bits. Anybody can carry strong encryption across the U.S. 
border on a single diskette hidden in his pocket without being 
detected or, alternatively, can download it off the Internet 
from anywhere in the world.
    In addition, the Administration's policy only allows the 
export of greater than 56-bit encryption in limited 
circumstances, or for those who promise to build in ``key 
recovery.'' ``Key recovery'' or ``key escrow'' essentially 
means that when stored data or electronic communications are 
encrypted, a third party has a copy of the key needed to 
decrypt the information. As presented by proponents of this 
policy, escrowed encryption is intended to provide for 
encryption protection for legitimate uses but also enable law 
enforcement officials to gain access to the key when necessary 
to decode the plaintext date as part of and investigation.
    This has been interpreted as an attempt to use the export 
control process to manipulate and control the market for and 
expansion of encryption technology, by making it easy to export 
products with key recovery and difficult for those products 
without. The logical basis for this policy is flawed as it is 
rooted in the wrongful assumption that foreign competitors can 
be convinced to alter their policy to parallel what U.S. policy 
is calling for. The current policy is not based on fact, but on 
the optimistic view that the U.S. can influence other countries 
not to export strong encryption without an escrow system.
    Speculation does not make for good laws. Individually and 
as a unit, many of our European allies have clearly illustrated 
their commitment to allow market forces and individual needs to 
dictate the levels of encryption. In its April 1997 proposal 
entitled, ``A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce,'' the 
European Union stated as key elements of the Initiative to 
ensure a framework which ``boosts the trust and confidence of 
businesses for investments and consumers to make use of 
electronic commerce by dismantling remaining legal and 
regulatory barriers and preventing the creation of new 
obstacles.'' It goes on to say that: ``The use of strong 
encryption which ensures the confidentiality of both sensitive 
commercial and personal data is one of the foundation stones of 
electronic commerce. * * * The Community (European Community) 
shall work at the international level towards the removal of trade 
barriers for encryption products.''
    Even the more conservative recommendations made in March 
1997 by the Council of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, clearly state that: ``Users should 
have access to cryptography that meets their needs, so that 
they can trust in the security of information and 
communications systems, and the confidentiality and integrity 
of data on those systems.'' The Council further underscores 
that: ``Government controls on cryptographic methods * * * 
should respect user choice to the greatest extent possible * * 
* and should not be interpreted as implying that governments 
should initiate legislation which limits user choice.'' 
Finally, they add: ``The development and provision of 
cryptographic methods should be determined by the market in an 
open and competitive environment. Such an approach would best 
ensure that solutions keep pace with changing technology, the 
demands of users and evolving threats to communications systems 
security.''
    While U.S. companies are kept at 56-bit encryption with the 
condition that they commit to develop key recovery, non-U.S. 
exporters, particularly the countries of the European Union, 
are producing packages that include encryption technology using 
128 bits leaving American companies far behind in the race to 
capture new markets.
    American companies are placed at a competitive disadvantage 
by being forced to create and deploy two separate systems to 
meet two separate standards. Because of the nightmare this 
would create, most U.S. businesses end up making their domestic 
products subject to the same restrictions as their exportable 
products. By not allowing U.S. industries to provide secure 
products in the face of strong foreign competitors who are not 
restricted by outdated export controls, current law is hurting 
U.S. businesses. No one will buy encryption products for which 
the U.S. government can obtain a key. A recent report by the 
CEOs of 13 large American technology companies concluded that 
the U.S. computer industry could potentially lose up to $30-60 
billion annually by the year 2000 due to these export controls.
    At a fundamental level, evaluating the value of key 
recovery systems in and of themselves, eleven of the world's 
top cryptographers concluded that key recovery systems would 
create new vulnerabilities. A key recovery system would create 
serious difficulties as it would require a vast infrastructure 
of recovery agents and oversight entities to manage access to 
keys. In their May 1997 report entitled, ``The Risks of Key 
Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third Party Encryption'', 
these experts also determined that ``the field of cryptography 
has no experience in deploying secure systems of this scope and 
complexity'' and that such systems could potentially cost many 
billions of dollars.
    Key recovery systems do not even meet the national security 
needs on which the policy is based. Several noted studies have 
documented hundreds of foreign encryption products already 
widely available abroad and to which criminals, terrorists, and 
foreign governments have access. Just recently, a George 
Washington University study entitled ``Growing Development of 
Foreign Encryption Products in the Fact of U.S. Export 
Regulations'' found that there are currently over 800 strong 
encryption products in the marketplace incorporating 
cryptography manufactured in 35 countries outside the U.S., 
which is a 22 percent increase since 1997. It is the 
upstanding, law abiding citizen who suffers.
    The fact is that strong encryption helps further the goals 
of law enforcement and national security, more than key 
recovery could ever hope to. The use of strong encryption 
reduces the likelihood of theft of private information of 
American citizens and businesses, making the job of law 
enforcement easier and decreasing the occurrence of industrial 
espionage. In its landmark report on encryption policy, the 
blue-ribbon National Research Council concluded the following 
about the use of strong encryption:

          If cryptography can protect the trade secret and 
        proprietary information of business and thereby reduce 
        economic espionage (which it can), it also supports in 
        a most important manner the job of law enforcement. If 
        cryptography can help protect nationally critical 
        information systems and networks against unauthorized 
        penetration (which it can), it also supports the 
        national security of the United States.

    With a reach beyond the practical issues of national 
security and economic competitiveness, the debate over 
encryption penetrates the heart of our American identity: First 
and Fourth Amendment Rights, the right to privacy, and the 
struggle for democracy abroad. Many legal scholars argue that 
aspects of the Administration's current encryption regime place 
unconstitutional restraints on protected speech. In Bernstein 
v. Department of State, a California district court held that 
source code was protected by the First Amendment and current 
licensing requirements constituted an unconstitutional prior 
restraint. This decision was recently upheld by the 9th Circuit 
Court of Appeals. In addition, many consumer and privacy 
advocates have voiced concern that weak encryption and the key 
escrow policy is a threat to personal privacy. Confidentiality 
of our personal, medical, and financial records may be 
compromised if our keys gets into the wrong hands or if 
somebody cracks weak encryption codes. Furthermore, dissidents 
around the world rely on strong encryption to defy totalitarian 
regimes in their struggle for democracy.
    If U.S. laws are not changed soon, as H.R. 850 attempts to 
do, world standards for security technology will shift away 
from the U.S. as customers buy products from foreign 
manufacturers. The U.S. economy will lose billions of dollars 
and our workers hundreds of thousands of jobs. As U.S. 
industries lose their competitive edge to foreign companies, 
our law enforcement and national security agencies will not 
enjoy the same access or insight into the security technology 
that replaces U.S. technology as the world standards. Foreign 
companies are less likely to cooperate or share technological 
secrets with the U.S. Government to solve crimes or to defend 
our country.
    On July 7, 1997, German Economics Minister Guenter Rexrodt 
called for the removal of restrictions on encryption technology 
in his opening remarks or a two-day conference on Internet 
commerce attended by 40 government ministers from the European 
Union, The United States, Russia, Japan, and Canada. ``Users 
can only protect themselves against having data manipulated, 
destroyed or spied on through the use of strong encryption 
procedures,'' Rexrodt said, ``that is why we have to use all of 
our powers to promote such procedures instead of blocking 
them.''
    Individual Americans and U.S. businesses should be afforded 
the same protection and the same opportunities that other 
countries provide their own people and industries. H.R. 850--
the SAFE Act--does just that. It is aimed at correcting the 
unfair and unsafe situation that currently exists under current 
law. Specifically the bill as passed by the Judiciary and 
International Relations Committees allows the export of 
generally available encryption products after a one-time, 30 
working day technical review and custom products after the same 
review, if such products are commercially available from 
foreign companies or are approved for use by foreign banks, and 
codifies existing law regarding the use and sale of cnryption 
domestically. Additionally, the bill prohibits the government 
from mandating a key escrow or key recovery system on the 
private sector, but does not prohibit the government from using 
recoverable encryption on its own systems or from requiring the 
use of recoverable encryption in national security of law 
enforcement-related contracts. Finally, H.R. 850 allows the 
President to prohibit exports to terrorist states, to prohibit 
the export of encryption products over 56 bits to any military 
unit of the People's Republic of China, and to impose 
embargoes; contains criminal penalties for the use of 
encryption to cover up criminal activity; and allows the 
Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense, Secretary of State, Attorney General, FBI Director, 
DEA Administrator, and CIA Director, to stop the export of 
specific products to individuals or organizations in specific 
countries if there is credible evidence that such products will 
be used for military or terrorist purposes, used to facilitate 
the import of illegal drugs into the U.S. used in the 
manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, or used for 
activities relating to child pornography.
    In essence, H.R. 850 prevents economic espionage while 
protecting hundreds of thousands of American jobs by affording 
all Americans the freedom to use any type of encryption to be 
sold in the United States; and creates a level playing field by 
permitting the export of the generally available software, 
hardware, and other encryption-related computer products.
    The Committee hopes that other Members realize the need, 
value, and importance of H.R. 850 as it works its way thorough 
the legislative process. In the interest of the American 
people, of U.S. economic leadership and growth, and of national 
security, the Committee hopes the House will pass the SAFE Act.

                            Committee Action


               introduction and consideration of the bill

    H.R. 850, the Security and Freedom through Encryption 
(SAFE) Act, was introduced by Rep. Goodlatte on February 25, 
1999, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in 
addition to the Committee on International Relations. On April 
27, 1999 it was reported from the Committee on the Judiciary 
(H. Rept. 106-117, part I), and the referral to the Committee 
on International Relations was extended for a period ending not 
later than July 2, 1999. On April 27, it was also referred to 
the Committees on Armed Services, Commerce, and Intelligence, 
for a period ending not later than July 2. On July 2, it was 
reported from the Committee on Commerce (H. Rept. 106-117, part 
II), and the referral period was extended to not later than 
July 16 for the Committee on International Relations and to not 
later than July 23 for the Committees on Armed Service and 
Intelligence.
    On May 18, 1999, the International Economic Policy and 
Trade Subcommittee held a hearing on encryption. Testimony was 
received from the following witnesses: The Honorable William A. 
Reinsch, Undersecretary of Commerce, Bureau of Export 
Administration; The Honorable Barbara McNamara, Deputy 
Director, National Security Agency; The Honorable Ron Lee, 
Assistant Attorney General, National Security, Department of 
Justice; and several private sector witnesses including Ira 
Rubinstein, Senior Corporate Attorney of the Microsoft 
Corporation on behalf of the Business Software Alliance; Dinah 
PoKempner, Deputy General Counsel of Human Rights Watch; David 
Weiss, Vice President for Product Marketing of Citrix, 
Incorporated; Edward J. Black, President of the Computer and 
Communications Industry Association; Jeffrey H. Smith, Counsel 
of Americans for Computer Privacy; and Alan B. Davidson, Staff 
Counsel of the Center for Democracy and Technology.

                           markup of the bill

    On March 23, 1999, H.R. 850 was referred to the 
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade which 
subsequently waived consideration of the measure.
    The Full Committee marked up the bill, pursuant to notice, 
in open session, on July 13, 1999. The following amendments 
were considered:
    (1) Gilman amendment--page 12, line 18, adding paragraph 
``(4) Exports to major drug-transit and illicit drug producing 
countries.'' The amendments was agreed to by voice vote, as 
amended by #3.
    (2) Gejdenson amendment to Gilman amendment (#1)--page 17, 
line 22, adding ``(3) Drug producing and trafficking 
entities.''--This amendment was withdrawn.
    (3) Gejdenson/Campbell amendment to Gilman amendment (#1)--
at the end of the Gilman amendment add, ``This provision shall 
not authorize the denial of export of an encryption product, or 
the issuance of a specific export license, for which such 
denial is not otherwise appropriate, solely because the country 
of destination is a major drug-transit country or major illicit 
drug-producing country.'' The amendment was agreed to by voice 
vote.
    (4) Berman amendment--page 13, strike lines 16-23 and 
redesignate the succeeding subclauses accordingly; page 14, 
line 18, strike ``and'' * * * Mr. Berman asked Unanimous 
Consent to strike lines 1 and 2 of his amendment, and to change 
the word ``distribution'' in line 12 to ``approval''. There was 
no objection. The amendment was agreed to by voice vote.
    (5) Gilman amendment--page 17, after line 22, ``(3) Other 
Export Controls.'' The amendment, as amended by #6, was agreed 
to by voice vote.
    (6) Campbell amendment to the Gilman amendment (#5)--strike 
the last sentence of the Gilman (#5) amendment. The amendment 
was agreed to by unanimous consent.
    (7) Berman amendment--changes the ``15-day'' technical 
review by the Secretary to 30 working days and changed the 
standard to provide for the normal, extensive end use and 
verification checks. The amendment, as amended by #8, was 
agreed to by voice vote.
    (8) Gejdenson substitute amendment to #7--changes the ``15-
day'' technical review by the Secretary to 30 days but deleted 
the restoration of the current safeguards. A Gejdenson 
unanimous consent request to change ``30 days'' to ``30 working 
days'' was agreed to. The amendment was agreed to by a recorded 
vote of 21-11.
    (9) Gilman en block amendment. The amendment, as amended by 
#10, was agreed to by voice vote.
    (10) Gejdenson/Gilman amendment to #49--page 17, strike 
lines 16-22, and insert the following: ``(2) Specific 
Denials.--'' By unanimous consent, the word ``shall'' on line 1 
of the amendment was changed to ``may''. The amendment was 
agreed to by unanimous consent.
    (11) Davis amendment--page 12, line 3, strike 
``substantial'' and insert ``credible''; page 17, line 20 
strike ``substantial'' and insert ``credible''. The amendment 
was agreed to by voice vote.
    (12) Berman amendment--page 6, strike lines 3-15 and insert 
the following, ``(b) Exception for Government National Security 
and Law Enforcement Purposes.'' The amendment was agreed to by 
voice vote.
    (13) Berman amendment--page 17, line 13, strike ``or'' 
after the semicolon; page 17, line 15, strike the period and 
insert ``; or'', page 17, after line 15, insert ``(C) require a 
license for, or other control of, the export of an encryption 
product pursuant to a binding multilateral export control 
regime in which the United States participates.'' The amendment 
was defeated by a recorded vote of 15-22.
    With a quorum being present, the Committee, by a recorded 
vote of 33 ayes to five nays, ordered the bill, as amended, 
reported to the House, with the recommendation that the bill, 
as amended, do pass.

                              record votes

    Clause (3)(b) of the rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires that the results of each record vote 
on an amendment or motion to report, together with the names of 
those voting for or against, be printed in the committee 
report.

Descripion of amendment, motion order, or other proposition (Votes 
        during markup of H.R. 850--July 13, 1999)

    Vote No. 1 (1:43 p.m.)--Gejdenson amendment (#8) to the 
Berman amendment (#7), which changed the time allowed for a 
technical review by the Secretary from 15 days to 30 working 
days and eliminated from the Berman amendment a provision that 
would have maintained the normal end use check and 
verifications.
    Voting Yes: Goodling, Burton, Ballenger, Rohrabacher, 
Manzullo, Chabot, Salmon, Houghton, Campbell, Radanovich, 
Gejdenson, Ackerman, Payne, Menendez, McKinney, Hilliard, 
Sherman, Delahunt, Lee, Crowley, and Hoeffel.
    Voting No: Gilman, Bereuter, Royce, King, Tancredo, Berman, 
Brown, Danner, Rothman, Davis, and Pomeroy.
    Ayes 12. Noes 11.
    Vote No. 2 (2:20 p.m.)--Berman amendment (#13) which states 
that ``Nothing in this Act shall limit the authority of the 
President under the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act, the Trading with the Enemy Act, or the Export 
Administration Act of 1979, to require a license for, or other 
control of, the export of an encryption product pursuant to a 
binding multilateral export control regime in which the U.S. 
participates.''
    Voting Yes: Gilman, Goodling, Bereuter, Gallegly, 
Ballenger, Royce, King, Radanovich, Cooksey, Berman, Danner, 
Hilliard, Rothman, Davis, and Pomeroy.
    Voting No: Ros-Lehtinen, Rohrabacher, Manzullo, Chabot, 
Sanford, Salmon, Houghton, Campbell, Brady, Gillmore, Tancredo, 
Gejdenson, Ackerman, Payne, Menendez, Brown, McKinney, Sherman, 
Meeks, Lee, Crowley, and Hoeffel.
    Ayes 15. Noes 22.
    Vote No. 3 (2:26 p.m.)--Motion to favorably report the 
bill, as amended.
    Voting Yes: Goodling, Gallegly, Ballenger, Rohrabacher, 
Manzullo, Royce, Chabot, Sanford, Salmon, Houghton, Campbell, 
Brady, Gillmor, Radanvoich, Cooksey, Tancredo, Gejdenson, 
Ackerman, Faleomavaega, Martinez, Payne, Menendez, Brown, 
McKinney, Danner, Hilliard, Sherman, Davis, Pomeroy, Meeks, 
Lee, Crowley, and Hoeffel.
    Voting No: Gilman, Bereuter, King, Berman, and Rothman.
    Ayes 33. Noes 5.

                             Other Matters


                      committee oversight findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

                committee on government reform findings

    Clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires each committee report to contain a 
summary of the oversight findings and recommendations made by 
the Government Reform Committee pursuant to clause (4)(c)(2) of 
rule X of those rules. The Committee on International Relations 
has received no such findings or recommendations from the 
Committee on Government Reform.

                      advisory committee statement

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                applicability to the legislative branch

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to 
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of section 
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.

                   constitutional authority statement

    In compliance with clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee cites the 
following specific powers granted to the Congress in the 
Constitution as authority for enactment of H.R. 850 as reported 
by the Committee: Article I, section 8, clause 1 (relating to 
providing for the common defense and general welfare of the 
United States); Article I, section 8, clause 3 (relating to the 
regulation of commerce with foreign nations); and Article I, 
section 8, clause 18 (relating to making all laws necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution powers vested by the 
Constitution in the government of the United States).

                        preemption clarification

    Section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
requires the report of any committee on a bill or joint 
resolution to include a committee statement on the extent to 
which the bill or joint resolution is intended to preempt state 
or local law. H.R. 850 would preempt and is apparently intended 
to preempt state law, including common law, relating to the 
ability of states and localities to require the use of 
plaintext recovery systems of various types. It would--for 
example--bar states from requiring their contractors to both 
encrypt data the contractors process on behalf of the states 
and at the same time to require the use of plaintext recovery 
system. (It might be noted that H.R. 850 similarly bars the 
United States from making such a provision by regulation with 
respect to its contractors or suppliers.) The bill might even 
bar the states from making voluntary contractual arrangements 
along those lines with suppliers or customers. It would also 
bar the states from using their police powers to require that 
certain sensitive data in industries they regulate be both 
encrypted and recoverable or to require that if data used in 
such industries were encrypted, a plaintext recovery system be 
available.

new budget authority and tax expenditures, Congressional budget office 
             cost estimate, and federal mandates statements

    Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires each committee report that accompanies 
a measure providing new budget authority, new spending 
authority, or new credit authority or changing revenues or tax 
expenditures to contain a cost estimate, as required by section 
308(a)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended, 
and, when practicable with respect to estimates of new budget 
authority, a comparison of the estimated funding level for the 
relevant program (or programs) to the appropriate levels under 
current law.
    Clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires committees to include their own cost 
estimates in certain committee reports, which include, when 
practicable, a comparison of the total estimated funding level 
for the relevant program (or programs) with the appropriate 
levels under current law.
    Clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires the report of any committee on a 
measure which has been approved by the Committee to include a 
cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional 
Budget Office, pursuant to section 403 of the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974, if the cost estimate is timely submitted.
    Section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act requires the 
report of any committee on a bill or joint resolution that 
includes any Federal mandate to include specific information 
about such mandates. The Committee states that H.R. 850 does 
not include any Federal mandate.
    The Committee adopts the cost estimate of the Congressional 
Budget Office as its own submission of any new required 
information with respect to H.R. 850 on new budget authority, 
new spending authority, new credit authority, or an increase or 
decrease in the national debt. It also adopts the estimate of 
Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional 
Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act. The estimate and report which has been received is 
set out below.

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, June 16, 1999.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 850, the Security 
and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Mark 
Grabowicz (for costs of the Department of Justice), Mark Hadley 
(for costs of the Department of Commerce), and Shelley 
Finlayson (for the state and local impact).
            Sincerely,
                                          Barry B. Anderson
                                    (For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
    Enclosure.

H.R. 850--Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act

    Summary: H.R. 850 would allow individuals in the United 
States to use and sell any form of encryption and would 
prohibit states or the federal government from requiring 
individuals to relinquish the key to encryption technologies to 
any third party. The bill also would prevent the Bureau of 
Export Administration (BXA) in the Department of Commerce from 
restricting the export of most nonmilitary encryption products, 
unless there is credible evidence that such exports would be 
used in connection with certain military, criminal, or 
terrorist activities. H.R. 850 would establish criminal 
penalties and fines for the use of encryption technologies to 
conceal incriminating information relating to a felony from law 
enforcement officials. Finally, the bill would require the 
Attorney General to maintain data on the instances in which 
encryption impedes or obstructs the ability of the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) to enforce the criminal laws.
    Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO 
estimates that implementing H.R. 850 would result in additional 
discretionary spending, by DOJ, of $3 million to $5 million 
over the 2000-2004 period. (The department's spending for 
activities related to encryption exports is negligible under 
current law.) Enacting H.R. 850 also would affect direct 
spending and receipts, beginning in fiscal year 2000, through 
the imposition of criminal fines and the resulting spending 
from the Crime Victims Fund. Therefore, pay-as-you-go 
procedures would apply. CBO estimates, however, that the 
amounts of additional direct spending and receipts would not be 
significant.
    H.R. 850 contains intergovernmental mandates on state 
governments. CBO estimates, however, that states would not 
incur any costs to comply with the mandates. Local and tribal 
governments would not affected by the bill. H.R. 850 contains 
no new private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA).
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The expense of 
compiling and maintaining data on the instances in which 
encryption impedes or obstructs the ability of the department 
to enforce the criminal laws is difficult to ascertain because 
the number of such instances is unknown--but DOJ believes that 
if H.R. 850 were enacted they would be numerous. CBO estimates 
that such efforts would cost DOJ between $500,000 and $1 
million a year, assuming appropriation of the necessary 
amounts. These costs would fall within budget function 750 
(administration of justice).
    Under current policy, BXA would likely spend about $500,000 
a year reviewing exports of encryption products, pursuant to a 
November 1996 executive order and memorandum that authorized 
BXA to control the export of all nonmilitary encryption 
products. If H.R. 850 were enacted, BXA would still be required 
to review requests to export most computer hardware and 
software with encryption capabilities. Thus, enacting H.R. 850 
would not significantly affect BXA's spending.
    CBO estimates that the collections from criminal fines 
established by the bill--for the use of encryption technologies 
to conceal incriminating information relating to a felony--
would not be significant.
    Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures 
for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. H.R. 850 
would affect direct spending and receipts by imposing criminal 
fines for encrypting incriminating information related to a 
felony. Collections of such fines are recorded in the budget as 
governmental receipts (i.e., revenues), which are deposited in 
the Crime Victims Fund and spent in subsequent years. Any 
additional collections under this bill are likely to be 
negligible because the federal government would probably not 
pursue many additional cases under the bill. Because any 
increase in direct spending would equal the fines collected 
(with a lag of one year or more), the additional direct 
spending also would be negligible.
    Estimated impact on state, local, and tribal governments: 
H.R. 850 would preempt state law by prohibiting states from 
requiring persons to build decryption keys into computer 
hardware or software, make decryption keys available to another 
person or entity, or retain encryption keys. These preemptions 
would be mandates as defined by UMRA. However, states would 
bear no costs as the result of these mandates because none 
currently require the availability of such keys.
    Estimated impact on the private sector: This bill would 
impose no new private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA.
    Previous CBO estimates: On April 21, 1999, CBO transmitted 
a cost estimate for H.R. 850, the Security and Freedom Through 
Encryption (SAFE) Act, as ordered reported by the House 
Committee on the Judiciary on March 24, 1999. On July 1, 1999, 
CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 850 as ordered 
reported by the House Committee on Commerce on June 23, 1999. 
On July 9, 1999, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for S. 798, 
the Promote Reliable Online Transactions to Encourage Commerce 
and Trade (PROTECT) Act of 1999, as ordered reported by the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on 
June 23, 1999. CBO estimated that the Judiciary Committee's 
version of H.R. 850 would cost between $3 million and $5 
million over the 2000-2004 period and that the Commerce 
Committee's version of that bill and S. 798 would increase 
costs by at least $25 million over the same period.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Mark Grabowicz for DOJ 
and Mark Hadley for BXA; impact on state, local, and tribal 
governments: Shelley Finlayson.
    Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis


Section 1. Short title

    This section states that the Act may be cited at the 
``Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act''.

Section 2. Sale and use of encryption

    This section states that Part I of Title 18, United States 
Code, is amended by adding a new chapter after chapter 123.
    This section also creates ``Chapter 125--Encrypted Wire and 
Electronic Information'' which includes sections: 2801. 
Definition; 2802. Freedom to Use Encryption; 2803. Freedom to 
Sell Encryption; 2804. Prohibition on Mandatory Key Escrow; 
2805. Unlawful Use of Encryption in the furtherance of a 
criminal act.
    Section 2801 is titled, ``definitions'' and provides 
definitions for, ``person'', ``State'', ``wire communication'', 
``electronic communication'', ``investigative or law 
enforcement officer'', and ``judge of competent jurisdiction''. 
It also defines the terms ``encrypt'', ``encrypted'' and 
``encryption'', ``key'', ``key recovery information'', 
``plaintext access capability'' and ``United States person''.
    Section 2802 states that subject to Section 2805 it is 
legal for any person in the United States or any United States 
person in a foreign country, to use any form of encryption 
regardless of the algorithm, key length, or technique used in 
the encryption.
    Section 2803 states that subject to Section 2805, it is 
legal for any person within any State to sell in interstate 
commerce any encryption, regardless of the encryption algorithm 
selected, key length or technique used. The Committee intends 
that Sections 2802 and 2803 be read as limitations on 
government power. They should not be read as overriding 
otherwise lawful employer policies concerning employee use of 
the employer's computer system, nor as limiting the employer's 
otherwise lawful means to remedy violations of those policies.
    Section 2804 specifically prohibits requiring any person in 
lawful possession of an encryption key to turn that key over to 
another person. This section prevents any form of mandatory key 
escrow system with an exception for any law enforcement 
personnel or a member of the intelligence community. It also 
contains an exception whereby this prohibition does not apply 
to any department, agency or political subdivision of a State 
that has a valid contract with a non-government entity that is 
assisting in the performance of national security or law 
enforcement activity.
    Section 2805 makes it a crime to use encryption unlawfully 
in furtherance of some other crime. This new crime is 
punishable with a sentence of five years for a first offense 
and ten years for a second or subsequent offense. It also 
provides that the use of encryption by any person shall not be 
the sole basis for establishing probable cause with respect to 
a criminal offense or a search warrant and makes a conforming 
amendment for the table of chapters for Part I of Title 18.

Section 3. Export of encryption

    Subsection 3(a) of H.R. 850 amends the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 by creating a new subsection (g) 
entitled, ``Certain Consumer Products, Computers, and Related 
Equipment'', to 50 U.S.C. App. 2416.
    Subsection (g)(1), subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, places 
all encryption products under the jurisdiction of the Secretary 
of Commerce.
    Subsection (g)(2) provides that after a one time technical 
review by the Secretary, to be completed no later than 30 
working days after the product's submission for review, no 
export license may be required--except pursuant to the Trading 
With the Enemy Act or the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (and only to the extent that the authority of such 
Act is not exercised to extend controls imposed under this 
Act)--for the export or reexport of: (A) computer hardware or 
software that is generally available, that is in the public 
domain, or that is available to the public because it is 
generally accessible or that is used in a commercial, off-the-
shelf consumer product which includes encryption capabilities 
in accessible to the end user and not designed for military or 
intelligence end use; (B) any computing device solely because 
it incorporates hardware or software that is exempted from any 
requirement for a license under subparagraph (A); (C) any 
computer hardware or software with solely on the basis that it 
incorporates any interface mechanisms; (D) any computing 
devices with encryption capabilities that are not directly 
available to the end user or otherwise limit the encryption; 
(E) technical assistance used for the installation or 
maintenance of computer hardware or software with encryption 
capabilities; and (F) any encryption hardware or software not 
used for confidentiality purposes.
    Subsection (g)(3) provides that after a one time technical 
review of no later than 30 working days the Secretary shall 
authorize the export or reexport of computer hardware or 
software with encryption capabilities for nonmilitary end uses 
in any country (A) where such exports are permitted for use by 
financial institutions unless there is credible evidence that 
there would be diversion of the computer hardware or software 
to military or terrorist end use or reexported without 
authorization or (B) if the Secretary determines that a 
computer hardware or software offering comparable security is 
commercially available outside the United States from a foreign 
supplier without effective restrictions.
    Subsection (g)(4) states that the Secretary, before 
approving the export or reexport of encryption products to any 
major drug-transit country or any major drug producing country 
identified under Section 490(h) of the Foreign Assistance Act, 
shall consult with all relevant officials including the 
Attorney General, Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration on the potential impact of such export on the 
flow of illegal products into the U.S. It specifically does not 
authorize the denial of an export of an encryption product or 
of the issuance of a specific license solely because the 
country of destination is a major drug-transit country or major 
illicit drug producing country. The committee adopted an 
approach to exporting encryption devices as related to the war 
on drugsabroad that--irrespective where one stands on 
controlling the export of encryption technology--is clearly merited and 
was accepted by voice vote in committee. Each year, under section 
490(h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the President 
provides to the Congress a list of those ``major'' drug-producing or 
``major'' transit nations that substantially impact the United States 
from the flow of drugs from their nation into ours. It is only logical 
that there be law enforcement input and consultation into decisions 
whether to export encryption products to countries on the ``majors'' 
list. We should not do anything in regard to our export encryption 
products to countries on the ``majors'' list. We should not do anything 
in regard to our export policy to make their full cooperation with us 
any more difficult to obtain. This law enforcement consultation process 
will help to ensure that we do nothing to impair any and all law 
enforcement tools, including court-approved wire intercepts, which can 
turn the strength of the drug cartels, their command and control 
networks, into a weakness.
    Subsection (g)(5) defines a number of terms including 
``encryption'', ``wire communication'', ``electronic 
communication'', ``generally available'', ``computing device'', 
``computer hardware'', ``customer premises equipment'', 
``technical assistance'', ``technical data'', and ``technical 
review''.
    Subsection 3(b) provides that any encryption product not 
requiring an export license as of the date of enactment, as a 
result of administrative action or rulemaking, shall not 
require an export license.
    Subsection 3(c) states that in general nothing in the Act 
under the authority of the President under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, Trading with the enemy Act or 
the Export Administration Act of 1979 to (A) prohibit the 
export of encryption products to countries determined to have 
provided support on a repeated basis for acts of terrorism, (B) 
prohibit the export of encryption products with a strength of 
more than 56 bits to any military unit of the People's Republic 
of China, including the People's Liberation Army, or (C) impose 
an embargo on exports to, and imports from, a specific country. 
The Secretary may also prohibit the export of encryption 
products to an individual or organization in a specific foreign 
country or countries identified by the Secretary, if the 
Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Administrator of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Director of Central 
Intelligence, determines there is credible evidence that such 
encryption products will be used for: (A) military or terrorist 
end use, (B) facilitation of the import of illicit drugs into 
the United States, (C) the manufacture of weapons of mass 
destruction or otherwise assist in the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, or (D) illegal activities involving the 
sexual exploitation of minors. It also provides that any 
encryption product is subject to export controls for any reason 
other than the existence of encryption capability, including 
export controls imposed on high performance computers and 
defines the term, ``encryption''.
    Subsection 3(d) deems the Export Administration Act of 1979 
to be in effect for the purposes of carrying out the amendment 
made by subsection (a).

Section 4. Effect on law enforcement activities

    This section directs the Attorney General to compile, and 
maintain in classified form, data on the instances in which 
encryption has obstructed or interfered with the ability of the 
Department of Justice to enforce the criminal law of the United 
States and provides that the information compiled shall be made 
available, upon request, to any Member of Congress.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is 
printed in italic and existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                  TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                           PART I--CRIMES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


125. Encrypted wire and electronic information....................  2801
     * * * * * * *

         CHAPTER 125--ENCRYPTED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC INFORMATION

2801. Definitions.
2802. Freedom to use encryption.
2803. Freedom to sell encryption.
2804. Prohibition on mandatory key escrow.
2805. Unlawful use of encryption in furtherance of a criminal act.

Sec. 2801. Definitions

  As used in this chapter--
          (1) the terms ``person'', ``State'', ``wire 
        communication'', ``electronic communication'', 
        ``investigative or law enforcement officer'', and 
        ``judge of competent jurisdiction'' have the meanings 
        given those terms in section 2510 of this title;
          (2) the term ``decrypt'' means to retransform or 
        unscramble encrypted data, including communications, to 
        its readable form;
          (3) the terms ``encrypt'', ``encrypted'', and 
        ``encryption'' mean the scrambling of wire 
        communications, electronic communications, or 
        electronically stored information, using mathematical 
        formulas or algorithms in order to preserve the 
        confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of, and 
        prevent unauthorized recipients from accessing or 
        altering, such communications or information;
          (4) the term ``key'' means the variable information 
        used in a mathematical formula, code, or algorithm, or 
        any component thereof, used to decrypt wire 
        communications, electronic communications, or 
        electronically stored information, that has been 
        encrypted; and
          (5) the term ``key recovery information'' means 
        information that would enable obtaining the key of a 
        user of encryption;
          (6) the term ``plaintext access capability'' means 
        any method or mechanism which would provide information 
        in readable form prior to its being encrypted or after 
        it has been decrypted;
          (7) the term ``United States person'' means--
                  (A) any United States citizen;
                  (B) any other person organized under the laws 
                of any State, the District of Columbia, or any 
                commonwealth, territory, or possession of the 
                United States; and
                  (C) any person organized under the laws of 
                any foreign country who is owned or controlled 
                by individuals or persons described in 
                subparagraphs (A) and (B).

Sec. 2802. Freedom to use encryption

  Subject to section 2805, it shall be lawful for any person 
within any State, and for any United States person in a foreign 
country, to use any encryption, regardless of the encryption 
algorithm selected, encryption key length chosen, or 
implementation technique or medium used.

Sec. 2803. Freedom to sell encryption

  Subject to section 2805, it shall be lawful for any person 
within any State to sell in interstate commerce any encryption, 
regardless of the encryption algorithm selected, encryption key 
length chosen, or implementation technique or medium used.

Sec. 2804. Prohibition on mandatory key escrow

  (a) General Prohibition.--Neither the Federal Government nor 
a State may require that, or condition any approval on a 
requirement that, a key, access to a key, key recovery 
information, or any other plaintext access capability be--
          (1) built into computer hardware or software for any 
        purpose;
          (2) given to any other person, including a Federal 
        Government agency or an entity in the private sector 
        that may be certified or approved by the Federal 
        Government or a State to receive it; or
          (3) retained by the owner or user of an encryption 
        key or any other person, other than for encryption 
        products for use by the Federal Government or a State.
  (b) Exception for Government National Security and Law 
Enforcement Purposes.--The prohibition contained in subsection 
(a) shall not apply to any department, agency, or 
instrumentality of the United States, or to any department, 
agency, or political subdivision of a State, that has a valid 
contract with a nongovernmental entity that is assisting in the 
performance of national security or law enforcement activity.
  (c) Exception for Access for Law Enforcement Purposes.--
Subsection (a) shall not affect the authority of any 
investigative or law enforcement officer, or any member of the 
intelligence community as defined in section 3 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a), acting under any law in 
effect on the effective date of this chapter, to gain access to 
encrypted communications or information.

Sec. 2805. Unlawful use of encryption in furtherance of a criminal act

  (a) Encryption of Incriminating Communications or Information 
Unlawful.--Any person who, in the commission of a felony under 
a criminal statute of the United States, knowingly andwillfully 
encrypts incriminating communications or information relating to that 
felony with the intent to conceal such communications or information 
for the purpose of avoiding detection by law enforcement agencies or 
prosecution--
          (1) in the case of a first offense under this 
        section, shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, 
        or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or 
        both; and
          (2) in the case of a second or subsequent offense 
        under this section, shall be imprisoned for not more 
        than 10 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this 
        title, or both.
  (b) Use of Encryption Not a Basis for Probable Cause.--The 
use of encryption by any person shall not be the sole basis for 
establishing probable cause with respect to a criminal offense 
or a search warrant.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


          SECTION 17 OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979

                          effect on other acts

  Sec. 17. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (g) Certain Consumer Products, Computers, and Related 
Equipment.--
          (1) General rule.--Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), 
        the Secretary shall have exclusive authority to control 
        exports of all computer hardware, software, computing 
        devices, customer premises equipment, communications 
        network equipment, and technology for information 
        security (including encryption), except that which is 
        specifically designed or modified for military use, 
        including command, control, and intelligence 
        applications.
          (2) Items not requiring licenses.--After a 1-time 
        technical review by the Secretary, which shall be 
        completed not later than 30 working days after 
        submission of the product concerned for such technical 
        review, no export license may be required, except 
        pursuant to the Trading with the enemy Act or the 
        International Emergency Economic Powers Act (but only 
        to the extent that the authority of such Act is not 
        exercised to extend controls imposed under this Act), 
        for the export or reexport of--
                  (A) any computer hardware or software or 
                computing device, including computer hardware 
                or software or computing devices with 
                encryption capabilities--
                          (i) that is generally available;
                          (ii) that is in the public domain for 
                        which copyright or other protection is 
                        not available under title 17, United 
                        States Code, or that is available to 
                        the public because it is generally 
                        accessible to the interested public in 
                        any form; or
                          (iii) that is used in a commercial, 
                        off-the-shelf, consumer product or any 
                        component or subassembly designed for 
                        use in such a consumer product 
                        available within the United States or 
                        abroad which--
                                  (I) includes encryption 
                                capabilities which are 
                                inaccessible to the end user; 
                                and
                                  (II) is not designed for 
                                military or intelligence end 
                                use;
                  (B) any computing device solely because it 
                incorporates or employs in any form--
                          (i) computer hardware or software 
                        (including computer hardware or 
                        software with encryption capabilities) 
                        that is exempted from any requirement 
                        for a license under subparagraph (A); 
                        or
                          (ii) computer hardware or software 
                        that is no more technically complex in 
                        its encryption capabilities than 
                        computer hardware or software that is 
                        exempted from any requirement for a 
                        license under subparagraph (A) but is 
                        not designed for installation by the 
                        purchaser;
                  (C) any computer hardware or software or 
                computing device solely on the basis that it 
                incorporates or employs in any form interface 
                mechanisms for interaction with other computer 
                hardware or software or computing devices, 
                including computer hardware and software and 
                computing devices with encryption capabilities;
                  (D) any computing or telecommunication device 
                which incorporates or employs in any form 
                computer hardware or software encryption 
                capabilities which--
                          (i) are not directly available to the 
                        end user; or
                          (ii) limit the encryption to be 
                        point-to-point from the user to a 
                        central communications point or link 
                        and does not enable end-to-end user 
                        encryption;
                  (E) technical assistance and technical data 
                used for the installation or maintenance of 
                computer hardware or software or computing 
                devices with encryption capabilities covered 
                under this subsection; or
                  (F) any encryption hardware or software or 
                computing device not used for confidentiality 
                purposes, such as authentication, integrity, 
                electronic signatures, nonrepudiation, or copy 
                protection.
          (3) Computer hardware or software or computing 
        devices with encryption capabilities.--After a 1-time 
        technical review by the Secretary, which shall be 
        completed not later than 30 working days after 
        submission of the product concerned for such technical 
        review, the Secretary shall authorize the export or 
        reexport of computer hardware or software or computing 
        devices with encryption capabilities for nonmilitary 
        end uses in any country--
                  (A) to which exports of computer hardware or 
                software or computing devices of comparable 
                strength are permitted for use by financial 
                institutions not controlled in fact by United 
                States persons, unless there is credible 
                evidence that such computer hardware or 
                software or computing devices will be--
                          (i) diverted to a military end use or 
                        an end use supporting international 
                        terrorism;
                          (ii) modified for military or 
                        terrorist end use; or
                          (iii) reexported without any 
                        authorization by the United States that 
                        may be required under this Act; or
                  (B) if the Secretary determines that a 
                computer hardware or software or computing 
                device offering comparable security is 
                commercially available outside the United 
                States from a foreign supplier, without 
                effective restrictions.
          (4) Exports to major drug-transit and illicit drug 
        producing countries.--The Secretary, before approving 
        any export or reexport of encryption products to any 
        major drug-transit country or major illicit drug 
        producing country identified under section 490(h) of 
        the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, shall consult with 
        the Attorney General of the United States, the Director 
        of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
        Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration on 
        the potential impact of such export or reexport on the 
        flow of illicit drugs into the United States. This 
        paragraph shall not authorize the denial of an export 
        of an encryption product, or of the issuance of a 
        specific export license, for which such denial is not 
        otherwise appropriate, solely because the country of 
        destination is a major drug-transit country or major 
        illicit drug producing country.
          (5) Definitions.--As used in this subsection--
                  (A)(i) the term ``encryption'' means the 
                scrambling of wire communications, electronic 
                communications, or electronically stored 
                information, using mathematical formulas or 
                algorithms in order to preserve the 
                confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of, 
                and prevent unauthorized recipients from 
                accessing or altering, such communications or 
                information;
                  (ii) the terms ``wire communication'' and 
                ``electronic communication'' have the meanings 
                given those terms in section 2510 of title 18, 
                United States Code;
                  (B) the term ``generally available'' means, 
                in the case of computer hardware or computer 
                software (including computer hardware or 
                computer software with encryption 
                capabilities)--
                          (i) computer hardware or computer 
                        software that is--
                                  (I) distributed through the 
                                Internet;
                                  (II) offered for sale, 
                                license, or transfer to any 
                                person without restriction, 
                                whether or not for 
                                consideration, including, but 
                                not limited to, over-the-
                                counter retail sales, mail 
                                order transactions, phone order 
                                transactions, electronic 
                                distribution, or sale on 
                                approval;
                                  (III) preloaded on computer 
                                hardware or computing devices 
                                that are widely available for 
                                sale to the public; or
                                  (IV) assembled from computer 
                                hardware or computer software 
                                components that are widely 
                                available for sale to the 
                                public;
                          (ii) not designed, developed, or 
                        tailored by the manufacturer for 
                        specific purchasers or users, except 
                        that any such purchaser or user may--
                                  (I) supply certain 
                                installation parameters needed 
                                by the computer hardware or 
                                software to function properly 
                                with the computer system of the 
                                user or purchaser; or
                                  (II) select from among 
                                options contained in the 
                                computer hardware or computer 
                                software;
                          (iii) with respect to which the 
                        manufacturer of that computer hardware 
                        or computer software--
                                  (I) intended for the user or 
                                purchaser, including any 
                                licensee or transferee, to 
                                install the computer hardware 
                                or software and has supplied 
                                the necessary instructions to 
                                do so, except that the 
                                manufacturer of the computer 
                                hardware or software, or any 
                                agent of such manufacturer, may 
                                also provide telephone or 
                                electronic mail help line 
                                services for installation, 
                                electronic transmission, or 
                                basic operations; and
                                  (II) the computer hardware or 
                                software is designed for such 
                                installation by the user or 
                                purchaser without further 
                                substantial support by the 
                                manufacturer; and
                          (iv) offered for sale, license, or 
                        transfer to any person without 
                        restriction, whether or not for 
                        consideration, including, but not 
                        limited to, over-the-counter retail 
                        sales, mail order transactions, phone 
                        order transactions, electronic 
                        distribution, or sale on approval;
                  (C) the term ``computing device'' means a 
                device which incorporates one or more 
                microprocessor-based central processing units 
                that can accept, store, process, or provide 
                output of data;
                  (D) the term ``computer hardware'' includes, 
                but is not limited to, computer systems, 
                equipment, application-specific assemblies, 
                smart cards, modules, integrated circuits, and 
                printed circuit board assemblies;
                  (E) the term ``customer premises equipment'' 
                means equipment employed on the premises of a 
                person to originate, route, or terminate 
                communications;
                  (F) the term ``technical assistance'' 
                includes instruction, skills training, working 
                knowledge, consulting services, and the 
                transfer of technical data;
                  (G) the term ``technical data'' includes 
                blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulas, 
                tables, engineering designs and specifications, 
                and manuals and instructions written or 
                recorded on other media or devices such as 
                disks, tapes, or read-only memories; and
                  (H) the term ``technical review'' means a 
                review by the Secretary of computer hardware or 
                software or computing devices with encryption 
                capabilities, based on information about the 
                product's encryption capabilities supplied by 
                the manufacturer, that the computer hardware or 
                software or computing device works as 
                represented.

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

    While well-intentioned, H.R. 850 would gravely undermine 
the efforts of our law enforcement and national security 
agencies to protect the security and safety of the American 
people by giving our adversaries abroad and law breakers at 
home increased access to unrecoverable encryption. This 
legislation also adversely affects the Administration's ability 
to forge an international consensus on the creation of a 
multilateral export control arrangement.
    We recognize that the development of strong encryption can 
play a vital role in promoting electronic commerce, protecting 
the privacy of all Americans and safeguarding our government's 
own data base. In the past, timely detection has prevented 
untold death and devastation through the monitoring of 
communications relating to terrorism, weapons proliferation, 
military operations, and other threats to U.S. security. If 
strong encryption is in widespread use in the near future, 
deciphering encrypted communications will become virtually 
impossible as a result of such proliferation.
    Brute force attacks trying to crack cutting-edge encryption 
algorithms may not be feasible within a realistic time frame. 
For domestic law enforcement officials, strong encryption would 
deny access to data and communications to which they have been 
granted access under court order. Regrettably, since much of 
this important deciphering activity remains classified, much of 
the general public is not aware of the grave dangers of 
relaxing export restrictions.
    The Administration does not dispute the contention of U.S. 
software manufacturers that encryption products above 56 bits 
without key recovery systems are in use around the world. First 
of all, foreign software companies produce and sell encryption 
above 56 bits. However, American products are still more 
sophisticated then ``comparable products'' or software with 
similar key lengths, produced by foreign competitors. Secondly, 
there is no doubt strong encryption can be undetectable 
transferred across borders and easily downloaded off the 
Internet. However, for complicated reasons--one of which is 
that consumers need to trust the suppliers of their encryption 
products--the surprising fact is that these products are not 
yet being widely used by individuals, groups, and governments 
which threaten the United States.
    Accordingly, what H.R. 850 defines as ``generally 
available'' encryption products in a country may not be 
relevant in a national security context. Just because an 
Afghani bank in Kabul has access to high-end encryption 
software, it does not necessarily mean that Osama bin Laden can 
easily get his hands on it. Properly understood, U.S. export 
control policy aims not to unrealistically prevent the spread 
of strong encryption worldwide, but rather to discourage the 
flow of these products to certain groups and to give U.S. 
counter-encryption experts the breathing space to keep up with 
rapid technological advancements.
    Despite the improvements made to this measure adopted by 
the Committee during its consideration of the SAFE Act on July 
13, we remain concerned that in its present form H.R. 850 could 
still increase the availability of these products to 
individuals, groups, and governments hostile to the U.S. 
Specifically, this bill would allow exports of encryption to 
nonmilitary end-users which may inadvertently include 
objectionable recipients such as terrorists, criminals, certain 
companies potentially associated with weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), and agents of proliferation that masquerade 
as corporate subsidiaries. Louis Freeh, Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has warned, ``Law enforcement 
remains in unanimous agreement that the widespread use of 
robust non-recoverable encryption will ultimately devastate our 
ability to fight crime and terrorism. Unbreakable encryption 
overseas would allow drug lords, terrorists, and even violent 
gangs to communicate about their criminal intentions with 
impunity and to maintain electronically stored evidence of the 
crimes impervious to lawful search and seizure.''
    More than one half of the annual court-ordered wire taps 
are at the state and local level, and of the national total for 
all such wire taps, more than 70 percent are for drug-related 
cases. Congressional action of this legislation has the 
potential to affect our cities and towns where the devastating 
impact of illicit drugs already causes nearly $70 billion in 
annual societal costs. We ought not to add to that carnage and 
destruction by denying law enforcement one of the most 
effective tools against this scourge, timely access to lawful 
requests for information needed to combat these crimes.
    According to a recent analysis by the Department of 
Defense, H.R. 850 would impose additional difficulties for law 
enforcement and national security officials beyond those 
introduced by the elimination of the bit ceiling on encryption 
exports. First, this legislation would assign the Secretary of 
Commerce the sole authority to grant export licenses. However, 
the Secretary of Commerce may not be in the best position to 
determine whether a product will be diverted or modified. 
Second, the bill's definition of technical review is far from 
comprehensive. Third, H.R. 850 would eliminate end-use and 
post-export reporting which provide protection on the proper 
end use and monitoring of sensitive items and combat 
proliferation-related activities in countries of concern.
    Another goal of the Administration's policy is to slow down 
the spread of these products enough to give U.S. led diplomacy 
an opportunity to achieve increased multilateral cooperation on 
common export control policies and on the adoption of a global 
key managements infrastructure. Such an infrastructure would 
enable U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to 
cooperate with their counterparts in friendly countries in 
gaining access to communications that threaten common security 
and safety interests.
    A level playing field, with common rules of the game, is 
needed to avoid giving economic rivals competitive advantages 
over one another. The administration made an important and 
correct decision in seeking an international consensus on the 
key recovery approach to strong encryption and must continue to 
work hard in seeking this common global approach. While it has 
yet to achieve such a consensus within the OECD, many of the 
key players with the technical capability to ship advanced 
cryptography products and affect global markets are supporting 
the U.S. approach, and if a few more can be brought onboard, an 
international agreement on this issue can take shape.
    If enacted in its current form, this bill would undermine 
any prospects for achieving such consensus and would compel a 
number of the OECD countries to put additional import 
restrictions in place, blocking the entry of our strongest 
encryption products.
    We recognize the importance of American competitiveness in 
the encryption market for jobs and America's technological 
leadership. In September 1998, the Administration announced the 
relaxation of encryption export regulations to meet the needs 
of industry, the national security community as well as the 
average American, all to ensure that their communications 
remain confidential and private. Last year's update of our 
encryption policy opened a significant portion of the world's 
economies to our encryption products. As a result, the 
strongest encryption products with any key length can be 
exported to those markets that clearly require stronger 
encryption.
    We fully support the Administration's exemption for 
encryption products exported to the U.S. and foreign bank and 
financial institutions and their customers, the health/medical 
sector, the insurance sector, American corporations and their 
overseas subsidiaries, foreign trading partners with American 
partners, on-line merchants, and other business categories. We 
urge the Administration to continue its dialogue with the 
private sector on expanding the scope of some of these sectors 
and, where appropriate, to further liberalize our export 
control policy over the next several months dependent on the 
actions of our key allies in Europe and Asia. Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, multilateral agreements could further minimize 
the impact of export controls on American software companies.
    Prompted by sincere conviction, many supporters of H.R. 850 
have, in our view, overstated the negative effects of the 
current policy on the U.S. software industry. Granted the 
Administration export regime is mostly unilateral, U.S. 
companies, nevertheless, remain on the cutting edge of the 
encryption industry and we applaud the Administration's efforts 
in helping to open 80 percent of the world's economies to U.S. 
encryption products.

                                   Benjamin A. Gilman.
                                   Doug Bereuter.

                      ADDITIONAL DISSENTING VIEWS

    As a general matter, there is a very strong argument to 
eliminate export controls where those controls are made 
ineffective by reason of the wide availability of products 
similar to those being controlled. In the context of today's 
encryption marketplace, in which encryption products are widely 
available throughout much of the world, it is reasonable to ask 
how export controls can inhibit the availability of strong 
encryption to terrorist organizations or militaries adverse to 
U.S. interests. But for the time being, controls continue to 
have significant effectiveness. The arguments put forth in 
closed briefings by the national security and law enforcement 
community distinguishing ``wide availability'' from ``side 
usages'' are unassailable.
    It is generally accepted that if there were a binding 
multilateral agreement that would effectively control exports 
of strong encryption, such a multilateral approach, with 
international cooperation, would be preferable to unilateral 
decontrol. Our best option is to encourage the President to 
take steps to make the currently non-binding Wassenaar 
Arrangement binding upon the 33 countries that are signatory. 
Alternatively, we should encourage the president to take the 
lead in developing a new binding multilateral agreement on the 
control of dual-use technologies, including encryption. I 
offered an amendment that would acknowledge this preference by 
providing simply that nothing in H.R. 850 would limit the 
President's ability to meet U.S. obligations pursuant to a 
binding multilateral agreement.
    In contrast to the validity of the national security 
arguments, some of the arguments put forth by proponents of 
H.R. 850 are not persuasive. For example, the countries most 
cited as relaxing encryption export controls are either in a 
similar stage of analysis as the U.S., in that they maintain a 
licensing regime and are simply considering the evolution of 
that regime to keep pace with the development of new 
technologies, or they currently have a far more stringent 
policy than the U.S. Thus, a ``relaxation'' of their policy 
would not result in a more relaxed policy than the current 
Clinton Administration policy. Further, proponents argue that 
U.S. manufacturers have very limited access to foreign markets. 
However, according to the Administration, and I have not heard 
this fact disputed, over 80% of the legitimate world market for 
encryption can be accessed by U.S. manufacturers under the 
Administration's current policy for license exceptions. This is 
not to say that the license exception process cannot be 
improved, or that the Clinton Administration policymaking is 
adequately keeping pace with technological evaluation. However, 
I take issue with the approach of H.R. 850, essentially a 
unilateral, complete and instant decontrol of the export of the 
strongest encryption without effective means for the government 
to address national security concerns.
    It is not necessary to essentially eliminate export 
controls, as H.R. 850 does, to meet the needs of encryption 
manufactures and those who want to be able to export and use 
strong encryption products. Some proponents of H.R. 850 
acknowledge this. Testifying before the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence on June 9, 1999, Christopher Caine, 
Vice President, Governmental Programs, IMB Corporation, 
emphasized that as to encryption, ``a good dynamic regulatory 
approach is the best solution,'' absent that, IBM supports H.R. 
850. In fact, Mr. Caine had a much more moderate view of what 
was needed when compared to this bill. Not, as he characterized 
the view of some proponents, ``a binary approach--all or 
nothing.''
    This bill is an all or nothing proposition. Were this bill 
enacted, there would be no effective controls on export even to 
the seven countries known to the U.S. government as supporters 
of terrorist activities. H.R. 850, as introduced, pays lip 
service to the concerns that strong encryption should be 
controlled sufficiently to avoid exports to these seven 
countries, and to countries subject to an embargo or to 
individuals or organizations involved in terrorist or military 
activity. There are provisions in the bill to theoretically 
prohibit such export, but there are no effective means to 
implement these provisions. There is no effective mechanism for 
the government to identify the destination of even the 
strongest encryption products. In fact, the provisions of H.R. 
850 preclude such review.
    Were this bill enacted as introduced, the Secretary of 
Commerce would be unable to obtain from the manufacturer 
sufficient information to determine the destinations where the 
encryption product may be exported or consult with the proper 
government experts to determine the national security 
implications. H.R. 850 originally provided for a one-time, 15-
day ``technical review'' by only the Secretary of Commerce 
prior to export. I offered an amendment that in part, extended 
the technical review to 30 working days. Of the several 
provisions within my amendment, only this extension of the 
duration of the review was adopted--however, my goal was to 
make this review meaningful, as well as of sufficient duration.
    The current ``technical review'' is simply a ``product 
review,'' wherein the government can assess only that the 
product works as described by the manufacturer. This review 
does not allow for assessment of the actual or potential 
destinations for the encryption product, does not allow the 
government to require a manufacturer to disclose how the 
product actually works, and does not allow for the government 
to require disclosure of the quantity of the product that is 
expected to be exported, or is actually exported after the 
review. This information is necessary for the government to 
assess where a product could be used and by whom. Under the 
H.R. 850 ``technical review,'' there is no opportunity for the 
government to determine where the product may end up. As to 
national security concerns, it is a meaningless review.
    My amendment would have given the government the 
opportunity to get the information that it needs to decide if 
it should restrict an export to keep it out of the hands of 
terrorists or adverse military end-users, as it does today. 
Specifically, it would have given the Secretary of Commerce the 
opportunity to consult with the Secretaries of State and 
Defense, the Attorney General and the Director of the CIA, 
those who have the information needed to properly assess the 
risks to national security. Further, my amendment would have 
allowed the government to require a manufacturer to 
periodically report where a product is actually exported to, 
and in what quantity. Simple mechanisms, within a reasonable 
time frame--a system adequate to keep track of strong 
encryption and substantially maintain the government's current 
ability to keep strong encryption out of the wrong hands.
    Further, the one-time technical review provided for in H.R. 
850 does not provide for any reporting if the product undergoes 
significant changes. A more familiar example of the kind of 
change I am referring to is that of Microsoft Windows. This 
product, introduced as Windows in 1985 was extraordinarily less 
sophisticated than Windows 95, and even further from what we 
can expect from Windows 2000. And we certainly know that the 
evolution of a product can now be much faster. But under this 
provision, if this were an encryption product, after the review 
of the original Windows product, no further reporting about the 
capabilities of the evolved product could be required. A simple 
encryption product, possibly not even what is currently 
considered strong encryption, could be submitted for technical 
review. After a year, the product may evolve to provide very 
sophisticated strong encryption. But the manufacturer can 
continue to export the evolved product pursuant to the ``one-
time technical review'' of the original product. This problem 
is exasperated by the fact that many manufacturers submit 
products for government review before the product is ``final.'' 
Substantial changes may occur between the time of review and 
the time the product is made commercially available. My 
amendment would have addressed this problem by allowing the 
Secretary of Commerce to require reporting by the manufacturer 
of any significant changes to the product.
    I am not opposed to relaxing export controls on encryption 
products. However, we should not do so to such an extent that 
we exacerbate the availability of strong encryption to 
terrorists, criminals and adverse military end-users in a 
manner disproportionate to the benefit achieved for 
manufacturers and legitimate users of encryption products. As 
we consider H.R. 850, we should keep in mind that the 
Administration's policy is evolving. The remedy to the problems 
with the current policy may better be addressed by 
administrative changes, rather than legislation that is 
essentially a complete decontrol of exports of strong 
encryption. If we are to provide a legislative remedy, we 
should not do it at the peril of national security.

                                                  Howard L. Berman.