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107th Congress Rept. 107-92
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session Part 1
SUDAN PEACE ACT
June 8, 2001.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 2052]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on International Relations, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 2052) to facilitate famine relief
efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without
amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Background and Purpose........................................... 1
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 5
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 5
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 5
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 7
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 7
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion....................... 7
New Advisory Committees.......................................... 10
Congressional Accountability Act................................. 11
Federal Mandates................................................. 11
Background and Purpose
Sudan is suffering through the longest running civil war in
the world. While the current stage of this conflict, being
waged primarily between the National Islamic Front (NIF) or
National Congress government and the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A), based in southern Sudan, has run since
1983, southern-based rebellion has surfaced in Sudan
intermittently since 1955. The Sudan conflict has deep
religious, cultural, regional, and economic roots.
This conflict has caused human suffering in Sudan on a
massive scale. It is estimated that more than two million
Sudanese have died of war-related causes since 1983. More than
three million Sudanese are internally displaced, with two
million living in squatter areas of Khartoum. More than three
million Sudanese will require emergency food aid this year,
according to the World Food Program. Famine is a constant.
Society in southern Sudan has been disrupted on a massive
scale. The current fighting has contributed to a situation
whereby millions of Sudanese lack access to basic health and
education services. Estimates of adult illiteracy run as high
as 90 percent in southern Sudan.
Despite the fact that the most recent stage of the conflict
has been flaring for twenty years, Sudan has gained greater
prominence as a U.S. foreign policy concern in recent months.
Many Members of Congress from both parties have taken a role in
raising awareness of the magnitude of human suffering in Sudan.
At a March 7, 2001 Committee hearing, U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell suggested that Sudan is one of the greatest
tragedies on the face of the earth. During his testimony, the
Secretary made reference to the Administration's ongoing Sudan
policy review. Secretary Powell recently traveled to Africa,
where he consulted with African leaders about the crisis in
Sudan. As of this writing, the Committee is awaiting the
results of the Administration's Sudan policy review. Early
signs indicate a strong Administration commitment to addressing
the Sudan crisis.
H.R. 2052, the Sudan Peace Act, which enjoys broad
bipartisan support, condemns violations of human rights by all
sides to the conflict. It also recognizes that the Sudanese
Government and groups under its control bear by far the
greatest responsibility for human rights violations. The NIF
regularly blocks humanitarian relief efforts and bombs
humanitarian and civilian centers. Southern Sudanese are
victimized by slave raids, which this legislation recognizes as
government-backed, as well as religious persecution, which is
commonly believed to be the world's worst. Last year, the State
Department again designated Sudan as a Country of Particular
Concern due to Sudan's systematic and egregious violations of
religious freedom. Sudanese forced into slavery are subject to
all forms of physical abuse, including beatings and sexual
abuse, as well as forced religious conversions. The Committee
believes that U.S. policy should work toward a cease-fire,
followed by negotiations among the parties. This bill notes
that a resolution of this conflict would be best made through a
peace process based on the Declaration of Principles reached
among the parties in Nairobi, Kenya in 1994.
A recent development which the Committee believes has the
potential to alter fundamentally the Sudan conflict is the
Government's exploitation of oil resources. Over the last
several years, the China National Petroleum Company, Talisman
Energy (Canada), Petronas (Malaysia), Lundin Oil (Sweden) and
other non-U.S. companies have participated in developing oil
fields, located primarily in southern Sudan. Currently
producing some 200,000 barrels a day, Sudan has the potential
to become a mid-size oil producer. Oil revenues--$300-$500
million per year--have allowed the NIF to double its military
expenditures, giving it the means to prosecute the war more
aggressively. H.R. 2052 notes that the Government of Sudan has
repeatedly stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds
from future oil sales to increase the tempo and lethality of
the war against areas outside of its control. While the full
effect of oil development is uncertain, the NIF's claim that
its development of Sudan's energy resources strengthens its
hand are credible.
These new oil revenues, and the NIF's efforts to displace
Sudanese from oil production areas in the name of security
(described by the U.K.-based Organization Christian Aid and
others as ``scorched earth operations''), have led to actions
against oil companies operating in Sudan. These activities were
profiled at a March 28, 2001 hearing held jointly by the
Subcommittee on Africa and the Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights. A Petro China (China National
Petroleum Company subsidiary) IPO offered in the U.S. last year
was targeted for protest by grassroots organizations, resulting
in the offering raising only a fraction of anticipated
revenues. Talisman Energy has been the target of a
disinvestment campaign. The Committee concurs with the growing
sense in the U.S. and elsewhere that oil operations at this
point are part of the problem, not the solution, in Sudan.
Congress has gone on record on several occasions over the
last few years expressing concern over the strife and human
suffering in Sudan. In 1999, the House of Representatives
passed a resolution (H. Con. Res. 75) condemning the NIF for
its ``genocidal war in southern Sudan.'' The Sudan Peace Act
condemns the Government of Sudan in the strongest possible
terms, finding that its acts constitute genocide as defined by
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. Among other provisions, the Sudan Peace Act:
Requires companies with operations in Sudan
to disclose the nature of their Sudanese operations
before they are permitted to trade securities in U.S.
capital markets. This disclosure is to include the
nature of those operations and their relationship to
violations of religious freedom and other human rights
in Sudan. This disclosure is intended to be a tool in
alerting American investors, particularly those
considering energy sector investments, to the nature of
their potential investment. While this provision
applies to all business entities, American companies
and individuals are prohibited from operating in Sudan
by sweeping sanctions President Clinton imposed in
1997. The Committee notes that the Securities and
Exchange Commission is already moving to make
disclosure statements more readily available to the
investing public through electronic means. H.R. 2052's
requirement that the SEC publish and otherwise make
such disclosures public should include electronic
Urges the Administration to make available on
behalf of the National Democratic Alliance $10 million
dollars in previously appropriated funds. This funding
should be used to help build the civil society that has
been devastated in the South, and which is essential to
the region's long-term future. These funds cannot be
used for the provision of lethal aid.
Requires the Administration to develop a
contingency plan to operate outside of Operation
Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in the event the Government of
Sudan imposes even a partial ban on OLS air transport
flights. OLS is a United Nations-sponsored humanitarian
aid consortium that has been manipulated by the
Government of Sudan (using its flight approval power)
to advance its war aims, leading to widespread death by
starvation and other causes. The U.S. is the largest
financial supporter of OLS. Since 1989, it has spent
more than $1.2 billion on humanitarian relief efforts
in Sudan, the bulk being funded through OLS. While the
required preparation of an alternative approach does
not itself constitute a rejection of OLS, it does
express the Committee's concern and increasing
impatience with the Sudanese government's ability to
manipulate this consortium. It is for this reason that
H.R. 2052 also expresses the sense that the President
should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies
in the distribution of relief supplies in southern
Sudan. Given the inherent shortcomings of OLS,
including the price in principle the U.S. and others
pay by acceding to the Government of Sudan's
manipulation of relief supplies, it is prudent to
develop a non-OLS contingency plan. In order to
facilitate the President's ability to allocate
resources quickly to where they will be most effective,
H.R. 2052 removes the standard reprogramming
limitations and congressional notification requirements
for resources currently budgeted for Operation Lifeline
Directs the Secretary of State to collect
information and report to Congress on incidents taking
place in Sudan that may constitute war crimes. The
Committee is concerned that the National Islamic Front
Government and possibly other parties have engaged in
heinous actions that may constitute war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide, or other violations of
international humanitarian law. There have been
widespread allegations of organized, government-
supported militias raiding civilian villages,
slaughtering civilian males, enslaving children, and
raping women. Likewise, official government forces have
been involved in aerial bombardment of unarmed
civilians and civilian targets, including hospitals,
clinics, and schools. Though numerous non-official
reports exist regarding these incidents, the Committee
believes that the U.S. Government should provide an
official and more detailed account of these actions.
The Committee expects that the Secretary will
provide a detailed description of the following: (1)
incidents of Government-supported militia slave raids,
including the number of persons killed or kidnaped
during the raid, the location of the raid, whether the
raid fits into a pattern of removal of populations from
certain geographic areas, and a general description of
what happens to persons enslaved, particularly whether
women and children are branded, gang raped, and forced
to accept particular religious precepts; (2) incidents
of aerial bombardment conducted by Sudanese Government
or other forces against civilians and civilian targets,
including how many people are killed or wounded in each
incident, the location of each bombing, and an analysis
of whether there is a pattern to such bombings (the
Committee recognizes that some of this information may
be contained in the report required by section 9); and
(3) forced conversions and torture in government-run
``peace camps,'' where food is used as a method of
coercion. Although the Secretary of State has
discretion in determining how to administer the
collection of this information, the Committee believes
that the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and
the Ambassador's office should be closely involved.
The Committee recognizes that without a resolution to the
underlying conflict, human suffering in Sudan will continue to
mount. The Committee is under no illusions that the Sudan
crisis is easily resolvable. The development of oil may very
well be a complicating factor in forging peace, as it is with
other African conflicts. What the Committee does expect is a
determined and sustained Administration effort at achieving a
just peace in Sudan. A successful diplomatic effort will
require forging a common multilateral approach toward Sudan,
which the SPA encourages. The Administration will be forced to
cope with the NIF, which is complicated by it being officially
classified as a state sponsor of terrorism. The SPA is intended
to bolster Administration efforts by bringing attention to
Sudan, addressing shortcomings in the delivery of humanitarian
relief, and providing tools to the Administration, and the
American public, to attempt to end the massive suffering of the
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or
increased tax expenditures.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with
respect to the bill, H.R. 2052, the following estimate and
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, June 7, 2001.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2052, the Sudan
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Joseph C.
Whitehill (for federal costs), who can be reached at 226-2840,
and Paige Piper/Bach (for the private-sector impact), who can
be reached at 226-2940.
Dan L. Crippen, Director.
Honorable Tom Lantos
Ranking Democratic Member
H.R. 2052--Sudan Peace Act.
H.R. 2052 would condemn slavery and human rights abuses in
Sudan, require disclosure statements from any entity engaged in
commercial activity in Sudan, authorize the Secretary of State
to support the peace process in Sudan, and require the
President to devise a contingency plan for delivering aid to
Sudan. CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 2052 would have no
significant budgetary impact. The act would not affect direct
spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would
Each year the United States provides nearly $190 million in
assistance to the people of Sudan through various emergency
food-aid, disaster assistance, refugee assistance, and
development assistance programs. The provisions of H.R. 2052
would not substantially expand the Administration's authority
to provide such assistance. CBO estimates that spending on
those emergency and humanitarian programs would continue at
The bill contains several reporting and contingency
planning requirements that would not affect the State
Department's workload significantly. Based on information from
the department, CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 2052 would
increase the agency's spending by less than $500,000 annually,
assuming the availability of appropriated funds.
H.R. 2052 would impose a private-sector mandate as defined
by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) on entities engaged
in commercial activities in Sudan. The bill would require
disclosure of business activities in Sudan prior to an entity
trading its securities in any capital market in the United
States. Currently, under the President's Executive Order (E.O.
13067), trade with Sudan is prohibited except for importation
of gum arabic in raw form. According to government sources, the
number of companies affected by the bill would be limited.
Further, the cost to disclose information about business
activities in Sudan to the Securities and Exchange Commission
would be minimal. CBO estimates, therefore, that the direct
cost of the mandate would fall below the annual threshold
established by UMRA for private-sector mandates ($113 million
in 2001, adjusted annually for inflation).
H.R. 2052 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined
in UMRA and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or
The CBO staff contact for federal costs is Joseph C.
Whitehill, who can be reached at 226-2840. The CBO staff
contact for private-sector mandates is Paige Piper/Bach, who
can be reached at 226-2940. This estimate was approved by Peter
H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The goals and objectives of this legislation are to
encourage an end to the war in Sudan and improve international
capabilities to provide humanitarian assistance there.
Constitutional Authority Statement
The Committee finds the authority for this legislation in
Article I, section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion
To Facilitate Famine Relief Efforts and A Comprehensive
Solution to the War in Sudan
Section 1--Short Title
Section 1 cites the act as the ``Sudan Peace Act.''
Section 2 makes 16 findings concerning human rights,
humanitarian relief efforts, and the role of the U.S. in ending
the conflict abuses in Sudan:
Paragraph (1)--The Government of Sudan has intensified its
attack on areas it does not control, which has caused 2,000,000
deaths and has displaced over 4,000,000 people.
Paragraph (2)--A permanent resolution to the war must
protect human rights, make Sudan a self-sustaining nation,
result from a viable, comprehensive, and internationally
sponsored peace process that is immune to manipulation.
Paragraph (3)--Continued reform in the humanitarian relief
operations is an essential element in the effort to bring an
end to the war.
Paragraph (4)--It is vital that United States continue its
Paragraph (5)--Without legitimate civil authority and
supporting institutions, the Sudanese people can not sustain
themselves, nor can they establish a lasting peace.
Paragraph (6)--By manipulating traditional tribal feuds to
divide groups in the Southern areas outside its reach, the
Sudanese government has managed to conquer those populations.
Internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts provide an
effective check against these divide-and-conquer tactics, which
have inflicted much suffering.
Paragraph (7)--Sudan employs militias, Popular Defense
Forces, and other irregular units to raid and enslave opposing
parties which are beyond the reach of the Government. Such
tactics aim to insulate Sudan from international culpability.
Paragraph (8)--Sudan has expressed a strong intention to
channel proceeds from future oil sales into its military
Paragraph (9)--Sudan has systematically banned air
transport relief flights to transform humanitarian relief
efforts into a weapon against targeted groups. This
orchestrated starvation tactic is meant to force opposition
groups to capitulate areas outside Sudanese government control.
Paragraph (10)--The Government of Sudan has committed acts
of genocide as defined by the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Paragraph (11)--United States and other donors have played
a significant role in addressing deficiencies in Operation
Lifeline Sudan (OLS).
Paragraph (12)--The pressing needs of select areas facing
starvation have been addressed for now, but those outside the
control of the Sudanese government remain in danger of extreme
disruption of their ability to sustain themselves.
Paragraph (13)--Peoples in the areas of the Nuba Mountains,
Bahr al Ghazal, and the Upper Nile have been excluded
completely from OLS distributions.
Paragraph (14)--Current international relief efforts which
have exceeded $1 million per day, focus on immediate food needs
and are neither sustainable nor desirable.
Paragraph (15)--Sudan's neighboring states of Ethiopia,
Eritrea, and Uganda have not intervened in the conflict. This
has hampered the ability of populations to defend themselves
against attack from Sudanese government rebels.
Paragraph (16)--The United States should use necessary
pressure to exact a holistic conclusion to the war in Sudan
(A) multilateral economic and diplomatic tools;
(B) the facilitation or creation of viable,
democratic, civil authority in autonomous regions
beyond Sudanese government control;
(C) people-to-people reconciliation mechanisms;
(D) improved delivery systems for humanitarian
(E) international cooperation among United States and
its trading partners towards those ends.
Paragraph (1)--The Committee on International Relations in
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate are the appropriate congressional
Paragraph (2)--The Government of Sudan is the National
Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
Paragraph (3)--OLS is the United Nations relief operation
executed by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and participating
relief organizations known as ``Operation Lifeline Sudan.''
Section 4--Condemnation of Slavery, Other Human Rights Abuses, and
Tactics of the Government of Sudan.
Section 4 specifically condemns:
Paragraph (1)(A)--Violations of human rights by all sides
of the conflict;
Paragraph (1)(B)--The overall human rights record of the
Government of Sudan;
Paragraph (1)(C)--The continuing slave trade, as tolerated
and abetted by the government in Sudan;
Paragraph (1)(D)--Government of Sudan sponsored invasions
and enslavements in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, and the
Upper Nile and Blue Nile regions; and
Paragraph (1)(E)--Aerial bombardment of civilian targets by
the Government of Sudan.
Paragraph (2)--This section also acknowledges that acts,
such as raiding and enslaving people, are used by the
Government of Sudan as tools for creating food shortages
Section 5--Use of Appropriated Funds.
Section 5 urges the President to expend promptly on behalf
of the anti-government National Democratic Alliance coalition
the $10 million in Economic Support Funds appropriated for
fiscal year 2001.
Section 6--Support for An Internationally Sanctioned Peace Process.
Subsection (a)(1)--Finds that the greatest hope for a
negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan depends on
a single, viable, internationally and regionally sanctioned
Subsection (a)(2)--Finds that the resolution of the
conflict should be based on the 1994 Declaration of Principles,
reached in Nairobi, Kenya.
Subsection (b)(1-3)--This section authorizes the Secretary
of State to support with personnel and other resources the
negotiations between the Government of Sudan and opposition
forces as well as the implementation of any future peace
Section 7--Multilateral Pressure on Combatants.
Paragraphs (1-2)--This section encourages the President to
urge the United Nations to review and revise the terms of
Operation Lifeline Sudan for delivering humanitarian assistance
to end the veto power of the Government of Sudan over OLS
flights, to investigate the practice of slavery, and to sponsor
a UN condemnation of the Government of Sudan when it subjects
civilians to aerial bombardment.
Section 8--Disclosure of Business Activities in Sudan.
Subsection (a)--This section outlines which activities
businesses operating in Sudan must disclose. It prohibits any
entity engaged in any commercial activity in Sudan from trading
any of its securities (or depositary receipts with respect to
its securities) in any capital market in the United States
unless it has disclosed, in such form as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) shall prescribe----
Subsection (a)(1)--the nature and extent of that
commercial activity in Sudan including plans for
expansion or diversification;
Subsection (a)(2)--all Sudanese government agencies
with which it is doing business;
Subsection (a)(3)--the relationship of the commercial
activity to violations of human rights or religious
Subsection (a)(4)--the contribution of proceeds
raised in U.S. capital markets will make to the
commercial activity in Sudan.
Subsection (b)--directs the SEC to ensure that
disclosures are made available to the public.
Subsection (c)--authorizes the President to exercise
his authorities under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act to assist the SEC to carry out
Section 9--Reporting Requirement.
Section 9 directs the Secretary of State to prepare a
detailed report regarding the conflict in Sudan and submit this
report to the appropriate Committees of Congress within 6
months after the enactment of this act and annually thereafter.
The reports must include:
Paragraph (1)--Sudan's financial resources for
infrastructure and oil exploration;
Paragraph (2)--the extent to which United States funding
and involvement by American citizens contributed to these
Paragraph (3)--estimates on the extent of aerial
Paragraph (4)--extent of obstruction or manipulation by the
Government of Sudan in humanitarian relief operations.
Section 10--Continued Use of Non-OLS Organizations for Relief Efforts.
Subsection (a)--Congress encourages the use of humanitarian
aid agencies that are not part of the Operation Lifeline Sudan
Subsection (b)--The President is required to submit a
report to the appropriate congressional committees within 90
days after this act takes effect.
Section 11--Contingency Plan for Any Ban on Air Transport Relief
Subsection (a)--This section generally directs the
President to develop a contingency plan for relief delivery if
the Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial or incremental
ban on OLS relief transport.
Subsection (b)--This gives President the authority,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, to reprogram as
much as 100 percent of available OLS funds to carry out the
plan, if necessary.
Section 12--Investigation of War Crimes.
Subsection (a)--This section directs the Secretary of State
to collect information and report to Congress about incidents
which may constitute war crimes in Sudan.
Subsection (b)--The Secretary of State shall submit any
findings and determinations to the appropriate congressional
committees within 6 months after this act passes, and annually
Subsection (c)--In gathering information and preparing the
report, the Secretary of State must consult with relevant
New Advisory Committees
H.R. 2052 does not establish or authorize any new advisory
Congressional Accountability Act
H.R. 2052 does not apply to the legislative branch.
H.R. 2052 provides no Federal mandates.