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109th Congress Exec. Rept.
SENATE
1st Session 109-01
======================================================================
THE NOMINATION OF JOHN R. BOLTON TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS WITH RANK OF AMBASSADOR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO SESSIONS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
_______
May 18, 2005.-- Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Lugar, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[together with minority views]
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred
the nomination of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to
The United Nations with Rank Of Ambassador and U.S.
Representative to the United Nations Security Council and to be
U.S. Representative to Sessions of the United Nations General
Assembly during his tenure of service as U.S. Representative to
the United Nations, having considered the same, reports without
recommendation his nomination to the Senate.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Committee Action.................................................1
II. Committee Comments...............................................2
III. Report on the Investigation......................................2
IV. Minority Views.................................................276
I. Committee Action
The nomination of John R. Bolton, to be the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations was submitted to the
Senate by President Bush and referred to the committee on March
17, 2005. A hearing was held on April 11, 2005. An additional
hearing was held as part of the nomination process on April 12,
2005, when the committee heard the views on the nominee from
Mr. Carl W. Ford, Jr., a former Assistant Secretary of State
for Intelligence and Research.
The committee again considered Mr. Bolton's nomination at a
business session held on April 19, 2005 where the committee by
general agreement, postponed the vote on the nominee until May
12, 2005 in order for committee staff to investigate various
allegations raised at the meeting.
At its business meeting on May 12, 2005, the committee
voted by a vote of 10 to 8, with a quorum present and a
majority of those members physically present and voting in the
affirmative, to report the nomination without recommendation.
The following Senators voted in the affirmative: Lugar, Hagel,
Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu,
Murkowski, and Martinez. The following Senators voted in the
negative: Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer,
Nelson, and Obama. Senator Biden requested that a report be
prepared to which members of the committee could submit
addition views on the nominee.
II. Committee Comments
On May 12, 2005, the committee carefully considered the
nomination of Mr. Bolton. It recognized his many years of
public service and depth of knowledge on matters of foreign
policy and the United Nations, as well as his responses to
Questions for the Record (QFRs) submitted by various committee
members. The full text of Mr. Bolton's own opening statement to
the committee as presented at his nomination hearing (see Annex
A), his response to those QFRs are included in Annex (D). A
sampling of the numerous letters of support are included in
Annex C including letters signed by five former Secretaries of
State, Margaret Thatcher, and former USAID and Department of
Justice officials including Ed Meese and Richard Thornburgh.
During the committee's consideration of the nomination of
Mr. Bolton, Senator Biden and other members of the minority
raised concerns about the nominee related to his interactions
with various staff of the State Department and Central
Intelligence Agency as well as various speeches and testimony
related to his capacity as Undersecretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security.
The committee determined that Secretary Bolton is a highly
qualified nominee with deep experience in UN affairs. There was
a consensus on the committee that the United Nations is in need
of reform. The scandal afflicting the UN's Oil for Food Program
has revealed serious dysfunction within the United Nations
bureaucracy. President Bush nominated Secretary Bolton to help
facilitate reform at the UN in addition to representing the
American perspective. The President specifically chose
Secretary Bolton for the position with this goal in mind.
III. Report on the Investigation
The first business meeting on Secretary Bolton's
nomination, where a vote had been scheduled, was adjourned
without a vote after some Senators said the committee needed
more time to look into allegations regarding Secretary Bolton's
character and his ethical behavior while in office. An intense
period of investigation by joint Majority and Minority staffs
ensued. The committee sought and received some 800 pages of
emails, memos and draft speeches from the Department of State,
the Agency for International Development and the Central
Intelligence Agency. Additionally, the committee staffs jointly
conducted some 35 interviews which produced some 1,000 pages of
transcripts. It is important to understand the context and the
results of that investigation.
In the days immediately following Secretary Rice's March 7
announcement of Secretary Bolton's nomination, most Democratic
members of this committee expressed their opposition to the
nomination on policy grounds. A March 8 T3Associated Press
report states, ``Almost immediately after Bolton's nomination
was announced, Democrats objected.'' The March 8, edition of
the T3Baltimore Sun said, ``Reaction from Senate Democrats
promised contentious confirmation hearings for Bolton when he
goes before the Foreign Relations Committee.''
In several cases the statements by Democrats were
unequivocal in opposition. In several other cases, statements
were very negative, leaving open only the smallest of
possibilities that the Senator would ultimately support the
nominee. In all of these cases, objections were based on
Secretary Bolton's supposed attitudes toward the United
Nations. By March 31, still almost two weeks before the Bolton
hearing, a T3Los Angeles Times report noted, ``Democrats are
likely to vote unanimously against John R. Bolton when his
nomination to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations comes
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--according to
Democratic and Republican lawmakers and aides.''
Senators have the right to oppose a nominee because of his
substantive views and his past statements. However, the ethical
inquiry into Secretary Bolton's background was pressed by
members who planned to vote against him even before the
committee began interviewing witnesses. They had the right to
ask questions, and the committee had a responsibility to follow
up credible allegations. But it also important to understand
that at times the inquiry followed a more prosecutorial path
than most nominees have to endure.
The committee staff worked long and hard to run down
allegations that were raised at the first business meeting, and
they checked others that arose during that process.
The end result of all this is that Secretary Bolton emerged
looking better than when it began. Some allegations turned out
not to be as serious as they first appeared, new information
has cast others in a different light, most have proven to be
groundless or, at best, highly overstated, while some were
apparently judged by the Democratic Members as not even worth
looking into. The interviews and documents showed Secretary
Bolton to be a hardworking public servant, a pro-active
policymaker eager to implement President Bush's agenda, with
strong views and a blunt style that, frankly, sometimes rubbed
people the wrong way.
But there was no evidence to support the most serious
charge, that Secretary Bolton sought to manipulate
intelligence. He may have disagreed with intelligence findings
but in the end, he always accepted the final judgment of the
intelligence community.
One of the most sensationalized accusations against
Secretary Bolton is that 11 years ago, he chased a woman around
a Moscow hotel throwing things at her. This is problematic
first because the behavior described seems so out of place. But
secondly, because it was very difficult for committee staff,
despite many hours of interviews on this matter, to ascertain
just what happened.
The woman, Melody Townsel, who lives in Dallas, admits that
she is a liberal Democrat who worked for Mothers Opposing Bush
in the last election. Ms. Townsel also stated that her original
accusation, contained in a letter that was made public, may
have been too strong in some places. She said: `` `Chasing' may
not be the best word.'' What she meant was that Secretary
Bolton would approach her whenever he saw her at the hotel
where they were both staying because, as she describes it, she
did not want to meet with him over a legal matter. It is
important to remember that Secretary Bolton was a private
lawyer at that time. He was not representing the U.S.
government. He was working for a company against which Ms.
Townsel had made some very serious charges--charges which
proved unfounded--that could have cost his company an important
USAID contract in the former Soviet Union.
Ms. Townsel provided no eyewitnesses to the incidents,
which are said to have occurred in public or open areas of the
hotel. Moreover, although she claimed this was a highly
traumatic encounter and that she told several people about it,
staff had difficulty finding others who knew about it. Three
people whom Ms. Townsel identified as having heard her
complaints at the time of the events told staff that they had
no recollection of Ms. Townsel mentioning Secretary Bolton. Her
boss, Charles Black, of Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly, who
hired her for the post, said she never mentioned it to him.
Neither did her immediate supervisor back in Washington. An
employee of a sister company who assisted Ms. Townsel in making
her charges against the prime contractor on her project and
with whom she said she was in close touch at the time, also
knows nothing about it. Staffs talked to three representatives
of the contractor, a small Virginia firm which has long
experience working for USAID overseas. Those officials also
heard nothing about this encounter. They said that Secretary
Bolton was in Moscow at that time, but he was working as a
consultant for a health project they were involved in, not
doing legal work for them. Staff did find one of Ms. Townsel's
friends and co-workers from that time, who was not in Moscow,
who recalls talking with her by telephone about it, as well as
a subordinate of hers in a later USAID-funded project who
recalls her mentioning it.
Ultimately, the results of the lengthy investigation into
this isolated, long-ago incident were, at most, inconclusive.
On this point, Sen. Biden, the ranking member, concurred with
the judgment of the chairman. At the second business meeting,
Sen. Biden, the ranking member, said the charges remained
``unsubstantiated.'' Ms. Townsel went on to another USAID
project in the former Soviet Union, and the company she accused
of mismanagement was awarded more USAID contracts and continues
to be well regarded. The original charge against Secretary
Bolton appeared to be overstated. On the basis of what is
known, there was nothing to offset Secretary Bolton's long
record of public service in several different administrations.
It has been charged that Secretary Bolton sought to
retaliate in some way against analysts and others with whom he
disagreed. Committee staff looked into these cases thoroughly,
and in each one the allegations proved to be overstated. In the
case of Christian Westermann, the INR analyst whom the
committee heard about from Carl Ford, the dispute was over a
procedural issue and Mr. Westermann continued in his job. The
focus of Mr. Ford's complaint was that Secretary Bolton should
not have raised his objections directly with Mr. Westermann,
not that Mr. Bolton was wrong to raise the issue. Democratic
members at the first business meeting made much of the fact
that after this incident Secretary Powell had to go all the way
down to INR to boost morale. But Secretary Powell's chief of
staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, told staff that such visits were not
uncommon. It was part of the Secretary's leadership style to
visit with staff in the ``bowels of the building,'' including
INR.
In the case of the NIO for Latin America, e-mails the
committee staff viewed make it clear that Secretary Bolton's
primary objection was over disparaging and inaccurate comments
the analyst made to members of Congress about a speech.
Secretary Bolton took his complaint to the CIA. Although the
NIO has said he feels his career was damaged by Secretary
Bolton, his superiors fully backed him at the time, and other
witnesses told the committee that if he did not get the
promotions he felt he deserved, it was for other reasons.
Again, as far as Secretary Bolton was concerned, the dispute
was procedural. There was no attempt to fabricate intelligence.
Other allegations related to managerial style show the same
pattern upon examination--disagreement over procedure, not
policy. In the case of Rexon Ryu, a mid-level civil servant in
the non-proliferation bureau under Secretary Bolton, no policy
issues were involved at all. Secretary Bolton believed--
incorrectly, according to Mr. Ryu's supervisor--that Mr. Ryu
had deliberately neglected to share information with Bolton's
office. Some months later, Mr. Ryu was up for a job that would
have required him to work closely with Secretary Bolton.
Secretary Bolton, perhaps regrettably, expressed his opposition
to working with Mr. Ryu. Mr. Ryu was given another prized post
instead, an assignment to the deputy secretary.
The case of the State Department attorney, also raised by
the minority, is even more off the mark. This attorney fully
supported what Secretary Bolton wanted to do. It was only
because of miscommunication that Secretary Bolton thought the
attorney had given out wrong information on a case involving
sanctions against a Chinese company. The State Department Legal
Advisor, Will Taft, told committee staff that he quickly
straightened things out. The attorney stayed on the case, and
he even wrote the affidavit that Secretary Bolton later
submitted to court.
Staff also looked at a new case that came up. Secretary
Bolton's chief of staff, it was learned during the
investigation, went to an INR analyst to complain that he had
inappropriately attached to a CIA document a cover memo that
took exception to some of the CIA's findings regarding China.
Further inquiry revealed that no action was sought against the
analyst and none was taken. The issue was procedural, no
intelligence was manipulated, and Secretary Bolton was not even
directly involved, because he was out of the country at the
time.
Secretary Bolton's credibility has also been called into
question regarding his testimony before the committee on April
11. Members questioned whether Mr. Bolton really went to the
CIA to learn about the National Intelligence Council. Stuart
Cohen, the acting head of the NIC, said that while he could not
recall exactly why Secretary Bolton wanted to come, it was
``perfectly reasonable'' to believe that was the reason. In
fact, he added, ``I was delighted at the prospect that somebody
would come out wanting to know more about the NIC.'' He also
said that Secretary Bolton only talked about reassigning, not
firing, the NIO, just as Mr. Bolton testified. The
investigation has found nothing contrary to Secretary Bolton's
claim that his dispute with Mr. Westermann was over procedure,
not policy.
Former Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard called the
committee after Secretary Bolton's testimony about a
controversial speech he gave in South Korea. Secretary Bolton
testified that Ambassador Hubbard had thanked him for the
speech afterwards. The ambassador told committee staff he
indeed had thanked Secretary Bolton afterwards, but only for
making certain changes in the speech that he had requested.
Ambassador Hubbard told staff that he wanted to correct the
record on that point, but he was not accusing Secretary Bolton
of being deliberately misleading.
That speech was one of several by Secretary Bolton that
opponents of the nomination have questioned. The investigation
showed that many of these speeches and Congressional testimony
were preceded by strong policy debates within the
administration. As one witness told staff, ``That's how good
policy is made.'' In each case it was found that, in the end,
Secretary Bolton delivered a speech that was properly cleared
and that expressed official U.S. policy.
Finally, it is important to note while these are the major
allegations that the committee has investigated against Mr.
Bolton, they are not the only ones raised during the first
business meeting by Democratic Members when they asked for a
delay. For instance, one member said there were allegations
``that he harassed a career Justice Department attorney while
he was serving as the Attorney General for the Civil Rights
Division--in that case Mr. Bolton allegedly went to the lengths
to deny a career Justice Department attorney's request for
additional unpaid maternity leave--ultimately, the Deputy
Attorney General stepped in and overruled Mr. Bolton; that he
may have blocked important information from going to senior
members of the State Department, including Secretary Powell,
Secretary Armitage, and even Secretary Rice--information that
has been characterized, and I quote `As vital to the U.S.
strategies on Iran,' and related to the lack of international
support for Mr. Bolton's effort to have the head of the IAEA
removed.'' Yet even though the Chairman granted every witness
interview request, and did not oppose any document request,
these other charges remain both unsubstantiated--Secretary
Rice, for instance, has said she got all the information she
needed from Mr. Bolton in a timely way--and uninvestigated
because Democratic members apparently did not feel they were
worth the trouble. The ranking member, when he said he would
pursue the issue of getting full access to the NSA intercept
information that Secretary Bolton had sought, stated that he
believes that the results will be inconsequential for the
nominee.
Despite the fact that many charges were not proven or even
investigated, it has been charged that collectively the
allegations against Secretary Bolton form an unacceptable
pattern of behavior. This is an unfortunate argument by
opponents, because it depends on doubts arising from an intense
investigation of accusations, many of which had no
substantiation. By its nature, it also discounts the dozens of
positive testimonials on Secretary Bolton's behalf from former
co-workers who attest to his character and effectiveness.
It is important to be clear about the context of the
allegations leveled against Secretary Bolton. First, this has
been an extremely public inquiry. By its nature, it has
encouraged anyone with a grudge or disagreement with Secretary
Bolton stretching back to 1983 to come forward and tell their
story. There have been no thematic limits on the allegations
that opponents of the nominee have asked to be investigated. No
one working in Washington in high-ranking positions for that
long would come out unscathed from such a process. Any
assertive policy-maker will develop opponents based on
stylistic differences, personal disputes, or partisan
disagreements. Most members of this committee have been in
public life for decades. If they were nominated for a similar
position of responsibility after their terms in the Senate, how
many would want the same standard to be applied to their
confirmation process? How many of them would want any instance
of conflict or anger directed at their staffs or colleagues to
be fair game?
Second, as mentioned, the oldest allegation dates back all
the way to 1983. Thus, the committee subjected 22 years of
Secretary Bolton's career to a microscope. This included
service in many government jobs, as well as time spent in the
private sector. Given the length of John Bolton's service in
high-ranking positions, it is inevitable that he would have
conflict with co-workers of various ranks and political
persuasions. He would have had literally thousands of contacts,
meetings, and issues to deal with during his career. In this
context, the volume of alleged incidents is not that profound.
Third, in John Bolton's case unsubstantiated charges may
seem more material than they are because he has a reputation
for being an aggressive and blunt negotiator. But this should
not be a disqualifying factor, especially for a post that
historically has included a number of blunt, plain-spoken
individuals, including Jeane Kirkpatrick and our former
colleague Pat Moynihan. In fact, President Bush has cited John
Bolton's direct style as one of the reasons that he has picked
him for this particular job.
ANNEXES
----------
ANNEX A
Opening Statement of the Honorable John R. Bolton
NOMINEE FOR REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
T3Senate Foreign Relations Committee
T3April 11, 2005
Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, I am honored to appear
before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I am grateful
for your consideration and I look forward to discussing the
critical leadership role that the United States plays in the
United Nations. I would like to extend my warm thanks to
Senator Warner for his kind words and introduction. He is a
true and valued friend, and his remarks are all the more
appreciated given his long history of service to our nation.
Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunities that I
have had to work with this Committee over the years. This is
the fourth time I have appeared before this Committee in a
confirmation hearing. If confirmed, I pledge to fulfill the
President's vision of working in close partnership with the
United Nations.
The United States is committed to the success of the United
Nations and we view the UN as an important component of our
diplomacy. As the President stated before the UN General
Assembly last September, ``Let history show that in a decisive
decade, members of the United Nations did not grow weary in our
duties, or waver in meeting them.''
The Secretary has made this a top priority as well. She was
unequivocal in her remarks about how, ``The American people
respect the idealism that sparked the creation of the United
Nations and we share the UN's unshakable support for human
dignity. At this time of great opportunity and great promise,
the charge to the international community is clear: we who are
on the right side of freedom's divide have an obligation to
help those who were unlucky enough to be born on the wrong side
of that divide. The hard work of freedom is a task of
generations; yet, it is also urgent work that cannot be
deferred. . . . Now, more than ever, the UN must play a
critical role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and
aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and
fundamental human rights and to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom.''
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this
Committee to forge a stronger relationship between the United
States and the United Nations, which depends critically on
American leadership. Such leadership in turn must rest on broad
bipartisan support in Congress that must be earned by putting
to rest skepticism that too many feel about the UN system.
Through the course of three decades of public service, both
in and out of government, I have learned that this consensus is
not only essential, but possible. Working together, in the
spirit of bipartisan cooperation, I believe we can take
important steps to restore confidence in the United Nations.
Mr. Chairman, we are at a critical juncture, and I fully share
the sentiments you expressed in 1997, when you remarked that,
``It is time to decide if we want a strong and viable United
Nations that can serve United States interests, or a United
Nation that is crippled by insolvency and hobbled by
controversy and uncertainty.''
A Stronger, More Effective United Nations
The President and Secretary Rice believe that a stronger,
better, more effective United Nations is one which requires
sustained and decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan
support, and the support of the American public. If confirmed,
that would be my objective as well. Walking away from the
United Nations is not an option. I undertake to do my utmost to
uphold the confidence that the President, Secretary Rice, and
the Senate will have placed in me if confirmed.
Mr. Chairman, now more than ever, the United Nations needs
American leadership. President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Winston Churchill promoted a post-war international
organization to avert another world war when they envisioned a
collective security organization that would resist aggressor
states that threatened international peace and security.
Accordingly, the UN Charter lists as its first objective, ``to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.''
If the UN is to play a role in fulfilling that mission,
however, it is not enough that it reform its internal
structures. It must also clearly and forcefully address the new
challenges we face. Rogue states, which do not necessarily
subscribe to theories of deterrence, now threaten the global
community as both possessors and proliferators of weapons of
mass destruction. These weapons could also be transferred to
terrorist organizations that would have no compunction about
using them in cold blood against innocent civilian populations.
I believe my past government experience and writings
reflect my awareness of both the strengths and weaknesses of
the United Nations. I learned much about the UN's potential
when I served for four years as Assistant Secretary of State
for International Organization Affairs in 1989-1993, and again
later when I worked for the United Nations pro bono between
1997 and 2000, assisting former Secretary of State James Baker
in his capacity as the Secretary General's Personal Envoy for
the Western Sahara. I saw firsthand the impact of armed
conflict and repression, and the devastating consequences this
can have on innocent civilian populations.
I therefore wish to assure the Committee, the American
people, and potential future colleagues at the United Nations
that, if confirmed, I will strive to work with all interested
parties to build a stronger and more effective United Nations.
Doing so will promote not only American interests, but will
inevitably improve and enhance the UN's ability to serve all of
its members as well.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I pledge to bring my strong
record of experience of working cooperatively within the United
Nations to fulfill the intentions and aspirations of its
original promise. In particular, I will work closely with the
Congress and this Committee to achieve that goal. In attempting
to strengthen the UN's effort to promote international peace
and security, I would like to identify several priorities.
Supporting Freedom and Democracy
One priority is to strengthen and build institutions that
serve as the cornerstone of freedom in nascent democracies. I
am proud of my record in this regard. In 1981, as General
Counsel of the Agency for International Development, I proposed
that we fund international observers to witness upcoming
elections in El Salvador so that there would be an independent
assessment of whether those elections would be free and fair.
Many experts at the time thought that the Government of El
Salvador would not accept this idea, but, with the support of
USAID Administrator Peter McPherson and Deane Hinton, then our
Ambassador to El Salvador, I was encouraged to raise the
possibility with President Jose Napoleon Duarte in late 1981. I
did so and we were able to fund international election
observers through Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act,
very likely the first such assistance provided by USAID, thus
leading to further success stories in legitimizing and
instilling confidence in democracy in countries once torn apart
by violence.
During my service in IO in President George H.W. Bush's
Administration, I personally observed the legislative elections
in Namibia in 1989 as part of a presidential delegation led by
former Senator Edward Muskie, the largest effort to organize
elections by the United Nations in its history to that point.
It constituted a major test of UN capabilities and resources,
and served as a successful model for future elections in
Nicaragua, Cambodia and elsewhere.
Some of these earlier missions have no doubt helped pave
the way for the recent and remarkable success stories we have
observed in Afghanistan and Iraq, where UN assistance in both
countries played a critical role. Many of us today, myself
included, still marvel at the success of those elections--
elections which are having repercussions throughout the region
and beyond, as they are already doing in Lebanon. We appreciate
that the United Nations is committed over the long-term to
respond positively to the elected Iraqi Government's request
for help with its constitutional process and subsequent
elections, as laid out in Resolution 1546.
Mr. Chairman, we should never underestimate the impact of
free and fair elections on a country. I look forward, if
confirmed, to working with relevant UN agencies to enable them
to contribute further to democratic institutions in countries
freed from the bonds of oppression. I am sure that many of you
are aware of our support for programs such as the Community of
Democracies. If confirmed, I also look forward to working with
you on President Bush's request for $10 million in the Fiscal
Year 2006 budget to set up a Democracy Fund within the United
Nations, and I am grateful to Secretary General Annan for
endorsing the President's proposal in his new report on UN
reform. This fund would have a lean staff of experts who
identify carefully tailored projects for strengthening
democratic institutions, political parties, administration of
justice programs and respect for human rights advocacy. If
successful, the Fund will be among the best diplomatic tools we
have in the global war on terrorism.
While the UN has had its successes in the human rights
field, there have been problems as well, such as in the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights (``UNHRC''). For too long,
some of the most egregious violators of human rights have
undercut the UNHRC's principles and its effectiveness. The
consequence, as Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said, is that
the Commission's important work has ``been increasingly
undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism.''
We must work with our friends and allies to keep those who
would usurp the moral authority of this Commission off of it,
and we must send clear and strong signals that we will not shy
away from naming human-rights violators.
We must work to galvanize the General Assembly to focus its
attention on issues of true importance. Sadly, there have been
times when the General Assembly has gone off track. In my view,
one of the greatest stains on the United Nations was the
abominable Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism. This
canard for many years distracted the General Assembly from
focusing its attention on the very real problems confronting
the international community. I am proud to have been an active
player in getting this resolution repealed. I recall fondly the
day of December 16, 1991, when the General Assembly voted 111-
25 to repeal this odious resolution, when our delegation was
led by Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger,
accompanied in the General Assembly by Senator Moynihan. I was
proud to have served also as one of the original members of the
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom from 1999-
2001.
Stopping the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Mr. Chairman, a second priority should I be confirmed will
be stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to
ensure that terrorist organizations and the world's most
dangerous regimes are unable to threaten the United States, our
friends, and our allies.
As Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, I have worked with our friends and
allies to press states that have violated important treaties to
stop WMD proliferation such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical
Weapons Convention, to live up to their obligations or face a
referral to the UN Security Council. I have worked hard to
promote effective multilateral action to curb the flow of these
dangerous weapons. I served as the lead U.S. negotiator in the
creation of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the
Proliferation of WMD, through which we aim to add an additional
$10 billion in Nunn/Lugar type programs through contributions
by other nations. In the case of Libya, I had the opportunity
to work in close consultation with our British colleagues in
diplomatic efforts to secure the verifiable elimination of
their weapons of mass destruction programs.
I helped build a coalition of more than 60 countries to
help combat the spread of dangerous weapons through President
Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative (``PSI''). The
Administration welcomes the endorsement of this initiative in
the recently published Secretary Generals' Report,
``Strengthening the United Nations: an agenda for further
change.'' And despite fears that the U.S. withdrawal from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would result in a new arms race,
exactly the opposite occurred. I was proud to serve as the
Administration's chief negotiator for the Treaty of Moscow,
signed by Presidents Putin and Bush in 2002, which reduced
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by two-
thirds.
Effective multilateral solutions reflect a commitment on
the part of this Administration to use the best tools in our
arsenal. Activities such as these are helping to create a new
international consensus that recognizes the danger posed by
these weapons of terror. I have no doubt these efforts played a
crucial role in enabling the United States to lead the Security
Council to pass Resolution 1540, first suggested by President
Bush in his speech to the General Assembly in September, 2003.
This resolution calls upon ``all Member States to fulfill their
obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to
prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass
destruction.'' Resolution 1540 was the first of its kind
focusing on WMD proliferation, and I am proud that our strong
leadership contributed to its unanimous adoption. I am happy to
report that as of March 15, over 80 countries have submitted
reports required by the resolution outlining their plans to
enact and implement measures to stop WMD proliferation. I look
forward to working with Security Council members to achieve
100% compliance with the Resolution.
We also cannot ignore the real possibility that countries
may be brought before the Security Council if they do not cease
the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Failure of the
Security Council to act on such fundamental threats to
international peace and security will only weaken the Council's
role in security issues more generally. If confirmed, I would
make it a top priority to work with the Security Council to
take meaningful action in the face of these grave threats.
Winning the Global War on Terror
A third priority that I would pursue if confirmed is
supporting the global war on terror. As we all learned on
September 11, 2001, no one is safe from the devastating effects
of terrorists' intent on harming innocent people. Confronting
and triumphing in the global war on terror remains a central
priority of the Bush Administration, and to win this war
requires long-term cooperation with all like-minded nations.
The President is firmly committed to working with the
United Nations to make this shared goal of the civilized world
a reality. As he noted in his speech to the UN General Assembly
in September 2003, ``All governments that support terror are
complicit in a war against civilization. No government should
ignore the threat of terror, because to look the other way
gives terrorists the chance to regroup, recruit and prepare.
And all nations that fight terror, as if the lives of their own
people depend on it, will earn the favorable judgment of
history.''
The United Nations has taken positive steps to support the
war on terror, but more of course remains to be done. In the
wake of September 11th, we have been actively encouraging
Member States to become parties to the UN Conventions on
Terrorism. I have been personally involved in the past four
years as well in working to complete the negotiations on a
Nuclear Terrorism Convention. We must build upon Security
Council Resolution 1368, passed one day after the tragic events
of September 11th, which for the first time classified every
act of international terrorism as a threat to international
peace and security. We must also work together to help Member
States build capacities to combat terrorism as outlined in
Resolution 1373, passed on September 28, 2001. This resolution
obligates all UN member states to use their domestic laws and
courts to keep terrorists from sheltering resources or finding
safe haven anywhere in the world and to cooperate in
investigating, prosecuting, and preventing terrorism wherever
it may spring up. The UN Security Council is monitoring
compliance with the requirements of this resolution, with
impressive results: to date 142 countries have issued orders
freezing the assets of suspected terrorists and terrorist
organizations; accounts totaling almost $105 million have been
blocked--$34 million in the U.S. and over twice that amount in
other countries. Overall, Resolution 1373 has been the
framework for unprecedented international consultation and
coordination against terrorism, including the provision of
technical assistance to governments that want to do the right
thing, but may not have the specialized expertise necessary.
International Humanitarian Efforts
Mr. Chairman, a fourth priority of mine should I be
confirmed is addressing humanitarian crises. Following the
successful prosecution of the first Gulf War, we worked through
the Security Council to address the humanitarian disaster
caused by Saddam Hussein's repression of Shiites in southern
Iraq and the Kurdish population in the north and east of that
country. As we are all aware, this was a thorny and delicate
issue--one that required carefully calibrated coordination
within the Security Council.
During 1990, we were successful in having the United
Nations impose its most comprehensive economic sanctions
package ever, in Resolution 661, against Iraq. We were also
successful in passing the first Security Council authorization
for the use of force since Korea in Resolution 678. It was not
lost upon us, however, that a humanitarian crisis was beginning
to erupt. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Iraq into
other countries would certainly have had a dramatic and
destabilizing effect, in addition to the humanitarian costs of
lives lost and displaced.
As a result of our leadership and collaborative efforts, we
secured the adoption of Resolution 688, which decided that
internal repression causing substantial refugee flows could be
a threat to international peace and security. This gave the
Security Council jurisdiction to approve intervention into
Iraqi territory to aid displaced persons. The United States
took the lead in implementing this Resolution, under the name
``Operation Provide Comfort.'' Success stories such as these
are a direct result of decisive American leadership and our
effective multilateral diplomacy.
Of pressing urgency now is stopping the genocide and
violence devastating the Darfur region in the Sudan. The United
Nations has already played a critical role in bringing
attention to this crisis. But we all know there is much more to
be done. If confirmed, I pledge to work with our partners in
the Security Council to pressure parties to stop the violence
in Darfur, deploy the new peacekeeping mission to secure
implementation of the comprehensive North-South peace
agreement, and to assist the African Union mission in Darfur to
punish those responsible for the genocide. My hope is that we
can build upon the United Nation's considerable success record
in helping to ensure free and fair elections in the Sudan
despite its tortured past of violence and strife.
Careful oversight of such operations is critical,
particularly in light of recent reports concerning abuse by UN
peacekeepers themselves. If confirmed, I will make every effort
to see that the Secretary General's new zero-tolerance policy
of such behavior by UN personnel is enforced. There is a
pressing need to do so. In light of the current global
situation, we anticipate that 70,000 peacekeepers will be
deployed by the end of 2005, compared with 39,000 by the end of
2002. Since October 2003, the UN has created four new missions
including Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, and Haiti and has
expanded the Congo mission. In addition to the proper oversight
of such troops, there are additional concerns about capacity
and stressing the UN system too far. This is not lost upon UN
officials either. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under Secretary-General
for Peacekeeping Operations, acknowledges the system is getting
stretched to its limits, and that, in his own words, ``It is
difficult to run and tie your shoelaces properly. I sincerely
hope that the organization will not be required to deploy any
new complex peacekeeping operations in 2005, beyond what is
already on our plate or in the pipeline.'' Currently, we pay
roughly 27% of the costs of these operations.
Other humanitarian crises demand our attention as well. It
is not just the scourge of war we must confront. We must
confront the scourge of disease and afflictions such as HIV/
AIDS through strong U.S. leadership in the United Nations
system. We strongly support the UN Declaration of Commitment on
HIV/AIDS and are working to ensure resources from the Global
Fund for AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis are available to
countries most severely affected. We are actively pursuing the
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a five-year $15
billion investment, the largest commitment ever by a nation
toward an international health initiative for a single disease
or affliction.
I will make it a key priority as well to improve programs
that have been involved in the tsunami relief effort, so that
we can enhance and build upon structures and institutions
already in place. Doing so will not only help current victims
and communities, who will surely need help for years to come,
but will help prepare for the next time a natural disaster of
this magnitude strikes. More broadly, we must confront the
scourge of poverty, which leaves hundreds of millions on the
margins of societies scrambling for food or shelter with little
opportunity to improve their lives or those of their children.
We also must make sure that the UN acts effectively in
promoting the economic and social advancement of all people.
For far too long, the UN promoted statist solutions to the
problems of poverty and underdevelopment. Today, we know the
private sector can do the best job in generating flows of
investment capital and encourage small entrepreneurship, as set
out in the remarkable report of the Commission on the Private
Sector and Development, chaired by President Zedillo and
Martin, and in the consensus results of the Monterey Conference
on Financing for Development. Policy reform, institution
building, appropriate technology transfer and private sector
involvement are all necessary for underpinning sustained
economic growth. We will continue to support the contribution
of women to economic growth and development as well as their
critical role in the growth of democratic institutions
worldwide.
The UN, in conjunction with U.S. leadership, is hopefully
now recognizing that the traditional models of development are
insufficient to achieve development objectives and better the
lives of people around the world. The Partnership for Maternal,
New Born and Child Health, The Global Alliance for Vaccinations
& Immunizations, and Roll Back Malaria, are all examples of how
UN agencies, such as UNICEF, are working along side the private
sector, charitable organizations, and foundations, such as the
Gates Foundation, to leverage resources, generate new
activities and impact the lives of millions in developing
countries.
To enhance these efforts, if I am confirmed, I hope I would
have your support in increasing the level of American
representation in UN agencies and affiliated organizations.
This is not a question of simply getting our fair share of
positions. Americans have the skills and training to contribute
significantly to making the UN more efficient, effective, and
accountable.
A More Efficient UN Will Make a Stronger UN
Accountability and reform of the United Nations is
something I know this Committee has encouraged, including by
holding a hearing on this important question just last month.
This will be a top priority of mine if confirmed. During the
first President Bush's Administration, I worked hard to secure
appropriations to repay U.S. arrearages. Working with the
Congress, we also made sure that the United Nations would
target these arrearages to effective programs rather than
treating them as a ``windfall.'' If confirmed, I would look
forward to working with the Congress again to make certain that
the money you allocate is spent wisely and accountably.
I look forward if confirmed to reviving the concept of the
``Unitary UN,'' which served as a guiding analytical construct
during our work under Secretaries Baker and Eagleburger. As the
system has grown, there has been too little attention paid by
member governments to coordinating their efforts in key
programs. The consequence is a tremendous waste of resources
due to duplication, overlap and inefficiencies, all of which
can be corrected if member governments have the political will.
The Administration welcomes the Secretary-General's new
report on UN Reform, and we are examining carefully its many
recommendations. I hope to work closely with the Secretary-
General and my colleagues if confirmed to bring greater
accountability and transparency to the United Nations. The key
is to implement changes to the UN structure and management,
including budget, personnel, and oversight reforms. Scandals,
such as those we have witnessed with the Oil-for-Food program,
undermine not only America's confidence in the United Nations,
but the confidence of the international community as well. They
must not recur. To make this outcome a reality, we must
recognize the proper roles and capabilities of UN agencies,
funds and programs. Some have all but concluded that the Oil-
for-Food scandal was bound to happen because it was beyond the
UN's capabilities. Even the Deputy Secretary-General Louise
Frechette, has lamented, ``Personally, I hope to God we never
get another oil-for-food program or anything approaching that
kind of responsibility, which was tantamount to trying to
oversee the entire import-export regime of a country of 24
million people.'' Whether or not this is so, we must never lose
sight of the reality that ultimately it is member governments
that must take responsibility for the UN's actions, whether
they be successes or failures.
The successful implementation of any reform will require
broad consensus among member states. If confirmed, I will work
actively with my colleagues at the United Nations and with
Congress to help restore confidence in the organization.
Mr. Chairman, let me close by reiterating what I said at
the beginning. If confirmed, I will work closely and
effectively with this Committee and both Houses of Congress.
The President and Secretary Rice are committed to building a
strong, effective United Nations. The United Nations affords us
the opportunity to move our policies forward together with
unity of purpose. Now, more than ever, the UN must play a
critical role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and
aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and
fundamental human rights and to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom. This effort demands
decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan support, and the
backing of the American public. I will undertake to do my
utmost to uphold the confidence that the President, Secretary
Rice, and the Senate will have placed in me.
Thank you, and I would welcome the opportunity to answer
your questions.
------
ANNEX B
Biographic Summary
(HIGHLIGHTS)
NAME:
John Robert Bolton
POSITION FOR WHICH CONSIDERED:
Representative of the United States of America to
the United Nations
PRESENT POSITION:
Under Secretary of State (Arms Control and
International Security Affairs)
LEGAL RESIDENCE:
Maryland
OFFICE ADDRESS:
Washington, DC
DATE/PLACE OF BIRTH:
November 20, 1948--Baltimore, Maryland
MARITAL STATUS:
Married
NAME OF SPOUSE:
Gretchen Louise Bolton
NAMES OF CHILDREN:
Jennifer Sarah Bolton
EDUCATION:
J.D., Yale Law School, 1971-1974;
B.A., Yale College, 1966-1970
MILITARY SERVICE:
U.S. Army Reserves, 1974-1976;
U.S. Army National Guard, 1970-1974 (Honorable
Discharge)
FOREIGN LANGUAGES:
French
EXPERIENCE:
2001-present--Under Secretary of State (Arms Control
and International Security Affairs)
1997-2001--Senior Vice President, American
Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC
Dec 1999-2001--Of Counsel Kutak Rock LLP,
Washington, D.C.
May 1999-2001--Commissioner, U.S. Commission on
International Religion Freedom
1995-1996--President, National Policy Forum,
Washington, D.C.
1994-1996--Adjunct Professor, George Mason
University School of Law, Arlington, Virginia
1993-1999--Partner, Lerner, Reed, Bolton & McManus
(and predecessor firms) Washington, D.C.
Jan 1993-July 1993--Senior Fellow, Manhattan
Institute, Washington, D.C.
1989-1993--Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs
1988-1989--Assistant Attorney General for the Civil
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC
1985-1988--Assistant Attorney General for
Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C.
1983-1985--Partner, Covington & Burling, Washington,
D.C.
Aug 1993-Sept 1993--Consultant, Republican National
Committee, Washington, D.C.
1983-1983--Assistant Administrator for program and
Policy Coordination, U.S. Agency for International
Development, Washington, D.C.
1981-1982--General Counsel, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Washington, D.C.
1974-1981--Associate, Covington & Burling,
Washington, DC
June 1973-Aug 1973--Summer, associate Lord, Day &
Lord, New York, N.Y.
June 1972-Aug 1972--White House summer Intern,
Office of the Vice President
1970-1971--Executive Director, Lux et Veritas, Inc.
New Haven, Connecticut
HONORS/AWARDS:
U.S. Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award,
1998
U.S. Department of State Distinguished Service
Award, 1993
Tree of Life Award, Northern and Southern New
England Regions of Hadassah, 1990
Editor, Yale Law Journal
Phi Sigma Alpha
Phi Beta Kappa
Scholarships to McDonogh School, Yale College and
Yale Law School
ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS:
Member, Subcommittee on International Law,
Federalist Society, 1999-2001
Member of Board of Directors, Project for a New
American Century, 1989-2001
Advisory Board Member, Jewish Institute for National
Security Affairs, 1994-2001
------
ANNEX C
BUSINESS MEETING TO CONSIDER AND VOTE ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN R.
BOLTON TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman,
Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, Martinez, Biden,
Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This business meeting of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee is called to order.
Before beginning our testimony and our debate today, I
would like to lay out for members how we will proceed.
Democratic members have requested a 5-hour debate on the
nomination of John Bolton to be Ambassador to the United
Nations, and we have agreed to that request. I have agreed to
hold this debate to give all members of the committee an
opportunity, once again, to explain their views, and we look
forward to an enlightening and thoughtful debate.
Now, in the interest of decorum and order, it's my
intention to manage this debate much like a debate on the
Senate floor. I will control 2\1/2\ hours of time--that is, of
the 5 hours allotted to the debate--yielding time to Republican
members. Senator Biden, the distinguished ranking member, will
control the other two and a half hours, yielding time to
Democratic members.
Republicans will lead off the debate with approximately 1
hour of time, to be controlled by myself and my designees, to
be followed by an equal amount of time, another hour, under the
control of Senator Biden or designees. At that stage, we will
alternate between Democrats and Republican members until all
time on both sides is consumed or given back.
Now, as chairman and manager of the nomination, I'll
reserve the final 10 minutes of our time, on the Republican
side--that is, about 150 minutes--for myself. Throughout this
process, members should request time through the chairman or
through the ranking member. Senator Biden and I will be
responsible for apportioning the time on our respective sides.
Since 5 hours of debate time has been requested, and we
have an abundance of speakers on both sides, I will not
entertain motions or other business during the 5-hour debate.
If floor votes intervene, I believe we can continue the debate
without interruption by voting in shifts, as we frequently do.
I would, likewise, say, as members have need to have a bite to
eat or to drink a sip of water, they can proceed to do that.
Hopefully, our debate will continue on in some responsible way
throughout that period of time.
My hope is to complete the meeting by close to 3 p.m., as
members will have invested 5 hours of valuable time during this
experience. And I would just say, at that point that I begin my
statement, I will ask the Clerk to be, again, counting the time
so that our 150 minutes will begin to diminish as I make an
opening statement to open the debate this morning.
The Foreign Relations Committee meets today----
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, could I just----
The Chairman. Yes. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Senator Biden's not here yet, so I'm
reluctant--was this something we agreed to, between the Chair
and the Ranking Member? I'm just unclear as to the--how the
procedures will work.
The Chairman. No, I have not asked for agreement. I'm just
indicating the structure of our morning. I'm trying, at least,
in fairness, to allocate 2\1/2\ hours to both sides, indicate
that Senator Biden and I will manage the 2\1/2\ hours. During
that time, I hope we can continue the time running while we go
to vote. We will have a closure vote at 11:30, more or less. In
other words, I think these are reasonable statements, but,
nevertheless, the prerogative of the Chair, I think, is to
structure a debate in a fair manner, which I'm attempting to
do.
Senator Dodd. Fine. By the way, I'd ask consent that the--
this discussion here not be time taken away from the
chairman's----
The Chairman. I thank----
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. With the same caveat. Just because you
went--I was confused--it went on awhile. Now Senator Biden is
here. Would you please go over--I hate to do this, but could
you go over this one more time, what your plan is for how we're
going to take this five hours, so that Senator Biden may hear
it?
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Biden. The staff has informed me, but, please----
The Chairman. I'll proceed, once again, through the
statement, so there can be no ambiguity.
Before beginning, I would like to lay out for all members
how we will proceed today. Democratic members have requested a
5-hour debate on the nomination of John Bolton to be Ambassador
to the United Nations, and I have agreed to that plan. I have
agreed to hold this debate to give all members of the committee
a chance to explain their views, and I look forward to an
enlightening and thoughtful debate.
In the interest of decorum and order, it's my intention to
manage the debate much like a debate on the Senate floor. I
will control 2\1/2\ hours of time, yielding time to Republican
members. Senator Biden will control the other two and a half
hours, yielding time to Democratic members.
Republicans will lead off the debate with approximately 1
hour of time, to be controlled by myself and by my designees,
to be followed by an equal amount of time--that is, an hour,
more or less--under the control of Senator Biden or his
designees. At that stage, we would alternate between Democrat
and Republican members until all time is consumed or yielded
back.
As chairman and manager of the nomination, I would reserve
the last 10 minutes of our Republican time--that is, of our 150
minutes--for myself. Throughout this process, members should
request time through the chairman or through the ranking
member. Senator Biden and I will be responsible for
apportioning the time on our respective sides.
Since five hours of debate time has been requested, and we
have an abundance of speakers on both sides, I will not
entertain motions or other business during the five-hour
debate. If floor votes intervene, I believe that we can
continue the debate without interruption by voting in shifts,
as we frequently do. My intention is to complete the meeting as
close as possible to 3 p.m.
But, with that, I would instruct the Clerk to begin keeping
time now as I begin the opening segment, which I will do
shortly.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I think it's good to proceed
like we do on the floor, but the way usually do it on the floor
is, the manager of the bill and the opponent of the bill--the
manager speaks and then the opponent gets to speak--and then
they control the remaining time. So, I would prefer, if you're
willing, after you speak, for me to be able to--allowed to make
my opening statement, and then you control the time.
Otherwise--I mean, it's not usual, on the floor debate, that we
would have an hour of Republican or Democratic testimony--or,
not testimony--debate, other than if it's--if you wish to take
an hour, that's fine by me, but I would like to be able to open
at the time when you finish, and then you control the debate,
in terms of the remaining time, if that's appropriate.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate the Senator's suggestion.
I would like to follow the path I set forth, because the--in
the first hour, I will try to make a case for the nominee, but
then I will yield the remainder of that hour to Senator
Voinovich, who will approach the case of the nominee in his own
way, so that members and, I think, the public will have
perspective of our debate from that hour. And so, I would ask
the cooperation of the ranking member in allowing us to proceed
in that way.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I don't want this committee to
look like we're just tied up in parliamentary problems. I will
not object, but that is not how we do it on the floor. And I
understand your wishing to set the terms of the debate. I got
that part. And that's okay by me. But let's just not kid
ourselves; this is not how we do it in the Senate floor. But
it's okay if you want to do it that way. I understand the deal.
And I hope you'll be as accommodating to me if I decide to do
this if I ever become chairman again, and you'll allow me to do
things that we don't do on the floor.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, the Senator knows that I will be
accommodating and as reasonable as possible, and I thank the
Senator for his accommodation and his good humor.
Now, I will----
Senator Biden. I might have objected if it weren't going to
be Voinovich second, but that's all right.
The Chairman. Very well.
We will begin now, and I will ask, as I've mentioned
before, for the countdown. And we'll make available to the
ranking member and the chairman at various times, at our
request, how many minutes remain on both sides, so that the
management may continue as smoothly as possible.
The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to vote on the
nomination of John Bolton to be U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations. In this capacity, he would play an important role in
securing greater international support for the national-
security and the foreign-policy objectives of the United
States.
The Foreign Relations Committee has reviewed Secretary
Bolton's actions with respect to several allegations. In the
process, we have interviewed 29 witnesses, producing
approximately 1,000 pages of transcripts. We have received and
reviewed more than 830 pages of documents from the State
Department, USAID, and the CIA regarding the Bolton nomination.
We have questioned Secretary Bolton in person for seven hours.
We have received responses to nearly 100 questions for the
record, many containing numerous subparts.
This effort represents one of the most intense and far-
reaching examinations of a nominee in my experience. The depth
and breadth of the inquiry is particularly notable given that
Secretary Bolton has been confirmed four times by the Senate
already and that most of us have had personal experiences with
him.
After reviewing this material, it's my judgment that
Secretary Bolton should be confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations. I do not believe that the evidence supports a
disqualification of the President's nominee.
I was struck by the portrait of Secretary Bolton that
emerged from interviews of witnesses that shows him serving in
a job where some of his ideas and strategies were at odds with
those above and below him at the State Department. It is clear
from the transcripts that he was combative in defense of his
perspectives. In some cases, this led to split memos fed up the
policy chain, communicating multiple points of view. Secretary
Bolton's actions were not always exemplary. On several
occasions, he made incorrect assumptions about the behavior and
motivations of subordinates. At other times, he failed to use
proper managerial channels or unnecessarily personalized
internal disputes.
The picture is one of an aggressive policymaker who pressed
his missions at every opportunity and argued vociferously for
his point of view. In the process, his blunt style alienated
some colleagues, but there is no evidence that he has broken
laws or engaged in serious ethical misconduct.
At the core of any nomination process is the question of
whether the nominee is qualified to undertake the task for
which he or she is nominated. I have no doubts that Secretary
Bolton is extremely well qualified. He has just served four
years in a key Under Secretary position that technically
outranks the post for which he is now nominated. He has
succeeded in several high-profile negotiation settings. He was
the primary negotiator in the creation of the successful
Proliferation Security Initiative and the landmark Moscow
Treaty. He played a large role in the agreement with Libya on
the surrender of that nation's WMD programs and the ``10 Plus
10 Over 10'' agreement that resulted in $10 billion in pledges
from the other G8 countries to secure the Soviet weapons-of-
mass-destruction arsenal. These are among the Bush
administration's most important and indisputable foreign-policy
successes.
Opponents have argued that Secretary Bolton's personality
will prevent him from being effective at the U.N., but his
diplomatic successes over the last four years belie that
expectation.
Few people in government have thought more about U.N.
reform than John Bolton. He served 4 years as the Assistant
Secretary of State overseeing international organizations under
the first President Bush. He has written and commented
extensively on the subject.
Senator Biden acknowledged to the nominee at the hearing,
and I quote, ``There is no question that you have extensive
experience in U.N. affairs,'' end of quote.
Deputy Secretary Rich Armitage recently told reporters, and
I quote, ``John Bolton is eminently qualified. He is one of the
smartest guys in Washington,'' end of quote.
Secretary Bolton also demonstrated his ability to get
things done prior to becoming Under Secretary of State. Perhaps
the best example is his initiative to repeal U.N. Resolution
3379, which equated Zionism with racism. In May 1991, as
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations,
John Bolton refused to accept the common wisdom that repealing
this infamous resolution was impossible. He and his staff
initiated a campaign to change votes in the General Assembly,
even though they were advised that they would not be
successful. Within a few months, they had made substantial
progress. And, by the fall, the State Department put its full
weight behind the effort. On December 16, 1991, the U.N.
General Assembly voted to repeal the resolution, by a vote of
111 to 25.
In the private sector, Secretary Bolton made some blunt
statements about the United Nations, and many of these
statements were made in academic or think-tank settings where
debate on these subjects was encouraged. Many of the quotes
that have been repeated by opponents came in the context of
much larger speeches that were more nuanced. In fact--or the
fact that he has strong views and a long record of commentary
on the job that he is about to undertake should not be
disqualifying.
During our hearing, Secretary Bolton spoke of the United
Nations' important role in international security. He has
emphasized that he wants the institution to work well on behalf
of international security and the interests of the United
States.
Beyond qualifications, we should recognize that Secretary
Bolton has the confidence of the President and the Secretary of
State. The President has made it clear that this is not a
casual appointment. He wants a specific person to do a specific
job. President Bush has a reform agenda in mind at the United
Nations. This reform agenda is generally supported by the U.N.
Secretary General, who has put forward a reform plan of his
own. The President wants John Bolton, an avowed and
knowledgeable reformer, to carry out that reform agenda. Kofi
Annan has welcomed John Bolton's appointment.
I would emphasize that Secretary Bolton is being appointed
to a position that is within the chain of command of the
President and the Secretary of State. The Ambassador to the
U.N. reports directly to the President and to the Secretary of
State. In fact, historically, this ambassadorship has reflected
directly on the President. The Ambassador is seen as the
President's voice at the U.N. Consequently, there are few
positions in government where the President should have more
latitude in choosing the nominee.
In my judgment, it would be absolutely extraordinary
circumstances for the Senate to say, quote, ``Mr. President,
you can't have your choice to carry out your directive at the
U.N., even though the Senate has approved him for four other
high-ranking positions and he is extremely knowledgeable about
the task that you are giving him,'' end of quote.
At times during this process, opponents have suggested that
Secretary Bolton sits outside the mainstream in the Bush
administration. Senator Biden devoted several minutes of his
opening statement at Secretary Bolton's hearing to this point,
saying that, quote, ``Your views, based on what you've said in
the past, seems to be contrary to the direction the President
the Secretary now want to take this administration,'' end of
quote.
The problem with this assertion is that President Bush is
telling us that this is not so. President Bush is telling us
that Secretary Bolton accurately represents his views about the
U.N. and how that institution should be reformed. President
Bush is saying that Secretary Bolton is his considered choice
to implement his policies and diplomatic initiatives at the
U.N.
Some observers, who want a different program than the
President's, may not agree with the President's choice, but the
results of the 2004 election give the President the
responsibility and the right to nominate like-minded
representatives, and to define who a like-minded representative
is.
We have ample evidence that the United Nations is in need
of reform. The Foreign Relations Committee held the first
congressional hearing on the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food scandal more
than a year ago. Since that time, through the work of Paul
Volcker and our colleague, Senator Coleman, and many others, we
have learned much more about the extent of that corruption and
mismanagement, and this knowledge has supported the case for
reform. We know that billions of dollars that should have been
spend on humanitarian needs in Iraq were siphoned off by Saddam
Hussein's regime through a system of surcharges, bribes, and
kickbacks. This corruption depended upon members of the U.N.
Security Council who were willing to be complicit in these
activities. It also depended on U.N. officials and contractors
who were dishonest, inattentive, or willing to make damaging
compromises in pursuit of the compassionate mission.
United Nations reform is not a new issue. The structure and
role of the United Nations have been debated in our country
almost continuously since the U.N. was established, in 1945.
But, in 2005, we may have a unique opportunity to improve the
operations of the U.N. The revelations of the Oil-for-Food
scandal and the urgency of strengthening global cooperation to
address terrorism, the AIDS crisis, nuclear proliferation, many
other international problems, have created momentum in favor of
constructive reforms at the U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan has proposed a substantial
reform plan that will provide a platform for further reform
initiatives and discussions. The United States must be a leader
in the effort to improve the United Nations, particularly its
accountability. At a time when the United Nations is appealing
for greater international help in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in
trouble-spots around the world, the diminishment of U.N.
credibility because of scandal reduces U.S. options and
increases our own burdens.
Secretary Bolton has become closely associated with the
United States efforts to reform the U.N. If he goes to the U.N.
and helps achieve reform, the U.N. will gain in credibility,
especially with the American people. If reform moves forward,
Secretary Bolton will be in an excellent position to help
convince skeptics that reform has occurred and that the United
Nations can be an effective partner in achieving global
security. If we reject Secretary Bolton without even granting
him a vote on the Senate floor, President Bush's hand will be
weakened at the U.N. We will recover, but we will have wasted
time, and we will have strengthened the position of reform
opponents.
In the days immediately following Secretary Rice's March 7
announcement of Secretary Bolton's nomination, most Democrat
members of this committee expressed their opposition to the
nomination, on policy grounds.
A March 8th Associated Press report states, quote, ``Almost
immediately after Bolton's nomination was announced, Democrats
objected,'' end of quote.
The March 8 addition of the Baltimore Sun said, quote,
``Reaction from Senate Democrats promised contentious
confirmation hearings for Bolton when he goes before the
Foreign Relations Committee,'' end of quote.
In several cases, the statements by Democrats were
unequivocal in opposition. In several other cases, statements
were very negative, leaving open only the smallest of
possibilities that the Senate would ultimately support the
nominee. In all of these cases, objections were based on
Secretary Bolton's supposed attitudes toward the United
Nations.
Senator Dodd said that Secretary Bolton's, quote,
``antipathy to the U.N. will prevent him from effectively
discharging his duties as our ambassador,'' end of quote.
Senator Kerry says the Bolton nomination, quote, ``was the
most inexplicable appointment the President could make to
represent the United States in the world community,'' end of
quote.
Senator Boxer said of Secretary Bolton, quote, ``He's
contemptuous of the U.N.''
By March 31, still almost two weeks before the Bolton
hearing, a Los Angeles Times report noted, quote, ``Democrats
are likely to vote unanimously against John R. Bolton when the
nomination to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations comes
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, according to
Democratic and Republican lawmakers and aids,'' end of quote.
Now, Senators have the right to oppose a nominee because of
his substantive views and his past statements. However, it's
important to acknowledge that the ethical inquiry into
Secretary Bolton's background has been pressed by members who
had planned to vote against him even before we began
interviewing the witnesses. They have the right to ask
questions, and the committee has a responsibility to follow up
credible allegations. But we should also understand that, at
times, the inquiry has followed a more prosecutorial role than
many nominees have had to endure.
The committee staff has worked long and hard to run down
the salvo of unsubstantiated allegations that were leveled at
Secretary Bolton at the last business meeting. The end result
is that many of the accusations have proven to be groundless
or, at worse, overstated. New information has cast others in a
different light.
With regard to the most serious charge, that Secretary
Bolton sought to improperly manipulate intelligence, the
insights we have gained do not support that conclusion. He may
have disagreed with intelligence findings, but, in the end, he
always accepted the final judgment of the intelligence
community, and always delivered speeches in their cleared form.
During this inquiry, there has been the implication that if
nominee challenged or opposed the conclusions of intelligence
analysts, he somehow committed an ethical violation. I think we
need to be very precise that arguing in favor of one's own
reading of intelligence within the context of an internal
policy debate is not wrongdoing. Intelligence reports are not
sacrosanct. They involve interpretations, and they are intended
to stimulate debate.
This committee has held numerous classified briefings. The
word ``briefing'' is perhaps a misnomer, because, as Senators,
we spent much of the time during those briefings questioning
the panel. We probe to determine not just what analysts think,
but why they think it, and often we challenge their
conclusions.
Earlier this year, for example, our committee held a highly
classified briefing on North Korea, in which one of our members
pointedly disputed the conclusions of the briefer. There was a
blunt exchange of views, and no resolution to this disagreement
was achieved. And I am doubtful that any of us who have
attended a good number of intelligence briefings have not done
the same thing. My point is that the act of challenging or
disputing intelligence conclusion is not, in and of itself,
wrong.
Some have appeared shocked that Secretary Bolton might have
challenge intelligence conclusions or advanced alternative
interpretations, even though the same thing happens every day
in multiple departments and agencies.
Congress has the benefit of something called the, quote,
``speech and debate clause,'' end of quote. Article 1, Section
6 of the Constitution states that Members of Congress, quote,
``shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of
the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at
the session of their respective houses. And, in going to and
returning from the same, and for any speech or debate in either
house, they shall not be questioned in any other place,'' end
of quote.
The Founders put this extraordinary provision in the
Constitution because they saw the value in debate. The context
surrounding arguments within an administration over
intelligence is different, but the principle is the same.
Policymakers should be free to exert opinions and
interpretations during the policymaking process.
Clearly, there are lines that should not be crossed. Some
may argue that Secretary Bolton crossed these lines, but the
proof is in the result. After fighting for his interpretation,
Secretary Bolton conformed to the clearance process and gave
the speeches as they had been approved.
It has been charged Secretary Bolton sought to retaliate in
some way against analysts and others with whom he disagreed.
Our staffs have looked into these cases thoroughly; and, in
each one, I believe the allegations are overstated. In the case
of Christian Westermann, the INR analyst whom the committee
heard about from Carl Ford, the dispute was over a procedural
issue, and Mr. Westermann continued in his job. We should
recall that the focus of Mr. Ford's complaint was that Mr.
Bolton should not have raised his objections directly with Mr.
Westermann, not that Mr. Bolton was wrong to raise the issue.
Our Democratic colleagues, last month, made much of the
fact that, after this incident, Secretary Powell had to go all
the way down to INR to boost morale. But we heard, last week,
from Secretary Powell's chief of staff, that such visits were
not uncommon, that it was part of the Secretary's leadership
style to visit with staff in the bowels of the building,
including INR.
In the case of the NIO for Latin America, e-mails the
committee staff has viewed make it clear that Secretary
Bolton's primary objection was over disparaging and inaccurate
comments the analysts made to Members of Congress about a
speech. Secretary Bolton took his complaint to the CIA.
Although the NIO has said he feels his career was damaged by
Secretary Bolton, his superiors fully backed him at the time,
and other witnesses have told the committee that if he did not
get the promotions he felt he deserved, it was for other
reasons. Again, as far as Secretary Bolton was concerned, the
dispute was procedural; there was no attempt to fabricate
intelligence.
Other allegations related to managerial style show the same
pattern, upon examination: disagreement over procedure, not
policy. In the case of Rexon Ryu, a mid-level civil servant in
the Nonproliferation Bureau under Secretary Bolton, no policy
issues were involved at all. Secretary Bolton believed,
incorrectly, according to Mr. Ryu's supervisor, that Mr. Ryu
had deliberately neglected to share information with Bolton's
office. Some months later, Mr. Ryu was up for a job that would
have required him to work closely with Secretary Bolton.
Secretary Bolton, perhaps regrettably, expressed his opposition
to working with Mr. Ryu. Mr. Ryu was given another prized post
instead, an assignment to be Deputy Secretary.
The case of the State Department attorney, also raised by
the other side, is even more off the mark. This attorney fully
supported what Secretary Bolton wanted to do. It was only
because of miscommunication that Secretary Bolton thought the
attorney had given out wrong information on a case involving
sanctions against a Chinese company. The State Department legal
advisor, Will Taft, told our staff that he quickly straightened
things out. The attorney stayed on the case, even wrote the
affidavit that Secretary Bolton later submitted to the court.
Staff also looked at a new case that came up. Secretary
Bolton's chief of staff, we learned, went to an INR analyst to
complaint that he had inappropriately attached to a CIA
document a cover memo that took exception to some of the CIA's
findings regarding China. No action was sought against the
analyst, none was taken. The issue was procedural. No
intelligence was manipulated. And Secretary Bolton wasn't even
directly involved, because he was out of the country at the
time.
Secretary Bolton's credibility has also been called into
question regarding his testimony before our committee on April
11. Senator Biden questioned whether Mr. Bolton really went to
the CIA to learn about the National Intelligence Council.
Stuart Cohen, the acting head of the NIC, said that, while he
could not recall why Secretary Bolton wanted to come, it was,
quote, ``perfectly reasonable,'' end of quote, to believe that
was the reason. In fact, he added, quote, ``I was delighted at
the prospect that somebody would come out wanting to know more
about the NIC,'' end of quote. He also said that Secretary
Bolton only talked about reassigning, not firing, the NIO, just
as Mr. Bolton testified.
Our investigation has found nothing contrary to Secretary
Bolton's claim that his dispute with Mr. Westermann was over
procedure, and not policy.
Former Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard called the
committee, after Secretary Bolton's testimony, about a
controversial speech he gave in South Korea. Secretary Bolton
testified that Ambassador Hubbard had thanked him for the
speech afterwards. The Ambassador told us he, indeed, had
thanked Secretary Bolton afterwards, but only for making
certain changes in the speech that he had requested. Ambassador
Hubbard told our staff that he wanted to correct the record on
that point, but he was not accusing Secretary Bolton of being
deliberately misleading.
That speech was one of several by Secretary Bolton that
opponents to the nomination have questioned. Our investigation
has shown that many of these speeches and congressional
testimony were preceded by strong policy debates within the
administration. As one witness told our staff, quote, ``That's
how good policy is made,'' end of quote. In each case, we've
found that, in the end, Secretary Bolton delivered a speech
that was perfectly cleared and that expressed official U.S.
policy.
One of the most sensationalized accusations against
Secretary Bolton is that, 11 years ago, he chased a woman
around a Moscow hotel, throwing things at her. This is
problematic, first, because the behavior described seems so out
of place, but, secondly, because it has been very difficult for
our staffs, despite many hours of interviews on this matter, to
ascertain just what happened. The woman, Melody Townsel, who
lives in Dallas, admits that she is a liberal Democrat who
worked for Mothers Opposing Bush in the last election. Ms.
Townsel also told our staffs that her original accusation
contained a letter, that was made public--may have been too
strong in some pieces. She said, quote, ``chasing,'' end of
quote, may not be the best word. What she meant was that
Secretary Bolton would approach her whenever he saw her at the
hotel where they were both staying, because, as she describes
it, she didn't want to meet with him over a legal matter. It's
important to remember that Secretary Bolton was a private
lawyer at the time. He was not representing the U.S.
Government; he was working for company against which Ms.
Townsel had made some very serious charges, charges which
proved unfounded, that could have cost this company an
important USAID contract in the former Soviet Union.
Ms. Townsel provided no eyewitnesses to the incidents,
which are said to have occurred in public or open areas of the
hotel. Moreover, although she claimed that this was a highly
traumatic encounter and that she told several people about it,
staff had difficulty finding others who knew about it. Three
people whom Ms. Townsel identified as having heard her
complaints at the time of the events told us they had no
recollection of Ms. Townsel's mentioning Mr. Bolton. Her boss,
Charles Black, of Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly, who hired her
for the post, said she never mentioned it to him. Neither did
her intermediate supervisor back in Washington.
An employee of a sister company who assisted Ms. Townsel in
making her charges against the prime contractor on her project,
and with whom she said she was in close touch at the time, also
knows nothing about it.
Staffs talked to three representatives of the contractor, a
small Virginia firm, which has long experience working for
USAID overseas. These officials also heard nothing about this
encounter. They said that Secretary Bolton was in Moscow at the
time, but that he was working for a consultant for a health
project that they were involved in, not doing legal work for
them.
We did find one of her friends and coworkers from that
time, who was not in Moscow, who recalls talking with her by
telephone about it, as well as a subordinate of hers in a later
USAID-funded project who recalls her mentioning it.
Now, ultimately, the results of a lengthy investigation
into this isolated, long-ago incident are, at most,
inconclusive. Ms. Townsel went on to another USAID project in
former Soviet Union, and the company she accused of
mismanagement was awarded more USAID contracts and continues to
be well regarded. The original charge against Secretary Bolton
appears to be overstated.
On the basis of what we do know, there is nothing to offset
Secretary Bolton's long record of public service in several
different administrations.
It's been charged that, collectively, the allegations
against Secretary Bolton form an unacceptable pattern of
behavior. This is an unfortunate argument by opponents, because
it depends on doubts arising from an intense investigation of
accusations, many of which had no substantiation. By its
nature, it also discounts the dozens of positive testimonials
on Secretary Bolton's behalf from former coworkers, who attest
to his character and his effectiveness.
We need to think clearly about the context of the
allegations leveled against Secretary Bolton.
First, this has been an extremely public inquiry. By it's
nature, it has encountered anyone with a grudge or a
disagreement with Secretary Bolton, stretching back to 1983, to
come forward and tell their story. There have been no thematic
limits on the allegations that opponents of the nominee have
asked to be investigated.
I would simply submit that no one working in Washington in
high-ranking positions for that long would come out unscathed
from such a process. Any assertive policymaker will develop
opponents based on stylistic differences, personal disputes, or
partisan disagreements. Most members of this committee have
been in public life for decades. If we were nominated for a
similar position of responsibility after our terms in the
Senate, how many of us would want the same standard to be
applied to our confirmation process? How many of us would want
any instance of conflict or anger directed at our staffs or our
colleagues to be fair game?
Second, as mentioned, the oldest allegation dates back all
the way to 1983; thus, we are subjecting 22 years of Secretary
Bolton's career to a microscope. This included service in many
government jobs, as well as time spent in the private sector.
And given the length of John Bolton's service in high-ranking
positions, it's inevitable that he would have conflict with
coworkers of various ranks and political persuasions. He would
have had literally thousands of contacts, meetings, and issues
to deal with during his career. In this context, the volume of
alleged incidents is not that profound.
Third, in John Bolton's case, unsubstantiated charges may
seem more material than they are, because he has a reputation
for being an aggressive and blunt negotiator. But this should
not be a disqualifying factor, especially for a post that,
historically, has included a number of blunt, plainspoken
individuals, including Jeane Kirkpatrick and our former
colleague, Senator Pat Moynihan. In fact, President Bush has
cited John Bolton's direct style as one of the reasons that
he's picked him for this particular job.
It is easy to say that any inquiry into any allegation is
justified if we are pursuing the truth. But, as Senators who
are frequently called upon to pass judgment on nominees, we
know reality is more complicated than that. We want to ensure
that nominees are qualified, skilled, honest, and open.
Clearly, we should pursue credible reports of wrongdoing; but,
in doing so, we should understand that there can be human and
organizational costs if the inquiry is not focused and fair. We
have all witnessed quality nominees who have had to endure a
contentious nomination process that opened them up to any
charge leveled from any directions.
Both Republicans and Democrats have been guilty of
employing prosecuting tactics to oppose nominees with whom they
did not agree. Some would say that nominees are fair game. If
they accept an appointment, they enter the public arena, where
no quarter will be given. But we need capable people who are
willing to serve our government and the American people. And
among all the other qualifications, it seems that we require
nominees to subject themselves and their families to partisan
scrutiny. This has implications well beyond the current
nomination.
Our Democrat colleagues have recognized this fact when they
have defended Democrat nominees in the past. With respect to
one nominee, in October 1993, Senator Biden said, quote, ``The
Senate does nothing to fulfill its responsibility to advise and
consent on presidential nominations, and does nothing to
enhance its reputation as the world's greatest liberty body, by
entertaining a long and disagreeable litany of past policy
disagreements, not by entertaining anonymous and probably false
allegations,'' end of quote.
With regard to a troubled 1999 nomination, Senator Dodd,
quite insightfully, stated, quote, ``I am one, Mr. Chairman,
who worries deeply about our ability to attract the best our
society can produce to serve our country. It is not easy to
submit yourself and your family to the kind of public scrutiny
that a nomination of this magnitude involves. We have got to
sort out some ways in which we can go through this process
without making it so discouraging to people that--those watch
the process, think one day they might like to serve their
country--will be discouraged from doing so, in any
administration. And I am deeply worried that if we do not get a
better handle on this, that that will be the net result of what
we accomplish,'' end of quote.
Senator Dodd also provided comments for a March 1, 1997,
Washington Post article about the travails of a different
nominee. He said, and I quote, ``It's getting harder and harder
to get good people to serve in government. Advice and consent
does not have to be abuse,'' end of quote.
In an investigation of this type, we constantly have to ask
where we draw the line. Where does legitimate due diligence
turn into partisanship? Where does the desire for the truth
turn into a competition over who wins and who loses? Not every
line of inquiry is justified by our curiosity, or even our
suspicions.
The committee has focused a great deal of energy examining
several accusations against the nominee. And this may leave
some observers with the false impression that John Bolton's
service has been dominated by discord and conflict. We need to
acknowledge that a great many officials with whom he has worked
have endorsed him, and that many subordinates have attested to
his managerial character.
In the interest of fairness, I would like to cite just a
few of the comments received by the committee in support of
Secretary Bolton. Former Secretaries of State James Baker,
Larry Eagleburger, Alexander Haig, Henry Kissinger, and George
Shultz; former Secretaries of Defense Frank Carlucci, and James
Schlesinger; former Ambassadors Jeane Kirkpatrick and Max
Kampelman; former National Security Advisor Richard Allen;
former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth
Adelman; former Assistant Secretary of State David Abshire; and
former Department of State Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt
strongly endorsed Secretary Bolton in a letter to the
committee, saying, and I quote, ``It is a moment when we must
have an ambassador in place whose knowledge, experience,
dedication, and drive will be vital to protecting the American
interests in an effective, forward-looking United Nations.
Secretary Bolton, like the administration, has his critics.
Anyone as energetic and effective as John Bolton is bound to
encounter those who disagree with some, or even all, of his
administration policies. But the policies for which he is
sometimes criticized are those of the President and the
Department of State, which he has served with loyalty, honor,
and distinction.''
Andrew Natsios, the current USAID administrator, and Mr.
Peter McPherson, a former USAID administrator, along with 37
officials who worked with John Bolton during his years at
USAID, wrote, quote, ``We know John to be a forceful policy
advocate who both encourages and learns from rigorous debate.
We know him to be a man of balanced judgment. And we know him
to have a sense of humor, even about himself. John leads from
in front, with courage and conviction, especially positive
qualities, we believe, for the assignment he is being asked to
take on. He is tough, but fair. He does not abuse power or
people. John is direct, yet thoughtful, in his communications.
He is highly dedicated, working long hours in a never-ending
quest to maximize performance, yet he does not place undue time
demands on his staff, recognizing their family obligations.
What he does demand from his staff is personal honesty and
intellectual clarity,'' end of quote from that letter.
Another letter, from Former Attorneys General Ed Meese and
Dick Thornburgh, former Governors William Weld and Frank
Keating, former Counselors to the President C. Boyden Gray and
Arthur Culvahouse, Jr., and 39 other distinguished officials
stated, quote, ``Each of us has worked with Mr. Bolton. We know
him to be a man of personal and intellectual integrity, deeply
devoted to the service to this country and the promotion of our
foreign-policy interests, as established by this President and
Congress. Not one of us has ever witnessed conduct on his part
that resembles that which has been alleged. We feel our
collective knowledge of him and what he stands for, combined
with our experiences in government and in the private sector,
more than counterbalances the credibility of those who have
tried to destroy the distinguished achievements of a
lifetime,'' end of quote from that letter.
Another letter came from 21 former officials who worked
with John Bolton in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organizational Affairs, and states,
quote, ``Despite what has been said and written in the last few
weeks, John has never sought to damage the United Nations or
its mission. Quite the contrary, under John's leadership the
organization was properly challenged to fulfill its original
charter. John's energy and innovation transformed IO from a
State Department backwater into a highly appealing workplace in
which individuals could effectively articulate and advance U.S.
policy and their own careers, as well,'' end of quote.
A letter also arrived from 43 of John Bolton's former
colleagues at the American Enterprise Institute. It stated, and
I quote, ``As we have followed the strange allegations suddenly
leveled at Mr. Bolton in recent days, and reflected among
ourselves on our own experiences with him, we have come to
realize how much we have learned from him, and how deep and
lasting were his contributions. Contrary to portrayals of his
accusers, he combines a temperate disposition, good spirit,
utter honesty with his well-known attributes of exceptional
intelligence and intensity of purpose. This is a rare
combination and, we would think, highly desirable for an
American Ambassador to the United Nations,'' end of quote.
Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote, in a
recent letter to Secretary Bolton, quote, ``To combine, as you
do, clarity of thought, courtesy of expression, and an
unshakeable commitment to justice is rare in any walk of life,
but it's particularly so in international affairs. A capacity
for straight-talking, rather than peddling half-truths, is a
strength, and not a disadvantage, in diplomacy. Particularly in
the case of a great power like America, it is essential that
people know where you stand and assume that you mean what you
say. With you at the U.N., they will do both. These same
qualities are also required for any serious reform at the
United Nations, itself, without which cooperation between
nations to defend and extend liberty will be far more
difficult,'' end of quote from Mrs. Thatcher.
Now, during this inquiry, we have spent a great deal of
time scrutinizing individual conversations and incidents that
happened several years ago. Regardless of how each Senator
plans to vote today, we should not lose sight of the larger
national-security issues--U.N. reform and international
diplomacy--that are central to this nomination.
The President has tasked Secretary Bolton to undertake this
urgent mission. Secretary Bolton has affirmed his commitment to
fostering a strong United Nations. He has expressed his intent
to work hard to secure greater international support at the
U.N. for the national-security and foreign-policy objectives of
the United States. He has stated his belief in decisive
American leadership at the U.N., and underscored that an
effective United Nations is very much in the interest of U.S.
national security.
I believe that the President deserves to have his nominee
represent him at the United Nations. I am hopeful that we will
vote to report this nomination to the whole Senate.
At this time, I would like to yield to--the first
Republican segment--to Senator Voinovich for his comments.
Senator Voinovich.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me take this opportunity to thank you and your
staff for your graciousness and hard work on this nomination.
You have made strong arguments in favor of the nominee
throughout this process. Additionally, thank you for providing
all of the members of this committee with timely information
related to Mr. Bolton. I believe that the inquiry has been fair
and exhaustive. I'm confident that I have enough information to
cast my vote today. Again, I appreciate your staff's hard work,
as well as the administration's efforts.
Since our last meeting on this subject, I have pored over
hundreds of pages of testimony, have spoken to dozens, or so,
of individuals regarding their experiences, interactions, and
thoughts about John Bolton. Most importantly, in addition to
the meeting that I had with Mr. Bolton prior to the official
business meeting that we had on his nomination, I, once again,
met with Mr. Bolton this week, personally, to share my concerns
and to listen carefully to his thoughts.
After great thought and consideration, I have based my
decision on what I think is the bigger picture. Frankly, there
is a particular concern that I have about this nomination, and
it involves the big picture of U.S. public diplomacy.
It was not long ago when America's love of freedom was a
force of inspiration to the world, and America was admired for
its democracy, generosity, and its willingness to help others
in need of protection. Today, the United States is criticized
for what the world calls arrogance, unilateralism, and for
failing to listen and to seek the support of its friends and
allies. There has been a drastic change in the attitude of our
friends and allies in such organizations as the United Nations
and NATO and in the countries of leaders that we need to rely
upon for help. I discovered this last November, when I met--
when I was in London with people in the Parliament there--I
found that to be the case when we visited the NATO meeting in
Italy--that things have really changed in the last several
years.
It troubled me deeply that the United States is perceived
this way in a world community, because the United States will
face a steeper challenge in achieving its objectives without
their support. We will face more difficulties in conducting the
war on terrorism, promoting peace and stability worldwide, and
building democracies without the help from our friends to share
the responsibilities, leadership, and costs.
To achieve these objectives, public diplomacy must once
again be of high importance. If we cannot win over the hearts
and minds of the world community, and work together as a team,
our goals will be more difficult to achieve. Additionally, we
will be unable to reduce the burden on our own resources. The
most important of these resources are the human resources, the
lives of the men and women of our Armed Forces who are leaving
their families every day to serve their country overseas.
Just this last Tuesday, we passed an $82 billion
supplemental bill for our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
It is clear that the costs of this war are rising all the time,
and they are not expected to go down anytime soon. There are
not many allies standing up to join us in bearing the costs of
these wars, particularly Iraq. We need the help of other
countries to share the financial burden that is adding to our
national debt, and the human-resource burden that our Armed
Forces, national guardsman, and contractors are bearing so
heavily now, including the deaths of over 1500 American service
men and women.
And the key to this, I believe, is public diplomacy. Mr.
Chairman, I applaud the President and Secretary of State for
understanding that public diplomacy is an important objective
and beginning this new term with an emphasis on repairing
relationships. I applaud the President and Secretary Rice for
reaching out to our friends in the world community and
articulating that the United States does respect international
law and protocol. And I also applaud the President's decision
to appoint Karen Hughes to help take the lead in this effort.
Though the United States may have differences with our
friends at times, and though we may need to be firm with our
positions, it is important to send the message that we're
willing to sit down, talk about them, discuss our reasoning,
and to work for solutions.
The work of the President and Secretary of State Rice is a
move in the right direction, but what message are we sending to
the world community when, in the same breath, we have sought to
appoint an Ambassador to the United Nations who, himself, has
been accused of being arrogant, of not listening to his
friends, of acting unilaterally, of bullying those who do not
have the ability to properly defend themselves? These are the
very characteristics that we're trying to dispel in the world
community.
We must understand that, next to the President, the Vice
President, Secretary of State, the next most important
prominent public diplomat is our Ambassador to the United
Nations. It is my concern that the confirmation of John Bolton
would send a contradictory and negative message to the world
community about U.S. intentions. I'm afraid that his
confirmation will tell the world that we're not dedicated to
repairing our relationship or working as a team, but that we
believe only someone with sharp elbows can deal properly with
the international community.
I want to make it clear that I do believe that the U.N.
needs to be reformed if it's to be relevant in the 21st
century. I do believe we need to pursue its transformation
aggressively, sending the strong message that corruption's not
going to be tolerated. The corruption that occurred under the
Oil-for-Food Program made it possible for Saddam's Iraq to
discredit the U.N. and undermine the goals of its members. This
must never happen again, and severe reforms are needed to
strengthen the organization. And, yes, I believe that it will
be necessary to take a firm position so we can succeed. But it
will take a special individual to succeed at this endeavor, and
I have great concerns with the current nominee and his ability
to get the job done.
And to those who say a vote against John Bolton is against
reform of the U.N., I say, nonsense. There are many other
people who are qualified to go to the United Nations that can
get the job done for our country.
Frankly, I'm concerned that Mr. Bolton would make it more
difficult for us to achieve the badly needed reforms to this
outdated institution. I believe that there could even be more
obstacles to reform if Mr. Bolton is sent to the United Nations
than if he were another candidate.
Those in the international community who do not want to see
the U.N. reformed will act as a roadblock, and I fear that Mr.
Bolton's reputation will make it easier for them to succeed. I
believe that some member nations in the U.N. will use Mr.
Bolton as part of their agenda to further question the
integrity and credibility of the United States, and to
reinforce their negative U.S. propaganda--and there's a lot of
it out there today.
Another reason I believe Mr. Bolton is not the best
candidate for the job is his tendency to act without regard for
the views of others, and without respect for the chain of
command. We have heard that Mr. Bolton has a reputation for
straying off message on occasion. Ambassador Hubbard testified
that the tone of Mr. Bolton's speech on North Korea hurt,
rather than helped, efforts to achieve the President's
objectives. According to several respectable sources, Mr.
Bolton strayed off message too often, and had to be called on
the carpet quite often to be reprimanded. In fairness, those
sources said that, once reprimanded, Mr. Bolton got back on
track, but that he needs to be kept on a short leash.
However, this leaves me a very uneasy feeling. Who is to
say that Mr. Bolton will not continue to stray off message as
Ambassador to the U.N.? Who is to say he will not hurt, rather
than help, U.S. relations with the international community and
our desire to reform the U.N.?
When discussing all these concerns with Secretary Rice--
John Bolton's propensity to get off message, his lack of
interpersonal skills, his tendency to abuse others who disagree
with him--I was informed by the Secretary of State that she
understood all these things, and, in spite of them, still feels
that John Bolton is the best choice, and that she would be in
frequent communication with him, and he would be closely
supervised. My private thought at the time, and I should have
expressed it to her, is, Why in the world would you want to
send somebody up to the U.N. that has to be supervised?
I'm also concerned about Mr. Bolton's interpersonal skills.
Mr. Chairman, I understand there will be several vacant senior
posts on the staff when Mr. Bolton arrives in his new position.
As a matter of fact, I understand all the senior people, five
of them, they're leaving right now. For example, Ann Patterson,
who is highly regarded, is moving to another position. And I've
been told by several people that, if he gets there, to be
successful he's going to need somebody like Ann Patterson to
get the job done for him.
As such, Mr. Bolton's going to face a challenge. These
people are gone right now. He's going to have to find some new
ones. But his challenge right now is to inspire, lead, and
manage a new team, a staff of 150 individuals that he will need
to rely on to get the job done.
We have all witnessed the testimony and observations
related to Mr. Bolton's interpersonal and management skills. I
have concerns about Mr. Bolton's ability to inspire and lead
the team so that it can be as effective as possible in
completing the important task before him. And I'm not the only
one. I understand that 59 U.S. diplomats, who served under
administrations from both sides of the aisle, sent a letter to
the committee, saying that Mr. Bolton is the wrong man for the
job.
I want to note that the interview given by Colin Powell's
chief of staff, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, has said that Mr.
Bolton would be--would make an abysmal ambassador, that he is,
quote, ``incapable of listening to people and taking into
account their views.''
I would also like to highlight the words of another person
that I highly respect, who worked with Mr. Bolton, who told me
that if Mr. Bolton were confirmed, he'd be okay for a short
time, but, within 6 months his poor interpersonal skills and
lack of self-discipline would cause major problems.
Additionally, I wanted to note my concern that Colin
Powell, the person to whom Mr. Bolton answered to over the last
four years, was conspicuously absent from a letter signed by
former Secretaries of State recommending Mr. Bolton's
confirmation. He's the one that had to deal with him on a day-
to-day basis. He's the one that's more capable of commenting
about whether or not he's got the ability to get the job done.
And he--his name was not on that letter.
We are facing an era of foreign relations in which the
choice for our Ambassador to the United Nations should be one
of the most thoughtful decisions we make. The candidate needs
to be both a diplomat and a manager. A manager is important.
Interpersonal skills are important. The way you treat other
people--Do you treat them with dignity and respect?--very
important. You must have the ability to persuade and to inspire
our friends, to communicate and convince, to listen, to absorb
the ideas of others. Without such virtues, we will face more
challenges in our efforts to win the war on terrorism, to
spread democracy, and to foster stability globally.
The question is, Is John Bolton the best person for the
job? The administration has said they believe he's the right
man. They say that, despite his interpersonal shortcomings, he
knows the U.N., and he can reform the organization and make it
more powerful and relevant to the world.
Now, let me say, there's no doubt that John Bolton should
be commended and thanked for his service and his particular
achievements. He has accomplished an important objective,
against great odds. As a sponsor of legislation that
established an Office on Global Anti-Semitism in the State
Department, legislation that I worked very hard to get passed,
I am particularly impressed by his work to combat global anti-
Semitism. I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Bolton that we must
get the U.N. to change its anti-Israeli bias. Further, I am
impressed by Mr. Bolton's achievements in the areas of arms
control; specifically, the Moscow Treaty, the G8 Global
Partnership Fund, and the President's Proliferation Security
Initiative.
Despite these successes, there is no doubt that Mr. Bolton
has serious deficiencies in the areas that are critical to be a
good ambassador. As Carl Ford said, ``He is a kiss-up and kick-
down leader, who will not tolerate those who disagree with him,
and who goes out of his way to retaliate for their
disagreement.'' As Ambassador Hubbard said, ``He does not
listen when an esteemed colleague offers or suggests changes to
temper language in a speech.'' And, as I've already mentioned,
former Secretary of State Powell's chief of staff, Lawrence
Wilkerson, said, ``He would be an abysmal ambassador.''
As some others who have worked closely with Mr. Bolton
stated, ``He's an ideologue, and fosters an atmosphere of
intimidation. He does not tolerate disagreement. He does not
tolerate dissent.'' Another esteemed individual who has worked
with Mr. Bolton told me that, ``Even when he had success, he
had the tendency to lord if over and say, `Hey, boy, look what
I did.' '' Carl Ford testified that he had never seen anyone
behave as badly in all his days at the State Department, and
that he would not even have testified before this committee if
John Bolton had simply followed protocol and simple rules of
management. You know, just followed the procedure.
Mr. Chairman, I have to say that, after poring over the
hundreds of pages of testimony--and, you know, I wasn't here
for those hearings, but I did my penance; I read all of it----
[Laughter.]
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. I believe that John Bolton
would have been fired--fired--if he had worked for a major
corporation. This is not the behavior of a true leader, who
upholds the kind of democracy that President Bush is seeking to
promote, globally. This is not the behavior that should be
endorsed as the face of the United States to the world
community in the United Nations. Rather, Mr. Chairman, it is my
opinion that John Bolton is the poster-child of what someone in
the diplomatic corps should not be. I worry about the signal
that we're sending to thousands of individuals, under the State
Department, who are serving their country in Foreign Service
and Civil Service, living at posts across the world, and, in
some cases, risking their lives, all so they can represent our
country, promote diplomacy, and contribute to the safety of
Americans everywhere.
I just returned from a trip to the Balkans. I had a chance
to spend four days with people from the State Department. He's
not what they consider to be the ideal person, Mr. Chairman, to
be our Ambassador to the United States--or to the United
Nations. And I think it's important that we think about the
signal that we send out there to those people that are all over
this world, that are doing the very best job that they can to
represent the United States of America. This is an important
nomination by the President. What we're saying to these people,
when we confirm such an individual to one of the highest
positions--what are we saying?
I want to emphasize that I've weighed Mr. Bolton's
strengths carefully. I have weighed the fact that this is the
President's nominee. All things being equal, it is my
proclivity to support the President's nominee. However, in this
case, all things are not equal. It's a different world today
than it was four years ago. Our enemies are Muslim extremists
and religious fanatics who have hijacked the Koran and have
convinced people that the way to get to heaven is through jihad
against the world, particularly the United States. We must
recognize that to be successful in this war, one of our most
important tools is public diplomacy.
After hours of deliberations, telephone calls, personal
conversations, reading hundreds of pages of transcripts, and
asking for guidance from above, I have come to the
determination that the United States can do better than John
Bolton. The world needs an ambassador who's interested in
encouraging other people's points of view and discouraging any
atmosphere of intimidation. The world needs an American
Ambassador to the U.N. who will show that the United States has
respect for other countries and intermediary organizations,
that we are team players and consensus builders, and promoters
of symbiotic relationships.
In moving forward with the international community, we
should remember the words of the great Scot poet, who said,
``Oh, that some great power would give me the wisdom to see
myself as other people see me.''
That being said, Mr. Chairman, I am not so arrogant to
think that I should impose my judgment and perspective of the
U.S. position in the world community on the rest of my
colleagues. We owe it to the President to give Mr. Bolton and
up or down vote on the floor of the U.S. Senate. My hope is
that, on a bipartisan basis, we can sent Mr. Bolton's
nomination to the floor without recommendation, and let the
Senate work its will.
If that goes to the floor, I would plead to my colleagues
in the Senate to consider the decision and its consequences
carefully, to read all the pertinent material--so often we get
nominees, and we don't spend the time to look into the
background of the individuals--and to ask themselves several
questions:
Will John Bolton do the best job possible representing a
transatlantic face of America at the U.N.?
Will he be able to pursue the needed reforms at the U.N.,
despite his damaged credibility?
Will he share information with the right individuals, and
will he solicit information from the right individuals,
including his subordinates, so he can make the most informed
decision?
Is he capable of advancing the President and Secretary of
State's efforts to advance our public diplomacy?
Does he have the character, leadership, interpersonal
skills, self-discipline, common decency, and understanding of
the chain of command to lead his team to victory?
Will he recognize and seize opportunities to repair and
strengthen relationships, promote peace, uphold democracy as a
team with our fellow nations?
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say this. I have met
with Mr. Bolton on two occasions, spent almost two hours with
him. I like Mr. Bolton. I think he's a decent man. Our
conversations have been candid and cordial. But, Mr. Chairman,
I really don't believe he's the best man that we can send to
the United Nations.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
I now turn to the distinguished ranking member for his
statement and disposition of an opening hour of debate.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I don't know why I thought for a moment that maybe
Senator Voinovich shouldn't go second. I should have
reconsidered that position. [Laughter.]
So much for partisanship.
Look, I don't--quite frankly, much of what I was going to
say would be redundant and not as eloquent as what we just
heard.
And I have great respect for every one of my colleagues on
this committee, on both sides of the aisle. And I do respect
the fact that many of you may reach a conclusion different than
I have reached and, based on what I just heard, Senator
Voinovich has reached. I happened to reach the same
conclusion--and I'm not being solicitous--for the same reason,
the same basic, fundamental reason.
I cannot think of a time in my career here where I've heard
someone so succinctly state in one sentence what really should
have been the question: Why would you send someone to the
United Nations that needed to be supervised? I did ask a
similar question, that question, to the Secretary of State,
when she had the courtesy, which I appreciate, of calling me
before--before--the nominee was announced. At that time, she
asked me--and this is not violating any confidence, that--would
I withhold stating anything publicly until I had a chance--she
had a chance to talk with me more? And if you go back, you
notice what you've read about what Senators said, my name does
not appear there. I did withhold, until the day of the hearing,
any comment--to the chagrin, I suspect, of some of my
Democratic colleagues--my attitude and views and concerns about
Mr. Bolton.
I realize there is a very strong--we all are elected
officials in the most significant legislative body, I would
say, in the history of the world. And we all know, though, that
each of our parties have overwhelming requirements, sometimes,
to meet the concerns of portions of our party. That was implied
to me as one of the reasons why Mr. Bolton was being nominated.
The question I asked was, ``Do you know, Madam Secretary,
how much difficulty Mr. Bolton caused for Secretary Powell,
your predecessor?'' And the answer was, ``Yes.'' But there had
been a discussion, and there was a need to find an important
post for Mr. Bolton, who's been an admirable and bright and
patriotic servant of this country for a long time. And I asked
a rhetorical question, ``If you couldn't say no now to that
nomination, how are you going to say no if, in fact, he
breaches the control that you indicate to me that will be
imposed upon him?'' I don't know the answer to that, but I
would suggest that if there is a need to appoint him for
reasons, including and beyond his capacity, then it may be
difficult if, in fact, he strays. But that is not for me to
decide.
Mr. Chairman, you and I have worked together for a long
time. I think it's fair to say we've never had a cross, harsh
word. And we will not, as far as I'm concerned, have one over
this. But your opening statement makes it sort of sound that
it's self-evident that Mr. Bolton was going to be the guy to be
nominated to the United Nations. I would ask a rhetorical
question. Was anyone here in the Senate when Bolton's name was
mentioned, unless you had been briefed ahead of time? Did
anyone of you say, ``Ah, that fits. That's just what I was
thinking. That's just what I was thinking--U.N.--Bolton,
U.N.''? [Laughter.]
I'm not being facetious. I being deadly earnest. I think it
goes to this whole question of whether or not everybody's out
just on a witch hunt to go after Mr. Bolton. You must admit
that this was an unusual, if not surprising, nomination. If
someone had said Mr. Bolton was going to head up--he was going
to be brought in--I would have been less surprised, myself, if
he had been--if he was going to be--have the spot Mr. Hadley
has, a more--in some senses, a much more critical spot. I would
have been less surprised about that. But it's a little bit like
if one of us announced we're going go back and run for the
state legislature. It would kind of surprise me. It wouldn't
fit.
I want to make a second point. We did not seek out any
witnesses. I don't know whether you meant to imply, Mr.
Chairman, but it sounded--it might sound to some like the
Democrats are out there trying to dig up all they can on
Bolton. I had nothing to do, nor did any of you, with what now
is 102 former career ambassadors--Republican, Democratic;
Republican appointees, Democratic appointees. To the best of my
knowledge, my word as a--I know of no Democrat that had
anything to do with getting those folks to write us a letter.
Tom Hubbard, the Ambassador to South Korea, he contacted us
after hearing Mr. Bolton's testimony. We did not contact Mr.
Hubbard.
Mr. Westermann--nobody contacted Mr. Westermann first. That
came from Mr. Westermann in an inquiry by the Intelligence
Committee as to whether or not anyone had been--felt
intimidated. Mr. Westermann came forward to the Intelligence
Committee. We found out from the Intelligence Committee. We did
not go to Mr. Westermann.
Ms. Townsel--and, I agree, the evidence is not absolutely
conclusive. I agree with you. I think you honestly stated it,
as you always do. But we didn't go to Mrs. Townsel. She wrote
an open letter to us. I never met the woman, had never even
heard of her before.
So, I want to make the point that not only did we not seek
out these witnesses, it would have been irresponsible, in terms
of out constitutional responsibility, not to talk to them as
they came forward, or seek our corroboration and/or
contradictory statements relative to what they had to say.
And I might point out, the primary witnesses that we
interviewed, who had the most incredibly damaging things to--
let me rephrase that--who had some very damaging things to say
about Mr. Bolton's actions, are all in a Republican
administration. We did not go to a former administration. We
did not go to the Clinton administration to find former
assistant secretaries or heads of NIR--or INR. These are all
Republicans; if not Republicans, appointees and/or serving
under a Republican administration.
And, further, the argument that we need John Bolton for
reform at the U.N., and comparing him to Pat Moynihan--I'm
reminded of that famous phrase of our friend from Texas,
Senator Bentsen, ``I knew Pat Moynihan, and he's--and I know
John Bolton--and he's no Pat Moynihan.'' I mean, I find that
the biggest stretch--you know that old phrase we Irish say,
``Pat's probably rolling over in his grave hearing that
comparison.''
And so, we're not saying--one last point before I get into
the detail--we're not saying Mr. Bolton is not a patriotic
American, has not done very good things in his career, has been
a failure. We're not saying that. What we're saying is, he's
done some very good things. One that comes to mind, referenced
by our colleague from Ohio, the anti-Zionist resolution,
getting it repealed. That's a big deal. That's a big deal, a
notable accomplishment. But that does not a U.N. Ambassador
make. A lot of people have done very good things who turn out
not to be qualified or the right person for other assignments.
Mr. Chairman, my intention, obviously, is not to keep our
committee vote beyond the 3 p.m. agreement we have decided on,
but I feel obliged to lay out for the record one of my
institutional concerns here.
I recognize that the State Department, the CIA, and AID
have provided hundreds of pages of documents, and declassified
many of them. I don't minimize that. State and CIA have made
government officials available for interviews, and more than
once. But this cooperation has been grudging, to say the least.
Prior to the April 11th hearing, very little cooperation
was provided to the Democratic requests, until you, Mr.
Chairman, stepped in. After our first meeting, on April 19th,
we made additional document requests to the Department. The
chairman intervened again to help. But he also implicitly
invited the Department to ignore part of our request, saying
that some of our request were, quote, ``extremely broad and may
have marginal relevance to specific allegations.'' The letter
then expressed hope that certain specific requests would be
fulfilled, a list that omitted four parts of the Minority
request. The Department took the hint, and it has failed to
turn over some important materials related to preparation of
speeches and testimony.
Even after--even after we narrowed our request, at the
urging of the State Department, only a relatively small amount
of material that we narrowed the request for was provided. In
rejecting the request, the Department's offered an
extraordinary rationale. I think it's important, as a
committee, that we understand this. They said, in rejecting
some of the information we sought, quote, The Department,''
quote, ``does not believe the request to be specifically tied
to the issues being deliberated by the committee,'' end of
quote. As my mom would say, ``Who died and left them boss?''
Think about it for a minute. First, the Department is
responding only to the requests endorsed by the Majority, and,
second, the executive branch is deciding, for itself, the
issues which are relevant to this committee's review of a
nomination.
I believe this is an very important issue before the
committee. I believe it's very important whether or not Mr.
Bolton sought to stretch intelligence, to say things in public
statements that the intelligence would not support, and to keep
going back to the intelligence community again and again to get
answers he wants, not the answers the facts support. Put
another way, Did he attempt to politicize the intelligence
process for two former--as two former administration officials
have testified? That's why we requested this information.
I'm also concerned that the nominee may have given the
committee some misleading testimony. The material that was not
provided would shed further light on both these concerns. And
it relates to the preparation of congressional testimony on
Syria, their weapons-of-mass-destruction program. The
preparation of this testimony occurred in the summer of 2003.
Remember, we already know from intelligence officials that
there was an intense debate about what Mr. Bolton wanted to say
and whether he should be able to say it. And this was a time
when there was open discussion about, Is Syria next? Mr. Bolton
told us he didn't--hadn't seen the draft, and the Department
told us, in--later--in the letter yesterday, that he was not
personally involved in drafting the testimony. But this
committee has a right and a duty to look at the evidence.
The Department's letter, yesterday, saying that the
material is highly classified and compartmentalized, and the
Department is not prepared, quote, ``to share these
deliberations that cut across the intelligence community,'' as
their rational. This answer is unsatisfactory, as a matter of
principle, for future inquiries by this committee. We've
already received deliberative-process materials, some of which
are highly classified. Why won't the administration give us
this other material? Are they holding back relevant
information? Could it be that Mr. Bolton was, in fact, involved
in drafting the testimony? I don't know. But there's no cogent
rationale why they give us some of this, and not others.
The Department's attitude during the course of this
nomination is a significant departure--significant departure--
from past practice, including the past four years. It's been
the kind of--if this is the kind of cooperation we can expect
in the future, we may have a long three and a half years.
I'm even more concerned about the failure of the committee
to receive information relating to Mr. Bolton's request for NSA
information, and to identify U.S. persons that he wanted to
know in those intercepts. On April 13th, Senator Dodd made the
first request for this information. By a letter dated April 28,
Senator Lugar made a request for the information through the
Intelligence Committee. Specifically, Senator Lugar asked
Senators Roberts and Rockefeller, to seek, quote, ``all
information related to Mr. Bolton's request and the responses
thereto, including the unredacted contents of the documents in
question.'' Unredacted. And the letter said that the chairman
was, quote, ``prepared to follow the guidance of the Select
Committee with respect to,'' quote, ``access and storage of
such materials, as well as the provisions under which such
materials will be shared with members of the Committee on
Foreign Relations.''
Clearly, the chairman was pointing out that the past
practices mean that we have access to that information, and we
expected that access. That's why the reference to ``storage
material and the nature of the access''--not ``if'' we could
have access. In other words, Mr. Chairman, you made clear our
expectations that NSA would provide, quote, ``all the
information'' to the Intelligence Committee, which, in turn,
would share it with us.
And I understand that the chairman and vice chairman of the
Intelligence Committee were briefed Tuesday by General Hayden.
I understand that they were not given the identities of U.S.
persons that Mr. Bolton requested and received. And I have no
information on when, or whether, this committee or Senator
Lugar or I will be given access to the same information given
to the Intelligence Committee. So far as I can tell, Mr.
Chairman, your request has not been fulfilled. And I don't know
why. I think it's unacceptable. We have a right to this
information, not only as members of this committee, but in our
specific responsibility of exercising our advice-and-consent
responsibility.
Mr. Bolton has seen this information, but we cannot? Mr.
Bolton could see this information, but a 32-year Senator, who
never had once in his entire career had anybody raise a
question about his treatment of secret or classified data--I'm
not entitled to see it?
I would like someone to explain that to me. Can Ambassador
Negroponte explain it? Can General Hayden explain it? Can
someone at least do us the courtesy of telling us why this
information has not been provided?
After all the work we've done in the past decade to
strengthen the role of this committee, it is a serious mistake,
in my view, for all of us to acquiesce when the administration
is withholding the relevant information, whether they think it
is relevant or not. The integrity of the nominating process and
our constitutional role is being challenged, in my view.
Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the
President ``shall nominate and, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers and counsels, judges of the Supreme Court, and all
other officers of the United States,'' end of quote.
The failure of this administration to cooperate with this
committee, and the rationale offered for this failure, that the
Department does not believe these requests to be specifically
tied to issues being deliberated by the committee, it has no
constitutional justification, and it does damage to the
standing and the ability of this committee and other committees
to perform its function of oversight and advice and consent.
What makes this administration think that it has the right
to determine what the U.S. Senate needs in order to perform its
constitutional responsibility? It has asserted neither
executive privilege, nor any constitutionally based rationale
for not cooperating with this committee. It has no right under
past practices, no right under the Constitution, to offer as a
rationale that, quote--they ``do not believe the request to be
specifically tied to the issues being deliberated by the
committee.'' I repeat what my mother says, ``Who died and left
them boss?''
I do not work for the President of the United States of
America. None of you work for the President of the United
States of America. We are a coequal branch, equally powerful
and important, with a specifically assigned constitutional
responsibility that only we have a right to determine whether
information is relevant or not. Period.
The doctrine of separation of powers. It's within our
power, and ours alone, to decide what we think is relevant to
our deliberations in the exercise of our responsibility.
With due respect, Mr. Chairman, I think we're making a big
mistaken by not insisting that this information come forward.
And I might say, for the record, I don't think the information
requested is going to shed much light on anything. My guess
is--I've gone out and asked former Republican--present
Republicans--former Democrat administration officials, ``Is
this unusual to ask for this information?'' The answer I got
was, no, it's not that unusual. But I think this is a matter of
principle.
Mr. Chairman, I realize you're in a difficult position.
I've been there. Seventeen years, I was the chairman or ranking
member of the Judiciary Committee. I remember a President named
Clinton contacting me, through his staff and directly. He
wanted to have a woman named Zoe Baird to be Attorney General.
It was his first appointment. He needed it badly. Politically,
it was devastating to lose. I knew what my party would think
about me, but I insisted that all relevant information be made
available, even though they argued that it is not relevant to
the inquiry. I made it clear to the President, ``We will not go
forward.'' And we defeated--not an act I loved doing--the first
major appointee after Secretary of State?--we defeated, in the
Committee, Judiciary, the Attorney General of the United States
of America, headed by a Democrat and the Majority Democrats.
Then along came a woman named Zoe Baird. And I asked for
other--I mean, excuse me, Kimba Wood--and we jointly,
Republicans and Democrats, said, ``We insist on information
relating to not only her, but her husband, as related to an
accusation.'' The administration plead, ``Do not do this.''
And, adding insult to injury, a senior Democrat was the guy who
defeated the second nominee of a first-term President. That's
our constitutional responsibility.
Whether or not it causes defeat or not is not relevant. The
relevant point is, no administration, Democrat or Republican,
has the right to tell me or this committee or any other
committee, what is relevant. If they think it violates the
separation-of-powers doctrine, state it, exert executive
privilege, state a constitutional basis, but don't tell me,
don't tell this Senate, ``We, the administration, do not think
it is relevant.''
As I said, we don't work for the President. And no
President is entitled to the appointment of anyone he
nominates--no President is entitled--by the mere fact he has
nominated someone. That's why they wrote the Constitution the
way they did. It says ``advice and consent.'' And I think we
have undermined our authority, and we have shirked our
constitutional responsibility. And I intend, even if, tomorrow,
there is a vote in the Senate and they defeat it--John Bolton--
I would continue to insist we're entitled to that information.
It's just a matter of principle.
Let me now turn to the nomination. [Laughter.]
By the way, this is a big deal to me. I think it's a big
deal to this committee. We've fought so long and so hard to
regain--and you've established the stature of this committee,
Mr. Chairman, under your leadership. It feel in some, what you
might call, disrepair in the '70s and '80s. We weren't taken
seriously by Armed Services, by the Intelligence Committee, by
the Appropriations Committee. And, because of your statute, Mr.
Chairman, and, I hope, with a little bit of help from me, we've
reasserted the role, responsibility, and place of this
committee. And the idea that two guys in the Intelligence
Committee are going to tell me I can't see this information?
Give me a break. Give me a break.
My concern is not about the United Nations. My concern is
about the U.S. interests at the United Nations. And I believe
it will be damaged if John Bolton is sent to the United
Nations.
Based on the hearings we've held and the interviews we've
conducted and the documents we've examined, it is clear to me
that John Bolton is engaged in four distinct patterns of
conduct that should disqualify him from this job.
First, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought the removal of
intelligence analysts who disagreed with him. The removal of
them. Taking away their portfolios.
Second, in speeches and in testimony Mr. Bolton repeatedly
tried to stretch the intelligence to fit his views, and
repeatedly went back to the Intelligence community to get the
facts he wanted, or, as one witness said, ``politicizing the
process.''
And, lest you think that's an exaggeration, let me ask all
you--a rhetorical question of all you reporters out there. You
write a report about this hearing, and you go back, and it's
for a major Sunday piece, and your editor says, ``Do you really
have to mention Lugar or Biden or Jones or whoever in that?''
And you say, ``Yeah, I think it's relevant to the story.'' And
then this afternoon he says to you, ``Now, are you sure you
really have to mention those two guys?'' And tomorrow morning
you come in, and he says, ``Look, I read it again. Are you
sure--are you sure, you reporter, you have to mention this?''
And you say, ``Yeah, I think so.'' And then he comes to you in
the afternoon, before you leave--or evening--and says, ``Look,
I'm going to ask you one more time, are you sure?''
Now, I know many of you want to appear in the second
edition of Profiles in Courage at your newspaper, but I suspect
it would have a chilling effect on you, especially if you were
not a nationally known, highly valued at-the-moment reporter at
your newspaper. That's what I mean by ``politicizing.''
Third, in his relations with colleagues and subordinates in
and out of government, Mr. Bolton repeatedly exhibited abusive
behavior and an intolerance of different views, as my friend
from Ohio has said.
And, fourth, Mr. Bolton repeatedly made misleading,
disingenuous, or nonresponsive statements to this committee.
But don't take my word for any of this. Look closely at the
senior Republican--senior officials in this Republican
administration who have testified before this committee and its
joint staff. Carl Ford, a respected intelligence professional
with three decades of government service, who described himself
as a huge fan--quote, ``huge fan of Vice President Cheney.'' He
described for us not only the attempt by Mr. Bolton to remove
Mr. Westermann, one of his analysts, who worked for Mr. Ford,
but the unprofessional manner in which he treated his analysts.
Quote, ``Secretary Bolton chose to reach five or six levels
below him in the bureaucracy, bringing an analyst into his
office and giving him a tongue-lashing. He was so far over the
line that he's one--that he's one of the sort of memorable
moments in my career.'' Continuing the quote, ``I've never seen
anybody quite like Mr. Bolton--doesn't even come close; I don't
have a second, third, or fourth, in terms of the way he abuses
his power, authority--and authority with little people,'' end
of quote.
Afterwards, Mr. Ford said the news of Mr. Westermann's
incident, quote, ``spread like wildfire,'' end of quote, in the
bureau; so much so that Secretary Powell made a special point
of coming down to an assembled group of people at NIR--or INR,
and pointing out the analyst by name, and saying to the other
analysts that he wanted them to continue, in essence, to speak
truth to power.
Let me go right to the testimony here that was before us,
Mr. Wilkerson's characterization of this, which is that Powell
always went down. This was nothing unusual.
Powell's chief of staff, what did he say before our joint
staff? He said, ``That is to say, one of his leadership''--
referring to Powell--``one of his leadership techniques was to
walk around the building. He went to the basement and talked to
the men who clean up in the basement to find out how they felt,
how his morale was, and so forth. And he'd do it periodically
throughout the building. This was not that sort of unprompted
trip. This was a trip because several of his subordinate
leaders--in this case, I think, Carl Ford, in particular--had
indicated to him that he thought it might be necessary.''
So much for the fact that he was just wandering down there
and did this all the time. He may have, in the context that his
chief of staff--Powell's chief of staff said he went down.
Listen to John McLaughlin, a career CIA professional, who
served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and, for a
time, as Acting Director--both positions under President Bush.
When Mr. McLaughlin was told that Mr. Bolton was seeking to
have a national intelligence officer for Latin America
transferred, Mr. McLaughlin recalls that he firmly rejected,
and I quote, ``the request by saying, `Well, we're not going to
do that. Absolutely not. No way. End of story.' '' Mr.
McLaughlin explains why he's so adamantly opposed the request,
and it's important to his rationale why he opposed this
request. He said, ``It's perfectly all right for a policymaker
to express disagreement with NIO or an analyst, and it's
perfectly all right for them to challenge their work
vigorously, but I think it's different to then request, because
of a disagreement, that the person be transferred. And unless
there is a malfeasance involved here--and in this case, I had a
high regard for the individual's work; therefore, I had a
strong negative reaction to the suggestion of moving him.''
Hear what he said, ``it's different to then request transfer
because of disagreement.''
Listen to Robert Hutchings, chairman of the National
Intelligence Council, from 2003 to 2005. These are high-level
intelligence analysts who do the national intelligence
estimates that administration people get, and we get. He said,
in the summer of 2003, Mr. Bolton and his team prepared a
speech on Syria and weapons of mass destruction that, quote,
``struck me as going well beyond where the evidence would
ultimately take us. And that was the judgment of the experts on
my staff, as well. So I said that--under these circumstances,
that we should not clear this kind of testimony.''
Hutchings said--went on to say Mr. Bolton took, quote,
``isolated facts and made much more of them to build a case
than I thought the intelligence warranted. It was, sort of,
cherry-picking of little factoids, and little isolated bits
were drawn out to present the starkest possible case,'' end of
quote.
Let me make it clear. No one is saying Mr. Bolton could not
have his own views on intelligence. All this is about is Mr.
Bolton, when he--when he made an intelligence analyst--analysis
in public, had to say, ``I believe this to be case,
notwithstanding the intelligence community doesn't.'' No one
ever said a policymaker should be muzzled by the intelligence
community.
Let's get this straight, what we're talking about here.
This is all about whether Mr. Bolton can say the ``intelligence
community thinks.'' That's the only reason the intelligence
community's in this.
I can stand up, as my friend from--my chairman indicated,
and say, ``We vigorously disagree.'' We can vigorously
disagree, but I would never walk out of a hearing, nor would
any member of this committee, after being briefed by the
intelligence community, saying that there were no weapons of
mass destruction in Xanadu, the nonexistent country, and walk
out and say, ``You know, I just got briefed. There are weapons
of mass destruction in Xanadu.'' I'm allowed to walk out and
say, ``Speaking for myself, notwithstanding the fact that the
intelligence community doesn't believe Xanadu has weapons of
mass destruction, I think they do, and here's why.'' That's
what this is about.
I used to have a friend named Sid Bailick, who was a great
trial lawyer, and I went to work with him early on, as a young
man, and he'd say to a jury all the time, back in the days
where--you know, Mitch Miller's long gone, and Lawrence Welk--
he'd say, ``Follow the bouncing ball. Don't take your eye off
the ball here.'' The ball is not, Are we attempting--or anyone
attempting to muzzle Mr. Bolton as to what his opinion is?
That's not what the intelligence community was doing. It was
attempting to say, ``Don't say we believe that.''
Listen to Larry Wilkerson, the chief of staff of the
Secretary of State, a retired marine colonel. He said that Mr.
Bolton, quote--and I'm quoting--not my quote; his quote--``is a
lousy leader,'' end of quote, and had objected to him being
U.N. Ambassador because, quote, ``there are,'' quote, ``100 to
150 people in New York that have to be led, and led well,'' end
of quote. He described Mr. Bolton as a man who, quote, ``counts
beans,'' continue to quote, ``with no willingness, and, in many
cases, no capacity, to understand that other things that were
happening around those beans. And that is just a recipe for
problems at the United Nations,'' end of quote. A Republican,
colonel, chief of staff for the Secretary of State, with
indirect responsibility of supervising Mr. Bolton. Mr.
Wilkerson knows of what he speaks, as chief of staff. He kept,
as everyone said, and he said, an open door, literally an open
door, and he describes a regular flow of officials walking
through it to complain about Mr. Bolton's behavior.
These aren't anecdotal incidences. Mr. Wilkerson told us
that because of the problems with Mr. Bolton's speeches not
always being properly cleared, that Deputy Secretary Armitage,
quote, ``made a decision that John Bolton would not give any
testimony, nor give any speech, that wasn't cleared first by
Rich,'' referring to the Deputy Secretary of State, Rich
Armitage. And he later told--that is, Mr. Wilkerson told the
New York Times, and I quote, `` that, if anything, the
restrictions on Mr. Bolton got more stringent as time went
on.'' Quoting, ``No one else was subjected to these type
restrictions,'' end of quote.
Listen to John Wolf, a career Foreign Service Officer for
35 years, who worked closely with Mr. Bolton during two
different tours. His most recent tour was from 2001 to 2004,
when he was Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation.
Mr. Wolf told the committee staff, Republicans and Democrats,
that Mr. Bolton blocked an assignment of a man he described as
a truly outstanding civil servant some nine months after an
inadvertent mistake by that officer. Mr. Wolf says that Mr.
Bolton asked him to remove two other officials because of
disagreements over policy. And then Mr. Bolton, quote, ``tended
not to be enthusiastic about alternative views,'' end of quote.
Talk about State-Department-speak.
Listen to Mr. Wil Taft, who served as the State
Department's legal advisor under Secretary Powell, and, before
that, as general counsel in two other government departments,
as well as Deputy Secretary of Defense and as former Ambassador
to NATO. He told the committee that he had to take the
extraordinary step--the extraordinary step--of going to Deputy
Secretary Armitage to have Armitage remind Mr. Bolton that Mr.
Bolton was required to work with Mr. Taft on lawsuits in which
the State Department was the defendant. Why? Because Mr. Bolton
decided he could deal with the Justice Department himself on
the case and unilaterally decided to tell one of Mr. Taft's
attorneys, working for Mr. Taft, that his attorney was, quote,
``off the case.''
Mr. Bolton is an attorney, and a very good attorney. He was
once an attorney--he was one general counsel to AID, an
assistant attorney general in the civil division. He should
have understood the simple concept that the lawyers for Colin
Powell would need to work on the lawsuit that was filed against
Colin Powell. Yet, he had the arrogance to think that he knew
better, and dismissed the State Department's own lawyer, and,
consequently, had to be reminded, by Mr. Armitage, who was
boss.
Read the memo from Mr. Rich Armitage to Mr. Bolton in the
package of documents the State Department gave us last Friday.
Then ask yourself whether this is a guy who's likely to follow
directions from Washington.
Listen to Tom Hubbard, another career Foreign Service
Officer of long service, whose last post was as Ambassador to
South Korea. And I have never heard--nary a negative word, that
I've heard, has been said about him.
During the hearing on April 11, Senator Chafee asked Mr.
Bolton about a speech in Seoul on the eve of the Six-Party
talks. Mr. Bolton replied, quote, ``And I can tell you what our
Ambassador to South Korea Tom Hubbard said after the speech. He
said, `Thanks a lot for the speech, John. It's helps us a lot
out here.' ''
What did that trigger? Mr. Hubbard contacting the
committee. He either read it or heard the answer to your
question, Senator Chafee, and felt obliged to contact the
committee. Nobody contacted Ambassador Hubbard, to the best of
my knowledge.
He comes to us, Democrat and Republican, and he says,
basically, ``Let's get the facts straight. I remember it quite
differently.'' And he volunteered--and when he volunteered, he
made it clear that he disagreed wholesomely with the tone of
Mr. Bolton's speech, thought Mr. Bolton's speech was unhelpful
to the negotiation process, and felt that Mr. Bolton surely
knew that.
According to a memorandum for the record prepared by the
Republican staff of the committee who first interviewed Mr.
Hubbard, on April 26th, without a Democratic staff present,
Hubbard said that he felt compelled to contact the committee,
felt compelled to contact the Republican staff. So much for
Democratic, you know, digging things up here. He felt compelled
to go to the Republican staff. And he said that he's--because,
quote, ``It's misleading, to say the least, to have me praising
him for the speech.'' Let me read that again. Mr. Hubbard said,
on his own initiative contacting the Republican staff, quote,
``It's misleading, to say the least, to have me praising him
for the speech,'' end of quote.
If you're keeping track, now, that's seven senior officials
who have served at the Department of State or the CIA in this
administration, who have testified to the committee about Mr.
Bolton's actions. They told us that Mr. Bolton, one, seeks
retribution against intelligence analysts or policy officials
who disagree with him. They told us he pushes the envelope on
intelligence information.
I don't recall--I've been here for seven Presidents. I'm
not going to embarrass any of my colleagues what they recall;
I'll tell you what I don't recall. I don't recall, ever, a
senior official in a State Department, or Defense Department,
for that matter, being told by the Secretary of State and/or
the Deputy Secretary of State or Defense, that you cannot say a
single thing before a--before the Senate
Committees or House committees, or make a single public
speech without clearing it first. Maybe that's happened. If it
is, it's the best-kept secret in 32 years, since I've been
here.
Thirdly, what did they say, these seven senior officials?
He doesn't like to hear dissent. He doesn't like to follow
rules. He's a bad manager of people. He can't see the forest
for the trees. And he mischaracterizes the views of his
colleagues.
This is neither hearsay nor innuendo; as suggested in our
prior meeting, that it was hearsay or innuendo. This is what a
judge would call direct evidence and testimony and documentary
evidence--direct evidence. And it's all there for every Senator
to see.
Some people might ask, as Senator Lugar did, and may
assert, that none of this matters. Nobody lost a job. Mr.
Bolton gave these speeches he was authorized to give--after
yelling at the State Department lawyer, the lawyer is put back
in the case. And the young career officer that Mr. Bolton
blackballed from a career-advancing assignment ultimately
landed on his feet. No harm, no foul.
If you think his actions don't matter, then why would so
many serious people, not working in the government, come
forward, with little to gain and a lot to lose, to tell their
stories? We didn't subpoena a single person. We didn't pursue
anyone to come. We asked, they came. And they came forward
either without being asked or being asked because their name
came up. They came forward because they think Mr. Bolton
actions matter a lot.
If you think his actions don't matter, why was it necessary
for Rich Armitage to issue a special decree applied to Mr.
Bolton's speeches? Because words matter, especially when spoken
by a high-government official.
If you think his actions don't matter, why did Armitage,
according to Larry Wilkerson, chief of staff of the Secretary
of State, get mad at his Asian expert, Jim Kelly, for clearing
the Seoul speech? Because it almost impeded the Six-Party
talks, led Secretary Powell having to send an envoy to New York
after that speech to encourage the North Koreans to come to the
talks.
If you think his actions don't matter, why did Mr. Armitage
postpone Mr. Bolton's testimony on Syria? By the way, Mr.
Bolton told us that he canceled his own testimony. But Larry
Wilkerson said that Secretary Armitage is the one who canceled
it, because there was, quote, ``some diplomacy at the time that
might not have served us well, and, also, the testimony was a
bit off the policy line, and so, needed to be corrected
somewhat.'' In other words, we didn't let him make the--give
the testimony.
Remember, this is summer of 2003, when Iraq--when we're in
Iraq. Some people are talking about who's next. Syria's high on
the list. Mr. Bolton wants to give a statement about Syria's
alleged weapons-of-mass-destruction programs that Mr. Hutchings
says was not supported by the intelligence. This is just a few
months after faulty intelligence helped make the case for the
war in Iraq, and Mr. Bolton is trying to push the intelligence
envelope on Syria; and Armitage intervenes to stop it, thank
goodness.
Connect the dots, folks. Of course it matters. We don't
know exactly what Mr. Bolton wanted to say, because these are
among the documents the State Department's refused to turn
over. But we do know the--what the intelligence community said.
They said, ``No way. Don't characterize us that way.'' Why are
they hiding, not providing those documents?
If you think these actions didn't matter, then why did
Colin Powell make a special point, to use Carl Ford's words, to
go down to the Intelligence Bureau to tell--INR--to tell them
do their jobs? Carl Ford said that he made visits to INR
before, but both Ford and Larry Wilkerson, who was chief of
staff, said this instance was a special trip.
If you think these actions don't matter, why did John Wolf
have to assign a brilliant mid-level officer to another bureau?
Because he said, quote--he, Wolf, said--``He didn't want this
brilliant young analyst manning an empty desk.'' He stayed on a
good career tack only because Mr. Wolf worked to secure him an
assignment away from Mr. Bolton's reach, according to Mr. Wolf.
If you think actions don't matter, then listen to Mr.
Hutchings on the dangerous policymakers--on the dangers of
policymakers pushing to stretch the intelligence, even if they
fail. Here's what he said, ``When policy officials come back
repeatedly to push the same kind of judgments and push the
intelligence community to confirm a particular set of
judgments, it does have an affect of politicizing intelligence,
because the so-called correct answer becomes all too clear. And
even when it's successfully resisted, it has an effect.''
Continuing to quote, ``It creates a climate of intimidation and
a culture of conformity that is damaging,'' end of quote.
It matters, even if they didn't get fired.
Is Mr. Bolton really worthy of this trouble? Is this really
the best we can do? Are there no other tough-minded
professionals in the Republican party?
It's been said, usually in the same breath about Mr.
Bolton's reputation of straight talk, that if you oppose Mr.
Bolton, you oppose U.N. reform. Let me remind you all, it was
Joe Biden and Jesse Helms--Joe Biden and Jesse Helms--over the
objection of the chairman and my colleague, Mr. Sarbanes, their
objection, that got tough on the U.N., wrote the reform
legislation that the chairman and my senior member opposed. I
don't need a lesson, from Mr. Bolton or anybody else, how to
get tough with the U.N., nor does Senator Helms.
Mr. Bolton isn't the only guy who can push the U.N. reform.
Matter of fact, he's the worst guy. In fact, the Secretary of
State has said as much, because--no one talks about this--I
wanted to get that--I know the vote's almost over--four days
after Mr. Bolton's nomination was announced, the Secretary of
State appointed someone else to handle the issue of U.N.
reform. On March 11th, the Secretary appointed Dr. Tahir Kheli
to, quote, ``serve as the Secretary's senior advisor and chief
interlocutor on U.N. reform in collaboration with the Assistant
Secretary for International Organizations.'' Dr. Tahir Khalid
reports directly to the Secretary of State. Continuing, the
Secretary said, ``She will engage the U.N. Secretary General
and the Secretary on U.N. reform efforts, including the high-
level panel report and the report of the Secretary General on
Reform. She will coordinate within the State Department and the
interagency community the U.S. Government's position on
reform.''
So much for that being the rationale for why Bolton was
appointed. I understand why people would say that. It's the
last straw I think you can grasp at.
The press release makes no mention--the Secretary's press
release makes no mention of Mr. Bolton or the U.N. Ambassador.
So let's not kid each other. It's not about U.N. reform; it's
about whether the appointment of Mr. Bolton is in the national
interest. Is it in the national interest to have, as some
Republican administration officials have characterized, have a
bully--their words--and a lousy leader--their words--running
our mission in New York, with 150 people who need strong
leadership?
Concluding, Mr. President--Mr. Chairman, I don't believe
it's in the interest, the national interest, to have an
ideologue who appears to have no governor on his internal
engine representing the United States at the U.N.
Is it in the national interest to have someone who has a
reputation for exaggerating intelligence, seeking and speaking
for the U.N. when the next crisis arises, whether it's Iran or
Syria? And it will arise. We have already lost a lot of
credibility at home and abroad after the fiasco over the
intelligence on Iraq, and Mr. Bolton is not the man to help us
to rebuild it. He's the wrong choice. We can do a lot better.
And I think an awful lot of our colleagues know that,
notwithstanding the administration wanting him.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't know how much time is
left of the hour we had.
The Chairman. The Senator has at least 13 minutes, but we
just said ``more or less,'' and----
Senator Biden. Well, I would yield to my friend, Senator
Specter--not Senator Specter--Senator Sarbanes--he's my friend,
too----
[Laughter.]
Senator Biden [continuing]. To Senator Sarbanes, as much
time as he needs.
I'm going to vote.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL S. SARBANES, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, I want to take just a
moment or two of the committee's time, at the outset, to read
the names of those who have served as the U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations, in order to set some context in thinking
about this nomination: Warren Austin, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.,
James Wadsworth, Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Goldberg, George W.
Ball, James Russell Wiggins, Charles Yost, George Bush, John
Scali, Daniel P. Moynihan, William W. Scranton, Andrew J.
Young, Donald F. McHenry, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Vernon Walters,
Thomas Pickering, Edward Joseph Perkins, Madeleine Albright,
Bill Richardson, Richard Holbrooke, John Negroponte, and John
Danforth.
Now, I do this to underscore the importance of the U.N.
ambassadorship, and it's an importance that I think has been
recognized in prior administrations. In fact, in some
administrations the U.N. Ambassador has been given Cabinet
status--not in all, but in some, the position has been elevated
to Cabinet status. It's a very highly-visible position. In the
U.N., our Ambassador to the U.N. is, in effect, our spokesman,
in so many ways, to the world.
Now, this has been underscored, the importance of the U.N.,
by these selections. The U.N. makes decisions that affect war
and peace. It has a vital role in advancing U.S. foreign-policy
objectives, if we are skillful in exercising our leadership at
the U.N. It helps to determine whether the United States will
have international support and allies, or will be forced to
undertake difficult missions on its own, in the face of broad
opposition across the globe. The United Nations is a forum for
making our case to the world, for demonstrating international
leadership and building multilateral cooperation.
Our representatives at the United Nations must be men and
women of exceptional integrity and credibility who can listen
and persuade, whose counsel and leadership other nations will
seek and rely on. This is a very important position. And the
quality of the previous ambassadors demonstrates that that is
how it's been so regarded in administration after
administration, whether Democratic or Republican.
Now, over a number of years, Mr. Bolton has demonstrated
outright hostility for the United Nations as an institution and
for the legitimacy of international law. He has argued
repeatedly that the United States has no legal obligation to
pay its dues to the United Nations, that treaties are nothing
more than political commitments. He called the Law of the Sea
Treaty, which has been endorsed by our military and submitted
by President Bush as an urgent priority for Senate advice and
consent, an illegitimate method of forcing fundamental policy
changes on the United States outside the customary political
process. He is quoted as saying that, ``It is a big mistake for
us to grant any validity to international law, even when it may
seem in our short-term interest to do so, because, over the
long term, the goal of those who think that international law
really means anything are those who want to constrict the
United States.''
To send someone as our Ambassador to the United Nations who
does not demonstrate a basic respect for the institution and
its legal foundations is a disservice to our national
interests. This has nothing to do with whether you're going to
carry out reforms at the U.N. or more closely monitor its
activities. This represents very basic questions about one's
mindset about the United States, about the United Nations, and
about international law.
Secondly, I think it's very clear that Mr. Bolton does not
have the diplomatic skills or, indeed, the demeanor to
represent our country effectively. There are certainly moments
when the situation may call for bluntness, when abandoning
diplomatic niceties can convey the urgency of a particular
issue or position; however, Mr. Bolton has shown a propensity
for making extreme and provocative statements that have caused
unnecessary conflict and confrontation.
Does it help us in trying to shape the direction in which
the U.N. is to move when Mr. Bolton says that the Security
Council should have one permanent member--the United States--
because that's real reflection of the distribution of power in
the world?
Does anyone think that Mr. Bolton's assertion that if the
U.N. Secretariat building in New York lost 10 stories, it
wouldn't make a bit of difference? Does that help us in
persuading other countries to support U.N. reform efforts?
These are not isolated misstatements or slips of the
tongue, but, rather, his customary and consistent approach to
dealing with others who disagree with him. Even given the
opportunity to demonstrate a less confrontational approach, he
has repeatedly declined to do so. Mr. Bolton, time and time
again, has shown himself singularly lacking in the willingness
to hear, to consider, and to respect opposing points of view.
Contrast that attitude with these comments to the
committee, in their confirmations hearings, by Ambassador
Moynihan and by Ambassador Kirkpatrick.
Now, I might note, Mr. Chairman, that all of these previous
nominees to be U.N. Ambassadors were approved by overwhelming
votes in the committee and on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Not
a one of them had a close vote; many of them, unanimous; and in
the instances where it wasn't, only a handful of votes.
Pat Moynihan, in his confirmation hearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee--and I set out these quotes to
contrast them with all the testimony we received about how Mr.
Bolton carries on his activities--said, and I quote, ``A
certain principal statement of views on both sides can be
useful. It requires that we respect what others think, and try
to understand what they think, and ask that they do the same in
return. Things where we disagree are marginal compared with
where we do agree, and yet it is so easy to grow estranged at
the first problem. The first question is how to get away from
the confrontation system, back to the quest for understanding
in a situation where this is wholly possible and entirely
necessary.''
And Ambassador Kirkpatrick, in her confirmation hearing
before this committee, said, and I quote, ``I do not think that
one should ever seek confrontation. What I have every intention
and hope of doing is to operate in a low-key, quiet,
persuasive, and consensus-building way.''
Now, thirdly--and I want to speak to the prospects of Mr.
Bolton's credibility as our spokesperson at the United
Nations--the material has been quite extensively developed--and
I'll not go into it in detail here--but it's clear that he's
attempted to politicize intelligence in a way that I think has
harmed our nation's diplomacy.
He sought to transfer two intelligence analysts who
disagreed with him on substantive matters. There was such a
feeling of fear and intimidation in the Department that the
Secretary of State actually visited with the analysts to give
them reassurance. He's repeatedly attempted to stretch the
facts to back his own ideological predispositions.
You know, in testimony here, when he had the hearing, he
denied that he tried to have analysts punished, or to
discipline a CIA employee, or that he thought--or sought
retribution against employees with dissenting views. He told
us, and I quote, ``I shrugged my shoulders, and I moved on,''
when his attempts to have them reassigned were rebuffed. And
yet we have learned, from extensive interviews with numerous
administration officials, he did try to have the analysts
removed from their positions, he did seek to punish people for
disagreeing with him, and he did persist in his efforts for
many months after he supposedly made his point and moved on.
That he was ultimately unsuccessful does not speak for Mr.
Bolton. The question is not solely whether the truth is in the
results. What it speaks to is the steadiness and determination
of those professionals who withstood his demands and refused to
bend to this inordinate pressure that he was applying.
Given this conduct, when he goes before the U.N. to make a
statement about evidence of nuclear weapons production or a
terrorist plot, or whatever it may be, who's going to believe
him, knowing that he repeatedly punished intelligence analysts
who delivered contradictory information, knowing that he is the
kind of person who, as Robert Hutchings, the former chairman of
the National Intelligence Council, put it, ``took isolated
facts and made much more of them to build a case than I thought
the intelligence warranted. It was a cherry-picking of little
factoids and little isolated bits that were drawn out to
present the starkest possible case.''
We need a credible spokesman at the United Nations, and
this past conduct on his part casts serious doubt.
Finally, Mr. Bolton's poor administrative and management
skills, in my view, make him unfit to exercise a senior
leadership role. The testimony from Carl Ford, Assistant
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, has
previously been referred to. He said that, ``In my experience
throughout my time in the executive branch, I have really never
seen someone so abusive to such a subordinate person.'' He said
he didn't have anyone else in mind who even comes close to John
Bolton, in terms of the way that he abuses his power and his
authority with little people.
Larry Wilkerson, who was Secretary Powell's chief of staff,
described to the committee staff the kind of problems he had on
a daily basis in dealing with Bolton, ``Assistant secretaries,
principal deputy assistant secretaries, acting assistant
secretaries coming into my office and telling me, `Can I sit
down?' And I would say to them, `Sure. Sit down. What's the
problem?' `I've got to leave.' `What's the problem?' `Bolton.'
'' When asked if he got similar complaints about other under
secretaries, he replied, ``On one occasion, on one particular
individual. The rest were all about Under Secretary Bolton.''
In summarizing his experience with Bolton, Wilkerson stated,
``I think he's a lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people
up there that have to be led. They have to be led well, and
they have to be led properly.''
Being Ambassador to the United Nations is not just a
representational job, it's also a managerial job. There are 125
full-time permanent State Department employees working there at
our mission, alongside of numerous detailees from other
agencies and departments. The Ambassador has supervisory
responsibility over all these people. Most are career civil
servants, and they are there to represent the policies of our
President and to serve the interests of our nation. What are
they going to do up there in New York if John Bolton repeats
the kind of abusive behavior that led people in the State
Department, under incredible duress, to seek the support and
counsel of their assistant secretaries and the Deputy Secretary
and the Secretary's chief of staff? There will no one in New
York to shield them from the wrath and vindictiveness of John
Bolton.
Mr. Chairman, let me just say, because, to some now, it's a
favorite pastime to assault the United Nations, but the United
Nations has a very important role to play.
Skillful U.S. leadership can enhance our national interests
in very significant ways. And part of that skillful leadership
is to send an ambassador who has the skill and the wisdom and
all of the other talents that are essential to carrying out his
responsibilities in an effective manner. I think this nominee
falls far short of that standard, and that is why I oppose his
confirmation.
And let me just add a word on my respect for those
witnesses who came forward. Now, Senator Biden is absolutely
right, these people, in effect, volunteered themselves to give
what they felt would be an accurate view of Mr. Bolton's
behavior, particularly the interpersonal behavior. It took a
lot of courage, in my view, for people like Carl Ford and Mr.
Wilkerson, Mr. Hutchings, Ambassador Hubbard, and others to
come forward. I'm concerned that they're going to pay a price
for that, for a very brave action. I deeply regret if that
should turn out to be the case. I think they--their motive in
coming was the national interest of their country. In that
sense, I think they were true patriots. They had nothing to
gain by opposing the nomination; in fact, they may have much to
lose. They clearly were not ideologues with an ax to grind. In
fact, they were very supportive of the policies of the
President. But they felt that it was their duty, as loyal
Americans and as public servants, to tell the truth and to take
the--and to follow their consciences. And I respect that. And I
want to place that on the record and to thank them for this
service to their country.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Let me ask the Clerk how much time now remains on both
sides? An hour and 32 minutes remains on both sides. Each?
Okay. Very well.
I'd recognize Senator Allen, the distinguished Senator from
Virginia.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
your patience and the professional manner in which you have
handled this nomination. You've maintained, I believe, a great
sense of fairness and full disclosure, which I think is in the
interest of this committee, the American people, and also this
nominee.
The situation here is one where I know some of the other
side of the aisle will be quoting Senator Voinovich, and some
seem to worry about these interpersonal skills. You hear
worries and concerns about John Bolton's speech characterizing
living in North Korea as ``a hellish nightmare.'' I will remind
folks that then the North Koreans said that he was ``human
scum.''
The reality is, as I--I would think that it is a hellish
nightmare to have to live in North Korea. And this committee
has had hearings about how awful it is for those who actually
do get to escape. They go to China, then China sends them back
to be tortured, or worse.
I also will note, just for the history, in some of the
cases, from some of the colleagues on this committee, in 2001,
when John Bolton was nominated for Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security, before all these
concerns about speech-writing and--``interpersonal skills'' was
the phrase used--arose, many of them voted against him then.
And I would take note of that.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss John Bolton and his
qualifications actually to serve as Ambassador to the United
Nations. What has been lost, Mr. Chairman, though, in this
debate, virtually from the very beginning, is the desperate
need for reform in the United Nations. The testimony before the
committee, and subsequent interviews conducted by staff, in all
of this there's virtually no mention or discussion of what
needs to be done to reform the United Nations.
I do believe, contrary to my colleague from Maryland,
Senator Sarbanes, that John Bolton does have the skills. He has
the wisdom to effectuate these changes. More importantly, he
also has the principles. I think he's the right person to
unflinchingly lead those changes as our representative.
Rather than focusing on all these innuendos and assertions
against John Bolton and worrying about, gosh, people whose
sensibilities are easily offended and this fascination with how
speeches are crafted and noting that he said the same thing
about Cuban biological weapons capabilities as did Mr. Ford, we
ought to focus--the one who really ought to be getting the
scrutiny is the United Nations. The United Nations is the one
that we need to be worrying about them straying. And, rather
than worrying about controlling John Bolton, I'd prefer to
pursue the U.N. abuse and their anti-Americanism. And I'm much
more concerned about the United Nations being used as a front
for dictatorships and terrorism.
The United Nations--you know, we've just witnessed scandal
after scandal being uncovered. Unfortunately, these are not
things that can be addressed very easily by internal changes.
They are issues that have shaken the credibility of the United
Nations body and caused many of our citizens here in the United
States, and, indeed, people around the world, to wonder whether
the United Nations has any real relevance or redeeming role in
world affairs.
The United Nations was founded on many principles, one of
which was to promote universal human rights and freedoms for
all people. And while the United Nations does a number of
admirable things, it's also beholden to tyrants and dictators
and repressive regimes in certain circumstances.
Not considering even the scandals, this is an organization
that has allowed the world's worst violators of human rights to
chair the Commission on Human Rights. When the United States
has made a commitment to the spread of freedom and justice
throughout the world, it's difficult for our citizens to see
the United Nations as anything but a waste of their tax dollars
when countries like Libya and Sudan chair the Human Rights
Commission. And, just recently, just last week, Zimbabwe
selected as a member of the Human Rights Commission. Surely,
not an indication that Secretary General Kofi Annan's call for
reform on the Commission of Human Rights is being heeded.
We're public servants. Obviously, we have to make decisions
here. We're also stewards of the taxpayers' money. The United
States is the largest contributor. And it was something that
Senator Helms and Senator Biden worked out in the funding of
the United Nations. Over $2 billion a year. Just for their
regular budget, it's $439 million; but over $2 billion a year
go to the United Nations. Twenty-two percent of their funding
comes from American taxpayers.
As the largest contributor to the United Nations, we ought
to hold them accountable to certain principles and certain
policies. One principle surely should be the Commission on
Human Rights, and to have reasonable requirements that human
rights are actually honored in the countries who serve on that
commission.
I think all Americans want reforms enacted that would
prevent future abuse programs, such as the Oil-for-Food scandal
that plowed in--allowed Saddam and his thugs to skim off $20
billion. We ought to hold the U.N. peacekeepers who commit
crimes against children accountable. The American people, I
think, demand swift and severe action against this. And,
indeed, if our U.S. Government had ever done anything like
this, our citizens would certainly hold our government
accountable for it, and we certainly ought to do the same with
the United Nations.
We have to look--to work with like-minded reformers at the
U.N. to make sure policies are implemented to prevent similar
abuses in the future. And reform is what is necessary. The
United Nations is in a crisis, and our country and our
taxpayers have a strong interest in seeing that it emerge as a
credible and relevant institution once again.
The U.N. Security Council and International Atomic Energy
Agency, IAEA, they need--they're very needed in--for discussing
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the actions that are
needed to be taken to ensure that rogue nations do not acquire
those weapons.
We have seen, in recent years, that the United Nations can
provide an important role in helping spread democracy and build
societies that have been ruined by decades of repression and
tyranny. The United Nations has an important role to play in
the future of global affairs and security. But it only can do
so if it takes serious steps to reform from the extraordinary
corruption and ineptitude that has plagued it in recent years.
Now, John Bolton's qualifications. He comes to this
nomination with a broad and deep knowledge of international
affairs, from his early days as general counsel to the U.S.
Agency for International Development under the Reagan
administration, to his most recent post, of course, as Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Affairs.
In all these situations, Mr. Bolton has spent a great deal of
time and his professional life working on U.S. foreign policy
and devising strategies to carry out effectively that policy.
Some have criticized John Bolton as being a rigid
unilateral--unilateralist who's incapable of building consensus
with allies. However, his service in this administration shows
otherwise.
Mr. Bolton led the U.S. negotiations to develop President
Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative. That brought in 60
countries to work with us to help stop, or interdict, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related
materials worldwide, and also delivery systems.
To further combat nuclear proliferation, Mr. Bolton helped
create the Global Partnership at the G8 Summit in Canada. This
partnership doubled the size of the nonproliferation effort in
the former Soviet Union by committing our G8 partners to match
the United States $1 billion per year Cooperative Threat
Reduction, or Nunn-Lugar, Program.
He also played a central role in negotiating the treaty of
Moscow, which will reduce operationally deployed nuclear
weapons by two-thirds.
As Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organizations, John Bolton led an effort to have the United
Nations change its odious resolution which likened Zionism to
racism. And it is hard to get the United Nations, or any group,
to rescind a resolution, but he was able to do that.
So, he does have the knowledge, he does have the experience
to effectively represent the United States in the United
Nations, and also negotiate the changes that need to be made to
ensure its relevancy in the future.
Now, a few of us--a few here may not agree with his
forthright critique of the United Nations and its failings, but
it's clear to me that Mr. Bolton has placed a great deal of
thought into his views. And, in fact, I think his views are
borne out by the actions, or lack of actions, by the United
Nations. I think the American people want someone at the United
Nations who pushes strongly for reform and is not going to be
seduced by flowery, evasive pontifications from those
bureaucrats.
Senator Biden said, ``Well, who was he thinking of? And
maybe Mr. Bolton should have had another position.'' Well,
President Bush was elected, and that's who he thought should be
in this position. And I think that--I'll say for myself--I
think John Bolton is the type of person, or someone like him,
should be in this position.
We are not electing Mr. Congeniality. We do not need Mr.
Milktoast in the United Nations. We're not electing Mr. Peepers
to go there and just be really happy and drinking tea with
their pinkies up and just saying all these meaningless things,
when we do need a straight-talker and someone who's going to go
there and shake it up. And it needs shaking up. It needs
reform.
We can't just keep spending $2 billion a year of the
taxpayers' money and have the sort of fraud, abuse, lack of
accountability, propping up dictators, funneling money to
corrupt regimes, whether it's Saddam's or others.
And so, I know that this has been a confirmation process
that we haven't seen--at least I haven't. I haven't been here
as long as many in the Senate. And we've pursued all these wild
claims. They've been exaggerations. The concerns of Mr.
Westermann or any of these folks, and the speech-crafting--the
point of the matter, they're all in their jobs. I think they're
more secure and safe now. But if any of them ever had anyone
reduce their position, it would be looked upon as retribution,
so I think, in the grievance procedures, they're safer than
ever. I thought Mr. Ford was a very engaging, likeable
individual, but the bottom line was, he wasn't in the meeting
when the supposed finger-wagging was going on. He couldn't
remember whether or not the word ``fire'' was used. The bottom
line is, all these people are still in their positions.
The exaggerated innuendo that came up in the last hearing
from Ms. Townsel, I'm not going to repeat all the adequately
rebutted arguments of our chairman, but Ms. Townsel certainly
had--did not have much credibility, and the facts simply were
not as she represented--in fact, clearly were not true.
So, while we've gone through these overly hyped charges, I
think they have been refuted, and, really, they don't have much
bearing, at least in my view, to say there's any compelling
reason that John Bolton is not the right person to actually
represent the interests, the principles, and desires of the
American people in the United Nations. I do think the President
has selected wisely in John Bolton.
Now, the way that this is going to proceed--after the last
hearing we had, where we played for second down--as I
understand it, the goal here, Mr. Chairman, is to somehow vote
on John Bolton's nomination and to get him to proceed to the
Senate floor, where this debate will continue for all of our
colleagues. And so, I'm encouraged that, notwithstanding some
of the concerns the Senator from Ohio has about Secretary
Bolton, I thank him for allowing this nomination to proceed to
the Senate floor. And we have moved the ball downfield.
And I thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy and
your steady, fair leadership on this issue, as well as others.
Senator Biden. We're looking for an on-sides kick.
[Laughter.]
Senator Allen. Say, what?
Senator Biden. We're looking for an on-sides kick.
Senator Allen. No, we just got a first down. [Laughter.]
Haven't scored yet.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Allen.
Senator Biden, would you designate----
Senator Biden. Yes. Senator--we have----
The Chairman. Senator Dodd?
Senator Biden [continuing]. As I say to my colleagues, we
have, as I understand it, roughly 15 minutes for all the
remaining members, each. And if others don't show, then the
time can be--we can move back. So, if we can try to stay at 15.
Senator Dodd. Thank you. In fact, if you would put the
clock on here, and we may try to make it even briefer than
that.
Senator Biden. Is that possible, to stick the clock on----
Senator Dodd. Clock on, so we can keep an eye on our--why
don't you put it on for 10.
Senator Biden. Put it on for 10, and we'll see.
Senator Dodd. And then--try and wrap it up there.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
CONNECTICUT
Senator Dodd. First of all, Mr. Chairman, let me begin by
thanking you, Senator Biden, and your respective staffs. It's
been over a month--a month ago, yesterday--that we had the
public hearing, and then, of course, this month-long period in
which a tremendous amount of work has been done by the
committee staff. And I would not want the moment here to pass
without expressing our gratitude to the people who sit behind
us here, who spent a lot of long hours over the last month in
gathering the information they have. So, I want them to know
how much I appreciate the efforts that you've made on behalf of
us, who sit here in the front seats.
I appreciate, as well, the chairman's comments during his
opening remarks about some of my views regarding presidential
appointees and the process of confirmation.
I went back and tried to calculate, because of some
accusations that I was a serial abuser when it came to
presidential nominees, and, over the 24 years serving under--
eight years under Republican administrations, and eight years
under a Democratic administration--in senior-level people I've
voted on one way or another, close to 7,000 presidential
appointees. And of those 7,000, there were 52 that I voted
against. Three or four of those, I've written letters and
apologized to them because I voted against them, and I
shouldn't have. And I wrote them letters. Everett Koop is one
that comes to mind immediately. I voted against Everett Koop,
and regretted, afterwards, having done so, and expressed to him
in the letter some months later.
So, I am of a mind, not unlike my friend and colleague from
Ohio and, I think, most of us here--I think we generally like
to be supportive of presidential choices. I think that's--
doesn't mean you shouldn't object where you think it's
appropriate to do so, but, as a general matter, I think we like
to defer, particularly when it comes to a Cabinet or people who
are going to be part of the official family, if you will, of an
administration. And so, I want to be on record as still
subscribing to the views that the chairman ascribed to me in
talking about how we ought to handle these matters.
This is uncomfortable. None of us enjoy this. I think we'd
much rather be debating policy issues than the fate of one
individual here to hold a high-level position. We have an awful
lot of work to do. There are important issues that I think the
general public would like to see us address. And so, it's
somewhat disappointing that we find ourselves in this
situation.
As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, I've been here for 24 years.
And tonight--I keep a, as I think most of us do, a little
journal. It's not every day. But with my two young children,
two young daughters, I try to record moments that I think are
of significance during my tenure here. And I'm going to go home
tonight and write in my journal about a senatorial moment. We
don't have them every single day around here, but we had one
this morning. We had a senatorial moment. And I want to tell my
colleague from Ohio what a privilege it is to serve with him.
I've been where you've been on nominations on these matters.
It's not comfortable. But I look back on those moments, and
they're some of the proudest moments I've had as a Senator,
when you stand up against the flow of events and your own
party--and Senator Biden mentioned moments that he's had as--on
similar cases. So, I thank him for what he did.
I want to point out, as well, here that--and Senator
Sarbanes did this, but I think it's worth noting here--this
will be resolved in this committee and on the floor of the
Senate, I presume, in the next number of days. And another
issue will come along. And those of us who have disagreed on
this will find matters which we agree on with each other, and
we'll go about our business. But for an awful lot of people,
roughly--almost 20 individuals, either presently serving or
recent appointees of the Bush administration, have either sat
at this table or sat with our staffs and have done something
you rarely see. It wasn't just one or two. It's--in my
experience, I can't think of another example, in my 24 hours on
this committee, to see as many people of like political stripe,
of common ideological and philosophical viewpoints, willing to
come forward and say to us, as a committee, ``Please be careful
about what you're doing.'' This is a rare moment. And our
colleagues here need to take note of this.
And I think it's worth just describing who these people
are, and quickly going down the list: Stuart Cohen, Acting
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA; Alan
Foley, former Head of WINPAC at the CIA; John McLaughlin,
Director of Central Intelligence--Deputy Director and Acting
Director; Jamie Miscik, former Deputy Director of Intelligence;
Thomas Hubbard, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea; John
Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation;
Christian Westermann, whom we've talked about, the INR analyst;
Tom Finger, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research; Beth Friesa, immediate supervisor to Mr. Westermann;
a man who's asked that his name not be made public here, but an
attorney at the State Department who was involved in the issue
involving Mr. Bolton's efforts to move one of the employees
there; William Taft, a legal advisor at the State Department;
Fred Fleitz, the Acting Chief of Staff for Mr. Bolton; Neil
Silver, the INR Office Director supervising Mr. Westermann;
Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Secretary Powell;
Robert Hutchings, former Chairman of the National Intelligence
Council.
These are all significant people, who have all said to us,
in their own words, one way or the other, ``This is a bad
choice.'' And I just think it's important that these people--
whether you agree with them or not, that it's important that we
encourage people who feel like this to express themselves to a
committee like us here. And so, I hope that--regardless of the
outcome of this, that there will be an appreciation of the work
that they've done.
And, Mr. Chairman, my--as you know, the very first question
I asked on the April 11th hearing--in fact, it was the very
first question the chairman asked at that hearing--had to do
with what has been my principal concern from the very
beginning. It's been said by others here today, but let me just
repeat it. I have--if this were a question of a person's
style--I think Senator Voinovich made as strong a case that
could be made about whether or not this kind of a style is what
you want for someone serving as an Ambassador to the United
Nations.
But that's not my objection. I'm--I think if we get into
the business here of deciding to be for or against people
because of their styles, this is not going to be terribly
successful, in terms of how we relate to them, depending upon
the position, although I don't disagree with his concerns about
public diplomacy, as my colleague has expressed.
My concern is that we've just come through an incredible
period in American history where major decisions were made
about this nation's foreign policy based on the intelligence we
are receiving. People are losing their lives every single day
in a far-off land here, because there was a firm belief, based
on the intelligence we had, that weapons of mass destruction
existed. Now, put aside whether or not you think it's right or
wrong for us to be there today. The reason--the reason--that we
voted the way we did on that issue was because it was the
collective wisdom of the intelligence community that weapons of
mass destruction existed. We now know that not to be the case.
In the case of Mr. Bolton--putting aside his personality,
putting aside his style--the fact that he tried to fire--and
there is just--I don't know how many witnesses you need to have
stand up here to tell that that's exactly what he did, despite
what he claimed to do. He tried to fire--fire--intelligence
analysts because they would not conform to what he wanted to
say that represented the position of the United States in a
public speech. We now have further evidence--my colleagues and
some of them said, ``I need further information.'' During the
30 interviews that occurred over the last 30 days, we
discovered e-mails and additional information that, in fact,
contradict rather significantly what Mr. Bolton said before
this committee on April 11th, that it wasn't just a casual trip
to the CIA, it wasn't just ended there. In fact, there were
significant efforts to penalize, in fact, some of these people
including taking away their building privileges or their
identification to go into the State Department. It was--got so
petty that it went beyond just a casual conversation at the
CIA.
That's my major concern here. If we can't make a statement
to all future nominees who may be serving in critical positions
today, ``If you do this, you disqualify yourself, in my view.
Whatever other issues may arise, if you do this, if you try to
fire people because you didn't like what they had to say, in a
supervisory position, that disqualifies you, in my view. I
don't care whether you're a Democrat in the White House, a
Republican in the White House. Anyone who does that.''
And my concern is not just that they may be rewarded with a
position, but what it does down in the positions. Mr. Bolton
said, ``I lost confidence in Mr. Westermann.'' To lose
confidence in someone presupposes you had confidence in them
previously. There's no evidence at all that Mr. Bolton had any
idea who Mr. Westermann was. In fact, on the chart back here,
as I pointed out to the committee back on the day we had the
markup on this nomination, Mr. Bolton's position is a senior
policy position. Mr. Westermann was down as a GS-14 in the
analyst office. He didn't know Mr. Westermann. How do you lose
confidence in someone you have no idea even exists, until
you've discovered they told you you can't say what you want to
say?
Losing confidence in someone. That wasn't the reason that
he decided he wanted to fire him. He didn't want some GS-14
telling a presidential appointee that he couldn't say what he
wanted to say. And he said, ``I'm going to fire you, or try to
fire you, for doing it.'' That's what Carl Ford said he did.
That's what the chief of staff of Mr. Bolton said. That's what
every single person who had any knowledge of this case told
this committee, either in testimony provided to the staff or in
front of this committee, itself. That's why, more than any
other reasons I can think of, this nominee does not deserve the
support of this committee.
Now, let me just make one further point here, and I won't
go into all the details. The information is there. The
interviews are public.
I gather, based on what my colleague from Ohio has said
here--and I know he's--notice he's left the room here, so I--
I'm going to talk about something he said. But, Mr. Chairman,
there's a reason why committees exist in the Senate. And that
is--and I'd ask to be able to go on here a couple of minutes
yet. There's a reason why committees exist in the Senate. Our
colleagues--we defer to each other, because there's no way a
hundred people can sit and be busy on every single issue. And
so, we are asked to draw judgments. I only know of one case--
and I'm sure the staff will contradict me if I'm wrong here--
but only one case in my 24 years where the committee has sent,
without recommendation, a nominee to the floor of the Senate. I
think it was the case of Kenneth Adelman, I believe. Now, maybe
there are--I'm told that's not the case, but--maybe someone has
a different example.
The point is, it's, then, very, very rare, in my
experience, because we're the ones who have to do the work
here. And our colleagues, I think, would like to rely on us, to
some degree. Now, I know it's done from time to time; it's not
without precedent.
But I think it's deluding ourselves to think that our
colleagues are going to spend as much time as we have on this
issue. They may listen to us on the floor. But, in some ways,
these matters are painful and difficult to deal with.
But we bear responsibility to our colleagues, and, I think,
to the public, to move on here. I don't think we're serving the
President well. I don't think we're serving our role at the
United Nations well. This is going to drag on. This nominee may
go to the floor. We're going to be on the floor with this. And
it's not going to be a short debate on the floor. It's going to
go on. And I don't think our interests are being well served by
doing that. This is a painful choice to have to make of
someone, painful for their families. I understand that.
But I would hope the committee might reconsider. If the
decision is not to support this nominee, then it ought to end
here. End here. And invite the President to send us someone.
And let me say to my friend from Virginia, who's also left
the room--I don't--shouldn't take this as an insult--there are
plenty of good people to fill this job. The idea that there's
only one individual who can do the job that needs to be done at
the United Nations is--to quote my friend from Ohio, is
nonsense. I can think of five or six names, off the top of my
head, that are bona fide, conservative, blunt Republicans, who
would serve well in the United Nations and help do the things
that need to be done there. The idea that John Bolton's the
only person is an insult, in a way, to the leadership of the
Republican party that no one else could possibly fulfill this
role at all.
And we owe it to the American public, we owe it to
ourselves, let's end this matter, and let's move on to the more
serious business we must deal with, major policy issues and
filling these jobs that need to be filled to get the job done.
I thank the Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
The Chair recognizes, now, Senator Chafee.
STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE
ISLAND
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
This has been a difficult few weeks as we have exercised
our duty of advice and consent on President Bush's nominee to
be the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton.
There have been many charges and accusations, and I do agree
with Senator Dodd that any intimidation of intelligence
analysts is wrong. And I'm apprehensive that by promoting John
Bolton, we're signaling an endorsement of that intimidation.
And I am particularly concerned with the speech that Mr.
Bolton gave in Seoul, South Korea, in the midst of those six-
nation talks. That speech was cleared--Mr. Bolton says that
speech was cleared by the highest level of our government. True
though that may be, it does not diminish the questionable
wisdom of his having delivered it at such a sensitive time.
There have been other instances where I've had reservations
about Mr. Bolton's decision-making.
I also recognize the diplomatic successes Mr. Bolton has
had. The Proliferation Security Initiative is one. And, as
Senator Allen said, this is a global effort that aims to stop
shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI uses existing
authorities, national and international, to defeat
proliferation. Mr. Bolton worked in a multilateral fashion on
this proposal. Ten other countries--Australia, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United
Kingdom--initially agreed to PSI, and 60 more have agreed
since.
I do want to take, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bolton at his word as
to how he will perform as our Ambassador to the United Nations.
He testified, under oath, that, ``If confirmed, I pledge to
fulfill the President's vision of working in close partnership
with the United Nations.'' And that vision is that the United
States is committed to the success of the United Nations. And
we view the U.N. as an important component of our diplomacy.
Mr. Bolton said that he will work for a stronger, better,
more effective United Nations, one which requires sustained and
decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan support, and
support of the American public. He said walking away from the
United Nations is not an option.
He also said that he assures the committee, the American
people, and potential future colleagues at the United Nations
that, if confirmed, he will work to--with all interested
parties to build a stronger and more effective United Nations.
He said, ``Doing so will promote not only American interests,
but will inevitably improve and enhance the U.N.'s ability to
serve all of its members, as well.'' He went on to say, ``I
pledge to bring my strong record of experience in working
cooperatively within the United Nations to fulfill the
intentions and aspirations of its original promise. In
particular, I will work closely with the Congress and this
committee to achieve that goal.'' I will repeat that, ``In
particular, I will work closely with the Congress and this
committee to achieve that goal.''
So, I want to take him at his word, and I will support
Chairman Lugar and Senator Voinovich's motion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Biden, would you designate----
[Pause.]
Senator Biden. Senator Kerry.
The Chairman. Senator Kerry is recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM
MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me
begin, first of all, by echoing the comments of other
colleagues. And I thank you, personally, for the way in which
you've defended this process. And I think you've handled that
with great grace, and I think you've been terrific at helping
the committee to fill out the record here, though I certainly
concur with Senator Biden, I wish we were able to have that
full record. I think that remains something that we hope we can
work out with you.
Secondly, I also want to say to those people who came
forward, I think this is a very serious moment for the
committee. And it's hard sometimes to convey that to people,
because a lot of what happens around here gets politicized, as
well as trivialized. But this should not be. I regret that some
have, sort of, circled political wagons in this effort, and I
think this is one of the most conscientious, legitimate
processes of the committee that I've been engaged in, in the
time that I've been here. And it's not party interest; it's
America's interest. And I think Senator Voinovich articulated
that. And others, I think, in their statements have tried to
articulate that, or have articulated it.
And those people who have come forward, I mean, you just
can't dismiss that. You can't reduce this, somehow, to
politics, when people have spontaneously come forward,
particularly people from the same workplace, people from the
same ideology, people from the same background, people who are
invested in the same goals as John Bolton, but who have
spontaneously come forward to, from their gut, and at great
risk, put their views on line here. And I think that does raise
the level of scrutiny that each of us, as Senators, ought to be
giving this.
Thirdly, there's this assumption that is thrown out so
easily by a lot of people that we ought to give a President the
person the President puts forward. Well, generally speaking, we
do. But the whole concept of advice and consent embodies in
its--in the term, not just that we give advice and walk away,
but that we have to consent, that we do consent. And, as
Senator Biden, I thought, very forcefully stated, this is
within the constitutional requirement of us, as Senators, of
the Senate, and the Congress as a separate and equal branch of
government. And that consent should not be automatic. It is not
automatic. It has never been automatic when we conduct
ourselves properly and do our duty to its fullest.
Now, I wanted to comment--I'm glad Senator Voinovich is
back here, because, you know, this puts him in a difficult
situation, and probably our saying something nice about it puts
him in a difficult situation. [Laughter.]
But what I want to say, I think, is not directed only at
him; it's directed at all of us, as Senators. I was really
struck, at the meeting we had before, when Senator Voinovich
stopped the proceedings, rewrote the script, based on his
conscience. I mean, he just sat up and said, ``I'm
uncomfortable with this.'' And, lo and behold, people were
amazed, Washington was amazed, the country was amazed. And I
was amazed that everybody was amazed, because what is going on
that a Senator doesn't act according to script, acts according
to conscience, and everybody is taken aback? I think Senator
Chafee said this is the first time this has happened in the
four years that I've been here. Well, then something is wrong
with ``here,'' not with Senator Voinovich.
And I was struck that he was, you know, set upon by certain
automatic forces in the country that are then unleashed to
vilify him for acting as a Senator ought to act. When I first
came here, that's the way almost everybody did. That's the way
it worked. And we shouldn't be so amazed that somebody, in
fact, stops and thinks about something, and responds according
to their conscience.
Now, what is at stake here is not party, not Democrat, not
Republican. What is at stake here is our national interest, our
security interest, our ability to advance our interests within
the United Nations.
And I take exception with Senator Allen. You know, long
before he was on this committee, a lot of us were working with
Senator Kassenbaum, with Senator Helms, Senator Biden, and
others to reform the United Nations. We were among the first to
withhold the dues. We were among the first to withhold the
peacekeeping money. We worked hard to try to advance the cause
of reform, and we got some distance in that. But there's, of
course, an enormous amount more to be done.
This is not about reform at the United Nations. This is
about who is the best person to advance the serious interests
of our country in one of the most important fori in the world.
And a lot of us approached this, indeed, I may comment,
skeptical, because I think everybody was taken aback, as
Senator Biden said. I mean, this appointment, on its face,
struck a lot of people as odd. I respectfully submit that it
struck a lot of Republican Senators as odd. But then the
political wagons, kind of, circled.
I think this is bigger than that now. And the question is
whether between now and a vote on the floor of the Senate,
people on the floor of the Senate--people are really going to
take stock of the full measure of what is at stake here.
Mr. Chairman, you made the right decision, in the last
weeks, to keep this process open and to make judgments. And I
think the record that has been compiled, the additional
witnesses and testimony that has been compiled, underscores the
difficulties that this nomination presents on the merits, on an
apolitical, meritorious judgment of whether or not this is the
best person to carry out this job, and whether or not this
person can now, under the circumstances of what we've learned,
actually advance the cause and our interests at the United
Nations.
I mean, imagine when he walks into the--one of the first
meetings, if he's confirmed. People will sit there and say,
``Well, here's Ambassador Bolton. Is he sitting on one of the
floors that he wanted to eliminate?'' ``Here's Ambassador
Bolton. Is he, today, telling us intelligence that's his view
or someone else's view?'' And when he makes his view known,
almost to a certainty, it's going to be second-guessed, and
people are going to back and say, ``Well, is this--you know,
are we getting the full speech? Is this what the intelligence
community says?'' It's going to have to be rechecked. It's
going to have to be double-efforted in every case, because that
question is there.
In fact, Ambassador Bolton, himself, to my astonishment--I
mean, here he is seeking to represent the country at the United
Nations, where the views you express have to be those of the
administration and the others, and he's reserving--he's busy
reserving the right--in answer of the question I submitted he
said, ``I understand that, as a policy, official statements
identifying the views of the Intelligence Committee have to be
fully vetted. I've submitted to this process throughout my
tenure. Your question, however, fails to recognize a second
principle; namely, that a policy official may state his own
reading of the intelligence as long as he doesn't purport to
speak for the intelligence community.'' So every time he speaks
up there, he's going to have to clarify, ``I'm not speaking for
the intelligence community,'' or, ``I am speaking for the
intelligence community.''
But, even more disturbing, he also said, quote, ``The
intelligence community needs to be pushed. It will not do its
best unless it is pressed by policymakers, sometimes to the
point of discomfort.''
Now, his version of doing that, we have seen, puts people
at risk, changes the consensus of the intelligence community
itself, and will, in every instance in which he speaks, my
colleagues, leave people asking the question of who he is
speaking for. He has, himself, reiterated that and underscored
that in this statement.
Now, I think--you know, let--you know, let me just share
with colleagues what a prior ambassador to the United Nations
said about this job. I quote, ``I do not think that one should
ever seek confrontation. What I have every intention or hope of
doing is to operate in a low-key, quiet, persuasive, and
consensus-building way. I think a principal objective should be
to try to communicate effectively with the representatives of
as many nations as possible to broaden a bit the areas of
mutual understanding. We should try to extend a bit the
frontiers of reason and cooperation. And I think we should work
to that end, and we should work to establish the patterns of
consultation and trust.'' These are the words of Jeane
Kirkpatrick during her January 1981 confirmation.
Can I continue?
Senator Biden. Please.
Senator Kerry. I don't know, how much time have I taken?
Senator Biden. You've got another 5 minutes.
Senator Kerry. So, no one's every going to accuse Jeane
Kirkpatrick of shying away from her views. And, like John
Bolton, she's a staunch conservative who speaks her mind. But
she understood and respected the value of diplomacy,
negotiation, listening to--listening to--and respecting other
views, seeking a broad point of view.
And the question is, clearly, on the basis of this record,
whether you can say that about John Bolton, whether he sees the
big picture, whether he seeks those views. Could he handle
opposing points of views? Does he have the leadership skill?
And, interestingly enough, it was Jeane Kirkpatrick, herself,
who said of John Bolton that he is not a diplomat.
Now, the larger issue, I'm not going to go in, because I
don't have the time, but, you know, you can take Lawrence
Wilkerson, who was quoted in the New York Times as saying that
John Bolton--he is the former chief of staff to the Secretary
of State--who said he thought he would be--John Bolton would be
an abysmal ambassador to the United Nations. Jeane Kirkpatrick,
who said, ``He loves to tussle. He may do diplomatic jobs for
the U.S. Government, but John is not a diplomat.''
Now, more disturbingly, there are a pattern of things that
have been laid out here, and I don't have time to go into all
of them. One is this berating of analysts and what it does to
intelligence at a time where intelligence needs to be trusted.
That's one very serious question. The other is the question of
how he treated people and what that does, in terms of
leadership. But most importantly, I think, is the question of
credibility, itself.
Credibility. When United States speaks to the world, we've
got to be believable. We have an extraordinary message about
democracy, about transformation of the world, about our
leadership. And we need somebody there who is not going to be
questioned in that. We may have to make the case about Iran or
North Korea or Syria. But, in each of those cases, North Korea
and Iran, Mr. Bolton has already made statements that have been
questioned by the highest officials in our government. And,
more importantly, he tried to stretch the intelligence to fit
his own views in each of those cases. Again and again. He tried
to inflate language about Syria's nuclear activities, beyond
what intelligence analysts saw. The chairman of the National
Intelligence Council ordered his staff to resist Mr. Bolton's
efforts. This is a man who's going to speak for America with
credibility about Syria?
Former National Intelligence Council Chair Robert Hutchings
said, quote, ``Let's say that he took isolated facts and made
much more of them to build a case than I thought the
intelligence warranted. It was, sort of, cherry-picking of
little factoids and little isolated bits that were drawn out to
present the starkest possible case.''
I could go on about that, Mr. Chairman. I don't have time
to do it, because I want to get to one of the most important
things of all for each of us to think about.
Not only have you questions about Mr. Bolton's credibility
on the subject of intelligence and his voice at the U.N., but,
frankly, we've got serious questions about his credibility
before this committee, itself.
In the case of Christian Westermann, he denied trying to
have him disciplined. He denied, before this committee, under
oath, trying to have him disciplined. He said, ``I mentioned it
to Mr. Finger. I may have mentioned it to one or two other
people.'' ``I may have mentioned it to one or two other
people.'' This is an intelligent man. This is a man who's been
cited by everybody as having a steel-trap mind, one of the best
minds of all. ``But then I shrugged my shoulders and moved
on,'' he said. That is not true, folks. That's not what he did.
The testimony of Mr. Westermann and all of his superiors, all
of his superiors at INR--Ford, Finger, Silver, as well as the
recollection of his own chief of staff, Mr. Fleitz--make it
clear that removing Westermann is exactly what he sought. There
was no if, ands, and buts, no ``may have,'' no ``might have
talked to somebody.'' He wanted him removed, and that was
clear, and he wasn't candid with this committee.
The dispute went on for months. There was no shrugging of
his shoulders and moving on. It went on for months. And it had
a lasting impact on Mr. Bolton's relationship with INR.
Bolton said to this committee, quote, ``I basically thought
the matter was closed when I got Mr. Finger's e-mail saying,
`It won't happen again.' '' But a few days later, Bolton took
up the issue with Carl Ford, and then he took it up with Neil
Silver. And, despite his characterization to this committee, he
hardly considered it closed.
This was not the only time he was not candid with the
committee, Mr. Chairman. Regarding his efforts to have the NIO
for Latin America removed, he told the committee, ``I had one
part of one conversation with one person, one time on Mr.
Smith, and that was it, I let it go.'' Not true. That wasn't
it. He didn't let it go. Documentary evidence shows that he
took steps to remove the NIO, and it was under active
discussion for four months.
Letters were drafted that would be signed by Mr. Bolton and
Otto Reich, the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere,
demanding the NIO's removal. On one subsequent occasion, he was
reported to have told his staff, quote, he didn't ``want the
matter to slip any further,'' end quote.
So, Bolton's distortions before the committee weren't
limited even to these two cases. He told the committee he
didn't threaten or try to have anyone punished because of their
policy views, but several witnesses have personally said,
directly, that he did.
So, Mr. Chairman, again, you know, he told the committee
that U.S. Ambassador Hubbard approved and supported his speech,
but you now know directly from Hubbard, that was not true.
Does it matter whether you tell the truth or don't tell the
truth in your confirmation hearings to a committee of the U.S.
Senate, or doesn't it matter? And if you can't tell the truth
to this committee, are you going to tell the truth to the other
people? And will they believe him when he goes to the United
Nations?
Senator, you weren't here. This is not about whether or not
we're all for reform of the United Nations as it is; it's about
whether or not this is the best person to effect that reform.
And I don't think that you begin by not being candid to a
committee of the U.S. Senate, under oath.
So, there are these serious issues, and more, many more.
And I hope--I don't think we ought to send it out of this
committee, personally. I think it ought to end here, because
this isn't the right person. Now, if it doesn't end here, we
are going to have a serious debate on the floor of the Senate,
and that debate will not improve Mr. Bolton's standing at the
United Nations. So, I think we would be better off doing what
is appropriate to the record. The record speaks for itself. And
now this committee ought to speak for itself.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.
Senator Coleman, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I do think it's appropriate to acknowledge
the extraordinary steps that you have taken to work with
Majority and Minority members in building an incredible record
to bring us to the point we're at today.
I also want to compliment you on your statement. I hope
that all our colleagues on both sides of the aisle read the
chairman's opening statement.
I also appreciate your strong statement about U.N. reform.
I'll talk about that later. I think we all agree on that.
And I guess the question, in the end is, Is this the right
guy? And who makes that decision? Who makes that judgment? I
think we had an election that said who makes that judgment, who
is weighing, I'm sure, all the stuff that we're weighing here,
and has come to a conclusion about John Bolton's, and it's a
conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that I support.
We've had, over the course of the last 3 weeks, 35 separate
interviews, 29 different people testifying, 1,000 pages of
transcripts, I think 7 to 800 pages of documents. And when you
get through the whole process, where are at? I think we're
probably right back where we started in this process. I don't
know if there's anything new that any of us have seen that
would say that--certainly from my perspective, that John Bolton
is not qualified to serve in this position. He continues to
have the support of the President. He continues to have the
support of the Secretary of State.
My concern is a little bit about the process. And I'm--I
think some of the allegations, clearly, are patently false;
some have been blown wildly out of proportion. My concern is
about the--as we look to the future, the chilling effect of
what's going on here and the impact it will have on good
people. Senator Dodd, in the past, has talked about the--how
it's getting harder and harder to get good nominees who want to
serve.
At the last hearing we had, my colleagues on the other side
of the aisle raised a concern about an incident that apparently
took place a number of years ago, when Bolton was in private
practice. It had to do with an incident that--regarding a
contractor and then--that he worked for and--doing some work in
Kyrgyzstan. And, you know, what we heard were all the
allegations about chasing somebody down in a hotel in Moscow,
and harassment. I didn't have it at that time, but I think I
had read a newspaper article that, in fact, the person who
owned the company, the subcontractor who was, in effect,
Bolton's boss, had submitted a letter to the committee. I know
my colleagues on the other side had a copy of that letter. What
we heard and what the public heard, without refutation, are
instances about outrageous conduct on the part of John Bolton
without any retort, without folks saying, ``Hey, this''--you
know, not only, maybe this isn't the case, but the folks who
knew the principals and said it wasn't the case, and said it in
some very, very strong terms.
And so, I do worry about the chilling effect that we're
having here. This is certainly not a court of law, and it
certainly doesn't have the same standards. And, certainly, it's
a world we have to live with. But I am concerned about what Mr.
Bolton has gone through, and the nature of these allegations.
And, as I said, I think, Mr. Chairman, in your opening
statement, you did a good job of responding and rebutting.
I do want to talk a little bit about the Cuba speech and
the conversation between Mr. Bolton and Mr. Westermann.
Bolton, himself, told Christian Westermann, I quote, ``You
are welcome to disagree with me, just not behind my back.'' And
during Westermann's staff interview, when asked about whether
Bolton made such a statement, he replied, ``That does ring a
bell.''
And what happened there--and, again, this one of the cases
where you get kind of two sides of the story--from Bolton's
perspective, he was going to give a speech, it was supposed to
be circulated, it was supposed to be circulated to other
agencies, and they would make a judgment--intelligence
agencies--about whether what he's saying was accurate. He
didn't know that Westermann had put a--had torpedoed it as it
went out. He didn't know that.
My colleague from Connecticut has asked, you know, ``On
what basis does he have to lose confidence in Westermann? He
didn't have it to begin with.'' The basis is pretty clear, and
it's in the record, it's in the e-mail that Bolton got from
Finger when he raised the issue of what happened. And what did
Mr. Finger--Mr. Westermann's sup---what did he say? He went on
to say that, ``INR has no position on what a principal--in
other words, we shouldn't have made the judgment about whether
this was good or bad information, the right thing, and not to
say--choice of phrase, ``does not concur, was entirely
inappropriate.'' And these are Mr. Finger's words, not mine,
``We screwed up.'' ``We screwed up.''
So, if you're John Bolton, do you have a reason to lose
confidence? I guess so. The record would demonstrate that.
And, again, we can each bring our own take to this, but the
record clearly shows that, from Mr. Bolton's perspective,
somebody did something they shouldn't have done. That was
reaffirmed to him. And then the question becomes--raised is
whether there was--somehow he was not being candid with us. Mr.
Bolton says, ``I didn't pursue it.''
And I would ask the question, Where is the record that the
dispute went on for months, as some of my colleagues on the
other side of the aisle have talked about? There isn't any. The
reality is, is--what you have is, you have Bolton having a
conversation with Ford that took place over a water fountain,
that lasted about two minutes, and then a conversation down the
road with Silver, in which Silver says, ``I asked the issue. Is
there any other things that you're upset about?'' And then
Bolton volunteered that.
This is not the pattern of behavior intent on penalizing
and hurting somebody, somebody obsessed with ``getting at''
somebody because they disagree with them over policy. It's
consistent with everything John Bolton said.
There has been no lack of candor here, Mr. Chairman, and I
think the record is very, very clear on that.
We talked about the incident in dealing with Melody
Townsel, and the allegation that she was harassed and had had
things thrown at her. I think her own testimony challenged
that. The letter from Jaylon Kalotra, who was the head of the
company that Bolton was working for, and he was very, very
clear. He indicated, by the way, that Ms. Townsel had made
inaccurate and misleading statements. He said he didn't hear
anything contemporaneously about the incident. He says that her
recollection didn't square with the facts. He indicated that,
as a team leader, she attempted, unsuccessfully, to charge the
U.S. Government for disallowable costs, and she became enraged
and abusive; and that he found Bolton to be highly intelligent,
hardworking, entirely ethical.
And so, what you have there, again, was an incident laid
out in public to disparage the reputation and the name of John
Bolton, and then you've got evidence, substantial evidence, on
the other side, something to the contrary. And we don't know. I
wasn't there, Mr. Chairman. You weren't there. But to use this
as a basis for somehow saying that John Bolton's not qualified
to be U.S. Ambassador is not only wrong, it is another example
of the kind of chilling impact that I think folks looking at
this process, who may be called upon to serve, are going to ask
themselves, ``What am I going to be--what I am going to be
subject to? And will that be fair?''
So, what have we done? We've put under the microscope every
contentious interaction John Bolton had within the State
Department, and even outside of it. There was an interesting
editorial. And I'm not always a big fan of the Washington Post,
but I could say these words--they said it, and I'll say it as I
said it--talking about--the editorial, about a vote on Bolton,
and he said, ``The committee interviews have provided some
colorful details without breaking new ground. What has long
been a well-understood split in the first Bush administration,
a split between those who saw themselves as pragmatic
diplomats, the power camp, and those like Mr. Bolton, who saw
themselves are more willing to bruise feelings here and abroad
in standing up for U.S. interests.''
And they go on to say, as I would say, that, ``The
President is taking risks, maybe, but, in the end, the
President knows the role that Mr. Bolton is to play. The
nominee is intelligent and qualified. We should support him.''
I think that's a pretty fair summary.
Is John Bolton strong-willed? Darn right. There's no
question about that. But--and it's interesting, because you
look at the record, and, you know, I guess it depends, you can
look at all the criticism that are there.
One of my concerns about this process, Mr. Chairman--and,
you, again, in your opening statement, lay it out--when this
nomination was put on the table, it was almost unanimously
objected to by the other side. And it was about policy. It was
about policy. Substantial policy disagreements with John Bolton
and that he shouldn't serve as U.N. Ambassador. And then as the
process went on, it went from policy to procedure, from policy
to personality, from policy to the ability to interact and deal
well with others.
When I was a prosecutor, we used say--on closing arguments,
I'd stand in front of the jury, and I'd say, ``You know, you've
got to watch out for the rabbit-out-of-the-hat's trick.'' And
what happens is that the defense would come in, they've got a
hat, a magician's hat, and they've got lots of rabbits, and
they go running around. And they hope that one member of the
jury chases one of those rabbits and takes their eye off the
goal, the main thing--being the main thing.
And so, we have the rabbit of personal relations, and we
have the rabbit of violating procedure, and we have the rabbit
of lack of candor, we have the rabbit of bad policy judgments.
But the bottom line is that in each and every instance, despite
every measure of conflict, John Bolton delivered the approved
speech. He never maliciously impacted the career of a single
employee. We could just as well have spent this time simply
reading the record, all the comments made by John Bolton for
those who worked with him. There's a question about whether he
can put together a team or work well with others. You had 37
officials who worked with him at USAID. They worked with him.
They know him. And their judgment was that, ``John leads in
front with courage and conviction. He doesn't abuse power. He's
direct, yet thoughtful, in communication. What he does is
demand from his staff personal honestly and intellectual
clarity.''
And then the letter from 39 other former attorney generals,
distinguished citizens, again, who know John Bolton, again,
being extraordinarily positive. Twenty-one former presidential
appointees, career and noncareer Civil Service and Foreign
Service employees, again, who worked and know John Bolton.
Forty-three of John Bolton's former colleagues at the American
Enterprise Institute. All saying the same thing, that, ``We
know this guy, that we work with him, and he does have the
ability and the skill that's needed.''
And then, in addition to that, the statements of former
Secretaries of State who also worked with John Bolton. They
didn't just know him. They worked with him. He's got a long and
distinguished career. And they were very, very clear about his
ability to do what has to be done.
I think the issue here, Mr. Chairman, is what my colleague
from Virginia has raised. It is about U.N. reform. That's the
issue in front of us today. The--and I have to say, it's
interesting, because there are a couple of folks who have been
at the U.N. who have been pretty blunt on occasion, and one of
them was Jeane Kirkpatrick, who once said that what takes place
in the Security Council, and I quote, ``more closely resembles
a mugging than either a political debate or an effort a
problem-solving.
And I would note that my colleague from Massachusetts
quoted Ms. Kirkpatrick, who said that, you know, we need low-
key, quiet consensus way. And, by the way, Ms. Kirkpatrick
supports John Bolton. Jeane Kirkpatrick signed a letter in
support of John Bolton. She knows what the job needs. Jeane
Kirkpatrick was Ambassador to the U.N. at a time before we had
evidence of U.N. employees raping and being involved in child
prostitution in South--in Africa. She was our U.S. Ambassador
to the U.N. before we had evidence of sexual harassment and
abuse by senior U.N. officials that went undealt with for over
8 months. She was Ambassador to the United Nations before Oil-
for-Food scandal, which--where Saddam Hussein was able to rip
off that program for billions of dollars.
Just today, Mr. Chairman, the committee that I chair, the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, released reports of
payoffs to folks who are--British members of Parliament, former
French foreign ministers, interior ministers, documenting a
system of them receiving oil allocations and payoffs going back
to Saddam and then being in a position to enrich their own
pockets.
Clearly, clearly, the U.N. needs reform. And I think we've
got to get back to what my colleague, Senator Chafee, in the
end, quoted, and that is that statement of John Bolton
pledging--and I'm going to quote one part of it, ``to fulfill
the aspirations of its original promise.'' That's what we want
the United Nations to do.
My challenge to the United Nations--it's not about
attacking the United Nations or tearing it down, but it
certainly needs some strong--right now, it needs strong
leadership from the United States, working in concert, but
strong leadership with an individual, John Bolton, who's
demonstrated that capacity. And I've got to believe that that's
what the President is looking for, Mr. Chairman. That's what
he's looking at.
You know, is John Bolton the nicest guy in the world? He's
not going to win that prize. Not going to win that prize. But
look at the challenge that we're faced with, with U.N. reform.
Just last week, Zimbabwe put on the Human Rights Commission. We
need a kind of strength. And it's interesting, I'm saying
``we.'' In the end, Mr. Chairman, I do believe that John Bolton
is the best person, the best person that the President has
picked for this job. Because that's what it's about. Elections
do have consequences. And the President has made a judgment,
and he's weighed the good, and he's weighed the bad, and he's
looked at the tough-minded negotiations, how it played a key
role in Libya's change of heart in achieving the Treaty of
Moscow. He's looked at what--he's look at the difficulty of
getting 191 member nations of the United Nations, the number of
states that changed their ways. And that's not going to be
very, very easy, Mr. Chairman.
So, in the end, as I said, in--most importantly, the
President needs to have the right to appoint members of his
team. John Bolton has the confidence of the President. In the
absence of any wrongdoing, there's nothing on this record that
demonstrates any wrongdoing. We may have disagreements about
how he interacted with staff. We may have disagreements about
what's appropriate, in terms of dealing with folks who you
think back-doored you. But, in the end, the President should
have the team he wants. He's made the determination that John
Bolton is the right person to finally bring about U.N. reform.
And I look forward, Mr. Chairman, when John Bolton is
confirmed, to be able to work with him in the Permanent
Subcommittee, and to work with folks at the U.N. to bring about
reform.
I urge my colleagues to support the President's choice for
U.N. Ambassador. No one is better qualified to bring about U.N.
reform than John Bolton. In the words of my colleague from
Connecticut, the place clearly needs cleaning up. John Bolton
represents our best chance to shape a credible, effective world
body for the next generation. And like my colleague from Rhode
Island, I'm willing to take him at his word. I'm willing to
take him at his word. There's nothing in this hearing that
should have undermined our confidence in taking him at his word
that what he wants to do is bring back--get the U.N. to fulfill
its original aspirations. That's a noble goal. He's made that
commitment. Let's give him a chance.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, the committee
congratulates you on your very conscientious work as the s
I07ubcommittee chairman looking into U.N. reform. And we wish
you well as you----
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [continuing]. Continue to proceed.
Let me just mention that, at this point, there are 58
minutes remaining to the Republican side, 63 minutes available
to the Democratic side.
And I call upon my distinguished ranking member to
designate a speaker.
Senator Biden. I would designate Senator Feingold. And if
he could stay within 15 minutes----
STATEMENT OF HON. RUSS FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Certainly. I thank the chairman. I thank
the ranking member.
Mr. Chairman, in 2001, this committee voted to confirm John
Bolton to be the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security. I voted for Mr. Bolton at that time,
despite many strong disagreements with his views on arms
control and security policy, generally. In fact, it's my
understanding I was the only Democrat on this committee to vote
for Mr. Bolton for that position. I did so because I generally
believe that the President has the right to choose executive
branch nominees who share his overall world view, even when I
do not. So, barring serious ethical lapses or a clear lack of
appropriate qualifications for a give job, I tend to give the
President a great deal of latitude in making these
appointments.
Mr. Chairman, I will vote to oppose--oppose--the
confirmation of John Bolton to be the next U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations. As I indicated last month, Mr. Bolton is
simply unsuited for the job to which he has been nominated. His
blatant hostility toward the institution at which he would
serve, and his history of pursuing his personal policy agenda
while holding public office, indicate that he would be ill-
equipped to advance U.S. interests as our Ambassador to the
United Nations.
I share the views of many who are insisting on reform at
the U.N. The U.N. must become more effective and more
accountable. And, as stewards of the American taxpayers'
dollars, we must insist on that point.
Mr. Bolton's record suggests that his personal animosity
toward the United Nations is so great that he would rather see
the institution dramatically weakened, rather than strengthened
through reform. He seems to view the U.N. as an instrument to
be used when it suits only our immediate interests, but one
best ignored, or even undermined, the rest of the time. His
failure to grasp the give and take required for effective
multilateralism makes him a real obstacle to any hope of
pursuing vital U.S. interets and increasing burden-sharing and
marshaling a global force strong enough to defeat the
terrorists networks that seek to do us harm. Mr. Bolton's idea
of U.N. reform would hurt, rather than help, U.S. interests.
Mr. Bolton's record also reveals many, many instances of
intemperance and rash decisionmaking. At least two senior
intelligence officials told committee staff that Bolton's draft
testimony prepared for a House hearing on Syria in 2003 went
well beyond what the intelligence community could clear. This
wasn't a case in which INR alone had concerns about Bolton's
proposed language. The CIA, the Department of Energy, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency all objected. And according to
interviews conducted by the committee staff, Bolton's office,
quote, ``pushed back,'' unquote, resisting the intelligence
community's efforts to alter problematic provisions.
Bolton was determined to be such a loose cannon that the
Deputy Secretary of State instituted an extraordinary policy to
address the problem, requiring all of Mr. Bolton's public
presentations to be cleared by Larry Wilkerson, Secretary
Powell's chief of staff, or Deputy Secretary Armitage, himself.
Given this record, I do not have confidence that Mr.
Bolton's personal agenda would always be subordinated to that
of the Secretary of State, who, in testimony before this
committee and in her first days in office, has placed such a
premium on restoring frayed diplomatic ties.
Additional information that has come to light since our
last meeting has simply affirmed my conclusion that this is one
of the rare cases in which I must oppose the President's
nomination for a position in the executive branch.
First, the record indicating that Mr. Bolton was in the
business of suppressing dissent has only gotten stronger. It's
a matter of record that Bolton sought to retaliate against
intelligence analysts when their work did not suit his policy
inclinations.
Now, this is not about careless remarks simply made in the
heat of a tough bureaucratic dispute. The evidence shows that
over a period of many months, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought Mr.
Westermann's removal from his portfolio at INR, which would
mean, effectively, ending his career. Mr. Bolton repeatedly
sought the removal of Mr. Smith from his post as the National
Intelligence Officer for Latin America, again pursuing this
vendetta for months--not just of heated minutes, but for
months--going so far as to consider blocking country clearance
for Mr. Smith to travel abroad.
In both cases, the offense that so incensed Mr. Bolton
appears to be that the analysts did their jobs, they presented
the facts as they saw them, and they declined to keep silent
when the facts did not support what Mr. Bolton wanted to say.
And, in both cases, senior officials with decades of experience
in government, who were involved in these episodes told
committee staff that Bolton's actions, his attempts to
retaliate against these analysts, were absolutely
extraordinary.
In addition to these disturbing incidents, other interviews
revealed a broader pattern of--to simply cut out those who
disagreed with his policy views, or those who he believed
disagreed with his policy views, from the policymaking process
entirely. This kind of tunnel vision, everyone-else-out-of-the-
room approach, was summed up by Secretary of State Powell's
chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson, who told the committee staff,
quote, ``When people ignore diplomacy that is aimed at dealing
with''--referring to North Korea's nuclear weapons development
problem--``in order to push their pet rocks in other areas, it
bothers me, as a diplomat and as a citizen of this country.''
And then, when asked specifically if he thought that Mr. Bolton
had done that, Wilkerson said, ``Absolutely.''
Mr. Wilkerson ended his interview with the committee with
the following comments, quote, ``I would like to make just one
statement. I don't have a large problem with Under Secretary
Bolton serving our country. My objections to what we've been
talking about here--that is, him being our Ambassador to the
United Nations--stem from two basic things. One, I think he's a
lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people up there that
have to be led. They have to be led well, and they have to be
led properly. I think in that capacity, if he goes up there,
you'll see the proof of the pudding in a year. Second, I differ
from a lot of people in Washington, both friend and foe of
Under Secretary Bolton, as to his, quote, `brilliance,'
unquote. I didn't see it. I saw a man who counted beans, who
said, `98 today, 99 tomorrow, 100 the next day,' and had no
willingness, and, in many cases, no capacity, to understand the
other things that were happening around those beans. And that
is just a recipe for problems at the United Nations, and that's
the only reason I said anything,'' end of quote.
Some have suggested that because Mr. Bolton did not succeed
in his attempts to end the careers of analysts whose dissenting
views angered him, and because he did not succeed in his
attempts to manipulate the government's processes to shut out
voices of disagreement, caution, or dissent, that, in the end,
as I think the phrase that has been used, no harm, no foul, or
that there's no problem here.
I cannot believe that any of my colleagues actually believe
that's true. Why, after all that we have learned about the
vital importance of dissent in the intelligence community from
the 9/11 Commission, the Silverman-Robb Commission, and
numerous other investigations into the major intelligence
failures that have gravely harmed our credibility and our
security over the past year, why would we choose to promote to
a position of prominence and trust and individual who has tried
strenuously to manipulate intelligence?
Finally, in recent weeks serious concerns have been raised
regarding Mr. Bolton's understanding of his obligations to be
forthcoming with this committee. Several of Mr. Bolton's
answers to Senators' questions were misleading, and several
were quite blatantly nonresponsive. In light of the evidence
this committee has seen in recent weeks, most of us can
probably agree that if Mr. Bolton does end up being our next
Ambassador to the United Nations, extremely careful oversight
will be required. But our oversight responsibilities depend, in
many instances, upon the executive branch officials who come
before us understanding that they have a constitutional
obligation to be forthcoming with Congress. I have no
confidence that Mr. Bolton intends to adhere to this
obligation.
Mr. Bolton's nomination raises fundamental questions
regarding both credibility and accountability. The credibility
of our representation at the U.N., the credibility of
intelligence, the credibility of the oversight process are all
at stake. And the question of whether or not this committee
will hold officials who seek to dissent--suppress dissent
accountable for their actions is before us today, as well.
I, like many other members of this committee, deeply
appreciate the extraordinary courage of the many people who
came forward to share with this committee their own concerns
about Mr. Bolton's fitness for the U.N. post or to correct
inaccuracies in the record, in some cases at real risk to their
careers. I am grateful for their efforts, and I deeply
appreciate their honesty. And so, Mr. Chairman, after listening
to them, I'm all the more certain I cannot support this
nomination.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Hagel.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I would like to add my thanks to you and to the ranking
member for the work that you have produced, contributions
you've made, the leadership you've shown at a difficult but
important time. I would add, also, my thanks to the staff, both
Minority and Majority, for their work.
There have been some references today to the relevancy and
the importance of this committee. I believe it was Mr. Biden
who noted, as others on the Democratic side, their years of
service on this committee and how, over those years,
unfortunately, the Foreign Relations Committee in the U.S.
Senate has diminished, not only in stature, but in importance.
I make this point, because I recall, when I was elected in
1996, and I was given, as all new Senators are, their choice of
committees--limited--and the committee that I asked to be
considered for first was the Foreign Relations Committee. And I
was questioned by the political experts at the time, ``Why in
the world would you waste your time on the Foreign Relations?''
Not was only was it a committee that could not raise money, but
where is the constituency in America for foreign relations?
Where is the constituency for diplomacy? Where is the
constituency for the United Nations, their problems. ``They're
drains on our budget, they're drains on our energy, so why in
the world would you do that?''
The second ``Why would you do it?''--because it was not an
important committee. Maybe it once was. I remember Ted Kennedy
telling me, years ago, that his brother, John Kennedy, wanted
to be on the Foreign Relations Committee when he came to the
Senate, but he couldn't get on it. It took him a few years to
get on it, because it was then regarded as one of the most
important committees in the U.S. Senate. Why was that? It was
after World War II, and we were literally restructuring the
world. We. I emphasize ``we.'' The United States led, but we
did it with alliances and coalitions and friends and strong
allies, who believed in our purpose.
I also mention this point, not only to, again, acknowledge
you and the ranking member for what you have done to make this
a relevant committee once again, but, in fact, it is the
committee--and this was my answer to those who asked me the
question about why I would want to be on this committee. My
answer was, it is the committee that is the framework that
represents America's interests around the world. When you look
at the jurisdiction of this committee, is it wide, deep, and
relevant, and it is becoming more and more so.
So, therefore, this nomination that we are meeting to
discuss today, and will vote on later, is important, and this
committee is important, and, therefore, should never, ever be
framed up by either the Democratic party or the Republican
party as a partisan issue. It has never worked that way, nor
should it ever. And the groups on both sides of this issue do a
great disservice to our country when they try to simplify it
into a political common denominator issue. It is not.
This position, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, is one of the most important jobs in our
government. It is the face, the American face, to the world.
That's important. A hundred and ninety-one nations. No body in
the world like the United Nations. And who structured and
framed and led to put the United Nations together after World
War II? The United States. The United Nations, like all
multilateral institutions that we led on, we framed, we put
together after World War II, have been extensions of America's
purpose and our power, not limitations. It's given us
alliances. It's given us opportunities to promote who we are.
And it has, quite frankly, served our foreign-relations
objectives.
Now, is the United Nations in need of reform? Of course it
is. Of course it is. And it has wandered from its original
charter. And I do not believe that necessarily is the core
issue here that some have tried to frame up, that if you're
against John Bolton, you're against reforming the United
Nations. That's patently ridiculous. That makes no sense. That
is not the issue.
And I would say to my friend from Virginia, I would think
that Mr. Negroponte and our former colleague, Mr. Danforth, who
have been recent U.N. Ambassadors, would not consider
themselves as tea-drinkers and milktoasts, nor would I think
that the first President Bush would consider himself as a
milktoast and a tea-drinker. Maybe they drink tea. Nor Jeane
Kirkpatrick. We're talking about something bigger and wider
here than just those easy characterizations.
Ladies and gentlemen, we're living through a
transformational time in the history of man. This is one of the
most defining, important times in the history of the world.
That's the bigger picture here. Now, whether Mr. Bolton is
qualified or not, obviously, is our more concise challenge for
this committee.
I have had long conversations with Secretary Rice about Mr.
Bolton. I have known Mr. Bolton, I have worked with Mr. Bolton,
and I have had long conversations with Mr. Bolton. As has been
noted here, mainly on our side of the committee, he has assured
me, he has assured the President and Secretary Rice, that he
will carry out the policy of this administration, that policy
set by the President. Foreign relations is set by the
President--not the Secretary of State, but the President. And
President Bush has been forceful, over the last few months,
talking about the importance of the United Nations. I take the
President at his word. I take the Secretary of State at her
word, and Mr. Bolton, in saying that he will be--my words, I
asked--a uniter, a builder, someone, in fact, not only who will
carry out the interests of the United States at the United
Nations, but will go beyond that.
The expectations are high for Mr. Bolton. And they should
be. Anyone we send to the United Nations to represent this
great country to the world should be held to very high
expectations. But, in the end, he is the agent of the
President.
I have enough confidence in this President, this Secretary
of State, to take them at their word, and Mr. Bolton at his
word, when he says that, ``I will be a uniter. I will be a
builder,'' and do the things that will be required, not just to
reform the United Nations, but to go beyond that.
This isn't just about reforming the United Nations. This is
about extending America's purpose and the optics and who we
are, and reaching out. If there was ever a time in history that
the United States requires friends and alliances and
coalitions, it is now. The world is too complicated to do
otherwise. It is too dangerous to do otherwise.
Many of you have read Tom Friedman's new book, and I
recommend it highly. Tom Friedman captures the essence of the
world that we live in today, but, more importantly, the world
our children will live in, in the next few years. The name of
that book is, ``The World is Flat.'' There's a diffusion of
power in the world today that we've never seen, and I think
that's good for America. But we've worked for that. That means
we carry less burden. Hopefully, we will become less and less
the world's policemen. That means now we've lost--over 1600
dead in Iraq, and over 12,000 wounded. Hopefully, there will be
a time when that won't occur, because we are sharing
responsibilities in the world.
These are the big issues that we're talking about in this
committee, and, specifically, for this nominee. Mr. Chairman, I
am, like all on this committee, grateful to be on the
committee. I am privileged to serve in the U.S. Senate. And as
long as I am an elected official in the U.S. Senate, I will do
what I think is right--not for my party, not for my President--
but for the country that I take, as all my colleagues do, an
allegiance to when I swear to the Constitution of the United
States.
I say this, again, because there is afoot in this land a
dangerous, dangerous move, in both extremes of the political
parties, to make foreign policy and everything a political
issue. We will not only debase our system and our process, but
we will make the world far more dangerous than it is at a
complicated historic transformational time in our history. We
must stop it and get above it. We're dealing with other issues
like this in the U.S. Senate. We are elected to uphold the
interests of this country first.
We will all make our vote today on the Bolton nomination. I
will support the President, I'll support the Chairman's motion
to move this nomination out onto the floor of the Senate.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Biden, will you designate your speaker?
Senator Biden. My colleague from California.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, Senator Biden. Thanks to all the members of the committee
who feel very strongly about this, one way or the other.
And I do agree with what Senator Hagel said, that we are at
a critical moment in U.S. foreign policy--we are a critical
moment in U.S. foreign policy, a time where we need to lead the
world to a better place. It is that fork in the road where one
place is dark and one place is light. And, to do that, we need
the world with us, so much, or the burdens on our people will
just be too much to bear. And I think Senator Voinovich said
that in a magnificent way. I think Senator Hagel also said that
in a beautiful way, and other members said it in their way. And
that's why this debate is so important, and that's why the U.N.
Ambassador is to important. Will this individual unite the
world with us so that we can move to that better place?
I was sort of stunned at Senator Coleman, when he asked a
rhetorical question. ``Who makes the judgment about who is the
best person to represent the U.N.,'' he asked, rhetorically,
and then went on to answer his question, ``There was an
election.'' But, Senator, you forgot something. There was an
election for individual Senators, too. And maybe it's because--
I remember it because I, also, was on the ballot at the same
time as the President.
And I would just urge the Senator to look at Article 2,
Section 2 of the Constitution, ``The President shall nominate
and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall
appoint ambassadors.'' It doesn't say, ``With the advice and
consent of the President if he feels like it, or if he's in the
mood for it, or he should turn to the Senate on Monday at
3:00.'' It's pretty clear here. It's in the same sentence. And
I hope that you will have more pride in this institution and
your responsibility not to say that it is the President, alone,
regardless of whether the President is a Democrat or a
Republican. It is a shared responsibility, and that's why this
debate is so important.
It also is not about whether Mr. Bolton is nice, as my
friend said. He said it certainly shouldn't be about that, and
he's right. It is about many other things of deep importance,
where my friend just doesn't want to go. And I understand it.
I do want to pick up on something Senator Dodd said,
because I think it's key. There is not a majority on this
committee in favor of Mr. Bolton right now. There is not. And
it is our job to send a signal to our colleagues. And, I think,
to send a signal that we're moving this forward would be the
wrong signal. It's not true. There is not a majority on this
committee who supports John Bolton today, so I will not be
voting to move this forward without recommendation.
And there's another point, Mr. Chairman, and it really
involves you and Senator Biden more than it involves me. But I
am deeply disappointed that we have not gotten all the
information we requested. And I agree with my leader on this
committee, Senator Biden, that this is a matter of principle.
Perhaps there's nothing in there, perhaps there's something,
but there are several areas--the intercepts, that's one area;
Mr. Freedman and his potential conflicts, we've asked for that
information; and there's some information about Syria. And I
will just say, because I'm--Mr. Chairman, I have such respect
for you, I would never blind-side you--that I am going to do
all I can to see that we get this information before this moves
out of here onto the floor--or let me say before this gets onto
the floor, because it's not right to cast a vote where you
really don't have the full information.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I think there are many reasons to oppose
Mr. Bolton, and I'm going to lay them out, but I'm not going to
go on, hopefully not, for the full 15 minutes, but it may
happen. Sometimes I forget to watch the clock. But I would ask
that my full statement be placed in the record.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
Senator Boxer. Thanks.
So, I will skim through it, and I will not reiterate what
other people have.
First, and, to me, the most important, is the
politicization--and I didn't say it right--of intelligence.
This is the most important issue, when we see what phony and
exaggerated intelligence can lead to. It can lead to war. We've
seen it. It's happening every day. It is tragic. Thousands of
deaths and injuries--1600 deaths, plus. And in my state we have
about 25 percent of those deaths, people who were born in
California or were activated from California, so, wear that
heavily our state. So, why on earth would we want to hire
someone who has shown he's willing to put political pressure on
independent intelligence analysts?
We know about Westermann. We know about Mr. Smith. I'm not
going to go through that. We know about it.
Robert Hutchings, Chairman of the NIC, described the risk
of this politicizing intelligence in this way, ``I think every
judgment ought to be challenged and questioned, but when it
goes beyond that to a search for a pretty clearly defined
preformed set of judgments, then it's politicization. And even
when it's successfully resisted, it creates a climate of
intimidation and a culture of conformity that is damaging.''
So here we take someone who put pressure on these people--
you saw the chart that Senator Dodd had--reached down. This is
not a person that we should be promoting when we have the war
in Iraq that was based on this faulty intelligence. We
shouldn't do it.
Second reason, disdain for the U.N. I know that doesn't get
a lot of votes around here, but, it seems to me, putting
someone into that situation who has said, ``There is no United
Nations,'' it just--it is shocking. I mean, Senator Biden said
``surprising.'' It was shocking to me.
I think, in that regard, there are inaccurate comparisons
to Moynihan and Kirkpatrick. I think Senator Kerry pointed that
out. And I will let that go into the record.
International law. John Bolton's comments versus Senator
Moynihan--it's not even in the same league.
Then there's three, a pattern of retribution and abuse.
And, again, we know about what he tried to do. So, it's not
only that he tried to twist arms to get, you know, faulty
intelligence forward, but he actually exerted retribution on
people. That's wrong. And someone like that should not be
promoted.
And, again, I'll put all of that into the record.
But I'm going to close with two areas, one that Senator
Kerry touched on, the failure to be candid with this committee.
My God, we ought to at least believe that we deserve someone to
tell us the whole truth. And I want to go through this on a
chart here, because I can't do it any other way. So, bear with
me.
Bolton, ``I never sought to have Mr. Westermann fired at
all. I, in no sense, sought to have any discipline imposed on
Mr. Westermann.''
Carl Ford, responding to that, ``I remember going back to
my office with the impression that I had been asked to fire the
analyst. Now, whether the words were `fire,' whether that was,
`Reassign. Get him away from me. I don't want to see him
again,' I don't remember. I do remember that I came away with
the impression that I had just been asked to fire somebody in
the intelligence community for doing what I considered their
job.''
Bolton, quote, ``I may have mentioned the Westermann issue
to one or two people, but then I shrugged my shoulders and
moved on.''
Several months later, Bolton raised Mr. Westermann with the
INR director, Neil Silver. According to Mr. Silver, quote, ``To
the best of my recollection, Bolton raised Mr. Westermann's
name, and he asked or indicated that he would like me to
consider having him moved to some other portfolio.''
Bolton, ``So I basically went out to pay a courtesy call on
Mr. Cohen, and, it's true, I drove my own car out there. I have
to make a confession here, the CIA is, sort of, more or less,
on the way home for me, and, from time to time, when I've gone
out there, I've driven my own car, I've had my meetings--I hate
to say this, but I left and went home.'' He takes a long time
to describe how he just dropped by on the way home. He says,
``I didn't go back to the office.''
Well, we have Secretary--we have Secretary Bolton's
calendar here. For the day in question, the meeting with Mr.
Cohen was scheduled, it was on his schedule for 9:30, and he
had other meetings scheduled that afternoon.
And I think we go on with some other charts here. Is that
the 10 minutes or the----
Senator Biden. That's ten.
Senator Boxer. Ten, okay.
Bolton: ``I went out to pay a courtesy call, and my
recollection is, the bulk of the meeting was composed of Mr.
Cohen explaining to me what the NIC did, and told me what their
complications were and how it had been created, and gave me
some background on it.
Committee staff member asks, ``Do you remember giving
Bolton a primer about the NIC?''
Mr. Cohen, ``No. I just don't recall the details of the
meeting, other than the fact that there was a focus on Mr.
Smith.''
Bolton, ``I didn't seek to have these people fired. I
didn't seek to have discipline imposed on them. I said I've
lost trust in them, and there are other portfolios they could
follow.''
Carl Ford, ``I do remember that I came away with the
impression that I had been asked to fire somebody in the
intelligence community.''
John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the CIA--``Do
you recall other--do you recall other requests similar to this,
to remove one of your analysts?'' John McLaughlin, ``No, this
is the only time I had ever heard of such a request. I didn't
think it appropriate.''
Bolton, ``And I can tell you what our Ambassador to South
Korea, Tom Hubbard, said after the speech. He said, 'Thanks a
lot for that speech, John. It'll help us a lot out here.' ''
Hubbard, former Ambassador to South Korea, quote, ``At the
very least, he greatly, greatly exaggerated my comments. I told
the committee that if you're basing your vote on Bolton's
assertion that I approved his speech, that is not true.''
So, we see here lack of candor, misleading statements. It's
absolutely shocking to me that more people on the committee
aren't disturbed with this.
I also would say this. The strongest opposition to Mr.
Bolton, outside of members of this committee, comes from the
people from the Bush administration. And I don't have time to
read everything, but here we have, again, Carl Ford, Lawrence
Wilkerson. He says--I won't repeat that quote, because somebody
else gave it.
Elizabeth Jones, former Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs, ``I don't know if he's capable
of negotiation, but he's unwilling.''
John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation, ``I believe it would be fair to say that some
of the officers within my bureau complained that they felt
undue pressure to conform to the views of the Under Secretary,
versus the views that they thought they could support.''
And, again, John McLaughlin, ``It's perfectly all right for
a policymaker to express disagreement with an NIO or an
analyst, and it's perfectly all right for them to challenge
such an individual vigorously, challenge their work, but I
think it's different to then request, because of the
disagreement, the person be transferred. I had high regard for
the individual's work; therefore, I had a strong negative
reaction to the suggestion about moving him.''
So, here you have people from the Bush administration, who
served there proudly, in many cases saying--they're
conservative, they're Republican, they're proud to support the
President, the Vice President--coming out against this nominee.
It is hard for me to understand why the President didn't simply
say he's going to send down somebody else.
I guess he wants a fight. I guess he's asking people to
walk the line. And if that's where we're going, that's where
we're going, because we're going to have a fight. If this comes
to the floor, we're going to have a fight. And the American
people are going to engage in it, and they're going to look at
it. And I guess, at the end of the day, their sentiments may be
able to sway some of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle;
frankly, I don't know even where my Democratic colleagues are
on this, except for the ones in the committee. But that's the
greatness of this place. We'll take this to battle. We'll take
these quotes, we'll take these interviews down to the floor.
And we're going to ask the American people to help us on this
one.
And I thank you all.
The Chairman. I thank you, Senator Boxer.
The Chair would like to recognize Senator Alexander.
Let me just add, before you commence, Senator Alexander.
Forty-eight minutes remain on our side, so this means,
hopefully, framing of 10-minute speeches, more or less. And if
you would proceed on that basis, I would appreciate it.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Biden. Without us asking for any more time--we
won't--if you need more time, it's fine by us for your people
to be able to speak.
The Chairman. I appreciate it.
Senator Alexander.
STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Senator Biden.
That should be plenty of time. And if you could let me know
when that's about expired, I'll expire, as well.
I'd like to insert my full statement in the record, if I
may.
The Chairman. It'll be included in full in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Alexander follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Alexander
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to take a few moments to talk about the
nominee before the committee, his qualifications, the importance of the
post to which he's been nominated, and some of the charges made against
him by the other side.
I believe John Bolton will do a fine job as our next Permanent
Representative at the United Nations.
John Bolton has a distinguished background:
Last four years as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security;
Assistant Secretary for International Organizations (like
the UN) under the first President Bush
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, 1985-
1989;
Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination,
U.S. Agency for International Development, 1982-1983;
General Counsel, U.S. Agency for International Development,
1981-1982; and
He graduated with a B.A., summa cum laude, from Yale
University and received his J.D. from Yale Law School.
Solid Accomplishments:
Helped lead the American effort to repeal Resolution 3379,
which equated Zionism with racism (under Bush Sr.);
As Assistant Secretary for International Organizations,
steered a critical series of resolutions supporting our
liberation of Kuwait in 1991 through the U.N. Security Council;
Joined former Secretary Jim Baker in supporting the UN's
work in Western Sahara in the 1990's--pro bono; and
Designed this administration's Proliferation Security
Initiative, under which more than 60 nations now share
intelligence and take action to stop the transfer of dangerous
weapons.
Impressive Appearance Before the Foreign Relations Committee
Demonstrated command of the issues facing the United
Nations;
Despite intense questioning that lasted more than seven
hours, Bolton was calm and collected; and
He focused on the need for reform of the United Nations
Strong Support:
Endorsed by five former Secretaries of State: James Baker,
Lawrence Eagleburger, Al Haig, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz;
Also endorsed by more than 50 former Ambassadors
I was with one of those former ambassadors a couple weeks ago, the
former majority leader of this body, Ejpward Baker, with whom I and
other members had lunch. He remarked about how he had dealt with
Secretary Bolton over the last 4 years in Tokyo, when Senator Baker was
our Ambassador to Japan. Senator Baker liked Bolton. He was impressed
with him. He said he spoke frankly, that he would be a good ambassador.
Intelligence Charges Against Bolton
The second day of hearings was a little different than the first. I
was surprised and disappointed by what I heard. There was a man named
Carl Ford, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research, who was well respected by members of the committee, who
presented evidence that John Bolton had ``chewed out,'' to use
colloquial words, intelligence analysts in the State Department.
Mr. Ford, to his credit, didn't like that because those persons
were down the line. Mr. Ford was a pretty good witness because he
didn't overstate his case. He acknowledged that it wasn't unusual for
policy people and intelligence analysts to argue, for policy people to
hope for intelligence that supported their positions. He just didn't
like the fact that in this case he had heard about--he wasn't there, he
had heard about--that Mr. Bolton in effect chewed out one of Mr. Ford's
employees, and Mr. Ford didn't like it. He told Mr. Bolton so, and they
exchanged words.
That is what Mr. Ford said.
There have been some other things said about Mr. Bolton. It was
suggested that Mr. Bolton was misusing or compromising intelligence.
But Mr. Ford himself said: ``In this particular case''--the one Mr.
Ford was led there to complain about--``there wasn't politicization [of
the intelligence].''
Mr. Ford was very clear on that point in his testimony to the
committee.
In interviews conducted by this committee's staff since that time,
another issue was raised where there was a disageement over
intelligence. One of Mr. Bolton's subordinates, who was on detail from
the CIA, sent a report to the Deputy Secretary of State for review and
was unhappy that another bureau had put a memo on top of that report
that said the report was incorrect. This sounds like a simple
disagreement to me, a disagreement over intelligence that is quite
common from what we've been told even by Mr. Ford. And in this case,
there's no evidence Mr. Bolton was even aware of the dispute at all.
So, again, there is no evidence of politicization of intelligence.
Rather, it appears that different staff members were arguing for their
own point of view, which shouldn't surprise anybody.
Other Questionable Charges:
He is accused of trying to have analysts removed, or reassigned, in
whom he had lost confidence. But there is no evidence any of these
individuals suffered in their career path whatsoever--o one was fired
or reassigned.
He was accused by a former USAID contractor of ``chasing'' her
around a Moscow hotel to stop her from damaging his client, but in her
interview with committee staff, the accuser later admits that perhaps
``chasing'' wasn't the best word. Rather she ``felt chased'' because he
kept tryjng to talk to her. Her employer at the time also failed to
corroborate her story.
In the end, only one charge appears to have any substance: John
Bolton has been rude to staff members below him in the bureaucracy.
I imagine Mr. Bolton is embarrassed by those charges. I didn't like
to hear them. And perhaps he deserves to be embarrassed by the charges
and perhaps he has learned a lesson. But what I heard doesn't change my
vote, even though I hope it might change some of Mr. Bolton's ways of
dealing with people with whom he works.
How significant is this charge that he was rude to people in the
bureaucracy? As has been mentioned by others, if that were the standard
for remaining in the Senate, we would have a hard time getting a
quorum.
There are regularly occasions when busy Senators, eager to make
their own point, are rude to their staff and even shout at one another.
In fact, the shouting was so loud in the last business meeting of this
committee by some of the Senators that I could barely hear the charges
against Mr. Bolton. That is not attractive, and I don't endorse it. It
even caused me to think back about times that I may have become angry
or impatient or startled in dealing with a staff member or another
person, and made me redouble my efforts to make sure I swallow my pride
and think about what I say and not do that anymore. It's not good
business.
But how significant is this? Here is what former Secretary of State
Larry Eagleburger had to say about it a couple weeks ago in the
T3Washington Post . This deserves special attention. Larry Eagleburger
was Secretary of State for the first President Bush, but in a way he
was more than that. He had 27 years in the Foreign Service. We hear
that a football player is a football player's player or a man is a
man's man or a woman is a woman's woman. Larry Eagleburger is a Foreign
Service officer's Secretary of State. He had and has enormous respect
from all those men and women who put their lives on the line around the
world and in the United States in support of our diplomacy and foreign
policy. Here is what he said:
As to the charge that Bolton has been tough on subordinates,
I can say only that in more than a decade of association with
him in the State Department I never saw or heard anything to
support such a charge. Nor do I see anything wrong with
challenging intelligence analysts on their findings. They can,
as recent history demonstrates, make mistakes. And they must be
prepared to defend their findings under intense questioning. If
John pushed too hard or dressed down subordinates, he deserves
criticism, but it hardly merits a vote against confirmation
when balanced against his many accomplishments.
That is where I am. I think the benefit of hearing Mr. Ford's
testimony might be a little bit of a lesson to Mr. Bolton and a
reminder to the rest of us of how unattractive it is to shout at an
associate or unnecessarily dress down a staff member. I agree with
Secretary Eagleburger. John Bolton has a distinguished background and
record. He has dedicated himself to improving our country's foreign
policy. His action toward subordinates might have been inappropriate.
Perhaps he has learned a lesson, but it doesn't cause me to change my
vote. I am glad to support him.
This is a critical time for the United Nations. Even the Secretary
General acknowledges it is in need of reform. Billions of dollars
filtered from the UN's coffers to Saddam Hussein's pockets in the oil-
for-food scandal. Top human rights abusers such as Sudan and Zimbabwe
sit on the Human Rights Commission. United Nations peacekeepers in
Africa have been found to rape and pillage.
Now the United Nations has many important roles in the world. I am
glad we have it. I want it to work, but I believe the President is
right in his thinking, that we need to take action to help the UN
reform itself, and that a frank-talking, experienced diplomat named
John Bolton is an excellent candidate for that commission. I intend to
vote for him in committee and on the floor. It is my hope that we will
report Mr. Bolton's nomination to the floor and the Senate will approve
it and give him a chance to go to work in reforming the U.N.
In Defense of the Chairman
Mr. Chairman, I'd also like to take a moment, if I may, to comment
about the decorum with which this committee has proceeded in
considering Mr. Bolton's nomination. I want to compliment you, Mr.
Chairman, because I think you have shown incredible patience and
diligence in making sure that all Senators have the facts and are able
to make a well-informed decision.
Seldom has there been a more thorough investigation of a nominee.
The committee has heard more than seven hours of sworn testimony from
Mr. Bolton. Ninety-four questions for the record were further submitted
to Mr. Bolton in writing, many with multiple parts, and he has
responded. We heard sworn testimony from Mr. Ford, someone who opposed
the President's nominee--which is a rarity in itself.
Further, the committee has conducted 35 additional interviews that
has resulted in over 1,000 pages of transcripts which are publicly
available. At the Chairman's insistence, 700 pages of documents have
been turned over to the committee from various related agencies,
including the State Department, the CIA, and USAID.
I have seen in the press some comments that suggest the Chairman
has somehow ``stonewalled'' efforts to investigate Mr. Bolton. That's
an outrageous claim, especially when compared to just how far the
Chairman has bent over backwards to get answers to questions by members
of the minority. The Chairman supported numerous requests by the other
side for more information. Indeed, we wouldn't have nearly 2,000 pages
of documentation without his active leadership.
Senator Alexander. And I would like to thank the chairman
for this opportunity. I'd like to summarize a few points in my
remarks.
I've said what I had to say before in this committee. And
after reviewing the evidence and listening to the hearings,
which I did, I made a statement just before the recess, about
10 days ago, about how I felt. So, I'd like to summarize those
thoughts.
And, basically, since I think Mr.--I'm convinced Mr.
Bolton's credentials for the position are well-established,
superior credentials, and I'd like to try to put in context the
charges that have been made against him and the conclusion I've
come to and I evaluate those charges.
It's important, even though it's been repeated many times,
to remind ourselves of the credentials. Because of those
credentials, I expected to be impressed by Mr. Bolton when he
appeared before the committee, and I was. I mean, not many
people have been, as the chairman indicated in his remarks,
confirmed four times by the U.S. Senate for major positions--
Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Assistant Attorney
General in the Department of Justice--that was in another
administration; that was in the 1980s. Those are big jobs.
Those are jobs that manage large numbers of attorneys in
complex cases. And then his academic record is unusually,
unusually good. And many of the Senators have recited his
accomplishments in professional life--the U.N. resolution on
Zionism, the work he did in the U.N. helping--with the U.N.
helping to shepherd the resolutions about Kuwait in 1991, the
fact that the Secretary General asked former Secretary of State
Jim Baker to help with Western Sahara, and Baker invited John
Bolton. All of those activities suggested a very accomplished
nominee.
And so, I was not surprised when, on the first day of our
hearings, his performance was impressive. I listened. I was
here for most of it. I thought he displayed a good command of
the issues, extremely detailed knowledge of the United Nations,
and that, while he got hard questions, as nominees are supposed
to get--I was--once had the honor of being--going through a
confirmation process before a committee of the U.S. Senate.
It's a very special experience. And I thought he handled that
experience very, very well. He handled it calmly, he answered
the questions, he wasn't combative. I went home that day very
impressed.
I was impressed by the strong support from the former
Secretaries of State, who have been mentioned, by the number of
ambassadors, who have been mentioned. And I had lunch with one
of those ambassadors the other day who's well known to this
group, Senator Howard Baker, who was Ambassador to Japan, and
he volunteered to me, this former Majority Leader of the U.S.
Senate, how he had dealt with Secretary Bolton over the least
four years while Senator Baker was in Japan, and how impressed
he was with him. He said, ``He's a good man. He'd make a good
ambassador. He spoke frankly. I enjoyed working with him.''
So, after one day, I was very impressed.
I was surprised and disappointed by the second day of
testimony. It was a little different. Carl Ford, who's been
mentioned here, was a good witness. Very believable. He didn't
overstate his case. He acknowledged it wasn't unusual for
policy people and intelligence people to disagree. He was
really mad about the fact that John Bolton, in his words, ``had
chewed out somebody way down the line.'' He didn't like it at
all, and he felt it was important to come before the committee
and say so. Many members of the committee know and respect him.
I found his testimony believable, and I was disappointed by it.
There have been some other things said about Mr. Bolton,
which Mr. Ford, himself, dismissed. Mr. Ford, himself, said
there was a politicization of the intelligence that Mr. Bolton
was accused of misusing.
There was other testimony, which has been dealt through
here. Senator Lugar and others have talked about it.
But it was about--as I've listened very carefully to all of
the charges, in the one--in the end, only one charge, to me,
seemed to have any substance, and that is that John Bolton has
been rude to staff members who had subordinate jobs to his in
the U.S. Government.
I imagine Mr. Bolton is embarrassed by those charges. I
didn't like to hear them, and perhaps he deserves to be
embarrassed by those charges. And perhaps he's learned a
lesson.
What I heard didn't change my vote, but I hope it might
change some of Mr. Bolton's ways and dealings with his
colleagues and with other people in the bureaucracies with
which he will be working.
How significant is this charge of rudeness? As has been
mentioned by others, if it were the standard for remaining in
the U.S. Senate, we probably wouldn't be able to get a quorum.
There are regular occasions--all of us know about them--when
Senators eager to make their own points are rude to their
staffs and even occasionally shout at one another. In fact, the
noise was so loud in our first hearing, I was not sure I would
be able to hear the charges against Mr. Bolton above the
shouting. It's not attractive. I don't endorse it. It's even
caused me to think back over times I may have become impatient
or angry or startled in dealing with a staff member or another
person, and it's redoubled my efforts to try to make sure I
swallow my pride, think about what I say, and not do that
anymore. It's not good business.
But how significant is this?--is the question. Given such a
distinguished, credentialed person, with such broad experience,
who this body has confirmed four different times, how big a
problem is this?
Here's what former Secretary Larry Eagleburger had to say
about it. Now, Larry Eagleburger's comments deserve special
consideration in this--in this discussion. We often hear about
a man being a football player's football player, or a woman
who's a woman's woman. Well, Larry Eagleburger is a Foreign
Service's--Foreign Service Officer's Secretary of State.
Now, for 27 years he was in the Foreign Service. He has
enormous respect from all those men and women around the world
who put their lives on the line in support of our diplomacy and
foreign policy. And here is what Larry Eagleburger had to say
about John Bolton, ``As to the charge,'' quoting, ``that Bolton
has been tough on subordinates, I can say only that in more
than a decade of association with him in the State Department,
I never saw or heard anything to support such a charge. I never
saw or heard anything to support such a charge. Nor do I see
anything wrong with challenging intelligence analysts on their
findings. They can, as recent history demonstrates, make
mistakes, and they must be prepared to defend their findings
under intense questioning. If John pushed too hard or dressed-
down subordinates, he deserves criticism, but it hardly merits
a vote against confirmation when balanced against his many
accomplishments,'' unquote.
Mr. Chairman, that's where I am. I think the benefit of
hearing Mr. Ford's testimony might be a little bit of a lesson
to Mr. Bolton and a reminder to the rest of us of how
unattractive it is to shout at an associate or a colleague or
unnecessarily dress-down a staff member in a moment of
impatience or disagreement.
I agree with Secretary Eagleburger, though. John Bolton has
a distinguished background and record, he has dedicated himself
to improving our country's foreign policy. His action towards
subordinates might have been inappropriate. Perhaps he has
learned a lesson. But it doesn't cause me to change my vote.
I'm glad to support him.
This is a critical time for the United Nations. It has many
important roles. I'm glad we have it. I believe a frank-talking
experienced diplomat named John Bolton is an excellent
candidate for the commission. And I'm glad--I hope that he will
move out of this committee to the floor so we can discuss it.
Two more brief things I would like to say about members of
the committee. I especially appreciated the comments of the
Senator from Nebraska as he talked about the role of this
committee and the importance of our looking at our
responsibilities in the world on the basis that puts our
allegiance first to the country. And I'll do my best to do
that.
I want to express to Senator Voinovich of Ohio my respect
for his careful thinking about this. I know him well, and have
for a long time. He's always been dedicated to civil servants,
those who work for the government, and he would be the first to
be offended by rudeness to anyone down the line. I'm not so
surprised that he reacted strongly to this, and I respect his
thoughtful statement.
And I'd like to say to the chairman, who has great
patience, that he's demonstrated almost all of it during this--
--
[Laughter.]
Senator Alexander [continuing]. During this consideration.
Ninety-four questions for the record, testimony from Mr. Ford,
700 pages of documents, some people suggesting you're
stonewalling.
You have, with the cooperation of Senator Biden, over time,
helped this committee be an outpost of decency and
thoughtfulness in a time of increased partisanship. And for
that, I thank you, and I appreciate your patience, which has
been more than almost any of the rest of us would likely have
had.
Thank you for the time.
The Chairman. I thank the Senator.
Senator Biden, you designate----
Senator Biden. Senator Obama.
The Chairman. Senator Obama.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Biden.
I was extraordinarily impressed with the presentation that
Senator Voinovich made, and I think that he expressed a number
of the concerns that many of us share on this committee. So,
I'm not going to reiterate all my points. I would like to have
my statement placed in the record.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
There are a couple of issues that I think are important to
touch on. The first is, I think the tendency in this debate to
suggest that opposition to Mr. Bolton's nomination is based on
the fact that he is occasionally rude, he showed some bluster,
he got mad--the previous speaker is exactly right, if that's
the only criteria by which we would oppose the nomination, then
most of us might not qualify, because, at any point in time,
we've displayed probably inappropriate behavior or anger that
we regret afterwards. And I think if somebody was to look at
our life's work and behavior, and was able to scrutinize it,
that a lot of us would have problems.
That, unfortunately, is not, I think, the basis for our
objections. I think the basis for the objections have to do
with very specific, credible allegations that Mr. Bolton
reached down, not to immediate subordinates of his, but reached
far afield to attempt to have fired intelligence officers that
would not support statements that he was making on behalf of
the U.S. Government, or wished to make on behalf of the U.S.
Government.
Now, we can define ``politicization'' in various ways. What
I do know is that there is substantial credible evidence from
Republican appointees serving in the Bush administration that
Mr. Bolton sought to massage intelligence to fit an ideological
predisposition.
Now, it's been stated that intelligence officers are often
wrong and their analysis should be challenged. In fact, our
recent history indicates that, where intelligence officers are
wrong, it primarily has to do with the fact that they succumb
to the temptation to tell the folks higher up what they want to
hear. That appears to be part of what happened with respect to
our failed intelligence in Iraq. And at a time when it is
critical for us to have sound intelligence, we should be
sending a message to our intelligence officers that, in fact,
we want them to play it straight and to tell us stuff even when
we don't necessarily want to hear it. And that is not what Mr.
Bolton appears to do. That's now how he operates. And that is
credible evidence. There may have been some other evidence of
allegations with respect to Mr. Bolton's behavior that were not
supported. His attempt to reach down and have intelligence
officers removed from their positions because they provided
analysis that was not what he wanted to hear, that does not
appear to be largely disputed.
Now, I think the President is entitled to the benefit of
the doubt when appointing senior members of his team. To that
end, I supported a number of the President's choices for top
foreign-policy positions, including Secretary Rice and
including Robert Zoellick to be her deputy.
But, as has been emphasized previously, the Constitution
gives the Senate the power to advise and consent. This is a
responsibility I take very seriously. I think that the breach
of the line between politics and policymaking and intelligence,
in and of itself, renders Mr. Bolton less than credible in his
position to the United Nations.
Let me add one additional point that I think may not have
been touched on in the hearing this morning. It's been
suggested that perhaps we should vote for Mr. Bolton anyway,
even if he has a bad temper, even if he showed some poor
judgment with respect to how he handled intelligence, because
he is so highly qualified for the job. The suggestion is, is
that his competence is such, is so unique, that we are willing
to overlook some of his warts.
I'm a little bit baffled as to that assertion. This is not
a line of inquiry that we really pursued much during the course
of our discussions here. But when I look at the record of Mr.
Bolton during the last four years at the State Department as
the top Arms Control and Nonproliferation official for the
United States, I am not impressed with that record.
Let's just examine some of the things that he was
responsible for.
The approach that was advocated by Mr. Bolton, with respect
to North Korea, and the administration has simply not worked.
Here's the bottom line. Under Mr. Bolton's watch, there are no
longer international inspectors and cameras at any site in
North Korea. The North Koreans have withdrawn from the NPT. We
believe that North Korea has developed six to eight nuclear
weapons during Mr. Bolton's watch.
Now, when North Korea has one or two nuclear weapons, the
situation is critical. They can test one weapon and hold one
weapon. When it has six to eight, the situation is terminal. It
can test one, hold a couple, sell the rest. And we all know
that North Korea will do virtually anything for money.
That's not a record that I'm wildly impressed with.
And when I hear Mr. Bolton testify, to my questioning,
directly, and say--when I asked him, ``Do you think that your
approach with respect to engaging in name-calling with--towards
North Korea in a speech was helpful?''--and he says, ``The
Ambassador of South Korea told me, `Thank goodness. You really
helped out.' ''--and that same Ambassador, a Bush appointee,
Ambassador Hubbard, has to say, publicly, in the newspapers,
``I never said such a thing''--that indicates to me a problem.
Another area that he was responsible with--for,
Nonproliferation Treaty. There is little doubt that the NPT is
a critically important tool for combating nuclear
proliferation. At the same time, it needs to be strengthened.
The President recognized this reality and pledged to do so, in
a 2004 speech at National Defense University. A week later, Mr.
Bolton pledged to do the same.
What's happened in the interim? Virtually nothing. The
administration has made very little progress on this issue. The
NPT Review Conference, currently under way, is not going well.
Newsweek reports that, quote, ``The United States has been
losing control of the conference's agenda this week to Iran and
other countries, a potentially serious setback to U.S. efforts
to isolate Tehran.''
Where's Mr. Bolton been throughout this process? In this
same article in Newsweek, they state, ``John--since last fall,
Bolton, Bush's embattled nominee to be America's Ambassador to
the United Nations, has aggressively lobbied for a senior job
in the second Bush administration. `During that time, Mr.
Bolton did almost no diplomatic groundwork for the NPT
Conference,' these official say. `Everyone knew the conference
was coming and that it would be contentious,' says a former
senior Bush official, but Bolton stopped all diplomacy on this
six months ago.''
This notion that somehow Mr. Bolton is uniquely qualified
for this task, and we should overlook some of these problems
with respect to intelligence because he is uniquely qualified
to reform the United Nations, doesn't seem to be borne out by
his track record doing his current job.
Mr. Chairman, I know I'm running out of time, but let me
just make a couple of other points on this.
Senator Biden. Excuse me, Senator. You can have some of my
time.
Senator Obama. Okay.
The administration holds up Libya as its biggest success in
nonproliferation. This is something that Mr. Bolton touts. It
appears that this deal with respect to Libya was struck in
spite of Mr. Bolton, not because of Mr. Bolton. There are
credible reports that he was sidelined from the negotiations by
the White House, and the British Government did not want him to
play a role. I've got an article right here, stating--this is
from MSNBC--``Bolton, for instance, often takes, and is given,
credit for the administration's Proliferation Security
Initiative, an agreement to interdict suspected WMD shipments
on the high seas, and the deal to dismantle Libya's nuclear
program, a deal that Bolton, by the way, had sought to block.
But the former senior Bush official who criticized Bolton's
performance on the NPT conferences says that, in fact, Bolton's
successor, Robert Joseph, deserves most of the credit for these
achievements. This official adds that it was Joseph, who was in
charge of counterproliferation at the NSC, who had to pitch in
when Bolton fumbled preparations for the NPT conference, as
well.''
Last point, along these same lines. Economic Support Fund.
``Mr. Bolton's predecessors were responsible for administering
and overseeing around $2 billion in annual Economic Support
Fund assistance. Secretary Bolton and his staff, during 2001,
brought the utilization of a large portion of Economic Support
Fund assistance to a near halt as he and his staff sought to
micromanage virtually every obligation from the ESF fund--
assistance. It appeared that Under Secretary Bolton was seeking
to redirect ESF on his own, without consulting other bureaus of
the Department or, as required by custom and law, the Congress.
In 2001, a bipartisan group in Congress, completely fed up with
his management of this money, passed legislation which stripped
Mr. Bolton's ability to manage this money. The provision
originated with the House Republicans.''
Now, here's my point. If we thought that Mr. Bolton was a
terrific diplomat, maybe some on this committee would choose to
overlook what I consider to be actions with respect to analysts
that I think disqualify him from the job. But I could
understand why some people would say, ``You know what? This is
the guy to reform the U.N.'' But the record indicates that in
his current job he has not had much success, which then asks
me, Why is it that we're so confident that this is the person
who's going to reform the U.N.?
I would love to see the U.N. reformed. The notion that we
have people like Zimbabwe--countries like Zimbabwe and Libya on
the Human Rights Commission is an insult to all the people who
are being oppressed in those countries. What happened with
respect to the Oil-for-Food Program deserved to be
investigated. Some people on this committee have done good
work. We need to do some serious cleanup of the United Nations.
Why is it that we think that this is the best qualified
person to accomplish that? Do we really believe that there is
not a tough, straight-talking, conservative, Republican
diplomat somewhere out there who has credibility and who can
accomplish this task, other than Mr. Bolton?
Throughout this testimony, there was a lot of badmouthing
of the United Nations. I did not hear a single actual plan for
how Mr. Bolton was planning to reform the United Nations. I
still don't have a plan from the Bush administration, in terms
of how this reform is going to take place. And I would argue
that, as a consequence of Mr. Bolton's diminished credibility,
I think he is going to be less effective in reforming the U.N.
than if somebody else was selected. That's the irony of this
process. I think countries like Zimbabwe and Libya and others,
who don't want to see reform take place--when Mr. Bolton says
something, they are going to be able to dismiss him as a U.N.-
basher, somebody who's ideologically disposed to dislike the
U.N., and use that as a shield to prevent the very reforms that
need to take place.
This is a bad choice.
And let me just close by saying this. You know, in my
opening testimony, I mentioned the fact that there was a
gentleman with credibility, temperament, and the diplomatic
skills to guide us through some very difficult times in the
United Nations, and that was Adlai Stevenson, a great citizen
of the state of Illinois. After the Bay of Pigs, despite the
fact that he had been misinformed about intelligence, he still
had the credibility to allow the United States to isolate the
Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis, and advance U.S.
interests at the U.N.
Given the issues that have surfaced surrounding Mr.
Bolton's nomination, I'd simply ask my colleagues this. If a
crisis were to occur with North Korea or Iran right now, are we
sure that the integrity and credibility of Mr. Bolton would
command the respect of the rest of the world? Would Mr. Bolton,
like Adlai Stevenson, be able to convince the world that our
intelligence and our policies are right and are true? Would Mr.
Bolton be able to isolate our enemies and build a coalition
that would ultimately make our troops safer and our mission
easier?
Regrettably, Mr. Bolton's testimony leaves me with serious
doubts that he would be the kind of representative we need in
the United Nations, and that's why I feel compelled to vote no
with respect to his nomination.
Thank you for your forbearance, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.
The Chair now recognizes Senator Sununu.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW
HAMPSHIRE
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is instructive to note that the opponents of
John Bolton cannot decide whether it is behavior or policy or
management skills that bother them so much about the nominee.
And----
Senator Sarbanes. All of the above.
Senator Sununu [continuing]. And I--well, I will address
each of the above, but let's start with behavior.
Adlai Stevenson was mentioned. I believe it was Adlai
Stevenson, in his capacity as Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, that shouted across the room at the Russian
representative not to dare wait for the translation, because he
knew what the question was, and he ought to be able to answer
it right away regarding missile placements in Cuba. Bad
behavior in diplomatic circles, if there ever was such a thing.
But was it effective? Was it probably the right thing to do at
the time for the United States and the United Nations and
international security? I think so.
So, you know, I think we need to be careful about reading
too much into an individual's behavior at a particular time or
a particular place and suggesting that that renders them
disqualified for any particular position.
Second, with regard to the United Nations, Senator Hagel
made an important point, that a vote against John Bolton isn't
a vote against reform in the United Nations. This is true. But,
at the same time, the suggestion that has been made, that John
Bolton is hostile to the United Nations, that John Bolton would
like to weaken the United Nations, is demonstrably false. It
simply cannot be justified, I believe, by any reasonable
interpretation of the record.
Cathy Bertini, supporting the nomination of John Bolton,
underscores the work that he did to strengthen the World Food
Program, to make the World Food Program work better. And anyone
that has spent time in New York talking to United Nations
administrators about their organizations around the world would
underscore that the World Food Program is probably the one that
works best and delivers the most important and greatest benefit
more effectively than any other U.N.-sponsored organizations.
As was pointed out by Senator Coleman and others, the Anti-
Defamation League strongly is supporting John Bolton, because
he worked effectively within the United Nations dealing with
the controversial Zionism-is-racism resolution.
John Bolton worked to build an organization--or helped put
together a coalition of 60 states--60 countries opposing the
proliferation of weapons. And now to suggest that the lead
State Department official responsible for nonproliferation
shouldn't really be given any credit at all for the
nonproliferation achievements with regard to Libya is simply
ridiculous.
I think we need to understand and recognize that he has
worked effectively on a bilateral basis, but John Bolton has
always worked very effectively with the United Nations to make
it more effective. And in his--in capacity as a Permanent
Representative, I think we can expect that kind of an approach
to continue.
Second, let me touch on two issues about policy, policy
that was made--policy that was referenced in two speeches,
Syria and North Korea. We have heard quotes offered by
opponents of Mr. Bolton that suggest somehow that the speeches
on North Korea and Syria were not cleared by the State
Department. The suggestion that Ambassador Hubbard was--had a
quote that he didn't agree with the tone of the speech, that
is--that suggestion is misleading. The suggestion that these
speeches were not clear is misleading, at best.
In both cases, the content of the speeches were cleared
fully and appropriately through the channels in our State
Department. Period. The speech on North Korea was cleared. The
testimony on Syria was cleared. Cleared not just by State, but
also through Homeland Security and the CIA and the NSC. If we
want to quibble about the timing or the process, that it was
slower than it should be, well, we can do that, but was the
testimony cleared? Yes. Was the speech in Korea cleared?
Absolutely.
Which brings us to this--the issue, the very specific issue
of policy versus procedure. And this is important, because,
again, suggestions were made that simply aren't accurate. In
particular, I think the phrase was just used that he attempted
to fire, or have fired, intelligence officers that would not
support his interpretation of analysis. I think ``arm-
twisting'' was also used, that he twisted the arms of those
that did not agree with his analysis. It's wrong.
In two cases in particular, and the two that we've spent
the most time on here, the Westermann case and the Smith case.
In the Westermann case, Mr. Ford, in his testimony, said that
the disagreement--the controversy, if you will--quote, ``had
nothing to do with intelligence analysis. It had to do with the
procedures that were used.'' In the Smith case, as well, the
confrontation wasn't around disagreements on analysis--and
there may have been disagreements on substance; I'm sure there
have been many disagreements on substance--but the controversy,
the argument, the bad behavior centered around disagreement in
process and procedure.
Now, let me touch on both of those.
In the Smith case, there was a concern that Mr. Smith
misrepresented the truth when he claimed that the--Mr. Bolton's
speech on Cuba had not been properly cleared within the
intelligence community. Now, what does that mean? What that
means is, an intelligence officer, analyst, actually made
reference in a hearing to, I believe, Senators, but certainly
to other staff members, and suggested that it hadn't been
properly cleared, that the proper procedures weren't used. What
kind of an allegation is that? That's a very serious
allegation, suggesting that John Bolton didn't properly handle
intelligence, didn't properly handle information that may or
may not be classified, that he was cavalier with intelligence.
Now, I asked a simple question. Senator Lugar, in his
opening statement, said, ``You know, would we want to be held
to the same standard that some are placing on John Bolton?''
Well, let's look at this case, in particular. What if a staff
member--we found out that a staff member or a fellow member of
the Senate were making accusations against us that we couldn't
properly handle intelligence, that we were not going through
the proper procedure in dealing with important intelligence
analysis? Would we be angry? I think some of us would be angry.
Would we try to have staff fired? I believe I would not. But I
don't think it's too strong a statement to say that there may
be members of the U.S. Senate that would actually try to have
staff fired. Not necessarily the right thing, not good
behavior. And maybe none of the hundred Senators would do so.
But what if someone had made such an allegation? And it is not
a matter of speculation that this allegation was made; it is
not a matter of speculation that this individual made a--
suggested that proper procedure wasn't used; it's a matter of
public record.
Second, the Westermann case. I think the chairman's opening
statement, and Senator Coleman, highlighted a couple of
important points here. But, again, this was a question of
procedure, not a--the confrontation with Mr. Westermann wasn't
based on a disagreement on analysis or the intelligence,
itself, even though there may have been a different approach
that the two have taken. But the argument, the berating, if you
will, had to do with the fact that Mr. Westermann failed to
follow proper clearance procedures regarding the
declassification of this language. That's why there was an e-
mail that same day that said this was inappropriate, quote,
``We screwed up.'' That refers to the fact that the proper
procedures weren't followed.
Now, here's the irony. What if John Bolton was the one that
failed to follow the proper procedure? What would we be talking
about then? Of course, his opponents would be criticizing him
mercilessly for failing to follow proper procedures dealing
with intelligence analysis.
So, here we have--his opponents would clearly criticize him
if he didn't use the proper procedure, and they're criticizing
him for criticizing someone else for not using the proper
procedure. This is a double standard, at best; and it is
hypocrisy, pure and simple, at worse.
But the point to underscore is that these are questions of
procedure, where, in the cases of Syria and Korea, his
speeches, he followed the proper procedure. In the case of his
disagreement with Mr. Smith, it had to do with the fact that
Smith accused him of not following procedure, when he did. And,
in the case of Westermann, it's clear from the record that Mr.
Westermann did not follow proper procedure.
This isn't about firing intelligence--members of the
intelligence community that happened to disagree with him. This
is serious concerns about using the right procedure. We can
talk about--and certainly we're raising the issue of whether he
handled all cases the way he would have preferred to, in
hindsight. But, I think, when we're making allegations or
throwing out quotes, we need to make sure we're putting them in
their proper context. We need to make sure that we understand
the facts of each of these incidents before we try to cut short
what has been, I think, a very strong and distinguished career.
Mr. Chairman, you've been very gracious with the time. I
thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sununu.
Now, let me ask the permission of the distinguished ranking
member to----
Senator Biden. Yes, please.
The Chairman [continuing]. Recognize----
Senator Biden. Please continue. We only have one more
member that wishes to speak, and he's in another--he has
another appointment. He said he will be here shortly, so----
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Biden [continuing]. Whatever time that comes,
we'll--I'll yield to him.
The Chairman. Senator Murkowski.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know that this has been a long process, not only for Mr.
Bolton, but for the committee, as well, and I thank you for
your indulgence, your patience.
I also want to thank you for the delay, if you will, the
time that we have had, since this committee last met, to do
just exactly what Senator Sununu was talking about, was to get
to the facts. There were things that were raised at the last
business meeting, and it was probably your prerogative, as the
Chair, to move forward at that point in time, but I appreciate
the chance that you gave this committee to go out and do its
homework.
I, as a committee member, undertook that willingly, and
perhaps--you know, my eyes are paying for it now, but I
appreciate that you gave us that opportunity, because it is
important to go into some of the allegations, to go into the
background.
I also want to thank the committee staff, who probably
spent most of their recess going through with the interviews
and providing the transcripts so that we could then review
them. That was tough.
The challenges and the opportunities that face the next
U.S. Representatives to the U.N. here are incredibly
significant, and we've heard that repeated here this afternoon.
But we are at a point--a point in time where real reform can
take place, where countries that are habitual abusers of human
rights do not find seats on the Human Rights Commission, and
that investigations into the Oil-for-Food Program are given the
real consideration that they deserve. So, this is not the time
for us--this is not the time for the United States to send an
individual to the U.N. that is just going to be a caretaker,
but one who will be proactive in pushing the United States
agenda.
So the question that we are faced with today, that has been
raised by several, the question before us is, Is John Bolton
the right individual for that particular job?
Now, prior to the President's nomination of Mr. Bolton to
be the Representative to the U.N., I had not had any personal
dealings with this gentleman, I hadn't had an opportunity to
meet him, to interact with him, so what I knew was really what
I had heard from the media, fortunately or unfortunately, and
comments from my colleagues. And since this intervening time in
this past couple of months, I have come to know a great deal
about Mr. Bolton. And as I--I told him yesterday, ``I probably
know far more about you than I had ever hoped to.'' But I think
it's fair to say that one of the things that I have learned
about him is that Mr. Bolton has a management style that is
perhaps far different than my particular management style.
Now, there's been discussion about behavior, about
management style, about how one conducts oneself. And, as you
go through the transcripts, as you listen to the testimony that
we have heard, and as I have talked to individuals who have had
the opportunity to work with Mr. Bolton, you hear some words
that describe him. He has been described as overcharging, hard-
charging, overbearing, and confrontation. Now, there are some
here that view these characteristics, as--hard-charging, as
exactly what we need in the U.N. right now, a no-nonsense,
straight-talking, you know, this-guy's-not-going-to-take-bull-
from-anybody type of a representative.
I've also had conversations with people, and read the
testimony from those who have interacted with the nominee that
have used the word ``brilliant'' when they have described him.
But they also use the term--they say he's very difficult to
work with. He can be focused, but he can be over-aggressive.
It's also become clear to me that when Mr. Bolton has made
up his mind about an issue, he can be very--it can be difficult
to change that mindset.
And I, too--I guess I've paid my penance, as Senator
Voinovich said, for going through all of the pages and pages,
the hundreds of pages of testimony. Fortunately, I've got a
long plane ride between Alaska and D.C., so I had a lot of time
to do the reading. But I also had a lot of time to do the
thinking.
You know, when I first met with Mr. Bolton in our courtesy
visit--this was prior to the time that any allegations had come
out that he had been abusive toward staff members, and so, it
was a topic that we did not discuss. What we did discuss at
that meeting, though, was his role in New York. We talked about
some of the inflammatory statements that he had made in the
past. And the question that I asked him was, Whose opinion
would he be presenting at the U.N.? Would it be the
President's, the Secretary of State's, or would it be his own?
And I bring this up for a couple of reasons. When he made
his comments about North Korea's leader in his speech in North
Korea, this became part of the committee's focus during that
interview process. And we, in Alaska, spend a lot of time and
energy looking and focusing on the North Korea issue.
I found Mr. Bolton's comments to be inflammatory at a time
when we were trying to promote diplomacy in the region, and it
seemed to me that if he was willing to fan the flames with
disparaging rhetoric at that point in time, it was a question
to me as to how he would conduct himself in New York. And it
was an issue that we brought up at that initial meeting.
I also understand that Mr. Bolton remarked during his
confirmation hearing that he received a thank you, from then-
Ambassador Hubbard, for his speech, saying that the speech had
been helpful, and it would do them some good in South Korea.
And yet, when I reviewed the transcript from the interview with
Ambassador Hubbard, it was very clear that Hubbard's intent had
not been to thank Mr. Bolton for the speech, itself, but for
making some factual changes to the speech so as not to spread
the flames any further. And I have to agree with Ambassador
Hubbard's assessment that the speech did not advance the
President's objective of verifiably dismantling North Korea's
nuclear program through negotiation.
A second matter, I had had concerns that Mr. Bolton might
get out ahead of instructions while stationed in a post outside
of Washington. And in reviewing the transcripts, and in
conversations that I have had with individuals, I believe that
there is a pattern of Mr. Bolton pushing that envelope on
whether he could or could not say in trying to push policy that
was perhaps more ambitious than the administration might be
willing to go. But then you dig deeper into the evidence. You
find out Mr. Hubbard's suggestion that it was possible that Mr.
Bolton may have misinterpreted his remarks leading to his
comments at the hearing.
And then we've got Secretary Powell's letter to Senator Kyl
stating very clearly that Mr. Bolton's speech had been fully
cleared by the State Department.
Then you look at the transcript from Lawrence Wilkerson's
interview, and it was very clear that Bolton went through the
appropriate hoops and hurdles to have his speech cleared, even
if those who cleared it may not have given it the attention
that it needed. We saw that there had been e-mails released
indicating the appropriate officials had signed off on that
speech.
So, whether you support or don't support the content of the
speech--and I do question the language that was used at that
particular time--the reality is that Mr. Bolton did what he was
supposed to do in getting the speech cleared, which was
approved by those at a higher paygrade.
Now, when the committee, at the business meeting that we
had last, learned of the allegations that Mr. Bolton had
berated an INR analyst in his office, an individual who was not
directly working for Mr. Bolton, that concerned me. It concerns
me a great deal. And the additional charges of trying to get
other personnel removed from their positions only added to that
concern. Because I do believe that how one treats, not only
those on in a similar level of authority, but also those with
not as much power, it says a lot. It says a lot about them as a
person and how they will work with others. And in this position
in the U.N., our representative needs to be able to work with
others to build that--those relationships.
But, at the same time, I recognize that this is the
President's nominee. The President deserves to be surrounded by
individuals that he trusts, by individuals that he selects, and
by individuals who will advance the interests of the
administration. And that's a high bar to overcome.
When it comes down to--right down to it, it's not about Mr.
Bolton's intelligence. He's certainly demonstrated that he has
intellectual prowess. It's not about his capability, as he's
clearly demonstrated, in a number of global projects, he's
advancing the U.S.'s interests. There's no question in my mind
that Mr. Bolton has the ability to effectively represent the
United States in a beneficial manner if that ability is
directed appropriately.
My concern, as you can probably tell, has more to do with
the conduct, how Mr. Bolton conducts himself, how he treats
those who disagree with his assessments, how he conducts
himself with his superiors, his equals, and those below him on
the totem pole. So, it's not how John Bolton treats Lisa
Murkowski; it's how John Bolton will interact with other
representatives and their staff in the U.N., and how he
represents the United States.
So, ultimately, in a position assigned by the President,
that conduct is going to reflect on the President and the head
of the Department. It's the President's responsibility to
ensure that his nominee is part of the team, he's not a
freelancer, and that the nominee abides by the chain of
command, receives the appropriate input, and listens to that
input. The President has put his trust in John Bolton.
Secretary Rice has put her trust in John Bolton. The President
deserves to have an individual that he believes will be most
effective in that position. And with the understanding that how
Mr. Bolton conducts himself at the U.N. reflects directly on
the President of the United States, I will support moving Mr.
Bolton's nomination to the Senate floor.
The Chairman. I thank you, Senator Murkowski.
Senator Biden, may I recognize Senator Martinez?
Senator Biden. Sure.
The Chairman. Senator Martinez, you're recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. MEL MARTINEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to, in the interest of time, have my entire
statement placed in the record.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
Senator Martinez. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Martinez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Mel Martinez
Chairman Lugar, I would like to thank you and your staff for the
continued time and effort you have put forth on this nomination. You
and your team have completed an exhaustive review of Mr. Bolton, and I
commend you for your continued effort on this important nomination.
Over the years I have observed the work of the Foreign Relations
Committee, and I have to say one of the reasons I was so drawn to
working on the Foreign Relations Committee as a new Senator was the
bipartisan nature of the work done here. So I have been a little
disappointed by the events of the past several weeks--by what appears
to be a departure from that proud tradition.
This is an important appointment at a crucial moment in the history
of the U.N. Our debate should be about how the U.S. should and can
contribute to the reform of the United Nations, but I have not heard
much conversation on the specifics of United Nations reform during this
process.
I wholeheartedly agree with the recent remarks made by Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage, ``John Bolton is eminently
qualified. He's one of the smartest guys in Washington.''
Mr. Bolton's legal background, tenure at USAID, experience at the
State Department, and extensive research and related writing work makes
him an ideal candidate to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations. I cannot think of a more qualified individual and it appears
that this very committee is also aware of Mr. Bolton's qualifications,
having advanced Mr. Bolton's nomination three times before.
In 1982, this committee voted in favor of naming Mr. Bolton
Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination at USAID.
In 1989, this committee voted in favor of naming Mr. Bolton Assistant
Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs. And, in
2001, this committee voted in favor of naming for Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security. All three of these
previous nominations were advanced by this committee and confirmed by
the United States Senate.
During each of these nominations, this committee undertook a very
thorough look at Mr. Bolton's qualifications and experience. On January
27, 1982, the committee received testimony on Mr. Bolton's first
nomination to be Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy
Coordination at USAID. Mr. Chairman--Even then, Mr. Bolton already
possessed an impressive resume, which included General Counsel for
USAID, and Legal Counsel for the White House and a graduate of Yale
College, and Yale Law School. And because of this experience and
background, the Senate confirmed Mr. Bolton's nomination, and Mr.
Bolton did an honorable job of carrying out that policy during very
uncertain Cold War times.
In 1989, this committee again reviewed Mr. Bolton--this time for
his nomination as the Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organizations Affairs. In fact, our distinguished colleague from
Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry, presided over his nomination hearing. As Mr.
Kerry explained in his opening remarks, as the Assistant Secretary, Mr.
Bolton would be responsible for U.S. relations with the United Nations.
Mr. Bolton shared his views on the UN system and why it was
important to build upon then-recent improvements to its effectiveness.
Mr. Bolton relayed that the then ``44-year old Charter of the United
Nations embodies those values which have guided this nation during the
course of more than two hundred years of our development.'' He
identified the essence of the U.N. Charter to be a ``Respect for the
supremacy of law above individuals, for the peaceful resolution of
disputes between men and nations, and most importantly, the faith that
mankind can peacefully build a better world for succeeding
generations.''
More than 15 years ago, Mr. Bolton was already was talking to this
Committee about tangible ideas to strengthen and improve the United
Nations and make sure it was a viable part of our international
community. This is a man who believed--and still believes--in the
mission of the UN more than 15 years ago he was already presenting
solid ideas about how to make the U.N. work and make it better. This is
a man who fifteen years ago could see both the strengths and the
weaknesses of the United Nations and identify a positive way ahead.
For example, Mr. Bolton talked about the quiet day-to-day work the
UN did to improve the welfare of poverty stricken women, children, the
sick, and refugees around the world. And he explained that these
efforts deserve the fullest possible extent of support from us and
other nations.
Yet, and I will quote Mr. Bolton's testimony: ``While we seek to
support the many worthy efforts of the United Nations and its
specialized agencies we must not turn a blind eye to some excesses and
poor management that have undermined UN effectiveness. Politicization
and mismanagement have robbed the UN and some of its agencies of the
moral high ground in recent years.''
It is disappointing to me that fifteen years later, Mr. Bolton's
warning about turning a blind eye remains so fitting to the environment
we find ourselves in today at the U.N. Rampant corruption, waste and
ineffectiveness are the norm at the United Nations, and we have an
institution failing in its mission.
During the same hearing, the presiding Chairman, our distinguished
colleague--Mr. Kerry--discussed with Mr. Bolton his qualifications for
the Assistant Secretary position and Mr. Bolton, I think very
eloquently, outlined his respective experience.
How his background as a lawyer would prepare him for the
international law and legal procedures, which govern the UN. How his
years at the Justice Department in the Legislative Affairs shop would
give him insight in the Western-styled legislatures of the General
Assembly and the various governing councils of the specialized
agencies.
And how his time as the General Counsel, and then as Assistant
Administrator at USAID, gave him the opportunity to learn a
considerable amount about economic development in the Third World and
had an opportunity to work with a number of UN agencies, the Rome Food
Agencies, and others. And because of this experience, Mr. Chairman, the
Senate confirmed Mr. Bolton's nomination by Unanimous Consent.
So, now we are spring of 2001--when Mr. Bolton was again before
this Committee--this time with a nomination to be Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security.
Interestingly, a principal concern about Mr. Bolton's nomination
for the Under Secretary position was the strength of his background in
arms control. Ironically, the concern was that Mr. Bolton's background
was principally in international development, multi-national
organizations, and foreign assistance. The very background that makes
him ideal for the position he is being considered for today.
In fact, as my distinguished colleague from Connecticut remarked
during the floor debate on Mr. Bolton's nomination, ``there is no
question that Mr. Bolton is an individual of integrity and
intelligence.'' Mr. Dodd even said Mr. Bolton had a ``distinguished
record.'' And as Senator John Warner reported in his introduction of
Mr. Bolton to the committee, ``he is a seasoned negotiator who knows
how to represent American national interests in the toughest of
situations,'' and ``has extensive personal and professional experience
dealing with multinational organizations.''
But, similar to today, the heart of the debate was whether or not
you agreed with John Bolton's thinking and views.
I think former Chairman Jesse Helms summed up the debate quite well
when he remarked to Mr. Bolton during his nomination hearing, ``This
ought not to be a partisan thing . . . Whether they like you or not is
irrelevant. What should be decided here is whether you are a competent
man.'' I couldn't agree more.
Equally intriguing were the subsequent remarks by the Ranking
Member, Mr. Biden. And if I could, Mr. Chairman, I will quote the
distinguished Ranking Member directly:
I want to make it clear, this is not about your competence.
My problem with you over the years has been you have been too
competent. I mean, I would rather you be stupid and not very
effective. I would have been had a better shot over the years.
But I really mean it sincerely,--none of this, my questions,
nor do I believe any of my colleagues questions, relate to any
personal animus about you as a person. I think you're an
honorable man and you are extremely competent. It's about how
different your views are.
And this is the very same debate we are facing today.
This isn't a debate about Mr. Bolton's qualifications or expertise.
This isn't about whether he has the right experience and background for
the job the President has nominated him for--what we're dealing with
today is a very partisan political effort to disqualify Mr. Bolton's
nomination.
This is about John Bolton's personality. And, at the risk of
oversimplifying, whether he is a nice guy. And whether we like him. I
think the majority of my colleagues--Republican and Democrat alike--
agree that Mr. Bolton is a competent man. His record speaks for itself.
Previous attempts at discrediting his views, experience, and
qualifications have failed, so now, all there's left to talk about is
whether or not he is a nice guy.
Mr. Chairman, the fact is, even the allegations against Mr.
Bolton's character are very weak. And they surely haven't revealed any
pattern of inappropriate conduct. I reinforced this point during the
last month's hearing with Mr. Ford.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to recount my exchange with Mr. Ford,
specifically his broad sweeping statement, under oath, regarding Mr.
Bolton's character.
Senator Martinez. In other words, there was a confrontation
between you and he in a hallway which, admittedly we have to
say, you had a pretty good falling out or pretty good
discussion, it was heated, it was emotional, it was
confrontational.
Mr. Ford. That's correct, sir.
Senator Martinez. Okay, and that arose out of the same
circumstance, the same event which was the conversation between
the analyst and Secretary Bolton, correct?
Mr. Ford. That's correct.
Senator Martinez. But you really cannot, in good faith,
under oath, suggest that you have the ability to tell this
Committee that this now represents a broader character flaw in
Mr. Bolton's part, can you?
Mr. Ford. You're absolutely correct in terms of I have
absolutely--beyond what I've talked to you about, and
admittedly extremely limited--right or wrong, good or bad, I
still believe that this was not an exceptional day, or out of
the ordinary in terms of his normal management style.
Senator Martinez. That's your sense, that's your opinion.
But that's not something you can really provide.
Mr. Ford. No, sir.
Senator Martinez. In the nature of testimony under oath.
Mr. Ford. No, certainly not from me, you can't get that.
Mr. Chairman, one incident does not constitute a pattern. And you
surely can't speak of something being a pattern if you haven't
personally witnessed it, even once. Fundamental fairness requires that
hearsay be discounted. It's just unacceptable that this instance has
received as much attention as it has.
Turning to another topic that I believe has been extremely
inaccurately portrayed, Mr. Chairman, I want to clear up any
misunderstandings surrounding a supposedly controversial statement that
Mr. Bolton has made previously, which is that the United States
believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare
research effort, and that Cuba has provided dual-use bio-technology to
other rogue states, and a concern that such technology could support
bio-weapons programs in those states.
Let me set the record straight: It is the U.S. position today--as
it has been since March 2002 when Carl Ford testified before this
committee that the U.S. believes Cuba does indeed have some biological
warfare capabilities.
In February, 2002, there was on all accounts a heated confrontation
between John Bolton and intelligence analyst, Christian Westermann. At
issue was Mr. Westermann's attempt to block Mr. Bolton's request to
have Cuba biological warfare related language declassified for speech
purposes.
Specifically, Mr. Westermann went behind Mr. Bolton's back and sent
a biased and confusing declassification request to the intelligence
community. He subsequently misled the Under Secretary's office about
his actions. In a nutshell, because Mr. Westermann did not agree with
the ``message'' of the requested language, he sought to have it
changed. Despite Mr. Westermann's efforts Bolton's language was
ultimately approved for declassification and was included in his May 6,
2002 Heritage Foundation speech.
As Mr. Ford confirmed for this committee, that very same statement
appeared in Mr. Ford's own testimony before this committee during
March. That very same language was cleared by Mr. Ford's office, as
well as other intelligence agencies. Former Otto Reich has also used
the same statement in subsequent remarks.
This had nothing to do with John Bolton trying to skew intelligence
on Cuba's biological warfare program. This language was approved by the
intelligence community and has been used by several sources since its
approval. And per Mr. Ford, this multiply issued statement reflected
the correct belief of the United States, as it stood at that time.
The dispute with Mr. Westermann as the language was developed in
February 2002 had to do 100% with Westermann's conduct--not a dispute
over his analysis. I don't see any real issue here, Mr. Chairman.
One final matter I discussed with Mr. Ford, which I'll briefly
share with the Committee, was Mr. Ford's concern about how that
information ultimately became a part of his Mr. Bolton's speech.
Initially, Mr. Ford suggested to this Committee that the entire
controversy related to the analyst would have been avoided if Mr.
Bolton had merely come to Mr. Ford first. Mr. Ford identified this as a
central cause of the problem. However, when questioned, Mr. Ford
admitted that Mr. Bolton had, in fact, tried to contact him initially--
but that Mr. Ford was out of the building that day. As such, Mr. Bolton
didn't reach Mr. Ford. But he got his Principal Deputy, Mr. Fingar. And
the response from this Principal Deputy was that the behavior by his
analyst was inappropriate, and that they ``screwed up.'' That ``it
won't happen again.'' We have all seen copies of the actual email Mr.
Fingar sent to Mr. Bolton with these remarks.
Mr. Chairman, this was all contemporaneous with the events. Mr.
Bolton did, in fact, try to reach Mr. Ford. And in Mr. Ford's absence,
Mr. Bolton handled the situation with Ford's Principal Deputy. And, the
Principal Deputy confirmed that the anaylyst was in error. Point being,
this was a red herring. And the other allegations unearthed against Mr.
Bolton carry similar meaning and weight. This is merely a collateral
attack against Mr. Bolton.
You need more than hearsay, more than unsubstantiated rhetoric to
carry through--to destroy a person's reputation and character. We
should be operating on a standard of fundamental fairness. We simply
haven't met that threshold. We haven't even come close. Interestingly,
what we do have, is a growing list of individuals coming forward with
an opposite account of Mr. Bolton's personality and management style.
I'd like to share, for a moment, what some people who've actually
worked for John Bolton had to say. In an April 22nd letter to Chairman
Lugar, 43 former associates of Mr. Bolton at the American Enterprise
Institute wrote:
The various allegations that have been raised before your
Committee, concerning Mr. Bolton's management style and conduct
in other organizations and circumstances, are radically at odds
with our experiences in more than four years of intense,
frequent, and continuous interaction with him.
He was unfailingly courteous and respectful to us regardless
of our (AEI) positions or seniority.
John Bolton's management style (at AEI) became legendary for
its crispness, openness, fairness, and efficiency.
In the T3Washington Post, on April 24, 2005, Former Secretary of
State Lawrence Eagleburger remarked:
[A]s to the charge that Bolton has been tough on
subordinates, I can say only that in more than a decade of
association with him in the State Department, I never saw or
heard anything to support such a charge.
Mr. Chairman, I am sure you have seen a similar outpouring of
remarks in favor of Mr. Bolton--outlining a ecidedly positive pattern
of behavior. That said, I think we have to ask ourselves, isn't this a
very bizarre discussion to be having when it comes to the nomination of
our Ambassador to the United Nations? We're not voting on his
popularity for homecoming court--we're looking at his ability to get
the job done for which he has been nominated--the very important job of
representing the United States as Ambassador to the United Nations.
This debate has been hijacked to rehash different allegations about
personality and whether or not we approve of John Bolton's management
style, rather than reviewing his respective qualifications, and talking
meaningfully about how he would tackle some of the key issues
confronting the UN.
Contrary to Mr. Bolton's three previous nominations before this
committee--when committee members questioned Mr. Bolton about
everything from the CTBT to USAID's partnership with PVOs), there is a
noted absence of substantive dialogue about key issues. There has been
no real debate about his qualifications or ability to get the job done.
For example, what should the future role of the UN be in Haiti?
What steps would Bolton take to move the UN out of the costly and
dangerous mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea? And towards a final and
binding decision of the Boundary Commission? Also absent is meaningful
dialogue about Mr. Bolton's writings related to the UN and its reform.
In addition to the congressional testimony I already referenced,
Mr. Bolton's research and writings have long advocated a stronger UN.
For example, in 1997, Mr. Bolton wrote that ``traditional
peacekeeping, together with the often-important role the agencies of
the U.N. system play in international delivery of humanitarian
assistance, can work and should be continued.'' He added that the
United Nations can be a ``useful tool in the American foreign policy
kit.''
To me, we should have been using recent hearings and time spent in
countless interviews talking about John Bolton's ideas for the future
of the U.N. To talk, in detail, about how we can work with the
Secretary General and his desire for reform.
The fact is, President Bush chose John Bolton because he knows how
to get things done. This nomination is a direct reflection of the
President's determination to make the UN work. And the President should
have this push for reform given a chance to succeed.
Mr. Chairman, I think you would agree that Mr. Bolton's remarks,
writings, and action over the past twenty plus years, beginning with
his first nomination hearing before this committee in January, 1982,
reveal a very comprehensive understanding of the UN--an understanding
of both its strengths and its weaknesses.
John Bolton has long been a strong voice for UN reform and
effective multilateralism, and will continue to be a strong voice at a
time when the UN is undertaking essential reform initiatives. President
Bush wants John Bolton as part of his foreign policy team and to
represent the United States at the United Nations. He is qualified and
prepared.
The issues raised questioning his qualifications and character have
failed to come anywhere close to the level of disqualifying him from
this position.
There is no compelling reason to deny the POTUS his choice of
nominee for this position. I look forward to voting to confirm Mr.
Bolton and supporting this nominee.
Senator Martinez. I want to thank the Chair and the
ranking member for the manner in which you've conducted all of
these deliberations.
I want to also compliment the Chair for the very thoughtful
opening remarks, which I thought were comprehensive in nature
and covered the--in a wonderful way, and, I think, also put
perspective and fairness into a process that I, frankly, at
times, have wondered about.
Let me also say that, as Senator Hagel commented, this is a
committee that has been revered through the history of our
nation. And as a person not born to this land, but one who's
adopted it as his own land, I must say that I always remarked
and marveled at the bipartisan nature of American foreign
policy and the way in which folks with very different thoughts
and ideas would come together for the greater good of the
country. And I would hope, as we go forward in this committee,
Mr. Chairman--and I know how important that is to you and to
the ranking member--that we can always keep that in mind,
because I think in the difficult days in which we live, and the
difficulties the world faces, and our nation faces in the
world, it is vitally important that we always keep in mind the
importance of us to all pull together as Americans--not
Democrats, not Republicans, but as Americans. And I--my hope,
in that spirit, is that this committee will always conduct its
deliberations----
As I look at the nominee, I believe, first and foremost,
the President of the United States has nominated him. I think,
secondarily, our advice and consent responsibility, which I,
too, take seriously, begins by analyzing the qualifications of
the candidate. And as it relates to the qualifications of this
particular nominee, I take a lot of comfort from the comments
of Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who very directly
worked with Secretary Bolton, who said, ``John Bolton is
eminently qualified, and he's one of the smartest guys in
Washington.''
And, Mr. Chairman, I know that coming in the order of the
lineup in which I do, there's a tendency to think of myself as
cleanup. I'm also thinking, though, that I may be hitting
number nine, which is a very different statement than cleanup.
But, be that is it may, I want to, maybe, summarize a little of
what's transpired.
And I think, you know, looking at his background at USAID,
his experience in the State Department, and extensive research
and writing relating to many different subjects, which I think
prepared him for this role at the United Nations. And then, of
course, we move on to the various nominations that he has
received in the past, and confirmations by this committee, in
1982, as Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy
Coordination at USAID; in 1989, this committee in favor of
naming Mr. Bolton Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organizational Affairs; and, in 2001, voted in
favor of naming him Under Secretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security.
All three of these previous nominations were advanced by
this committee and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. During each of
these nominations, this committee undertook a thorough look at
Mr. Bolton's qualifications and his experience. The committee
received, on January 27 of '82, Mr. Bolton's first nomination
for Assistant Secretary of Policy of USAID. And, even at that
time, Mr. Chairman, he already had a distinguished record of
accomplishment. And he, in addition to that, did a very
honorable job in carrying out his assignments during the
difficult years of the Cold War.
In 1989, this committee again, reviewed Mr. Bolton; this
time, for Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organizations. And my distinguished colleague from
Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry, presided over his hearing at that
time. And, as Mr. Kerry explained in his opening remarks, the
Assistant Secretary, Mr. Bolton, would be responsible for U.S.
relations with the United Nations.
At that time, Mr. Bolton shared his views on the U.N.
system, on why it was important to build upon the then-recent
improvements to its effectiveness. And Mr. Bolton then
relayed--the 44-year-old charter of the U.N. embodies those
values which have guided this nation during the course of more
than 200 years of our development, and he identified the
essence of the U.N. charter to be a respect for the supremacy
of law above individuals, for the peaceful resolution of
disputes between men and nations, and, most importantly, the
faith that mankind can peacefully build a better world for
succeeding generations.
This doesn't sound to me, Mr. Chairman, as far back as 15
years ago, as someone who was bent upon the destruction of this
organization, but someone who held it in high esteem and high
regard. This is a man who, 15 years ago, could also see the
strengths and the weaknesses of this organization. Mr. Bolton
talked quietly--talked about the quiet day-to-day work of the
U.N. that it did to improve the welfare of poverty-stricken
women and children, the sick, and refugees around the world.
And he explained that these efforts deserve the fullest
possible extent of support from us and other nations.
And yet I will quote from Mr. Bolton's testimony, ``While
we seek to support the many worthy efforts of the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, we must not turn a blind
eye to some excesses and poor management that have undermined
its effectiveness. Politicization and mismanagement have robbed
the U.N. and some of its agencies of the high moral ground in
recent years.''
And, Mr. Chairman, 15 years later, it's disappointing to
know that Mr. Bolton's warning about turning a blind eye
remains so fitting to the environment we find ourself today in
the United Nations. Rampant corruption, waste, and
ineffectiveness are the norm at the U.N., and we have an
institution that, in many ways, is failing in its mission.
Because of this experience, Mr. Chairman, the United
States--because of his experience, the U.S. Senate confirmed
Mr. Bolton's nomination by unanimous consent.
And now we're in the spring of 2001, when, again, Mr.
Bolton was before this committee. And this time the nomination
for Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security. And, interestingly enough, at that time, the concern
about Mr. Bolton's nomination for this particular position was
the strength of his background in arms control. It was then
said that his background was in international organizations,
where he had spent so much of his time worrying about the
world's poor and USAID, worrying about the U.S. relationship
with the U.N. and other international organizations, and
whether or not, in fact, he had the sufficient background in
the arms-control arena.
And, as my distinguished colleague from Connecticut
remarked during the floor debate on Mr. Bolton's nomination,
``There is no question,'' he said, ``that Mr. Bolton is an
individual of integrity and intelligence.'' Mr. Dodd even said
Mr. Bolton had a distinguished record.
Similar to today, the heart of the debate of whether or not
you agree with--is really about whether you agree with Mr.
Bolton's thinking. At that time, at that hearing, the remarks
by the ranking member, Mr. Biden--and, if I could, Mr.
Chairman, I'll quote again from the ranking member directly--he
said, ``I want to make it clear that it's not about your
competence. My problem with you over the years has been that
you've been too competent. I mean, I would rather you be stupid
and not very effective. I would have been--it would have been--
it would have been--had a better shot over the years. But I
really mean it sincerely. None of this--my questions, nor do I
believe any of my colleagues' questions, relate to any personal
animus about you as a person. I think you're an honorable man,
and you're extremely competent. It's about how different your
views are.''
And, Mr. Chairman, that's the very same debate we face here
today. This is not a debate about his qualifications or
expertise; this is about a debate of whether he has the right
experience and background for the job. What we're dealing here
today is a debate that has gotten somewhat partisan, and it
really has to do about Mr. Bolton's views. The majority of my
colleagues, Republicans and Democrats alike, agree that Mr.
Bolton is a competent man, and I believe his record speaks for
itself. And previous attempts at discrediting his views,
experience, and qualifications have failed. So now we're
talking in another direction about--a collateral attack about
things that cannot be as easily discussed on the record, but
about his demeanor and so forth.
And so, I go to Mr. Ford's testimony, here in the
committee, who made the broad, sweeping statement, under oath,
regarding Mr. Bolton's character. He simply said that Mr.
Bolton did not have the temperament necessary, and sweepingly
attempted to attack his character.
And, Mr. Chairman, I want to just briefly quote from this
soliloquy that took place between Mr. Ford and myself.
I asked the witness, ``In other words, there was a
confrontation between you--in the hallway, in which--between
the two of you in the hallway, which you admittedly have to say
you had a pretty good falling out, a pretty good discussion. It
was heated. It was emotional. It was confrontational.''
Mr. Ford, ``That is correct.''
And then I asked, ``Okay, and that arose out of the same
circumstance, the same event, which was the conversation
between the analyst and Secretary Bolton, correct?''
``That's correct,'' was his answer.
And then I asked, ``But you really cannot, in good faith,
under oath, suggest that you have the ability to tell this
committee that this now represents a broader character flaw in
Mr. Bolton's part, can you?''
Mr. Ford--and Mr. Ford answered, ``You're absolutely
correct. In terms of--I have absolutely--beyond what I've
talked about, and admittedly extremely limited, right or wrong,
good or bad, I still believe that this was not an exceptional
day or out of the ordinary, in terms of his normal management
style.''
And then I asked him, ``That's your sense. That's your
opinion. But that's not something you can really provide''----
He interrupted and said, ``No, sir.
``--in the nature of testimony under oath.''
And then he said, ``No, certainly not. Not from me. You
can't get that.''
One incident does not constitute a pattern. One event does
not constitute a way of life. And I believe, Mr. Chairman, that
one of the things that has been absent from this discussion is
the principles of fundamental fairness. We have a man with a
long and distinguished record of public service to his country,
of dedicated service, of mostly competent service, and that it
cannot be said that, by the failure of a few incidents, it's
now without merit and someone whose entire career should be
diminished by those comments.
Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up, and I realize that we're
very short on time, but I believe, in closing, that I would say
that the fundamental fairness standard is what we should
operate by. It should not be about hearsay.
You detailed very well in your statement many of the
charges that were then rebutted. I do not believe that it can
ever be said this gentleman was guilty of massaging
intelligence. That simply does not meet the test of the facts.
And I would just finish by saying, Mr. Chairman, that one
thing that should be crystal clear is that Mr. Bolton's
statement before--the speech that he gave was the very same
information regarding bioweapons in Cuba than had been given by
Mr. Ford to the committee here three months earlier, and that,
undisputed, continues to be the view of the U.S. Government
today, that Cuba held a potential for biological weapons, and
that it shared that information with rogue states. That is not
changed, and that is not any different. That continues to be
the view of the U.S. Government today.
So, Mr. Chairman, I'm prepared to support Mr. Bolton's
nomination. I'm prepared to move it forward. I think he's a
dedicated and qualified man, who will make us an excellent
Representative at the United Nations. I look forward to working
with him, as I know the President has the confidence in him to
put the United Nations in a better place, take it to a better
place. It takes someone who will have the courage and the
forcefulness of Mr. Bolton to help us fix the United Nations,
because it is important that we have it there for us and the
rest of the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the staff how much
time that's in the control of the Senator from Delaware is
still left?
The Chairman. Twenty-four minutes.
Senator Biden. Twenty-four minutes? I will yield ten
minutes to my friend from Florida. Actually, I'll yield 15
minutes to my friend.
The Chairman. Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I don't need that much time.
I can make my statement very clear to the committee in a very
short period of time.
This, to me, is about performance. This, to me, is one of
the most important jobs that we have representing our country
to the world body of nations of which we so desperately need
their help at this time. Look at our position in Iraq and
Afghanistan. We bemoan the fact that it's mainly us and the
British that are there, and we need to bring others to table to
support us, not only in Iraq, but around the world.
And so, when we're talking about a representative of the
United States of America to the United Nations, we've got to
have the best and the brightest, and someone who can reach out
and bring people together. The good book says, ``Come, let us
reason together.'' That's the kind of person that we ought to
have.
So, to get a clue, we have a saying in the South, ``You can
tell about where a fellow's going by where he's been.'' Well,
let's look at his job. Does he deserve being promoted because
of the job that he's done as arms-control negotiator? Where are
two of the hotspots in the world where the biggest threat to
the interest of the United States is today? It's North Korea
and Iran. And, in four years, how much progress have we made in
stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons in those two
countries? And who was the person that was charged with, in
fact, that arms-control negotiation? And now we are asked to
promote him to a position representing us in front of the world
body? It just doesn't make sense to me. And so, I'm going to
vote no on the nomination.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Biden, you have at least 20 minutes----
Senator Biden. Oh, I won't take that long, but I'm going
to--at your--whenever your suggest, Mr. Chairman, I will sum
up, knowing--leaving the remainder of the time----
The Chairman. Well, I will leave that to you, because--we
have four minutes on our side, so I will use that as a summing-
up----
Senator Biden. Well, obviously, Mr. Chairman, you take as
much time as you want to sum up. I don't--it's fine by me and
my side.
Let me state what I hope is the obvious. Our disagreement
over Mr. Bolton in this committee, the disagreement you and I
have over Mr. Bolton, and even the disagreements we've had
internally about how to proceed, sometimes, I want to make it
absolutely clear, I pledge that's not going to affect at all,
regardless of the outcome of this, the continued cooperation,
as I think it's fair to say we have cooperated, on every major
foreign-policy issue that has come before this committee. This
is about an individual, whether he should be in the position
for which he's nominated. It is not about our willingness to
cooperate, an attempt to maintain, as best we can here, a
bipartisan foreign policy.
And I have been proud, as I know you have, and I hope all
members have been, that--and it's not a criticism of other
committees directly, but this has not been a committee that has
been contentious. This is the most contentious thing we've had
in recent times, although there was a fairly contentious debate
over Mr. Holbrooke, which was when you were not chairman, and a
fairly contentious debate over Mr. Negroponte.
And, I might add, it's been repeatedly stated here--or,
excuse me, sorry--several times it's been stated that this has
taken an extraordinarily long time. Well, obviously, it's been
stated by those people, understandably, who haven't been here.
This is not long at all, even for this committee.
Let me just remind folks, you had, in May of the first
year, Mr. Holbrooke's name floated to be the nominee. He did
not get a hearing until the following February. He didn't get
nominated until the following February. He did not get
confirmed until the following June. Okay? It was August?
August. Excuse me. He didn't get--so, February to June--I mean,
February to August. I've got June on my mind, my wife's
birthday. Anyway.
Secondly, Mr. Negroponte. His name came up here in May, and
he was confirmed in September. So, let's get the record
straight. Let's get the record straight.
And in the case of Mr. Holbrooke, he had--three separate
hearings we brought him back. Three separate times. And none of
my colleagues were arguing then, including us, that he wasn't--
he was being brought back too many times.
So, for the record--for the record--just taking the recent
history--the recent history--this is not a long time, number
one.
Now, the second point that I'd like to make is, I am
confident that our two colleagues in the Intelligence committee
are going to, at some point, produce a letter saying they
looked at the information coming from the so- called
intercepts, and that they see no pattern that would raise any
alarm. But they will also tell you they were not given what Mr.
Bolton was given. Notwithstanding the fact that they reach that
conclusion--I believe they will reach that conclusion--they
were redacted files. They did not have the name of, quote,
``the American.''
Call home. [Laughter.]
And so, I don't have any doubt. But it doesn't, in any way,
undercut the argument that we're entitled to see what they saw,
and they were entitled to see more. And, as I said to you all
the beginning, I'm not at all sure--I think it's kind of a
blind alley. I don't think there's probably anything there,
based on my going to present administration officials who I
respect and past administration officials. But the facts are
that we're not--we don't have that information.
Now, I may be mistaken, but I don't ever recall--at least
in my tenure on this committee, which is embarrassingly long--I
don't ever recall a nominee being put forward by a President
that had so many people who worked for that President come
forward and say, ``That nominee should not be confirmed.'' I
don't ever recall that. My friend from Maryland's been here
almost as long as I have. I'm not being--and my friend from
Indiana has been here almost as long as I have--I would--I
stand to be corrected, but I don't think it's ever happened.
Ever. At least in the last 32 years. I would note, that's
mildly remarkable.
And I would also point out that notwithstanding the fact--
let's assume--let's grant--as my friend from Florida, the great
trial lawyer that he was and is, might say, let's argue this in
the alternative here. Let's assume every one of us are being
totally partisan. Even if that were true, it doesn't undercut a
single thing we're saying. Sometimes even when you're partisan,
you're right. And I would argue that just look at the number of
significant present and former administration officials who
said, ``Uh-uh. Bad idea.''
Now, I go back to a version of what was stated by one of my
Republican colleagues earlier today. I'm sure--I shouldn't say
I'm sure--the Secretary of State has indicated to me--she has
indicated at least one other member of this committee, based on
what they said today, and, I suspected, indicated to a lot of
you, ``Don't worry. He won't go off the reservation.'' I'm
paraphrasing. ``It won't happen like it has happened at State.
It won't happen. We'll control him.'' Wow.
Question that was asked by one of my colleagues, Why would
you send someone to the United Nations at this moment that you
acknowledge you're going to need to control? Can you think of
any time in the recent past where our interests are more at
stake than this moment at the United Nations? Does anybody
within earshot think that in the next three years we are not
going to have to attempt to bring North Korea and Iraq before
the Security Council? I suspect that may happen. Is there any
time we might need an Adlai Stevenson, whose effectiveness in
looking across and say, ``Don't wait''--paraphrasing--``Don't
wait for the translation.'' Why was it so effective? Because
that was not his style. It was so remarkable that he did that.
It was such an exception. A little bit like me being calm.
[Laughter.]
So, I just think that we can't really kid ourselves here.
And I think--and I--and, by the way--I mean this sincerely--
I've worked with a lot of you in this committee a long time. I
hope my bona fides have--with you, personally, are real. And I
respect your arguments that you've all made. But, as I listen
to you all, it comes down to one really compelling argument:
the President's entitled to his man. I respect that. I disagree
with that. Unfortunately, Democratic President's have found out
I disagree with that--Mr. Carter, Mr. Clinton. They found out I
don't share that view. I don't share the view: because he wants
it--the President wants it, that he should get it. Although I
do believe--to quote my--paraphrase my friend from Illinois--
that, on matters of assembling your Cabinet around you, you
should give deference--we should give deference, as opposed to
a life-time appointment to a third branch of the government.
But that seems to be the strongest argument for Mr. Bolton.
I notice no one has said, on either side of the aisle, either
side of this committee, that the assertions of Mr. Bolton's
behavior and management style are not true. They argue that it
shouldn't matter, or it doesn't matter as much. I didn't hear
anybody come in here and say, ``No, no, no, this is all wrong.
You've got this guy wrong. You've got this guy all wrong.'' I
didn't hear anybody say that he didn't--wasn't aggressive on
his point of dealing with the intelligence community. Some say
he's aggressive, and that's good. Some say, he's aggressive,
that's bad. But nobody suggests that this is a fellow who
doesn't push his point to the point of exhaustion.
Now, we can disagree on whether or not that is good or bad,
appropriate or inappropriate. I think it's inappropriate. But
no one's saying he didn't do that.
And, again, I want to make clear, those in the intelligence
community, or formerly in the intelligence community, who are
opposed to Mr. Bolton and suggest he should not go forward, are
not suggesting Mr. Bolton, in his previous position, is not
entitled to his own opinion. What this was always about was
whether Mr. Bolton could assert a governmental position that
was inconsistent with, or at odds with, the intelligence
community's opinion. In the end of the day, he didn't. That
shouldn't be remarkable. Because had he--had he done it, he
would have--I assume he would have gotten fired.
But, as I say, again, how many times do you have to be
told, as a subordinate, or at least in a subordinate position,
by a superior that, ``Are you sure you got that right? Are you
sure it's not that? I think it's that,'' to not get the
message?
Now, the remarkable thing is, most of these folks had the
political and personal gumption to stand fast. But, more
importantly, they had men and women of character, who were
equal to or superior in political strength to Mr. Bolton, to
tell them to go back sand. They had their protector in each of
these instances. But the remarkable thing is that, even in the
first instance, none of these folks caved.
And I want to mention two things. I won't take any time,
I'll just put them in the record.
With regard to the Townsel matter, Senator Coleman made
much of the unsubstantiated allegations by Mrs. Townsel having
been discussed at a meeting April 19th. I'll remind everybody,
that's why I made a motion to go into closed session. Because
they were unsubstantiated at that moment. That's why I wanted
to go into closed session.
Again, I don't recall--it probably has happened, but I
don't recall a time when a Senator has said to his colleagues,
``Let's go into closed session for a little bit. I want to tell
you something I know, an allegation,'' or, ``I want to discuss
something.'' Speaking of comity, not say, ``Okay, we'll recess
for 20 minutes and go into closed session.''
The second point I'd make is, nobody on this side that I
heard today used as a rationale for voting against Mr. Bolton
the alleged conduct with regard to Mrs. Townsel. And I'll
remind everyone that when the chairman raised it, and I--in my
opening statement, I said what he said--it's he-said/she-said,
and it's unsubstantiated.
I would also like to put in the record what we actually
learned from Mrs.--from the witnesses we, the staff, Minority
and Majority staff, interviewed with regard to that allegation.
The Chairman. It will be put in the record in full.
Senator Biden. Secondly, the issue of whether or not Mr.
Bolton obeyed the rules on clearing speeches. It's been
asserted, flatly, that he has. I would like to put in the
record--not take the time now--what was stated by witnesses and
those familiar with how the community works in clearing those
speeches.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
Senator Biden. And, thirdly, the assertion that Mr. Bolton
went behind--or, excuse me, Mr. Westermann went behind Mr.
Bolton's back and lost his trust. I just note, and I'll put it
in the record, the testimony of Carl Ford, Tom Finger, Carol
Rodley, Neil Silver, and Christian Westermann, confirming that
Mr. Westermann followed standard operating procedure. And I'd
ask that be put in the record.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
Senator Biden. And, Mr. Chairman, I understand, when we
finish, after you conclude your statement, you're going to make
a motion. And, in keeping with what we committed we will do, we
will not make--unless I'm unaware of something one of my
colleagues is going to do, we will not make any competing
motion, if it's the motion that the Senator from Ohio indicated
he would support, and--in order to move this, out of committee
in almost the exact time--we said by 3 o'clock, but within the
time that we were allotted at the beginning here.
But I would repeat to my colleagues--and I mean this
sincerely--I think I've demonstrated this--all of whom I
respect--that I can understand how there is disagreement if you
start off with this overwhelming presumption that the
President's entitled to his person. But there are two things
that seem to me to be operative here. One is that that is the
controlling rationale for why Mr. Bolton should move forward by
a majority of members of this committee, if he should move
forward. And, secondly, that we may be ``damning with faint
praise'' here.
And one of my colleagues said, earlier today--and,
obviously, it is not for me to decide, or the colleague who
said this--but I truly believe that, in light of what I expect
is about to happen, the President, in the interest of the
United States would be better served by Mr. Bolton's nomination
being pulled down. I don't expect that to happen. But I
honestly believe he would be better served if that were the
case. And it--there is precedent for that, in Democratic
administrations and in Republican administrations.
I might add, there's also precedent--on our watch, we were
in charge, the Democrats, we voted out--someone out of the
committee with a negative recommendation. We have voted people
out, I would submit for the record, without recommendation. And
we've voted people out with a favorable recommendation. But it
is somewhat unusual. It is somewhat unusual to move that way.
And I'm not, in any way, questioning the majority's right
to do that, but I would suggest that it doesn't appear that Mr.
Bolton has the confidence of the majority of this committee.
And I would suggest that it may be worth the President's
interest to take note of that.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your
cooperation. And I still will, on another matter, pursue those
issues--not in terms of stopping the nomination, but as a
matter of policy and principle that we should be able to, you
and I and this committee, have access to the information that
we sought. I think that is an institutional issue.
So, I thank you, and I yield back our time.
The Chairman. Well, I thank the distinguished ranking
member. I thank all members. All 18 of us have spoken. The
statements were, I believe, thoughtful, well-drafted issues
expressed as the debate continues.
Let me just take this moment to thank the distinguished
ranking member, in particular, because I can recall, although
it is not a comparable moment, when we had debates over several
weeks and months prior to American being engaged in Iraq. And
we had a very difficult time wrestling with those issues in the
committee. Now, the chairman was then Senator Biden. The
ultimate conclusion was that we would support the President.
But it was not unanimous in this committee, nor on the floor.
And, indeed, historians, I suspect, will still argue some of
the points that were argued in the committee at that point.
I mention that because we have work to do. The chairman has
mentioned North Korea, Iran, just to think of two, quite apart
from the work--support in the peace process in the Middle East,
tremendously important deliberations before this committee. The
need for unity, insofar as we can have it, is imperative.
And I appreciate very much the fact that members on both
sides of the aisle were here for this business meeting, and
stayed, and participated. That, I appreciate. I appreciate we
were not challenged by the parliamentary procedure on the
floor. It would have prevented us from meeting. Now, I'm sure
that was not by chance. I thank the distinguished ranking
member for making that possible.
But we now have had an important debate, in which I believe
we must move forward. The chairman has indicated the motion
that I'm about to make. It was, I suspect, more than hinted by
Senator Voinovich's comments earlier this morning. The Chair
has listened carefully, has attempted to find a motion that a
majority of our committee can agree upon.
And so, I will say now, the question is on the nomination
of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to the United
Nations, with rank of Ambassador. The vote will be to report
the nomination without recommendation.
The Clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Allen.
Senator Allen. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Biden.
Senator Biden. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Dodd.
Senator Dodd. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Kerry.
Senator Kerry. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Feingold.
Senator Feingold. No.
The Clerk. Mrs. Boxer.
Senator Boxer. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Nelson.
Senator Nelson. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Obama.
Senator Obama. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Aye.
Will the Clerk please report the tally?
The Clerk. Ten aye, eight nay.
The Chairman. Ten ayes, eight nays. And, therefore, the
nomination is reported, and the business meeting is concluded.
Senator Biden. Wait, wait, wait. Mr. Chairman, before we
conclude, I want to state to my colleagues what I said to you
privately. We will have--so there is no delay, we will have the
Minority views written and available to the committee by
Monday.
The Chairman. I appreciate that.
Senator Biden. And so, we----
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, right at the end you said,
``The nomination is reported to the floor''--but without
recommendation, is that----
The Chairman. That's correct. That was the motion.
I thank the distinguished ranking member once again----
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [continuing]. And all members. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
------
ANNEX D
Material in Support of John Bolton's Nomination
----------
I53 May 6, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dirksen Senate Office
Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lugar: The attached letter is co-signed by
former presidential appointees, career and non-career Civil
Service and Foreign Service employees who knew and worked with
John Bolton from 1989-1993. These people and many more have
indicated their strong support for Secretary Bolton. For
example, John's former supervisors including former Secretary
of State James A. Baker III, former Under Secretary for
Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt, and I, have publicly
expressed our foil confidence and support for John, and our
belief that he will be a superb representative of the United
States in the United Nations.
The attached letter demonstrates that many of those who
worked for or with him share this belief. Ipersonally know if
others who now hold positions in the United Nations or the
State Department who support John, but for ``conflict of
interest'' reasons prefer to express that support through
private letters to you and your colleagues.
Sincerely,
Lawrence S. Eagleburger.
May 6, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: We are former presidential appointees,
career and non-career Civil Service and Foreign Service
employees who knew and worked with John Bolton in his capacity
as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs under the leadership of Secretaries James A. Baker III
and Lawrence S. Eagleburger from 1989-1993. While we have
followed John's nomination to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations with great interest and enthusiasm, the recent
and unreasonable attacks on his character and integrity during
his Senate confirmation process have precipitated this letter
of support; we only regret that we did not act sooner in
conveying our views and strong support for his nomination.
Despite what has been said and written in the last few
weeks, John has never sought to damage the United Nations or
its mission. Quite the contrary--under John's leadership the
organization was properly challenged to fulfill its original
charter. John's energy and innovation transformed 10 from a
State Department backwater into a highly appealing work place
in which individuals could effectively articulate and advance
U.S. policy and their own careers as well. During the Persian
Gulf War, John played a significant and substantive role in
achieving the numerous Security Council resolutions adopted
during the first Bush administration. He was also deeply
engaged in matters beyond the spotlight of the Security
Council, including refugees, human rights, development,
democracy, food aid, UN management and budgets. His call for a
``unitary UN'' guided and motivated the 10 bureau to promote
consistent and piuductive practices across the entire gamut of
UN organizations. John championed this concept in order to
fashion a more effective United Nations, and a signal
achievement in this regard was his effort to repeal the
execrable ``Zionism is Racism'' resolution, which was a stain
on the credibility of that institution. It is this laudable
record of professional achievement in IO that we were
privileged to witness, as well as over three decades of public
service to this country, which define his character and
capabilities.
We are proud to have served with John, and grateful for his
leadership, integrity, and vision. The allegations about his
abuse of subordinates simply do not accord with our experience
while he was Assistant Secretary for International Organization
Affairs. His treatment now before the Committee on Foreign
Relations is thus particularly disturbing and disheartening to
those who have been fortunate enough to work for and with him.
We hope this letter will help set the record straight and
inform your committee's decision.
Sincerely yours,
Margaret D. Tutwiler, Former Assistant Secretary for Public
Affairs and Spokesman
John F.W. Rogers, Former Under Secretary for Management
Ambassador Dennis Ross, Former Director of Policy Planning,
Former Special Middle East Coordinator
Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders, Former Deputy Assistant
Secretary for International Organization Affairs
Sonia Landau, Former Assistant Secretary of State, rank of
Ambassador
Richard Burt, Former Assistant Secretary of State
Randall M. Fort, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Analysis and Research
Richard Schifter, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Catherine Bertini, Former Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department
of Agriculture
Richard T. Miller, Former U.S. Observer to UNESCO
Caroline Weil Barnett, Former Special Assistant to Assistant
Secretary John R. Bolton
Christine E. Samuelian, Former Confidential Assistant to
Assistant Secretary John R. Bolton
David A. Schwarz, Former Special Assistant to U.S. Permanent
Representative to the European Office of the United
Nations
John M. Herzberg, Former Public Affairs Officer, Bureau for
International Organization Affairs
C. Craig Smith, Former Confidential Assistant to the DAS,
International Organization Affairs
Frederick H. Fleitz, Intelligence Analyst, Central Intelligence
Agency
Fran Westner, Former Director of Public Affairs, International
Organization Affairs
Thomas A. Johnson, Counselor for Legal Affairs, U.S. Mission,
Geneva
M. Deborah Wynes, Former Civil Service Employee, U.S Department
of State
Lena Murrell, Former Secretary to Deputy Assistant Secretary,
International Organization Affairs
Sam Brock, Former Action Officer, Office of UN Political
Affairs, Bureau for International Organization Affairs
Antonio Gayoso, Former Agency Director, USAID
------
May 6, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lugar: We write to express our full
confidence in the professionalism and integrity of John R.
Bolton and to offer our strong support for his nomination to be
permanent representative of the United States at the United
Nations.
As signatories we are diverse; career and non-career,
Republican and Democrat, employed and retired. Many of us
worked directly with John Bolton during his service at USAID
under President Reagan. Some of us have served at USAID
following his legacy. All of us deeply respect and admire John
Bolton as a leader who exhibits the utmost integrity, fairness,
intellect, and sense of America's national interests. Based on
this personal experience, we know the caricature drawn of
Secretary Bolton in this confirmation process is unrecognizable
and grossly unfair.
We know John to be a forceful policy advocate who both
encourages and learns from rigorous debate. We know him to be a
man of balanced judgment. And we know him to have a sense of
humor, even about himself.
John leads from in front with courage and conviction--
especially positive qualities, we believe, for the assignment
he is being asked to take on. He is tough but fair. He does not
abuse power or people. John is direct, yet thoughtful in his
communication. He is highly dedicated, working long hours in a
never-ending quest to maximize performance. Yet, he does not
place undue time demands on his staff, recognizing their family
obligations. What he does demand from staff is personal honesty
and intellectual clarity.
Throughout his illustrious career John Bolton has been an
energetic change agent. As such, he has made enemies, for there
are always those who abhor and resist change. But John is known
more for his friends than his enemies. We ask that you listen
to his friends, giving them at least equal weight.
We highly recommend Secretary Bolton to you with the full
confidence that be will serve his country as U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations with honor and great distinction.
Respectfully,
M. Peter McPherson, Former Administrator, U.S. Agency for
International Development
Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International
Development
Frederick W. Schieck, Deputy Administrator, U.S. Agency for
International Development
Kate Semerad, Former Assistant Administrator, External Affairs,
USAID
Michelle D. Laxalt, Former Director, Legislative Affairs, USAID
Frank Ruddy, Former Assistant Administrator for Africa, USAID,
Former General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy,
Former U.S. Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea
Elise du Pont, Former Assistant Administrator (and founder) for
Private Enterprise, USAID
Charlotte Norwood Walker, Former Secretary to Elise du Pont,
Bureau for Private Enterprise, USAID
Otto J. Reich, Former Assistant Administrator of USAID, Former
U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, former Assistant
Secretary of State, former Special Envoy of the
President for Western Hemisphere Initiatives.
Marc Leland, Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
International Affairs
Molly Hageboeck, Former Chief of Staff, USAID
Mary Beth Allen Yarbrough, Commissioned Foreign Service
Officer, USAID)
Franklin L. Lavin, Special Assistant Bureau for Asia, Bureau
for Africa, USAID
Barbara A. Upton, Former Director, Office of International
Donor Coordination, USAID
Sarah Tinsley Demarest, Former Director, Office of Women in
Development, USAID
Caroline Weil Barnett, Former Special Assistant to General
Counsel and Assistant Administrator John R. Bolton
Kevin E. Rushton, Former Special Assistant, USAID, Former
Economic Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the Asian
Development Bank
R. Blair Downing, Former Special Assistant USAID, Former
Executive Secretary, Department of Treasury
Patrice Malone Pisinski, Former Special Assistant, USAID
Liliane Willens, Ph.D., Former Desk Officer for Indian Ocean
States, Africa Bureau, USAID
Clark D. Horvath, Horvath and Associates
Michael Ussery, U.S. Ambassador (Ret.)
John L. Wilkinson, Brigadier General, USAFR (Ret.), Former
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and
Near East; Former Deputy Assistant Administrator,
Bureau for Private Enterprise, USAID
Joseph P. Duggan, Formerly U.S. Mission to the United Nations;
Department of State; White House Staff; USAID
Richard Derham, Former General Counsel, UDAID, Former Assistant
Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination
Kay Davies, Former Director, Office of Women in Development
Dee Ann Smith Shuff, Executive Officer, Foreign Service (Ret.)
Carole Neideffer Gallagher, Confidential Assistant to
Administrator McPherson (Ret.)
David M. Rybak, U.S. Agency for International Development,
Retired Foreign Service
Rick Endres, Former Special Assistant, Office of Interbureau
Affairs and Officer, Office of Foreign, Disaster
Assistance, USAID; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Technology Policy
Matthew C. Freedman, Former International Development Advisor,
USAID
Sean Walsh, Former Director of Office of Urban Programs for the
NIS
Kimberley McGraw Euston, Former Interim Program Officer for the
Caribbean--Bureau of INM, U.S. State, Department,
Former Confidential Assistant to the Vice President's
National Security Advisor
Nadine M. Hogan, Former Mission Director, USAID
Dr. Edwin W. Hullander, Former Associate Assistant
Administrator for Policy, Programs and Project Review;
Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Programs, AID
Ed Lijewski, Program Analyst, USAID
Bob Hawkins, Chairman, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Affairs, President of The Institute for Contemporary
Studies
Neal S. Zank, Former policy analyst, Bureau for Program and
Policy Coordination, USAID
Richard Sheppard, Former Office Director, Bureau for Program
and Policy Coordination, USAID
Emily Leonard, USAID (FEOC) Ret.
Peter K. Monk, Formerly Keene-Monk Associates
------
The Rt. Hon. the Baroness Thatcher,
House of Lords,
London, England, May 4, 2005.
Hon. John R. Bolton,
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
Washington, DC.
Dear John: I am writing this letter in order to let you
know how strongly I support your nomination as U.S. ambassador
to the United Nations. On the basis of our years of friendship,
I know from experience the great qualities you will bring to
that demanding post.
To combine, as you do, clarity of thought, courtesy of
expression and an unshakable commitment to justice is rare in
any walk of life. But it is particularly so in international
affairs. A capacity for straight talking rather than peddling
half-truths is a strength and not a disadvantage in diplomacy.
Particularly in the case of a great power like America, it is
essential that people know where you stand and assume that you
mean what you say. With you at the UN, they will do both. Those
same qualities are also required for any serious reform of the
United Nations itself, without which cooperation between
nations to defend and extend liberty will be far more
difficult.
I cannot imagine anyone better fitted to undertake these
tasks than you.
All good wishes,
Yours ever,
Margaret Thatcher.
------
April 22, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hart Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: We, the undersigned, have been appalled
at the charges that have been leveled at John Bolton during the
course of his nomination hearing to be this country's
ambassador to the United Nations. Rather than a rational,
mature discussion about the future course American policy
should take with respect to the United Nations, or whether and
to what extent Mr. Bolton's extensive knowledge and experience
with the UN further that course, what we have witnessed instead
has been a character assassination masquerading as a nomination
hearing. Mr. Bolton spent a full day before your Committee
prepared to delve deeply into issues of foreign policy, and yet
all but a sliver of the Committee's time was devoted to
unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct.
Each of us has worked with Mr. Bolton. We know him to be a
man of personal and intellectual integrity, deeply devoted to
the service of this country and the promotion of our foreign
policy interests as established by this President and the
Congress. Not one of us has ever witnessed conduct on his part
that resembles that which has been alleged. We feel our
collective knowledge of him and what he stands for, combined
with our own experiences in government and in the private
sector, more than counterbalances the credibility of those who
have tried to destroy the distinguished achievements of a
lifetime.
President Bush and Secretary Rice have personally expressed
confidence in Mr. Bolton's ability to effectively represent
this country in the United Nations. And for those of us who
have worked with and known John Bolton for decades, we urge you
and the Committee to consider our views. We believe John Bolton
deserves to have the Foreign Relations Committee's vote of
confidence and support as well.
Sincerely,
Ed Meese, Former Attorney General of the United States
Dick Thornburgh, Former Governor of Pennsylvania, Former
Attorney General of the United States, Former Under
Secretary General for Administration and Management,
The United Nations
Frank Keating, Former Governor of Oklahoma, Former Associate
Attorney General, Former General Counsel, Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Former Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury
William F. Weld, Former Governor of Massachusetts, Former
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division
Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Former Counsel to President Ronald
Reagan
C. Boyden Gray, Former Counsel to the President George H.W.
Bush
T. Kenneth Cribb, Jr., Former Assistant to the President, for
Domestic Affairs
Richard Willard, Former Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division
Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Former Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Rights Division
Douglas W. Kmiec, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel
Thomas M. Boyd, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs, Former Director, Office of Policy
Development
James F. Rill, Former Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division
Charles J. Cooper, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel
Becky Norton Dunlop, Former Senior Special Advisor to the
Attorney General
Eugene W. Hickok, Former Special Assistant, Office of Legal
Counsel, Former Deputy Secretary of Education
Mark R. Levin, Former Chief of Staff to the Attorney General
John Richardson, Former Chief of Staff to the Attorney General
William P. Cook, Former General Counsel, U.S. Immigration &
Naturalization Service
Steve Calabresi, Former Special Assistant to the Attorney
General
Murray Dickman, Former Assistant to the Undersecretary General
of the United Nations, Former Assistant to the Attorney
General
Terry Eastland, Former Director of Public Affairs
Roger Pilon, Former Director, Asylum Policy and Review Unit
Lee Liberman Otis, Former Associate Deputy Attorney General,
Former General Counsel, Department of Energy
C.H ``Bud'' Albright, Jr., Former Deputy Associate Attorney
General
Gary L. McDowell, Former Associate Director of Public Affairs
Laura Nelson, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legislative Affairs
Michael Carvin, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel
Mark R. Disler, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Rights Division
Brent 0. Hatch, Former Associate White House Counsel, Former
General Counsel National Endowment for the Humanities,
Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division
Steven R. Valentine, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division
David B. Rivkin, Jr., Former Deputy Director, Office of Policy
Development, Member, U.N. Sub-commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
Lee A. Casey, Former Attorney Advisor, Office of Legal Counsel,
Member, U.N. Sub-commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights
------
American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research,
Washington, DC, April 22, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Biden: We were close
colleagues of John Bolton during his tenure as senior vice
president of the American Enterprise Institute from January
1997 through May 2001. (Our positions at AEI during Mr.
Bolton's tenure are given below our signatures.) We are writing
to tell you and your colleagues that the various allegations
that have been raised before your Committee, concerning Mr.
Bolton's management style and conduct in other organizations
and circumstances, are radically at odds with our experiences
in more than four years of intense, frequent, and continuous
interaction with him.
Mr. Bolton was a demanding colleague--and was always at
least as demanding of himself as of those around him. He was
unfailingly courteous and respectful to us regardless of our
AEI positions or seniority. Several of us were Mr. Bolton's
subordinates, and the idea that he would seek to punish or
settle scores with those who disagreed with him seems
particularly preposterous to us. At AEI, whenever uncertainties
or disagreements arose concerning research or administrative
matters, the Bolton style was clear and consistent: he would
state his own views openly and directly, expect others to be
equally open and direct, and go out of his way to encourage
subordinates to be open and direct, all in the service of
arriving at the best possible decision. Disagreement was never
discouraged and often led him to revise his own views; once a
decision was reached, he expected subordinates to follow the
decision with the same alacrity with which he followed the
decisions of his peers or superiors.
For these and other reasons, John Bolton's management style
at AEI became legendary for its crispness, openness, fairness,
and efficiency. As we have followed the strange allegations
suddenly leveled at Mr. Bolton in recent days and reflected
among ourselves on our own experiences with him, we have come
to realize how much we learned from him, and how deep and
lasting were his contributions to improving AEI's management
and esprit de corps as well as the substance of our research
programs. Contrary to the portrayals of his accusers, he
combines a temperate disposition, good spirit, and utter
honesty with his well-known attributes of exceptional
intelligence and intensity of purpose. This is a very rare
combination and, we would think, highly desirable for an
American ambassador to the United Nations.
We respectfully request that this letter be shared with the
other members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and entered
into its records.
Yours truly,
Leon Aron, Resident Scholar
Douglas Besharov, Resident Scholar
Claude Barfield, Resident Scholar
Frances Bolton, Assistant to the Senior Vice President
Steven Berchem, Vice President
Elizabeth Bowen, Director of Conferences
Walter Berns, Resident Scholar
Karlyn Bowman, Resident Fellow
Montgomery Brown, Director of Communications
Mark Falcoff, Resident Scholar
Virginia Bryant, Director of Publications, Marketing
Isabel Ferguson, Director of Conferences
Seth Cropsey, Visiting Fellow
David Gerson, Executive Vice President
Aimee Dayhoff, Assistant to the Senior Vice President
Newt Gingrich, Senior Fellow
Christopher DeMuth, President
James Glassman, Resident Fellow
Nicholas Eberstadt, Resident Scholar
Jack Landman Goldsmith III, Adjunct Scholar
Bob Hahn, Resident Scholar
Danielle Maxwell, Marketing Manager for Donor Relations
Kevin Hassett, Resident Scholar
Allan Meltzer, Visiting Scholar
Robert Helms, Resident Scholar
Michael Novak, Resident Scholar
R. Glenn Hubbard, Visiting Scholar
Richard Perle, Resident Fellow
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Senior Fellow
Jeremy Rabkin, Adjunct Scholar
Marvin Kosters, Resident Scholar
Robert Riley, Computer Operations Specialist
Michael Ledeen, Freedom Scholar
Veronique Rodman, Director of Public Affairs
Nicole Ruman Skinner, Director of Marketing
Audrey Williams, Training Manager and Research/Staff Assistant
Kathryn Staulcup, Communications Assistant
Joanna Yu, Staff Assistant
Tarn Sweeney, Marketing Communications Manager
MangHao Zhao, Research Assistant
Peter Wallison, Resident Fellow
Scott Walter, Senior Editor, The American Enterprise
Ben Wattenberg, Senior Fellow
------
April 12, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hart Senate Office
Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lugar: Your Committee will soon be reasoning
together on the nomination of John R. Bolton as our country's
next Ambassador to the United Nations. We urge you to give
special weight at this time to the explosions of freedom now
taking place in Ukraine, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan,
Zimbabwe, to name just a few. We believe that these early
stirrings of courageous groups within countries that for too
long have held on to rigid authoritarian or in some cases
totalitarian rule reflect in large measure the policies and
optimistic realism of President George W. Bush.
No one in the world of diplomacy and geo-political policy
has a better grounding of proven experience than John Bolton.
He was on hand as an active participant during the period of
the break-up of the Soviet Union and made important
contributions to policy-making at a time of total ambiguity
when the world of two superpowers was morphing into what we
have today.
We believe it is in the best interest of the community of
nations as represented by the United Nations, for the
maintenance of world peace and security, that the views of
America's President be clearly and directly presented in both
the General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN.
It is for this reason more than any other that we urge you
to quickly and clearly approve John's nomination.
Sincerely,
Bruce S. Geib, former Director of USIA; former Ambassador to
Belgium
Anne L. Armstrong, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom
William S. Farish, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Walter J.P. Curley, former Ambassador to France and Ireland
Richard R. Burt, former Ambassador to Germany
Edward N. Ney, former Ambassador to Canada
Chic Hecht, former Ambassador to The Bahamas; former U.S.
Senator
Alfred H. Kingon, former Ambassador to the European Union;
former Assistant Secretary of Commerce
Thomas Patrick Melady, former Ambassador to The Vatican, Uganda
and Burundi
Frank Shakespeare, former Ambassador to Portugal and The
Vatican
Michael Sotirhos, former Ambassador to Greece and Jamaica
Robert D. Stuart, Jr., former Ambassador to Norway
Weston Adams, former Ambassador to Malawi
Everett E. Bierman, former Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, the
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu
Stephen F. Brauer, former Ambassador to Belgium
Nancy G. Brinker, former Ambassador to Hungary
Keith L. Brown, former Ambassador to Denmark and Lesotho
Richard W. Carlson, former Director of VOA; former Ambassador
to Seychelles
Gerald P. Carmen, former Ambassador to the United Nations
Sue McCourt Cobb, former Ambassador to Jamaica
Charles E. Cobb, Jr., former Ambassador to Iceland
Peter H. Dailey, former Ambassador to Ireland and Special Envoy
to NATO
Diana Lady Dougan, former Ambassador--U.S. Coordinator for
International Communications and Information Policy
Richard J. Egan, former Ambassador to Ireland
William H.G. Fitzgerald, former Ambassador to Ireland
Joseph Ghougassian, former Ambassador to Qatar and Senior
member in Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq
Joseph B. Gildenhorn, former Ambassador to Switzerland
Glen A. Holden, former Ambassador to Jamaica
Richard L. Holwill, former Ambassador to Ecuador
Charles W. Hostler, former Ambassador to Bahrain
Roy M. Huffington, former Ambassador to Austria
O. Philip Hughes, former Ambassador to Barbados, Dominica, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Lester B. Korn, former Ambassador to the United Nations
Economic and Social Council
Paul C. Lambert, former Ambassador to Ecuador
L.W. Lane, Jr., former Ambassador to Australia and Nauru
Ronald S. Lauder, former Ambassador to Austria
John Langeloth Loeb, Jr., former Ambassador to Denmark
Gregory J. Newell, former Ambassador to Sweden; former
Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organizations
Julian M. Niemczyk, former Ambassador to Czechoslovakia
Sally Z. Novetzke, former Ambassador to Malta
Penne Korth Peacock, former Ambassador to Mauritius
Joseph Canton Petrone, former Ambassador to the United Nations
European Office (Geneva)
Charles J. Pilliod, Jr., former Ambassador to Mexico
James W. Rawlings, former Ambassador to Zimbabwe
Frank Ruddy, former Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea
Paul A. Russo, former Ambassador to Barbados, St. Kitts,
Antigua, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Dominica
Ronald J. Sorini, former Ambassador and Chief Textile
Negotiator
Timothy L. Towell, former Ambassador to Paraguay
Helene van Damm, former Ambassador to Austria
Leon J. Weil, former Ambassador to Nepal
Faith Whittlesey, former Ambassador to Switzerland
Joseph Zappala, former Ambassador to Spain
------
April 5, 2005.
Senator Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: We write to urge that the Senate act
expeditiously to confirm John Bolton as our ambassador to the
United Nations. This is a moment when unprecedented turbulence
at the United Nations is creating momentum for much needed
reform. It is a moment when we must have an ambassador in place
whose knowledge, experience, dedication and drive will be vital
to protecting the American interest in an effective, forward-
looking United Nations.
In his position as Undersecretary of State, John Bolton has
taken the lead in strengthening international community
approaches to the daunting problem of the proliferation of
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As a
result of his hard work, intellectual as well as operational,
the G-8 has supported U.S. proposals to strengthen safeguards
and verification at the International Atomic Energy Agency and
the Proliferation Security Initiative was launched and
established within three months--a world speed record in these
complex, multilateral matters. Moreover, Secretary Bolton led
the successful effort to complete the negotiation of UN
Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously in April,
2004. UN 1540 called on member states to criminalize the
proliferation of WMD--which it declared to be a threat to
international peace and security--and to enact strict export
controls.
Secretary Bolton, like the Administration, has his critics,
of course. Anyone as energetic and effective as John is bound
to encounter those who disagree with some or even all of the
Administration's policies. But the policies for which he is
sometimes criticized are those of the President and the
Department of State which he has served with loyalty, honor and
distinction.
Strong supporters of the United Nations understand the
challenges it now faces. With his service as assistant
secretary of state for international organizations, where he
was instrumental in securing the repeal of the repugnant
resolution equating Zionism with racism, and as undersecretary
for arms control and international security, we believe John
Bolton will bring great skill and energy to meeting those
challenges.
Sincerely yours,
The Honorable David Abshire, former Assistant Secretary of
State
The Honorable Kenneth Adelman, former Director, Antis Control
Disarmament Agency
The Honorable Richard Allen, former Assistant to the President
for National Security
The Honorable James Baker, former Secretary of State
The Honorable Frank Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense
The Honorable Lawrence Eagleburger, former Secretary of State
The Honorable Al Haig, former Secretary of State
Ambassador Max Kampelman, former Ambassador and Head of the
U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations with the Soviet
Union on Nuclear and Space Arms.
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Ambassador to the United
Nations
The Honorable Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State
The Honorable James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense
The Honorable George Shultz, former Secretary of State
The Honorable Helmut Sonnenfeldt, former Counselor, Department
of State
------
I89[From the Washington Post, May 12, 2005]
A Vote on Mr. Bolton
On April 19 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
unexpectedly postponed a vote on the nomination of John R.
Bolton as ambassador to the United Nations, citing concerns
that he had engaged in a pattern of abuse of subordinates and
manipulation of intelligence. Three weeks of further digging,
mostly by Democratic committee staff members, have not produced
evidence of such a pattern. The committee ought to give Mr.
Bolton a vote today. Ours would be an unenthusiastic,
deference-to-the-president yes.
It's as clear now as it was on April 19 that Mr. Bolton is
a contentious figure who has both strong admirers and
impassioned critics in Washington. He engages in hand-to-hand
bureaucratic combat, and on a couple of occasions he pushed too
hard. He challenged intelligence analysts, but it's naive to
think that such analysts are always ideologically neutral and
beyond politics--that they should never be challenged. What
emerges from the interviews conducted by committee staffers is
how intensely policy-driven, as opposed to personal, were most
of Mt Bolton's clashes in the State Department, during
President Bush's first term, under Secretary of State Colin L.
PowelL
If anyone might have been expected to provide evidence of
dysfunctional behavior, for exaniple, it would be Lawrence B.
Wilkerson, who was Mr. Powell's chief of staff. Mr. Wilkerson
has said that he does not believe Mr. Bolton is fit to be U.N.
ambassador, and by his description he knew pretty much
everything that was happening at Foggy Bottom: ``I was also a
sponge, sopping up everything! could about the Department,
about its efficiency; about its effectiveness, about its people
. . . and reporting to Powell.''
Yet in an interview last Friday, Mr. Wilkerson was unable
to provide any fresh examples of misbehavior by Mr. Bolton.
Instead he complained about policy differences: Mr. Bolton was
too eager to sanction Chinese companies that violated the
nonproliferation regime, thereby making diplomacy more
difficult. He was too zealous in carring out his mission to
persuade other countries to exempt U.S. soldiers from the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. When Mr.
Bolton delivered a speech vilifying North Korean leader Kim
Jong II, ``Rich was very angry''--that would be former deputy
secretary Richard L. Armitage--but, Mr. Wilkerson acknowledged,
he was angry because the speech had been cleared by the
assistant secretary for Asia, a Powell ally.
The committee interviews have provided some colorful
details without breaking new ground on what has long been a
well-understood split in the first Bush administration: a split
between those who saw themselves as pragmatic diplomats (the
Powell camp) and those, like Mr. Bolton, who saw themselves as
more willing to bruise feelings here and abroad in standing up
for U.S. interests. Our view was that Mr. Bolton often, though
not always, had the worse end of those arguments; he helped
hamstring diplomacy toward Iran and North Korea, and his
single-minded focus on the International Criminal Court
endangered relations even with allies who were supporting the
United States in Iraq.
Moreover, the first-term divisions themselves were harmful
to U.S. policymaking. Will Mr. Bolton perpetuate the divisions
from a new perch in New York? That seems to us a risk. But it
also strikes us as a risk that a president is entitled to take
on if he wants. Mr. Bush surely knows what role Mr. Bolton
played in the first term, and he says he wants to put Mr.
Bolton's bluntness to work at the United Nations. The nominee
is intelligent and qualified, we still see no compelling reason
to deny the president his choice.
------
The Secretary of State,
Washington, DC, August 26, 2003.
Hon. Jon Kyl,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Jon: I am pleased to reply to your recent letter
concerning John Bolton's speech in Korea and our reaction.
Undersecretary Bolton's speech was fully cleared within the
Department. It was consistent with Administration policy, did
not really break new ground with regard to our disdain for the
North Korean leadership and, as such, was official. The speech
was given during a time of delicate negotiations on the part of
the Chinese government to arrange six-party multilateral
discussions. As a result, it got a lot of attention in the
regional press and drew a sharp North Korean reaction directed
towards Secretary Bolton.
My acting spokesman, Phil Reeker, and the president's press
officer, Scott McClellan, both supported Mr. Bolton. Mr. Bolton
even cleared the response Phil Reeker used at his press
conference. We refused to be drawn into a debate with the North
Koreans, noting that Mr. Bolton spoke officially and the
Secretary and the President would decide who would represent
the United States in the talks. If you read the full text of
Mr. Armitage's statement in Australia, you will see that he
also supported that line. Assistant Secretary Jim Kelly, during
a background briefing on August 22, got the question yet again
and gave the same response.
Mr. Jack Pritchard, who you mentioned in your letter, from
time to time meets with the North Korean Ambassador to the UN.
His job is to listen to whatever they have to say, tell them
whatever we want them to hear. He does not debate with them or
even engage them beyond seeking clarification of their remarks.
I've read the transcript of his recent meeting. They complained
about Mr. Bolton. Mr. Pritchard took note of their complaint
and said they were aware of U.S. policy. He did not say or
imply that Mr. Bolton was speaking only in a personal capacity.
We know who we are dealing with when we deal with the North
Koreans. The President has given me solid guidance how to
manage this difficult account and I believe we are making
progress. I am fortunate to receive informed advice and
judgment from Mr. Bolton, Mr. Kelly and Mr. Pritchard. Mr.
Pritchard has just resigned having requested retirement some
months ago. I am pleased I was able to keep him on a while
longer and grateful for his many years of dedicated service to
our country.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Colin L. Powell.
------
A Dictatorship at the Crossroad
BY JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS, EAST ASIA INSTITUTE, SEOUL HILTON, SEOUL, SOUTH
KOREA, JULY 31, 2003
Distinguished guests, it is a pleasure to have the
opportunity to speak to you again. Since I last spoke here in
Seoul nearly 1 year ago, the United States and the Republic of
Korea have forged ahead in strengthening our alliance and
friendship. The foundation for this was made all the stronger
by the extremely successful summit last May between President
Bush and President Roh. At that summit, our two presidents made
the firm commitment to move in lock-step to meet our shared
challenges and opportunities. I am happy to say that we are
taking the shared vision of our presidents and putting it into
action.
Indeed, action is needed. As we stand here today having
just celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Armistice agreement
that ended combat on the peninsula, the threat to the North
posed by the Kim Jong Il dictatorship is a constant reminder of
a powerful truth--freedom is not free.
In preserving freedom, it is important for all to have a
shared understanding of the threats we face. Unfortunately, the
last year has seen a dizzying whirlwind of developments on the
threat posed by the Kim Jong Il dictatorship. Being so close to
North Korea, there is no doubt that the threat posed by Kim
Jong Il must weigh heavily on you. While it would be naive and
disingenuous for me to dismiss the danger, let me start off by
striking a positive note: The world is united in working
together to seek a peaceful solution to the threat posed by Kim
Jong Il. Rarely have we seen the international community so
willing to speak with the same voice and deliver a consistent
message on an issue. In addition to consistency, there is a
striking clarity to this message as well: The world will not
tolerate Kim Jong Il threatening international peace and
security with weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear
weapons.
The brazenness of Kim Jong Il's behavior in the past year
is striking. While nuclear blackmail used to be the province of
fictional spy movies, Kim Jong Il is forcing us to live that
reality as we enter the new millennium. To give in to his
extortionist demands would only encourage him, and perhaps more
ominously, other would-be tyrants around the world. One needs
little reminding that we have tested Kim Jong Il's intentions
many times before--a test he has consistently failed. Since
1994, billions of dollars in economic and energy assistance
have flowed into the coffers of Pyongyang to buy off their
nuclear weapons program. Nine years later, Kim Jong Il has
repaid us by threatening the world with not one, but two
separate nuclear weapons programs--one based on plutonium, the
other highly enriched uranium.
If history is any guide, Kim Jong Il probably expects that
his current threats wit! result in newfound legitimacy and
billions of dollars of economic and energy assistance pouring
into his failed economy. in this case, however, history is not
an especially good guide--a page has been turned. Particularly
after September 11, the world is acutely aware of the danger
posed to civilian populations by weapons of mass destruction
being developed by tyrannical rogue state leaders like Kim Jong
Il or falling into the hands of terrorists. Simply put, the
world has changed. Consider that in 1994, I could have used the
term ``WMD'' and most audiences would have stared at me
blankly. In 2003, we all know it is shorthand for ``weapons of
mass destruction.'' Clearly, this is a sad reflection on the
dangerous times we live in.
Let us also consider the fact that in 1994, North Korea
could have chosen to enter the international community on a new
and different footing. While communist dictatorships were
collapsing or reforming across the globe, there was even hope
that Kim Il Sung's North Korea would follow suit. When power
passed to Kim Jong Il, the world hoped he would be more
enlightened and recognize the benefits of participating in the
global community--as opposed to threatening and blackmailing
it.
Unfortunately; this still has not come to pass. Even a
cursory glance of the first decade of Kim Jong Il's dictatorial
reign suggests that he has done nothing but squander
opportunity after opportunity, olive branch after olive branch.
Sadly, as an editorial cartoon in The Economist recently
expressed so well, Kim Jong Il seems to care more about
enriching uranium than enriching his own people.
Kim Jong Il, of course, has not had to endure the
consequences of his failed policies. While he lives like
royalty in Pyongyang, he keeps hundreds of thousands of his
people locked in prison camps with millions more mired in
abject poverty, scrounging the ground for food. For many in
North Korea, life is a hellish nightmare. As reported by the
State Department Report on Human Rights, we believe that some
400,000 persons died in prison since 1972 and that starvation
and executions were common. Entire families, including
children, were imprisoned when only one member of the family
was accused of a crime. Consider the testimony of Lee Soon-ok,
a woman who spent years in North Korean prison camps. She
testified before the U.S. Senate that she witnessed severe
beatings and torture involving water forced into a victim's
stomach with a rubber hose and pumped out by guards jumping on
a board placed across the victim's abdomen. She also reported
chemical and biological warfare experiments conducted on
inmates by the army.
And while Kim Jong Il is rumored to enjoy the internet so
he can observe the outside world, he does not afford that right
to his own people who are forced to watch and listen to only
government television and radio programs.
Why is Kim Jong Il so scared of letting his people observe
the outside world? The answer, of course, is that they will see
the freedom enjoyed by much of the world and what they have
been denied. They will see their brothers and sisters in Seoul,
the capital of a booming vibrant democracy. They will see that
there is a world where children stand a good chance to live to
adulthood--a dream of every parent. More important, they will
see that the excuses for their failed system provided by Kim
Jong Il don't stand scrutiny. It is not natural disasters that
are to blame for the deprivation of the North Korean people--
but the failed policies of Kim Jong Il. They will see that,
unless he changes course, his regime is directly responsible
for bringing economic ruin to their country. The world already
knows this--which is why we will continue to give humanitarian
food aid to the starving people of North Korea. But let there
be no doubt about where blame falls for the misery of the North
Korean people--it falls squarely on the shoulders of Kim Jong
Il and his regime.
There is still hope that Kim Jong Il may change course. All
civilized nations and peace-loving people hope this to be true.
But Kim Jong Il must make the personal decision to do so and
choose a different path.
It is holding out this hope that has prompted the United
States, in lock-step with our friends and allies in the region,
to pursue the multilateral negotiations track. Let me be clear:
the United States seeks a peaceful solution to this situation.
President Bush has unambiguously led the way in mobilizing
world public opinion to support us in finding a lasting
multilateral solution to a problem that threatens the security
of the entire world.
The operative term is ``multilateral.'' It would be the
height of irresponsibility for the Bush administration to enter
into another bilateral agreement with the Kim Jong Il
dictatorship. The Clinton administration bravely tried with the
Agreed Framework but failed because Kim Jong Il instructed his
subordinates to systematically violate it in secret. To enter
into a similar type of agreement again would simply postpone
the problem for some future administration--something the Bush
administration will not do.
Postponing the elimination of Kim Jong Il's nuclear weapons
program will only allow him time to amass even more nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and to develop even longer
range missiles. Any doubts that Kim Jong Il would peddle
nuclear materials or nuclear weapons to any buyer on the
international market were dispelled last April when his envoy
threatened to do just that.
This will not stand. Some have speculated that the U.S. is
resigned to nuclear weapons on the peninsula and we will simply
have to learn to live with nuclear weapons in the hands of a
tyrannical dictator, who has threatened to export them. Nothing
could be further from the truth.
This is why we are working so hard on pursuing the
multilateral track in Beijing. Having just been in Beijing, I
can confirm that we all believe this track is alive and well,
but the ball is North Korea's court. The key now is to get
South Korea and Japan, and ultimately Russia and others, a seat
at the table. We know that as crucial players in the region,
and the countries most threatened by Kim Jong Il, the roles of
Seoul and Tokyo are vital to finding any permanent solution.
Those with a direct stake in the outcome must be part of the
process. On this point we will not waver.
While the Beijing track is on course, prudence suggests
that we pursue other tracks as well. We have been clear in
saying that we seek a peaceful solution to resolve the threat
posed by Kim Jong Il, but that all options are on the table. I
would like to discuss two complementary tracks that we are
pursuing now.
The first is action through the United Nations Security
Council. As the UN body charged with protecting international
peace and security, it could play an important role in helping
to reach a peaceful settlement. Unfortunately, the Council is
not playing the part it should. It was 6 months ago that the
Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency
voted overwhelmingly to report North Korea's violations to the
Security Council.
To date, virtually nothing has happened. We believe that
appropriate and timely action by the Security Council would
complement our efforts on the multilateral track in Beijing.
Just as important, it would send a signal to the rest of the
world that the Council takes its responsibilities seriously. I
would note that when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty the first time in March 1993, the
Council took action within a month. Ignoring this issue will
not make it go away--it will only reduce confidence in the
Council and suggest to proliferators that they can sell their
deadly arsenals with impunity.
The other track we are pursuing now is through the
Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI. When I spoke in
Seoul almost a year ago, I detailed at length the WMD programs
actively being pursued by Kim Jong Il. The last year has seen
Kim Jong Il accelerate these programs, particularly on the
nuclear front. Brazenly threatening to demonstrate, even
export, nuclear weapons, Kim Jong Il and his supports have
defied the unanimous will of the international community.
If Pyongyang thought the international community would
simply ignore its threats--it was mistaken. Recently, I
attended the second meeting of the PSI, held in Brisbane,
Australia and met with officials from 10 other countries on the
threats posed by dictators like Kim Jong Il. As the Chairman's
Statement underscores, ``the PSI is a global initiative with
global reach.'' And we ``agreed to move quickly on direct,
practical measures to impede the trafficking in weapons of mass
destruction, missiles and related items.'' Specifically, we are
working on ``defining actions necessary to collectively or
individually interdict shipments of WMD or missiles and related
items at sea, in the air or on land.''
While global in scope, the PSI is cognizant of the reality
that different countries pose different degrees of threat. Just
as the South Korean Ministry of National Defense recently
defined North Korea as the ``main enemy,'' the nations
participating in the PSI put North Korea and Iran at the top of
the list of proliferant countries. That North Korea has earned
this dubious distinction should come as little surprise in
light of Pyongyang's trafficking in death and destruction to
keep Kim Jong Il in power. It is practically their only source
of hard currency earnings, unless of course you add narcotics
and other illegal activities.
Hopefully, initiatives such as PSI will send a clear
message to dictators like Kim Jong Il. In his specific case, we
hope to communicate that while actively pursuing and believing
that multilateral talks are a preferable way to find a lasting
solution to the situation, we are not going to allow the DPRK
regime to peddle its deadly arsenals to rogue states and
terrorists throughout the world. Our national security, and our
allies, as well as the lives of our citizens are at stake.
Already, we are, planning operational training exercises on
interdiction utilizing both military and civilian assets. Kim
Jong Il would be wise to consider diversifying his export base
to something besides weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles.
The international community's tolerance for actions that
defy global norms is fast shrinking. There is growing political
will to take concrete steps to prevent dictators such as Kim
Jong Il from profiting in ill-gotten gains. We are moving to
translate this political will into action.
This choice is Kim Jong Il's and his alone. In coordination
with our allies, we are prepared to welcome a reformed North
Korea into the world of civilized nations. This would mean,
however, that Kim Jong Il makes the political decision to
undergo sweeping reforms. A good start would be to respect the
human rights of his people and not starve them to death or put
them in death camps. He should allow the families of the
Japanese abductees to be reunited, and he should provide a full
account of the cause of death for the eight deceased abductees.
It would also mean respecting international norms and
abiding by international commitments and giving up their
extensive chemical and biological weapons programs. And it will
certainly require Kim Jong Il to dismantle his nuclear weapons
program--completely, verifiably, and irreversibly.
The days of DPRK blackmail are over. Kim Jong Il is dead
wrong to think that developing nuclear weapons will improve his
security. Indeed, the opposite is true. As President Bush has
made clear: ``A decision to develop a nuclear arsenal is one
that will alienate you from the rest of the world.'' Kim Jong
Il has already squandered the first decade of his rule. To
continue down the path toward nuclear weapons will squander his
legacy as well. The choice is his to make--but whichever path
he does choose--the United States and its allies are prepared.
Let us hope he makes the right choice.
------
Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats From Weapons of Mass
Destruction
BY JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY, REMARKS TO THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 6,
2002
Thank you for asking me here to the Heritage Foundation.
I'm pleased to be able to speak to you today about the Bush
Administration's efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. The spread of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) to state sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups is,
in my estimation, the gravest security threat we now face.
States engaging in this behavior--some of them parties to
international treaties prohibiting such activities--must be
held accountable, and must know that only by renouncing
terrorism and verifiably forsaking WMD can they rejoin the
community of nations.
The New Security Environment
Eight months into the war on terror, the United States and
its partners have made great strides. We have helped the Afghan
people overthrow an oppressive, terrorist-harboring regime in
Afghanistan, foiled terrorist plots in places such as Germany,
Yemen, Spain and Singapore, and stanched the flow of funds that
allowed Al-Qaeda's schemes to come to fruition. We have
captured the number three man in Al-Qaeda, and will bring him
to justice. And this is just the beginning.
The attacks of September 11 reinforced with blinding
clarity the need to be steadfast in the face of emerging
threats to our security. The international security environment
has changed, and our greatest threat comes not from the specter
of nuclear war between two superpowers, as it did during the
Cold War, but from transnational terrorist cells that will
strike without warning using weapons of mass destruction. Every
nation--not just the United States--has had to reassess its
security situation, and to decide where it stands on the war on
terrorism.
In the context of this new international security
situation, we are working hard to create a comprehensive
security strategy with Russia, a plan President Bush calls the
New Strategic Framework. The New Strategic Framework involves
reducing offensive nuclear weapons, creating limited defensive
systems that deter the threat of missile attacks, strengthening
nonproliferation and counterproliferation measures, and
cooperating with Russia to combat terrorism. It is based on the
premise that the more cooperative, post-Cold War relationship
between Rissia and the United States makes new approaches to
these issues possible.
In preparation for the summit meeting in Moscow and St.
Petersburg later this month, we have been working closely with
the Russians to embody the reductions in offensive warheads
into a legally-binding document that will outlast the
administrations of both Presidents. We are also working to
draft a political declaration on the New Strategic Framework
that would cover the issues of strategic offensive and
defensive systems, nonproliferation and counterproliferation.
We are optimistic that we will have agreement in time for the
summit in Moscow, May 23rd to 25th.
Strengthening the U.S.-Russian relationship has been a
priority of the Bush Administration, even prior to the
September 11 attacks. In the current security climate,
cooperation with Russia becomes even more important, so that we
can work together to combat terrorism and the spread of weapons
of mass destruction, which threaten both our countries.
Preventing Terrorism's Next Wave
President Bush believes it is critical not to underestimate
the threat from terrorist groups and rogue states intent on
obtaining weapons of mass destruction. As he said on the six-
month anniversary of the attacks, ``Every nation in our
coalition must take seriously the growing threat of terror on a
catastrophic scale--terror armed with biological, chemical, or
nuclear weapons.'' We must not doubt for a moment the possible
catastrophic consequences of terrorists or their rogue state
sponsors who are willing to use disease as a weapon to spread
chemical agents to inflict pain and death, or to send suicide-
bound adherents armed with radiological weapons on missions of
mass murder.
Every nation must commit itself to preventing the
acquisition of such weapons by state sponsors of terrorism or
terrorist groups. As President Bush said: ``Our lives, our way
of life, and our every hope for the world depend on a single
commitment: The authors of mass murder must be defeated, and
never allowed to gain or use the weapons of mass destruction.''
To this end, we use a variety of methods to combat the spread
of weapons of mass destruction, including export controls,
missile defense, arms control, nonproliferation and counter-
proliferation measures.
In the past, the United States relied principally on
passive measures to stem proliferation. Arms control and
nonproliferation regimes, export controls, and diplomatic
overtures were the primary tools used in this fight. But
September 11th, the subsequent anthrax attacks, and our
discoveries regarding Al-Qaeda and its WMD aspirations has
required The U.S to complement these more traditional
strategies with a new approach. The Bush Administration is
committed to combating the spread of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, missiles, and related equipment, and is
determined to prevent the use of these deadly weapons against
our citizens, troops, allies, and friends. While diplomatic
efforts and multilateral regimes will remain important to our
efforts, we also intend to complement this approach with other
measures, as we work both in concert with likeminded nations,
and on our own, to prevent terrorists and terrorist regimes
from acquiring or using WMD. In the past, we looked at
proliferation and terrorism as entirely separate issues. As
Secretary Powell said in his Senate testimony April 24, ``There
are terrorists in the world who would like nothing better than
to get their hands on and use nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons. So there is a definite link between terrorism and WMD.
Not to recognize that link would be foolhardy to the extreme.''
America is determined to prevent the next wave of terror.
States that sponsor terror and pursue WMD must stop. States
that renounce terror and abandon WMD can become part of our
effort. But those that do not can expect to become our targets.
This means directing firm international condemnation toward
states that shelter--and in some cases directly sponsor--
terrorists within their borders. It means uncovering their
activities that may be in violation of international treaties.
It means having a direct dialogue with the rest of the world
about what is at stake. It means taking action against
proliferators, middlemen, and weapons brokers, by exposing
them, sanctioning their behavior, and working with other
countries to prosecute them or otherwise bring a halt to their
activities. It means taking law-enforcement action against
suspect shipments, front companies, and financial institutions
that launder prollferator's funds. And it requires, above all,
effective use, improvement, and enforcement of the multilateral
tools at our disposal--both arms control and nonproliferation
treaties and export control regimes.
The Problem of Noncompliance
Multilateral agreements are important to our
nonproliferation arsenal. This Administration strongly supports
treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the
Biological Weapons Convention. But in order to be effective and
provide the assurances they are designed to bring, they must be
carefully and universally adhered to by all signatories.
Therefore, strict compliance with existing treaties remains a
major goal of our arms control policy.
This has been our aim in particular with the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC). In 1969, President Nixon announced
that the United States would unilaterally renounce biological
weapons. The U.S. example was soon followed by other countries,
and by 1972 the BWC was opened for signature. This
international treaty, to which more than 140 countries are
parties, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling,
acquisition or retention of biological and toxin weapons.
While the vast majority of the BWC's parties have
conscientiously met their commitments, the United States is
extremely concerned that several states are conducting
offensive biological weapons programs while publicly avowing
compliance with the agreement. To expose some of these
violators to the international community, last November, I
named publicly several states the U.S. government knows to be
producing biological warfare agents in violation of the BWC.
Foremost is Iraq. Although it became a signatory to the BWC
in 1972 and became a State Party in 1991, Iraq has developed,
produced, and stockpiled biological warfare agents and weapons.
The United States strongly suspects that Iraq has taken
advantage of more than three years of no UN inspections to
improve all phases of its offensive BW program. Iraq also has
developed, produced, and stockpiled chemical weapons, and shown
a continuing interest in developing nuclear weapons and longer
range missiles.
Next is North Korea. North Korea has a dedicated, national-
level effort to achieve a BW capability and has developed and
produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of
the Convention. Despite the fact that its citizens are
starving, the leadership in Pyongyang has spent large sums of
money to acquire the resources, including a biotechnology
infrastructure, capable of producing infectious agents, toxins,
and other crude biological weapons. It likely has the
capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological
agents for military purposes within weeks of deciding to do so,
and has a variety of means at its disposal for delivering these
deadly weapons.
In January, I also named North Korea and Iraq for their
covert nuclear weapons programs, in violation of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. This year, North Korea did not meet
Congressional certification requirements because of its
continued lack of cooperation with the International Atomic
Energy Agency, its failure to make any progress toward
implementing the North-South Joint Denuclearization Declaration
as called for under the Agreed Framework, and for proliferating
long-range ballistic missiles. Finally, we believe that North
Korea has a sizeable stockpile of chemical weapons, and can
manufacture all manner of CW agents.
Then comes Iran. Iran's biological weapons program began
during the Iran-Iraq war, and accelerated after Tehran learned
how far along Saddam Hussein had progressed in his own program.
The Iranians have all of the necessary pharmaceutical
expertise, as well as the commercial infrastructure needed to
produce--and hide--a biological warfare program. The United
States believes Iran probably has produced and weaponized BW
agents in violation of the Convention. Again, Iran's BW program
is complemented by an even more aggressive chemical warfare
program, Iran's ongoing interest in nuclear weapons, and its
aggressive ballistic missile research, development, and flight
testing regimen.
President Bush named these three countries in his State of
the Union address earlier this year as the world's most
dangerous proliferators. ``States like these, and their
terrorist allies,'' he said, ``constitute an axis of evil,
arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons
of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing
danger.''
Trouble Ahead
Beyond the axis of evil, there are other rogue states
intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction--particularly
biological weapons. Given our vulnerability to attack from
biological agents, as evidenced recently in the anthrax
releases, it is important to carefully assess and respond to
potential proliferators. Today, I want to discuss three other
state sponsors of terrorism that are pursuing or who have the
potential to pursue weapons of mass destruction or have the
capability to do so in violation of their treaty obligations.
While we will continue to use diplomatic efforts and
multilateral regimes with these countries, it is important to
review the challenges we face and to underline the issues that
these states must address. As the President has said, ``America
will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security.
We'll be deliberate. Yet time is not on our side. I will not
wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as
peril draws closer and closer.''
First, Libya. There is no doubt that Libya continues its
longstanding pursuit of nuclear weapons. We believe that since
the suspension of UN sanctions against Libya in 1999, Libya has
been able to increase its access to dual use nuclear
technologies. Although Libya would need significant foreign
assistance to acquire a nuclear weapon, Tripoli's nuclear
infrastructure enhancement remains of concern. Qaddafi hinted
at this in a recent (25 March) interview with Al-Jazirah when
he said, ``We demanded the dismantling of the weapons of mass
destruction that the Israelis have; we must continue to demand
that. Otherwise, the Arabs will have the right to possess that
weapon.''
Among its weapons of mass destruction programs, Libya--
which is not a party to the CWC--continues its goal of
reestablishing its offensive chemical weapons ability, as well
as pursuing an indigenous chemical warfare production
capability. Libya has produced at least 100 tons of different
kinds of chemical weapons, using its Rabta facility. That
facility closed down after it was subject to media scrutiny,
but then re-opened as a pharmaceutical plant in 1995. Although
production of chemical agents reportedly has been halted, CW
production at Rabta cannot be ruled out. It remains heavily
dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals,
technical expertise, and other key chemical warfare-related
equipment. Following the suspension of UN sanctions in April
1999, Libya has reestablished contacts with illicit foreign
sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals in the
Middle East, Asia, and Western Europe.
Conversely, Libya has publicly indicated its intent to join
the CWC. While our perceptions of Libya would not change
overnight, such a move could be positive. Under the CWC, Libya
would be required to declare and destroy all chemical weapons
production facilities and stockpiles, make declarations about
any dual use chemical industry, undertake not to research or
produce any chemical weapons, and not to export certain
chemicals to countries that have not signed the CWC. Libya
would also be subject to challenge inspections of any facility,
declared or not.
Significantly for predictive purposes, Libya became a State
Party to the BWC in January 1982, but the U.S. believes that
Libya has continued its biological warfare program. Although
its program is in the research and development stage, Libya may
be capable of producing small quantities of biological agent
Libya's BW program has been hindered, in part, by the country's
poor scientific and technological base, equipment shortages,
and a lack of skilled personnel, as well as by UN sanctions in
place from 1992 to 1999.
Libya is also continuing its efforts to obtain ballistic
missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise
from foreign sources. Outside assistance--particularly Serbian,
Indian, North Korean, and Chinese--is critical to its ballistic
missile development programs, and the suspension of UN
sanctions in 1999 has allowed Tripoli to expand its procurement
effort. Libya's current capability probably remains limited to
its Scud B missiles, but with continued foreign assistance it
may achieve an MRBM capability--a long desired goal-or
extended-range Scud capability.
Although Libya is one of seven countries on the State
Department's list of state sponsors of terror \1\ N, the U.S.
has noted recent positive steps by the Libyan government that
we hope indicate that Tripoli wishes to rejoin the community of
civilized states. In 1999, Libya turned over two Libyans wanted
in connection with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland, for trial in the Netherlands. In 2001, it
condemned the September 11 attacks publicly and signed the
twelve terrorist conventions listed in UN Security Council
Resolution 1273. And, as I have already mentioned, Libya has
also announced its intention to accede to CWC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
N\1\ ``Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000,'' U.S. Department of
State, April 20, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, as I have also said, words are not enough. The key
is to see clear, hard evidence that Libya will, in fact, live
up to the public standards it has set for itself. Libya can
make a positive gesture in this regard by fulfilling its
obligations under WMD treaties and becoming a party to the CWC.
Moreover, Libya must honor the relevant UN Security Council
Resolutions relating to the resolution of Pan Am 103, arguably
the worst air terrorist disaster prior to September 11. Libya
has yet to comply fully with these resolutions, which include
accepting responsibility and paying compensation. It is past
time that Libya did this.
The United States also knows that Syria has long had a
chemical warfare program. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent
sarin and is engaged in research and development of the more
toxic and persistent nerve agent VX. Although Damascus
currently is dependent on foreign sources for key elements of
its chemical warfare program, including precursor chemicals and
key production equipment, we are concerned about Syrian
advances in its indigenous CW infrastructure which would
significantly increase the independence of its CW program. We
think that Syria has a variety of aerial bombs and SCUD
warheads, which are potential means of delivery of deadly
agents capable of striking neighboring countries.
Syria, which has signed but not ratified the BWC, is
pursuing the development of biological weapons and is able to
produce at least small amounts of biological warfare agents.
While we believe Syria would need foreign assistance to launch
a large-scale biological weapons program right now, it may
obtain such assistance by the end of this decade.
Syria has a combined total of several hundred Scud B, Scud
C and SS-21 SRBMs, It is pursuing both solid- and liquid-
propellant missile programs and relies extensively on foreign
assistance in these endeavors. North Korean and Russian
entities have been involved in aiding Syria's ballistic missile
development. All of Syria's missiles are mobile and can reach
much of Israel, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well
within the country.
In addition to Libya and Syria, there is a threat coming
from another BWC signatory, and one that lies just 90 miles
from the U.S. mainland--namely, Cuba. This totalitarian state
has long been a violator of human rights. The State Department
said last year in its Annual Report on Human Rights Practices
that ``the Government continued to violate systematically the
fundamental civil and political rights of its citizens.
Citizens do not have the right to change their government
peacefully. Prisoners died in jail due to lack of medical care.
Members of the security forces and prison officials continued
to beat and otherwise abuse detainees and prisoners . . . The
Government denied its citizens the freedoms of speech, press,
assembly and association.''
Havana has long provided safehaven for terrorists, earning
it a place on the State Department's list of terrorist-
sponsoring states. The country is known to be harboring
terrorists from Colombia, Spain, and fugitives from the United
States. We know that Cuba is collaborating with other state
sponsors of terror.
Castro has repeatedly denounced the U.S. war on terrorism.
He continues to view terror as a legitimate tactic to further
revolutionary objectives. Last year, Castro visited Iran. Syria
and Libya--all designees on the same list of terrorist-
sponsoring states. At Tehran University, these were his words:
``Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring
America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are
witnessing this weakness from close up.''
But Cuba's threat to our security often has been
underplayed. An official U.S. government report in 1998
concluded that Cuba did not represent a significant military
threat to the United States or the region. It went only so far
as to say that, ``Cuba has a limited capacity to engage in some
military and intelligence activities which could pose a danger
to U.S. citizens under some circumstances.'' However, then-
Secretary of Defense William Cohen tried to add some balance to
this report by expressing in the preface his serious concerns
about Cuba's intelligence activities against the United States
and its human rights practices. Most notably, he said, ``I
remain concerned about Cuba's potential to develop and produce
biological agents, given its biotechnology infrastructure . .
.''
Why was the 1998 report on Cuba so unbalanced? Why did it
underplay the threat Cuba posed to the United States? A major
reason is Cuba's aggressive intelligence operations against the
United States, which included recruiting the Defense
Intelligence Agency's senior Cuba analyst, Ana Belen Montes, to
spy for Cuba. Montes not only had a hand in drafting the 1998
Cuba report but also passed some of our most sensitive
information about Cuba back to Havana. Montes was arrested last
fall and pleaded guilty to espionage on March 19th.
For four decades Cuba has maintained a well-developed and
sophisticated biomedical industry, supported until 1990 by the
Soviet Union. This industry is one of the most advanced in
Latin America, and leads in the production of pharmaceuticals
and vaccines that are sold worldwide. Analysts and Cuban
defectors have long cast suspicion on the activities conducted
in these biomedical facilities.
Here is what we now know: The United States believes that
Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare
research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use
biotechnology to other rogue states. We are concerned that such
technology could support BW programs in those states. We call
on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue
states and to fully comply with all of its obligations under
the Biological Weapons Convention.
Conclusion
America is leading in the fight to root out and destroy
terror. Our goals are to stop the development of weapons of
mass destruction and insure compliance with existing arms
control and nonproliferation treaties and commitments, which
the Bush Administration strongly supports, but experience has
shown that treaties and agreements are an insufficient check
against state sponsors of terrorism. Noncompliance can
undermine the efficacy and legitimacy of these treaties and
regimes. After all, any nation ready to violate one agreement
is perfectly capable of violating another, denying its actual
behavior all the while. And so I close with four fundamental
conclusions. First, that global terrorism has changed the
nature of the threat we face. Keeping WMD out of terrorist
hands must be a core element of our nonproliferation strategy.
Second, the Administration supports an international
dialogue on weapons of mass destruction and encourages
countries to educate their publics on the WMD threat. We must
not shy away from truth telling.
Third, the Administration will not assume that because a
country's formal subscription to UN counterterrorism
conventions or its membership in multilateral regimes
necessarily constitutes an accurate reading of its intentions.
We call on Libya, Cuba, and Syria to live up to the agreements
they have signed. We will watch closely their actions, not
simply listen to their words. Working with our allies, we will
expose those countries that do not live up to their
commitments.
Finally, the United States will continue to exercise strong
leadership in multilateral forums and will take whatever steps
are necessary to protect and defend our interests and eliminate
the terrorist threat.
Thank you.
------
Announcement of Nomination of John Bolton as U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N.
BY SECRETARY CONDOLEEZZA RICE, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN ROOM, WASHINGTON, DC,
MARCH 7, 2005
SECRETARY RICE: Good afternoon. This past September at the
United Nations General Assembly, President Bush spoke of our
nation's commitments to working in close partnership with the
United Nations. The United States is committed to the success
of the United Nations and we view the U.N. as an important
component of our diplomacy. The American people respect the
idealism that sparked the creation of the United Nations and we
share the UN's unshakable support for human dignity.
At this time of great opportunity and great promise, the
charge to the International community is clear: we who are on
the right side of freedom's divide have an obligation to help
those who were unlucky enough to be born on the wrong side of
that divide. The hard work of freedom is a task of generations;
yet, it is also urgent work that cannot be deferred.
We have watched in awe in Afghanistan, as men and women
once suppressed by the Tatiban walked miles and stood for hours
in the snow just to cast a ballot for their first vote as a
free people. We have watched as millions of Iraqi men and women
defied terrorists and cast their free votes and began their
nation's new history. We have seen determination in the faces
of citizens in places like Ukraine and Georgia and the
Palestinian territories, as they have stood firm for their
freedom.
We are seeing political reforms begin to take place in
Qatar and Jordan and Egypt and Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and
this very morning we applaud the courage of those on the
frontlines of freedom in Lebanon who are seeking free and fair
elections. In this era of expanding freedom, there is room for
optimism but much hard work lies ahead. The international
community has a challenging agenda before it, from the Middle
East to Sudan to Haiti to the Balkans from Iran to the Korean
Peninsula and on many other issues.
Now, more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical role as
it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and aspirations of
its original promise to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and fundamental human rights
and to promote social progress and better standards of life in
larger freedom. President Bush has sent our most skilled and
experienced diplomats to represent the United States at the
U.N. Today, I am honored to continue that tradition by
announcing that President Bush intends to nominate John Bolton
to be our next Ambassador to the United Nations.
The President and I have asked John to do this work because
he knows how to get things done. He is a tough-minded diplomat,
he has a strong record of success and he has a proven track
record of effective multilateralism. For the past four years
John has served as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security Affairs. In that position, John has
held primary responsibility for the issue that U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan has identified as one of our most crucial
challenges to international peace and security: stemming the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
John helped build a coalition of more than 60 countries to
help combat the spread of WMD through the President's
Proliferation Security Initiative. John played a key diplomatic
role in our sensitive negotiations with Libya when that nation
made the wise choice to give up its pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction. And John was the chief negotiator of the Treaty of
Moscow, which was signed by Presidents Putin and Bush to reduce
nuclear warheads by two-thirds.
In President George H.W. Bush's Administration, John served
as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations
and worked on several key diplomatic initiatives with the U.N.,
including work on U.N. reform and work on the repayment of
arrearages and assessments. In 1991, John was the principal
architect behind the initiative that finally led the United
Nations General Assembly to repeal the notorious resolution
that equated Zionism and racism.
And few may remember this, but John worked between 1997 and
2000 as an assistant to former Secretary James Baker in his
capacity as the Secretary General's personal envoy to the
Western Sahara. John did work pro bono. If few Americans have
direct experience working for the United Nations, I'm confident
that fewer still have gained that experience on their own
nickel. Through history, some of our best ambassadors have been
those with the strongest voices, ambassadors like Jeane
Kirkpatrick and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
John Bolton is personally committed to the future success
of the United Nations and he will be a strong voice for reform
at a time when the United Nations has begun to reform itself to
help meet the challenging agenda before the international
community. John will also help to build a broader base of
support here in the United Nations for the U.N.--in the United
States for the U.N. and its mission. As Secretary General Annan
has said, ``U.S. support the U.N. is critical to the success of
this institution.'' The United States will continue to do its
part.
John, you have my confidence and that of the President. We
thank you for the work you have done on behalf of our nation.
To John's wife, Gretchen, and daughter Jennifer Sarah and other
friends of John who are here with us today, we thank you for
all that you do. But John, your most important work is yet to
come. And I look forward to working closely with you on behalf
of our nation and the international community in support of the
United Nations.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Madame Secretary, you and the
President have done me a great honor in nominating me to be the
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
If confirmed by the Senate, I will continue to work closely
with members of Congress and our colleagues both in the Foreign
Service and in the civil service to advance President Bush's
policies.
As you know, Madame Secretary, I've worked in the
government for many years, at the Agency for International
Development, the Department of Justice and here at the
Department of State. This work has afforded me the opportunity
to learn from some of our nation's finest public servants. It
has been an honor and a privilege to represent the United
States Government in crafting many multinational and bilateral
agreements to further our National Security objectives.
Madame Secretary, my record over many years demonstrates
clear support for effective multilateral diplomacy. Whether it
be the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 global
partnership or adopting UN resolutions, working closely with
others is essential to ensuring a safer world. We all agree
that there are numerous challenges facing the United States and
the security of our country and all freedom-loving peoples must
be protected. Close cooperation and the time-honored tradition
of frank communication is central to achieving our mutually-
held objectives. The United Nations affords us the opportunity
to move our policies forward together with unity of purpose.
As you know, I have over the years written critically about
the U.N. Indeed, one highlight of my professional career was
the 1991 successful effort to repeal the General Assembly's
1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism, thus removing the
greatest stain on the U.N.'S reputation. I have consistently
stressed in my writings that American leadership is critical to
the success of the U.N., an effective U.N., one that is true to
the original intent of its charter's framers.
This is a time of opportunity for the U.N. which, likewise,
requires American leadership to achieve successful reform. I
know you and the President will provide that leadership. If
confirmed by the Senate, I will roll up my sleeves to join you
in that effort which will require close, bipartisan
Congressional support.
Finally a personal note, I'd like to thank two very special
people who have been with me for many years, my wife Gretchen
and our daughter Jennifer Sarah, who have endured my many
foreign trips and long absences in the service of our country.
Madame Secretary, again, I want to thank you and the
President for your confidence and for your support.
------
Memo re: Unclassified Briefing on the Process of Getting Identities
From NSA Intercepts
On Friday, May 6, officials from the State Department's
bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) gave a briefing to
majority and minority staffs on how policymakers and others can
obtain the blacked-out names of Americans in intercepts from
the National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA regularly sends
relevant, highly-classified reports to various policymakers, as
well as to INR, as part of the normal intelligence briefing
process. The volume of reports depends on both availability of
information and the interest of the policymaker. Sometimes
those reports will include excerpts of intercepted
conversations between foreigners that mention U.S. citizens. By
law, the American names are blacked out, and it is noted that
speakers are referring to ``named U.S. person'', ``named U.S.
official'' or ``named U.S. company.''
If the person receiving the NSA report wants to know the
identity of the ``named'' person, he or she contacts the
relevant INR analyst and asks for it. INR prepares a formal
request for NSA, signed by INR's Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary. The requester needs to give no special reason other
than he/she needs the name ``to assess the intelligence value
of the report.'' INR rarely if ever questions the requester.
The request is sent over to the NSA, and the name comes back,
sometimes overnight, or a day or so later. No request has ever
been denied by NSA, as far as we were told. The analyst is
shown the ``ident'', and then goes and informs the requester.
Requesters can be ``any policy customer who has the authority
to see the report.'' Typically the individual is at the Deputy
Assistant Secretary rank or above, sometimes office director or
above.
The briefers said they receive ``two or three'' such
requests a week, especially from INR analysts, who need the
information to understand better the intelligence they are
analyzing. The Committee has been told that during Secretary
Bolton's tenure, 400 such requests were made by the State
Department, including 10 by Secretary Bolton. An estimated 50%
of the 400 requests come from INR; an almost equally large
number are requested by officials from Diplomatic Security.
By law, the NSA may not eavesdrop on the conversations of a
U.S. citizen, even if that citizen is abroad. Therefore, any
blacked-out names would be Americans who are being talked
about, not Americans who are talking on the intercept.
The NSA reports are typically so highly classified that
they do not stay with the requester once he or she has read it.
They must be stored in more secure facilities than most
officials have in their offices. When the name comes back from
NSA (via secure e-mail), the analyst is shown the name, but
apparently is not given it on a piece of paper. The analyst
then takes the original intercept report to the requester,
discloses the ``ident'', then takes the report back again.
There is some discrepancy about how many requests have been
made. If the requester asks for two different names on the same
report, INR counts that as two requests, NSA counts it as one.
Therefore, INR counts somewhat more requests than NSA's 400.
INR assumes that if a request comes from the chief of staff or
some other top person in an official's office, it is coming
from the official. The briefers did not believe INR's records
are scrupulous in recording whether the request came directly
from the principal or from staff. The INR records of the idents
are destroyed within nine months.
Like any SCI material, the NSA reports are available only a
need to know basis. Someone with a clearance can't simply go
rooting around NSA reports. A person requesting an ident on a
report clearly outside his/her area would raise a red flag.
------
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, April 28, 2005.
Hon. Pat Roberts,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington DC.
Hon. Jay Rockefeller,
Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman/Vice Chairman: As part of the Committee
on Foreign Relations' due diligence process, in connection with
the nomination of John Bolton to be the United States
Representative to the United Nations, questions have arisen
with regard to requests by the nominee in his capacity as Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control. More specifically, Mr.
Bolton has testified that, on approximately ten occasions
between 2001 and 2004, he requested the names of U.S. persons
that were redacted in the release to policymakers of various
intelligence products.
A number of questions have been raised regarding these
types of requests, including the process by which such requests
are made, transmitted, and approved. There is also concern as
to whether information regarding Mr. Bolton's specific requests
has been handled appropriately by those with knowledge of such
requests.
Therefore, the Committee, working with and through the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate,
hereby requests that you solicit from the appropriate
intelligence agencies or elements thereof all information
related to Mr. Bolton's requests and the responses thereto,
including but not limited to, the unredacted contents of the
documents in question, the process by which Mr. Bolton's
requests were handled, the contents of the responses and the
process by which they were communicated, as well as any
conclusions reached by the appropriate intelligence agencies or
elements thereto as to any violations of procedures,
directives, regulations, or law by those with knowledge of Mr.
Bolton's requests.
Assuming the provision of such material, the Committee on
Foreign Relations is prepared to follow the guidance of the
Select Committee on Intelligence with access and storage of
such material, as well as the provisions under which such
materials will be shared with Members of the Committee on
Foreign Relations.
Thank you for your consideration of this request.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman.
------
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 5, 2005.
Hon. Richard Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Committee has received your letter
of April 28, 2005. As you requested in that letter, the Select
Committee on Intelligence is prepared to assist the Foreign
Relations Committee in its review of specific Intelligence
Community holdings as they relate to the nomination of John
Bolton to be the U.S. Representative to the United Nations.
The Select Committee on Intelligence looks forward to
working with you and your Committee in order to facilitate this
request.
Sincerely,
Pat Roberts,
Chairman.
ANNEX E
HEARING ON NOMINATION OF JOHN R. BOLTON TO BE U.S., REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
----------
MONDAY, APRIL 11, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman,
Alexander, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer,
Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to consider
President George W. Bush's nomination of John Bolton to be
United States Ambassador to the United Nations. Mr. Bolton has
served the last four years as the Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security Affairs. In this
capacity, he has played an important role in several of the
Bush administration's most notable diplomatic successes,
including the President's proliferation security initiative,
the Moscow Treaty, the G8 Global Partnership Against the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the opening
of Libya's WMD programs.
Secretary Bolton also served for four years in the
administration of George H.W. Bush, as the Assistant Secretary
of State for International Organizations. In this position, he
was heavily involved in matters related to the United Nations,
including United Nations financing and reform proposals. He
also assisted former Secretary of State James Baker in his role
as the Secretary General's personal envoy for the Western
Sahara.
In announcing this nomination, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice stated, and I quote, ``John Bolton is
personally committed to the future success of the United
Nations, and he will be a strong voice for reform at a time
when the United Nations has begun to reform itself to help meet
the challenging agenda before the international community,''
end of quote from Dr. Rice.
Perhaps no organization is so frequently oversimplified by
both its proponents and its detractors as the United Nations.
The United Nations is not a monolithic entity controlled by a
Secretary General; rather, it's a complex collection of
agencies, programs, diplomatic venues, traditions, and
agreements that depend on the actions of the individual member
states. As such, the various parts of the U.N. often work
independently from one another with little coordination or
oversight.
The U.N. has produced great accomplishments, even as some
of its structures have experienced episodes of corruption,
mismanagement, contentiousness, or timidity. Some agencies and
programs, like the World Health Organization, the World Food
Program, and UNICEF, have a proven record of achievement and
are trusted by people and nations around the world. Other
endeavors, like the Oil-for-Food Program or the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, have been gravely flawed and suffer from
severe organizational deficiencies.
Foreign Relations Committee held the first congressional
hearing on the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food scandal a year ago this
month. At that hearing, I said, and I quote, ``Billions of
dollars that should have been spent on humanitarian needs in
Iraq were siphoned off by Saddam Hussein's regime through a
system of surcharges, bribes, and kickbacks. This corruption
was not solely a product of Saddam Hussein's machination; he
depended upon members of the U.N. Security Council who were
willing to be complicit in his activities, and they needed U.N.
officials and contractors who were dishonest, inattentive, or
willing to make damaging compromises in pursuit of a
compassionate mission,'' end of quote.
During the last year, we have learned much more about the
extent of that corruption and mismanagement involved, and this
knowledge has supported the case for reform.
United Nations reform is not a new issue. The structure and
role of the United Nations has been debated in our country
almost continuously since the U.N. was established, in 1945.
But in 2005 we may have a unique opportunity to improve the
operations of the U.N. The revelations of the Oil-for-Food
scandal and the urgency of strengthening global cooperation to
address terrorism, the AIDS crisis, nuclear proliferation, and
many other international problems have created momentum in
favor of constructive reforms at the U.N.
Secretary General Annan has proposed a substantial reform
plan that will provide a platform for further reform
initiatives and discussion. The United States must be a leader
in the effort to improve the United Nations, particularly its
accountability. At a time when the United Nations is appealing
for greater international help in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in
trouble spots around the world, the diminishment of U.N.
credibility because of scandal reduces U.S. options and
increases our burdens.
Secretary Bolton has thought a great deal about this
subject, and we are anxious to listen to his ideas for reform,
as well as his evaluation of the Secretary General's plan. We
want to know what specific parts of that plan deserve United
States support. Beyond substantive evaluation, we want to know
how the nominee intends to pursue these reform ideas. What
strategy does he propose for making constructive changes a
reality? How will he apply the substantial experience in this
area?
Even as reform must be a priority, the world will not stop
while we attempt to improve the structures of the U.N. The next
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. must pursue reform without
diminishing the effectiveness of its core diplomatic mission;
namely, securing greater international support for the
national-security and foreign-policy objectives of the United
States.
During the last several months, President Bush and
Secretary Rice have undertaken important missions designed to
reinvigorate relations with allies and partners. This is an
urgent national-security imperative that cannot be neglected by
the next ambassador to the U.N. The United States does not
possess infinite financial and military resources. We need help
to advance security, democracy, and human rights. This fact
should not preclude us from taking unilateral action when it is
in our interest, but it does require that we be persistent and
imaginative in our pursuits of international support.
The nomination of Secretary Bolton to be Ambassador to the
United Nations has generated public debate on U.S. policies
toward the United Nations and on the degree to which the United
States should embrace multilateralism. In this context,
opponents of Mr. Bolton have criticized some statements of the
nominee as abrasive, confrontational, and insensitive. Some of
these same statements have been celebrated by supporters of the
nominee as demonstrating a tough-minded, refreshingly blunt
approach to diplomacy. But in the diplomatic world, neither
bluntness nor rhetorical sensitivity is a virtue, in itself.
There are times when blunt talk serves a policy purpose. Other
times, it does not.
When President Ronald Reagan stood before the Brandenburg
Gate in 1987 and said, ``Mr. Gorbachev, tear down that wall,''
blunt speech was serving a carefully planned diplomatic
purpose. It reflected broader themes of democracy that had been
nurtured for years by the Reagan administration. It reaffirmed
to Germany, on both sides of the wall, the United States would
have staying power in Europe. It underscored to the Kremlin, in
a personal, tangible way, that the United States and its allies
were intent on achieving the peaceful transformation of Eastern
Europe.
Blunt as it was, there was nothing gratuitous about
President Reagan's statement. Diplomatic speech by any high-
ranking administration official has policy consequences. It
should never be undertaken simply to score international
debating points, to appeal to segments of the U.S. public
opinion, or to validate a personal point of view.
As President John Kennedy once said, and I quote, ``The
purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our
own sentiments of hope or indignation; it is to shape real
events in a real world,'' end of quote.
I believe that diplomats serving under the President and
Secretary of State can apply a basic three-part test to almost
anything they utter in a diplomatic context. First, is the
statement true? Second, is the statement consistent with the
policies and directives of the President and the Secretary of
State? And, third, is there a rational expectation that the
statement will advance or support U.S. interests?
It is particularly important that the statements of our
ambassadors to the U.N. meet this test, because, more so than
any other American ambassadors, they are perceived as speaking
directly for the President of the United States.
President Bush has selected John Bolton, a nominee of
experience and accomplishment, to be his spokesman and
representative at the United Nations. Given the importance of
the position, it is vital that we act both expeditiously and
thoroughly in evaluating the nominee. We look forward to
hearing the nominee's insights and learning how he will work on
behalf of the President and the Secretary of State in
fulfilling this duty.
I'd like to turn now to the distinguished Ranking Member of
the committee, Senator Biden, for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM
DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
Mr. Secretary.
Let me say, at the outset, I'm probably--of all the people
up here, I'm going to be the least critical of anyone who's
blunt. I don't like to indict myself publicly that way. But--I
hadn't planned on starting this way, but I think that the--to
state my grave concern with this appointment, Mr. Chairman, I
think that the test you set out for diplomacy is the accurate
one: true, consistent with the policy of the administration,
and a rational expectation that it would be in U.S. interests.
Obviously, all of this is subject to explanation and
rebuttal and--by our friend, Mr. Bolton, but I think that my
problem with your statements about the U.N. is, I don't think
they're true, I don't think they're consistent with U.S.
policy, and I don't think--I clearly believe they do not
advance U.S. interests. And, you know, you can be blunt.
President Reagan was blunt about the Berlin Wall, because it
was, in fact, clear to the whole world that it was an odious
thing. I think your statements, which I'll go into in a minute,
about the U.N. are a little bit like being blunt about NATO. If
you had said, which you haven't, to the best of my knowledge,
``NATO forces can't keep with us--up with us. The French air
force can't fly on our wing,'' et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
That would be blunt. That be also clearly against U.S.
interests to say those things. But it would be blunt. And I
would think that's more akin to my criticism of what you will
soon hear of your statements about the U.N. than the Berlin
Wall.
I don't believe--well, I should point out, at the outset,
Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you for your cooperation. You
have been, as always, straightforward and honorable and fair to
both the witness and to the minority. I don't believe this
hearing, quite frankly, is ready to be conducted today, because
we've not completed the review of certain allegations, none of
which go to the integrity, the honesty, the personal conduct of
the nominee. When I say ``allegations,'' I'll get into what I
mean by that, allegations involving the nominee. They all
relate to whether or not he attempted to use his influence
unfairly to get certain analysts fired because they didn't
agree with his assessments. That's what I mean, at the outset,
so the press doesn't think there's anything nefarious about
this. That's the issue that's going to be discussed here, among
others.
On March 21st, I asked the State Department for access to
certain individuals and documents related to an incident
involving the nominee and a State Department employee relating
to whether or not that person should or should not have been
fired. For two weeks, the Department stonewalled. It was only
after you, Mr. Chairman, intervened, last Thursday--and we sent
repeated letters to the State Department--last Thursday that
you intervened, that we received some cooperation.
On Thursday, last, at 1:45 p.m., the Democratic staff was
informed that two individuals--we asked for four--would be made
available that afternoon, starting at 3:00 p.m. On Friday
morning, some of the documents we requested began to arrive,
but the committee was not allowed to retain them or make copies
of them, but only take notes, further handicapping our ability
to review the materials.
Since Thursday afternoon, staff on both sides--this has
been on both sides--I asked my chief of staff to correct me--on
every interview, there's been a majority member staff person
there, so this isn't a--this isn't--the Democrats are asking
for it, but this--none of this has been done absent a majority
staff person being present.
Since Thursday afternoon, staff on both sides have worked
diligently to interview the witnesses and review materials. And
so, I'm grateful for your intervention at the time that you
intervened, because I was having no success with Secretary
Rice. But the committee's work to investigate this matter,
which would have proceeded over the past two-week period, was
compressed into 90 hours. The staff still only--has at least
two more interviews to conduct, and I don't believe that all
documents responsive to the request have been provided.
And because many of the documents are classified, they
could not be made available to Senators to review unless they
happened to be in Washington during this period. Many of us
were--the reason it was initially postponed is, many of us were
in Rome with the President's funeral. Excuse me. Freudian. I
beg your pardon. At the Pope's funeral that the President
attended.
This is not a way that we should do business. The
Department's lack of cooperation--this is not Mr. Bolton; he
did not fail to cooperate, the Department did not cooperate
until the last possible minute--stands in marked contrast to
the nomination four years ago for this same position. In that
case, involving John Negroponte, the committee reviewed, with
full cooperation, and obtained hundreds of pages of documents
without delay or resistance. And my friend from Connecticut was
a prime mover in dealing with that nomination.
The fact is that, unlike four years ago, Under Secretary
Bolton, when he came before this committee, had little
background in Arms Controls, and we confirmed him. But there's
no question that he comes before us today with extensive
experience in U.N. affairs. He served as the Assistant
Secretary of State during the first Bush administration,
supervising policy regarding the United Nations. And he has
written and testified frequently about the subject. And it is
precisely the record in his first part of this--the first Bush
term that concerns me.
I believe the President is entitled to significant
deference in his appointment of senior personnel, and I've --
but I have opposed nominees, however, who I believe were
hostile to the mission for which--to which they were assigned.
For example, I voted against two--one Secretary of the Interior
who was--clearly had an animus toward that Department, under
the Reagan administration. And I voted against Secretaries of
Education appointed by Reagan, because he said he was
appointing them for the express purpose of doing away with the
Department of Education.
And so, this will--not the first time I have voted against
a--if I vote against John--it would not be the first time that
I voted against a nominee for--that the President has put
forward that's not a member of the judiciary.
And, quite frankly, I'm surprised that the nominee wants
the job that he's been nominated for, given his--the many
negative things he had to say about the U.N., international
institutions, and international law. Now, you've going to have
an opportunity to respond to all these kinds of things. They're
taken--they're attempted to be in context, but they're--but I'm
just going to cite some of the things you said, and they'll be
put in context during the question-and-answer period.
You said, there's no such thing as the United Nations --
quote, ``There's no such thing as the United Nations.''
You said, and I quote, that--excuse me--you said, If they
removed ten stories from the 38-story U.N. headquarters, quote,
``it wouldn't make a bit of difference,'' end of quote.
You said that if the Security Council were to be made
today, that you would have only one permanent member, the
United States.
You said that international law really isn't, quote,
``It''--that it really isn't law, and that, quote, ``While
treaties may well be politically or even morally binding, they
are not legally obligatory,'' end of quote.
You said the International Court of Justice, a body created
under the U.N. Charter, is a, quote, ``travesty and a pretend
court,'' end of quote.
You said that the peace-enforcement operations of the
United--of nation and nation-building should, quote, ``be
relegated to history's junk pile at the first opportunity,''
end of quote, because they resulted in, as you said, quote,
``American personnel and resources being committed to U.N.
operations far removed from America's vital interests,'' end of
quote, even though they wouldn't be there unless we--if we
didn't want them there, we could veto the effort.
I want to give you a chance to explain, clarify, and
possibly, hopefully, repudiate these and other statements
you've made over the years, but, for now, let me point to two
things.
First, the logical conclusion of your views is that--in my
view, is that if the U.S. Embassy is sacked by a foreign state,
or a U.S. soldier tortured, then this country and its citizens
have no recourse under international law, because, in your
view, there's no such thing as international law. How can that
possibly be in America's interest?
Second, it seems to me your views about the U.N. treaties
and international law are out of sync with those of the
President of the United States and Secretary Rice. Soon after
his election, the President stated that one of his priorities
for the second term was, quote, ``to defend our security and
spread freedom by building effective multinational and
multilateral institutions and supporting effective multilateral
action,'' end of quote.
The President, right now, is demanding, to his great
credit, Syria's full withdrawal from Lebanon, under the
authority of a U.N. Security Council Resolution. The
administration has finally joined the European effort to
convince Iran to forego nuclear weapons. Quote, ``We're working
closely with Britain, France, and Germany,'' the President
said, continuing the quote, ``as they insist that Tehran comply
with international law.''
The President recently decided the United States, quote,
``will discharge its international obligations,'' end of quote,
under decisions of the International Court of Justice by having
several state courts, including courts in Texas, give effect to
the decision of that court in certain death-penalty cases. Does
he know that he's implementing an order that is from a
``pretend court''?
The administration strongly endorses the U.N. decision to
send 10,000 peacekeepers to Sudan to help secure a North-South
peace agreement, a mission your statements about peacekeeping
suggest that you'd have trouble supporting.
During her confirmation hearing, Secretary Rice told this
committee, quote, ``that the time for diplomacy is now,'' end
of quote.
This month, speaking before the American Society of
International Law, she said, and I quote, ``One of the pillars
of that diplomacy is our strong belief that international law
is a vital and powerful force in the search for freedom,'' end
of quote.
I suspect that if President Clinton's Secretary of State
had made that same statement, you might have been leading the
charge that this was an ill-founded statement. I could be
wrong. I'm anxious to hear what you have to say.
In the past two months, the President and the Secretary
have made clear that there is a new-found commitment to work
closely with others, including the United Nations. And I'm
hopeful that they're trying to return America to its historic
role in building a strong international system that serves our
interests, rather than running roughshod over it.
Your views seem, based on what you've said in the past,
John, to be contradictory and contrary to the direction the
President and the Secretary of State now want to take this
administration, which leads me to believe that it must mean
that you no longer agree with those statements, because they
appointed you. I wonder, as I did in 2001, about your
diplomatic temperament. You have a habit of belittling your
opposition, and even some of your friends.
You said that, quote, ``Republicans are adults on foreign-
policy questions, and we define what we're willing to do
militarily and politically by what is in the best interest of
the United States.'' I wonder what you think of the motives of
some of us who aren't Republicans.
You once quoted that the head of the International Law
Commission--you once quoted the head of the International Law
Commission as evidence of the grandiose ambitions of supporters
in the International Criminal Court by saying, quote, ``That's
not the same as knuckle-dragging''--excuse me--``That's''--
excuse me--of the International Criminal Court by saying,
quote, ``That's not some knuckle-dragging Republican from some
southern state, it's the head of the International Law
Commission,'' end of quote. I don't think that's the kind of
attitude that is going to serve us very well in the United
Nations if it continues.
The U.N. needs reform. Lots of it. I work with former
Chairman Jesse Helms to promote such reforms. The Helm-Biden
amendment was--the legislation was part of that reform. That
work's not finished. We need a strong voice in New York who
knows the U.N. and who can advance our reform agenda, but we
don't need a voice which people may not be inclined to listen
to. And I fear that, knowing your reputation, and your
reputation known well at the U.N., people will be inclined to
tune you out. Above all, we need an able diplomat skilled in
working the corridors of a complex international institution.
Some have said that sending you to New York would be like
sending Nixon to China. I'm concerned it'll be more like
sending a bull into a china shop.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick, who served at the U.N. under
President Reagan and strongly supports you, may have summed it
up best in describing you in the New York Times. She said, ``He
may not--he may do diplomatic jobs for the U.S. Government, but
John is not a diplomat,'' end of quote.
So we'll want to spend some more time exploring your views
on the United Nations and how you approach the job, if
confirmed. We also have an obligation to assess your
performance in your current job, Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security. The fact is that, on
your watch, in areas in which you are responsible, the world
has gotten more, and not less, dangerous. Not your fault, but
that's a fact. We didn't create these threats, but it's our
responsibility to contend with them wisely and effectively.
And, in my judgement, your judgement on how to deal with the
emerging threats have not been particularly useful.
Over the past four years, Korea has increased its nuclear-
weapons capacity by as much as 400 percent. It may now have as
many as eight nuclear weapons, which it could test, hide, sell,
or sell to the highest bidder. During your 2001 confirmation
hearing, you highlighted a danger posed by North Korea 27
times. You were right. But the record suggests that your
approach has undermined the efforts to address the growing
threat posed by Pyongyang.
Over the past four years, Iran has accelerated its own
nuclear program. It's much closer to the bomb than when the
President took office. The record suggests you opposed the
President's policy, the one finally adopted by President Bush.
He's come around to, after several years, a coordinated
strategy of carrots and sticks with our European partners. No
one can guarantee it will work. We do know that the approach
you apparently advocated has not worked.
Over the past four years, the invaluable program Chairman
Lugar started to help Russia account and destroy excess nuclear
weapons and a complementary program to deal with its chemical
arsenal has to withstand efforts by some in this administration
to cut it. Now these programs have become mired in red tape,
and despite the fact that loose Russian weapons pose one of the
greatest potential threats to our security, we still haven't
cut through that red tape.
The administration did succeed in convincing Libya to give
up its weapons of mass destruction, but, according to press
accounts--and I'd like to hear what your view is--that only
happened after you were taken off the case. And that success
was the result of a policy begun by a previous administration
that you roundly disparaged.
Finally, a serious concern has been raised about your
attitude toward dissenting views. Specifically, it has been
alleged that, on at least two occasions, you sought to have
removed from their positions officials who disagreed with your
assessment of critical intelligence matters. After all this
country has been through with Iraq and faulty intelligence, if
that's true, that's not the approach we should be rewarding.
You'll have a full opportunity to address these complaints.
John, I have great respect for your abilities and your
intellectual capacity. It's your judgement and temperament, as
well as your approach to many of these issues, that give me
great pause.
Let me conclude with this. After a necessary war in
Afghanistan and a optional war in Iraq, Americans are rightly
confident in the example of our power. But I've been concerned
that many in this administration have forgotten the power of
our example. Foreign policy is not a popularity contest. We
must confront hard issues. Sometimes they require hard choices
that other countries don't like. But, above all, they require
American leadership. That's the kind that persuades others to
follow. And I'm not convinced this nominee has that as his
strongest suit.
I thank the Chair, and I yield back to the Chair.
The Chairman. I thank the distinguished Ranking Member.
I would mention that when the hearing was originally
scheduled for Thursday of last week, our distinguished
colleague, Senator Warner, had planned to join us to introduce
Secretary Bolton. With the rescheduling of the hearing for this
morning, Senator Warner is unable to attend because of
commitments in his state. He's asked me to convey to the
committee his strong support for the nominee. And I would ask
unanimous consent that Senator Warner's statement be included
in the record. [The prepared statement of Senator Warner
follows:]
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, may I clarify the point I
made? I said ``every witness has been interviewed jointly.''
Three weeks ago, the Democratic staff interviewed one witness
alone, and then, I believe, notified--am I correct?--notified
the majority staff, who then interviewed that nominee, which
began this ball rolling. So there was one interview, that I'm
aware of, that the initial interview did not take place with
both majority and minority in the room. That was the only one.
I just wanted to clarify the record.
The Chairman. I thank the Senator for the clarification.
Let me say, at the outset, that we have good attendance
this morning, for which the Chair is grateful, and I would ask
that Members limit their questions to ten minutes. We will have
a ten-minute round, followed by an additional ten-minute round.
I would just simply announce my willingness to preside over the
committee throughout the afternoon and into an evening session,
if that is required, for Members to have opportunity to ask all
the questions that they wish to ask. I want to make that clear
at the outset, that Members will have that opportunity
throughout the morning, the afternoon, and the evening, but I
would ask Members to respect the ten-minute time limit.
Now, the Chair will not stop the witness from responding
when the ten minutes comes to a conclusion, but I will ask the
Senator involved to restrain from further doing business during
that period until another turn comes around, in fairness to
most Members who have changed their plans in order to be here
today and have come at least to do business, to participate in
the hearing.
Having mentioned that, I will ask the Clerk to start the
clock on my questioning, and I will ask the first ten minutes
of questions and then yield to my distinguished colleague,
Senator Biden. We'll go back and forth, then, with our
questions.
Excuse me, I've jumped the gun. We've not heard from the
nominee. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. And we do want to hear from the nominee.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. We were so excited about asking you
questions, Secretary Bolton--[Laughter.]
The Chairman. --that we just wanted to get right into it.
But, nevertheless, we do look forward to your statement. Please
take the time that is required, really, to fully express your
views, and then I'll start the clock on my ten minutes of
questioning.
Secretary Bolton?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, NOMINEE TO BE U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR
AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO SESSIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Bolton. Thank you, Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden.
I am honored to appear before you today as President Bush's
nominee to be U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations. I'm grateful for your consideration, and I look
forward to discussing the critical leadership role that the
United States plays in the United Nations.
I'd like to thank Senator Warner, who would have been here,
as you suggested, had the schedule not changed, and my wife
Gretchen, who is here with me today.
I do have a longer statement, Senator, if I could, I'd
submit for the record, and I'll just read a shorter version of
it.
The Chairman. It will be published in the record in full.
Mr. Bolton. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the
opportunities that I have had to work with this committee over
the years. This is the fourth time I have appeared before this
committee in a confirmation hearing. If confirmed, I pledge to
fulfill the President's vision of working in close partnership
with the United Nations.
The United States is committed to the success of the United
Nations, and we view the U.N. as an important component of our
diplomacy. As the President stated before the U.N. General
Assembly last September, ``Let history show that, in a decisive
decade, members of the United Nations did not grow weary in our
duties or waver in meeting them.''
The Secretary has made this a top priority, as well. She
was unequivocal in her remarks, and I quote, ``The American
people respect the idealism that sparked the creation of the
United Nations, and we share the U.N.'s unshakeable support for
human dignity. At this time of great opportunity and great
promise, the charge to the international community is clear.
We, who are on the right side of freedom's divide, have an
obligation to help those who were unlucky enough to be born on
the wrong side of that divide. The hard work of freedom is a
task of generations, yet it is also urgent work that cannot be
deferred. Now, more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical
role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and
aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, and to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom.''
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this
committee to forge a stronger relationship between the United
States and the United Nations, which depends critically on
American leadership. Such leadership, in turn, must rest upon
broad bipartisan support in Congress. It must be earned by
putting to rest skepticism that so many feel about the U.N.
system.
Through the course of three decades of public service, both
in and out of government, I have learned that this consensus is
not only essential, but possible. Working together in a spirit
of bipartisan cooperation, I believe we can take important
steps to restore confidence in the United Nations.
Mr. Chairman, we are at a critical juncture, and I fully
share the sentiments that you expressed in 1997 when you
remarked, and I quote, ``It is time to decide if we want a
strong and viable United Nations that can serve United States'
interests, or a United Nations that is crippled by insolvency
and hobbled by controversy and uncertainty.''
Mr. Chairman, there are four priorities that I believe are
important to pursue if confirmed as U.S. Representative to the
U.N. One priority is to strengthen and build institutions that
serve as the cornerstone of freedom in nascent democracies. Mr.
Chairman, we should never underestimate the impact of free and
fair elections on a country. I look forward, if confirmed, to
working with relevant U.N. agencies to enable them to
contribute further to the growth of democratic institutions in
countries freed from the bonds of oppression.
I also look forward to working with you on President Bush's
request for $10 million in the fiscal year 2006 budget to set
up a democracy fund within the United Nations. I'm grateful to
Secretary General Annan for endorsing the President's proposal
in his new report in U.N. reform.
While the U.N. has had its successes in the human-rights
field, there have been problems, as well, such as the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights. For too long, some of the
most egregious violators of human rights have undercut UNHRC's
principles and its effectiveness. The consequence, as Secretary
General Annan has said, is that the Commission's important work
has, and I quote, ``been increasingly undermined by its
declining credibility and professionalism,'' close quote. We
must work with our friends and allies to keep those who would
usurp the moral authority of this Commission off of it, and to
send clear and strong signals that we will not shy away from
naming human-rights violators.
We must work to galvanize the General Assembly to focus its
attention on issues of true importance. Sadly, there have been
times when the General Assembly has gone off track, such as
with the abominable Resolution 3379, equating Zionism with
racism. I am proud to have been an active player in getting
this resolution repealed.
Mr. Chairman, a second priority, should I be confirmed will
be stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to
ensure that terrorist organizations and the world's most
dangerous regimes are unable to threaten the United States, our
friends, and our allies. As Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security, I have worked hard to
promote effective multilateral action to curb the flow of
dangerous weapons. As you know, I served as the lead U.S.
negotiator in the creation of the G8 Global Partnership Against
the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,
which will add an additional $10 billion over ten years in
Nunn-Lugar-type programs.
In the case of Libya, I had the opportunity to work in
close consultation with our British colleagues in diplomatic
efforts to secure the verifiable elimination of Libyan weapons
of mass destruction. I also helped build a coalition of more
than 60 countries to help combat the spread of dangerous
weapons through President Bush's Proliferation Security
Initiative.
I have no doubt that these efforts played a critical role
in enabling the United States to lead the Security Council to
pass Resolution 1540, first suggested by President Bush in his
speech to the General Assembly in September 2003. This
resolution calls upon ``all member states to fulfill their
obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament, and to
prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass
destruction.''
Resolution 1540 was the first of its kind focusing on WMD
proliferation. I am proud that our strong leadership
contributed to its unanimous adoption. I'm happy to report
that, as of March 15, over 80 countries have submitted reports
required by the resolution, outlining their plans to enact and
implement measures to stop WMD proliferation. I look forward to
working with Security Council members to achieve 100 percent
compliance with the resolution.
A third priority that I would pursue, if confirmed, is
supporting the global war on terror. As we all learned on
September the 11th, 2001, no one is safe from the devastating
effects of terrorists intent on harming innocent people.
Confronting and triumphing in the global war on terror remains
the central priority of the Bush administration. To win this
war requires long-term cooperation with all like-minded
nations.
The President is firmly committed to working with the
United Nations to make this shared goal of the civilized world
a reality. As he noted in his speech to the U.N. General
Assembly in September 2003, ``All governments that support
terror are complicit in a war against civilization. No
government should ignore the threat of terror, because to look
the other way gives terrorists the chance to regroup, recruit,
and prepare. And all nations that fight terror as if the lives
of their own people depend on it will earn the favorable
judgement of history.''
The United Nations has taken positive steps to support the
war on terror, but more, of course, remains to be done. In the
wake of September the 11th, we have been actively encouraging
member states to become parties to the U.N. conventions on
terrorism. I have been personally involved, in the past four
years, as well, in working to complete the negotiations on a
Nuclear Terrorism Convention. We must built upon Security
Council Resolution 1368, passed one day after the tragic events
of September 11, and which, for the first time, classified
every act of international terrorism as a threat to
international peace and security.
We must also work together to help member states build
capacities to combat terrorism, as outlined in Resolution 1373,
passed on September 28th, 2001. This resolution obligates all
U.N. member states to use their domestic laws and courts to
keep terrorists from sheltering resources or finding safe
havens anywhere in the world and to cooperate in investigating,
prosecuting, and preventing terrorism wherever it may spring
up.
The U.N. Security Council is monitoring compliance with the
requirements of this resolution, with impressive results. To
date, 142 countries have issued orders freezing the assets of
suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations. Accounts
totaling almost 105 million have been blocked; 34 million in
the U.S., and over twice that amount in other countries.
Overall, Resolution 1373 has been the framework for
unprecedented international consultation and coordination
against terrorism, including the provision of technical
assistance to governments that want to do the right thing, but
may not have the specialized expertise necessary.
Mr. Chairman, a fourth priority is addressing humanitarian
crises. It is not just the scourge of war we must confront. We
must confront the scourge of disease and affliction, such as
HIV/AIDS, through strong U.S. leadership in the United Nations
system. Along with the President's emergency plan for AIDS
relief, a five-year, $15 billion investment, we are strong
supporters of the U.N. declaration of commitment on HIV/AIDS
and are working to ensure resources from the global fund for
AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis are available to countries most
severely affected by the disease.
I will make it a key priority, as well, to improve programs
that have been involved in the tsunami relief effort so that we
can enhance and build upon structures and institutions already
in place.
More broadly, we must confront the scourge of poverty,
which leaves hundreds of millions on the margins of societies
scrambling for food or shelter, with little opportunity to
improve their lives or those of their children.
We must also make sure that the U.N. acts effectively in
promoting the economic and social advancement of all people.
Policy reform, institution-building, appropriate technology
transfer, and private-sector involvement are critical for
sustained economic growth. We will continue to support the
contributions of women to economic growth and development, as
well as their critical role in the growth of democratic
institutions worldwide.
The U.N., in conjunction with U.S. leadership, has
recognized that the traditional models of development have been
insufficient to achieve development objectives and better the
lives of people around the world. The Partnership for Maternal,
Newborn, and Child Health, the Global Alliance for Vaccinations
and Immunizations, and Rollback Malaria are all examples of how
U.N. agencies, such as UNICEF, are working alongside the
private sector, charitable organizations, and foundations such
as the Gates Foundation, to leverage resources, generate new
activities, and impact the lives of millions in developing
countries. We support these new and innovative structures that
rely less on bureaucracy and more on putting resources into the
field, aiding results-based performance standards.
This brings me to the issue of accountability and reform.
The administration welcomes the Secretary General's new report
on U.N. reform, and we are examining carefully its many
recommendations. I hope to work closely with the Secretary
General and my colleagues to bring greater accountability and
transparency to the United Nations.
On a personal note, I should mention that Secretary General
Kofi Annan and I have had a relationship that goes back 16
years, based on mutual respect and friendship, and I was
pleased to receive a call from him last week.
The key is to implement changes to the U.N. structure and
management, including budget, personnel, and oversight reforms.
Scandals such as those that we have witnessed with the Oil-for-
Food Program, undermine, not only America's confidence in the
United Nations, but the confidence of the international
community, as well. They must not recur. And we must never lose
sight of the reality that ultimately it is member governments
that must take responsibility for the U.N.'s actions, whether
they be successes or failures.
Mr. Chairman, let me close by reiterating what I said at
the beginning. If confirmed, I will work closely and
effectively with this committee in both houses of Congress. The
President and Secretary Rice are committed to building a
strong, effective United Nations. The United Nations affords us
an opportunity to move our policies forward together with unity
of purpose. Now, more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical
role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and
aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, and to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom. This effort demands
decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan support, and the
backing of the American public. I will undertake to do my
utmost to uphold the confidence that the President, Secretary
Rice, and the Senate will have placed in me.
Thank you, and I would welcome the opportunity to answer
your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton follows:]
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Bolton, for
your opening statement.
I'd like to mention that Mrs. Bolton is with us today, on
the front row, and we're delighted that you are here, and we
appreciate your coming to the hearing.
Now, as I mentioned earlier, and prematurely, we'll have a
ten-minute round of questioning, and we'll begin the clock now,
as I commence my ten minutes of questioning. Then I will yield
to Senator Biden.
Secretary Bolton, as Senator Biden has mentioned in his
opening statement, prior to this hearing staff on both sides of
the aisle have visited with Mr. Carl Ford. Carl Ford was
supervisor for Christian Westermann, who is an INR biological
warfare analyst. Now, I mention this because the allegation has
been made that, in a speech that you were preparing for the AEI
on Cuba, and which, I might mention, was on television this
morning in its entirety, that you wished to change some
language. Christian Westermann, the analyst, refused to change
the language. You were severe in your criticism of him. And so,
herein lies at least what appears to be a major flap for the
last 90 hours, as Senator Biden has pointed out.
Now, staff has, in fact, interviewed Mr. Westermann and
Carl Ford, who will be appearing before the committee, as I
understand, tomorrow morning, at our hearing at 9:30, Mr. Fred
Fleitz, the Bolton special assistant, who might know something
about this, Tom Fingar, the INR Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary at the time, Fulton Armstrong, National Intelligence
Office for Latin America at the NIC at the time, Stuart Cohen,
Mr. Armstrong's supervisor at the NIC at that time. These
interviews took place, aside from the Carl Ford interview,
which Senator Biden has pointed out occurred earlier, on April
5, the other interviews on April 7 and April 8, and lasted, in
most cases, for two hours, although the Fingar interview was
only an hour and a quarter, and 30 minutes devoted to Stuart
Cohen.
Now, I mention all of this because, very clearly, there has
been at least an allegation that pressure was applied, and, as
Senator Biden suggested, making a transfer, that I think is a
stretch. But we are very sensitive in this country about
reports given on Iraq intelligence and how accurate, or how
comprehensive, our intelligence agencies were, whether anyone
distorted that, or misused that, or went beyond that
intelligence with regard to public policy. Nonetheless, you
were talking about biological warfare in Cuba. Your suggestions
for change were not accepted. The speech, therefore, did not
have words that you wanted, but it had the official
interpretation. And, as a matter of fact, no one was
discharged, although feelings may have been hurt.
I raise all of this, in this context, simply to give you an
opportunity to explain, if you can, what the flap is about. In
essence, who said what to whom, and for what reason? And if you
had it to do all over again, would you do it the same way? In
essence, give your side of the story.
Mr. Bolton. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that
the couple of points I'd want to stress from the outset is that
all of these allegations have been reviewed in the past by the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the committee
found that there was no evidence of any indication of an
attempt to influence or pressure analysts in their professional
conclusions.
Second, with respect to the speech, which was in May of
2002, and was entitled ``Beyond the Axis of Evil,'' it was a
discussion of WMD efforts in a number of countries--really had
preparations begun earlier in the year, just a few months after
September the 11th, when I think we all conclude that, however
horrible September the 11th was, it could have been far worse
had the terrorists had access to chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons. And it was our feeling in the administration
that we wanted to talk seriously to the American public about
these kinds of threats.
The intelligence community gave appropriate clearance to
declassified language and to the text of the speech itself. The
speech was cleared throughout the State Department, including
the Office of the Deputy Secretary, throughout the interagency.
Assistant Secretaries Ford and Otto Reich used essentially the
same declassified language in testimony in March, before the
speech; in June, after the speech; and elsewhere.
And I wanted to say, also, Mr. Chairman, as you say, there
have been a lot of interviews and transcripts and documents
produced. I haven't seen all of them. But I want to say to the
committee, right here, unequivocally, I'd be happy if all of
that were made public right now. There are problems with
classifications. Some of it, I think, we need to be concerned
about privacy for people who are, sort of, collaterally
involved, the issues that have to be worked out. Mr. Chairman,
there is nothing there, there, and I would put it all out on
the public record. All of it.
The Chairman. Well, I would indicate, Secretary Bolton,
that State Department and CIA representatives stayed with the
materials as they were made available in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee offices. There were a number of pages that
were classified, and that, I think, is an important point. But,
at the same time, I appreciate your forthcoming desire that all
of this be made public. And I suspect that that can be
accommodated.
Now, I simply want to know, with the specific allegation of
pressure and discharge and those specific thoughts surrounding
Mr. Westermann, specifically, what is the case? What happened?
Mr. Bolton. I never sought to have Mr. Westermann fired,
at all. And, in fact, you have e-mail from the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for the Intelligence Research
Bureau the day of the conversation, Tom Fingar; his e-mail to
me that day that said that Mr. Westermann behavior was, and I
quote, ``entirely inappropriate,'' close quote. Mr. Fingar
said, referring to INR, quote, ``We screwed up,'' close quote.
And he said, twice in a relatively short e-mail, quote, ``It
won't happen again,'' close quote.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you for that clarification. I
suspect that we will hear more about it throughout the hearing.
But, at the outset, I wanted to raise it, because it appears to
me to have been the source, really, of almost half of the
controversy about your nomination thus far.
Now, let me get into the second half. What are you going to
do about reform at the U.N.? You have mentioned specific
desirable aspects, but clearly one of the rationales given by
the President, and, even more emphatically, by the Secretary of
State, is that you are a person who is going to be able to
bring about reform of the institution so it will be
strengthened. The United Nations is important for our foreign
policy. It's more important if, in fact, it's a strong
organization, with greater integrity, in terms of its
activities. What do you have in mind as you approach this task?
Mr. Bolton. I think there are--analytically, there are
basically two categories of reform that one can consider. The
first category is the reform of governance structures in the
U.N., how the member governments of the U.N. carry out their
business. The second analytical category, I would call
management, budget, and personnel, actual operation, actual
delivery of product from U.N. agencies. And I think that
there's a lot of work to be done in both categories.
And I mentioned, in my prepared remarks, the widespread
feeling, including as shared by Secretary General Kofi Annan
himself, that the U.N. Human Rights Commission had come close
to completely crashing. That definitely needs to be fixed.
We must address, I think, the most important question,
governance question in the U.N. system, the composition of the
permanent membership of the Security Council. This is an issue
that I faced, myself, going back to the first Bush
administration, when Japan made a very strong case for its
becoming a permanent member, a case which has grown even
stronger over the years, and which Secretary Rice commented on
during her recent trip.
There are a lot of very complex and competing claims for
change in the composition of the Security Council. It's going
to take time to work that out. I think one rule I hope we can
all agree on one objective to achieve in working on that
structure is that we not make the Council less effective than
it is now, and that's going to be, I think, a very arduous
task.
I think, just quickly, on the management side, back in the
first Bush administration I developed a concept called the
``unitary U.N.,'' which was a way of trying to look at the U.N.
system as a whole, not bits and pieces; not loosely structured,
unconnected specialized agencies, but looking at the system as
a whole to try and rationalize its delivery of services, the
research that it carries out, the work of the various
specialized agencies and funds and programs that, on an
organizational chart, are really quite complex.
These are some of the things I hope to get into, if
confirmed, and I think I've had the benefit of, as you
mentioned, four years of service as Assistant Secretary for
International Organizations, and the chance to work for the
U.N. on a pro-bono basis, myself.
The Chairman. Thank you for those responses. My time is
up.
And I recognize the distinguished Senator from Delaware,
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
There's a number of things, Mr. Secretary, I'd like to
discuss with you. I'm going to try to do it in sort of an
orderly way.
I will be asking you a number of questions this afternoon,
and as long as we go, about the issue of trying to have
professionals removed from--I don't think anybody's ever said
you tried to have them fired--``have them removed from your
portfolio,'' I think is the term of art. Did you ever ask
anyone to remove Mr. Westermann from your portfolio?
Mr. Bolton. I think, as the interviews that your staff
conducted show--and that's one reason why I want to get them
all out in public--we believe Mr. Westermann had behaved in an
underhanded fashion. And I think I--as my assistant mentioned
to your staff, I said to him at the time, ``I don't care if you
disagree with me, just don't do it behind my back.'' I
mentioned it----
Senator Biden. Well, that's not my question. I only have
ten minutes, so I don't want you to be a Senator and filibuster
me.
Did you attempt to have him removed from your portfolio?
Mr. Bolton. I mentioned it to Mr. Fingar. I may have
mentioned it to one or two other people. But then I shrugged my
shoulders, and I moved on. He was----
Senator Biden. So the answer is, yes, you did.
Mr. Bolton. And he was not moved, and I did not----
Senator Biden. Okay, and that's all I wanted--I just
wanted to make sure we're talking about the same thing.
Let me talk about the U.N. I'll go back to----
Mr. Bolton. I, in no sense, sought to have any discipline
imposed on Mr. Westermann.
Senator Biden. Other than removed from your----
Mr. Bolton. No.
Senator Biden. --portfolio.
Mr. Bolton. No. I said, to at least one of his
supervisors, that I specifically had no intention whatever to
cause him any ill will, but I----
Senator Biden. I'm not suggesting that.
Mr. Bolton. --had lost trust and confidence in him. And I
think in any professional relationship, you need trust and
confidence.
Senator Biden. No, I got that. I just want to make sure
our terminology is--we're all using the same terminology when I
talk about this with you this afternoon.
But let me speak about the U.N., if I may, for a moment. As
you know, Chairman Lugar and I have been working to improve the
Federal Civilian Response to post-conflict reconstruction and
stabilization crises that we now face, and will face in the
future, and we strongly support the new Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization of the State
Department, which, really, the overwhelming credit should go to
my colleague from Indiana. The mission statement of that office
outlines, and I quote, ``Failing in post-conflict states pose
one of the greatest national, international security--and
international security challenges of our day. Struggling states
can provide breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking,
and human catastrophes, and can destabilize an entire region.''
Now, that's the statement, the mission statement of the
office. You have stated, on the record, unrelated to that
office, before--and, as a matter of fact, in your capacity--
well, I believe the date was in '97. You said, quote, ``We
should be relegated--what should be relegated to history's junk
pile at the first opportunity is this chimerical Clinton notion
of U.N.,'' quote, ``peaceful enforcement and nation-building
and enlargement. Those unworldly concepts have resulted in
American personnel and resources being committed to U.N.
operations far removed from vital American interests.'' And
that was in the ``Creation, Fall--Rise and Fall of the United
Nations'' speech I believe you delivered.
How do you define, in that context, ``America's vital
interests''?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I don't--I don't think you have that
quote accurately, Senator, but I won't slow down----
Senator Biden. Well, no, that's very important. I do not
want to, in any way, misrepresent what you say. Let's get
everything really straight.
Mr. Bolton. And I would----
Senator Biden. Because now--with all due respect, I don't
want to--I don't want to put you in a spot to say something you
didn't say. ``Creation, Fall, and Rise of the United Nations,''
John R. Bolton--where was this speech made? Pardon me? And
what's the name of the book? It's chapter 3 of a book entitled
``Delusions of Grandeur.'' And I want to read it again so
we're--
It says, ``Traditional peacekeeping, together with the
often important role of agencies of the U.N. system play in
international delivery of humanitarian assistance can work and
should be continued. Although peacekeeping has only been
limited--has had only limited use throughout much of U.N.
history, it is an option that we should preserve for
appropriate use, such as U.N. disengagement observer force
along the Golan Heights, between Israel and Syria. What should
be relegated to history's junk pile at the first opportunity,
however, are''--am I pronouncing it correctly?--c-h-i-m-e-r-i-
c-a-l, chimerical?
Mr. Bolton. Chimerical.
Senator Biden. --``Clinton notions of U.N.''--internal
quotes, ``'peace enforcement,''' comma, quote, ``'nation-
building,''' comma, ``and,'' quote, ``'enlargement''' period.
``Those unworldly concepts have resulted in American personnel
and resources being committed to U.N. operations far removed
from vital American interests. These concepts are based on
misreadings of what happened in the world and in the U.N. in
the late '80s and early '90s,'' end of quote.
Now, my question to you is--and here's the cover--title of
the book, ``Delusions of Grandeur, the United Nations and
Global Intervention,'' edited by Ted Galen Carpenter, ``Why We
Shouldn't Give the U.N. More Power,'' Cato, 1997.
Now, my question is, to you--and I'm going to run out of
time very quickly, obviously--and let me be more precise--the
United States strongly endorses the recent U.N. Security
Council resolution to send 10,000 U.N. peacekeepers to Sudan to
support North-South peace agreement. Is this an example of an
operation far removed from the vital interests of the United
States?
Mr. Bolton. Absolutely not. And, in fact, in the passage
you read, the second time you read, you referred--you read what
I had written about the effectiveness, the historical
effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping operations, citing the
example of the U.N. disengagement observer force along the
Golan Heights.
At least part of the distinction I was making there was
between peacekeeping, as that term has been historically
defined in U.N. operations, and peace enforcement.
Traditionally, peacekeeping relies on the consent of the
parties to the conflict, the consent to U.N. involvement, and
U.N. neutrality, as between the parties, and the very limited
rules of engagement for the peacekeepers, essentially being
authorized to use force only as a means of self defense.
By contrast, peace enforcement, as envisaged conceptually,
would give the--would give U.N. forces a role without the
consent of the parties. The U.N. would not act in a neutral
fashion, and the U.N. rules of engagement would be much more
robust.
Senator Biden. Which is----
Mr. Bolton. The situation in the Sudan is a peacekeeping
role, as traditionally defined. We have a historic agreement
between the government in Khartoum and the rebels in the south
that Senator Danforth and many others worked on. The force to
be deployed, pursuant to the recently adopted resolution, I
would say, is clearly a traditional U.N. peacekeeping
operation.
Senator Biden. Now, is that--do you support it, or not? I
thought I--I thought you said peacekeeping and peace--what's
the other alternative?
Mr. Bolton. The analytical terms----
Senator Biden. It's enforcement, right?
Mr. Bolton. --that are implied are peace-----
Senator Biden. Keeping and enforcing.
Mr. Bolton. ---keeping versus peace enforcement. And those
imply separate kinds of operations. The force to be deployed in
Sudan is a peacekeeping force.
Senator Biden. And do you support the peacekeeping----
Mr. Bolton. Absolutely.
Senator Biden. If it had been a peace-enforcement
operation?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think that's a hypothetical, because--
--
Senator Biden. Okay, take Kosovo.
Mr. Bolton. But it's an important----
Senator Biden. Let's take Kosovo. Now, it didn't involve
the U.N. It involved NATO.
Mr. Bolton. Right.
Senator Biden. In terms of Kosovo. That was a--would that
be--if that had been a U.N. operation, would that have been
called a peace-enforcement operation?
Mr. Bolton. That would have been called peace enforcement,
I think, that's correct. And that's--I think that's one reason
why it never--it never achieved the approval of the Security
Council.
Senator Biden. That's true. Now, would you not have
supported that?
Mr. Bolton. I did not feel, at the time, that that was an
appropriate action.
Senator Biden. Was--what was the U.N. role in Korea? Was
that peace enforcement or peacekeeping?
Mr. Bolton. Well, the--that was very definitely a kind of
peace enforcement, but one that the U.N. has only engaged in
essentially twice in its history, once in Korea, when the
authorization to use force was adopted, because the Soviet
Union was boycotting the Security Council in protest of the
continued presence of the Republic of China holding the Chinese
permanent seat. When the Russians--Soviets realized that their
absence from the Council and their inability to veto
resolutions was allowing coalition resistance to the North
Korean invasion, they returned, and that ended the
effectiveness of the Security Council in the Korean incident.
The second, of course, was in the first President Bush's
administration, in the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, when President Bush and Secretary Baker led
the successful effort through a series of Security Council
resolutions, ultimately resulting in Resolution 678, which was
only the second authorization to use force in U.N. Security
Council history.
Senator Biden. So when you say that--is peace enforcement
associated with nation-building?
Mr. Bolton. No, I think it's very separate concepts.
Senator Biden. And so, the peace enforcement and nation-
building and enlargement are things we should stay out of, not
be involved with, with the United Nations. Is that right?
Mr. Bolton. I think they're very--I think they're very
separate contexts. I was writing, at that point, specifically
critiquing the Clinton administration policy, yes, sir.
Senator Biden. I'll come back to that.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel?
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Secretary Bolton, welcome. Thank you for agreeing to take
on a big job if this committee and the United States Senate
work its will and send you to that big job. We appreciate what
you're doing.
I have been a United States Senator who has strongly
supported the United Nations. It's an imperfect institution,
like all institutions are, but if the world had not had this
body over the last almost 60 years, I don't think we would have
seen the kind of progress in the world that we've seen that's
occurred in a complicated post-World War II community. Much yet
to be accomplished, and you've noted some of those challenges
in your statement. But the entire purpose, the focus on the
United Nations, as you have also alluded to, was to bring the
world community together in common purpose to deal with common
challenges in a common-interest way. It hasn't always worked.
There have been difficulties. Obviously, reform is a dimension
of institutions, every institution, that is always in play.
And I want to start with the reform part of this and then
work our way down into a couple of the specific questions I
have for you.
You noted in your four principles, which I agree with,
where you would focus your priorities, where America should
focus its priorities, working with our allies at the United
Nations. And you talk about reform. You talk about the
Secretary General, who you have a relationship with. Give me
some sense of the larger context of reforming that institution,
without getting into a lot of the specifics, because I suspect
we will get into those when Senator Coleman's time is here. We
will talk about Oil-for-Food and other issues. But I'm
interested in your philosophy about the future of the United
Nations. How should it be reformed? Less power? More power?
More engagement? Less engagement? Give this committee some
sense of your own feeling about that issue.
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think that there is enormous potential
in the institution that is often not allowed to be developed,
in part because of the attitude of member governments. And this
is one of the points, I suppose, will come to a little bit
later in some statements I've made over the years. But I
alluded to this in my opening statement. I think it's
important. The United States puts an enormous amount of
resources at the State Department and its missions around the
world to working on U.N. matters. And I think that it's because
we believe that, as the largest paying member government, that
we have a big responsibility for what goes on in the United
Nations.
I think, though, even within the United States and in a
number of other countries, there's sometimes the temptation to
say, ``Well, if we, sort of, give a problem to the United
States--to the United Nations, it takes it off our plate, and
that people can say, 'Well, the United Nations is handling
it.'''
Fundamentally, talking about any element of reform is to
recognize that the United Nations is made up of member
governments, and the United Nations does what member
governments want it to do. And reform in the U.N. means member
governments have to take their responsibilities seriously.
That's something I think that we have historically done here. I
think it's important that all member governments do that.
I think that in implementing, then, the policies that we're
trying to pursue, that you have to take into account what's
possible in the real world, and you have to be realistic about
what can be done through, not just the United Nations, but
through any institution, any international organization we've
set up. And I think that the sustained attention to these kinds
of issues is required.
This is nothing that can be overcome in a matter of a few
months, or even a few years; this is something that's going to
take a lot of work over a long period of time.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Let me ask about a specific area of the United Nations, the
International Atomic Energy Agency. I'd like to hear your
thoughts about the relevancy, the effectiveness of the IAEA,
Director Baradei, what you think of him. I think most who are
following your nomination are aware--certainly, this panel is
aware--that as we have seen the results of more of our internal
intelligence reports, the Senator Intelligence Committee, the
recent Silverman-Robb Commission report, the 9/11 Report, what
we've seen is that Hans Blix and the United Nations inspectors
had it right in Iraq; we had it wrong. I would like you to work
your way into that. How could they, the United Nations
inspectors, be so right and our Intelligence Committee be so
wrong? And that cuts to the bigger question of the future of
the IAEA. Do you support the IAEA? Do you support Mr. Baradei's
continuation as director?
Mr. Bolton. Well, perhaps I could address the IAEA
question first, and then try to come to your larger question. I
have been, since the first Bush administration, a supporter of
the IAEA. I remember the first President Bush, in the hours
before giving one of his speeches to the General Assembly,
saying how much he wanted to strengthen the hand of the IAEA.
It's been a phrase that has stayed in my mind ever since then.
And I think we've seen, just in the first four years of this
administration, that the level of cooperation with the IAEA on
the question of North Korea, before North Korea withdrew from
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was very good.
I think that we have had a number of transactions with the
IAEA involving Iran, involving sharing some pretty sensitive
information that's been very helpful. We have maintained our
contributions to the IAEA. We are--we've had numerous voluntary
contributions to the IAEA's work.
Our feeling on the Director General is that we support the
longstanding policy of two terms for Director Generals. That's
been the policy. We'll--there are no--currently, there are no
candidates to oppose him, so we'll have to see how that policy
plays out. But we've said repeatedly that's not a policy aimed
at him or anybody else, it's a policy that we think is good for
the U.N. system as a whole.
On your larger question, I don't think there's any doubt
that what we've learned about--what we've learned post-war in
Iraq about our intelligence is the kind of lesson that we need
to address, and in a very serious way, in a very urgent manner.
I think the Silverman-Robb Commission--and I haven't--I
don't want to say I've carefully studied all of it, including
the classified portions, but I have read large parts of it, and
particularly the parts on Iraq, and I think that the Silverman-
Robb Commission really captured quite well many of the failings
that, not just our intelligence community, but many of us had.
And I would describe the principal insight that they had
that I think is just very clarifying of what the problem was,
that reasonable hypotheses about what Saddam was up to and what
Iraq's capabilities were became hardened in the minds of the
intelligence community over the years into assumptions and then
presumptions that were not subjected to repeated scrutiny and
verification by hard facts, and that then were not really
corroborated in more recent years by hard intel on the ground
in Iraq.
So there are two basic failings, among others. One, the
belief, the reasonable belief, that Saddam Hussein's inability,
for example, to account for large stocks of chemical-weapon
agent that he had declared in the aftermath of the first Gulf
War, his inability to prove he had destroyed those stocks led
to the hypothesis that they still existed.
Senator Hagel. May I interrupt you? And I apologize for
this, but I have very little time left.
Let me ask you, in following along with your point here,
How could the United Nations inspectors be right? And why
didn't we listen to them? Which cuts right to the question that
you answered about the credibility, and are they important,
should we continue to strengthen them? But following along with
your point here, how did we miss it, and they told us?
Mr. Bolton. Yeah.
Senator Hagel. In fact, I was briefed many times by the
U.N. inspectors. And so, how could we miss it?
Mr. Bolton. I would say two things, if I could. And I see
your time is short here.
On the chemical-weapons point, Hans Blix, himself, took
seriously the absence of records that Saddam had actually
destroyed the chemical weapons. And he said--it was reported
publicly, he had said to the Iraqis, ``Look, this stuff isn't
marmalade. You must have records that you've destroyed it.''
Now, that--it still hasn't been found. And his conclusion, that
the hypothesis that the chemical agents still existed was
wrong, was probably right.
On the IAEA, you know, the IAEA was pretty clear that they
did not see evidence of a revived uranium enrichment program.
And contrary to what some press reports have indicated, I think
we believe that that was right. It's very hard to hide an
extensive uranium enrichment program. It's much easier in the
case of chemical or biological weapons, because of the inherent
dual-use nature of that sort of thing. But I don't really think
that the IAEA conclusions on the absence of an ongoing Iraqi
uranium enrichment program were really disputed by the
administration.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Sarbanes?
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bolton, what's your position on the Law of the Sea
Treaty?
Mr. Bolton. The administration has submitted the Law of
the Sea Treaty as one of its priorities, and I support that.
Senator Sarbanes. That's simply because it's an
administration position, or does that represent your own view
of it?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I haven't personally read the Law of the
Sea Treaty. I don't think I've ever read it, to be honest with
you. The issues that--concerning the Law of the Sea Treaty that
came within the cognizance of bureaus operating under my
supervision this time, the--basically, Law of the Sea aspects
dealing with military use of international waters--the Pentagon
approved, and I had no reason to dispute them.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, now, in an article in a book
entitled ``Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign
Relations,'' published by the Royal Institute of International
Affairs in London, you called the Law of the Sea Treaty not
only undesirable as a policy, but also illegitimate methods of
forcing fundamental policy changes on the United States outside
the customary political process. Am I correct about that?
Mr. Bolton. I don't--I don't have the article in front of
me, Senator. It was--this was a Chatham House publication?
Senator Sarbanes. I assume so, yes.
Mr. Bolton. Yeah. The issue that I believe led President
Reagan to oppose the Law of the Sea Treaty in the first
instance was the--were the provisions having to do with the
undersea mining issue that were--and that's why President
Reagan withdrew American support for it. Those issues were
addressed later during the Clinton administration, and reviewed
by people, not including myself. During this administration, a
decision on--the decision was that the provisions had been
adequately fixed. I----
Senator Sarbanes. But you wrote this article in 2000.
Mr. Bolton. Right.
Senator Sarbanes. That's after these problems had been
addressed, by your own statement, just now.
Mr. Bolton. Right. I have not----
Senator Sarbanes. Well, if the problems had been
addressed, which you just suggested made the treaty acceptable,
how could you, at that point, be writing that it was a--not
only undesirable as a policy, but also illegitimate methods of
forcing fundamental policy changes on the United States outside
the customary political process?
Mr. Bolton. That was my opinion at the time, based on what
I knew at the time.
Senator Sarbanes. But you just told me that you were --
that you thought the problems that President Reagan found had
been addressed by that point, correct?
Mr. Bolton. The analysis----
Senator Sarbanes. You were still holding to a position
regarding this as illegitimate and undesirable.
Mr. Bolton. I think what I said, Senator--I hope that I
said this--if I didn't, if I was unclear, I apologize--I think
what I said was, those who had--those in the Bush
administration who reviewed these particular provisions of the
charter--and that did not include me, because they were not
part of my responsibility--concluded that the issues had been
successfully addressed, and that, therefore, they were to
recommend to the President that he support the treaty.
I've not independently gone back into that, because I've
been busy with other things, frankly. But if it's the opinion
of my colleagues in the administration who are expert in these
matters that it's satisfactory, I accept that.
Senator Sarbanes. What's your view of the NGOs and their
involvement in the U.N. system?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think that, in terms of delivery of
humanitarian services, and in disaster situations, in work in
international development, my own experience, in two and a half
years of the U.S. Agency for International Development has
given me a view that they can be--they can be very effective.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, now, in an article you wrote for
the Oxford Companion, ``The Politics of the World,'' in 2001,
you stated, and I quote, ``The penetration into the U.N. system
by NGOs has had profoundly undemocratic consequences by giving
some, but not all, interest groups a second bite at
international decision-making.'' How do you square that with
the--what you just said about----
Mr. Bolton. I think----
Senator Sarbanes. --the role of the NGOs?
Mr. Bolton. It's two separate issues, Senator. The
question of the role of the NGOs goes to--and there's a huge
literature on this, both in the academic world and in the
policy world--that goes to how decision-making in an
organization composed of member governments should be made,
that the--in my judgement, member governments should make the
decisions, member governments should set the policy. NGOs, in
democratic societies, have every right, and should be
encouraged, to make their voices known within their democratic
societies. And through elections, and through all of the
political processes that we're familiar with, governments come
up with policies. Those policies are then negotiated out by the
governments that are members of the international organization.
The second-bite-at-the-apple concept comes when some NGOs
that are perhaps disappointed in their ability to influence
policy within their own--within their own government, try and
come back at it again. They are not accountable to anybody.
Nobody elected them. That's what the basic problem of
democratic theory is there.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, then how would they--I thought, at
the outset, you wanted to encourage the NGOs' involvement in
the U.N. process.
Mr. Bolton. I think, as I said--I hope I was clear; let me
try it again--the NGOs, as deliverers of services providing
humanitarian assistance, for example, in the case of the recent
tsunami and other natural disasters, in civil conflicts, their
contribution in the longer-term effort of international
development, as recipients of grants or contracts by USAID, The
World Bank, or the U.N. Development Program--I think these are
all very desirable, and should be encouraged. The issue is not
their participation in the economic and social and humanitarian
operational side of things. It's the democratic theory question
about whether they should have influence outside of, and above,
member governments.
Senator Sarbanes. In other words, their influence has to
go through the member governments? Is that the way you see it?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think, as a matter of democratic
theory, within the United States we have interest groups that
cover the entire spectrum, and they can, and should, under our
system of liberty, make their influence felt any way they
choose, that they can participate in elections, they sponsor
seminars, they engage in public education. And out of this
process that we're all familiar with comes a United States
Government position.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, now, it's not just the U.S.
Government. You took the further--you made the statement to the
U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade and Small Arms and Light
Weapons, in 2001, ``We do not support the promotion of
international advocacy activity by international or
nongovernmental organizations.'' Is that your position?
Mr. Bolton. That was a statement that was cleared within
the United States Government and reflected our view of what the
U.N.'s role in the small arms and light weapons arena should
be. That is a reflection of----
Senator Sarbanes. Let me broaden it beyond that issue. Is
that your position with respect to advocacy activity by
international or nongovernmental organizations?
Mr. Bolton. Senator, that was in the context of a larger
statement, which, again, I don't have in front of me, but which
explained the circumstances that we faced at that conference,
in 2001.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I'm trying to get you to go
outside of that particular issue. You're not prepared to do
that, I take it?
Mr. Bolton. Not without the document in front of me,
Senator. You know, that----
Senator Sarbanes. What's your general position on the
NGOs----
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think people-----
Senator Sarbanes. --and advocacy?
Mr. Bolton. I mean, I think anybody is free to advocate
anytime they want.
Senator Sarbanes. But you don't think they--you think it
counters democratic theory if they do that, not working through
the country, is that correct?
Mr. Bolton. I think--well, I think this is an important
question of democratic theory.
Senator Sarbanes. All right, now, who speaks for people in
undemocratic countries?
Mr. Bolton. The issue----
Senator Sarbanes. If the NGOs can't present an advocacy
position because they have to work through their government,
who speaks for the people in undemocratic countries?
Mr. Bolton. Senator, the context--well, I think it's
permissible for them to speak for people in nondemocratic
countries. The precise context I was speaking of was in
democratic countries, where NGOs participate in the broad
political process. I'm not confining it to the electoral
process. They participate in the broad political process. The
result is a policy that the government, of which they are
citizens, espouses. And then the question is whether, having
participated in that democratic process, they get a second bite
of the apple.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, now, in the past, the U.S. has
been at the forefront of encouraging the United Nations and
other multilateral institutions actually to invite and welcome
the participation of civil-society groups, albeit outside the
formal decision-making process. I take it, from what you're
telling me today, you have difficulty with that encouragement.
Mr. Bolton. I have difficulty when international
organizations try to influence opinion within democratic
societies. And I think some of the groups, not all of them,
have that in mind. That's been very evident in some of their
public statements. And I do think this is a--this is an
important question of democratic theory. Responsible
government, representative government, rests on constitutional
structures that define who participates, and how. And, for us,
as Americans, those structures are the foundation of legitimacy
in government. And I think if those structures are disregarded,
we have a potential problem.
Senator Sarbanes. So would you welcome--I'll close with
this question, Mr. Chairman; I see the red light is on--would
you welcome the participation of an NGO in the U.N. process if
the NGO was speaking on behalf of peoples in an undemocratic
country?
Mr. Bolton. I would not object to that.
Senator Sarbanes. You wouldn't.
Mr. Bolton. I would not.
Senator Sarbanes. Uh-huh. What is it you would object to?
Mr. Bolton. The second bite at the apple. In other words,
the--as I said before--I guess that's about as clear as I can
be on it.
Senator Sarbanes. Would you welcome an NGO from a
democratic country speaking on behalf of the peoples of an
undemocratic country?
Mr. Bolton. I don't have any trouble with that.
Senator Sarbanes. Even if it runs counter to the policy of
the democratic country?
Mr. Bolton. I think--I think that's a different
circumstance. What I'm talking about is the challenge to
legitimacy----
Senator Sarbanes. All right----
Mr. Bolton. --of representative----
Senator Sarbanes. --thank you.
Senator Sarbanes. --government.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Chafee?
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Welcome, Mr. Bolton. You said all the right things in your
opening statement. And one of them, you said that Kofi Annan--
Secretary General Kofi Annan had called. I'm curious, did he
endorse your candidacy? [Laughter.]
Mr. Bolton. He said--well, I probably shouldn't get into
it, but he said, ``Get yourself confirmed quickly.''
Senator Chafee. Well, I think that's important.
My question is having to do with your confirmation hearing
in 2001, and you said that you felt that the admission of
Taiwan to the United Nations would be consistent with this
administration's ``one-China policy.'' You explained how Taiwan
meets the requirements of statehood, and, therefore, entrance
to the U.N. And you went on to compare our government's
position on Taiwan to our prior positions on Germany and the
two Koreas.
The one-China policy has been successful due to consistent
and partly ambiguous statements by government officials. A
careful balance of words has to be struck in order to help
preserve the relationships we have with both countries, and
their confidence that current actions on our part are intended
to help strike a balance across the Straits.
I would like to know how you would balance these competing
interests of wishing to support our democratic ally, Taiwan,
and trying to gain various concessions from the People's
Republic of China.
Mr. Bolton. Well, Senator, perhaps I could answer your
question by falling back a little bit on the subject of the
comments I had made on Taiwan during my time as a private
citizen in think-tanks and so on, where I was expressing my
opinions as a private citizens on--and without the
responsibility of being a government official. And I think I
was--in the 2001 hearing, I still had the luxury of being a
private citizen, and I was discussing it at that point. I think
I can say that this is a good example of something where I've
had an opinion, and I've expressed it. I don't back away from
the opinion. But time and tide have moved on. President Bush
has expressed his view on the relationship between Taiwan and
China. He's made it clear the administration has supported
Taiwan as observer in the World Health Organization, but that
he doesn't go beyond that. And I accept that.
I think when a person comes into the government, either
fresh or when you go into a new position, just because you've
had an opinion ten years before doesn't give you the chance to
say, ``Okay, let's start over at square one and talk about my
opinions.'' I'm not a golfer, but I think the metaphor is, you
have to play it as it lays. And I know what the President's
policy is, and I'm prepared to follow it.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you very much.
As the Six-Party talks commenced with North Korea, you gave
a speech that some would say undermined the stated policy of
the State Department at the time. And there was a bit of a
dispute with Mr. Pritchard and him saying, ``Those are your own
personal views.'' Ultimately, he resigned. Can you tell us what
happened there? Especially in view of saying that you like to
play it as it lies, using the golf metaphor.
Mr. Bolton. Senator, on that speech, I can assure you that
speech was fully cleared within the appropriate bureaucracy and
was given in Seoul. People knew it was coming for weeks, and
the timing of it. And I can tell you what our Ambassador to
South Korea, Tom Hubbard, said after the speech. He said,
``Thanks a lot for that speech, John. It'll help us a lot out
here.''
Senator Chafee. Why would Mr. Pritchard take exception to
that?
Mr. Bolton. Probably his----
Senator Chafee. His position at the time was Special Envoy
for Negotiations with North Korea. He's the point man.
Mr. Bolton. Probably for the same reason he resigned from
the administration. I don't think he agreed with the
President's policy. I respect Mr. Pritchard, but I don't think
he agreed with the President's policy.
Senator Chafee. Was the State Department policy at odds
with the President's policy?
Mr. Bolton. Not at that point, no. I think--and, as I say,
the speech was cleared within the State Department and
throughout the interagency.
Senator Chafee. Well, the ramifications from that dispute
were that, at the time, some of the top diplomats in China were
saying that United States does not have a negotiating strategy,
and they considered the United States their main obstacle--
these are their quotes, back at the time--to progress on these
Six-Party talks. And one of their diplomats, Chinese--People's
Republic of China diplomats said, ``How the U.S. is threatening
the DPRK, this needs to be further discussed in the next round
of talks.'' He says, ``Washington's negative policy towards
North Korea is an impediment.'' So the ramifications of this
dispute seem to be impeding our progress as we try and work
with North Korea.
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think that North Korea has taken
exception to a number of things that we've said. They took
exception to the President putting them in the ``axis of
evil.'' Most recently, they took exception to Secretary Rice
calling them an ``outpost of tyranny.'' I think that the fact
is, though, that, as I say, the speech was in preparation for
quite some time. It was known within the Department of State.
Everybody who should have had a chop on it, did have a chop on
it. And it was given with the full knowledge and understanding
of the Department, as a whole.
I think--I don't mean to underestimate, at all, the
difficulty of working these Six-Party talks. It's something
that the President is very committed to. We've worked hard on
it. We've worked particularly hard with China, which has been
the host of three rounds of the Six-Party talks. Secretary
Rice, as you know, was recently there, and worked hard with
China to try and get the North Koreans back to the negotiating
table. It's now been ten months since the last round of Six-
Party talks, and we've been prepared, for quite some time, to
sit down and resume those talks.
Senator Chafee. Well, very good. On the positive side,
certainly one of the initiatives you had at the State
Department, which you were rightfully praised for, is the
Proliferation Security Initiative. And the PSI is a global
effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass
destruction, the delivery systems, and related materials
worldwide. The PSI uses existing authorities, national and
international, to defeat proliferation. And you worked in a
multilateral fashion on this proposal. Ten other countries--
Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom--all agreed initially
to PSI, and 60 more have signed on since.
But you have said that you are loathe to call it an
organization. You call it an activity. And you said, in Tokyo,
``Our goal with the PSI is based on an equally simple tenet,
that the impact of states working together in a deliberatively
cooperative manner would be greater than the states alone in an
ad-hoc fashion.'' And this statement would seem to point to
your support of the kind of cooperation a body like the U.N.
can foster.
Can you outline your feelings on the best way to set up
multilateral agreements?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think PSI is an example of a flexible
approach to a very serious problem. And, as you indicated,
there's no doubt in our minds that international trafficking in
weapons and materials of mass destruction can only be addressed
in a multilateral fashion. The United States acting alone
simply is unable to stop that international trafficking. That's
why we began with our original 11-country core group to put
together the statement of interdiction principles and then to
try and persuade others to accept the PSI.
I think that--and we've had some notable successes, not
least of which was the interception of the ship, the BBC China,
which I think played a material role in Libya's strategic
decision to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. And I think
the lesson that I derived from PSI and from the G8 Global
Partnership is that you can conduct multilateral activity
effectively without large bureaucracies. That's not to say
that, in some cases, you don't need bureaucracies. The IAEA
that Senator Hagel asked me about a minute ago is an example.
You need experts in an organization like that to build up their
knowledge and conduct operations over a long period of time.
But surely you can do this without large bureaucracies that
don't deliver effectively.
And so, I think there's always room for improvement in
bureaucracy, and the lesson I draw from PSI is, the leaner you
make the operation, the more successful you're likely to be.
Senator Chafee. And can you make some relationship to how
you'll work now with the United Nations, which is a gigantic
bureaucracy?
Mr. Bolton. Yeah, well, I hope--I hope the lesson of PSI
is that you can take what many people thought at the time was a
pretty controversial idea, the physical interdiction of weapons
or materials of mass destruction in international commerce,
explain that we were prepared to do it entirely consistently
with existing international and national authorities, and rally
support for it. I think that's the kind of thing that I had a
small hand--I was a junior official at the time in first
President Bush's administration, when he and Secretary Baker
rallied the Security Council and the international community to
the series of resolutions that led to the ouster of Saddam
Hussein from Kuwait. But I think that is possible. I think
that's what our objective should be.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Dodd?
The Chairman. The Chair calls for order. The hearing is
adjourned until order is restored. [Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m.,
the hearing was adjourned.] [Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the
hearing was resumed.]
The Chairman. The hearing will recommence.
I now call upon the distinguished Senator from Connecticut,
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Does that come out of my time, by the way?
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. The full ten minutes are restored.
Senator Dodd. Timing's everything.
Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have some opening
comments, but I'd like to ask unanimous consent they be
included in the record, if I may----
The Chairman. They will be included in the record in full.
Senator Dodd. --and lay out some thoughts on this, on the
nomination, generally, if we could.
Secondly, let me just say, I think most of my colleagues--
I've been on this committee for 24 years. I've enjoyed working
with several Members here during that entire period of time. I
was trying to recall other occasions in this committee when
I've opposed a nominee, and I can't recall one. There have only
been a handful. In fact, many of my colleagues on this side, I
know, are disappointed from time to time when I've supported
nominees of the administration, not because I agreed with their
views, but because I've generally embraced the view that
Presidents, once elected, have a right to put together their
official families, people who share their views. So I--others
have a different criteria, but that's generally been my point
of view.
So I begin, Mr. Chairman, as I think you do, and others
have over the years, with the assumption that if a President
sends up a nominee here, that the Presidents begin, with my
view, anyway, to be able to have that team, unless there are
reasons which would disqualify an individual under any set of
circumstances, not just their views with particular matter of
policy; in this case, foreign policy.
I'd ask, as well, Mr. Chairman--Mr. Bolton has made the
request, and I don't think it's an unfair one at all--you may
want to evaluate how to do this--but I think all of these
interviews and e-mails and so forth ought to be made a part of
the public record. And I'll make the request. If you want to
think about that, Mr. Chairman, I'll--before you want to
respond to it, but I'd make the request, because I think it
deserves to be out there in the public domain so that people
can have a full opportunity to review what's been said, what
are in e-mails, what other witnesses--we've interviewed some; I
think the staff have jointly--some six different people, who
bring a particular set of facts regarding what I think are the
most serious allegations about your nomination, and that is the
allegation that you tried to have two analysts removed from
their jobs because you disagreed with their intelligence
conclusions. That, to me, is, in this environment we're in
today, Mr. Bolton, I would say, putting aside your views about
the United Nations and other things--if that is true, then I
don't think you have a right to serve in a high post. I think
it would be unfortunate to set the example, in this day and
age, when we're trying to get the best intelligence we can, if
you tried to remove someone. Whether or not you were successful
or not is not the issue. Trying to rob a bank and failing to do
so is not--is a crime, in my view. Trying to remove someone, as
an analyst, from their job, because you disagree with what
they're saying, I think, is dreadfully wrong. And you've got an
opportunity to defend yourself here, and I want to get to the
bottom of it if we can.
Now, you've made the statement, in response to Senator
Biden, that you did not try to--or you did try to remove --or
at least you recommended that these two individuals--one we've
talked about, Mr. Westermann; the other we'll just call an
intelligence officer, because his name should be kept private.
Is that--did I hear you correctly when you responded to Senator
Biden?
Mr. Bolton. I don't think so, Senator, respectfully. The
way you put it, at the beginning, was that I tried to have
people removed because of their--because I disagreed with their
intelligence conclusions, and that's not true.
Senator Dodd. You thought because they went behind your
back----
Mr. Bolton. I thought in--I thought, in both cases, if I
may say so, their conduct was unprofessional and broke my
confidence and trust, which I think--I think is important in
all professional relationships, especially in ones involving
intelligence.
Senator Dodd. Let me address that particular point. Now,
as I understand it, Mr. Westermann, who, by the way, has a
distinguished background, is highly regarded by his peers--and
I'll lay that out for the record hearing here, going back and
interviewing his superiors and others over the years. As I
understand it--and you correct me if I'm wrong, now--that this
going behind your back--Mr. Westermann sent an e-mail to your
Chief of Staff, as I understand it now, Frederick Fleitz--is
that how you pronounce his name?
Mr. Bolton. That's correct.
Senator Dodd. He sent an e-mail in February to your Chief
of Staff that tried to alert your assistant that you were
probably going to have trouble getting the language cleared
that you wanted to include, and suggested alternative language,
at that time, to him. Your assistant, Mr. Fleitz, pressed to
have the language sent out for clearance. So Mr. Westermann did
so, at the suggestion of your Chief of Staff. The submission to
the Intelligence Committee made clear the language that you
wanted cleared. It was also--contained Mr. Westermann's
suggested alternative language. Now, all due respect, how is
that going behind your back?
Mr. Bolton. You know, Senator, a lot of the material
that's in the----
Senator Dodd. Well, am I correct in my assessment of what
occurred, that he did send an e-mail?
Mr. Bolton. I don't--I don't know what the circumstances
were. I've seen a lot of it, after the time. What I did was
talk to Mr. Westermann's supervisor. I first called Mr. Ford.
He was not in the office that day. I forget the reason why.
Carl Ford, the Assistant Secretary, the head of the Bureau. I
then asked to speak to Tom Fingar, who was the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Bureau, the senior career official.
And I said, basically--I said, basically, ``What's going on
here?'' And----
Senator Dodd. Did you call Mr. Westermann?
Mr. Bolton. I called--I called him to find--and he--and he
basically said he had--he had sent something out into the
clearance process without notifying us. So I put this to Mr.
Fingar----
Senator Dodd. Well, you've made a statement he went behind
your back.
Mr. Bolton. Yes, and----
Senator Dodd. Have you checked?
Mr. Bolton. I did. That's why I asked Mr. Fingar. I didn't
know what the facts were. I asked Mr. Fingar, the senior career
officer in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and he came
back a couple of hours later with--he didn't know what the
circumstances were, which is understandable, I think--but he
came back to me a couple of hours later with an e-mail that
said that Mr. Westermann's behavior was, quote, ``entirely
inappropriate,'' close quote. He said--meaning--referring to
INR--he said, quote, ``We screwed up,'' close quote. And he
said, twice, ``It won't happen again.''
Senator Dodd. Let me--let me just--because I think that's
important. You said that earlier. Mr. Brannigan, who is a staff
member of the Chairman of this committee, had an interview with
Mr. Fingar over the last several days, and let me quote Mr.
Brannigan's question to Mr. Fingar regarding this very point.
Mr. Brannigan, speaking now to Mr. Fingar, ``You said that
what Mr. Westermann did was entirely within the procedure. He
was never disciplined. It was perfectly normal. That the only
failure of his was lack of prudence. And then there is the e-
mail to Mr. Bolton. You say it's entirely inappropriate, and we
screwed up, and it won't happen again. That seems like a rather
different assessment.''
Mr. Fingar, responding to this question, in the last 72
hours or so, ``Well, I knew I was dealing with somebody who was
very upset,'' speaking about you, sir. ``I was trying to get
the incident closed, which I didn't regard as a big deal. I
knew John Bolton was mad. I assume when people are mad, they
get over it, so I did lean over in the direction of, 'Sure,
we'll take responsibility.' He thanked me for it. At least as
far as I'm concerned in my dealings with Mr. Bolton, that
closed it.''
That's a different assessment. In fact, what Mr. Fingar is
saying is that the reason he said what he did was because you
were furious.
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think the--I mean, I basically thought
the matter was closed when I got Mr. Fingar's e-mail saying,
``It won't happen again.'' And I----
Senator Dodd. Well, then----
Mr. Bolton. --take his----
Senator Dodd. Let me move you forward.
Mr. Bolton. May I just add one point?
Senator Dodd. Yeah, go ahead.
Mr. Bolton. The comments Mr. Fingar made the day of the
incident, I took to be his opinion at the time. And I think
that's the relevant point in time to look at. But I ----
Senator Dodd. Yeah, well----
Mr. Bolton. --but I agree with his point--I agree with his
concluding point.
Senator Dodd. Well, then Mr. Brannigan asked him again,
``Were there any policies or procedures changed as a result of
this incident?'' Answer: ``No.''
Mr. Bolton. Senator, I have no idea what INR's policies
are. That's why we gave it to INR, and that's why I asked Mr.
Fingar to look into it. And his response back to me was, what
happened was entirely inappropriate----
Senator Dodd. Well, let me take----
Mr. Bolton. --and that they----
Senator Dodd. --you seven months forward.
Mr. Bolton. --screwed up.
Senator Dodd. Let me take you to September 2000. That's
February. So the matter's over with in February, in your mind.
And yet in September of 2000, in a conversation that you had
with--let me get the quote here if I can--here it is now, in
September, with Mr. Neil Silver. Do you know who Mr. Neil
Silver is?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, I do.
Senator Dodd. Right. He was the direct supervisor for Mr.
Westermann.
Mr. Bolton. One level up, right?
Senator Dodd. Right. Okay? So, in September, seven months
later, now, all right? Mr. Silver is in your office. All right?
And, again, here--now, this is an interview done in the last
few days here by the joint staff of this committee. September
2002, I think. ``Neil told me that, at the end of the meeting
that he had with Mr. Bolton, Mr. Bolton took him aside and, out
of the blue, said, 'And that Westermann fellow, we really would
like him removed from his portfolio, and transferred.'''
Mr. Bolton. This is Mr. Silver testifying?
Senator Dodd. Well, this is Mr. Westermann talking about
his interview with Mr. Silver. By the way, that is also
corroborated in other documents we have here, from this, right
here. This is also included, if you will, in the Report on U.S.
Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessment on
Iraq, page 278, paragraph (u), the third paragraph on that
page. The analyst said, ``Six months later, after the incident,
with his new office director, met with the Under Secretary,''
speaking about yourself, ``the Under Secretary asked to have
the analyst removed from his current worldwide chemical and
biological weapons portfolio. The analyst said he was not
removed from his portfolio and did not suffer any negative
effects professionally.'' That's seven months later, Mr.
Bolton.
Mr. Bolton. Yes. And have you interviewed Mr. Silver?
Senator Dodd. Not yet. We've tried to. We're going to try
interview----
Mr. Bolton. My recollection is that, for some period of
time----
Senator Sarbanes. You do think he should be interviewed,
right?
Mr. Bolton. I have--absolutely.
Senator Dodd. Yeah.
Senator Sarbanes. Uh-huh.
Mr. Bolton. The--for some period of time, there had been a
vacancy. Mr. Silver came in to be the office director, and he
asked to come up to pay a courtesy call on me. I didn't ask for
the meeting. And he wanted to come up and introduce himself.
And I think my schedule was such that several months went by.
But he came in September, and my recollection is that he said,
you know, he hoped his office would work with the bureaus that
reported to me, and asked if there had ever been any problems.
And I thought, he had asked an honest question, I ought to give
him an honest answer, which I did, and that----
Senator Dodd. So in September, it still bothered you.
Mr. Bolton. It was a--it was a one-on-one meeting. It was
a courtesy call. He said, ``Have you ever had problems?'' And I
said, ``Yes.''
Senator Dodd. Yeah.
Senator Sarbanes. And did you say----
Mr. Bolton. But I had done nothing----
Senator Sarbanes. --did you say to him you thought
Westermann should be removed?
Mr. Bolton. I thought he should be given other
responsibilities. I do recall, very specifically, with Mr.
Silver, since he had obviously had no contact with this episode
before. I said, ``I wish Westermann no ill will. I'm not trying
to affect him. I just have lost trust in him.''
Senator Dodd. Well, let me tell you we've talked in the
last few days. Now, you've made the statement----
The Chairman. Let me just ask----
Senator Dodd. Let me just finish on this, if I can, Mr.
Chairman.
We've talked to Thomas Fingar, who is presently the
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.
We've talked to your Acting Chief of Staff, Mr. Fleitz. We have
reports, at least, about the Neil Silver conversation. We've
also spoken with Carl Ford. We've talked with Stuart Cohen,
former Chair of the International Intelligence Council and the
former boss of the nameless NIO. In every one of those
instances, they claim, independently, that you asked for this
man, Mr. Westermann, or this NIO, to be removed from their job.
Every one of them have said this. These are your people, in
some cases, who have said it. I'll quote 'em for you here.
Mr. Bolton. Senator, and that's one reason why I'd like
all these transcripts to be released.
Senator Dodd. Well, I've asked unanimous consent they all
be laid out there.
Mr. Bolton. So that the----
Senator Dodd. So I'm going to ask you once again, Did you
ask for these two people to be removed from their jobs?
Mr. Bolton. No. I said that I wanted the--in the case of
Mr. Westermann, that I had lost trust in him, and thought he
should work on other accounts.
Senator Dodd. What other portfolio did he have?
Mr. Bolton. In the case within INR, I think they're----
Senator Dodd. What's his portfolio?
Mr. Bolton. A lot of----
Senator Dodd. What's his----
Mr. Bolton. I don't know what his portfolio was.
Senator Dodd. He has one portfolio, biological weapons and
chemical weapons.
Mr. Bolton. If you say so, Senator. I don't--I don't know
what his portfolio is.
The Chairman. All right. And the----
Senator Dodd. In the case----
The Chairman. --Chair would like to ask that we continue
this, maybe, in the next round.
And I'd like to recognize, now, Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Bolton, for being here. And I look
forward to all the questions, back and forth.
Mr. Chairman, I have a statement I'd like to be made part
of the record.
The Chairman. It will be made in part--made in the record
in full.
Senator Allen. For those who are watching this hearing,
you can cross-examine people in such a way that it makes it act
as if it's something more than it is. The--I don't think all of
this questions on these individuals, and e-mails, would matter
if Members didn't have, really, a disagreement with you, let's
say, on what really matters. You are--you have been appointed,
or nominated, by the President to be our representative, the
United States Representative to the United Nations. And I think
we ought to focus on the big picture, and your record of
performance on the big picture.
Senator Chafee brought up the admirable leadership you
provided in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which
garnered 60 nations in this effort. And that is something that
showed initiative on your part, obviously essential to get
other countries involved in it, and I think that's part of your
record of performance, which I find very salutary, that, as you
talked in your opening statement about supporting freedom and
democracy, we want to, in my view, advance freedom and justice
and, obviously, our security, and when the United Nations can
be helpful, they can be; if not, find a method--a way of doing
it. And you have done that. As well as the G8 Summit, where you
got other countries to match the United States' $1 billion in
the Cooperative Threat Reduction, or Nunn-Lugar Program.
You also played a central role in negotiating the Treaty of
Moscow, which will reduce operationally-deployed nuclear
weapons by two thirds. You also, in previous years, served in a
variety of fronts, but one of the best things you did was--is
get the United Nations to repeal that odious U.N. resolution
that likened Zionism to racism. And that's why I think groups
like B'nai Brith and others are supporting you, as well.
You, I think, have the experience, you have the knowledge,
you have the background and the right principles to come into
the United Nations at this time. There's scandals right now.
The Oil-for-Food scandal that I know Senator Coleman has just
been a lead in the Senate in addressing. It is important that
we have, for the United States, someone who will be advocating,
forthrightly and honestly, the views of the American people. I
guarantee you, the taxpayers out in the real world aren't so
concerned about e-mails back and forth, and personnel
disagreements, here, there, and the other; they care about
what's going on with the money we're putting in the United
Nations. Is the United Nations helpful for the advancement of
freedom and justice? Can it be made into an organization more
relevant to real people in the real world?
And I think the President, in selecting you, Mr. Bolton,
has selected the absolute perfect person. The fact that there
has been controversy, the American people, they think that's
probably good, because you'll bring a credibility to the United
Nations that they sorely need. And I like the fact that you'll
advocate our principles, you're not going to be seduced by
empty, meaningless, courteous pontifications by international
bureaucracies. And I like that. And that's important for the
advancement of our ideals, and it--as well as for others in the
world.
Now, as has been discussed in a variety of ways, the United
Nations--even Kofi Annan has put forward some recommendations
to reform and bring greater efficiency to the United Nations.
Let me ask you how you would prioritize many of these needed
changes at the United Nations, and how do those relate to the
interests of the United States?
Mr. Bolton. Well, many of the governance changes discussed
previously--the Security Council, the reform of the Human
Rights Commission--these are all things that need attention.
But I think, in terms of the management side of reform, one of
the aspects that we tried to emphasize in the first Bush
administration, Bush 41, under the concept of ``unitary U.N.,''
was to avoid the duplication and overlap and waste of resources
that existed in many of the U.N. specialized agencies, funds,
and programs, where many different agencies are doing the same
thing, and, in effect, duplicating work, and in a very
inefficient way. And I think--and I don't want to anticipate
questions that may come later, but the Oil-for-Food Program, as
it has evolved, has taught us a lot, I think, about the culture
of the bureaucracy at the U.N. And just as we've learned
through the Silverman-Robb report, and others, about the
culture of some of our practices on the intelligence side, I
think Oil-for-Food has told us a lot about the culture of the
bureaucracy at the U.N., and emphasized why management reform
is needed there.
And I think working with the other principal contributors
in the Geneva group--this is the group of countries that
supply, typically, more than one--each of them supplies, in the
assessed budget, more than 1 percent of that budget--and
working with other concerned countries, that this is a real
moment of opportunity to eliminate waste and duplication and
overlap in the U.N. system, and to concentrate on performance-
based evaluation for the services and the activities that the
various U.N. agencies are involved in.
Senator Allen. Well, thank you. I'd--the American people
would never tolerate that sort of fraud and abuse that was in
the Oil-for-Food Program in our own government, nor should we
tolerate it in any organization that we fund with the
taxpayers' money. And I think the concept of accountability and
measurement--or, you call it ``performance-based''--is very
important. I think it--what gets measured, gets better. And to
the extent that that can be done with the United Nations,
that's helpful.
Let me ask you this, since you worked on some of the
proliferation issues. How do you envision the United States
working with the United Nations, if possible, to realize a
solution to the nuclear concerns that we have with North Korea,
as well as with Iran?
Mr. Bolton. Well, on those two, specifically, when North
Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we worked in
the IAEA Board of Governors and got a unanimous agreement that
the question of North Korea should be referred to the Security
Council, as the IAEA statute provides. Now, the Council has not
taken action on North Korea, because of the pendency of the
Six-Party talks. But I think the fact that the Security Council
is there as a possibility is an important point to make, not
just to North Korea, but to other countries that would attempt
to achieve weapons of mass destruction.
In the case of Iran, we have worked hard, at the IAEA, to
have the matter of Iran referred to the Security Council,
because its pursuit of nuclear weapons, as North Korea's
pursuit of nuclear weapons, amounts to a clear threat to
international peace and security. And I think one of the
important steps that Secretary Rice was able to make, in just
her first couple of weeks on the job in providing certain
commitments we made to the Europeans, was to receive, from the
EU-3 in return, their very clear public statement in a report
to their EU colleagues that they, too, would support a referral
to the Security Council at an appropriate time if Iran did not
make the strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons.
I think that weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and
the confluence of those two things, are the biggest threat to
international peace and security that the civilized community
faces. And the Security Council should play a role in that.
That's the position I've taken within the administration,
within this--within this administration from the get-go.
Senator Allen. Well, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate those remarks, because I think
that these are the issues that matter most with the United
Nations and for our own security. It will be proliferation of
arms, weapons of mass destruction, as well as nuclear
proliferation.
Your record is one that is exemplary in that area. Also,
that of advocating freedom for all people, regardless of their
background and culture, throughout the world, which I think can
be very--where the United Nations could be very helpful. If
they're not, then we have to find other approaches to doing so.
And I think you've shown that, that capability.
Finally, just to follow up--I think it was Senator Chafee,
or maybe it was Senator Sarbanes--insofar as Taiwan joining the
World Health Organization, you support Taiwan joining the World
Health Organization?
Mr. Bolton. The administration's position has been to
support Taiwan becoming an observer in the WHO.
Senator Allen. Right. Good. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sarbanes. Is that your position?
Mr. Bolton. Yes. I support that position.
Senator Sarbanes. I thought you supported their being a
member.
Mr. Bolton. When I--as I said before, when I wrote, as a
private citizen, during the 1990s, that's what I said. And when
I wrote it then, I understood it. The President has made his
policy on this very clear, and I support his policy.
Senator Allen. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I'd be,
personally, happy if they were a member, but if we can have
them as an observer, they certainly ought to be involved,
especially with the SARS epidemic. They can be very, very
helpful. And the fact that China is so paranoid about it should
not be of any consequence when we're concerned about world
health.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Allen.
Senator Kerry?
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
With all due respect to Senator Allen, I just don't think
that one can dismiss, or should dismiss, how one interprets
intelligence and how one operates within a position of high
responsibility as somehow not important to the American people.
We've just come off the most massive intelligence failure in
our history, and we recognize that there are serious questions
still outstanding about the degree to which that intelligence
was manipulated, or the degree to which a predetermined
position determined the outcome of that intelligence. And so,
it is vital to the security of the American people, whether or
not Mr. Bolton, in his position, was party to the same kind of
activities. And that's the question with respect to Mr.
Westermann.
The fact is that on September 18th, in 2004, the Bush
administration using stringent standards--and I'm quoting from
the New York Times--adopted, after the failure to find banned
weapons in Iraq, conducted a new assessment of Cuba's
biological weapons capacity, and concluded that it is no longer
clear that Cuba has an active offensive big-weapons program.
And so, that directly contradicted the position that Mr. Bolton
took. And, in fact, Mr. Westermann, was correct. And I think
the American people deserve to have people, who are correct,
not fired, but rewarded.
So that's what's at issue here. And it is in the interest
of the American people to know that their intelligence is being
properly sifted and vetted and listened to.
Now, I don't think that's the only reason to have questions
and doubts about this nomination. I want to make that clear.
It's only one of the issues. It's not the prime issue in my
mind. There are much more serious and significant issues.
The ambassadorship to the United Nations is one of the most
important, foremost diplomatic positions in the world today.
And I think that it is critical that we have someone there who
comes with both the respect for that institution and the
reputation for diplomacy that is vital to American interests at
this point in time.
I think we need somebody who believes in the United
Nations, despite its flaws, and believes in that diplomacy and
negotiation, and has a track record of effectiveness. And that
track record of effectiveness is what we need to measure here
today.
There are questions about Mr. Bolton's commitment to the
United Nations, and his effectiveness. I'm not going to go in--
I'd like to ask unanimous consent that the full text of my
opening statement be put in the record.
The Chairman. Put in the record in full.
Senator Kerry. But, you know, we've seen, certainly, some
instance where, when Mr. Bolton wants to, he's effective. I
think the PSI is a good effort, and I think there have been
some positive advances for our country in that regard. But on
two of the most critical proliferation issues facing us, both
North Korea and Iran, Secretary Bolton opposed the idea of
direct negotiations with each of these countries, even when our
allies were asking us to do so. And that's an important part of
the diplomatic effort that we're going to have to engage in,
going forward.
At a critical moment with North Korea, in a speech that he
gave in Seoul, that he attacked Kim Jung-Il, whom we all
attacked, we all dislike, we all recognize is, you know,
someone we'd love to see removed or in a different--you know,
not leading that country; but, on the other hand, at this
critical moment, to almost 50 times in one speech personally
vilify him, was to almost guarantee the outcome of the
diplomatic effort that he was engaged in.
In North Korea, I think Mr. Bolton deserves a lot of the
credit for the abandonment of the efforts that the Clinton
administration had made that effectively froze Pyongyang's
plutonium program. Now, whatever you want to say about the
cheating--and we all understood that that was probably going
on, including Bill Perry, who was negotiating it at the time--
nevertheless, we knew where that plutonium was. We had
inspectors in the reactor. We had television cameras in the
reactor. Today, we don't.
There's been a huge increase in the nuclear capacity of
North Korea, on your watch. And the question, legitimately,
ought to be asked why you ought to be rewarded to go to an
increasingly important position, given that. In fact, Senator
Domenici raised those questions. Threat reduction programs are
spread over the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy. I'm
not going to belabor the administration's refusal to heed the
advice of the Baker-Cutler Commission to increase funding for
threat reduction, but when the committee met last year to hear
from Mr. Bolton about threat reduction, the fact is that
there's been a failure to dispose of nearly 70 tons of
plutonium. That's enough for thousands of weapons. Our
colleague, Senator Domenici, said, at that hearing, quote,
``Why a program of this much global importance should be
blocked by something as basic as liability remains beyond me.
I've been amazed that the leadership of the United States and
Russia cannot resolve this issue. Failure to resolve this issue
is simply not consistent with the urgency that the
administration has attached to nuclear proliferation.''
Senator Domenici took specific issue with Mr. Bolton's
performance. He said, ``I submit that Mr. John Bolton, who has
been assigned to negotiate this, has a very heavy
responsibility, and I hate to say that I'm not sure, to this
point, that he's up to it. If he doesn't think it's important
enough to solve this issue of liability, then I submit that you
ought to get somebody who can.''
I also believe Mr. Bolton has made a selective reading of
recent events. For instance, he frequently refers to the Libya
model of counterproliferation. By his interpretation of events,
a proliferating country makes a strategic decision on its own
just to abandon nuclear weapons. And he suggests that that's
what Iran and North Korea ought to do. Well, it would be
wonderful if they did. But that's a distortion of the reality
of what happened.
The fact is that the Clinton administration and the British
were long involved prior to this administration and engaged in
a dialogue with Libya. Libya was prepared to move, some time
ago. And the fact is that the Libyan model represented a
willingness of the United Kingdom to engage in a patient,
frank, and secret dialogue that ultimately resulted in their
giving it up. And some people have suggested publicly that Mr.
Bolton engaged in an effort to try to scuttle that particular
initiative.
So when you add the totality of statements made and beliefs
about the United Nations, I think there are serious questions
about the nomination.
Mr. Bolton, let me just ask you, Is it fair to say that you
really don't respect or believe in the institution of the
United Nations?
Mr. Bolton. No, I think it's very inaccurate, and I'll
just give you one example to show why it's not accurate. During
the period, roughly, 1997 to 2000, I served, without
compensation, as an assistant to former Secretary of State
Baker, who, at that time, had been asked by Secretary General
Annan to be his personal envoy for the Western Sahara. The U.N.
peacekeeping force in the Western Sahara, MINURSO, which is--
it's a Spanish acronym--had been created during the first Bush
administration, in the late spring or early summer of 1991, but
had not been successful. And Secretary General Annan wanted to
take advantage of Secretary Baker being out of office to see if
he couldn't help resolve the matter. And Secretary Baker called
me--I think it was in January of 1997--and asked if I would be
willing to assist. He said, ``I'm going to do this pro bono, so
if you want to help, you're going to have to do it pro bono,
too.'' And I said that I would. And Secretary----
Senator Kerry. But that's--sorry, go ahead.
Mr. Bolton. Secretary Baker has just recently resigned his
position; unfortunately, in my judgement. He devoted an awful
lot of time to it.
The reason I worked for him again, for the United Nations,
for free was not because I ever expected to use it in a
confirmation hearing, or because I expected anybody to give me
a pat on the head; I did it because I thought that the U.N.
peacekeeping operation in the Western Sahara could bring a
resolution to the uncertainty of the status of that territory
and get those tens of thousands of refugees who have been in
the Sahara Desert for decades----
Senator Kerry. But my question to you----
Mr. Bolton. --back to their homeland.
Senator Kerry. --is not----
Mr. Bolton. That's what I worked for.
Senator Kerry. My question to you is not whether or not
you have selectively chosen, here and there. As I said a moment
ago, there's a selectively to your approach, as there was,
evidently, in your belief about the intelligence with respect
to Cuba. When it serves a particular purpose, you adopt it;
but, generically, over the long history, your writings, your
comments, your public statements, your speeches, your
interviews about the United Nations have been disdainful of it.
I mean, you have said, ``There's no such thing as the
United Nations.''
You've said, ``There's an international community that
occasionally can be led by the only real power in the world,''
and you point to the United States as essentially being the
United Nations.
You've said, ``If the U.N. Secretary building in New York
lost ten stories, it wouldn't make a bit of difference.''
You've said that you would have one permanent member of the
Security Council, because that's the real reflection of the
distribution of power in the world.
You've said that you not only don't care about losing the
General Assembly vote, but it actually--you see it as a ``make
my day'' outcome.
How do these statements reflect a respect for the United
Nations and empower you to go there and have other people
believe you're there to enhance it?
Mr. Bolton. Well, first, Senator, a lot of those
statements are not accurate reflections of what I've said.
Second----
Senator Kerry. You said them. Do you deny saying them?
Mr. Bolton. Yes. I can--I can think of several that are--
--
Senator Kerry. You didn't say those statements.
Mr. Bolton. --quoted out of context, and I'd be happy to
address them. But my larger point is----
Senator Kerry. Well, they're direct quotes. They're right
off tapes. There's--I mean, how is the context out of context?
Mr. Bolton. Well, for example, the last--I believe, the
last one you mentioned had to do with the loss of the U.N.
vote, which comes from an article that I wrote in the 1990s at
a time when, under the U.N. financial regulations, U.S.----
Senator Kerry. But that's precisely what you wrote.
Mr. Bolton. Well, and----
Senator Kerry. I can quote the whole article for you.
Mr. Bolton. --and----
Senator Kerry. --I have it here.
Mr. Bolton. I would like to put the whole article in the
record, because, at the end of the article, what I say is,
there is a solution to this problem of the U.S. arrearages that
can result in the U.S. not losing its vote. And the solution,
if I may just elaborate on it, was to take the very extensive
in-kind contributions that the Department of Defense had made
to U.N. peacekeeping operations beginning in the early 1990s,
but for which we had not charged the United Nations, and, in
effect, restate the books of the U.N. to reflect that reality.
This is analogous to things that were done for China, Russia,
and France, in circumstances over the years, to bring--to
eliminate their contested arrearages account. So, in that case,
I wasn't say it would ``make my day'' to lose the vote; I
proposed a way to--so as not to lose the U.S. vote.
Senator Kerry. Well, we need to come back to this. My time
is up.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.
Now, the Chair would just like to outline the roadmap until
we recess.
Senator Sarbanes. Another roadmap?
The Chairman. Exactly. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. This is the Bolton-hearing roadmap.
Senator Sarbanes. I'm not sure we can handle the roadmap
we----
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Sarbanes. --already have.
The Chairman. We will hear from Senator Coleman, in order,
and then each of the four Democratic Senators who are here,
because you've patiently waited for this period of time. And by
12:30 or 12:40, we'll have been three hours in the hearing.
Then we will commence again this afternoon with another round
of ten-minute questioning.
Senator Coleman?
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I really want to talk about U.N. reform. I'd like to get,
if I can, kind of, the nitty-gritty of--but before I do, I want
to just--kind of, for the purpose of clarifying the record, I
want to go over a couple of things, just to make sure that I
understand them.
We've had a lot of discussion about Westermann. And, for
some, the issue is whether you lost confidence in someone, and
the ramifications of that. For others, it may be how one
interprets intelligence. If I can just walk through it.
As I understand, 2002, you were going to give a speech on
weapons of mass destruction in countries on the terrorist list.
Mr. Bolton. That's correct.
Senator Coleman. And, at that point, was that the process
is, if you're going to give a speech, you've got to run it
through folks to make sure that it's--if there's classified
information on that, that that's not in there; if anything has
to be declassified--but you run it through a process, and part
of that is intelligence services, including those within the
State Department, get a chance to review that. Is that the way
the process works?
Senator Biden. Will the Senator yield on an important
point? The speech doesn't have to be reviewed, does it? Only
the portions of the speech that cite intelligence----
Mr. Bolton. There are two--there are two issues here. The
first is, in the case--can I say one thing first? This speech
was not about Cuba. It was about a whole range of countries--
Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. The question, in the
case of Cuba, arose because the U.S. Government had not said
anything publicly about Cuba's BW efforts in a number of years.
There was classified information in various publications of the
intelligence agencies that discussed that. So to say anything
about Cuba, you have to--it was necessary to get agreement by
the intelligence agencies----
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Bolton. --that they would declassify it. And this is--
this is, I want to say, is an entirely legitimate and important
step, because the sensitivity of sources and methods that might
be involved, particularly at a time, you know, when we just had
the arrest and then confession of the spy, Ana Balen Montes, a
Cuban spy--the intelligence agencies were going to be concerned
that nobody say anything in an unclassified environment that
would compromise sources and methods.
And so, the first step, Senator, was, in the case of
language about the Cuba BW situation, to see if there--frankly,
if there was anything that the intelligence agencies would
agree upon to say.
Senator Coleman. And your concern with Mr. Westermann was
that, in his review of it, he offered his own views, he
indicated INR does not concur, added some alternative language,
and you found out about that after the fact?
Mr. Bolton. That's correct. That's what I thought was
``behind my back.''
Senator Coleman. So you----
Senator Biden. Excuse me, if I can ask--this is--I'm not
taking issue; I just want to make sure--I'd ask unanimous
consent that this not be on the Senator's time--and that is, I
want to make clear, Mr. Westermann did not have access to your
whole speech, did he?
Mr. Bolton. The question at the time was the
declassification. The whole speech was later cleared by the
Bureau of Intelligence----
Senator Biden. That's not my----
Mr. Bolton. --and Research.
Senator Biden. --question. I just--I'm not taking issue----
Mr. Bolton. The whole speech wasn't written then.
Senator Biden. No.
Mr. Bolton. It wasn't a speech then, basically.
Senator Biden. But if the process--it's really important
we're all on the same page and understand the process, to give
you a fair shake here--the process is, your staff sends to INR
the portion of what you're considering saying about biological
weapons relating to Cuba. They do not send the whole speech,
right? It's just--it's--in fact, it was basically a paragraph,
is that not correct?
Mr. Bolton. It was language taken from existing
intelligence reports----
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Bolton. --put together. And this was----
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Bolton. --to be--the declassification procedures. This
is then, in turn, sent to INR, which is----
Senator Biden. Gotcha.
Mr. Bolton. --the function within the State Department
that deals with----
Senator Biden. Last interruption----
Mr. Bolton. --intelligence.
Senator Biden. --Mr. Chairman. The only point I want to
make is, there was--Mr. Westermann was not commenting on your
speech; he did not have a copy of a speech. He had a copy of
the material that had been gathered by the intelligence
community relative to BW, biological weapons, in Cuba that you
might or might not be attempting to use in a public way, and
this had to be cleared, correct?
Mr. Bolton. No, no, no. I mean, had the language been
declassified, that would have been the language used in the
speech.
Senator Biden. No, I got it. But it wasn't.
Mr. Bolton. And so----
Senator Biden. That's the point.
Mr. Bolton. --it was--but the----
Senator Biden. It needed to be cleared, right?
Mr. Bolton. It needed--it's a two-step process. First was,
the language had to be declassified. And, because of the
sensitivity of intelligence----
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Bolton. --sources and methods, the--what was agreed to
be declassified was the only intelligence material that I would
use. So, in a sense, had they declassified what was derived
from their own reports, that would have been what was in the
speech.
The Chairman. Let me just say, now, that the Chair has
felt these questions were relevant, but I'm hopeful that we can
stay within our time limit. We're going to have more
opportunities. And in fairness to each one of us, we ought to
observe that.
Back to Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Just to conclude, then. So, Westermann has this piece of
this--does he send this request to other agencies with his own
notations in it?
Mr. Bolton. That's my understanding.
Senator Coleman. And that--and you found out about that
after the fact, and so you lost confidence in him.
Mr. Bolton. Yeah. I mean, occasionally there's--another
way to have done this would be--it's not unheard of; it does
happen once in awhile, for the State Department to have one
view. If he had had a different--he could have come to my
office, to my staff, and said, ``Look, let's work this out,''
and he didn't--that's what caused me to lose confidence----
Senator Coleman. This is not an issue of interpreting
intelligence, is it?
Mr. Bolton. It has nothing to do with the substance of
intelligence, the analysis, or anything--there's no substantive
disagreement here.
Senator Coleman. And, in fact, as I understand it, the
speech actually was supposed to be given on May 6th. It was
ultimately given later. But the information in question, was
that actually--that information the language delivered to the
Foreign Relations Committee on March 19th----
Mr. Bolton. Essentially----
Senator Coleman. --by Assistant Secretary of State Carl
Ford?
Mr. Bolton. --essentially, exactly the same language, yes.
Senator Coleman. So, again, we're not talking about
interpreting intelligence here.
Mr. Bolton. It's not a disagreement about the substance of
the intelligence. In fact, when Assistant Secretary Ford
testified again before this committee in June, he was--he said
that the language in my speech--he said, ``That language was
our language, the intelligence-community language, not his,''
meaning not mine.
Senator Coleman. Mr. Bolton--Secretary Bolton, is there
any question--do you have any question whatsoever about your
commitment to the mission of the United Nations in taking this
position?
Mr. Bolton. Absolutely not.
And to finish, in part, if I can, and answer to Senator
Kerry, the consistent theme of my writings, consistent theme of
my writings, is that for the U.N. to be effective, it requires
American leadership. I say it over and over again. I deeply
believe it.
My criticisms during the 1990s were, in large measure,
because of what I thought was the lack of effective American
leadership.
Senator Coleman. And in terms of the U.N., itself, it's
fair to say that it's legitimate to be disdainful of the United
Nations action of comparing Zionism with racism.
Mr. Bolton. Yeah, I thought--I don't think there's any
doubt, that is the greatest mistake the United Nations ever
made. And I can tell you, it was very much my view, but also
the view of Secretary Baker and President Bush 41, we wanted to
repeal ``Zionism is racism'' because it was the right thing to
do, to--it was--it needed to be expunged. But we also knew that
many Americans, across the political spectrum, understood
``Zionism is racism'' to be an emblem of the U.N. When they
thought of the U.N., they thought ``Zionism is racisim.'' And
repealing that resolution was a prerequisite to getting past
the--in the minds of many Americans, the idea that the U.N.
could be useful for anything. So it had a very important
operational role, as well.
Senator Coleman. And, in fact, you know, as we kind of
move to the present time, the Secretary General, himself, has
said the U.N. needs reform. And I wanted to repeat what Senator
Hagel said. I'm going to make the same comment. I strongly
believe in the United Nations, but I think it's very legitimate
to raise--to criticize the United Nations that has Libya, at
one time, as the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission, or a
Human Rights Commission that has Zimbabwe or the Sudan or Cuba,
as part as the Human Rights Commission. They've been working
the last couple of weeks, right now. And in 2005 we're finally
hearing discussion from the Secretary General that maybe
something--not ``maybe''--that something is wrong. Does--when
Cuba or Zimbabwe or the Sudan are part of the Human Rights
Commission, do you think that undermines the credibility of the
United Nations?
Mr. Bolton. I do. And I thank Secretary General Annan
does, as well. I don't think there can be any question about
it. That's why we need reform.
Senator Coleman. And let me focus, in the time I have in
this round, a little bit on Oil-for-Food. You made the comment
that it taught us about the culture of the bureaucracy. And let
me back it up. You have a scandal, and one could argue about
the amount of dollars, but it's all in the B's, with billions,
that Saddam was able to put in his pocket because the Oil-for-
Food Program was in effect. And it's pretty clear, from the
first Volcker report, that Benon Sevon, who was in charge of
the program, Kofi Annan's personal point person in charge of--
was on the take from Saddam Hussein. It's pretty clear, from
the Volcker reports, that Secretary General's Chief of Staff
destroyed three years' worth of documents. It's pretty clear
from the OIOS audits that were done, that what you saw was
massive mismanagement, massive mismanagement.
You made the comment that it taught us about the culture of
the bureaucracy of the United Nations. What did you mean by
that?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think--in terms of some of the
specifics, I think it's important, from the administration
perspective, that we wait for the final Volcker report, and we
wait for the results of the investigations of all six of the--I
think it's six congressional committees that are looking--that
are looking into the matter. But I know, going back to my own
time serving in the first President Bush's administration, that
the potential of the United Nations is often sadly diluted by
the encrustations of bureaucracy that have grown up over the
years. And it's very important that, in order to be able to
justify the large amounts that administrations every year
request for Congress to appropriate, that we can make the case
that we are acting to make the United Nations a more efficient
and uncorrupt organization. And the United Nations, itself, is
obviously concerned. The Deputy Secretary General Louise
Frechette, said, a few weeks ago, ``We hope we never get
another Oil-for-Food assignment.'' I, personally, disagree with
that. There may come a time when we want the United Nations to
undertake something like this.
We had--in the first Bush administration, we imagined the
Oil-for-Food Program, as set up under Resolution 706 and 712,
as very different from the program that was actually carried
out. Saddam Hussein rejected 706/712. If it had, it would have
been an even larger U.N. operation, because we didn't want to
have the distribution of humanitarian assistance inside Iraq,
in Iraq hands. We wanted it in U.N. hands.
But if you can't--if you don't have the basic support and
belief that the United Nations will function in an uncorrupt
and effective fashion in the Congress of the United States,
we'll never have the opportunity to do something potentially
even bigger than the Oil-for-Food Program. So this is--this, to
me, is an urgent matter.
Senator Coleman. And reform really has to be in two parts.
There's both the structural reform nature of the Security
Council who's involved--who are the members--Human Rights
Commission, other things like that--but then there's also the
management side.
I'm going to just read a list of areas where it would be--
it's clear to me that the U.N. has to improve: performance
measurement, program management, procurement, evaluation,
monitoring. Are there--can you respond to those? And are there
things that are needed, in terms of a comprehensive management
strategy that the U.N. should be looking at, or that we, in
Congress, should be urging the U.N. to look at?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think both of those are true. It think
one thing that you might find interesting is, if you went back
to the Thornburg report of 1993, when, again, the first
President Bush persuaded former Attorney General Thornburg to
become Under Secretary General for Management at the U.N. And
after President Bush lost the '92 election, Dick Thornburg
was--his one-year appointment was not extended. I guess that's
the way I should put it. But before he left, he produced a
report on his year experience at the U.N. and the kinds of
management changes that he would recommend and that he would
have endeavored to carry out, had he been there--had he been
able to stay. And it makes for--it makes for good reading
today.
I'm not saying that there aren't good people at the U.N.,
who work hard. And, in fact, the current Under Secretary
General for Management, Cathy Bertini, is an American citizen
and a long-time friend of mine. She's worked herself to the
bone. But it requires a sustained effort of a long period of
time, and I am very optimistic that, with the Secretary
General, himself, weighing in, we've got a major chance of
success here.
Senator Coleman. I'd like to continue that discussion in
the next round, and also talk about the role of Congress.
Just one other thing for the record. There was a comment
made that you didn't respond to. Is it your belief that, in the
Clinton administration, that North Korea froze its nuclear
development program?
Mr. Bolton. I think the evidence is overwhelming that,
while the United States and others were, sort of, looking down
a soda straw at the plutonium facility, the plutonium storage--
the spent-fuel storage and reactors at Yongbyon, the North
Koreans had embarked on an aggressive procurement program to
acquire uranium enrichment capability that would take them on a
different road to nuclear weapons. And the intelligence is far
from clear, there's much that we don't know. The only, I
think--but one--the only real question is, How early in time
did the North Koreans begin violating the agreed framework?
It's something that we talked about in 2001, Senator Kerry, as
you remember.
Senator Kerry. Yeah, let me just make clear, if I can
insert, I didn't suggest they froze the nuclear program. I said
the plutonium program. Everybody knew the uranium program was
on the side.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
Senator Feingold?
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Bolton, in your testimony you indicate that, if
confirmed, you will make it your objective to provide sustained
and decisive leadership to create a stronger, better, more
effective U.N. In the same spirit as Senator Kerry's opening
remarks, I'm trying to square this idea with your past
statements, which really do suggest that you view the U.N. as a
deeply flawed institution. And I agree with you, with that part
of your assessment. It can sometimes serve as a useful
instrument for U.S. policy. But, otherwise, you appear to
believe that the U.N. is, at best, irrelevant, and, at worst,
harmful.
Now, I believe that we cannot effectively fight the
terrorist threat before us without a strong multinational
commitment to doing so. I also believe that getting the rest of
the world to invest in what is our top priority, fighting
terrorism, means that we probably have to convince them that we
are also invested in their top priorities, like fighting
poverty, fighting poverty in the developing world. But you have
suggested that the United States should engage with the United
Nations only when our vital interests are at stake.
Secretary Bolton, I think we have a vital interest, all of
the time, in sustaining an effective institution where states
can engage in the bargaining and the give and take necessary to
sustain some sense of a shared global enterprise.
My first question is sort of a case in point. I understand
that just last week in a public discussion among various
countries at the Commission on Human Rights, a United States
delegate objected to some language in the annual torture
resolution. In particular, the delegate objected to language
stressing that, quote, ``Each state shall take effective
measures to prevent acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment in any territory under its
jurisdiction,'' unquote.
The delegate argued that, while the United States has an
obligation under the Torture Convention to take effective
measures to prevent torture, there is no obligation, no
obligation, to take effective measures to prevent cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment in the text of the treaty.
Apparently, the Government of Pakistan was the only government
present that actually supported this United States view.
Do you believe that the United States delegate took an
appropriate, or even accurate, position in this case?
Mr. Bolton. Well, Senator, my honest answer is, this is
the first I've heard of it. I don't--I'd have to--I'd have to
look at the words of the convention, and I'd have to understand
what the nature of the debate was. And I will endeavor to do
that and maybe try and get something over the lunch hour. I'm
not----
Senator Feingold. Well----
Mr. Bolton. --I'm not familiar with the----
Senator Feingold. Secretary, I gave you the words. The
words state, ``Each state shall take effective measures to
prevent acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment in any territory under its
jurisdiction.'' Our delegate, our representative from the
United States, did not adhere to that position. That's very
simple and straightforward. It's not a language issue. I want
you to tell me whether you believe that this is in the national
security interest of the United States to take this kind of
position.
Mr. Bolton. Senator, it's hard for me to believe that it
is, but I think that--but that's my opinion, sitting here
today.
Senator Feingold. Let me switch to another issue involving
issues concerning the U.N. in the past. We recently observed
the 11th anniversary of the start of the Rwandan genocide. Much
has been written about the decisions made by U.S. policymakers
in the spring of 1994, when the Rwandan genocide began. I'd
like you to comment a bit, if you could, on the manner in which
the United States chose to use its influence at the U.N. in
response to the emerging crisis, and on the manner in which the
U.N. reacted to developments in Rwanda in 1994. Do you think
that the U.S. and U.N. policymakers made mistakes in their
responses? What should they have done differently?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think there were mistakes all around,
both on the part of the member governments and on the part of
the United Nations. And I think that this is a case where the
fallacy of false concreteness applies with particular force. I
don't think that this is something that the United Nations,
alone, was responsible for. I think the member governments had
to take that responsibility.
Now, there is a lot of debate, and I've read articles on
both sides about, logistically, when there was awareness of the
genocide, what steps could have been taken, what our military
could have done, that I think are unresolved. But, while there
were clearly failures within the U.N. secretariat, I think that
it's ultimately the Security Council that's responsible. The
Security Council deployed the force into Rwanda, not the
secretariat.
Senator Feingold. I want to pursue this more. I'm
interested in how you think we should have done things
differently. If you are confirmed, you would be at that
Security Council.
Mr. Bolton. Yeah.
Senator Feingold. There are situations in Africa, at this
moment, that some would argue--in fact, our previous Secretary
of State referred to it as genocide. What would you have done
differently? Give me some sense of what you would do in these
currently situations differently to try to avoid this kind of
disaster.
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think the question, if you look at the
contrasting situations in Burundi and Rwanda at about the same
time, the mission of Ould Abdullah, the former Foreign Minister
of Mauritania, in Burundi, was actually much more successful in
working the politics inside Burundi and preventing the kind of
tragedy that occurred inside Rwanda.
I don't think that the dispatch of a U.N. peacekeeping
force, alone, is indicative of--necessarily, of success or
failure. And I think, obviously, what happened inside Rwanda
was a failure on multiple levels.
Senator Feingold. Let me try one more time. If you had
been United States Ambassador to the U.N. at that time, knowing
all that you know now, what action would you have taken?
Mr. Bolton. I'm not sure that I can honestly answer that,
Senator, because we don't know, logistically, whether it would
have been possible to do anything different than what the
administration did at the time. It is--I think you have to ask
the predicate question, What could have been done in the years
beforehand that might have avoided the triggering of the
genocide, itself? Once it started, as I say, there are serious
people who argue that the bulk of the genocide was, and would
have been, concluded before any outside presence could have
been brought to bear. And I don't--I know there are
disagreements with that. I think it's not something I have the
capability to----
Senator Feingold. Mr. Secretary, in theory, you could be
sitting at that table very soon. I must say, your answer is
amazingly passive considering what happened ten years ago and
what may be happening in Sudan at this point.
Mr. Secretary, how do you think Secretary Powell's dramatic
2003 presentation to the United Nations regarding Iraq's
weapons-of-mass-destruction programs affected United States
credibility at the U.N. and in the international community? And
what lessons can we draw from that episode?
Mr. Bolton. Well, if I could just add one word on the
earlier point, on Sudan, I think the administration has taken
substantial effort. It was a very extensive diplomatic project
to get the agreement between north and south that's now been
signed, and the dispatch of the U.N. peacekeepers. And I think
that's the kind of activity that was--that might have made the
difference in Rwanda. It's very hard to go back and
secondguess, especially given the information that people had
at the time.
In terms----
Senator Feingold. I don't--let me just say, I don't think
our actions to date--this administration's actions with regard
to Sudan rise to that level, or even approach the efforts that
need to be taken. But if you'd answer the question regarding
Secretary Powell?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think, unquestionably, the failure to
find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has led some people to
question our goodwill and our credibility. We have worked hard,
in the case, for example, of Iran and North Korea, to assure
other governments that the information that we have is the best
that there is available. And I think that--for those who deal
with weapons-of-mass-destruction issues, that there is an
understanding that the circumstances, the threat that we see
from North Korea and Iran, is as real as is humanly possibly to
know. But I also agree with the Silverman-Robb Commission
conclusion that there is too little that we know about North
Korea and Iran. That absence of information doesn't make me
feel more comfortable, however.
Senator Feingold. That's a general answer, but I want to
know, specifically, your reaction to the spectacle of Secretary
Powell having presented this incorrect information to the world
at--in the United Nations, and what consequences that has had.
Mr. Bolton. I felt very sorry for him, after the fact. And
I think it has had consequences. I think that there's no
adverse consequences. There's no way of getting around it.
Senator Feingold. One more question. Are you arguing--back
to the Darfur issue--are you arguing that the administration
has taken any effective action to stop genocide in Darfur?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think the actions that have been taken
have focused largely on locking in the North-South Agreement. I
think that's critical, because the--what's happening in Darfur
is not a subset of the North-South dispute, but that North-
South dispute, as you know, went on for years and years and
years. The question of the accountability of the government in
Khartoum is critical, I think, to getting the situation in
Darfur resolved, and it's why, contrary to what some have said,
we did have, and pushed vigorously for, a mechanism to bring
accountability. But we also pushed for the deployment of AU
forces into the Darfur region, which was logistically the only
option that we had available. And it would have been helpful, I
think, if some of our colleagues on the Security Council had
been more forthcoming on that score.
But this is something that the President has been--paid
very close personal attention to. It's a matter--it was a
matter of highest priority for Secretary Powell, and it is for
Secretary Rice.
Senator Feingold. I know my time's up, but let me just
finish by saying, I happen to think that, as important as the
North-South Agreement is with regard to Sudan, and it was very
important that we focus on it, too often it's used as a reason
not to address the Darfur issue, rather than as a foundation
for dealing with it. So the notion that somehow this has been
effective, in terms of putting in a situation to stop the
genocide in Darfur, I think, is simply untrue.
Mr. Bolton. No, but I--if I could, I think I agree with
you on that point, Senator. I'm not saying that working about--
worrying about the North-South situation is an excuse for not
doing anything in Darfur. I'm saying that if the North-South
Agreement were to come unstuck, we would lose the advantage of
that agreement and make it even more difficult than it's been
to do anything about Darfur.
Senator Feingold. Well, that's a red herring. I asked
about whether we've taken any effective action with regard to
Darfur, and you did not indicate that we had, so I'm taking
that as a no.
Mr. Bolton. But, if I could, because I think--if I could
just continue the answer--I think that we have worked, in the
Security Council and diplomatically, and certainly applied
pressure to the Government of Khartoum. It's one of the reasons
why we wanted the resolution on sanctions adopted by the
Security Council, and why the Council's decision to adopt that
resolution was so important.
I don't think we're satisfied. I don't want to leave the
impression that we're satisfied that the situation has been
addressed adequately. We've made some progress, but there is no
dispute, Senator, that much more needs to be done.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Senator Boxer?
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dodd is right when he said that we don't often vote
no. I, myself, went back to the record. I've voted no three
times out of hundreds that have come through this committee,
ambassadors and the rest, in the Bush administration. So this
is a serious moment for a lot of us. And I know it's difficult
for you, Mr. Bolton, but--but we are where we are.
Mr. Chairman, I'm bewildered by this nomination, given the
situation in the world, where the President has gone around the
world to try to rebuild relationships, Secretary Rice has done
that.
Mr. Bolton, I respect your commitment to public service--I
do--and the good things you've done, among a whole list of
things that maybe I didn't think were as good as some. But I
have spent the last month extensively reviewing your writings,
your public statements about the United Nations. And my overall
assessment, Mr. Bolton, is that you have nothing but disdain
for the United Nations.
Now, you can dance around it, you can run away from it, you
can put perfume on it, but the bottom line is the bottom line.
And I--as Senator Biden said in his opening, it's hard for me
to know why you'd want to work at an institution that you said
didn't even exist. You said, ``It doesn't even exist.'' And you
want to work there.
Now, there's a three-minute tape I would like to show, and
use those three minutes of my time, because I think the
American people need to see you away from this hearing, where
you're parsing your words, and see you at this conference,
where you were talking about the United Nations, Global
Structures Convocation, Human Rights, Global Governance, and
Strengthening the U.N. So I'd like us to watch that for the
next three minutes and also make a point that I have all your
whole statement here. They're brief. Everything you see here is
not taken out of context at all. And I just think it's
important for people to see this. So if we could roll that, it
would be great. [Presentation of video:]
Mr. Bolton [video]: Let me start off with what may seem a
somewhat radical----
Senator Boxer. Louder, please.
The Chairman. Turn the volume up.
Senator Boxer. Louder.
Mr. Bolton [video]: --if we could consider potential roles
for the United Nations----
Senator Boxer. More.
Senator Biden. Get it all the way up.
Mr. Bolton [video]: --that proposition is, there is no such
thing as the United Nations. There is an organization, which is
composed of member governments. It does have an entity called
the Security Council, which is principally responsible for
international peace and security under the charter. But there
is no ``being'' out there called the ``United Nations.'' There
is simply a group of member governments, who, if they have the
political will every once in awhile to protect international
peace and security, they're able to do it.
The point that I want to leave with you in this very brief
presentation is where I started, is that there is no United
Nations. There is an international community that occasionally
can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that's
the United States, when it suits our interest and when we can
get others to go along. And I think it would be a real mistake
to count on the United Nations as if it's some disembodied
entity out there that can function on its own. When the United
States leaves, the United Nations will fall. When it suits our
interest to do so, we will leave. When it does not suit our
interest to do so, we will not. And I think that is the most
important thing to carry away tonight.
Second, if you think that there is any possibility in this
country that a 51,000-person bureaucracy is going to be
supported by most Americans, you'd better think again. The
secretariat building in New York has 38 stories. If you lost
ten stories today, it wouldn't make a bit of difference.
The fact of the matter is that the international system
that has grown up--and, again, I leave out the World Bank and
the IMF, because I do think they're in a separate category--has
been put into a position of hiring ineffective people who do
ineffective things that have no real-world impact, and we pay
25 percent of the budget.
The League of Nations was a failure, because the United
States did not participate. The United Nations would be a
failure if the United States did not participate. And, in fact,
I remember as vividly as if it were yesterday, right after Iraq
invaded Kuwait, Jim Baker said to me, ``We're going not make
this United Nations work. We're going to find out whether it's
a League of Nations or the U.N.''
And that's the fact. And if you don't like it, then I'm
sorry. The United States makes the U.N. work, when it wants to
work, and that is exactly the way it should be, because the
only question--the only question for the United States is,
What's our national interest? And if you don't like that, I'm
sorry, but that is the fact. [End of video presentation.]
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, the reason I wanted to show
that is many-fold. First, I think there's a little bit of
revisionist history going on here, in terms of the nominee's
attitude toward the United Nations. I mean, I watch this, just
as a human being, forget about the Senate part, and I see an
anger, a hostility. Who would ever dream of saying, ``If ten
floors of a building were to disappear''? I mean, I wonder if
you thought about the fact that 1400-plus Americans work in
that building, who chose to in that building because they
believe it's a worthy thing to try and bring peace to the
world?
So I just feel that this nominee could do lots of other
things for President Bush, I'm sure, and do them really well,
but I don't see this. It just doesn't make sense.
And I guess, you know, this comparison that Secretary Rice
made when she endorsed you and announced your appointment, she
compared you to Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Daniel Moynihan. And I'd
like to show you this comparison and see whether you think some
of the things you said were inappropriate, wrong, or whatever.
This is what Dr. Rice said, ``Through history, some of our
best ambassadors have been those with the strongest voices,
ambassadors like Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Daniel Patrick
Moynihan.''
And this is what Jeanne Kirkpatrick said, in 1981, ``I do
not think that one should ever seek confrontation. What I have
every intention and hope of doing is to operate in a low-key,
quiet, persuasive, and consensus-building way.''
And this is what you say, ``The Secretariat building in New
York has 38 stories. If you lost ten stories, it wouldn't make
a bit of difference.'' You said, ``There is no United
Nations.'' ``If we were redoing the Security Council, I'd have
one permanent member, because that's the real reflection of the
distribution of power in the world.''
Now, do you disagree--now, do you disagree with the
statements that you made?
Mr. Bolton. Well, the tape that you just showed, and some
of those statements, come from a panel discussion--I think it
was in 1994--before the World Federalists. The World
Federalists believe in world government. And I do not.
Senator Boxer. I'm not interested in them. I'm interested
in you.
Mr. Bolton. I was talking to that audience at the time, so
that's what I'm trying to explain.
Senator Boxer. Well, you don't say different things to
different audiences.
Mr. Bolton. I was--no, I don't. What many of the World
Federalists believe is that the U.N. is the nascent world
government coming into being. And I don't agree with that,
either. So what I was trying to do to that audience of World
Federalists was get their attention, and the comment about----
Senator Boxer. So you don't----
Mr. Bolton. --the ten stories was a way of saying there's
not a bureaucracy in the world that can't be made leaner and
more efficient. I was----
Senator Boxer. Well, that isn't----
Mr. Bolton. --trying to get their attention.
Senator Boxer. --what you said. You said, ``It wouldn't be
missed.'' We can look at--you know, what wouldn't be missed?
Talk to us about that.
Mr. Bolton. I think a reduction in personnel is something
that every manager and every government organization, every
international organization should strive for, and that was the
metaphor I was trying to come up with, as I say, to get their
attention.
The question about--as the--you cut off the middle of my
presentation in your showing of----
Senator Boxer. Well, I asked----
Mr. Bolton. --the tape.
Senator Boxer. --unanimous consent to put the entire
statement in the record.
Mr. Bolton. I appreciate that.
The concept that I was addressing there is the problem of
false concreteness, where many people say, ``Well, the U.N. did
that,'' or, ``The U.N. did that.'' ``The U.N. failed here,''
or, ``The U.N. succeeded here.'' And in the vast majority of
cases, it's not a question of the U.N. qua U.N. succeeding or
failing. It's a question of whether the member governments of
the United Nations have made the correct decision. And that
problem of false concreteness is something that I think is a
very real problem. It's a----
Senator Boxer. Mr. Bolton, I don't mean--I don't mean to
cut you off, but you're getting away from the point. I read
everything in here. You didn't talk about there being--you need
to fire certain people. You say, ``The point I want to leave
with you in this very brief presentation is where I started,
there is no United Nations. There is an international community
that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the
world, and that's the United States, when it suits our interest
and when--and when we can get others to go along. And I think
it would be a real mistake to count on the U.N. as if it's some
disembodied entity out there that can function.''
Now, the point is, that's what you want to leave these
people with, and we will put this in the record. So if this
afternoon--I want to be fair to you. I honestly do. There is
nothing in there that I believe would change, in any way, your
main points here. But, you know, I'm looking over the building,
the secretariat building. The 36th floor where the Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is located, that is
the office that coordinates U.N. assistance in response to
emergencies, like the recent tsunami that devastated part of
Asia. Maybe they have too many people working there? Should
they maybe fire the receptionist who's not good, just like we
could do that around here, or you could in your office? That
wasn't the stuff of what you were talking about. You said, ``If
there were ten floors gone.''
And then I wonder if you were talking about the 31st floor,
the U.N.'s Department for Disarmament Affairs, which works to
strengthen the disarmament regimes with respect to weapons of
mass destruction and promotes disarmament in the area of
conventional weapons.
I wonder if you were talking about the Office of the
Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict that
works to stop the use of child soldiers.
So the point is that what we saw here, I think, is the real
John Bolton. You know, basically, this is who--what you
believe. And for you to be going go the United Nations, when
everyone knows you said these things, you know, ``Hi, I'm John
Bolton. I've come to the U.N.'' It's a very tough thing for
those at the other end. And I think it would be a very tough
thing for you, when you put so much of your passion and your
anger into bringing down this particular institution.
Is my time up? I will save the rest. I'm sure you're
delighted to know that.
Thank you. [Laughter.]
Mr. Bolton. No, but I think that--the Chairman's very
courteous decision at the beginning was that I could answer the
question even if the red light was on, and I will just say, in
25 words or less, the passage that you left out of the tape is
my description of President Bush and Secretary Baker's very
effective creation of the coalition after Saddam Hussein's
invasion of Kuwait, in 1990, and their use of the Security
Council to repel the invaders.
Senator Boxer. Well, if I----
The Chairman. The entire statement----
Senator Boxer. --if I might say----
The Chairman. --will be put in the record.
Senator Boxer. --everyone should read it. It has nothing to
do with your--what you're leaving the people with. It is a
small part of this. It is not the main body of this.
The Chairman. I thank the Senator.
Senator Obama?
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bolton, thank you very much for appearing here. I know
this is right before the break, so just bear with me.
First of all, I'd like unanimous consent to place my
written statement into the record.
The Chairman. It will be placed in full.
Senator Obama. You know, I was reflecting on the fact that
some of the most distinguished Americans, Democrats and
Republicans--Daniel Patrick Moynihan, George H.W. Bush, Henry
Cabot Lodge--have served in the position to which you're now
seeking confirmation. There's one particular person that I
would like to mention, not only because he's an Illinoian, but
because I think he speaks to how important this position can
be, and that's Adlai Stevenson.
I think some people may be aware of the fact that Adlai
Stevenson served in this position during the Cuban Missile
Crisis. And, as we all know, it was Stevenson's presentation to
the U.N. Security Council that proved to the world that the
Soviets were moving intermediate-range missiles into Cuba. He
used charts and photos to build a compelling case, declared to
Soviet Ambassador Zorin that he was prepared to wait until hell
freezes over for Zorin's response to the U.S. charges.
You know, what many people don't recall is that Stevenson's
presentation came on the heels of what might be considered a
substantial intelligence failure on the part of the U.S.
Government. A year earlier, Stevenson had been misled by the
White House and the CIA into publicly stating that the United
States was not behind the Bay of Pigs invasion. And you
probably are aware of the fact that Stevenson almost resigned
over that incident.
The reason I think that this is worth keeping mind is that,
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, we were able to succeed
diplomatically because of the stature and integrity of the
Permanent Representative to the United Nations. In fact,
President Kennedy said--I'm quoting here--``The integrity and
credibility of Adlai Stevenson constitute one of our greatest
national assets.'' And, as a result of that credibility,
Stevenson was able to get tough, isolate the Soviets, be blunt,
and convince the world that we were right.
I, personally, think we're facing a similar situation today
with the rest of the world questioning our intelligence
capabilities and nuclear proliferation threats from Iran to
North Korea that may require action by the Security Council. We
have to be able to convince the world that we're right.
And so, you know, we had occasion to meet in my office, and
I very much appreciated our dialogue. You know, my overall
impression is that you are extraordinarily capable,
extraordinarily intelligent. And I have to say that most of the
provocative statements that I've heard are ones that--some of
them, I probably subscribe to; others, which, you know, I take
as being part of an academic exercise or, you know, the process
of speaking in panels. You're outside of government, you're
speaking your mind. I don't hold each and every one of these
statements against you. The overall portrait, though, is of
someone who may not be in a position to do what Stevenson did,
which is persuade the world that America is right, and not
simply partisan.
And I have to say, there's one quote in that tape that
particularly disturbed me, and that was, ``subscribe to the
notion that we will lead when it suits our interests,'' the
implication being that when it's convenient for us to engage in
the United Nations, we shall do so; and when it's not
convenient, we won't. As I think Senator Feingold mentioned, if
that ends up being the standard, then it's going to be pretty
hard for us to gain the kind of cooperation that we need on
important issues like the war on terror.
But let me focus just on a couple of specific questions
that may help clarify the record here.
I thought that you made an interesting statement, one that
I was--I actually wanted to get the precise transcript on--in
your assessment of the Silverman-Robb report, because you said
that the principal problem that you gleaned from the report was
that reasonable hypotheses became hardened in the minds of
certain administration analysts, intelligence officers, and so
forth, that those then turned into presumptions that remained,
despite the fact that they were not corroborated by hard facts.
I don't have the precise statement in front of me, but I think
that was a pretty accurate--I tried to write it down as fast as
I can, because I thought it made a lot of sense. Would you say
that's an accurate----
Mr. Bolton. I think that's a fair characterization.
Senator Obama. Okay. I think that the concern that--the
concerns that have been raised with respect to these e-mails
going back and forth and your relationship with Mr. Westermann
and so forth is not a bunch of cheap shots. It's not
bureaucratic infighting that we're trying to disclose. What--it
has to do with whether this is an example exactly of what you
said the Silverman-Robb report warns against, which is that you
had a particular perspective, you had an intelligence analyst
who was concerned that your perspective was not quite right,
and that, in that context, you were interested in shading or
shaping the analysis to fit your reasonable hypotheses. That's,
I think, the reason that we're concerned. Applying your test,
that we don't want our intelligence to be not corroborated by
hard facts.
And so, I understand that you're going to get the record of
all the statements that have been made available. At this
stage, since you haven't had a chance to review them all, I
guess I would just ask you, If the record indicates that you
were seeking to reject hard facts because they didn't neatly
fit into a speech that you were making on behalf of the United
States Government, is it fair to say that that would be
something that this panel should be concerned about, and that
that might undermine your capacity to be a credible advocate
for the United States in the United Nations?
Mr. Bolton. Yeah, I think failure to pay attention to
reality and facts, however unpleasant they are, is an extremely
undesirable characteristic. In this case, I don't remember what
the alternative formulation was. It was not anything having to
do with the substance of whatever it was; it was the fact I
didn't think I had been dealt with squarely.
Senator Obama. Fair enough. I just want to pinpoint,
though--it may be that there's a dispute on the facts. But what
I want to do is establish a common principle, which is that we
want our intelligence analysts to give us information that's
based on their best assessment of the facts, even if it doesn't
fit our hypotheses. Is that a----
Mr. Bolton. I absolutely----
Senator Obama. --fair principle?
Mr. Bolton. --I absolutely agree with that.
Senator Obama. And if we have a situation where the
higher-ups in our foreign-policy community are squelching
dissent--albeit internal--squelching dissent that might impede
the American people from getting the best possible intelligence
information to the people who are in decision-making positions,
then that could potentially hamper our ability to fight the war
on terrorism.
Mr. Bolton. We have to have the facts as they are, whether
they're pleasant or not.
Senator Obama. Okay.
Mr. Bolton. There's simply no doubt about it.
Senator Obama. We don't have time before the break to make
this determination. I think one of the things that we'll want
to pursue, then, after the break, is whether that is, in fact,
what happened here. My understanding is, you don't feel that's
what happened here. I think some of the panel, based on the
interviews we've seen, feels that it is what happened. But I
just wanted to establish the principle that it would be
troubling if we are discouraging analysts from giving us the
best possible information.
Let me just move to a couple of other points. I have to
watch out for my time here.
I want to talk to you a little bit about Iran, because
that's obviously an area where, along with North Korea, we're
going to have a lot of interest in making sure that the
international community joins us in expressing concern and
impeding the development of nuclear weapons there. What's your
assessment, at this point, of our administration's position
with respect to the European efforts of diplomacy with Iran and
the fact that it appears, at least, that the President's made
some contradictory statements with respect to whether or not we
should be engaging in Iran?
And, finally, just let me close the loop by saying, What do
you think the Security Council's role in this overall process
should be?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think, from the outset of our focus on
Iran, there has been agreement between the United States and
the EU-3 on the overall objective. And that is to say, it was
unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapons capability.
There had been, for the past year and a half, roughly, tactical
disagreements between the EU-3 and the United States about how
to proceed. There had also been discussions that we had
conducted with Russia, in terms of the fueling or the Bushehr
reactor in Iran, and discussions we've had with Japan and China
on their interest in access to Iran oil and gas reserves. And
one of the things that I think has troubled us from the outset
on this is that Iran has split all of these different powers
that I've mentioned, among which I think there really is broad
agreement on the unacceptability of Iran achieving a nuclear-
weapons status.
Now, it had been our view, and remains our view, that the
Iranian effort to achieve nuclear weapons constitutes a threat
to international peace and security, which is the triggering
threshold for Security Council jurisdiction.
What the President and Secretary Rice have accomplished in
the past two months, I think, is a substantial closing of the
tactical gap with the Europeans, and indirectly with the
Russians, on that point. Having made a number of modifications
in our position, we achieved from the European--the three
European foreign ministers, I think, a pretty clear statement
that utilization of the Security Council at some point in
dealing with the Iranian nuclear-weapons program was something
that they would be willing to undertake.
The issue about the Security Council, from the outset, has
been exactly what role it would have. And we have, over the
course of the past year, roughly, exchanged thoughts with the
three European countries, with Japan, with Russia, and with
China, over how the Security Council might engage if the issue
with Iran's nuclear-weapons program got on the Council's
agenda. It was not a question simply of automatic resort to
sanctions. There is a--I think, a large measure of additional
sunlight and pressure that's brought to bear by having Iran to
try and answer in the Security Council, and that's been one of
the reasons why it's been our view that it needs to get to the
Security Council at some point. That's why we've been pressing
in the IAEA Board of Governors for that referral.
Now, I think the ball is really in Iran's court at this
point, that the Europeans have delivered the message about the
what the President and the Secretary have said, they've made it
clear that they need to see something from Iran, in terms of
demonstrating that it's prepared to make the strategic decision
to forego to the pursuit of nuclear weapons. I think there's
some feeling that it's unlikely we will get a major substantive
response from the Iranians before their elections in June. I
don't know whether that's right or not. That's the feeling of
many people. And that it may be that we're going to have to
wait for some period of time after the elections.
So, we may be in something of a period of indeterminancy,
but I do think that the President and the Secretary have
achieved a significant success in closing the tactical gap that
existed.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'll
seek to pursue this a little bit longer next round.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, am I the only thing standing
between us and lunch? [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief.
Mr. Bolton, I'm sure we would agree that it is important
for us, the United States of America, to have the best
representative for America to represent the interests of the
U.S. in the world body, the United Nations. And I think
ambassadors such as Ambassador Negroponte and Ambassador--
former Senator John Danforth, were forceful and effective
advocates of U.S. interests in the United Nations. And what I
worry about in your confirmation is that your history of
somewhat inflammatory rhetoric and your speaking style is going
to create an incentive for other nations to oppose us at the
U.N.
Would you comment, please?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I hope that would not be true, Senator.
I think--as I believe Senator Lugar said in his opening
remarks, I think you have different styles of speaking,
depending on different circumstances. In close, tense, hard
negotiations, I think you're pursuing one approach. I think if
you're trying to engage in public diplomacy, you may engage in
another approach.
You know, I can speak as a former Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organizations. It's hardwired in me
that the Permanent Representative in New York needs to follow
instructions. And many of the statements that are made on the
record in New York are actually written here in Washington,
written and cleared around here in Washington. And I don't
anticipate that's going to change.
I think this is a heavy responsibility. I have no doubt
about it. If confirmed, it would be a major task for me. But I
think that, looking at the record that I've achieved in other
diplomatic areas--in the negotiation of the Proliferation
Security Initiative, the negotiation of the Treaty of Moscow
that President Bush and President Putin signed in May of 2002,
the successful withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the repeal of
the Zionism is Racism Resolution, the G8 Global Partnership,
and other things--that that is a--that is an indication of what
is possible in New York.
Senator Nelson. Well, let's talk about that. Your job, for
the last four years, has been arms negotiator. What success can
you point to with regard to those negotiations in one of the
major interests of the United States? And that is the
nonproliferation of North Korea?
Mr. Bolton. I think that the policy that the President has
pursued to have the major regional powers surrounding North
Korea engaged in what we now call the Six-Party talks, as
opposed to having the United States engaged bilaterally with
North Korea, is precisely the right way to go. We've been
trying now for two years to persuade the North Koreans that no
one accepts that they are to have nuclear weapons. The North
Koreans have been refusing to negotiate. They have clearly not
made the strategic choice to give up the pursuit of nuclear
weapons. And, as I said a few moments ago, Secretary Rice, in
her recent trip to Asia, I think, stressed, in China, South
Korea, and Japan, the importance that we attach to getting
North Korea back to the negotiating table.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Bolton, over the course of the last
four years, has North Korea increased in its nuclear capability
and/or increased its possession of nuclear warheads?
Mr. Bolton. There are some estimates to that effect, but I
don't think we know for sure. The original estimate of North
Korea having sufficient fissile material for one to two
plutonium-based nuclear weapons was in, actually, 1991 to 1992,
based on open sources. What we don't know is how many--how much
fissile material for plutonium weapons they now may have, or
whether any of it's been fashioned into weapons.
The major development, I think, in the North Korea matter,
the tectonic shift that occurred, came in the summer of 2002,
when all of our intelligence agencies concluded that North
Korea had been engaged, for some period of time, in a
production scope procurement to acquire a uranium enrichment
capability, given them a separate route to nuclear weapons. We
don't know a lot about that, but it's a very troubling
development, because a lot of this is simply--involves
processes that we don't know much about. We don't know what the
real North Korean capacity is. And that's one of the reasons
why President Bush has made the Six-Party talks the priority
that he's had, why he's had any number of discussions with the
Chinese leadership about the importance of pursuing it.
Senator Nelson. And the Six-Party talks are stalled, and
we are getting nowhere, and the nuclear clock continues to
tick, and, increasingly, North Korea gains the capability as a
nuclear power, and we've seen that they have already had a
history of peddling any kind of weapons system. And if we keep
going on and don't draw to a successful conclusion, whether it
be Six-Party or one-on-one negotiations, it's not a very good
result for the United States. What makes you think that the
current policy will change the North Koreans' minds over the
next four years?
Mr. Bolton. Senator, I don't disagree at all with your
assessment of the North Koreans and their propensity to
proliferate weapons and technology of weapons of mass
destruction. That is one of the most disturbing aspects about
that government. We know, already, that the revenues that they
obtained from the proliferation of ballistic-missile
technology, for example, they used to support their nuclear-
weapons program. So--and it was the North Korean activity, in
large part, that led to the idea that became the Proliferation
Security Initiative. That's why, over a year ago, I think, Dr.
Rice was asked, ``How long do you anticipate the Six-Party
talks will go on?'' And this was over a year ago. But she said,
``As long as they're productive.''
The real issue here, at the moment, is whether North Korea
is going to come back to the table, because, obviously, if
they're not there negotiating, we're not making much progress.
And I don't--you know, I don't--there's no deadline or anything
like that, but I also think it's manifest that if we are not
making progress, at some point you have to look at other
possibilities.
We've been--I don't mean to run on this answer; I'd just
say one more thing--we've been very grateful for the effort the
Chinese have made to make the Six-Party talks effective.
They're not the problem. The problem is North Korea.
Senator Nelson. I wanted you to run on, and I wasn't going
to interrupt you, because I wanted to hear your answer as to
why you think your job, as a negotiator, has been successful
with regard to North Korea over the last four years.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity.
And I told you I'd stay, not only within, but less than the
allotted time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
And the hearing is recessed until 2:00 p.m.
[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m. in room
SH-216, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Sununu,
Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.
Also present: Senator John Warner.
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called, again, to order. Secretary Bolton, it may
have been a lapse on my part this morning, but there have been
requests that you be a sworn witness, so if you would rise now,
I would like to swear you in.
Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Bolton. I do.
The Chairman. I thank you, sir.
We will commence another round of ten minutes for each
Senator, and I will begin now and ask the clerk to start the
clock running on these questions.
STATEMENT OF JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The Chairman. Secretary Bolton, do you believe that U.N.
reforms should include a look at the internal structures of the
United Nations to see whether there are opportunities to
streamline them and their procedures? There are five
committees, for example, that report to the General Assembly.
The suggestion has been made that, perhaps, the second and
third committees--those that deal with economic and social
issues on the one hand, and social and humanitarian and
cultural matters on the other--might be combined and that's a
more obvious choice, perhaps, but have you given thought,
getting into the nitty gritty details of the U.N. structure,
during this time the Secretary General has called for a general
reform, and you've mentioned specifically this morning Security
Council reform, I ask if the committees or other structural
situations you would like to lay before us in laying down this
record today?
Mr. Bolton. Mr. Chairman, this is really, I think, a very
important point about internal U.N. procedures. You know, the
Charter sets up the Economic and Social Council as one of the
principle organs of the United Nations, along with the General
Assembly, the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council. The
Economic and Social Council, or ECOSOC as it's called, has
oversight responsibility for all the U.N. specialized agencies,
or at least the principle specialized agencies that deal with
economic and humanitarian affairs. So, that you have a
situation where the work of the second and third committees of
the General Assembly, in very large measure--not entirely, but
in very large measure--overlaps what ECOSOC does. And as with
all of the six principle committees of the General Assembly,
the second and third committees are committees of the whole, so
that the--all 191 members--are involved in their work. I think
a question of what to do with the, first, the overlap between
the responsibility, the second and third committees is
important to take a look at, and then second, to see what might
be possible with respect to ECOSOC. In the first Bush
Administration, we made an effort to revive ECOSOC that I'd
have to say was only partially successful, at best.
That's one example. Another example would be the fourth
committee of the General Assembly, which deals with special
political and decolonization questions. Decolonization is not
exactly a major topic of debate these days, and one would have
to ask whether the fourth committee, in its present form,
should not be reviewed as well.
Mr. Chairman. I thank you for those constructive
suggestions, and I know maybe other members will want to follow
up in that area of reform.
Let me comment that I appreciated your response to the
senior Senator from Maryland, Senator Sarbanes, on the Law of
the Sea issue. It is one that I have raised with you prior to
the hearing, in which you have given extensive answers that are
not identical, certainly follow very much what the Secretary of
State has given to the Committee in her testimony. And my
question, more recently, the Council for the State Department,
specifically, I raise the Law of the Sea question in the
context of this hearing because some critics of the Law of the
Sea have contended that--in the event that we ratify the
treaty--our sovereignty would be compromised, that we would, in
fact, become part of a United Nations organization that, in
fact, taxes might be levied on the United States through the
United Nations, through the Seabed Commission, or through other
aspects of this. And, in essence, that the Law of the Sea
situation embroils us in the sort of world governments business
that you were discussing this morning, as opposed to
facilitating our military--as we've heard testimony from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and, for
that matter, specific endorsement of the President of the
United States who asked us to ratify that treaty as one of five
treaties that he felt was especially important.
I mention all of this in preface to ask from your own
experience as a person involved in the United Nations or from
the outside, in the State Department or so forth, do you see
any potential entanglement of the United States with the Law of
the Sea Treaty, and loss of sovereignty to the U.N. or to any
other world body?
Mr. Bolton. No, I don't see that the Law of the Sea Treaty
implicates the United Nations in any material respect, and
those that have gone over the question of the seabed conclude
that there's no risk of taxation or anything like that. As I
say, my own review--and that of the bureaus that report to me--
was on the importance that our military attached to it. I will
say, perhaps one related point--a number of people have asked
about the relationship of the Law of the Sea Treaty to the
Proliferation Security Initiative--and you know, I don't think
that if the Senate were to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty and
it were to, the President were to make the Treaty, that it
would have any negative impact whatever on PSI. One of the
things that PSI's Statement of Interdiction Principles says
that there clearly is that any actions taken pursuant to PSI
would be done in accordance with existing national and
international authority. And of course, all of our other core
group members of PSI are states party to the Law of the Sea
Treaty, we would not ask them, obviously, to do anything that
would violate their obligations, so in effect we built that
into the PSI base, as it were.
The Chairman. I appreciate the question, the Committee is
continuing to pursue the Law of the Sea Treaty, because of the
request of our Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of
Defense. There are a lot of other reasons to do so, obviously,
in terms of our international cooperation, as well as our
fishing industry, and others who have testified, but in terms
of national defense--and that is what we're talking about
today, and I say security and international relations--I wanted
to raise the question, I thank you for your responses.
Let me ask, in the event that the United States takes issue
with the United Nations--from time to time there are motions
that come before the Senate, indeed we did not have a chance to
dispose of these amendments last week, and the State Department
authorization which may or may not have been an appropriate
time to do so--but there were amendments suggesting reduction
of dues to the U.N., or generally, a reduction of our support
altogether. What is your view as you hear arguments about the
dues reduction? Dues withholding, impounding and so forth? Can
you give us any overall view? You must have thought about the
problem of finance, our responsibilities, either pro or con, in
terms of whether we do more or less.
Mr. Bolton. I think that as a general proposition, the
United States should pay its assessed contributions. I think
that's what the expectation is. During the first Bush
Administration, President Bush followed through on President
Reagan's commitment to repay the arrearage that had been built
up in the 1980's over a five year period at the rate of 20
percent a year, which we were not entirely successful in doing
for a variety of reasons, but that was the position we took,
and I supported that internally.
At the same time, there have been circumstances--and again,
I recur to the first President Bush Administration where the
financial issue has been important--and I can think,
specifically, of the case in 1989 when the PLO was trying to
become a member of the World Health Organization, as the WHO
charter requires statehood as a precondition, the PLO was, in
effect, trying to create facts on the ground, and Secretary
Baker, we were in pretty tough shape. I have to say, Mr.
Chairman, the PLO was basically winning that fight and we were
basically losing, just before the World Health Assembly in May
of 1989, Secretary Baker issued a statement at the time that
said if any U.N. body changed the status of the PLO, he would
recommend to the President that we withhold our assessments.
And, obviously, Secretary Baker would not have made such a
statement unless he had conferred with his boss. That was
dispositive in convincing the members of the World Health
Assembly not to admit the PLO, and in fact, we achieved both of
our objectives--we kept the PLO from achieving state status,
but we also avoided having to cut our assessments--which I
think almost certainly would have happened if we had failed
diplomatically, and Congress had responded.
The Chairman. I thank you for those responses.
I now turn to my distinguished colleague, Senator Biden,
for his round of questions.
Senator Biden. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest
that Mr. Bolton be sworn.
The Chairman. He had been sworn.
Senator Biden. Oh, he has been, great, thank you very,
very much. I apologize for my being late and not knowing that.
Let me make two comments, if I may, at the outset.
Senator Sarbanes. Was he sworn at the outset of the
hearing?
The Chairman. He was sworn about fifteen minutes ago.
Senator Sarbanes. Presumably, though, that covers the
morning's testimony as well?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Biden. Let me say at the outset--with regard to
the Intelligence Committee having already investigated these
matters about whether or not pressure was put upon, or
attempted to be put upon, as alleged, on government officials
who, with whom the nominee has thought either went behind his
back or went around him, or just simply disagreed with him--the
Intelligence Committee did not look at that. What the
Intelligence Committee did, they started to look at that, and
when they were assured that had nothing to do with Iraq--it had
to do with Cuba--they ceased their investigation. And so, our
staff--yours and mine--went to the Intelligence Committee, got
the Intelligence Committee records. Now that does not mean that
the allegations made subsequently are true or not true, it just
means it was not--was not, emphasized--was not thoroughly
investigated by the Intelligence Committee. So, we're not
repeating, we're not repeating work that has already been done,
that's the first point that I'd like to make.
The second point I'd like to make is that there are--as we
mentioned this morning--at least one witness that we have not
had an opportunity, because he's been out of the country to
have majority or minority staff interview him, and that--as we
mentioned this morning--that it would be essential that we have
that in order to give, as well, Mr. Bolton the opportunity to
either corroborate or disagree with whatever Mr. Silver would
say, and I have not--nor has anybody to the best of my
knowledge--spoken to Mr. Silver. And there are, there is at
least one other witness that I'm aware of that we have not had
an opportunity to interview. I'm assuming we get to interview
these people very quickly, and now that Mr. Silver's being made
available, hopefully that can be done today, but until those
witnesses have been interviewed, there will be no possibility--
in my view--to end the hearing. I expect we can do that--if
they're made available today and tomorrow--to do that in a
timely fashion, because these interviews have all taken place
just since you intervened, Mr. Chairman, last Thursday. And, as
evidence of the fact that we're not trying to slow anything up,
they were done during the weekend, and they were briefed during
the weekend, and we're not even fully--the entire Committee
staff hasn't been, I mean the entire membership of the
Committee--has not had the opportunity to read all of that, and
we have yet to agree to go forward. So there's no attempt to
slow this up, I just want to make it clear. There's at least
one, and probably two additional witnesses staff must
interview.
And if I can, I'd like to take three minutes, Mr. Chairman,
to kind of lay out what our collective concern is here. And
that is, to review, a very serious matter. Namely that Mr.
Bolton, the allegation is, sought to have intelligence analysts
removed from their positions--not fired--removed from their
positions. And the obvious reason for that is, we saw how
intelligence was--at least alleged--to have been not fully
vented during the Iraq, the lead up to the war in Iraq; we've
seen how it has been, was fundamentally flawed, and there were
no weapons of mass destruction, and there is a--stating this
bluntly, Mr. Bolton--a concern that your ideological
predisposition relating to some of these issues is one that has
clouded your judgment. That's what we're talking about here,
and that's what we're investigating.
And this is what we know from interviews thus far. We know
that in--I say we know, we believe based on interviews that
were conducted--that February of '02, Mr. Bolton summoned a
line analyst from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research into
his office, and according to this analyst, Mr. Bolton got quite
angry and red in the face. Mr. Bolton berated him for allegedly
taking action to rewrite language for a speech he wanted to
give that had been transmitted to the CIA for clearance by the
Intelligence Community. Then it's alleged Mr. Bolton threw him
out of his office and summoned his boss, the acting Assistant
Secretary. We know that Mr. Bolton--it was stated to us--that
Mr. Bolton then asked the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Fingar, to
remove the analyst from his position. We know that some days
later--when he returned from being out of office--Mr. Bolton
asked the Assistant Secretary, Carl Ford, who's Fingar's boss,
to remove the analyst from his position. We know that several
months later Mr. Bolton, once again, asked the new Office
Director in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the
State Department, to remove the analyst from his position. We
know from the interviews that sometime in the summer of '02,
Mr. Bolton got into his automobile and drove out to CIA
headquarters. He had an appointment with Stewart Cohen, then
the acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. We
know from Mr. Cohen that Mr. Bolton asked him to remove the
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America from his
position. The dispute here is whether Mr. Bolton was asked by
Mr. Cohen--well, I won't get into that now. And we know this
much--Mr. Bolton deserves an opportunity to be heard in these
matters, and we have a responsibility to review them. As I said
earlier, the idea that government officials might be suppressed
from dissenting views in intelligence matters is a very, very
serious matter in these days.
Fortunately, neither of the two men who are alleged to have
been asked to be removed from the position by Mr. Bolton,
neither of them were removed, their bosses protected them from
the attempted intervention, but there is a danger that such
action can cause a chilling effect, an effect that may ripple
across the Intelligence Community, and thereby contribute to
the politicizing of intelligence.
No, I want to also make it clear who Mr. Westermann is, the
fellow we're talking about. Now, I realize we only have ten
minutes here, I hope we are able to expand the rounds so that
we can have some continuity in this pursuit. Mr. Westermann is
a senior analyst from the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research. He served 23 years in the United
States Navy as a combat officer, with an intelligence
subspeciality. Several tours made use of his subspecialty
including two as an Arms Controller, inspecting the Soviet
Union. His last tours were on detail with the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, the State Department Bureau of Non-
Proliferation, and then INR. He retired from the Navy in 2000
with a rank of Lieutenant Commander, was hired by INR as a GS-
14 analyst, the top grade for any analyst, in January of 2001.
He got every within-grade pay raise for which he was eligible
and received outstanding job performance evaluation during ever
year of his employment at the Department of State. He's
received numerous awards during his tenure as a Navy officer
and at the State Department. He received an Honorable Discharge
from the Navy, and he was awarded the Defense Superior Service
Medal from the Secretary of Defense, for exceptionally
meritorious serve in the United States Navy. He served under
hostile fire, and he's been responsible for men's lives. He was
hand-selected by Jack Daley, Vice-Commander of the--Commandant
of the Marine Corps--to serve as his assistant and also serve
as Special Assistant to Ambassador Ralph Rowe, the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. He received meritorious honor award
from the Department of State, as well as awards for his work on
terrorism, his involvement in the operation Iraqi Freedom, and
for his efforts to combat proliferation throughout the world.
It is unusual for me to read this background. But
obviously, there is a question here of credibility, and I want
to make sure that we're not talking about some new bureaucrat,
hired on by a department. This is a man with a distinguished,
distinguished background.
And the same in Tom Fingar, his boss, on Westermann, he
has--according to the Assistant Secretary of State this
morning, let me read for the record what Mr. Fingar says about
Mr. Westermann. Question of staff, ``Did INR keep Mr.
Westermann on the account because you had confidence in his
ability to perform the job?'' Fingar, ``Yes.'' Staff, ``So,
there was nothing about the incident in February when Bolton
tried to have Westermann removed from his job that caused INR
management to lose confidence in Mr. Westermann as an analyst,
or in his integrity as an employee of the State Department?''
Fingar, ``None whatsoever.'' Staff, ``Do you have the
impression of how Mr. Westermann is regarded both by his
colleagues, within INR, and by his colleagues in the larger
Intelligence Community with whom he interacts.'' Fingar, ``By
everything I know, he's highly regarded. Certainly the NIO, the
National Intelligence Officer, for Strategic Systems who then
picked up the WMD account, Bob Walpole, pled with me, twisted
my arm, over an extended period, for me to persuade
Christian,'' that's Westermann, ``to accept the invitation that
he had been extended, that had been extended to Westermann, to
become the Deputy National Intelligence Office for BW/CW.''
Staff, ``Is it fair to say that it was an offer that would be
made only to someone who is held in high esteem by the National
Intelligence Officer?'' Fingar, ``Absolutely. The position
would have been the Intelligence Community's ranking analyst on
CBW.''
I realize my time is up, but I'm going to come back at the
appropriate time, Mr. Chairman, and go into some considerable
detail as to what appeared to be different interpretations, and
different assertions relative to what Mr. Westermann did, and
the reason why, one of the reasons asserted by Mr. Bolton as to
why he lost confidence, is accurate, and what he did, or didn't
do, after he reached the conclusion he no longer had confidence
in Mr. Westermann, and the NIO Officer whose name we cannot
reveal because he is in a covered position right now, I'm also,
I'm going to speak to that as well.
I'm sorry to take this preliminary time to lay this out,
but I want to make it clear. The two men of three that we are
talking about here, are men who have impeccable reputations,
and have made assertions fundamentally at odds with what Mr.
Bolton is saying, based upon the testimony taken by staff, to
the best of my knowledge and recollection as made available to
me by staff. I thank you.
Mr. Chairman. I thank you, Senator.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Maybe I'll
yield some of my time to have Mr. Bolton at least respond in
some way to Senator Biden before I ask a question.
Mr. Bolton. Thank you, Senator, go ahead. I'll try to
respond to your questions, I'm sure Senator Biden will ask me
again.
Senator Chafee. I'll give you the opportunity one more
time----
Mr. Bolton. Okay, well then, I'll just say one thing.
Thank you, by the way.
The report from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
on pages 277 to 279 covers the Westermann question, and I'll
just quote from the conclusion of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, who was dealing with stories about five
individuals, one of whom was Mr. Westermann, and the SSCI said,
``None of these individuals provided any information to the
Committee that showed that policy makers had attempted to
coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their analysis
or that any intelligence analyst changed their intelligence
judgments as a result of political pressure.''
Senator Biden. Will the Senator yield for a brief comment?
Senator Chafee. A brief comment, yes.
Senator Biden. The Select Committee on Intelligence
possesses only a handful of documents, they interviewed only
the INR analyst, Mr. Westermann, the Select Committee did not
interview the analysts's supervisor, or people under the
Secretary's office. They did not review any original documents
from the Department except two electronic messages sent to the
Select Committee by a member of Undersecretary Bolton's staff
as a part of a process for a fact-checking of a draft report.
And the staff of the SSCI itself, agrees that their review is
limited for the simple reason that the main focus of their
effort was prewar intelligence about Iraq.
Mr. Bolton. If you'll give me one more chance to respond,
that's why I said this morning: Let's make all this public.
Let's put all these interviews, let's put everything out. I'm
ready.
Senator Biden. I agree. I would ask unanimous consent we
do that.
The Chairman. Unanimous consent is granted, given the fact
that obviously the Committee would not wish to declassify
material, we would exempt those persons and those documents
that have classification. But those things that are a part of
the open----
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, on this point--
--
Senator Dodd. Some of those documents came up here
``unclassified'' and have now been stamped ``classified.'' So,
some of the very--we would have to go back in, we'd have to
look at some of these things that go back and trace this a
little bit to make sure we're not excluding documents from the
record that otherwise would have been allowed a few days ago.
The Chairman. I would respond to the member by saying the
members who are cleared and staff who are cleared would be able
to examine those documents, but the request was for general
public publication, and I'm indicating those documents that are
not classified would be published.
Mr. Bolton. If we could go beyond that, I think there's
some of the classified documents I would see to have
declassified, frankly.
Senator Biden. It should be. It should be. There are State
Department documents, you could help us in that regard by
contacting the State Department, and we have no authority to
declassify documents they send to us classified. We can,
immediately, and with your permission, Mr. Chairman, release
the transcript of and the notes on all the interviews conducted
by each of the individuals we have interviewed. We can so that.
But we cannot declassify memos sent to us, or documents sent to
us by the State Department, that they marked classified.
Senator Dodd. Let the record show these were unclassified
documents until we made the request.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry, if I
might?
The Chairman. Yes?
Senator Boxer. I'm just trying to get a word in because
Mr. Bolton, to his credit, says he wants everything on the
table. That means we need some time here to interview some of
the folks that are deeply involved before we have a vote on
this nominee, and I'm just saying I hope that, as you work with
our ranking member here, you will allow us that opportunity,
because there are a couple of people--one is in New York--it's
hard to get to these people, but since Mr. Bolton himself says
it all should be on the table, I think we all agree we're going
to need a little time to--not a lot of time--just to find a
couple of these people who feel that they have been in a
situation where pressure was put upon them by Mr. Bolton, and
we need to question them.
The Chairman. Well, the Senator makes an excellent point.
Let me just say from the standpoint of the Chair that we have
attempted to move as expeditiously as possible to make
available, not only to Senators, Senator's staffs and that
would be members of staffs who are not part of the official
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Republicans, Democrats. Mr.
Bolton has been available. I'm hopeful that Senators have some
sense of reason about this because we clearly could get into a
study period----
Senator Boxer. No, I know.
The Chairman [continuing]. That was extensive, and I think
in fairness to the President, who needs to have an Ambassador
to the U.N., to our witness today who aspires to that position,
and to the American people who anticipate that we ought to be
doing our job. I appreciate there have been extenuating
circumstances of the very important funeral services for John
Paul II, which has led to our initial postponement of the
hearing which would have occurred last Thursday, until today.
We have another hearing tomorrow for Carl Ford, which I
gather--because of the nature of the witness--will be back into
these issues which are circulating today. So, I would hope that
members would avail themselves at least to the calendar day
today and tomorrow to exhaust whatever their curiosity might
be. But I'm hopeful we can pursue, at least, a decision. I
think that's very important. And I think most of the American
public anticipates that we will do that.
Senator Biden. On that point, Mr. Chairman, I want to make
it clear. The best of our knowledge is only two witnesses we
have had to interview, they are both in the employ of the State
Department, they're both able to be made available by the State
Department. My staff tells me the one, Mr. Silver, whose name
has already been invoked, is not available until tomorrow
afternoon, we have been under the assumption--we're prepared,
I'm not taking issue with that, but just so you know--it's not
us delaying that. We thought it would be today, it won't be
until tomorrow, and there's one other witness--who I'd rather
not name at the moment--we let Mr. Bolton and you know, I'm not
sure whether he is under cover or not, I don't think he is, but
I don't want to make a mistake, who is a State Department
employee as well. They are the only two witnesses at this
moment, to the best of my knowledge that the minority is
seeking to interview, and they're both within the employ of the
State Department, I think both are in country, if I'm not
mistaken.
Senator Dodd. Just one caveat again, there's a third one,
Mr. Chairman, who would be someone who is under cover, and it
would be highly inappropriate for that individual to testify in
a public setting, but has expressed a willingness to testify if
he is so directed, in a closed session.
Senator Biden. Two different issues, I don't want to
confuse this, Mr. Chairman. One, is interviews that have not
taken place yet; two, is additional witnesses among those were
interviewed who may or may not be asked to call or Secretary
Bolton may or may not wish to have called. The State Department
may conclude they want Mr. Silver called, because he
corroborates what Mr. Bolton said. We may ask Mr. Silver to be
called if, in fact, he says what he think he is going to say,
but don't know. And so, but right now, the only two additional
witnesses seeking to be interviewed by the minority are both
State Department employees. And among those who have been
interviewed it is possible, although there is no plan at this
moment, to ask that one of them testify as Mr. Ford is testify.
That could all be done immediately, it could be done quickly,
this is not next week, or two weeks or three weeks down the
road. This is all able to be wrapped up very clearly, and Mr.
Bolton's answer to much of what we have--when we get a chance
to go through it--may satisfy us there's no need to call
anymore witnesses.
The Chairman. Well, everyone has had discussion for the
moment of the situation, and let me just indicate that I think
we'll want to consult with all members of the Committee, I've
attempted to be as accommodating as I could for requests that
are coming, but I would just have to say to Senators--and I'm
one of these Senators--having read all the material that has
thus far been exhumed, 150 pages from the State Department,
additional measure from the CIA, the interviews with these five
people, and maybe six--that I am not impressed with the gravity
that is being suggested. Now, I appreciate an important
argument is being made, namely the Iraq failure of
intelligence, and the question of whether this activity by Mr.
Bolton a while back shows some manifestations of something that
was very, very serious, Iraq. But, that is a matter of judgment
of Senators, so we will all read everything, we will try to get
the people as rapidly as possible, but at some point, we're
going o try to bring this to conclusion, and so I hope the
members understand that, that there is a disagreement over how
grave the alleged offense may have been, and finally--even if
it was substantial--whether that would influence the Senators'
vote for or against Mr. Bolton.
So, we will try to make available all of the record that is
not classified, we will try to make available the classified
persons and/or materials as rapidly as possible. I know Mr.
Bolton and the State Department will cooperate in attempting to
expedite that situation. And we know we have ahead of us,
still, questions this afternoon, and then another hearing
tomorrow.
Having said that, we're back to Senator Chafee, to reclaim
him time.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
But continuing on the same theme--maybe you could detach
yourself, if possible, from this furor about influence over
individuals and the threatening of their positions, if you
could detach yourself--how serious are these accusations? What
do you think, in the abstract?
Mr. Bolton. I think, fundamentally, there's nothing there.
The issue here has nothing to do with intelligence analysis,
has nothing to do with the substantive positions taken by
either of the two individuals in question, has nothing to do
with whether they agree or disagree with me on what I said
about Cuba's BW efforts--it has nothing to do with the
political construct about, the allegations about political
pressure on analysts dealing with Iraq, it has nothing to do
with that at all. It has to do with a question of
straightforward behavior, and open and honest dealings. And,
you know, as I said earlier this morning--when you lose trust
and confidence in somebody in a professional environment--it's
a problem, especially when it's in the intelligence area. I
didn't see to have these people fired, I didn't seek to have
discipline imposed on them, I said, ``I've lost trust in
them,'' and are there other portfolios they could follow, it
wasn't anything to me that I followed at great length, I made
my point and I moved on.
If I can just address on thing that we referred to, this
other analyst at the CIA whom I'll try and call ``Mr. Smith''
here, I hope I can keep that straight, you know, the other
analyst, ``Mr. Smith,'' I'd never even heard of him, I didn't
know who he was until after the Heritage speech. When I heard
that somehow he was saying he hadn't been involved in the
clearance process, as a member of the National Intelligence
Council--as I say, I'd never heard of this individual, I didn't
know his name, I frankly didn't understand what the National
Intelligence Council did. I checked with the CIA and they said
they had, indeed, they had cleared the speech with the National
Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology, who has
cognizance over biological warfare issues, and therefore was
the right NIO to clear. When I heard all of these things, and I
said, ``I'm a State Department person, I don't fully
understand, I want to go out and talk to the gentleman,'' who
at that point was the Chairman or maybe it was the Acting
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and find out what
this instrument was. So, I went out to basically pay a courtesy
call on Mr. Cohen, and it's true--as Senator Biden has found
out--that I drove my own car out there, I have to make a
confession here, the CIA is sort of more or less on the way
home for me, and from time to time when I've gone out there I
have driven my own car, I've had my meetings and then, I hate
to say this, but I left and went home, I didn't go back to my
office. So, I went out to pay a courtesy call, and my
recollection was that the bulk of the meeting was composed of
Mr. Cohen explaining to me what the NIC did, and told me what
their publications were and how it had been created, and gave
me some background on it.
I also knew that in the weeks and months previous thereto,
dealing with this ``Mr. Smith,'' Otto Reich, who is the
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs,
had told me and told other he had very grave problems with Mr.
Smith, on a range of issues--Cuba BW being one of the least of
his concerns. And dealing, not just with Cuba, but with other
matters--and that he had told Mr. Cohen, he thought--he was not
satisfied with Mr. Smith's performance. And I think I said to
Mr. Cohen, Stewart Cohen, in the course of the conversation,
that based on what I had seen in my limited area, that I agreed
with them. And that was it, I had one part of one conversation
with one person, one time on Mr. Smith, and that was it, I let
it go.
Senator Chafee. I'll try and rephrase my question. If you
remove yourself, the personal involvement, and the facts of
personally being involved in this incident, incidents, I think
the accusation from your opponents is that you're trying to
influence people to try to change their assessments, which they
didn't believe--to change their assessment, essentially
falsifying evidence with the threat to their job, but do you
see it that way, and how serious do you feel these accusations
are? Not to you personally, but just as someone that's applying
to be the Ambassador to whatever, in this case, the United
Nations, but it could be for any promotion.
Mr. Bolton. I think that is part of the allegation, it's
false, I have never----
Senator Chafee. How serious? If it were true.
Mr. Bolton [continuing]. Tried to do that. I think it's,
intelligence analysts should give their honest assessment, I
have tried in four years in this job--in fact that's something
that I've seen in the press--I've tried in four years in this
job to get as much intelligence as I could from as many
different sources as I could. I brought in, from the CIA, and
put on my staff, an intelligence analyst, precisely so that I
would have better access to the broader Intelligence Community.
I welcome--I probably met dozens, scores, maybe hundreds of
intelligence analysts in the course of my four years; I've got
out to NSA, I've gone out to CIA, I've met with people involved
and intelligence activities at the Los Alamos and Sandia and
Lawrence Livermore laboratories, I've talked to them in my
office--I welcome the interchange, I respect the positions they
take, I think it's critically important to the formation of
American Foreign Policy, and I've never tried to change
anybody's position through any kind of improper influence or
pressure, that's not my style. My style is to say, ``Here's
what I think, what do you think?''
Senator Chafee. Okay, thank you. I'll change tacks a
little bit, in the morning session you--I believe, correct me
if I'm wrong--said you didn't necessarily criticize the United
Nations through the years, it's been our role, the United
States' role, do I have that right?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, that's correct.
Senator Chafee. And then said we did not exhibit good
leadership in the nineties, do I have that right?
Mr. Bolton. That's correct.
Senator Chafee. Can you be more specific about failure
through the nineties?
Mr. Bolton. Senator, through roughly the late 1980's, I
think it is fair to say that the Security Council was grid
locked by the Cold War. In fact, grid locked almost from its
formation in 1945.
In the mid and late-10980s, as what was called ``new
thinking'' developed in Soviet foreign policy, the possibility
that that grid lock could be broken in the Security Council
began to be apparent. And it was--as is almost always the case
in the Security Council--what became possible there was a
reflection of changes in the larger geostrategic environment,
so that in the Soviet Union, as I say, new thinking was
beginning to play out and policy makers began to look at their
foreign policy through the interests of the Soviet Union, as
opposed to the prism of Communist philosophy. And, they began
to say, ``What exactly are our interests, from a Soviet point
of view, in Angola? Why, exactly, are we subsidizing Cuba,
through the barter of oil at well below market prices? What is
this,'' and, to be candid, ``What is this from a Russian point
of view that's really involved here?'' So that in the late-
1980s, a number of new peace keeping operations became possible
in areas that had been cockpits of Cold War conflict, and I can
think specifically of the case of the link between Namibia and
Angola. Whereby very effective diplomacy of the United States
and others--myself not involved, I should say--we were able to
work out in Angola the withdrawal of Cuban forces, and a--the
first election, the first free and fair election in Namibia on
a multiracial basis. This was an example of the Soviet Union--
as it was still there, through Russia--playing out a normal
nation's foreign policy. And the real test of that occurred at
the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when I remember
distinctly Jim Baker, I think, was hunting in Mongolia, and
instead of coming home, he went to Moscow, and he and
Shevardnadze worked out a very important statement in
opposition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait that was the
fundamental basis for the cooperation between the Soviet Union,
as it was still then, and the United States in the Security
Council. It was the first, really, major manifestation of the
end of Security Council grid lock after the Cold War, and the
whole series of Iraq-related resolutions in the Council. It was
a very optimistic time, and I think I mentioned earlier, we set
up other peacekeeping operations--MINURSO in the Western Sahara
in the late spring/early summer of 1991--and I think this
optimism was misread by many people, unfortunately, to believe
that somehow the United Nations was back in 1945, and that a
lot of the constraints that, unfortunately, still existed, had
disappeared. And that, that led to the United Nations being put
into a lot of situation where, frankly, there was no clear
political resolution in sight, member governments didn't
provide adequate support, the United Nations didn't have
adequate guidance, and it did not contribute to a resolution of
threats to international peace and security.
In many respects, the handing over of these kinds of
disputes to the U.N. was a way for some policy makers to say,
``That's off my plate,'' and I think it was dereliction in the
responsibility of member governments to do that. And it led to,
what many people called, failures by the United Nations. That's
why--I come back to my point about false concreteness--there's
failures by member governments. And not directly due to
mistakes by the Secretariat, but by policies that the member
governments have created.
I think now we've got a--both the opportunity and the
responsibility--in a way, I can see almost going back to the
days right after the successful resolutions in Iraq in the
early 1990's, and seeing if we can't avoid the mistakes that
were made. It's always easy in hindsight to see the mistakes,
we should at least try to benefit from them--that, at least, is
the attitude that President Bush brings to this question about
how to move the U.N. forward.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me--again,
if I can--Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, first of all, for
your comments this afternoon on how we ought to proceed, I
think all of us here have no problem with that whatsoever, this
is not a delaying tactic at all, but really trying to get to
the bottom of issues, and I----
Senator Biden. By the way, if we wish to delay, under
Senate rules we could call for the hearing to end right now.
Because the Senate's in session, you can't go two hours beyond
the Senate's in session. I offer that as evidence of the fact
that we have no desire to delay this.
Senator Dodd. I think you for that, I'll agree with that.
Secondly, I want to thank you for your statement this morning,
your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, as always, just
excellent. And ones that I couldn't agreement with more--I
think, your closing words here because I think they, in a
sense, go to the heart of what our colleague from Illinois
raised with his questions at the end of the session this
morning about this particular point, it's causing some of us to
have some real concerns about. And that is the--and I quote
from your opening comments here this morning--``diplomatic
speech by any high-ranking administration official has policy
consequences. It should never be undertaken simply to score
some international debating points to appeal to U.S. public
opinion, or to validate a personal point of view.'' And you
quoted President Kennedy, once saying, you quoted him, ``The
purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our
own sentiments, or hopes, or indignation. It is to shape events
in the real world,'' end of quote. It's an excellent statement
to have as we talk about the subject matter. So, I want to make
that statement again.
The point is, there's nothing at all wrong, for any
official--Mr. Bolton, or anyone else, for that matter--to stand
up and give a speech, and say what they believe to be the case.
I believe, in this particular case, the issue was about Cuba at
the time, I believe, that Cuba has biological weapons--has
every right in the world to do that--you may disagree with it.
The problem occurs when a Mr. Bolton, or anyone else in the
government gets up and says what the U.S. believes. And you go
to the Intelligence Community to get corroboration. And that's
what this is really all about. And, let me, just so that it's
on the record, I'll ask unanimous consent that this language be
included in the record. What Mr. Bolton wanted to say, in
February of 2002, is the following, ``The analysts,'' that's
the Senate Intelligence Committee Report, excuse me, this is
the proposed cleared text from the Senate Intelligence
Committee.
Senator Biden. That's the actual language from the Senate
Intelligence Committee looking into this matter, in their
report. This is what they said.
Senator Dodd. The sentence would say, ``The United States
believes that Cuba has a developmental offensive biological
warfare program and is providing assistance to other rogue
state programs.'' The text also call for international
observers.
What was approved, what Mr. Westermann suggested, he said,
is ``The United States believes that Cuba,''--that was the,
ultimately approved, this was what was ultimately approved.
What was ultimately approved was, that ``Cuba has, at least, a
limited offensive biological warfare research and development
effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue
states. We're concerned that such technology could support BW
programs in those states. We call on Cuba to cease all
biological applicable cooperation with rogue states, and to
comply fully with all of its obligations under the Biological
Weapons Convention,'' end of quote. And there are various--it
may not sound like a big difference to those who have just
heard this--but there are significant differences.
One is, of course, what the U.S. believes, and that's the
important point here. And the salient differences are one,
limited, the word limited, which is not insignificant;
``research and development,'' instead of ``developmental
program,'' which would have implied a far more structured
activity; ``Cuba has provided dual-use technology that could
support BW programs,'' that's a carefully caveated phrase,
obviously. Rather than just ``providing assistance to other
rogue states,'' and it deleted any reference to inspections
that the U.S. government believes it would be ineffective, and
does not warrant a greater precedent for inspections there. So,
there is a difference, a significant difference, that's
important to note.
Let me say also as well, I think some of my colleagues may
have made this point as well. If this were a one-time event,
you might be upset about it, but I don't think it would
warrant, necessarily, taking the time of this confirmation out
of the confirmation process. All of us have been in situations
where staff or others have said or done things that we've
disagreed with, and we might have said or done things in
retrospect that were probably not terribly wise. The question
is, is there a pattern here, Mr. Bolton? And that's what's
worried many of us here. And so that's why we raise these
issues.
Again, this morning, we're quoting here, I'm quoting from
these interviews that occurred just a few days ago. Mr. Fleitz,
``All I can remember, and this is from Mr. Bolton,'' I'm
quoting him now, ``is that he spoke to Mr. Fingar to express
his concern over what happened, and said that Mr. Westermann
had lost his confidence, and he should have been given a new
portfolio.'' Mr. Fleitz again, ``When Silver was there, Bolton
relayed the fact that he had lost confidence in Mr. Westermann,
and asked that he be given a different portfolio.'' That's in
September. Mr. Fingar, I mentioned this morning, is Assistant
Secretary for State, for INR, again, being interviewed,
``Bolton said that he wanted Westermann taken off his
accounts.'' He said, that is, Fingar said, ``He's our chemical
weapons/biological weapons specialist, that is what he does. He
expressed again,'' Mr. Fingar speaking, Mr. Bolton says, ``He
expressed again, as I remember it, that he was the President's
appointee, and he could say what he wanted.'' End of quote, Mr.
Fingar. Let me add here, I'm going to ask you whether or not
you recall saying this at all, but Mr. Fingar, when asked, Mr.
Fingar what Mr. Bolton had to say about Mr. Westermann, Mr.
Fingar said, and I quote him again in the interview several
days ago, ``That he was the President's,'' talking about you,
``that he was the President's appointee, that he had every
right to say what he believed, that he wasn't going to be told
what he could say by a mid-level INR munchkin analyst.'' End of
quote.
Again, then there's several others here, it just seems to
me here, you've got a number of people now who believe that
you're, you were so upset with what Mr. Westermann was doing,
that you wanted him removed, and that's my concern--even if you
were right about the substance, in this case, it's not the
case, I think it ultimately proved that the INR's assessment
was a more appropriate assessment on what Cuba's situation
was--but even if you were right and they were wrong, the point
that Senator Obama made this morning, the point the Chairman
made in his opening comments--it is deeply disturbing to me in
the environment we're in, where it is so important for us who
sit on this side of the table, for those of you who sit on the
side of the table you're on--that we have factual information
coming from our Intelligence Community. And if, at any point,
we begin to suspect that that information is being tailored to
serve, what Senator Lugar talked about this morning, a personal
point of view, then I think it's dangerous. And that's why
we're spending so much time on this.
Mr. Bolton. May I respond?
Senator Dodd. Absolutely.
Mr. Bolton. Senator, he wasn't straight with me. And
that's what I expressed----
Senator Dodd. This is good, but tell me about the process
in this, now I understand the process, you tell me where I'm
wrong. That your office says to them, ``This is what we want to
say, the three sentences,'' and then, then, it would come back
to Mr. Westermann anyway, at some point, to make a
determination as to whether or not that was right or not.
Where's the backstabbing here? If, in fact, in sends the
language he would suggest to you, how is that backstabbing you?
Mr. Bolton. Senator, I don't know the ins and outs of the
process, I don't pretend to, it is what staff does, I'm not an
expert on it. That's why, as I said this morning, and I don't
really have anything to add to what I said this morning, but
it's why I went to Mr. Fingar and said, ``What's going on
here?'' And at the time, the day of the incident, Mr. Fingar
said that Westermann's behavior was, ``entirely
inappropriate,'' he said, ``we screwed up,'' and he said,
twice, ``it won't happen again.'' That's, I didn't try to have
Mr. Westermann removed----
Senator Dodd. Do you recall saying that to Mr. Fingar?
That you were the President's appointee, that you had every
right to say what you wanted to?
Mr. Bolton. I don't, no, I don't recall the conversation
in any substance, what I wanted to know was what, what exactly
happened. I wanted to know why this process was happening the
way it was, I wanted to hear from somebody at the top of INR,
and that's what Mr. Fingar said back to me. But I did not,
look, I didn't try to have disciplinary action imposed on
Westermann, I just didn't feel that he had been straight with
me, and I don't know what INR did, apparently they didn't do
anything, and I haven't complained about it since then. I made
my point, and moved on.
Senator Biden. Will the Senator yield? Mr. Secretary, you
say you don't know this clearance process for a speech, after
all these years?
Mr. Bolton. I don't, no, no, no. What I said was, that, I
thought what Senator Dodd was asking was, who had done what to
whom at the staff level, and I don't know, no, I don't know
that----
Senator Biden. I thought you were asking how something
gets cleared in a speech. You send it to your guy at INR, the
INR guy then sends it to the CIA, the CIA then circulates it
throughout the entire Intelligence Community.
Mr. Bolton. Right.
Senator Biden. Each of those people, including the guy who
heads up INR, get back to them and say, ``this is good, or bad,
or indifferent,'' then it gets back to you. That's the process,
right?
Mr. Bolton. I think, as I've learned now, that's what the
process is, it's also possible because INR is part of the State
Department that INR could have--at a staff level--come to us
first before they had done that. I thought that he had gone
behind my back, that's why I asked Mr. Fingar, and I thought
Mr. Fingar's response that the behavior was entirely
inappropriate supported----
Senator Dodd. You heard, you know what Mr. Fingar says
today?
Mr. Bolton. I knew what he said at the time.
Senator Dodd. But most recently you know what he said, we
went over that this morning, let me tell you what Mr.
Westermann said, because he was asked by the Committee in the
last couple of days. He's quoting again, he said, ``He's,''
meaning by that you, Mr. Bolton, ``was quite upset that I had
objected, and he wanted to know what right I had trying to
change an Undersecretary's language, and what he would say, or
not say, on something like that. And I tried to explain to him
a little bit of the same thing about the process and how we
clear language, and I guess he wasn't really in a mood to
listen. And he was quite angry, and basically told me that I
had no right to do that. He got very red in the face, and
shaking his finger at me, and explained to me that I was acting
way beyond my position, and for someone who worked for him. I
told him I didn't work for him.'' He goes on to talk about
waving your finger at him and so forth. His recollection is not
you saying to him ``you went around my back, you should have
come to me,'' and so forth, which I think they did in the e-
mail exchange, but his point is, you didn't say that, you said
he had no right to correct your language, you were the
Undersecretary, he's just a mid-level analyst. Who's he to be
telling a Presidential appointee what to say?
Mr. Bolton. That's why I called Mr. Fingar.
Senator Dodd. But did you say this or not?
Mr. Bolton. I don't recall saying that, what I recall
saying is that he was out of line and that he had gone behind
my back and I said, ``I don't care if you disagree with me, I
just think you shouldn't do it behind my back.''
Senator Dodd. Well, let me ask you again about the,
because, as I say, if this were one event, you know, I'll be
the first one to tell you, you probably shouldn't have done
this, but I wouldn't spend thirty seconds on this issue. But
what concerns me is that there's the second incident that we
have involving the ``Mr. Smith,'' as you've called him, our
unnamed intelligence officer.
The Chairman. Would you summarize this?
Senator Dodd. I'm sorry. Well just, again, you know, the
question arises because, again, we've had testimony from this
individual, from people at the agency that, in fact, you, you
and Otto Reich both went out to the Agency and raised the issue
about whether or not this individual was going to be removed as
an intelligence officer for Latin America, did that or not,
happen?
Mr. Bolton. I went out to the Agency to meet with Mr.
Cohen to get a, an understanding of what the NIC was, and to
follow up on trying to get a better understanding of what the
clearance process was, and I mentioned--as I said before--that
I had lost confidence in Mr. Smith, and that I knew Otto Reich
had been out there before on a much larger series of concerns,
I can't really speak to those concerns, because they weren't in
my area of responsibility.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
Senator Dodd. Well, Mr. Chairman, just so the record is
clear, Mr. Cohen was visited by Otto Reich at the office,
Friday afternoon in 2002, Reich wanted to make the case for
removing the NIO from Latin America from his position, he
presented two lines of argument and said he was speaking, not
only on his own behalf, but on behalf of Mr. Bolton. Mr. Reich
has said this again in public, publications, that that was what
he was there for. A week later, Mr. Bolton called and asked to
meet Mr. Cohen as well, traveled to the Agency on his way home
or whatever, the case is here, Cohen did not recall specifics,
but believed his intent was clear. This is Mr. Cohen, now, I
mean, this is all these people lining up here. At some point
you've got to say, ``This is not enemies of yours that are
doing this,'' Mr. Cohen said intent was clear, namely, he
wanted the NIO removed. Cohen described both meetings as
``amicable.'' But you wanted him removed. That's what worries
me. Exactly the point Barack Obama made about credible
intelligence, the point the Chairman made in his opening
comments. It's a significant issue, this--in all due respect to
the Chairman--I think this is the most profound question. I,
frankly, kind of agree with a lot of your statements about the
United Nations, candidly. I think you've been on the mark with
many of them. I might disagree with some of the rhetoric you've
used, but I don't have a substantive problem with that. My
problem is this: we're suffering terribly when the Senate, we
sent the Secretary of State to the United Nations to make a
case for the presence of weapons of mass destruction, it was
wrong. Terrible information. We were damaged terribly by that.
If this is true that you tried to remove an analyst because you
disagreed with their conclusions about this, that is going to
hurt us further at the--that's my concern.
Mr. Bolton. If I could just say, I have never done
anything in connection with any analyst's views. Nothing.
Senator Dodd. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bolton, a lot of this has gotten off to this tangent of
this speech, and I find it interesting this fascination of the
process of speech composition. But I do like to have it somehow
relevant to the major issues that you will address as
Ambassador to the United Nations, and I have a hard time
determining how this has anything to do with advancing freedom
and Democracy, Senator Dodd mentioned he agreed with all of
your statements, your advocacy, your characterization--maybe he
doesn't like some of the adjectives, I like adjectives, I like
your adjectives as well, that you used--but regardless, the
issue is stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
the issues are reducing Russian nuclear warheads, advancing
freedom, and of course, efficiency and accountability in the
United Nations. And trying to figure out once--and I'm glad to
hear that we're going to read all this testimony, and I hope
it's done quickly so that we're not off on too long of a detour
off the main track here, and I think that we shouldn't be
slowing up a vote on a tangential issue, at best--I'm trying to
discern the essence of this concern, and it seems to me that at
the end of the day, it's going to come down to, and Senator
Biden who I have a great deal of respect for, is talking about
whether it clouds your judgment or not, and the question of
credibility, and I think it's probably going to come down to
differing interpretations of your loss of confidence, or trust,
in some of these individuals, and you're saying you never tried
to have them change positions, but you lose confidence in
people. I think all of us, from time to time, may have that,
realized that some people who are advising us, you say, ``Wait
a second, this isn't researched properly,'' and that's normal.
I'm wondering how much it really matters. Now, all it's gotten
down to, and I hate to get into it, but seeing how this
tangent, or this issue, is important to some members on this
Committee--the issue is Cuba's biological capabilities, and how
they might be transferring it to rogue states. It would be
helpful to say which rogue states these are, because I remember
we had a briefing on it, and it was, it wasn't absolutely
clear, but we knew they had biological weapon capability, and
they had, actually, a fairly good bio/tech infrastructure in
Cuba. And then the question wasn't just the biological and the
pharmaceuticals, but which ones of those could be dual-use, and
which countries, which are also countries which are on the
State Department's list of those that are sponsors of state
terrorism, which were involved.
Now, so you can through all of that, and which states we're
concerned about, but ultimately, would you characterize--in
your view--the difference between what you were proffering, as
to whether or not that could be stated, versus what was an
approved statement. And, granted, there were some
qualifications, Senator Dodd said that there's a qualification
here, there, but in essence, was there all that much of a
difference from what you wanted to say, I know there's a lot of
questions in there, but I just wanted to allow you to give your
point of view of this particular detour.
Mr. Bolton. I think that the main point was that we
realized in late 2001, as I say, within a couple of months
after September the 11th, that the United States government had
not said anything publically about Cuba's BW effort in some
time, and that, in the wake of September the 11th, where the
terrorist attacks has awakened all of us, unfortunately, to how
much danger we were in, and how much it would have been worse
if the terrorists used biological, chemical or nuclear weapons,
we had to have a discussion--a public discussion--in the United
States about the nature of the threat that we faced. And I
wouldn't have been surprised, frankly, if the Intelligence
Community had said, ``We're not going to agree to declassify
anything about Cuba,'' because the nature of the sources and
methods was potentially so sensitive that it was simply too
risky to do. And this was all in the context of the arrest and
then confession and conviction of Ana Belan Montes, a Cuban
spy, who had been the senior Cuba analyst in the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and it's a frightening thing when you
think about it, what she could have been transmitting back to
Cuba and what--and I'll just say this in an abstract sense, if
somebody knows, some other country knows a little bit about
what we know, their ability to conduct denial and deception
activities increases remarkably. So, I felt it was important to
discuss this issue, and based on what the Intelligence
Community had already written, we started a process to see what
would come out. And I was satisfied with the end result--
Senator Dodd quoted a series of differences, I don't recall, I
didn't really, frankly, get into the back and forth, it was
done at the staff level--but I felt that the language that I
used, which turned out to be--I felt the language I used on the
Cuba BW effort was about right. And it turned out that----
Senator Allen. Are you talking about the--Senator Dodd
quoted the language which was approved, which I assume that you
espoused in this speech, is that right?
Mr. Bolton. That's correct, yeah.
Senator Dodd. If the Senator would yield--I quoted the
language that Mr. Bolton wanted to use, and what was approved,
and what the differences were between what he wanted to say,
and what was actually approved to be said, and the difference
is significant.
Senator Dodd. I'm going to ask Mr. Bolton to say, and
there may be--whether you want to call them nuance differences,
or qualitative difference, or significance--I would like you to
share with us whether you think that what was ultimately
approved, which I assumed is what you said in your speech, I
don't think there's any question in that regard, but how would
you characterize the differences in what was approved, versus
what you had proffered as a general concept to include as part
of the speech?
Mr. Bolton. Well, this was sort of a moving process, and
I'm not sure exactly where it was, but I was content to have, I
wanted to say what was accurate. I didn't want to go through
what we're going through now, and that's why we went through
this extensive clearance process, and I'll tell you--the thing
that probably I'll never forget all of this--when I gave this
speech at the Heritage Foundation and it got attention the next
day, I talked about a lot of other countries, Cuba was what got
attention, but I was sitting, reading the morning Washington
Post the day after the speech, reading through the story about
the speech, and I came to the very last paragraph, and what it
says is, ``As it happens, Bolton was not the first official to
make a public statement on the subject. Carl W. Ford, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research,
used identical language in March 19 Congressional testimony,
that largely went unnoticed.'' So, that's the language we're
talking about, it was used several times by a number of
different people, Assistant Secretary Reich, I think, used it,
I used it, Assistant Secretary Ford----
Senator Kerry. Which language? Can we get that clarified?
Senator Allen. There's the language that--fair enough--
it's the language that we're referring to as again, similar to
what Senator Dodd----
Mr. Bolton. It's essentially the same, right? It's
essentially the same.
Senator Allen. And, do you find that to be--how would you
describe the difference between what you said in that speech--
which apparently was the same as what others had said in
previous speeches, folks just pay attention when you speak,
folks listen--which is good, we expect them to in the United
Nations. Especially when you're representing Americans, but how
would you characterize the difference from what your inquiry
was, or your proffered language, versus what was approved?
Mr. Bolton. I think that there were some language changes,
but that basically what we were, what was eventually cleared
was to make the point that Cuba had a research and development
effort. And I think that was the point to be made, and I was
happy to be able to make it.
Senator Allen. Do you see any reason why this discussion
on crafting speeches and the process of speeches will have any
impact on your ability to assist and lead the United Nations to
greater reforms and efficiency, or stopping the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction?
Mr. Bolton. I don't think it will have any impact one way
or the other, to tell you the truth, the process of clearances
is an important process, and I think when you're speaking on
behalf of the United States, you should speak with all of the
equities in the government covered, that's what we tried to do
in this speech, that's what I've tried to do in all of my
speeches.
Senator Allen. Well, I think we all will, and in fact, any
intelligence we receive, regardless of party, in the future
we're going to all look at it with greater scrutiny after the
information and decisions made on evidence before the military
action in Iraq. But I agree with you, I don't see where this
nuance difference in crafting a speech, stating the same things
that have been stated by others, will have any impact
whatsoever on your ability to lead this country, and lead also,
the United Nations toward greater reforms while representing
our values and principles.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me make it clear that this language that's being
referred to, that other people have said, is the approved
language. That's what Carl Ford said, the approved language.
Carl Ford did not say what you were proposing to say, which was
corrected by the review process. Now, a moment ago you said,
the reason that you did the corrective process was to avoid all
of this. That's not accurate. The reason you did the corrective
process is because it's standard operating procedure that
anything that involves intelligence that is to be spoken by a
national public official, goes to the Intelligence Community
for review, correct? It's normal procedure, correct?
Mr. Bolton. If it involved intelligence, yes.
Senator Kerry. The clearance procedure----
Mr. Bolton [continuing]. Is much broader than just
clearance in the Intelligence Community.
Senator Kerry. I understand that. But this paragraph by
normal operating procedure of the department, had to go and be
cleared, correct?
Mr. Bolton. Let me try and separate, we've got two
different things that's being, that are being talked about
here. The first was that the language that we talked about had
to be declassified. Now, had it then, once declassified, then--
--
Senator Kerry. What I'm getting to is the judgment, the
substance, the assessment.
Mr. Bolton. Right.
Senator Kerry. You were proposing to say the words, ``A
developmental, offensive, biological warfare program,'' and
``is providing assistance to other rogue state programs,''
implying that the developmental offensive biological warfare
program was developmental--not research--but developmental, and
being provided to other rogue state programs. Now,
substantively, the analyst who worked with you disagreed with
you, and you knew that. You knew that ahead of time. In fact,
your own staff Chief Fleitz, in the interview with the
Committee, said very clearly that--I think I have it hear--
right here. You summoned Mr. Westermann to your office on
February 12, after you learned that he'd expressed INR's
objection to parts of what you wanted to say. And Mr. Fleitz,
who is your Chief of Staff, requested that Mr. Westermann bring
his comment, along with the original language that you
proposed, up to your office, and he did so. And Fleitz said, I
quote Fleitz, ``Well, I sent an e-mail to Mr. Westermann, as I
had said, and when he came up to the front office, I had
instructions from Mr. Bolton to bring him into Mr. Bolton's
office, and Christian went into Mr. Bolton's office, and I
accompanied him. And Mr. Bolton looked at the e-mail, or the
document, and he said something like, `What gives? What did you
do?' But he didn't defend what he did, he argued on the
substance of what we had asked to be declassified.'' So it was
not procedural, as you said this morning. He disagreed with you
on the substance of what you were saying, correct?
Mr. Bolton. Let me just say, I----
Senator Kerry. Is that correct or isn't it?
Mr. Bolton. I don't remember the conversation, what I
remember was----
Senator Kerry. You don't remember whether he disagreed
with you on the substance?
Mr. Bolton. I don't remember enough about the
conversation----
Senator Kerry. Well, how can you say that it wasn't
substantive, then, that it was procedural, if you don't
remember.
Mr. Bolton. I think it was procedural. For me, he had----
Senator Kerry. What do you mean, for you it was
procedural? Either it involved substance, or it doesn't.
Mr. Bolton. For me it was procedural.
Senator Kerry. I see. The substance of whether or not Cuba
had a developmental program, versus the substance of whether
it's research and how they're helping rogue states is
procedural, not substantive?
Mr. Bolton. The process that I was concerned about was to
get an honest assessment within the Intelligence Community of
what could be declassified, and I felt that by the method that
Westermann had used, he was not being straightforward with me.
That's why I, I wanted to be sure, that's why I called Mr.
Fingar.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Bolton, let me go to that right now.
Well, that's really at the heart of this. You're smarter than
that. And you know what substance is, you know what process is.
What you didn't like was the fact that he disagreed with you.
Mr. Bolton. Simply not true, Senator.
Senator Kerry. Well, let's get to that. On February 10th,
this is when this took place. And your Chief of Staff is the
one who asked him to go get the clearance. He was following the
normal standard procedure as requested by your Chief of Staff,
and you already knew he disagreed with you.
Mr. Bolton. I did not----
Senator Kerry. But he'd expressed that.
Mr. Bolton. I had no idea.
Senator Kerry. He then followed the instructions of your
Chief of Staff, now your Chief of Staff said it was necessary
to do it in a hurry. Now, if he follows procedure, he sends it
over to INR for clearance. INR's going to come back, to the
CIA, excuse me. And they're going to come back to him and
request his opinion. He simply sent his opinion along at the
same time, knowing that they would come back to him, in order
to expedite your request. Now, he did nothing that was outside
of the normal procedures of the State Department and of the
clearance process.
Mr. Bolton. Mr. Fingar, at the time, said what he had done
was entirely inappropriate.
Senator Kerry. Why was it inappropriate?
Mr. Bolton. I went to, first I called Carl Ford, the
Assistant Secretary, and----
Senator Kerry. What was inappropriate about putting his
opinion that he was going to be asked for anyway?
Mr. Bolton. Then I called Mr. Fingar to say, ``What is
going on here, can you explain this to me?'' And I recall Tom
saying, basically, ``I don't know anything about it,''
basically, ``I'll check and get back to you,'' and later in the
day, he sent me an e-mail that said, ``We screwed up,
Westermann's behavior was entirely inappropriate,'' and he said
twice, it won't happen again.
Senator Kerry. Well, let me just say that the formal
process of the State Department is that when there is a
proposed text, if it is derived from intelligence information,
it gets submitted to the State INR bureau and that was done.
The INR then sends the proposed text to the demarche
coordinator in WINPAC, which is the DCI's Weapons Intelligence
Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Intelligence Center, that's
what he did. WINPAC then sends the proposed text to over a
dozen Intelligence Community offices, one of which would have
been Mr. Westermann, for his opinion, only he sent it right up
front, including any relevant National Intelligence Officers
for their review and clearance. The Intelligence Community
considered whether the proposed would expose sensitive
intelligence sources and methods, and whether, if it cites U.S.
intelligence, it is consistent with U.S. intelligence analysis.
Now, this is not a one-time incident. Which is what
disturbs us.
Senator Biden. Would the Senator yield--the whole
Intelligence Community reached the same conclusion.
Senator Kerry. The whole Intelligence Community came to
the same conclusion as Mr. Westermann, a 23-year veteran of the
Navy, who had no other purpose here except to be accurate. And
you, and this will come up more, were not in accord with this
judgment.
Now, subsequent to that, you said this morning, that you
had this one confrontation with him, and you dropped the
matter. This was February. But, in fact, with the Mr. Smith/NIO
officer, you had another confrontation on this issue of
intelligence, why? Because the speech that you wound up giving
to the Heritage Foundation caused a stir, Senator Dodd was
going to have a hearing, in the process you sent that speech
around, or you were planning a statement that was going to be
made to the Committee, you sent that statement around to the
various Intelligence Community entities to get it cleared, and
it couldn't get cleared. Because you were making statements in
that testimony that were not in accord with the judgments of
the Intelligence Community. In the end, you didn't appear, and
the hearing didn't take place, because the Secretary didn't
allow your appearance, I believe, and subsequent to that, in
July, you didn't let it drop, you in fact, went out there in
your own car, and expressed your displeasure with the
Intelligence Community that wouldn't ratify your judgments
which were, in effect, wrong. Now, that's an accurate
reflection of a timetable and a sequence of events here, is it
not?
Mr. Bolton. It is not.
Senator Kerry. Well, tell me where we're wrong. You didn't
go out in July? Let's just review it. Did you go out in July,
in your car?
Mr. Bolton. I don't recall when I met with Mr. Cohen.
enator Kerry. If I tell you it was, in fact, in July,
would you accept that?
Mr. Bolton. I don't have any reason to accept it or reject
it, I just don't know.
Senator Kerry. Maybe you could check your calendar, but
for the purposes of this, we'll say it is July and I believe
the record will show it is July. Now, the purpose of going out
there was to complain, which you did, did you not----
Mr. Bolton. That was not the purpose.
Senator Kerry. Well, it's what you did.
Mr. Bolton. The purpose of the meeting with Mr. Cohen was
a courtesy call on him in his capacity as Chairman----
Senator Kerry. But you hadn't let the matter drop, it was
in your head, and you raised your displeasure with the
Intelligence judgments, correct?
Mr. Bolton. I wanted to find out more about what the NIC
was, because I didn't, I had never encountered it before.
Senator Kerry. Well, could you tell me, and the Committee,
what the process issue was, then, that you were unhappy with?
Particularly with the NIO officer? What was his process
violation?
Mr. Bolton. Mr. Smith had said that the speech was not
cleared by him. And I didn't know who Mr. Smith was. So, I
talked to the person who was at the head of WINPAC, and I said,
probably something like, ``What's the National Intelligence
Council?'' And he said, ``That's who it is, you ought to come
out and talk to him.'' And I said, ``Did you clear the speech
with the National Intelligence Council?'' And he said, ``Yes,
in fact, we did. We cleared it with the National Intelligence
Officer who has cognizance over BW programs worldwide, the
National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology. And
this is a case where we sent this thing out to INR and out to
the Intelligence Community, I didn't ask anybody in particular
to clear it, I didn't know who was supposed to clear it. We
wanted INR to perform its function of liaison with the
Intelligence Community, and we thought they had, and then
somebody else raises his hand and says, ``Hey, I didn't clear
that speech.'' So, I wanted to find out what the purpose was.
If I could just mention one other point here, on the
question of whether or not I testified. I'd like to, I think
you've got this, I'd offer it for the record if you don't have
it, a letter to Senator Dodd from Secretary Powell, dated July
23, 2002, it says, ``Dear Senator Dodd, This is a follow up to
our conversation after a June 5 briefing on my recently
completed Moscow trip. At that time I acknowledged your
concerns on Cuba and bioterrorism. My decision to send
Assistant Secretary Ford to testify was based on the purpose of
the hearing as expressed in your letter, and in my judgment
regarding the most appropriate witness for the purposes of your
hearing, which focused on intelligence findings. At that time,
I agreed to make Undersecretary Bolton available, to discuss
separately, the policy implications behind Cuba's biological
capabilities. Undersecretary Bolton stands ready to appear
before the Foreign Relations Committee for this purpose. The
Department puts a high value on its relationship with the
Committee, and will work to accommodate your oversight
responsibilities. We look forward to working with you, and
other members of the Committee. Sincerely, Colin L. Powell.''
Senator Kerry. I respect the letter, but it doesn't do
anything to address the fact that the Intelligence Community
did not, and would not, clear the testimony that you proposed.
Mr. Bolton. May I then quote Assistant Secretary Ford's
testimony at the June hearing, and he is addressing the
question of how is it that he used the words that turned out to
be in my speech. So, I will quote Assistant Secretary Ford----
Senator Kerry. But that doesn't----
Mr. Bolton. This goes directly to your question, Senator.
``Mr. Ford, the history of the words on BW in that speech were,
as I understand it, Secretary Bolton invited the Intelligence
Community to provide him with some words that he could use in a
speech on BW. He was very careful, I think, not to suggest
words to the Community for clearance, he asked them, 'What do
you think? What do you say?' So that they came up with the
lines in the speech, and presented those back to INR to take
back to Secretary Bolton for his use. As I understand it, his
speech was postponed. I wasn't aware of this. I had a
requirement on short notice to come up and brief the Committee
on CW/BW worldwide. Apparently those words that had been
approved for Mr. Bolton were picked up by my staff to insert in
my presentation to the full Committee, and so that I then
presented that information that had been cleared by the IC.
When it came time for Mr. Bolton to give his speech a month or
two later, he then took the same language that had been
approved earlier by the Community, and stuck it into his
Heritage speech. But those words were our words, the
Intelligence Community's words, not his.''
Senator Kerry. There's no question about that, nobody is,
Mr. Chairman, nobody even questions that. That is one of the
great sidesteps of all time. I asked you about your testimony
before Senator Dodd, whether or not it was cleared. You still
haven't answered it, it was not cleared, was it?
Mr. Bolton. The testimony was never finished, I----
Senator Kerry. But it was never cleared, that's why it
wasn't finished.
Mr. Bolton. I'm not sure I ever saw a draft of it.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Kerry----
Senator Kerry. Oh, what about Cohen, what did you say to
Mr. Cohen?
Mr. Bolton. I said--as I testified earlier--that I went
out to see Mr. Cohen to pay a courtesy call on him, to get a
better understanding of the National Intelligence Council, I
won't----
Senator Kerry. Well, what did you did say to him about the
personnel that you wanted removed?
Mr. Bolton. I said, I was aware that Assistant Secretary
Reich had been out to see him a short period before that, and
that Assistant Secretary Reich had very substantial concerns
with Mr. Smith, and what I said was, that in my dealings with
him I had, his behavior was unprofessional, and that I had lost
confidence in him and supported Mr. Reich.
Senator Kerry. Well, let me just say, Mr. Cohen says he
didn't recall many of the specifics of the Bolton meeting, but
believed his intent was clear, namely that he wanted the NIO
removed. That's Mr. Cohen's recollection.
Mr. Bolton. My recollection is that I--as I've just----
Senator Kerry. And your Chief of Staff said the same
thing.
Mr. Bolton. As I've just said, that his behavior had been
unprofessional and that I'd lost confidence in him.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, we can sit here----
Mr. Bolton. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kerry. May I just take one moment? Thirty seconds,
Mr. Chairman. This is reading from Mr. Fleitz's interview,
where he said, ``Did Otto Reich share his belief that Fulton
Armstrong should be removed from his position? The answer is
yes. Did John Bolton share that view?'' Mr. Fleitz said,
``Yes.''
Mr. Bolton. As I said, I had lost confidence in Mr. Smith,
and I conveyed that. I thought that was the honest thing to do.
Senator Kerry. You lost confidence because you didn't
agree with him.
Mr. Bolton. No, absolutely not, Senator, confidence
because he was claiming a process foul that was inaccurate and
untrue.
Senator Allen. Mr. Chairman, when I was asking Mr. Bolton
what was the difference from what he was proposing to talk
about insofar as Cuba, and their biological capabilities with
rogue states. And Senator Kerry said, we all agreed on what he
said, what was the difference, and you characterized it as
``not much of a difference.'' What you're trying to do is just
point out that concern, and wanted to have approved language.
You characterized answers to my question that there really
wasn't much of a difference in what you wanted to say, or
proffered as a concept, versus what was actually enunciated in
the Heritage Foundation speech, isn't that correct?
Mr. Bolton. I think that's basically correct.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, it's important, the facts
here. Let's say, the Select Committee on Intelligence,
reporting on the U.S. Intelligence Community's prewar
intelligence assessment on Iraq, the very report that Mr.
Bolton quoted, is saying they had cleared, they had
investigated this issue on page 277 said, ``The analyst,''
referring to Mr. Westermann, ``The analyst told the Senator
Intelligence Committee,'' this is a quote from the report by
our Intelligence Committee, ``The analyst,'' Mr. Westermann,
told the Senate Intelligence Committee staff, that ``the text
of the Undersecretary's speech contained a sentence which said
the U.S., not Mr. Bolton, the U.S. believed that Cuba has a
developmental offensive biological warfare program, and is
providing assistance to other rogue state programs. The text
also called for international observers of Cuba's biological
facilities.'' End of quote. That is fundamentally different
than what got cleared. What got cleared was ``The United States
believes that Cuba has a limited offensive biological warfare
research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use
biotechnology to other rogue states.'' Very different than
saying it has provided offensive biological warfare program,
and is providing assistance to other states. Fundamentally
different.
Senator Allen. Dual-use means dual-use.
Senator Boxer. Computers could be called dual-use, you
know that, Senator. We work on that all the time, there's big
difference.
Senator Biden. The Intelligence Committee paragraph
reference I would ask be placed in the record at this point, as
well as the language that was ultimately approved to be able to
be used by Mr. Bolton in his speech.
The Chairman. Both will be put in the record.
The Chair would just observe, the Chair has heard this
language at least four times, at least that amount. So, fair
enough, so we proceed on to Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, thank you Mr. Chair. I will
spend about three minutes on this, and seven on the work I hope
you're going to be doing, that any ambassador to the United
Nations has to be doing.
I do want to say that I appreciate and respect the
sensitivity of all my colleagues on this issue. The reality is,
when Colin Powell testifies before the United Nations and talks
about biological weapons and other things, and they're not
there--that hurts all of us. And so, what you're facing,
Secretary, is a great, legitimate sensitivity on these issues.
But then you've got to get past that and say, ``So, what do we
have?'' And, number one, you've said it again and again, did
you threaten any analyst because of their views? The answer to
that has been ``No.''
Mr. Bolton. No.
Senator Coleman. Consistently. What you have here is a
question of process. You're concerned about the process being
that the INR, this analyst sent it out and it had his comments
in there, he had alternative language in there, he had a number
of things in there, you didn't see that, it then went out to
the Intelligence Community, came back to you, and you
questioned that process. And you were angry about that. Is that
fair to say?
Mr. Bolton. I was concerned about that, that's exactly
right.
Senator Coleman. So, what we have is a, and the other
issue is the issue of pattern. As a former prosecutor, I know
about patterns, what you have here is you have two incidences
where you were upset with analysts, but in each instance you're
saying it was not over substance, it was over process. They had
different substance than you, but your issue was process, is
that correct?
Mr. Bolton. Precisely.
Senator Coleman. So, in the end, it's management style.
Mr. Bolton. Precisely.
Senator Coleman. And the question that we have to decide
in casting our vote is management style, it's going to move us
one way or the other.
Let me get to the other issue, because I think it's
important. My colleague, Senator Obama, raised an important
question, but I don't think it's the question, at least, that I
want, that I think we have to answer, the U.S. has to answer.
He talked about, in this wonderful history of United Nations
ambassadors and I believe he said something to the effect of,
``We have to convince the world we are right,'' the importance
of having the credibility and the stature to do that, the
integrity to do that. I really think that the question is that
the U.N. has to convince the American public and the world that
it's credible. That's the issue right now. Credibility of the
United Nations. And whether it's Oil-for-Food, and the 56 U.N.
audits that talked about the millions, the millions that were
ripped off from the, the hundreds of millions from the Iraqi
people, the billions that Saddam put into his own pocket,
whether it's the sex abuse--brutal, horrible sex abuse in the
Congo, child rape, prostitution--and whether the U.N. acted
quickly enough to deal with that. Whether it's sexual
harassment, and the question of whether the U.N. acted quickly
enough, and in fact, in that instance, originally those
allegations, the individual who was eventually removed,
originally his position was supported by the Secretary General,
and only after the world press brought it to everyone's
attention, was there reversal. And so I would maintain that the
question is and the challenge that I'm going to ask you is what
are you going to do and what should we do to help the U.N.
continue, if you are in a position where its credibility is
restored. What I'm looking at, and I think something that you
have here, is a culture of impunity. If we're not a community
for Benon Sevan, white washing of U.N. officials accused of
sexual harassment, U.N. peace keepers accused of abusing women
and girls, can only be held accountable by their own
government. So, my question for you is, help me understand what
is it that the U.N. has to do to regain credibility, and then
what is it that we in Congress, what is our responsibility?
What is our opportunity to turn this around so that we have a
credible organization that can be a partner in dealing with
international crisis and dealing with peacekeeping.
Mr. Bolton. I think it's a very difficult undertaking to
try and change a organizational bureaucratic culture. It's
probably one of the most difficult managerial tasks you can
undertake, but I referred earlier today to Dick Thornberg's
report at the end of his year as Undersecretary General for
management, and one of the things that he tried to do with the
very strong support of the first President Bush, was create in
the United Nations system an effective analog to what we call
``Inspectors General'' in the federal government. It was a
concept that was completely foreign to the United Nations at
the time, although there were outside auditors in existence,
there was nothing really like the IG system as we have it. Now,
ultimately in the early 1990's an office was set up, the
Internal Oversight Office. It did not have the kind of
independence and support that our statutory Inspectors General
do in this country, and if you read the, I think in both
interim reports by the Volcker Investigative Commission, you'll
see criticisms by the Volcker Commission of the lack of
independence, lack of support for the internal investigative
office, and the general lack of independence of internal audit
functions, which is closely related, although somewhat more
limited, to the broader mandate that IG's have. I really think
that this is sort of the tangible, concrete reform that we can,
that we should be looking at to enhance the sense of
responsibility that I think most U.N. employees have. I think
that most want to do the right thing, if they knew what the
right things was, but having an effective IG is certainly, I
can say as a government official myself, having an IG out there
is a very important tool, I think it would serve us well in the
United Nations, that's the kind of thing we've got, that
suggestion, as I recall in the late 1980's and the early 1990's
came largely from Congress, because of Congress's experience in
the years before that of creating a statutory IG system, but I
think that's an example of something both the Congress, that's
an idea that came from Congress, and from other sources too,
but that we were then not as successful as we should have been
in getting implemented, that's something to look at right now.
Senator Coleman. And I'm sure that Congress is going to be
involved in this discussion, we've got a big stake in this, I
mean, the IOS you're talking about, they don't have independent
budgetary authority. They're dependent on the folks who they
investigate to get their budget authority. Benon Sevan was able
to stop the IOS from submitting reports to the Security
Council. We don't have, there aren't ethical guidelines in
terms of, in the issue of procurement, either for the procurers
or the contractors, there are not a series of guidelines, there
aren't a whole range of kind of basic stuff that we would
insist, that in Congress we would insist that is happening. And
I know the Secretary General has raised these issues, and I
applaud him for that, the question is, how do you get it done?
And what do we do to keep the pressure on to make sure it gets
done?
Mr. Bolton. I have one other suggestion on that, and I
know I've raised this with a number of you when I've met with
you in preparation for this hearing, and that is, based on my
experiences as Assistant Secretary for International
Organizations during the first Bush Administration, I really
think that there's an enormous benefit to getting elected
officials, American elected officials, up to New York, to talk
to senior officials in the Secretariat, talk to ambassadors
from some of the other countries, you know, we have a
tradition, alternating between the House and the Senate that,
on a bipartisan basis, two members of Congress are part of the
delegation to the U.N. every year, and five years ago, Senator
Helms took the Committee for, what I believe--correct me if I'm
wrong--the first hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee ever outside of Washington. So, if I get confirmed
here, and I can persuade the Chairman, that might be something,
and I also think having members go up there--I think it's
important for U.N. Secretariat officials to hear from elected
Americans, people like yourselves who are responsible to actual
voters--I think it's a very salutary experience, and I think it
would be a big help to me in my job if I get confirmed,
frankly.
Senator Coleman. I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that my
colleagues would have their staff look at the 56 audit reports
that were released by the ILC. Management failings extending
every basic management skill needed to effectively manage a
program, achieve the program's results. Failings included
budget planning, execution, coordination, strategic planning,
communication, procurement, inventory, controlled cash
management, accounting for assets, documents justifying
expenditures, information technology, human resource
management. I think the job is almost overwhelming, it needs to
be done, though, and we need a strong voice. And we need
someone, and I applaud you for this, we need someone who has
raised some of these concerns, who has been critical of the
United Nations in the past, but has a commitment, then, to
working with this organization so that it is lifted up, and
then in the end has the kind of transparency and accountability
and credibility that is needed if it is to be a partner with
us, to work with us to deal with some of the challenges in the
world today.
Mr. Bolton. I think that's the President's clear
intention.
Senator Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Senator Coleman, you're
very eloquent, and it would be great to lift up the United
Nations, it's tough to do it if you think it doesn't exist. So,
that's what I'm trying to grapple with. You know, Senator
Allen, you said that we're taking a detour here as we go into
these questions about the pressure put on independent
intelligence analysts when you don't like the answer you get
from them. I think it's quite central to this particular
nominee. Mr. Bolton, you seem to be the only person involved,
because we have testimony here from several people, who is
minimizing what you did to Mr. Westermann. Who, as Senator
Biden has pointed out--and he did it in detail--is a real hero.
Serving this country under fire in Iraqi Freedom, 23 years in
the Navy, etc. Now, maybe you were unaware of his bio when you
called him a ``mid-level INR munchkin,'' but maybe you should
apologize to him at this point. Calling a war hero who served
23 years, who was under fire, referring to him in that fashion,
I just think that's outrageous.
Now, that in itself, it's unfortunate, but it's certainly
not enough to disqualify you. But I think what is enough to
disqualify you from this position is that, it seems that there
is a pattern, when you can't get the answers that you want,
because you want to build a case, I think of an imminent threat
against America by a country you think is an imminent threat,
but the intelligence officials don't agree with you, then you
seek retribution and you get very upset, and then when we ask
you about it, instead of just coming out with it, and saying,
``God, I was frustrated! You know, I thought I had the
information, I thought it was documented,'' you tell us, ``No,
it had nothing to do with that. It was procedural,'' and the
words you used, ``he wasn't,'' Mr. Westermann ``wasn't
straightforward with me.'' And then we find out, that in fact
what Mr. Westermann did, was completely appropriate. And that
what he's supposed to do is send out your words for comment,
and he expedited the process, and then when you found out that
it was, in essence, a turn-down, and whatever Senator Allen
says, is a huge difference between dual-use and actually giving
people help with the program--it's like night and day. I worked
on that with, I think, the good Senator, on making sure that,
for example, that our computers can still be exported, because
sometimes they accuse of in the State Department that they're
``dual-use.'' But what happened is, you went absolutely wild.
This is what Mr. Westermann said, ``He was quite upset that I
had objected, and he wanted to know what right I had trying to
change an Undersecretary's language. And what he would say, or
not say, or something like that, and I tried to explain to him
a little bit of the same thing, about the process of how we
clear language, and I guess he really wasn't in the mood to
listen, and he was quite angry, and basically told me I had no
right to do that. He got very red in the face and shaking his
finger at me, and explained to me that I was acting way beyond
my position and for someone that worked for him. I told him I
didn't work for him, I worked for Mr. Ford,'' and it goes on
and other people come forward and corroborate this story, and
then we have the Mr. Smith story where you just happened to get
in your car and drive out, by happenstance, raise the subject
when we know Mr. Reich had already spoken for you on Mr. Smith
in a previous occasion. So, there is a pattern here, which is
very disturbing, which is why we're going to try to get some
more people here to keep on putting the puzzle together.
Frankly, if you had just ponged up and said, ``You know, I was
angry, I was upset, I wanted to make a much stronger case
against Cuba, and I think they bent over backwards and weren't
fair to me,'' I would have more respect. But trying to say it's
some kind of process, it's upsetting.
Mr. Chairman, I can't concentrate. Senator Biden, I'm sorry
to interrupt you, I can't make this case. But I want to move on
because, again, Secretary Rice, in her strong endorsement of
you, compared you to Jean Kirkpatrick and compared you to
Senator Moynihan, and I want to take you through this. Again, I
say ``No comparison.'' Jean Kirkpatrick said, ``U.N. votes
matter, because they effect widely held views about perceptions
of power, about effectiveness and about legitimacy.'' And,
here's your quote in the Washington Times. ``Many Republicans
in Congress, and perhaps a majority, not only do not care about
losing the General Assembly vote, but actually see it as a
'make my day' outcome.''
I think there's a big difference here between Jean
Kirkpatrick who say that U.N. votes matter, and yours who say,
when we lose it, it's a 'make my day' outcome. It sounds a
little bit like ``bring it on'' and we know what happened after
that.
Mr. Bolton. I think we're actually talking here, Dr.
Kirkpatrick is talking about the circumstance that she faced in
the early 1980's at the United Nations when following the
adoption of ``Zionism is Racism'' resolution in 1975, there
were--really throughout the 70's--but in the years after that
as well, the attitude in, among many policy makers in
Washington of a sort of, I'll use the colloquial, ``Boys will
be boys,'' in New York, and that the votes in the General
Assembly didn't matter. She, I think, quite correctly, argued--
and it was really American policy throughout the Reagan and
Bush Administrations--to take these votes very seriously.
The point I was making in the passage you've quoted there--
which we also discussed earlier today--was that there were some
people in Congress, the argument was we were about to lose our
vote in the General Assembly, because under the U.N.'s
financial regulations, we were about to fall two years in
arrears. And some people were saying we had to pay up the full
assessment, even though many in Congress were not satisfied, or
we'd lose the vote in the General Assembly. What I said there
was, that's not very appealing to many people in Congress that
I know, that would be a situation that would just further
affirm their lack of desire to participate in the U.N. and I
didn't want that to happen, and I propose----
Senator Boxer. I'm sorry to cut you off, but my time is a-
wastin' here. You know, what you're doing is saying, ``Yeah, I
said that, but I meant about one specific thing,'' you know,
you don't say that here, and Jean Kirkpatrick doesn't say that
here, so let me move on to another quote, because I think this
comparison was made by Dr. Rice and I don't think anything
could be further than the truth. I've got a lot of these. This
one is, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ``International law can
actually enhance the national security of the United States.''
You've been compared to him, this is what you say, ``It is a
big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law,
even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do so,
because, over the long term, the goal of those who think that
international law really means anything, are those who want to
constrict the United States.'' So, do you see a difference here
between the two statements: ``International law can actually
enhance the national security,'' and yours that international
law really constricts the United States.
Mr. Bolton. I think there is a difference, I will say that
Senator Moynihan was somebody with whom I was fortunate to have
a number of conversations after my confirmation to the IO job,
which he helped expedite, and we had a number of conversations,
really, literally, in the months before he died on the
international criminal court where I think his view and mine
were actually the same, but on the this subject, I think he had
a different view.
Senator Boxer. Okay, that's fair, good, because I want to
ask you about some of these international laws here, since you
say, you make this sweeping statement that they constrict. Here
are some examples of international law, and I wonder if you can
tell us if you feel that they constrict us, or whether they
actually are good things, and if you don't know about them,
I've got some details on them.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. Do you think that's a law we should be a party to? An
international law that we should be a party to?
Mr. Bolton. Absolutely, and you know, of course, Senator,
we're dualist countries, so the terms of the Convention on
Genocide were enacted as positive law by Congress.
Senator Boxer. So, you agree with that and so you do
believe in this case that international law does not constrict
us.
Mr. Bolton. In this case, the terms of the Convention on
Genocide were enacted by Congress as positive law, since we are
a dualist country.
Senator Boxer. So you believe that this particular law
does not constrict us.
Mr. Bolton. No, I favor this one.
Senator Boxer. You do not think it constricts us.
Mr. Bolton. Right.
Senator Boxer. So, your broad statement was overly broad.
How about the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons?
Mr. Bolton. I support that.
Senator Boxer. And you don't think that international law
constricts us?
Mr. Bolton. You know, if I could just make the
philosophical statement here, that this issue of what
international law amounts to is something that legal theorists
have talked about, I wrote about it in Advaine, in Law Review
articles and others, the fact is that this is something legal
theorists will debate for a long time, they've been debating it
for centuries already. I acknowledge in my capacity as an
American official that the United States does, and should,
follow international law. The question of whether international
law is law in the same sense as municipal law is a
philosophical question I've written on, I've given my opinion,
I think you've all got the articles, that's not the same as
what we're talking about here, which is concrete.
Senator Boxer. I don't know anyone who thinks that it's
the same as municipal law, but I think what I think----
Mr. Bolton. ``Municipal law'' is the term of art used for
``National law.'' National law versus international law.
Senator Boxer. Yes, I understand. But, what I wanted to
say to you is this: You've been compared to Ambassador
Moynihan, you have said different things on international law,
and you've said you disagree with him on international law, so
we have a list here, we'll come back to it later, but the first
two, you would agree, we should be a party to, and it doesn't
constrict us, so your statement that you made was overly broad.
Mr. Bolton. I never said we shouldn't agree in bilateral
or multilateral treaties that are in America's interest. And
the first, well, the sign just got taken down, but the first
three or four that I was able to read, I support all of them.
Senator Boxer. Good.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer, you----
Senator Boxer. I'll just end with the quote, ``It's a big
mistake for us to grant any validity to international law, even
when it may seem in our short term interest to do so, because
over the long run, the goal of those who think that
international law really means anything, are those who want to
constrict the United States.'' And I'm glad to hear that you
agree with some of those, at least, that I had up on the chart,
because I wouldn't want you to think that I, for example, are
trying to constrict the United States, America, because I
support those treaties as well. Thank you.
Mr. Bolton. And I have said and written that the United
States should honor the treaty obligations that it undertakes.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to defer to
Senator Obama, he's been sitting here patiently, so if you'd
come to me after him.
The Chairman. Very well, Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just pick up on a point that was made by my
colleague from Minnesota, his suggestion that the question is
not whether the world believers we're right on these issues. In
the first Gulf War, we had to convince nation after nation to
help the U.S. put boots on the ground, Senator Baker and his
team were able to convince the world that we were right with
respect to repelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, and that
capacity to do so made our soldiers safer, reduced the burden
on our taxpayers, so I'm just curious as to whether you would
endorse the notion that in military actions that we take across
the world, we don't need the world's approval in order to
protect our interests, but that putting together coalitions,
effective coalitions, can be helpful and serve our national
security interests.
Mr. Bolton. Absolutely.
Senator Obama. The second point I guess I want to make, is
that I am, like Senator Dodd, I think, who mentioned this
earlier, am actually with you on seeing what we can do to
reform the bureaucracy of the U.N., and some of the litany of
wrongs that Senator Coleman listed have to be addressed. And I
look forward to seeing how the State Department and the
permanent representative to the United Nations can do so. But I
just want to make clear, you've made quite a bit of hay about
the notion that the United Nations is really just a building,
and it's member states that have to be held accountable for how
we function. That isn't to say that we don't correct internal
bureaucratic bungling on the part of United Nations officials,
but that there's a false concreteness when we say, ``The United
Nations is responsible for this,'' or responsible for that, but
in fact, it's whether the member nations are willing to commit
to certain courses of action that makes the U.N. effective or
not effective, is that an accurate assessment?
Mr. Bolton. Right, actually it was Senator Clinton who
used the building metaphor in her speech at Verekunda, I
didn't----
Senator Obama. Fair enough. But you understand, it's the
same point.
Mr. Bolton. It's the same point, yes.
Senator Obama. I just think it's important that, as we go
forward in terms of these reforms, I think it would be fair to
say that we don't want to apply false concreteness when it
comes to the Oil-for-Food program, and sort of suggest that
somehow it's the United Nations as an institution as opposed to
its member states that are entirely responsible for the flaws
of that, it makes more sense for us to examine our relationship
with the member nations as well as our own actions to figure
out how we're holding the behavior of what we call the United
Nations responsible for failures in the field. Would that be an
accurate statement?
Mr. Bolton. Yeah, I agree with that entirely, the point I
was trying to make earlier, perhaps not clearly, is that the
original Oil-for-Food program, during the first Bush
Administration, was embodied in Resolution 706 and 712, and it
kind of played a very intrusive U.N. presence throughout Iraq
in terms of the distribution of supplies.
Senator Obama. Right.
Mr. Bolton. Saddam Hussein rejected that.
Obama. Right.
Mr. Bolton. And, in fact, the program went through a
number of iterations in the Security Council which Saddam
repeatedly rejected until he finally found a version that he
liked. And I think that the fact that he finally found a
version he thought he could exploit, could only be, the
responsibility for that--the responsibility for the
consequences of that--can only be laid at the doorstep of the
member governments of the Security Council.
Senator Obama. On the Security Council. Fair enough. We
actually agree on that.
Let me move on. I'm going to read a statement in the
newspaper, now this is unsubstantiated, I want you to have the
opportunity to respond to it, this is from July 15, 2003,
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, ``In a new dispute over interpreting
intelligence data, the CIA and other agencies objected
vigorously to a Bush Administration assessment of the threat of
Syria's weapons of mass destruction that was to be presented
today on Capitol Hill. After the objections, the planned
testimony of Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton, a leading
Administration hawk, was delayed until September. U.S.
officials told Knight-Ridder that Bolton was prepared to tell
members of the House of Representatives International Relations
Subcommittee that serious development of biological, chemical
and nuclear weapons had progressed to such a point that they
posed a threat to stability in the region. The CIA and other
intelligence agencies said that assessment was exaggerated.''
And then, further down it says, ``Bolton's planned remarks
caused a 'revolt' among intelligence experts, who thought they
inflated the progress Syria has made in their weapons program,
said a U.S. official who wasn't from the CIA, but was involved
in the dispute.''
Now, first of all, this is unsubstantiated, so I want to
give you a brief opportunity to respond, be mindful, though,
that I'm sure you want to go home, your poor wife, I'm sure,
wants to go home after all this, so if you can keep responses
relatively brief.
Mr. Bolton. I was invited to give both classified and
unclassified testimony to a Subcommittee of the House, drafts
were prepared--and I should say as is often the case, and was
in part in the case in other speeches--I hadn't even seen the
draft. I had been traveling, when I came back I found that I
had a conflict, I had been assigned to go to a Deputy's
Committee meeting at the White House, there were a lot of
disagreements about the speech, it was clear to me that more
work needed to be done on it. I called Congresswoman Iliana
Rose-Light on and said, ``Look, I'm going to, on my own hook,
cancel this. We need more time,'' schedules were such that with
the August recess, we couldn't reschedule it until September,
and that's what was done.
Senator Obama. Okay. The reason I say this--let me try to
put in context some of the questioning that at least has been
coming from this other side of the aisle. My colleague from
Minnesota suggested this is a dispute about management style.
Let me reiterate, I don't think it's a dispute about management
style. What I think is of concern, is that--to the extent that
you have a strong set of opinions, I'd call it an ideology, but
I think that is, you know, sort of a loaded term--so let's say
you have a strong set of opinions about foeign policy. That
you've been on the lecture circuit delivering to the
International Community as well as to think tanks, etc. You're
not seeking a position of power in which every utterance you
make matters. To the extent that there is a pattern in which
you are pushing the envelope on your take on the world, and
seeking to have intelligence matters conform to your views,
then we agreed this morning that that is not good for America's
national security. There are two instances that we know of in
which, although you say that you did not want to have these
people fired, it seems to me that we're playing semantics here,
because you did suggest that they be redeployed. The proverbial
``station them in Antarctica.'' There are at least two
circumstances where there was a dispute, now you say that it
was about process, but what it appears from the record is that
they did not breach any process, they just did not do it
exactly the way you wanted, partly because--it seems as if--
there was a substantive disagreement, and you felt that they
were challenging your substantive assessments. You now have an
article here, where at least--again, I haven't interviewed
these people personally--but there is substantial evidence
indicating that perhaps you had a more aggressive view about
Syria's capabilities and that the CIA had to reign you in.
There are example with respect to Libya in which you make
statements saying that the reason that Libya gave up its WMD
program was because of the tough actions in Iraq, although
there were assessments that indicate that, in fact, diplomacy
served a critical function in that regard. Although you say you
don't do carrots, actually it turns out that there were some
carrots applied there that made a difference.
And so the concern, I think, that I have--I'm all for U.N.
reform, but I'm also making sure that we have sufficient
credibility in the world that when our troops are deployed
around the world that they've got support and that when we are
spending enormous sums to bring about some semblance of order
in disruptive areas of the world, that we've got other people
also willing to pick up some of the tab. And that, it strikes
me, would be an important function that you would play as this
permanent representative to the United Nations.
Now, I know that was a mouthful, and I apologize for that,
this is one of the problems with, you know, you're sitting here
for three hours you think of all kinds of things to say.
Mr. Bolton. I've thought of a few things myself.
Senator Obama. I'm sure you did. (Laughter.)
Senator Obama. That's what I figured. And I think you are
probably wise enough--out of all the things you were thinking
about ----
Mr. Bolton. They were much more learned than ----
Senator Obama. So, let me just go to this particular
point. Moving forward, with respect to assessments of threats
in Syria or North Korea, or Iran, we can't afford to cry wolf.
We've got to be able to--when we say that there's a threat--
people have to believe us. Am I wrong to think that this kind
of potential overstating after what happened in Iraq, after
Colin Powell's presentation before the United Nations, etc.,
may hamper our ability to protect our national security.
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think, Senator, the test is what
language is finally approved. In the case of the Syria speech,
it needed a lot of work, it wasn't ready. And the, one of the
consequences of the clearance process is to take drafts and
turn them into an acceptable final product. And as I say, I saw
that there was a lot of disagreement both in the classified and
the unclassified version, we had a small problem, and we were
proposing to tell the House International Relations Committee
intelligence that had not been briefed to the House
Intelligence Committee and the Senate Committee, that was a
problem, but the speech wasn't ready, and I put it off. And I
think that was the right thing to do, and I think that the
final product, the speech, the testimony, the unclassified
testimony and the classified testimony that I finally gave, was
broadly accepted. And that's part of, that's inherent in the
nature of government. And I think it's a--it can be
frustrating, to say the least--but it's a necessary process,
and I have submitted to it throughout my tenure in this job,
and I think ----
Senator Obama. Although, in at least two circumstances,
you were unhappy with it to the effect that you might have been
taking it out on somebody else.
Mr. Bolton. No.
Senator Obama. Let me just make this point, and you know,
I don't mean to cut you off here, I'm assuming I'm out of time
here, Mr. Chairman. Poor Mr. Chairman, he's nodding. But, at
minimum what happened in these circumstances was that you, a
powerful person in the Administration expressed sufficient
displeasure about lower ranking analysts that their superiors
felt that you were trying to get rid of them. Now, that may
have been unintended on your part, it may have been
miscommunication on your part, but we have testimony indicating
that at minimum, you sent a signal that was interpreted as,
these guys are out of bounds, and I'd like to see them removed.
That strikes me as contrary to the very statement that you just
made which is these clearance processes are necessary--
frustrating, but necessary--parts of the process. And the
reason that I think that this side of the aisle is belaboring
this point is that as we move forward with respect to Iran,
North Korea and other threats involving weapons of mass
destruction and terrorist activity, if we gild the lily and
overstate our case, that can--over the long term--undermine our
effectiveness and actually threaten troops overseas as well as
the safety of people here at home.
Mr. Bolton. I absolutely agree that we do not want to
overstate the case, and I want to say again, as strongly as I
know how, that the two cases we've been talking about were
cases of what I considered to be unprofessional behavior. There
are, as many on the panel would no doubt say, a lot of people
in the State Department who disagree with me on a lot of
issues. That's never been something that I have found
troubling, or been unwilling to discuss. But my approach to
business and professional matters is, I hope, imperfect, but I
hope is open and above-board. And that's the way I try and
treat people, and when that behavior is not reciprocated, I'm
troubled by it.
Senator Obama. Well, I appreciate your appearing before
this confirmation, I wish I had more time, as I'm sure all of
the other members do. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Obama. Let me
just make note, I've informed the distinguished ranking member
that Mr. Neil Silver will meet with staff the day after the
hearing, the court reporter, and another individual in question
will be available by phone immediately thereafter. I mention
that in response to requests and we will try to fulfill those
today.
Let me just indicate that, Senator Sarbanes, you have
seniority at this point, I will recognize you, unless you wish
to yield to Senator Nelson, but in any event, the two of you
will be recognized to complete this round.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bolton, a number of people have called for the
resignation of the Secretary General of the United Nations,
including--in fact--some members of the Congress. Do you have
an opinion on that question?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, that is not the position of the
Administration, as Secretary Rice and others have said, we have
been working with the Secretary General, I think in terms of
the allegations that have been out there on the Oil-for-Food
program, that we've said that we should wait for the final
report of the Volcker Commission and the outcome of the
Congressional investigations.
Senator Sarbanes. And is that your view as well?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, it is.
Senator Sarbanes. Was it your view before the
Administration took a position?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, it was.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, the U.N. was founded 60 years ago
this spring. What mistakes were made in the founding of the
U.N.--you've been a sharp critic of it--where did those who
founded it 60 years ago go wrong?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I have less to fault with the framers of
the U.N. charter than with the direction that--in many cases--
the Organization has taken since then. The effort, originally
understood by Roosevelt and Churchill and others, was to
recreate in the post-World War environment, the kind of United
Nations decision making that existed during World War II,
indeed the very name--United Nations--comes from the term
applied to the victorious powers in World War II. If you want
to call it a mistake--and I wouldn't call it a mistake--they
wrote the Charter, Chapter 7, in particular, the way they
thought best, it grid locked, within a matter of years,
afterwards, because of the Cold War. That's why, in years since
then, much of the Charter has been inoperative.
The question now, and this was addressed both by the high
level panel, and by the Secretary General, is whether and to
what extent as part of U.N. reform, U.N. Charter revision needs
to be a part of that process, and that is a, it's obviously
required if we're going to change the permanent membership of
the Security Council, there are other suggestions as well.
That's a pretty weighty undertaking if we decide to go ahead
with them.
Senator Sarbanes. Now some have said in response to
criticisms that have been made about the United Nations, that
if we didn't have a United Nations, we would have to invent
one. Suggesting that the world needs such an institution.
What's your view on that?
Mr. Bolton. I think that makes a lot of sense.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, in China, over the weekend, it's
reported that they're having significant demonstrations--in
fact, in some instances they've called them, I think, riots--
and one of the things they're demonstrating about, apparently,
is the proposal or the suggestions that are being made that
Japan should play a bigger role in the U.N. It after all is
playing quite an enhanced financial role in the U.N. What's
your view on that question?
Mr. Bolton. Well, the subject of changing the composition
of the permanent membership has been around in one form or
another for many years--it's been the subject of active
conversation for at least the past fifteen years, since Japan
made a very strong move in the early 1990's to get permanent
membership--now there are a number of other countries that have
sought to get permanent membership as well, and it's been a
politic very actively in New York and capitals around the
world. It's going to be politically, very difficult to make any
change in the composition of the permanent membership, and the
things that were going on in China over the weekend combine
them, I'd say, with some public statements made by senior
Chinese officials, certainly don't indicate a very positive
attitude towards Japan's aspirations for a permanent seat, and
I'd have to say, given our strong support for a Japanese
permanent seat that this is going to make a very complex
situation even more complex.
Senator Sarbanes. But, am I to understand that you have
enunciated the view on occasions that the only country that
ought to be a permanent member given the power realities of the
world, is the United States?
Mr. Bolton. I think what I was trying to say at that point
is that there are a lot of factors that are suggested for why
one country or another should be a permanent member of the
Council, and if you look at the--what I was saying was--if you
look solely at the issue of power in the world, in a cliche
probably everybody in this room has used of the U.S. being the
sole remaining super power, under that theory, that there would
be only one permanent member. Obviously, I understand that
there are five permanent members, and the question is, are we
going to leave it at those five, or are we going to change it?
I regard that as a serious question, the Administration is
taking very responsibly and seriously, I think, the obligation
of looking at that issue.
Senator Sarbanes. Does changing that encompass changing
the number downwards as well as upwards? Maybe even downwards
to one? The United States?
Mr. Bolton. No, it does not.
Senator Sarbanes. I'd like to pursue this international
law issue, and it's been touched on by others. In an article
for the Chicago Journal, International Law in 2000, you stated
that efforts to create an international system of laws and
codes of conduct are ``belittling our popular sovereignty and
constitutionalism and restricting both our domestic and our
international policy flexibility and power.''
Am I to read that to mean that you think the body of
international law that's been developed since World War II--
take for instance as it relates to human rights--has been a
mistake, and that moving down this path of making some
commitment to international law is the wrong path? Senator
Moynihan, I might note, was quite committed to the concept of
international law, and sought to develop it in many ways in
both his tenure at the United Nations and his service here in
the United States Senate.
Mr. Bolton. I believe that there's no question that the
United States should comply with its international obligations,
there is a centuries' old philosophical debate about the
meaning of law and whether municipal law and international law
are really, whether they really cover the same ground. The
issue--I think--turns principally on the notion of what
constitutes binding obligations for a country. I think
democratic theory and sound constitutional principles from our
perspective require that law that bind American citizens be
decided upon by our constitutional officials--the Congress, and
the President. Not derived by abstract discussions in academic
circles and international bodies.
Senator Sarbanes. But if we approve a treaty, doesn't that
represent a decision by the Congress under our constitutional
system?
Mr. Bolton. It does, and that is binding on the United
States, as I've written.
Senator Sarbanes. And do you think we should develop such
systems of treaties?
Mr. Bolton. I think that when they're in the national
interest of the United States that that can be an appropriate
way to proceed.
Senator Sarbanes. What constitutes the national interest
of the United States?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think that's one of the central issues
that we can debate. If you look at the ABM Treaty of 1972, for
example, that was a bilateral treaty, it ha been in force since
1972, many people believe that the treaty reflected an outdated
strategic relationship with the Soviet Union and then the
Russian Federation, and that it inhibited the ability of the
United States to defend itself. President Bush campaigned on
that as part of his platform in 2000, and many on the other
hand, opposed withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, their argument
was that if the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty that
the entire fabric of arms control treaties that existed would
collapse. The President did not agree with that, we were, we
tried to work with the Russians so that we could mutually move
beyond the ABM Treaty, but fundamentally we had concluded that
in order to develop a limited national missile defense system,
we had to become free of the constraints of the treaty. And
although we worked with the Russians to try to get them to
agree to mutually withdraw--when we were unable to do that, the
President exercised his authority under the ABM Treaty--and
gave notice of withdrawal.
I think the ABM Treaty was a treaty that did not serve the
national interests of the United States, and that's why the
President withdrew.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, do you generally hold the view
that since treaties might well constrain our freedom of action,
and since we're now clearly the single-most powerful country in
the world, that as a general proposition we should be very
skeptical about entering into treaties, because they
circumscribe, or limit, our freedom of action?
Mr. Bolton. I think you have to take each treaty on its
own basis, I don't have a theological view about it, I think
it's a practical question.
Sarbanes. And is the practical question that you're
answering the degree of constraint that it places upon the
United States?
Mr. Bolton. No, I think there are other factors that come
into play, for example, the Treat of Moscow, that President
Bush and President Putin signed in May of 2002 ratified
unanimously by the Senate provided for the reduction in
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds
over a ten year period. I think that was a treaty that was
clearly in the interest of the United States to sign.
Senator Sarbanes. What about a general view that a system
of treaties that constrains the ability of others to act would
be of benefit to the United States. That, while we might be
constrained in certain instances by treaty arrangements in
terms of having our power limited, there's a benefit that flows
to us by constructing such an international system because of
the constraints and restraints that it places upon others. And
it, therefore, contributes to making the international
environment a more ``rule of law'' environment. Is that
something to be sought after?
Mr. Bolton. I think that as an abstract proposition that
might be true, I think you'd have to look at the specifics of
the treaty to determine the specifics of whatever system or
treaty you might be talking about to know whether it applies in
fact.
Senator Sarbanes. I think one final question, I think you
said earlier in the testimony that your views and those of
Senator Moynihan's on the international criminal court, or the
ICC were similar?
Mr. Bolton. I had conversations with him before he died,
where I don't want to leave the impression that our views were
identical, but I know that he had read several articles that
I'd written and he shared many of the concerns I had written
about. He called me up to mention that.
Senator Sarbanes. He did send a letter, signed a letter,
along with a number of members, to President Clinton at the end
of 2000, urging the President to sign the treaty for the
International Criminal Court, and I think your view was that
the happiest day of your life was when the U.S. withdrew, is
that correct?
Mr. Bolton. Right, he called me after signing that letter,
it was literally, and it was literally within a few weeks
before he died.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I have no way to question that, do
I?
Mr. Bolton. Sadly.
Senator Sarbanes. I do have his letter which directly
contradicts that, but you would say that he had a, if not a
death bed conversion, a switch of position, is that right?
Mr. Bolton. I think what he had, what he had done was look
at some of the concerns and had, my recollection was that he
was preparing an article at the time, and had wanted to talk
about it, and had read one or more of my articles.
Senator Sarbanes. He also said that it was outrageous that
we hadn't paid our U.N. dues, calling us one of the world's
biggest deadbeats. But you disagreed with that position, I take
it.
Mr. Bolton. No, I testified earlier today, Senator, that
during the first Bush Administration, we followed a policy that
President Reagan had articulated at the end of his
Administration to repay the arrearage that had built up during
the 1980's, and in the late 1990's, I certainly supported the
Helms-Biden legislation that was intended to find a way through
the arrearage question.
The Chairman. That will need to all, I think we need to
conclude.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bolton, according to a Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Report on page 277, in reference to this big
dispute here that we've been talking about, the process and the
analyst and so forth, I want to get to the substance of this
whole dispute. And in that report, they refer to your speech,
this is the May '02 speech, the Heritage lectures, the Heritage
Foundation. The analyst told the Senate Intelligence Committee
staff that the text of your speech contained a sentence that
said, ``The U.S. believes that Cuba has a developmental
offensive biological warfare program, and is providing
assistance to other rogue state programs.'' The text also
called for international observers of Cuba's biological
facilities.
Do you believe that Cuba has, or had in 2002, offensive
biological weapons development program?
Mr. Bolton. What we believed at the time was the sentence
that actually appeared in the text of the Heritage statement,
which I would be happy to read, and in Assistant Secretary
Ford's testimony, and indeed, Assistant Secretary Ford said
later that he believed, in testimony before this Committee,
that the evidence for that proposition was substantial.
Senator Nelson. So did you believe that Cuba was providing
biological weapons assistance to rogue nations?
Mr. Bolton. I think there was intelligence that tended to
suggest that, but the point of giving this to the Intelligence
Community to clear was to make sure that the statement was
accurate. Because there was no point, from my perspective, in
saying something that was no accurate. So, changes were made,
I'm sure this drafting process went on for--at the staff
level--for a long time, and the language that was ultimately
cleared was the language that was used.
Senator Nelson. And, of course, that's the whole dispute
here, is whether or not there was pressure put on the analysts
from your initial view.
Mr. Bolton. No, it was not.
Senator Nelson. That was not your initial view.
Mr. Bolton. That was not the issue that turned on, that we
were discussing, which occurred back in February when I thought
the analyst had not been straightforward with me on a process
point.
Senator Nelson. Until the CIA gave their input into the
question of offensive biological weapons, did you believe that
there was an offensive biological weapons developmental program
in Cuba?
Mr. Bolton. I wasn't sure from the intelligence I read,
where different intelligence agencies had different views, what
the consensus of the Community would be. And that's not
unusual, and not only is it not unusual, I don't think it's a
bad thing. I think the Silberman-Robb Report makes it clear
that one of the problems we have with intelligence is with the
analytical process of intelligence is agencies not being
competitive enough in their viewpoints, and it's not something
that policy makers get involved in, and I didn't get involved
in this. We kept, we gave, the staff-level people were putting
language forward, other people were giving alternative
formulations, and it was being worked out. It was not me
staking out a position, it was speech writers trying to write a
speech.
Senator Nelson. Well, we're going to have a chance to
cross-examine that fellow tomorrow, and one of the questions
that we're going to ask him is, what was the text that was
submitted? And, according to this Senate Select Committee
Intelligence Report, on page 277, it was as I just stated.
Mr. Bolton. I think there were many drafts of it, Senator,
and you know, that's the nature of speech drafting in the
government. I think what a public official is responsible for,
is what he actually testifies.
Senator Nelson. Well, what ultimately came out that was
scrubbed, was softened. ``The United States believes that Cuba
has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research
and development effort,'' ``Cuba has provided dual-use
biotechnology to other rogue states. We are concerned that such
technology could support BW programs in those states.'' Is this
an issue that we should be concerned about, in your opinion?
Mr. Bolton. About the Cuban BW effort as described there?
Yes, I did think it was something that we should be concerned
about. And that was the best judgment that the Intelligence
Community had as of that time.
Senator Nelson. Well, then what is the U.S. government
doing about it?
Mr. Bolton. Part of the problem at that time that the U.S.
government was involved in, was it was still dealing with the
question of what the Cuba spy, Ana Belan Montes, had done to
undercut our efforts to understand better what the Cubans were
up to. And my point in raising this was--as I said--in the wake
of September the 11th, I felt that it was responsible to have a
discussion about BW/CW and nuclear threats that we faced,
because part of what was important here was building public
understanding, but our efforts, what we said was that we called
on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue
states, and to fully comply with all of its obligations under
the biological weapons convention.
Senator Nelson. Have we called for international weapons
inspectors?
Mr. Bolton. We have not, no. Not in Cuba under the, the
BWC doesn't provide for that.
Senator Nelson. Well, have you had consideration of taking
the issue to the Security Council to seek sanctions?
Mr. Bolton. No, that was never discussed. The issue of
what Cuba was doing here, was not the same as saying that we
could say with any degree of conclusiveness that Cuba had
biological weapons, which some press reports said I said, but
which I didn't, or anything that would give us a basis to go to
the Security Council.
Senator Nelson. Have we intercepted, or disrupted any
transfers of the dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states
from Cuba?
Mr. Bolton. I'm not aware that we have.
Senator Nelson. Have we, as a policy of the
Administration, have we urged our allies to use their influence
to get Cuba to give up this biological weapons capability?
Mr. Bolton. I know we have discussed it with them, and
it's a subject that when we have consultations on proliferation
matters, comes up in the conversations, yes.
Senator Nelson. Well, in what way, since you raised this
issue nearly three years ago, this very important issue, in
what way has it become a priority since it was raised by you in
this speech to the Heritage Foundation.
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think we've done we felt was within
the limits of our ability to do. And there are some things that
there are a lot of assessments of countries that have
clandestine chemical and biological weapons programs or efforts
underway that there's not a lot we can do about it, because
they are, for biological warfare in particular, these are all
inherently dual-use operations. So that operationally, there
isn't much we can do.
But I think what we have tried to do, and this goes back to
the point I made earlier about the Biological Weapons
Convention Review Conference in November/December 2001, where
one of the things we wanted to do is to highlight the problem
of noncompliance with the BWC. That there were a number of
states that were parties to it, that participated in all of the
conferences, and that we very strongly felt were violating the
treaty. So that part of what we were trying to do is build
international diplomatic pressure on those countries to comply
with the obligations under the convention that they had
undertaken.
Senator Nelson. In the process do you realize you shook up
a bunch of my constituents? We're only 90 miles from Cuba.
Mr. Bolton. Yes, and I had conversations with Congressman
Lincoln Biaz Bilart, and Congresswoman Iliana Rose-Light on who
both thanked me for raising the issue, which was something they
had been concerned about previously, indeed.
Senator Nelson. And you say there is very little we can do
about it, which is what you just said. That's a scary
admission.
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think there have also been continuing
evaluations of the program and what the evidence is. Part of
the concern is that Cuba has a very sophisticated biotech and
pharmaceutical industry, and given what I said before about the
inherently dual-use nature of biological warfare, that is a
problem that's endemic in a country that has that kind of
capability.
Senator Nelson. I think, Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by
saying that when there is the tendency to step over the line
with an inflammatory statement, it's troubling to overstate a
threat. And, in my experience here in the Senate, that's one of
the examples of what got us into trouble in Iraq, by a threat
being overstated. Mr. Chairman, I'll conclude.
I'm curious, has Secretary Powell and Secretary Armitage,
have they endorsed you?
Mr. Bolton. I haven't asked them to endorse me. Secretary
Powell sent me a congratulatory e-mail, ``On to the Waldorf,''
it said.
Senator Nelson. So, that sounds like an endorsement.
Mr. Bolton. Well, I wrote him back and said, ``Thanks very
much.''
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Nelson.
Let me just indicate that we've completed the second round,
we're about to commence the third round, but before we do so,
I'd like to recognize the fact that we've been joined by the
distinguished Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, John
Warner, who will give a brief greeting to our nominee.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It had been my intention to introduce our distinguished
nominee last week, but of course, the need to reschedule today,
and I had long-term plans to travel in my state, so I
apologize, but the Chairman very thoughtfully put my statement
into the record.
I've had a great and long interest in the United Nations. I
think I'm the only serving member of the Senate now that served
in Korea under the United Nations flag in the winter of 1951-
1952 in the Marines. And that was my introduction, and I'm very
proud of my association, although modest it may have been, with
the U.N. at that time. And in the ensuing years, I've had many
opportunities to visit, I remember very well, Mr. Chairman,
going up with Senator Helms. He asked me to accompany him when
he went up to establish a truce of some sort, and get the dues
in order.
But, anyway, I feel it's an organization that has played
very important roles in the history of our nation with a half
century that I've known it, and that it can become--and I hope
will become--a much stronger organization, because there are
many purposes that it, and it alone, can serve, in the cause of
human freedom, and mankind, and human rights. So, as I said in
my statement, I wish you the best, and you have my support,
strong support, in your confirmation process.
I thank the Chair.
The Chairman. Well, we thank the Chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, it's a privilege for Senator Biden and for
me to work with you and Senator Levin. We have many common
interests and important goals to work on together. Thank you
for coming.
Senator Warner. I might note that in that winter, I think
the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, his father was
there. We often, reminisced many times, he also was in the
Marines.
The Chairman. Let me just suggest that this course of
action, we're going to have two roll call votes of the Senate
the first commencing at 5:30, as it's the Chair's estimate that
that is likely to take about a half an hour, and that another
vote will be occurring at about 6:00 p.m. Therefore, I would
suggest that we would go until 5:30, recommence the round if we
have not completed it, at 6:15.
Now, in the event that you, Secretary Bolton, would like a
short recess before then, fair enough. Otherwise we will
proceed until 5:30. And you will know at that point that there
is forty-five minutes of surcease.
Mr. Bolton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Let me just say that in this round I will
not ask questions and I will yield to my colleague, Senator
Chafee for the first Republican questions.
Senator Chafee. I'll pass, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. He passes, I'll yield then to Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Again, we've been focusing a lot on, and it's confusing, at
least I think it's confusing, I was going to say ``who struck
John?'' but that's a inappropriate phrase, who said what to
whom, when and how and whether you used undue or inappropriate
pressure on people just doing their job, and again, just to re-
recap here, what anybody has in their minds, at least speaking
for myself, is the debate over aluminum tubes, and whether they
were for gas centrifuge systems, and the assertions by the Vice
President that there had been a reconstitution of a nuclear
program in Iraq, and so on and so forth, and it turns out at
the end of the day, the Intelligence Community was far from
unified in any of that.
And so that's the context in which there's a lot of concern
here. And also that you are a very bright, straight-forward and
have very clear views about what you think about most of the
rest of the world, and have never been reluctant to state it,
nor should you be.
For whatever the reasons that you sought the change in
assignment, not to penalize, just to get both Mr. Westermann
and Mr. Smith off your watch, for whatever the reasons, the
facts are that their superiors, in every case, in the case of
Mr. Westermann going all the way up to the Secretary of State,
said ``No, we think you're doing a find job, we're keeping him
right where he is.'' Mr. Westermann's immediate boss, Mr.
Westermann's working with the man that I'm told is going to
testify tomorrow, I'm told he took it from there up to the
Deputy Secretary of State, that was taken to the Secretary of
State, they all said, ``Nope, he didn't do anything wrong, he
did his job, and he's doing his job in an excellent manner.''
And so, for whatever your motive, whether it was loss of faith,
or whatever, the conclusion of your superiors was, he should
stay right where he was, is that correct?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I'm not aware of all of the background,
I made my point about him, and I didn't press it. There were a
couple of conversations, I wrote no memos on the subject--if I
had been determined to get something done, I think I probably
knew how to do it--but I wasn't, I made my point, I had lost
trust and confidence in the fellow, and there it was.
Senator Biden. And you made that known, though, right? You
made it known to him, did you make it known--you made it known
to Mr.--the guy testifying tomorrow--Ford, Mr. Ford's
assistant, you made it known to them and they concluded, for
whatever else they wrote to you, he stayed right in place.
Right?
Mr. Bolton. I felt from what Mr. Fingar had written to me
that Mr. Westermann's behavior was entirely inappropriate, that
we screwed up, that it won't happen again, I had made my point.
Senator Biden. I got that, but he stayed right where he
was, right? You made your point, but he didn't move, right?
Mr. Bolton. That's correct, and that's fine.
Senator Biden. And, so one of the things that seems, maybe
I'm--it's been so long since I've done this, but--it seems to
me this is all about, it comes down to me whether or not your
motive was that you lost confidence because they went around
your back, or your motive in wanting them move was because they
disagreed with you on substance. You say you lost confidence
because, paraphrasing, they went behind your back, it had
nothing to do with the substantive differences that may have
existed relating to intelligence analysis in Cuba, and to me, a
lot rests in that question. So that I make sure I understand
this, I'm going to try to recount, and you interrupt me if I
say anything that you think is inaccurate.
Mr. Bolton. I dare not interrupt.
Senator Biden. No, no. For real, because this is getting
late in the day, and we're not nearly as tired as you because
you've had to go nonstop, we just go everything thirty minutes
or so, but everybody has said that old joke, ``My job is to
speak and yours is to listen, if you finish your job before I
finish mine, raise your hand, we all go home.''
Mr. Bolton. Why don't you go ahead and give your side of
it, and I'll take notes, that's the easiest thing.
Senator Biden. Let me tell you what I think has happened
here, factually. For whatever reason, somewhere around February
11th, your Chief of Staff contacts the INR guy, who happens to
be Mr. Westermann, and says, ``Can you clear these several
sentences?'' I'm assuming that the reason you wanted them
cleared is because they were part of, considered to be put in a
speech or some public statement you were going to make,
otherwise, I assume there would be no need to have them
cleared, if you weren't going to say anything outside the
building.
Then there is this back and forth, whether or not Mr.
Westermann when he did what is his job, passed those comments
on to, from INR to the CIA or the Director of Intelligence, and
an office within that building, that he--instead of waiting to
be asked for them, what do you think?--he attached his
comments, saying that he didn't think the way you were seeking
the three sentences he got should not be used. As a matter of
fact, I'm told that even before he did that, he sent approved
language to your Chief of Staff, even before he sent anything
off to the Central Intelligence Organization, for those average
Americans listening.
But your Chief of Staff said, ``No, send it on, we need an
answer, and we need it quickly, as to whether or not we can use
it as we have characterized, as we, the way we have written
this.'' And there's the back and forth, and the back comes
language that is referenced in the Intelligence Committee
Report, that's different than the language that you initially
wanted to use, but that you subsequently used. As a matter of
fact, Mr. Ford, in March, coming up to testify before a
committee in this Senate, he used the exact language, even
before you did, that had been approved, these three sentences.
Now, then along comes the speech that you make at the
Heritage Foundation on May the 6th. That speech includes those
three sentences, as approved, but a lot more. A lot more about
other countries than Cuba, and more about Cuba, including
whether or not we should be looking at how accurate the
intelligence assessments were, based on the fact that we found
a Cuban spy. You referenced this spy, it had been uncovered, in
your Heritage Foundation speech, among other things relating to
Cuba that were not the three sentences that had been approved.
So now, we now find ourselves in the position where, after
you make that speech, in preparation for testimony, before
Senator Dodd's subcommittee, Mr. Smith doesn't give testimony,
but is debriefed in a closed hearing about the Cuba speech. And
he says, not in a public hearing, but to the staff of Mr. Dodd,
or whoever the subcommittee chair was that Mr. Helms' staff.
Pardon me? You were chair, but Mr. Helms' staff also was heard,
what Mr. Smith had to say. What Mr. Smith said was, in addition
to the three lines that have been, that we've discussed so much
here, and that the Chairman doesn't want read again, I don't
blame him, there are other things in the Bolton Heritage
Foundation speech that had been given roughly a month later, or
earlier, that were not cleared.
Then, the next day you were going to come and testify, and
the testimony you were going to give, it is asserted, before
the subcommittee of Mr. Dodd, was also not cleared. But you
never gave it because the Secretary of State said you're not
available to testify.
In this same time frame, between the time you gave the
speech on May the 6th at the Heritage Foundation, and the time
that Mr. Smith talked with Mr. Dodd's subcommittee, an
interesting thing happened. The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the CIA, sends out an internal assessment
that goes to policy makers and other intelligence people,
reaffirming their conclusions about Cuba's BWI and chemical
weapons efforts. Which is at odds with parts of the speech that
you made to the Heritage Foundation on May 6th.
I am told that one of Senator Helms' staff picked up the
phone after the meeting with Senator Dodd's subcommittee, and
says, ``Mr. Smith is saying Mr. Bolton's speech to the Heritage
Foundation was never cleared.'' So two things, maybe related or
unrelated, happen in the same time frame, that come to your
attention. One, all of the policy makers related to Cuba and
all of the Intelligence Agency gets a reaffirmation of the
judgments made about Cuba's chemical and biological weapons
program, that you are implicitly criticizing in your speech on
May the 6th, and Mr. Smith says your speech on May the 6th
never was cleared.
The next thing we're aware of that happens, is you make a
courtesy call to the CIA, and you speak with Mr. Cohen. And you
say it was just a courtesy call, and in the process, in the
midst of that courtesy call, Mr. Cohen says, basically,
``Anything else on your mind?'' And you say, ``Yeah, Reich is
right, this guy Smith should not be doing this job,'' or
something to that effect.
And so, it seems to me that you had a substantive motive
for both dealing with Mr. Westermann and Mr. Smith as you did.
Because it was a little embarrassing, wasn't it? That the CIA
after your Heritage Foundation speech reasserts to the whole
community and the policy makers, ``Hey, we stand by what we've
been saying, and this is what we've been saying.'' They never
reference your speech on May the 6, but it's sort of the
spontaneity of this reaffirmation coming up is--in my thirty-
two years here, and being on the Intelligence Committee for ten
of them, is not something they often reaffirm, unless there's
other incidences that occur that put in question their
assessment. And then you have Mr. Cohen saying he had no doubt
that one of the reasons you were seeing him was to deal with
Mr. Smith, and so it seems to me that you had a, I'm not
suggesting an immoral or illegal, but you had a motive in that
you had both Mr. Westermann and Mr. Smith taking issue with not
only the language you had, and you used, but the veracity of
it, the implication that would be drawn by a reasonable person
from it. Such as, the Undersecretary's speech contained a
sentence which said the U.S. believes Cuba has developmental
offensive biological programs, and is providing assistance to
rogue state programs. That's substantively different than,
``we're concerned that such technology, dual technology could
support BW programs in those states.''
And in addition to that you have, I can understand why you
might be upset with Mr. Smith, because he says to Mr. Dodd's
committee, ``Hey, Bolton's speech was never cleared.'' And your
explanation is two-fold. One, it wasn't about policy, it was
about the method they used to express their disagreement with
me, or the language or the speech or what I was intending to
say or do; and secondly, the part that's confusing me the most,
John, as experienced a bureaucrat, using your own language, you
said, ``If you wanted to deal with him, you knew had to do it,
you never wrote a memorandum, but if you wanted to, you
would,'' but you seem to be devoid of any knowledge of how
these kinds of speeches were cleared in the past for your
predecessor, for your successor, for whoever that will be, for
everybody. And you said, ``Well, I just didn't know and I was
going out to find out from the new guy on the block at the CIA
to find out how this process worked.''
To be blunt with you, I find it, it takes a leap of
imagination for me to believe you didn't know how it worked, b)
that this was strictly a procedural disagreement you had with
these men, and toward that end, and in the interest of time, if
you'd let me, if my colleagues would yield me a little bit of
time, and their time so we won't take anybody else's--I don't
understand. I have a few just, basic questions, about when in
fact, you knew what, and who you asked. You know, did you
summon the guy heading up INR into your office to tell him how
dissatisfied you were? Did you tell him that he didn't go
through the right channels? Did you ask for him to be removed
from your portfolio? Did you talk with Otto Reich before you
went to see Cohen on your drive home for the casual visits. I
mean, what are--explain to me why my reading of your motive is
not accurate?
The Chairman. Please respond, and then we will proceed to
Senator Coleman.
Mr. Bolton. I think I've answered, essentially, all of
those questions before, and I don't have a better way to answer
than I answered before so I would, as Cap Weinberger used to
say, ``If I said any more I'd simply be repeating myself,''
I'll just incorporate my previous answers into this answer.
There is one new question that, or two new points I think
you've raised. First, who cleared the speech? And let me say,
it's unequivocal, and you have it in the documents that were
produced, INR cleared the speech. INR cleared the speech, and
the CIA cleared the speech. Now, who else in the Intelligence
Community cleared it, didn't clear it, should have cleared it,
I don't know. That's why we leave it to the Intelligence
Community. You know, much of your commentary has been
unwarranted or impermissible policy making influence on the
Intelligence Community. Okay?
Senator Biden. It sure seems that way.
Mr. Bolton. So, what we did was, this speech, other
speeches that contain intelligence-related information, you
give it to them, and it's up to them to decide who to clear.
But it came back, and it's not disputed. INR cleared the
speech, and CIA cleared the speech.
The other new point that you raised was did I talk to Otto
Reich before I saw Mr. Cohen, and the answer to that is yes, I
did. He--I think I mentioned this earlier--but Assistant
Secretary Reich was responsible for all Western Hemisphere
policy matters, and he was very concerned about Mr. Smith. And
he had heard about this question of the speech and came and
talked to me about it, and he said he was going to go out and
speak to the pertinent people out in the Intelligence
Community, and he was going to let me know that, because he had
known I had this problem. And I think it's fair to say that he
felt pretty strongly about it.
Senator Biden. If you said, ``Leave it up to the
Intelligence Community to determine it,'' why'd you get so mad
at Westermann, then? Every single person in the Intelligence
Community agreed with his assessment.
Mr. Bolton. I don't actually know whether that's accurate,
or not accurate, what I was objecting to was that ----
Senator Biden. Why don't you know that, John? How could
you not know that?
Mr. Bolton. He went behind my back, he sent out an ----
Senator Biden. How could you not know that?
Mr. Bolton. He sent, this was the day it happened, he
sent out a document that says, ``INR does not concur with the
language,'' and I said to myself, ``How does that happen?''
That's why I called Carl Ford, and with Carl out of the office,
and I don't know why, I then asked for the next highest ranking
person, who was Mr. Fingar, and I said, ``Could you check into
this?'' And he did, and he said, ``Westermann's behavior was
entirely inappropriate, we screwed up,'' and he said twice,
``it won't happen again.''
Senator Biden. And that was the end of it for you?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think, the conversation I had with
Carl Ford, I think he came back into the office from wherever
he was, and we talked about this, and I repeated, essentially,
what I had said to Fingar.
Senator Biden. Did you mention it with Carl Ford, or did
he come to see, to talk to you about it?
Mr. Bolton. I don't honestly remember, it may have been on
the margins of one of the Secretary's 8:30 staff meetings, he
may have been in my office after the meeting, I don't remember.
Senator Biden. Well, just let the record show that every
other member of the Intelligence Community that reviewed the
three sentences you want, concurred with INR, to the best of my
knowledge, in the assessment that Mr. Westermann gave
contemporaneously with sending on those comments.
Mr. Bolton. Here's the bottom line--I gave the language
that was cleared by the Intelligence Community, I did not give
other language.
Senator Biden. Bottom line is, did you try to get someone
moved, that's the bottom line for me.
The Chairman. Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me actually
focus on a conversation responding to some concerns from my
colleague from Illinois, and I do want to make it clear that I
also believe putting together effective coalitions is in our
interest, it absolutely is. My concern is that the ability of
the U.N. to do that, the ability of the U.N. to do a
peacekeeping effort, to do a sanctions effort, has certainly
been undermined by some of the circumstances and the situations
that we've seen--be it in the Congo with sexual abuse or be it
Oil-for-Food--so that clearly, it is in our interest to put
together coalitions. We must have a United Nations that has
credibility. But one of the questions that was raised was
concerns about false concreteness, when we say the U.N. is
responsible, that in fact the responsibility goes to member
states. And clearly, in looking at Oil-for-Food, for example,
there's no doubt that member states made decisions--both in
setting up a program and allowing things to happen, in blocking
the effort to, at times, to contain the Oil-for-Food program as
it was expanded, there were concerns that the United States and
Britain had during that process--but I want to, my concern is I
have these discussions, often times it seems to me the people
pointing fingers at these abstract, these ``member states,''
without absolutely there being some real responsibility for
individuals who are making actions. There is a U.N.
bureaucracy, there is the Secretariat, they got $1.4 billion of
Oil-for-Food money to oversee the Oil-for-Food program. And as
you've noted in the past, one of the problems when you have a
bureaucracy, they're not beholden to any democratic state,
they're not beholden to any government. Benon Sevan who was
overseeing the program, and who, in the Volcker Report, it's
clear that he received what I would call bribes from Saddam, he
lied to the investigators about the source of the money that he
received--he lied about that, there's no question about that--
you have Saddam's Chief of Staff who shredded documents, you
have Louise Frechette who, at one point in time when the IOS
wanted to submit audits to member states, in fact, the IOS was
stopped from doing that. So, I would hope it is your sense that
there is some accountability for individuals in the
organization, that it's not simply a responsibility for member
states, and we somehow hold blameless those folks who are
involved in overseeing, failing to manage fraud, abuse and
mismanagement, who were involved, perhaps, in corruption
themselves. When, in the instance of the Secretary General in
the Volcker report didn't ``fully investigate'' conflicts of
interests between the company Cotecna, and his son. Could you
clarify that a little bit for me?
Mr. Bolton. I think there clearly are joint
responsibilities here. The reason you have a Secretariat is to
carry out the programs that the member states order. And, in
fact, it is the responsibility in the first instance--the
responsibility of the Security Council to set these programs,
the Security Council or General Assembly--to set these programs
up, and the Secretariat, then, to manage them. And, I think
it's important when you talk about the Secretary General,
Article 97 of the U.N. Charter says, referring to the Secretary
General, ``He shall be the chief administrative officer of the
organization.'' And I think what that shows is that the Charter
intends that the Secretary General basically be a manager of
programs, in this case reporting to the Security Council. So,
the member states, obviously, can't be overseeing every single
detail. What you need is political accountability from the
member states, to the extent you can get it, and management
accountability from the Secretariat, and what the Volcker
Commission and others' investigations have shown is, I think,
that there are some problems here that have been uncovered that
clearly need to be pursued.
Senator Coleman. And my concern as a former mayor who has
worked with a bureaucracy and knows how hard it is to make
change. As I look at the United Nations, and I look at 191
members, and the challenge, the great challenge of reform.
Again, at both levels that we've talked about, one is certainly
on the political structure, the nature of a Security Council,
who serves on it--India, Brazil, Japan, do these have roles in
the Security Council, the Human Rights Commission--but then
also the organization itself, the bureaucracy, the auditing
functions. And, clearly what we've seen in Oil-for-Food, simply
being the one instance--but I presume many, many more if you
look at the IOS audits--of lack of controls, of standards, of
evaluations, of a whole range of basic management tools, an
organization that we're putting in close to 25 percent of its
operating budget. And I would hope as Ambassador that you would
be as vigorous in focusing in on that bureaucracy, who, I
think, deserves to have a system in which there is
accountability and responsibility. And my fear was, as we
talked about this kind of, this concept of false concreteness,
and as we say, U.N. is responsible, that somehow, we end up
holding no one responsible. And, in this instance, that's been
my concern with the Secretary General. That ultimately the buck
has to stop somewhere--and if it's your Chief of Staff who's
shredding documents, if the person you appointed to oversee the
program is on the take, if you've been out there advocating
expansion of the program when Saddam was raking in billions
from it for himself--that in the end if there isn't anybody
that we hold responsible, then in the end we have this great
diplomatic discussion and it doesn't serve the interest of
reform, and credibility and accountability.
Mr. Bolton. My notion of false concreteness is the notion
that the U.N. has some political decision making authority,
independent of member governments, which I think is completely
incorrect, but there's no false concreteness in looking at the
Secretariat, they're the people who are carrying out the
responsibilities; they are the people that have to be at the
high management standards that I think are important to give
the U.N. credibility in this country. As you say, to justify
the appropriations Congress is annually called upon to make.
Senator Coleman. Just one last comment--I believe that the
budget for the IOS is about 24 million, and I'm told that the
budget for the Communications Office in the U.N. is about 160
million. I would hope that you take a look at that and see if
we can somehow refocus priorities.
Mr. Bolton. That's a good point.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. I thank the Senator also
for his vigilance in hearings on Oil-for-Food, he has been
vigorous in pursuing all aspects of that, as is evidenced by
his questions. And, in the event you are confirmed, Secretary
Bolton, hopefully you will work closely with the Senator's
subcommittee.
Mr. Bolton. I will, indeed.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd?
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bolton, I
appreciate your perseverence here, it's been a long day, and
I'm sorry about going so long, but it's important to try to
move this along, I appreciate the Chairman sticking with this.
We've been over and over this, let me just tell you my
concern again with the motive behind all of this. While others
maybe think this is tangential, this question, I think it is so
critically important because of my fear and worry that others
will see this as an improper message about whether or not you
can do this. As I see it--and we're going to hear from, I
guess, one of these, maybe more, depending upon, Mr. Chairman,
our success in getting a couple of these people before us ----
The Chairman. They're going to be here at 5:30.
Senator Dodd. I mean other witnesses tomorrow.
The Chairman. We have only Carl Ford.
Senator Dodd. His, if you're looking at this, Mr. Bolton,
and again--can I see the response to Senator Biden's question
this morning?--Senator Biden, at the very outset of this
hearing--after Senator Lugar asked questions--when asked the
question about whether or not, your recollection if you had
ever sought to remove any intelligence analyst as a result of a
difference of opinion, whether it was over substance or
process. At least initially, your response was you may have,
you couldn't really remember, but you were, as clear as you've
become during the day long hearing here. Here's what I'm sort
of confronted with as I look at this--and again, we're trying
to decide--I've got Mr. Westermann and Mr. Smith. I don't know
what their views are, Mr. Westermann serves 23 years in the
Navy, by every account, highly qualified guy, I can't tell what
his politics are or anything else, he's a defense intelligence
analyst. Mr. Smith, I gather again, is a person highly
regarded, a specialist on Latin American affairs at the
Agency--let me just jump back, Mr. Chairman, here's the point--
Senator Biden asked the question, and Mr. Bolton's answer at
that time was, ``I may have mentioned it to a couple of people,
shrugged my shoulders and moved on.'' I mean, that's, whether
or not you'd asked them to be removed from office, from their
positions. Your Chief of Staff, Mr. Fleitz, Mr. Fingar--who's
presently the head of INR--Mr. Cohen, who's on the National
Intelligence Council, Mr. Ford, a former head of the INR, Mr.
Silver we haven't heard from yet, I'm not sure what he's going
to say--but here are people who agree with you, substantively,
on issues, to the best of my knowledge, don't embrace any
ideological difference of opinion--I'm hard-pressed to
determine what motivation they would have for stating, as they
have, that in their view, their impression was, that you wanted
them removed. This isn't one person, this is five, six, seven
people who we've talked to in the last several days, who said
their impressions were that you, and the actions you took, were
designed to change their portfolio, move them on, get them out
of the positions they were in. So, I'm hard-pressed, as some
would be, when you're talking and you ask yourself, ``What's
behind this? Why would they do this?'' Who's this Mr.
Westermann, that he would have an ax to grind with John Bolton?
Who's this--why would your Chief of Staff, as he recounts what
occurs here, why would he say that? Why would Mr. Ford--years
of experience at the Central Intelligence Agency, or Mr.
Fingar--why would they say these things? Why would Mr. Cohen
say that when you come up, you have a nice, amicable
conversation, you stopped off at the CIA when you got there,
and when you were there, this was the thing you suggested, that
you remove this guy, Mr. Smith. I'm just hard-pressed to
understand what motivations these five, six, seven people would
have to draw those conclusions. If it was one of them, or two
of them, I would say, ``He said/she said,'' I think we can
solve that. But, I've got on the one hand, five or six or seven
people, with credible backgrounds, long experience in this
area, professional individuals, who have no ax to grind with
John Bolton, who--when asked these questions, not even under
oath--offer this to our joint staff who interviewed them in the
last few days. I'm sitting here trying to draw a conclusion.
What is a person do when you're confronted with that now? If
you don't think this is an important issue, then you don't
care, and whether or not you put pressure or you suggest that
whether or not you agree with that conclusion or not, I want to
make that point. I'm not really as concerned about whether or
not what they were writing or not writing was right or wrong--
that is important and I don't disregard it--but the more
important question to me is what happens to someone--that I
think you ought to encourage dissent; I think there are people
who disagree with policy centers and I heard you say this, and
I agree with you--there ought to be that debating side, so you
get it right. So, no one's arguing about debate and dissent.
The question is, what happens to you if you dissent? And if
what happens to you when you dissent is that your job is on the
line, then we need to put a stop to that. And I think you'll
agree with that. And the question is, what I have here, what
conclusion is one to draw when you have five, six, seven people
who have no ax to grind, to take a view that, in fact you did
try to have these people removed, and you tell me you didn't.
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think that the--your characterization
of Mr. Fleitz's testimony is not accurate--but, let me try
again to say what I felt. That, in the case of Mr. Westermann--
as I believe I said to him at the time--I don't care if you
disagree with me, I just don't think you should do it behind my
back. And, when there's a loss of trust and confidence in
somebody in that kind of position, I just think it's better for
everybody to reshuffle the deck. INR's a large bureau, the
State Department is a large place, it's not a question of
putting somebody out on the street, there's no question of that
involved here, at all. And, in the case of ----
Senator Dodd. Let me just say on Mr. Fleitz, let me quote
him, Mr. Fleitz's interview, page 50, lines ten and thirteen of
the interview with Mr. Fleitz, and I'll just read these to you:
``Mr. Fleitz:'' and I'm quoting, ``All I can remember--and this
is from Mr. Bolton--is that he spoke to Mr. Fingar to express
his concern over what had happened, and said that Mr.
Westermann had lost his confidence, and should be given a new
portfolio.'' Mr. Fleitz goes on, ``While Silver was there,
Bolton relayed the fact that he had lost confidence in Mr.
Westermann, and asked that he be given a different portfolio.''
Fleitz interview, page 48, lines 20 to 23. You know, get a new
portfolio--we've all pretty much decided--is a euphemism for
moving on, the guy only had one portfolio. So, here's a guy who
says something you disagree with--and you're saying it's
process, I understand that--but even if it's process, say you
lost some confidence in him, you don't try to fire a person
over that.
Mr. Bolton. I didn't try to fire him. I just felt that if
he wasn't being straight in his dealings with me that he ought
to have other responsibilities, and I've said that repeatedly,
and I think that's what Mr. Fleitz is saying, don't you?
Senator Dodd. All right, well, I thank you. Let me just,
one or two other little questions, and I'll be done, Mr.
Chairman.
Let me just ask you here, and I word this question--I want
to read the question because I want to make sure I don't
overstep a line here--and the question very simply, Mr. Bolton,
and I want you to listen to the question carefully, you'll
appreciate why I say that when I read the question. I want to
know whether or not you requested to see NSA information about
any other American officials.
Mr. Bolton. The answer to that is 'yes', on a number of
occasions I can think of. The way--I'm not even sure I should
say this in open forum, but I'll try and do it--the Privacy Act
precludes naming names of Americans, even in the intercepts we
get. Now, a lot of things that--people use titles and so on--
but there are occasions when an intercept comes in on
something--it might involve a member of another nationality
that also gets these intercepts, I might say--where it's
important to find out who it is who's saying what to whom. And
from time to time--on a couple of occasions maybe a few more--
I've asked to know the name of the person so I can better
understand the intercept.
Senator Dodd. And that was the only motivation for that?
Mr. Bolton. Exactly.
Senator Dodd. I'll leave that one be. We may want--I don't
know if we want to have a private session to maybe delve into
that a little bit more, but I'll leave that, if we ever get to
that point.
And last, Mr. Chairman, I note--and again, I, it's sort of
a unique, it's fairly unique, I'm trying to recall, I was
asking staff if they could recall other such occasions--when
all of us, I think, on this Committee received a letter dated
March 29th, to each of us here, regarding this nomination of
Mr. Bolton to the Ambassadorship of the United Nations. It goes
on--about a page and a half, almost two pages--and it's signed
by 62 former ambassadors, serving in Johnson, Nixon, Ford,
Clinton, Reagan, Bush administrations, Eisenhower in some
cases, going back--opposed to this nomination. Now, there may
be other circumstances that's occurred, but it's fairly unique,
in my regard, to have that many ambassadors, in that many
different administrations--and I'd ask unanimous consent that
this letter be included in the record.
I full well know there were former Secretaries of State who
have written in supporting this nomination, and if it hasn't
been, I would ask unanimous consent that that letter be
included.
The Chairman. Both letters will be in the record.
Senator Dodd. As I say, my staff can correct this, but I
found this to be rather significant, that many people who have
served as an ambassadorial rank would have such reservations
about the nomination.
And lastly, let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for
giving us the opportunity to spend a little time on this thing,
and if I'm wrong in raising these questions, then I will stand
to be corrected, but I think, Mr. Bolton said earlier in
response to Senator Obama, the question about the importance of
this question. And while others may not think it is that
important, I think you do--even though we disagree over what
happened here--I was impressed over the fact in response to
Barack Obama that it would pose a serious problem if, in fact--
there were a conflict here--and someone's job were put on the
line because there was a disagreement over policy. Or over
intelligence information. And, to that extent, I appreciate
your willingness to say that, because I think it's important,
too. And particularly, we've got younger people coming along,
people in the intelligence analyst community, and it's
important that they know that when they disagree, it's
important they speak up. And they need to know that when they
speak up, under proper circumstances, they should not have to
worry about their job being on the line. And people who--if
they, in fact, do propose threats--these people, in my view,
should not be rewarded with high positions in office. So, I'll
end on that particular note, Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
Mr. Chairman. I thank the Senator.
Let me just comment that we're coming up to the vote, at
5:30. If both Senators can restrict themselves to ten minutes,
the Chair will 