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109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     109-721

======================================================================



 
 HENRY J. HYDE UNITED STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION 
                              ACT OF 2006

                                _______
                                

                December 7, 2006.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

  Mr. Hyde, from the committee of conference, submitted the following

                           CONFERENCE REPORT

                        [To accompany H.R. 5682]

      The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of 
the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 
5682), to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with 
India, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed 
to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as 
follows:
      That the House recede from its disagreement to the 
amendment of the Senate and agree to the same with an amendment 
as follows:
      In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the 
Senate amendment, insert the following:

          TITLE I--UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Henry J. Hyde United 
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006''.

SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear 
        weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, the means 
        to produce them, and the means to deliver them are 
        critical objectives for United States foreign policy;
            (2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
        (NPT) and strengthening its implementation, 
        particularly its verification and compliance, is the 
        keystone of United States nonproliferation policy;
            (3) the NPT has been a significant success in 
        preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
        capabilities and maintaining a stable international 
        security situation;
            (4) countries that have never become a party to the 
        NPT and remain outside that treaty's legal regime pose 
        a potential challenge to the achievement of the overall 
        goals of global nonproliferation, because those 
        countries have not undertaken the NPT obligation to 
        prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities;
            (5) it is in the interest of the United States to 
        the fullest extent possible to ensure that those 
        countries that are not States Party to the NPT are 
        responsible in the disposition of any nuclear 
        technology they develop;
            (6) it is in the interest of the United States to 
        enter into an agreement for nuclear cooperation 
        arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy 
        Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) with a country that has 
        never been a State Party to the NPT if--
                    (A) the country has demonstrated 
                responsible behavior with respect to the 
                nonproliferation of technology related to 
                nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them;
                    (B) the country has a functioning and 
                uninterrupted democratic system of government, 
                has a foreign policy that is congruent to that 
                of the United States, and is working with the 
                United States on key foreign policy initiatives 
                related to nonproliferation;
                    (C) such cooperation induces the country to 
                promulgate and implement substantially improved 
                protections against the proliferation of 
                technology related to nuclear weapons and the 
                means to deliver them, and to refrain from 
                actions that would further the development of 
                its nuclear weapons program; and
                    (D) such cooperation will induce the 
                country to give greater political and material 
                support to the achievement of United States 
                global and regional nonproliferation 
                objectives, especially with respect to 
                dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, 
                sanctioning and containing states that sponsor 
                terrorism and terrorist groups that are seeking 
                to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or 
                other weapons of mass destruction capability 
                and the means to deliver such weapons;
            (7) the United States should continue its policy of 
        engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with and 
        between India and Pakistan;
            (8) strong bilateral relations with India are in 
        the national interest of the United States;
            (9) the United States and India share common 
        democratic values and the potential for increasing and 
        sustained economic engagement;
            (10) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by 
        the United States and other countries has the potential 
        to benefit the people of all countries;
            (11) such commerce also represents a significant 
        change in United States policy regarding commerce with 
        countries that are not States Party to the NPT, which 
        remains the foundation of the international 
        nonproliferation regime;
            (12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with 
        India by the United States and other countries must be 
        achieved in a manner that minimizes the risk of nuclear 
        proliferation or regional arms races and maximizes 
        India's adherence to international nonproliferation 
        regimes, including, in particular, the guidelines of 
        the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); and
            (13) the United States should not seek to 
        facilitate or encourage the continuation of nuclear 
        exports to India by any other party if such exports are 
        terminated under United States law.

SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

    (a) In General.--The following shall be the policies of the 
United States:
            (1) Oppose the development of a capability to 
        produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon 
        state, within or outside of the NPT.
            (2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret 
        the right to ``develop research, production and use of 
        nuclear energy for peaceful purposes'', as set forth in 
        Article IV of the NPT, as being a right that applies 
        only to the extent that it is consistent with the 
        object and purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of 
        nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities, 
        including by refraining from all nuclear cooperation 
        with any State Party that the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency (IAEA) determines is not in full 
        compliance with its NPT obligations, including its 
        safeguards obligations.
            (3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the 
        Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for 
        Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, 
        Materials, Software and Related Technology developed by 
        the NSG, and decisions related to those guidelines, and 
        the rules and practices regarding NSG decisionmaking.
            (4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions 
        concerning consultation by members regarding violations 
        of supplier and recipient understandings by instituting 
        the practice of a timely and coordinated response by 
        NSG members to all such violations, including 
        termination of nuclear transfers to an involved 
        recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from 
        continuing cooperation with such recipient until such 
        time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response 
        has been achieved.
            (5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and 
        technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the 
        reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production 
        of heavy water, work with members of the NSG, 
        individually and collectively, to further restrict the 
        transfers of such equipment and technologies, including 
        to India.
            (6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of 
        nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other 
        participating governments in the NSG or from any other 
        source if nuclear transfers to that country are 
        suspended or terminated pursuant to this title, the 
        Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or 
        any other United States law.
    (b) With Respect to South Asia.--The following shall be the 
policies of the United States with respect to South Asia:
            (1) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a 
        moratorium on the production of fissile material for 
        nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the 
        conclusion and implementation of a treaty banning the 
        production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to 
        which both the United States and India become parties.
            (3) Secure India's--
                    (A) full participation in the Proliferation 
                Security Initiative;
                    (B) formal commitment to the Statement of 
                Interdiction Principles of such Initiative;
                    (C) public announcement of its decision to 
                conform its export control laws, regulations, 
                and policies with the Australia Group and with 
                the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and 
                Control Lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement;
                    (D) demonstration of satisfactory progress 
                toward implementing the decision described in 
                subparagraph (C); and
                    (E) ratification of or accession to the 
                Convention on Supplementary Compensation for 
                Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna on September 12, 
                1997.
            (4) Secure India's full and active participation in 
        United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if 
        necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to 
        acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a 
        nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich 
        uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel, and the means to 
        deliver weapons of mass destruction.
            (5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon 
        arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction 
        and eventual elimination.
            (6) Ensure that spent fuel generated in India's 
        civilian nuclear power reactors is not transferred to 
        the United States except pursuant to the Congressional 
        review procedures required under section 131 f. of the 
        Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160 (f)).
            (7) Pending implementation of the multilateral 
        moratorium described in paragraph (1) or the treaty 
        described in paragraph (2), encourage India not to 
        increase its production of fissile material at 
        unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
            (8) Ensure that any safeguards agreement or 
        Additional Protocol to which India is a party with the 
        IAEA can reliably safeguard any export or reexport to 
        India of any nuclear materials and equipment.
            (9) Ensure that the text and implementation of any 
        agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant 
        to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
        U.S.C. 2153) meet the requirements set forth in 
        subsections a.(1) and a.(3) through a.(9) of such 
        section.
            (10) Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve 
        provided to the Government of India for use in 
        safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be 
        commensurate with reasonable reactor operating 
        requirements.

SEC. 104. WAIVER AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

    (a) In General.--If the President makes the determination 
described in subsection (b), the President may--
            (1) exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation 
        with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the 
        Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) from the 
        requirement of subsection a.(2) of such section;
            (2) waive the application of section 128 of the 
        Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect 
        to exports to India; and
            (3) waive with respect to India the application 
        of--
                    (A) section 129 a.(1)(D) of the Atomic 
                Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158(a)(1)(D)); 
                and
                    (B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
                2158) regarding any actions that occurred 
                before July 18, 2005.
    (b) Determination by the President.--The determination 
referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the 
President that the following actions have occurred:
            (1) India has provided the United States and the 
        IAEA with a credible plan to separate civil and 
        military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, 
        and has filed a declaration regarding its civil 
        facilities and materials with the IAEA.
            (2) India and the IAEA have concluded all legal 
        steps required prior to signature by the parties of an 
        agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards 
        in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, 
        principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of 
        Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India's civil 
        nuclear facilities, materials, and programs as declared 
        in the plan described in paragraph (1), including 
        materials used in or produced through the use of 
        India's civil nuclear facilities.
            (3) India and the IAEA are making substantial 
        progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol 
        consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and 
        policies that would apply to India's civil nuclear 
        program.
            (4) India is working actively with the United 
        States for the early conclusion of a multilateral 
        treaty on the cessation of the production of fissile 
        materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
        explosive devices.
            (5) India is working with and supporting United 
        States and international efforts to prevent the spread 
        of enrichment and reprocessing technology to any state 
        that does not already possess full-scale, functioning 
        enrichment or reprocessing plants.
            (6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure 
        nuclear and other sensitive materials and technology, 
        including through--
                    (A) the enactment and effective enforcement 
                of comprehensive export control legislation and 
                regulations;
                    (B) harmonization of its export control 
                laws, regulations, policies, and practices with 
                the guidelines and practices of the Missile 
                Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the NSG; 
                and
                    (C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in 
                accordance with the procedures of those regimes 
                for unilateral adherence.
            (7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit 
        supply to India of nuclear items covered by the 
        guidelines of the NSG.
    (c) Submission to Congress.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees the determination 
        made pursuant to subsection (b), together with a report 
        detailing the basis for the determination.
            (2) Information to be included.--To the fullest 
        extent available to the United States, the report 
        referred to in paragraph (1) shall include the 
        following information:
                    (A) A summary of the plan provided by India 
                to the United States and the IAEA to separate 
                India's civil and military nuclear facilities, 
                materials, and programs, and the declaration 
                made by India to the IAEA identifying India's 
                civil facilities to be placed under IAEA 
                safeguards, including an analysis of the 
                credibility of such plan and declaration, 
                together with copies of the plan and 
                declaration.
                    (B) A summary of the agreement that has 
                been entered into between India and the IAEA 
                requiring the application of safeguards in 
                accordance with IAEA practices to India's civil 
                nuclear facilities as declared in the plan 
                described in subparagraph (A), together with a 
                copy of the agreement, and a description of the 
                progress toward its full implementation.
                    (C) A summary of the progress made toward 
                conclusion and implementation of an Additional 
                Protocol between India and the IAEA, including 
                a description of the scope of such Additional 
                Protocol.
                    (D) A description of the steps that India 
                is taking to work with the United States for 
                the conclusion of a multilateral treaty banning 
                the production of fissile material for nuclear 
                weapons, including a description of the steps 
                that the United States has taken and will take 
                to encourage India to identify and declare a 
                date by which India would be willing to stop 
                production of fissile material for nuclear 
                weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a 
                multilateral moratorium or treaty.
                    (E) A description of the steps India is 
                taking to prevent the spread of nuclear-related 
                technology, including enrichment and 
                reprocessing technology or materials that can 
                be used to acquire a nuclear weapons 
                capability, as well as the support that India 
                is providing to the United States to further 
                United States objectives to restrict the spread 
                of such technology.
                    (F) A description of the steps that India 
                is taking to secure materials and technology 
                applicable for the development, acquisition, or 
                manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and 
                the means to deliver such weapons through the 
                application of comprehensive export control 
                legislation and regulations, and through 
                harmonization with and adherence to MTCR, NSG, 
                Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement 
                guidelines, compliance with United Nations 
                Security Council Resolution 1540, and 
                participation in the Proliferation Security 
                Initiative.
                    (G) A description and assessment of the 
                specific measures that India has taken to fully 
                and actively participate in United States and 
                international efforts to dissuade, isolate, 
                and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran 
                for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass 
                destruction, including a nuclear weapons 
                capability and the capability to enrich uranium 
                or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to 
                deliver weapons of mass destruction.
                    (H) A description of the decision of the 
                NSG relating to nuclear cooperation with India, 
                including whether nuclear cooperation by the 
                United States under an agreement for 
                cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 of 
                the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
                is consistent with the decision, practices, and 
                policies of the NSG.
                    (I) A description of the scope of peaceful 
                cooperation envisioned by the United States and 
                India that will be implemented under the 
                agreement for nuclear cooperation, including 
                whether such cooperation will include the 
                provision of enrichment and reprocessing 
                technology.
                    (J) A description of the steps taken to 
                ensure that proposed United States civil 
                nuclear cooperation with India will not in any 
                way assist India's nuclear weapons program.
    (d) Restrictions on Nuclear Transfers.--
            (1) In general.--Pursuant to the obligations of the 
        United States under Article I of the NPT, nothing in 
        this title constitutes authority to carry out any civil 
        nuclear cooperation between the United States and a 
        country that is not a nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
        NPT that would in any way assist, encourage, or induce 
        that country to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
        nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
            (2) NSG transfer guidelines.--Notwithstanding the 
        entry into force of an agreement for cooperation with 
        India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic 
        Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and pursuant to 
        this title, no item subject to such agreement or 
        subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG, or to 
        NSG decisions related thereto, may be transferred to 
        India if such transfer would be inconsistent with the 
        transfer guidelines of the NSG in effect on the date of 
        the transfer.
            (3) Termination of nuclear transfers to india.--
                    (A) In general.--Notwithstanding the entry 
                into force of an agreement for cooperation with 
                India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the 
                Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and 
                pursuant to this title, and except as provided 
                under subparagraph (B), exports of nuclear and 
                nuclear-related material, equipment, or 
                technology to India shall be terminated if 
                there is any materially significant transfer by 
                an Indian person of--
                            (i) nuclear or nuclear-related 
                        material, equipment, or technology that 
                        is not consistent with NSG guidelines 
                        or decisions, or
                            (ii) ballistic missiles or missile-
                        related equipment or technology that is 
                        not consistent with MTCR guidelines,

                unless the President determines that cessation 
                of such exports would be seriously prejudicial 
                to the achievement of United States 
                nonproliferation objectives or otherwise 
                jeopardize the common defense and security.
                    (B) Exception.--The President may choose 
                not to terminate exports of nuclear and 
                nuclear-related material, equipment, and 
                technology to India under subparagraph (A) if--
                            (i) the transfer covered under such 
                        subparagraph was made without the 
                        knowledge of the Government of India;
                            (ii) at the time of the transfer, 
                        either the Government of India did not 
                        own, control, or direct the Indian 
                        person that made the transfer or the 
                        Indian person that made the transfer is 
                        a natural person who acted without the 
                        knowledge of any entity described in 
                        subparagraph (B) or (C) of section 
                        110(5); and
                            (iii) the President certifies to 
                        the appropriate congressional 
                        committees that the Government of India 
                        has taken or is taking appropriate 
                        judicial or other enforcement actions 
                        against the Indian person with respect 
                        to such transfer.
            (4) Exports, reexports, transfers, and retransfers 
        to india related to enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy 
        water production.--
                    (A) In general.--
                            (i) Nuclear regulatory 
                        commission.--The Nuclear Regulatory 
                        Commission may only issue licenses for 
                        the export or reexport to India of any 
                        equipment, components, or materials 
                        related to the enrichment of uranium, 
                        the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, 
                        or the production of heavy water if the 
                        requirements of subparagraph (B) are 
                        met.
                            (ii) Secretary of energy.--The 
                        Secretary of Energy may only issue 
                        authorizations for the transfer or 
                        retransfer to India of any equipment, 
                        materials, or technology related to the 
                        enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing 
                        of spent nuclear fuel, or the 
                        production of heavy water (including 
                        under the terms of a subsequent 
                        arrangement under section 131 of the 
                        Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
                        2160)) if the requirements of 
                        subparagraph (B) are met.
                    (B) Requirements for approvals.--Exports, 
                reexports, transfers, and retransfers referred 
                to in subparagraph (A) may only be approved 
                if--
                            (i) the end user--
                                    (I) is a multinational 
                                facility participating in an 
                                IAEA-approved program to 
                                provide alternatives to 
                                national fuel cycle 
                                capabilities; or
                                    (II) is a facility 
                                participating in, and the 
                                export, reexport, transfer, or 
                                retransfer is associated with, 
                                a bilateral or multinational 
                                program to develop a 
                                proliferation-resistant fuel 
                                cycle;
                            (ii) appropriate measures are in 
                        place at any facility referred to in 
                        clause (i) to ensure that no sensitive 
                        nuclear technology, as defined in 
                        section 4(5) of the Nuclear 
                        Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 
                        3203(5)), will be diverted to any 
                        person, site, facility, location, or 
                        program not under IAEA safeguards; and
                            (iii) the President   determines 
                        that the export, reexport, transfer, or 
                        retransfer will not assist in the 
                        manufacture or acquisition of nuclear 
                        explosive devices or the production of 
                        fissile material for military purposes.
            (5) Nuclear export accountability program.--
                    (A) In general.--The President shall ensure 
                that all appropriate measures are taken to 
                maintain accountability with respect to nuclear 
                materials, equipment, and technology sold, 
                leased, exported, or reexported to India so as 
                to ensure--
                            (i) full implementation of the 
                        protections required under section 123 
                        a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
                        (42 U.S.C. 2153 (a)(1)); and
                            (ii) United States compliance with 
                        Article I of the NPT.
                    (B) Measures.--The measures taken pursuant 
                to subparagraph (A) shall include the 
                following:
                            (i) Obtaining and implementing 
                        assurances and conditions pursuant to 
                        the export licensing authorities of the 
                        Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 
                        Department of Commerce and the 
                        authorizing authorities of the 
                        Department of Energy, including, as 
                        appropriate, conditions regarding end-
                        use monitoring.
                            (ii) A detailed system of reporting 
                        and accounting for technology 
                        transfers, including any retransfers in 
                        India, authorized by the Department of 
                        Energy pursuant to section 57 b. of the 
                        Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
                        2077(b)). Such system shall be capable 
                        of providing assurances that--
                                    (I) the identified 
                                recipients of the nuclear 
                                technology are authorized to 
                                receive the nuclear technology;
                                    (II) the nuclear technology 
                                identified for transfer will be 
                                used only for peaceful 
                                safeguarded nuclear activities 
                                and will not be used for any 
                                military or nuclear explosive 
                                purpose; and
                                    (III) the nuclear 
                                technology identified for 
                                transfer will not be 
                                retransferred without the prior 
                                consent of the United States, 
                                and facilities, equipment, or 
                                materials derived through the 
                                use of transferred technology 
                                will not be transferred without 
                                the prior consent of the United 
                                States.
                            (iii) In the event the IAEA is 
                        unable to implement safeguards as 
                        required by an agreement for 
                        cooperation arranged pursuant to 
                        section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
                        1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), appropriate 
                        assurance that arrangements will be put 
                        in place expeditiously that are 
                        consistent with the requirements of 
                        section 123 a.(1) of such Act (42 
                        U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding the 
                        maintenance of safeguards as set forth 
                        in the agreement regardless of whether 
                        the agreement is terminated or 
                        suspended for any reason.
                    (C) Implementation.--The measures described 
                in subparagraph (B) shall be implemented to 
                provide reasonable assurances that the 
                recipient is complying with the relevant 
                requirements, terms, and conditions of any 
                licenses issued by the United States regarding 
                such exports, including those relating to the 
                use, retransfer, safe handling, secure transit, 
                and storage of such exports.
    (e) Joint Resolution of Approval Requirement.--Section 123 
d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) is 
amended in the second proviso by inserting after ``that 
subsection'' the following: ``, or an agreement exempted 
pursuant to section 104(a)(1) of the Henry J. Hyde United 
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006,''.
    (f) Sunset.--The authority provided under subsection (a)(1) 
to exempt an agreement shall terminate upon the enactment of a 
joint resolution under section 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) approving such an agreement.
    (g) Reporting to Congress.--
            (1) Information on nuclear activities of india.--
        The President shall keep the appropriate congressional 
        committees fully and currently informed of the facts 
        and implications of any significant nuclear activities 
        of India, including--
                    (A) any material noncompliance on the part 
                of the Government of India with--
                            (i) the nonproliferation 
                        commitments undertaken in the Joint 
                        Statement of July 18, 2005, between the 
                        President of the United States and the 
                        Prime Minister of India;
                            (ii) the separation plan presented 
                        in the national parliament of India on 
                        March 7, 2006, and in greater detail on 
                        May 11, 2006;
                            (iii) a safeguards agreement 
                        between the Government of India and the 
                        IAEA;
                            (iv) an Additional Protocol between 
                        the Government of India and the IAEA;
                            (v) an agreement for cooperation 
                        between the Government of India and the 
                        United States Government arranged 
                        pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic 
                        Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) or 
                        any subsequent arrangement under 
                        section 131 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
                        2160);
                            (vi) the terms and conditions of 
                        any approved licenses regarding the 
                        export or reexport of nuclear material 
                        or dual-use material, equipment, or 
                        technology; and
                            (vii) United States laws and 
                        regulations regarding such licenses;
                    (B) the construction of a nuclear facility 
                in India after the date of the enactment of 
                this title;
                    (C) significant changes in the production 
                by India of nuclear weapons or in the types or 
                amounts of fissile material produced; and
                    (D) changes in the purpose or operational 
                status of any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle 
                activities in India.
            (2) Implementation and compliance report.--Not 
        later than 180 days after the date on which an 
        agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant 
        to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
        U.S.C. 2153) enters into force, and annually 
        thereafter, the President shall submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees a report 
        including--
                    (A) a description of any additional nuclear 
                facilities and nuclear materials that the 
                Government of India has placed or intends to 
                place under IAEA safeguards;
                    (B) a comprehensive listing of--
                            (i) all licenses that have been 
                        approved by the Nuclear Regulatory 
                        Commission and the Secretary of Energy 
                        for exports and reexports to India 
                        under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, 
                        Code of Federal Regulations;
                            (ii) any licenses approved by the 
                        Department of Commerce for the export 
                        or reexport to India of commodities, 
                        related technology, and software which 
                        are controlled for nuclear 
                        nonproliferation reasons on the Nuclear 
                        Referral List of the Commerce Control 
                        List maintained under part 774 of title 
                        15, Code of Federal Regulation, or any 
                        successor regulation;
                            (iii) any other United States 
                        authorizations for the export or 
                        reexport to India of nuclear materials 
                        and equipment; and
                            (iv) with respect to each such 
                        license or other form of authorization 
                        described in clauses (i), (ii), and 
                        (iii)--
                                    (I) the number or other 
                                identifying information of each 
                                license or authorization;
                                    (II) the name or names of 
                                the authorized end user or end 
                                users;
                                    (III) the name of the site, 
                                facility, or location in India 
                                to which the export or reexport 
                                was made;
                                    (IV) the terms and 
                                conditions included on such 
                                licenses and authorizations;
                                    (V) any post-shipment 
                                verification procedures that 
                                will be applied to such exports 
                                or reexports; and
                                    (VI) the term of validity 
                                of each such license or 
                                authorization;
                    (C) a description of any significant 
                nuclear commerce between India and other 
                countries, including any such trade that--
                            (i) is not consistent with 
                        applicable guidelines or decisions of 
                        the NSG; or
                            (ii) would not meet the standards 
                        applied to exports or reexports of such 
                        material, equipment, or technology of 
                        United States origin;
                    (D) either--
                            (i) an assessment that India is in 
                        full compliance with the commitments 
                        and obligations contained in the 
                        agreements and other documents 
                        referenced in clauses (i) through (vi) 
                        of paragraph (1)(A); or
                            (ii) an identification and analysis 
                        of all compliance issues arising with 
                        regard to the adherence by India to its 
                        commitments and obligations, 
                        including--
                                    (I) the measures the United 
                                States Government has taken to 
                                remedy or otherwise respond to 
                                such compliance issues;
                                    (II) the responses of the 
                                Government of India to such 
                                measures;
                                    (III) the measures the 
                                United States Government plans 
                                to take to this end in the 
                                coming year; and
                                    (IV) an assessment of the 
                                implications of any continued 
                                noncompliance, including 
                                whether nuclear commerce with 
                                India remains in the national 
                                security interest of the United 
                                States;
                    (E)(i) an assessment of whether India is 
                fully and actively participating in United 
                States and international efforts to dissuade, 
                isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and 
                contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons 
                of mass destruction, including a nuclear 
                weapons capability (including the capability to 
                enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel), and 
                the means to deliver weapons of mass 
                destruction, including a description of the 
                specific measures that India has taken in this 
                regard; and
                    (ii) if India is not assessed to be fully 
                and actively participating in such efforts, a 
                description of--
                            (I) the measures the United States 
                        Government has taken to secure India's 
                        full and active participation in such 
                        efforts;
                            (II) the responses of the 
                        Government of India to such measures; 
                        and
                            (III) the measures the United 
                        States Government plans to take in the 
                        coming year to secure India's full and 
                        active participation;
                    (F) an analysis of whether United States 
                civil nuclear cooperation with India is in any 
                way assisting India's nuclear weapons program, 
                including through--
                            (i) the use of any United States 
                        equipment, technology, or nuclear 
                        material by India in an unsafeguarded 
                        nuclear facility or nuclear-weapons 
                        related complex;
                            (ii) the replication and subsequent 
                        use of any United States technology by 
                        India in an unsafeguarded nuclear 
                        facility or unsafeguarded nuclear 
                        weapons-related complex, or for any 
                        activity related to the research, 
                        development, testing, or manufacture of 
                        nuclear explosive devices; and
                            (iii) the provision of nuclear fuel 
                        in such a manner as to facilitate the 
                        increased production by India of highly 
                        enriched uranium or plutonium in 
                        unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;
                    (G) a detailed description of--
                            (i) United States efforts to 
                        promote national or regional progress 
                        by India and Pakistan in disclosing, 
                        securing, limiting, and reducing their 
                        fissile material stockpiles, including 
                        stockpiles for military purposes, 
                        pending creation of a worldwide fissile 
                        material cut-off regime, including the 
                        institution of a Fissile Material Cut-
                        off Treaty;
                            (ii) the responses of India and 
                        Pakistan to such efforts; and
                            (iii) assistance that the United 
                        States is providing, or would be able 
                        to provide, to India and Pakistan to 
                        promote the objectives in clause (i), 
                        consistent with its obligations under 
                        international law and existing 
                        agreements;
                    (H) an estimate of--
                            (i) the amount of uranium mined and 
                        milled in India during the previous 
                        year;
                            (ii) the amount of such uranium 
                        that has likely been used or allocated 
                        for the production of nuclear explosive 
                        devices; and
                            (iii) the rate of production in 
                        India of--
                                    (I) fissile material for 
                                nuclear explosive devices; and
                                    (II) nuclear explosive 
                                devices;
                    (I) an estimate of the amount of 
                electricity India's nuclear reactors produced 
                for civil purposes during the previous year and 
                the proportion of such production that can be 
                attributed to India's declared civil reactors;
                    (J) an analysis as to whether imported 
                uranium has affected the rate of production in 
                India of nuclear explosive devices;
                    (K) a detailed description of efforts and 
                progress made toward the achievement of 
                India's--
                            (i) full participation in the 
                        Proliferation Security Initiative;
                            (ii) formal commitment to the 
                        Statement of Interdiction Principles of 
                        such Initiative;
                            (iii) public announcement of its 
                        decision to conform its export control 
                        laws, regulations, and policies with 
                        the Australia Group and with the 
                        Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and 
                        Controls List of the Wassenaar 
                        Arrangement; and
                            (iv) effective implementation of 
                        the decision described in clause (iii); 
                        and
                    (L) the disposal during the previous year 
                of spent nuclear fuel from India's civilian 
                nuclear program, and any plans or activities 
                relating to future disposal of such spent 
                nuclear fuel.
            (3) Submittal with other annual reports.--
                    (A) Report on proliferation prevention.--
                Each annual report submitted under paragraph 
                (2) after the initial report may be submitted 
                together with the annual report on 
                proliferation prevention required under section 
                601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 
                1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281(a)).
                    (B) Report on progress toward regional 
                nonproliferation.--The information required to 
                be submitted under paragraph (2)(F) after the 
                initial report may be submitted together with 
                the annual report on progress toward regional 
                nonproliferation required under section 620F(c) 
                of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
                U.S.C. 2376(c)).
            (4) Form.--Each report submitted under this 
        subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
        may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 105. UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH ITS NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 
                    TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

    Nothing in this title constitutes authority for any action 
in violation of an obligation of the United States under the 
NPT.

SEC. 106. INOPERABILITY OF DETERMINATION AND WAIVERS.

    A determination and any waiver under section 104 shall 
cease to be effective if the President determines that India 
has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the 
enactment of this title.

SEC. 107. MTCR ADHERENT STATUS.

    Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the 
purposes of section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2797b).

SEC. 108. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.

    Section 1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg 
Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 
and 2001 (as enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public 
Law 106-113 and contained in appendix G of that Act; 113 Stat. 
1501-486)) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' after 
        the semicolon at the end;
            (2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as 
        subparagraph (D); and
            (3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the 
        following new subparagraph:
                    ``(C) so much of the reports required under 
                section 104 of the Henry J. Hyde United States-
                India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 
                2006 as relates to verification or compliance 
                matters; and''.

SEC. 109. UNITED STATES-INDIA SCIENTIFIC COOPERATIVE NUCLEAR 
                    NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Energy, acting through 
the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, is authorized to establish a cooperative 
nuclear nonproliferation program to pursue jointly with 
scientists from the United States and India a program to 
further common nuclear nonproliferation goals, including 
scientific research and development efforts, with an emphasis 
on nuclear safeguards (in this section referred to as ``the 
program'').
    (b) Consultation.--The program shall be carried out in 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Defense.
    (c) National Academies Recommendations.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of Energy shall 
        enter into an agreement with the National Academies to 
        develop recommendations for the implementation of the 
        program.
            (2) Recommendations.--The agreement entered into 
        under paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation 
        by qualified individuals with relevant expertise and 
        knowledge and the communication to the Secretary of 
        Energy each fiscal year of--
                    (A) recommendations for research and 
                related programs designed to overcome existing 
                technological barriers to nuclear 
                nonproliferation; and
                    (B) an assessment of whether activities and 
                programs funded under this section are 
                achieving the goals of the activities and 
                programs.
            (3) Public availability.--The recommendations and 
        assessments prepared under this subsection shall be 
        made publicly available.
    (d) Consistency With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.--All 
United States activities related to the program shall be 
consistent with United States obligations under the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
this section for each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

SEC. 110. DEFINITIONS.

    In this title:
            (1) The term ``Additional Protocol'' means a 
        protocol additional to a safeguards agreement with the 
        IAEA, as negotiated between a country and the IAEA 
        based on a Model Additional Protocol as set forth in 
        IAEA information circular (INFCIRC) 540.
            (2) The term ``appropriate congressional 
        committees'' means the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate and the Committee on International 
        Relations of the House of Representatives.
            (3) The term ``dual-use material, equipment, or 
        technology'' means material, equipment, or technology 
        that may be used in nuclear or nonnuclear applications.
            (4) The term ``IAEA safeguards'' has the meaning 
        given the term in section 830(3) of the Nuclear 
        Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 
        6305(3)).
            (5) The term ``Indian person'' means--
                    (A) a natural person that is a citizen of 
                India or is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
                Government of India;
                    (B) a corporation, business association, 
                partnership, society, trust, or any other 
                nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, 
                that is organized under the laws of India or 
                has its principal place of business in India; 
                and
                    (C) any Indian governmental entity, 
                including any governmental entity operating as 
                a business enterprise.
            (6) The terms ``Missile Technology Control 
        Regime'', ``MTCR'', and ``MTCR adherent'' have the 
        meanings given the terms in section 74 of the Arms 
        Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c).
            (7) The term ``nuclear materials and equipment'' 
        means source material, special nuclear material, 
        production and utilization facilities and any 
        components thereof, and any other items or materials 
        that are determined to have significance for nuclear 
        explosive purposes pursuant to subsection 109 b. of the 
        Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2139(b)).
            (8) The terms ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' 
        and ``NPT'' mean the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
        Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
        July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (21 
        UST 483).
            (9) The terms ``Nuclear Suppliers Group'' and 
        ``NSG'' refer to a group, which met initially in 1975 
        and has met at least annually since 1992, of 
        Participating Governments that have promulgated and 
        agreed to adhere to Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers 
        (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1) and 
        Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use 
        Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology 
        (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2).
            (10) The terms ``nuclear weapon'' and ``nuclear 
        explosive device'' mean any device designed to produce 
        an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy 
        from special nuclear material that is greater than the 
        amount of energy that would be released from the 
        detonation of one point of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
            (11) The term ``process'' includes the term 
        ``reprocess''.
            (12) The terms ``reprocessing'' and ``reprocess'' 
        refer to the separation of irradiated nuclear materials 
        and fission products from spent nuclear fuel.
            (13) The term ``sensitive nuclear technology'' 
        means any information, including information 
        incorporated in a production or utilization facility or 
        important component part thereof, that is not available 
        to the public and which is important to the design, 
        construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of 
        a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing 
        facility or a facility for the production of heavy 
        water.
            (14) The term ``source material'' has the meaning 
        given the term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy 
        Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(z)).
            (15) The term ``special nuclear material'' has the 
        meaning given the term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic 
        Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).
            (16) The term ``unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle 
        activity'' means research on, or development, design, 
        manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance 
        of--
                    (A) any existing or future reactor, 
                critical facility, conversion plant, 
                fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, plant 
                for the separation of isotopes of source or 
                special fissionable material, or separate 
                storage installation with respect to which 
                there is no obligation to accept IAEA 
                safeguards at the relevant reactor, facility, 
                plant, or installation that contains source or 
                special fissionable material; or
                    (B) any existing or future heavy water 
                production plant with respect to which there is 
                no obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on any 
                nuclear material produced by or used in 
                connection with any heavy water produced 
                therefrom.

       TITLE II--UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``United States Additional 
Protocol Implementation Act''.

SEC. 202. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other 
        nuclear explosive devices poses a grave threat to the 
        national security of the United States and its vital 
        national interests.
            (2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven 
        critical to limiting such proliferation.
            (3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be 
        effective, each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties 
        must conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with 
        the IAEA, and such agreements must be honored and 
        enforced.
            (4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of 
        strengthening the effectiveness and improving the 
        efficiency of the safeguards system. This can best be 
        accomplished by providing IAEA inspectors with more 
        information about, and broader access to, nuclear 
        activities within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon 
        State Parties.
            (5) The proposed scope of such expanded information 
        and access has been negotiated by the member states of 
        the IAEA in the form of a Model Additional Protocol to 
        its existing safeguards agreements, and universal 
        acceptance of Additional Protocols by non-nuclear 
        weapons states is essential to enhancing the 
        effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
            (6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a 
        nuclear-weapon State Party, signed an Additional 
        Protocol that is based on the Model Additional 
        Protocol, but which also contains measures, consistent 
        with its existing safeguards agreements with its 
        members, that protect the right of the United States to 
        exclude the application of IAEA safeguards to locations 
        and activities with direct national security 
        significance or to locations or information associated 
        with such activities.
            (7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in 
        the United States in a manner consistent with United 
        States obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty may encourage other parties to the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty, especially non-nuclear-weapon 
        State Parties, to conclude Additional Protocols and 
        thereby strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
        safeguards system and help reduce the threat of nuclear 
        proliferation, which is of direct and substantial 
        benefit to the United States.
            (8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by 
        the United States is not required and is completely 
        voluntary given its status as a nuclear-weapon State 
        Party, but the United States has acceded to the 
        Additional Protocol to demonstrate its commitment to 
        the nuclear nonproliferation regime and to make United 
        States civil nuclear activities available to the same 
        IAEA inspections as are applied in the case of non-
        nuclear-weapon State Parties.
            (9) In accordance with the national security 
        exclusion contained in Article 1.b of its Additional 
        Protocol, the United States will not allow any 
        inspection activities, nor make any declaration of any 
        information with respect to, locations, information, 
        and activities of direct national security significance 
        to the United States.
            (10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol will 
        conform to the principles set forth in the letter of 
        April 30, 2002, from the United States Permanent 
        Representative to the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency and the Vienna Office of the United Nations to 
        the Director General of the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency.

SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS.

    In this title:
            (1) Additional protocol.--The term ``Additional 
        Protocol'', when used in the singular form, means the 
        Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United 
        States of America and the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United 
        States of America, with Annexes, signed at Vienna June 
        12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-097).
            (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the 
        Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, the 
        Committee on International Relations, the Committee on 
        Science, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        House of Representatives.
            (3) Complementary access.--The term ``complementary 
        access'' means the exercise of the IAEA's access rights 
        as set forth in Articles 4 to 6 of the Additional 
        Protocol.
            (4) Executive agency.--The term ``executive 
        agency'' has the meaning given such term in section 105 
        of title 5, United States Code.
            (5) Facility.--The term ``facility'' has the 
        meaning set forth in Article 18i. of the Additional 
        Protocol.
            (6) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency.
            (7) Judge of the united states.--The term ``judge 
        of the United States'' means a United States district 
        judge, or a United States magistrate judge appointed 
        under the authority of chapter 43 of title 28, United 
        States Code.
            (8) Location.--The term ``location'' means any 
        geographic point or area declared or identified by the 
        United States or specified by the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency.
            (9) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The term 
        ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty 
        on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 
        Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and 
        entered into force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).
            (10) Nuclear-weapon state party and non-nuclear-
        weapon state party.--The terms ``nuclear-weapon State 
        Party'' and ``non-nuclear-weapon State Party'' have the 
        meanings given such terms in the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty.
            (11) Person.--The term ``person'', except as 
        otherwise provided, means any individual, corporation, 
        partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public 
        or private institution, any State or any political 
        subdivision thereof, or any political entity within a 
        State, any foreign government or nation or any agency, 
        instrumentality, or political subdivision of any such 
        government or nation, or other entity located in the 
        United States.
            (12) Site.--The term ``site'' has the meaning set 
        forth in Article 18b. of the Additional Protocol.
            (13) United states.--The term ``United States'', 
        when used as a geographic reference, means the several 
        States of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
        and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of 
        the United States and includes all places under the 
        jurisdiction or control of the United States, 
        including--
                    (A) the territorial sea and the overlying 
                airspace;
                    (B) any civil aircraft of the United States 
                or public aircraft, as such terms are defined 
                in paragraphs (17) and (41), respectively, of 
                section 40102(a) of title 49, United States 
                Code; and
                    (C) any vessel of the United States, as 
                such term is defined in section 3(b) of the 
                Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. 
                App. 1903(b)).
            (14) Wide-area environmental sampling.--The term 
        ``wide-area environmental sampling'' has the meaning 
        set forth in Article 18g. of the Additional Protocol.

SEC. 204. SEVERABILITY.

    If any provision of this title, or the application of such 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
remainder of this title, or the application of such provision 
to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is 
held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.

                     Subtitle A--General Provisions

SEC. 211. AUTHORITY.

    (a) In General.--The President is authorized to implement 
and carry out the provisions of this title and the Additional 
Protocol and shall designate through Executive order which 
executive agency or agencies of the United States, which may 
include but are not limited to the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the 
Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall issue or amend and enforce 
regulations in order to implement this title and the provisions 
of the Additional Protocol.
    (b) Included Authority.--For any executive agency 
designated under subsection (a) that does not currently possess 
the authority to conduct site vulnerability assessments and 
related activities, the authority provided in subsection (a) 
includes such authority.
    (c) Exception.--The authority described in subsection (b) 
does not supersede or otherwise modify any existing authority 
of any Federal department or agency already having such 
authority.

                    Subtitle B--Complementary Access

SEC. 221. REQUIREMENT FOR AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

    (a) Prohibition.--No complementary access to any location 
in the United States shall take place pursuant to the 
Additional Protocol without the authorization of the United 
States Government in accordance with the requirements of this 
title.
    (b) Authority.--
            (1) In general.--Complementary access to any 
        location in the United States subject to access under 
        the Additional Protocol is authorized in accordance 
        with this title.
            (2) United states representatives.--
                    (A) Restrictions.--In the event of 
                complementary access to a privately owned or 
                operated location, no employee of the 
                Environmental Protection Agency or of the Mine 
                Safety and Health Administration or the 
                Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
                of the Department of Labor may participate in 
                the access.
                    (B) Number.--The number of designated 
                United States representatives accompanying IAEA 
                inspectors shall be kept to the minimum 
                necessary.

SEC. 222. PROCEDURES FOR COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

    (a) In General.--Each instance of complementary access to a 
location in the United States under the Additional Protocol 
shall be conducted in accordance with this subtitle.
    (b) Notice.--
            (1) In general.--Complementary access referred to 
        in subsection (a) may occur only upon the issuance of 
        an actual written notice by the United States 
        Government to the owner, operator, occupant, or agent 
        in charge of the location to be subject to 
        complementary access.
            (2) Time of notification.--The notice under 
        paragraph (1) shall be submitted to such owner, 
        operator, occupant, or agent as soon as possible after 
        the United States Government has received notification 
        that the IAEA seeks complementary access. Notices may 
        be posted prominently at the location if the United 
        States Government is unable to provide actual written 
        notice to such owner, operator, occupant, or agent.
            (3) Content of notice.--
                    (A) In general.--The notice required by 
                paragraph (1) shall specify--
                            (i) the purpose for the 
                        complementary access;
                            (ii) the basis for the selection of 
                        the facility, site, or other location 
                        for the complementary access sought;
                            (iii) the activities that will be 
                        carried out during the complementary 
                        access;
                            (iv) the time and date that the 
                        complementary access is expected to 
                        begin, and the anticipated period 
                        covered by the complementary access; 
                        and
                            (v) the names and titles of the 
                        inspectors.
            (4) Separate notices required.--A separate notice 
        shall be provided each time that complementary access 
        is sought by the IAEA.
    (c) Credentials.--The complementary access team of the IAEA 
and representatives or designees of the United States 
Government shall display appropriate identifying credentials to 
the owner, operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the 
location before gaining entry in connection with complementary 
access.
    (d) Scope.--
            (1) In general.--Except as provided in a warrant 
        issued under section 223, and subject to the rights of 
        the United States Government under the Additional 
        Protocol to limit complementary access, complementary 
        access to a location pursuant to this title may extend 
        to all activities specifically permitted for such 
        locations under Article 6 of the Additional Protocol.
            (2) Exception.--Unless required by the Additional 
        Protocol, no inspection under this title shall extend 
        to--
                    (A) financial data (other than production 
                data);
                    (B) sales and marketing data (other than 
                shipment data);
                    (C) pricing data;
                    (D) personnel data;
                    (E) patent data;
                    (F) data maintained for compliance with 
                environmental or occupational health and safety 
                regulations; or
                    (G) research data.
    (e) Environment, Health, Safety, and Security.--In carrying 
out their activities, members of the IAEA complementary access 
team and representatives or designees of the United States 
Government shall observe applicable environmental, health, 
safety, and security regulations established at the location 
subject to complementary access, including those for protection 
of controlled environments within a facility and for personal 
safety.

SEC. 223. CONSENTS, WARRANTS, AND COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

    (a) In General.--
            (1) Procedure.--
                    (A) Consent.--Except as provided in 
                paragraph (2), an appropriate official of the 
                United States Government shall seek or have the 
                consent of the owner, operator, occupant, or 
                agent in charge of a location prior to entering 
                that location in connection with complementary 
                access pursuant to sections 221 and 222. The 
                owner, operator, occupant, or agent in charge 
                of the location may withhold consent for any 
                reason or no reason.
                    (B) Administrative search warrant.--In the 
                absence of consent, the United States 
                Government may seek an administrative search 
                warrant from a judge of the United States under 
                subsection (b). Proceedings regarding the 
                issuance of an administrative search warrant 
                shall be conducted ex parte, unless otherwise 
                requested by the United States Government.
            (2) Expedited access.--For purposes of obtaining 
        access to a location pursuant to Article 4b.(ii) of the 
        Additional Protocol in order to satisfy United States 
        obligations under the Additional Protocol when notice 
        of two hours or less is required, the United States 
        Government may gain entry to such location in 
        connection with complementary access, to the extent 
        such access is consistent with the Fourth Amendment to 
        the United States Constitution, without obtaining 
        either a warrant or consent.
    (b) Administrative Search Warrants for Complementary 
Access.--
            (1) Obtaining administrative search warrants.--For 
        complementary access conducted in the United States 
        pursuant to the Additional Protocol, and for which the 
        acquisition of a warrant is required, the United States 
        Government shall first obtain an administrative search 
        warrant from a judge of the United States. The United 
        States Government shall provide to such judge all 
        appropriate information regarding the basis for the 
        selection of the facility, site, or other location to 
        which complementary access is sought.
            (2) Content of affidavits for administrative search 
        warrants.--A judge of the United States shall promptly 
        issue an administrative search warrant authorizing the 
        requested complementary access upon an affidavit 
        submitted by the United States Government--
                    (A) stating that the Additional Protocol is 
                in force;
                    (B) stating that the designated facility, 
                site, or other location is subject to 
                complementary access under the Additional 
                Protocol;
                    (C) stating that the purpose of the 
                complementary access is consistent with Article 
                4 of the Additional Protocol;
                    (D) stating that the requested 
                complementary access is in accordance with 
                Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;
                    (E) containing assurances that the scope of 
                the IAEA's complementary access, as well as 
                what it may collect, shall be limited to the 
                access provided for in Article 6 of the 
                Additional Protocol;
                    (F) listing the items, documents, and areas 
                to be searched and seized;
                    (G) stating the earliest commencement and 
                the anticipated duration of the complementary 
                access period, as well as the expected times of 
                day during which such complementary access will 
                take place; and
                    (H) stating that the location to which 
                entry in connection with complementary access 
                is sought was selected either--
                            (i) because there is probable 
                        cause, on the basis of specific 
                        evidence, to believe that information 
                        required to be reported regarding a 
                        location pursuant to regulations 
                        promulgated under this title is 
                        incorrect or incomplete, and that the 
                        location to be accessed contains 
                        evidence regarding that violation; or
                            (ii) pursuant to a reasonable 
                        general administrative plan based upon 
                        specific neutral criteria.
            (3) Content of warrants.--A warrant issued under 
        paragraph (2) shall specify the same matters required 
        of an affidavit under that paragraph. In addition, each 
        warrant shall contain the identities of the 
        representatives of the IAEA on the complementary access 
        team and the identities of the representatives or 
        designees of the United States Government required to 
        display identifying credentials under section 222(c).

SEC. 224. PROHIBITED ACTS RELATING TO COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

    It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or 
refuse to permit, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise impede, a 
complementary access authorized by this subtitle or an entry in 
connection with such access.

               Subtitle C--Confidentiality of Information

SEC. 231. PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION.

    Information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the 
United States Government under this title or under the 
Additional Protocol shall be exempt from disclosure under 
section 552 of title 5, United States Code.

                        Subtitle D--Enforcement

SEC. 241. RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS.

    It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or 
refuse--
            (1) to establish or maintain any record required by 
        any regulation prescribed under this title;
            (2) to submit any report, notice, or other 
        information to the United States Government in 
        accordance with any regulation prescribed under this 
        title; or
            (3) to permit access to or copying of any record by 
        the United States Government in accordance with any 
        regulation prescribed under this title.

SEC. 242. PENALTIES.

    (a) Civil.--
            (1) Penalty amounts.--Any person that is 
        determined, in accordance with paragraph (2), to have 
        violated section 224 or section 241 shall be required 
        by order to pay a civil penalty in an amount not to 
        exceed $25,000 for each violation. For the purposes of 
        this paragraph, each day during which a violation of 
        section 224 continues shall constitute a separate 
        violation of that section.
            (2) Notice and hearing.--
                    (A) In general.--Before imposing a penalty 
                against a person under paragraph (1), the head 
                of an executive agency designated under section 
                211(a) shall provide the person with notice of 
                the order. If, within 15 days after receiving 
                the notice, the person requests a hearing, the 
                head of the designated executive agency shall 
                initiate a hearing on the violation.
                    (B) Conduct of hearing.--Any hearing so 
                requested shall be conducted before an 
                administrative judge. The hearing shall be 
                conducted in accordance with the requirements 
                of section 554 of title 5, United States Code. 
                If no hearing is so requested, the order 
                imposed by the head of the designated agency 
                shall constitute a final agency action.
                    (C) Issuance of orders.--If the 
                administrative judge determines, upon the 
                preponderance of the evidence received, that a 
                person named in the complaint has violated 
                section 224 or section 241, the administrative 
                judge shall state the findings of fact and 
                conclusions of law, and issue and serve on such 
                person an order described in paragraph (1).
                    (D) Factors for determination of penalty 
                amounts.--In determining the amount of any 
                civil penalty, the administrative judge or the 
                head of the designated agency shall take into 
                account the nature, circumstances, extent, and 
                gravity of the violation or violations and, 
                with respect to the violator, the ability to 
                pay, effect on ability to continue to do 
                business, any history of such violations, the 
                degree of culpability, the existence of an 
                internal compliance program, and such other 
                matters as justice may require.
                    (E) Content of notice.--For the purposes of 
                this paragraph, notice shall be in writing and 
                shall be verifiably served upon the person or 
                persons subject to an order described in 
                paragraph (1). In addition, the notice shall--
                            (i) set forth the time, date, and 
                        specific nature of the alleged 
                        violation or violations; and
                            (ii) specify the administrative and 
                        judicial remedies available to the 
                        person or persons subject to the order, 
                        including the availability of a hearing 
                        and subsequent appeal.
            (3) Administrative appellate review.--The decision 
        and order of an administrative judge shall be the 
        recommended decision and order and shall be referred to 
        the head of the designated executive agency for final 
        decision and order. If, within 60 days, the head of the 
        designated executive agency does not modify or vacate 
        the decision and order, it shall become a final agency 
        action under this subsection.
            (4) Judicial review.--A person adversely affected 
        by a final order may, within 30 days after the date the 
        final order is issued, file a petition in the Court of 
        Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the 
        Court of Appeals for the district in which the 
        violation occurred.
            (5) Enforcement of final orders.--
                    (A) In general.--If a person fails to 
                comply with a final order issued against such 
                person under this subsection and--
                            (i) the person has not filed a 
                        petition for judicial review of the 
                        order in accordance with paragraph (4), 
                        or
                            (ii) a court in an action brought 
                        under paragraph (4) has entered a final 
                        judgment in favor of the designated 
                        executive agency,
                the head of the designated executive agency 
                shall commence a civil action to seek 
                compliance with the final order in any 
                appropriate district court of the United 
                States.
                    (B) No review.--In any such civil action, 
                the validity and appropriateness of the final 
                order shall not be subject to review.
                    (C) Interest.--Payment of penalties 
                assessed in a final order under this section 
                shall include interest at currently prevailing 
                rates calculated from the date of expiration of 
                the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (3) 
                or the date of such final order, as the case 
                may be.
    (b) Criminal.--Any person who violates section 224 or 
section 241 may, in addition to or in lieu of any civil penalty 
which may be imposed under subsection (a) for such violation, 
be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not 
more than five years, or both.

SEC. 243. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT.

    (a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States 
shall have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the head 
of an executive agency designated under section 211(a)--
            (1) to restrain any conduct in violation of section 
        224 or section 241; or
            (2) to compel the taking of any action required by 
        or under this title or the Additional Protocol.
    (b) Civil Actions.--
            (1) In general.--A civil action described in 
        subsection (a) may be brought--
                    (A) in the case of a civil action described 
                in paragraph (1) of such subsection, in the 
                United States district court for the judicial 
                district in which any act, omission, or 
                transaction constituting a violation of section 
                224 or section 241 occurred or in which the 
                defendant is found or transacts business; or
                    (B) in the case of a civil action described 
                in paragraph (2) of such subsection, in the 
                United States district court for the judicial 
                district in which the defendant is found or 
                transacts business.
            (2) Service of process.--In any such civil action, 
        process shall be served on a defendant wherever the 
        defendant may reside or may be found.

                   Subtitle E--Environmental Sampling

SEC. 251. NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF IAEA BOARD APPROVAL OF WIDE-AREA 
                    ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date on 
which the Board of Governors of the IAEA approves wide-area 
environmental sampling for use as a safeguards verification 
tool, the President shall notify the appropriate congressional 
committees.
    (b) Content.--The notification under subsection (a) shall 
contain--
            (1) a description of the specific methods and 
        sampling techniques approved by the Board of Governors 
        that are to be employed for purposes of wide-area 
        sampling;
            (2) a statement as to whether or not such sampling 
        may be conducted in the United States under the 
        Additional Protocol; and
            (3) an assessment of the ability of the approved 
        methods and sampling techniques to detect, identify, 
        and determine the conduct, type, and nature of nuclear 
        activities.

SEC. 252. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLUSION TO WIDE-AREA 
                    ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

    In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, 
the United States shall not permit any wide-area environmental 
sampling proposed by the IAEA to be conducted at a specified 
location in the United States under Article 9 of the Additional 
Protocol unless the President has determined and reported to 
the appropriate congressional committees with respect to that 
proposed use of environmental sampling that--
            (1) the proposed use of wide-area environmental 
        sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the 
        IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the 
        territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party;
            (2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental 
        sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to 
        locations, activities, or information of direct 
        national security significance; and
            (3) the United States--
                    (A) has been provided sufficient 
                opportunity for consultation with the IAEA if 
                the IAEA has requested complementary access 
                involving wide-area environmental sampling; or
                    (B) has requested under Article 8 of the 
                Additional Protocol that the IAEA engage in 
                complementary access in the United States that 
                involves the use of wide-area environmental 
                sampling.

SEC. 253. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLUSION TO LOCATION-
                    SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

    In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, 
the United States shall not permit any location-specific 
environmental sampling in the United States under Article 5 of 
the Additional Protocol unless the President has determined and 
reported to the appropriate congressional committees with 
respect to that proposed use of environmental sampling that--
            (1) the proposed use of location-specific 
        environmental sampling is necessary to increase the 
        capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear 
        activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon 
        State Party;
            (2) the proposed use of location-specific 
        environmental sampling will not result in access by the 
        IAEA to locations, activities, or information of direct 
        national security significance; and
            (3) with respect to the proposed use of 
        environmental sampling, the United States--
                    (A) has been provided sufficient 
                opportunity for consultation with the IAEA if 
                the IAEA has requested complementary access 
                involving location-specific environmental 
                sampling; or
                    (B) has requested under Article 8 of the 
                Additional Protocol that the IAEA engage in 
                complementary access in the United States that 
                involves the use of location-specific 
                environmental sampling.

SEC. 254. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

    As used in this subtitle, the term ``necessary to increase 
the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear 
activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State 
Party'' shall not be construed to encompass proposed uses of 
environmental sampling that might assist the IAEA in detecting 
undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-
nuclear-weapon State Party by--
            (1) setting a good example of cooperation in the 
        conduct of such sampling; or
            (2) facilitating the formation of a political 
        consensus or political support for such sampling in the 
        territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party.

 Subtitle F--Protection of National Security Information and Activities

SEC. 261. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.

    (a) Locations and Facilities of Direct National Security 
Significance.--No current or former Department of Defense or 
Department of Energy location, site, or facility of direct 
national security significance shall be declared or be subject 
to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol.
    (b) Information of Direct National Security Significance.--
No information of direct national security significance 
regarding any location, site, or facility associated with 
activities of the Department of Defense or the Department of 
Energy shall be provided under the Additional Protocol.
    (c) Restricted Data.--Nothing in this title shall be 
construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA 
or IAEA employees of restricted data controlled by the 
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et 
seq.), including in particular ``Restricted Data'' as defined 
under paragraph (1) of section 11 y. of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
2014(y)).
    (d) Classified Information.--Nothing in this Act shall be 
construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA 
or IAEA employees of national security information and other 
classified information.

SEC. 262. IAEA INSPECTIONS AND VISITS.

    (a) Certain Individuals Prohibited From Obtaining Access.--
No national of a country designated by the Secretary of State 
under section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2371) as a government supporting acts of international 
terrorism shall be permitted access to the United States to 
carry out an inspection activity under the Additional Protocol 
or a related safeguards agreement.
    (b) Presence of United States Government Personnel.--IAEA 
inspectors shall be accompanied at all times by United States 
Government personnel when inspecting sites, locations, 
facilities, or activities in the United States under the 
Additional Protocol.
    (c) Vulnerability and Related Assessments.--The President 
shall conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related 
assessments not less than every 5 years to ensure that 
information of direct national security significance remains 
protected at all sites, locations, facilities, and activities 
in the United States that are subject to IAEA inspection under 
the Additional Protocol.

                          Subtitle G--Reports

SEC. 271. REPORT ON INITIAL UNITED STATES DECLARATION.

    Not later than 60 days before submitting the initial United 
States declaration to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, 
the President shall submit to Congress a list of the sites, 
locations, facilities, and activities in the United States that 
the President intends to declare to the IAEA, and a report 
thereon.

SEC. 272. REPORT ON REVISIONS TO INITIAL UNITED STATES DECLARATION.

    Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA any 
revisions to the United States declaration submitted under the 
Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to Congress a 
list of any sites, locations, facilities, or activities in the 
United States that the President intends to add to or remove 
from the declaration, and a report thereon.

SEC. 273. CONTENT OF REPORTS ON UNITED STATES DECLARATIONS.

    The reports required under section 271 and section 272 
shall present the reasons for each site, location, facility, 
and activity being declared or being removed from the 
declaration list and shall certify that--
            (1) each site, location, facility, and activity 
        included in the list has been examined by each agency 
        with national security equities with respect to such 
        site, location, facility, or activity; and
            (2) appropriate measures have been taken to ensure 
        that information of direct national security 
        significance will not be compromised at any such site, 
        location, facility, or activity in connection with an 
        IAEA inspection.

SEC. 274. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL 
                    PROTOCOLS.

    Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the 
Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on--
            (1) measures that have been or should be taken to 
        achieve the adoption of additional protocols to 
        existing safeguards agreements signed by non-nuclear-
        weapon State Parties; and
            (2) assistance that has been or should be provided 
        by the United States to the IAEA in order to promote 
        the effective implementation of additional protocols to 
        existing safeguards agreements signed by non-nuclear-
        weapon State Parties and the verification of the 
        compliance of such parties with IAEA obligations, with 
        a plan for providing any needed additional funding.

SEC. 275. NOTICE OF IAEA NOTIFICATIONS.

    The President shall notify Congress of any notifications 
issued by the IAEA to the United States under Article 10 of the 
Additional Protocol.

              Subtitle H--Authorization of Appropriations

SEC. 281. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
necessary to carry out this title.
    And the Senate agree to the same.

                                   Henry Hyde,
                                   John Boehner,
                                   Tom Lantos,
                                 Managers on the Part of the House.

                                   Richard G. Lugar,
                                   Chuck Hagel,
                                   George Allen,
                                   Bill Frist,
                                   Joe Biden,
                                   Chris Dodd,
                                Managers on the Part of the Senate.
       JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE

      The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at 
the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on 
the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 5682), to exempt 
from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a 
proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India, submit 
the following joint statement to the House and the Senate in 
explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the 
managers and recommended in the accompanying conference report:
      The Senate amendment struck all of the House bill after 
the enacting clause and inserted a substitute text.
      The House recedes from its disagreement to the amendment 
of the Senate with an amendment that is a substitute for the 
House bill and the Senate amendment. The differences between 
the House bill, the Senate amendment, and the substitute agreed 
to in conference are noted below, except for clerical 
corrections, conforming changes made necessary by agreements 
reached by the conferees, and minor drafting and clarifying 
changes.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

      With the fading of the Cold War's global divisions and 
the rise of new challenges such as globalization and trans-
national terrorism, there is increasing recognition in both the 
United States and in India that significant benefits may be 
obtained from closer cooperation across a broad spectrum of 
activities and policies. These range from shared strategic 
interests, such as enhanced stability and security in South 
Asia and the international system as a whole, to more specific 
priorities, including greater effectiveness in combating the 
AIDS epidemic, combating terrorism, and preventing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among others.
      To that end, on July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement 
announcing a `global partnership' between the two countries. 
The Joint Statement covered a range of issues and common 
interests, including the re-establishment of civil nuclear 
commerce between the United States and India.
      In the Joint Statement, India committed to placing more 
of its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in perpetuity, signing and 
adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian 
nuclear facilities, working with the United States for the 
conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, 
refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies to states that do not have them and supporting 
international efforts to limit their spread, ensuring that the 
necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and 
technology through comprehensive export control legislation and 
through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
guidelines, and continuing its moratorium on further nuclear 
testing.
      For the United States, President Bush committed that he 
would ``work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation 
with India as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear power 
and achieving energy security'' and to ``seek agreement from 
Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies'' to permit that 
cooperation. President Bush also promised to ``work with 
friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable 
full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, 
including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel 
supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.''
      The Administration's proposed legislation envisioned 
Congress granting the President the authority to waive certain 
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) that contain 
restrictions on cooperation that the Administration deemed to 
be impediments to conducting civil nuclear cooperation with 
India. Section 123 a.(2) of the AEA requires that a non-nuclear 
weapon state have IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material in 
all peaceful nuclear activities in that state, under its 
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere 
(commonly referred to as ``full-scope safeguards'') as a 
condition of continued United States nuclear supply and 
approval for new nuclear cooperation agreements, a requirement 
that India does not meet and, as a state with nuclear weapons, 
would be unlikely to meet for the foreseeable future. Section 
128 requires a non-nuclear weapon state (under the NPT, which 
recognizes only five ``Nuclear Weapon States''--Russia, France, 
China, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to have full-
scope safeguards as a prerequisite for receiving U.S. civil 
nuclear exports. Finally, Section 129 requires the termination 
of nuclear exports if a non-nuclear weapon state has, among 
other things, tested nuclear weapons after 1978, which India 
did in 1998. There are waivers available to the President for 
these provisions in existing law. But the standard for such 
waivers is very high.
      In addition, international civil nuclear commerce is 
restricted pursuant to the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers of 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group. NSG Guidelines permit such trade 
with countries only when the receiving State has brought into 
force an agreement with the IAEA requiring the application of 
safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in 
its current and future peaceful activities.
      The Administration's proposed legislation would have 
given the President the authority to permanently waive these 
provisions for India, subject to the President's determination 
that India had achieved certain benchmarks, such as engaging in 
negotiations with the IAEA on a safeguards agreement and that 
the NSG has agreed to provide an exemption for India to allow 
its participating states to export civil nuclear materials, 
equipment, and technology to India.
      Under existing law, a nuclear cooperation agreement with 
a country that does have full-scope safeguards and that 
satisfies other criteria under 123a. of the AEA would come into 
force 90 days after its submission for congressional review 
unless a resolution of disapproval were passed in both Houses. 
In practice, it is very difficult to secure passage of such 
resolutions because a veto by the President of the joint 
resolution would require a two-thirds vote in both Houses to 
override.
      By contrast, nuclear cooperation agreements with 
countries, such as India, that do not satisfy all the 
conditions of 123a, such as full-scope safeguards, can come 
into effect only if both Houses of Congress pass a joint 
resolution of approval within 90 days. If either chamber does 
not approve the resolution, the agreement does not enter into 
force.
      The Administration's legislative proposal sought to avoid 
this latter procedure by providing for a process of 
congressional consideration of a 123 agreement with India such 
as that reserved for countries that do have full-scope 
safeguards. In that event, a nuclear cooperation agreement with 
India would come into force automatically unless both Houses of 
Congress passed a joint resolution of disapproval. In effect, 
the Administration's proposal would have given it excessive 
latitude in negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement with 
India, leaving Congress with little ability to influence the 
terms of that agreement, regardless of any concerns it might 
have.
      Both the House International Relations Committee and the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected this approach, 
believing that the Administration's proposal did not provide 
for appropriate congressional oversight over what was, by any 
measure, an unprecedented nuclear cooperative relationship with 
India. Both committees were troubled by the lack of 
consultation by the Administration with Congress before the 
July 18, 2005 Joint Statement and the March 2006 U.S.-India 
Declaration (in which the terms by which India would separate 
its civil and military nuclear facilities and further 
commitments by the United States were announced).
      Consequently, both committees introduced legislation 
that, while informed by the Administration's proposal, reverts 
to existing procedures laid out in the AEA for approval of 123 
agreements that do not meet the criteria of section 123 a. The 
Conference agreement grants the President the ability to waive 
the aforementioned sections of the AEA for a future U.S.-India 
agreement for civil nuclear cooperation. However, any such 
agreement cannot enter into force until it has been submitted 
to the Congress, along with a completed IAEA-India safeguards 
agreement and other documents and Presidential determinations 
such as a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment (required by the AEA 
and by this legislation, as detailed in the section-by-section 
review of this report), and approved by both Houses according 
to the existing procedures of Section 130(i) of the AEA. 
Furthermore, the Administration's ability to waive existing 
provisions of section 129 of the AEA, which mandates the 
termination of U.S. civil nuclear exports to a country if that 
country tests a nuclear explosive device, terminates or 
abrogates IAEA safeguards, materially violates an IAEA 
safeguards agreement, or engages in other activities related to 
nuclear proliferation, is limited to any such activities India 
engaged in prior to July 18, 2005. Any such future activity by 
India would invoke Section 129, subject to the waiver 
provisions already available to the President in existing law. 
Thus, the Conference agreement provides that for other conduct 
that, under section 129, would result in termination of 
cooperation, that section would continue to apply. If India 
were to terminate or abrogate IAEA safeguards (129(1)(B)), 
materially violate IAEA safeguards (129(1)(C)), violate an 
agreement for cooperation with the United States (129(2)(A)), 
encourage a non-nuclear weapon state to engage in proliferation 
activities involving source and special nuclear material 
(129(2)(B)), or engage in unauthorized proliferation of 
reprocessing technology (129(2)(C)), the Conference agreement 
would terminate cooperation. The Administration's bill would 
have made section 129 inapplicable to such future actions on 
the part of India.
      As further clarified in the section-by-section analysis 
included in this report, the conferees believe that there 
should be no ambiguity regarding the legal and policy 
consequences of any future Indian test of a nuclear explosive 
device. In that event, the President must terminate all export 
and reexport of U.S.-origin nuclear materials, nuclear 
equipment, and sensitive nuclear technology to India. The 
conferees expect the President to make full and immediate use 
of U.S. rights to demand the return of all nuclear-related 
items, materials, and sensitive nuclear technology that have 
been exported or reexported to India if India were to test or 
detonate, or otherwise cause the test or detonation of, a 
nuclear explosive device for any reason, including such 
instances in which India describes its actions as being ``for 
peaceful purposes.'' This legal condition is further 
strengthened in the Conference agreement beyond section 129 of 
the AEA by a provision that the waiver authority in this 
legislation terminates with any Indian test. The conferees 
believe that termination would include the suspension and 
revocation of any current or pending export or reexport 
licenses, and that the return of U.S.-origin items and 
materials should extend to any special nuclear material 
produced by India through the use of any nuclear materials, 
equipment, or sensitive nuclear technology exported or 
reexported to India by the United States.
      The prohibition concerning a recipient country not 
engaging in activities involving source or special nuclear 
material under Section 129 are permanently waived for India, as 
India will undoubtedly continue to produce fissile material, 
until such time after it is able to fulfill its commitment in 
the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement to work with the United 
States toward conclusion of a future Fissile Material Cut-off 
Treaty.
      H.R. 5682 reflects the widely held view in both the House 
and the Senate that peaceful nuclear cooperation with India can 
serve multiple U.S. foreign policy and national security 
objectives but that this must be secured in a manner that 
minimizes potential risks to the global nonproliferation 
regime. Among the most important considerations are ensuring 
that NSG guidelines and consensus decision-making are upheld 
and that a U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement and subsequent 
U.S. nuclear exports are consistent with the decisions, 
policies, and guidelines of the NSG. The conferees note that 
the converse is equally important, namely that the United 
States must ensure that any decision that the NSG makes 
regarding granting an exemption for nuclear commerce does not 
disadvantage U.S. industry by setting less strict conditions 
for countries trading with India than those embodied in the 
conditions and requirements of this Act. Since the NSG operates 
by consensus, the United States possesses the necessary 
leverage to ensure a favorable outcome, and the conference 
agreement reflects this view.
      The bill requires, as a condition for the President to 
exercise his waiver authority, that the NSG agree by consensus 
to an exception to its guidelines specifically for India and 
that no U.S. exports may be transferred to India that do not 
comport with NSG guidelines and decisions. Equally important is 
the need to ensure that U.S. cooperation does not assist the 
Indian nuclear weapons program, directly or indirectly, in 
order to avoid contributing to a nuclear arms race in South 
Asia and in accordance with U.S. obligations under the NPT.
      As in the Administration's proposed legislation, H.R. 
5682 requires the President to determine that India is 
upholding its July 18, 2005, commitments as a prerequisite for 
using his waiver authority. The conferees believe that India's 
continued implementation of those commitments is central to the 
integrity of our bilateral relationship. Therefore, the bill 
contains reporting requirements and a provision that calls for 
termination of exports in the event of violations of certain 
commitments. In addition, the bill seeks to uphold existing 
statutory congressional oversight of U.S. nuclear cooperation 
and exports. At a time when many countries are considering 
nuclear energy as a viable and desirable alternative to carbon-
based energy sources, careful oversight of its expansion is 
crucial.
      The establishment of a ``global partnership'' with India 
is among the most important strategic diplomatic initiatives 
undertaken by this Administration. This partnership, along with 
the extensive set of cooperative agreements that accompany it, 
embraces a long-term outlook that seeks to strengthen U.S. 
foreign policy and enhance global stability.
      The House International Relations Committee and the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee studied carefully the 
implications of the proposed agreement for nonproliferation 
policy. Both committees were concerned about the precedent this 
exception for India could establish and worked to ensure that 
this agreement does not undercut U.S. compliance with its 
responsibilities under the NPT. As a result of these efforts, 
each committee's bill was approved overwhelmingly by its 
respective chamber. The conferees believe that the conference 
agreement achieves a proper balance among competing priorities 
and concerns and will help solidify New Delhi's commitments to 
implement strong export controls, separate its civilian nuclear 
infrastructure from its weapons program, and place additional 
civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards. An agreement for 
peaceful nuclear cooperation with India approved by Congress 
according to the procedures and conditions of this conference 
report would be a powerful incentive for India to cooperate 
more closely with the United States in stopping proliferation 
and to abstain from further nuclear weapons tests.
      The Administration's decision to establish an 
increasingly close relationship with this country of enormous 
potential, and its declaration that the U.S. welcomes India's 
advancement as a major economic and political player on the 
world stage represents a new and significant strategic 
opportunity to advance U.S. goals. Given that India already 
possesses a vibrant democracy, a rapidly growing economy, and a 
well-educated middle class greater than the entire U.S. 
population, it can serve as an engine of global economic 
growth. Its increasing economic, military, and political power 
may also contribute significantly to promoting stability in 
South Asia and other regions.
      India has the potential to become a valued partner in 
countering the rise of extremism around the world as both 
countries can cooperate to promote religious pluralism, 
tolerance, and democratic freedoms. As a country with well-
entrenched democratic traditions and the world's second largest 
Muslim population, India can set an example of a multi-
religious and multi-cultural democracy in an otherwise volatile 
region.
      The conferees believe that the conference agreement will 
help solidify India's commitments to implement strong export 
controls, separate its civilian nuclear infrastructure from its 
weapons program, and place additional civilian facilities under 
IAEA safeguards. An agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation 
with India approved by Congress according to the procedures and 
conditions of this conference report would be a powerful 
incentive for India to cooperate closely with the United States 
in halting proliferation and abstaining from additional tests 
of nuclear weapons. The conferees, along with both Houses, 
place great emphasis on their expectation that India's full 
cooperation with efforts by the U.S. and the international 
community to prevent Iran from acquiring the capability to 
produce nuclear weapons will be forthcoming.
      India is already assuming a more prominent role in world 
affairs. Its votes in the IAEA Board of Governors in September 
2005 and February 2006 regarding Iran's likely efforts to 
acquire a nuclear weapons capability are evidence that the 
Government of India is able and willing to adopt a more 
constructive role on international non-proliferation issues. 
The Conferees believe the true test of the wisdom of this 
legislation, which will be the effectiveness of India's new 
commitments and obligations regarding nuclear nonproliferation, 
can be judged only over time. India is determined to secure a 
more prominent role in global affairs. This agreement will 
provide it with enhanced incentives to use its rapidly 
expanding influence to promote regional and international 
stability and global economic progress.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

          TITLE I--UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

Section 101. Short title
      Section 101 states that this title may be cited as the 
``Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy 
Cooperation Act of 2006''.
Section 102. Sense of Congress
      Section 102 combines provisions relating to the Sense of 
Congress in the House bill and in the Senate amendment. It 
expresses the Sense of Congress regarding the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and the principles that should guide the 
United States in entering into an agreement on nuclear 
cooperation with a country that has never been a State Party to 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Paragraph (1) 
states that preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the means to 
deliver these are critical objectives for United States foreign 
policy. Paragraph (2) states that sustaining the NPT and 
strengthening its implementation is the keystone of United 
States non-proliferation policy. Paragraph (3) states that the 
NPT has been a significant success in preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons capabilities to other countries and in 
maintaining a stable international security situation. 
Paragraph (4) states that countries that have never become a 
party to the NPT and remain outside that treaty's legal regime 
pose a potential challenge to the achievement of the overall 
goals of global nonproliferation because those countries have 
not undertaken the NPT's international obligation to prohibit 
the spread of dangerous nuclear technologies. Paragraph (5) 
states that it is in the interest of the United States to 
ensure to the fullest extent possible that those countries that 
are not States Party to the NPT act responsibly in the 
disposition of any nuclear technology they develop.
      Paragraph (6) states that it is in the interest of the 
United States to cooperate with a country that has never signed 
the NPT with respect to civilian nuclear technology if that 
country meets certain criteria. These criteria include 
demonstrating responsible behavior with respect to the 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons technology and the means to 
deliver these weapons; the country has a functioning and 
uninterrupted democratic system of government, has a foreign 
policy that is congruent with that of the United States, and is 
working with the United States in key foreign policy 
initiatives related to non-proliferation; such cooperation 
induces the country to promulgate and implement substantially 
improved protections against the proliferation of technology 
related to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them and 
also to refrain from actions that would further the development 
of its nuclear weapons program; and that such cooperation will 
induce the country to give greater political and material 
support to the achievement of U.S. global and regional 
nonproliferation objectives, especially with respect to 
dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, sanctioning and 
containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups 
and that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or 
other WMD capability and the means to deliver such weapons.
      Paragraph (7) states that the United States should 
continue its policy of engagement, collaboration, and exchanges 
with and between India and Pakistan. Paragraph (8) states that 
strong bilateral relations with India are in the national 
interest of the United States. Paragraph (9) states that the 
United States and India share common democratic values and the 
potential for increasing and sustained economic engagement. 
Paragraph (10) states that commerce in civil nuclear energy 
with India by the United States and other countries has the 
potential to benefit the people of all countries.
      Paragraph (11) states that civil nuclear commerce with 
India represents a significant change in U.S. policy toward 
countries not parties to the NPT and stresses that the NPT 
remains the foundation of the international non-proliferation 
regime. Paragraph (12) states that any commerce in civil 
nuclear energy with India by the United States and other 
countries must be achieved in a manner that minimizes the risk 
of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and maximizes 
India's adherence to international nonproliferation regimes, 
including, in particular, the guidelines of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group. Paragraph (13) states that the United States 
should not seek to facilitate or encourage the continuation of 
nuclear exports to India by any other party if such exports are 
terminated under United States law.
Section 103. Statements of policy
      Section 103 contains provisions from the House bill and 
from the Senate amendment and sets forth two sets of policies 
of the United States: those general in nature and those 
specific to South Asia.
      Subsection (a) states that it shall be the policy of the 
United States to:
            1. Oppose the development of a capability to 
        produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon 
        state, within or outside of the NPT;
            2. Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret 
        the right to ``develop research, production and use of 
        nuclear energy for peaceful purposes'', as set forth in 
        Article IV of the NPT, as being a right that applies 
        only to the extent that it is consistent with the 
        purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear 
        weapons and nuclear weapons capability, including by 
        refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any State 
        Party that the IAEA determines is not in full 
        compliance with its NPT obligations, including its 
        safeguards obligations;
            3. Act in a manner fully consistent with the NSG 
        guidelines concerning nuclear transfers and transfers 
        of nuclear-related dual-use items;
            4. Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions 
        concerning consultation by members regarding violations 
        of supplier and recipient understandings by instituting 
        the practice of a timely and coordinated response by 
        NSG members to all such violations, including 
        termination of all nuclear transfers to an involved 
        recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from 
        continuing cooperation with such recipient until such 
        time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response 
        has been achieved;
            5. Given the special sensitivity of equipment and 
        technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the 
        reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production 
        of heavy water, work with members of the NSG, 
        individually and collectively, to further restrict the 
        transfers of such equipment and technologies, including 
        to India; and
            6. Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of 
        nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other 
        participating governments in the NSG or from any other 
        source if nuclear transfers to that country are 
        suspended or terminated pursuant to this title, the 
        Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or 
        any other United States law.
      Regarding the second statement, the conferees note that 
the NPT was conceived for the specific and overriding purpose 
of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
explosive devices, as stated in the Preamble and its first 
three Articles. All provisions of the NPT must be interpreted 
within the context of preventing the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear explosive devices; and Article IV 
conditions a country's ``inalienable right to develop research, 
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination'' on that country's conformity with 
Articles I, II, and III, which obligate each non-nuclear weapon 
State Party ``not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or 
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices.''
      The conferees believe that, because the processes of 
enriching uranium or separating plutonium for peaceful or 
military purposes are essentially identical, they inherently 
pose an enhanced risk of proliferation, even under strict 
international safeguards. Rights under Article IV of the NPT 
must be properly understood and exercised only insofar as they 
are consistent with preventing the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Therefore, the world must not accept a claim by a non-
nuclear weapon state of a right to develop or possess a 
complete nuclear fuel cycle if that country has not provided 
convincing evidence that its nuclear activities are fully 
safeguarded from contributing to a nuclear weapons capability.
      Regarding the third and fourth statements, the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group, although not a formal organization that can 
issue legally-binding directives, is nonetheless one of the 
most effective elements of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. For a generation, U.S. Presidents have forged in this 
forum an important international consensus on the need to 
prevent nuclear proliferation by controlling the export of 
sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology. The 
conferees believe strongly that no bilateral objective, even 
the important objective of a new relationship with India, 
should be allowed to undermine the NSG's effectiveness. The 
United States must continue to abide by the NSG Guidelines, 
which it has worked so diligently to achieve.
      Equally, the United States must maintain the consensus 
decision mechanism of the NSG, and not look for any way around 
that requirement. The conferees believe that the effectiveness 
of the NSG rests upon its consensus decision-making, resulting 
in unified policies and enhanced compliance with those 
policies. The conferees are mindful that a country outside the 
regime that seeks an exception from NSG guidelines could agree 
to stringent safeguards with some NSG members, but later import 
only from other NSG members that did not impose such 
requirements. To preclude such a scenario, the conferees urge 
the Executive branch to persuade other NSG members to act in 
concert in terms of the timing, scope, and safeguarding of 
nuclear supply to all countries, including India. In 
particular, the conferees intend that the United States seek 
agreement among NSG members that violations by one country of 
an agreement with any NSG member should result in joint action 
by all members, including, as appropriate, the termination of 
nuclear exports. In addition, the conferees intend that the 
Administration work with individual states to encourage them to 
refrain from sensitive exports.
      Regarding the sixth statement, if U.S. exports to a 
country were to be suspended or terminated pursuant to U.S. 
law, it will be U.S. policy to seek to prevent the transfer to 
such country of nuclear equipment, material or technology from 
other sources. This concern could arise if, for example, there 
were a nuclear test explosion, termination or abrogation of 
IAEA safeguards, material violation of IAEA safeguards or an 
agreement of cooperation with the United States, assistance or 
encouragement of a non-nuclear weapon state in nuclear-weapons 
related activities or reprocessing-related activities, or (in 
India's case) failure to uphold its July 18, 2005, Joint 
Statement commitments. In such a circumstance, the conferees 
expect the United States to encourage other supplier countries 
not to undermine U.S. sanctions.
      On March 6, 2006, the Indian Prime Minister told the 
Indian Parliament that the U.S. Government had said that if a 
disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the U.S. would, 
with India, jointly convene a group of friendly supplier 
countries, such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom, to 
pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India. The 
conferees understand and expect that such assurance of supply 
arrangements that the U.S. is party to will be concerned only 
with disruption of supply of fuel due to market failures or 
similar reasons, and not due to Indian actions that are 
inconsistent with the July 18, 2005, commitments, such as a 
nuclear explosive test.
      Subsection (b) states that, with respect to South Asia, 
it shall be U.S. policy to:
            1. Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a 
        moratorium on the production of fissile material for 
        nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the 
        People's Republic of China;
            2. Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the 
        conclusion and implementation of a treaty banning the 
        production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to 
        which both the United States and India become parties;
            3. Secure India's full participation in the 
        Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), formal 
        commitment to the PSI's Statement of Interdiction 
        Principles, public announcement of its decision to 
        conform its export control laws, regulations, and 
        policies with the Australia Group and with the 
        Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Control Lists of 
        the Wassenaar Arrangement, and demonstration of 
        satisfactory progress toward implementing this 
        decision; and ratification of or accession to the 
        Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
        Damage;
            4. Secure India's full and active participation in 
        U.S. efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, 
        sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire 
        WMDs, including a nuclear weapons capability and the 
        capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel 
        and the means to deliver WMDs;
            5. Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon 
        arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction 
        and eventual elimination;
            6. Ensure that spent fuel generated in India's 
        civilian nuclear power reactors is not transferred to 
        the United States except under procedures required 
        under section 131f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;
            7. Pending implementation of the multilateral 
        moratorium or treaty described in paragraphs (1) and 
        (2), encourage India not to increase its production of 
        fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;
            8. Ensure that any safeguards agreement or 
        Additional Protocol to which India is a party with the 
        IAEA can reliably safeguard any export or reexport to 
        India of nuclear materials and equipment;
            9. Ensure that the text and implementation of any 
        agreement for cooperation with India meet the 
        requirements set forth in subsections a.(l) and a.(3) 
        through a.(9) of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 
        of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153); and
            10. Ensure that any nuclear power reactor fuel 
        reserve provided to the Government of India for use in 
        safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be 
        commensurate with reasonable reactor operating 
        requirements.
      The conferees believe that a U.S.-India nuclear 
cooperation agreement will mark an important and positive 
turning point in the U.S.-India relationship. This does not 
mean, however, that the United States should sacrifice its 
long-standing objectives for non-proliferation in South Asia. 
This subsection states that U.S. policy must be to continue to 
support a fissile material moratorium in South Asia and a halt 
to the increase in nuclear arsenals in the region, which would 
bring great benefits to India and its neighbors. The United 
States must also continue to work for a broader fissile 
material production halt, whether through Fissile Material Cut-
off Treaty negotiations or, for example, through an agreement 
reached by all the countries that have fissile material for 
nuclear weapons purposes.
      The conferees believe also that India has a significant 
role to play in preventing the proliferation of dangerous 
nuclear technologies to other countries and that India must be 
a part of the international effort to prevent Iran from 
acquiring weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear 
weapons. The conferees fully expect and look forward to the day 
when India joins the world community in conforming to the full 
range of nonproliferation and export control regimes. In the 
July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, India committed to accept the 
``same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same 
benefits and advantages as other leading countries with 
advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States.'' 
India's welcome steps regarding nuclear and missile-related 
export controls are important progress in this regard, but the 
other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology will 
expect India to join them also in stemming the flow of items 
that can contribute to chemical and biological weapons programs 
and of destabilizing types or amounts of certain conventional 
weapons. India's participation in the Proliferation Security 
Initiative would also be of great benefit to the world and to 
the region.
      It is also vital that India hasten the day when it can 
halt the production of fissile material for weapons, as four of 
the five nuclear weapon states under the NPT have openly done. 
The conferees understand that India cannot do this alone, and 
therefore urge the Executive branch to pursue a joint 
moratorium by India, Pakistan and China, as well as a 
multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material 
for nuclear weapons.
      The conferees believe it is critical to secure India's 
full participation in U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons, a position held by many members of 
both houses of Congress. The conferees express their 
appreciation for India's favorable votes on this issue in the 
IAEA Board of Governors and its statements that Iran should 
indeed cooperate with the IAEA and refrain from developing 
nuclear weapons. They understand also that India has long-
standing ties with Iran. Precisely because India has those 
ties, it can and must play a prominent and positive role in 
convincing Iran that the path of cooperation and of nuclear 
development with international assurances, but without an 
indigenous full fuel cycle, is far preferable to the path of 
obduracy and isolation in order to develop uranium enrichment 
and plutonium production capabilities.
      The United States has an obligation under Article I of 
the NPT not to ``in any way assist, encourage, or induce a non-
nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons.'' Many nonproliferation experts have noted the 
need to avoid a nuclear arms race in South Asia, as well as to 
ensure that U.S. assistance does not encourage India to 
increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded 
nuclear facilities. The conferees understand that U.S. peaceful 
nuclear cooperation with India will not be intended to inhibit 
India's nuclear weapons program. At the same time, however, 
such cooperation must be conducted in a manner that does not 
assist that program. That is why the conferees stress the need 
for effective safeguards on nuclear-related exports or 
reexports to India, the need to meet the requirements in 
sections a.(1) and a.(3) through a.(9) of section 123 of the 
Atomic Energy Act, and the need for any nuclear fuel reserve 
provided to the Government of India to be commensurate with 
reasonable reactor operating requirements, rather than of a 
size that would enable India to break its commitments or end 
its moratorium on nuclear testing and maintain its civil 
nuclear energy production despite unilateral or international 
sanctions.
      Indian officials have publicly stated that under the 
U.S.-India agreement, India will be able to produce as much 
fissile material for weapons purposes as it desires. At the 
same time, however, many experts have said that there is no 
reason why India would need or want to increase that production 
significantly. The conferees hope that India will demonstrate 
restraint and not increase significantly its production of 
fissile material. If civil nuclear commerce were to be seen, 
some years from now, as having in fact contributed to India's 
nuclear weapons program, there could be severe consequences for 
nuclear cooperation, for U.S.-Indian relations, and for the 
world-wide nuclear nonproliferation regime.
      India's March 2006 nuclear facility separation plan 
stated: ``The United States will support an Indian effort to 
develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against 
any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's 
reactors.'' Congress has not been able to determine precisely 
what was said on this matter in high-level U.S.-Indian 
discussions. U.S. officials testified, however, that the United 
States does not intend to help India build a stockpile of 
nuclear fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that 
might be imposed in response to Indian actions such as 
conducting another nuclear test. The conferees understand that 
nuclear reactor facilities commonly have some fresh fuel 
stored, so as to minimize down time when reactor cores are 
removed. They endorse the Senate proposal, however, that there 
be a clear U.S. policy that any fuel reserve provided to India 
should be commensurate with normal operating requirements for 
India's safeguarded reactors.
Section 104. Waiver authority and Congressional approval
      The conference agreement adopts the framework of the 
House bill, but adds a number of provisions from the Senate 
amendment.
      Section 104(a) provides the President with authority to 
exempt an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with India 
and nuclear exports to India from certain sections of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) that would otherwise present 
obstacles to approving and implementing such an agreement. 
Specifically, the waiver authority applies to sections 123 
a.(2), 128, and 129.
      Both the House of Representatives and the Senate 
concurred with the administration regarding the need for relief 
from the requirement in section 123 a.(2) of the AEA, which 
would otherwise require that India agree to put all its nuclear 
facilities under IAEA safeguards. They concluded, in 
particular, that the Executive branch would be unable to meet 
the standard in existing law for exempting a U.S.-India 
agreement from this requirement, namely that failure to make 
the proposed exception/waiver would be ``seriously prejudicial 
to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives 
or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.'' The 
conferees recommend allowing the President to exempt an 
agreement with India from the requirement in section 123 a.(2) 
of the AEA without making this determination. Instead, 
subsection 104(a) requires that the President make the 
determination in subsection 104(b).
      The conferees emphasize their intent, however, that 
section 123 a.(2) be the only portion of the AEA from which 
their recommendation provides relief. The Executive branch will 
still be required to coordinate and submit to Congress a 
Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement under section 123. 
In addition, an agreement for cooperation with India will still 
have to meet the requirements of section 123 a.(1) and a.(3) 
through (9), unless the President can meet the standard quoted 
above for exempting the agreement from one or more of those 
requirements.
      The conferees recommend subsection 104(e), moreover, 
which amends section 123 a. of the AEA so as to make clear that 
an agreement with India for which the President has exercised 
the waiver provided by subsection 104(a) of this title will be 
considered under existing AEA procedures for approval of an 
agreement for cooperation exempted from one of the requirements 
of section 123 a. These procedures provide for expedited 
consideration of a joint resolution of approval of the 
agreement, but do not permit the agreement to enter into force 
unless and until a joint resolution of approval is enacted. 
Parliamentary practice in the two houses of Congress is that 
the expedited joint resolution will not contain any conditions 
to their approval of the agreement and will not be subject to 
amendment. Congress could pass a joint resolution of approval 
with conditions, but would have to proceed without benefit of 
the expedited procedures offered by sections 123 and 130 of the 
AEA.
      Section 104(a)(2) provides the President authority to 
waive section 128 of the AEA with respect to exports to India, 
without the additional limitations proposed in the House bill.
      In addition, this title would allow the President to 
waive the restrictions of section 129 a.(1)(A) of the AEA for 
any activity that occurred on or before July 18, 2005, and also 
to waive the restrictions of section 129 a.(1)(D). This would 
provide authority to waive a termination of nuclear exports 
that would otherwise be required because of President Clinton's 
determination that India had tested a nuclear explosive device 
in 1998, while keeping in place the requirement to cut off 
exports should India test in the future. It would also provide 
waiver authority for cessation of U.S. nuclear exports to India 
in the event that the President determines that India has 
``engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear 
material and having direct significance for the manufacture or 
acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to 
take steps which, in the President's judgment, represent 
sufficient progress toward terminating such activities.'' This 
waiver will be necessary because India will presumably continue 
to produce material for its nuclear weapons program, consistent 
with its separation plan.
      Subsection (b) requires the President to make the 
following determinations:
            (1) India has provided the United States and the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency with a credible plan 
        to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, 
        materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration 
        regarding its civil facilities and materials with the 
        IAEA;
            (2) India and the IAEA have concluded all legal 
        steps required prior to signature by the parties of an 
        agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards 
        in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, 
        principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of 
        Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India's civil 
        nuclear facilities, materials, and programs as declared 
        in its separation plan, including materials used in or 
        produced through the use of India's civil nuclear 
        facilities;
            (3) India and the IAEA are making substantial 
        progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol 
        consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and 
        policies that would apply to India's civil nuclear 
        program;
            (4) India is working actively with the United 
        States for the early conclusion of a multilateral 
        treaty on the cessation of the production of fissile 
        materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
        explosive devices;
            (5) India is working with and supporting U.S. and 
        international efforts to prevent the spread of 
        enrichment and reprocessing technology to any state 
        that does not already possess full-scale, functioning 
        enrichment or reprocessing plants;
            (6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure 
        nuclear and other sensitive materials and technology, 
        including through: the enactment and enforcement of 
        comprehensive export control legislation and 
        regulations; harmonization of its export control laws, 
        regulations, policies, and practices with the policies 
        of the MTCR and the NSG, and adherence to the MTCR and 
        the NSG in accordance with the procedures of those 
        regimes for unilateral adherence;
            (7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit 
        supply to India of nuclear items covered by the 
        guidelines of the NSG.
      The conferees intend that the need for these 
determinations will make certain that measures needed to ensure 
that the agreement can safely come into force are in place, 
e.g., a safeguards agreement negotiated with the IAEA, and that 
India has fulfilled key obligations it undertook freely in its 
July 18, 2005, statement and in subsequent statements. The 
conferees recognize that a number of these conditions will 
require considerable expenditure of effort and resources to 
satisfy, such as the negotiation of an Additional Protocol that 
must be tailored to India's unique needs, and for that reason 
have 15 allowed for significant latitude regarding their 
completion. But the conferees believe that none of these 
conditions, either singly or in combination with others, is 
onerous. In addition, although they did not impose rigorous 
measurements or deadlines, the conferees intend that 
considerable substantive progress on the foregoing measures can 
be demonstrated, including India's cooperation with the United 
States to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing 
technology and its taking steps to strengthen its export laws 
and regulations.
      The House bill required a determination that India and 
the IAEA ``have concluded'' a safeguards agreement, while the 
Senate version required that the agreement ``has entered into 
force.'' The conferees want to ensure that the Congress can 
have confidence that the text of the safeguards agreement, 
which will be provided when an agreement with India is 
submitted to Congress, is what will actually come into effect. 
The conferees recognize, however, that there might well be a 
delay between the approval of a safeguards agreement and the 
date of its entry into force. They understand also that India 
may be wary of signing a safeguards agreement with the IAEA 
before an agreement for cooperation with the United States has 
been approved.
      The conferees recommend that the President be required to 
determine that India and the IAEA have concluded all legal 
steps required prior to signature by the parties of a 
safeguards agreement that conforms to IAEA standards, 
principles, and practices. They have been assured that 
signature is the final step in the process of negotiating and 
approving a safeguards agreement. Normally, safeguards 
agreements enter into force upon signature. The Executive 
branch understands that Congress must be confident that the 
India-IAEA safeguards agreement text it is shown when an 
agreement for cooperation is submitted is, in fact, what will 
be signed and come into force. The conferees believe that 
Congress will be able to rely upon a text that has gone through 
all legal steps required prior to signature by the parties.
      With regard to Indian adherence to the MTCR and the NSG, 
the conferees understand that there are specific procedures 
that a country uses to unilaterally adhere to such regimes. The 
conferees also understand that the Government of India is aware 
of those procedures.
      Paragraph (7) requires a presidential determination that 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided by consensus to permit 
supply to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of 
the NSG. The conferees believe that it is vital to maintain the 
role and effectiveness of the NSG, a position which is 
consistent with statements by senior Administration officials. 
This provision ensures that the NSG will change its guidelines, 
or grant an exemption from them, only in accordance with its 
longstanding practice that all such changes require consensus 
among its participating governments.
      Subsection (c) requires the President to submit to the 
House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee the determination described in subsection 
(b) and a report regarding this determination that includes:
            (1) summaries and copies of India's separation plan 
        and of its declaration of which of its civil nuclear 
        facilities will be placed under IAEA safeguards, 
        including an analysis of the credibility of the plan 
        and declaration;
            (2) a summary of the safeguards agreement between 
        India and the IAEA, including a copy of the agreement 
        and a description of progress toward its full 
        implementation
            (3) a summary of the progress made toward 
        concluding and implementing an Additional Protocol 
        between India and the IAEA, including a description of 
        the scope of that Additional Protocol;
            (4) a description of the steps India is taking to 
        work with the United States for the conclusion of a 
        multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile 
        material for nuclear weapons, including a description 
        of the steps the United States has taken and will take 
        to encourage India to identify and declare a date by 
        which India would be willing to stop production of 
        fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally or 
        pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty;
            (5) a description of the steps India is taking to 
        prevent the spread of nuclear-related technology, 
        including enrichment and reprocessing technology or 
        materials that can be used to acquire nuclear weapons 
        technology, as well as the support that India is 
        providing to the United States to restrict the spread 
        of such technology;
            (6) a description of the steps that India is taking 
        to secure materials and technology applicable for the 
        development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of 
        mass destruction and the means to deliver such weapons 
        through the application of comprehensive export control 
        legislation and regulations, and through harmonization 
        and adherence to MTCR, NSG, Australia Group, and 
        Wassenaar Arrangement guidelines, as well as compliance 
        with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, 
        and participation in the Proliferation Security 
        Initiative;
            (7) a description and assessment of the specific 
        measures that India has taken to fully and actively 
        participate in United States and international efforts 
        to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and 
        contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass 
        destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and 
        the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear 
        fuel, and the means to deliver weapons of mass 
        destruction;
            (8) a description of the NSG decision regarding 
        India, including whether the U.S.-India civil nuclear 
        cooperation agreement is consistent with the decision 
        and with the practices and policies of the NSG;
            (9) a description of the scope of peaceful 
        cooperation envisioned by the United States and India 
        that will be implemented under the Agreement for 
        Nuclear Cooperation, including whether such cooperation 
        will include the provision of enrichment and 
        reprocessing technology; and
            (10) a description of the measures the United 
        States will take to prevent the use of any United 
        States equipment, technology, or nuclear material by 
        India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or for any 
        activity related to nuclear explosive devices, and 
        ensure that the provision of nuclear reactor fuel does 
        not result in increased production of fissile material 
        in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
      Since the IAEA Board of Governors resolved that Iran was 
in noncompliance with its safeguards and NPT obligations in 
September 2005, diplomatic negotiations to dissuade, sanction 
and contain the Iranian nuclear program have been largely 
unsuccessful. It is imperative to obtain the support of key 
states to develop measures that would enable the world 
community once again to have confidence in both Iran's nuclear 
intentions and the ability to monitor developments. India's 
support, as a long-time leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and 
as a state with military and economic relations with Iran, is 
particularly important. The conferees believe that India's full 
and active participation in U.S. and international efforts to 
dissuade, sanction, and contain Iran's nuclear program would 
greatly benefit both the region and the world, and that the 
report on its efforts in this regard, required by subparagraph 
(c)(2)(G) will be of great interest to many Members of 
Congress.
      There has been much concern about the possibility that 
the provision of nuclear technology and nuclear fuel to India 
could indirectly assist or encourage India's nuclear weapons 
program. To increase confidence that no such developments will 
take place, the conferees recommend the reporting requirement 
in subparagraph (c)(2)(J). The report should address the 
potential replication of U.S.-origin nuclear technology in 
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in India, as well as the 
possible utilization of foreign nuclear fuel supplies in a 
manner that leads to the increased production of fissile 
material in India's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities using 
domestic uranium reserves. Further, the conferees urge the 
Administration to encourage India to exercise the utmost 
restraint with respect to its nuclear weapons program, 
including with respect to any new reactor that would increase 
India's plutonium production capability.
      Subsection (d) provides, in part, that:
            (1) nothing in this title constitutes authority to 
        carry out any civil nuclear cooperation between the 
        U.S. and a country that is not a nuclear-weapon State 
        Party to the NPT that would in any way assist, 
        encourage, or induce that country to manufacture or 
        otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive 
        devices;
            (2) no item subject to the transfer guidelines of 
        the NSG may be transferred to India if such transfer 
        would be inconsistent with the guidelines in effect on 
        the date of the transfer; and
            (3) exports of nuclear and nuclear-related 
        material, equipment, or technology to India shall be 
        terminated if India makes any materially significant 
        transfer of nuclear or nuclear-related material, 
        equipment, or technology that does not conform to NSG 
        guidelines or ballistic missiles or missile-related 
        equipment or technology that does not conform to MTCR 
        guidelines, unless the President either determines that 
        cessation of such exports would be seriously 
        prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation 
        objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense 
        and security; or chooses not to terminate exports 
        because: the transfer was made without the knowledge of 
        the Government of India; at the time of the transfer, 
        either the Government of India did not own, control or 
        direct the Indian person that made the transfer or the 
        Indian person that made the transfer is a natural 
        person who acted without knowledge of any entity 
        described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of section 110(5); 
        and the President certifies to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that the Government of India 
        has taken or is taking appropriate judicial or other 
        enforcement actions against the entity with respect to 
        such transfer.
      As stated above, the conferees believe the NPT is the 
keystone of U.S. nonproliferation policy and must be sustained 
and strengthened. The United States has always abided by its 
obligation under Article I of the NPT to not in any way assist, 
encourage, or induce non-nuclear weapon states to manufacture 
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive 
devices. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 set a 
standard almost thirty years ago for the United States in its 
civil nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear weapon states by 
requiring those states to have full-scope safeguards. In making 
an exception for a future nuclear cooperation agreement with 
India in this bill, it is paramount to ensure that nothing in 
such cooperation would undermine America's commitment to abide 
by Article I of the NPT. The conferees recommend paragraph 
104(d)(I) to underscore this view.
      Section 104(d)(2) is one of several provisions in the 
bill intended to ensure that any civil nuclear cooperation 
between the United States and India strengthens rather than 
weakens the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. This 
provision contributes to the achievement of this objective by 
prohibiting the transfer to India of any item the transfer of 
which is subject to (1) a U.S.-India agreement for cooperation, 
(2) the NSG Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254, Part 
1), or (3) the NSG Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related 
Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology 
(INFCIRC/254, Part 2), if such transfer would be inconsistent 
with either of the aforementioned NSG guidelines as in effect 
on the date of the transfer. No waiver authority is provided to 
permit transfers to be made notwithstanding this restriction.
      This restriction will ensure that U.S.-India nuclear 
cooperation continues to be carried out in a manner consistent 
with the transfer guidelines and policies of the NSG. The 
Administration has expressed confidence that the NSG will 
adjust its guidelines in order to permit civil nuclear 
cooperation along the lines contemplated by the July 18, 2005, 
Joint Statement of President Bush and Prime Minister Singh. 
Further, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has publicly 
assured Congress, by means of a letter dated June 28, 2006, to 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, 
that:

            * * * in carrying out the laws and regulations of 
        the United States governing the export of nuclear-
        related items, the United States Government will 
        continue to act in accordance with IAEA INFCIRC/254, as 
        amended, the Guidelines and Annexes of the Nuclear 
        Suppliers Group. The U.S. will also continue to act 
        within the policies and practices of the decisions 
        taken by the Nuclear Suppliers Group with respect to 
        India. We intend to do so notwithstanding any contrary 
        actions by any other participating countries in the 
        Nuclear Suppliers Group.

      Section 104(d)(3) reflects the importance the conferees 
attach to India's commitments in the July 18, 2005, Joint 
Statement to secure its nuclear materials and nuclear and 
missile technology through comprehensive export control 
legislation and through harmonization and adherence to MTCR and 
NSG guidelines. These two steps are critical to bringing India 
closer to the nonproliferation mainstream, one of the benefits 
attributed to U.S. nuclear cooperation with India by the 
Administration. Failure to conform to these nuclear and missile 
export control guidelines, both in principle and in practice, 
would represent a failure by India to meet the nonproliferation 
standards expected of other responsible states.
      This provision mandates termination of exports under an 
agreement for cooperation with India if an Indian person 
engages in transfers that are not consistent with NSG or MTCR 
guidelines. The term ``Indian person,'' which is defined in 
subsection 110(5), is used in a legal sense, to encompass both 
individuals and entities of all sorts that are under India's 
jurisdiction, as well as governmental entities. The term 
includes non-Indian nationals, if they are under India's 
jurisdiction.
      As no export control system is perfect, the conferees 
recommend that the threshold of violation be one of material 
significance. This should eliminate any concern that the sale 
of a ``widget'' to the wrong country could trigger the sanction 
in paragraph 104(d)(2).
      The conferees recommend granting to the President two 
separate waiver authorities regarding this sanction. The first 
could be exercised if the President determines that cessation 
of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the 
achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or 
otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.
      The second waiver could be used if the offending transfer 
was made without the knowledge of the Government of India, such 
transfer was made either by an Indian person not owned, 
controlled, or directed by the Government of India at the time 
of the transfer, or by an individual who acted alone without 
the knowledge of the relevant Indian entity, and the President 
certified to the appropriate congressional committees that the 
Government of India has taken or is taking appropriate judicial 
or other enforcement actions against the Indian person with 
respect to such transfer. The conferees do not intend that an 
Indian individual working alone for private gain and without 
the knowledge of the entity for which that individual works 
would trigger the restrictions in this section. However, if 
such individual is a senior officer of such entity, the 
conferees believe that constructive knowledge must be deemed to 
exist. In a case where it is impossible for the Government of 
India to bring judicial or other enforcement action against an 
Indian person because the government cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over the person or entity, or if the Government of 
India cannot bring an enforcement action because of its good 
faith interpretation of applicable law, or for some other 
reason, the statutory requirement that ``appropriate'' action 
be taken to avoid the termination required in subparagraph (A) 
may be deemed fulfilled. The conferees thus intend not to put 
an agreement for cooperation with India in jeopardy, but rather 
to encourage India's compliance with its commitments and to 
allow sanctions to be waived if compliance efforts are in 
train. It is the President's responsibility, however, to show 
in his certification to Congress that such circumstances 
limiting the Government of India's enforcement actions truly 
exist, and are not in reality an evasion of the intent of this 
provision that India exercise true oversight over the persons 
and entities that operate within its territory or jurisdiction.
      The conferees understand that, if necessary, the 
President could use his waiver authority to give India some 
time in which to commence appropriate enforcement actions. The 
conferees intend, however, that any such waiver would be for a 
limited period and would be withdrawn if the expected 
enforcement failed to materialize.
      Section 104(d)(4) derives from a provision in the Senate 
bill that prohibited the export and reexport to India of any 
equipment, materials, or technology related to the enrichment 
of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the 
production of heavy water to India, except where the Indian end 
user is a multinational facility participating in an IAEA-
approved program to provide alternatives to national fuel cycle 
capabilities or a facility participating in a bilateral or 
multinational program to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel 
cycle, and where the President determines that the export or 
reexport will not improve India's ability to produce nuclear 
weapons or fissile material for military uses. The conferees 
recommend the Senate provision with an amendment.
      Section 104(d)(4) regulates U.S. cooperation with India 
in the areas of uranium enrichment, reprocessing of spent fuel 
and heavy water production. Under the Atomic Energy Act, such 
cooperation is not restricted, but agreements for cooperation 
must specify if such cooperation is to take place.
      In dealing with such matters as related to India, the 
conferees have paid particular attention to the general status 
of such cooperation under U.S. law and with all nations that 
currently have 123 agreements with the United States, and to 
the policies of the present Administration. The conferees note 
that all but one currently active Section 123 agreement (with 
Australia) specifically prohibit such cooperation. In order to 
meet the requirement of Section 123 a.(9) of the Atomic Energy 
Act (that equipment, material, or production or utilization 
facilities produced as a result of a U.S. nuclear cooperation 
agreement will be subject to all the other requirements of 
Section 123 a.), it has been deemed necessary to amend 
agreements for cooperation, submitting them to Congress for 
approval. In 1999, when the United States Government opted to 
expand U.S.-Australian nuclear cooperation to allow for 
cooperation in the SILEX uranium enrichment process, an amended 
agreement was submitted to Congress for approval.
      The conferees intend that, should any such cooperation 
with India be contemplated, either the original agreement for 
cooperation would specify that such cooperation is authorized 
or a subsequently amended agreement would be submitted to the 
Congress. In either circumstance, existing congressional 
prerogatives to review and approve such cooperation would be 
maintained. The conferees note that the Administration has 
already stipulated that ``full civil nuclear cooperation,'' the 
term used in the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement between 
President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh, will not 
include enrichment or reprocessing technology. This is 
consistent with President Bush's February 11, 2004, speech at 
the National Defense University, in which he stated that 
``enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations 
seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,'' and 
the fact that, other than in the SILEX arrangement with 
Australia, the United States does not currently engage in 
cooperation regarding enrichment or reprocessing technology 
with any country.
      The conferees recommend an additional provision, not 
contained in the original Senate bill, that would add a 
requirement that appropriate measures will be in place to 
ensure that no sensitive nuclear technology (SNT), as defined 
in section 4(5) of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 
U.S.C. 3203(5)), will be diverted to any person, site, 
facility, location, or program not under IAEA safeguards.
      The conferees believe that this language is necessary to 
ensure that no SNT related to the enrichment of uranium (which 
can be used to make highly-enriched uranium for weapons), the 
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (which can provide plutonium 
for weapons), or the production of heavy water (which is used 
in reactors that produce weapons-grade plutonium and tritium as 
a byproduct) is transferred to India, unless under 
circumstances that provide assurance that this technology would 
not be diverted to a similar site, facility, location, or 
program not associated with peaceful nuclear fuel-cycle 
activities.
      India currently produces heavy water, operates heavy-
water moderated reactors, reprocesses spent nuclear fuel, and 
has a limited uranium enrichment capability. Only a portion of 
India's facilities will be under IAEA safeguards, and sensitive 
nuclear technologies will reside in India in both safeguarded 
and un-safeguarded facilities. The conferees seek to ensure 
that the United States does not provide, even inadvertently, 
assistance to India that could further India's development of 
these technologies for noncivilian purposes. Such assistance 
could be viewed as a violation of U.S. obligations under 
Article I of the NPT.
      The conferees intend that no licenses be issued pursuant 
to Parts 110 and 810 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the 
Secretary of Energy except under the requirements of 
subparagraph (B) of subsection 104(d)(4). Such a restriction on 
transfers would also extend to any Department of Energy 
authority to transfer enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water 
production-related technology, not pursuant to a Section 123 
agreement.
      The conferees note that section 104(d)(4) cannot override 
the terms of an agreement for cooperation with India arranged 
pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act that may not 
permit such cooperation and would thus bar such exports or 
transfers, and the conferees do not intend to create such 
authority. They expect that, as in other nuclear cooperation 
agreements, the Executive branch would submit an amended or new 
nuclear cooperation agreement to cover enrichment, 
reprocessing, or heavy water production-related cooperation, 
should such a change be undertaken in the future with India. 
Such an agreement would not be pursuant to the terms of this 
title, and would have to be submitted under the existing 
exemption authority contained in section 123 of the AEA.
      Section 104(d)(5) contains broad requirements for a 
nuclear export accountability program to be carried out with 
respect to U.S. exports and re-exports of nuclear materials, 
equipment, and technology sold, leased, exported, or reexported 
to India. Such a program can provide increased confidence in 
India's separation of its civilian from its military nuclear 
programs, facilities, materials and personnel, and also would 
further ensure United States compliance with Article I of the 
NPT and implementation of section 123 a.(1) of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954. The provision is not intended to reflect 
poorly on India's July 18, 2005, Joint Statement commitments 
and its March and May 2006 separation documents. Rather, the 
conferees believe that the resulting and regular cooperation 
between U.S. regulatory agencies, in particular with the NRC, 
can provide a basis for even greater cooperation between the 
two nations.
      Section 104(d)(5) provides a large degree of flexibility 
to the President. Clauses (B)(i) and (ii) require sufficient 
measures to ensure that all the assurances and conditions of 
any licenses or authorizations issued for exports and reexports 
to India by the NRC (which are issued under 10 CFR Part 110) 
and by the Secretary of Energy (which are issued pursuant to 10 
CFR Part 810) are being met and complied with in India. Clause 
(B)(ii) would require that, with respect to any authorizations 
issued by the Secretary of Energy pursuant to section 57 b. of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)): the 
identified recipients of the nuclear technology are authorized 
to receive the nuclear technology; the nuclear technology 
identified for transfer will be used only for safeguarded 
nuclear activities and will not be used for any military or 
nuclear explosive purpose; and the nuclear technology 
identified for transfer will not be retransferred without the 
prior consent of the United States, and facilities, equipment, 
or materials derived through the use of transferred technology 
will not be transferred without the prior consent of the United 
States.
      Section 104(d)(5)(B)(iii) mandates that, in the event the 
IAEA is unable to implement safeguards as required by an 
agreement between the United States and India approved pursuant 
to this title, there be appropriate assurance that arrangements 
will be put in place expeditiously that are consistent with the 
requirements of section 123 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding the maintenance of 
safeguards as set forth in the agreement regardless of whether 
the agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason. 
Assurances that there will be such ``fall-back safeguards,'' if 
needed, are an important feature of agreements for nuclear 
cooperation; they enable such safeguards to exist more clearly 
in perpetuity. There is always a possibility that budget or 
personnel strains in the IAEA will render it unable to fulfill 
a safeguards mandate. Such strains would likely have nothing to 
do with India, but would have a major impact on the ability of 
the United States to assure that U.S. exports were being used 
responsibly. The conferees intend to assure that the 
requirements of section 123 a.(1) are fully met; they do not 
intend to impose a more intrusive regime than arrangements that 
have been used before in one or more U.S. agreements for 
cooperation.
      Section 104(e) makes a conforming amendment to section 
123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The purpose of this 
provision is to make clear that the U.S.-India agreement on 
civil nuclear cooperation, even if exempted from subsection 
a.(2) of section 123, may enter into force only if approved by 
Congress by a joint resolution of approval, consistent with 
current law with regard to an agreement that the President 
exempts from any requirement of subsection a. of section 123. 
As with any other agreement submitted under section 123 d., the 
congressional approval procedures under section 130 i. of the 
Atomic Energy Act would apply.
      Section 104(f) provides that the authority under 
subsection (a)(1) to exempt a U.S.-India agreement on civil 
nuclear cooperation will terminate if a joint resolution, 
approved as required under section 123 d. (as amended by 
subsection (e)), is enacted. The purpose of this provision is 
to ensure that a future President may not use the authority of 
this title to exempt a new U.S.-India agreement on civil 
nuclear cooperation.
      Section 104(g) provides for several reports to Congress.
      Paragraph (1) requires the President to keep the 
appropriate congressional committees fully and currently 
informed of the facts and implications of any significant 
nuclear activities of India. This requirement includes 
information on any material noncompliance on the part of the 
Government of India with the nonproliferation commitments 
undertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, the March 
7, 2006, separation plan, the future IAEA-India safeguards 
agreement and Additional Protocol, a peaceful nuclear 
cooperation agreement between India and the United States, the 
terms and conditions of any approved licenses regarding the 
export or reexport of nuclear material or dual-use material, 
equipment, or technology, and United States laws and 
regulations regarding such licenses. This reporting requirement 
also encompasses information regarding the construction of a 
nuclear facility in India after the date of the enactment of 
this title, significant changes in the production by India of 
nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile material 
produced, and changes in the purpose or operational status of 
any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.
      The term ``fully and currently informed'' creates an 
obligation upon the Executive branch to inform the appropriate 
committees whenever significant information becomes available, 
rather than waiting to include it in a regularly scheduled 
report. This does not mean that the committees can expect daily 
or weekly briefings; rather, the Executive branch is trusted to 
use common sense in determining how best to discharge its duty 
to keep the committees up to date on important information.
      Paragraph (2) requires an ``Implementation and Compliance 
Report'' by the President to Congress not later than 180 days 
after the date on which a civil nuclear cooperation agreement 
between the U.S. and India enters into force and annually 
thereafter.
      This report must include a description of any additional 
nuclear facilities and nuclear materials that the Government of 
India has placed or intends to place under IAEA safeguards; a 
comprehensive listing of all licenses that have been approved 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Secretary of 
Energy for exports and reexports to India under parts 110 and 
810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations; any licenses 
approved by the Department of Commerce for the export or 
reexport to India of commodities, related technology, and 
software which are controlled for nuclear nonproliferation 
reasons on the Nuclear Referral List of the Commerce Control 
List maintained under part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal 
Regulation, or any successor regulation; any other United 
States authorizations for the export or reexport to India of 
nuclear materials and equipment; and with respect to each such 
license or other form of authorization as described: (1) the 
number or other identifying information of each license or 
authorization; (2) the name or names of the authorized end user 
or end users; (3) the name of the site, facility, or location 
in India to which the export or reexport was made; (4) the 
terms and conditions included on such licenses and 
authorizations; (5) any postshipment verification procedures 
that will be applied to such exports or reexports; and (6) the 
term of validity of each such license or authorization.
      This report must also include information regarding any 
significant nuclear commerce between India and other countries, 
including any such trade that is not consistent with applicable 
NSG guidelines or decisions, or would not meet the standards 
applied to exports or reexports of such material, equipment, or 
technology of United States origin. In addition, the report 
must include either an assessment that India is in full 
compliance with the commitments and obligations contained in 
the agreements and other documents referenced above; or an 
identification and analysis of all compliance issues arising 
with regard to the adherence by India to its commitments and 
obligations, including (1) the steps the U.S. Government has 
taken to remedy or otherwise respond to such compliance issues; 
(2) the responses of the Government of India to such steps; (3) 
the steps the U.S. Government will take to this end in the 
coming year; and (4) an assessment of the implications of any 
continued noncompliance, including whether nuclear commerce 
with India remains in the national security interest of the 
United States.
      Further, the report must contain an assessment of whether 
India is fully and actively participating in United States and 
international efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, 
sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and 
the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel, and 
the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction, including a 
description of the specific measures that India has taken in 
this regard; and if India is not assessed to be fully and 
actively participating in these efforts, a description of: the 
measures the United States Government has taken to secure 
India's full and active participation, the responses of the 
Government of India to such measures, and the measures the 
United States Government plans to take in the coming year to 
secure India's full and active participation.
      The report must provide an analysis of whether United 
States civil nuclear assistance to India is in any way 
assisting India's nuclear weapons program, including through 
the use of any U.S. equipment, technology, or nuclear material 
by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-
weapons related complex; the replication and subsequent use of 
any U.S. technology by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear 
facility or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or 
for any activity related to the research, development, testing, 
or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; and the provision 
of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to facilitate the increased 
production by India of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium in 
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
      A detailed description is also required regarding U.S. 
efforts to promote national or regional progress by India and 
Pakistan in disclosing, securing, limiting, and reducing their 
fissile material stockpiles, including stockpiles for military 
purposes, pending creation of a world-wide fissile material 
cut-off regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material 
Cut-off Treaty; the responses of India and Pakistan to such 
efforts; and assistance that the United States is providing, or 
would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan to promote the 
aforementioned national and regional progress by India and 
Pakistan.
      The report must also contain an estimate of the amount of 
uranium mined and milled in India during the previous year, the 
amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated 
for the production of nuclear explosive devices, and the rate 
of production in India of fissile material for nuclear 
explosive devices and of nuclear explosive devices, along with 
an estimate of the amount of electricity India's nuclear 
reactors produced for civil purposes during the previous year, 
and the proportion of such production that can be attributed to 
India's declared civil reactors, given that India's military 
reactors produce some electricity for use in the civil sector. 
In addition, there must be an analysis as to whether imported 
uranium has affected the rate of production in India of nuclear 
explosive devices.
      The report must also provide a detailed description of 
efforts and progress made toward the achievement of India's 
full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and 
formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles 
of the PSI; public announcement of its decision to conform its 
export control laws, regulations, and policies with the 
Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, 
and Controls List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and effective 
implementation of these decisions.
      Finally, this report requires information regarding the 
disposal during the previous year of spent nuclear fuel from 
India's civilian nuclear program, and any plans or activities 
relating to future disposal of such spent nuclear fuel.
      Paragraph (3) allows the President to submit the 
aforementioned reports under Paragraph (2) with other annual 
reports. The report shall be unclassified but may contain a 
classified annex.
Section 105. United States compliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation 
        Treaty obligations
      Sec. 105 states that nothing in this title constitutes 
authority for any action in violation of an obligation of the 
United States under the NPT. As stated earlier in this report, 
the conferees consider the NPT to be the cornerstone of U.S. 
nuclear nonproliferation policy. They expect the Executive 
branch to keep its NPT obligations in mind when considering 
each export or reexport, transfer, or retransfer pursuant to an 
agreement for cooperation, and especially pursuant to such an 
agreement with a state that is not a State Party to the NPT.
Section 106. Inoperability of determination and waivers
      Sec. 106 states that a determination and any waiver under 
section 104 shall cease to be effective if the President 
determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device 
after the date of the enactment of this Act. The conferees 
intend this section to make absolutely clear a point that 
already follows from section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 
U.S.C. 2158). This title affords no waiver from section 129 for 
an Indian nuclear detonation after July 18, 2005.
Section 107. MTCR adherent status
      Section 107 is included to clarify the status accorded to 
India. Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 
mandates sanctions on transfers of MTCR equipment or technology 
if the President determines that a foreign person knowingly 
exports, transfers, or otherwise engages in the trade of any 
MTCR equipment or technology that contributes to the 
acquisition, design, development, or production of missiles in 
a country that is not an MTCR adherent and would be, if it were 
United States-origin equipment or technology, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States under the AECA; or if a 
foreign person conspires to or attempts to engage in such 
export, transfer, or trade; or if a foreign person facilitates 
such an export, transfer, or trade by any other person; or if 
the President has made a determination with respect to a 
foreign person under section 11B(b)(1) of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)). 
Section 73 of AECA is, however, inapplicable to MTCR adherents 
if the export in question is ``any export, transfer, or trading 
activity that is authorized by the laws of an MTCR adherent, if 
such authorization is not obtained by misrepresentation or 
fraud'' or if the export, transfer, or trade of an item is to 
an end user in a country that is an MTCR adherent (section 
73(b)). Section 73 also provides for the termination of 
sanctions when an MTCR adherent takes steps toward effective 
judicial enforcement against persons violating the prohibitions 
in section 73, if such actions are ``comprehensive'' and are 
``performed to the satisfaction of the United States'' and the 
findings of such proceedings are satisfactory to the United 
States (section 73(c)(1)(A) and (B) and section 73(c)(2)).
      Secretary Rice has stated that ``India would not be 
considered an `MTCR Adherent' as defined under Section 73'' 
because:

            India has committed to unilaterally adhere to the 
        Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines. 
        The missile sanctions law would generally still apply 
        to a ``unilateral adherent'' to the MTCR.
            Unilateral adherence to the MTCR Guidelines means 
        that a country makes a unilateral political commitment 
        to abide by the Guidelines and Annex of the MTCR. In 
        particular, an MTCR unilateral adherent commits to 
        control exports of missile-related equipment and 
        technology according the MTCR Guidelines, including any 
        subsequent changes to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex. 
        Inter alia, this means that MTCR unilateral adherent 
        countries need to have in place laws and regulations 
        that permit them to control the export of MTCR Annex 
        equipment and technology consistent with the MTCR 
        Guidelines.
            An ``MTCR Adherent'' is a specially defined status 
        in terms of Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act 
        (also referred to as the missile sanctions law). An 
        ``MTCR Adherent,'' as defined in Section 73 of the 
        missile sanctions law, is a country that 
        ``participates'' in the MTCR or that, ``pursuant to an 
        international understanding to which the United States 
        is a party, controls MTCR equipment and technology in 
        accordance with the criteria and standards set forth in 
        the MTCR.'' India's ``unilateral adherence'' to the 
        MTCR would not meet this requirement.

      Since India's unilateral adherence does not qualify it as 
an MTCR adherent under section 73 of AECA, the conferees 
included section 107 to clarify this point. While the provision 
accomplishes this, it is also drafted in such a manner as to 
permit India, should it so decide in the future, to enjoy the 
benefits of AECA section 73 by becoming a full adherent to the 
MTCR. Because the provision states a factual finding by 
Congress, the provision would no longer have effect if India 
were to meet the requirements laid out as in Secretary Rice's 
statement. Under section 107, however, India's transfers of 
missile or missile-related equipment, technology and technical 
data, remain for now subject to U.S. sanctions if they should 
violate subsection 73(a) of the AECA.
Section 108. Technical amendment
      Sec. 108 is a technical amendment regarding Section 
1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Authorization Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. 
Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted into law by section 
1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113 and contained in appendix G of 
that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A-486).
Section 109. United States-India Scientific Cooperative Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Program
      Section 109 authorizes the Secretary of Energy to 
establish a cooperative nuclear nonproliferation program to 
pursue jointly with scientists from the United States and India 
a program to further common nuclear nonproliferation goals, 
including scientific research and development efforts, with an 
emphasis on nuclear safeguards. The conferees believe that 
there are exciting opportunities for cooperative efforts 
between U.S. and Indian scientists and engineers in this area, 
and they hope that the two countries' civil nuclear power 
experts, in particular, will share new ideas and best practices 
for the benefit of all. Section 109 is not intended to create 
an obligation for India to meet, but rather to open an avenue 
for increased cooperation on topics of concern to both 
countries.
      Subsection (c) mandates that the Secretary of Energy 
enter into an agreement with the National Academies to develop 
recommendations for the implementation of the cooperative 
nonproliferation program. The National Academies, which 
include, inter alia, the National Academy of Sciences, the 
National Academy of Engineering, and the National Research 
Council, have a long and distinguished history of cooperation 
with Indian scientists and are skilled at building bridges to 
further joint efforts. The conferees encourage the Secretary of 
Energy to arrange for this National Academies assistance in the 
coming months, even if funds for the cooperative program cannot 
be appropriated until fiscal year 2008.
Section 110. Definitions
      Section 110 defines terms used in this Act.

       TITLE II--UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION

      Title II is a Senate provision, based almost entirely 
upon S. 2489, the U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act, 
reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 
3, 2006, in Senate Report 109-226. It implements the Additional 
Protocol between the United States and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (T. Doc. 107-7), to which the Senate gave advice 
and consent to ratification on March 31, 2004.
      The Senate adopted amendments to the S. 2489 text when it 
was debated as title II of this bill, and the conferees 
recommend a small number of further amendments. The conferees 
hereby incorporate by reference Senate Report 109-226, except 
where provisions were later amended either in the Senate or by 
the conferees.
      Sections 252 and 253 were modified by the Senate, 
principally to require that location-specific IAEA 
environmental sampling not be permitted in the United States 
under Article 5 of the Additional Protocol unless the President 
has determined and reported to the appropriate congressional 
committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental 
sampling that the proposed use of location-specific 
environmental sampling is necessary to increase the capability 
of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in a non-
nuclear weapon state. The conferees are persuaded that the IAEA 
is unlikely to propose such sampling, given that the United 
States, as a nuclear weapon state, is not barred from using 
fissile material for military purposes.
      The conferees are further persuaded that these sections 
will not prevent the United States from fulfilling its 
obligations under the Additional Protocol. This is true even 
though section 254, also added by the Senate, limits the 
purposes that may be construed as covered by the phrase 
``necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect 
undeclared nuclear activities in a non-nuclear weapon state.''
      Subtitle F of title II, Protection of National Security 
Information and Activities, was added by the Senate. Section 
261(a) provides that no current or former Department of Defense 
or Department of Energy location, site, or facility of direct 
national security significance shall be declared or be subject 
to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol. Similarly, 
under section 261(b), no information of direct national 
security significance regarding such locations, sites, or 
facilities shall be provided under the Additional Protocol. 
These requirements parallel statements that Administration 
officials have made for several years regarding how the 
Additional Protocol's national security exemption will be 
implemented.
      Sections 261(c) and 261(d) provide that nothing in this 
title shall be construed to permit the communication or 
disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees of restricted data 
controlled by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
or of national security information and other classified 
information. These provisions parallel an understanding in the 
resolution of ratification approved by the Senate in 2004 that 
the Additional Protocol does not require any such disclosure. 
The conferees note that these provisions do not bar the 
Executive branch, however, from using any other authority that 
it may possess to provide classified information to the IAEA.
      Section 262(a) provides that no national of a country 
designated by the Secretary of State under section 620A of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) as a government 
supporting acts of international terrorism shall be permitted 
access to the United States to carry out an inspection activity 
under the Additional Protocol or a related safeguards 
agreement. Both the Additional Protocol and the underlying 
U.S.-IAEA safeguards agreement allow the United States to bar 
individual inspectors from engaging in inspections in the 
United States, and the United States has routinely exercised 
that right as appropriate. The conferees know of no occasion on 
which a national of a state sponsor of terrorism has conducted 
an IAEA inspection in this country.
      Section 262(b) requires that IAEA inspectors be 
accompanied at all times by U.S. Government personnel when 
inspecting sites, locations, facilities, or activities in the 
United States under the Additional Protocol. The conferees 
understand that this provision will not require any change in 
current practices.
      Section 262(c) provides that the President shall conduct 
vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related assessments not 
less than every 5 years to ensure that information of direct 
national security significance remains protected at all sites, 
locations, facilities, and activities in the United States that 
are subject to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol. 
The conferees understand that once this title is enacted, the 
Executive branch will resume such assessments.
      Subtitle G of title II provides for several reports from 
the Executive branch. Sections 271 through 273 provide for 
prior notice of sites, locations, facilities, and activities in 
the United States to be declared to the IAEA or removed from 
that status, along with the reasons for those decisions; and 
certification that the necessary security assessments have been 
conducted and appropriate measures taken to ensure that 
information of direct national security significance will not 
be compromised.
      Section 274 provides for reports on: measures that have 
been or should be taken to achieve the adoption of additional 
protocols to existing safeguards agreements signed by non-
nuclear-weapon States Party; and on assistance that has been 
provided or should be provided by the United States to the IAEA 
in order to promote the effective implementation of additional 
protocols to existing safeguards agreements signed by non-
nuclear-weapon States Party and the verification of the 
compliance of such parties with IAEA obligations, with a plan 
for providing any needed additional funding. The conferees 
believe that the safeguards function is a vital element of U.S. 
nonproliferation policy and urge the Executive branch to 
maintain robust funding for U.S. assistance to the IAEA, taking 
into account the continuing need for improved safeguards in 
countries of concern, the additional safeguards load that the 
IAEA will have to bear when India begins to engage in large-
scale civil nuclear commerce, and the likely advent of 
additional safeguards requirements as the world moves to 
increase nuclear power production.
      Section 275 provides that the President shall notify 
Congress of any notifications issued by the IAEA to the United 
States under Article 10 of the Additional Protocol. Article 10 
says that the IAEA shall inform the United States of activities 
carried out under the Additional Protocol, including those in 
response to questions or inconsistencies the IAEA had brought 
to the attention of the United States, the results of those 
IAEA activities, and the conclusions that the IAEA has drawn. 
Article 10 notifications will take place at least annually.

                                   Henry Hyde,
                                   John Boehner,
                                   Tom Lantos,
                                 Managers on the Part of the House.

                                   Richard G. Lugar,
                                   Chuck Hagel,
                                   George Allen,
                                   Bill Frist,
                                   Joe Biden,
                                   Chris Dodd,
                                Managers on the Part of the Senate.