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109th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session                                                     109-360

======================================================================



 
                          COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

                                _______
                                

               November 16, 2006.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Roberts, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the 
                               following

                             SPECIAL REPORT

                            I. Introduction

    The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) 
dedicated much of its oversight efforts during the 108th 
Congress to the study of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 
issue, which resulted in the Report of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar 
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (Senate Report 108-301), 
published on July 9, 2004. In addition to this effort, the 
Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005 
reflect the Committee's attention to six priority areas: (1) 
revitalization of the National Security Agency (NSA); (2) 
improving human intelligence collection; (3) increased emphasis 
on advanced research and development; (4) greater access to and 
sharing of information across the Intelligence Community (IC); 
(5) elimination of unnecessary programs; and (6) greater 
organizational efficiency of the IC.
    The SSCI was established in 1976 by Senate Resolution 400 
to strengthen congressional oversight of the programs and 
activities of U.S. intelligence agencies. Throughout its 
history, the Committee has sought to carry out its oversight 
responsibilities in a non-partisan manner. During the 108th 
Congress, the Committee continued this tradition in crafting 
important intelligence legislation, conducting investigations 
and audits into IC and other national security issues, and 
authorizing--and as necessary, increasing or reallocating--
funding for a wide array of U.S. intelligence activities.
    As part of its oversight responsibilities, the Committee 
performs an annual review of the intelligence budget submitted 
by the President and prepares legislation authorizing 
appropriations for the various civilian and military agencies 
and departments comprising the IC. These entities include the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the 
intelligence capabilities of the military services, as well as 
the intelligence-related components of the Department of State, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the 
Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Department of 
Homeland Security. The Committee makes recommendations to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on authorizations for the 
intelligence-related components of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, 
U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps. The Committee also 
conducts periodic investigations, audits, and inspections of 
intelligence activities and programs.
    The Committee's charge is to ensure that the IC provides 
the accurate and timely intelligence necessary to identify and 
monitor threats to the national security and to support the 
Executive and Legislative branches in their decisions on 
national security matters; to ensure that U.S. military 
commanders have intelligence support to allow them to prevail 
swiftly and decisively on the battlefield; and, to ensure that 
all intelligence activities and programs conform with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States of America.

                            II. Legislation


                         A. INTELLIGENCE BUDGET

    During the 108th Congress, the Committee conducted annual 
reviews of the fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 budget 
requests for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the 
Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical 
Intelligence and Related Activities programs of the Department 
of Defense. In addition, the Committee reviewed supplemental 
funding requests for the same fiscal years in support of 
ongoing operations in Iraq and the global war on terror. As 
part of its review, the Committee received testimony from 
senior IC officials and evaluated the detailed budget 
justification documents submitted by the Executive branch.
    For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the Administration 
continued its requests for substantial increases in funds for 
the National Foreign Intelligence Program. Combined with large 
supplemental budgets for both fiscal years, the IC received 
unprecedented levels of funding during the 108th Congress. The 
Committee endorsed these increases but expressed concern that 
the IC is approaching a point where it will be difficult to 
absorb further increases.

         B. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

    On May 8, 2003, the Committee reported an original bill, S. 
1025, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. 
The bill and its classified supplement contained 
recommendations for annual authorization levels of funds 
appropriated for the intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government. In addition to 
authorized funding levels and certain technical amendments, the 
bill contained several unclassified substantive provisions, 
including:

          An amendment to Section 504 of the National Security 
        Act of 1947 to remove the criterion that reprogrammings 
        or transfers under that provision be based on 
        ``unforeseen requirements'';
          Modifications to Section 602 of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-
        359) to change unprogrammed construction notice-and-
        wait periods and to raise notification thresholds for 
        certain construction and renovation projects;
          Authorization for use of certain funds designated for 
        intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for 
        assistance to the Government of Colombia for 
        counterdrug activities;
          Establishment of a pilot program to provide analysts 
        throughout the IC with access to data collected by the 
        National Security Agency (NSA);
          Establishment of a pilot program to assess the 
        feasibility of a Reserve Officers' Training Corps-like 
        program to train intelligence analysts;
          Extension of the National Commission for the Review 
        of the Research and Development Program of the United 
        States Intelligence Community;
          Clarification and Modifications to Section 224 of the 
        USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56) to preserve 
        valuable and necessary intelligence exemptions 
        contained in Section 204 of that Act;
          Requirements for certain one-time reports and repeal 
        of some statutory reporting requirements that were 
        deemed of little continuing utility to the legislative 
        oversight process;
          Extension for an indefinite period of the 
        Congressionally-directed reorganization of the 
        Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office;
          Modifications to the Safe Explosives Act (Secs. 1121-
        28, Public Law 107-296) to ensure sufficient authority 
        for the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central 
        Intelligence to conduct the military and intelligence 
        activities of the U.S. Government;
          Amendments to Section 313 of the Immigration and 
        Naturalization Act to reflect the establishment of the 
        Department of Homeland Security and to ensure 
        consistency with other similar provisions of law;
          Expansion of the definition of ``financial 
        institution'' for purposes of Section 1114 of the Right 
        to Financial Privacy Act to reflect the growth in the 
        types of entities that provide financial services to 
        the public;
          A requirement for a joint report by the National 
        Science Foundation and the Office of Science and 
        Technology Policy designed to enhance the U.S. 
        Government's approach to security evaluations;
          Amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) 
        notification requirements under the CIA Act of 1949 
        regarding its personnel allowances and benefits similar 
        to those authorized for members of the Foreign Service;
          Protection for certain CIA and NSA personnel from 
        tort liability when those personnel take reasonable 
        action to prevent or stop a ``crime of violence'' or to 
        protect an individual from bodily harm;
          Exemption of certain NSA ``operational files'' from 
        the search and review requirements of the Freedom of 
        Information Act (FOIA);
          Provision of affordable living quarters for certain 
        students working at NSA laboratories; and
          Authorization for IC elements within the Department 
        of Defense to award personal services contracts.

    The Armed Services Committee took S. 1025 on sequential 
referral and reported the measure favorably with recommended 
amendments, S. Rep. 108-80 (June 26, 2003).
    S. 1025 was considered by the Senate on July 31, 2003. The 
measure, with the amendments recommended by the Armed Services 
Committee and additional amendments jointly proposed by 
Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller, was adopted by 
unanimous consent. Of particular note, the amendments adopted 
by the Senate:

          Mandated the submission of Independent Cost Estimates 
        by elements of the IC concerning the costs of 
        acquisitions of major systems;
          Required a report on the operations of the 
        Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
        Protection and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center; 
        and
          Permitted CIA employees to deposit certain bonus pay 
        to Thrift Savings Plan Accounts.

    The Senate then proceeded to consideration of H.R. 2417, 
the version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2004 passed by the House of Representatives, struck all 
after the enacting clause, and inserted the text of S. 1025. As 
amended, H.R. 2417 was passed by unanimous consent.
    In conference on H.R. 2417, the conferees from the House 
receded from their disagreement to the amendments of the 
Senate, and the conferees agreed to an amendment containing 
many provisions from both the House-passed andSenate-amended 
versions of H.R. 2417. In addition to modifications or deletions of 
some of the provisions noted above, the conferees:

          Established an Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
        within the Department of the Treasury;
          Authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 
        award certain personal services contracts;
          Modified the sunset provision governing the effect of 
        certain sanction laws to intelligence activities;
          Established a training program through the Department 
        of Homeland Security for State and local officials to 
        enhance information sharing activities between such 
        officials and the Federal Government;
          Mandated a pilot project to promote the recruitment 
        and retention of women and minorities throughout the IC 
        and encouraged the IC to recruit former members of the 
        Armed Forces for civilian positions;
          Authorized several counterintelligence reforms;
          Required a report on the Terrorist Screening Center;
          Ensured protection for classified information related 
        to certain judicial proceedings concerning money 
        laundering;
          Required the Director of Central Intelligence and 
        Secretary of Defense to incorporate basic sensor 
        research into the measurement and signatures 
        intelligence (MASINT) systems of the United States; and
          Authorized additional funds for NSA national security 
        scholarships.

    The conference report passed both houses and was signed by 
the President on December 13, 2003, becoming Public Law 108-
177.

 C. EXTENSION OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST THE 
                             UNITED STATES

    Following requests by the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) and the 
President, on February 26, 2004, the Committee reported a bill, 
S. 2136, extending the report deadline of the 9/11 Commission 
by two months, but requiring completion of all 9/11 
Commission's activities in 30 fewer days. The bill also 
authorized additional funding for the 9/11 Commission in order 
for it to complete its work.
    On February 27, 2004, the Senate passed S. 2136 by 
unanimous consent.
    The bill was referred to the House and passed without 
objection on March 3, 2004.
    The President signed the bill on March 16, 2004, enacting 
the measure as Public Law 108-207.

         D. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

    On May 5, 2004, the Committee reported an original bill, S. 
2386, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. 
The bill and its classified supplement contained 
recommendations for annual authorization levels of funds 
appropriated for the intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government. In addition to 
authorized funding levels, the bill contained several 
unclassified substantive provisions:

          Authorizing, for purposes of Section 504(a)(3) of the 
        National Security Act of 1947, funds appropriated for 
        fiscal year 2004 in excess of amounts specified in the 
        classified Schedule of Authorizations accompanying the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004;
          Amending Section 504 of the National Security Act of 
        1947 to remove the ``unforeseen requirements'' 
        criterion governing reprogrammings or transfers under 
        that provision;
          Authorizing the use of the Foreign Intelligence 
        Surveillance Act (FISA) to collect intelligence 
        information concerning non-United States persons who 
        engage in international terrorism without a known 
        affiliation with an international terrorist group;
          Requiring additional reports from the Attorney 
        General under the FISA;
          Repealing from S. Res. 400 (94th Cong.) the 
        limitation on length of service as a member of the 
        Senate Select Committee on Intelligence;
          Authorizing a permanent extension of the CIA 
        voluntary separation incentive program;
          Providing additional authority to enhance the cover 
        and ensure the secure operations of individuals serving 
        at the CIA under nonofficial cover;
          Repealing the sunset provision governing the use of 
        commercial activities as security for intelligence 
        collection activities of the Department of Defense;
          Providing an exemption from certain Privacy Act 
        requirements for human intelligence operations by the 
        Department of Defense; and
          Authorizing the use of certain funds designated for 
        intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for 
        assistance to the Government of Colombia for 
        counterdrug activities.

    The bill, S. 2386, was reported unanimously by the 
Committee. It was referred to the Armed Services Committee and 
reported favorably (S. Rep. 108-300) on July 8, 2004, with 
recommendations for certain amendments.
    S. 2386 was considered by the Senate on October 11, 2004. 
The measure, with the amendments recommended by the Armed 
Services Committee and additional amendments jointly proposed 
by Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller, was adopted 
by unanimous consent. Of particular note, the amendments 
adopted by the Senate:

          Required an intelligence assessment on sanctuaries 
        for terrorists;
          Extended the filing deadline for the report of the 
        National Commission for the Review of the Research and 
        Development Program of the United States IC; and
          Provided a four-year extension for the activities of 
        the Public Interest Declassification Board;

    Following passage of S. 2386, the Senate proceeded to 
consideration of H.R. 4548, the version of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 passed by the House of 
Representatives, struck all after the enacting clause, and 
inserted the text of S. 2386. As amended, H.R. 4548 was passed 
by unanimous consent.
    In conference on H.R. 4548, the conferees from the House 
receded from their disagreement to the amendments of the 
Senate, and the conferees agreed to an amendment containing 
many provisions from both the House-passed and Senate-amended 
versions of H.R. 4548. In addition to modifications or 
deletions of some of the provisions noted above, the conferees:

          Established a Chief Information Officer for the IC;
          Enhanced the authorities of the National Virtual 
        Translation Center;
          Encouraged the cooperation of the IC with 
        Congressional investigation of the Iraq Oil-for-Food 
        Program of the United Nations;
          Established an Emerging Technologies Panel for the 
        NSA;
          Provided additional funding and authorized additional 
        programs relating to the education, training, and 
        recruitment of IC personnel;
          Authorized a pilot project to establish a civilian 
        linguist reserve corps;
          Required a report on the status, consolidation, and 
        improvement of education programs that are supported, 
        funded and carried out by the IC or otherwise intended 
        to aid in the recruitment, retention, or training of IC 
        personnel;
          Mandated a report on the recruitment and retention of 
        Defense Language Institute instructors; and
          Required additional information on terrorist groups 
        to be included in certain reporting requirements under 
        Section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
        Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f)

    The conference report passed both houses and was signed by 
the President on December 23, 2004, becoming Public Law 108-
487.

                       III. Oversight Activities


 A. INQUIRY INTO THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE 
                          ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ

    In June 2003, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
initiated a review of U.S. intelligence on the existence of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Iraq's ties to terrorist 
groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in 
the region, and his violations of human rights.
    The Committee staff had, for the previous several months, 
already been examining aspects of intelligence activities 
regarding Iraq, including the IC's intelligence support to the 
United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection 
Commission (UNMOVIC) weapons inspections in Iraq and the IC's 
analysis and collection of reporting related to the alleged 
Niger-Iraq uranium deal.
    On June 20, 2003, the Committee agreed to also examine: (1) 
the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons 
of mass destruction programs, ties to terrorist groups, Saddam 
Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and 
his repression of his own people; (2) the objectivity, 
reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments 
reached by the IC; (3) whether those judgments were properly 
disseminated to policymakers in the Executive branch and 
Congress; (4) whether any influence was brought to bear on 
anyone to shape their analysis to support policy objectives; 
and (5) other issues identified in the course of the 
Committee's review.
    In the months that followed, the Committee staff reviewed 
approximately 100,000 pages of intelligence documents and 
interviewed more than 200 individuals including intelligence 
analysts and senior officials with the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of 
Defense, Department of Energy, Department of State, National 
Ground Intelligence Center, the Air Force, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. Staff also interviewed the Director of 
Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 
National Intelligence Officers, former intelligence analysts, 
operations officers, signals intelligence collectors, imagery 
analysts, nuclear experts with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Ambassadors, former United Nations inspectors, 
Department of Defense weapons experts, State Department 
officials, and National Security Council staff members. As part 
of the investigative effort, the Committee held four closed 
hearings on aspects of U.S. intelligence on Iraq: the Iraq-
Niger connection, the CIA and State Department Inspectors 
General report on the review of the Iraq-Niger issue, the 
history and continuity of weapons of mass destruction 
assessments pertaining to Iraq, and Iraq prewar intelligence.
    These efforts enabled the Committee to develop a full 
understanding of the quality and quantity of intelligence 
reporting on Iraq's WMD programs, Iraq's ties to terrorist 
groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in 
the region, and his violations of human rights. The Committee 
also gained an understanding of how intelligence analysts 
throughout the IC used that intelligence to develop their 
assessments, how the assessments were disseminated to 
policymakers, whether the assessments were reasonable, 
objective, and independent of political consideration, and 
whether any influence was brought to bear to shape their 
analysis to support policy objectives.
    In June 2004, the Committee unanimously approved a 
classified 500-page report on the Committee's findings and 
conclusions. An unclassified version of the report, which 
included Members' ``Additional Views'' was released in July 
2004 (S. Report 108-301).
    The Committee concluded that most of the major key 
judgments in the IC's National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's 
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either 
overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying 
intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in 
analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of 
intelligence. In particular, the Committee concluded that the 
IC suffered from ``group think'' in that there was a collective 
presumptionthat Iraq had an active and growing weapons of mass 
destruction program. This led analysts and managers to interpret 
ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as well 
as to ignore or minimize evidence to the contrary. This ``group think'' 
dynamic was so strong that formalized IC mechanisms to challenge 
assumptions, such as alternative analysis and red teams, were not used. 
A number of continuing systemic weaknesses, including a lack of 
information sharing and short-comings in human intelligence collection, 
contributed to the IC's failure to develop a reasonable assessment of 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities. The Committee found no 
evidence that Administration officials attempted to pressure analysts 
to change their judgments related to Iraq's WMD programs.
    The Committee found that the IC's analysis of Iraq's links 
to al-Qaida prior to the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was 
reasonable and objective based on the information available. 
Moreover, the categories outlined by the CIA to help define the 
``links'' between Iraq and al-Qaida--contacts, training, safe 
haven, and operational cooperation--were an appropriate and 
reasonable approach to the question. The Committee found that 
the CIA had an extensive historical knowledge of Iraq's ties to 
secular Palestinian groups and to the Mujahiddin e-Khalq, but 
far less information on any potential Iraqi regime ties to al-
Qaida. Additionally, the Committee concluded that the CIA 
reasonably assessed that Saddam Hussein was most likely to use 
his own intelligence service operatives to conduct attacks.
    Many IC agencies have taken the Committee's findings and 
conclusions, in conjunction with the results of post-war 
investigations of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, 
seriously and have implemented changes and reforms. The 
Committee continued to monitor those efforts and call for 
additional reform. On February 12, 2004, the Committee agreed 
to include the following additional matters in its review:

          The collection of intelligence on Iraq from the end 
        of the Gulf War to the commencement of Operation Iraqi 
        Freedom;
          Whether public statements and reports and testimony 
        regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made 
        between the Gulf War period and the commencement of 
        Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by 
        intelligence information;
          The postwar findings about Iraq's weapons of mass 
        destruction and weapons programs and links to terrorism 
        and how they compare with prewar assessments;
          Prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq;
          Any intelligence activities relating to Iraq 
        conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation 
        Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within 
        the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
        Policy; and
          The use by the Intelligence Community of information 
        provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC).

    The review was ongoing at the conclusion of the 108th 
Congress.

                              B. HEARINGS

1. Intelligence reform

    Following release of the Report of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar 
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (July 9, 2004), the Committee 
turned its attention to the reform and reorganization of the 
IC. On July 20, 2004, the Committee received testimony from two 
panels regarding the need for IC reform, including 
reexamination of the responsibilities and authorities of the 
Director of Central Intelligence. The first witness, Senator 
Dianne Feinstein, testified concerning her proposed 
legislation, S. 190, the IC Leadership Act of 2003. Following 
Senator Feinstein, the Committee heard testimony from Dr. 
JohnJ. Hamre, Lieutenant General William E. Odom (United States Army 
(Ret.)), and Mr. James R. Woolsey. During the August recess and 
following the July 22, 2004, release of the Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorists Attacks upon the United States (9/11 
Commission), the Committee conducted additional hearings on the need 
for intelligence reform. On August 18, 2004, Dr. David Kay, Dr. Amy B. 
Zegart, and General Charles G. Boyd (United States Air Force (Ret.)) 
testified before the Committee. On September 7, 2004, the Committee 
held an open hearing on the 9/11 Commission report. The Committee heard 
testimony from 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas H. Kean, Vice Chair Lee 
H. Hamilton, and Commissioner John F. Lehman. In addition to these open 
hearings, the Committee also held a closed meeting on September 16, 
2004, with Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, United States Air Force 
(Ret.), then-Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board.

2. National security threats to the United States

    Early in each session of the 108th Congress, the Committee 
held hearings to review the IC's assessments on the current and 
projected national security threats and issues of concern to 
the United States. These hearings covered a wide range of 
issues and were held in open and closed sessions. They provided 
the heads of various IC organizations an opportunity to inform 
the Committee and the American public about the threats facing 
the country and how their organizations were poised to provide 
information on and counter these threats.
    On February 11, 2003, the Committee held open and closed 
hearings on the current and projected threats to the United 
States. Testifying before the Committee in open session were 
the Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert 
Mueller, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice 
Admiral Lowell Jacoby, and the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research, Carl Ford.
    On February 24, 2004, the Committee held open and closed 
hearings on the current and projected threats to the United 
States. Testifying in open session before the Committee were 
the Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet; the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert 
Mueller; and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby. Testifying in closed session were 
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, John McLaughlin; 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert 
Mueller; and the Director of Intelligence for the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Major General Ronald Burgess, United States Army.
    The Committee also routinely held hearings and received 
threat updates from IC personnel. These issues frequently 
covered the global war on terrorism, threats to major events 
(such as the U.S. election, the Olympics, and the Democratic 
and Republican National Conventions), and other substantive 
developments of interest to the Committee in its oversight 
role.
    The transcripts of the open hearings, ``Current and 
Projected National Security Threats to the United States'' [S. 
Hrg. 108-161, dated February 11, 2003, and S. Hrg. 108-588, 
dated February 24, 2004] were printed and made available to the 
public.

3. Counterterrorism

    The Committee focused on counterterrorism initiatives in 
several hearings and received numerous briefings on worldwide 
terrorist threats during the 108th Congress. While intelligence 
briefings covered threats to U.S. and allied interests 
worldwide, the Committee focused on the sustained threat to the 
U.S. Homeland from al-Qaida, and on the IC's measures to 
counter and disrupt the group. The IC briefed the Committee 
weekly on current intelligence topics, which included terrorism 
threat updates. In addition to these Member briefings, 
Committee staff routinely received briefings on a range of 
counterterrorism issues. These briefings covered substantive 
and administrative issues to include resources, office 
structure, and interagency cooperation.
    The Committee closely monitored the development of the 
Terrorist ThreatIntegration Center (TTIC), and continued to 
monitor its evolution into the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). 
The TTIC was the first entity of its kind in the IC, and housed 
analysts and ``assignees'' from not only the IC agencies, but also 
representatives from agencies that constitute the largest consumers of 
threat reporting and analysis.

4. Detainee abuse hearings

    In the wake of specific revelations of detainee abuse at 
the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the Committee held hearings--in 
addition to staff briefings--to ascertain the nature of the 
involvement, if any, of intelligence entities in this scandal.

5. Counterproliferation

    The accelerating proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery remains a central 
threat to U.S. national security. The IC's ability to monitor, 
accurately assess and respond to WMD and delivery threats from 
both state and non-state actors is essential. Because of the 
importance of these capabilities, particularly as the nation is 
engaged in the global war on terrorism, the Committee reviewed 
the scope and trend of proliferation, in order to assess and 
improve the IC's counter-proliferation capabilities.
    The Committee held numerous hearings and briefings on 
proliferation topics including global proliferation trends, 
non-state proliferators, North Korean, Libyan, and Iranian 
proliferation activities, and, as part of its formal review of 
intelligence assessments on Iraq, the existence of Iraqi 
weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the Committee 
reviewed numerous IC products addressing the production and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, held several 
staff briefings, and conducted hundreds of staff interviews 
regarding intelligence assessments of Iraqi WMD programs.

6. Human intelligence

    Human Intelligence (HUMINT) was a prominent topic of 
concern for the Committee during the entire period of the 108th 
Congress. The Committee held one hearing dedicated solely to 
the Future of HUMINT, but the issue was a central facet of 
other closed and open hearings. The number of formal hearings, 
however, does not convey the full sense of urgency concerning 
HUMINT in the 108th Congress. Committee Members and staff 
combined dozens of visits to IC facilities and other staff-
level discussions with experts to further examine HUMINT 
processes.
    In particular, the Committee examined HUMINT as part of its 
inquiry into prewar analysis of Iraq's WMD capabilities. The 
Committee noted the poor condition of U.S. HUMINT capabilities 
focused on the Iraqi target. The Committee's concerns are 
documented at length in the Committee's report on The U.S. 
Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on 
Iraq. The HUMINT concerns also guided Committee Members in 
deliberations related to the enactment of the ``Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.''

7. USA PATRIOT Act

    In addition to receipt of reports under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, continuing oversight of Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) intelligence activities, and 
review of IC information access concerns, the Committee held a 
closed hearing on October 23, 2003 to review the modifications 
to intelligence and national security authorities made by the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Public Law 107-56 (October 26, 2001). 
Witnesses appearing at this hearing from the Department of 
Justice and FBI testified regarding the continuing intelligence 
and national security importance of the modifications to law 
found in the USA PATRIOT Act. The witnesses explained how the 
USA PATRIOT Act removed barriers to information sharing, closed 
investigative gaps where existing authorities had not provided 
sufficient legal authority, and updated authorities to reflect 
advances in technology. The witnesses also addressed civil 
liberties and privacy concerns, explaining how authorities 
provided by the Act are consistent with the Constitution, and 
reiterating the importance of Congressional oversight to the 
intelligence process.

8. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

    The Committee held a closed hearing on the potential 
effects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
on the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
United States Government. Administration officials from the 
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Department of 
State, and the United States Navy (and, on a separate panel, a 
former Judge Advocate General for the United States Navy) 
testified that United States accession to the treaty would do 
no harm to the intelligence activities of the United States and 
would provide useful protections for United States military and 
commercial maritime operations. At two other panels, two former 
Secretaries of the Navy and a former United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations expressed continued 
reservations about the treaty, including particular concerns 
about the potential impact of the treaty's dispute resolution 
procedures on United States national security.

9. Covert action quarterly review

    The Committee continued to conduct rigorous oversight of 
covert action programs during the 108th Congress. Unlike 
intelligence collection and analysis, which are intended to 
gather and understand information about national security 
issues, covert action programs are policy tools that can be a 
significant factor in accomplishing foreign policy objectives. 
The Committee reviewed these programs to ensure their means and 
objectives were consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals, were 
conducted in accordance with all applicable American laws and 
were consistent with the ideals and principles of our nation. 
During the 108th Congress, the Committee reviewed written 
quarterly reports and held periodic hearings and briefings with 
Central Intelligence Agency and Department of State officials.

                          C. COMMUNITY ISSUES

1. Independent cost estimates

    The Committee became increasingly concerned by the cost 
growth of major IC acquisitions. These substantial cost 
increases reduce the availability of funds for other programs 
and new initiatives within the IC. Additionally, to address 
funding shortfalls resulting from unanticipated acquisition 
costs, IC funds are often shifted from program to program and 
from fiscal year to fiscal year, hindering effective financial 
management.
    Prior to Committee action to address the growth in 
acquisition costs, the budget for major systems generally 
reflected cost estimates prepared by the IC component 
responsible for acquiring and operating the system. The 
magnitude and frequency of cost growth in major systems 
indicated to the Committee a systemic bias within the IC to 
underestimate the costs of such acquisitions. The Committee 
recognized that the use of independent cost estimates prepared 
by offices outside the acquiring and operating components had 
resulted in more accurate projections of the costs of major 
systems.
    During floor consideration of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, the Senate adopted a 
Committee amendment formalizing the process for development of 
independent cost estimates for major IC acquisitions. Section 
312 of that Act required the Director of Central Intelligence, 
in consultation with the head of the element responsible for 
acquiring and operating the system at issue, to prepare, and 
update as required, an independent cost estimate of the full 
life-cycle cost of development, procurement, and operation of 
any system projected to cost more than $500 million. The 
provision also required the President's budget request to 
reflect the amounts identified in the independent cost 
estimates, or if not, explain why the amount requested differed 
from the independent cost estimate. The Committee will monitor 
Executive branch compliance with this provision, including 
prohibitions on the obligation or expenditure of funds for the 
development or procurement of major systems without statutory 
independent cost estimates.

2. Information access

    The Committee took an active role in improving information 
access across the IC. The Committee remains extremely concerned 
that the Community is not managed as an information enterprise, 
but rather as a loose affiliation of agencies. As the Committee 
noted in its report accompanying S. 2386, the Intelligence 
Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2005, elements within the IC 
acted as though they own the intelligence data they collect, 
rather than treating that data as belonging to the U.S. 
Government. As a result of the Community's failure to repudiate 
outdated restrictions on information access and a refusal to 
revisit legal interpretations and policy decisions that predate 
the threats now confronting the United States, impediments to 
information access are re-emerging in the very programs 
designed to address the problem.
    The Committee's review of the Community's pre-war 
assessments on Iraq highlighted the effect of such restrictions 
on data access by intelligence analysts. In its Report of the 
Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence 
Community's Pre-War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, the 
Committee concluded, inter alia, that the IC's failure to 
provide access to information across the Community to cleared 
analysts with a legitimate need-to-know contributed to the IC's 
flawed assessments on Iraq. For example, the Committee found 
that the CIA's excessive compartmentalization and failure to 
share information regarding Iraq's alleged mobile biological 
weapons program and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program 
``left analysts and policymakers with an incomplete and, at 
times, misleading picture of these issues.'' \1\ The Committee 
also concluded that the CIA's practice of providing source 
information and operational detail only to CIA analysts 
``limited the level of discussion and debate that should have 
taken place across the Community on [Iraq's interactions with 
al-Qaida].'' \2\ Emphasizing the importance of improving 
information access across the Community, the Committee wrote,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. IC's 
Pre-War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S. Rpt. 108-301, 26.
    \2\ Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. 
Intelligence Community's Pre-war Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S. 
Rpt. 108-301, 33.

    The process by which the IC calculates the benefits and 
risks of sharing sensitive human intelligence is skewed too 
heavily toward withholding information. This issue has been 
raised repeatedly with the IC, particularly after the lack of 
information sharing was found to have played a key role in the 
intelligence failures of 9/11. The Committee believes that the 
IC must reconsider whether the risks of expanding access to 
cleared analysts are truly greater than the risks of keeping 
information so tightly compartmented that the analysts who need 
it to make informed judgments are kept in the dark.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\Ibid, pp. 26-27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     In an effort to encourage management of the IC as an 
information enterprise, and thereby enhance the Community's 
capacity to undertake ``all source fusion'' analysis, the 
Committee initiated a number of efforts to remove outdated 
restrictions on information and data access. For example, in S. 
Rept. 108-258, the Committee directed the Director of Central 
Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of Defense, to complete by February 1, 2005, an 
Information Sharing Working Group (ISWG) review identifying 
impediments to information access in existing IC and Department 
of Defense policies and laws. Additionally, Section 317 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, P.L. 108-
381, established a pilot program to assess the feasibility and 
advisability of permitting analysts of various elements of the 
IC to access and analyze intelligence from the databases of 
other Community elements. Finally, Section 354 of P.L. 108-381 
required the President to identify current policies and 
regulations that impede the sharing of classified information 
horizontally across and among Federal departments and agencies 
and vertically between the Federal Government and State and 
local agencies; and to propose appropriate modifications of 
policy, law, and regulations to eliminate these impediments in 
order to facilitate access to such classified information.

3. Oversight of IC Inspectors General

    The Committee continued to monitor the activities of the 
Inspectors General (IGs) of the IC during the 108th Congress. 
This oversight included: review of numerous IG products, 
including audit reports, inspection reports, reports of 
investigation, and semi-annual reports of IG activities; visits 
to IG offices for updates on plans and procedures; and 
attendance and participation at several IG conferences. In 
addition to a variety of hearings focused on issues reviewed by 
the IC IGs, the Committee arranged a number of briefings with 
Community program and IG personnel in order to follow up on the 
status of IG recommendations. Examples include employee 
grievances, management of operational activities, contracting 
procedures, effective use of resources on new technology, 
covert action programs, and financial management practices.
    During the 108th Congress, the Committee continued its work 
to ensure the effectiveness and independence of the 
administrative Inspectors General at the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Security Agency 
(NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The Committee reinforced 
the importance of the IG function through its regular 
interaction with the agency directors, the IGs, and their 
staffs. In response to language in the Committee's Intelligence 
Authorization Bills, the administrative IGs also submitted 
annual reports to the Committee detailing their requests for 
fiscal and personnel resources, and the plan for their use. 
These reports included the programs and activities of their 
agency scheduled for review during the fiscal year, comments on 
the office's ability to hire and retain qualified personnel, 
any concerns relating to the independence and effectiveness of 
the IG's office, and an overall assessment of the agency's 
response to the IG's recommendations during the previous year. 
These annual reports served as a basis for Committee oversight 
throughout the year.

4. IC compliance with Federal financial accounting standards

    The Committee continued to closely monitor the IC's 
financial management practices during the 108th Congress. 
During the previous Congress, in the report accompanying S. 
1428 (S. Rpt. 107-63), the Committee instructed the Director of 
Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to ensure 
that the NSA, the DIA, the NGA, and the CIA receive an audit of 
their financial statements no later than March 1, 2005, to be 
performed by a statutory Inspector General or a qualified 
independent public accountant.
    Reports issued by the Department of Defense (DOD) and CIA 
Inspectors General in 2002 indicated that the NSA, DIA, NGA, 
and CIA were unable to produce auditable financial statements, 
and this remained the case in 2004. In recognition of the 
difficulties in acquiring the systems necessary to produce 
financial statements, the Committee indicated in Senate Report 
108-44, accompanying S. 1025, the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2004, that it would consider an extension 
of the auditable financial statement due date, provided that 
the relevant agencies offered evidence of significant progress 
in this area.
    Based on information provided by the agencies in 2004, the 
Committee recognized that meaningful measures had been devoted 
to producing auditable financial statements but concluded that 
maintaining the original March 1, 2005, deadline would be 
counterproductive in that it would require audits that would 
divert resources from actual financial system improvements. 
Accordingly, in S. Rpt. 108-258, accompanying S. 2386, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, the 
Committee extended the due date set in the report accompanying 
S. 1428 (S. Rpt. 107-63), for the NSA, DIA, and NGA by two 
years, to March 1, 2007, to allow for audits of the Fiscal Year 
2006 financial statements. This change does not affect the CIA, 
which was required by Public Law 107-289 to submit audited 
financial statements for Fiscal Year 2004.

                    D. INVESTIGATIONS AND INQUIRIES

1. Captain Michael ``Scott'' Speicher

    Following numerous hearings, Member briefings, staff-led 
meetings, and the production of a lengthy classified report in 
prior years, during the 108th Congress, the Committee continued 
its involvement in the case of U.S. Navy Captain Michael 
``Scott'' Speicher, who was shot down over Iraq on January 17, 
1991, the first night of Operation Desert Storm. He was 
declared Killed In Action (KIA) in May 1991; the Navy changed 
his status to Missing In Action (MIA) in January 2001; and the 
Navy designated him Missing/Captured in October 2002. Through 
staff and member briefings, the Committee continued its 
oversight of IC efforts to ascertain the fate of Captain 
Speicher.

                               E. AUDITS

    The Committee's Audit and Investigations Staff was created 
in 1988 to provide ``a credible independent arm for committee 
review of covert action programs and other specific IC 
functions and issues.'' During the 108th Congress, the staff of 
three full-time auditors led or provided significant support to 
the Committee's review of a number of administrative and 
operational issues relating to the agencies of the IC. In 
addition, the Audit and Investigations Staff completed five in-
depth reviews of specific intelligence programs or issues. 
These reviews included the following:

1. The NRO's Future Imagery Architecture Program

    During 2003, the Committee's Audit and Investigations Staff 
examined the acquisition management processes for the National 
Reconnaissance Office's (NRO) Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) 
program. The audit focused on the NRO's contract administration 
and financial management mechanisms as they related to FIA, in 
addition to a general overview of the FIA program. The National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's segment of the FIA program 
also was examined.

2. Joint Inquiry Committee recommendations

    The Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence Joint Inquiry into IC Activities Before and After 
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (the ``Joint 
Inquiry''), was issued in December 2002. The Report contained 
19 recommendations relating to improving the U.S. Government's 
ability to combat terrorism at home and abroad. During the 
108th Congress, the Audit and Investigations Staff conducted a 
review of the status of these recommendations. The review 
determined that many of the recommendations had been or were in 
the process of being implemented, although several had yet to 
be fully addressed.

3. IC information sharing

    In 2003, the Committee's Audit and Investigations Staff was 
tasked with reviewing the current status of information sharing 
across the IC, to include its interactions with state, local, 
and private sector entities. The review determined that the 
Community has undertaken a number of initiatives since 
September 11, 2001, to enhance the sharing of information 
related to countering terrorism. The Audit and Investigations 
Staff found that progress in increasing the sharing of 
information was being made organizationally, technologically, 
and culturally throughout the IC. Problem areas noted during 
this review include the need for increased senior management 
attention, additional financial resources, electronic 
interconnectivity, and further breaking down of historical, 
cultural barriers.

4. Central Intelligence Agency Program

    In 2004, the Audit and Investigations Staff reviewed the 
past several years of the Central Intelligence Agency Program, 
with a focus on emergency supplemental funding, to ensure that 
the CIA could accurately and efficiently track the use of its 
appropriated funding.

5. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

    At the end of the 108th Congress, the Audit and 
Investigations Staff was completing a review of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The last Committee review 
of the FISA was completed in July 1998. Since 1998 there have 
been a number of developments that have had an effect on the 
statute itself, as well as its implementation.

                           IV. Confirmations


          A. PORTER J. GOSS, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

    On September 7, 2004, the President formally submitted to 
the Senate the nomination of Congressman Porter J. Goss to 
serve as the Director of Central Intelligence. On September 13 
and 14, 2004, the Committee held public hearings on Mr. Goss's 
nomination. At the time of his nomination, Mr. Goss had served 
in the House of Representatives for nearly 16 years as the 
Representative of the 14th Congressional District of Florida, 
and the final seven years as Chairman of the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence. From 1960 to 1962, Mr. Goss 
served as an intelligence officer in the United States Army 
and, from 1962 to 1972, served as a member of the clandestine 
service of the Central Intelligence Agency. Under the National 
Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence 
serves as the head of the United States IC, as the principal 
advisor to the President on intelligence matters, as well as 
head of the Central Intelligence Agency.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Following Mr. Goss's confirmation, the National Security 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, Title I of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee favorably reported Mr. Goss's nomination to 
the full Senate on September 20, 2004. The Senate considered 
and approved his nomination on September 22, 2004, following a 
roll call vote.

  B. LARRY C. KINDSVATER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR 
                          COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT

    On May 11, 2004, the President nominated Larry C. 
Kindsvater to serve as the Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence for Community Management. On July 15, 2004, the 
Committee held a closed hearing on Mr. Kindsvater's nomination 
to permit a more thorough discussion of sensitive intelligence 
matters. At the time of his nomination, Mr. Kindsvater had 
served the United States in numerous positions within the IC, 
including the preceding four years as Executive Director for IC 
Affairs. From 1972 through 1994, Mr. Kindsvater served in 
various analytic and leadership positions in the Central 
Intelligence Agency. From 1994 through his nomination, Mr. 
Kindsvater served as a member of the DCI's Community Management 
Staff, focusing primarily on budget and resource management 
issues. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the Deputy 
Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management 
directs the operations of the Community Management Staff and 
provides management and oversight, through three Assistant 
Directors of Central Intelligence, for the collection, analysis 
and production, and management functions of the IC.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, Title I 
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public 
Law 108-458 (December 17, 2004), dissolved the position of Deputy 
Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management as a 
statutory position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee favorably reported Mr. Kindsvater's 
nomination to the full Senate on July 21, 2004. The Senate 
considered and approved his nomination on July 22, 2004, by 
unanimous consent.

    C. FRANK LIBUTTI, UNDER SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND 
       INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    On April 28, 2003, the President nominated Frank Libutti to 
serve as Under Secretary for Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security. The 
Committee held a public hearing on June 17, 2003 to consider 
Mr. Libutti's nomination. Prior to his nomination, Mr. Libutti 
had served as the New York City Deputy Police Commissioner for 
Counterterrorism. From 1966 to 2001, Mr. Libutti served as an 
officer in the Marine Corps. He retired as a lieutenant 
general.
    The Committee favorably reported Mr. Libutti's nomination 
to the full Senate on June 18, 2003. The Senate considered and 
approved his nomination on June 23, 2003, by unanimous consent.

                          D. OTHER NOMINATIONS

    Consistent with the Committee's jurisdiction over the 
intelligence activities and programs of the United States 
Government, the Committee held two additional closed sessions 
to discuss issues with Presidential nominees for IC positions 
within the Administration. On March 4, 2003, Dr. Stephen A. 
Cambone, then the President's nominee for the position of Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, briefed the Committee 
regarding the role of the new position in the management and 
oversight of the intelligence activities of the Department of 
Defense and the relationship of the position to the Director of 
Central Intelligence. On July 13, 2004, Mr. Thomas Fingar, then 
the President's nominee for the position of Assistant Secretary 
of State for Intelligence and Research, appeared before the 
Committee to discuss his plans for the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research, an element of the IC under the National Security 
Act of 1947.
    Based on the amendments made to S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. 
(May 19, 1976), by S. Res. 445, 108th Cong. (Oct. 9, 2004), 
future Presidential nominees for all civilian positions within 
the IC, requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to the 
appointments, will be referred to this Committee. Under the 
terms of Sec. 17 of S. Res. 400, as amended, only this 
Committee will have jurisdiction to report such nominations to 
the full Senate.

                        V. Support to the Senate

    The Committee undertook a number of activities to support 
the Senate's deliberations. In addition to its unclassified 
reports, the Committee sought to support Senate deliberations 
by inviting the participation of members outside the Committee 
in briefings and hearings on issues of shared jurisdiction or 
interest. The Committee prepared, and made available for the 
Senate, compendia of intelligence information regarding topics 
relevant to current legislation. Members outside the Committee 
frequently sought and received intelligence briefings by 
members of the Committee staff. Members also requested and 
received assistance in resolving issues through the actions of 
elements of the IC. Finally, the Committee routinely invited 
staff from other committees to briefings on intelligence issues 
of common concern.

                              VI. Appendix


                      SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIONS

A. Number of meetings

    During the 108th Congress, the Committee held a total of 
216 on-the-record meetings, briefings, and hearings. There were 
13 hearings held on the IC budget, including the Conference 
sessions with the House. Three nomination hearings were held.

B. Bills and Resolutions originated by the Committee

          1. S. Res. 27--An original resolution authorizing 
        expenditures by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
          2. S. 1025--Intelligence Authorization Bill for 
        Fiscal Year 2004.
          3. S. 2136--To extend the final report date and 
        termination date of the National Commission on 
        Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
          4. S. 2386--Intelligence Authorization Bill for 
        Fiscal Year 2005.

C. Bills referred to the Committee

          1. S. 266--To provide for the access and handling by 
        personnel of State and local governments of classified 
        information to facilitate preparation and response to 
        terrorist attacks, and for other purposes.
          2. S. 410--To establish the Homeland Intelligence 
        Agency, and for other purposes.
          3. S. 190--To establish the Director of National 
        Intelligence as head of the IC, to modify and enhance 
        authorities and responsibilities relating to the 
        administration of intelligence and the IC, and for 
        other purposes.
          4. S. 1212--To identify certain sites as key 
        resources for protection by the Directorate for 
        Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of 
        the Department of Homeland Security and for other 
        purposes.
          5. S. 1520--To amend the National Security Act of 
        1947 to reorganize and improve the leadership of the 
        Intelligence Community of the United States, to provide 
        for the enhancement of the counterterrorism activities 
        of the United States Government, and for other 
        purposes.
          6. S. 2040--To extend the date for the submittal of 
        the final report of the National Commission on 
        Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, to provide 
        additional funding for the Commission, and for other 
        purposes.
          7. S. 2672--To establish an Independent National 
        Security Classification Board in the executive branch, 
        and for other purposes.
          8. S. 2854--To facilitate alternative analyses of 
        intelligence by the Intelligence Community.

D. Publications

          1. S. Hrg. 108-161--Current and Projected National 
        Security Threats to the United States.
          2. S. Hrg. 108-182--Hearing on Nomination of Frank 
        Libutti to be Under Secretary for Information Analysis 
        and Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland 
        Security.
          3. Report 108-52--Special Report of the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence, Committee Activities January 
        3, 2001 to November 22, 2002.
          4. Report 108-44--Report to Accompany S. 1025.
          5. Report 108-258--Report to Accompany S. 2836.
          6. S. Rept. 108-301--Report on the U.S. Intelligence 
        Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.
          7. S. Hrg. 108-655--Intelligence Community Reform.
          8. S. Hrg. 108-588--Current and Projected National 
        Security Threats to the United States.