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110th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                    110-154

======================================================================



 
        VOTER CONFIDENCE AND INCREASED ACCESSIBILITY ACT OF 2007

                                _______
                                

  May 16, 2007.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Brady of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on House Administration,

                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 811]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on House Administration, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 811) to amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 
to require a voter-verified permanent paper ballot under title 
III of such Act, and for other purposes, having considered the 
same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend 
that the bill as amended do pass.

  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Voter Confidence and Increased 
Accessibility Act of 2007''.

SEC. 2. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-
                    VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT.

  (a) Ballot Verification and Audit Capacity.--
          (1) In general.--Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote 
        Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(2)) is amended to read as 
        follows:
          ``(2) Ballot verification and audit capacity.--
                  ``(A) Voter-verified paper ballots.--
                          ``(i) Verification.--(I) The voting system 
                        shall require the use of or produce an 
                        individual, durable, voter-verified paper 
                        ballot of the voter's vote that shall be 
                        created by or made available for inspection and 
                        verification by the voter before the voter's 
                        vote is cast and counted. For purposes of this 
                        subclause, examples of such a ballot include a 
                        paper ballot marked by the voter for the 
                        purpose of being counted by hand or read by an 
                        optical scanner or other similar device, a 
                        paper ballot prepared by the voter to be mailed 
                        to an election official (whether from a 
                        domestic or overseas location), a paper ballot 
                        created through the use of a ballot marking 
                        device or system, or a paper ballot produced by 
                        a touch screen or other electronic voting 
                        machine, so long as in each case the voter is 
                        permitted to verify the ballot in a paper form 
                        in accordance with this subparagraph.
                          ``(II) The voting system shall provide the 
                        voter with an opportunity to correct any error 
                        made by the system in the voter-verified paper 
                        ballot before the permanent voter-verified 
                        paper ballot is preserved in accordance with 
                        clause (ii).
                          ``(III) The voting system shall not preserve 
                        the voter-verified paper ballots in any manner 
                        that makes it possible, at any time after the 
                        ballot has been cast, to associate a voter with 
                        the record of the voter's vote.
                          ``(ii) Preservation.--The individual, durable 
                        voter-verified paper ballot produced in 
                        accordance with clause (i) shall be used as the 
                        official ballot for purposes of any recount or 
                        audit conducted with respect to any election 
                        for Federal office in which the voting system 
                        is used, and shall be preserved--
                                  ``(I) in the case of votes cast at 
                                the polling place on the date of the 
                                election, within the polling place in 
                                the manner or method in which all other 
                                paper ballots are preserved within such 
                                polling place on such date; or
                                  ``(II) in any other case, in a manner 
                                which is consistent with the manner 
                                employed by the jurisdiction for 
                                preserving such ballots in general.
                          ``(iii) Manual audit capacity.--(I) Each 
                        paper ballot produced pursuant to clause (i) 
                        shall be suitable for a manual audit equivalent 
                        to that of a paper ballot voting system, and 
                        shall be counted by hand in any recount or 
                        audit conducted with respect to any election 
                        for Federal office.
                          ``(II) In the event of any inconsistencies or 
                        irregularities between any electronic vote 
                        tallies and the vote tallies determined by 
                        counting by hand the individual, durable voter-
                        verified paper ballots produced pursuant to 
                        clause (i), and subject to subparagraph (B), 
                        the individual, durable voter-verified paper 
                        ballots shall be the true and correct record of 
                        the votes cast.
                  ``(B) Special rule for treatment of disputes when 
                paper ballots have been shown to be compromised.--
                          ``(i) In general.--In the event that--
                                  ``(I) there is any inconsistency 
                                between any electronic vote tallies and 
                                the vote tallies determined by counting 
                                by hand the individual, durable voter-
                                verified paper ballots produced 
                                pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i) with 
                                respect to any election for Federal 
                                office; and
                                  ``(II) it is demonstrated by clear 
                                and convincing evidence (as determined 
                                in accordance with the applicable 
                                standards in the jurisdiction involved) 
                                in any recount, audit, or contest of 
                                the result of the election that the 
                                paper ballots have been compromised (by 
                                damage or mischief or otherwise) and 
                                that a sufficient number of the ballots 
                                have been so compromised that the 
                                result of the election could be 
                                changed,
                        the determination of the appropriate remedy 
                        with respect to the election shall be made in 
                        accordance with applicable State law, except 
                        that the electronic tally shall not be used as 
                        the exclusive basis for determining the 
                        official certified vote tally.
                          ``(ii) Rule for consideration of ballots 
                        associated with each voting machine.--For 
                        purposes of clause (i), the paper ballots 
                        associated with each voting system shall be 
                        considered on a voting-machine-by-voting-
                        machine basis, and only the paper ballots 
                        deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered 
                        in the calculation of whether or not the result 
                        of the election could be changed due to the 
                        compromised paper ballots.''.
          (2) Conforming amendment clarifying applicability of 
        alternative language accessibility.--Section 301(a)(4) of such 
        Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(4)) is amended by inserting 
        ``(including the paper ballots required to be produced under 
        paragraph (2) and the notices required under paragraphs (7) and 
        (13)(C))'' after ``voting system''.
          (3) Other conforming amendments.--Section 301(a)(1) of such 
        Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(1)) is amended--
                  (A) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ``counted'' 
                and inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs 
                (2) and (3)'';
                  (B) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``counted'' 
                and inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs 
                (2) and (3)'';
                  (C) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking ``counted'' 
                each place it appears and inserting ``counted, in 
                accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and
                  (D) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``counted'' 
                and inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs 
                (2) and (3)''.
  (b) Accessibility and Ballot Verification for Individuals With 
Disabilities.--
          (1) In general.--Section 301(a)(3)(B) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
        15481(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read as follows:
                  ``(B)(i) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) 
                through the use of at least one voting system equipped 
                for individuals with disabilities at each polling 
                place; and
                  ``(ii) meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) and 
                paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that--
                          ``(I) allows the voter to privately and 
                        independently verify the individual, durable 
                        paper ballot through the conversion of the 
                        human-readable printed or marked vote 
                        selections into accessible form,
                          ``(II) ensures that the entire process of 
                        ballot verification and vote casting is 
                        equipped for individuals with disabilities, and
                          ``(III) does not preclude the supplementary 
                        use of Braille or tactile ballots; and''.
          (2) Specific requirement of study, testing, and development 
        of accessible ballot verification mechanisms.--
                  (A) Study and reporting.--Subtitle C of title II of 
                such Act (42 U.S.C. 15381 et seq.) is amended--
                          (i) by redesignating section 247 as section 
                        248; and
                          (ii) by inserting after section 246 the 
                        following new section:

``SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION 
                    MECHANISMS.

  ``(a) Study and Report.--The Director of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology shall study, test, and develop best practices 
to enhance the accessibility of ballot verification mechanisms for 
individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary language is not 
English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy, including best 
practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes through which 
the mechanisms are used. In carrying out this section, the Director 
shall specifically investigate existing and potential methods or 
devices, including non-electronic devices, that will assist such 
individuals and voters in creating voter-verified paper ballots and 
presenting or transmitting the information printed or marked on such 
ballots back to such individuals and voters.
  ``(b) Coordination With Grants for Technology Improvements.--The 
Director shall coordinate the activities carried out under subsection 
(a) with the research conducted under the grant program carried out by 
the Commission under section 271, to the extent that the Director and 
Commission determine necessary to provide for the advancement of 
accessible voting technology.
  ``(c) Deadline.--The Director shall complete the requirements of 
subsection (a) not later than December 31, 2008.
  ``(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $3,000,000, to remain 
available until expended.''.
                  (B) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents of 
                such Act is amended--
                          (i) by redesignating the item relating to 
                        section 247 as relating to section 248; and
                          (ii) by inserting after the item relating to 
                        section 246 the following new item:

``Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible ballot verification 
mechanisms.''.

          (3) Clarification of accessibility standards under voluntary 
        voting system guidance.--In adopting any voluntary guidance 
        under subtitle B of title III of the Help America Vote Act with 
        respect to the accessibility of the paper ballot verification 
        requirements for individuals with disabilities, the Election 
        Assistance Commission shall include and apply the same 
        accessibility standards applicable under the voluntary guidance 
        adopted for accessible voting systems under such subtitle.
  (c) Additional Voting System Requirements.--
          (1) Requirements described.--Section 301(a) of such Act (42 
        U.S.C. 15481(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
        new paragraphs:
          ``(7) Instruction reminding voters of importance of verifying 
        paper ballot.--
                  ``(A) In general.--The appropriate election official 
                at each polling place shall cause to be placed in a 
                prominent location in the polling place which is 
                clearly visible from the voting booths a notice, in 
                large font print accessible to the visually impaired, 
                advising voters that the paper ballots representing 
                their votes shall serve as the vote of record in all 
                audits and recounts in elections for Federal office, 
                and that they should not leave the voting booth until 
                confirming that such paper ballots accurately record 
                their vote.
                  ``(B) Systems for individuals with disabilities.--All 
                voting systems equipped for individuals with 
                disabilities shall present or transmit in accessible 
                form the statement referred to in subparagraph (A), as 
                well as an explanation of the verification process 
                described in paragraph (3)(B)(ii).
          ``(8) Prohibiting use of uncertified election-dedicated 
        voting system technologies; disclosure requirements.--
                  ``(A) In general.--A voting system used in an 
                election for Federal office in a State may not at any 
                time during the election contain or use any election-
                dedicated voting system technology which has not been 
                certified by the State for use in the election and 
                which has not been deposited with an accredited 
                laboratory described in section 231 to be held in 
                escrow and disclosed in accordance with this section.
                  ``(B) Requirement for and restrictions on 
                disclosure.--An accredited laboratory under section 231 
                with whom an election-dedicated voting system 
                technology has been deposited shall--
                          ``(i) hold the technology in escrow; and
                          ``(ii) disclose technology and information 
                        regarding the technology to another person if--
                                  ``(I) the person is a qualified 
                                person described in subparagraph (C) 
                                who has entered into a nondisclosure 
                                agreement with respect to the 
                                technology which meets the requirements 
                                of subparagraph (D); or
                                  ``(II) the laboratory is required to 
                                disclose the technology to the person 
                                under State law, in accordance with the 
                                terms and conditions applicable under 
                                such law.
                  ``(C) Qualified persons described.--With respect to 
                the disclosure of election-dedicated voting system 
                technology by a laboratory under subparagraph 
                (B)(ii)(I), a `qualified person' is any of the 
                following:
                          ``(i) A governmental entity with 
                        responsibility for the administration of voting 
                        and election-related matters for purposes of 
                        reviewing, analyzing, or reporting on the 
                        technology.
                          ``(ii) A party to pre- or post-election 
                        litigation challenging the result of an 
                        election or the administration or use of the 
                        technology used in an election, including but 
                        not limited to election contests or challenges 
                        to the certification of the technology, or an 
                        expert for a party to such litigation, for 
                        purposes of reviewing or analyzing the 
                        technology to support or oppose the litigation, 
                        and all parties to the litigation shall have 
                        access to the technology for such purposes.
                          ``(iii) A person not described in clause (i) 
                        or (ii) who reviews, analyzes, or reports on 
                        the technology solely for an academic, 
                        scientific, technological, or other 
                        investigation or inquiry concerning the 
                        accuracy or integrity of the technology.
                  ``(D) Requirements for nondisclosure agreements.--A 
                nondisclosure agreement entered into with respect to an 
                election-dedicated voting system technology meets the 
                requirements of this subparagraph if the agreement--
                          ``(i) is limited in scope to coverage of the 
                        technology disclosed under subparagraph (B) and 
                        any trade secrets and intellectual property 
                        rights related thereto;
                          ``(ii) does not prohibit a signatory from 
                        entering into other nondisclosure agreements to 
                        review other technologies under this paragraph;
                          ``(iii) exempts from coverage any information 
                        the signatory lawfully obtained from another 
                        source or any information in the public domain;
                          ``(iv) remains in effect for not longer than 
                        the life of any trade secret or other 
                        intellectual property right related thereto;
                          ``(v) prohibits the use of injunctions 
                        barring a signatory from carrying out any 
                        activity authorized under subparagraph (C), 
                        including injunctions limited to the period 
                        prior to a trial involving the technology;
                          ``(vi) is silent as to damages awarded for 
                        breach of the agreement, other than a reference 
                        to damages available under applicable law;
                          ``(vii) allows disclosure of evidence of 
                        crime, including in response to a subpoena or 
                        warrant;
                          ``(viii) allows the signatory to perform 
                        analyses on the technology (including by 
                        executing the technology), disclose reports and 
                        analyses that describe operational issues 
                        pertaining to the technology (including 
                        vulnerabilities to tampering, errors, risks 
                        associated with use, failures as a result of 
                        use, and other problems), and describe or 
                        explain why or how a voting system failed or 
                        otherwise did not perform as intended; and
                          ``(ix) provides that the agreement shall be 
                        governed by the trade secret laws of the 
                        applicable State.
                  ``(E) Election-dedicated voting system technology 
                defined.--For purposes of this paragraph, `election-
                dedicated voting system technology' means `voting 
                system software' as defined under the 2005 voluntary 
                voting system guidelines adopted by the Commission 
                under section 222, but excludes `commercial-off-the-
                shelf' software and hardware defined under those 
                guidelines.
          ``(9) Prohibition of use of wireless communications devices 
        in voting systems.--No voting system shall contain, use, or be 
        accessible by any wireless, power-line, or concealed 
        communication device, except that enclosed infrared 
        communications devices which are certified for use in the 
        voting system by the State and which cannot be used for any 
        remote or wide area communications or used without the 
        knowledge of poll workers shall be permitted.
          ``(10) Prohibiting connection of system or transmission of 
        system information over the internet.--No component of any 
        voting device upon which ballots are programmed or votes are 
        cast or tabulated shall be connected to the Internet at any 
        time.
          ``(11) Security standards for voting systems used in federal 
        elections.--
                  ``(A) In general.--No voting system may be used in an 
                election for Federal office unless the manufacturer of 
                such system and the election officials using such 
                system meet the applicable requirements described in 
                subparagraph (B).
                  ``(B) Requirements described.--The requirements 
                described in this subparagraph are as follows:
                          ``(i) The manufacturer and the election 
                        officials shall document the secure chain of 
                        custody for the handling of all software, 
                        hardware, vote storage media, ballots, and 
                        voter-verified ballots used in connection with 
                        voting systems, and shall make the information 
                        available upon request to the Commission.
                          ``(ii) The manufacturer shall disclose to an 
                        accredited laboratory under section 231 and to 
                        the appropriate election official any 
                        information required to be disclosed under 
                        paragraph (8).
                          ``(iii) After the appropriate election 
                        official has certified the election-dedicated 
                        and other voting system software for use in an 
                        election, the manufacturer may not--
                                  ``(I) alter such software; or
                                  ``(II) insert or use in the voting 
                                system any software not certified by 
                                the State for use in the election.
                          ``(iv) At the request of the Commission--
                                  ``(I) the appropriate election 
                                official shall submit information to 
                                the Commission regarding the State's 
                                compliance with this subparagraph; and
                                  ``(II) the manufacturer shall submit 
                                information to the Commission regarding 
                                the manufacturer's compliance with this 
                                subparagraph.
                  ``(C) Development and publication of best practices 
                on documentation of secure chain of custody.--Not later 
                than August 1, 2008, the Commission shall develop and 
                make publicly available best practices regarding the 
                requirement of subparagraph (B)(i).
                  ``(D) Disclosure of secure chain of custody.--The 
                Commission shall make information provided to the 
                Commission under subparagraph (B)(i) available to any 
                person upon request.
          ``(12) Durability and readability requirements for ballots.--
                  ``(A) Durability requirements for paper ballots.--
                          ``(i) In general.--All voter-verified paper 
                        ballots required to be used under this Act 
                        (including the paper ballots provided to voters 
                        under paragraph (13)) shall be marked, printed, 
                        or recorded on durable paper.
                          ``(ii) Definition.-- For purposes of this 
                        Act, paper is `durable' if it is capable of 
                        withstanding multiple counts and recounts by 
                        hand without compromising the fundamental 
                        integrity of the ballots, and capable of 
                        retaining the information marked, printed, or 
                        recorded on them for the full duration of a 
                        retention and preservation period of 22 months.
                  ``(B) Readability requirements for machine-marked or 
                printed paper ballots.--All voter-verified paper 
                ballots completed by the voter through the use of a 
                marking or printing device shall be clearly readable by 
                the voter without assistance (other than eyeglasses or 
                other personal vision enhancing devices) and by a 
                scanner or other device equipped for individuals with 
                disabilities.
          ``(13) Mandatory availability of paper ballots at polling 
        place.--
                  ``(A) Requiring ballots to be offered and provided.--
                The appropriate election official at each polling place 
                in an election for Federal office shall offer each 
                individual who is eligible to cast a vote in the 
                election at the polling place the opportunity to cast 
                the vote using a pre-printed paper ballot which the 
                individual may mark by hand and which is not produced 
                by a direct recording electronic voting machine. If the 
                individual accepts the offer to cast the vote using 
                such a ballot, the official shall provide the 
                individual with the ballot and the supplies necessary 
                to mark the ballot, and shall ensure (to the greatest 
                extent practicable) that the waiting period for the 
                individual to cast a vote is not greater than the 
                waiting period for an individual who does not agree to 
                cast the vote using such a paper ballot under this 
                paragraph.
                  ``(B) Treatment of ballot.--Any paper ballot which is 
                cast by an individual under this paragraph shall be 
                counted and otherwise treated as a regular ballot for 
                all purposes (including, to the greatest extent 
                practicable, the deadline for counting the ballot) and 
                not as a provisional ballot, unless the individual 
                casting the ballot would have otherwise been required 
                to cast a provisional ballot if the individual had not 
                accepted the offer to cast the vote using a paper 
                ballot under this paragraph.
                  ``(C) Posting of notice.--The appropriate election 
                official shall ensure that at each polling place a 
                notice is displayed prominently which describes the 
                obligation of the official to offer individuals the 
                opportunity to cast votes using a pre-printed paper 
                ballot under this paragraph.
                  ``(D) Training of election officials.--The chief 
                State election official shall ensure that election 
                officials at polling places in the State are aware of 
                the requirements of this paragraph, including the 
                requirement to display a notice under subparagraph (C), 
                and are aware that it is a violation of the 
                requirements of this title for an election official to 
                fail to offer an individual the opportunity to cast a 
                vote using a pre-printed paper ballot under this 
                paragraph.
                  ``(E) Exceptions.--This paragraph does not apply with 
                respect to--
                          ``(i) a polling place at which each voting 
                        system used in the administration of an 
                        election for Federal office uses only pre-
                        printed paper ballots which are marked by hand 
                        and which are not produced by a direct 
                        recording electronic voting machine (other than 
                        a system used to meet the disability access 
                        requirements of paragraph (3)); or
                          ``(ii) a polling place in operation prior to 
                        the date of the election, but only with respect 
                        to days prior to the date of the election.
                  ``(F) Effective date.--This paragraph shall apply 
                with respect to the regularly scheduled general 
                election for Federal office in November 2010 and each 
                succeeding election for Federal office.''.
          (2) Requiring laboratories to meet standards prohibiting 
        conflicts of interest as condition of accreditation for testing 
        of voting system hardware and software.--
                  (A) In general.--Section 231(b) of such Act (42 
                U.S.C. 15371(b)) is amended by adding at the end the 
                following new paragraphs:
          ``(3) Prohibiting conflicts of interest; ensuring 
        availability of results.--
                  ``(A) In general.--A laboratory may not be accredited 
                by the Commission for purposes of this section unless--
                          ``(i) the laboratory certifies that the only 
                        compensation it receives for the testing 
                        carried out in connection with the 
                        certification, decertification, and 
                        recertification of the manufacturer's voting 
                        system hardware and software is the payment 
                        made from the Testing Escrow Account under 
                        paragraph (4);
                          ``(ii) the laboratory meets such standards as 
                        the Commission shall establish (after notice 
                        and opportunity for public comment) to prevent 
                        the existence or appearance of any conflict of 
                        interest in the testing carried out by the 
                        laboratory under this section, including 
                        standards to ensure that the laboratory does 
                        not have a financial interest in the 
                        manufacture, sale, and distribution of voting 
                        system hardware and software, and is 
                        sufficiently independent from other persons 
                        with such an interest;
                          ``(iii) the laboratory certifies that it will 
                        permit an expert designated by the Commission 
                        to observe any testing the laboratory carries 
                        out under this section; and
                          ``(iv) the laboratory, upon completion of any 
                        testing carried out under this section, 
                        discloses the test protocols, results, and all 
                        communication between the laboratory and the 
                        manufacturer to the Commission.
                  ``(B) Availability of results.--Upon receipt of 
                information under subparagraph (A), the Commission 
                shall make the information available promptly to 
                election officials and the public.
          ``(4) Procedures for conducting testing; payment of user fees 
        for compensation of accredited laboratories.--
                  ``(A) Establishment of escrow account.--The 
                Commission shall establish an escrow account (to be 
                known as the `Testing Escrow Account') for making 
                payments to accredited laboratories for the costs of 
                the testing carried out in connection with the 
                certification, decertification, and recertification of 
                voting system hardware and software.
                  ``(B) Schedule of fees.--In consultation with the 
                accredited laboratories, the Commission shall establish 
                and regularly update a schedule of fees for the testing 
                carried out in connection with the certification, 
                decertification, and recertification of voting system 
                hardware and software, based on the reasonable costs 
                expected to be incurred by the accredited laboratories 
                in carrying out the testing for various types of 
                hardware and software.
                  ``(C) Requests and payments by manufacturers.--A 
                manufacturer of voting system hardware and software may 
                not have the hardware or software tested by an 
                accredited laboratory under this section unless--
                          ``(i) the manufacturer submits a detailed 
                        request for the testing to the Commission; and
                          ``(ii) the manufacturer pays to the 
                        Commission, for deposit into the Testing Escrow 
                        Account established under subparagraph (A), the 
                        applicable fee under the schedule established 
                        and in effect under subparagraph (B).
                  ``(D) Selection of laboratory.--Upon receiving a 
                request for testing and the payment from a manufacturer 
                required under subparagraph (C), the Commission shall 
                select at random (to the greatest extent practicable), 
                from all laboratories which are accredited under this 
                section to carry out the specific testing requested by 
                the manufacturer, an accredited laboratory to carry out 
                the testing.
                  ``(E) Payments to laboratories.--Upon receiving a 
                certification from a laboratory selected to carry out 
                testing pursuant to subparagraph (D) that the testing 
                is completed, along with a copy of the results of the 
                test as required under paragraph (3)(A)(iv), the 
                Commission shall make a payment to the laboratory from 
                the Testing Escrow Account established under 
                subparagraph (A) in an amount equal to the applicable 
                fee paid by the manufacturer under subparagraph 
                (C)(ii).
          ``(5) Dissemination of additional information on accredited 
        laboratories.--
                  ``(A) Information on testing.--Upon completion of the 
                testing of a voting system under this section, the 
                Commission shall promptly disseminate to the public the 
                identification of the laboratory which carried out the 
                testing.
                  ``(B) Information on status of laboratories.--The 
                Commission shall promptly notify Congress, the chief 
                State election official of each State, and the public 
                whenever--
                          ``(i) the Commission revokes, terminates, or 
                        suspends the accreditation of a laboratory 
                        under this section;
                          ``(ii) the Commission restores the 
                        accreditation of a laboratory under this 
                        section which has been revoked, terminated, or 
                        suspended; or
                          ``(iii) the Commission has credible evidence 
                        of significant security failure at an 
                        accredited laboratory.''.
                  (B) Conforming amendments.--Section 231 of such Act 
                (42 U.S.C. 15371) is further amended--
                          (i) in subsection (a)(1), by striking 
                        ``testing, certification,'' and all that 
                        follows and inserting the following: ``testing 
                        of voting system hardware and software by 
                        accredited laboratories in connection with the 
                        certification, decertification, and 
                        recertification of the hardware and software 
                        for purposes of this Act.'';
                          (ii) in subsection (a)(2), by striking 
                        ``testing, certification,'' and all that 
                        follows and inserting the following: ``testing 
                        of its voting system hardware and software by 
                        the laboratories accredited by the Commission 
                        under this section in connection with 
                        certifying, decertifying, and recertifying the 
                        hardware and software.'';
                          (iii) in subsection (b)(1), by striking 
                        ``testing, certification, decertification, and 
                        recertification'' and inserting ``testing''; 
                        and
                          (iv) in subsection (d), by striking 
                        ``testing, certification, decertification, and 
                        recertification'' each place it appears and 
                        inserting ``testing''.
                  (C) Deadline for establishment of standards, escrow 
                account, and schedule of fees.--The Election Assistance 
                Commission shall establish the standards described in 
                section 231(b)(3) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 
                and the Testing Escrow Account and schedule of fees 
                described in section 231(b)(4) of such Act (as added by 
                subparagraph (A)) not later than January 1, 2008.
                  (D) Authorization of appropriations.--There are 
                authorized to be appropriated to the Election 
                Assistance Commission such sums as may be necessary to 
                carry out the Commission's duties under paragraphs (3) 
                and (4) of section 231 of the Help America Vote Act of 
                2002 (as added by subparagraph (A)).
          (3) Special certification of ballot durability and 
        readability requirements for states not currently using durable 
        paper ballots.--
                  (A) In general.--If any of the voting systems used in 
                a State for the regularly scheduled 2006 general 
                elections for Federal office did not require the use of 
                or produce durable paper ballots, the State shall 
                certify to the Election Assistance Commission not later 
                than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 
                Act that the State will be in compliance with the 
                requirements of sections 301(a)(2), 301(a)(12), and 
                301(b) of the Help America Vote of 2002, as added or 
                amended by this subsection, in accordance with the 
                deadline established under this Act, and shall include 
                in the certification the methods by which the State 
                will meet the requirements.
                  (B) Certifications by states that require changes to 
                state law.--In the case of a State that requires State 
                legislation to carry out an activity covered by any 
                certification submitted under this paragraph, the State 
                shall be permitted to make the certification 
                notwithstanding that the legislation has not been 
                enacted at the time the certification is submitted and 
                such State shall submit an additional certification 
                once such legislation is enacted.
          (4) Grants for research on development of election-dedicated 
        voting system software.--
                  (A) In general.--Subtitle D of title II of the Help 
                America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15401 et seq.) is 
                amended by adding at the end the following new part:

  ``PART 7--GRANTS FOR RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION-DEDICATED 
                         VOTING SYSTEM SOFTWARE

``SEC. 297. GRANTS FOR RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION-DEDICATED 
                    VOTING SYSTEM SOFTWARE.

  ``(a) In General.--The Director of the National Science Foundation 
(hereafter in this part referred to as the `Director') shall make 
grants to not fewer than 3 eligible entities to conduct research on the 
development of election-dedicated voting system software.
  ``(b) Eligibility.--An entity is eligible to receive a grant under 
this part if it submits to the Director (at such time and in such form 
as the Director may require) an application containing--
          ``(1) certifications regarding the benefits of operating 
        voting systems on election-dedicated software which is easily 
        understandable and which is written exclusively for the purpose 
        of conducting elections;
          ``(2) certifications that the entity will use the funds 
        provided under the grant to carry out research on how to 
        develop voting systems that run on election-dedicated software 
        and that will meet the applicable requirements for voting 
        systems under title III; and
          ``(3) such other information and certifications as the 
        Director may require.
  ``(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated for grants under this part $1,500,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2007 and 2008, to remain available until expended.''.
                  (B) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents of 
                such Act is amended by adding at the end of the items 
                relating to subtitle D of title II the following:

  ``Part 7--Grants for Research on Development of Election-Dedicated 
                         Voting System Software

``Sec. 297. Grants for research on development of election-dedicated 
voting system software.''.

  (d) Availability of Additional Funding to Enable States to Meet Costs 
of Revised Requirements.--
          (1) Extension of requirements payments for meeting revised 
        requirements.--Section 257(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 
        2002 (42 U.S.C. 15407(a)) is amended by adding at the end the 
        following new paragraph:
          ``(4) For fiscal year 2007, $1,000,000,000, except that any 
        funds provided under the authorization made by this paragraph 
        shall be used by a State only to meet the requirements of title 
        III which are first imposed on the State pursuant to the 
        amendments made by section 2 of the Voter Confidence and 
        Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, or to otherwise modify or 
        replace its voting systems in response to such amendments.''.
          (2) Use of revised formula for allocation of funds.--Section 
        252(b) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15402(b)) is amended to read as 
        follows:
  ``(b) State Allocation Percentage Defined.--
          ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
        `State allocation percentage' for a State is the amount 
        (expressed as a percentage) equal to the quotient of--
                  ``(A) the voting age population of the State (as 
                reported in the most recent decennial census); and
                  ``(B) the total voting age population of all States 
                (as reported in the most recent decennial census).
          ``(2) Special rule for payments for fiscal year 2007.--
                  ``(A) In general.--In the case of the requirements 
                payment made to a State for fiscal year 2007, the 
                `State allocation percentage' for a State is the amount 
                (expressed as a percentage) equal to the quotient of--
                          ``(i) the sum of the number of noncompliant 
                        precincts in the State and 50% of the number of 
                        partially noncompliant precincts in the State; 
                        and
                          ``(ii) the sum of the number of noncompliant 
                        precincts in all States and 50% of the number 
                        of partially noncompliant precincts in all 
                        States.
                  ``(B) Noncompliant precinct defined.--In this 
                paragraph, a `noncompliant precinct' means any precinct 
                (or equivalent location) within a State for which the 
                voting system used to administer the regularly 
                scheduled general election for Federal office held in 
                November 2006 did not meet either of the requirements 
                described in subparagraph (D).
                  ``(C) Partially noncompliant precinct defined.--In 
                this paragraph, a `partially noncompliant precinct' 
                means any precinct (or equivalent location) within a 
                State for which the voting system used to administer 
                the regularly scheduled general election for Federal 
                office held in November 2006 met only one of the 
                requirements described in subparagraph (D).
                  ``(D) Requirements described.--The requirements 
                described in this subparagraph with respect to a voting 
                system are as follows:
                          ``(i) The primary voting system required the 
                        use of or produced durable paper ballots (as 
                        described in section 301(a)(12)(A)) for every 
                        vote cast.
                          ``(ii) The voting system provided that the 
                        entire process of paper ballot verification was 
                        equipped for individuals with disabilities.''.
          (3) Increase in state minimum share of payment.--Section 
        252(c) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15402(c)) is amended--
                  (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting after ``one-half 
                of 1 percent'' the following: ``(or, in the case of the 
                payment made for fiscal year 2007, 1 percent)''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting after ``one-tenth 
                of 1 percent'' the following: ``(or, in the case of the 
                payment made for fiscal year 2007, one-half of 1 
                percent)''.
          (4) Revised conditions for receipt of funds.--Section 253 of 
        such Act (42 U.S.C. 15403) is amended--
                  (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``A State is 
                eligible'' and inserting ``Except as provided in 
                subsection (f), a State is eligible''; and
                  (B) by adding at the end the following new 
                subsection:
  ``(f) Special Rule for Fiscal Year 2007.--
          ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
        this part, a State is eligible to receive a requirements 
        payment for fiscal year 2007 if, not later than 90 days after 
        the date of the enactment of the Voter Confidence and Increased 
        Accessibility Act of 2007, the chief executive officer of the 
        State, or designee, in consultation and coordination with the 
        chief State election official--
                  ``(A) certifies to the Commission the number of 
                noncompliant and partially noncompliant precincts in 
                the State (as defined in section 252(b)(2)); and
                  ``(B) files a statement with the Commission 
                describing the State's need for the payment and how the 
                State will use the payment to meet the requirements of 
                title III (in accordance with the limitations 
                applicable to the use of the payment under section 
                257(a)(4)).
          ``(2) Certifications by states that require changes to state 
        law.--In the case of a State that requires State legislation to 
        carry out any activity covered by any certification submitted 
        under this subsection, the State shall be permitted to make the 
        certification notwithstanding that the legislation has not been 
        enacted at the time the certification is submitted and such 
        State shall submit an additional certification once such 
        legislation is enacted.''.
          (5) Permitting use of funds for reimbursement for costs 
        previously incurred.--Section 251(c)(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
        15401(c)(1)) is amended by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting the following: ``, or as a reimbursement for any 
        costs incurred in meeting the requirements of title III which 
        are imposed pursuant to the amendments made by section 2 of the 
        Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 or in 
        otherwise modifying or replacing voting systems in response to 
        such amendments.''.
          (6) Rule of construction regarding states receiving other 
        funds for replacing punch card, lever, or other voting 
        machines.--Nothing in the amendments made by this subsection or 
        in any other provision of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 may 
        be construed to prohibit a State which received or was 
        authorized to receive a payment under title I or II of such Act 
        for replacing punch card, lever, or other voting machines from 
        receiving or using any funds which are made available under the 
        amendments made by this subsection.
          (7) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection 
        shall apply with respect to fiscal years beginning with fiscal 
        year 2007.
  (e) Effective Date For New Requirements.--Section 301(d) of such Act 
(42 U.S.C. 15481(d)) is amended to read as follows:
  ``(d) Effective Date.--
          ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), each 
        State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the 
        requirements of this section on and after January 1, 2006.
          ``(2) Special rule for certain requirements.--
                  ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph 
                (B), the requirements of this section which are first 
                imposed on a State and jurisdiction pursuant to the 
                amendments made by section 2 of the Voter Confidence 
                and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 shall apply 
                with respect to the regularly scheduled general 
                election for Federal office held in November 2008 and 
                each succeeding election for Federal office.
                  ``(B) Delay for jurisdictions using certain paper 
                ballot printers or certain paper ballot-equipped 
                accessible machines in 2006.--
                          ``(i) Delay.--In the case of a jurisdiction 
                        described in clause (ii), subparagraph (A) 
                        shall apply to the jurisdiction as if the 
                        reference in such subparagraph to `the 
                        regularly scheduled general election for 
                        Federal office held in November 2008 and each 
                        succeeding election for Federal office' were a 
                        reference to `elections for Federal office 
                        occurring during 2010 and each succeeding 
                        year', but only with respect to the following 
                        requirements of this section:
                                  ``(I) Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) and 
                                (II) of subsection (a) (relating to 
                                access to verification from the durable 
                                paper ballot).
                                  ``(II) Paragraph (12) of subsection 
                                (a) (relating to durability and 
                                readability requirements for ballots).
                          ``(ii) Jurisdictions described.--A 
                        jurisdiction described in this clause is--
                                  ``(I) a jurisdiction which used 
                                thermal reel-to-reel voter verified 
                                paper ballot printers attached to 
                                direct recording electronic voting 
                                machines for the administration of the 
                                regularly scheduled general election 
                                for Federal office held in November 
                                2006 and which will continue to use 
                                such printers attached to such voting 
                                machines for the administration of 
                                elections for Federal office held in 
                                2008; or
                                  ``(II) a jurisdiction which used 
                                voting machines which met the 
                                accessibility requirements of paragraph 
                                (3) of subsection (a) (as in effect 
                                with respect to such election) for the 
                                administration of the regularly 
                                scheduled general election for Federal 
                                office held in November 2006 and which 
                                used or produced a paper ballot, and 
                                which will continue to use such voting 
                                machines for the administration of 
                                elections for Federal office held in 
                                2008.''.

SEC. 3. ENHANCEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT OF HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002.

  Section 401 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15511) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``The Attorney General'' and inserting ``(a) 
        In General.--The Attorney General''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
  ``(b) Filing of Complaints by Aggrieved Persons.--
          ``(1) In general.--A person who is aggrieved by a violation 
        of section 301, 302, or 303 which has occurred, is occurring, 
        or is about to occur may file a written, signed, notarized 
        complaint with the Attorney General describing the violation 
        and requesting the Attorney General to take appropriate action 
        under this section.
          ``(2) Response by attorney general.--The Attorney General 
        shall respond to each complaint filed under paragraph (1), in 
        accordance with procedures established by the Attorney General 
        that require responses and determinations to be made within the 
        same (or shorter) deadlines which apply to a State under the 
        State-based administrative complaint procedures described in 
        section 402(a)(2).
  ``(c) Clarification of Availability of Private Right of Action.--
Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit any person from 
bringing an action under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the 
United States (42 U.S.C. 1983) (including any individual who seeks to 
enforce the individual's right to a voter-verified paper ballot, the 
right to have the voter-verified paper ballot counted in accordance 
with this Act, or any other right under subtitle A of title III) to 
enforce the uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and 
administration requirements under sections 301, 302, and 303.
  ``(d) No Effect on State Procedures.--Nothing in this section may be 
construed to affect the availability of the State-based administrative 
complaint procedures required under section 402 to any person filing a 
complaint under this subsection.''.

SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY MANUAL AUDITS BY HAND COUNT.

  (a) Mandatory Manual Audits.--Title III of the Help America Vote Act 
of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15481 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new subtitle:

                 ``Subtitle C--Mandatory Manual Audits

``SEC. 321. REQUIRING AUDITS OF RESULTS OF ELECTIONS.

  ``(a) Requiring Audits.--
          ``(1) In general.--In accordance with this subtitle, each 
        State shall administer, without advance notice to the precincts 
        selected, audits of the results of elections for Federal office 
        held in the State (and, at the option of the State or 
        jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office 
        held at the same time as such election) consisting of random 
        hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots required to be 
        produced and preserved pursuant to section 301(a)(2).
          ``(2) Exception for certain elections.--A State shall not be 
        required to administer an audit of the results of an election 
        for Federal office under this subtitle if the winning candidate 
        in the election--
                  ``(A) had no opposition on the ballot; or
                  ``(B) received 80% or more of the total number of 
                votes cast in the election, as determined on the basis 
                of the final unofficial vote count.
  ``(b) Determination of Entity Conducting Audits; Application of GAO 
Independence Standards.--The State shall administer audits under this 
subtitle through an entity selected for such purpose by the State in 
accordance with such criteria as the State considers appropriate 
consistent with the requirements of this subtitle, except that the 
entity must meet the general standards established by the Comptroller 
General to ensure the independence (including the organizational 
independence) of entities performing financial audits, attestation 
engagements, and performance audits under generally accepted government 
accounting standards.
  ``(c) References to Election Auditor.--In this subtitle, the term 
`Election Auditor' means, with respect to a State, the entity selected 
by the State under subsection (b).

``SEC. 322. NUMBER OF BALLOTS COUNTED UNDER AUDIT.

  ``(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the number 
of voter-verified paper ballots which will be subject to a hand count 
administered by the Election Auditor of a State under this subtitle 
with respect to an election shall be determined as follows:
          ``(1) In the event that the unofficial count as described in 
        section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between 
        the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the 
        election is less than 1 percent of the total votes cast in that 
        election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots 
        shall occur in at least 10 percent of all precincts or 
        equivalent locations (or alternative audit units used in 
        accordance with the method provided for under subsection (b)) 
        in the Congressional district involved (in the case of an 
        election for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the 
        case of any other election for Federal office).
          ``(2) In the event that the unofficial count as described in 
        section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between 
        the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the 
        election is greater than or equal to 1 percent but less than 2 
        percent of the total votes cast in that election, the hand 
        counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in at 
        least 5 percent of all precincts or equivalent locations (or 
        alternative audit units used in accordance with the method 
        provided for under subsection (b)) in the Congressional 
        district involved (in the case of an election for the House of 
        Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other 
        election for Federal office).
          ``(3) In the event that the unofficial count as described in 
        section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between 
        the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the 
        election is equal to or greater than 2 percent of the total 
        votes cast in that election, the hand counts of the voter-
        verified paper ballots shall occur in at least 3 percent of all 
        precincts or equivalent locations (or alternative audit units 
        used in accordance with the method provided for under 
        subsection (b)) in the Congressional district involved (in the 
        case of an election for the House of Representatives) or the 
        State (in the case of any other election for Federal office).
  ``(b) Use of Alternative Mechanism.--Notwithstanding subsection (a), 
a State may adopt and apply an alternative mechanism to determine the 
number of voter-verified paper ballots which will be subject to the 
hand counts required under this subtitle with respect to an election, 
so long as the alternative mechanism uses the voter-verified paper 
ballots to conduct the audit and the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology determines that the alternative mechanism will be at 
least as statistically effective in ensuring the accuracy of the 
election results as the procedure under this subtitle.

``SEC. 323. PROCESS FOR ADMINISTERING AUDITS.

  ``(a) In General.--The Election Auditor of a State shall administer 
an audit under this section of the results of an election in accordance 
with the following procedures:
          ``(1) Within 24 hours after the State announces the final 
        unofficial vote count (as defined by the State) in each 
        precinct in the State, the Election Auditor shall determine and 
        then announce the precincts in the State in which it will 
        administer the audits.
          ``(2) With respect to votes cast at the precinct or 
        equivalent location on or before the date of the election 
        (other than provisional ballots described in paragraph (3)), 
        the Election Auditor shall administer the hand count of the 
        votes on the voter-verified paper ballots required to be 
        produced and preserved under section 301(a)(2)(A) and the 
        comparison of the count of the votes on those ballots with the 
        final unofficial count of such votes as announced by the State.
          ``(3) With respect to votes cast other than at the precinct 
        on the date of the election (other than votes cast before the 
        date of the election described in paragraph (2)) or votes cast 
        by provisional ballot on the date of the election which are 
        certified and counted by the State on or after the date of the 
        election, including votes cast by absent uniformed services 
        voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed and Overseas 
        Citizens Absentee Voting Act, the Election Auditor shall 
        administer the hand count of the votes on the applicable voter-
        verified paper ballots required to be produced and preserved 
        under section 301(a)(2)(A) and the comparison of the count of 
        the votes on those ballots with the final unofficial count of 
        such votes as announced by the State.
  ``(b) Use of Election Personnel.--In administering the audits, the 
Election Auditor may utilize the services of election administration 
personnel of the State or jurisdiction, including poll workers, without 
regard to whether or not the personnel have professional auditing 
experience.
  ``(c) Location.--The Election Auditor shall administer an audit of an 
election at the location where the ballots cast in the election are 
stored and counted after the date of the election, and in the presence 
of those personnel who under State law are responsible for the custody 
of the ballots.
  ``(d) Special Rule in Case of Delay in Reporting Absentee Vote 
Count.--In the case of a State in which the final count of absentee and 
provisional votes is not announced until after the expiration of the 7-
day period which begins on the date of the election, the Election 
Auditor shall initiate the process described in subsection (a) for 
administering the audit not later than 24 hours after the State 
announces the final unofficial vote count for the votes cast at the 
precinct or equivalent location on or before the date of the election, 
and shall initiate the administration of the audit of the absentee and 
provisional votes pursuant to subsection (a)(3) not later than 24 hours 
after the State announces the final unofficial count of such votes.
  ``(e) Additional Audits if Cause Shown.--
          ``(1) In general.--If the Election Auditor finds that any of 
        the hand counts administered under this section do not match 
        the final unofficial tally of the results of an election, the 
        Election Auditor shall administer hand counts under this 
        section of such additional precincts (or equivalent 
        jurisdictions) as the Election Auditor considers appropriate to 
        resolve any concerns resulting from the audit and ensure the 
        accuracy of the results.
          ``(2) Establishment and publication of procedures governing 
        additional audits.--Not later than August 1, 2008, each State 
        shall establish and publish procedures for carrying out the 
        additional audits under this subsection, including the means by 
        which the State shall resolve any concerns resulting from the 
        audit with finality and ensure the accuracy of the results.
  ``(f) Public Observation of Audits.--Each audit conducted under this 
section shall be conducted in a manner that allows public observation 
of the entire process.

``SEC. 324. SELECTION OF PRECINCTS.

  ``(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the 
selection of the precincts in the State in which the Election Auditor 
of the State shall administer the hand counts under this subtitle shall 
be made by the Election Auditor on an entirely random basis using a 
uniform distribution in which all precincts in a Congressional district 
have an equal chance of being selected, in accordance with procedures 
adopted by the Commission, except that at least one precinct shall be 
selected at random in each county.
  ``(b) Public Selection.--The random selection of precincts under 
subsection (a) shall be conducted in public, at a time and place 
announced in advance.
  ``(c) Mandatory Selection of Precincts Established Specifically For 
Absentee Ballots.--If a State establishes a separate precinct for 
purposes of counting the absentee ballots cast in an election and 
treats all absentee ballots as having been cast in that precinct, and 
if the state does not make absentee ballots sortable by precinct and 
include those ballots in the hand count administered with respect to 
that precinct, the State shall include that precinct among the 
precincts in the State in which the Election Auditor shall administer 
the hand counts under this subtitle.
  ``(d) Deadline for Adoption of Procedures by Commission.--The 
Commission shall adopt the procedures described in subsection (a) not 
later than March 31, 2008, and shall publish them in the Federal 
Register upon adoption.

``SEC. 325. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS.

  ``(a) Submission to Commission.--As soon as practicable after the 
completion of an audit under this subtitle, the Election Auditor of a 
State shall submit to the Commission the results of the audit, and 
shall include in the submission a comparison of the results of the 
election in the precinct as determined by the Election Auditor under 
the audit and the final unofficial vote count in the precinct as 
announced by the State and all undervotes, overvotes, blank ballots, 
and spoiled, voided or cancelled ballots, as well as a list of any 
discrepancies discovered between the initial, subsequent, and final 
hand counts administered by the Election Auditor and such final 
unofficial vote count and any explanation for such discrepancies, 
broken down by the categories of votes described in paragraphs (2) and 
(3) of section 323(a).
  ``(b) Publication by Commission.--Immediately after receiving the 
submission of the results of an audit from the Election Auditor of a 
State under subsection (a), the Commission shall publicly announce and 
publish the information contained in the submission.
  ``(c) Delay in Certification of Results by State.--
          ``(1) Prohibiting certification until completion of audits.--
        No State may certify the results of any election which is 
        subject to an audit under this subtitle prior to--
                  ``(A) to the completion of the audit (and, if 
                required, any additional audit conducted under section 
                323(d)(1)) and the announcement and submission of the 
                results of each such audit to the Commission for 
                publication of the information required under this 
                section; and
                  ``(B) the completion of any procedure established by 
                the State pursuant to section 323(d)(2) to resolve 
                discrepancies and ensure the accuracy of results.
          ``(2) Deadline for completion of audits of presidential 
        elections.--In the case of an election for electors for 
        President and Vice President which is subject to an audit under 
        this subtitle, the State shall complete the audits and announce 
        and submit the results to the Commission for publication of the 
        information required under this section in time for the State 
        to certify the results of the election and provide for the 
        final determination of any controversy or contest concerning 
        the appointment of such electors prior to the deadline 
        described in section 6 of title 3, United States Code.

``SEC. 326. PAYMENTS TO STATES.

  ``(a) Payments For Costs of Conducting Audits.--In accordance with 
the requirements and procedures of this section, the Commission shall 
make a payment to a State to cover the costs incurred by the State in 
carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections that are the 
subject of the audits conducted under this subtitle.
  ``(b) Certification of Compliance and Anticipated Costs.--
          ``(1) Certification required.--In order to receive a payment 
        under this section, a State shall submit to the Commission, in 
        such form as the Commission may require, a statement 
        containing--
                  ``(A) a certification that the State will conduct the 
                audits required under this subtitle in accordance with 
                all of the requirements of this subtitle;
                  ``(B) a notice of the reasonable costs incurred or 
                the reasonable costs anticipated to be incurred by the 
                State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the 
                elections involved; and
                  ``(C) such other information and assurances as the 
                Commission may require.
          ``(2) Amount of payment.--The amount of a payment made to a 
        State under this section shall be equal to the reasonable costs 
        incurred or the reasonable costs anticipated to be incurred by 
        the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the 
        elections involved, as set forth in the statement submitted 
        under paragraph (1).
          ``(3) Timing of notice.--The State may not submit a notice 
        under paragraph (1) until candidates have been selected to 
        appear on the ballot for all of the elections for Federal 
        office which will be the subject of the audits involved.
  ``(c) Timing of Payments.--The Commission shall make the payment 
required under this section to a State not later than 30 days after 
receiving the notice submitted by the State under subsection (b).
  ``(d) Recoupment of Overpayments.--No payment may be made to a State 
under this section unless the State agrees to repay to the Commission 
the excess (if any) of--
          ``(1) the amount of the payment received by the State under 
        this section with respect to the elections involved; over
          ``(2) the actual costs incurred by the State in carrying out 
        this subtitle with respect to the elections involved.
  ``(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Commission for fiscal year 2008 and each succeeding 
fiscal year $100,000,000 for payments under this section.

``SEC. 327. EXCEPTION FOR ELECTIONS SUBJECT TO RECOUNT UNDER STATE LAW 
                    PRIOR TO CERTIFICATION.

  ``(a) Exception.--This subtitle does not apply to any election for 
which a recount under State law will commence prior to the 
certification of the results of the election, including but not limited 
to a recount required automatically because of the margin of victory 
between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the 
election, but only if each of the following applies to the recount:
          ``(1) The recount commences prior to the determination and 
        announcement by the Election Auditor under section 323(a)(1) of 
        the precincts in the State in which it will administer the 
        audits under this subtitle.
          ``(2) If the recount would apply to fewer than 100% of the 
        ballots cast in the election--
                  ``(A) the number of ballots counted will be at least 
                as many as would be counted if an audit were conducted 
                with respect to the election in accordance with this 
                subtitle; and
                  ``(B) the selection of the precincts in which the 
                recount will be conducted will be made in accordance 
                with the random selection procedures applicable under 
                section 324.
          ``(3) The recount for the election meets the requirements of 
        section 323(e) (relating to public observation).
          ``(4) The State meets the requirements of section 325 
        (relating to the publication of results and the delay in the 
        certification of results) with respect to the recount.
  ``(b) Clarification of Effect on Other Requirements.-- Nothing in 
this section may be construed to waive the application of any other 
provision of this Act to any election (including the requirement set 
forth in section 301(a)(2) that the voter verified paper ballots serve 
as the vote of record and shall be counted by hand in all audits and 
recounts, including audits and recounts described in this subtitle).

``SEC. 328. EFFECTIVE DATE.

  ``This subtitle shall apply with respect to elections for Federal 
office beginning with the regularly scheduled general elections held in 
November 2008.''.
  (b) Availability of Enforcement Under Help America Vote Act of 
2002.--Section 401 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15511), as amended by section 
3, is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting the following: ``, or the requirements of subtitle C 
        of title III.'';
          (2) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``303'' and inserting 
        ``303, or subtitle C of title III,''; and
          (3) in subsection (c)--
                  (A) by striking ``subtitle A'' and inserting 
                ``subtitles A or C'', and
                  (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting 
                the following: ``, or the requirements of subtitle C of 
                title III.''.
  (c) Guidance on Best Practices for Alternative Audit Mechanisms.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than May 1, 2008, the Director of 
        the National Institute for Standards and Technology shall 
        establish guidance for States that wish to establish 
        alternative audit mechanisms under section 322(b) of the Help 
        America Vote Act of 2002 (as added by subsection (a)). Such 
        guidance shall be based upon scientifically and statistically 
        reasonable assumptions for the purpose of creating an 
        alternative audit mechanism that will be at least as effective 
        in ensuring the accuracy of election results and as transparent 
        as the procedure under subtitle C of title III of such Act (as 
        so added).
          (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to 
        be appropriated to carry out paragraph (1) $100,000, to remain 
        available until expended.
  (d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is amended 
by adding at the end of the items relating to title III the following:

                 ``Subtitle C--Mandatory Manual Audits

``Sec. 321. Requiring audits of results of elections.
``Sec. 322. Number of ballots counted under audit.
``Sec. 323. Process for administering audits.
``Sec. 324. Selection of precincts.
``Sec. 325. Publication of results.
``Sec. 326. Payments to States.
``Sec. 327. Exception for elections subject to recount under State law 
prior to certification.
``Sec. 328. Effective date.''.

SEC. 5. REPEAL OF EXEMPTION OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION FROM 
                    CERTAIN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) In General.--Section 205 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 
U.S.C. 15325) is amended by striking subsection (e).
  (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply 
with respect to contracts entered into by the Election Assistance 
Commission on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

  Except as otherwise provided, this Act and the amendments made by 
this Act shall apply with respect to the regularly scheduled general 
election for Federal office in November 2008 and each succeeding 
election for Federal office.

                       Purpose of the Legislation

    In 2002, in response to the public's mounting concern about 
election administration problems, Congress passed the Help 
America Vote Act (HAVA) P.L. 107-252 (42 U.S.C. 15301) to 
improve the voting process in a number of ways. One of the 
hallmark changes allowed citizens to cast provisional ballots 
if their eligibility was questioned at the polls. The 
eligibility of these provisional ballot voters would be 
verified before the ballots were ultimately counted, as 
Congress guaranteed that no eligible voter should ever leave 
the polling station without casting a ballot.
    Another improvement to the election process involved the 
replacement of punch card and lever voting machines with 
paperless direct recording electronic voting machines. Although 
these machines are generally easy to use and, if properly 
equipped, accessible to voters with disability and language 
assistance needs, the 2006 election revealed that these 
machines suffer from an essential flaw: the digital results 
reported from these machines cannot be audited independently. 
The only output available is a digital readout that relies on 
the accuracy of the electronic software during the voting 
process and cannot be recounted. As a result, many of these 
paperless DRE voting machines are not properly equipped to 
independently demonstrate voter intent during a recount or 
audit.
    If a voter casts a vote on an paperless electronic voting 
machine, the only thing the voter verifies--the information 
displayed on the touch screen surface for a few moments while 
the voter votes--disappears forever the moment the voter hits 
the cast vote button and leaves the voting booth. No election 
official, no computer scientist, and no voting system vendor 
can reconstruct what that voter intended because the voter 
votes in secret.
    Because of the secret ballot, only the voter can verify 
that his or her intention is recorded correctly, and it is 
impossible for the voter to verify an electronic record.
    When questions arise, candidates, voters and election 
officials alike are left to trust voting system vendors who 
insist their trade-secret-protected software counts votes 
accurately. This difficulty became glaringly apparent in the 
2006 election, when reports revealed voting problems in 
numerous jurisdictions, producing a lack of voter confidence 
and uncertainty regarding election results.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Examples of news articles include: Tinsley, Anna M. and Anthony 
Spangler. ``Vote Spike Blamed on Program Snafu.'' Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, March 9, 2006; Tinsley, Anna M. ``Judicial Candidate Files 
Challenge.'' Fort Worth Star-Telegram, April 6, 2006; ``Pottawattamie 
County Recorder's Race Leads to Recount.'' The Associated Press, June 
8, 2006; Rabin, Charles and Darran Simon. ``Glitches Cited in Early 
Voting; Early Voters are Urged to Cast Their Ballots with Care 
Following Scattered Reports of Problems with Heavily Used Machines.'' 
The Miami Herald, October 28, 2006; McCormick, John. ``Voting Equipment 
Glitches Lingering.'' Chicago Tribune, November 2, 2006; Smith, Tammy 
M. ``New Voting Machines Pose Election Day Problems.'' Sun Herald 
(Mississippi), November 7, 2006; ``Voting Problems Reported in NJ.'' 
New Jersey--WABC, November 7, 2006; Glendenning, Lauren. ``Voting 
Glitch in Fairfax, Some Machine Malfunctions Could Fuel Arguments for 
Recount.'' The Connection Newspaper (Virginia), November 8, 2006; 
``Some Electronic Voting Machines Not 'up to date'.'' Pittsburg 
Tribune-Review, November 8, 2006; Burk, Jennifer. ``Bibb Voting 
Glitches Nothing Out of the Ordinary, Carr Says.'' The Telegraph 
(Georgia), November 9, 2006; ``Disabled Voters Disappointed with Touch-
Screen Problems.'' WISH--TV, November 10, 2006; King, Lauren. ``Count 
on Recount in E. City Mayor's Race.'' The Virginian-Pilot, November 11, 
2005; ``Arkansas Mayoral Candidate Disputes Tally of Zero Votes, Says 
He Voted for Himself.'' The Associated Press, November 11, 2006; 
``Hendersonville Voters Back Building Height Restriction.'' Tryon Daily 
Bulletin, November 13, 2006; ``Another Voting Glitch in Baldwin 
County.'' The Associated Press, November 14, 2006; Spoto, Maryann. 
``Voting Mishap Blamed on Software Problems, Some Ballots Counted 
Twice, Sparking a Call for a Check of Totals at Shore.'' Star-Ledger 
(New Jersey), November 14, 2006; Peters, Paul. ``Communication 
Breakdown.'' Missoula Independent, November 16, 2006; ``E-voting Glitch 
Turns up in Texas.'' CNet.News, November 16, 2006; Toland, Bill. ``If 
You Think the Computer 'Flipped' Your Vote, You're Not Alone; Though 
Solid Evidence is Hard to Pin Down, Complaints Abound About Voting 
Machines.'' Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, December 10, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In order to restore public confidence and ensure 
transparency in future elections, the law must be revised to 
require an independent paper copy of each vote--verified by the 
voter him or herself--to serve as a check on any electronic 
tallies reported by the voting machines. If a jurisdiction 
chooses an electronic system to tally votes, the vote of 
record--the ballot--must be tangible, not electronic.
    H.R. 811 allows jurisdictions to continue to rely on the 
expediency, convenience and accessibility of computer-assisted 
voting, while preserving the critical ability to independently 
confirm that the will of the voters is reflected in the final 
results. Votes represent the most basic right of citizens in a 
free society, and voters must be given the confidence that they 
are accurately tallied and easily recounted.
    In amending H.R. 811, the Committee has taken into account 
concerns raised by state and local officials and other 
stakeholders concerning the timing of implementation. As 
reported, the bill allows jurisdictions that used any paper-
ballot-based voting system in 2006 a waiver until the first 
election in 2010 to meet new requirements. If H.R. 811 is 
enacted promptly, these states will have adequate time to 
implement the new requirements. Only the jurisdictions that 
used voting systems without any sort of voter-verified paper 
ballot in 2006 must replace or upgrade those systems by 
November 2008. This means that only six states would be 
required to replace all of their voting machines by 2008 
(Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee).
    Four states, New Mexico, Nevada, North Carolina, and West 
Virginia, recently converted to voter verifiable paper ballot 
systems in less than one year:
           New Mexico enacted a law on March 2, 2006 
        requiring conversion from a mixed system with paperless 
        electronic voting machines to a uniform statewide 
        system using paper optical scan ballots with accessible 
        ballot marking devices. All 33 counties fully deployed 
        the new system eight months later, in time for the 2006 
        mid-term election.
           Nevada's then-Secretary of State, now 
        Representative Dean Heller, mandated in December 2003 
        that the state would obtain new voting systems with 
        voter-verified paper records. By the following August 
        (again, eight months later), 16 of 17 counties deployed 
        voter-verified paper record systems county-wide in time 
        for the primary, and all counties had them for the 
        November 2004 presidential election.
           North Carolina enacted a law requiring voter 
        verified paper records on August 26, 2005. Eight months 
        later, in time for the May 2006 primary, the entire 
        state had completed the conversion process to new 
        systems, including RFP, testing, certification and 
        training.
           West Virginia enacted a law requiring voter-
        verified paper records in May 2005; every county had 
        new voter-verified paper record equipment in place for 
        the primary the following year.
    To delay implementation beyond 2008 in jurisdictions that 
have no paper ballots at all would reduce trust in the process 
of democracy.
    Concern has been raised over relying on paper ballots as 
the primary vehicle for recounts and audits where thermal reel-
to-reel systems remain in place. In the primary in Cuyahoga 
County, Ohio in 2006, where thermal paper printer retrofits 
were used, approximately 10% of the ballots were lost, missing 
or destroyed; however, thermal paper ballot printers used in 
(for example) Mississippi and Nevada did not experience similar 
failure rates. As amended, H.R. 811 addresses this concern by 
providing that if it is demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence that the paper ballots have been compromised, and that 
a sufficient number of the ballots have been so compromised 
that the results of the election could be changed, the 
appropriate remedy will be determined in accordance with 
applicable State law, except that the electronic tally shall 
not be used as the exclusive basis for determining the official 
certified vote tally.
    During the 109th Congress, the House narrowly approved H.R. 
4844, ``The Federal Election Integrity Act of 2006'' introduced 
by former Representative Henry Hyde, which required all states 
to demand voters provide government-issued photo identification 
in order to vote in the 2008 election. By the time H.R. 4844 
was considered on the floor, more than 100 civil rights 
organizations and citizen groups wrote to the House in 
opposition to any measures aimed at creating voter 
identification and proof of citizenship requirements to vote. 
The Committee considered and rejected two similar provisions 
proposed as amendments to H.R. 811 during Committee 
consideration of the bill.
    The Committee's opposition to these photo ID proposals 
rests on several factors. In addition to the lack of evidence 
demonstrating voter fraud as a rampant problem that needs to be 
addressed, requiring Americans to show identification at the 
polls is contrary to the foundation of our democracy. Photo ID 
laws disproportionately impact the elderly, people with 
disabilities, rural voters, students, racial and ethnic 
minorities, the homeless, low-income people, frequent movers, 
and members of large households--all of whom are less likely to 
have current and valid photo ID. Requiring government-issued 
photo identification to vote also amounts to a modern-day poll 
tax because acquiring the supporting documents required to 
obtain government photo ID takes both time and money. A birth 
certificate typically costs $10 to $15, a passport over $100, 
and naturalization papers, if they are lost or damaged and need 
to be replaced, cost $220. Lastly, voters with photo ID can be 
turned away for more benign reasons as well. If an ID card does 
not contain the voter's current address or name, which is true 
of countless Americans who move or marry, he or she will likely 
be turned away from the polls. Instead of increasing voter 
confidence and participation, onerous voter identification 
requirements will only serve to skew election results by 
removing countless eligible voters from the process.
    The Committee also assured reliable voting for all eligible 
voters by working extensively with prominent organizations and 
advocates in the disability community to ensure the standard of 
providing every voter access to a private and independent 
ballot, established by HAVA, is not violated. Diane Cordry 
Golden, Ph.D., Director, Missouri Assistive Technology conveyed 
in testimony presented before the House Administrations' 
Subcommittee on Elections, March 15, 2007, hearing that 
Congress should not restrict the rights of the disabled to vote 
privately and independently with new laws. H.R. 811 does not 
change section 301(a)(3)(A) of HAVA, which requires each 
polling place be equipped with a voting machines that is 
accessible for individuals with disabilities, including 
nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in 
a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and 
participation (including privacy and independence) as other 
voters.
    As Ms. Golden testified, ``Accessible verification 
technology will only develop if the law clearly requires it, 
and the technology will only be adequate if reasonable time and 
appropriate resources are allocated to support that 
development.'' H.R. 811 provides clear indication that voting 
systems must be accessible for all voters. In fact, H.R. 811 
extends further protections for persons with disabilities by 
requiring that any such voting system mush adhere to the 
following:
    (1) allow the voter to ``privately and independently verify 
the permanent paper ballot through the conversion of the human-
readable printed or marked vote selections into accessible 
form;''
    (2) ensure that ``the entire process of ballot verification 
and vote casting is equipped for individuals with 
disabilities;'' and
    (3) not preclude the supplemental use of Braille and 
tactile ballots.
    H.R. 811 does not alter satisfaction of the HAVA mandate 
requiring voting systems be equipped for individuals with 
disabilities in each polling place.
    Lastly, it is the intention of the Committee that the term 
``election dedicated voting system technology,'' as used in 
Section 2(c)(1) of the Voter Confidence and Increased 
Accessibility Act, and in what will be Section 301(a)(8) of the 
Help America Vote Act, as amended by the same, be construed 
broadly to include all elements of election dedicated software, 
code, and programming files, all of which are to be disclosed 
in electronic form. In addition to the elements of ``voting 
system software'' included in the definition of ``voting system 
software'' contained in the 2005 Voluntary Voting System 
Guidelines, it is the intention of the Committee that all of 
the elements and components mentioned in Sections 5.4 through 
5.9 of the Election Assistance Commission's Voting System 
Testing and Certification Manual Version 1.0, as well as 
subsequent versions and similar software or equivalent going 
forward, also be disclosed. The exclusion of ``commercial off 
the shelf'' software and hardware is intended to apply to the 
definition of ``voting system software'' included in the 2005 
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, and the elements and 
components mentioned in Sections 5.4 through 5.9 of the 
Election Assistance Commission's Voting System Testing and 
Certification Manual Version 1.0 Attached to this Report as 
Exhibits C and D are the definition of ``voting system 
software'' and the definition of ``commercial off the shelf'' 
software and hardware, as defined by the 2005 Voluntary Voting 
System Guidelines, and Sections 5.4 through 5.9 of the Election 
Assistance Commission's Voting System Testing and Certification 
Manual Version 1.0. The Committee worked tirelessly with 
stakeholders to form a consensus that will allow for the 
protection of intellectual property while ensuring that 
manufacturers will provide adequate evidence to demonstrate 
that their products functioned as intended.

             Section by Section Summary of the Legislation

    The bill is to amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 
(HAVA) to require a voter-verified permanent paper ballot under 
Title III of that Act, and for other purposes.
    Section 1.--Short title--provides a short title.
    Section 2.--Promoting accuracy, integrity, and security 
through voter-verified permanent paper ballot.--amends Section 
301 of HAVA to require all voting systems to require the use of 
or produce a voter verified paper ballot, increase 
accessibility, and implement security requirements as more 
specifically set forth below.
    Section (2)(a)(1): ``Ballot Verification and Audit 
Capacity.''
    Verification--each voting system must ``require the use of 
or produce'' an ``individual durable voter-verified paper 
ballot'' that ``shall be created by or made available for 
inspection and verification by the voter before the voter's 
vote is cast and counted.'' Examples are listed, including 
optical scan ballots, mail in ballots and print-outs from 
direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines. Optical scan 
and other paper-ballot-based systems already meet the 
requirement; this bill is not exclusively about requiring DREs 
to print paper records, but it does require that.
    Voters must be allowed to correct ``errors made by the 
system'' on the paper ballot. (HAVA Section 301(a)(1), which is 
not changed by H.R. 811, already allows voters to correct 
errors made by themselves, and/or to change their mind and 
change their vote.) While machine errors in ballot production 
should not be an issue with optical scan ballots, which are 
created by the voter, machine errors could be an issue with 
DREs, which print ballots themselves after receiving data 
input. If the DRE prints an erroneous ballot, the voter must be 
given an opportunity to correct it.
    Preservation--the voting system ``shall not preserve the 
voter-verifiable paper ballots in any manner that makes it 
possible, at any time after the ballot is cast, to associate'' 
the voter with his or her vote. This provision protects the 
secrecy of the ballot.
    The voter-verified ballots shall be used as the official 
ballots for purposes of any recount or audit and must be 
preserved by election officials. They do not leave the polling 
station with voters, thus minimizing vote-selling risks.
    Manual Audit Capacity--The paper ballots ``shall be 
suitable for a manual audit equivalent to that of a paper 
ballot voting system and shall be counted by hand in any 
recount or audit.'' This provision in effect rules out 
cryptographic audit schemes likely to be incomprehensible to 
the average voter. Audits required under the bill must be done 
by hand count.
    In the event of discrepancies between an electronic tally 
and a hand count, the paper ballots ``shall be the true and 
correct records of the votes cast.'' The paper records are 
deemed the vote of record because they are the only ones 
verified by the voter, rather than the voting machine. Strictly 
electronic ``recounts'' (the computer re-reporting its first 
reported total) would not be acceptable under H.R. 811.
    Compromised paper ballots--If it is demonstrated by clear 
and convincing evidence that the paper ballots have been 
compromised, and that a sufficient number of the ballots have 
been so compromised that the results of the election would be 
changed, ``the determination of the appropriate remedy . . . 
shall be made in accordance with applicable State law, except 
that the electronic tally shall not be used as the exclusive 
basis for determining the official certified vote tally.''
    Section (2)(a)(2)--Language Access--clarifies that the 
language access requirements of the Voting Rights Act apply to 
the voter verified paper ballots and the instructional notices 
called for under the bill.
    Section 2(b)(1)--amends in part HAVA Section 301(a)(3), 
``Accessibility for Individuals with Disabilities''.
    HAVA's existing subparagraph 301(a)(3)(A) is unchanged; it 
requires voting systems to be ``accessible for individuals with 
disabilities . . . in a manner that provides the same 
opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and 
independence) as for other voters.''
    HAVA's existing subparagraph 301(a)(3)(C) is also 
unchanged; it requires that voting systems shall, ``if 
purchased with funds made available under title II on or after 
January 1, 2007, meet the voting system standards for 
disability access (as outlined in this paragraph).'' This 
deadline has passed and the provision applies to HAVA's 
requirements; the new requirements of H.R. 811 have later 
deadlines (as set forth below).
    HAVA's remaining subparagraph (B) in Section 301(a)(3) is 
preserved and amended as follows: it requires voting systems to 
satisfy the accessibility requirement in subparagraph 
301(a)(3)(A) ``through the use of at least one voting system 
equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling 
place.'' H.R. 811 extends this by requiring any such system to:
    (4) allow the voter to ``privately and independently verify 
the permanent paper ballot through the conversion of the human-
readable printed or marked vote selections into accessible 
form;''
    (5) ensure that ``the entire process of ballot verification 
and vote casting is equipped for individuals with 
disabilities;'' and
    (6) not preclude the supplemental use of Braille and 
tactile ballots.
    Section 2(b)(2)--NIST Accessibility Study--adds to HAVA a 
requirement that the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) study, test and develop accessible ballot 
marking and paper ballot verification mechanisms and best 
practices pertaining thereto; this requirement also applies to 
enhancing language access mechanisms. $3 million is authorized 
for the study, and the results are due by December 2008. 
Accessible systems that used or produced paper ballots and were 
used in 2006 may be used until 2010, while improved systems are 
developed.
    Section 2(b)(3)--VVSG Accessibility Standards--requires 
that the voluntary voting system guidelines established by the 
Election Assistance Commission apply the same accessibility 
standards for access to ballot verification as are applied to 
access to voting.
    Section 2(c)(1)--Additional Voting System Requirements--
HAVA's current ``Voting System Requirements'' include (a) the 
opportunity for 2nd chance voting (changing your mind); (b) a 
requirement for ``a permanent paper record'' (but not a voter-
verified paper record); (c) disability access; (d) language 
access; (e) compliance with federal error rate standards; and 
(f) a uniform definition of what constitutes a ``vote''. H.R. 
811 adds to those the requirements that:
    (1) Vote of record instruction--a notice must be posted in 
each polling place instructing voters that the paper ballot 
shall serve as the vote of record in all recounts and audits, 
and not to leave the voting booth without verifying it.
    (2) Ban on uncertified, undisclosed software--no voting 
system shall ``contain or use'' any ``undisclosed software,'' 
or any software not certified by the State,'' ``at any time'' 
(vendors'' and others' proprietary rights to the software 
remain, enabling them to license and sell it (etc.); 
downloading and use of undisclosed, uncertified ``patches'' at 
the last minute, however, are prohibited). Test labs are to 
hold the software in escrow and release it to qualified 
reviewers who sign non-disclosure agreements protecting 
intellectual property and trade secrets.
    (3) Ban on wireless devices--voting systems must not 
``contain, use or be accessible by any wireless, power-line, 
remote, wide area or concealed communications device,'' except 
enclosed infrared communications devices that cannot be used 
for remote or wide area communications.
    (4) Ban on Internet connections--``no component of any 
voting device upon which ballots are programmed or votes are 
cast or tabulated shall be connected to the Internet at any 
time.''
    (5) Security standards for voting systems--no voting system 
shall be used unless
    (i) its manufacturer and the election officials using it 
document the secure chain of custody for handling the software, 
hardware, vote storage media and ballots; the Election 
Assistance Commission (EAC) is to develop best practices for 
same by August 2008;
    (ii) the manufacturer discloses its code to the test labs 
as required under item (2);
    (iii) the manufacturer does not, after election officials 
have certified the software, alter the software or insert or 
use in the system any software not certified by the State; and
    (iv) election officials submit information regarding the 
State's compliance with the foregoing to the EAC upon request; 
the EAC is to disclose information confirming secure chain of 
custody to the public upon request.
    (6) Durability and readability of paper ballots-- All 
voter-verified paper ballots shall be:
    (i) marked, printed or recorded on ``durable'' paper, 
defined as ``capable of withstanding multiple counts and 
recounts by hand without compromising the fundamental integrity 
of the ballots,'' and capable of retaining the information 
marked, printed or recorded on them for 22 months.
    (ii) ``clearly readable by the voter without assistance'' 
(other than eyeglasses, etc) and ``by a scanner or other device 
equipped for individuals with disabilities.''
    (7) Mandatory availability of paper ballots at the Polls--
Election officials at the polls shall make available to any 
individual who is eligible to vote the option of casting such 
vote by pre-printed paper ballot which is not produced by a 
direct recording electronic voting machine. The election 
officials shall, to the greatest extent practicable ensure that 
the waiting time to cast a vote on paper is not greater than 
the waiting period to cast a vote on a machine. All such 
ballots shall be counted as regular ballots (unless the voter 
was otherwise required to vote provisionally). Election 
officials are to be trained in this right and notice of this 
right is to be posted.
    Section 2(c)(2)--Testing Escrow Account--adds to HAVA's 
existing ``Certification and Testing'' requirements, which 
currently mandates that the EAC will provide for the 
certification of voting system hardware and software by 
accredited labs, and makes it optional for States to provide 
for certification through those labs. H.R. 811 adds the 
following requirements to HAVA's provisions describing the lab 
approval process:
    (1) A lab cannot be accredited unless (i) it certifies that 
the only payment it receives for testing is from the Testing 
Escrow Account (see item (2)); (ii) it prohibits, in accordance 
with EAC protocols, ``the existence or appearance'' of 
conflicts of interest with respect to its dealings with the 
manufacturers who hire the labs to test their equipment; (iii) 
the lab permits an expert designated by the EAC to observe 
testing; (iv) the lab discloses ``the test protocols, results, 
and all communication between'' the lab and the manufacturer. 
The EAC must disclose the results.
    (2) The EAC must, by January 1, 2008, establish a ``Testing 
Escrow Account'' and a schedule of testing fees; the 
manufacturer requests a test and pays the appropriate fee, upon 
which the EAC randomly (to the greatest extent practicable) 
selects a lab to conduct the test, and pays the lab upon 
completion of the test and submission of the results.
    (3) The EAC must disclose the identity of the lab that 
conducted the testing, and notify Congress, the chief state 
election official in each State and the public if it suspends, 
revokes or restores the accreditation of, or has credible 
evidence of a significant security failure at, any laboratory.
    Section 2(c)(3)--Certification as to compliance with new 
requirements--Requires each State not currently using durable 
paper ballots to certify to the EAC, within 90 days of 
enactment of the bill, that it will be in compliance with the 
durability, accessibility and readability requirements for 
paper ballots and the methods by which the State will meet the 
requirements. States are authorized to make the certification 
even if their legislatures have not met.
    Section 2(c)(4)--NSF Software Study--The National Science 
Foundation is to award grants to at least 3 entities for the 
purpose of researching and developing election dedicated voting 
systems software. $3 million is authorized (half in FY 2007 and 
half in FY 2008).
    Section 2(d)--Funding for new voting system requirements--
provides funding to meet the requirements of Section 2. In 
particular, it amends HAVA Section 257, which authorized for $3 
billion over fiscal years 2003, 2004 and 2005 to be paid to the 
states to help them meet their Title III (Voting System 
Standards) requirements, by:
    (1) adding $1 billion to be paid to states to help them 
meet the new paper record and other requirements of Title III 
imposed by H.R. 811;
    (2) establishing a formula for disbursement of funds, 
allocating the bulk of the funds to ``noncompliant'' (those 
with neither durable paper ballots nor accessible paper ballot 
verification) and ``partially noncompliant'' (those with either 
durable paper ballots or accessible paper ballot verification) 
precincts;
    (3) increasing the minimum requirements payment to each 
State to 1% (.5% for the territories);
    (4) requiring States to identify their noncompliant and 
partially compliant precincts and to describe their need for 
the payments and how they will spend the funds within 90 days 
of enactment (States are authorized to make this certification 
even if their legislatures have not met);
    (5) allowing the funds to be used to reimburse states for 
costs incurred to meet such requirements prior to enactment of 
H.R. 811; and
    (6) allowing States to receive funds even if they already 
received HAVA funds to replace voting equipment.
    HAVA provides, and H.R. 811 preserves the requirement, that 
all funds appropriated under this section remain available 
without fiscal year limitation until expended.
    Section 2(e)--Delayed Implementation for jurisdictions that 
used paper-ballot-based systems in 2006--The durable paper 
ballot and accessible ballot verification (scanning or 
conversion of vote selections from the paper ballot itself) 
requirements of Section 2 of the bill are to be implemented in 
time for the November 2008 election, except that
    (i) Jurisdictions that used thermal reel-to-reel paper 
ballot printers in 2006 and
    (ii) Jurisdictions that used accessible system in 2006 that 
used or produced a paper ballot,
and will continue to use them in 2008, are authorized to keep 
using them until the first federal election in 2010.
    Section 3.--Enhancement of Enforcement of Help America Vote 
Act--amends the enforcement provisions of HAVA to clarify the 
rights of individuals and the Attorney General, respectively, 
to pursue legal resolution of complaints pertaining to 
violations of HAVA (as amended by H.R. 811) and discrepancies 
revealed by audits (as further described in Section 5).
    Section 401 of HAVA allows the Attorney General to bring a 
civil action to enforce Sections 301 (pertaining to Voting 
System Standards), 302 (pertaining to provisional ballots) and 
Section 303 of HAVA (pertaining to computerized statewide voter 
registration databases). Section 402 of HAVA requires States to 
set up administrative complaint procedures through which voters 
can file complaints with respect to violations of Title III.
    H.R. 811 (Sections 3 and Section 5(b)) would amend HAVA 
Section 401 to:
    (1) allow individuals to file complaints with the Attorney 
General pertaining to violations of 301, 302, 303 and the new 
subtitle C of Title III (pertaining to routine random audits); 
and
    (2) require the Attorney General to respond on the same (or 
shorter) time frame as applies to State-based administrative 
complaint procedures;
    (3) clarify that nothing in the section may be construed to 
prohibit any person from bringing a civil action on his or her 
own behalf under section 1979 of 42 U.S.C. 1983 to enforce 
sections 301, 302, 303 and Subtitle C of Title III; and
    (4) clarify that nothing in the section may be construed to 
affect the availability of Section 402's State-based 
administrative complaint procedures.
    Section 4.--Requirement for Mandatory Manual Audits by Hand 
Count--adds to HAVA a requirement for routine, random audits to 
be administered by a State audit board.
    Section 4(a)--Requiring audits (Section 321(a))--adds a new 
subtitle C to HAVA Title III, ``Mandatory Manual Audits,'' 
which requires each State to administer, ``without advance 
notice to the precincts selected,'' ``random hand counts of the 
voter-verified paper ballots.'' At the option of the States, 
elections for State and local office may be included in the 
audits. Exceptions--Audits do not have to be conducted in
    (i) Unopposed races and
    (ii) Races determined by 80% or more of the vote
    Section 321(b)--Requirement of ``independence''--The entity 
conducting the audits (the ``Election Auditor'') must satisfy 
the requirement of ``independence,'' including ``organizational 
independence,'' as defined in GAO Government Accounting 
Standards.
    Section 322(a)--Number of Ballots Counted Under Audit--sets 
forth the number of ballots that shall be subject to a hand 
count: (1) at least 3% of the precincts in the case of 
elections decided by more than a 2% margin; (2) at least 5% of 
the precincts in the case of races decided by a margin of 
between 1% and 2%; and (3) at least 10% of the precincts in the 
case of races decided by a margin of less than 1%.
    Section 322(b)--Alternative ballot sampling method--allows 
States to use an ``alternative mechanism'' to determine the 
number of ballots selected for a hand count, so long as NIST 
determines that it is ``at least as statistically effective in 
ensuring the accuracy of the election results'' and equally 
transparent as the procedure set forth in the bill.
    Section 323(a)--``Process for Administering Audits--sets 
forth the process for administering the audits:
    (1) Within 24 hours after the State announces the final 
unofficial vote count, the Audit Board shall determine and then 
announce the precincts in which the audits are to be conducted.
    (2) Early votes are to be included in the audit.
    (3) Mail-in (including military and overseas) and 
provisional votes are to be included in the audit.
    Sections 323(b) and (c)--Personnel and ballot custody--
provide that election administration personnel may be used to 
conduct audits, regardless of whether they have auditing 
experience, and that the audits must be done where the ballots 
are kept and in the presence of the ballot custodian.
    Section 323(d)--Two-stage audit to include absentee and 
provisional ballots--sets forth a procedure for including 
absentee and provisional votes not counted on election day: if 
more than 7 days elapse between the date of the election and 
the date upon which mail-in and provisional votes are counted, 
the audit process shall be conducted in 2 stages. The 1st will 
commence within 24 hours of the announced totals of all early 
and election-day votes, and the 2nd within 24 hours of the 
announced totals for all mail-in and provisional votes.
    Section 323(e)--Additional audits--sets forth a procedure 
by which additional audits can be conducted if cause is shown:
    (1) If the Audit Board finds that the ``results don't 
match,'' the Election Auditor shall conduct hand counts of 
``such additional precincts . . . as the Election Auditor 
considers appropriate to resolve any concerns resulting from 
the audit and to ensure the accuracy of the results;'' and
    (2) by August 1, 2008, each State must establish and 
publish a procedure by which it will ``resolve any concerns 
resulting from the audit with finality and ensure the accuracy 
of the results.''
    Section 323(f)--Publicly observable--requires the audits be 
conducted in a manner ``that allows public observation of the 
entire process.''
    Section 324(a)--Selection of Precincts--sets forth the 
manner in which precincts to be hand counted are to be 
selected:
    (1) the Election Auditor shall select the precincts ``on an 
entirely random basis using a uniform distribution in which all 
precincts in a Congressional District have an equal chance of 
being selected''; and
    (2) ``at least one precinct shall be selected at random in 
each county.''
    Section 324(b)--Public selection process--requires the 
random selection to be conducted in public (in a sense similar 
to public lottery drawings).
    Section 324(c)--Absentee ballot precinct--provides that if 
a State establishes a separate precinct for absentee ballots, 
and if the absentee ballots are not sortable by precinct, then 
the absentee ballot precinct will be included in the precincts 
selected for audit.
    Section 324(d)--Publication of selection procedure--
requires the EAC to adopt and publish the random selection 
procedures in the Federal Register by March 31, 2008.
    Section 325(a)--Publication of Results--requires the Audit 
Boards to announce and submit to the EAC for publication the 
audit results, in accordance with the following procedures:
    (1) ``as soon as practicable after the completion'' of the 
audit, the Board is to submit to the EAC the results of the 
audit
    (2) The announcement/publication shall include a comparison 
of the results as announced by the jurisdiction as well as a 
list of any discrepancies discovered . . . and an explanation 
for such discrepancies.
    (3) The announcement/publication shall, include undervotes 
and spoiled ballots and be broken down by the categories of 
early, day-of, mail-in and provisional ballots
    Section 325(b)--Publication by Commission--requires the EAC 
to publish the results ``immediately after receiving'' them.
    Section 325(c)--Delay in Certification of Results by 
State--requires that the audits (and any additional audits) be 
conducted and completed, discrepancies be resolved in 
accordance with state procedures called for by Section 323(c), 
and the results sent to the EAC, prior to certification of 
results by a State and, in Presidential elections, prior to 
appointment of electors.
    Section 326--Payments to States--provides that the EAC 
shall make payments to the states to cover the costs of the 
audits. In order to receive payments, the States must certify 
that it will conduct the required audits and submit a ``notice 
of reasonable costs'' of the audits. The EAC will then issue 
payment equal to ``the reasonable costs.'' The notice cannot be 
submitted until the ballots are final and include all of the 
candidates. Payment is due to the state within 30 days of 
receipt of the notice. $100 million is authorized each fiscal 
year to make the payments.
    Section 327--Exception for Elections Subject to Automatic 
Recount Under State Law--pre-empts the possibility that a 
recount that will commence prior to certification (including 
but not limited to recounts triggered automatically under state 
law due to a narrow margin of victory) could take place at the 
same time as an audit--especially a large audit as called for 
due to narrow margin of victory under the bill. Several states 
commence such automatically-triggered and other recounts or 
allow other recounts to commence prior to certification. The 
recount, however:
           Must commence prior to when the audit would 
        have commenced;
           Must be by hand count of the paper ballots;
           Must include at least as many ballots as 
        would have been called for by the audit and use the 
        same random selection method called for by the audit 
        section if the recount would be less than a 100% 
        recount;
           Must be conducted in the same transparent 
        manner as required by the audit section; and
           Must ensure that all discrepancies are 
        reported and resolved prior to certification as called 
        for by the audit section.
    Section 328--Effective Date--establishes a November 2008 
implementation date for the audits.
    Section 4(b)--Conforming changes to HAVA enforcement 
provisions--further amends HAVA's Section 401 (see Section 3 
above) to clarify HAVA's enforcement provisions.
    Section 4(c)--NIST Guidance re: Alternative Method--NIST 
must develop and publish guidance with respect to the 
alternative ballot sampling method described in 322(b) by May 
1, 2008; $100,000 is authorized to NIST for such development.
    Section 5.--Repeal of exemption of Election Assistance 
Commission from certain government contracting requirements--
Repeals HAVA's exemption of the EAC from government contracting 
requirements, effective as of the date of enactment of H.R. 
811.
    Section 6.--Effective date--Provides that the 
implementation deadline for HR 811 is November 2008, except as 
otherwise provided in the bill.

                         IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within 90 Days of Enactment...............  Paperless States to certify
                                             how they will meet
                                             requirements of the
                                             legislation
                                            States to identify the
                                             number of non-compliant and
                                             partially-compliant
                                             precincts they have and
                                             describe how the State will
                                             use the funding under the
                                             bill to meet the
                                             requirements of the bill
January 2008..............................  Establishment of testing
                                             escrow account and fee
                                             schedule
March 2008................................  EAC to publish procedures
                                             for random selection of
                                             precincts
May 2008..................................  NIST to publish guidance on
                                             best practices for
                                             alternative ballot sampling
                                             methods
August 2008...............................  EAC best practices for
                                             documenting secure chain of
                                             custody to be published
                                            States to publish produces
                                             by which they will resolve
                                             discrepancies in audits
December 2008.............................  NIST to complete accessible
                                             ballot verification study
January 2010 (First federal election in     States using paper-ballot
 2010).                                      based systems (thermal reel-
                                             to-reel and/or accessible
                                             systems that used or
                                             produced a paper ballot) in
                                             2006 to be in compliance
                                             with durable paper and
                                             accessible paper ballot
                                             verification requirements
                                             of H.R. 811
------------------------------------------------------------------------

               Committee Consideration of the Legislation


                       INTRODUCTION AND REFERRAL

    On February 5, 2007, Mr. Holt, along with 168 members of 
the House, introduced H.R. 811, which was referred to the 
Committee on House Administration. The Committee referred the 
legislation to the Subcommittee on Elections on March 23, 2007.

                                HEARINGS

    The Committee on House Administration Subcommittee on 
Elections held three hearings relating to issues encompassed in 
H.R. 811.
    On March 15, 2007, the Subcommittee on Elections held its 
first hearing on matters relating to HR 811 titled ``Election 
Reform Hearing: Machines & Software.''
    Members present: Subcommittee Chair Zoe Lofgren, Juanita 
Millender-McDonald, Susan Davis, and Kevin McCarthy.

Witnesses:

Panel 1:

    1. The Honorable Eric Clark--Secretary of State, State of 
Mississippi
    2. Diane Cordry Golden, Ph.D.--Director, Missouri Assistive 
Technology
    3. Ted Selker, Ph.D.--Director, Voting Technology Project, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    4. Mr. Kelly Pierce--Disability Specialist, Cook County 
(IL) State's Attorney Office

Panel 2:

    1. Brit Williams, Ph.D.--Professor of Computer Science and 
Information Systems, Kennesaw State University
    2. David Wagner, Ph.D.--Associate Professor, University of 
California, Berkeley
    3. Mr. Brian Behlendorf--Founder and Chief Technology 
Officer, CollabNet
    4. Mr. Hugh J. Gallagher--Managing Director, Election 
System Acquisition and Management Services, Inc.
    5. Mr. Matt Zimmerman--Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation
    On March 20, 2007, the Committee on House Administration 
Subcommittee on Elections held its second hearing relating to 
the subject matter of H.R. 811 titled ``Election Reform 
Hearing: Auditing.''
    Members present: Subcommittee Chair Zoe Lofgren, Charlie 
Gonzalez, Susan Davis, Kevin McCarthy, and Vern Ehlers.

Witnesses:

Panel 1:

    1. Ion Sancho--Supervisor of Elections, Leon County (FL)
    2. Matt Damschroder--Director, Franklin County (OH) Board 
of Elections

Panel 2:

    1. Candice Hoke--Director, Cleveland State University 
Center for Election Integrity
    2. R. Doug Lewis--Executive Director, National Association 
of Election Officials
    3. Lawrence Norden--Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice
    4. Tammy Patrick--Federal Compliance Officer, Maricopa 
County (AZ) Elections Department
    5. Pamela Smith--President, Verified Voter
    On March 23, 2007, Committee on House Administration 
Subcommittee on Elections held its third hearing on matters 
relating to H.R. 811.
    Members present: Subcommittee Chair Zoe Lofgren, Juanita 
Millender-McDonald, Charlie Gonzalez, Susan Davis, Kevin 
McCarthy, and Vern Ehlers.

Witnesses:

Panel 1:

    1. The Honorable Charlie Crist, Governor of Florida

Panel 2:

    1. The Honorable Rush Holt
    2. The Honorable Tom Petri

Panel 3:

    1. The Honorable Debra Bowen, Secretary of State of 
California
    2. The Honorable Chris Nelson, Secretary of State of South 
Dakota

Panel 4:

    1. Tanya Clay House, Director of Public Policy, People for 
the American Way
    2. George Gilbert, Director of Elections, Guilford County, 
North Carolina
    3. Edward Felten, Ph.D., Professor of Computer Science and 
Public Affairs, Princeton University
    4. Don Norris, Ph.D., Professor of Public Policy, 
University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Panel 5:

    1. Noel Runyan, President, Personal Data Systems
    2. Dr. Harold Snider, Access for the Handicap, Inc.
    3. Warren Stewart, Policy Director, VoteTrustUSA
    4. Commissioner Gail W. Mahoney, Jackson County, Michigan; 
Chair, National Association of Counties
    Also, full Committee Chairwoman Juanita Millender-McDonald 
and Ranking Member Vernon Ehlers hosted a voting machine forum 
on March 15, 2007, which gave Members of Congress and their 
staff an opportunity to learn more about voting systems first-
hand. The companies in attendance were: Avante, Automark, 
Diebold Election Systems, Hart InterCivic, Inc., IVS--Vote by 
Phone, Perfect Voting System, Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc., 
Unisyn Voting Solutions.
    Companies that were unable to attend but provided materials 
for distribution included: Election Systems and Software, 
Unilect Corporation, VoteHere, Inc.

                                 MARKUP

    On Tuesday, May 8, 2007, the Committee met to mark up H.R. 
811. The Committee favorably reported H.R. 811, as amended, by 
a recorded vote (6-3), a quorum being present.

             Matters Required Under the Rules of the House


                         COMMITTEE RECORD VOTES

    Clause 3(b) of House rule XIII requires the results of each 
record vote on an amendment or motion to report, together with 
the names of those voting for and against, to be printed in the 
committee report. The first amendment introduced was an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute by Ms. Lofgren. All of 
the following votes, until the vote on the Lofgren substitute, 
were on amendments to the Lofgren substitute.

Ehlers' Amendment to the Lofgren Substitute.

    The first recorded vote of the mark-up was on an amendment 
in the nature of a substitute to the Lofgren substitute offered 
by Mr. Ehlers. The amendment directs the EAC with the help of 
NIST to establish guidelines and standards for new Federal 
election equipment. The substitute also requires States to 
submit both audit plans and security implementation plans to 
the EAC that would be implemented in the states by the 2010 
elections. The vote was 3-5 and the amendment was not agreed 
to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................        --         X        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................        --        --        --
Mr. Capuano...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................        --         X        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................        --         X        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................        --         X        --
Mr. Ehlers................................         X        --        --
Mr. Lungren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................         X        --        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         3         5        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Record votes on additional amendments to the Lofgren Substitute

    The Committee then voted on Mr. Ehlers' Amendment #1, which 
would give election officials the choice of deciding what the 
official ballot of record should be in case of recount and 
audits. The vote was 3-6 and the amendment was not agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................        --         X        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Capuano...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................        --         X        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................        --         X        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................        --         X        --
Mr. Ehlers................................         X        --        --
Mr. Lungren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................         X        --        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         3         6        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee then voted on Mr. Lungren's Amendment #1, 
which would allow states to continue the to use of electronic 
voting machines that use thermal paper in perpetuity. The vote 
was 3-5 and the amendment was not agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................        --         X        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Capuano...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................        --         X        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................        --         X        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................        --        --        --
Mr. Ehlers................................         X        --        --
Mr. Lungren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................         X        --        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         3         5        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee then voted on Mr. McCarthy's Amendment #1, 
which would allow states to continue use electronic voting 
machines not equipped with any voter verified paper ballots for 
early voting. The vote was 3-5 and the amendment was not agreed 
to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................        --         X        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Capuano...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................        --        --        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................        --         X        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................        --         X        --
Mr. Ehlers................................         X        --        --
Mr. Lungren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................         X        --        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         3         5        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee then voted on Mr. Ehlers' Amendment #2, which 
would require states to submit audit plans to the Election 
Assistance Commission by the 2010 election cycle. The vote was 
3-5 and the amendment was not agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................        --         X        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Capuano...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................        --        --        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................        --         X        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................        --         X        --
Mr. Ehlers................................         X        --        --
Mr. Lungren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................         X        --        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         3         5        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee then voted on Mr. Lungren's Amendment #2, 
which would allow states to continue the use of paperless 
electronic voting machines to comply with the disability access 
provisions of HAVA. The vote was 3-5 and the amendment was not 
agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................        --         X        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Capuano...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................        --        --        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................        --         X        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................        --         X        --
Mr. Ehlers................................         X        --        --
Mr. Lungren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................         X        --        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         3         5        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee then voted on Mr. Lungren's Amendment #3, 
which would remove the software code disclosure language 
entirely from the legislation. The vote was 3-6 and the 
amendment was not agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................        --         X        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Capuano...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................        --         X        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................        --         X        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................        --         X        --
Mr. Ehlers................................         X        --        --
Mr. Lungren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................         X        --        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         3         6        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee then voted on Mr. McCarthy's Amendment #2, 
which would force voters to show government-issued photo 
identification at the polls by 2010. The vote was 3-5 and the 
amendment was not agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................        --         X        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Capuano...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................        --        --        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................        --         X        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................        --         X        --
Mr. Ehlers................................         X        --        --
Mr. Lungren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................         X        --        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         3         5        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee then voted on Mr. McCarthy's Amendment #3, 
which would require voters to show government-issued photo 
identification at the polls by 2010. If voters could not 
produce such identification, they must sign affidavits swearing 
to their identity. The vote was 3-5 and the amendment was not 
agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................        --         X        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Capuano...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................        --        --        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................        --         X        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................        --         X        --
Mr. Ehlers................................         X        --        --
Mr. Lungren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................         X        --        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         3         5        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee then voted on Mr. Lungren's Amendment #4, 
which would remove the private right of action section of the 
legislation. The vote was 2-5 and the amendment was not agreed 
to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................        --         X        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Capuano...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................        --         X        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................        --        --        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................        --         X        --
Mr. Ehlers................................        --        --        --
Mr. Lungren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................         X        --        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         2         5        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee then voted on Mr. McCarthy's Amendment #4, 
which would suspend the requirements of the bill until the 
authorization amount is fully appropriated. The vote was 3-5 
and the amendment was not agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................        --         X        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Capuano...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................        --         X        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................        --        --        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................        --         X        --
Mr. Ehlers................................         X        --        --
Mr. Lungren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................         X        --        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         3         5        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee then voted on Mr. Lungren's Amendment #5, 
which would delay the implementation date until 2012. The vote 
was 3-5 and the amendment was not agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................        --         X        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Capuano...............................        --         X        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................        --         X        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................        --        --        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................        --         X        --
Mr. Ehlers................................         X        --        --
Mr. Lungren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................         X        --        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         3         5        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lofgren Amendment in the nature of a substitute

    Offered by Ms. Lofgren. The substitute addresses a number 
of concerns that were raised by the minority, interest groups 
and other stakeholders during the timeframe between 
introduction of the original bill and the mark-up. For example, 
the amendment addresses many of the concerns regarding 
implementation dates and funding of the legislation. All 
jurisdictions that used any paper-ballot-based voting system in 
2006, including thermal reel-to-reel systems and accessible 
systems that used a paper ballot in any manner have until the 
first election in 2010 to meet new requirements. Additionally, 
funding for the voting system requirements has been increased 
from $300 million to $1 billion. Furthermore, entities chosen 
by the State to conduct the audits must satisfy the 
requirements of ``independence'' set forth in the GAO's 
``Government Accounting Standards.''
    The Lofgren substitute changes the original bill in the 
following areas:
    Effective Date for New Requirements--January 2008 deadline 
has been replaced with bifurcated deadline:
           All jurisdictions that used any paper-
        ballot-based voting system at all in 2006 (including 
        thermal reel-to-reel systems and accessible systems 
        that used a paper ballot in any manner) have until the 
        first election in 2010 to meet new requirements;
           All jurisdictions that had no voter verified 
        paper ballots at all in 2006 have until November 2008 
        to meet all of the requirements (and they are not 
        entitled to a waiver).
    Funding for Voting System Requirements--has been increased 
from $300 million to $1 billion.
    Ban on Internet connections--has been expanded to include, 
in addition to devices upon which votes are cast, devices upon 
which votes are tabulated and ballots are programmed.
    Software disclosure--the requirement that software be 
disclosed to any person has been replaced by a requirement that 
election-dedicated software be released to qualified persons 
who sign non-disclosure agreements protecting intellectual 
property rights and trade secrets.
    Extension of Authorization of EAC--has been removed.
    Military and overseas voting--overseas ballots are included 
in audits, but the requirement that the DOD and EAC develop 
protocols for treatment of paper ballots has been removed.
    Vote of Record language--now provides that even if paper 
ballots have been demonstrated to have been compromised in 
numbers exceeding the margin of victory, ``the electronic tally 
shall not be used as the exclusive basis for determining the 
official certified vote tally.''
    Audit Board--The Audit Board has been removed, but it has 
been replaced with a requirement that the entity chosen by the 
State to conduct the audits satisfy the requirements of 
``independence'' set forth in the GAO's ``Government Accounting 
Standards.''
    How many federal elections will be audited--Unopposed 
elections and elections determined by more than an 80% margin 
of victory are not required to be audited.
    Audit procedures and ballot custody--Audits must be 
conducted in the place where the ballots are stored and counted 
after the election, and in the presence of the ballot 
custodians.
    Funding for audits--an explicit authorization of $100 
million annually has been added.
    Recounts that occur prior to certification (and might 
overlap with an audit)--Section 327 requires that any pre-
certification recount done instead of an audit be done by hand 
count of the paper ballots, and it has been expanded to provide 
that if the recount is not a 100% count, that at least as many 
ballots be counted, the selection of those ballots be just as 
random, the recount be just as publicly observable, and the 
results be published, all as is required of audits.
    Mandatory availability of paper ballots at the polls--adds 
that any eligible voter shall be given the option by the 
election officials of casting a vote by a pre-printed paper 
ballot not produced by a direct recording electronic voting 
machine. The election officials shall, to the greatest extent 
practicable ensure that the waiting time to cast a vote on 
paper is not greater than the waiting period to cast a vote on 
a machine. It further requires the posting of notice regarding 
this right of voters to access the paper ballot, and additional 
poll worker training regarding this requirement. It exempts 
early voting, since voters exercising this option have a 
separate opportunity to access a paper ballot. The amendment 
takes effect in November 2010.

Amendments to the Lofgren Substitute agreed to by voice vote

    The amendment offered by Mr. Capuano provides every voter 
voting in a polling place the opportunity to vote using a pre-
printed paper ballot not produced by a direct recording 
electronic voting machine, regardless of the circumstance. It 
further requires the posting of notice regarding the right of 
voters to access the paper ballot, and additional poll worker 
training regarding this requirement. It also exempts early 
voting, since voters exercising this option have a separate 
opportunity to access a paper ballot. The amendment takes 
effect in November 2010.
    The amendment offered by Mr. Gonzalez makes two technical 
corrections to the Lofgren substitute. The first change, which 
was contemplated in an earlier version of the substitute, 
replaces the term ``Commission'' in a section where it should 
state ``laboratory accredited under Section 231.'' Mr. 
Gonzalez's amendment also inserts the amended clause (iv) of 
Section 2(c)(1) of the substitute to read as follows: ``(iv) At 
the request of the Commission--``(I) the appropriate election 
official shall submit information to the Commission regarding 
the State's compliance with this subparagraph; and ``(II) the 
manufacturer shall submit information to the Commission 
regarding the manufacturer's compliance with this 
subparagraph.'' Both are conforming changes that did nothing to 
affect the substance of the substitute
    The Committee then voted on the amendment in the nature of 
a substitute, as amended, offered by Ms. Lofgren. The vote was 
6-3 and the amendment was agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................         X        --        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. Capuano...............................         X        --        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................         X        --        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................         X        --        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................         X        --        --
Mr. Ehlers................................        --         X        --
Mr. Lungren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................        --         X        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         6         3        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee then voted to favorably report H.R. 811, as 
amended. The vote to report favorably was approved by a 
recorded vote (6-3).

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Member                      Ayes      Noes     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brady.................................         X        --        --
Ms. Lofgren...............................         X        --        --
Mr. Capuano...............................         X        --        --
Mr. Gonzalez..............................         X        --        --
Mrs. Davis (CA)...........................         X        --        --
Mr. Davis (AL)............................         X        --        --
Mr. Ehlers................................        --         X        --
Mr. Lungren...............................        --         X        --
Mr. McCarthy..............................        --         X        --
                                           -----------------------------
      Total...............................         6         3        --
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee states that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

                General Performance Goals and Objectives

    The Committee states, with respect to clause 3(c)(4) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, that 
the goal and objective of H.R. 811 is to increase voter 
confidence in the election process by requiring an independent 
audit mechanism for all voting systems in Federal elections.

                        Constitutional Authority

    In compliance with clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the 
Committee states that Article 1, Section 4 of the U.S. 
Constitution grants Congress the authority to make laws 
governing the time, place and manner of holding Federal 
elections.

                         Earmark Identification

    Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI, H.R. 811, the Voter 
Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, does not 
include any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or 
limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 
9(f) of rule XXI.

                        Preemption Clarification

    Section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
requires the report of any committee on a bill or joint 
resolution to include a committee statement on the extent to 
which the bill or joint resolution is intended to preempt state 
or local law. H.R. 811 is intended to apply in all States and 
preempt laws to the contrary in their application to Federal 
elections.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with 
respect to the bill, the following estimate and comparison 
prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office 
under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:

                                                      May 15, 2007.
Hon. Robert A. Brady,
Chairman, Committee on House Administration,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 811, the Voter 
Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew 
Pickford.
            Sincerely,
                                                   Peter R. Orszag.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 811--Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007

    Summary: H.R. 811 would amend the Help America Vote Act of 
2002 to authorize the appropriation of more than $1 billion for 
the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to provide grants to 
states to prepare permanent paper ballots for use in all 
federal elections beginning with the November 2008 federal 
election. H.R. 811 also would authorize the appropriation of 
$100 million annually for states to audit the paper ballots. 
Finally, the legislation would authorize appropriations for the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) to study voting technologies.
    Assuming appropriation of the authorized and estimated 
amounts, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 811 would cost 
$10 million in 2007 and $1.3 billion over the 2007-2012 period. 
Enacting the bill would affect direct spending or revenues, 
however, CBO estimates that there would be no significant net 
budgetary impact from those effects each year. All provisions 
of H.R. 811 would be excluded from the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act (UMRA).
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of H.R. 811 is shown in the following table. 
The costs of this legislation fall within budget functions 250 
(general science, space, and technology), 370 (commerce and 
housing credit), and 800 (general government).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                                                   2007    2008    2009    2010    2011    2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION \1\

Ballot Verification and Other Requirements:
    Authorization Level.........................................   1,000       0       0       0       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........................................       0     800     100     100       0       0
Audit Payments to States:
    Authorization Level.........................................       0     100     100     100     100     100
    Estimated Outlays...........................................       0      60      40      60      40      60
Testing and Certification of Voting Systems:
    Estimated Authorization Level...............................       0      10       5       5       5       5
    Estimated Outlays...........................................       0       8       7       5       5       5
Other Reporting Provisions:
    Authorization Level.........................................       2       5       0       0       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........................................       0       4       3       0       0       0
Other Provisions:
    Estimated Authorization Level...............................       0      10       8       8       9       9
    Estimated Outlays...........................................       0      10       8       8       9       9
    Total Proposed Changes:
        Estimated Authorization Level...........................   1,002     125     113     113     114     114
        Estimated Outlays.......................................       0     882     158     173      54      74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ H.R. 811 also would affect revenues and direct spending by authorizing an escrow account to collect fees
  from voting systems manufacturers and spend those fees to have testing laboratories verify the performance of
  the equipment. CBO estimates that the net budgetary impact of this activity would be insignificant each year.

    Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the 
bill will be enacted near the end of fiscal year 2007, that the 
necessary amounts will be appropriated each year, and that 
outlays will follow historical spending patterns for similar 
programs. CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 811 would cost 
$1.3 billion over the 2008-2012 period, assuming appropriation 
of the specified and estimated amounts. (For this estimate, we 
assume that authorized 2007 funding would be provided late in 
the year, with no outlays until fiscal year 2008.)

Ballot verification and other requirements

    H.R. 811 would authorize the appropriation of $1 billion in 
fiscal year 2007 for grants to states to pay for the cost of 
providing a permanent paper record of each voter's ballot. 
Assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts, CBO estimates 
that implementing those provisions would cost $1 billion over 
the 2008-2012 period (with no estimated outlays in 2007).

Audit payments to States

    The bill would authorize the appropriation of $100 million 
annually over the 2008-2012 period for payments to states to 
provide various audits of the paper ballots. This would include 
specific audit requirements for elections that are closely 
contested. Based on information from EAC, CBO expects that the 
audits would take place over a two-year period. Assuming 
appropriation of the authorized amounts, CBO estimates that 
implementing this provision would cost $60 million in 2008 and 
$260 million over the 2008-2012 period.

Testing and certification of voting systems

    The bill would authorize the EAC to create a Testing Escrow 
Account that would be used by accredited laboratories to 
certify the performance of voting system hardware and software. 
The EAC would set a fee schedule for the voting equipment 
industry, receive fees from each manufacturer, and distribute 
the fees to laboratories to conduct testing. CBO expects that 
such fees would be recorded as federal revenues, and their 
expenditure would constitute direct spending. The net effect of 
those collections and their distribution would be insignificant 
in each year.
    Based on information from the EAC, CBO expects that six 
laboratories would be accredited to test the equipment of 10 
manufacturers. Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, 
CBO estimates that implementing this section would cost $30 
million over the 2008-2012 period for the EAC to administer the 
new program.

Other reporting provisions

    H.R. 811 also would authorize the appropriation of $3 
million in fiscal year 2008 for the NIST to study and report to 
the Congress on ballot verification methods for individuals 
with disabilities and best practices for ballot auditing. In 
addition, the legislation would authorize the appropriation of 
$1.5 million annually over the 2007-2008 period for the NSF to 
provide grants to study election voting software. Assuming 
appropriation of the specified amounts, CBO estimates that 
implementing those provisions would cost $7 million over the 
2008-2012 period.

Other provisions

    Implementing H.R. 811 would increase the responsibilities 
of the EAC. The agency estimates that it would need more than 
30 new staff primarily to oversee the certification of voting 
systems nationwide and to audit the new grant programs. CBO 
estimates that the additional staff and administrative 
requirements would cost $45 million over the 2008-2012 period.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: Section 4 of 
UMRA excludes from the application of that act any legislative 
provisions that enforce the Constitutional rights of 
individuals. CBO has determined that the provisions of H.R. 811 
would fall within that exclusion because they would protect 
individuals' voting rights. Therefore, CBO has not reviewed 
this bill for mandates.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Matthew Pickford. 
Impact on State, local, and tribal governments: Elizabeth Cove. 
Impact on the private sector: Paige Piper-Bach.
    Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is 
as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
     * * * * * * *

                          TITLE II--COMMISSION

     * * * * * * *

     Subtitle C--Studies and Other Activities To Promote Effective 
                   Administration of Federal Elections

Sec. 241. Periodic studies of election administration issues.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible ballot verification mechanisms.
Sec. [247] 248. Consultation with Standards Board and Board of Advisors.

                     Subtitle D--Election Assistance

     * * * * * * *

Part 7--Grants for Research on Development of Election-Dedicated Voting 
                             System Software

Sec. 297. Grants for research on development of election-dedicated 
          voting system software.
     * * * * * * *

    TITLE III--UNIFORM AND NONDISCRIMINATORY ELECTION TECHNOLOGY AND 
                       ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

     * * * * * * *

                   Subtitle C--Mandatory Manual Audits

Sec. 321. Requiring audits of results of elections.
Sec. 322. Number of ballots counted under audit.
Sec. 323. Process for administering audits.
Sec. 324. Selection of precincts.
Sec. 325. Publication of results.
Sec. 326. Payments to States.
Sec. 327. Exception for elections subject to recount under State law 
          prior to certification.
Sec. 328. Effective date.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          TITLE II--COMMISSION

           Subtitle A--Establishment and General Organization

PART 1--ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 205. POWERS.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(e) Contracts.--The Commission may contract with and 
compensate persons and Federal agencies for supplies and 
services without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes 
of the United States (41 U.S.C. 5).]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       Subtitle B--Testing, Certification, Decertification, and 
         Recertification of Voting System Hardware and Software

SEC. 231. CERTIFICATION AND TESTING OF VOTING SYSTEMS.

  (a) Certification and Testing.--
          (1) In general.--The Commission shall provide for the 
        [testing, certification, decertification, and 
        recertification of voting system hardware and software 
        by accredited laboratories.] testing of voting system 
        hardware and software by accredited laboratories in 
        connection with the certification, decertification, and 
        recertification of the hardware and software for 
        purposes of this Act.
          (2) Optional use by states.--At the option of a 
        State, the State may provide for the [testing, 
        certification, decertification, or recertification of 
        its voting system hardware and software by the 
        laboratories accredited by the Commission under this 
        section.] testing of its voting system hardware and 
        software by the laboratories accredited by the 
        Commission under this section in connection with 
        certifying, decertifying, and recertifying the hardware 
        and software.
  (b) Laboratory Accreditation.--
          (1) Recommendations by national institute of 
        standards and technology.--Not later than 6 months 
        after the Commission first adopts voluntary voting 
        system guidelines under part 3 of subtitle A, the 
        Director of the National Institute of Standards and 
        Technology shall conduct an evaluation of independent, 
        non-Federal laboratories and shall submit to the 
        Commission a list of those laboratories the Director 
        proposes to be accredited to carry out the [testing, 
        certification, decertification, and recertification] 
        testing provided for under this section.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (3) Prohibiting conflicts of interest; ensuring 
        availability of results.--
                  (A) In general.--A laboratory may not be 
                accredited by the Commission for purposes of 
                this section unless--
                          (i) the laboratory certifies that the 
                        only compensation it receives for the 
                        testing carried out in connection with 
                        the certification, decertification, and 
                        recertification of the manufacturer's 
                        voting system hardware and software is 
                        the payment made from the Testing 
                        Escrow Account under paragraph (4);
                          (ii) the laboratory meets such 
                        standards as the Commission shall 
                        establish (after notice and opportunity 
                        for public comment) to prevent the 
                        existence or appearance of any conflict 
                        of interest in the testing carried out 
                        by the laboratory under this section, 
                        including standards to ensure that the 
                        laboratory does not have a financial 
                        interest in the manufacture, sale, and 
                        distribution of voting system hardware 
                        and software, and is sufficiently 
                        independent from other persons with 
                        such an interest;
                          (iii) the laboratory certifies that 
                        it will permit an expert designated by 
                        the Commission to observe any testing 
                        the laboratory carries out under this 
                        section; and
                          (iv) the laboratory, upon completion 
                        of any testing carried out under this 
                        section, discloses the test protocols, 
                        results, and all communication between 
                        the laboratory and the manufacturer to 
                        the Commission.
                  (B) Availability of results.--Upon receipt of 
                information under subparagraph (A), the 
                Commission shall make the information available 
                promptly to election officials and the public.
          (4) Procedures for conducting testing; payment of 
        user fees for compensation of accredited 
        laboratories.--
                  (A) Establishment of escrow account.--The 
                Commission shall establish an escrow account 
                (to be known as the ``Testing Escrow Account'') 
                for making payments to accredited laboratories 
                for the costs of the testing carried out in 
                connection with the certification, 
                decertification, and recertification of voting 
                system hardware and software.
                  (B) Schedule of fees.--In consultation with 
                the accredited laboratories, the Commission 
                shall establish and regularly update a schedule 
                of fees for the testing carried out in 
                connection with the certification, 
                decertification, and recertification of voting 
                system hardware and software, based on the 
                reasonable costs expected to be incurred by the 
                accredited laboratories in carrying out the 
                testing for various types of hardware and 
                software.
                  (C) Requests and payments by manufacturers.--
                A manufacturer of voting system hardware and 
                software may not have the hardware or software 
                tested by an accredited laboratory under this 
                section unless--
                          (i) the manufacturer submits a 
                        detailed request for the testing to the 
                        Commission; and
                          (ii) the manufacturer pays to the 
                        Commission, for deposit into the 
                        Testing Escrow Account established 
                        under subparagraph (A), the applicable 
                        fee under the schedule established and 
                        in effect under subparagraph (B).
                  (D) Selection of laboratory.--Upon receiving 
                a request for testing and the payment from a 
                manufacturer required under subparagraph (C), 
                the Commission shall select at random (to the 
                greatest extent practicable), from all 
                laboratories which are accredited under this 
                section to carry out the specific testing 
                requested by the manufacturer, an accredited 
                laboratory to carry out the testing.
                  (E) Payments to laboratories.--Upon receiving 
                a certification from a laboratory selected to 
                carry out testing pursuant to subparagraph (D) 
                that the testing is completed, along with a 
                copy of the results of the test as required 
                under paragraph (3)(A)(iv), the Commission 
                shall make a payment to the laboratory from the 
                Testing Escrow Account established under 
                subparagraph (A) in an amount equal to the 
                applicable fee paid by the manufacturer under 
                subparagraph (C)(ii).
          (5) Dissemination of additional information on 
        accredited laboratories.--
                  (A) Information on testing.--Upon completion 
                of the testing of a voting system under this 
                section, the Commission shall promptly 
                disseminate to the public the identification of 
                the laboratory which carried out the testing.
                  (B) Information on status of laboratories.--
                The Commission shall promptly notify Congress, 
                the chief State election official of each 
                State, and the public whenever--
                          (i) the Commission revokes, 
                        terminates, or suspends the 
                        accreditation of a laboratory under 
                        this section;
                          (ii) the Commission restores the 
                        accreditation of a laboratory under 
                        this section which has been revoked, 
                        terminated, or suspended; or
                          (iii) the Commission has credible 
                        evidence of significant security 
                        failure at an accredited laboratory.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Transition.--Until such time as the Commission provides 
for the [testing, certification, decertification, and 
recertification] testing of voting system hardware and software 
by accredited laboratories under this section, the 
accreditation of laboratories and the procedure for the 
[testing, certification, decertification, and recertification] 
testing of voting system hardware and software used as of the 
date of the enactment of this Act shall remain in effect.

     Subtitle C--Studies and Other Activities To Promote Effective 
Administration of Federal Elections

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION 
                    MECHANISMS.

  (a) Study and Report.--The Director of the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology shall study, test, and develop best 
practices to enhance the accessibility of ballot verification 
mechanisms for individuals with disabilities, for voters whose 
primary language is not English, and for voters with 
difficulties in literacy, including best practices for the 
mechanisms themselves and the processes through which the 
mechanisms are used. In carrying out this section, the Director 
shall specifically investigate existing and potential methods 
or devices, including non-electronic devices, that will assist 
such individuals and voters in creating voter-verified paper 
ballots and presenting or transmitting the information printed 
or marked on such ballots back to such individuals and voters.
  (b) Coordination With Grants for Technology Improvements.--
The Director shall coordinate the activities carried out under 
subsection (a) with the research conducted under the grant 
program carried out by the Commission under section 271, to the 
extent that the Director and Commission determine necessary to 
provide for the advancement of accessible voting technology.
  (c) Deadline.--The Director shall complete the requirements 
of subsection (a) not later than December 31, 2008.
  (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to 
be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $3,000,000, to 
remain available until expended.

SEC. [247] 248. CONSULTATION WITH STANDARDS BOARD AND BOARD OF 
                    ADVISORS.

  The Commission shall carry out its duties under this subtitle 
in consultation with the Standards Board and the Board of 
Advisors.

                    Subtitle D--Election Assistance

                     PART 1--REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS

SEC. 251. REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Retroactive Payments.--
          (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
        of this subtitle, including the maintenance of effort 
        requirements of section 254(a)(7), a State may use a 
        requirements payment as a reimbursement for costs 
        incurred in obtaining voting equipment which meets the 
        requirements of section 301 if the State obtains the 
        equipment after the regularly scheduled general 
        election for Federal office held in November 2000[.], 
        or as a reimbursement for any costs incurred in meeting 
        the requirements of title III which are imposed 
        pursuant to the amendments made by section 2 of the 
        Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 
        2007 or in otherwise modifying or replacing voting 
        systems in response to such amendments.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 252. ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.

  (a) * * *
  [(b) State Allocation Percentage Defined.--The ``State 
allocation percentage'' for a State is the amount (expressed as 
a percentage) equal to the quotient of--
          [(1) the voting age population of the State (as 
        reported in the most recent decennial census); and
          [(2) the total voting age population of all States 
        (as reported in the most recent decennial census).]
  (b) State Allocation Percentage Defined.--
          (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
        the ``State allocation percentage'' for a State is the 
        amount (expressed as a percentage) equal to the 
        quotient of--
                  (A) the voting age population of the State 
                (as reported in the most recent decennial 
                census); and
                  (B) the total voting age population of all 
                States (as reported in the most recent 
                decennial census).
          (2) Special rule for payments for fiscal year 2007.--
                  (A) In general.--In the case of the 
                requirements payment made to a State for fiscal 
                year 2007, the ``State allocation percentage'' 
                for a State is the amount (expressed as a 
                percentage) equal to the quotient of--
                          (i) the sum of the number of 
                        noncompliant precincts in the State and 
                        50% of the number of partially 
                        noncompliant precincts in the State; 
                        and
                          (ii) the sum of the number of 
                        noncompliant precincts in all States 
                        and 50% of the number of partially 
                        noncompliant precincts in all States.
                  (B) Noncompliant precinct defined.--In this 
                paragraph, a ``noncompliant precinct'' means 
                any precinct (or equivalent location) within a 
                State for which the voting system used to 
                administer the regularly scheduled general 
                election for Federal office held in November 
                2006 did not meet either of the requirements 
                described in subparagraph (D).
                  (C) Partially noncompliant precinct 
                defined.--In this paragraph, a ``partially 
                noncompliant precinct'' means any precinct (or 
                equivalent location) within a State for which 
                the voting system used to administer the 
                regularly scheduled general election for 
                Federal office held in November 2006 met only 
                one of the requirements described in 
                subparagraph (D).
                  (D) Requirements described.--The requirements 
                described in this subparagraph with respect to 
                a voting system are as follows:
                          (i) The primary voting system 
                        required the use of or produced durable 
                        paper ballots (as described in section 
                        301(a)(12)(A)) for every vote cast.
                          (ii) The voting system provided that 
                        the entire process of paper ballot 
                        verification was equipped for 
                        individuals with disabilities.
  (c) Minimum Amount of Payment.--The amount of a requirements 
payment made to a State for a year may not be less than--
          (1) in the case of any of the several States or the 
        District of Columbia, one-half of 1 percent (or, in the 
        case of the payment made for fiscal year 2007, 1 
        percent) of the total amount appropriated for 
        requirements payments for the year under section 257; 
        or
          (2) in the case of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
        Guam, American Samoa, or the United States Virgin 
        Islands, one-tenth of 1 percent (or, in the case of the 
        payment made for fiscal year 2007, one-half of 1 
        percent) of such total amount.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 253. CONDITION FOR RECEIPT OF FUNDS.

  (a) In General.--[A State is eligible] Except as provided in 
subsection (f), a State is eligible to receive a requirements 
payment for a fiscal year if the chief executive officer of the 
State, or designee, in consultation and coordination with the 
chief State election official, has filed with the Commission a 
statement certifying that the State is in compliance with the 
requirements referred to in subsection (b). A State may meet 
the requirement of the previous sentence by filing with the 
Commission a statement which reads as follows: ``______ hereby 
certifies that it is in compliance with the requirements 
referred to in section 253(b) of the Help America Vote Act of 
2002.'' (with the blank to be filled in with the name of the 
State involved).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f) Special Rule for Fiscal Year 2007.--
          (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
        of this part, a State is eligible to receive a 
        requirements payment for fiscal year 2007 if, not later 
        than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the 
        Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 
        2007, the chief executive officer of the State, or 
        designee, in consultation and coordination with the 
        chief State election official--
                  (A) certifies to the Commission the number of 
                noncompliant and partially noncompliant 
                precincts in the State (as defined in section 
                252(b)(2)); and
                  (B) files a statement with the Commission 
                describing the State's need for the payment and 
                how the State will use the payment to meet the 
                requirements of title III (in accordance with 
                the limitations applicable to the use of the 
                payment under section 257(a)(4)).
          (2) Certifications by states that require changes to 
        state law.--In the case of a State that requires State 
        legislation to carry out any activity covered by any 
        certification submitted under this subsection, the 
        State shall be permitted to make the certification 
        notwithstanding that the legislation has not been 
        enacted at the time the certification is submitted and 
        such State shall submit an additional certification 
        once such legislation is enacted.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 257. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  (a) In General.--In addition to amounts transferred under 
section 104(c), there are authorized to be appropriated for 
requirements payments under this part the following amounts:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) For fiscal year 2007, $1,000,000,000, except that 
        any funds provided under the authorization made by this 
        paragraph shall be used by a State only to meet the 
        requirements of title III which are first imposed on 
        the State pursuant to the amendments made by section 2 
        of the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act 
        of 2007, or to otherwise modify or replace its voting 
        systems in response to such amendments.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART 7--GRANTS FOR RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION-DEDICATED VOTING 
                            SYSTEM SOFTWARE

SEC. 297. GRANTS FOR RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION-DEDICATED 
                    VOTING SYSTEM SOFTWARE.

  (a) In General.--The Director of the National Science 
Foundation (hereafter in this part referred to as the 
``Director'') shall make grants to not fewer than 3 eligible 
entities to conduct research on the development of election-
dedicated voting system software.
  (b) Eligibility.--An entity is eligible to receive a grant 
under this part if it submits to the Director (at such time and 
in such form as the Director may require) an application 
containing--
          (1) certifications regarding the benefits of 
        operating voting systems on election-dedicated software 
        which is easily understandable and which is written 
        exclusively for the purpose of conducting elections;
          (2) certifications that the entity will use the funds 
        provided under the grant to carry out research on how 
        to develop voting systems that run on election-
        dedicated software and that will meet the applicable 
        requirements for voting systems under title III; and
          (3) such other information and certifications as the 
        Director may require.
  (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to 
be appropriated for grants under this part $1,500,000 for each 
of fiscal years 2007 and 2008, to remain available until 
expended.

   TITLE III--UNIFORM AND NONDISCRIMINATORY ELECTION TECHNOLOGY AND 
                      ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

                        Subtitle A--Requirements

SEC. 301. VOTING SYSTEMS STANDARDS.

  (a) Requirements.--Each voting system used in an election for 
Federal office shall meet the following requirements:
          (1) In general.--
                  (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
                the voting system (including any lever voting 
                system, optical scanning voting system, or 
                direct recording electronic system) shall--
                          (i) permit the voter to verify (in a 
                        private and independent manner) the 
                        votes selected by the voter on the 
                        ballot before the ballot is cast and 
                        [counted] counted, in accordance with 
                        paragraphs (2) and (3);
                          (ii) provide the voter with the 
                        opportunity (in a private and 
                        independent manner) to change the 
                        ballot or correct any error before the 
                        ballot is cast and [counted] counted, 
                        in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 
                        (3) (including the opportunity to 
                        correct the error through the issuance 
                        of a replacement ballot if the voter 
                        was otherwise unable to change the 
                        ballot or correct any error); and
                          (iii) if the voter selects votes for 
                        more than one candidate for a single 
                        office--
                                  (I) notify the voter that the 
                                voter has selected more than 
                                one candidate for a single 
                                office on the ballot;
                                  (II) notify the voter before 
                                the ballot is cast and 
                                [counted] counted, in 
                                accordance with paragraphs (2) 
                                and (3) of the effect of 
                                casting multiple votes for the 
                                office; and
                                  (III) provide the voter with 
                                the opportunity to correct the 
                                ballot before the ballot is 
                                cast and [counted] counted, in 
                                accordance with paragraphs (2) 
                                and (3).
                  (B) A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper 
                ballot voting system, a punch card voting 
                system, or a central count voting system 
                (including mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in 
                ballots), may meet the requirements of 
                subparagraph (A)(iii) by--
                          (i) * * *
                          (ii) providing the voter with 
                        instructions on how to correct the 
                        ballot before it is cast and [counted] 
                        counted, in accordance with paragraphs 
                        (2) and (3) (including instructions on 
                        how to correct the error through the 
                        issuance of a replacement ballot if the 
                        voter was otherwise unable to change 
                        the ballot or correct any error).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [(2) Audit capacity.--
                  [(A) In general.--The voting system shall 
                produce a record with an audit capacity for 
                such system.
                  [(B) Manual audit capacity.--
                          [(i) The voting system shall produce 
                        a permanent paper record with a manual 
                        audit capacity for such system.
                          [(ii) The voting system shall provide 
                        the voter with an opportunity to change 
                        the ballot or correct any error before 
                        the permanent paper record is produced.
                          [(iii) The paper record produced 
                        under subparagraph (A) shall be 
                        available as an official record for any 
                        recount conducted with respect to any 
                        election in which the system is used.]
          (2) Ballot verification and audit capacity.--
                  (A) Voter-verified paper ballots.--
                          (i) Verification.--(I) The voting 
                        system shall require the use of or 
                        produce an individual, durable, voter-
                        verified paper ballot of the voter's 
                        vote that shall be created by or made 
                        available for inspection and 
                        verification by the voter before the 
                        voter's vote is cast and counted. For 
                        purposes of this subclause, examples of 
                        such a ballot include a paper ballot 
                        marked by the voter for the purpose of 
                        being counted by hand or read by an 
                        optical scanner or other similar 
                        device, a paper ballot prepared by the 
                        voter to be mailed to an election 
                        official (whether from a domestic or 
                        overseas location), a paper ballot 
                        created through the use of a ballot 
                        marking device or system, or a paper 
                        ballot produced by a touch screen or 
                        other electronic voting machine, so 
                        long as in each case the voter is 
                        permitted to verify the ballot in a 
                        paper form in accordance with this 
                        subparagraph.
                          (II) The voting system shall provide 
                        the voter with an opportunity to 
                        correct any error made by the system in 
                        the voter-verified paper ballot before 
                        the permanent voter-verified paper 
                        ballot is preserved in accordance with 
                        clause (ii).
                          (III) The voting system shall not 
                        preserve the voter-verified paper 
                        ballots in any manner that makes it 
                        possible, at any time after the ballot 
                        has been cast, to associate a voter 
                        with the record of the voter's vote.
                          (ii) Preservation.--The individual, 
                        durable voter-verified paper ballot 
                        produced in accordance with clause (i) 
                        shall be used as the official ballot 
                        for purposes of any recount or audit 
                        conducted with respect to any election 
                        for Federal office in which the voting 
                        system is used, and shall be 
                        preserved--
                                  (I) in the case of votes cast 
                                at the polling place on the 
                                date of the election, within 
                                the polling place in the manner 
                                or method in which all other 
                                paper ballots are preserved 
                                within such polling place on 
                                such date; or
                                  (II) in any other case, in a 
                                manner which is consistent with 
                                the manner employed by the 
                                jurisdiction for preserving 
                                such ballots in general.
                          (iii) Manual audit capacity.--(I) 
                        Each paper ballot produced pursuant to 
                        clause (i) shall be suitable for a 
                        manual audit equivalent to that of a 
                        paper ballot voting system, and shall 
                        be counted by hand in any recount or 
                        audit conducted with respect to any 
                        election for Federal office.
                          (II) In the event of any 
                        inconsistencies or irregularities 
                        between any electronic vote tallies and 
                        the vote tallies determined by counting 
                        by hand the individual, durable voter-
                        verified paper ballots produced 
                        pursuant to clause (i), and subject to 
                        subparagraph (B), the individual, 
                        durable voter-verified paper ballots 
                        shall be the true and correct record of 
                        the votes cast.
                  (B) Special rule for treatment of disputes 
                when paper ballots have been shown to be 
                compromised.--
                          (i) In general.--In the event that--
                                  (I) there is any 
                                inconsistency between any 
                                electronic vote tallies and the 
                                vote tallies determined by 
                                counting by hand the 
                                individual, durable voter-
                                verified paper ballots produced 
                                pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i) 
                                with respect to any election 
                                for Federal office; and
                                  (II) it is demonstrated by 
                                clear and convincing evidence 
                                (as determined in accordance 
                                with the applicable standards 
                                in the jurisdiction involved) 
                                in any recount, audit, or 
                                contest of the result of the 
                                election that the paper ballots 
                                have been compromised (by 
                                damage or mischief or 
                                otherwise) and that a 
                                sufficient number of the 
                                ballots have been so 
                                compromised that the result of 
                                the election could be changed,
                        the determination of the appropriate 
                        remedy with respect to the election 
                        shall be made in accordance with 
                        applicable State law, except that the 
                        electronic tally shall not be used as 
                        the exclusive basis for determining the 
                        official certified vote tally.
                          (ii) Rule for consideration of 
                        ballots associated with each voting 
                        machine.--For purposes of clause (i), 
                        the paper ballots associated with each 
                        voting system shall be considered on a 
                        voting-machine-by-voting-machine basis, 
                        and only the paper ballots deemed 
                        compromised, if any, shall be 
                        considered in the calculation of 
                        whether or not the result of the 
                        election could be changed due to the 
                        compromised paper ballots.
          (3) Accessibility for individuals with 
        disabilities.--The voting system shall--
                  (A) * * *
                  [(B) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph 
                (A) through the use of at least one direct 
                recording electronic voting system or other 
                voting system equipped for individuals with 
                disabilities at each polling place; and]
                  (B)(i) satisfy the requirement of 
                subparagraph (A) through the use of at least 
                one voting system equipped for individuals with 
                disabilities at each polling place; and
                  (ii) meet the requirements of subparagraph 
                (A) and paragraph (2)(A) by using a system 
                that--
                          (I) allows the voter to privately and 
                        independently verify the individual, 
                        durable paper ballot through the 
                        conversion of the human-readable 
                        printed or marked vote selections into 
                        accessible form,
                          (II) ensures that the entire process 
                        of ballot verification and vote casting 
                        is equipped for individuals with 
                        disabilities, and
                          (III) does not preclude the 
                        supplementary use of Braille or tactile 
                        ballots; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) Alternative language accessibility.--The voting 
        system (including the paper ballots required to be 
        produced under paragraph (2) and the notices required 
        under paragraphs (7) and (13)(C)) shall provide 
        alternative language accessibility pursuant to the 
        requirements of section 203 of the Voting Rights Act of 
        1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973aa-1a).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (7) Instruction reminding voters of importance of 
        verifying paper ballot.--
                  (A) In general.--The appropriate election 
                official at each polling place shall cause to 
                be placed in a prominent location in the 
                polling place which is clearly visible from the 
                voting booths a notice, in large font print 
                accessible to the visually impaired, advising 
                voters that the paper ballots representing 
                their votes shall serve as the vote of record 
                in all audits and recounts in elections for 
                Federal office, and that they should not leave 
                the voting booth until confirming that such 
                paper ballots accurately record their vote.
                  (B) Systems for individuals with 
                disabilities.--All voting systems equipped for 
                individuals with disabilities shall present or 
                transmit in accessible form the statement 
                referred to in subparagraph (A), as well as an 
                explanation of the verification process 
                described in paragraph (3)(B)(ii).
          (8) Prohibiting use of uncertified election-dedicated 
        voting system technologies; disclosure requirements.--
                  (A) In general.--A voting system used in an 
                election for Federal office in a State may not 
                at any time during the election contain or use 
                any election-dedicated voting system technology 
                which has not been certified by the State for 
                use in the election and which has not been 
                deposited with an accredited laboratory 
                described in section 231 to be held in escrow 
                and disclosed in accordance with this section.
                  (B) Requirement for and restrictions on 
                disclosure.--An accredited laboratory under 
                section 231 with whom an election-dedicated 
                voting system technology has been deposited 
                shall--
                          (i) hold the technology in escrow; 
                        and
                          (ii) disclose technology and 
                        information regarding the technology to 
                        another person if--
                                  (I) the person is a qualified 
                                person described in 
                                subparagraph (C) who has 
                                entered into a nondisclosure 
                                agreement with respect to the 
                                technology which meets the 
                                requirements of subparagraph 
                                (D); or
                                  (II) the laboratory is 
                                required to disclose the 
                                technology to the person under 
                                State law, in accordance with 
                                the terms and conditions 
                                applicable under such law.
                  (C) Qualified persons described.--With 
                respect to the disclosure of election-dedicated 
                voting system technology by a laboratory under 
                subparagraph (B)(ii)(I), a ``qualified person'' 
                is any of the following:
                          (i) A governmental entity with 
                        responsibility for the administration 
                        of voting and election-related matters 
                        for purposes of reviewing, analyzing, 
                        or reporting on the technology.
                          (ii) A party to pre- or post-election 
                        litigation challenging the result of an 
                        election or the administration or use 
                        of the technology used in an election, 
                        including but not limited to election 
                        contests or challenges to the 
                        certification of the technology, or an 
                        expert for a party to such litigation, 
                        for purposes of reviewing or analyzing 
                        the technology to support or oppose the 
                        litigation, and all parties to the 
                        litigation shall have access to the 
                        technology for such purposes.
                          (iii) A person not described in 
                        clause (i) or (ii) who reviews, 
                        analyzes, or reports on the technology 
                        solely for an academic, scientific, 
                        technological, or other investigation 
                        or inquiry concerning the accuracy or 
                        integrity of the technology.
                  (D) Requirements for nondisclosure 
                agreements.--A nondisclosure agreement entered 
                into with respect to an election-dedicated 
                voting system technology meets the requirements 
                of this subparagraph if the agreement--
                          (i) is limited in scope to coverage 
                        of the technology disclosed under 
                        subparagraph (B) and any trade secrets 
                        and intellectual property rights 
                        related thereto;
                          (ii) does not prohibit a signatory 
                        from entering into other nondisclosure 
                        agreements to review other technologies 
                        under this paragraph;
                          (iii) exempts from coverage any 
                        information the signatory lawfully 
                        obtained from another source or any 
                        information in the public domain;
                          (iv) remains in effect for not longer 
                        than the life of any trade secret or 
                        other intellectual property right 
                        related thereto;
                          (v) prohibits the use of injunctions 
                        barring a signatory from carrying out 
                        any activity authorized under 
                        subparagraph (C), including injunctions 
                        limited to the period prior to a trial 
                        involving the technology;
                          (vi) is silent as to damages awarded 
                        for breach of the agreement, other than 
                        a reference to damages available under 
                        applicable law;
                          (vii) allows disclosure of evidence 
                        of crime, including in response to a 
                        subpoena or warrant;
                          (viii) allows the signatory to 
                        perform analyses on the technology 
                        (including by executing the 
                        technology), disclose reports and 
                        analyses that describe operational 
                        issues pertaining to the technology 
                        (including vulnerabilities to 
                        tampering, errors, risks associated 
                        with use, failures as a result of use, 
                        and other problems), and describe or 
                        explain why or how a voting system 
                        failed or otherwise did not perform as 
                        intended; and
                          (ix) provides that the agreement 
                        shall be governed by the trade secret 
                        laws of the applicable State.
                  (E) Election-dedicated voting system 
                technology defined.--For purposes of this 
                paragraph, ``election-dedicated voting system 
                technology'' means ``voting system software'' 
                as defined under the 2005 voluntary voting 
                system guidelines adopted by the Commission 
                under section 222, but excludes ``commercial-
                off-the-shelf'' software and hardware defined 
                under those guidelines.
          (9) Prohibition of use of wireless communications 
        devices in voting systems.--No voting system shall 
        contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, power-
        line, or concealed communication device, except that 
        enclosed infrared communications devices which are 
        certified for use in the voting system by the State and 
        which cannot be used for any remote or wide area 
        communications or used without the knowledge of poll 
        workers shall be permitted.
          (10) Prohibiting connection of system or transmission 
        of system information over the internet.--No component 
        of any voting device upon which ballots are programmed 
        or votes are cast or tabulated shall be connected to 
        the Internet at any time.
          (11) Security standards for voting systems used in 
        federal elections.--
                  (A) In general.--No voting system may be used 
                in an election for Federal office unless the 
                manufacturer of such system and the election 
                officials using such system meet the applicable 
                requirements described in subparagraph (B).
                  (B) Requirements described.--The requirements 
                described in this subparagraph are as follows:
                          (i) The manufacturer and the election 
                        officials shall document the secure 
                        chain of custody for the handling of 
                        all software, hardware, vote storage 
                        media, ballots, and voter-verified 
                        ballots used in connection with voting 
                        systems, and shall make the information 
                        available upon request to the 
                        Commission.
                          (ii) The manufacturer shall disclose 
                        to an accredited laboratory under 
                        section 231 and to the appropriate 
                        election official any information 
                        required to be disclosed under 
                        paragraph (8).
                          (iii) After the appropriate election 
                        official has certified the election-
                        dedicated and other voting system 
                        software for use in an election, the 
                        manufacturer may not--
                                  (I) alter such software; or
                                  (II) insert or use in the 
                                voting system any software not 
                                certified by the State for use 
                                in the election.
                          (iv) At the request of the 
                        Commission--
                                  (I) the appropriate election 
                                official shall submit 
                                information to the Commission 
                                regarding the State's 
                                compliance with this 
                                subparagraph; and
                                  (II) the manufacturer shall 
                                submit information to the 
                                Commission regarding the 
                                manufacturer's compliance with 
                                this subparagraph.
                  (C) Development and publication of best 
                practices on documentation of secure chain of 
                custody.--Not later than August 1, 2008, the 
                Commission shall develop and make publicly 
                available best practices regarding the 
                requirement of subparagraph (B)(i).
                  (D) Disclosure of secure chain of custody.--
                The Commission shall make information provided 
                to the Commission under subparagraph (B)(i) 
                available to any person upon request.
          (12) Durability and readability requirements for 
        ballots.--
                  (A) Durability requirements for paper 
                ballots.--
                          (i) In general.--All voter-verified 
                        paper ballots required to be used under 
                        this Act (including the paper ballots 
                        provided to voters under paragraph 
                        (13)) shall be marked, printed, or 
                        recorded on durable paper.
                          (ii) Definition.-- For purposes of 
                        this Act, paper is ``durable'' if it is 
                        capable of withstanding multiple counts 
                        and recounts by hand without 
                        compromising the fundamental integrity 
                        of the ballots, and capable of 
                        retaining the information marked, 
                        printed, or recorded on them for the 
                        full duration of a retention and 
                        preservation period of 22 months.
                  (B) Readability requirements for machine-
                marked or printed paper ballots.--All voter-
                verified paper ballots completed by the voter 
                through the use of a marking or printing device 
                shall be clearly readable by the voter without 
                assistance (other than eyeglasses or other 
                personal vision enhancing devices) and by a 
                scanner or other device equipped for 
                individuals with disabilities.
          (13) Mandatory availability of paper ballots at 
        polling place.--
                  (A) Requiring ballots to be offered and 
                provided.--The appropriate election official at 
                each polling place in an election for Federal 
                office shall offer each individual who is 
                eligible to cast a vote in the election at the 
                polling place the opportunity to cast the vote 
                using a pre-printed paper ballot which the 
                individual may mark by hand and which is not 
                produced by a direct recording electronic 
                voting machine. If the individual accepts the 
                offer to cast the vote using such a ballot, the 
                official shall provide the individual with the 
                ballot and the supplies necessary to mark the 
                ballot, and shall ensure (to the greatest 
                extent practicable) that the waiting period for 
                the individual to cast a vote is not greater 
                than the waiting period for an individual who 
                does not agree to cast the vote using such a 
                paper ballot under this paragraph.
                  (B) Treatment of ballot.--Any paper ballot 
                which is cast by an individual under this 
                paragraph shall be counted and otherwise 
                treated as a regular ballot for all purposes 
                (including, to the greatest extent practicable, 
                the deadline for counting the ballot) and not 
                as a provisional ballot, unless the individual 
                casting the ballot would have otherwise been 
                required to cast a provisional ballot if the 
                individual had not accepted the offer to cast 
                the vote using a paper ballot under this 
                paragraph.
                  (C) Posting of notice.--The appropriate 
                election official shall ensure that at each 
                polling place a notice is displayed prominently 
                which describes the obligation of the official 
                to offer individuals the opportunity to cast 
                votes using a pre-printed paper ballot under 
                this paragraph.
                  (D) Training of election officials.--The 
                chief State election official shall ensure that 
                election officials at polling places in the 
                State are aware of the requirements of this 
                paragraph, including the requirement to display 
                a notice under subparagraph (C), and are aware 
                that it is a violation of the requirements of 
                this title for an election official to fail to 
                offer an individual the opportunity to cast a 
                vote using a pre-printed paper ballot under 
                this paragraph.
                  (E) Exceptions.--This paragraph does not 
                apply with respect to--
                          (i) a polling place at which each 
                        voting system used in the 
                        administration of an election for 
                        Federal office uses only pre-printed 
                        paper ballots which are marked by hand 
                        and which are not produced by a direct 
                        recording electronic voting machine 
                        (other than a system used to meet the 
                        disability access requirements of 
                        paragraph (3)); or
                          (ii) a polling place in operation 
                        prior to the date of the election, but 
                        only with respect to days prior to the 
                        date of the election.
                  (F) Effective date.--This paragraph shall 
                apply with respect to the regularly scheduled 
                general election for Federal office in November 
                2010 and each succeeding election for Federal 
                office.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(d) Effective Date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be 
required to comply with the requirements of this section on and 
after January 1, 2006.]
  (d) Effective Date.--
          (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
        each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply 
        with the requirements of this section on and after 
        January 1, 2006.
          (2) Special rule for certain requirements.--
                  (A) In general.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), the requirements of this 
                section which are first imposed on a State and 
                jurisdiction pursuant to the amendments made by 
                section 2 of the Voter Confidence and Increased 
                Accessibility Act of 2007 shall apply with 
                respect to the regularly scheduled general 
                election for Federal office held in November 
                2008 and each succeeding election for Federal 
                office.
                  (B) Delay for jurisdictions using certain 
                paper ballot printers or certain paper ballot-
                equipped accessible machines in 2006.--
                          (i) Delay.--In the case of a 
                        jurisdiction described in clause (ii), 
                        subparagraph (A) shall apply to the 
                        jurisdiction as if the reference in 
                        such subparagraph to ``the regularly 
                        scheduled general election for Federal 
                        office held in November 2008 and each 
                        succeeding election for Federal 
                        office'' were a reference to 
                        ``elections for Federal office 
                        occurring during 2010 and each 
                        succeeding year'', but only with 
                        respect to the following requirements 
                        of this section:
                                  (I) Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) 
                                and (II) of subsection (a) 
                                (relating to access to 
                                verification from the durable 
                                paper ballot).
                                  (II) Paragraph (12) of 
                                subsection (a) (relating to 
                                durability and readability 
                                requirements for ballots).
                          (ii) Jurisdictions described.--A 
                        jurisdiction described in this clause 
                        is--
                                  (I) a jurisdiction which used 
                                thermal reel-to-reel voter 
                                verified paper ballot printers 
                                attached to direct recording 
                                electronic voting machines for 
                                the administration of the 
                                regularly scheduled general 
                                election for Federal office 
                                held in November 2006 and which 
                                will continue to use such 
                                printers attached to such 
                                voting machines for the 
                                administration of elections for 
                                Federal office held in 2008; or
                                  (II) a jurisdiction which 
                                used voting machines which met 
                                the accessibility requirements 
                                of paragraph (3) of subsection 
                                (a) (as in effect with respect 
                                to such election) for the 
                                administration of the regularly 
                                scheduled general election for 
                                Federal office held in November 
                                2006 and which used or produced 
                                a paper ballot, and which will 
                                continue to use such voting 
                                machines for the administration 
                                of elections for Federal office 
                                held in 2008.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  Subtitle C--Mandatory Manual Audits

SEC. 321. REQUIRING AUDITS OF RESULTS OF ELECTIONS.

  (a) Requiring Audits.--
          (1) In general.--In accordance with this subtitle, 
        each State shall administer, without advance notice to 
        the precincts selected, audits of the results of 
        elections for Federal office held in the State (and, at 
        the option of the State or jurisdiction involved, of 
        elections for State and local office held at the same 
        time as such election) consisting of random hand counts 
        of the voter-verified paper ballots required to be 
        produced and preserved pursuant to section 301(a)(2).
          (2) Exception for certain elections.--A State shall 
        not be required to administer an audit of the results 
        of an election for Federal office under this subtitle 
        if the winning candidate in the election--
                  (A) had no opposition on the ballot; or
                  (B) received 80% or more of the total number 
                of votes cast in the election, as determined on 
                the basis of the final unofficial vote count.
  (b) Determination of Entity Conducting Audits; Application of 
GAO Independence Standards.--The State shall administer audits 
under this subtitle through an entity selected for such purpose 
by the State in accordance with such criteria as the State 
considers appropriate consistent with the requirements of this 
subtitle, except that the entity must meet the general 
standards established by the Comptroller General to ensure the 
independence (including the organizational independence) of 
entities performing financial audits, attestation engagements, 
and performance audits under generally accepted government 
accounting standards.
  (c) References to Election Auditor.--In this subtitle, the 
term ``Election Auditor'' means, with respect to a State, the 
entity selected by the State under subsection (b).

SEC. 322. NUMBER OF BALLOTS COUNTED UNDER AUDIT.

  (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the 
number of voter-verified paper ballots which will be subject to 
a hand count administered by the Election Auditor of a State 
under this subtitle with respect to an election shall be 
determined as follows:
          (1) In the event that the unofficial count as 
        described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin 
        of victory between the two candidates receiving the 
        largest number of votes in the election is less than 1 
        percent of the total votes cast in that election, the 
        hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall 
        occur in at least 10 percent of all precincts or 
        equivalent locations (or alternative audit units used 
        in accordance with the method provided for under 
        subsection (b)) in the Congressional district involved 
        (in the case of an election for the House of 
        Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other 
        election for Federal office).
          (2) In the event that the unofficial count as 
        described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin 
        of victory between the two candidates receiving the 
        largest number of votes in the election is greater than 
        or equal to 1 percent but less than 2 percent of the 
        total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of 
        the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in at 
        least 5 percent of all precincts or equivalent 
        locations (or alternative audit units used in 
        accordance with the method provided for under 
        subsection (b)) in the Congressional district involved 
        (in the case of an election for the House of 
        Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other 
        election for Federal office).
          (3) In the event that the unofficial count as 
        described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin 
        of victory between the two candidates receiving the 
        largest number of votes in the election is equal to or 
        greater than 2 percent of the total votes cast in that 
        election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper 
        ballots shall occur in at least 3 percent of all 
        precincts or equivalent locations (or alternative audit 
        units used in accordance with the method provided for 
        under subsection (b)) in the Congressional district 
        involved (in the case of an election for the House of 
        Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other 
        election for Federal office).
  (b) Use of Alternative Mechanism.--Notwithstanding subsection 
(a), a State may adopt and apply an alternative mechanism to 
determine the number of voter-verified paper ballots which will 
be subject to the hand counts required under this subtitle with 
respect to an election, so long as the alternative mechanism 
uses the voter-verified paper ballots to conduct the audit and 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology determines 
that the alternative mechanism will be at least as 
statistically effective in ensuring the accuracy of the 
election results as the procedure under this subtitle.

SEC. 323. PROCESS FOR ADMINISTERING AUDITS.

  (a) In General.--The Election Auditor of a State shall 
administer an audit under this section of the results of an 
election in accordance with the following procedures:
          (1) Within 24 hours after the State announces the 
        final unofficial vote count (as defined by the State) 
        in each precinct in the State, the Election Auditor 
        shall determine and then announce the precincts in the 
        State in which it will administer the audits.
          (2) With respect to votes cast at the precinct or 
        equivalent location on or before the date of the 
        election (other than provisional ballots described in 
        paragraph (3)), the Election Auditor shall administer 
        the hand count of the votes on the voter-verified paper 
        ballots required to be produced and preserved under 
        section 301(a)(2)(A) and the comparison of the count of 
        the votes on those ballots with the final unofficial 
        count of such votes as announced by the State.
          (3) With respect to votes cast other than at the 
        precinct on the date of the election (other than votes 
        cast before the date of the election described in 
        paragraph (2)) or votes cast by provisional ballot on 
        the date of the election which are certified and 
        counted by the State on or after the date of the 
        election, including votes cast by absent uniformed 
        services voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed 
        and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, the Election 
        Auditor shall administer the hand count of the votes on 
        the applicable voter-verified paper ballots required to 
        be produced and preserved under section 301(a)(2)(A) 
        and the comparison of the count of the votes on those 
        ballots with the final unofficial count of such votes 
        as announced by the State.
  (b) Use of Election Personnel.--In administering the audits, 
the Election Auditor may utilize the services of election 
administration personnel of the State or jurisdiction, 
including poll workers, without regard to whether or not the 
personnel have professional auditing experience.
  (c) Location.--The Election Auditor shall administer an audit 
of an election at the location where the ballots cast in the 
election are stored and counted after the date of the election, 
and in the presence of those personnel who under State law are 
responsible for the custody of the ballots.
  (d) Special Rule in Case of Delay in Reporting Absentee Vote 
Count.--In the case of a State in which the final count of 
absentee and provisional votes is not announced until after the 
expiration of the 7-day period which begins on the date of the 
election, the Election Auditor shall initiate the process 
described in subsection (a) for administering the audit not 
later than 24 hours after the State announces the final 
unofficial vote count for the votes cast at the precinct or 
equivalent location on or before the date of the election, and 
shall initiate the administration of the audit of the absentee 
and provisional votes pursuant to subsection (a)(3) not later 
than 24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial 
count of such votes.
  (e) Additional Audits if Cause Shown.--
          (1) In general.--If the Election Auditor finds that 
        any of the hand counts administered under this section 
        do not match the final unofficial tally of the results 
        of an election, the Election Auditor shall administer 
        hand counts under this section of such additional 
        precincts (or equivalent jurisdictions) as the Election 
        Auditor considers appropriate to resolve any concerns 
        resulting from the audit and ensure the accuracy of the 
        results.
          (2) Establishment and publication of procedures 
        governing additional audits.--Not later than August 1, 
        2008, each State shall establish and publish procedures 
        for carrying out the additional audits under this 
        subsection, including the means by which the State 
        shall resolve any concerns resulting from the audit 
        with finality and ensure the accuracy of the results.
  (f) Public Observation of Audits.--Each audit conducted under 
this section shall be conducted in a manner that allows public 
observation of the entire process.

SEC. 324. SELECTION OF PRECINCTS.

  (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the 
selection of the precincts in the State in which the Election 
Auditor of the State shall administer the hand counts under 
this subtitle shall be made by the Election Auditor on an 
entirely random basis using a uniform distribution in which all 
precincts in a Congressional district have an equal chance of 
being selected, in accordance with procedures adopted by the 
Commission, except that at least one precinct shall be selected 
at random in each county.
  (b) Public Selection.--The random selection of precincts 
under subsection (a) shall be conducted in public, at a time 
and place announced in advance.
  (c) Mandatory Selection of Precincts Established Specifically 
For Absentee Ballots.--If a State establishes a separate 
precinct for purposes of counting the absentee ballots cast in 
an election and treats all absentee ballots as having been cast 
in that precinct, and if the state does not make absentee 
ballots sortable by precinct and include those ballots in the 
hand count administered with respect to that precinct, the 
State shall include that precinct among the precincts in the 
State in which the Election Auditor shall administer the hand 
counts under this subtitle.
  (d) Deadline for Adoption of Procedures by Commission.--The 
Commission shall adopt the procedures described in subsection 
(a) not later than March 31, 2008, and shall publish them in 
the Federal Register upon adoption.

SEC. 325. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS.

  (a) Submission to Commission.--As soon as practicable after 
the completion of an audit under this subtitle, the Election 
Auditor of a State shall submit to the Commission the results 
of the audit, and shall include in the submission a comparison 
of the results of the election in the precinct as determined by 
the Election Auditor under the audit and the final unofficial 
vote count in the precinct as announced by the State and all 
undervotes, overvotes, blank ballots, and spoiled, voided or 
cancelled ballots, as well as a list of any discrepancies 
discovered between the initial, subsequent, and final hand 
counts administered by the Election Auditor and such final 
unofficial vote count and any explanation for such 
discrepancies, broken down by the categories of votes described 
in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 323(a).
  (b) Publication by Commission.--Immediately after receiving 
the submission of the results of an audit from the Election 
Auditor of a State under subsection (a), the Commission shall 
publicly announce and publish the information contained in the 
submission.
  (c) Delay in Certification of Results by State.--
          (1) Prohibiting certification until completion of 
        audits.--No State may certify the results of any 
        election which is subject to an audit under this 
        subtitle prior to--
                  (A) to the completion of the audit (and, if 
                required, any additional audit conducted under 
                section 323(d)(1)) and the announcement and 
                submission of the results of each such audit to 
                the Commission for publication of the 
                information required under this section; and
                  (B) the completion of any procedure 
                established by the State pursuant to section 
                323(d)(2) to resolve discrepancies and ensure 
                the accuracy of results.
          (2) Deadline for completion of audits of presidential 
        elections.--In the case of an election for electors for 
        President and Vice President which is subject to an 
        audit under this subtitle, the State shall complete the 
        audits and announce and submit the results to the 
        Commission for publication of the information required 
        under this section in time for the State to certify the 
        results of the election and provide for the final 
        determination of any controversy or contest concerning 
        the appointment of such electors prior to the deadline 
        described in section 6 of title 3, United States Code.

SEC. 326. PAYMENTS TO STATES.

  (a) Payments For Costs of Conducting Audits.--In accordance 
with the requirements and procedures of this section, the 
Commission shall make a payment to a State to cover the costs 
incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with 
respect to the elections that are the subject of the audits 
conducted under this subtitle.
  (b) Certification of Compliance and Anticipated Costs.--
          (1) Certification required.--In order to receive a 
        payment under this section, a State shall submit to the 
        Commission, in such form as the Commission may require, 
        a statement containing--
                  (A) a certification that the State will 
                conduct the audits required under this subtitle 
                in accordance with all of the requirements of 
                this subtitle;
                  (B) a notice of the reasonable costs incurred 
                or the reasonable costs anticipated to be 
                incurred by the State in carrying out this 
                subtitle with respect to the elections 
                involved; and
                  (C) such other information and assurances as 
                the Commission may require.
          (2) Amount of payment.--The amount of a payment made 
        to a State under this section shall be equal to the 
        reasonable costs incurred or the reasonable costs 
        anticipated to be incurred by the State in carrying out 
        this subtitle with respect to the elections involved, 
        as set forth in the statement submitted under paragraph 
        (1).
          (3) Timing of notice.--The State may not submit a 
        notice under paragraph (1) until candidates have been 
        selected to appear on the ballot for all of the 
        elections for Federal office which will be the subject 
        of the audits involved.
  (c) Timing of Payments.--The Commission shall make the 
payment required under this section to a State not later than 
30 days after receiving the notice submitted by the State under 
subsection (b).
  (d) Recoupment of Overpayments.--No payment may be made to a 
State under this section unless the State agrees to repay to 
the Commission the excess (if any) of--
          (1) the amount of the payment received by the State 
        under this section with respect to the elections 
        involved; over
          (2) the actual costs incurred by the State in 
        carrying out this subtitle with respect to the 
        elections involved.
  (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to 
be appropriated to the Commission for fiscal year 2008 and each 
succeeding fiscal year $100,000,000 for payments under this 
section.

SEC. 327. EXCEPTION FOR ELECTIONS SUBJECT TO RECOUNT UNDER STATE LAW 
                    PRIOR TO CERTIFICATION.

  (a) Exception.--This subtitle does not apply to any election 
for which a recount under State law will commence prior to the 
certification of the results of the election, including but not 
limited to a recount required automatically because of the 
margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the 
largest number of votes in the election, but only if each of 
the following applies to the recount:
          (1) The recount commences prior to the determination 
        and announcement by the Election Auditor under section 
        323(a)(1) of the precincts in the State in which it 
        will administer the audits under this subtitle.
          (2) If the recount would apply to fewer than 100% of 
        the ballots cast in the election--
                  (A) the number of ballots counted will be at 
                least as many as would be counted if an audit 
                were conducted with respect to the election in 
                accordance with this subtitle; and
                  (B) the selection of the precincts in which 
                the recount will be conducted will be made in 
                accordance with the random selection procedures 
                applicable under section 324.
          (3) The recount for the election meets the 
        requirements of section 323(e) (relating to public 
        observation).
          (4) The State meets the requirements of section 325 
        (relating to the publication of results and the delay 
        in the certification of results) with respect to the 
        recount.
  (b) Clarification of Effect on Other Requirements.-- Nothing 
in this section may be construed to waive the application of 
any other provision of this Act to any election (including the 
requirement set forth in section 301(a)(2) that the voter 
verified paper ballots serve as the vote of record and shall be 
counted by hand in all audits and recounts, including audits 
and recounts described in this subtitle).

SEC. 328. EFFECTIVE DATE.

  This subtitle shall apply with respect to elections for 
Federal office beginning with the regularly scheduled general 
elections held in November 2008.

                         TITLE IV--ENFORCEMENT

SEC. 401. ACTIONS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR DECLARATORY AND 
                    INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

  [The Attorney General] (a) In General.--The Attorney General 
may bring a civil action against any State or jurisdiction in 
an appropriate United States District Court for such 
declaratory and injunctive relief (including a temporary 
restraining order, a permanent or temporary injunction, or 
other order) as may be necessary to carry out the uniform and 
nondiscriminatory election technology and administration 
requirements under sections 301, 302, and 303[.], or the 
requirements of subtitle C of title III.
  (b) Filing of Complaints by Aggrieved Persons.--
          (1) In general.--A person who is aggrieved by a 
        violation of section 301, 302, or 303, or subtitle C of 
        title III, which has occurred, is occurring, or is 
        about to occur may file a written, signed, notarized 
        complaint with the Attorney General describing the 
        violation and requesting the Attorney General to take 
        appropriate action under this section.
          (2) Response by attorney general.--The Attorney 
        General shall respond to each complaint filed under 
        paragraph (1), in accordance with procedures 
        established by the Attorney General that require 
        responses and determinations to be made within the same 
        (or shorter) deadlines which apply to a State under the 
        State-based administrative complaint procedures 
        described in section 402(a)(2).
  (c) Clarification of Availability of Private Right of 
Action.--Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit 
any person from bringing an action under section 1979 of the 
Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983) 
(including any individual who seeks to enforce the individual's 
right to a voter-verified paper ballot, the right to have the 
voter-verified paper ballot counted in accordance with this 
Act, or any other right under subtitles A or C of title III) to 
enforce the uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology 
and administration requirements under sections 301, 302, and 
303, or the requirements of subtitle C of title III.
  (d) No Effect on State Procedures.--Nothing in this section 
may be construed to affect the availability of the State-based 
administrative complaint procedures required under section 402 
to any person filing a complaint under this subsection.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                               APPENDIX A

                              ----------                              

                     Leadership Conference on Civil Rights,
                                       Washington, DC, May 8, 2007.

     Oppose 21st Century Poll Tax: Defeat Ehlers Voter ID Amendment

    Dear House Administration Committee Member: On behalf of 
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), the nation's 
oldest, largest, and most diverse civil and human rights 
coalition, we write in strong opposition to any amendment to 
H.R. 811 that would impose new requirements on voters to show 
photo identification prior to exercising their constitutional 
right to vote. We understand that Committee Ranking Member Rep. 
Vernon Ehlers (R-MI) intends to offer such an amendment. If so, 
we urge you in the strongest terms to defeat it.
    Voters ID requirements represent one of the most serious 
threats in decades to our efforts to ensure the right of every 
eligible American to vote. They would encourage racial and 
ethnic discrimination at polling places, would prevent many 
eligible voters across the country from participating in our 
democracy, and would do nothing to combat genuine instances of 
voter fraud. Indeed, citing such concerns, federal courts have 
already struck down several state-level voter ID laws on 
constitutional grounds.
    We oppose the Ehlers voter ID amendment for the following 
reasons:
    First, no citizen should have to pay to vote. Many U.S. 
citizens either do not have or cannot easily access documents 
that prove their identity, such as a passport or birth 
certificate. Proposals that would give free ID to voters who 
cannot afford it are not sufficient, as our most cherished 
civil right should never depend on the annual appropriations 
process. Furthermore, citizens would still be faced with the 
expense and time involved in getting the documentation required 
to obtain photo ID. While the Voting Rights Act eliminated poll 
taxes, the Ehlers amendment would bring them back.
    Second, photo ID requirements will disproportionately 
disenfranchise people of color, the elderly, individuals with 
disabilities, rural and Native voters, the homeless, low-income 
people, and married women, who are less likely to carry a photo 
ID. They also give poll workers an unacceptable level of 
discretion, opening the door to discrimination at the polls 
against racial, ethnic, and language-minority voters.
    Third, while supports of stronger photo ID requirements 
argue that they are needed to combat voter fraud, the evidence 
clearly establishes that current anti-fraud laws work. 
Moreover, while there is no question that election misconduct 
exists, including improper purges of voters, distributing false 
information about when and where to vote, stuffing ballot 
boxes, and tampering with registration forms, there is no 
evidence that the type of fraud that the Ehlers amendment 
purports to address--voters who misrepresent their identity--is 
anything but an anomaly.
    The right to vote, and to have your vote counted, is the 
most important civil right of all. Photo identification 
requirements are one of the greatest threats to fair and equal 
voting rights today. Congress should be in the business of 
encouraging full participation of our citizenry, not developing 
ways to limit the right to vote. For these reasons, we urge you 
to oppose any photo identification amendment that may arise 
during the consideration of H.R. 811.
    Thank you for your consideration. If you have any 
questions, please contact Rob Randhava, LCCR Counsel, at (202) 
466-6058 or at [email protected]
            Sincerely,
                                   Wade Henderson,
                                           President & CEO.
                                   Nancy Zirkin,
                                           Vice President/Director of 
                                               Public Policy.

                               APPENDIX B

                              ----------                              

                               People For the American Way,
                                       Washington, DC, May 8, 2007.
House Administration Committee,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Committee Member: On behalf of the more than one 
million members and activists of People For the American Way 
(PFAW), we write in support of the Voter Confidence and 
Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 (H.R. 811) introduced by 
Representative Holt, and also to oppose any photo-
identification amendments that may be offered to this 
worthwhile bill. This much needed legislation is likely to lead 
to major improvements over the status quo, diminishing voting 
machine problems and making elections safer and more secure.
    Unfortunately--with millions of voters disenfranchised each 
election cycle--our citizens have lost confidence that their 
votes are counted accurately--or even counted at all. The 
recent debacle in Sarasota County, where some 18,000 votes were 
inexplicably not recorded on the paperless voting machines, is 
only the tip of the iceberg. Poll after poll shows the impact 
of voting irregularities on people's faith in our electoral 
system. H.R. 811 addresses this national crisis.
    Most importantly, H.R. 811 gives voters a chance to verify 
that their vote was recorded properly before they leave the 
booth. Under H.R. 811, all voting machines must produce a paper 
ballot that would count as the official ballot for purposes of 
all recounts. In addition, H.R. 811 contains two very important 
safeguards. It requires voting machine vendors to provide 
independent access to their machines source codes to permit 
inspections to verify the integrity of elections without 
compromising ballot secrecy. And it requires manual audits of 
all voting machines pursuant to established federal standards.
    H.R. 811 also goes a long way toward protecting voters with 
disabilities and language minority voters' access to the ballot 
box. Voters whose primary language is not English will be able 
to make the best and most informed choice at the polls. It will 
also allow voters with disabilities to cast their ballots with 
the privacy and dignity we all expect.
    Additionally, in the spirit of moving H.R. 811 forward in a 
bipartisan fashion, we urge you to oppose any amendment that 
would add to this legislation language requiring that voters 
provide photo identification before casting a ballot. Such 
requirements are unnecessary and harmful. They impose a severe 
burden and are likely to disenfranchise poor, minority, elderly 
and young voters, who are less likely to have photo 
identification and move more frequently. The data is clear:
           Approximately 6 to 10% of the American 
        electorate does not have any form of state 
        identification.
           African Americans are four to five times 
        less likely than whites to have photo identification.
           Young adults (age 20-29) move almost 6 times 
        more frequently than adults over 55, and minorities 
        move 50% more frequently than whites.
           In Georgia, it is estimated that nearly 40% 
        of seniors lack photo identification.
    The purported reason for enacting such restrictive voting 
measures to counteract voter fraud is unsubstantiated. 
Virtually every academic study of voter fraud concludes that it 
is not close to being a significant problem. In fact, in 2002 
the Bush Justice Department launched the ``Voting Access and 
Integrity Initiative,'' which directed Justice Department 
attorneys, including those in U.S. Attorneys' offices, to 
prioritize investigations of alleged voter fraud. Despite being 
a top priority, this initiative resulted in only 24 convictions 
for illegally voting nationwide from 2002 to 2005, compared to 
the hundreds of millions of votes cast during that period. Even 
bipartisan experts contracted by the Election Assistance 
Commission (EAC) similarly found, in a report they submitted to 
the EAC in 2006, that there is no widespread existence of voter 
fraud.
    Furthermore, when questioned regarding the existence of 
voter fraud in states where it was used as the justification 
for requiring restrictive voter identification, supporters of 
voter identification have been consistently forced to testify 
that they cannot prove that any widespread voter fraud exists. 
Examples include:
           The State of Indiana, and its Republican 
        Secretary of State Todd Rokita, in defending the voter 
        identification law in court documents, admitted that it 
        could not find one single instance of voter 
        impersonation fraud in the history of the state. 
        Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
        LEXIS 20321 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
           The Republican Governor of Missouri, who had 
        formerly been the Secretary of State (and run 
        Missouri's elections), admitted that elections in 
        Missouri were ``fraud-free,'' before unsuccessfully 
        defending the restrictive voter identification laws in 
        court. Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 
        2006). Missouri's Secretary of State agrees, noting in 
        a recent report that ``As in previous elections, the 
        absence of reports of voting impersonation or voting 
        fraud in the 2006 election in Missouri was notable.''
           The State of Arizona and its counties, in 
        defending their restrictive voter registration laws and 
        voter identification laws, admitted that, of the over 
        2.7 million registered voters in Arizona, not one had 
        been convicted of registering to vote illegally, and 
        not one instance of voting by an ineligible non-
        citizen.
    Voter identification proposals unnecessarily erect barriers 
to the ballot and are likely to be enforced in discriminatory 
ways against poor and minority voters to intimidate, misinform, 
stigmatize, and ultimately suppress the vote. The right to vote 
is fundamental and Congress should be focused on ways to open 
the franchise to all eligible citizens. Consistent with this 
view, PFAW urges that photo identification requirements be 
opposed in hopes of passing a bipartisan H.R. 811.
    Make no mistake: the need for election reform in this 
country is urgent. Americans deserve to know that the next time 
they cast a vote it will be counted--and, if necessary, 
recounted, by fair and independent observers. Nothing less than 
the integrity and fairness of the 2008 elections is at stake. 
Congress must act immediately to pass H.R. 811. We urge you to 
support H.R. 811 as it moves toward passage by voting in favor 
of it during the committee markup.
            Sincerely,
                                   Ralph G. Neas,
                                           President.
                                   Tanya Clay House,
                                           Director, Public Policy.

                               APPENDIX C

                              ----------                              

                      National Network for Election Reform,
                                                       May 8, 2007.
    Dear Member of Congress: Attached is a letter sent by the 
National Network for Election Reform in response to the most 
recent attempt to pass additional photo-identification 
requirements in the 109th Congress. It is our understanding 
that a similarly focused amendment will be offered during the 
markup of H.R. 811, the Voter Confidence and Increased 
Accessibility Act of 2007. On behalf of the National Network 
for Election Reform, we wish to reiterate our continued 
opposition to such attempts and encourage Committee members to 
oppose any such amendment should it be offered. Thank you.
            Signed,
                                   Tanya Clay House,
                                           Director, Public Policy, 
                                               People For the American 
                                               Way.
                                   Jonah Goldman,
                                           Director, National Campaign 
                                               for Fair Elections, 
                                               Lawyers' Committee for 
                                               Civil Rights Under Law.
                                ------                                

                      National Network for Election Reform,
                                                September 19, 2006.
    Dear Member of Congress: We write on behalf of the National 
Network for Election Reform in strong opposition to H.R. 4844, 
the deceptively titled ``Federal Election Integrity Act of 
2006.'' The National Network is a coalition of organizations 
committed to providing Americans with a responsive and fair 
election system. As written, the bill will sacrifice the 
integrity of our electoral process by imposing an unfunded 
mandate on the states and blocking countless eligible seniors, 
minority voters, poor voters, students and young voters, and 
voters with disabilities from the polls. Moreover, H.R. 4844 
will do nothing to address the shortcomings with America's 
electoral infrastructure. Instead, by passing H.R. 4844, 
Congress will create a 21st Century poll tax.
    In August, Congress demonstrated its commitment to a fair 
and open democratic process by reauthorizing the expiring 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act with unprecedented bi-
partisan unity. Passing H.R. 4844 will undermine that noble 
pursuit by disfranchising the very Americans that the Voting 
Rights Act protects.
    H.R. 4844 will require nearly every eligible American voter 
to navigate a new and complex bureaucracy in order to cast a 
ballot. Additionally, this measure will force the vast majority 
of states to implement an incredibly costly new process for 
issuing identification. The bill's central provision requires 
all eligible voters to produce a government-issued photo 
identification before participating in the electoral process. 
According to the mandates of the bill, the only acceptable form 
of identification is one that requires proof of citizenship as 
a condition of its issuance and indicates citizenship status on 
the face of the identification. Currently, the only types of 
identification that satisfy this requirement are a few states' 
driver's licenses, and a United States Passport which, 
according to the Bureau of Consular Affairs, only 25-27% of 
Americans have. For the rest of the country, state governments 
will have to develop and issue new identification in order to 
facilitate voting in federal elections.
    Designing and implementing a program that will facilitate 
identification to comply with H.R. 4844 will be an 
unprecedented burden on state governments. A recent example 
portends the drastic complications that states will have to 
navigate in order to meet the demands of H.R. 4844. In 2002, 
Congress created the Transportation Workers Identity 
Credential, a program to provide identification similar to that 
required by H.R. 4844 for the nation's 750,000 critical sea, 
air and land transportation facility workers by the end of 
2003. Nearly three years past the deadline, fewer than 5,000 of 
these workers have been issued this identification and the 
program costs have skyrocketed, nearly doubling from the 
original projections. This demonstrates that requiring the vast 
majority of states to engage in this type of endeavor for 
nearly 200 million Americans is not only unworkable, but 
irresponsible.
    The unfunded mandate that this bill will create, coupled 
with the financially precarious situation of many state 
budgets, means that citizens will be burdened with the 
increased cost of this program. In addition to the high price 
that many voters will be forced to pay to obtain this new form 
of identification, each voter will also be required to produce 
proof of citizenship. Official citizenship documents, such as 
birth certificates, passports or naturalization papers, are 
expensive and time-consuming to obtain. While this burden is 
heavy on all Americans, voters in poor and minority 
communities, seniors, students and young voters, voters with 
disabilities, and Americans in rural areas are the voters who 
are least likely to have documents that prove their citizenship 
and are the least likely to be able to afford the increased 
cost of obtaining both the underlying documentation and the new 
identification required by H.R. 4844. Requiring citizens to pay 
for these documents as a prerequisite to voting constitutes a 
poll tax in violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.
    Proponents of H.R. 4844 claim that this measure is 
necessary to prevent misconduct in elections; that assertion, 
however, is contradicted by overwhelming evidence. There are no 
facts to suggest our elections are plagued by a wave of 
individuals voting multiple times or voting as someone else. 
Likewise, despite detailed investigations across the country, 
there is almost no evidence of non-citizens voting. This is not 
surprising since each act of this type of voter fraud carries 
with it possible penalties of five years in prison and a 
$10,000 fine. Individuals know that the risk is not worth the 
cost. In addition to these harsh penalties, non-citizens would 
sacrifice their ability to become citizens or remain in this 
country legally. Undocumented immigrants would risk announcing 
their presence to a government official each time they 
attempted to register or vote. Effective safeguards are already 
in place to protect election results from being manipulated by 
ineligible voters.
    H.R. 4844 will do nothing to address the systemic problems 
that plague our democratic process nor will it effectively 
secure our election administration system. Because of the 
bill's failure to address the needs of American voters, it will 
not restore public confidence in the electoral process. Since 
the presidential election in 2000, voters across the country 
have begun to notice the shortcomings in our electoral system. 
Congress has the opportunity to address the real obstacles that 
voters face each time they go to the polling place; 
unfortunately, H.R. 4844 chooses instead to create additional 
barriers.
    We oppose H.R. 4844, the ``Federal Election Integrity Act 
of 2006,'' because it imposes an unfunded mandate on the states 
and blocks countless eligible voters from the electoral 
process. We urge you to oppose H.R. 4844. For more information, 
please contact Jonah Goldman, Lawyers' Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law, (202) 662-8321 or Tanya Clay House, People 
For the American Way, (202) 467-2341.
    Signed,
    African American Ministers in Action.
    American Association of University Women.
    American Jewish Committee.
    Anti-Defamation League.
    Asian American Justice Center.
    Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund.
    Brennan Center for Justice.
    Common Cause.
    Demos.
    Electronic Frontier Foundation.
    FairVote.
    Jewish Council for Public Affairs.
    Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.
    League of United Latin American Citizens.
    League of Young Voters Education Fund.
    Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund.
    MassVote.
    NAACP.
    National Congress of American Indians.
    National Council of Jewish Women.
    National Disability Rights Network.
    National Education Association.
    National Voting Rights Institute.
    People For the American Way.
    Project Vote.
    Rock the Vote.
    Service Employees International Union.
    The Arc of the United States.
    Union for Reform Judaism.
    United Cerebral Palsy.
    United Church of Christ Justice & Witness Ministries.
    U.S. PIRG.
    Vote By Mail Project.

                               APPENDIX D

                              ----------                              


                2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

                GLOSSARY DEFINITIONS FOR SELECTED TERMS

    ``voting system software:'' All the executable code and 
associated configuration files needed for the proper operation 
of the voting system. This includes third party software such 
as operating systems, drivers, and database management tools. 
See also ``dynamic voting system software,'' ``semi-static 
voting system software,'' and ``static voting system 
software.''
    ``dynamic voting system software:'' Software that changes 
over time once it is installed on the voting equipment. See 
also voting system software.
    ``semi-static voting system software:'' Software that may 
change in response equipment on which it is installed or to 
election-specific programming.
    ``static voting system software:'' Software that does not 
change based on the election being conducted or the voting 
equipment upon which it is installed, e.g., executable code.
    ``commercial off-the-shelf (COTS):'' Commercial, readily 
available hardware devices (such as card readers, printers or 
personal computers) or software products (such as operating 
systems, programming language compilers, or database management 
systems).

                               APPENDIX E

                     Election Assistance Commission

  VOTING SYSTEM TESTING AND CERTIFICATION PROGRAM MANUAL VERSION 1.0, 
                       EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2007

    5.4. Pre-Certification Requirements. Before an Initial 
Decision becomes final and a certification is issued, 
Manufacturers must ensure certain steps are taken. They must 
confirm that the final version of the software that was 
certified and which the Manufacturer will deliver with the 
certified system has been subject to a trusted build (see 
Section 5.6), has been delivered for deposit in an EAC-approved 
repository (see Section 5.7), and can be verified using 
Manufacturer-developed identification tools (see Section 5.8). 
The Manufacturer must provide the EAC documentation 
demonstrating compliance with these requirements.
    5.5. Trusted Build. A software build (also referred to as a 
compilation) is the process whereby source code is converted to 
machine-readable binary instructions (executable code) for the 
computer. A ``trusted build'' (or trusted compilation) is a 
build performed with adequate security measures implemented to 
give confidence that the executable code is a verifiable and 
faithful representation of the source code. A trusted build 
creates a chain of evidence from the Technical Data Package and 
source code submitted to the [Voting System Test Labs (VSTLs)] 
to the actual executable programs that are run on the system. 
Specifically, the build will do the following:
    5.5.1. Demonstrate that the software was built as described 
in the Technical Data Package.
    5.5.2. Show that the tested and approved source code was 
actually used to build the executable code used on the system.
    5.5.3. Demonstrate that no elements other than those 
included in the Technical Data Package were introduced in the 
software build.
    5.5.4. Document for future reference the configuration of 
the system certified.
    5.6. Trusted Build Procedure. A trusted build is a three-
step process: (1) the build environment is constructed, (2) the 
source code is loaded onto the build environment, and (3) the 
executable code is compiled and the installation device is 
created. The process may be simplified for modification to 
previously certified systems. In each step, a minimum of two 
witnesses from different organizations is required to 
participate. These participants must include a VSTL 
representative and vendor representative. Before creating the 
trusted build, the VSTL must complete the source code review of 
the software delivered from the vendor for compliance with the 
VVSG and must produce and record file signatures of all source 
code modules.
    5.6.1. Constructing the Build Environment. The VSTL shall 
construct the build environment in an isolated environment 
controlled by the VSTL, as follows:
    5.6.1.1. The device that will hold the build environment 
shall be completely erased by the VSTL to ensure a total and 
complete cleaning of it. The VSTL shall use commercial off-the-
shelf software, purchased by the laboratory, for cleaning the 
device.
    5.6.1.2. The VSTL, with vendor consultation and 
observation, shall construct the build environment.
    5.6.1.3. After construction of the build environment, the 
VSTL shall produce and record a file signature of the build 
environment.
    Loading Source Code Onto the Build Environment. After 
successful source code review, the VSTL shall load source code 
onto the build environment as follows:
    5.6.2.1. The VSTL shall check the file signatures of the 
source code modules and build environment to ensure that they 
are unchanged from their original form.
    5.6.2.2. The VSTL shall load the source code onto the build 
environment and produce and record the file signature of the 
resulting combination.
    5.6.2.3. The VSTL shall capture a disk image of the 
combination build environment and source code modules 
immediately before performing the build.
    5.6.2.4. The VSTL shall deposit the disk image into an 
authorized archive to ensure that the build can be reproduced, 
if necessary, at a later date.
    5.6.3. Creating the Executable Code. Upon completion of all 
the tasks outlined above, the VSTL shall produce the executable 
code.
    5.6.3.1. The VSTL shall produce and record a file signature 
of the executable code.
    5.6.3.2. The VSTL shall deposit the executable code into an 
EAC-approved software repository and create installation 
disk(s) from the executable code.
    5.6.3.3. The VSTL shall produce and record file signatures 
of the installation disk(s) in order to provide a mechanism to 
validate the software before installation on the voting system 
in a purchasing jurisdiction.
    5.6.3.4. The VSTL shall install the executable code onto 
the system submitted for testing and certification before 
completion of system testing.
    5.6.4. Trusted Build for Modifications. The process of 
building new executable code when a previously certified system 
has been modified is somewhat simplified.
    5.6.4.1. The build environment used in the original 
certification is removed from storage and its file signature 
verified.
    5.6.4.2. After source code review, the modified files are 
placed onto the verified build environment and new executable 
files are produced.
    5.6.4.3. If the original build environment is unavailable 
or its file signatures cannot be verified against those 
recorded from the original certification, then the more labor-
intensive process of creating the build environment must be 
performed. Further source code review may be required of 
unmodified files to validate that they are unmodified from 
their originally certified versions.
    [5.7 Additional Elements.] After EAC certification has been 
granted, the VSTL project manager, or an appropriate delegate 
of the project manager, shall deliver for deposit the following 
elements in one or more trusted archive(s) (repositories) 
designated by the EAC:
    5.7.1. Source code used for the trusted build and its file 
signatures.
    5.7.2. Disk image of the pre-build, build environment, and 
any file signatures to validate that it is unmodified.
    5.7.3. Disk image of the post-build, build environment, and 
any file signatures to validate that it is unmodified.
    5.7.4. Executable code produced by the trusted build and 
its file signatures of all files produced.
    5.7.5. Installation device(s) and file signatures.
    5.8. System Identification Tools. The Manufacturer shall 
provide tools through which a fielded voting system may be 
identified and demonstrated to be unmodified from the system 
that was certified. The purpose of this requirement is to make 
such tools available to Federal, State, and local officials to 
identify and verify that the equipment used in elections is 
unmodified from its certified version. Manufacturers may 
develop and provide these tools as they see fit. The tools, 
however, must provide the means to identify and verify hardware 
and software. The EAC may review the system identification 
tools developed by the Manufacturer to ensure compliance. 
System identification tools include the following examples:
    5.8.1. Hardware is commonly identified by model number and 
revision number on the unit, its printed wiring boards (PWBs), 
and major subunits. Typically, hardware is verified as 
unmodified by providing detailed photographs of the PWBs and 
internal construction of the unit. These images may be used to 
compare with the unit being verified.
    5.8.2. Software operating on a host computer will typically 
be verified by providing a self-booting compact disk (CD) or 
similar device that verifies the file signatures of the voting 
system application files AND the signatures of all nonvolatile 
files that the application files access during their operation. 
Note that the creation of such a CD requires having a file map 
of all nonvolatile files that are used by the voting system. 
Such a tool must be provided for verification using the file 
signatures of the original executable files provided for 
testing. If during the certification process modifications are 
made and new executable files created, then the tool must be 
updated to reflect the file signatures of the final files to be 
distributed for use. For software operating on devices in which 
a self-booting CD or similar device cannot be used, a procedure 
must be provided to allow identification and verification of 
the software that is being used on the device.
    5.9. Documentation. Manufacturers shall provide 
documentation to the Program Director verifying that the 
trusted build has been performed, software has been deposited 
in an approved repository, and system identification tools are 
available to election officials. The Manufacturer shall submit 
a letter, signed by both its management representative and a 
VSTL official, stating (under penalty of law) that it has (1) 
performed a trusted build consistent with the requirements of 
Section 5.6 of this Manual, (2) deposited software consistent 
with Section 5.7 of this Manual, and (3) created and made 
available system identification tools consistent with Section 
5.8 of this Manual. This letter shall also include (as 
attachments) a copy and description of the system 
identification tool developed under Section 5.8 above.

Minority Views of the Honorable Vernon J. Ehlers, the Honorable Daniel 
              E. Lungren, and the Honorable Kevin McCarthy

                              ----------                              


   H.R. 811, Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007

    On Tuesday, May 8, 2007, the Committee on House 
Administration ordered favorably reported to the House H.R. 
811, the ``Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 
2007,'' as amended, on a 6-3 party-line vote. In our view, H.R. 
811 would not accomplish the objectives that the majority 
purports are needed to ensure integrity and increased voter 
confidence in U.S. elections. In fact, this bill would do 
everything to promote a false sense of security and diminish 
confidence in our elections. H.R. 811 would undermine the goals 
and the true reforms of the bipartisan Help America Vote Act of 
2002 \1\ (HAVA) that improved elections and increased voter 
participation. Furthermore, H.R. 811 would roll back 
significant strides allowing disabled voters to cast ballots 
both independently and privately for the first time. If the 
goal is to provide a secure fraud-proof election process, which 
we support, H.R. 811 as currently written falls woefully short 
and in the words of one election official in one of the largest 
counties in the nation, is ``ill-conceived and unworkable.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                PREFACE

    H.R. 811, under the guise of providing voters with a paper 
mechanism to independently verify their vote, would create 
serious unintended consequences that will hinder the 
administration of the upcoming 2008 Federal elections. Most of 
the bill's provisions have absolutely nothing to do with 
independent verification of votes cast on machines at the polls 
on Election Day. Rather, these alterations are aimed at 
limiting the use and value of electronic voting systems, 
weakening intellectual property rights, infringing on state's 
rights, federalizing and micro-managing the administration of 
elections, expanding enforcement by private parties and 
ultimately waste taxpayer dollars.
    H.R. 811 would deny state and local election administrators 
the ability to determine what voting system is preferable in 
their specific locale based on demographics. Instead H.R. 811 
creates a one-size-fits-all voting scheme that is tailored to 
nowhere and no one and considers all thoughts and viewpoints 
from Washington, D.C. as being definitive, inerrant and 
prescient. What may work well in urban areas of California or 
New York may not be administratively feasible in rural areas of 
South Dakota or North Carolina; the bill ignores that fact.
    It has been five years since the enactment of HAVA. 
Regrettably, there are states that have yet to fully comply 
with the requirements. Until the requirements of HAVA are fully 
implemented, we are unable to accurately measure its successes 
and shortcomings. It would be hasty and potentially detrimental 
to implement new Federal standards until we can closely examine 
the current system. With approximately 18 months until the 2008 
General Elections, forcing states to adopt change is now 
foolish, particularly when so many states are reconsidering 
their Presidential election process and timelines.
    H.R. 811 does not enjoy the type of bipartisan or industry 
support that Federal election modification deserves. In 2002, 
HAVA affected meaningful change that met the shared goals of 
both the majority and minority parties to improve our nation's 
voting systems. Unlike HAVA, which was reported out of the 
Committee on a truly bipartisan vote of 8-0, H.R. 811 is the 
majority's hasty attempt at election restructuring that 
received insufficient deliberation from their members and zero 
support from Republican members of the Committee. Not only have 
election officials in over 35 states opposed H.R. 811, industry 
experts, the disabled community and other interest groups have 
expressed concerns and highlighted the myriad of problems 
associated with the bill. The Republican members of the 
Committee realize the bill's shortcomings and offered a 
substitute amendment as well as 12 additional amendments to 
address the concerns raised by these groups in an effort to 
reach a bipartisan consensus. Rather than address these 
concerns or seek compromise, the majority charged forward with 
blinders, ignoring the very people who are responsible for 
administering our nation's elections: city clerks, county 
clerks, state election officials and secretaries of state. 
Below is a more detailed review of the major deficiencies and 
flaws contained in H.R. 811.

                      Principal Flaws of H.R. 811

                 PAPER AS THE OFFICIAL BALLOT OF RECORD

    H.R. 811's reliance on paper as the official ballot of 
record for all Federal elections is misguided. We have all 
learned from the 2000 Presidential recount in Florida that 
paper ballots (punch cards, in this case) are not the answer 
for instilling confidence in our voting system. The primary 
reason that the nation moved from paper ballots to more 
mechanical voting machines in the last century was because of 
fraud associated with paper ballots and frequent problems with 
discerning voter intent. Paper ballots are more susceptible to 
being lost, stolen or damaged.
    When paper ballots are the official ballot of record, 
history has shown, there is increased risk of disenfranchising 
voters and producing inconsistent election results.\2\ The 
Director of Elections for Franklin County, Ohio, in his 
testimony before the Committee on House Administration's 
Subcommittee on Elections, advised members of problems with 
relying on paper for the recounts and stated (Voter Verified 
Paper Audit Trails) VVPATs should be used only as an audit 
device to prove an electronic record.\3\ In discussing the 
procedures for the recount conducted in Ohio's 15th 
Congressional District, he demonstrated how having VVPATs as 
the official ballots of record would make it possible for 
properly cast ballots accurately recorded by Direct-Recording 
Electronic Voting Machines (DREs) to be ignored during 
recounts. In a close election, paper jams or poll worker errors 
in loading the paper backwards could cause erroneous 
results.\4\ Congress should not support a voting system that 
has the potential of disenfranchising voters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Dr. Donald F. Norris, Ph.D., testified before the Committee on 
House Administration's Elections Subcommittee on March 23, 2007 that, 
``In nearly every election where recounts are undertaken of paper 
ballots, the vote tallies completed manually by human beings produce 
inconsistent and sometimes conflicting results.''
    \3\ During the Committee on House Administration's Elections 
Subcommittee hearing on March 20, 2007, Matt Damschroder, Director of 
Elections for Franklin County, Ohio, further discussed, ``the question 
`what constitutes a vote' having long been determined in Ohio for punch 
cards and optically scanned paper ballots, it seemed wrong to introduce 
a new voter intent question that could cause a voter's properly cast 
and accurately recorded vote to go uncounted.''
    \4\ Testimony from Matt Damschroder, Director of Elections, 
Franklin County, Ohio, House Administration's Elections Subcommittee 
hearing on March 20, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  MANDATED VOTING MACHINE REPLACEMENT

    H.R. 811 mandates replacement of paperless DREs by 2008 and 
DREs equipped with current VVPATs by 2010. The only voting 
machines that meet the durable paper ballot requirement under 
H.R. 811 are paper-based optical scan voting machines. The 
motivation for the change back to a paper ballot system is 
based largely on unfounded claims and unsubstantiated fears 
that electronic voting systems are not secure. Computer 
scientists have stated that the software contained in 
electronic voting systems is, in fact, harder to manipulate 
than a paper ballot would be during an election.\5\ While there 
may have been isolated instances of voting machine problems in 
2006, there was no evidence of rampant electronic voting system 
malfunction, including DRE voting machines, in the 2006 
elections. Most of the incidents on Election Day were a direct 
result of human errors, including poll worker errors, voter 
mistakes or poor ballot design. While optical scan machines 
satisfy the auditable paper audit trail provisions of H.R. 811, 
these machines do not always provide 100% accurate results and 
can fail due to calibration problems or be difficult to count 
due to ballot marking by voters that make voter intent 
unclear.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Testimony from Dr. Michael Shamos, Committee on House 
Administration Hearing, September 28, 2006.
    \6\ Dr. Norris also notes problems with optical scan voting systems 
in an editorial that appeared in the Baltimore Sun on February 26, 
2007. He states in relevant part, ``Voters are more likely to select 
the wrong candidate or commit ``undervotes'' or ``overvotes'' when 
voting on paper than when using the state's touch screen system. The 
evidence further shows that voters who try to change their votes or 
cast write-in votes also make more errors when using paper. This may be 
because, unlike touch screen systems, opscan [optical scan] systems 
have no review screen. And in the event of a controversy, recount 
discrepancies can occur with the interpretation of paper ballots, as we 
well know from Florida in 2000 and Washington State in 2004.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since the 2000 presidential elections, contrary to the 
majority's allegations, Americans have increased confidence in 
our voting system. Exit polls conducted for CNN in the 2006 
election found that 88 percent of voters said that they had 
``full confidence'' that their votes were counted 
accurately.\7\ In November 2006, there were many Federal 
candidates elected on electronic voting machines not equipped 
with a verified paper audit trail, and all 435 Congressional 
results were certified by their respective states for being 
free and fair elections. The mere fact that electronic voting 
machines did not provide paper verification should not be the 
rationale for placing doubt on election results or the 
justification for requiring states to change their preferred 
voting system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Testimony during the Committee on House Administration's 
Elections Subcommittee hearing on March 20, 2007, from R. Doug Lewis, 
Executive Director of the National Association of Election Officials. 
Dr. Ted Selker during the Committee on House Administration's Elections 
Subcommittee hearing on March 15, 2007, also stated that exit polls 
show ``that people are comfortable with the voting systems they use.'' 
candidates elected on electronic voting machines not equipped with a 
verified paper audit trail, and all 435 Congressional results were 
certified by their respective states for being free and fair elections. 
The mere fact that electronic voting machines did not provide paper 
verification should not be the rationale for placing doubt on election 
results or the justification for requiring states to change their 
preferred voting system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many states enjoy the benefits of using DRE voting machines 
for their elections. DREs have made it administratively 
feasible for states and local jurisdictions to successfully 
implement early voting programs, provide multiple language 
ballots and meet the accessibility requirements for disabled 
voters under HAVA. Prohibiting the use of DREs will not only 
frustrate the administration of elections at the local levels, 
it may likely contribute to longer lines at polls.
    We are not opposed to the idea of a redundant method of 
capturing vote totals; in fact we welcome it. But we believe 
all avenues should be explored to accomplish duplicate capture 
of this information, not just paper ballots. The goal of HAVA 
was to provide the states with the flexibility to choose the 
voting system that best fits its needs. Congress should not be 
the judge, nor require one type of voting system for all 
elections, nor should we outlaw voting machines that have 
recently been purchased to meet 2006 HAVA mandates.

          UNFETTERED ACCESS TO PROTECTED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

    H.R. 811 allows access to sensitive and security-related 
voting machine software to a broad spectrum of parties, some of 
whom may not have real interest in the software or the security 
of elections. While the majority believes this expanded access 
will make elections more transparent, it poses serious security 
threats to our election system. Allowing access to the source 
code for voting machines will give the blueprint for 
manipulation of elections and the ability to irrationally 
criticize the software to the point that it negatively affects 
voter confidence.
    The level of access provided in H.R. 811 also sets new 
precedents for intellectual property disclosure requirements. 
Software disclosure of this nature and magnitude does not apply 
to the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, 
the Department of Defense, or even the airline industry. 
People's lives and national security are at stake in each of 
those cases. It is unclear why the majority is authorizing 
different treatment for election-related intellectual property 
that provides fundamental protections to one of our most 
precious rights as United States citizens; the right to vote. 
Although H.R. 811 requires non-disclosure agreements to be 
signed by qualified individuals who wish to review election 
dedicated software, it does not provide for any enforcement 
actions or criminal penalties for disclosure breaches or trade 
secret violations. Furthermore, it provides no protections 
against nefarious attempts to ``hack'' the computer code.
    Expanded access to election dedicated software essentially 
takes away the proprietary rights of companies and gives them 
away. This is contrary to the whole premise of our free 
enterprise system. Moreover, H.R. 811's disclosure requirements 
will limit the desire of election industry companies to 
continue to develop new technologies and improve their existing 
systems.

                 DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF DISABLED VOTERS

    H.R. 811 severely limits voter accessibility among disabled 
voters. HAVA required states to deploy at least one voting 
system in each polling location that allowed individuals with 
disabilities to vote independently and privately, a right that 
they had not had before. Many states purchased DRE voting 
machines to satisfy the accessibility requirement. The 
provisions contained in H.R. 811 prohibit the use of the 
paperless DRE voting machines. While proponents of H.R. 811 
state there are accessible paper-based voting systems currently 
on the market that accommodate individuals with disabilities, 
these systems fall short of providing these individuals with 
the ability to cast or verify a ballot independently or 
privately. Testimony presented before the Committee 
demonstrated that access problems with paper ballots and paper 
trails still exist.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ During the March 15, 2007 hearing before the Committee on House 
Administration's Elections Subcommittee, Dr. Diane Golden, disability 
access and technology witness, testified, ``there are two access 
problems that we have still got in existing products related to print. 
It is not going to work to have an accessible electronic vote record or 
ballot and an inaccessible paper one. You just see the problem with 
that. It is clearly lack of equal access. When you add paper into that 
process (speaking about the EAC system standards), we currently don't 
have equipment on the market readily available that delivers all of 
those access features when a paper ballot is involved.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is the Republican members' view that if Congress is 
going to require accessible machines for the disabled to be 
equipped with a paper backup, it must first ensure that these 
machines meet accessibility standards for all disabled voters 
before requiring states to purchase such technology. Congress 
should not roll back the significant progress made for disabled 
voters and risk disenfranchising this group of American voters.

            UNREASONABLE FEDERAL ELECTION AUDITING PROTOCOLS

    H.R. 811 requires states to administer hand-counted audits 
of virtually all Federal races before certifying official 
election results. Under this mandatory audit plan states must 
administer audits for at least 3% of all precincts after every 
Federal election unless a candidate wins by at least 80% or 
runs unopposed. This one-size-fits-all approach is severely 
flawed as it fails to consider the statutory requirements and 
deadlines states have in place to administer elections.
    State and local administrators testified to the difficulty 
in auditing Federal races under the scheme mandated by H.R. 
811. Testimony presented to the Committee revealed that these 
requirements would not accomplish the goals the majority seeks. 
First, mandating a hand-counted audit for virtually every 
Federal race would take weeks to administer and would cause 
significant delays in certifying official election results.\9\ 
Second, the tiered audit scheme contained in H.R. 811 has never 
been piloted in any state's Federal election and has not been 
proven to be statistically relevant to the objectives cited by 
the majority for conducting hand-counted audits. It is 
imprudent and costly to require every state to administer this 
method of manual election audits without empirical evidence of 
its effectiveness and feasibility. Several states have already 
instituted a mandatory audit of their respective elections,\10\ 
while a majority of states administer automatic recounts of 
races where the margin of victory between two candidates is 
within a certain percentage.\11\ Permitting this overly 
prescriptive hand-counted audit process will not only stifle 
the ability of election officials to administer elections and 
report results, but will also eliminate audit programs that 
have been successful in certain state and local jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, as cited earlier, hand counting ballots has been 
shown to be inaccurate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ During the March 20, 2007 hearing before the Committee on House 
Administration's Elections Subcommittee, when asked if he would audit 
every race Florida Election Administrator Ion Sancho said ``No, I would 
randomly select races.'' Guilford County Election Administrator George 
Gilbert opined: ``We have counted paper ballots by hand before, and we 
know how difficult--it is the most difficult aspect of conducting an 
election.''
    \10\ During the March 20, 2007 hearing before the Committee on 
House Administration's Elections Subcommittee, Tammy Patrick, Federal 
Compliance Officer for Maricopa County Elections Department in her 
testimony discussed Arizona's statutory hand audit requirement of 2% of 
the precinct-cast ballots and 1% of early ballots.
    \11\ For example, the Ohio Election Code provides ``If the number 
of votes cast for the declared winning candidate in a district election 
does not exceed the number of votes cast for the declared losing 
candidate by a margin of one-half of one percent or more of the total 
vote, a recount shall be conducted. If the number of votes cast for the 
declared winning candidate in a statewide election does not exceed the 
number of votes cast for the declared losing candidate by a margin of 
one-fourth of one percent or more of the total vote, a recount shall be 
conducted. Any candidate who was not declared elected may submit an 
application for a recount of the votes. Any group of five or more 
qualified electors may also file an application for a recount of the 
votes at an election upon any question or issue, provided that they 
either voted ``Yes'' or in favor of an issue that was defeated of they 
voted ``No'' or against an issue that was adopted.'' Ohio Revised Code 
Sec. 3515.01-3515.071
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

       UNNECESSARY CREATION OF A FEDERAL PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION

    H.R. 811 creates a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1983 against any state to enforce provisions of Title III 
of HAVA. This provision authorizes a system that would not 
benefit voters, but rather would result in endless Federal 
litigation. Perhaps the only beneficiaries would be attorneys. 
Individuals who are disenfranchised by their state's election 
process or claim their jurisdiction is not following the 
provisions under Title III of HAVA already have a means for 
filing claims. Currently under HAVA, states are required to 
establish administrative grievance procedures to provide 
sufficient Federal and state enforcement of HAVA requirements. 
We also have grave concerns whether the Department of Justice 
has adequate staffing to timely and successfully respond to the 
volume of potential claims; this might result in delays of 
election results. Moreover, creating a Federal private right of 
action will impose an additional administrative burden on local 
and state election officials, and it may force local 
governments to spend millions of dollars on politically or 
financially motivated lawsuits.

                          INSUFFICIENT FUNDING

    H.R. 811 authorizes $1 billion dollars for voting equipment 
replacement and $300 million for audit reimbursement. HAVA 
authorized $3.86 billion for states to replace punch card and 
lever machines, provide training for poll workers, provide 
voter education, and improve the administration of Federal 
elections. To date, states have not received the final $800 
million needed to meet all the HAVA mandates, and have had to 
resort to using state funds to meet all of the 2006 compliance 
deadlines.
    Clearly, the amount of funding provided in H.R. 811, which 
a number of election experts have deemed inadequate, will leave 
taxpayers holding the bill. Congress has a duty to spend the 
public's money wisely, and not to use it to attempt to 
implement legislation that the states have told is unnecessary 
and unworkable. Not considering the full implementation of our 
actions, is utterly irresponsible.

                UNATTAINABLE STATE COMPLIANCE DEADLINES

    H.R. 811 places unrealistic deadlines on state and local 
election officials to effectively administer the 2008 
elections. Testimony presented to the Committee suggests that 
the changes that are required under this bill would take 
approximately 18 months to 4 years to accomplish. This 
Committee was well aware of the potential danger of 
implementing major changes in elections during a presidential 
election year. HAVA gave states more than four years to acquire 
new voting systems. H.R. 811 is forcing states to again replace 
their newly purchased voting equipment under a time frame of 
less than 18 months.
    Other than optical scan voting machines, there is no other 
voting system currently certified and in use in the United 
States that meets the very specific requirements proposed in 
H.R. 811. Not one witness over the course of three hearings 
before the Committee on House Administration's Elections 
Subcommittee was able to identify a DRE equipped with a VVPAT 
or an accessible voting machine that ensures independent 
verification that: (1) is available in the marketplace, (2) has 
been used in an election in the United States and (3) can be 
appropriately tested and certified for use through the Election 
Assistance Commission Voting System Certification Program by 
2008. It is clear that the intent of H.R. 811 is to move toward 
nationwide deployment of optical scan voting machines which 
directly contradicts the flexibility HAVA provided to the 
states in administering elections.
    Since the implementation of HAVA, states have endured major 
changes to their election process, including the replacement of 
voting machines, implementation of statewide voter registration 
systems and steps to increase the accessibility to polling 
locations. Many states have already enacted legislation that 
requires their voting systems to be equipped with a voter 
verifiable paper audit trail. In addition, a number of states 
have also enacted mandatory manual audits.\12\ It is 
unnecessary to mandate Federal changes when states are already 
adopting requirements that are similar to those in H.R. 811. 
Moreover, requiring them to comply with the provisions 
contained in H.R. 811 is not only unattainable, but may result 
in utter chaos in the 2008 election cycle.\13\
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    \12\ During the March 20, 2007 hearing before the Committee on 
House Administration's Elections Subcommittee, Pamela Smith, President, 
VerifiedVoting.org testified that there are 16 states that require 
post-election manual audits: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, 
Colorado, Kentucky, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington and West Virginia.
    \13\ During the March 15, 2007 hearing before the Committee on 
House Administration's Elections Subcommittee, Secretary of State Eric 
Clark of Mississippi testified, ``There is no way under the sun we 
[state election administrators] can make the kind of changes that are 
contemplated in [H.R. 811] by next year's elections.'' During the March 
23, 2007 hearing before the Committee on House Administration's 
Elections Subcommittee, George Gilbert, Director of Elections for 
Guilford County North Carolina stated, ``We are concerned that 
implementation date of 2008 would actually collapse the election 
system.'' Mr. Gilbert further stated, ``We do not believe that it would 
be feasible nationwide to implement the kinds of changes, both 
procedural and technological that [H.R. 811] proposes by 2008.''
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                               CONCLUSION

    H.R. 811 directly undermines the valuable gains from HAVA 
and takes us back to 19th Century election systems and 
procedures. Congress should craft legislation and utilize 
technology to strengthen, secure, and improve our nation's 
voting systems, not revert back to requirements of problematic 
paper ballots. It has been 5 years since the enactment of HAVA, 
and there are still states that have yet to fully comply with 
HAVA's requirements. It is foolhardy to believe that states 
will have the ability to implement all the requirements of H.R. 
811 for the 2008 election cycle. To resort back to a pure paper 
voting system, without additional research into alternative 
technologies that may be more reliable for voter verification, 
would be ill-advised. Instead of rushing to implement a paper 
voting system that has been historically mired with problems, 
we should allow the marketplace to develop new technologies and 
solutions to enhance our voting systems.\14\
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    \14\ For example, during the March 15, 2007 hearing before the 
Committee on House Administration's Elections Subcommittee Dr. Selker 
describes a voter-verified audit trail which is accessible to 
individuals with disabilities and contains a tape drive which ``is a 
much more reliable drive than any of the printers that we have been 
able to find.'' In addition, VoteHere, a division of Dategrity Corp has 
developed a DRE Audit Trail that provides equal accessibility to voter 
verification.
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    Republicans have been most willing to work with the 
Democrats to draft election-related legislation that increases 
confidence and ensures security and integrity in our nation's 
voting system. We are dismayed that our offer was rebuffed. We 
believe H.R. 811 is a step backwards, and is far from 
accomplishing its primary objective of increasing voter 
confidence. If H.R. 811 becomes law, Americans just could bear 
witness to the most dysfunctional administration of Federal 
elections in our nation's history.

                                   Vernon J. Ehlers.
                                   Daniel E. Lungren.
                                   Kevin McCarthy.