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110th Congress 
 2nd Session                     SENATE                          Report
                                                                110-262
_______________________________________________________________________
                                                       Calendar No. 578
 
                  INSPECTOR GENERAL REFORM ACT OF 2007

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                   COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

                          GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                              to accompany

                                S. 2324


 TO AMEND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978 (5 U.S.C. APP.) TO ENHANCE 
   THE OFFICES OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, TO CREATE A COUNCIL OF THE 
 INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES




               February 22, 2008.--Ordered to be printed

 Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of February 14, 2008
        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois               PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JON TESTER, Montana                  JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

                  Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
                     Kevin J. Landy, Chief Counsel
                       Holly A. Idelson, Counsel
     Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
               Richard A. Beutel, Minority Senior Counsel
                  Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
 II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................7
 IV. Section by Section Analysis......................................8
  V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact.................................12
 VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate.......................12
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported...........15

                                                       Calendar No. 578
110th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session                                                     110-262

======================================================================



                  INSPECTOR GENERAL REFORM ACT OF 2007

                                _______
                                

               February 22, 2008.--Ordered to be printed

 Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of February 14, 2008

                                _______
                                

Mr. Lieberman, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
                    Affairs, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 2324]

    The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 2324) to amend the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to enhance the 
Offices of the Inspectors General, to create a Council of the 
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and for other 
purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
with amendments and recommends that the bill do pass.

                         I. Purpose and Summary

    S. 2324 is a bipartisan bill to strengthen the Inspector 
General system within the federal government. It has been 
almost 30 years since Congress created the Inspector General 
system to improve government efficiency and accountability. The 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act) \1\ established a 
network of internal watchdogs within key federal agencies to 
help prevent and uncover waste, fraud and abuse. In 1988, the 
IG Act was expanded to reach most major departments and 
agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The IG Act (PL 95-452) and its subsequent amendments are 
codified at 5 U.S.C. Appendix and 31 U.S.C. Section 1105(a)(25).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By and large, the IG Act has worked well to help the 
Executive Branch and Congress alike strive to ensure more 
effective and efficient government. However, time has revealed 
some shortcomings in the existing Act. It is essential that 
Inspectors General operate with sufficient independence to do 
their jobs well, yet the current IG structure does not go far 
enough to safeguard this independence. At the same time, it is 
imperative to strengthen the oversight process for the IGs 
themselves, to ensure they do not abuse their unique 
authorities. This legislation, therefore, would make certain 
adjustments in the structure and organization of the Inspector 
General community. It strengthens and modernizes this community 
to provide for both greater independence and greater 
accountability of the Inspectors General.

              II. Background and Need for the Legislation

    Today it is easy to take for granted the network of federal 
Inspectors General, who serve a unique and indispensible role 
as internal watchdogs within executive departments and 
agencies. Yet while the Inspector General concept dates back to 
the beginnings of our government, the modern statutory 
Inspector General community is a relatively new institution. 
The framework for these statutory IGs was laid out in the 
Inspector General Act of 1978, and expanded in the 1988 
amendments to that Act. These Inspectors General are charged 
with conducting audits and investigations to promote the 
effective, efficient and ethical operation of the government 
agencies. They do this as senior officials within their 
respective agencies, where they operate with a broad mandate 
and report directly to the agency head. Yet the IGs are also 
charged with reporting directly to Congress, giving them a 
unique status and responsibility to inform and facilitate 
effective Congressional oversight of the Executive Branch.
    There are currently 58 Inspector General offices 
established under the IG Act. Of these, 29 are appointed by the 
President with Senate confirmation (presidential IGs) and 29 
are appointed by their agency heads in designated federal 
entities (DFE IGs). In addition, there are three statutory 
Inspectors General already established in the legislative 
branch--for the Government Printing Office (GPO), \2\ the 
Library of Congress \3\ and the Capitol Police. \4\ A fourth 
legislative branch Inspector General--for the Architect of the 
Capitol--was authorized after this legislation was considered 
in the Committee.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 44 U.S.C. Section 3902.
    \3\ U.S.C. Section 185.
    \4\ 2 U.S.C. Section 1909.
    \5\ Public Law 10-161, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, 
Division H.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Pursuant to executive orders, the IG community is organized 
into two interagency councils: the President's Council on 
Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) for presidential IGs and the 
Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) for the 
DFE IGs.\6\ The Deputy Director for Management in the Office of 
Management and Budget chairs both councils.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Executive Order 12805, May 11, 1992; Executive Order 12993, 
March 2, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The work of these Inspectors General has been invaluable. 
Investigations by Inspectors General have helped the government 
recover billions of dollars in fraudulent charges, and their 
audit recommendations could create billions more in savings. 
Their work has also shut down possible future abuses by laying 
the groundwork for thousands of prosecutions, suspensions, 
debarments and personnel actions. In 2006 alone, audits by 
Inspector General offices resulted in $9.9 billion in potential 
savings from audit recommendations and $6.8 billion in 
investigative recoveries.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Honorable Clay Johnson III, testimony, Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee, July 11, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An example from the Committee's recent work illustrates the 
tremendous value of the work of the IGs. In a six-month period 
following the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) IG operation produced 29 reports 
related to the recovery efforts that included such alarming 
discoveries as that 63 percent of the DHS purchase-card 
transactions made during the response had no documentation of 
goods or services actually being received.\8\ The DHS IG 
investigations overall in this period helped produce 243 
convictions for fraud or related offenses, and recovery of 
millions of taxpayer dollars.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 
Semiannual Report to Congress April 1, 2006--September 30, 2006, p. 3.
    \9\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The investigations and reports of Inspectors General 
throughout the government help Congress shape legislation and 
oversight activities--improving the government's performance, 
providing important transparency into programs, and giving 
Americans better value for their tax dollar. Their work goes 
beyond dollar savings, however; by revealing unethical or 
unlawful conduct, the Inspectors General also help safeguard 
the integrity and credibility of government. For instance, the 
Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
revealed the sloppy and sometimes inappropriate use of National 
Security Letters to conduct wiretaps within this country.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ ``Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, ``A 
Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Use of National 
Security Letters,'' March 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To achieve these results, Inspectors General must operate 
without fear of improper intervention or intimidation by 
management or political forces. That is why the IG Act gives 
the Inspectors General a high degree of operational autonomy 
and authorizes a direct reporting channel to Congress. It is 
critical that agency management respect this independence and 
not attempt to retaliate against a vigorous Inspector General 
by threatening his or her tenure or budget, or otherwise 
interfere in effective oversight by the IG.
    For the most part, the Inspectors General have been able to 
operate with sufficient independence. However, the Committee is 
aware of several instances of real or perceived encroachments 
on IG authority. Just in the past year, for instance, there 
have been several public accounts from current or former 
Inspectors General who believed they were being improperly 
pressured or denied resources to carry out needed oversight. 
The Committee is aware of additional complaints from several 
OIGs.
    The Committee is also concerned about oversight of the 
Inspectors General, because with their heightened autonomy 
comes a heightened risk of abuse of power. Again, recent years 
have brought to light significant misconduct allegations 
against several Inspectors General. To maintain the 
effectiveness of the IGs and faith in their oversight, there 
must be a credible and effective channel to investigate 
complaints against an Inspector General or his senior staff, so 
as to deter and punish real or potential misconduct. The 
Integrity Committee of the PCIE has provided an important 
channel for investigating such complaints. However the 
Integrity Committee operates without clearly understood 
procedures or effective Congressional oversight. It is critical 
that this oversight process become more transparent and more 
accountable.
    S. 2324 would build on the strengths of the IG Act, while 
addressing some of these recent concerns. Some key aspects of 
the legislation are discussed below.

                    QUALIFICATIONS AND COMPENSATION

    This legislation amends the Inspector General Act of 1978 
to explicitly require appointments on the basis of ability and 
integrity, not political affiliation. This is already required 
for the presidentially appointed IGs, and the legislation would 
extend these requirements to the DFE IGs as well.
    With respect to compensation, the legislation would ensure 
that Inspectors General receive compensation that is 
appropriate to their status and responsibilities yet also 
assure that this compensation does not present any real or 
apparent conflict of interest.
    Currently there are two problems with compensation for the 
Inspectors General. First, the compensation of some Inspectors 
General depends on bonuses awarded by officials they oversee. 
Presidentially appointed IGs have generally agreed to forego 
such bonuses, but they remain an important part of the overall 
compensation of some DFE IGs. This presents at least the 
appearance of a conflict of interest, and should not be part of 
the IG pay structure.
    Second, some Inspectors General earn too little. Many 
Inspectors General are paid considerably less than officials 
they supervise. In some cases this is linked to a self-imposed 
ban on bonuses, in others it is simply the result of the 
Inspector General being slotted too low on the pay scale.
    The bill prohibits any Inspector General from receiving a 
bonus but would ensure that the overall compensation of any IG 
is appropriate and adequate to attract and retain skilled 
professionals. For presidentially appointed IGs, the bill 
includes a specific, statutory pay raise to Executive Schedule 
III plus 3 percent. For DFE IGs, the legislation requires that 
the Inspector General be classified at a grade, level, or rank 
designation at or above those of a majority of the senior level 
executives of that agency. In addition, it requires that DFE 
IGs receive not less than the average compensation of those 
senior executives within the agency. To ensure that this 
formula yields appropriate salaries for the DFE IGs, the 
legislation also requires that Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report back to Congress on the implementation of these 
pay provisions.

                       STRENGTHENING INDEPENDENCE

    In addition to adjusting the qualifications and 
compensation provisions for Inspectors General, the legislation 
would add certain structural protections to safeguard their 
independence.
    The bill includes a requirement that the President or 
appropriate agency head notify Congress 30 days before 
transferring or removing an Inspector General. This would allow 
for an appropriate dialogue with Congress in the event that the 
planned transfer or removal is viewed as an inappropriate or 
politically motivated attempt to terminate an effective 
Inspector General. As part of this advance notice, the 
Administration would be required to supply written reasons for 
the planned transfer or termination. This advance notice 
provision was widely endorsed by the IG community as a useful 
deterrent against improper intimidation or dismissal. By 
contrast, the Inspectors General were divided over proposals to 
create fixed terms for IGs with dismissal only ``for 
cause.''\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ GAO, Highlights of the Comptroller General's Panel on Federal 
Oversight and the Inspectors General, GAO-06-931SP (Washington, D.C.; 
Sept. 11, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While we hope that this advance notice will encourage 
useful communication between Congress and the Executive Branch 
on IG performance and serve as an effective deterrent against 
improper terminations, we note that the provision does not 
alter the President's ultimate authorities with respect to 
Executive Branch employees.
    The legislation also would safeguard IG independence in the 
budget process, by requiring a separate budget line for 
Inspectors General that includes their overall budget and 
training needs. Currently, there is not necessarily a separate 
line item for each OIG within the budget of its respective 
agency and no requirement that training expenses or 
contributions to the work of the PCIE or ECIE be clearly 
identified. This budget requirement will create greater 
transparency regarding IG program and training needs, to help 
ensure these offices are adequately funded and to protect 
against any punitive budget cuts.
    The legislation includes several other measures designed to 
strengthen the operational authorities of the Inspectors 
General, including enhancing their authority to manage their 
own staff.

                                COUNCIL

    The existing IG Councils (the PCIE and the ECIE) serve as 
vehicles for individual Inspectors General to forge common 
standards and provide resources to support their respective 
missions. The PCIE also includes an Integrity Committee that is 
the mechanism for reviewing misconduct allegations against 
Inspectors General or their top staff members.
    While these Councils play a valuable role, they are badly 
in need of strengthening. The Councils operate on an ad hoc, 
shoestring budget, have no dedicated staff, and have limited 
legal authority for joint endeavors, such as a standardized 
training program for OIG staff. In testimony and numerous 
interviews with Committee staff, the Inspectors General have 
cited strengthening the resources and authorities of the 
Councils as a key component of improving the effectiveness of 
the IG community.
    This legislation would create a more robust IG Council to 
promote the work of the Inspectors General, and also provide 
more effective oversight for the IG community. It would replace 
the two existing councils with one, statutory council for the 
entire IG community. The bill gives the new Council a broad 
charter to conduct activities to build a strong, professional 
IG community and explicitly authorizes individual Inspectors 
General to pool resources for Council programs, including 
training. Additionally, as noted above, the budget provisions 
of the bill require that the Inspectors General and 
Administration identify the amounts sought and recommended for 
Council expenses and training--a provision designed to bring 
greater transparency to the cost of Council activities and 
which the Committee intends will encourage adequate funding for 
these extremely important activities. The Committee also 
supports enhanced funding for the Council through any other 
appropriate mechanism.
    The bill would also codify an Integrity Committee to review 
allegations of misconduct by Inspectors General and their top 
staff, as described below.

                             ACCOUNTABILITY

    This legislation also addresses issues of how the 
Inspectors General are to be held accountable. Unfortunately, 
the Inspectors General are not immune from real or alleged 
misconduct or mismanagement and it is critical that there be an 
effective and credible mechanism to address these complaints 
when they arise. Currently, the Integrity Committee of the PCIE 
serves as a forum for allegations against Inspectors General 
and their senior staff. The bill would strengthen the Integrity 
Committee by codifying it and requiring greater transparency 
and Congressional oversight for its work. Congress currently 
has no systematic or assured way to learn of serious 
allegations against an Inspector General or learn the results 
of an investigation into those allegations. The new Integrity 
Committee would be required to notify Congress of its 
procedures, and prepare regular reports on investigations it 
undertakes. The Committee is also concerned that there are not 
dedicated resources for the Integrity Committee and intends 
that the budget provisions of this bill be used to help assure 
sufficient resources for effective Integrity Committee work, as 
well as other Council activities.
    Additionally, S. 2324 requires that the Government 
Accountability Office prepare a report analyzing the policies 
and practices of the Integrity Committee, as well as other 
mechanisms for handling complaints against an Inspector General 
or his staff.

                       DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OIG

    Another provision of the bill would eliminate a statutory 
restriction on the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) OIG. Currently, the DOJ OIG does not have authority to 
investigate misconduct allegations concerning Department 
attorneys acting in a legal capacity or investigators acting at 
an attorney's direction. Those cases are instead referred to 
the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). No other 
statutory Office of Inspector General has such a limitation; 
alleged misconduct by career lawyers at other federal 
departments and agencies is within the purview of that agency's 
Inspector General.
    This bill would eliminate that restriction. The Committee 
believes it is appropriate to give the DOJ OIG a ``right of 
first refusal'' on allegations involving Department lawyers, as 
well as other officials. OPR does not operate with the same 
structural independence as the OIG, and its reports are rarely 
made public. The Committee believes it is more appropriate that 
the OIG investigate matters involving high ranking Department 
attorneys or widespread policies or practices at the 
Department. It is troubling, for instance, that the 
investigations into the U.S. attorney firing scandal was 
initially referred to OPR; the OIG was allowed to participate 
only after objecting to the Department leadership.\12\ The 
current arrangement also can lead to unproductive duplication 
of effort between the OIG and OPR when an investigation 
implicates matters within the IG's jurisdiction as well as some 
aspects of attorney conduct.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ The Honorable Glenn A. Fine, testimony, Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, July 11, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By including this provision, the Committee is not seeking 
to diminish or disparage the important contributions of OPR. 
The Committee recognizes that OPR is generally highly regarded 
for its expertise and integrity. For the most part, the work of 
OPR would continue as it does now; the Committee does not 
anticipate or intend that the OIG would normally investigate 
routine attorney misconduct cases involving line attorneys that 
are the core of OPR's work. The Committee anticipates that the 
OIG and OPR would work out a protocol to determine which cases 
should be referred to OPR and which retained by the OIG--much 
as the Inspector General has with other investigative elements 
of the Department of Justice.

                        ADDITIONAL ENHANCEMENTS

    S. 2324 includes additional provisions that improve and 
strengthen the IG system:
     The bill would clarify that the subpoena authority 
of Inspectors General extends to electronic documents.
     The bill would require that agencies provide a 
clear link to that agency's Inspector General website, and that 
OIG reports be promptly posted on agency websites.
     The bill would allow DFE IGs to apply to the 
Department of Justice for law enforcement designation and seek 
recoveries under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act, 
authorities currently exercised only by presidential IGs.

                        III. Legislative History

    S. 2324 was introduced on November 8, 2007, by Senator 
McCaskill with Senators Collins, Lieberman and Coburn as 
original cosponsors. The bill was read twice and referred to 
the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs on 
November 8, 2007.
    S. 2324 was grounded in two earlier legislative proposals--
S. 680 and S. 1723. S. 680, the Accountability in Government 
Contracting Act of 2007, was introduced on February 17, 2007 by 
Senator Collins and originally included some of the reforms 
included in this legislation. However, the provisions of S. 680 
governing Inspectors General were removed from that bill during 
markup on August 1, 2007. S. 1723, the Improvement in 
Government Accountability Act of 2007, was introduced on June 
28, 2007 by Senator McCaskill and also contained many of the 
provisions included in S. 2324.
    In addition, the Committee held a hearing on July 11, 2007 
to consider the status of the Inspector General system and the 
need for possible reforms. Witnesses at that hearing were: The 
Honorable Clay Johnson III, Deputy Director for Management, 
Office of Management and Budget; The Honorable Glenn A. Fine, 
Inspector General, Department of Justice; the Honorable Earl E. 
Devaney, Inspector General, Department of the Interior; the 
Honorable Eleanor J. Hill, former Inspector General, Department 
of Defense; and Danielle Brian, Executive Director, Project on 
Government Oversight. The Committee also received written 
testimony from: the Honorable Phyllis K. Fong, Inspector 
General, Department of Agriculture; Dr. Christine Boesz, 
Inspector General, National Science Foundation; David M. 
Walker, Comptroller General of the United States; Jane E. 
Altenhofen, Inspector General, National Labor Relations Board; 
and Susan Khoury, former Special Agent, Office of the Inspector 
General, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
    Following the July hearing, Senators McCaskill, Collins, 
Lieberman and Coburn collaborated to draft a new version of 
Inspector General reform legislation, which was then introduced 
as S. 2324.
    On November 14, 2007, the Committee considered S. 2324. 
Senators Lieberman, Collins, McCaskill and Coburn offered a 
manager's amendment, which made technical changes and added a 
section relating to investigations of allegations against the 
Special Counsel or Deputy Special Counsel. The amendment was 
adopted by voice vote. The bill, as amended, was adopted by the 
Committee by voice vote and ordered reported to the Senate. 
Members present for the vote on the manager's amendment were 
Senators Lieberman, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Collins, 
Stevens, Voinovich and Coleman. Members present for the vote on 
the bill as amended were Senators Lieberman, Carper, McCaskill, 
Tester, Collins, Stevens, Voinovich, Coleman and Coburn.
    Senators Akaka, Clinton and Obama joined as cosponsors on 
November 13, 2007. Senators Carper and Stevens joined as 
cosponsors on November 14, 2007, Senator Levin joined as a 
cosponsor on November 15, 2007 and Senator Coleman joined as a 
cosponsor on November 16, 2007. Senator Grassley joined as a 
cosponsor on December 19, 2007.

                    IV. Section by Section Analysis

    Section 1: Title
    Section 2: This section requires that Inspectors General 
for the designated federal entities (non-presidential 
appointees) be selected on the basis of skills and integrity 
and without regard to political affiliation--the same 
requirements that currently apply to presidentially appointed 
IGs. This section is designed to ensure that Inspectors General 
are selected on the basis of their qualifications to perform 
this important role and not any other basis. This section 
eliminates the unintentional distinction between presidentially 
appointed IGs and non-presidentially appointed IGs.
    Section 3: This section requires that before an Inspector 
General can be removed or transferred, Congress must be 
provided with 30 days advance written notice including reasons 
for termination or transfer. This section applies to 
presidentially appointed IGs, those at designated federal 
entities, and the three statutory IGs within the legislative 
branch. The Committee intends that Inspectors General who fail 
to perform their duties properly whether through malfeasance or 
nonfeasance, or whose personal actions bring discredit upon the 
office, be removed. The requirement to notify the Congress in 
advance of the reasons for the removal should serve to ensure 
that Inspectors General are not removed for political reasons 
or because they are doing their jobs of ferreting out fraud, 
waste and abuse.
    Section 4: This section is necessary to ensure that the 
compensation of Inspectors General is set at a level to attract 
highly competent and skilled individuals to public service and 
to retain these individuals as long as they continue to perform 
at the highest levels. The Committee has evidence that the 
current pay for Inspectors General has created disparities 
where some IGs are being paid less than their deputies or other 
members of their office. Combine these pay disparities with the 
fact that many Inspectors General choose to refuse bonuses 
awarded their peers in order to avoid the appearance of 
impropriety, and the pay disparities in the current system 
actually serve as a disincentive for individuals to seek out 
and retain the Office of Inspector General.
    Subsection (a) adjusts the pay for presidentially appointed 
IGs. Pay for these Inspectors General would rise from Executive 
Schedule IV to Executive Schedule III, plus 3 percent. 
Currently, most presidentially appointed IGs earn less than 
subordinates in the Senior Executive Service (SES). This 
disparity is exacerbated by the fact that SES employees are 
eligible for performance awards or bonuses, which the 
presidential IGs have voluntarily agreed to forego and which 
would be prohibited for them under this legislation. By 
increasing the pay of the presidentially appointed IGs to 
Executive Schedule III plus 3 percent, the Committee hopes to 
eliminate or significantly diminish this disparity.
    Subsection (b) would adjust the classification and pay for 
the Inspectors General of designated federal entities. For the 
DFE IGs, grade, level or rank designation would be set at or 
above those of a majority of the senior level executives of the 
agency, such as the General Counsel, the Chief Acquisition 
Officer, the Chief Information Officer, the Chief Financial 
Officer and the Chief Human Capital Officer at that agency. The 
Inspector General's pay can not be less than the average total 
compensation of the senior level executives at that agency.
    Section 5: Prohibits any Inspector General from receiving a 
cash bonus or award. It is already the practice of many 
Inspectors General to refuse bonuses from the agencies they 
serve. They do so to avoid the appearance of impropriety that 
accepting a bonus from the organization they are providing 
oversight to might cause them to be less than vigorous in their 
pursuit of fraud, waste and abuse. The Committee believes it is 
appropriate to extend the no-bonus policy to all Inspectors 
General. At the same time, the Committee recognizes that 
bonuses are currently a significant part of the overall 
compensation for some DFE IGs, and has attempted in Section 4 
to adjust the salaries of these IGs such that they will not be 
significantly harmed by the no-bonus policy.
    Section 6: Requires that each Inspector General have his or 
her own legal counsel or obtain necessary legal counsel from 
another OIG or the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity 
and Efficiency (created in Section 7 of this bill). This 
provision does not require that each OIG have its own Counsel. 
It does require that each Inspector General obtain advice from 
a lawyer that is employed by an Inspector General or the IG 
Council so as to preserve the independence of the Inspectors 
General.
    Section 7: Subsection (a) creates a new Inspector General 
council that would merge, codify and strengthen the two 
existing councils, created by Executive Order, for the 
presidentially appointed and designated federal entity IGs 
respectively. The council's mission is to ``address integrity, 
economy and effectiveness issues that transcend individual 
government agencies, and also to increase the professionalism 
and effectiveness of personnel by developing policies, 
standards, and approaches to aid in the establishment of a 
well-trained and highly skilled workforce in the Offices of 
Inspectors General.''
    This subsection establishes an Integrity Committee within 
the council to receive, review, investigate or refer for 
investigation allegations of wrongdoing that are made against 
Inspectors General or certain senior staff members within an 
OIG. The Integrity Committee is chaired by an official of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and would also include the 
Office of Government Ethics and the Office of Special Counsel, 
as well as several Inspectors General. The Integrity Committee 
would be required to report to Congress on its activities.
    The Council would also submit recommendations of 
individuals to fill IG vacancies. The purpose of this provision 
is to provide the President and agency heads the benefit of the 
advice of the IG community, not to tie the hands of the 
President or agency head in selecting Inspectors General. The 
committee believes that this practice will provide valuable 
advice to selecting officials and improve the quality and 
professionalism of the IG community.
    The Council is authorized to develop a budget, and to 
establish a fund to support the Integrity Committee functions 
and to fund training across the government and for other 
authorized purposes. This will allow the Inspectors General to 
incorporate in their agency budget submissions requirements to 
support the Council and for the Council to ``pool'' funds among 
the IGs to ensure that required training is provided for IGs 
and their employees. It will ensure that necessary funding is 
clearly identified and apportioned among the agencies to 
support the vital and necessary functions of the Council.
    This section also specifies, in subsection (b), that the 
Integrity Committee can review allegations of wrongdoing 
against the Special Counsel of the Office of Special Counsel, 
provided that the Special Counsel recuse himself from 
considering any such allegation.
    Section 8: This section specifies that Inspector General 
budget requests at the agency level clearly document the 
amounts requested and specifically identify amounts needed for 
training and support of Council activities. The section also 
requires that the President's budget submission state how much 
money they are requesting for each IG office, as well as the 
funding level each Inspector General requested from their 
agency. This provision will provide Congress with transparency 
into the funding of the agency IGs but does not interfere with 
the agency head's or the President's right to formulate and 
transmit a budget to Congress. Ensuring adequate funding of the 
Office of the Inspector General in each agency through the 
current budget process is essential to ensuring the 
independence of the Inspectors General.
    Section 9: This section extends the subpoena power of the 
Inspectors General to address information stored in any medium, 
including electronically stored information. Nothing in this 
section is intended to provide for the disclosure of 
information otherwise exempted from release pertaining to the 
witness protection program. It does, however, clarify that IG 
authority extends to all documents whether generated or stored 
in hard copy or electronic media.
    Section 10: This section would authorize Inspectors General 
at designated federal entities (DFEs) to pursue fraud claims 
and recoup losses under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act 
(an authority currently given to the presidentially appointed 
IGs). This clarifies the authority of the Inspectors General in 
the DFEs but does not require that they exercise this authority 
if it is not consistent with authorities already exercised by 
the agency.
    Section 11: This section authorizes all Inspectors General 
appointed under Sections 3 or 8(G) of the IG Act to apply to 
the Justice Department for law enforcement authorities for its 
agents, an authority currently held only by the presidentially 
appointed IGs. This eliminates the unnecessary distinction 
between presidentially appointed and designated federal entity 
IGs.
    Section 12: This section broadens the requirements for the 
IG semiannual reports to encompass inspection and evaluation 
reports as well as audits.
    Section 13: This section requires several enhancements of 
Inspector General websites. It requires a direct link to the IG 
website from the agency homepage; requires all reports and 
audits to be posted within 3 working days of its public 
release; and requires that IG websites include a direct link 
for individuals to anonymously report fraud, waste or abuse. 
The requirement for the 3 working day posting is subject to the 
support received by the Inspectors General from their 
respective agencies in managing their websites.
    Section 14: This section would eliminate a statutory 
restriction on the jurisdiction of the DOJ OIG, enabling the 
OIG to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by all Department 
employees. Currently, the OIG cannot investigate misconduct 
involving attorneys and investigators operating at their 
direction and these cases are referred to the Office of 
Professional Responsibility (OPR). The Committee anticipates 
that OPR will continue to investigate most of the routine 
misconduct cases involving Department attorneys. However, as 
evidenced by the issues raised by the recent dismissal of 
certain U.S. Attorneys, there are some cases of alleged 
attorney misconduct that should be reviewed by the OIG--for 
instance because they involve high ranking Department lawyers 
or reflect broad policies or practices of the Department. This 
provision affirms the primary jurisdiction of the OIG over all 
Departmental misconduct, without prejudicing or precluding all 
appropriate referrals to OPR.
    Section 15: Subsection (a) enhances certain personnel 
authorities for Inspectors General, specifying that they, 
rather than the agency head for their respective entities, will 
be considered the ``agency head'' with respect to certain 
personnel matters. It should expedite personnel actions and 
give the Inspectors General greater leeway to structure and 
staff their offices as they consider necessary. Subsection (b) 
authorizes the Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration to help provide physical security for Internal 
Revenue Service employees.
    Section 16: Subsection (a) requires GAO to report on the 
adequacy of oversight mechanisms for the Inspectors General, 
including the practices of the Integrity Committee and the 
handling of complaints against Inspectors General through other 
channels. Subsection (b) requires a report on the 
implementation of the pay provisions of this legislation in 
Section 4.

                   V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    Pursuant to the requirement of paragraph 11(b)(1) of rule 
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate the Committee has 
considered the regulatory impact of this bill. CBO states that 
there are no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as 
defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and no costs on 
State, local, or tribal governments. The legislation contains 
no other regulatory impact.

             VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                                  December 3, 2007.
Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate,Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 2324, the Inspector 
General Reform Act of 2007.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew 
Pickford.
            Sincerely,
                                                   Peter R. Orszag.
    Enclosure.

S. 2324--Inspector General Reform Act of 2007

    Summary: S. 2324 would amend the Inspector General Act of 
1978. In general, the legislation would strengthen the 
independence of inspectors general (IGs) from their respective 
federal agencies. The bill would:
           Require Congressional notification on the 
        removal of an inspector general;
           Expand the reporting requirements for IG 
        budget requests;
           Require IGs to have their own legal counsel;
           Establish an IG Council;
           Provide IGs with some additional 
        investigative, law enforcement, and personnel 
        authorities and require additional reports by IGs and 
        the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
    CBO estimates that implementing S. 2324 would cost $83 
million over the 2008-2012 period, assuming the appropriation 
of the necessary funds. The legislation could affect direct 
spending and revenues, but CBO estimates that any such effects 
would be negligible.
    S. 2324 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 
and would not affect the budget of state, local, or tribal 
governments.
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of S. 2324 is shown in the following table. 
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 800 
(general government) and all other budget functions where 
federal agencies employ inspectors general.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      By fiscal year, in millions of
                                                 dollars--
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                   2008    2009    2010    2011    2012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

Inspector General Authorities:
    Estimated Authorization            6      12      12      12      12
     Level......................
    Estimated Outlays...........       6      11      12      12      12
Council of Inspectors General on
 Integrity and Efficiency:
    Estimated Authorization            5       5       5       5       5
     Level......................
    Estimated Outlays...........       4       5       5       5       5
Pay Provisions:
    Estimated Authorization            1       1       1       1       1
     Level......................
    Estimated Outlays...........       1       1       1       1       1
Other Provisions:
    Estimated Authorization            1       *       0       0       0
     Level......................
    Estimated Outlays...........       1       *       0       0       0
    Total Changes:
        Estimated Authorization       13      18      18      18      18
         Level..................
        Estimated Outlays.......      12      17      18      18     18
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note--* = less than $500,000.

    Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the 
bill will be enacted near the end of calendar year 2007, that 
the necessary funds will be provided for each year, and that 
spending will follow historical patterns for similar 
activities.
    The Inspector General Act of 1978 created independent 
offices headed by inspectors general responsible for conducting 
and supervising audits and investigations; promoting economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness; and preventing and detecting 
fraud and abuse in government programs and operations. There 
are two types of IGs. There are 30 IGs who are appointed by the 
President with Senate confirmation (known as Presidential IGs), 
half of whom serve the 15 cabinet departments. Another 34 IGs 
serve as designated federal entity (DFE) IGs at smaller 
agencies and are appointed (and may be removed) by the head of 
the agency. The Government Accountability Office reported that 
IGs had appropriated budgets of almost $2 billion in 2006 and 
employ over 12,000 employees.

Spending subject to appropriation

    Inspector General Authorities. Under current law, many IG 
activities come under the purview of the agency they oversee. 
The budgets for IG activities are included as part of the 
agency's overall budget request to the Congress, with funding 
determined by the Congress through the appropriations process. 
Personnel matters, including hiring and retirement issues, are 
handled by each IG's agency. IGs at some of the larger agencies 
have independent law enforcement authorities, such as carrying 
firearms and executing warrants for arrests; those at smaller 
agencies are usually deputized by the U.S. Marshall Service to 
perform such functions. In addition, IGs issue semi-annual 
reports on their activities and operations.
    S. 2324 would amend existing law to make all IG offices 
separate agencies with the same powers and duties as the agency 
they monitor and investigate. IGs would be authorized to submit 
specified budget requests to OMB that would include their 
requests, the President's request, training requirements, and 
the funding needs of the IG council. The legislation would also 
require IGs to have their own legal counsel as well as 
additional reporting requirements for IGs and their websites. 
Under S. 2324, IGs would be given additional personnel 
authorities, including more flexible hiring authorities. In 
addition, S. 2324 would provide new law enforcement authorities 
to IGs appointed by agency heads, including the ability to 
carry firearms and execute warrants.
    Based on information from IG offices and the cost of 
similar authorities, CBO estimates that those provisions would 
cost $53 million over the 2008-2012 period, mostly for 
additional personnel costs. CBO expects that few IG offices 
would become wholly independent of the administrative support 
of their agencies, but most would require additional personnel, 
especially the smaller IG offices. This estimate includes the 
cost of additional staff, training for budget and human 
resources functions, website development, as well as additional 
law enforcement training.
    Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. 
Currently, there are two advisory councils for IG functions: 
inspectors general appointed by the President are members of 
the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), 
while DFE IGs are members of the Executive Council on Integrity 
and Efficiency (ECIE). The two councils were created by 
Presidential Executive Orders and usually meet separately. They 
receive no specific appropriation but are funded by the various 
IGs on an ad hoc basis.
    S. 2324 would establish a single council with duties and 
functions similar to the PCIE and ECIE. It would charge the new 
council with identifying, reviewing, and discussing areas of 
weakness and fraud in federal operations and programs; 
developing plans for coordinated governmentwide activities that 
address those problems; developing policies and professional 
programs for IG personnel; and investigating allegations 
against IGs. Based on information from PCIE and ECIE regarding 
their current operations, CBO estimates that implementing this 
provision would cost $25 million over the 2008-2012 period, 
primarily for the cost of professional training for IGs.
    Pay Provisions. Section 4 would amend the Inspector General 
Act of 1978 to raise the annual salary level of 31 IGs 
specified in the legislation from Level IV to Level III of the 
executive schedule plus an additional 3 percent. The bill would 
set a minimum level of pay for IGs of designated federal 
entities at the average level of total compensation received by 
senior level staff members at those entities. In addition, 
section 5 would prohibit payment of cash awards and bonuses to 
IGs.
    Based on data and information provided by the Office of 
Personnel Management, CBO estimates that increasing the pay for 
IGs would cost $4 million over the 2008-2012 period, subject to 
the availability of appropriated funds.
    Other Provisions. The legislation would require GAO to 
prepare two reports within one year on the practices, policies, 
and procedures of the IG council and the pay of IGs. Based on 
the cost of similar reports, CBO estimates that preparing and 
distributing the report would cost about $1 million over the 
2008-2009 period.

Direct spending and revenues

    A few IGs are employed by offices that have direct spending 
authority to pay salaries and expenses. Amendments made by S. 
2324 would have an insignificant impact on spending by those 
offices. Enacting S. 2324 could affect federal revenues from 
civil penalties as a result of allowing IGs appointed by their 
agency heads to investigate and report false claims and recoup 
losses resulting from fraud involving amounts under $150,000. 
Collections of civil penalties are recorded in the budget as 
revenues and deposited in the general fund of the Treasury. 
Based on information from Presidential IGs, CBO estimates that 
any change in revenues that would result from enacting the bill 
would not be significant.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 2324 
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as 
defined in UMRA and would not affect the budget of state, 
local, or tribal governments.
    Previous CBO estimate: On September 27, 2007, CBO 
transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 928, the Improving 
Government Accountability Act, as ordered reported by the House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on August 2, 2007. 
The two pieces of legislation have similar provisions relating 
to IGs, but S. 2324 has additional personnel and reporting 
requirements. The cost estimates reflect those differences.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Spending: Inspectors 
General--Matthew Pickford, Pay and benefits--Barry Blom; Impact 
on state, local, and tribal governments: Elizabeth Cove; Impact 
on the private sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
    Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Assistant Director 
for Budget Analysis.

      VIII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the following changes in existing 
law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows 
(existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black 
brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in 
which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

                           UNITED STATES CODE

                         TITLE 2--THE CONGRESS

CHAPTER 5--LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Sec. 185. Inspector General of the Library of Congress

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (c) * * *
          (2) Removal. The Inspector General may be removed 
        from office by the Librarian of Congress. [The 
        Librarian of Congress shall, promptly upon such 
        removal, communicate in writing the reasons for any 
        such removal to each House of the Congress.] If the 
        Inspector General is removed from office or is 
        transferred to another position or location within the 
        Library of Congress, the Librarian of Congress shall 
        communicate in writing the reasons for any such removal 
        or transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than 
        30 days before the removal or transfer.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                       CHAPTER 29--CAPITOL POLICE


Subchapter I--Organization and Administration

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Sec. 1909. Inspector General for the United States Capitol Police

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (b) * * *
          (3) Removal. [The Inspector General may be removed 
        from office prior to the expiration of his term only by 
        the unanimous vote of all of the voting members of the 
        Capitol Police Board, and the Board shall communicate 
        the reasons for any such removal to the Committee on 
        House Administration, the Senate Committee on Rules and 
        Administration and the Committees on Appropriations of 
        the House of Representatives and of the Senate.] The 
        Inspector General may be removed or transferred from 
        office before the expiration of his term only by the 
        unanimous vote of all voting members of the Capitol 
        Police Board. If an Inspector General is removed from 
        office or is transferred to another position or 
        location within the Capitol Police, the Capitol Police 
        Board shall communicate in writing the reasons for any 
        such removal or transfer to the Committee on Rules and 
        Administration of the Senate, the Committee on House 
        Administration of the House of Representatives, and the 
        Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the 
        House of Representatives, not later than 30 days before 
        the removal or transfer.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             TITLE 5--GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES

                          PART III--EMPLOYEES

                     Subpart D--Pay and Allowances

                   CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS


Subchapter II--Executive Schedules and Pay Rates

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Sec. 5315. Positions at Level IV

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, Department of Education]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, Department of Energy]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, Department of Health and Human 
Services]
    [Inspector General, Department of Agriculture]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, Department of Labor]
    [Inspector General, Department of Transportation]
    [Inspector General, Department of Veterans Affairs]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, Department of Defense]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, Department of State]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, Department of Commerce]
    [Inspector General, Department of the Interior]
    [Inspector General, Department of Justice]
    [Inspector General, Department of the Treasury]
    [Inspector General, Agency for International Development]
    [Inspector General, Environmental Protection Agency]
    [Inspector General, Export-Import Bank]
    [Inspector General, Federal Emergency Management Agency]
    [Inspector General, General Services Administration]
    [Inspector General, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration]
    [Inspector General, Nuclear Regulatory Commission]
    [Inspector General, Office of Personnel Management]
    [Inspector General, Railroad Retirement Board]
    [Inspector General, Small Business Administration]
    [Inspector General, Tennessee Valley Authority]
    [Inspector General, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, Resolution Trust Corporation]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, Social Security Administration]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Inspector General, United States Postal Service]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                APPENDIX


Inspector General Act of 1978

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Sec. 2 Purpose and establishment of Offices of Inspector General; 
                    departments and agencies involved

    In order to create independent and objective units--
          (1) to conduct and supervise audits and 
        investigations relating to the programs and operations 
        of the establishments listed in section [11(2)] 12(2);

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 3. Appointment of Inspector General; supervision; removal; 
                    political activities; appointment of Assistant 
                    Inspector General for Auditing and Assistant 
                    Inspector General for Investigations

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (b) An Inspector General may be removed from office by the 
President. [The President shall communicate the reasons for any 
such removal to both Houses of Congress.] If an Inspector 
General is removed from office or is transferred to another 
position or location within an establishment, the President 
shall communicate in writing the reasons for such removal or 
transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than 30 days 
before the removal or transfer.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (e) The annual rate of basic pay for an Inspector General 
(as defined under section 11(3)) shall be the rate payable for 
level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 
5, United States Code, plus 3 percent.
    (f) An Inspector General (as defined under section 8G(a)(6) 
or 11(3)) may not receive any cash award or cash bonus, 
including any cash award under chapter 45 of title 5, United 
States Code.
    (g) Each Inspector General shall, in accordance with 
applicable laws and regulations governing the civil service, 
obtain legal advice from a counsel either reporting directly to 
the Inspector General or another Inspector General.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 4. Duties and Responsibilities; reports of criminal violations to 
                    Attorney General

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (b) * * *
          (2) For purposes of determining compliance with 
        paragraph (1)(A) with respect to whether internal 
        quality controls are in place and operating and whether 
        established audit standards, policies, and procedures 
        are being followed by Offices of Inspector General of 
        establishments defined under section [11(2)] 12(2), 
        Offices of Inspector General of designated Federal 
        entities defined under section 8F(a)(2),\1\ and any 
        audit office established within a Federal entity 
        defined under section 8F(a)(1),\1\ reviews shall be 
        performed exclusively by an audit entity in the Federal 
        Government, including the General Accounting Office or 
        the Office of Inspector General of each establishment 
        defined under section 11(2), or the Office of Inspector 
        General of each designated Federal entity defined under 
        section 8F(a)(2).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5. Semiannual reports; transmittal to Congress; availability to 
                    public; immediate report on serious or flagrant 
                    problems; disclosure of information; definitions

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (a) * * *
          (6) a listing, subdivided according to subject 
        matter, of each audit report, inspection reports and 
        evaluation reports issued by the Office during the 
        reporting period and for each [audit] report, where 
        applicable, the total dollar value of questioned costs 
        (including a separate category for the dollar value of 
        unsupported costs) and the dollar value of 
        recommendations that funds be put to better use;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (8) statistical tables showing the total number of 
        audit reports, inspection reports and evaluation 
        reports and the total dollar value of questioned costs 
        (including a separate category for the dollar value of 
        unsupported costs), for [audit] reports--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (9) statistical tables showing the total number of 
        audit reports, inspection reports and evaluation 
        reports and the dollar value of recommendations that 
        funds be put to better use by management, for [audit] 
        reports--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (10) a summary of each audit report, inspection 
        reports and evaluation reports issued before the 
        commencement of the reporting period for which no 
        management decision has been made by the end of the 
        reporting period (including the date and title of each 
        such report), an explanation of the reasons such 
        management decision has not been made, and a statement 
        concerning the desired timetable for achieving a 
        management decision on each such report;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (b) * * *
          (2) statistical tables showing the total number of 
        audit reports, inspection reports and evaluation 
        reports and the dollar value of disallowed costs, for 
        [audit] reports--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (3) statistical tables showing the total number of audit 
reports, inspection reports and evaluation reports and the 
dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use 
by management agreed to in a management decision, for [audit] 
reports--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 6. Authority of Inspector General; information and assistance from 
                    Federal agencies; unreasonable refusal; office 
                    space and equipment

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (a) * * *
          (4) to require by [subpena] subpoena the production 
        of all information, documents, reports, answers, 
        records, accounts, papers, and other data in any medium 
        (including electronically stored information, as well 
        as any tangible thing) and documentary evidence 
        necessary in the performance of the functions assigned 
        by this Act, which [subpena] subpoena, in the case of 
        contumacy or refusal to obey, shall be enforceable by 
        order of any appropriate United States district court: 
        Provided, That procedures other than [subpenas] 
        subpoenas shall be used by the Inspector General to 
        obtain documents and information from Federal agencies;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (d) [For purposes of the provision of Title 5, United 
States Code, governing the Senior Executive Service, any 
reference in such provisions to the ``appointing authority'' 
for a member of the Senior Executive Service or for a Senior 
Executive Service position shall, if such member or position is 
or would be within the Office of an Inspector General, be 
deemed to be a reference to such Inspector General.] (1)(A) For 
purposes of applying the provisions of law identified in 
subparagraph (B)-- 
          (i) each Office of Inspector General shall be 
        considered to be a separate agency; and
          (ii) the Inspector General who is the head of an 
        office referred to in clause (i) shall, with respect to 
        such office, have the functions, powers, and duties of 
        an agency head or appointing authority under such 
        provisions.
    (B) This paragraph applies with respect to the following 
provisions of title 5, United States Code:
          (i) Subchapter II of chapter 35.
          (ii) Sections 8335(b), 8336, 8344, 8414, 8468, and 
        8425(b).
          (iii) All provisions relating to the Senior Executive 
        Service (as determined by the Office of Personnel 
        Management), subject to paragraph (2).
    (2) For purposes of applying section 4507(b) of title 5, 
United States Code, paragraph (1)(A)(ii) shall be applied by 
substituting 'the Council of the Inspectors General on 
Integrity and Efficiency (established by section 11 of the 
Inspector General Act) shall' for `the Inspector General who is 
the head of an office referred to in clause (i) shall, with 
respect to such office,
    (e) * * *
          (1) In addition to the authority otherwise provided 
        by this Act, each Inspector General[ appointed under 
        section 3], any Assistant Inspector General for 
        Investigations under such an Inspector General, and any 
        special agent supervised by such an Assistant Inspector 
        General may be authorized by the Attorney General to--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (9) In this subsection the term `Inspector General' 
        means an Inspector General appointed under section 3 or 
        an Inspector General appointed under section 8G.
    (f)(1) For each fiscal year, an Inspector General shall 
transmit a budget estimate and request to the head of 
establishment or designated Federal entity to which the 
Inspector General reports. The budget request shall specify the 
aggregate amount of funds requested for such fiscal year for 
the operations of that Inspector General and shall specify the 
amount requested for all training requirements, including a 
certification from the Inspector General that the amount 
requested satisfies all training needs for the Inspector 
General's office for that fiscal year, and any resources 
necessary to support the Council of the Inspectors General on 
Integrity and Efficiency. Resources necessary to support the 
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency 
shall be specifically identified and justified in the budget 
request.
    (2) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for 
approval, the head of each establishment or designated Federal 
entity shall include--
          (A) an aggregate request for the Inspector General;
          (B) amounts for Inspector General training;
          (C) amounts for support of the Council of the 
        Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and
          (D) any comments of the affected Inspector General 
        with respect to the proposal.
    (3) The President shall include in each budget of the 
United States Government submitted to Congress--
          (A) a separate statement of the budget estimate 
        prepared in accordance with paragraph (1);
          (B) the amount requested by the President for each 
        Inspector General;
          (C) the amount requested by the President for 
        training of Inspectors General;
          (D)the amount requested by the President for support 
        for the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity 
        and Efficiency; and
          (E) any comments of the affected Inspector General 
        with respect to the proposal, including whether the 
        budget request submitted by the head of the 
        establishment or designated Federal entity would 
        substantially inhibit the Inspector General from 
        performing the duties of the office.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 8D. Special provisions concerning the Department of Treasury

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (k) * * *
          (1) * * *
                  (C) shall be responsible for protecting the 
                Internal Revenue Service against external 
                attempts to corrupt or threaten employees of 
                the Internal Revenue Service, but shall not be 
                responsible for the conducting of background 
                checks[ and the providing of physical 
                security]; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 8E. Special provisions concerning the Department of Justice

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (b) In carrying out the duties and responsibilities 
specified in this Act, the Inspector General of the Department 
of Justice--
          (1) may initiate, conduct and supervise such audits 
        and investigations in the Department of Justice as the 
        Inspector General considers appropriate;
          (2) except as specified in subsection (a)[ and 
        paragraph (3)], may investigate allegations of criminal 
        wrongdoing or administrative misconduct by an employee 
        of the Department of Justice, or may, in the discretion 
        of the Inspector General, refer such allegations to the 
        Office of Professional Responsibility or the internal 
        affairs office of the appropriate component of the 
        Department of Justice;
          [(3) shall refer to the Counsel, Office of 
        Professional Responsibility of the Department of 
        Justice, allegations of misconduct involving Department 
        attorneys, investigators, or law enforcement personnel, 
        where the allegations relate to the exercise of the 
        authority of an attorney to investigate, litigate, or 
        provide legal advice, except that no such referral 
        shall be made if the attorney is employed in the Office 
        of Professional Responsibility;]
          [(4)](3) may investigate allegations of criminal 
        wrongdoing or administrative misconduct by a person who 
        is the head of any agency or component of the 
        Department of Justice; and
          [(5)](4) shall forward the results of any 
        investigation conducted under paragraph [(4)](3), along 
        with any appropriate recommendation for disciplinary 
        action, to the Attorney General.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (d) The Attorney General shall ensure by regulation that 
any component of the Department of Justice receiving a 
nonfrivolous allegation of criminal wrongdoing or 
administrative misconduct by an employee of the Department of 
Justice[, except with respect to allegations described in 
subsection (b)(3),] shall report that information to the 
Inspector General.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 8G. Requirements for Federal entities and designated Federal 
                    entities

    (a) Notwithstanding section [11] 12 of this Act, as used in 
this section--
          (1) * * *
                  (A) an establishment (as defined under 
                section [11(2)] 12(2) of this Act) or part of 
                an establishment;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (c) Except as provided under subsection (f) of this 
section, the Inspector General shall be appointed by the head 
of the designated Federal entity in accordance with the 
applicable laws and regulations governing appointments within 
the designated Federal entity. Each Inspector General shall be 
appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on 
the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, 
auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public 
administration, or investigations.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (e) If an Inspector General is removed from office or is 
transferred to another position or location within a designated 
Federal entity, the head of the designated Federal entity 
[shall promptly communicate in writing the reasons for any such 
removal or transfer to both Houses of the Congress] shall 
communicate in writing the reason for any such removal or 
transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than 30 days 
before the removal or transfer.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (g) * * *
          (4) Each Inspector General shall, in accordance with 
        applicable laws and regulations governing appointments 
        within the designated Federal entity, appoint a Counsel 
        to the Inspector General who shall report to the 
        Inspector General or obtain the services of a counsel 
        appointed by and directly reporting to another 
        Inspector General or the Council of the Inspectors 
        General on Integrity and Efficiency on a reimbursable 
        basis.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 8L. Information on websites of Offices of Inspectors General

    ``(a) ``Direct Links to Inspectors General Offices.--
          ``(1) In general.--Each agency shall establish and 
        maintain on the homepage of the website of that agency, 
        a direct link to the website of the Office of the 
        Inspector General of that agency.
          ``(2) Accessibility.--The direct link under paragraph 
        (1) shall be obvious and facilitate accessibility to 
        the website of the Office of the Inspector General.
    ``(b) Requirements for Inspectors General Websites.--
          ``(1) Posting of reports and audits.--The Inspector 
        General of each agency shall--
                  ``(A) in accordance with section 552a of 
                title 5, United States Code (commonly referred 
                to as the Privacy Act), not later than 3 
                working days after any report or audit (or 
                portion of any report or audit), that is 
                subject to release under section 552 of that 
                title (commonly referred to as the Freedom of 
                Information Act), is made publicly available, 
                post that report or audit (or portion of that 
                report or audit) on the website of the Office 
                of the Inspector General; and
                  ``(B) ensure that any posted report or audit 
                (or portion of that report or audit) described 
                under subparagraph (A)--
                          ``(i) is easily accessible from a 
                        direct link on the homepage of the 
                        website of the Office of the Inspector 
                        General;
                          ``(ii) includes a summary of the 
                        findings of the Inspector General; 
                        and--
                          ``(iii) is in a format that 
                                  ``(I) is searchable and 
                                downloadable; and
                                  ``(II) facilitates printing 
                                by individuals of the public 
                                accessing the website.
          ``(2) Reporting of fraud, waste, and abuse.--
                  ``(A) In general.--The Inspector General of 
                each agency shall establish and maintain a 
                direct link on the homepage of the website of 
                the Office of the Inspector General for 
                individuals to report fraud, waste, and abuse. 
                Individuals reporting fraud, waste, or abuse 
                using the direct link established under this 
                paragraph shall not be required to provide 
                personally identifying information relating to 
                that individual.
                  ``(B) Anonymity.--The Inspector General of 
                each agency shall not disclose the identity of 
                any individual making a report under this 
                paragraph without the consent of the individual 
                unless the Inspector General determines that 
                such a disclosure is unavoidable during the 
                course of the investigation.''.
    (b) Implementation.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of enactment of this Act, the head of each agency and the 
Inspector General of each agency shall implement the amendment 
made by this section.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 11. Establishment of the Council of the Inspector General on 
                    integrity and efficiency

    ``(a) Establishment and Mission.--
          ``(1) Establishment.--There is established as an 
        independent entity within the executive branch the 
        Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
        Efficiency (in this section referred to as the 
        'Council').
          (2) Mission.--The mission of the Council shall be 
        to--
                  ``(A) address integrity, economy, and 
                effectiveness issues that transcend individual 
                Government agencies; and
                  ``(B) increase the professionalism and 
                effectiveness of personnel by developing 
                policies, standards, and approaches to aid in 
                the establishment of a well-trained and highly 
                skilled workforce in the offices of the 
                Inspectors General.
    ``(b) Membership.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Council shall consist of the 
        following members:
                  ``(A) All Inspectors General whose offices 
                are established under--
                          ``(i) section 2; or
                          ``(ii) section 8G.
                  ``(B) The Inspectors General of the Office of 
                the Director of National Intelligence and the 
                Central Intelligence Agency.
                  ``(C) The Controller of the Office of Federal 
                Financial Management.
                  ``(D) A senior level official of the Federal 
                Bureau of Investigation designated by the 
                Director of the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation.
                  ``(E) The Director of the Office of 
                Government Ethics.
                  ``(F) The Special Counsel of the Office of 
                Special Counsel.
                  ``(G) The Deputy Director of the Office of 
                Personnel Management.
                  ``(H) The Deputy Director for Management of 
                the Office of Management and Budget.
                  ``(I) The Office of Inspectors General of the 
                Library of Congress, Capitol Police, and the 
                Government Printing Office.
                  ``(J) Any other members designated by the 
                President.
          ``(2) Chairperson and executive chairperson.--
                  ``(A) Executive chairperson.--The Deputy 
                Director for Management of the Office of 
                Management and Budget shall be the Executive 
                Chairperson of the Council.
                  ``(B) Chairperson.--The Council shall elect 1 
                of the Inspectors General referred to in 
                paragraph (1)(A) or (B) to act as Chairperson 
                of the Council. The term of office of the 
                Chairperson shall be 2 years.
          ``(3) Functions of chairperson and executive 
        chairperson.--
                  ``(A) Executive chairperson.--The Executive 
                Chairperson shall--
                          ``(i) preside over meetings of the 
                        Council;
                          ``(ii) provide to the heads of 
                        agencies and entities represented on 
                        the Council summary reports of the 
                        activities of the Council; and
                          ``(iii) provide to the Council such 
                        information relating to the agencies 
                        and entities represented on the Council 
                        as assists the Council in performing 
                        its functions.
                  ``(B) Chairperson.--The Chairperson shall--
                          ``(i) convene meetings of the 
                        Council--
                                  ``(I) at least 6 times each 
                                year;
                                  ``(II) monthly to the extent 
                                possible; and
                                  ``(III) more frequently at 
                                the discretion of the 
                                Chairperson;
                          ``(ii) exercise the functions and 
                        duties of the Council under subsection 
                        (c);
                          ``(iii) appoint a Vice Chairperson to 
                        assist in carrying out the functions of 
                        the Council and act in the absence of 
                        the Chairperson, from a category of 
                        Inspectors General described in 
                        subparagraph (A)(i), (A)(ii), or (B) of 
                        paragraph (1), other than the category 
                        from which the Chairperson was elected;
                          ``(iv) make such payments from funds 
                        otherwise available to the Council as 
                        may be necessary to carry out the 
                        functions of the Council;
                          ``(v) select, appoint, and employ 
                        personnel as needed to carry out the 
                        functions of the Council subject to the 
                        availability of appropriations and the 
                        provisions of title 5, United States 
                        Code, governing appointments in the 
                        competitive service, and the provisions 
                        of chapter 51 and subchapter III of 
                        chapter 53 of such title, relating to 
                        classification and General Schedule pay 
                        rates;
                          ``(vi) to the extent and in such 
                        amounts as may be provided in advance 
                        by appropriations Acts, enter into 
                        contracts and other arrangements with 
                        public agencies and private persons to 
                        carry out the functions and duties of 
                        the Council;
                          ``(vii) establish, in consultation 
                        with the members of the Council, such 
                        committees as determined by the 
                        Chairperson to be necessary and 
                        appropriate for the efficient conduct 
                        of Council functions; and
                          ``(viii) prepare and transmit a 
                        report annually on behalf of the 
                        Council to the President on the 
                        activities of the Council.
    ``(c) Functions and Duties of Council.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Council shall--
                  ``(A) continually identify, review, and 
                discuss areas of weakness and vulnerability in 
                Federal programs and operations with respect to 
                fraud, waste, and abuse;
                  ``(B) develop plans for coordinated, 
                governmentwide activities that address these 
                problems and promote economy and efficiency in 
                Federal programs and operations, including 
                interagency and interentity audit, 
                investigation, inspection, and evaluation 
                programs and projects to deal efficiently and 
                effectively with those problems concerning 
                fraud and waste that exceed the capability or 
                jurisdiction of an individual agency or entity;
                  ``(C) develop policies that will aid in the 
                maintenance of a corps of well-trained and 
                highly skilled Office of Inspector General 
                personnel;
                  ``(D) maintain an Internet website and other 
                electronic systems for the benefit of all 
                Inspectors General, as the Council determines 
                are necessary or desirable;
                  ``(E) maintain 1 or more academies as the 
                Council considers desirable for the 
                professional training of auditors, 
                investigators, inspectors, evaluators, and 
                other personnel of the various offices of 
                Inspector General;
                  ``(F) submit recommendations of individuals 
                to the appropriate appointing authority for any 
                appointment to an office of Inspector General 
                described under subsection (b)(1)(A) or (B);
                  ``(G) make such reports to Congress as the 
                Chairperson determines are necessary or 
                appropriate; and
                  ``(H) perform other duties within the 
                authority and jurisdiction of the Council, as 
                appropriate.
          ``(2) Adherence and participation by members.--To the 
        extent permitted under law, and to the extent not 
        inconsistent with standards established by the 
        Comptroller General of the United States for audits of 
        Federal establishments, organizations, programs, 
        activities, and functions, each member of the Council 
        shall adhere to professional standards developed by the 
        Council and participate in the plans, programs, and 
        projects of the Council, as appropriate.
          ``(3) Additional administrative authorities.--
                  ``(A) Interagency funding.--Notwithstanding 
                section 1532 of title 31, United States Code, 
                or any other provision of law prohibiting the 
                interagency funding of activities described 
                under subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause 
                (i), in the performance of the 
                responsibilities, authorities, and duties of 
                the Council--
                          ``(i) the Executive Chairperson may 
                        authorize the use of interagency 
                        funding for--
                                  ``(I) Governmentwide training 
                                of employees of the Offices of 
                                the Inspectors General;
                                  ``(II) the functions of the 
                                Integrity Committee of the 
                                Council; and
                                  ``(III) any other authorized 
                                purpose determined by the 
                                Council; and
                          ``(ii) upon the authorization of the 
                        Executive Chairperson, any department, 
                        agency, or entity of the executive 
                        branch which has a member on the 
                        Council shall fund or participate in 
                        the funding of such activities.
                  ``(B) Superseding provisions.--No provision 
                of law enacted after the date of enactment of 
                this subsection shall be construed to limit or 
                supersede the authority under paragraph (1), 
                unless such provision makes specific reference 
                to the authority in that paragraph.
          ``(4) Existing authorities and responsibilities.--The 
        establishment and operation of the Council shall not 
        affect--
                  ``(A) the role of the Department of Justice 
                in law enforcement and litigation;
                  ``(B) the authority or responsibilities of 
                any Government agency or entity; and
                  ``(C) the authority or responsibilities of 
                individual members of the Council.
    ``(d) Integrity Committee.--
          ``(1) Establishment.--The Council shall have an 
        Integrity Committee, which shall receive, review, and 
        refer for investigation allegations of wrongdoing that 
        are made against Inspectors General and staff members 
        of the various Offices of Inspector General described 
        under paragraph (4)(C).
          ``(2) Membership.--The Integrity Committee shall 
        consist of the following members:
                  ``(A) The official of the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation serving on the Council, who shall 
                serve as Chairperson of the Integrity 
                Committee.
                  ``(B) Three or more Inspectors General 
                described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of 
                subsection (b)(1) appointed by the Chairperson 
                of the Council, representing both 
                establishments and designated Federal entities 
                (as that term is defined in section 8G(a)).
                  ``(C) The Special Counsel of the Office of 
                Special Counsel.
                  ``(D) The Director of the Office of 
                Government Ethics.
          ``(3) Legal advisor.--The Chief of the Public 
        Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the 
        Department of Justice, or his designee, shall serve as 
        a legal advisor to the Integrity Committee.
          ``(4) Referral of allegations.--
                  ``(A) Requirement.--An Inspector General 
                shall refer to the Integrity Committee any 
                allegation of wrongdoing against a staff member 
                of the office of that Inspector General, if--
                          ``(i) review of the substance of the 
                        allegation cannot be assigned to an 
                        agency of the executive branch with 
                        appropriate jurisdiction over the 
                        matter; and
                          ``(ii) the Inspector General 
                        determines that--
                                  ``(I) an objective internal 
                                investigation of the allegation 
                                is not feasible; or
                                  ``(II) an internal 
                                investigation of the allegation 
                                may appear not to be objective.
                  ``(B) Definition.--In this paragraph the term 
                `staff member' means--
                          ``(i) any employee of an Office of 
                        Inspector General who reports directly 
                        to an Inspector General; or
                          ``(ii) who is designated by an 
                        Inspector General under subparagraph 
                        (C).
                  ``(C) Designation of staff members.--Each 
                Inspector General shall annually submit to the 
                Chairperson of the Integrity Committee a 
                designation of positions whose holders are 
                staff members for purposes of subparagraph (B).
          ``(5) Review of allegations.--The Integrity Committee 
        shall--
                  ``(A) review all allegations of wrongdoing 
                the Integrity Committee receives against an 
                Inspector General, or against a staff member of 
                an Office of Inspector General described under 
                paragraph (4)(C);
                  ``(B) refer any allegation of wrongdoing to 
                the agency of the executive branch with 
                appropriate jurisdiction over the matter; and
                  ``(C) refer to the Chairperson of the 
                Integrity Committee any allegation of 
                wrongdoing determined by the Integrity 
                Committee under subparagraph (A) to be 
                potentially meritorious that cannot be referred 
                to an agency under subparagraph (B).
          ``(6) Authority to investigate allegations.--
                  ``(A) Requirement.--The Chairperson of the 
                Integrity Committee shall cause a thorough and 
                timely investigation of each allegation 
                referred under paragraph (5)(C) to be conducted 
                in accordance with this paragraph.
                  ``(B) Resources.--At the request of the 
                Chairperson of the Integrity Committee, the 
                head of each agency or entity represented on 
                the Council--
                          ``(i) may provide resources necessary 
                        to the Integrity Committee; and
                          ``(ii) may detail employees from that 
                        agency or entity to the Integrity 
                        Committee, subject to the control and 
                        direction of the Chairperson, to 
                        conduct an investigation under this 
                        subsection.
          ``(7) Procedures for investigations.--
                  ``(A) Standards applicable.--Investigations 
                initiated under this subsection shall be 
                conducted in accordance with the most current 
                Quality Standards for Investigations issued by 
                the Council or by its predecessors (the 
                President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency 
                and the Executive Council on Integrity and 
                Efficiency).
                  ``(B) Additional policies and procedures.--
                          ``(i) Establishment.--The Integrity 
                        Committee, in conjunction with the 
                        Chairperson of the Council, shall 
                        establish additional policies and 
                        procedures necessary to ensure fairness 
                        and consistency in--
                                  ``(I) determining whether to 
                                initiate an investigation;
                                  ``(II) conducting 
                                investigations;
                                  ``(III) reporting the results 
                                of an investigation; and
                                  ``(IV) providing the person 
                                who is the subject of an 
                                investigation with an 
                                opportunity to respond to any 
                                Integrity Committee report.
                          ``(ii) Submission to congress.--The 
                        Council shall submit a copy of the 
                        policies and procedures established 
                        under clause (i) to the congressional 
                        committees of jurisdiction.
                  ``(C) Reports.--
                          ``(i) Potentially meritorious 
                        allegations.--For allegations described 
                        under paragraph (5)(C), the Chairperson 
                        of the Integrity Committee shall make a 
                        report containing the results of the 
                        investigation of the Chairperson and 
                        shall provide such report to members of 
                        the Integrity Committee.
                          ``(ii) Allegations of wrongdoing.--
                        For allegations referred to an agency 
                        under paragraph (5)(B), the head of 
                        that agency shall make a report 
                        containing the results of the 
                        investigation and shall provide such 
                        report to members of the Integrity 
                        Committee.
          ``(8) Assessment and final disposition.--
                  ``(A) In general.--With respect to any report 
                received under paragraph (7)(C), the Integrity 
                Committee shall--
                          ``(i) assess the report;
                          ``(ii) forward the report, with the 
                        recommendations of the Integrity 
                        Committee, including those on 
                        disciplinary action, within 30 days (to 
                        the maximum extent practicable) after 
                        the completion of the investigation, to 
                        the Executive Chairperson of the 
                        Council and to the President (in the 
                        case of a report relating to an 
                        Inspector General of an establishment 
                        or any employee of that Inspector 
                        General) or the head of a designated 
                        Federal entity (in the case of a report 
                        relating to an Inspector General of 
                        such an entity or any employee of that 
                        Inspector General) for resolution; and
                          ``(iii) submit to the congressional 
                        committees of jurisdiction an executive 
                        summary of such report and 
                        recommendations within 30 days after 
                        the submission of such report to the 
                        Executive Chairperson under clause 
                        (ii).
                  ``(B) Disposition.--The Executive Chairperson 
                of the Council shall report to the Integrity 
                Committee the final disposition of the matter, 
                including what action was taken by the 
                President or agency head.
          ``(9) Annual report.--The Council shall submit to 
        Congress and the President by December 31 of each year 
        a report on the activities of the Integrity Committee 
        during the preceding fiscal year, which shall include 
        the following:
                  ``(A) The number of allegations received.
                  ``(B) The number of allegations referred to 
                other agencies, including the number of 
                allegations referred for criminal 
                investigation.
                  ``(C) The number of allegations referred to 
                the Chairperson of the Integrity Committee for 
                investigation.
                  ``(D) The number of allegations closed 
                without referral.
                  ``(E) The date each allegation was received 
                and the date each allegation was finally 
                disposed of.
                  ``(F) In the case of allegations referred to 
                the Chairperson of the Integrity Committee, a 
                summary of the status of the investigation of 
                the allegations and, in the case of 
                investigations completed during the preceding 
                fiscal year, a summary of the findings of the 
                investigations.
                  ``(G) Other matters that the Council 
                considers appropriate.
          ``(10) Requests for more information.--With respect 
        to paragraphs (8) and (9), the Council shall provide 
        more detailed information about specific allegations 
        upon request from any of the following:
                  ``(A) The chairperson or ranking member of 
                the Committee on Homeland Security and 
                Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
                  ``(B) The chairperson or ranking member of 
                the Committee on Oversight and Government 
                Reform of the House of Representatives.
                  ``(C) The chairperson or ranking member of 
                the congressional committees of jurisdiction.
          ``(11) No right or benefit.--This subsection is not 
        intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or 
        procedural, enforceable at law by a person against the 
        United States, its agencies, its officers, or any 
        person.''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. [11] 12. Definitions

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. [12] 13. Effective date

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                      TITLE 31--MONEY AND FINANCE

                    Subtitle II--The Budget Process

CHAPTER 11--THE BUDGET AND FISCAL, BUDGET, AND PROGRAM INFORMATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Sec. 1105. Budget contents and submission to Congress

    (a) * * *
          (33) [a separate appropriation account for 
        appropriations for the Inspectors General Criminal 
        Investigator Academy and the Inspectors General 
        Forensic Laboratory of the Department of the Treasury.] 
        a separate appropriation account for appropriations for 
        the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
        Efficiency, and, included in that account, a separate 
        statement of the aggregate amount of appropriations 
        requested for each academy maintained by the Council of 
        the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   Subtitle III--Financial Management

  CHAPTER 38--ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FOR FALSE CLAIMS AND STATEMENTS


Sec. 3801. Definitions

    (a) * * *
          (1) * * *
                  (D) the United States Postal Service; [and]
                  (E) National Science Foundation; and
                  (F) a designated Federal entity (as such term 
                is defined under section 8G(a)(2) of the 
                Inspector General Act of 1978).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                TITLE 42--THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE

              CHAPTER 129--NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE


    Subchapter I--National and Community Service State Grant Program


DIVISION G--CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 12651e. Officers

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (b) * * *
          [(3) Compensation The Inspector General shall be 
        compensated at the rate provided for level IV of the 
        Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                TITLE 44--PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER--GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Sec. 3902. Appointment of Inspector General; supervision; removal

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (b) The Inspector General may be removed from office by the 
Public Printer. [The Public Printer shall, promptly upon such 
removal, communicate in writing the reasons for any such 
removal to each House of the Congress.] If the Inspector 
General is removed from office or is transferred to another 
position or location within the Government Printing Office, the 
Public Printer shall communicate in writing the reasons for any 
such removal or transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later 
than 30 days before the removal or transfer.