S. Rept. 110-444 - 110th Congress (2007-2008)
August 01, 2008, As Reported by the Finance Committee

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Senate Report 110-444 - APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003




[Senate Report 110-444]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]



                                                       Calendar No. 895
110th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session                                                     110-444

======================================================================



 
 APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE 
                   FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

                                _______
                                

                 August 1, 2008.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Baucus, from the Committee on Finance, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                      [To accompany S.J. Res. 41]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint 
resolution (S.J. Res. 41) approving the renewal of import 
restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 
of 2003, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
without amendment and recommends that the joint resolution do 
pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
 I. Report and Other Matters of the Committee.........................2
        A. Report of the Committee on Finance....................     2
        B. Background............................................     2
            1. The Government of Burma...........................     2
            2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.....     2
            3. Expedited Procedures for Renewing the Import 
                Restrictions Contained in the Burmese Freedom and 
                Democracy Act of 2003............................     3
            4. Committee Consideration of S.J. Res. 41...........     4
            5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the 
                Trade Sanctions Against Burma....................     4
            6. Additional International Sanctions Against Burma..     9
II. Budgetary Impact of the Joint Resolution.........................10
III.Regulatory Impact of the Joint Resolution and Other Matters......11

IV. Changes in Existing Law..........................................12

              I. REPORT AND OTHER MATTERS OF THE COMMITTEE


                 A. Report of the Committee on Finance

    The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint 
resolution (S.J. Res. 41) approving the renewal of import 
restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 
of 2003, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
without amendment and recommends that the resolution do pass.

                             B. Background


1. The Government of Burma

    Burma is governed by the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC), which is a military junta that took power in 
September 1988. Since taking power, the junta has violently 
suppressed pro-democracy movements. International human rights 
organizations and the U.S. Department of State have reported a 
pattern of SPDC policies that include the suppression of 
political and civil liberties, jailing of political prisoners, 
widespread physical abuses, forced relocation of civilians, 
conscription of civilians--including children--into military 
services, and conscription of thousands of civilians for work 
on economic projects.
    In recent years, the SPDC has continued to suppress 
political opponents. On May 30, 2003, a pro-government group of 
several hundred people assaulted the opposition National League 
for Democracy (NLD) leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her 
supporters near Mandalay, Burma's second-largest city. The 
attackers were members of the United Solidarity Development 
Association (USDA), a mass organization affiliated with the 
SDPC. Some NLD supporters were killed, and other NLD leaders 
were taken into custody. Arrests and disappearances of 
political activists continue. The military regime continues to 
be hostile to all forms of political opposition. In May 2008, 
the Burmese Government extended the house arrest of Daw Aung 
San Suu Kyi for another year.
    Burma's human rights conditions further deteriorated in 
2007 and 2008. In September 2007, the Burmese Government 
forcibly restrained Buddhist monks who were demonstrating 
against poor economic conditions in Burma. In May 2008, Cyclone 
Nargis struck Burma, and left thousands of Burmese people dead, 
injured, or homeless. After the cyclone, the government refused 
to allow the speedy entry of international humanitarian aid.

2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003

    On June 4, 2003, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 
2003 (the Act) was introduced in the U.S. House of 
Representatives (H.R. 2330) and the U.S. Senate (S. 1182) in 
response to the May 30 attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. A 
revised version of the legislation was introduced in the Senate 
(S. 1215) on June 9, 2003. That latter version, S. 1215, passed 
the Senate with an amendment on June 11, 2003, by a recorded 
vote of 97-1. In the House, H.R. 2330 passed with an amendment 
on July 15, 2003, by a recorded vote of 418-2, 1 Present. The 
Senate then passed the House-passed version of H.R. 2330 
without amendment on July 16, 2003, by a recorded vote of 94-1. 
The legislation was presented to the President on July 22, 
2003, and signed into law by the President on July 28, 2003 
(Pub. L. 108-61).
    The Act bans the importation of any article that is a 
product of Burma. This ban affects mainly imports of Burmese 
textiles and garments. The Act allows the President to lift 
these import restrictions if he certifies to Congress that (1) 
the SPDC has made substantial progress to end human rights 
violations, including rapes, and no longer systematically 
violates workers' rights, including forced and child labor, and 
conscription of child-soldiers; (2) the SPDC has made 
substantial progress toward implementing a democratic 
government, including by releasing political prisoners, 
allowing freedom of speech, press, association, and religion, 
and reached agreement with the NLD for a civilian government 
chosen through democratic elections; and (3) Burma has not been 
designated as a country that has failed to abide by its 
obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and 
take other effective counternarcotics measures. Under the Act, 
the import ban must be renewed on a yearly basis. In addition 
to the import ban, the Act freezes Burmese assets in the United 
States and requires the United States to oppose aid to Burma by 
international financial institutions.
    As originally enacted, section 9(a)(1) of the Act limited 
the imposition of import restrictions to a maximum of 3 years. 
In 2006, a joint resolution was introduced to permit the 
renewal of import restrictions for a maximum of 6 years; 
specifically, H.J. Res. 86 was introduced in the House on May 
19, 2006, and S.J. Res. 38 was introduced in the Senate on May 
26, 2006. The House passed H.J. Res. 86 on July 11, 2006, by 
voice vote. H.J. Res. 86 was placed on the Senate calendar on 
July 26, 2006, and passed without amendment by voice vote. The 
President signed the joint resolution on August 1, 2006 (Pub. 
L. 109-251).
    Pursuant to section 9(b) of the Act, the import ban will 
expire after 1 year unless a new joint resolution (renewal 
resolution) approving a 1-year renewal of the import ban is 
enacted into law prior to the anniversary of the date of 
enactment of the Act. The current import ban, which expired on 
July 28, 2008, was signed into law by the President on August 
1, 2007 (H.J. Res. 44; Pub. L. 110-52).
    S.J. Res. 41 renews the import ban for another year, in 
accordance with the Act. A similar resolution (H.J. Res. 93), 
which included budgetary offsets, was passed by the House on 
July 23, 2008, by voice vote. H.J. Res. 93 was placed on the 
Senate Calendar on July 24, 2008, and passed by Unanimous 
Consent. The President signed H.J. Res. 93 on July 29, 2008 
(Pub. L. No. 110-287), thus extending the import ban until July 
28, 2009.

3. Expedited procedures for renewing the import restrictions contained 
        in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003

    Section 9(c)(2)(B) of the Act applies the expedited 
procedures set forth in section 152 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) 
of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (b), (c), (d), (e), 
and (f)), to Committee and floor consideration of a joint 
resolution to renew the import ban for another year.
    Pursuant to those procedures, a renewal resolution 
introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee. 
The Committee has 30 days to consider and report the 
resolution, not counting any day excluded under section 154(b) 
of the Trade Act of 1974. Section 154(b) excludes Saturdays and 
Sundays when either House is not in session, any day during 
which either House is adjourned for more than 3 days, and any 
day while Congress is adjourned sine die. If the Committee does 
not report the resolution within that period, it is in order 
for any Member favoring the resolution to move to discharge the 
Committee from further consideration of the resolution. A 
renewal resolution is not amendable.
    In this case, S.J. Res. 41 was introduced in the Senate, 
and the Committee reported the Senate measure, before receipt 
of H.J. Res. 93 from the House. Thus, upon receipt of the 
House-passed measure the House resolution was placed on the 
Senate calendar, and the Committee continued to report the 
Senate measure. After the Committee reported the Senate 
measure, the vote on passage in the Senate was on the House-
passed measure.

4. Committee consideration of S.J. Res. 41

    The Committee considered S.J. Res. 41 in open executive 
session on July 23, 2008. The Committee voted unanimously, and 
without amendment, to favorably report S.J. Res. 41.
    With a quorum present, the Committee approved S.J. Res. 41 
by unanimous voice vote.
    The Chairman reported the resolution to the Senate on July 
23, 2008.

5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the Trade Sanctions 
        Against Burma

    On May 28, 2008, the U.S. Department of State submitted to 
Congress a report regarding the trade sanctions against Burma, 
as required by section 8(b)(3) of the Burmese Freedom and 
Democracy Act of 2003. At the request of the Chairman, that 
report was made a part of the record of the Committee's 
consideration of S.J. Res. 41. The State Department report is 
reprinted below:

                                  U.S. Department of State,
                                      Washington, DC, May 23, 2008.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The enclosed report reviews measures to 
promote human rights and democracy in Burma and assesses the 
effectiveness of the trade provisions in the Burmese Freedom 
and Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-61) to improve conditions 
in Burma and advance U.S. policy objectives. This report also 
discusses the importance of maintaining the import ban 
contained in the Act.
    We hope this information is useful to you. Please do not 
hesitate to contact us if we may be of further assistance in 
this matter.
            Sincerely,
                                        Jeffrey T. Bergner,
                          Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
    Enclosures:
      As stated.

  Report on U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Burma May 2007-April 2008


                        INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

    In view of the impending expiration of the import ban 
contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, 
P.L. 108-61 (the BFDA), as amended, this report reviews 
bilateral and multilateral measures to promote human rights and 
democracy in Burma and assesses the effectiveness of the Act's 
trade provisions relative to the improvement of conditions in 
Burma and the furtherance of U.S. policy objectives.
    During this reporting period the United States 
significantly tightened financial sanctions targeting the 
leaders and supporters of the Burmese regime. U.S. economic 
sanctions have increased pressure on the Burmese junta and its 
supporters, as restrictions on their ability to access the U.S. 
financial system have made it more difficult for them to do 
business in U.S. dollars. The European Union, Australia, and 
Canada also expanded targeted sanctions on the Burmese regime 
as well. Despite these measures, expanding trade with countries 
in the region and growing income from the exploration and 
exploitation of Burma's natural gas reserves provided the 
regime the economic means to maintain its grip on power and to 
continue to impose its self-styled ``roadmap to democracy,'' a 
process designed to lend a veneer of democratic legitimacy to 
the perpetuation of authoritarian military rule. In light of 
the regime's crackdown on peaceful protestors in August and 
September 2007, and its continued imposition of its 
illegitimate constitutional process on the Burmese people, the 
State Department supports a renewal resolution to maintain the 
import ban.
    At the end of this reporting period, Tropical Cyclone 
Nargis struck Burma. Following this natural disaster, the 
Treasury Department issued a general license authorizing the 
exportation or reexportation of financial services to Burma in 
support of not-for-profit humanitarian or religious activities.

                  BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MEASURES

    During the reporting period, the United States intensified 
its efforts to promote human rights and democracy in Burma 
through diplomatic engagement with key stakeholders in 
Southeast Asia and beyond, by supporting U.N. Security Council 
action on Burma, by tightening targeted sanctions on the 
Burmese leadership and its supporters, and through support to 
the Burmese democracy movement. Following the Burmese regime's 
crackdown on peaceful protestors in August and September 2007, 
the United States used the increased attention on Burma to push 
for international pressure on the Burmese regime to begin a 
dialogue with representatives of democratic and ethnic minority 
groups on a transition to democracy. Senior U.S. officials 
encouraged their counterparts in the EU, China, India, Japan, 
South Korea, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and the U.N. Security Council, to press the 
regime to take concrete and credible actions toward the 
democratic transition it claims to want. The U.S. Embassy in 
Rangoon remained in regular contact with representatives of 
civil society, pro-democracy activists, and ethnic minority 
groups, as well as urging Burmese officials at every 
opportunity to begin an inclusive political dialogue, release 
political prisoners, and respect human rights. The State 
Department regularly issued statements highlighting the 
regime's human rights abuses and calling for a genuine 
dialogue.
    The United States worked closely with like-minded members 
of the U.N. Security Council to address the threats posed to 
regional security by the situation in Burma. On October 11, 
2007, the Security Council unanimously adopted a Presidential 
Statement that expressed support for the Secretary General's 
``good offices'' mission, deplored the regime's use of violence 
against peaceful demonstrators, and highlighted the importance 
of the release of political prisoners and the creation of a 
dialogue among all relevant parties. The Security Council 
received regular briefings from U.N. Special Advisor on Burma, 
Ibrahim Gambari.
    On September 25, 2007, President Bush announced that the 
United States would tighten U.S. sanctions against Burma, and 
the Treasury Department subsequently imposed financial 
sanctions on 14 regime leaders. On October 18, 2007, President 
Bush signed Executive Order 13448 authorizing targeted 
sanctions on, amongothers, the financial and material 
supporters of the regime, and the Treasury Department blocked the 
property and interests in property of senior regime leaders. To date, 
the United States has sanctioned 25 senior regime officials, as well as 
five financial supporters of the regime and 27 of their companies; 
several other individuals, including spouses and dependent children of 
regime officials and individuals involved in the financial networks of 
regime supporters, have also been sanctioned. On April 30, 2008, 
President Bush signed a new Executive Order blocking property and 
interests in property of three Burmese entities and authorizing 
additional designations of, among others, persons determined to be 
owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly, the Government of Burma 
or an official or officials of the Government of Burma.
    The Treasury Department recently issued a general license 
authorizing the exportation or reexportation of financial 
services to Burma in support of not-for-profit humanitarian or 
religious activities in Burma by any organization or 
individual, for a period of 120 days, with the exceptions of 
the Government of Burma and persons blocked under the Burma 
sanctions program. In addition, Treasury issued a second 
general license authorizing unlimited noncommercial, personal 
remittances to family and friends in Burma. These licenses 
allow transfers to be made utilizing the services of blocked 
financial institutions in Burma, provided the transfers are 
made through third-country banks and that debits or credits are 
not made to any blocked account on the books of a U.S. 
financial institution.
    Many in the international community joined the United 
States in condemning the regime's crackdown. On September 27, 
2007, Singapore, as Chair of ASEAN issued a statement on behalf 
of ASEAN Foreign Ministers expressing their ``revulsion'' at 
the Burmese generals' use of violence against the Burmese 
people. EU Foreign Ministers joined Secretary Rice in issuing a 
joint statement condemning the crackdown and calling for a 
transition to democracy. In October 2007, EU Foreign Ministers 
announced additional restrictions on certain trade and 
investment in Burma. The same month Australia announced that it 
would freeze the assets and block any transactions associated 
with key regime leaders. In December 2007, Canada announced 
broad economic sanctions against Burma, including a freeze of 
the assets of designated individuals, a ban on the exportation 
and importation of goods to and from Burma, a ban on new 
investment, and a ban on the export of financial services. EU 
Foreign Ministers renewed EU sanctions on Burma on April 29 and 
indicated their readiness to introduce further restrictive 
measures in light of developments in Burma.
    The U.N. continued its efforts to promote human rights and 
national reconciliation in Burma. Despite Special Advisor 
Gambari's visits to Burma in September and November 2007, and 
March 2008, the regime failed to respond to his requests to 
release political prisoners and begin a genuine dialogue. U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Paulo Sergio Pinheiro 
visited Burma in November 2007 and subsequently issued a report 
that was highly critical of both the regime's crackdown and its 
self-styled ``roadmap to democracy.'' On March 28, 2008, the 
U.N. Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning Burma 
for ``systematic violations'' of human rights. It also extended 
the mandate for the Special Rapporteur on Burma, appointing 
Tomas Ojea Quintana of Argentina to replace Pinheiro after his 
term had ended.

               EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON SITUATION IN BURMA

    U.S. economic sanctions have increased pressure on the 
Burmese junta and its supporters, as restrictions on their 
ability to access the U.S. financial system have made it more 
difficult for them to do business in U.S. dollars. Influential 
businessmen in Rangoon with connections to the regime 
increasingly have complained to the regime and to others about 
the effects that financial sanctions have had on their business 
operations and personal lives. For example, after the issuance 
of E.O. 13448, Air Bagan, an airline owned by regime supporter 
Tay Za, suspended flights to Singapore when certain financial 
institutions decided to terminate their business relationships 
with a company so closely affiliated with the regime. The 
Treasury Department blocked 86 transactions involving Burmese 
entities totaling approximately $1.8 million between April 2007 
and April 2008. Over the same period, the Treasury Department 
issued 152 licenses. The regime has also announced its 
intention to authorize the use of Singaporean and Chinese 
currencies for transactions requiring foreign currency, 
apparently due to difficulties in making such transactions in 
U.S. dollars. Increased political and economicpressure after 
the crackdown notwithstanding, the Burmese regime has given no 
indication that it is open 10 meaningful democratization.
    Despite the tightening of sanctions, growing trade with 
countries in the region and increased income from the 
exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits 
provided the regime the economic means to maintain a firm grip 
on power. Burma's oil and natural gas revenues doubled in 2006-
07 from just over $1 billion the previous year to over $2 
billion, due primarily to rising global prices rather than any 
increase in output. According to Burma's Ministry of Commerce, 
its total trade reached $8.7 billion in 2007, with exports of 
$5.9 billion and imports of $2.7 billion, a record high since 
the regime took power. In addition to natural gas and oil, 
Burma's major exports included agricultural products, timber, 
and minerals. Thailand was Burma's leading trade partner ($3 
billion in total bilateral trade), followed by Singapore ($1.66 
billion), China ($1 billion), and India ($744 million).
    Its increased income notwithstanding, the regime's 
corruption and economic mismanagement have resulted in a 
decreasing quality of life for the average Burmese citizen. 
Official spending on health and education equals only 1.4 
percent of GDP. Burma has the fourth highest infant mortality 
in the world. Malaria, a leading cause of morbidity and 
mortality in Burma, results four times the deaths in Burma than 
in any other country in the region. Forty percent of Burma's 
population is believed to be infected with tuberculosis. Due to 
poor public health administration, drug resistance to malaria 
and tuberculosis treatments is on the rise in Burma. As a 
result of continued military offensives against civilians in 
ethnic minority areas, particularly in eastern Burma, it is 
estimated there were at least 500,000 internally displaced 
persons in Burma at the end of 2007.
    Respect for human rights in Burma deteriorated sharply 
during this reporting period. The regime acknowledged that 15 
persons died during its crackdown on peaceful protestors in 
August and September 2007. While U.N. Special Rapporteur for 
Human Rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro estimated that the 
regime killed at least 30 persons. Some human rights groups 
estimated that the actual death toll was much higher. During 
and after the crackdown, the regime detained more than 3,000 
persons suspected of participating in the demonstrations and 
many were held indefinitely and without charges. At the end of 
April 2008, over 1,800 political prisoners remained in custody. 
In addition to deaths and arbitrary detentions, many Burmese 
monks were beaten, and several monasteries were raided, 
ransacked, and closed in retribution for their monks' 
involvement in the September protest marches. Harassment and 
violent attacks on civic activists continued throughout the 
reporting period, as did arbitrary detention, prosecution, and 
punishment of persons for engaging in legitimate political 
activities.
    The Burmese regime continued to impose its self-styled 
``roadmap to democracy,'' despite its lack of popular support, 
by announcing on February 9 a referendum on its draft 
constitution. The draft constitution was written in secret by a 
hand-picked committee that excluded input from democratic 
groups and ignored ethnic minority recommendations. The 
Referendum Law, like other junta decrees, criminalized 
criticism of the constitution and referendum, making it 
punishable by up to three years in prison. The National League 
for Democracy and other democratic organizations have denounced 
the regime's draft constitution, which is designed to 
perpetuate authoritarian military rule, and the unfair manner 
in which the referendum is being conducted.

             EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON BROADER U.S. INTERESTS

    Intensified sanctions targeting regime leaders and their 
supporters send a clear signal to the regime and to the Burmese 
people that the United States supports a transition to 
democracy. The vast majority of individuals in the Burmese 
democracy movement support U.S. sanctions. However, some 
academics and exiled Burmese have questioned whether U.S. 
sanctions have any chance of success without the participation 
of Burma's major trading partners, including China, India, 
ASEAN members, and other countries in the region.
    The trade-related and financial sanctions implemented 
pursuant to the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 and 
Executive Orders 13310 and 13448 have had a limited impact on 
U.S. relations with other nations. Although some foreign 
businesses and their representative embassies complained about 
the impact ofsanctions, most acknowledge that they are not 
investing due to the difficult operating environment and overall poor 
economic climate created by the regime.

                               CONCLUSION

    Despite the increased international criticism of the 
Burmese regime's repression following the crackdown of August 
and September 2007, the generals ruling Burma continue to 
ignore the desire of the Burmese people for democracy and 
respect for human rights. Nonetheless, the Administration's 
support for Burma's democracy movement remains firm. The United 
States continues to work within the U.N. and with other 
countries in Southeast Asia and beyond to promote a peaceful 
transition to democracy. Economic sanctions remain an important 
tool for exerting pressure on the regime to respect the will of 
the Burmese people and to cooperate with the international 
community's efforts to facilitate a genuine dialogue with 
democratic and ethnic minority representatives on a transition 
to democracy. In light of the crackdown and the regime's 
continued imposition of its illegitimate constitutional process 
on the Burmese people, failure to renew the import ban in the 
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act would send Burma's ruling 
generals the wrong message. The State Department supports a 
renewal resolution to maintain the import ban.

6. Additional international sanctions against Burma

    In recent months, the international community has protested 
the SPDC's use of violence to restrain protests by Buddhist 
monks, and its slow response to Cyclone Nargis. In May 2008, 
the European Union imposed import sanctions against Burmese 
gems, timber, and metal, and expanded financial and travel 
sanctions on SPDC and other Burmese officials. Also in May 
2008, the United Nations called on the Burmese Government to 
hold a free and fair constitutional referendum, and to allow 
greater humanitarian aid to enter the country. On October 18, 
2007, the House introduced a bill to strengthen sanctions 
against Burma (H.R. 3890). The Senate passed an amended version 
of that bill on December 19, 2007. After resolving differences 
with the Senate, the House passed the ``Tom Lantos Block 
Burmese JADE (Juntas Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008'' 
(JADE Act) on July 15, 2008 by voice vote. On July 22, 2008, 
the Senate passed the JADE Act by Unanimous Consent. The 
President signed the JADE Act on July 29, 2008 (Pub. L. No. 
110-286). The JADE Act expands import sanctions on Burma, and 
imposes additional financial and visa sanctions on members of 
the SPDC or USDA, and their immediate family members.

              II. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION


S.J. Res. 41--A joint resolution approving the renewal of import 
        restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 
        of 2003

    Summary: S.J. Res. 41 would renew for one year the ban on 
all imports from Burma. The ban was originally enacted as the 
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-61) 
and was set to expire on July 28, 2004. The ban has 
subsequently been renewed four times, most recently in Public 
Law 110-52, through its current expiration date of July 28, 
2008. The original legislation limited renewals of the ban to a 
total of three years. The third renewal resolution increased 
that limit to six years, thereby allowing three additional one-
year bans.
    CBO estimates that extending the ban on U.S. imports from 
Burma would reduce federal revenues by less than $500,000 in 
2008 and by about $2 million in 2009, with no effect 
thereafter. CBO estimates that enacting S.J. Res. 41 would not 
affect federal spending.
    Under S.J. Res. 41, the President could lift the import 
restrictions if the State Peace and Development Council, the 
military regime of Burma, has made substantial and measurable 
progress to end violations of human rights, implemented a 
democratic government, and met its obligations under 
international counter-narcotics agreements. The President also 
would have the authority to terminate the restrictions upon the 
request of a democratically elected government in Burma or 
waive them in the national interest.
    By renewing the ban on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 41 
would impose private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). CBO cannot estimate the cost of 
those mandates because information on the value of lost profits 
to importers resulting from the ban is not available. Thus, CBO 
cannot determine whether the aggregate direct cost of the 
mandates would exceed the annual threshold for private-sector 
mandates established by UMRA ($136 million in 2008, adjusted 
annually for inflation). CBO has also determined that S.J. Res. 
41 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA 
and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal 
governments.
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of S.J. Res. 41 is shown in the following 
table.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                                                   2008    2009    2010    2011    2012    2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               CHANGES IN REVENUES

Estimated Revenues..............................................       *      -2       0       0       0      0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* = Loss of less than $500,000.

    Basis of estimate: Under S.J. Res. 41, the President would 
have the authority to lift or waive the ban imposed by the 
resolution. For this estimate, CBO assumes that the President 
would not exercise this authority before the termination of the 
one-year ban.
    Based on data from the U.S. International Trade Commission 
on recent U.S. imports from Burma and CBO's most recent 
forecast of total U.S. imports, CBO estimates that enacting 
S.J. Res. 41 would reduce federal revenues by less than 
$500,000 in 2008 and by about $2 million in 2009, net of income 
and payroll tax offsets.
    In years just before the import ban first went into effect, 
over half of all U.S. imports from Burma were knitted or 
crocheted clothing and apparel goods. The remaining imports 
included apparel items not knitted or crocheted, certain types 
of fish and crustaceans, goods made of wood, certain precious 
and semiprecious stones and metals, and woven fabrics and 
tapestries. In 2001 and 2002, roughly 80 percent of duties 
collected on these imports came from knitted and crocheted 
articles. CBO assumes that most of the banned imports would be 
replaced with imports from other countries.
    The President could remove the ban on imports upon the 
request of a democratically elected government in Burma or if 
he were to determine and notify the Congress that to do so is 
in the national interest. Should the ban be lifted, U.S. 
companies would be allowed to resume importation of goods 
produced, manufactured, grown, or assembled in Burma. If such 
an action were taken during the 2008-2009 period, the impact on 
federal revenues would be reduced accordingly.
    Estimated impact on state, local, and tribal governments: 
CBO has determined that S.J. Res. 41 contains no 
intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA and would impose 
no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
    Estimated impact on the private sector: By renewing the ban 
on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 41 would impose private-
sector mandates as defined in UMRA. CBO cannot estimate the 
cost of those mandates because information on the value of lost 
profits to importers resulting from the ban is not available. 
Thus, CBO cannot determine whether the aggregate direct cost of 
the mandates would exceed the annual threshold for private-
sector mandates established by UMRA ($136 million in 2008, 
adjusted annually for inflation).
    Estimate prepared by: Federal revenues: Zachary Epstein. 
Impact on state, local, and tribal governments: Neil Hood. 
Impact on the private sector: Dang Du and MarDestinee C. Perez.
    Estimate approved by: G. Thomas Woodward, Assistant 
Director for Tax Analysis.

    III. REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION AND OTHER MATTERS

    Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule 
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states 
that the resolution will not significantly regulate any 
individuals or businesses, will not affect the personal privacy 
of individuals, and will result in no significant additional 
paperwork.
    The following information is provided in accordance with 
section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) 
(Pub. L. No. 104-04). The Committee has reviewed the provisions 
of S.J. Res. 41 as approved by the Committee on July 23, 2008. 
In accordance with the requirement of Pub. L. No. 104-04, the 
Committee has determined that the bill contains no 
intergovernment mandates, as defined in the UMRA, and would not 
affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

                      IV. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

    Pursuant to paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules 
of the Senate, the Committee finds no changes in existing law 
made by S.J. Res. 41, as ordered reported.