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111th Congress                                            Rept. 111-659
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                      Part 1

======================================================================



 
              WMD PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2010

                                _______
                                

               November 18, 2010.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, from the Committee on Homeland Security, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 5498]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 5498) to enhance homeland security by improving 
efforts to prevent, deter, prepare for, detect, attribute, 
respond to, and recover from an attack with a weapon of mass 
destruction, and for other purposes, having considered the 
same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend 
that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................    27
Background and Need for Legislation..............................    27
Hearings.........................................................    28
Committee Consideration..........................................    30
Committee Votes..................................................    31
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    32
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures    32
Congressional Budget Office Estimate.............................    32
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............    37
Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff 
  Benefits.......................................................    39
Federal Mandates Statement.......................................    39
Advisory Committee Statement.....................................    39
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................    39
Applicability to Legislative Branch..............................    39
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation...................    39
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    71
Additional, Minority, and Dissenting Views.......................   107

  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``WMD Prevention and 
Preparedness Act of 2010''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                     TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Sec. 101. National intelligence strategy for countering the threat from 
weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 102. National intelligence strategy for countering biological 
threats.

                  TITLE II--HOMELAND SECURITY MATTERS

Sec. 201. Weapons of mass destruction prevention and preparedness.
Sec. 202. Definitions.
Sec. 203. Dual-use terrorist risks from synthetic genomics.
Sec. 204. Dissemination of information analyzed by the Department to 
State, local, tribal, and private entities with responsibilities 
relating to homeland security.
Sec. 205. National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC).
Sec. 206. Report on establishment of the system assessment and 
validation for emergency responders (SAVER) program.
Sec. 207. National Academy of Sciences study of forensic science in 
homeland security.
Sec. 208. Harmonization of regulations.
Sec. 209. Communications planning for weapons of mass destruction 
information dissemination.
Sec. 210. Environmental recovery from chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear attacks.

                    TITLE III--PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS

Sec. 301. National medical countermeasure dispensing strategy.
Sec. 302. Material threat assessments and determinations.
Sec. 303. National pre-event vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing 
policy review.
Sec. 304. Designation of tier 1 material threat agents.
Sec. 305. Background checks.
Sec. 306. Biotechnology research, development, and procurement.

                  TITLE IV--FOREIGN RELATIONS MATTERS

Sec. 401. International collaboration and information sharing relating 
to biosecurity.
Sec. 402. International engagement to enhance biodefense and 
biosecurity.
Sec. 403. Interagency task force on best practices for global 
biopreparedness.
Sec. 404. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

   In this Act:
          (1) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means 
        the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
        Representatives and any committee of the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate having legislative jurisdiction 
        under the rules of the House of Representatives or Senate, 
        respectively, over the matter concerned.
          (2) The term ``weapon of mass destruction'' has the meaning 
        given that term in section 1403(1) fo the Defense Against 
        Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302).
          (3) The term ``Intelligence Community'' has the meaning given 
        that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 
        (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
          (4) The term ``national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders'' means officials from the Federal, State, local, 
        and tribal authorities and individuals from the private sector 
        who are involved in efforts to prevent, deter, prepare for, 
        detect, attribute, respond, and recover from a biological 
        attack or other phenomena that may have serious health 
        consequences for the United States, including wide-scale 
        fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks.

                     TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

SEC. 101. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING THE THREAT FROM 
                    WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

  (a) Strategy.--
          (1) Development.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
        heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, 
        shall develop and implement--
                  (A) a strategy designed to improve the capabilities 
                of the United States to collect, analyze, and 
                disseminate intelligence related to weapons of mass 
                destruction; and
                  (B) a plan to implement such strategy.
          (2) Title.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be known as the ``National Intelligence Strategy for Countering 
        the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction''.
  (b) Contents.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
          (1) include methods for the recruitment, training, and 
        retention of a workforce with expertise in the collection, 
        analysis, and dissemination of intelligence related to all 
        types of weapons of mass destruction and science and technology 
        related to weapons of mass destruction, as well as expertise in 
        science and technology relating to threats posed by weapons of 
        mass destruction;
          (2) include methods for collaboration, as appropriate, with 
        individuals with the expertise described in paragraph (1) who 
        are not employed by the Federal Government;
          (3) identify and address domestic needs for analysis and 
        collection including the development of innovative human and 
        technical intelligence collection capabilities and techniques; 
        and
          (4) address each type of weapon of mass destruction as 
        necessary and appropriate.
  (c) Implementation Plan.--The plan for implementing the strategy 
required under subsection (a) shall include--
          (1) actions necessary to increase the effectiveness and 
        efficiency of the sharing of intelligence on weapons of mass 
        destruction throughout the Intelligence Community, including a 
        description of statutory, regulatory, policy, technical, 
        security, or other barriers that prevent such sharing, and, as 
        appropriate, the development of uniform standards across the 
        Intelligence Community for such sharing;
          (2) methods to disseminate intelligence products to national 
        biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders in unclassified formats 
        to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the sharing of 
        information;
          (3) actions necessary to provide open-source intelligence 
        relating to weapons of mass destruction to--
                  (A) appropriate Federal departments and agencies;
                  (B) State, local, and tribal authorities; and
                  (C) private entities;
          (4) specific objectives to be accomplished, with 
        corresponding schedule, for each year of the five-year period 
        that begins on the date on which the strategy is submitted to 
        the appropriate congressional committees under subsection (e) 
        and tasks to accomplish such objectives, including--
                  (A) a list prioritizing such objectives and such 
                tasks; and
                  (B) a schedule for meeting such objectives and 
                carrying out such tasks;
          (5) assignments of roles and responsibilities to elements of 
        the Intelligence Community to implement the strategy; and
          (6) a schedule for assessment of the effectiveness and 
        efficiency of the strategy, including metrics.
  (d) Coordination.--The Director of National Intelligence shall, as 
the Director considers appropriate, coordinate with State, local, and 
tribal government authorities, private sector, and nongovernmental 
organizations in the development of the National Intelligence Strategy 
for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction.
  (e) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees the strategy and plan required 
under subsection (a). The report shall be in unclassified form but with 
a classified annex, as appropriate.

SEC. 102. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL 
                    THREATS.

  (a) Strategy.--
          (1) Development.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
        heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, 
        shall develop and implement a strategy and a plan for 
        implementing the strategy that is integrated into the National 
        Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of 
        Mass Destruction, as required under this title.
          (2) Title.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be known as the ``National Intelligence Strategy for Countering 
        Biological Threats''.
  (b) Contents.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
          (1) include a for plan for establishing in the Intelligence 
        Community a cadre of--
                  (A) collectors and analysts in all agencies in the 
                Intelligence Community that are familiar with 
                biological threats, biological science, and 
                biotechnology;
                  (B) biological scientists;
                  (C) biotechologists; and
                  (D) experts with knowledge of the current state of 
                technologies that could be used to develop a weapon of 
                mass destruction;
          (2) include a plan for defining the functions, capabilities, 
        and gaps with respect to addressing the risk of a weapon of 
        mass destruction attack in the intelligence workforce;
          (3) identify strategies to recruit, retain, and protect such 
        workforce from workplace exposures to biological agents in the 
        conduct of the duties of such workforce;
          (4) include methods for collaboration, as appropriate, with 
        individuals with expertise described in paragraph (1) who are 
        not employed by the Federal Government;
          (5) address domestic and international needs for analysis and 
        collection;
          (6) include a plan for defining, integrating, focusing, and 
        enhancing existing capabilities in the Intelligence Community 
        dedicated to current tactical and strategic biological threats; 
        and
          (7) include a plan for ensuring the prioritization and 
        sustained commitment of intelligence personnel and resources to 
        address biological threats.
  (c) Implementation Plan.--The implementation plan for the strategy 
required under subsection (a) shall--
          (1) include actions necessary to increase the effectiveness 
        and efficiency of the sharing of intelligence throughout the 
        Intelligence Community on biological weapons and organisms that 
        could be used for biological terrorism, including a description 
        of statutory, regulatory, policy, technical, security, or other 
        barriers that prevent such sharing, and, as appropriate, the 
        development of uniform standards across the Intelligence 
        Community for such sharing;
          (2) address strategic and tactical human intelligence, 
        measurement and signature intelligence, technical intelligence, 
        medical intelligence, and open-source intelligence activities 
        necessary to implement the strategy;
          (3) identify specific objectives to be accomplished during 
        each year of the five-year period that begins on the date on 
        which the strategy is submitted to the appropriate 
        congressional committees under subsection (d) and tasks to 
        accomplish such objectives, including--
                  (A) a list prioritizing such objectives and such 
                tasks; and
                  (B) a schedule for meeting such objectives and 
                carrying out such tasks;
          (4) assign roles and responsibilities to elements of the 
        Intelligence Community to implement the strategy;
          (5) a schedule for assessment of the effectiveness and 
        efficiency of the strategy, including metrics; and
          (6) a schedule for evaluating on a regular basis the efforts 
        of the Intelligence Community and progress on understanding and 
        countering biological threats.
  (d) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees the strategy and plan required 
under subsection (a). The report shall be in unclassified form but with 
a classified annex, as appropriate.

                  TITLE II--HOMELAND SECURITY MATTERS

SEC. 201. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS.

  (a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et 
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new title:

  ``TITLE XXI--WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

                ``Subtitle A--Prevention and Deterrence

``SEC. 2101. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION 
                    SHARING UNIT.

  ``(a) In General.--There is established in the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis of the Department a unit for weapons of mass destruction 
intelligence and information sharing. The unit shall conduct 
intelligence and information sharing activities consistent with the 
National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons 
of Mass Destruction under section 101 of the WMD Prevention and 
Preparedness Act of 2010 and the National Intelligence Strategy for 
Countering Biological Threats under section 102 of that Act and shall--
          ``(1) evaluate and establish a baseline of terrorist actors, 
        their claims, and their plans to conduct attacks involving 
        chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials 
        against the Nation;
          ``(2) support homeland security-focused intelligence analysis 
        of global infectious disease, public health, food, 
        agricultural, and veterinary issues;
          ``(3) provide tailored analytical support on these threats to 
        State, local, and tribal authorities as well as members of the 
        public health, scientific, and response communities; and
          ``(4) perform other responsibilities, as assigned by the 
        Secretary.
  ``(b) Coordination.--Where appropriate, the unit shall coordinate 
with others in the Intelligence Community, including the National 
Counter Proliferation Center.
  ``(c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this section and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall 
report to the appropriate congressional committees on the intelligence 
and information sharing activities of the unit for weapons of mass 
destruction intelligence and information sharing established under 
subsection (a) and all relevant entities within the Department to 
counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction and how the 
Department acted in accordance with relevant intelligence strategies, 
including the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat 
from Weapons of Mass Destruction and the National Intelligence Strategy 
for Countering Biological Threats.

``SEC. 2102. INFORMATION SHARING AND COLLABORATION FOR BIOSECURITY AND 
                    BIODEFENSE.

  ``(a) Responsibilities of Secretary of Homeland Security.--To 
increase situational awareness, the Secretary, acting through the Under 
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, shall--
          ``(1) to the greatest extent practicable, integrate into the 
        homeland security, intelligence, and information sharing 
        process national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders;
          ``(2) develop an information sharing framework for homeland 
        security intelligence and information sharing withe national 
        biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders;
          ``(3) enable national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders 
        to provide recommendations with respect to the development of 
        mechanisms and protocols to integrate information from national 
        biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders;
          ``(4) leverage existing and emerging homeland security 
        capabilities and structures, including fusion centers 
        established pursuant to section 210A, to enhance prevention, 
        detection, preparedness, and collective response, attribution, 
        and recovery efforts of from a biological attack or other 
        phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the 
        United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious 
        disease outbreaks; and
          ``(5) advance partnerships between the Department and other 
        Federal departments and agencies in assessing potential threats 
        and the risks from the intentional use of biological agents by 
        terrorists or other actors.
  ``(b) Coordination With Other Departments and Agencies.--The 
Secretary shall work in coordination with the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies.

``SEC. 2103. BIOTERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENTS.

  ``(a) Risk Assessment.--The Secretary, in coordination with the heads 
of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall produce 
biennial integrated risk assessments, to be known as `Bioterrorism Risk 
Assessments' to identify and assess the evolving terrorist risk of a 
biological attack or other phenomena that may have serious health 
consequences for the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or 
infectious disease outbreaks. These assessments shall--
          ``(1) identify the threat, vulnerability, and consequences of 
        a biological terrorist attack against the United States;
          ``(2) take into account intelligence and information 
        regarding terrorist intentions, capabilities, plans, and 
        actions;
          ``(3) be used to inform and guide threat assessments and 
        determinations made by the Secretary regarding agents and 
        toxins pursuant to section 302(9), and to guide prioritization 
        of other homeland security activities, as appropriate;
          ``(4) provide the basis for risk-informed investments in 
        national strategic biodefense research, development, planning, 
        preparedness, and collective response to biological attacks;
          ``(5) identify key knowledge and data gaps;
          ``(6) define critical biodefense vulnerabilities;
          ``(7) provide risk-based prioritization of agents for 
        bioterrorism; and
          ``(8) evaluate progress in implementing national 
        biopreparedness policy.
  ``(b) Requirement.--The Secretary shall--
          ``(1) convene an interagency task force of subject matter 
        experts to provide recommendations to the Under Secretary for 
        Science and Technology as to the adequacy of the methodology 
        used in the Assessments and to establish requirements and 
        standards for the Assessments;
          ``(2) engage with national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders to obtain their input regarding the Assessments, 
        as appropriate; and
          ``(3) ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, that the 
        Assessments inform the risk management decisions of the 
        Department and can be made available to national biosecurity 
        and biodefense stakeholders, as appropriate.

``SEC. 2104. RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS SECURITY.

  ``(a) Risk Assessment.--The Secretary shall enhance domestic 
preparedness for and collective response to terrorism by conducting 
annual risk assessments regarding the threat, vulnerability, and 
consequences of theft or other procurement of radiological materials 
that could be used by a terrorist in a radiological dispersion device, 
including any specific threat information pertinent to the use of 
radiological materials in a possible terrorist attack using a 
radiological dispersion device.
  ``(b) Considerations.--In conducting the terrorism risk assessments 
under subsection (a), the Secretary shall--
          ``(1) consult with Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Heath 
        and Human Services, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
          ``(2) consider relevant studies previously prepared by other 
        Federal agencies, or other reputable sources;
          ``(3) focus on those radiological materials that constitute 
        the greatest risk, and designate those materials as high-risk 
        radiological materials for purposes of this section;
          ``(4) consider the potential radiological dispersion device 
        value of different radiological materials including 
        availability, dispersability, and ease of handling of such 
        materials;
          ``(5) consider the vulnerability for theft or other 
        procurement that different facilities represent; and
          ``(6) consider the consequences of a successful radiological 
        dispersion device attack, including risk of death or injury and 
        economic losses.
  ``(c) Consultation.--In conducting the terrorism risk assessments 
under subsection (a), the Secretary shall consult with the Intelligence 
Community, the Secretary of Energy and the Field Intelligence Elements 
of the National Laboratories, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and other appropriate 
experts to integrate and analyze information needed to develop the risk 
assessment.
  ``(d) Dissemination of Findings.--The Secretary shall disseminate the 
findings of the risk assessments and any specific risk information 
developed in the assessment to all participating agencies including 
those described in subsection (c), as well State and local agencies, 
and the facilities containing radiological source material and 
regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
  ``(e) Classification.--The Secretary shall, as appropriate, share the 
terrorism risk assessments with law enforcement and critical 
infrastructure operators with appropriate security clearances. The 
Secretary shall also make available an unclassified version to each 
agency with which the Secretary is required to consult under subsection 
(c), as well as State and local law enforcement and public health 
authorities, and facilities possessing radiological materials with the 
support of the Department of Energy.

``SEC. 2105. ENHANCED BIOSECURITY MEASURES.

  ``(a) Regulations.--At the request of the Secretary, the Secretary, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, and the heads of other appropriate Federal 
agencies, shall, through a negotiated rulemaking committee under 
subchapter III of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, establish 
enhanced biosecurity measures for persons or laboratories that possess, 
use, or transfer Tier I Material Threat Agents. Such measures shall 
include--
          ``(1) standards for personnel surety programs;
          ``(2) standards for biosecurity practices and training of 
        responsible officials, laboratory personnel, and support 
        personnel;
          ``(3) standards for performing laboratory vulnerability 
        assessments in collaboration with each facility;
          ``(4) risk-based laboratory security performance standards;
          ``(5) penalties (including civil money penalties and 
        intermediate sanctions), in addition to any other penalties 
        that may apply under provisions of law; and
          ``(6) any other security standards determined necessary by 
        the Secretary, the Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of 
        Health and Human Services, and other agencies as appropriate.
  ``(b) Negotiated Rulemaking Committee.--The Secretary shall establish 
a negotiated rulemaking committee for purposes of subsection (a). Such 
committee shall include a representative from each of the following:
          ``(1) The Department.
          ``(2) The Department of Health and Human Services.
          ``(3) The Department of Agriculture.
          ``(4) The Department of Defense.
          ``(5) The Department of Energy.
          ``(6) The Department of Justice.
          ``(7) For-profit research institutions.
          ``(8) Academic research institutions.
          ``(9) Nonprofit research institutions
          ``(10) Other stakeholders, as the Secretary determines 
        appropriate.
  ``(c) Time Requirement.--The procedures for the negotiated rulemaking 
referred to in subsection (a) shall be conducted in a timely manner to 
ensure that--
          ``(1) any recommendations with respect to proposed 
        regulations are provided to the Secretary and the heads of the 
        other appropriate Federal agencies not later than one year 
        after the date of the enactment of this section; and
          ``(2) a final rule is promulgated not later than two years 
        after the date of the enactment of this section.
  ``(d) Factors to Be Considered.--In developing proposed and final 
standards pursuant to the negotiated rulemaking referred to in 
subsection (a), the negotiated rulemaking committee shall consider--
          ``(1) the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass 
        Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (established under 
        section 1851 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
        Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53; 121 Stat. 501));
          ``(2) the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity 
        (established under section 217a of title 42, United States 
        Code, section 222 of the Public Health Service Act, and section 
        205 of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act);
          ``(3) any working group established under Executive Order 
        13486 (74 Fed. Reg. 2289) relating to strengthening laboratory 
        biosecurity;
          ``(4) the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009; and
          ``(5) views from representatives of biosecurity and 
        biodefense stakeholders for methods to minimize any 
        disincentives to biological research arising from enhanced 
        biosecurity measures.
  ``(e) Implementation of Enhanced Biosecurity Measures.--
          ``(1) Enforcement.--The Secretary of Agriculture and the 
        Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with 
        the Secretary, as appropriate, shall enforce the measures 
        established under subsection (a) and any standards promulgated 
        pursuant to such section.
          ``(2) Training programs.--The Secretary of Agriculture and 
        the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination 
        with the Secretary and the heads of other Federal agencies, as 
        appropriate, shall develop training programs that comply with 
        such measures and standards.
          ``(3) Procedures.--The Secretary of Agriculture and the 
        Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with 
        the Secretary and the heads of other Federal agencies, as 
        appropriate, shall develop and implement procedures with 
        respect to when and how penalties and intermediate sanctions 
        may be imposed. Such procedures shall provide for notice, a 
        reasonable opportunity to respond to the proposed penalty or 
        intermediate sanction, and appropriate procedures for appealing 
        determinations relating to the imposition of a penalty or 
        intermediate sanction.
          ``(4) Simultaneous laboratory inspections.--
                  ``(A) Inspection data sharing and enforcement 
                uniformity.--The Secretary of Agriculture and the 
                Secretary of Health and Human Services shall 
                periodically provide the Secretary with all data 
                concerning inspections of laboratories that handle Tier 
                1 Material Threat Agents to ensure uniformity in 
                enforcement of the regulations enacted under subsection 
                (a) and to identify areas where the Secretary can 
                provide guidance to the Secretary of Agriculture or the 
                Secretary of Health and Human Services about approaches 
                to enhance security at specific laboratories.
                  ``(B) Simultaneous inspections.--Any inspections of 
                the same laboratory conducted by the Secretary of 
                Agriculture pursuant to section 212(a)(1) of the 
                Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 and 
                the Secretary of Health and Human Services for 
                compliance with regulations promulgated under the 
                Select Agent Program under section 351A(a)(1) of the 
                Public Health Service Act, shall be conducted 
                simultaneously to the extent practicable.
                  ``(C) Common inspection procedures.--Departments 
                conducting simultaneous inspections of a laboratory 
                under this subsection shall ensure, to the maximum 
                extent practicable, that such inspections are conducted 
                using a common set of inspection procedures across such 
                departments in order to minimize the administrative 
                burden on such laboratory.
                  ``(D) Inspection reports.--Inspection reports 
                generated under this paragraph shall be made available 
                to each Federal agency that supports select agent 
                laboratory activities at the institution that is the 
                subject of the inspection report, and to the 
                institutions that are the object of inspections.

``SEC. 2106. TIER I MATERIAL THREAT AGENT LOCATIONS.

  ``The Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services shall provide to the Secretary a list of laboratories and 
other locations where Tier I Material Threat Agents are present in the 
United States and its territories.

``SEC. 2107. HIGH CONTAINMENT BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY SECURITY GRANTS.

  ``(a) Grants Authorized.--The Secretary, acting through the 
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, may award 
grants based on risk to academic and nonprofit organizations and to 
State, local, and tribal authorities that possess, use, or transfer 
Tier I Material Threat Agents, to enhance security at laboratories of 
such organizations and authorities.
  ``(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security to carry out this 
subsection $50,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2013.

``SEC. 2108. LABORATORY BIOSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING.

  ``(a) In General.--Consistent with the responsibilities of the 
Secretary under section 201(d), the Secretary shall establish 
procedures, with appropriate controls on access, for the sharing of 
homeland security information, including vulnerability assessments, 
security plans, best practices and other laboratory biosecurity-related 
information, as the Secretary determines appropriate, with State, 
local, and tribal government authorities, including law enforcement 
authorities and emergency response providers.
  ``(b) Access to Information in Databases.--In carrying out this 
section, the Secretary shall have access to and may use information 
from the national databases established under section 212(d)(2) of the 
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. 8401(d)(2)) 
and subsections (d)(2) and (f)(3) of section 351A of the Public Health 
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262a).
  ``(c) Classified and Sensitive Information.--The Secretary shall 
ensure that any information disseminated under this section is handled 
consistent with--
          ``(1) the authority of the Director of National Intelligence 
        to protect intelligence sources and methods under the National 
        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and related 
        procedures or similar authorities of the Attorney General 
        concerning sensitive law enforcement information;
          ``(2) section 552a of title 5, United States Code (commonly 
        referred to as the Privacy Act of 1974); and
          ``(3) other relevant laws.

``SEC. 2109. PERIODIC HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW OF CRIMINAL STATUTES.

  ``(a) In General.--The Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney 
General and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, as 
appropriate, shall, for purposes of enhancing homeland security--
          ``(1) periodically review and recommend updates to criminal 
        laws to ensure that such laws are well suited to the evolving 
        risks of misuse of life sciences by terrorists and others; and
          ``(2) ensure that national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders at unique risk of exploitation have access to 
        guidance regarding actions that can reduce the risk of misuse 
        of life sciences by terrorists and others.
  ``(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this section, and biannually thereafter, the Secretary, in 
coordination with the Attorney General, shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees the recommended updates to criminal laws, as 
described in subsection (a)(1).

``SEC. 2110. EXPORT ENFORCEMENT FOR COUNTER-PROLIFERATION.

  ``(a) In General.--The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the 
Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the 
heads of other appropriate Federal agencies shall--
          ``(1) conduct homeland security investigations and enforce 
        criminal violations of customs and export laws of the United 
        States related to military items, controlled commodities, and 
        sanctioned or embargoed countries to prevent individuals, 
        terrorist groups, foreign adversaries, and hostile nations 
        from--
                  ``(A) illegally obtaining sensitive United States 
                technology and munitions; and
                  ``(B) obtaining weapons of mass destruction 
                components, precursors, and delivery systems, 
                including--
                          ``(i) United States military technical data, 
                        hardware, small arms and defense services;
                          ``(ii) dual-use technical data/source code 
                        and commodities; and
                          ``(iii) deemed exports; and
          ``(2) conduct industry outreach with manufacturers and 
        exporters of strategic commodities that may be targeted for 
        procurement by terrorist organizations and the countries that 
        support them as well as countries identified as weapons 
        proliferators, in a manner that acknowledges commerce and 
        trade, by--
                  ``(A) educating companies and individuals on the 
                export laws of the United States;
                  ``(B) discussing export licensing issues and 
                requirements;
                  ``(C) identifying red flag indicators used in illegal 
                procurement;
                  ``(D) identifying the government agencies responsible 
                for the licensing of export-controlled commodities and 
                technology; and
                  ``(E) establishing and fostering relationships 
                whereby companies and individuals can report suspicious 
                contacts or attempts to violate the export laws of the 
                United States.
  ``(b) National Export Enforcement Coordination.--
          ``(1) Establishment; membership.--There is established in the 
        Department a unit responsible for national export enforcement 
        coordination that is managed by the Secretary. The unit shall 
        be composed of members who are representatives from the 
        Department, the Department of Commerce, the Department of 
        Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, 
        the Department of State, the Intelligence Community, and other 
        Federal agencies as appropriate.
          ``(2) Responsibilities.--The unit shall carry out the 
        following responsibilities:
                  ``(A) Coordinating law enforcement counter-
                proliferation investigations and intelligence counter-
                proliferation activities.
                  ``(B) Addressing licensing inquiries, reviews, 
                requests, checks, and verifications.
                  ``(C) Conducting outreach and providing training to 
                the export trade community.

                       ``Subtitle B--Preparedness

``SEC. 2121. COMMUNICATION OF THREAT INFORMATION AND ALERTS.

  ``(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
          ``(1) The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass 
        Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism recommended that `the 
        Federal Government should practice greater openness of public 
        information so that citizens better understand the threat and 
        the risk this threat poses to them'.
          ``(2) There are unique challenges for community preparedness 
        for attacks from weapons of mass destruction and their agents.
  ``(b) Terrorism Threat Awareness.--
          ``(1) Terrorism threat awareness.--The Secretary, in 
        coordination with the heads of appropriate Federal agencies, 
        shall ensure that homeland security information concerning 
        terrorist threats is provided to State, local, and tribal 
        authorities and the public within the United States, as 
        appropriate, for purposes of preparedness and collective 
        response to terrorism and for other purposes.
          ``(2) Threat bulletins.--
                  ``(A) In general.--Consistent with the requirements 
                of paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, on a timely 
                basis, prepare unclassified terrorism-related threat 
                and risk assessments.
                  ``(B) Requirements.--Each assessment required under 
                subparagraph (A) shall--
                          ``(i) include guidance to the public for 
                        preventing and responding to acts of terrorism; 
                        and
                          ``(ii) be made available on the Internet 
                        website of the Department and other publicly 
                        accessible Internet websites, communication 
                        systems, and information networks.
          ``(3) Guidance to state, local, and tribal authorities.--The 
        Secretary--
                  ``(A) acting through the Administrator of the Federal 
                Emergency Management Agency, shall provide to State, 
                local, and tribal authorities written guidance on 
                communicating terrorism-related threats and risks to 
                the public within their jurisdictions; and
                  ``(B) shall identify and articulate the governmental 
                rationale for identifying particular communities as 
                being at heightened risk of exploitation.
          ``(4) Use of existing resources.--The Secretary shall use 
        Internet websites, communication systems, and information 
        networks in operation on the date of an assessment under this 
        subsection to satisfy the requirements of paragraph (2)(B)(ii). 
        The Secretary shall provide guidance on how State, local, 
        tribal, and private entities can partner with public television 
        stations to disseminate information provided by the Department 
        and shall provide information on best practices on 
        disseminating information to residents of local communities, 
        including leveraging public television stations.

``SEC. 2122. INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS 
                    DESTRUCTION.

  ``(a) In General.--The Secretary, acting through the Administrator 
for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall assist State, local, 
and tribal authorities in improving and promoting individual and 
community preparedness and collective response to weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear materials against the United States by--
          ``(1) developing guidance and checklists of recommended 
        actions for individual and community prevention and 
        preparedness efforts and disseminating such guidance and 
        checklists to communities and individuals;
          ``(2) disseminating the guidance developed under section 2151 
        to communities and individuals, as appropriate;
          ``(3) providing information and training materials in support 
        of individual and community preparedness efforts;
          ``(4) conducting individual and community preparedness 
        outreach efforts; and
          ``(5) such other actions as the Secretary determines 
        appropriate.
  ``(b) Coordination.--Where appropriate, the Secretary shall 
coordinate with private sector and nongovernmental organizations to 
promote individual and community preparedness and collective response 
to weapons of mass destruction and terrorist attacks involving 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials against the 
United States.
  ``(c) Best Practices.--In compiling guidance for individual and 
community preparedness in order to carry out subsection (a)(3), the 
Secretary shall give due regard to best practices based on the 
experience of other countries and agencies and th expertise of academic 
institutions and non-governmental organizations.

                        ``Subtitle C--Detection

``SEC. 2131. NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE STRATEGY.

  ``(a) Current State of Biosurveillance.--The Secretary shall examine 
of the state of domestic and global biosurveillance.
  ``(b) Strategy for Biosurveillance.--The Secretary shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a national strategy for 
biosurveillance.
  ``(c) Matters for Inclusion.--
          ``(1) In general.--In developing the strategy required under 
        subsection (b), the Secretary shall take into consideration--
                  ``(A) the state of biosurveillance domestically and 
                internationally;
                  ``(B) material threat assessments and determinations 
                developed by the Secretary in accordance with the 
                Project BioShield Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-276) and 
                the amendments made by that Act;
                  ``(C) reports on global trends produced by the Office 
                of the Director of National Intelligence regarding the 
                biological threat;
                  ``(D) information available in biosurveillance 
                systems and changes to information technology to allow 
                for the incorporation and integration of this 
                information;
                  ``(E) Intelligence Community needs as articulated in 
                relevant intelligence strategies; and
                  ``(F) costs associated with establishing and 
                maintaining the necessary infrastructure to integrate 
                biosurveillance systems.
          ``(2) Additional requirements.--This strategy required under 
        subsection (b) shall--
                  ``(A) include a plan for advancing situational 
                awareness;
                  ``(B) identify key elements of information to be 
                shared, critical sensitivities to be protected, and a 
                framework for enabling information exchange;
                  ``(C) include a plan for fostering information 
                sharing between law enforcement, security, 
                intelligence, and national biosecurity and biodefense 
                stakeholders to identify potential threats, reduce 
                vulnerabilities and improve collective response 
                activities to and investigations of suspected 
                biological attacks; and
                  ``(D) include strategic and implementation plans for 
                the National Biosurveillance Integration Center under 
                section 316.

``SEC. 2132. DETECTION OF BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS.

  ``(a) Program.--The Secretary shall carry out a program in the 
Department to detect a biological attack or event. Through such 
program, the Secretary shall--
          ``(1) deploy detectors to areas, based on risk, to indicate 
        the presence of biological agents;
          ``(2) provide information to participating laboratories for 
        their use in monitoring public health, and biological material 
        from these detectors to participating laboratories for testing;
          ``(3) provide information about the presence of biological 
        agents to public health and law enforcement personnel at all 
        levels of government; and
          ``(4) provide advanced planning tools, concepts of operations 
        (including alarm resolution protocols), and training exercises 
        for collective response to and recovery from biological 
        attacks.
  ``(b) Program Requirements.--Under the program required under 
subsection (a), the Secretary shall--
          ``(1) enter into memoranda of agreement or interagency 
        agreements under the Economy Act of 1933 (31 U.S.C. 1535 et 
        seq.) with the Director of the Centers of Disease Control and 
        Prevention and the Administrator of the Environmental 
        Protection Agency, and the heads of other Federal departments 
        and agencies, setting forth roles and responsibilities, 
        including with respect to filter testing protocols for 
        participating laboratories and coordination with appropriate 
        State, local, and tribal agencies;
          ``(2) determine, on an annual basis, whether plans for 
        biological detector capabilities and coverage sufficiently 
        protect the United States population; and
          ``(3) acting through the Under Secretary for Science and 
        Technology, and in consultation with the Director for the 
        Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, implement an assay 
        equivalency program for biological threat assays that--
                  ``(A) may evaluate biological threat detection 
                assays, their protocols for use, and their associated 
                response algorithms for confirmation of biological 
                threat agents, taking performance measures and concepts 
                of operation into consideration;
                  ``(B) may develop assay equivalency standards based 
                on the findings of the evaluation under subparagraph 
                (A);
                  ``(C) will be updated as necessary;
                  ``(D) shall require implementation of the standards 
                developed under subparagraph (B) for all Department 
                biological detection programs; and
                  ``(E) shall make such standards available to support 
                all other Federal biological detection programs.
  ``(c) Contract Authority.--The Secretary is authorized to enter into 
contracts with participating laboratories for--
          ``(1) the provision of laboratory services to test detector 
        filters on a fee-for-service basis or on a prepayment or other 
        similar basis; and
          ``(2) administrative and other costs related to hosting 
        program personnel and equipment in these laboratories.
  ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) The term `participating laboratory' means a laboratory 
        that has been accepted as a member of the Laboratory Response 
        Network for Bioterrorism that--
                  ``(A) is fully equipped to detect and respond quickly 
                to acts of biological terrorism;
                  ``(B) provides biocontainment and microbiological 
                analysis in support of the Department, the Federal 
                Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement 
                agencies with responsibilities for investigating 
                biological incidents; and
                  ``(C) supports threat agent characterization studies 
                and assay evaluation, research and development.
          ``(2) The term `assay' means any scientific test that is 
        designed to detect the presence of a biological threat agent 
        that is of a type selected under criteria established by the 
        Secretary.

``SEC. 2133. RAPID BIOLOGICAL THREAT DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION.

  ``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 302(4) the Secretary shall 
require the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, in consultation 
with the heads of other relevant operational components of the 
Department, assess whether the development of screening capabilities 
for biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other infectious 
diseases should be undertaken by the Science and Technology Directorate 
to support entry and exit screening at ports of entry and for other 
purposes.
  ``(b) Development of Methods.--If the Under Secretary determines that 
the development of such screening capabilities should be undertaken, 
the Secretary shall, to the extent possible, initiate development of 
safe and effective methods to rapidly screen incoming travelers at 
ports of entry for biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other 
infectious diseases.
  ``(c) Collaboration.--In developing methods under subsection (b), the 
Secretary may collaborate with the heads of other Federal agencies, as 
needed.

``SEC. 2134. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION FOR 
                    EMERGENCY RESPONDERS (SAVER) PROGRAM.

  ``The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and 
Technology, shall carry out a program for system assessment and 
validation of emergency response equipment at the Department, to be 
known as the `SAVER Program'. The Secretary shall ensure that such 
program--
          ``(1) conducts objective, impartial, practitioner-relevant, 
        and operationally-oriented assessments and validations of 
        commercial emergency responder equipment and systems, including 
        hand-held detectors for agents used in weapons of mass 
        destruction;
          ``(2) is supported by a network of scientists who perform the 
        assessment and validation activities;
          ``(3) provides results along with other relevant equipment 
        information to the emergency response provider community in an 
        operationally useful form;
          ``(4) provides information on equipment that falls within the 
        categories listed in the Department's authorized equipment 
        list;
          ``(5) provides information that enables decision-makers and 
        responders to better select, procure, use and maintain 
        emergency responder equipment; and
          ``(6) shares such information nationally with the emergency 
        response provider community.

``SEC. 2135. PAYMENT FOR BIOTERRORISM LABORATORY SERVICES.

  ``In carrying out their functions, responsibilities, authorities, and 
duties to counter biological terrorism, the Secretary, the Attorney 
General, and the heads of other participating Federal agencies are 
authorized to enter into contracts with the State and local public 
health laboratories that compose the Laboratory Response Network for 
Bioterrorism, and any other qualified laboratories, for the provision 
of laboratory testing services on a fee-for-service basis or on a 
prepayment or other similar basis.

``SEC. 2136. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTEGRATED CONSORTIUM OF LABORATORY 
                    NETWORKS.

  ``(a) Establishment.--There is established in the Department an 
Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks that is managed by the 
Secretary.
  ``(b) Requirements.--The Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks 
shall--
          ``(1) be composed of networks of laboratories capable of 
        integrated and coordinated response to and consequence 
        management of attacks from weapons of mass destruction, acts of 
        terrorism, and other incidents requiring laboratory response 
        capabilities;
          ``(2) be a coordinated and operational system of laboratory 
        networks that provide timely, high quality results for early 
        detection and effective consequence management of attacks from 
        weapons of mass destruction, acts of terrorism, and other 
        events requiring an integrated laboratory response;
          ``(3) serve as a system of laboratory networks that are 
        equipped to detect and respond quickly to attacks from weapons 
        of mass destruction and acts of terrorism;
          ``(4) provide limited containment and analysis in support of 
        the Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other 
        law enforcement agencies with responsibilities for 
        investigating incidents involving weapons of mass destruction 
        or their agents; and
          ``(5) support threat agent characterization studies and assay 
        evaluation, research and development.

                       ``Subtitle D--Attribution

``SEC. 2141. BIOFORENSICS CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGY.

  ``(a) National Bioforensics Analysis Center.--There is established in 
the Department a National Bioforensics Analysis Center which shall 
serve as the lead Federal facility to--
          ``(1) provide definitive forensic examination of biothreat 
        agents and related evidence;
          ``(2) provide necessary biocontainment;
          ``(3) integrate bioforensics requirements for law 
        enforcement, national security, and homeland security;
          ``(4) provide bioforensics analysis in support of the 
        executive agencies with primary responsibilities for 
        preventing, deterring, responding to, attributing, and 
        recovering from biological attacks;
          ``(5) develop national bioforensics standards;
          ``(6) maintain the national bioforensics repository 
        collection as a reference collection of biological agents and 
        toxins for bioforensics comparisons and identifications; and
          ``(7) support threat agent characterization studies and 
        bioforensics assay evaluation research and development.
  ``(b) National Bioforensics Repository Collection.--
          ``(1) In general.--The National Bioforensics Analysis Center 
        shall maintain a distributed national bioforensics repository 
        collection.
          ``(2) Activities.--The national bioforensics repository 
        collection shall--
                  ``(A) receive, store, and distribute biological 
                threat agents and toxins;
                  ``(B) serve as a distributed reference collection for 
                comparative bioforensics identifications and 
                characterizations; and
                  ``(C) support threat agent characterization studies 
                and the development of bioforensics assays, genomic 
                analyses, organic and inorganic chemical analyses, 
                electron microscopy analyses, and other relevant 
                assays, analyses, and tests.
          ``(3) Participation.--
                  ``(A) In general.--The Secretary, the Attorney 
                General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of 
                Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of 
                Health and Human Services, the Director of National 
                Intelligence, and the head of any other appropriate 
                executive agency with a biological agent or toxin 
                collection that is useful for the bioforensics analysis 
                of biological attacks, performance of biological threat 
                agent identification and characterization studies, or 
                evaluation and development of bioforensics assays and 
                methods shall provide to the distributed national 
                bioforensics repository collection authenticated 
                replicate samples of, or information on, all relevant 
                biological strains and toxins, as determined by the 
                Secretary, in consultation with the head of the 
                executive agency possessing the agent or toxin.
                  ``(B) Other biological agents and toxins.--The 
                Secretary shall require the contribution to the 
                national bioforensics repository collection of 
                authenticated replicate samples of, or information on, 
                all relevant biological strains and toxins, as 
                determined by the Secretary, from public and private 
                biological agent and toxin collections that were 
                collected or created with support from a Federal grant 
                or contract and that support the functions described in 
                paragraph (2).
          ``(4) Access.--The Secretary shall--
                  ``(A) provide any executive agency that submits a 
                biological agent or toxin, or information on a 
                biological agent or toxin, to the national bioforensics 
                repository collection with access to the collection; 
                and
                  ``(B) establish a mechanism to provide public and 
                private entities with access to agents or toxins in, or 
                information regarding, the national bioforensics 
                repository collection, as determined appropriate by the 
                Secretary, with appropriate protection of classified or 
                law enforcement sensitive information and intellectual 
                property rights.
          ``(5) Report.--
                  ``(A) In general.--Not later than one year after the 
                date of the enactment of this section, and annually 
                thereafter, the Secretary, in consultation with the 
                Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the 
                Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the 
                Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of 
                National Intelligence, and the head of any other 
                appropriate executive agency that participates in or 
                contributes agents, or toxins, or information to the 
                national bioforensics repository collection, shall 
                submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
                report regarding the national bioforensics repository 
                collection.
                  ``(B) Contents.--The report submitted under 
                subparagraph (A) shall--
                          ``(i) discuss the status of the establishment 
                        of the distributed national bioforensics 
                        repository collection;
                          ``(ii) identify domestic and international 
                        biological agent and toxin collections that 
                        would prove useful in carrying out the 
                        functions of the distributed national 
                        bioforensics repository collection;
                          ``(iii) examine any access or participation 
                        issues affecting the establishment of the 
                        distributed national bioforensics repository 
                        collection or the ability to support 
                        bioforensics analysis, threat agent 
                        characterization studies, or bioforensics assay 
                        evaluation, research, and development, 
                        including--
                                  ``(I) intellectual property concerns;
                                  ``(II) access to collected or created 
                                biological agent or toxin collections 
                                funded by a Federal grant or contract;
                                  ``(III) costs incurred by domestic 
                                and international biological agent and 
                                toxin collections to access or 
                                contribute biological agents or toxins 
                                to the national bioforensics repository 
                                collection; and
                                  ``(IV) access to the national 
                                bioforensics repository collection by 
                                public and private researchers to 
                                support threat agent characterization 
                                studies, bioforensics assay evaluation, 
                                research, and development, and 
                                biosecurity research and development; 
                                and
                          ``(iv) other issues determined appropriate.
  ``(c) National Bioforensics Strategy.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in coordination with the 
        Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary 
        of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
        Director of National Intelligence, and the head of any other 
        appropriate executive agency, as determined by the Secretary, 
        shall develop, coordinate, and maintain a national bioforensics 
        strategy.
          ``(2) Contents.--The national bioforensics strategy shall--
                  ``(A) provide for a coordinated approach across all 
                executive agencies with responsibilities for--
                          ``(i) conducting bioforensics examination of 
                        biological threat agents and related evidence; 
                        and
                          ``(ii) generating bioforensics requirements 
                        for law enforcement, national security, and 
                        homeland security;
                  ``(B) describe the roles and responsibilities of all 
                relevant executive agencies, including--
                          ``(i) research to characterize threat agents;
                          ``(ii) assay evaluation, research, and 
                        development; and
                          ``(iii) funding;
                  ``(C) establish mechanisms, in coordination with 
                State, local, and tribal authorities, for coordinating 
                with public health, homeland security, and law 
                enforcement agencies for the collection or receipt, 
                transfer, or submission of bioforensics evidence for 
                analysis and its use; and
                  ``(D) include--
                          ``(i) guidance for collecting, processing, 
                        and analyzing samples;
                          ``(ii) requirements for reporting 
                        bioforensics information to appropriate 
                        agencies; and
                          ``(iii) requirements for the distributed 
                        national bioforensics repository collection.
          ``(3) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
        enactment of this section, and biennially thereafter, the 
        Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, the 
        Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Defense, the 
        Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of 
        National Intelligence, and the heads of other appropriate 
        agencies, as determined by the Secretary, shall submit to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress the national bioforensics 
        strategy.
  ``(d) Concept of Operations.--The Secretary, in coordination with the 
Attorney General and the heads of any other appropriate Federal 
agencies shall ensure the availability of a detailed concept of 
operations for information sharing and all-source analysis to support 
timely attribution of biological attacks.
  ``(e) Detailee Program.--Subject to the availability of 
appropriations, the Secretary may implement a detailee program to 
detail from governmental entities national biosecurity and biodefense 
stakeholders with appropriate clearances, on a reimbursable basis, to 
the National Bioforensics Analysis Center for the purpose of--
          ``(1) providing training and other educational benefits for 
        such stakeholders to help them to better understand the 
        policies, procedures, and laws governing national bioforensics 
        activities; and
          ``(2) bolstering the capabilities and information sharing 
        activities of the National Bioforensics Analysis Center with 
        national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders.
  ``(f) Research and Development.--The Secretary, in coordination with 
the Attorney General and the heads of any other appropriate Federal 
agencies, shall establish a national-level research and development 
strategy and implementation plan to advance the field of bioforensics.
  ``(g) Definition of Bioforensics.--In this section, the term 
`bioforensics' means the scientific discipline dedicated to analyzing 
evidence from an attack with a biological weapon of mass destruction, 
an act of bioterrorism, a biological agent- or toxin-based criminal 
act, or the inadvertent release of a biological agent or toxin for 
attribution purposes.

``SEC. 2142. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING TO INVESTIGATE BIOLOGICAL 
                    THREATS.

  ``The Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General, the 
Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, 
shall make available to law enforcement, public health, and security 
personnel at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center training on 
recognizing and responding to situations involving potential biological 
threats, including performing joint criminal and epidemiological 
investigations, and shall--
          ``(1) ensure that tailored tactics, techniques, and 
        procedures are made available to law enforcement and security 
        personnel, including access to the tools needed to respond to 
        biological threats;
          ``(2) promote the use of simulation among Federal partners to 
        exercise capabilities, refine operational concepts, and 
        strengthen relationships across the Government; and
          ``(3) make training available that will ensure that law 
        enforcement, public health, and agricultural investigations of 
        biological threats are coordinated.

                         ``Subtitle E--Response

``SEC. 2151. FIRST RESPONDER GUIDANCE CONCERNING WEAPONS OF MASS 
                    DESTRUCTION ATTACKS.

  ``(a) Establishment of Voluntary Guidance.--Not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary shall--
          ``(1) develop for police, fire, emergency medical services, 
        emergency management, and public health personnel, voluntary 
        guidance for responding to a release of chemical, biological, 
        radiological, or nuclear material;
          ``(2) in developing the guidance under paragraph (1), review 
        the experiences of other countries and the expertise of 
        academic institutions and non-governmental organizations; and
          ``(3) make such guidance available to State, local, and 
        tribal authorities, nongovernmental organizations, the private 
        sector, and the public.
  ``(b) Contents.--The guidance developed under subsection (a)(1) shall 
include--
          ``(1) protective action guidance for ensuring the security, 
        health, and safety of emergency response providers;
          ``(2) specific information regarding the effects of the 
        chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material on 
        those exposed to the agent; and
          ``(3) best practices for emergency response providers to 
        effectively deal with individuals affected by an incident 
        involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
        material.
  ``(c) Review and Revision of Guidance.--The Secretary shall--
          ``(1) review the guidance developed under subsection (a)(1) 
        at least once every 2 years,
          ``(2) make revisions to the guidance as appropriate; and
          ``(3) make any revised guidance available to State, local, 
        and tribal authorities, nongovernmental organizations, the 
        private sector, and the public.
  ``(d) Procedures for Developing and Revising Guidance.--In carrying 
out the requirements of this section, the Secretary shall establish 
procedures to--
          ``(1) inventory existing relevant hazardous material response 
        guidance;
          ``(2) enable members of the first responder and first 
        provider community to submit recommendations of areas in which 
        guidance is needed and could be developed under subsection 
        (a)(1);
          ``(3) determine which entities should be consulted in 
        developing or revising the guidance;
          ``(4) prioritize, on a regular basis, guidance that should be 
        developed or revised; and
          ``(5) develop and disseminate the guidance in accordance with 
        the prioritization under paragraph (4).
  ``(e) Consultations.--The Secretary shall develop and revise the 
guidance developed under subsection (a)(1), and the procedures required 
under subsection (d), in consultation with--
          ``(1) the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, as 
        appropriate;
          ``(2) the National Advisory Council established under section 
        508;
          ``(3) the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium;
          ``(4) State, local, and tribal authorities; and
          ``(5) nongovernmental organizations and private industry.
  ``(f) Reporting Requirements.--Not later than 18 months after the 
date of the enactment of this section and annually thereafter, the 
Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees--
          ``(1) a description of the procedures established under 
        subsection (d);
          ``(2) any guidance in effect on the date of the report;
          ``(3) a list of entities to which the guidance described in 
        paragraph (2) was disseminated;
          ``(4) a plan for reviewing the guidance described in 
        paragraph (2), in accordance with subsection (e);
          ``(5) guidance required under subsection (d)(4), and the 
        methodology used by the Secretary for such prioritization; and
          ``(6) a plan for developing, revising, and disseminating the 
        guidance.

``SEC. 2152. INTEGRATED PLUME MODELING FOR COLLECTIVE RESPONSE.

  ``(a) Development.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall acquire, use, and 
        disseminate integrated plume models to enable rapid response 
        activities following a chemical, biological, nuclear, or 
        radiological attack or event.
          ``(2) Scope.--The Secretary shall--
                  ``(A) ensure the rapid development and distribution 
                of integrated plume models to appropriate officials of 
                the Federal Government and State, local, and tribal 
                authorities to enable immediate response to a chemical, 
                biological, or radiological attack or event;
                  ``(B) establish mechanisms for dissemination by 
                appropriate emergency response officials of the 
                integrated plume models described in paragraph (1) to 
                nongovernmental organizations and the public to enable 
                appropriate collective response activities;
                  ``(C) ensure that the development and dissemination 
                of integrated plume models are assessed during 
                exercises administered by the Department; and
                  ``(D) ensure that lessons learned from assessing the 
                development and dissemination of integrated plume 
                models during exercises administered by the Department 
                are put into the Department of Homeland Security 
                Lessons Learned Information Sharing system.
  ``(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of enactment of 
this section, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report regarding--
          ``(1) the acquisition, use, and dissemination of integrated 
        plume models under this section;
          ``(2) lessons learned from assessing the development and 
        dissemination of integrated plume models during exercises 
        administered by the Department; and
          ``(3) recommendations for improving integrated plume models, 
        as appropriate.
  ``(c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
          ``(1) The term `plume model' means the assessment of the 
        location and prediction of the spread of agents following a 
        chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or event.
          ``(2) The term `integrated plume model' means a plume model 
        that integrates protective action guidance and other 
        information as the Secretary determines appropriate.

                         ``Subtitle F--Recovery

``SEC. 2161. RECOVERY AND RESTORATION FROM A BIOLOGICAL ATTACK OR 
                    INCIDENT GUIDANCE.

  ``(a) Establishment of Guidance.--Not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary, in coordination 
with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and in 
consultation with the Director of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Agency, and the Director of the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health, shall develop and issue guidance for clean-up and 
restoration of indoor and outdoor areas, including subways and other 
mass transportation facilities, that have been affected by a biological 
attack or event.
  ``(b) Contents.--The guidance developed under subsection (a) shall 
include--
          ``(1) acceptable levels of growth of the organism in post-
        remediation area samples from affected sites;
          ``(2) standards for effective clean-up of affected sites;
          ``(3) standards for safe post-event occupancy of affected 
        sites;
          ``(4) requirements to ensure that the decontamination 
        procedures for responding organizations do not conflict;
          ``(5) requirements that each responding organization uses a 
        uniform system for tracking costs and performance of clean-up 
        contractors;
          ``(6) levels of personal protection equipment;
          ``(7) maintenance of negative air pressure in buildings;
          ``(8) standards for proper selection and use of personal 
        protective equipment;
          ``(9) air sampling procedures; and
          ``(10) how to develop occupational health and safety plans 
        that are appropriate for the specific risk to responder health.
  ``(c) Review and Revision of Guidance.--The Secretary shall--
          ``(1) not less frequently than once every 2 years, review the 
        guidance developed under subsection (a);
          ``(2) make revisions to the guidance as appropriate; and
          ``(3) make the revised guidance available to the Federal 
        government, State, local, and tribal authorities, 
        nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the 
        public.
  ``(d) Procedures for Developing and Revising Guidance.--In carrying 
out the requirements of this section, the Secretary shall establish 
procedures to--
          ``(1) inventory existing relevant guidance;
          ``(2) enable the public to submit recommendations of areas in 
        which guidance is needed;
          ``(3) determine which entities should be consulted in 
        developing or revising the guidance;
          ``(4) prioritize, on a regular basis, guidance that should be 
        developed or revised; and
          ``(5) develop and disseminate the guidance in accordance with 
        the prioritization under paragraph (4).
  ``(e) Consultations.--The Secretary shall develop and revise the 
guidance developed under subsection (a), and the procedures required 
under subsection (d), in consultation with--
          ``(1) the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, as 
        appropriate;
          ``(2) State, local, and tribal authorities; and
          ``(3) nongovernmental organizations and private industry.
  ``(f) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall 
provide appropriate congressional committees with--
          ``(1) a description of the procedures established under 
        subsection (d);
          ``(2) any guidance in effect on the date of the report;
          ``(3) a list of entities to which the guidance described in 
        paragraph (2) were disseminated;
          ``(4) a plan for reviewing the guidance described in 
        paragraph (2), in accordance with subsection (e);
          ``(5) the prioritized list of the guidance required under 
        subsection (d)(4), and the methodology used by the Secretary 
        for such prioritization; and
          ``(6) a plan for developing, revising, and disseminating the 
        guidance.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendments.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of 
such Act is amended by adding at the end the following new items:

  ``TITLE XXI--WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

                ``Subtitle A--Prevention and Deterrence

        ``Sec. 2101. Weapons of Mass Destruction Intelligence and 
                        Information Sharing Unit.
        ``Sec. 2102. Information sharing and collaboration for 
                        biosecurity and biodefense.
        ``Sec. 2103. Bioterrorism risk assessments.
        ``Sec. 2104. Radiological materials security.
        ``Sec. 2105. Enhanced biosecurity measures.
        ``Sec. 2106. Tier I Material Threat Agent locations.
        ``Sec. 2107. High containment biological laboratory security 
                        grants.
        ``Sec. 2108. Laboratory biosecurity information sharing.
        ``Sec. 2109. Periodic homeland security review of criminal 
                        statutes.
        ``Sec. 2110. Export enforcement for counter-proliferation.

                       ``Subtitle B--Preparedness

        ``Sec. 2121. Communication of threat information and alerts.
        ``Sec. 2122. Individual and community preparedness for weapons 
                        of mass destruction.

                        ``Subtitle C--Detection

        ``Sec. 2131. National biosurveillance strategy.
        ``Sec. 2132. Detection of biological attacks.
        ``Sec. 2133. Rapid biological threat detection and 
                        identification.
        ``Sec. 2134. Establishment of the system assessment and 
                        validation for emergency responders (SAVER) 
                        program.
        ``Sec. 2135. Payment for bioterrorism laboratory services.
        ``Sec. 2136. Establishment of the integrated consortium of 
                        laboratory networks.

                       ``Subtitle D--Attribution

        ``Sec. 2141. Bioforensics capabilities and strategy.
        ``Sec. 2142. Federal law enforcement training to investigate 
                        biological threats.

                         ``Subtitle E--Response

        ``Sec. 2151. First responder guidance concerning weapons of 
                        mass destruction attacks.
        ``Sec. 2152. Integrated plume modeling for collective response.

                         ``Subtitle F--Recovery

        ``Sec. 2161. Recovery and restoration from a biological attack 
                        or incident guidance.

SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.

  Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
          ``(19) The term `weapon of mass destruction' has the meaning 
        given that term in section 1403(1) fo the Defense Against 
        Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302).
          ``(20) The term `Intelligence Community' has the meaning 
        given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 
        1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
          ``(21) The term `national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders' means officials from the Federal, State, local, 
        and tribal authorities and individuals from the private sector 
        who are involved in efforts to prevent, deter, prepare for, 
        detect, attribute, respond, and recover from a biological 
        attack or other phenomena that may have serious health 
        consequences for the United States, including wide-scale 
        fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks.
          ``(22) The term `Tier I Material Threat Agent' means a 
        substance so designated under section 351A(a)(2) of the Public 
        Health Service Act or section 212(a)(2) of the Agricultural 
        Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002.''.

SEC. 203. DUAL-USE TERRORIST RISKS FROM SYNTHETIC GENOMICS.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the field of 
synthetic genomics has the potential to facilitate enormous gains in 
fundamental discovery and biotechnological applications, but it also 
has inherent dual-use homeland security risks that must be managed.
  (b) Requirement.--Not later than one year after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the 
Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and Technology, shall 
examine and report to the appropriate congressional committees on the 
homeland security implications of the dual-use nature of synthetic 
genomics, and if the Under Secretary determines that such research is 
appropriate, may conduct research in that area, including--
          (1) determining the current capability of synthetic nucleic 
        acid providers to effectively differentiate a legitimate 
        customer from a potential terrorist or other malicious actor;
          (2) determining the current capability of synthetic nucleic 
        acid providers to effectively screen orders for sequences of 
        homeland security concern; and
          (3) making recommendations regarding screening software, 
        protocols, and other remaining capability gaps uncovered by the 
        study.

SEC. 204. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ANALYZED BY THE DEPARTMENT TO 
                    STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL, AND PRIVATE ENTITIES WITH 
                    RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO HOMELAND SECURITY.

  (a) Responsibilities of the Secretary.--Section 201(d)(8) of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)(8)) is amended by 
striking ``and to agencies of State'' and all that follows and 
inserting ``to State, local, tribal, and private entities with such 
responsibilities, and, as appropriate, to the public, in order to 
assist in preventing, deterring, or responding to acts of terrorism 
against the United States.''.
  (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the implementation of 
this section.

SEC. 205. NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE INTEGRATION CENTER (NBIC).

  Section 316 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 195b) is 
amended--
          (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``an office or directorate 
        of the Department'' and all that follows through the period at 
        the end and inserting the following: ``the Office of 
        Intelligence and Analysis.'';
          (2) in subsection (d)(2)(B)--
                  (A) by inserting ``and disseminate'' after 
                ``integrate''; and
                  (B) by inserting ``, including information and 
                intelligence generated elsewhere within the Office of 
                Intelligence and Analysis and the Department,'' after 
                ``information'' ;
          (3) in subsection (e)(1), by striking subparagraph (A) and 
        inserting the following new subparagraph (A):
                  ``(A) integrate biosurveillance information into the 
                NBIC, with the goal of promoting information sharing 
                between Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities 
                to detect biological attacks and events of homeland 
                concern;'';
          (4) by amending paragraph (2) of subsection (f) to read as 
        follows:
          ``(2) Detail of personnel.--The head of a participating 
        Federal department or agency shall detail, on a reimbursable 
        basis, any of the personnel of that department or agency to the 
        Department to assist the NBIC in carrying out this section.''; 
        and
          (5) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k) and 
        inserting after subsection (i) the following new subsection 
        (j):
  ``(j) Annual Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010 and 
annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on--
          ``(1) the status of operations at the National 
        Biosurveillance Integration Center of the Department under 
        section 316;
          ``(2) efforts by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to 
        take responsibility for the National Biosurveillance 
        Integration Center; and
          ``(3) efforts to integrate the biosurveillance efforts of 
        Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities.''.

SEC. 206. REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT AND 
                    VALIDATION FOR EMERGENCY RESPONDERS (SAVER) 
                    PROGRAM.

  Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the SAVER Program under section 
2134 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by section 201.

SEC. 207. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES STUDY OF FORENSIC SCIENCE IN 
                    HOMELAND SECURITY.

  (a) Study.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under 
Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and Technology, shall seek 
to enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences to--
          (1) conduct a study, building on previous studies conducted 
        by the National Academy of Sciences, on the role of forensic 
        science in homeland security; and
          (2) issue recommendations to enhance this homeland security 
        capability to investigate attacks from weapons of mass 
        destruction, terrorist incidents, and other crimes investigated 
        by the Department.
  (b) Report.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report containing the results of the 
National Academy of Sciences study required under subsection (a), 
together with any recommendations of the Secretary related thereto.
  (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department, for fiscal year 2011, $1,000,000 to 
carry out this section.

SEC. 208. HARMONIZATION OF REGULATIONS.

  (a) Regulations Under Public Health Service Act.--Not later than one 
year after the Secretary of Homeland Security promulgates regulations 
or amendments thereto to carry out section 2104 of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, as added by section 201, the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services shall amend regulations promulgated under the Select 
Agent Program under section 351A(b)(1) of the Public Health Service Act 
(42 U.S.C. 262a(b)(1)) to ensure that such regulations are not 
redundant or are not in conflict with the regulations promulgated by 
the Secretary under such section 2104.
  (b) Regulations Under Agriculture Bioterrorism Protection Act of 
2002.--Not later than one year after the Secretary of Homeland Security 
promulgates regulations or amendments thereto pursuant to such section 
2104, the Secretary of Agriculture shall amend regulations promulgated 
under the Select Agent Program under section 212(b)(1) of the 
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. 8401(b)(1)) 
to ensure that such regulations are not redundant or are not in 
conflict with the regulations promulgated by the Secretary under such 
section 2104.

SEC. 209. COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
                    INFORMATION DISSEMINATION.

  (a) Communications Plans Required.--Section 653 of the Post-Katrina 
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 753) is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a)(4), by inserting after ``man-made 
        disasters'' the following ``, and a communications plan 
        described in subsection (f)''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(f) Communications Plan.--
          ``(1) In general.--A communications plan developed under 
        subsection (a)(4) shall be designed to provide information to 
        the public related to preventing, preparing for, and responding 
        to attacks from weapons of mass destruction and acts of 
        terrorism;
          ``(2) Consultation.--As appropriate, the Administrator shall 
        consult with State, local, and tribal authorities and 
        coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies in 
        developing communications plans under paragraph (1).
          ``(3) Pre-scripted messages and message templates.--
                  ``(A) In general.--The Administrator shall develop 
                and disseminate pre-scripted messages and message 
                templates to be provided to State, local, and tribal 
                authorities so that those authorities can quickly and 
                rapidly disseminate critical information to the public 
                in anticipation of, during, or in the immediate 
                aftermath of an attack from a weapon of mass 
                destruction or terrorist incident, and to be included 
                in the Department of Homeland Security's Lessons 
                Learned Information Sharing system.
                  ``(B) Development and design.--The pre-scripted 
                messages or message templates shall--
                          ``(i) be developed in consultation with 
                        State, local, and tribal authorities and in 
                        coordination with other appropriate Federal 
                        departments and agencies;
                          ``(ii) be designed to provide accurate, 
                        essential, and appropriate information and 
                        instructions to the population directly 
                        affected by an incident, including information 
                        regarding an evacuation, sheltering in place, 
                        hospital surge operations, health, and safety; 
                        and
                          ``(iii) be designed to provide accurate, 
                        essential, and appropriate information and 
                        instructions to emergency response providers 
                        and medical personnel responding to an 
                        incident.
                  ``(C) Communications formats.--The Administrator 
                shall develop pre-scripted messages or message 
                templates under this paragraph in multiple formats to 
                ensure delivery--
                          ``(i) in cases where the usual communications 
                        infrastructure is unusable; and
                          ``(ii) to individuals with disabilities or 
                        other special needs and individuals with 
                        limited English proficiency.
                  ``(D) Dissemination and technical assistance.--The 
                Administrator shall ensure that all pre-scripted 
                messages and message templates developed under this 
                paragraph are made available to State, local, and 
                tribal authorities so that those authorities may 
                incorporate them, as appropriate, into their emergency 
                plans. The Administrator shall also make available 
                relevant technical assistance to those authorities to 
                support communications planning.
                  ``(E) Exercises.--To ensure that the pre-scripted 
                messages or message templates developed under this 
                paragraph can be effectively utilized in a disaster or 
                incident, the Administrator shall incorporate such pre-
                scripted messages or message templates into exercises 
                conducted under the National Exercise Program described 
                in section 648 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
                Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 748).''.
  (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees the communications plans required to be 
developed under the amendments made by subsection (a), including pre-
scripted messages or message templates developed in conjunction with 
the plans and a description of the means that will be used to deliver 
these messages during such incidents.

SEC. 210. ENVIRONMENTAL RECOVERY FROM CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, 
                    RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS.

  (a) In General.--To facilitate environmental recovery from a 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or other incident 
involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials and 
to foster collective response to terrorism, the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, in coordination with the Administrator 
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall assess capability 
gaps in environmental recovery preparedness and provide guidance to 
State, local, and tribal authorities.
  (b) Requirements.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Administrator 
of the Environmental Protection Agency shall--
          (1) assess capability gaps in the Nation's ability to recover 
        from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks or 
        incidents, with specific attention to--
                  (A) decontamination standards, gaps in such 
                standards, and recommendations for research to minimize 
                these gaps;
                  (B) environmental remediation methods; and
                  (C) such other components as determined by the 
                Secretary;
          (2) disseminate guidance to State, local, and tribal 
        authorities that conforms to the goals of the National Disaster 
        Recovery Strategy as required in Section 682 of the Department 
        of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-
        295; 6 U.S.C. 771) regarding how to conduct environmental 
        remediation of contaminated areas, including--
                  (A) clarification of Federal roles and 
                responsibilities for assisting State, local, and tribal 
                authorities; and
                  (B) such other guidance as determined by the 
                Secretary; and
          (3) develop exercises in consultation with State, local, and 
        tribal authorities and other appropriate Federal agencies, to 
        enhance collective response to and recovery from chemical, 
        biological, radiological and nuclear attacks and incidents, 
        including exercises that address analysis, environmental 
        cleanup methods, and decontamination standards.
  (c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
the Administrator's assessment under section 2162 of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, as added by section 201.

SEC. 211. UNIVERSITY-BASED CENTERS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY CRITERIA FOR 
                    DESIGNATION.

  Section 308(b)(2)(B)(iii) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
U.S.C. 188(b)(2)(B)(iii)) is amended by inserting before the period at 
the end the following ``, including medical readiness training and 
research, and community resiliency for public health and healthcare 
critical infrastructure''.

                    TITLE III--PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS

SEC. 301. NATIONAL MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE DISPENSING STRATEGY.

  Title III of the Public Health Service Act is amended by inserting 
after section 319F-4 (42 U.S.C. 247d-6e) the following:

``SEC. 319F-5. NATIONAL MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE DISPENSING STRATEGY.

  ``(a) Definitions.--In this section--
          ``(1) the term `dispense' means to provide medical 
        countermeasures to an affected population in response to a 
        threat or incident; and
          ``(2) the term `medical countermeasure' means a qualified 
        countermeasure (as defined in section 319F-1(a)(2)).
  ``(b) Strategy.--The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the Secretary of Agriculture, and other appropriate 
Federal agencies, shall develop, implement, and, as appropriate, 
periodically update a National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing 
Strategy to enhance preparedness and collective response to a terrorist 
attack on humans or animals with any chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear material.
  ``(c) Coordination.--Where appropriate, the Secretary shall 
coordinate with State, local, and tribal authorities, private sector, 
and nongovernmental organizations on the National Medical 
Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy.
  ``(d) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this section, the Secretary, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit the National Medical 
Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy to the appropriate congressional 
committees.''.

SEC. 302. MATERIAL THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND DETERMINATIONS.

  Section 319F-2(c)(2)(A) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
Sec 247d-6b(c)(2)(A)) is amended--
          (1) in clause (i), by striking ``and'' at the end;
          (2) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
          (3) by adding at the end the following:
                          ``(iii) review and reassess determinations 
                        under clause (ii) to determine whether agents 
                        continue to present a material threat against 
                        the United States population sufficient to 
                        affect national security and homeland 
                        security.''.

SEC. 303. NATIONAL PRE-EVENT VACCINATION AND ANTIMICROBIAL DISPENSING 
                    POLICY REVIEW.

  (a) Requirement.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall review the 
adequacy of domestic vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing policy, 
guidance, and information provided to the public in light of any known 
terrorist risk of a biological attack or other phenomena that may have 
serious health consequences for the United States, including wide-scale 
fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks. In carrying out the review 
under this section, the Secretary shall consider--
          (1) material threat assessments and determinations conducted 
        by the Department of Homeland Security;
          (2) reports on global trends and intelligence produced by the 
        Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the 
        Intelligence Community regarding biological threats;
          (3) the availability of domestic vaccine and antimicrobials 
        to dispense to the public, on a voluntary basis, in 
        anticipation of a biological attack; and
          (4) making surplus or expiring domestic vaccine and 
        antimicrobials available to State, local, and tribal emergency 
        responders, including health care responders, on a voluntary 
        basis.
  (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report on the review 
required by subsection (a), together with any recommendations relating 
to the availability of domestic vaccine and antimicrobials for 
disbursing to the public and voluntary immunization by first 
responders.

SEC. 304. DESIGNATION OF TIER 1 MATERIAL THREAT AGENTS.

  (a) Public Health Service Act.--Section 351A of the Public Health 
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262a) is amended in subsection (a)--
          (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3);
          (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
          ``(2) Tier i material threat agents.--
                  ``(A) Designation of tier i: material threat 
                agents.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
                enactment of this paragraph, the Secretary, in 
                coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security 
                and other Federal officials as appropriate, shall by 
                regulation designate as `Tier I Material Threat Agents' 
                those agents and toxins--
                          ``(i) that--
                                  ``(I) are determined by the Secretary 
                                of Homeland Security under section 
                                319F-2(c)(2) to present a material 
                                threat against the United States 
                                population sufficient to affect 
                                national security; and
                                  ``(II) are determined to warrant 
                                designation after applying the criteria 
                                in subparagraph (B); or
                          ``(ii) that clearly present a material threat 
                        to the Nation as otherwise determined by the 
                        Secretary or the Secretary of Homeland 
                        Security.
                  ``(B) Criteria.--In determining whether to designate 
                an agent or toxin as a Tier I Material Threat Agent 
                under subparagraph (A)(i), the Secretary, in 
                coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
                shall consider--
                          ``(i) whether the agent or toxin can be used 
                        effectively in a biological attack;
                          ``(ii) information available from any 
                        biological or bioterrorism risk assessments 
                        conducted by the Department of Homeland 
                        Security and relevant assessments by other 
                        agencies; and
                          ``(iii) such other criteria and information 
                        as the Secretary, in coordination with the 
                        Secretary of Homeland Security, determines 
                        appropriate and relevant.
                  ``(C) Inclusion of agents and toxins not previously 
                listed.--All agents or toxins designated by the 
                Secretary as Tier I Material Threat Agents shall be 
                included on the list maintained by the Secretary 
                pursuant to paragraph (1).
                  ``(D) Evaluation of tier i material threat agents.--
                The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security, shall--
                          ``(i) on an ongoing basis, consider the 
                        inclusion of additional agents or toxins on the 
                        list of Tier I Material Threat Agents, as 
                        appropriate; and
                          ``(ii) at least biennially, review the list 
                        of Tier I Material Threat agents to determine 
                        whether any agents or toxins should be removed 
                        from the list.''; and
          (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated--
                  (A) by striking ``list under paragraph (1)'' and 
                inserting ``lists under paragraphs (1) and (2)''; and
                  (B) by striking ``revise the list'' and inserting 
                ``revise the lists''.
  (b) Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002.--Section 212(a) 
of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. 
8401(a)) is amended--
          (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3);
          (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
          ``(2) Tier i material threat agents.--
                  ``(A) Designation of tier i: material threat 
                agents.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
                enactment of this paragraph, the Secretary, in 
                coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
                the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and other 
                Federal officials as appropriate, shall by regulation 
                designate as `Tier I Material Threat Agents' those 
                agents and toxins--
                          ``(i) that--
                                  ``(I) are determined by the Secretary 
                                of Homeland Security under section 
                                319F-2(c)(2) of the Public Health 
                                Service Act to present a material 
                                threat against the United States 
                                population sufficient to affect 
                                national security; and
                                  ``(II) are determined to warrant 
                                designation after applying the criteria 
                                in subparagraph (B); or
                          ``(ii) that clearly present a material threat 
                        to the Nation as otherwise determined by the 
                        Secretary or the Secretary of Homeland 
                        Security.
                  ``(B) Criteria.--In determining whether to designate 
                an agent or toxin as a Tier I Material Threat Agent 
                under subparagraph (A)(i), the Secretary, in 
                coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
                shall consider--
                          ``(i) whether the agent or toxin can be used 
                        effectively in a biological attack;
                          ``(ii) information available from any 
                        biological or bioterrorism risk assessments 
                        conducted by the Department of Homeland 
                        Security and relevant assessments by other 
                        agencies; and
                          ``(iii) such other criteria and information 
                        that the Secretary, in coordination with the 
                        Secretary of Homeland Security, determines 
                        appropriate and relevant.
                  ``(C) Inclusion of agents and toxins not previously 
                listed.--All agents or toxins designated by the 
                Secretary as Tier 1 Material Threat Agents shall be 
                included on the list maintained by the Secretary 
                pursuant to paragraph (1).
                  ``(D) Evaluation of tier i material threat agents.--
                The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security, shall--
                          ``(i) on an ongoing basis, consider the 
                        inclusion of additional agents or toxins on the 
                        list of Tier I Material Threat Agents, as 
                        appropriate; and
                          ``(ii) at least biennially, review the list 
                        of Tier I Material Threat agents to determine 
                        whether any agents or toxins should be removed 
                        from the list.''; and
          (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated--
                  (A) by striking ``list under paragraph (1)'' and 
                inserting ``lists under paragraphs (1) and (2)''; and
                  (B) by striking ``revise the list'' and inserting 
                ``revise the lists''.

SEC. 305. BACKGROUND CHECKS.

  Section 351A(e)(3)(A) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
262a(e)(3)(A)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``In 
identifying whether an individual is within a category specified in 
subparagraph (B)(ii)(II), the Attorney General shall coordinate with 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Secretary of State to determine whether these officials possess any 
information relevant to the identification of such an individual by the 
Attorney General.''.

SEC. 306. BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND PROCUREMENT.

   Title III of the Public Health Service Act is amended by inserting 
after section 319M (42 U.S.C. 247d-f) the following:

``SEC. 319N. BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND PROCUREMENT.

  ``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall develop a comprehensive 
research, development, and acquisition process to counter the 
biological threat that employs the inherent functions, capabilities, 
authorities, and responsibilities of NIH, BARDA, and Project BioShield. 
The process shall--
          ``(1) assign NIH responsibility for research and development 
        of technologies that range in development from basic principles 
        observed and reported up to model or prototype demonstration in 
        a relevant environment;
          ``(2) assign BARDA responsibility for research and 
        development of technologies that range in development from 
        model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment up 
        to a system qualified for application through successful test 
        and demonstration;
          ``(3) assign Project BioShield responsibility for procurement 
        of technologies that--
                  ``(A) are qualified for application through 
                successful test and demonstration; and
                  ``(B) meet the minimum statutory requirements for 
                emergency use authorization in section 564 of the 
                Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; and
          ``(4) include a formal agreement among NIH, BARDA, and 
        Project BioShield that--
                  ``(A) identifies the need for any specific biological 
                countermeasure, derived from information developed 
                under section 319F-2;
                  ``(B) identifies the current technology readiness 
                level of the countermeasure; and
                  ``(C) requires the development of the biological 
                countermeasure from the current technology readiness 
                level through the procurement of the countermeasure in 
                accordance with paragraph (3).
  ``(b) Responsibility of NIH.--For countermeasures identified under 
subsection (a)(4)(A) that have a level of development from basic 
principles observed and reported up to model or prototype demonstration 
in a relevant environment, the Director of NIH shall conduct research 
and development until the Director certifies to the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services that--
          ``(1) the countermeasure has completed model or prototype 
        demonstration in a relevant environment; or
          ``(2) the Director does not believe that completion of model 
        or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment is 
        reasonably achievable.
  ``(c) Responsibility of BARDA.--For countermeasures identified under 
subsection (a)(4)(A) that have a level of development of model or 
prototype demonstration in a relevant environment, including but not 
limited to those countermeasures certified to have that level of 
development by the Director of NIH, the Director of BARDA shall conduct 
research and development until the Director of BARDA certifies to the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services that--
          ``(1) the countermeasure has qualified for application 
        through successful test and demonstration; or
          ``(2) the Director does not believe that qualification for 
        application through successful test and demonstration is 
        reasonably achievable.
  ``(d) Responsibility of Project BioShield.--For countermeasures 
identified under subsection (a)(4)(A) that are qualified for 
application through successful test and demonstration, including but 
not limited to those countermeasures certified to have qualified for 
application through successful test and demonstration by the Director 
of BARDA, the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services for 
Preparedness and Response shall use the Project BioShield special 
reserve fund to may procure the countermeasure if the countermeasure 
meets the requirements for emergency use authorization described in 
subsection (a)(3)(B).
  ``(e) No Requirement for Food and Drug Administration General Use 
Approval.--The Secretary shall ensure that the Directors of NIH and 
BARDA and the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services for 
Preparedness and Response do not discontinue any research, development, 
or procurement of a countermeasure identified under subsection 
(a)(4)(A) because the Food and Drug Administration has not, or decides 
against, approving or licensing the countermeasure for general use 
under chapter V of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or section 
351 of this Act, as applicable.
  ``(f) Innovation.--The Secretary shall require the Directors of NIH 
and BARDA and the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services for 
Preparedness and Response to aggressively pursue innovative research, 
development, and procurement of each countermeasure identified under 
subsection (a)(4)(A).
  ``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) The term `BARDA' means the he Biomedical Advanced 
        Research and Development Authority established under section 
        319L(c).
          ``(2) The term `NIH' means the National Institutes of Health.
          ``(3) The term `Project Bioshield' means the Federal medical 
        countermeasure procurement program established by Public Law 
        108-276.''.

                  TITLE IV--FOREIGN RELATIONS MATTERS

SEC. 401. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION SHARING RELATING 
                    TO BIOSECURITY.

  The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, and the heads of other appropriate Federal 
agencies, shall--
          (1) support efforts in other countries and regions to develop 
        mechanisms and capabilities for reporting to United Nations 
        organizations validated data on biological attacks or other 
        phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the 
        United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious 
        disease outbreaks;
          (2) engage other Federal and nongovernmental entities and 
        other countries to advance awareness and understanding of the 
        risk posed by information derived from the life sciences that 
        has the potential for misuse to cause harm, and advance 
        recommendations on how best to address such risk;
          (3) engage such entities and countries to promote greater 
        awareness and understanding of the global availability of and 
        access to life science technologies and materials; and
          (4) promote the development and use of mechanisms for 
        reporting, preserving, and sharing data on Federal programs and 
        investments in international scientific, agricultural, medical, 
        and public health collaborations in support of efforts to 
        enhance global biosecurity.

SEC. 402. INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT TO ENHANCE BIODEFENSE AND 
                    BIOSECURITY.

  The Secretary of State, in coordination and consultation with the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads other appropriate Federal 
agencies, shall, as appropriate--
          (1) support efforts of other countries to establish and build 
        capacity to effectively implement legislation criminalizing the 
        development or use of biological weapons or acts of 
        bioterrorism;
          (2) engage other countries and international nongovernmental 
        entities to develop and establish common standards, guidance, 
        and best practices for actions relevant to preventing acts of 
        bioterrorism and the illicit use of life sciences;
          (3) support the efforts of other countries to enhance 
        biosecurity and safety practices at laboratories and other 
        facilities with materials that could be used in biological 
        weapons or in an act of bioterrorism;
          (4) promote the development and adoption of international 
        guidance for the safety and security of high-risk pathogens and 
        toxins; and
          (5) promote information sharing relating to threats and best 
        practices between the intelligence community, Federal law 
        enforcement, and international law enforcement and security 
        officials.

SEC. 403. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON BEST PRACTICES FOR GLOBAL 
                    BIOPREPAREDNESS.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that preparedness 
for a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident must be 
undertaken not only domestically but also internationally. 
Specifically, there is a need for a global preparedness architecture 
for such an event. Congress supports efforts to provide an 
international forum for discussion of key health security policies with 
international dimensions, and the establishment of a formal United 
States interagency task force to develop best practices and 
recommendations for implementation of a global preparedness 
architecture could enhance global preparedness.
  (b) Establishment of Task Force.--The Secretary of State shall 
convene and lead an interagency task force to examine--
          (1) the state of global biopreparedness for a major 
        biological event;
          (2) necessary components of a global biopreparedness 
        architecture that would advance international health security, 
        including considerations of--
                  (A) risk assessments;
                  (B) prevention and deterrence;
                  (C) detection;
                  (D) regional stockpiling of medical countermeasures, 
                including considerations of--
                          (i) security of the stockpile;
                          (ii) delivery planning; and
                          (iii) legal dimensions of and obstacles to 
                        implementing such an architecture;
                  (E) attribution;
                  (F) response;
                  (G) other elements that should be a component of such 
                an architecture; and
                  (H) obstacles to implementing such an architecture;
          (3) best practices for preparedness based on lessons learned 
        from domestic efforts to address the above issues, and that may 
        be applicable internationally;
          (4) activities undertaken through the National Strategy for 
        Countering Biological Threats and the International Health 
        Regulations 2005, as well as other activities deemed relevant 
        by the task force; and
          (5) the utility of working through existing international 
        forums as a mechanism for distributing this information to the 
        international community.
  (c) Membership.--Members of the task force shall include 
representatives from--
          (1) the Department of Homeland Security;
          (2) the Department of Health and Human Services, including 
        the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
          (3) the Department of Agriculture;
          (4) the Department of Defense;
          (5) the Department of Justice;
          (6) the Department of State;
          (7) the United States Agency for International Development;
          (8) the Director of National Intelligence;
          (9) other Federal Departments and agencies, as determined 
        appropriate by the Secretary; and
          (10) other national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders, 
        including private sector, including the pharmaceutical industry 
        and the biological laboratory community, as determined 
        appropriate by the Secretary.
  (d) Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the findings of the task force 
established under this section.

SEC. 404. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION.

  The Secretary of State shall--
          (1) promote confidence in effective implementation of and 
        compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
        Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
        (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 
        (commonly referred to as the ``Biological and Toxin Weapons 
        Convention'') by the States party to the Convention by 
        promoting transparency with respect to legitimate activities 
        and pursuing compliance diplomatically to address concerns;
          (2) promote universal membership in the Convention;
          (3) develop an action plan for increasing international 
        adherence to the Convention; and
          (4) ensure that United States participation in Convention 
        meetings is broadly inclusive of representatives of relevant 
        Federal departments and agencies.

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 5498, the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010, 
was introduced by Representatives Bill Pascrell (D-NJ) and 
Peter T. King (R-NY) on June 10, 2010. The purpose of H.R. 5498 
is to enhance homeland security by improving efforts to 
prevent, deter, prepare for, detect, attribute, respond to, and 
recover from attacks with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

                  Background and Need for Legislation

    Title 18 of the ``Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007'' (P.L. 110-53; Aug. 3, 2007) authorized 
the establishment of a bipartisan commission to study the 
threat that the proliferation of WMD poses to our country. 
Congress directed the independent, bipartisan Commission for 
the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism (the 
Commission) to address the WMD threat in general and the 
nuclear threat specifically.
    The Commission, led by former Senator Bob Graham (Chair) 
and Former Senator Jim Talent (Vice-Chair), was charged with: 
(1) Assessing Federal activities, initiatives, and programs to 
prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism; and (2) providing a 
clear and comprehensive strategy and concrete recommendations 
to address the WMD threat. The Commission decided to focus on 
biological and nuclear threats--the two WMD threats that they 
felt had the greatest potential to kill the largest number of 
people.
    The Commission submitted a report entitled ``World at 
Risk'' to the President and Congress in December 2008. The 
Commission concluded that: (1) unless the global community acts 
decisively and urgently, a terrorist attack involving WMD will 
more likely than not occur somewhere in the world by the end of 
2013; (2) terrorists are more likely to obtain and use a 
biological weapon than a nuclear weapon; and (3) the United 
States government needs to more aggressively limit the 
proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of 
a biological terrorist attack.
    In October 2009, the Commission issued a progress report 
entitled ``The Clock is Ticking'' to call attention to what the 
Commission believed to be the lack of progress in implementing 
its previous recommendations. Subsequently, in January 2010 the 
Commission released a ``Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 
Terrorism Report Card,'' which assessed the actions taken by 
the United States to address the recommendations made in 
``World at Risk.''
    Former Senators Graham and Talent testified before the Full 
Committee on Homeland Security on April 21, 2010. At this 
hearing, the former Senators testified to their belief that a 
WMD terrorist attack will occur somewhere in the world by 2013. 
They reiterated their view that the Nation had not done enough 
to prevent and prepare for a domestic biological attack. They 
also expressed their concern about the fractured state of 
Congressional jurisdiction over homeland security matters and 
their desire to see jurisdiction for the Department of Homeland 
Security consolidated in the Committee on Homeland Security in 
the House, and the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee in the Senate.
    Enactment of H.R. 5498 is needed to better address the gaps 
identified by the Commission and to better organize efforts by 
the public and private sectors to prevent, deter, prepare for, 
detect, attribute, respond to, and recover from an attack 
involving WMD. This legislation implements the Commission's 
recommendations by requiring a comprehensive approach to 
preventing and preparing for biological and other WMD attacks. 
This approach includes: (1) strengthening intelligence and 
bioforensics; (2) enhancing security at laboratories with the 
most dangerous pathogens; (3) reviewing national policies that 
govern medical countermeasures and vaccinations; (4) enhancing 
international collaboration against the WMD threat; and (5) 
improving environmental recovery from a WMD attack.

                                Hearings

    On June 15, 2010, the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology held a legislative 
hearing on H.R. 5498. The Subcommittee received testimony from 
Sara (Sally) T. Beatrice, PhD, Assistant Commissioner, Public 
Health Laboratory, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 
City of New York; Randall S. Murch, PhD, Associate Director, 
Research Program Development, National Capital Region, Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University; Robert P. Kadlec, 
MD, Vice President, Global Public Sector, PRTM Management 
Consulting; and Julie E. Fischer, PhD, Senior Associate, Global 
Health Security Program, Henry L. Stimson Center.
    Previously, on April 21, 2010, the Full Committee held a 
hearing entitled ``Viewpoints on Homeland Security: A 
Discussion with the WMD Commissioners.'' The Committee received 
testimony from former Senator Bob Graham, who chaired the 
Commission for the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 
Terrorism and from former Senator Jim Talent, who was Vice-
Chairman of the Commission for the Prevention of WMD 
Proliferation and Terrorism. Additionally, the following 
Committee on Homeland Security hearings informed H.R. 5498:
    On October 27, 2009, the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology held a hearing 
entitled ``Real-Time Assessment of the Federal Response to 
Pandemic Influenza.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: 
Alexander Garza, MD, Chief Medical Officer and Assistant 
Secretary for Health Affairs, Department of Homeland Security; 
Nicole Lurie, MD, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response, Department of Health and Human Services; Mr. Richard 
Serino, Deputy Administrator, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, Department of Homeland Security; and Ms. Marcy Forman, 
Director, Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, 
Department of Homeland Security.
    On September 14, 2009, the Subcommittee on Emerging 
Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology held a field 
hearing in Brooklyn, New York entitled ``Status Report on 
Federal and Local Efforts to Secure Radiological Sources.'' The 
Subcommittee received testimony from: Mr. Craig Conklin, 
Director, Sector Specific Agency Executive Management Office, 
Office of Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland 
Security; Mr. Kenneth Sheely, Associate Assistant Deputy 
Administrator for Global Threat Reduction, National Nuclear 
Security Administration, Department of Energy; Mr. Robert 
Lewis, Director, Division of Materials Safety and State 
Agreements, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Captain Michael 
Riggio, Counterterrorism Division, Police Department, City of 
New York, State of New York; Mr. Gene Miskin, Director, Office 
of Radiological Health, Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene, New York City, State of New York; Bonnie Arquilla, DO, 
Director of Disaster Preparedness, State University of New York 
Downstate Medical Center; and Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, 
Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability 
Office.
    On July 29, 2009, the Committee on Homeland Security held a 
hearing entitled ``Beyond Readiness: An Examination of the 
Current Status and Future Outlook of the National Response to 
Pandemic Influenza.'' The Committee received testimony from: 
Hon. Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland 
Security; Hon. William Corr, Deputy Secretary, Department of 
Health and Human Services; Ms. Bernice Steinhardt, Director, 
Strategy Issues, Government Accountability Office; Ms. Colleen 
M. Kelley, National President, National Treasury Employees 
Union; Mark B. Horton, MD, MSPH, Director, Department of Public 
Health, State of California; Mr. Richard G. Muth, Executive 
Director, Maryland Emergency Management Agency, State Emergency 
Operations Center, State of Maryland; and Thomas A. Farley, MD, 
MPH, Health Commissioner, New York City, State of New York.
    On July 22, 2008, the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology held a field hearing 
in Providence, Rhode Island, entitled ``Emerging Biological 
Threats and Public Health Preparedness: Getting Beyond Getting 
Ready.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: Jeffrey W. 
Runge, MD, Chief Medical Officer and Assistant Secretary for 
Health Affairs, Department of Homeland Security; RADM W. Craig 
Vanderwagen, MD, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response, Department of Health and Human Services; Captain 
Peter Boynton, Deputy Regional Principal Federal Official for 
Pandemic Influenza and Federal Security Director, Bradley 
International Airport (Connecticut), Transportation Security 
Administration, Department of Homeland Security; Michael G. 
Kurilla, MD, PhD, Director, Office of Biodefense Research 
Affairs and Associate Director for Biodefense Product 
Development, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Department of Health 
and Human Services; Daniel M. Sosin, MD, MPH, Director, 
Biosurveillance Coordination Unit, and Associate Director for 
Science, Coordination Office for Terrorism Preparedness and 
Emergency Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Department of Health and Human Services; David Gifford, MD, 
MPH, Director of Health, Department of Health, State of Rhode 
Island; MG Robert T. Bray, Rhode Island Adjutant General, 
Commanding General, Rhode Island National Guard, Director Rhode 
Island Emergency Management Agency, and Homeland Security 
Advisor, State of Rhode Island; Mr. Thomas J. Kilday, Jr., 
Homeland Security Program Manager, Rhode Island Emergency 
Management Agency, State of Rhode Island; and Hon. Peter T. 
Ginaitt, Director, Emergency Preparedness, Lifespan Hospital 
Network.
    On May 15, 2008, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a 
hearing entitled ``The Resilient Homeland: How DHS Intelligence 
Should Empower America to Prepare for, Prevent, and Withstand 
Terrorist Attacks.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: 
Stephen E. Flynn, PhD, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for 
National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Mr. 
Amos N. Guiora, Professor of Law, University of Utah; and Mr. 
R.P. Eddy, Ergo Advisors.
    On September 18, 2007, the Committee on Homeland Security 
held a hearing entitled ``Protecting the Protectors: Ensuring 
the Health and Safety of our First Responders in the Wake of 
Catastrophic Disasters.'' The Committee received testimony 
from: Jon R. Krohmer, MD, Deputy Chief Medical Officer and 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Health Affairs, 
Department of Homeland Security; John Howard, MD, Director, 
National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Health and 
Human Services; Ms. Cynthia A. Bascetta, Director, Health Care, 
Government Accountability Office; Philip J. Landrigan, MD, MSc, 
Professor and Chairman, Department of Community and Preventive 
Medicine, Mount Sinai School of Medicine; Deputy Chief Nicholas 
Visconti, International Association of Fire Fighters; and Mike 
D. McDaniel, PhD, Secretary, Department of Environmental 
Quality, State of Louisiana.

                        Committee Consideration


    The Committee met on June 23, 2010, to consider H.R. 5498, 
and ordered the measure to be reported to the House with a 
favorable recommendation, amended, by a recorded vote of 26 
yeas and 0 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 24). The Committee took the 
following actions:

     The Committee adopted H.R. 5498, as amended, by voice 
vote.

        The following amendments were offered:

     An Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. 
Thompson to H.R. 5498, (#1); was AGREED TO by voice vote.

       A unanimous consent request by Mr. Thompson that all of 
the amendments listed on the roster be adopted; was AGREED TO 
without objection.

    An Amendment offered by Ms. Richardson to the Amendment in 
the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 5498, (#1A),
    Page 31, after line 14, insert the following:
    ``(c) Best Practices._In compiling guidance for individual 
and community preparedness in order to carry out subsection 
(a)(3), the Secretary shall give due regard to best practices 
based on the experience of other countries and agencies and the 
expertise of academic institutions and non-governmental 
organizations.''; was AGREED TO by unanimous consent.

    An Amendment offered by Ms. Richardson to the Amendment in 
the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 5498, (#1B).
    Page 50, line 14, strike ``and''.
    Page 50, after line 14, insert the following:
      ``(2) in developing the guidance under paragraph (1), 
review the experiences of other countries and the expertise of 
academic institutions and non-governmental organizations, 
and''; was AGREED TO by unanimous consent.

    An Amendment offered by Mr. Austria to the Amendment in the 
Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 5498, (#1C); Page 51, line 19, 
after ``first responder'' insert the following: ``and first 
provider''.
    Page 52, after line 13, insert the following: ``the 
National Domestic Preparedness Consortium;''.
    Page 52, line 14, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(4)''.
    Page 53, line 15, strike ``(4)'' and insert ``(5)''.; was 
AGREED TO by unanimous consent.

    An Amendment offered by Mr. Austria to the Amendment in the 
Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 5498, (#1D), Page 73, after line 
7, insert a new section entitled ``Sec. 211. University-Based 
Centers for Homeland Security Criteria for Designation.''; was 
AGREED TO by unanimous consent.

    An Amendment offered by Ms. Clarke to the Amendment in the 
Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 5498, (#1E), Page 16, after line 
14, insert a new section entitled ``Sec. 2104. Radiological 
Materials Security.''; was AGREED TO by unanimous consent.

    An Amendment offered by Ms. Clarke to the Amendment in the 
Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 5498, (#1F), Page 56, line 1, 
after ``outdoor areas'' insert the following: ``, including 
subways and other mass transportation facilities,''.; was 
AGREED TO by unanimous consent.

    An Amendment offered by Mr. Green to the Amendment in the 
Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 5498, (#1G), Page 48, after line 
16, insert a new subparagraph entitled ``(e) Detailee 
Program.''
    Page 48, line 17, strike ``(e)'' and insert ``(f)''.
    Page 48, line 23, strike ``(f)'' and insert ``(g)''.; was 
AGREED TO by unanimous consent.

    An Amendment offered by Mr. Owens to the Amendment in the 
Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 5498, (#1H), In the proposed 
section 2121(b)(4) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as 
proposed to be inserted by section 201, add at the end the 
following: ``The Secretary shall provide guidance on how State 
and local, tribal, and private entities can partner with public 
television stations to disseminate information provided by the 
Department and shall provide information on best practices on 
disseminating information to residents of local communities, 
including leveraging public television stations.''; was AGREED 
TO by unanimous consent.

    An Amendment offered by Mr. Cuellar to the Amendment in the 
Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 5498, (#1I), Page 22, line 12, 
strike ``The'' and insert ``At the request of the Secretary, 
the''.; was AGREED TO by unanimous consent.

    An Amendment offered by Mr. Cuellar to the Amendment in the 
Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 5498, (#1J), Page 26, line 11, 
after ``proliferators,'' insert the following: ``in a manner 
that acknowledges commerce and trade,''.; was AGREED TO by 
unanimous consent.

                            Committee Votes

    Clause 3(b) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires the Committee to list the recorded 
votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments 
thereto.
    The Committee on Homeland Security considered H.R. 5498 on 
June 23, 2010, and ordered the measure reported to the House 
with a favorable recommendation, as amended, by a recorded vote 
of 26 yeas and 0 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 24).The vote was as 
follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Thompson
Ms. Sanchez
Ms. Harman
Ms. Norton
Mr. Cuellar
Mr. Carney
Ms. Clarke
Ms. Richardson
Mrs. Kirkpatrick
Mr. Pascrell
Mr. Cleaver
Mr. Green
Mr. Himes
Ms. Kilroy
Ms. Titus
Mr. Owens
Mr. King
Mr. Lungren
Mr. Rogers
Mr. McCaul
Mr. Dent
Mr. Bilirakis
Mr. Broun
Mr. Cao
Mr. Austria
Mr. Graves

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee has held oversight 
hearings and made findings that are reflected in this report.

   New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of Rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee finds that H.R. 
5498, the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010, would 
result in no new or increased budget authority, entitlement 
authority, or tax expenditures or revenues.

                  Congressional Budget Office Estimate

     The Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared 
by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to 
section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                  Washington, DC, October 26, 2010.
Hon. Bennie G. Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5498, the WMD 
Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark 
Grabowicz.
            Sincerely,
                                              Douglas W. Elmendorf.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 5498--WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010

    Summary: CBO estimates that H.R. 5498 would authorize the 
appropriation of $565 million over the 2011-2015 period for 
programs in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and other 
agencies to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
    Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO 
estimates that implementing H.R. 5498 would cost $455 million 
over the 2011-2015 period. We also estimate that enacting the 
bill would reduce direct spending by $58 million over the 2011-
2015 period and by $23 million over the 2011-2020 period. In 
addition, enacting, the bill could have an insignificant effect 
on revenues. Because H.R. 5498 would affect direct spending and 
revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures apply.
    H.R. 5498 would impose intergovernmental and private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 
because it would require public and private laboratories to 
comply with new security standards. Because the number of 
laboratories that would be affected and the types of security 
measures would depend on future regulations, CBO cannot 
estimate the costs of the mandates. Consequently, CBO cannot 
determine whether those costs would exceed the annual 
thresholds for intergovernmental or private-sector mandates 
($70 million and $141 million in 2010, respectively, adjusted 
annually for inflation).
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of H.R. 5498 is shown in the following table. 
The costs of this legislation fall within budget functions 150 
(international affairs), 300 (natural resources and 
environment), 350 (agriculture), 450 (community and regional 
development), 550 (health), and 750 (administration of justice)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                         -------------------------------------------------------
                                                            2011     2012     2013     2014     2015   2011-2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

DHS Programs:
    Estimated Authorization Level.......................       79       75       75       25       25       279
    Estimated Outlays...................................       25       35       47       55       57       219
HHS Programs:
    Estimated Authorization Level.......................       46       54       55       56       57       268
    Estimated Outlays...................................       17       42       51       53       56       219
Other Programs:
    Estimated Authorization Level.......................       10        2        2        2        2        18
    Estimated Outlays...................................        9        2        2        2        2        17
Total Changes:
    Estimated Authorization Level.......................      135      131      132       83       84       565
    Estimated Outlays...................................       51       79      100      110      115       455

                                          CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING\a\

Estimated Budget Authority..............................      -22      -71        0       30        5       -58
Estimated Outlays.......................................      -22      -71        0       30        5      -58
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note; DHS = Department of Homeland Security; HHS = Department of Health and Human Services.
\a\ Over the 2011-2020 period, CBO estimates that enacting the bill would reduce direct spending by $23 million.

    Basis of estimate: CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 
5498 would cost $455 million over the 2011-2015 period, 
assuming appropriation of the necessary funds. We estimate that 
enacting the bill also would reduce direct spending by $58 
million over the 2011-2015 period and by $23 million over the 
2011-2020 period. In addition, enacting the bill could have an 
insignificant effect on revenues.

Spending subject to appropriation

    For this estimate, CBO assumes that the necessary amounts 
will be appropriated near the start of each fiscal year and 
that spending will follow historical patterns for similar 
activities.
    DSH Programs. CBO estimates that H.R. 5498 would authorize 
the appropriation of $279 million over the 2011-2015 period for 
several DHS programs and activities.
    H.R. 5498 would authorize the appropriation of $50 million 
annually over the 2011-2013 period for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency to make grants to state, local, and tribal 
governments and nonprofit organizations to improve security at 
laboratories that contain toxins that present a threat to 
national security. CBO estimates that implementing this grant 
program would cost $98 million over the 2011-2015 period, and 
an additional $52 million after 2015.
    The bill would authorize DHS to reimburse state and local 
laboratories for their costs to participate in the BioWatch 
program, which includes a system of monitors placed near urban 
areas to detect biological attacks. About 30 labs participate 
in BioWatch, and each spends, on average, about $400,000 
annually on this activity. We estimate that it would cost $57 
million over the 2011-2015 period to cover the labs' expenses.
    The legislation also would direct DHS to establish a 
program to evaluate the effectiveness of tests to detect 
certain pathogens. Based on information from DHS about the cost 
of similar programs, we estimate that it would cost $47 million 
over the five- year period to carry out this activity.
    H.R. 5498 would require DHS to establish regulations for 
security measures at laboratories that contain certain toxins. 
Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates that it 
would cost DHS about $9 million to carry out this provision and 
to assist the Departments of Agriculture and HHS in enforcing 
the new regulations over the next five years.
    Finally, H.R. 5498 also would require DHS to develop 
strategies, share information, and prepare reports relating to 
threats from weapons of mass destruction. CBO estimates that it 
would cost $8 million over the 2011-2015 period to carry out 
those activities.
    HHS Programs. CBO estimates that H.R. 5498 would authorize 
the appropriation of $268 million over the 2011-2015 period for 
activities to be conducted by HHS.
    H.R. 5498 would require HHS to establish and implement a 
strategy for dispensing antidotes or other countermeasures to 
mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack with chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear materials. Those 
activities would overlap to a considerable degree with 
activities under Executive Order 13527, issued on December 30, 
2009; that order requires the Secretaries of Homeland Security 
and HHS to establish mechanisms for providing medical 
countermeasures following a biological attack. Based on 
information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and accounting for activities already required by that 
executive order, CBO estimates that implementing the bill's 
requirements would cost $185 million over the 2011-2015 period.
    A subsequent executive order, issued on July 2, 2010 
(Executive Order 13546), requires the Secretaries of HHS and 
Agriculture to establish a tiered list of select materials 
considered threats to the United States. H.R. 5498 would modify 
and expand those requirements, and it would require those 
agencies to provide DHS with a list of laboratories and other 
locations where the most dangerous materials are stored. It 
also would require HHS to conduct a review of its vaccination 
and antimicrobial dispensing policy and to issue a report with 
recommendations to improve that policy. Based on information 
from CDC and accounting for overlapping activities specified 
within the executive order, CBO estimates that this provision 
would cost $34 million over the 2011-2015 period.
    Other Programs. CBO estimates that H.R. 5498 would 
authorize the appropriation of $18 million over the 2011-2015 
period for other programs and activities.
    The bill would require the Department of Agriculture (along 
with HHS) to enforce security regulations for laboratories that 
contain certain agents. Based on information from the 
Department of Agriculture, CBO estimates that it would cost the 
department $10 million to carry out this responsibility over 
the next five years.
    H.R. 5498 would direct the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to assess the capability of federal, state, tribal, and 
local governments to recover from attacks involving chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear materials. The bill would 
require the agency to develop exercises and provide guidance 
for state, local, and tribal governments to improve 
environmental decontamination and cleanup methods. Based on 
information from EPA, CBO estimates it would cost the agency 
about $5 million in 2011 to carry out those activities.
    Section 403 would require the Secretary of State to 
establish an interagency task force to examine the current 
state of--and methods for improving--global preparedness for a 
major biological attack. The task force would include 
representatives from several federal departments, including 
DHS, HHS, and the Department of Defense, and would be required 
to submit a report detailing its findings to the Congress 
within 18 months of the bill's enactment. Based on the cost of 
similar efforts, CBO estimates that operating the task force 
would cost approximately $1 million in 2011 and less than 
$500,000 in 2012, assuming the availability of appropriated 
funds.
    H.R. 5498 would authorize the appropriation of $1 million 
for fiscal year 2011 for the National Academy of Sciences to 
prepare a report for the Congress on the use of forensic 
science to improve homeland security. We estimate that most of 
those funds would be spent in 2011.

Direct spending and revenues

    The Project Bioshield Act, enacted in 2004, provides 
funding for purchasing vaccines and pharmaceutical products 
that could be used in the event of a chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear threat. Under that act, HHS, with the 
concurrence of HHS and approval of the Office of Management and 
Budget, can enter into contractual agreements to purchase those 
products up to eight years before they would otherwise be 
approved for sale to the public. Provisions in H.R. 5498 would 
alter the criteria for procurement of those vaccines and 
pharmaceutical products.
    CBO anticipates that the new criteria would slow the 
procurement process for a subset of vaccines and pharmaceutical 
products by about one year. The delay in procurement is not 
expected to change total spending under Project Bioshield; 
however, it would delay some Bioshield spending until after 
2020. CBO estimates that enacting those provisions would. 
reduce direct spending by $58 million over the 2011-2015 period 
and $23 million over the 2011-2020 period.
    H.R. 5498 could increase revenues because the legislation 
would establish civil penalties for violations of the security 
regulations established by DHS. Civil lines are recorded as 
revenues and deposited in the Treasury. CBO estimates that any 
additional revenues would not be significant because of the 
small number of cases likely to be affected.
    Pay-As-You-Go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go 
Act of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement 
procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or 
revenues. The changes in outlays and revenues that are subject 
to those pay-as-you-go procedures, are shown in the following 
table.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                  By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     2011    2012    2013    2014    2015    2016    2017    2018    2019    2020   2011-2015  2011-2020
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       NET INCREASE OR DECREASE (-) IN THE DEFICIT

Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Impact....................     -22     -71       0      30       5       5       0       9      21       0       -58        -23
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: Under current 
law, laboratories must register with the National Select Agent 
Registry if they possess, use, or transfer select materials or 
toxins. They must also comply with security standards for 
conducting risk assessments. H.R. 5498 would impose additional 
duties on laboratories if they possess, use, or transfer select 
materials or toxins that are designated as tier I threats. 
Those laboratories would be required to comply with new 
security standards in addition to new standards for conducting 
background checks, training personnel, and performing 
vulnerability assessments.
    The duty to comply with the new federal regulations would 
impose intergovernmental and private-sector mandates as defined 
in UMRA. The Secretary of HHS in coordination with the 
Secretary of DHS would have broad authority to add to or remove 
materials from the list of tier I threats at any time. Because 
the number of laboratories that would be affected and the types 
of security measures required would depend on those future 
regulatory actions and would therefore be difficult to predict, 
CBO cannot estimate the cost of the mandates. Consequently, CBO 
cannot determine whether resulting costs would exceed the 
annual thresholds for intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates ($70 million and $141 million in 2010, respectively, 
adjusted annually for inflation).
    Grant funds authorized in the bill for enhancing security 
at laboratories would benefit certain, state, local, and tribal 
governments, including public institutions of higher education.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: DHS--Mark Grabowicz, 
HHS--Ellen Werble, Stephanie Cameron, and Jamease Kowalczyk, 
Department of Agriculture--Greg Hitz, Department of State and 
Intelligence Programs--Jason Wheelock, EPA--Susanne Mehlman; 
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Lisa Ramirez-
Branum; Impact on the Private Sector: Sarah Axeen.
    Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

         Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, H.R. 5498 contains the following 
general performance goals, and objectives, including outcome 
related goals and objectives authorized.
    The purpose of H.R. 5498 is to enhance homeland security by 
improving efforts to prevent, deter, prepare for, detect, 
attribute, respond to, and recover from attacks involving a 
weapon of mass destruction (WMD).
    The goals of this legislation are to prevent, deter, 
prepare for, detect, attribute, respond to, and recover from 
attacks with WMD or WMD agents. H.R. 5498 takes a comprehensive 
approach to the threat that terrorists will attempt to attack 
the United States with chemical, biological, radiological or 
nuclear materials and provides a comprehensive response to such 
a threat.
    The objectives of H.R. 5498 are:
          Improving the capabilities of the United States to 
        collect, analyze, and disseminate WMD-related 
        intelligence;
          Integrating national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders into the homeland security intelligence 
        and information sharing process;
          Strengthening of security at laboratories that 
        possess biological agents that are considered material 
        threats to the Nation;Preventing terrorists from 
        accessing sensitive United States technology and 
        munitions as well as WMD components, precursors, and 
        delivery systems;
          Increasing the awareness of manufacturers and 
        exporters of strategic technologies or commodities 
        through industry outreach;
          Requiring the coordination of law enforcement 
        counter-proliferation investigations and intelligence 
        counter-proliferation activities;
          Disseminating appropriate WMD threat information and 
        alerts to State, local, and tribal authorities, and the 
        United States public;
          Improving WMD-related information dissemination from 
        the Federal government to State, local, and tribal 
        authorities;
          Developing and disseminating guidance and other 
        information for individual and community preparedness 
        for and collective response to a WMD attack;
          Establishing a national biosurveillance strategy to 
        increase awareness of the biological threat and 
        identify acts of bioterrorism as soon as possible;
          Improving the performance of the National 
        Biosurveillance Integration Center;
          Improving the selection, procurement, use, and 
        maintenance of emergency responder equipment through 
        the System Assessment and Validation for Emergency 
        Responders program;
          Providing integrated laboratory support to Federal 
        law enforcement agencies as they investigate incidents 
        involving WMD and/or their agents;
          Establishing a national bioforensics strategy to 
        increase national bioforensics capabilities;
          Improving recognition of and response to situations 
        involving potential biological threats, including the 
        performance of coordinated joint criminal and 
        epidemiological investigations;
          Developing voluntary guidance for first responders, 
        first providers, and others to follow when responding 
        to a WMD attack or event;
          Developing and issuing guidance for clean-up and 
        restoration of areas that have been affected by a 
        biological attack or event, with submission of a report 
        to the appropriate Congressional committees within one 
        year of enactment and annually thereafter regarding 
        this guidance;
          Improving preparedness for environmental recovery 
        from WMD attacks or events and requiring the submission 
        of a progress report on the assessment of preparedness 
        requirements for environmental recovery to the 
        appropriate Congressional committees no later than one 
        year after enactment;
          Improving biotechnology research, development, and 
        procurement by directing that boundaries for the 
        research activities of the National Institutes of 
        Health, the Biodefense Advanced Research and 
        Development Authority, and the Project BioShield 
        Special Reserve Fund be established;
          Evaluating whether agents already identified as 
        material threats to the Nation still pose threats 
        sufficient to affect United States homeland security 
        and national security;
          Ensuring that United States vaccination and 
        antimicrobial distribution policies are adequate to 
        respond to the risks of terrorist-sponsored biological 
        attacks or to other events with significant health 
        consequences to the United States;
          Reducing the misuse of life sciences and enhancing 
        global biosecurity through increased international 
        collaboration and information sharing;
          Increasing international engagement to enhance 
        biodefense and biosecurity;
          Identifying and communicating best practices for 
        preparedness based on lessons learned from United 
        States domestic efforts that may be useful or 
        applicable internationally; and
          Promoting the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
        Convention.

   Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff 
                                Benefits

    In compliance with Rule XXI of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of the Rule 
XXI.

                       Federal Mandates Statement

    The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal 
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act.

                      Advisory Committee Statement

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds that the 
Constitutional authority for this legislation is provided in 
Article I, section 8, clause 1, which grants Congress the power 
to provide for the common Defense of the United States.

                  Applicability to Legislative Branch

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to 
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of section 
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.

             Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation


                     TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE MATTERS


Section 1.   Short Title; Table of Contents.
    This Act may be cited as the ``WMD Prevention and 
Preparedness Act of 2010.''

Section 2.   Definitions.
    This section defines the following terms: (1) ``appropriate 
congressional committees''; (2) ``weapon of mass destruction''; 
(3) ``Intelligence Community''; and (4) ``national biosecurity 
and biodefense stakeholders.''
    The Committee intends for the term ``biosecurity and 
biodefense stakeholders'' to be broadly construed and include 
officials from the Federal, State, local, and tribal 
authorities and individuals from the private sector who are 
involved in efforts to prevent, deter, prepare for, detect, 
attribute, respond to, and recover from a biological attack or 
other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for 
the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or 
infectious disease outbreaks.

Section 101.   National Intelligence Strategy for Countering 
the Threat from WMD.
    This section directs the Director of National Intelligence, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, to 
develop the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the 
Threat from WMD and an associated implementation plan. The 
purpose of the strategy is to improve the capabilities of the 
United States to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence 
related to WMD. The strategy shall address workforce issues, 
collaboration, domestic analysis and collection, and each type 
of WMD. The Director of National Intelligence shall, as the 
Director considers appropriate, coordinate with nongovernmental 
organizations and members of the public and private sectors to 
develop the strategy.
    The implementation plan shall include actions to better 
share intelligence on WMD throughout the Intelligence 
Community, disseminate WMD intelligence to stakeholders in 
unclassified formats, and provide open-source WMD intelligence 
to others in the public and private sectors. The implementation 
plan shall also include objectives to be accomplished over a 
five-year period, assignment of roles and responsibilities to 
elements of the Intelligence Community, and a schedule for 
assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the strategy.
    The Director of National Intelligence shall, as the 
Director considers appropriate, coordinate with nongovernmental 
organizations and members of the public and private sectors to 
develop the strategy.
    Not later than one year after enactment of this 
legislation, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall 
submit the strategy and implementation plan to the appropriate 
congressional committees. The report shall be in unclassified 
form, but may include a classified annex as appropriate.
    The Committee recognizes that the Intelligence Community 
addresses the WMD threat in various parts of the National 
Intelligence Strategy; however, the Committee believes that the 
establishment of a targeted national strategy for countering 
this homeland security threat is necessary given that the 
responses to this emerging threat are dissimilar from responses 
to traditional threats. Accordingly, the Committee intends for 
the strategy to take these differences into account and to 
contain goals and objectives that are tailored to the unique 
characteristics of the WMD threat.
    The Committee believes that individuals with considerable 
knowledge of WMD may reside in the United States government but 
outside of the Intelligence Community. The Committee intends 
for the Intelligence Community to reach out to these experts 
and, where appropriate, to ask these experts to assist in the 
analysis of technical information related to WMD.

Section 102.   National Intelligence Strategy for Countering 
Biological Threats.
    This section directs the Director of National Intelligence, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, to 
develop and implement the ``National Intelligence Strategy for 
Countering Biological Threats'' and an implementation plan for 
the strategy. This strategy should be integrated into the 
National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
    The strategy shall include a plan for increasing the number 
of individuals in the Intelligence Community and collaboration 
with those in the private sector that have the experience, 
education, and expertise to better collect information and/or 
analyze that information to produce intelligence that addresses 
the biological threat.
The strategy shall also address domestic and international 
intelligence needs regarding the biological threat, seek 
improvement of tactical and strategic intelligence regarding 
the threat, ensure that the commitment of human and other 
resources to address the biological threat is sustained, and 
make the biological threat an intelligence priority.
    The implementation plan shall include actions to share 
intelligence throughout the Intelligence Community on 
biological weapons and organisms that could be used for 
biological terrorism, and shall address the strategic and 
tactical intelligence activities (i.e., human intelligence, 
measurement and signature intelligence, technical intelligence, 
medical intelligence, and open source intelligence) necessary 
to implement the strategy.
    The implementation plan shall also include objectives to be 
accomplished over a five-year period, assignment of roles and 
responsibilities to elements of the Intelligence Community, a 
schedule for assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the strategy, and a schedule for regularly evaluating effort 
and progress in understanding and countering the biological 
threat.
    Not later than one year after enactment, the Director of 
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, shall submit the strategy and implementation 
plan to the appropriate congressional committees. The report 
shall be in unclassified form but with a classified annex, as 
appropriate.
    The Committee intends for this strategy to build on the 
National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological 
Threats, as initially produced in 2007 and to authorize the 
activities already in place regarding the National Intelligence 
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. The Committee also 
intends for the Director of National Intelligence to draw upon 
knowledge in the National Counterproliferation Center, the 
National Counterterrorism Center and other members of the 
Intelligence Community, as appropriate.
    The Committee believes that the Intelligence Community's 
capability to address the unique aspects of biological WMD 
threats would be enhanced by the recruitment of more personnel 
who can understand, analyze, and collect information on the 
biological threat. To better hire, attract, recruit, and retain 
these experts, the Committee believes that the Director of 
National Intelligence should first define the functions, 
capabilities, and gaps that exist in the current intelligence 
workforce.

                  TITLE II--HOMELAND SECURITY MATTERS


Section 201.   Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and 
Preparedness.
    This section amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by 
adding a new ``Title XXI--Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Prevention and Preparedness.'' This new title is comprised of 
six subtitles, which address all aspects of counter-WMD 
activities: (A) prevention and deterrence; (B) preparedness; 
(C) detection; (D) attribution; (E) response; (F) recovery.

                 Subtitle A--Prevention and Deterrence

Section 2101.   Weapons of Mass Destruction Intelligence and 
Information Sharing Unit.
    This section establishes a unit for WMD intelligence and 
information sharing in the Department of Homeland Security 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis. This office shall conduct 
intelligence-sharing activities in accordance with the National 
Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from WMD 
(section 101 of this Act) and the National Intelligence 
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (section 102 of this 
Act). The unit will analyze information regarding: (1) 
terrorist actors, claims, and plans for chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear attacks; and (2) global infectious 
disease, public health, food, agricultural, and veterinary 
issues that could impact homeland security. Also, the unit will 
provide State, local, and tribal authorities, as well as 
members of the public health, scientific, and response 
communities with analytical support on the WMD threat and 
perform other responsibilities, as assigned by the Secretary. 
Where appropriate, the unit shall coordinate with others in the 
Intelligence Community.
    Not later than one year after the date of enactment and 
annually thereafter, the Secretary shall report to the 
appropriate congressional committees on the intelligence and 
information sharing activities to counter the threat from WMD 
conducted by this unit and all relevant entities within the 
Department. The Secretary will also report on how the 
Department acted in accordance with relevant intelligence 
strategies.
    The Committee intends to authorize a pre-existing unit (or 
any successor) within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
of the Department of Homeland Security that is engaged in WMD 
intelligence and information sharing activities. The Committee 
believes that this unit should work to the greatest extent 
possible with other Department of Homeland Security components 
(operational and intelligence), headquarters elements, and 
State, local, and tribal authorities in order to advance the 
Department's counter-WMD activities. State, local, and tribal 
participation, in particular, should include officials from 
high threat areas. The Committee does not intend for this unit 
to conduct the same activities already conducted by the 
National Counterterrorism Center, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, or other members of the Intelligence Community. 
The Committee believes that strict adherence to relevant 
national intelligence strategies will ensure clarity of 
mission.

Section 2102.   Information Sharing and Collaboration for 
Biosecurity and Biodefense.
    This section increases situational awareness for homeland 
security purposes with respect to biological threats. The 
section directs the Secretary, acting through the Under 
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, to: (1) integrate 
national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders into the 
homeland security, intelligence, and information sharing 
process; (2) develop a framework for homeland security 
intelligence and information sharing with national biosecurity 
and biodefense stakeholders; (3) enable these stakeholders to 
provide recommendations on how to integrate information they 
possess into the homeland security, intelligence, and 
information sharing process; (4) leverage fusion centers (and 
other homeland security capabilities and structures) to counter 
biological attacks or other phenomena that may have serious 
health consequences for the United States, such as wide-scale 
fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks; and (5) partner 
with other Federal departments and agencies to perform 
biological threat and risk assessments. The Secretary shall 
coordinate with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Agriculture, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and 
the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies in carrying out 
these activities.
    The Committee intends for intelligence and information 
sharing activities to: (1) build upon the existing 
intelligence-sharing programs established by public health and 
health care deliverers; (2) expand to incorporate the larger 
group of national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders, 
including local officials from high threat areas; and (3) 
obtain input from national biosecurity and biodefense 
stakeholders on how to integrate information gathered from 
these stakeholders to increase situational awareness. The 
Committee also intends for the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis to continue to manage and facilitate this activity.

Section 2103.   Bioterrorism Risk Assessments.
    This section directs the Secretary, in coordination with 
the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and 
agencies, to produce biennial integrated Bioterrorism Risk 
Assessments to identify and assess the evolving terrorist risk 
of a biological attack or other phenomena that may have serious 
health consequences for the United States, such as wide-scale 
fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks. These assessments 
shall: (1) identify the threat, vulnerability, and consequences 
of a biological terrorist attack against the United States; (2) 
take into account intelligence and information regarding 
terrorist intentions, capabilities, plans, and actions; (3) 
inform and guide other homeland security biological threat 
assessments and determinations, and help determine the 
prioritization of other homeland security activities, as 
appropriate; (4) inform investments in national strategic 
biodefense research, development, planning, preparedness, and 
collective response to biological attacks; (5) identify key 
gaps in knowledge and data regarding the biological threat; (6) 
define critical biodefense vulnerabilities; (7) prioritize 
agents that could be used for bioterrorism, based on risk; and 
(8) evaluate progress in implementing national biopreparedness 
policy.
    To execute these activities, the Secretary shall: (1) 
convene an interagency task force of subject matter experts to 
advise the Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary for 
Science and Technology on whether the methodology used in the 
Assessments is adequate and to establish requirements and 
standards for these Assessments; (2) solicit input from 
national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders about the 
Assessments, as appropriate; and (3) ensure that the 
Assessments inform the risk management decisions of the 
Department and can be made available to national biosecurity 
and biodefense stakeholders, as appropriate.
    The Committee acknowledges that the Science and Technology 
Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security presently 
undertakes outreach to experts to help assess the risk of 
bioterrorism. The Committee urges the Science and Technology 
Directorate to continue to seek the opinion of experts in risk 
assessment, the threat of bioterrorism, and other relevant 
disciplines (e.g., threat assessment, consequence 
determination, and vulnerability assessment) in order to help 
ensure that the Bioterrorism Risk Assessments remain relevant. 
The Committee urges the Science and Technology Directorate to 
address the criticisms that have been levied at the 
Bioterrorism Risk Assessments; it believes that engaging these 
criticisms will enhance the assessments' credibility and 
utility. The Committee urges the Science and Technology 
Directorate to continue to improve the methodology used to 
develop the Bioterrorism Risk Assessments and seek assistance 
from the Office of Risk Management and Analysis (within the 
National Protection and Programs Directorate) and the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis. The Committee also urges the Science 
and Technology Directorate to make maximum use of persons 
within the Department of Homeland Security who could advise on 
information sharing, intelligence, and methodology, and provide 
other relevant insights.
    The Committee recognizes the need for the sharing of the 
bioterrorism risk assessment with Federal, State, local, and 
tribal agencies and be made available to the State, local and 
tribal first responder community so as to inform their 
bioterrorism preparedness activities. Further, the Committee 
recommends that the representatives from the first responder 
community at the State, local, and tribal levels be provided 
the opportunity to participate, as appropriate, in the 
bioterrorism risk assessment task force.

Section 2104.   Radiological Materials Security.
    This section directs the Secretary to conduct annual risk 
assessments regarding the threat, vulnerability, and 
consequences of theft or other procurement of radiological 
materials that could be used by a terrorist in a radiological 
dispersion device. These radiological risk assessments shall 
include any specific threat information regarding possible 
terrorist attacks using a radiological dispersion device.
    In conducting these radiological terrorism risk 
assessments, the Secretary shall: (1) consult with the 
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Heath and Human Services, 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (2) consider relevant 
studies conducted by other Federal agencies, or other reputable 
organizations; (3) designate certain materials as high-risk 
radiological materials; (4) consider the availability, ability 
to disperse, and ease of handling various radiological 
materials; (5) assess the vulnerability of different facilities 
for theft or other procurement of radiological materials; (6) 
consider the consequences of a successful radiological 
dispersion device attack as these consequences may include 
death, injury, and economic loss; and (7) consult with the 
Intelligence Community, the Secretary of Energy and the Field 
Intelligence Elements of the National Laboratories, and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, and other appropriate experts.
    The Secretary shall disseminate the findings of the 
radiological terrorism risk assessments and any associated 
specific risk information to all participating agencies as well 
as to State and local agencies and to those facilities that 
both house radiological source material and are regulated by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Secretary shall, as 
appropriate, share these radiological terrorism risk 
assessments with law enforcement and critical infrastructure 
operators with appropriate security clearances. The Secretary 
shall also make available an unclassified version to each 
agency with which the Secretary is required to consult, State 
and local law enforcement and public health authorities, and 
facilities that the Department of Energy has authorized to 
possess radiological materials.
    The Committee believes that radiological materials used in 
medical, industrial, academic, and other facilities must be 
secured to prevent theft and use in a radiological dispersion 
device by terrorists. The Committee intends for the Secretary 
of Homeland Security to take additional and measured steps to 
secure these materials by conducting a radiological terrorism 
risk assessment that will serve both as the basis for future 
action and to inform Federal and non-Federal agencies and 
organizations that possess or otherwise deal with radiological 
materials. In accordance with the definition of unclassified 
information, the Committee does not intend for the unclassified 
version of the risk assessment to contain information that 
would increase the vulnerability to a radiological terrorist 
attack or the number of crimes involving the theft of these 
radiological materials.

Section 2105.   Enhanced Biosecurity Measures.
    This section directs the Secretary, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, 
to establish enhanced biosecurity measures for persons or 
laboratories that possess, use, or transfer Tier I Material 
Threat Agents, using a negotiated rulemaking committee. The 
biosecurity measures to be established shall include: (1) 
standards for personnel surety programs; (2) standards for 
biosecurity practices and training of responsible officials, 
laboratory personnel, and support personnel; (3) standards for 
performing laboratory vulnerability assessments; (4) risk-based 
laboratory security performance standards; (5) penalties 
(including civil money penalties and intermediate sanctions) in 
addition to any other penalties that may apply; and (6) any 
other security standards determined necessary by the Secretary, 
the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, and other agencies as appropriate. Any 
recommendations with respect to proposed regulations shall be 
provided to the Secretary and the heads of the other 
appropriate Federal agencies not later than one year after the 
date of enactment of this section. A final rule shall be 
promulgated no later than two years after enactment of this 
Act.
    The negotiated rulemaking committee shall include a 
representative from: (1) the Department of Homeland Security; 
(2) the Department of Health and Human Services; (3) the 
Department of Agriculture; (4) the Department of Defense; (5) 
the Department of Energy; (6) the Department of Justice; (7) 
for-profit research institutions; (8) academic research 
institutions; (9) non-profit research institutions; and (10) 
other stakeholders, as the Secretary determines appropriate.
    The negotiated rulemaking committee should consider the 
following factors: (1) the recommendations of the Commission on 
the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and 
Terrorism; (2) the National Science Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity; (3) any working group established under Executive 
Order 13486 relating to strengthening laboratory biosecurity; 
(4) the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009; and (5) 
methods to minimize any disincentives to biological research 
arising from enhanced biosecurity measures.
    The Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services shall: (1) enforce the measures established 
and any standards promulgated, in consultation with the 
Secretary, as appropriate; (2) develop training programs that 
comply with such measures and standards, in coordination with 
the Secretary and the heads of other Federal agencies, as 
appropriate; and (3) develop and implement procedures that 
determine when and how penalties and intermediate sanctions may 
be imposed, in consultation with the Secretary and the heads of 
other Federal agencies, as appropriate.
    With respect to inspections, the Secretary of Agriculture 
and the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall 
periodically provide the Secretary with all data concerning 
inspections of laboratories that handle Tier 1 Material Threat 
Agents. This data will help to ensure that the regulations are 
uniformly enforced and to identify areas where the Secretary 
can advise the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services on approaches to enhancing security 
at specific laboratories. Inspections of the same laboratories 
by different Federal agencies shall be conducted simultaneously 
to the greatest extent practicable and shall use common 
inspection procedures in order to minimize the administrative 
burden on these laboratories. Each inspection report shall be 
made available to each laboratory that is the subject of the 
inspection as well as each Federal agency that supports 
laboratory activities at that laboratory.
    The Committee intends for a top tier of Select Agents that 
pose material threats to the Nation be developed. The Committee 
intends for laboratories that contain these Tier 1 Material 
Threat Agents to be better secured. The Committee believes that 
the Department of Homeland Security will be responsible for 
addressing cases in which these agents are obtained illicitly, 
used for terrorist purposes, or accidentally released. The 
Committee further observes that the two Departments in charge 
of the Select Agent Program-the Department of Agriculture and 
the Department of Health and Human Services-are not national 
security organizations. Therefore, the Committee believes that 
the Department of Homeland Security should have a substantial 
role in developing security protocols to enhance security at 
laboratories containing Tier 1 Material Threat Agents.
    The Committee intends for the Department of Homeland 
Security to be responsible for convening a negotiated 
rulemaking committee, composed of representatives from every 
Federal Department and agency, as well as private sector 
agencies, that work with, transfer, obtain, or otherwise 
process Tier 1 Material Threat Agents. The Committee encourages 
the Secretary to include local officials, including first 
responders, from high threat areas as participants. The 
Committee intends for this negotiated rulemaking committee to 
consider the threat posed by Tier 1 Material Threat Agents, the 
threat to facilities that contain these agents, and the ability 
of our nation's enemies to obtain and use these agents. The 
Committee also intends for the negotiated rulemaking committee 
to issue any necessary new standards, rules, and requirements 
for securing Tier 1 Material Threat Agents. In addition, the 
Committee intends for the Department of Agriculture and the 
Department of Health and Human Services to enforce any new 
regulations. However, due to the potential impact on the Nation 
and implications for action by the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Committee intends for the Department of 
Agriculture and the Department of Health and Human Services to 
report inspection and other regulatory data to the Department 
of Homeland Security. This reporting of data will allow the 
Department of Homeland Security to better advise and make 
recommendations regarding security at laboratories that possess 
Tier 1 Material Threat Agents and to provide these laboratories 
with additional grants so that they may increase their 
security.
    The Committee does not intend for the Department of 
Homeland Security to supplant efforts by other Federal agencies 
(including those of the Department of Agriculture and the 
Department of Health and Human Services) to enforce Select 
Agent regulations. However, the Committee does not believe that 
laboratories containing Select Agents are as secure as they 
could be; this fact is evidenced by incidents and inspections 
(such as those conducted by the Inspector General) that reveal 
insufficient security. The Committee also agrees with the 
assessment of the Commission that laboratory security must be 
increased. Therefore, the Committee intends for the Department 
of Homeland Security to partner with the Department of 
Agriculture and the Department of Health and Human Services in 
order to improve laboratory security for those laboratories in 
possession of Tier 1 Material Threat Agents.
    The Committee urges all Federal departments and agencies 
that conduct inspections of laboratories possessing Tier 1 
Material Threat Agents (as part of regulating Select Agent 
laboratories, ensuring contractors are performing in accordance 
with contractual obligations to the government, and so forth) 
to conduct these inspections in a manner that seeks to minimize 
disruption to affected laboratories. The Committee urges 
inspections be coordinated among Federal departments and 
agencies so as to avoid unnecessary duplicative inspections. 
The Committee also intends for Federal Departments and agencies 
to share inspection information in order to identify any 
ongoing security problems at particular laboratories.
    The Committee intends for a representative from the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence to participate in the 
activities addressed in this section. The Committee anticipates 
that the representative can articulate how agency decisions 
(particularly decisions made by the negotiated rulemaking 
committee) will impact research and development efforts by the 
Intelligence Community as well as other activities within the 
Community. The Committee also intends for these measures to 
enhance laboratory security for Tier 1 Material Threat Agents, 
while simultaneously allowing for legitimate research 
activities to continue. Additionally, the Committee intends for 
this section to support and reinforce Presidentially-driven 
reforms of laboratory security activities to avoid 
unnecessarily redundant burdens on research and allow for input 
from all relevant Federal departments and agencies regarding 
laboratory security requirements.

Section 2106.   Tier 1 Material Threat Agent Locations.
    This section directs the Secretary of Agriculture and the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to provide to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security (at the request of the 
Secretary) with lists of laboratories and other locations where 
Tier 1 Material Threat Agents are present in the United States 
and its territories.
    The Committee intends for the Department of Homeland 
Security to know where all laboratories possessing Tier 1 
Material Threat Agents are located in the United States and its 
territories. However, the Committee does not intend for the 
Department of Homeland Security to replicate work that is 
already being done by the Department of Agriculture and the 
Department of Health and Human Services regarding Select Agent 
laboratories (of which Tier 1 Material Threat Agent 
laboratories are only a portion). The Committee intends for the 
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Health and 
Human Services to provide lists of Tier 1 Material Threat Agent 
laboratories and their locations to the Department of Homeland 
Security at the request of the Secretary of Homeland Security 
and as often as the Department of Agriculture and the 
Department of Health and Human Services feel is necessary to 
help ensure homeland security. The Committee intends for 
classified information (such as classified locations) to be 
communicated to the Department of Homeland Security, and for 
the Department to handle this information in accordance with 
the rules and procedures that protect classified information.

Section 2107.   High Containment Biological Laboratory Security 
Grants.
    This section permits the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
provide grants to academic and non-profit organizations and to 
State, local, and tribal authorities to enhance the security of 
those laboratories that handle Tier 1 Material Threat Agents 
and other agents requiring high containment. This section 
authorizes the Secretary, acting through the Administrator of 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to award grants based 
on risk to academic and non-profit organizations and to State, 
local, and tribal authorities that possess, use, or transfer 
Tier I Material Threat Agents. The grants are designed to 
enhance security at laboratories handling Tier 1 Material 
Threat Agents. This section authorizes $50,000,000 per year to 
be appropriated for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 to the 
Department of Homeland Security.
    The Committee intends to raise the security standards at 
laboratories that possess Tier 1 Material Threat Agents. The 
Committee believes that it would not be fair to ask high 
containment laboratories to take make new investments to 
increase laboratory security to address the WMD threat without 
providing funding to help the laboratories meet the higher 
security standards. The Committee intends for funding provided 
under this section to augment (not replace) funding provided by 
other Federal departments and agencies. The Committee intends 
for these grants to be awarded to State, local and tribal 
public health laboratories as well as to academic and non-
profit laboratories that find their activities would be limited 
without the additional funding necessary to achieve the higher 
laboratory security standards for Tier 1 Material Threat 
Agents. Such laboratories include, but are not limited to the 
regional biocontainment laboratories, including Biosafety Level 
4 laboratories, that received awards from National Institutes 
of Health.

Section 2108.  Laboratory Biosecurity Information Sharing.
    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
establish procedures (with appropriate access controls) for the 
sharing of homeland security information (vulnerability 
assessments, security plans, best practices, and other 
laboratory biosecurity-related information) with, as the 
Secretary determines appropriate, State, local, and tribal 
government authorities, including law enforcement authorities 
and emergency response providers. In carrying out this 
responsibility, the Secretary shall have access to and may use 
information from the national databases established under 
section 212(d)(2) of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection 
Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. 8401(d)(2)) and subsections (d)(2) and 
(f)(3) of section 351A of the Public Health Service Act (42 
U.S.C. 262a). The Committee intends for any information 
disseminated under this section to be handled in accordance 
with rules and procedures for protecting classified information 
and sensitive law enforcement information, intelligence 
sources, and intelligence methods.
    The Committee intends for the Department of Homeland 
Security to share information necessary to improve and ensure 
high containment laboratory security-particularly regarding 
those laboratories that possess Tier 1 Material Threat Agents. 
The Committee believes that it is important for State, local, 
and tribal authorities to participate fully in the homeland 
security mission, and that in order to do so, these authorities 
must be empowered with knowledge. The Committee urges the 
Department of Homeland Security to share as much information as 
possible with State, local, and tribal authorities in order to 
help these authorities take the necessary actions and maintain 
the necessary awareness to secure laboratories, transport 
Select Agents (including Tier 1 Material Threat Agents), and so 
forth. Although the Committee believes that the Department of 
Homeland Security has taken some actions to date in this 
regard, the Committee believes that the entire community would 
benefit from the Department of Homeland Security establishing 
clear procedures, with appropriate controls for access to, and 
for the sharing of, this homeland security information.

Section 2109.   Periodic Homeland Security Review of Criminal 
Statutes.
    This section directs the Secretary, in coordination with 
the Attorney General and the heads of other Federal departments 
and agencies, as appropriate, to address the risk of misuse of 
life sciences by terrorists and others. The bill requires the 
Secretary to: (1) periodically review and recommend updates to 
relevant criminal laws; and (2) ensure that relevant guidance 
is available to national biosecurity and biodefense 
stakeholders. Not later than one year after enactment and 
biannually thereafter, the Secretary, in coordination with the 
Attorney General, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees recommended updates to relevant criminal laws.
    The Committee is concerned that, in some instances, the law 
enforcement community may have been hindered by criminal laws 
that do not adequately address the threat or are not well 
suited to the evolving risks of the misuse of life sciences. 
The Committee believes that criminal law may need to evolve as 
the threat evolves.

Section 2110.   Export Enforcement for Counter-Proliferation.
    This section authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary 
of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of National 
Intelligence, and the heads of other appropriate Federal 
Departments and agencies, to conduct homeland security 
investigations and enforce criminal violations of United States 
customs and export laws to prevent individuals and terrorist 
groups from obtaining sensitive United States technology and 
munitions, and WMD components, precursors, and delivery 
systems. This section also directs the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to conduct outreach to United States manufacturers and 
businesses that export technologies or commodities that both 
terrorist organizations (and the countries that support them) 
and countries that proliferate weapons may try to procure. The 
outreach should be conducted in a manner that acknowledges 
commerce and trade. Additionally, this section directs the 
Secretary to manage national export enforcement coordination at 
the Department of Homeland Security, with participants from the 
Department, the Department of Commerce, the Department of 
Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, 
the Department of State, the Intelligence Community, and other 
Federal agencies as appropriate. Law enforcement counter-
proliferation investigations, intelligence counter-
proliferation activities, licensing, and outreach to and 
training for the export trade community will be coordinated.
    The Committee supports the Obama Administration's efforts 
to create greater efficiencies in the export control community. 
The Committee intends to authorize activities underway at the 
Department of Homeland Security, most notably U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement's counter-proliferation efforts. The 
Committee recognizes the investigations that Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement and other Federal law enforcement agencies 
conduct in this regard, and intends to better support these 
efforts. The Committee also believes that outreach to the 
private sector is critical, and intends to authorize industry 
outreach activities like those conducted by U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement.
    The Committee intends to authorize export enforcement 
coordination activities already occurring under the auspices of 
Immigration and Customs and Enforcement in the Department of 
Homeland Security; it believes that a network for such 
coordination will increase efficiencies and better integrate 
law enforcement, intelligence, and other related activities for 
export control. The Committee also intends for these activities 
to be undertaken with an understanding of the commerce and 
security-related context in which counter-proliferation 
activities must occur. The Committee does not intend to subsume 
counter-proliferation activities conducted by the Intelligence 
Community under the Department of Homeland Security.

                        Subtitle B--Preparedness

Section 2121.   Communication of Threat Information and Alerts.
    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
coordination with appropriate Federal agencies, to ensure that 
homeland security information concerning terrorist threats is 
provided to State, local, and tribal authorities and to the 
public within the United States, as appropriate, so that they 
can better prepare for and collectively respond to terrorism. 
This coordination shall occur through the use of: (1) threat 
bulletins; (2) threat and risk assessments; (3) guidance to 
State, local, and tribal authorities; and (4) the use of 
existing resources (such as websites, communications systems, 
and information networks). This section also directs the 
Secretary to provide guidance to State, local, tribal and 
private sector entities about partnering with and leveraging 
public television stations to help disseminate information from 
the Department of Homeland Security.
    The Committee believes that State, local, and tribal 
authorities, as well as the public, are critical partners in 
ensuring homeland security. However, in order to be effective 
partners, these authorities and the public must be empowered 
with knowledge and information. The Committee urges the 
Department of Homeland Security to be expansive in its 
determination of how much information to share with these 
authorities and the public, while also using its best judgment 
to determine what and how much information must be secured. The 
Department is encouraged to develop a formal mechanism for 
early warning to appropriate State, local, and tribal officials 
of imminent or highly probable events. Additionally, the 
Committee intends for the Department of Homeland Security to 
partner with public television stations and use this valuable 
resource to better disseminate homeland security information. 
Further, the Committee intends for the Department to identify 
and provide best practices on leveraging public television to 
accomplish these purposes.

Section 2122.   Individual and Community Preparedness for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
acting through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, to help State, local, and tribal authorities 
improve and promote individual and community preparedness for 
and collective response to WMD and terrorist attacks. The 
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall: 
(1) develop and disseminate prevention and preparedness 
guidance and checklists; (2) disseminate first responder 
guidance regarding WMD attacks; (3) provide preparedness 
information and training materials; and (4) conduct outreach. 
Where appropriate, the Secretary shall coordinate with private 
sector and nongovernmental organizations to carry out these 
activities. When compiling this guidance, the Administrator 
shall take into account best practices based on the experience 
of other countries and agencies, and the expertise of academic 
institutions and non-governmental organizations. The Committee 
believes that State, local, and tribal authorities, as well as 
the public, are critical partners in preparing for and 
responding to WMD and terrorist attacks against the United 
States. The Committee recognizes that although the Department 
of Homeland Security has carried out many activities in this 
regard (particularly by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency) the Committee agrees with the Commission that more can 
and must be done. The Committee intends for the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency to provide State, local, and tribal 
authorities, as well as individuals, with the tools, training, 
and information they need to prepare for and respond to WMD and 
terrorist attacks individually and collectively. To ensure that 
the guidance remains relevant, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency Administrator is encouraged to periodically review new 
and existing guidance and update such guidance, as appropriate. 
The Committee also intends for the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency to apply and communicate best practices that other 
countries and institutions identify. The Committee urges the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency to seek out the expertise 
and knowledge available at academic institutions and within 
programs like the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative.

                         Subtitle C--Detection

Section 2131.   National Biosurveillance Strategy.
    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
examine the state of national and global biosurveillance and to 
develop and maintain a national strategy for biosurveillance. 
This strategy shall take into consideration the following: (1) 
current biosurveillance activities; (2) homeland security 
material threat assessments and determinations; (3) global 
trends identified by the Intelligence Community regarding the 
biological threat; (4) types of information available in 
biosurveillance systems and information technology changes to 
better incorporate and integrate this information; (5) 
Intelligence Community requirements; and (6) costs associated 
with integrating biosurveillance systems. This strategy shall 
address: (1) situational awareness; (2) key elements of 
biosurveillance information; (3) fostering information sharing 
between the public health, law enforcement, security, 
intelligence, and life science communities to identify 
potential threats, reduce vulnerabilities, and improve 
collective response to and investigations of suspected 
biological attacks; and (4) the National Biosurveillance 
Integration Center resident at the Department of Homeland 
Security (including strategic and implementation plans for this 
Center).
    The Committee believes that there are many challenges 
associated with analyzing biosurveillance data sets, collected 
nationally and internationally, sharing the data between and 
among different professions, and dealing with relevant 
classified information. Similarly, developing a national 
biosurveillance strategy that addresses these elements is also 
challenging. The Committee recognizes that the Department of 
Health and Human Services has been trying to meet this 
challenge and develop a national biosurveillance strategy 
targeted at human disease outbreaks. However, given that 
comprehensive biosurveillance draws upon more data sources than 
those under the control of the Department of Health and Human 
Services, it is important that the Department of Homeland 
Security play a central role in developing a national 
biosurveillance strategy. At the same time, the Committee 
strongly believes in the mission of the National 
Biosurveillance Integration Center, as managed by the 
Department of Homeland Security but is frustrated with the lack 
of participation by other appropriate Federal agencies. The 
Committee expects the national strategy to include strategic 
and implementation plans for the National Biosurveillance 
Integration Center to realize its mission.

Section 2132.   Detection of Biological Attacks.
    This section establishes the national BioWatch biological 
detectors program within the Department of Homeland Security, 
and directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to: (1) deploy 
these detectors throughout the Nation; (2) provide data 
generated by these detectors to participating host laboratories 
for their use in monitoring public health; (3) provide data 
generated by these detectors to public health and law 
enforcement personnel throughout government; and (4) provide 
advanced planning tools, concepts of operations (including 
alarm resolution protocols) and training for collective 
response to and recovery from biological attacks.
    This section also directs the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to enter into agreements with the Director of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Administrator 
of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other 
Federal departments and agencies, to set roles and 
responsibilities regarding filter testing by and coordination 
with State, local, and tribal agencies. The Secretary shall 
also determine annually whether the distribution of these 
detectors throughout the Nation, as well as their capabilities, 
sufficiently protects the United States. Additionally, acting 
through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology and in 
consultation with the Director of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, the Secretary shall implement an assay 
equivalency program for biological threat assays. Additionally, 
the Secretary is authorized to contract directly with 
participating laboratories for: (1) testing detector filters on 
a fee-for-service, prepayment, or other similar basis; and (2) 
administrative and other costs regarding hosting BioWatch 
personnel and equipment.
    The Committee intends to authorize the already existing 
BioWatch activity within the Department of Homeland Security. 
The Committee recognizes that the success of the BioWatch 
program depends on effective interaction with, provision of 
information and guidance to, and receipt of support from host 
State and local public health laboratories that are also 
members of the Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism. 
The Committee intends for the Department of Homeland Security 
to have resources to reimburse the State and local public 
health laboratories that host BioWatch activities for 
laboratory services and administrative costs.

Section 2133.   Rapid Biological Threat Detection and 
Identification.
    This section directs the Department of Homeland Security 
Under Secretary for Science and Technology, in consultation 
with the heads of other relevant operational components of the 
Department, to assess whether the Department of Homeland 
Security Science and Technology Directorate should develop 
screening capabilities for biological WMD agents, pandemic 
influenza, and other infectious diseases to screen people 
entering and exiting the United States at our ports of entry. 
If the Under Secretary determines that such screening 
capabilities should be developed, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security shall, to the extent possible, initiate the 
development of such methods that are safe and effective to 
rapidly screen incoming travelers at ports of entry for 
exposure to biological WMD agents, pandemic influenza, and 
other infectious diseases, collaborating with the heads of 
other Federal agencies, as needed.
    Currently, international borders offer very little 
protection from the spread of infectious disease due to the 
inability to quickly and effectively screen travelers. The 
Committee believes that the Department must assess whether the 
use of screening technologies could be effective in controlling 
the spread of disease or the trafficking of biological weapons. 
If the Department believes that such screening tools are 
necessary, the Committee intends for the Science and Technology 
Directorate of the Department to develop these screening 
capabilities.

Section 2134.   Establishment of the System Assessment and 
Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) Program.
    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
acting through the Department of Homeland Security Under 
Secretary for Science and Technology, to: (1) assess and 
validate commercially-produced emergency response equipment and 
systems (including hand-held detectors for WMD agents); (2) 
ensure that a network of scientists assess and validate the 
equipment and systems; (3) provide results and other 
information to the emergency response provider community in a 
form they find useful in the operational setting; (4) provide 
information on the equipment on the Department of Homeland 
Security authorized equipment list; (5) provide information to 
enable decision-makers and responders to better select, 
procure, use, and maintain emergency responder equipment; and 
(6) share this information with the emergency response provider 
community.
    The Committee intends to authorize this already existing 
activity within the Science and Technology Directorate of the 
Department of Homeland Security. The Committee believes that 
many systems and equipment for first responders and others do 
not produce sufficiently valid and/or reliable results. The 
Committee urges greater support for this program because the 
program works to determine the validity and reliability of 
these systems and equipment, and to provide that information to 
first responders so that they may make better purchasing 
decisions. The Committee also urges SAVER program personnel to 
reach out to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other 
Federal agencies who have conducted evaluations of such 
equipment and systems for other purposes, to get their views 
and other relevant input into the program.

Section 2135.   Payment for Bioterrorism Laboratory Services.
    This section authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
the Attorney General, and the heads of other participating 
Federal agencies to contract with State and local laboratories 
that compose the Laboratory Response Network (LRN)_and any 
other qualified
laboratories_for testing services on a fee-for-service, 
prepayment, or similar basis.
    The Committee recognizes the important work of the 
participating laboratories in the LRN. The Committee also 
recognizes that the vast amount of initial laboratory testing 
of suspicious powders and other materials is conducted by State 
and local public health member laboratories. Additionally, the 
Committee understands that at least one Federal agency has made 
an unsuccessful attempt to transfer funds to the Department of 
Health and Human Services for support of LRN laboratories. The 
Committee intends for the provision to allow Federal agencies 
participating in the LRN to be able to contract directly with 
State and local LRN laboratories to pay for laboratory testing 
services on a fee-for-service or similar basis, without going 
through other Federal agencies. The Committee does not intend 
for such payment for LRN services to supplant or replace other 
funding that State and local public health laboratories receive 
from other sources, including those from the Department of 
Health and Human Services.

Section 2136.   Establishment of the Integrated Consortium of 
Laboratory Networks (ICLN).
    This section establishes the Integrated Consortium of 
Laboratory Networks (ICLN) as an activity that is facilitated 
by the Secretary of Homeland Security. This section directs 
that the ICLN shall: (1) be composed of networks of 
laboratories (such as the LRN) capable of and equipped for 
conducting the testing necessary for detection, response to, 
and recovery from WMD attacks, acts of terrorism, and other 
incidents requiring laboratory response capabilities; (2) 
ensure that the activities of member laboratory networks are 
coordinated and integrated; (3) provide limited containment and 
analysis of biological samples in support of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies as they 
investigate incidents involving WMD or WMD agents; and (4) 
support studies to characterize threat agents, assay 
evaluation, research, and development.
    The Committee intends to authorize this already existing 
activity within the Department of Homeland Security. The 
Committee recognizes that the various laboratory response 
networks that are, or could be, members of the ICLN are at 
various stages of development. The Committee urges the 
Department of Homeland Security to seek consensus in pursuing 
ICLN activities (e.g. establishing standards for testing and 
reporting). Additionally, the Committee believes that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security should consider whether the ICLN 
should be moved out of the Science and Technology Directorate 
of the Department of Homeland Security and to another 
organizational entity within the Department.
    The Committee intends for the Department of Homeland 
Security to facilitate coordination of the ICLN through its 
position as chair and role as executive secretariat of the 
ICLN. The Committee believes that the ICLN should be managed by 
consensus among the various participating Federal agencies that 
participate in the coordination and leadership oversight 
activities of the ICLN. The Committee does not intend for ICLN 
member laboratories to carry out threat agent characterization 
studies and assay evaluation, research, and development 
themselves, but instead, the Committee intends for these 
laboratories to support those activities carried out by various 
Federal Departments and agencies in this regard.

                        Subtitle D--Attribution

Section 2141.   Bioforensics Capabilities and Strategy.
    This section establishes the National Bioforensic Analysis 
Center (NBFAC) within the Department of Homeland Security and 
designates the NBFAC as the lead Federal facility to: (1) 
forensically examine biological agents and related evidence; 
(2) provide the necessary containment to conduct forensic 
examinations of such evidence safely and securely; (3) 
integrate law enforcement, national security, and homeland 
security bioforensics requirements; (4) support other Federal 
agencies that are responsible for preventing, deterring, 
responding to, attributing, and recovering from biological 
attacks; (5) develop national standards for bioforensics; (6) 
maintain the distributed national bioforensics repository 
collection to assist with making forensic comparisons and 
identifying biological agents; and (7) support the 
characterization of threat agents, as well as research and 
development regarding the evaluation of bioforensics laboratory 
tests.
    This section directs the National Bioforensics Analysis 
Center to maintain a national repository collection of 
organisms and toxins for bioforensics activities that are not 
centralized, but are distributed throughout the country. This 
distributed repository collection shall: (1) receive, store, 
and distribute biological threat agents and toxins; (2) allow 
such organisms and toxins to be compared to those sent to the 
Center so that they may be identified and characterized; and 
(3) support the characterization of threat agents and the 
development of laboratory tests and analyses. In order to 
create this distributed repository collection, this section 
directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney 
General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, the Director of National Intelligence, and the 
head of any other appropriate executive agency with a 
collection of organisms or toxins to provide either samples of 
or information on these organisms or toxins to this distributed 
repository collection.
    These samples and information must be useful for: (1) 
bioforensics analysis; (2) identification and characterization 
of biological agents; and (3) evaluation and development of 
laboratory tests and other bioforensics methods. The Secretary 
of Homeland Security will determine what organisms and toxins 
are relevant for bioforensics, in consultation with the head of 
the Federal agency that possesses these organisms or toxins. 
The Secretary will also require the samples or information on 
organisms or toxins in those public and private sector 
collections that were Federally-funded and that the Secretary 
determines are relevant for bioforensics. This section directs 
the Secretary to provide any Federal agency that has 
contributed organisms or toxins to this distributed national 
repository collection with access. The Secretary is also 
directed to: (1) establish a mechanism to allow other public 
and private sector entities access to this collection, as 
determined to be appropriate by the Secretary; and (2) ensure 
that classified information, law enforcement sensitive 
information, and intellectual property rights are protected.
    Not later than one year after enactment, and annually 
thereafter, the Secretary in consultation with all other 
agencies that contribute specimens or information to the 
distributed repository collection will submit a report on the 
collection to the appropriate committees of Congress.
    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of 
Agriculture, Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, the Director of National Intelligence, and the 
heads of other appropriate Federal Departments and agencies (as 
determined by the Secretary), to develop, coordinate, and 
maintain a national bioforensics strategy to increase national 
bioforensics capabilities in a coordinated fashion across the 
Federal government. The strategy will include: (1) guidance for 
sample collection, processing, and analysis; (2) reporting 
requirements; and (3) requirements for the distributed 
bioforensics repository collection. Not later than one year 
after enactment and biennially thereafter, the Secretary, in 
consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of 
Agriculture, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, the Director of National Intelligence, and 
the heads of other appropriate agencies (as determined by the 
Secretary), shall submit the national bioforensics strategy to 
the appropriate committees of Congress.
    This section also directs the Secretary, in coordination 
with the Attorney General and the heads of any other 
appropriate Federal agencies, to ensure that a detailed concept 
of operations for information sharing and all-source analysis 
supporting timely attribution of biological attacks is 
available. Additionally, this section allows the Secretary to 
implement a detailee program to detail appropriately cleared 
governmental national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders 
on a reimbursable basis to the NBFAC. Lastly, this section 
directs the Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney 
General and the heads of any other appropriate Federal 
agencies, to establish a national-level research and 
development strategy and implementation plan to advance the 
field of bioforensics.
    The Committee intends to authorize the existing NBFAC 
within the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department 
of Homeland Security. The Committee is aware that activities 
envisioned for the NBFAC have not occurred according to 
schedule. The Committee believes delays have occurred at least 
in part because the NBFAC has not benefited from an overarching 
national strategy that would indicate how the NBFAC fits with 
and supports other governmental bioforensics activities. The 
Committee intends for the Federal members of the homeland 
security, intelligence, and defense communities that conduct 
bioforensics activities to: (1) work together to develop the 
national bioforensics strategy and (2) clearly identify roles, 
responsibilities, possibilities for transfer of technologies, 
and sharing of specimen-related information.
    The Committee intends for the national bioforensics 
repository collection to be distributed and not entirely 
centralized. The Committee intends for either physical 
specimens or information/data regarding specimens that would 
have utility for bioforensics purposes to compose the national 
bioforensics repository collection. Such a dispersed collection 
would take advantage of imaging and other technologies and 
would reduce the security risks associated with housing all 
specimens in one centralized, identifiable location. The 
Committee intends for information about and specimens contained 
within the repository to be accessible to all contributors, as 
the Secretary of Homeland Security deems appropriate.
    The Committee intends for the detailees to the NBFAC to 
assist the Department of Homeland Security in establishing 
sound bioforensic scientific practices, and to better align its 
activities with those in the broader scientific community. 
Considering that many of the potential specimens that could be 
considered part of the distributed national bioforensics 
repository collection are found throughout the United States 
government, the Committee believes that such detailees could 
provide critical insights and more realistic perspectives on 
establishing the collection. Additionally, the Committee 
believes that such detailees could help to build the 
relationships necessary for the NBFAC to carry out its job 
efficiently and effectively.

Section 2142.   Federal Law Enforcement Training to Investigate 
Biological Threats.
    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of 
Agriculture, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and 
the heads of other appropriate Federal Departments and 
agencies, to make training, tactics, and techniques available 
to law enforcement, public health, and security personnel at 
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) for 
recognizing and responding to situations involving potential 
biological threats, including the performance of coordinated 
joint criminal and epidemiological investigations.
    The Committee intends to authorize these already existing 
training activities within FLETC. The Committee urges FLETC to 
learn from other similar, related, and applicable training 
activities already occurring at the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Department of Health and Human Services, and 
other Federal Departments and agencies.

                          Subtitle E--Response

Section 2151.   First Responder Guidance Concerning Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Attacks.
    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security (in 
consultation with the heads of appropriate Federal Departments 
and agencies, the National Advisory Council, the National 
Domestic Preparedness Consortium, State, local, and tribal 
authorities, nongovernmental organizations, and private 
industry, and reviewing the experiences of other countries and 
the expertise of academic institutions and nongovernmental 
organizations) to develop voluntary guidance for first 
responders and first providers on responding to releases of 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material. This 
section also directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to make 
this guidance available to government and nongovernmental
organizations, the private sector, and the public. This 
guidance shall address: (1) protective actions for first 
responders and first providers; (2) the effects of chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear material on those exposed 
to these agents; and (3) best practices for first responders 
and first providers to effectively deal with affected 
individuals.
    At least every two years, this section directs the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to: (1) periodically review this 
guidance; (2) make revisions, as appropriate; and (3) make 
revised guidance available to government and nongovernmental 
organizations, the private sector, and the public. In carrying 
out the requirements of this section, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security shall: (1) inventory existing relevant HAZMAT response 
guidance; (2) enable first responders and first providers to 
recommend areas in which guidance is still needed; (3) 
determine who should be consulted; (4) regularly prioritize 
which guidance should be developed or revised; and (5) develop 
and disseminate the guidance.
    Not later than 18 months after enactment and annually 
thereafter, this section directs the Secretary to provide the 
appropriate congressional committees with: (1) a description of 
established procedures; (2) any guidance in effect; (3) a list 
of entities to which the guidance was disseminated; (4) a plan 
for reviewing the guidance; (5) guidance and methodology used 
by the Secretary for prioritization; and (6) a plan for 
developing, revising and disseminating the guidance.
    The Committee intends for the Department of Homeland 
Security to provide needed guidance to the first responder and 
first provider communities, as well as others that will be 
responding to WMD and terrorist attacks involving WMD agents. 
The Committee urges the Department of Homeland Security to 
review relevant existing Federal, non-Federal, international, 
academic, and non-governmental materials when developing the 
guidance to be issued under this section. The Committee also 
intends for the Department of Homeland Security to provide 
clear mechanisms for the first responder and first provider 
communities to identify areas for which they feel they are in 
need of guidance (as opposed to the Federal government making 
these determinations for them). The Committee believes that 
guidance promulgated under this section should be integrated 
into curricula for first responder training provided by the 
Center for Domestic Preparedness and other such accredited 
facilities to enhance WMD capabilities among our Nation's first 
responders. The Committee recognizes the importance of aligning 
response throughout the chain of leadership in response to a 
WMD attack or incident.
    For the purposes of this legislation, first providers are 
considered those personnel who provide immediate medical care 
when first at the scene of a chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear incident. Such personnel include 
trained medical professionals, as well as other emergency 
personnel who have received some medical training (such as 
police, firefighters, and civilians that have received first 
aid and other certified training) but are not considered 
medical professionals.

Section 2152.   Integrated Plume Modeling for Collective 
Response.
    This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
acquire, use and disseminate timely plume models that integrate 
protective action guidance and other appropriate information 
(called ``integrated plume models'') to enable quicker response 
to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or 
event. This section directs the Secretary to: (1) rapidly 
develop and distribute these models to appropriate government 
officials to enable immediate response to these types of 
incidents; (2) establish mechanisms for appropriate emergency 
response officials to disseminate these models to 
nongovernmental organizations and the public; (3) assess the 
development and dissemination of these models during exercises 
administered by the Department of Homeland Security; and (4) 
ensure that lessons learned from this assessment are 
incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security Lessons 
Learned Information Sharing system. Not later than one year 
after enactment, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report regarding: (1) the acquisition, use, and 
dissemination of these models; (2) lessons learned from the 
assessment of these models; and (3) recommendations for 
improving these models, as appropriate.
    The Committee recognizes that agencies other than the 
Department of Homeland Security (such as the Department of 
Energy and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) have 
produced many plume models for a variety of theoretical and 
real-world events. The Committee does not intend for the 
Department of Homeland Security to redo this work. Instead, the 
Committee intends for the Department of Homeland Security to 
acquire plume models from these agencies, work with them to 
integrate protective action guidelines and other appropriate 
information, and subsequently use and disseminate them 
subsequently.

                          Subtitle F--Recovery

Section 2161.   Recovery and Restoration from a Biological 
Attack or Incident Guidance.
    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
coordination with the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency and in consultation with the Director of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Agency, and the Director of the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, to 
develop and issue guidance for cleaning and restoring indoor 
and outdoor areas that have been affected by a biological 
attack or event. These guidelines shall address: (1) what is 
acceptable as far as the presence of an organism in a sample 
taken from an affected area, after it has been cleaned-up; (2) 
standards for effective clean up; (3) standards for people to 
safely reoccupy these sites; (4) requirements to make sure that 
decontamination procedures used by different organizations 
working to clean up the sites do not conflict; (5) use of a 
uniform system for tracking costs and performance of clean-up 
contractors; (6) personal protection equipment; (7) negative 
air pressure in buildings; (8) proper selection and use of 
personal protective equipment; (9) air sampling procedures; and 
(10) how to develop appropriate health and safety plans for 
responders.
    At least every two years, the Secretary shall: (1) review 
this guidance; (2) make appropriate revisions; and (3) make the 
revised guidance available to government and nongovernment 
organizations, the private sectors, as the public.
    In order to develop and revise this guidance, the Secretary 
of Homeland Security shall: (1) inventory any existing relevant 
guidance; (2) enable the public to recommend areas for which 
they think guidance is needed; (3) determine which entities 
should be consulted; (4) prioritize (on a regular basis) 
guidance that should be developed or revised; and (5) develop 
and disseminate the guidance.
    Not later than one year after enactment, this guidance 
shall be developed and issued. Not later than one year after 
enactment and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security shall provide appropriate congressional committees 
with: (1) a description of the procedures established; (2) any 
guidance in effect on the date of the report; (3) a list of 
entities to which the guidance was disseminated; (4) a plan for 
reviewing the guidance; (5) the prioritized list of the 
guidance required and the methodology used by the Secretary to 
set these priorities; and (6) a plan for developing, revising, 
and disseminating the guidelines.
    The Committee intends to authorize this already existing 
activity within the Science and Technology Directorate of the 
Department of Homeland Security, and add additional 
requirements to: (1) address clean-up and restoration of 
pseudo-internal/outdoor areas, such as subways; (2) produce a 
decision framework for local officials to determine how much of 
an organism growing in specimens taken from places that have 
been cleaned is acceptable; (3) establish effective clean up 
standards; and (4) establish standards for safe occupancy of 
affected sites after they have been cleaned-up. The guidance 
should be straight-forward and sufficiently detailed to help 
local officials restore their communities and ensure that 
affected areas are appropriately sampled, assessed, 
characterized, and cleaned.

Section 202.   Definitions.
    The following terms are defined in this section: (1) 
``weapon of mass destruction''; (2) ``Intelligence Community''; 
``national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders''; and (3) 
``Tier 1 Material Threat Agent.''

Section 203.   Dual-Use Terrorist Risks from Synthetic 
Genomics.
    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, 
to examine and report within a year from enactment on the 
homeland security implications of the dual-use nature of 
synthetic genomics and, if the Under Secretary determines that 
research into this area is appropriate, to conduct research in 
this area. This research will: (1) determine the current 
capability of providers of synthetic nucleic acids to 
effectively differentiate between legitimate customers and 
potential terrorists or other malicious actors; (2) determine 
the current capability of synthetic nucleic acid providers to 
effectively screen orders for sequences of homeland security 
concern; and (3) make recommendations regarding capability gaps 
uncovered by the study.
    The field of synthetic genomics has the potential to 
facilitate enormous gains in fundamental discovery and 
biotechnological applications, but it also has inherent dual-
use homeland security risks that must be managed. The Committee 
intends for the Department of Homeland Security to ascertain 
whether companies that produce and sell synthesized DNA have 
the ability to support legitimate researchers while screening 
out and preventing bad actors from obtaining these materials.

Section 204.   Dissemination of Information Analyzed by the 
Department to State, Local, Tribal, and Private Entities with 
Responsibilities Relating to Homeland Security.
    This section expands the list of entities in section 
201(d)(8) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to which the 
Department of Homeland Security disseminates information to 
include State, local, tribal and private sector entities with 
homeland security responsibilities, and as appropriate, to the 
public, in order to assist in preventing, deterring, and 
responding to acts of terrorism against the United States. Not 
later than one year after enactment, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional 
committees on the implementation of this section.
    The Committee intends for the Department of Homeland 
Security to disseminate information to State, local, tribal, 
and private sector entities with homeland security 
responsibilities, and as appropriate to the public. The 
Committee intends for the Department of Homeland Security to 
prioritize the goals of preventing, deterring, and responding 
to acts of terrorism against the United States in mind 
regarding needed information, and for the Department of 
Homeland Security to report on its activities in this regard.

Section 205.   National Biosurveillance Integration Center 
(NBIC).
    This section moves the NBIC to the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security (and out of 
the Department of Homeland Security Office of Health Affairs) 
and directs participating Federal Departments and agencies to 
detail personnel to the Department of Homeland Security on a 
reimbursable basis. Not later than one year after enactment, 
and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees an interim report on the: 
(1) status of NBIC; (2) efforts of the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis to take responsibility for NBIC; and (3) efforts 
to integrate the surveillance efforts of Federal, State, local, 
and tribal governments.
    The Committee is disappointed that the Department of 
Homeland Security has been unable to secure participation in 
the NBIC by other necessary Federal partners. The Committee 
intends to improve Federal participation by mandating both 
their participation and reimbursement for the costs of their 
participation by the Department of Homeland Security. The 
Committee believes that by moving the NBIC operation to the 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Center will have the 
opportunity to leverage existing channels for exchange of 
information with governmental and non-governmental partners, as 
exist within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. The 
Committee also believes that the NBIC would benefit from 
exposure to the intelligence activities in the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis regarding the biological threat.

Section 206.   Report on Establishment of the System Assessment 
and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) Program.
    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on 
the SAVER program (see section 2134 above) not later than one 
year after enactment.

Section 207.   National Academy of Sciences Study of Forensic 
Science in Homeland Security.
    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, 
to enter into an agreement (no later than 90 days after 
enactment) with the National Academy of Sciences. This 
agreement will be for the National Academy of Sciences to 
undertake a study on the role of forensic science in homeland 
security and to issue appropriate recommendations to enhance 
this capability to investigate WMD attacks, terrorist 
incidents, and other crimes investigated by the Department of 
Homeland Security. Not later than two years after enactment, 
the Secretary shall submit a report containing the results of 
the study, together with any recommendations from the 
Secretary. There is authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 to 
the Department of Homeland Security for fiscal year 2011 to 
carry out this section.
    The Committee recognizes the National Academy of Sciences' 
previous work in studying forensic science and is aware of its 
2009 report on forensics. The Committee intends for the 
National Academy of Sciences to undertake a comprehensive study 
of forensics in furtherance of the Department of Homeland 
Security law enforcement activities conducted by U.S. 
Immigration and Customs and Enforcement, the U.S. Secret 
Service, and other law enforcement agencies and agencies with 
law enforcement elements that conduct investigations with 
homeland security implications. Additionally, the Committee 
intends for the National Academy of Sciences to address 
forensics for WMD and acts of terrorism using other types of 
agents. The Committee intends for the National Academy of 
Sciences to also study forensics that are used by other Federal 
agencies (e.g., the Department of Defense and the Intelligence 
Community) for homeland security purposes. The Committee 
intends for the National Academy of Sciences to pay particular 
attention to bioforensics for homeland security and national 
security purposes used by the homeland security, intelligence, 
and defense communities.

Section 208.   Harmonization of Regulations.
    This section harmonizes regulations in the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, the Public Health Service Act, and the 
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Action of 2002 to ensure 
that such regulations are not redundant or in conflict with the 
regulations promulgated under section 2104 (see above).
    The Committee does not intend for new regulations put 
forward by the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010 to 
be redundant or conflict with regulations in the Public Health 
Service Act or the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 
2002.

Section 209.   Communications Planning for Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Information Dissemination.
    This section directs the Secretary, acting through the 
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (in 
consultation with State, local, and tribal authorities and in 
coordination with other Federal Departments and agencies, as 
appropriate) to develop a communications plan for providing 
information to the public on preventing, preparing for, and 
responding to attacks with WMD and acts of terrorism. This 
section directs the Administrator of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency to incorporate this plan into Federal 
Emergency Management Agency operational plans.
    This section also directs the Administrator of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency to develop pre-scripted messages 
and message templates (in consultation with State, local, and 
tribal authorities and in coordination with other Federal 
Departments and agencies, as appropriate) and disseminate them 
to State, local, and tribal authorities so that they can 
incorporate them into their own emergency plans, and quickly 
disseminate critical information to the public in anticipation 
of or immediately after a WMD or terrorist incident. These pre-
scripted messages and message templates will also be 
incorporated into the National Exercise Program, included in 
the Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned Information 
Sharing system, and issued in multiple formats. Not later than 
one year after enactment, the Administrator shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees the communications plans 
required to be developed under this section (including the pre-
scripted messages or message templates) and a description of 
how they will be used to deliver these messages.
    The Committee intends for the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency to disseminate as much information as possible in 
advance by developing pre-scripted messages and message 
templates, and disseminating these to State, local, and tribal 
authorities, so that they can plan in advance as well.

Section 210.   Environmental Recovery from Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Attacks.
    This section directs the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, in coordination with the Administrator of 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to: (1) assess 
capability gaps in preparedness for environmental recovery from 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks; (2) 
provide guidance to State, local, and tribal authorities for 
such recovery; and (3) develop exercises that enhance 
collective response to and recovery from such attacks. No later 
than one year after enactment, the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the Administrator's 
assessment (see section 2162 above).
    The Committee intends to identify the Environmental 
Protection Agency as the lead agency to accomplish this 
mission, and provides clear requirements for its 
responsibilities in this regard. Although the Committee 
recognizes the challenges inherent in addressing environmental 
recovery requirements, the Committee believes that there is a 
great need for the Environmental Protection Agency to establish 
such requirements.

Section 211.   University-Based Centers for Homeland Security 
Criteria for Designation.
    This section adds additional clarifying criteria to that 
used to designate university-based centers for homeland 
security. This section states that demonstrated expertise in 
emergency and diagnostic medical services shall include: (1) 
medical readiness training and research; and (2) community 
resiliency for public health and healthcare critical 
infrastructure.
    The Committee intends to ensure that universities that have 
demonstrated expertise in medical readiness training and 
research, and community resiliency for public health and 
healthcare critical infrastructure, are able to seek 
designation as university-based centers for homeland security. 
The Committee encourages universities with this demonstrated 
expertise to seek such designation.

                    TITLE III--PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS


Section 301.   National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing 
Strategy.
    This section directs the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the heads of other 
appropriate Federal Departments and agencies, to develop, 
implement, and update periodically a National Medical 
Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy to help prepare for and 
collectively respond to a terrorist attack on humans or animals 
with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents. 
This section directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
to coordinate with State, local, tribal, and nongovernmental 
organizations on this Strategy. Not later than one year after 
enactment, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall 
submit the National Medical Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy 
to the appropriate congressional committees.
    The Committee recognizes that the Department of Health and 
Human Services has been developing medical countermeasures, and 
has addressed medical countermeasures to a limited extent in 
the National Health Security Strategy. The Committee intends 
for the Department of Health and Human Services to give 
enhanced focus to developing a strategy for dispensing medical 
countermeasures, and to work with other Federal Departments and 
agencies to develop the National Medical Countermeasure 
Strategy. That detailed strategy should include an 
implementation plan and be adaptable to the needs of a local 
jurisdiction. The Committee believes that the strategy and 
implementation plan be developed in a manner that is closely 
aligned with ongoing work in the area by the Secretary. The 
Secretary is encouraged to seek input on the strategy from 
State and local public health officials.

Section 302.   Material Threat Assessments and Determinations.
    Recognizing the evolving nature of the threat, advances in 
technology, and changing priorities, this section amends the 
BioShield Act to require the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
and the heads of other appropriate Federal Departments and 
agencies, to review and reassess existing material threat 
determinations and decide whether the agents addressed continue 
to present material threats against the United States 
population, affecting homeland security and national security.
    The Committee recognizes that some agents pose material 
threats to the Nation; it acknowledges, however, the 
possibility that these agents may not always pose materials 
threats to the Nation or the same material threats over time. 
Congress has authorized the Department of Homeland Security to 
assess various agents and to determine whether they are 
material threats to the United States. The Committee intends 
for the list of material threat agents to be composed of agents 
that present current material threats to the Nation. The 
Committee also intends for agents to be removed from this list 
when they no longer pose material threats to the Nation. 
Additionally, the Committee intends for these decisions to be 
made in light of availability of medical and other 
countermeasures, new science and technologies, immunization 
rates, and other relevant factors.

Section 303.   National Pre-Event Vaccination and Antimicrobial 
Dispensing Policy Review.
    This section directs the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, to determine whether domestic vaccination policy, 
policy regarding the dispensing of antibiotics and other 
antimicrobials, as well as related guidance and information 
provided to the public are adequate, taking into consideration 
known terrorist risks of biological attacks or events with 
significant health consequences to the United States. In 
carrying out this review, the Secretary shall consider the 
following: (1) material threat assessments and determinations 
conducted by the Department of Homeland Security; (2) global 
trends identified by the Intelligence Community regarding the 
biological threat; (3) availability of vaccine and 
antimicrobials, and recommendations relating to voluntarily 
getting immunized and keeping a personal store of 
antimicrobials in advance of biological attacks or events with 
significant health consequences; and (4) making surplus or 
expiring vaccine and antimicrobials available to first 
responders. Not later than one year after enactment, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services shall submit this review 
to the appropriate congressional committees, with any 
recommendations relating to the availability of domestic 
vaccine and antimicrobials to give to the public, as well as 
voluntary immunization of first responders.
    The Committee notes that current vaccination policy varies 
according to threats from specific agents and does not require 
that vaccines that could prevent horrific diseases (e.g., 
smallpox) be provided on a mandatory or voluntary basis in 
advance of the terrorist use of biological agents. For purposes 
of this Act, the Committee believes that vaccination policy 
should align with material threat determinations. If certain 
biological agents pose material threats to the United States, 
then different policies may be needed (e.g., policy may change 
to allow first responders to be immunized against these agents 
on a voluntary basis, or to allow expiring or surplus vaccines 
and antimicrobials to be released from the national stockpile 
for more immediate use).
    In carrying out this section, the Departments of Health and 
Human Services and Homeland Security should take into 
consideration the views of public health, public safety, and 
homeland security experts in the course of conducting this 
examination of vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing 
practices. The Committee also intends for this examination to 
specifically address (in addition to other issues deemed 
important by the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the 
Secretary of the Homeland Security) voluntary immunization of 
first responders, further pre-distribution of antimicrobials to 
the public or a subset of the public, and sending expired 
vaccine and antimicrobials from the national stockpile to other 
countries that could make immediate use these expiring 
medicines.

Section 304.   Designation of Tier 1 Material Threat Agents.
    This section directs the Secretaries of Agriculture and 
Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Homeland Security and the heads of other appropriate Federal 
Departments and agencies, to issue regulations to create a top 
tier of Select Agents that are considered material threats to 
the United States (Tier 1 Material Threat Agents), and 
therefore require additional security. These Tier 1 Material 
Threat Agents will be designated as such no later than one year 
after enactment. Criteria for designation include: (1) whether 
the agent or toxin can be used effectively in a biological 
attack; (2) information available from biological or 
bioterrorism risk assessments; and (3) other criteria and 
information that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
determines are appropriate and relevant. All Tier 1 Material 
Threat Agents will be added to the Select Agents list, if they 
are not already there.
    This section also directs the Secretary of Agriculture and 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to consider whether 
other agents should be designated Tier 1 Material Threat agents 
on an ongoing basis. The Secretaries will also biennially 
consider whether agents should be removed from the list of Tier 
1 Material Threat agents.
    The Committee believes that agents in this tier (such as 
smallpox) must be secured at the highest levels. The Committee 
recognizes that these agents are both Select Agents (having the 
potential to cause significant amounts of illness and death) 
and considered to be material threats to the United States 
(having been weaponized for military purposes, having had state 
and/or non-state actors attempt to obtain them, and so forth). 
The Committee believes that it is imperative that we not allow 
terrorists and other criminals to access these particular 
agents.
    In carrying out this section, the Committee intends for the 
Tier 1 Material Threat list to be developed with great focus to 
ensure that the number of material threats is appropriately 
limited. The Committee recognizes that the Select Agent Program 
carries with it significant biosafety and laboratory security 
requirements to begin with, so there is no need to have a large 
number of Tier 1 Material Threat Agents. The Committee urges 
the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Agriculture, the Department of Health and Human Services, and 
other appropriate Federal Departments and agencies that make or 
inform these determinations to ensure that this list contains 
only those agents that must be represented, and to periodically 
remove agents from the list, as appropriate.

Section 305.   Background Checks.
    This section directs the Attorney General to coordinate 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of 
Defense, and the Secretary of State to determine if these 
Departments possess any information relevant to the 
identification of individuals who should not be given access to 
Select Agents because they are reasonably suspected of knowing 
involvement with an organization that engages in domestic or 
international terrorism or with any other organization that 
engages in crimes of violence. In requiring interagency 
coordination and exchange of information: (1) these Federal 
Departments may not have to duplicate background 
investigations; (2) personnel who should not be working with 
Select Agents may be more quickly identified; and (3) it will 
be that much more difficult for malevolent actors to gain 
access to Select Agents in general, and Tier 1 Material Threat 
Agents specifically.
    The Committee intends for Federal agencies to share 
information on individuals that should not be provided access 
to Select Agents, to prevent duplication of background 
investigations and the inappropriate accessing of Select 
Agents. The Committee intends for all previous legislation 
addressing background investigations, sole use considerations, 
etc., to remain in place.

Section 306.   Biotechnology Research, Development, and 
Procurement.
    This section directs the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to develop a comprehensive research, development, and 
acquisition process to counter the biological threat. This 
process will link the activities of the National Institutes of 
Health, the Biodefense Advanced Research and Development 
Authority, and the Project BioShield Special Reserve Fund. The 
process shall clearly make: (1) the National Institutes of 
Health responsible for basic research to development of models 
and prototypes; (2) the Biodefense Advanced Research and 
Development Authority responsible for development of models and 
prototypes to demonstrate that the systems work; and (3) the 
Project BioShield Special Reserve Fund responsible for 
procuring technologies that have been demonstrated to work and 
that meet the requirements for emergency use authorization. 
There is no requirement for General Use Approval by the Food 
and Drug Administration.
    This section also directs that the National Institutes of 
Health, the Biodefense Advanced Research and Development 
Authority, and the Project BioShield Special Reserve Fund to 
formally agree that: (1) a specific biological countermeasure 
is clearly necessary; (2) what the current level of technology 
is for that countermeasure; and (3) that the countermeasure 
will be procured. Further, this section directs the Director of 
the National Institutes of Health, the Biodefense Advanced 
Research and Development Authority, and the Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response of the Department of Health and 
Human Services to be aggressive in pursuing innovative 
research, development, and procurement of these 
countermeasures.
    The Committee, through its oversight work, has observed 
that there is a need for lines of demarcation between the 
National Institutes of Health, the Biomedical Advanced Research 
and Development Authority, and the Project BioShield Special 
Reserve Fund as to their relative responsibilities regarding 
biosecurity research and development. The Committee intends for 
clear guidance regarding the roles and responsibilities of the 
National Institutes of Health, the Biodefense Advanced Research 
and Development Authority, and the Project BioShield Special 
Reserve Fund be issued to companies wishing to engage in 
technology development. The Committee also intends to create 
requirements for the Department of Health and Human Services to 
transfer projects from one to the other without creating gaps, 
in order to ensure future success in countermeasure development 
and procurement.

                  TITLE IV--FOREIGN RELATIONS MATTERS


Section 401.   International Collaboration and Information 
Sharing Relating to Biosecurity.
    This section directs the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, and the heads of other appropriate Federal 
Departments and agencies, to support efforts in other countries 
to: (1) report information regarding biological attacks and 
events with significant health consequences to the United 
Nations; (2) prevent misuse of life sciences; and (3) promote 
greater awareness of how much life science technology is both 
available and accessible; and (4) promote the development of 
mechanisms to report, preserve, and share data regarding 
Federal activities to collaborate and enhance global 
biosecurity.
    The Committee intends for the United States to support 
efforts in other countries to increase biosecurity throughout 
the world, recognizing that: (1) diseases spread across 
borders; (2) biological weapons are proliferating overseas; and 
(3) lack of laboratory security could result in thefts and 
accidents that could in turn affect other countries, including 
the United States

Section 402.   International Engagement to Enhance Biodefense 
and Biosecurity.
    This section directs the Secretary of State, in 
coordination and consultation with the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and the heads of other appropriate Federal Departments 
and agencies, to address biosecurity in the international 
arena, to: (1) support other countries as they work to 
criminalize bioterrorism and the development and use of 
biological weapons; (2) engage international governmental and 
nongovernmental partners in developing and establishing common 
standards, guidance, and best practices to prevent the illicit 
use of life sciences; (3) support the efforts of other 
countries to enhance biological security and safety practices 
at laboratories that work with dangerous biological materials; 
(4) promote the development and adoption of international 
guidance regarding the safe handling and security of dangerous 
biological materials; and (5) promote the sharing of 
information between and among the intelligence, law 
enforcement, and security communities.

Section 403.   Interagency Task Force on Best Practices for 
Global Biopreparedness.
    This section expresses the sense of the Committee that 
preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
incidents must be undertaken both domestically and 
internationally, and that a global preparedness architecture is 
necessary for such events. This section also directs the 
Secretary of State to convene and lead an interagency task 
force to examine: (1) how prepared the world is for a major 
biological event; (2) the necessary elements of this 
architecture; (3) best practices for preparedness based on 
lessons learned from domestic efforts that may be applicable 
internationally; (4) relevant activities, including but not 
limited to those directed by the National Strategy for 
Countering Biological Threats and the International Health 
Regulations of 2005; and (5) whether existing international 
forums can distribute relevant information to the global 
community. The task force shall include representatives from 
the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Agriculture, the Department of Defense, the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, the 
Department of State, the United States Agency for International 
Development, and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. Other Federal Departments and agencies, and other 
national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders, including 
State and local public health and law enforcement officials, 
may also be members of the task force, as the Secretary 
determines they are appropriate. No later than 18 months after 
enactment, the Secretary shall submit a report regarding task 
force findings to the appropriate congressional committees.
    The Committee recognizes that the United States is ahead of 
many nations with respect to efforts to prevent, deter, prepare 
for, detect, attribute, respond to, and recover from WMD 
attacks. The Committee also recognizes that other countries may 
benefit from United States' lessons learned, best practices, 
and other information as they work to undertake these 
activities. The Committee intends for the Federal government to 
gather and communicate this information to other countries, as 
appropriate, without compromising homeland and national 
security.

Section 404.   Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).
    This section directs the Secretary of State to promote the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) by promoting 
transparency, pursuing compliance diplomatically, promoting 
universal BWC membership, developing an action plan for 
increasing international adherence to the BWC, and ensuring 
that United States participation in BWC meetings is broadly 
inclusive of representatives from all of its relevant Federal 
Departments and agencies.
    The Committee believes that the United States should 
support and promote the BWC. The Committee intends for the 
leadership role of the Department of State to be strengthened 
in this regard.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                     HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002


SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Homeland 
Security Act of 2002''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is 
as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
     * * * * * * *

   TITLE XXI--WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

                  Subtitle A--Prevention and Deterrence

Sec. 2101. Weapons of Mass Destruction Intelligence and Information 
          Sharing Unit.
Sec. 2102. Information sharing and collaboration for biosecurity and 
          biodefense.
Sec. 2103. Bioterrorism risk assessments.
Sec. 2104. Radiological materials security.
Sec. 2105. Enhanced biosecurity measures.
Sec. 2106. Tier I Material Threat Agent locations.
Sec. 2107. High containment biological laboratory security grants.
Sec. 2108. Laboratory biosecurity information sharing.
Sec. 2109. Periodic homeland security review of criminal statutes.
Sec. 2110. Export enforcement for counter-proliferation.

                        Subtitle B--Preparedness

Sec. 2121. Communication of threat information and alerts.
Sec. 2122. Individual and community preparedness for weapons of mass 
          destruction.

                          Subtitle C--Detection

Sec. 2131. National biosurveillance strategy.
Sec. 2132. Detection of biological attacks.
Sec. 2133. Rapid biological threat detection and identification.
Sec. 2134. Establishment of the system assessment and validation for 
          emergency responders (SAVER) program.
Sec. 2135. Payment for bioterrorism laboratory services.
Sec. 2136. Establishment of the integrated consortium of laboratory 
          networks.

                         Subtitle D--Attribution

Sec. 2141. Bioforensics capabilities and strategy.
Sec. 2142. Federal law enforcement training to investigate biological 
          threats.

                          Subtitle E--Response

Sec. 2151. First responder guidance concerning weapons of mass 
          destruction attacks.
Sec. 2152. Integrated plume modeling for collective response.

                          Subtitle F--Recovery

Sec. 2161. Recovery and restoration from a biological attack or incident 
          guidance.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          (19) The term ``weapon of mass destruction'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 1403(1) of the 
        Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 
        (50 U.S.C. 2302).
          (20) The term ``Intelligence Community'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National 
        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
          (21) The term ``national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders'' means officials from the Federal, State, 
        local, and tribal authorities and individuals from the 
        private sector who are involved in efforts to prevent, 
        deter, prepare for, detect, attribute, respond, and 
        recover from a biological attack or other phenomena 
        that may have serious health consequences for the 
        United States, including wide-scale fatalities or 
        infectious disease outbreaks.
          (22) The term ``Tier I Material Threat Agent'' means 
        a substance so designated under section 351A(a)(2) of 
        the Public Health Service Act or section 212(a)(2) of 
        the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

  Subtitle A--Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; 
                         Access to Information

SEC. 201. INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Responsibilities of Secretary Relating to Intelligence 
and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.--The 
responsibilities of the Secretary relating to intelligence and 
analysis and infrastructure protection shall be as follows:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (8) To disseminate, as appropriate, information 
        analyzed by the Department within the Department, to 
        other agencies of the Federal Government with 
        responsibilities relating to homeland security, [and to 
        agencies of State and local governments and private 
        sector entities with such responsibilities in order to 
        assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or 
        response to, terrorist attacks against the United 
        States.] to State, local, tribal, and private entities 
        with such responsibilities, and, as appropriate, to the 
        public, in order to assist in preventing, deterring, or 
        responding to acts of terrorism against the United 
        States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE III--SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 308. CONDUCT OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, DEMONSTRATION, TESTING AND 
                    EVALUATION.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Extramural Programs.--
          (1) * * *
          (2) University-based centers for homeland security.--
                  (A) * * *
                  (B) Criteria for designation.--Criteria for 
                the designation of colleges or universities as 
                a center for homeland security, shall include, 
                but are not limited to, demonstrated expertise 
                in--
                          (i) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                          (iii) Emergency and diagnostic 
                        medical services, including medical 
                        readiness training and research, and 
                        community resiliency for public health 
                        and healthcare critical infrastructure.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 316. NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE INTEGRATION CENTER.

  (a) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish, operate, 
and maintain a National Biosurveillance Integration Center 
(referred to in this section as the ``NBIC''), which shall be 
headed by a Directing Officer, under [an office or directorate 
of the Department that is in existence as of the date of the 
enactment of this section.] the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Responsibilities of the Directing Officer of the NBIC.--
          (1) * * *
          (2) Assessments.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC 
        shall--
                  (A) * * *
                  (B) integrate and disseminate homeland 
                security information, including information and 
                intelligence generated elsewhere within the 
                Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the 
                Department, with NBIC data to provide overall 
                situational awareness and determine whether a 
                biological event of national concern has 
                occurred.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Responsibilities of the NBIC Member Agencies.--
          (1) In general.--Each Member Agency shall--
                  [(A) use its best efforts to integrate 
                biosurveillance information into the NBIC, with 
                the goal of promoting information sharing 
                between Federal, State, local, and tribal 
                governments to detect biological events of 
                national concern;]
                  (A) integrate biosurveillance information 
                into the NBIC, with the goal of promoting 
                information sharing between Federal, State, 
                local, and tribal authorities to detect 
                biological attacks and events of homeland 
                concern;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f) Administrative Authorities.--
          (1) * * *
          [(2) Detail of personnel.--Upon the request of the 
        Directing Officer of the NBIC, the head of any Federal 
        department or agency may detail, on a reimbursable 
        basis, any of the personnel of that department or 
        agency to the Department to assist the NBIC in carrying 
        out this section.]
          (2) Detail of personnel.--The head of a participating 
        Federal department or agency shall detail, on a 
        reimbursable basis, any of the personnel of that 
        department or agency to the Department to assist the 
        NBIC in carrying out this section.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (j) Annual Report.--Not later than one year after the date of 
the enactment of the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 
2010 and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on--
          (1) the status of operations at the National 
        Biosurveillance Integration Center of the Department 
        under section 316;
          (2) efforts by the Office of Intelligence and 
        Analysis to take responsibility for the National 
        Biosurveillance Integration Center; and
          (3) efforts to integrate the biosurveillance efforts 
        of Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities.
  [(j)] (k) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   TITLE XXI--WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

                 Subtitle A--Prevention and Deterrence

SEC. 2101. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION 
                    SHARING UNIT.

  (a) In General.--There is established in the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis of the Department a unit for weapons 
of mass destruction intelligence and information sharing. The 
unit shall conduct intelligence and information sharing 
activities consistent with the National Intelligence Strategy 
for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction 
under section 101 of the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 
2010 and the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering 
Biological Threats under section 102 of that Act and shall--
          (1) evaluate and establish a baseline of terrorist 
        actors, their claims, and their plans to conduct 
        attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, 
        and nuclear materials against the Nation;
          (2) support homeland security-focused intelligence 
        analysis of global infectious disease, public health, 
        food, agricultural, and veterinary issues;
          (3) provide tailored analytical support on these 
        threats to State, local, and tribal authorities as well 
        as members of the public health, scientific, and 
        response communities; and
          (4) perform other responsibilities, as assigned by 
        the Secretary.
  (b) Coordination.--Where appropriate, the unit shall 
coordinate with others in the Intelligence Community, including 
the National Counter Proliferation Center.
  (c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this section and annually thereafter, the 
Secretary shall report to the appropriate congressional 
committees on the intelligence and information sharing 
activities of the unit for weapons of mass destruction 
intelligence and information sharing established under 
subsection (a) and all relevant entities within the Department 
to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction and how 
the Department acted in accordance with relevant intelligence 
strategies, including the National Intelligence Strategy for 
Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 
National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological 
Threats.

SEC. 2102. INFORMATION SHARING AND COLLABORATION FOR BIOSECURITY AND 
                    BIODEFENSE.

  (a) Responsibilities of Secretary of Homeland Security.--To 
increase situational awareness, the Secretary, acting through 
the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, shall--
          (1) to the greatest extent practicable, integrate 
        into the homeland security, intelligence, and 
        information sharing process national biosecurity and 
        biodefense stakeholders;
          (2) develop an information sharing framework for 
        homeland security intelligence and information sharing 
        withe national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders;
          (3) enable national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders to provide recommendations with respect to 
        the development of mechanisms and protocols to 
        integrate information from national biosecurity and 
        biodefense stakeholders;
          (4) leverage existing and emerging homeland security 
        capabilities and structures, including fusion centers 
        established pursuant to section 210A, to enhance 
        prevention, detection, preparedness, and collective 
        response, attribution, and recovery efforts of from a 
        biological attack or other phenomena that may have 
        serious health consequences for the United States, 
        including wide-scale fatalities or infectious disease 
        outbreaks; and
          (5) advance partnerships between the Department and 
        other Federal departments and agencies in assessing 
        potential threats and the risks from the intentional 
        use of biological agents by terrorists or other actors.
  (b) Coordination With Other Departments and Agencies.--The 
Secretary shall work in coordination with the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, and the heads of other appropriate Federal 
agencies.

SEC. 2103. BIOTERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENTS.

  (a) Risk Assessment.--The Secretary, in coordination with the 
heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, 
shall produce biennial integrated risk assessments, to be known 
as ``Bioterrorism Risk Assessments'' to identify and assess the 
evolving terrorist risk of a biological attack or other 
phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the 
United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious 
disease outbreaks. These assessments shall--
          (1) identify the threat, vulnerability, and 
        consequences of a biological terrorist attack against 
        the United States;
          (2) take into account intelligence and information 
        regarding terrorist intentions, capabilities, plans, 
        and actions;
          (3) be used to inform and guide threat assessments 
        and determinations made by the Secretary regarding 
        agents and toxins pursuant to section 302(9), and to 
        guide prioritization of other homeland security 
        activities, as appropriate;
          (4) provide the basis for risk-informed investments 
        in national strategic biodefense research, development, 
        planning, preparedness, and collective response to 
        biological attacks;
          (5) identify key knowledge and data gaps;
          (6) define critical biodefense vulnerabilities;
          (7) provide risk-based prioritization of agents for 
        bioterrorism; and
          (8) evaluate progress in implementing national 
        biopreparedness policy.
  (b) Requirement.--The Secretary shall--
          (1) convene an interagency task force of subject 
        matter experts to provide recommendations to the Under 
        Secretary for Science and Technology as to the adequacy 
        of the methodology used in the Assessments and to 
        establish requirements and standards for the 
        Assessments;
          (2) engage with national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders to obtain their input regarding the 
        Assessments, as appropriate; and
          (3) ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, that 
        the Assessments inform the risk management decisions of 
        the Department and can be made available to national 
        biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders, as 
        appropriate.

SEC. 2104. RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS SECURITY.

  (a) Risk Assessment.--The Secretary shall enhance domestic 
preparedness for and collective response to terrorism by 
conducting annual risk assessments regarding the threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences of theft or other procurement 
of radiological materials that could be used by a terrorist in 
a radiological dispersion device, including any specific threat 
information pertinent to the use of radiological materials in a 
possible terrorist attack using a radiological dispersion 
device.
  (b) Considerations.--In conducting the terrorism risk 
assessments under subsection (a), the Secretary shall--
          (1) consult with Secretary of Energy, Secretary of 
        Heath and Human Services, and the Nuclear Regulatory 
        Commission;
          (2) consider relevant studies previously prepared by 
        other Federal agencies, or other reputable sources;
          (3) focus on those radiological materials that 
        constitute the greatest risk, and designate those 
        materials as high-risk radiological materials for 
        purposes of this section;
          (4) consider the potential radiological dispersion 
        device value of different radiological materials 
        including availability, dispersability, and ease of 
        handling of such materials;
          (5) consider the vulnerability for theft or other 
        procurement that different facilities represent; and
          (6) consider the consequences of a successful 
        radiological dispersion device attack, including risk 
        of death or injury and economic losses.
  (c) Consultation.--In conducting the terrorism risk 
assessments under subsection (a), the Secretary shall consult 
with the Intelligence Community, the Secretary of Energy and 
the Field Intelligence Elements of the National Laboratories, 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, and other appropriate experts to integrate 
and analyze information needed to develop the risk assessment.
  (d) Dissemination of Findings.--The Secretary shall 
disseminate the findings of the risk assessments and any 
specific risk information developed in the assessment to all 
participating agencies including those described in subsection 
(c), as well State and local agencies, and the facilities 
containing radiological source material and regulated by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
  (e) Classification.--The Secretary shall, as appropriate, 
share the terrorism risk assessments with law enforcement and 
critical infrastructure operators with appropriate security 
clearances. The Secretary shall also make available an 
unclassified version to each agency with which the Secretary is 
required to consult under subsection (c), as well as State and 
local law enforcement and public health authorities, and 
facilities possessing radiological materials with the support 
of the Department of Energy.

SEC. 2105. ENHANCED BIOSECURITY MEASURES.

  (a) Regulations.--At the request of the Secretary, the 
Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the heads of 
other appropriate Federal agencies, shall, through a negotiated 
rulemaking committee under subchapter III of chapter 5 of title 
5, United States Code, establish enhanced biosecurity measures 
for persons or laboratories that possess, use, or transfer Tier 
I Material Threat Agents. Such measures shall include--
          (1) standards for personnel surety programs;
          (2) standards for biosecurity practices and training 
        of responsible officials, laboratory personnel, and 
        support personnel;
          (3) standards for performing laboratory vulnerability 
        assessments in collaboration with each facility;
          (4) risk-based laboratory security performance 
        standards;
          (5) penalties (including civil money penalties and 
        intermediate sanctions), in addition to any other 
        penalties that may apply under provisions of law; and
          (6) any other security standards determined necessary 
        by the Secretary, the Secretary of Agriculture, 
        Secretary of Health and Human Services, and other 
        agencies as appropriate.
  (b) Negotiated Rulemaking Committee.--The Secretary shall 
establish a negotiated rulemaking committee for purposes of 
subsection (a). Such committee shall include a representative 
from each of the following:
          (1) The Department.
          (2) The Department of Health and Human Services.
          (3) The Department of Agriculture.
          (4) The Department of Defense.
          (5) The Department of Energy.
          (6) The Department of Justice.
          (7) For-profit research institutions.
          (8) Academic research institutions.
          (9) Nonprofit research institutions
          (10) Other stakeholders, as the Secretary determines 
        appropriate.
  (c) Time Requirement.--The procedures for the negotiated 
rulemaking referred to in subsection (a) shall be conducted in 
a timely manner to ensure that--
          (1) any recommendations with respect to proposed 
        regulations are provided to the Secretary and the heads 
        of the other appropriate Federal agencies not later 
        than one year after the date of the enactment of this 
        section; and
          (2) a final rule is promulgated not later than two 
        years after the date of the enactment of this section.
  (d) Factors To Be Considered.--In developing proposed and 
final standards pursuant to the negotiated rulemaking referred 
to in subsection (a), the negotiated rulemaking committee shall 
consider--
          (1) the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of 
        Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism 
        (established under section 1851 of the Implementing 
        Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
        (Public Law 110-53; 121 Stat. 501));
          (2) the National Science Advisory Board for 
        Biosecurity (established under section 217a of title 
        42, United States Code, section 222 of the Public 
        Health Service Act, and section 205 of the Pandemic and 
        All-Hazards Preparedness Act);
          (3) any working group established under Executive 
        Order 13486 (74 Fed. Reg. 2289) relating to 
        strengthening laboratory biosecurity;
          (4) the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009; 
        and
          (5) views from representatives of biosecurity and 
        biodefense stakeholders for methods to minimize any 
        disincentives to biological research arising from 
        enhanced biosecurity measures.
  (e) Implementation of Enhanced Biosecurity Measures.--
          (1) Enforcement.--The Secretary of Agriculture and 
        the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in 
        consultation with the Secretary, as appropriate, shall 
        enforce the measures established under subsection (a) 
        and any standards promulgated pursuant to such section.
          (2) Training programs.--The Secretary of Agriculture 
        and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in 
        coordination with the Secretary and the heads of other 
        Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall develop 
        training programs that comply with such measures and 
        standards.
          (3) Procedures.--The Secretary of Agriculture and the 
        Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation 
        with the Secretary and the heads of other Federal 
        agencies, as appropriate, shall develop and implement 
        procedures with respect to when and how penalties and 
        intermediate sanctions may be imposed. Such procedures 
        shall provide for notice, a reasonable opportunity to 
        respond to the proposed penalty or intermediate 
        sanction, and appropriate procedures for appealing 
        determinations relating to the imposition of a penalty 
        or intermediate sanction.
          (4) Simultaneous laboratory inspections.--
                  (A) Inspection data sharing and enforcement 
                uniformity.--The Secretary of Agriculture and 
                the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
                shall periodically provide the Secretary with 
                all data concerning inspections of laboratories 
                that handle Tier 1 Material Threat Agents to 
                ensure uniformity in enforcement of the 
                regulations enacted under subsection (a) and to 
                identify areas where the Secretary can provide 
                guidance to the Secretary of Agriculture or the 
                Secretary of Health and Human Services about 
                approaches to enhance security at specific 
                laboratories.
                  (B) Simultaneous inspections.--Any 
                inspections of the same laboratory conducted by 
                the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to 
                section 212(a)(1) of the Agricultural 
                Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 and the 
                Secretary of Health and Human Services for 
                compliance with regulations promulgated under 
                the Select Agent Program under section 
                351A(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act, 
                shall be conducted simultaneously to the extent 
                practicable.
                  (C) Common inspection procedures.--
                Departments conducting simultaneous inspections 
                of a laboratory under this subsection shall 
                ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that 
                such inspections are conducted using a common 
                set of inspection procedures across such 
                departments in order to minimize the 
                administrative burden on such laboratory.
                  (D) Inspection reports.--Inspection reports 
                generated under this paragraph shall be made 
                available to each Federal agency that supports 
                select agent laboratory activities at the 
                institution that is the subject of the 
                inspection report, and to the institutions that 
                are the object of inspections.

SEC. 2106. TIER I MATERIAL THREAT AGENT LOCATIONS.

  The Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services shall provide to the Secretary a list of 
laboratories and other locations where Tier I Material Threat 
Agents are present in the United States and its territories.

SEC. 2107. HIGH CONTAINMENT BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY SECURITY GRANTS.

  (a) Grants Authorized.--The Secretary, acting through the 
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, may 
award grants based on risk to academic and nonprofit 
organizations and to State, local, and tribal authorities that 
possess, use, or transfer Tier I Material Threat Agents, to 
enhance security at laboratories of such organizations and 
authorities.
  (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to 
be appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security to carry 
out this subsection $50,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2011 
through 2013.

SEC. 2108. LABORATORY BIOSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING.

  (a) In General.--Consistent with the responsibilities of the 
Secretary under section 201(d), the Secretary shall establish 
procedures, with appropriate controls on access, for the 
sharing of homeland security information, including 
vulnerability assessments, security plans, best practices and 
other laboratory biosecurity-related information, as the 
Secretary determines appropriate, with State, local, and tribal 
government authorities, including law enforcement authorities 
and emergency response providers.
  (b) Access to Information in Databases.--In carrying out this 
section, the Secretary shall have access to and may use 
information from the national databases established under 
section 212(d)(2) of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection 
Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. 8401(d)(2)) and subsections (d)(2) and 
(f)(3) of section 351A of the Public Health Service Act (42 
U.S.C. 262a).
  (c) Classified and Sensitive Information.--The Secretary 
shall ensure that any information disseminated under this 
section is handled consistent with--
          (1) the authority of the Director of National 
        Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and 
        methods under the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
        U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and related procedures or similar 
        authorities of the Attorney General concerning 
        sensitive law enforcement information;
          (2) section 552a of title 5, United States Code 
        (commonly referred to as the Privacy Act of 1974); and
          (3) other relevant laws.

SEC. 2109. PERIODIC HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW OF CRIMINAL STATUTES.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary, in coordination with the 
Attorney General and the heads of other Federal departments and 
agencies, as appropriate, shall, for purposes of enhancing 
homeland security--
          (1) periodically review and recommend updates to 
        criminal laws to ensure that such laws are well suited 
        to the evolving risks of misuse of life sciences by 
        terrorists and others; and
          (2) ensure that national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders at unique risk of exploitation have access 
        to guidance regarding actions that can reduce the risk 
        of misuse of life sciences by terrorists and others.
  (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this section, and biannually thereafter, the 
Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees the 
recommended updates to criminal laws, as described in 
subsection (a)(1).

SEC. 2110. EXPORT ENFORCEMENT FOR COUNTER-PROLIFERATION.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney 
General, the Secretary of State, the Director of National 
Intelligence, and the heads of other appropriate Federal 
agencies shall--
          (1) conduct homeland security investigations and 
        enforce criminal violations of customs and export laws 
        of the United States related to military items, 
        controlled commodities, and sanctioned or embargoed 
        countries to prevent individuals, terrorist groups, 
        foreign adversaries, and hostile nations from--
                  (A) illegally obtaining sensitive United 
                States technology and munitions; and
                  (B) obtaining weapons of mass destruction 
                components, precursors, and delivery systems, 
                including--
                          (i) United States military technical 
                        data, hardware, small arms and defense 
                        services;
                          (ii) dual-use technical data/source 
                        code and commodities; and
                          (iii) deemed exports; and
          (2) conduct industry outreach with manufacturers and 
        exporters of strategic commodities that may be targeted 
        for procurement by terrorist organizations and the 
        countries that support them as well as countries 
        identified as weapons proliferators, in a manner that 
        acknowledges commerce and trade, by--
                  (A) educating companies and individuals on 
                the export laws of the United States;
                  (B) discussing export licensing issues and 
                requirements;
                  (C) identifying red flag indicators used in 
                illegal procurement;
                  (D) identifying the government agencies 
                responsible for the licensing of export-
                controlled commodities and technology; and
                  (E) establishing and fostering relationships 
                whereby companies and individuals can report 
                suspicious contacts or attempts to violate the 
                export laws of the United States.
  (b) National Export Enforcement Coordination.--
          (1) Establishment; membership.--There is established 
        in the Department a unit responsible for national 
        export enforcement coordination that is managed by the 
        Secretary. The unit shall be composed of members who 
        are representatives from the Department, the Department 
        of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department 
        of Energy, the Department of Justice, the Department of 
        State, the Intelligence Community, and other Federal 
        agencies as appropriate.
          (2) Responsibilities.--The unit shall carry out the 
        following responsibilities:
                  (A) Coordinating law enforcement counter-
                proliferation investigations and intelligence 
                counter-proliferation activities.
                  (B) Addressing licensing inquiries, reviews, 
                requests, checks, and verifications.
                  (C) Conducting outreach and providing 
                training to the export trade community.

                        Subtitle B--Preparedness

SEC. 2121. COMMUNICATION OF THREAT INFORMATION AND ALERTS.

  (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of 
        Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism 
        recommended that ``the Federal Government should 
        practice greater openness of public information so that 
        citizens better understand the threat and the risk this 
        threat poses to them''.
          (2) There are unique challenges for community 
        preparedness for attacks from weapons of mass 
        destruction and their agents.
  (b) Terrorism Threat Awareness.--
          (1) Terrorism threat awareness.--The Secretary, in 
        coordination with the heads of appropriate Federal 
        agencies, shall ensure that homeland security 
        information concerning terrorist threats is provided to 
        State, local, and tribal authorities and the public 
        within the United States, as appropriate, for purposes 
        of preparedness and collective response to terrorism 
        and for other purposes.
          (2) Threat bulletins.--
                  (A) In general.--Consistent with the 
                requirements of paragraph (1), the Secretary 
                shall, on a timely basis, prepare unclassified 
                terrorism-related threat and risk assessments.
                  (B) Requirements.--Each assessment required 
                under subparagraph (A) shall--
                          (i) include guidance to the public 
                        for preventing and responding to acts 
                        of terrorism; and
                          (ii) be made available on the 
                        Internet website of the Department and 
                        other publicly accessible Internet 
                        websites, communication systems, and 
                        information networks.
          (3) Guidance to state, local, and tribal 
        authorities.--The Secretary--
                  (A) acting through the Administrator of the 
                Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall 
                provide to State, local, and tribal authorities 
                written guidance on communicating terrorism-
                related threats and risks to the public within 
                their jurisdictions; and
                  (B) shall identify and articulate the 
                governmental rationale for identifying 
                particular communities as being at heightened 
                risk of exploitation.
          (4) Use of existing resources.--The Secretary shall 
        use Internet websites, communication systems, and 
        information networks in operation on the date of an 
        assessment under this subsection to satisfy the 
        requirements of paragraph (2)(B)(ii). The Secretary 
        shall provide guidance on how State, local, tribal, and 
        private entities can partner with public television 
        stations to disseminate information provided by the 
        Department and shall provide information on best 
        practices on disseminating information to residents of 
        local communities, including leveraging public 
        television stations.

SEC. 2122. INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS 
                    DESTRUCTION.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary, acting through the 
Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
shall assist State, local, and tribal authorities in improving 
and promoting individual and community preparedness and 
collective response to weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear materials against the United States by--
          (1) developing guidance and checklists of recommended 
        actions for individual and community prevention and 
        preparedness efforts and disseminating such guidance 
        and checklists to communities and individuals;
          (2) disseminating the guidance developed under 
        section 2151 to communities and individuals, as 
        appropriate;
          (3) providing information and training materials in 
        support of individual and community preparedness 
        efforts;
          (4) conducting individual and community preparedness 
        outreach efforts; and
          (5) such other actions as the Secretary determines 
        appropriate.
  (b) Coordination.--Where appropriate, the Secretary shall 
coordinate with private sector and nongovernmental 
organizations to promote individual and community preparedness 
and collective response to weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear materials against the United States.
  (c) Best Practices.--In compiling guidance for individual and 
community preparedness in order to carry out subsection (a)(3), 
the Secretary shall give due regard to best practices based on 
the experience of other countries and agencies and the 
expertise of academic institutions and non-governmental 
organizations.

                         Subtitle C--Detection

SEC. 2131. NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE STRATEGY.

  (a) Current State of Biosurveillance.--The Secretary shall 
examine of the state of domestic and global biosurveillance.
  (b) Strategy for Biosurveillance.--The Secretary shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a national strategy 
for biosurveillance.
  (c) Matters for Inclusion.--
          (1) In general.--In developing the strategy required 
        under subsection (b), the Secretary shall take into 
        consideration--
                  (A) the state of biosurveillance domestically 
                and internationally;
                  (B) material threat assessments and 
                determinations developed by the Secretary in 
                accordance with the Project BioShield Act of 
                2004 (Public Law 108-276) and the amendments 
                made by that Act;
                  (C) reports on global trends produced by the 
                Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
                regarding the biological threat;
                  (D) information available in biosurveillance 
                systems and changes to information technology 
                to allow for the incorporation and integration 
                of this information;
                  (E) Intelligence Community needs as 
                articulated in relevant intelligence 
                strategies; and
                  (F) costs associated with establishing and 
                maintaining the necessary infrastructure to 
                integrate biosurveillance systems.
          (2) Additional requirements.--This strategy required 
        under subsection (b) shall--
                  (A) include a plan for advancing situational 
                awareness;
                  (B) identify key elements of information to 
                be shared, critical sensitivities to be 
                protected, and a framework for enabling 
                information exchange;
                  (C) include a plan for fostering information 
                sharing between law enforcement, security, 
                intelligence, and national biosecurity and 
                biodefense stakeholders to identify potential 
                threats, reduce vulnerabilities and improve 
                collective response activities to and 
                investigations of suspected biological attacks; 
                and
                  (D) include strategic and implementation 
                plans for the National Biosurveillance 
                Integration Center under section 316.

SEC. 2132. DETECTION OF BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS.

  (a) Program.--The Secretary shall carry out a program in the 
Department to detect a biological attack or event. Through such 
program, the Secretary shall--
          (1) deploy detectors to areas, based on risk, to 
        indicate the presence of biological agents;
          (2) provide information to participating laboratories 
        for their use in monitoring public health, and 
        biological material from these detectors to 
        participating laboratories for testing;
          (3) provide information about the presence of 
        biological agents to public health and law enforcement 
        personnel at all levels of government; and
          (4) provide advanced planning tools, concepts of 
        operations (including alarm resolution protocols), and 
        training exercises for collective response to and 
        recovery from biological attacks.
  (b) Program Requirements.--Under the program required under 
subsection (a), the Secretary shall--
          (1) enter into memoranda of agreement or interagency 
        agreements under the Economy Act of 1933 (31 U.S.C. 
        1535 et seq.) with the Director of the Centers of 
        Disease Control and Prevention and the Administrator of 
        the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of 
        other Federal departments and agencies, setting forth 
        roles and responsibilities, including with respect to 
        filter testing protocols for participating laboratories 
        and coordination with appropriate State, local, and 
        tribal agencies;
          (2) determine, on an annual basis, whether plans for 
        biological detector capabilities and coverage 
        sufficiently protect the United States population; and
          (3) acting through the Under Secretary for Science 
        and Technology, and in consultation with the Director 
        for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
        implement an assay equivalency program for biological 
        threat assays that--
                  (A) may evaluate biological threat detection 
                assays, their protocols for use, and their 
                associated response algorithms for confirmation 
                of biological threat agents, taking performance 
                measures and concepts of operation into 
                consideration;
                  (B) may develop assay equivalency standards 
                based on the findings of the evaluation under 
                subparagraph (A);
                  (C) will be updated as necessary;
                  (D) shall require implementation of the 
                standards developed under subparagraph (B) for 
                all Department biological detection programs; 
                and
                  (E) shall make such standards available to 
                support all other Federal biological detection 
                programs.
  (c) Contract Authority.--The Secretary is authorized to enter 
into contracts with participating laboratories for--
          (1) the provision of laboratory services to test 
        detector filters on a fee-for-service basis or on a 
        prepayment or other similar basis; and
          (2) administrative and other costs related to hosting 
        program personnel and equipment in these laboratories.
  (d) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) The term ``participating laboratory'' means a 
        laboratory that has been accepted as a member of the 
        Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism that--
                  (A) is fully equipped to detect and respond 
                quickly to acts of biological terrorism;
                  (B) provides biocontainment and 
                microbiological analysis in support of the 
                Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
                and other law enforcement agencies with 
                responsibilities for investigating biological 
                incidents; and
                  (C) supports threat agent characterization 
                studies and assay evaluation, research and 
                development.
          (2) The term ``assay'' means any scientific test that 
        is designed to detect the presence of a biological 
        threat agent that is of a type selected under criteria 
        established by the Secretary.

SEC. 2133. RAPID BIOLOGICAL THREAT DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION.

  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 302(4) the Secretary 
shall require the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, 
in consultation with the heads of other relevant operational 
components of the Department, assess whether the development of 
screening capabilities for biological agents, pandemic 
influenza, and other infectious diseases should be undertaken 
by the Science and Technology Directorate to support entry and 
exit screening at ports of entry and for other purposes.
  (b) Development of Methods.--If the Under Secretary 
determines that the development of such screening capabilities 
should be undertaken, the Secretary shall, to the extent 
possible, initiate development of safe and effective methods to 
rapidly screen incoming travelers at ports of entry for 
biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other infectious 
diseases.
  (c) Collaboration.--In developing methods under subsection 
(b), the Secretary may collaborate with the heads of other 
Federal agencies, as needed.

SEC. 2134. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION FOR 
                    EMERGENCY RESPONDERS (SAVER) PROGRAM.

  The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science 
and Technology, shall carry out a program for system assessment 
and validation of emergency response equipment at the 
Department, to be known as the ``SAVER Program''. The Secretary 
shall ensure that such program--
          (1) conducts objective, impartial, practitioner-
        relevant, and operationally-oriented assessments and 
        validations of commercial emergency responder equipment 
        and systems, including hand-held detectors for agents 
        used in weapons of mass destruction;
          (2) is supported by a network of scientists who 
        perform the assessment and validation activities;
          (3) provides results along with other relevant 
        equipment information to the emergency response 
        provider community in an operationally useful form;
          (4) provides information on equipment that falls 
        within the categories listed in the Department's 
        authorized equipment list;
          (5) provides information that enables decision-makers 
        and responders to better select, procure, use and 
        maintain emergency responder equipment; and
          (6) shares such information nationally with the 
        emergency response provider community.

SEC. 2135. PAYMENT FOR BIOTERRORISM LABORATORY SERVICES.

  In carrying out their functions, responsibilities, 
authorities, and duties to counter biological terrorism, the 
Secretary, the Attorney General, and the heads of other 
participating Federal agencies are authorized to enter into 
contracts with the State and local public health laboratories 
that compose the Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism, 
and any other qualified laboratories, for the provision of 
laboratory testing services on a fee-for-service basis or on a 
prepayment or other similar basis.

SEC. 2136. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTEGRATED CONSORTIUM OF LABORATORY 
                    NETWORKS.

  (a) Establishment.--There is established in the Department an 
Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks that is managed by 
the Secretary.
  (b) Requirements.--The Integrated Consortium of Laboratory 
Networks shall--
          (1) be composed of networks of laboratories capable 
        of integrated and coordinated response to and 
        consequence management of attacks from weapons of mass 
        destruction, acts of terrorism, and other incidents 
        requiring laboratory response capabilities;
          (2) be a coordinated and operational system of 
        laboratory networks that provide timely, high quality 
        results for early detection and effective consequence 
        management of attacks from weapons of mass destruction, 
        acts of terrorism, and other events requiring an 
        integrated laboratory response;
          (3) serve as a system of laboratory networks that are 
        equipped to detect and respond quickly to attacks from 
        weapons of mass destruction and acts of terrorism;
          (4) provide limited containment and analysis in 
        support of the Department, the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, and other law enforcement agencies with 
        responsibilities for investigating incidents involving 
        weapons of mass destruction or their agents; and
          (5) support threat agent characterization studies and 
        assay evaluation, research and development.

                        Subtitle D--Attribution

SEC. 2141. BIOFORENSICS CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGY.

  (a) National Bioforensics Analysis Center.--There is 
established in the Department a National Bioforensics Analysis 
Center which shall serve as the lead Federal facility to--
          (1) provide definitive forensic examination of 
        biothreat agents and related evidence;
          (2) provide necessary biocontainment;
          (3) integrate bioforensics requirements for law 
        enforcement, national security, and homeland security;
          (4) provide bioforensics analysis in support of the 
        executive agencies with primary responsibilities for 
        preventing, deterring, responding to, attributing, and 
        recovering from biological attacks;
          (5) develop national bioforensics standards;
          (6) maintain the national bioforensics repository 
        collection as a reference collection of biological 
        agents and toxins for bioforensics comparisons and 
        identifications; and
          (7) support threat agent characterization studies and 
        bioforensics assay evaluation research and development.
  (b) National Bioforensics Repository Collection.--
          (1) In general.--The National Bioforensics Analysis 
        Center shall maintain a distributed national 
        bioforensics repository collection.
          (2) Activities.--The national bioforensics repository 
        collection shall--
                  (A) receive, store, and distribute biological 
                threat agents and toxins;
                  (B) serve as a distributed reference 
                collection for comparative bioforensics 
                identifications and characterizations; and
                  (C) support threat agent characterization 
                studies and the development of bioforensics 
                assays, genomic analyses, organic and inorganic 
                chemical analyses, electron microscopy 
                analyses, and other relevant assays, analyses, 
                and tests.
          (3) Participation.--
                  (A) In general.--The Secretary, the Attorney 
                General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the 
                Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, 
                the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
                Director of National Intelligence, and the head 
                of any other appropriate executive agency with 
                a biological agent or toxin collection that is 
                useful for the bioforensics analysis of 
                biological attacks, performance of biological 
                threat agent identification and 
                characterization studies, or evaluation and 
                development of bioforensics assays and methods 
                shall provide to the distributed national 
                bioforensics repository collection 
                authenticated replicate samples of, or 
                information on, all relevant biological strains 
                and toxins, as determined by the Secretary, in 
                consultation with the head of the executive 
                agency possessing the agent or toxin.
                  (B) Other biological agents and toxins.--The 
                Secretary shall require the contribution to the 
                national bioforensics repository collection of 
                authenticated replicate samples of, or 
                information on, all relevant biological strains 
                and toxins, as determined by the Secretary, 
                from public and private biological agent and 
                toxin collections that were collected or 
                created with support from a Federal grant or 
                contract and that support the functions 
                described in paragraph (2).
          (4) Access.--The Secretary shall--
                  (A) provide any executive agency that submits 
                a biological agent or toxin, or information on 
                a biological agent or toxin, to the national 
                bioforensics repository collection with access 
                to the collection; and
                  (B) establish a mechanism to provide public 
                and private entities with access to agents or 
                toxins in, or information regarding, the 
                national bioforensics repository collection, as 
                determined appropriate by the Secretary, with 
                appropriate protection of classified or law 
                enforcement sensitive information and 
                intellectual property rights.
          (5) Report.--
                  (A) In general.--Not later than one year 
                after the date of the enactment of this 
                section, and annually thereafter, the 
                Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney 
                General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the 
                Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, 
                the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
                Director of National Intelligence, and the head 
                of any other appropriate executive agency that 
                participates in or contributes agents, or 
                toxins, or information to the national 
                bioforensics repository collection, shall 
                submit to the appropriate committees of 
                Congress a report regarding the national 
                bioforensics repository collection.
                  (B) Contents.--The report submitted under 
                subparagraph (A) shall--
                          (i) discuss the status of the 
                        establishment of the distributed 
                        national bioforensics repository 
                        collection;
                          (ii) identify domestic and 
                        international biological agent and 
                        toxin collections that would prove 
                        useful in carrying out the functions of 
                        the distributed national bioforensics 
                        repository collection;
                          (iii) examine any access or 
                        participation issues affecting the 
                        establishment of the distributed 
                        national bioforensics repository 
                        collection or the ability to support 
                        bioforensics analysis, threat agent 
                        characterization studies, or 
                        bioforensics assay evaluation, 
                        research, and development, including--
                                  (I) intellectual property 
                                concerns;
                                  (II) access to collected or 
                                created biological agent or 
                                toxin collections funded by a 
                                Federal grant or contract;
                                  (III) costs incurred by 
                                domestic and international 
                                biological agent and toxin 
                                collections to access or 
                                contribute biological agents or 
                                toxins to the national 
                                bioforensics repository 
                                collection; and
                                  (IV) access to the national 
                                bioforensics repository 
                                collection by public and 
                                private researchers to support 
                                threat agent characterization 
                                studies, bioforensics assay 
                                evaluation, research, and 
                                development, and biosecurity 
                                research and development; and
                          (iv) other issues determined 
                        appropriate.
  (c) National Bioforensics Strategy.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary, in coordination with 
        the Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the 
        Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human 
        Services, the Director of National Intelligence, and 
        the head of any other appropriate executive agency, as 
        determined by the Secretary, shall develop, coordinate, 
        and maintain a national bioforensics strategy.
          (2) Contents.--The national bioforensics strategy 
        shall--
                  (A) provide for a coordinated approach across 
                all executive agencies with responsibilities 
                for--
                          (i) conducting bioforensics 
                        examination of biological threat agents 
                        and related evidence; and
                          (ii) generating bioforensics 
                        requirements for law enforcement, 
                        national security, and homeland 
                        security;
                  (B) describe the roles and responsibilities 
                of all relevant executive agencies, including--
                          (i) research to characterize threat 
                        agents;
                          (ii) assay evaluation, research, and 
                        development; and
                          (iii) funding;
                  (C) establish mechanisms, in coordination 
                with State, local, and tribal authorities, for 
                coordinating with public health, homeland 
                security, and law enforcement agencies for the 
                collection or receipt, transfer, or submission 
                of bioforensics evidence for analysis and its 
                use; and
                  (D) include--
                          (i) guidance for collecting, 
                        processing, and analyzing samples;
                          (ii) requirements for reporting 
                        bioforensics information to appropriate 
                        agencies; and
                          (iii) requirements for the 
                        distributed national bioforensics 
                        repository collection.
          (3) Report.--Not later than one year after the date 
        of the enactment of this section, and biennially 
        thereafter, the Secretary, in consultation with the 
        Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the 
        Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human 
        Services, the Director of National Intelligence, and 
        the heads of other appropriate agencies, as determined 
        by the Secretary, shall submit to the appropriate 
        committees of Congress the national bioforensics 
        strategy.
  (d) Concept of Operations.--The Secretary, in coordination 
with the Attorney General and the heads of any other 
appropriate Federal agencies shall ensure the availability of a 
detailed concept of operations for information sharing and all-
source analysis to support timely attribution of biological 
attacks.
  (e) Detailee Program.--Subject to the availability of 
appropriations, the Secretary may implement a detailee program 
to detail from governmental entities national biosecurity and 
biodefense stakeholders with appropriate clearances, on a 
reimbursable basis, to the National Bioforensics Analysis 
Center for the purpose of--
          (1) providing training and other educational benefits 
        for such stakeholders to help them to better understand 
        the policies, procedures, and laws governing national 
        bioforensics activities; and
          (2) bolstering the capabilities and information 
        sharing activities of the National Bioforensics 
        Analysis Center with national biosecurity and 
        biodefense stakeholders.
  (f) Research and Development.--The Secretary, in coordination 
with the Attorney General and the heads of any other 
appropriate Federal agencies, shall establish a national-level 
research and development strategy and implementation plan to 
advance the field of bioforensics.
  (g) Definition of Bioforensics.--In this section, the term 
``bioforensics'' means the scientific discipline dedicated to 
analyzing evidence from an attack with a biological weapon of 
mass destruction, an act of bioterrorism, a biological agent- 
or toxin-based criminal act, or the inadvertent release of a 
biological agent or toxin for attribution purposes.

SEC. 2142. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING TO INVESTIGATE BIOLOGICAL 
                    THREATS.

  The Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General, the 
Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, and the heads of other appropriate Federal 
departments and agencies, shall make available to law 
enforcement, public health, and security personnel at the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center training on recognizing 
and responding to situations involving potential biological 
threats, including performing joint criminal and 
epidemiological investigations, and shall--
          (1) ensure that tailored tactics, techniques, and 
        procedures are made available to law enforcement and 
        security personnel, including access to the tools 
        needed to respond to biological threats;
          (2) promote the use of simulation among Federal 
        partners to exercise capabilities, refine operational 
        concepts, and strengthen relationships across the 
        Government; and
          (3) make training available that will ensure that law 
        enforcement, public health, and agricultural 
        investigations of biological threats are coordinated.

                          Subtitle E--Response

SEC. 2151. FIRST RESPONDER GUIDANCE CONCERNING WEAPONS OF MASS 
                    DESTRUCTION ATTACKS.

  (a) Establishment of Voluntary Guidance.--Not later than one 
year after the date of the enactment of this section, the 
Secretary shall--
          (1) develop for police, fire, emergency medical 
        services, emergency management, and public health 
        personnel, voluntary guidance for responding to a 
        release of chemical, biological, radiological, or 
        nuclear material;
          (2) in developing the guidance under paragraph (1), 
        review the experiences of other countries and the 
        expertise of academic institutions and non-governmental 
        organizations; and
          (3) make such guidance available to State, local, and 
        tribal authorities, nongovernmental organizations, the 
        private sector, and the public.
  (b) Contents.--The guidance developed under subsection (a)(1) 
shall include--
          (1) protective action guidance for ensuring the 
        security, health, and safety of emergency response 
        providers;
          (2) specific information regarding the effects of the 
        chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material 
        on those exposed to the agent; and
          (3) best practices for emergency response providers 
        to effectively deal with individuals affected by an 
        incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, 
        or nuclear material.
  (c) Review and Revision of Guidance.--The Secretary shall--
          (1) review the guidance developed under subsection 
        (a)(1) at least once every 2 years,
          (2) make revisions to the guidance as appropriate; 
        and
          (3) make any revised guidance available to State, 
        local, and tribal authorities, nongovernmental 
        organizations, the private sector, and the public.
  (d) Procedures for Developing and Revising Guidance.--In 
carrying out the requirements of this section, the Secretary 
shall establish procedures to--
          (1) inventory existing relevant hazardous material 
        response guidance;
          (2) enable members of the first responder and first 
        provider community to submit recommendations of areas 
        in which guidance is needed and could be developed 
        under subsection (a)(1);
          (3) determine which entities should be consulted in 
        developing or revising the guidance;
          (4) prioritize, on a regular basis, guidance that 
        should be developed or revised; and
          (5) develop and disseminate the guidance in 
        accordance with the prioritization under paragraph (4).
  (e) Consultations.--The Secretary shall develop and revise 
the guidance developed under subsection (a)(1), and the 
procedures required under subsection (d), in consultation 
with--
          (1) the heads of other Federal departments and 
        agencies, as appropriate;
          (2) the National Advisory Council established under 
        section 508;
          (3) the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium;
          (4) State, local, and tribal authorities; and
          (5) nongovernmental organizations and private 
        industry.
  (f) Reporting Requirements.--Not later than 18 months after 
the date of the enactment of this section and annually 
thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees--
          (1) a description of the procedures established under 
        subsection (d);
          (2) any guidance in effect on the date of the report;
          (3) a list of entities to which the guidance 
        described in paragraph (2) was disseminated;
          (4) a plan for reviewing the guidance described in 
        paragraph (2), in accordance with subsection (e);
          (5) guidance required under subsection (d)(4), and 
        the methodology used by the Secretary for such 
        prioritization; and
          (6) a plan for developing, revising, and 
        disseminating the guidance.

SEC. 2152. INTEGRATED PLUME MODELING FOR COLLECTIVE RESPONSE.

  (a) Development.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary shall acquire, use, 
        and disseminate integrated plume models to enable rapid 
        response activities following a chemical, biological, 
        nuclear, or radiological attack or event.
          (2) Scope.--The Secretary shall--
                  (A) ensure the rapid development and 
                distribution of integrated plume models to 
                appropriate officials of the Federal Government 
                and State, local, and tribal authorities to 
                enable immediate response to a chemical, 
                biological, or radiological attack or event;
                  (B) establish mechanisms for dissemination by 
                appropriate emergency response officials of the 
                integrated plume models described in paragraph 
                (1) to nongovernmental organizations and the 
                public to enable appropriate collective 
                response activities;
                  (C) ensure that the development and 
                dissemination of integrated plume models are 
                assessed during exercises administered by the 
                Department; and
                  (D) ensure that lessons learned from 
                assessing the development and dissemination of 
                integrated plume models during exercises 
                administered by the Department are put into the 
                Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned 
                Information Sharing system.
  (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of 
enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the 
Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report regarding--
          (1) the acquisition, use, and dissemination of 
        integrated plume models under this section;
          (2) lessons learned from assessing the development 
        and dissemination of integrated plume models during 
        exercises administered by the Department; and
          (3) recommendations for improving integrated plume 
        models, as appropriate.
  (c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
          (1) The term ``plume model'' means the assessment of 
        the location and prediction of the spread of agents 
        following a chemical, biological, radiological, or 
        nuclear attack or event.
          (2) The term ``integrated plume model'' means a plume 
        model that integrates protective action guidance and 
        other information as the Secretary determines 
        appropriate.

                          Subtitle F--Recovery

SEC. 2161. RECOVERY AND RESTORATION FROM A BIOLOGICAL ATTACK OR 
                    INCIDENT GUIDANCE.

  (a) Establishment of Guidance.--Not later than one year after 
the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary, in 
coordination with the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency and in consultation with the Director of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Agency, and the Director of the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, shall 
develop and issue guidance for clean-up and restoration of 
indoor and outdoor areas, including subways and other mass 
transportation facilities, that have been affected by a 
biological attack or event.
  (b) Contents.--The guidance developed under subsection (a) 
shall include--
          (1) acceptable levels of growth of the organism in 
        post-remediation area samples from affected sites;
          (2) standards for effective clean-up of affected 
        sites;
          (3) standards for safe post-event occupancy of 
        affected sites;
          (4) requirements to ensure that the decontamination 
        procedures for responding organizations do not 
        conflict;
          (5) requirements that each responding organization 
        uses a uniform system for tracking costs and 
        performance of clean-up contractors;
          (6) levels of personal protection equipment;
          (7) maintenance of negative air pressure in 
        buildings;
          (8) standards for proper selection and use of 
        personal protective equipment;
          (9) air sampling procedures; and
          (10) how to develop occupational health and safety 
        plans that are appropriate for the specific risk to 
        responder health.
  (c) Review and Revision of Guidance.--The Secretary shall--
          (1) not less frequently than once every 2 years, 
        review the guidance developed under subsection (a);
          (2) make revisions to the guidance as appropriate; 
        and
          (3) make the revised guidance available to the 
        Federal government, State, local, and tribal 
        authorities, nongovernmental organizations, the private 
        sector, and the public.
  (d) Procedures for Developing and Revising Guidance.--In 
carrying out the requirements of this section, the Secretary 
shall establish procedures to--
          (1) inventory existing relevant guidance;
          (2) enable the public to submit recommendations of 
        areas in which guidance is needed;
          (3) determine which entities should be consulted in 
        developing or revising the guidance;
          (4) prioritize, on a regular basis, guidance that 
        should be developed or revised; and
          (5) develop and disseminate the guidance in 
        accordance with the prioritization under paragraph (4).
  (e) Consultations.--The Secretary shall develop and revise 
the guidance developed under subsection (a), and the procedures 
required under subsection (d), in consultation with--
          (1) the heads of other Federal departments and 
        agencies, as appropriate;
          (2) State, local, and tribal authorities; and
          (3) nongovernmental organizations and private 
        industry.
  (f) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the 
Secretary shall provide appropriate congressional committees 
with--
          (1) a description of the procedures established under 
        subsection (d);
          (2) any guidance in effect on the date of the report;
          (3) a list of entities to which the guidance 
        described in paragraph (2) were disseminated;
          (4) a plan for reviewing the guidance described in 
        paragraph (2), in accordance with subsection (e);
          (5) the prioritized list of the guidance required 
        under subsection (d)(4), and the methodology used by 
        the Secretary for such prioritization; and
          (6) a plan for developing, revising, and 
        disseminating the guidance.
                              ----------                              


POST-KATRINA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT REFORM ACT OF 2006

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE VI--NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             Subtitle C--Comprehensive Preparedness System

CHAPTER 1--NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 653. FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS.

  (a) Agency Responsibility.--In support of the national 
preparedness system, the President shall ensure that each 
Federal agency with responsibilities under the National 
Response Plan--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) develops deliberate operational plans and the 
        corresponding capabilities, including crisis planning, 
        to respond effectively to natural disasters, acts of 
        terrorism, and other man-made disasters, and a 
        communications plan described in subsection (f) in 
        support of the National Response Plan to ensure a 
        coordinated Federal response; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f) Communications Plan.--
          (1) In general.--A communications plan developed 
        under subsection (a)(4) shall be designed to provide 
        information to the public related to preventing, 
        preparing for, and responding to attacks from weapons 
        of mass destruction and acts of terrorism;
          (2) Consultation.--As appropriate, the Administrator 
        shall consult with State, local, and tribal authorities 
        and coordinate with other Federal departments and 
        agencies in developing communications plans under 
        paragraph (1).
          (3) Pre-scripted messages and message templates.--
                  (A) In general.--The Administrator shall 
                develop and disseminate pre-scripted messages 
                and message templates to be provided to State, 
                local, and tribal authorities so that those 
                authorities can quickly and rapidly disseminate 
                critical information to the public in 
                anticipation of, during, or in the immediate 
                aftermath of an attack from a weapon of mass 
                destruction or terrorist incident, and to be 
                included in the Department of Homeland 
                Security's Lessons Learned Information Sharing 
                system.
                  (B) Development and design.--The pre-scripted 
                messages or message templates shall--
                          (i) be developed in consultation with 
                        State, local, and tribal authorities 
                        and in coordination with other 
                        appropriate Federal departments and 
                        agencies;
                          (ii) be designed to provide accurate, 
                        essential, and appropriate information 
                        and instructions to the population 
                        directly affected by an incident, 
                        including information regarding an 
                        evacuation, sheltering in place, 
                        hospital surge operations, health, and 
                        safety; and
                          (iii) be designed to provide 
                        accurate, essential, and appropriate 
                        information and instructions to 
                        emergency response providers and 
                        medical personnel responding to an 
                        incident.
                  (C) Communications formats.--The 
                Administrator shall develop pre-scripted 
                messages or message templates under this 
                paragraph in multiple formats to ensure 
                delivery--
                          (i) in cases where the usual 
                        communications infrastructure is 
                        unusable; and
                          (ii) to individuals with disabilities 
                        or other special needs and individuals 
                        with limited English proficiency.
                  (D) Dissemination and technical assistance.--
                The Administrator shall ensure that all pre-
                scripted messages and message templates 
                developed under this paragraph are made 
                available to State, local, and tribal 
                authorities so that those authorities may 
                incorporate them, as appropriate, into their 
                emergency plans. The Administrator shall also 
                make available relevant technical assistance to 
                those authorities to support communications 
                planning.
                  (E) Exercises.--To ensure that the pre-
                scripted messages or message templates 
                developed under this paragraph can be 
                effectively utilized in a disaster or incident, 
                the Administrator shall incorporate such pre-
                scripted messages or message templates into 
                exercises conducted under the National Exercise 
                Program described in section 648 of the Post-
                Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 
                (6 U.S.C. 748).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                       PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT

TITLE III--GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Part B--Federal-State Cooperation

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 319F-2. STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE AND SECURITY COUNTERMEASURE 
                    PROCUREMENTS.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Additional Authority Regarding Procurement of Certain 
Countermeasures; Availability of Special Reserve Fund.--
          (1) * * *
          (2) Determination of material threats.--
                  (A) Material threat.--The Homeland Security 
                Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary 
                and the heads of other agencies as appropriate, 
                shall on an ongoing basis--
                          (i) assess current and emerging 
                        threats of chemical, biological, 
                        radiological, and nuclear agents; [and]
                          (ii) determine which of such agents 
                        present a material threat against the 
                        United States population sufficient to 
                        affect national security[.]; and
                          (iii) review and reassess 
                        determinations under clause (ii) to 
                        determine whether agents continue to 
                        present a material threat against the 
                        United States population sufficient to 
                        affect national security and homeland 
                        security.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 319F-5. NATIONAL MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE DISPENSING STRATEGY.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section--
          (1) the term ``dispense'' means to provide medical 
        countermeasures to an affected population in response 
        to a threat or incident; and
          (2) the term ``medical countermeasure'' means a 
        qualified countermeasure (as defined in section 319F-
        1(a)(2)).
  (b) Strategy.--The Secretary, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Agriculture, 
and other appropriate Federal agencies, shall develop, 
implement, and, as appropriate, periodically update a National 
Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy to enhance 
preparedness and collective response to a terrorist attack on 
humans or animals with any chemical, biological, radiological, 
or nuclear material.
  (c) Coordination.--Where appropriate, the Secretary shall 
coordinate with State, local, and tribal authorities, private 
sector, and nongovernmental organizations on the National 
Medical Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy.
  (d) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this section, the Secretary, in coordination with 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit the National 
Medical Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy to the appropriate 
congressional committees.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 319N. BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND PROCUREMENT.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary shall develop a comprehensive 
research, development, and acquisition process to counter the 
biological threat that employs the inherent functions, 
capabilities, authorities, and responsibilities of NIH, BARDA, 
and Project BioShield. The process shall--
          (1) assign NIH responsibility for research and 
        development of technologies that range in development 
        from basic principles observed and reported up to model 
        or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment;
          (2) assign BARDA responsibility for research and 
        development of technologies that range in development 
        from model or prototype demonstration in a relevant 
        environment up to a system qualified for application 
        through successful test and demonstration;
          (3) assign Project BioShield responsibility for 
        procurement of technologies that--
                  (A) are qualified for application through 
                successful test and demonstration; and
                  (B) meet the minimum statutory requirements 
                for emergency use authorization in section 564 
                of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; 
                and
          (4) include a formal agreement among NIH, BARDA, and 
        Project BioShield that--
                  (A) identifies the need for any specific 
                biological countermeasure, derived from 
                information developed under section 319F-2;
                  (B) identifies the current technology 
                readiness level of the countermeasure; and
                  (C) requires the development of the 
                biological countermeasure from the current 
                technology readiness level through the 
                procurement of the countermeasure in accordance 
                with paragraph (3).
  (b) Responsibility of NIH.--For countermeasures identified 
under subsection (a)(4)(A) that have a level of development 
from basic principles observed and reported up to model or 
prototype demonstration in a relevant environment, the Director 
of NIH shall conduct research and development until the 
Director certifies to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services that--
          (1) the countermeasure has completed model or 
        prototype demonstration in a relevant environment; or
          (2) the Director does not believe that completion of 
        model or prototype demonstration in a relevant 
        environment is reasonably achievable.
  (c) Responsibility of BARDA.--For countermeasures identified 
under subsection (a)(4)(A) that have a level of development of 
model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment, 
including but not limited to those countermeasures certified to 
have that level of development by the Director of NIH, the 
Director of BARDA shall conduct research and development until 
the Director of BARDA certifies to the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services that--
          (1) the countermeasure has qualified for application 
        through successful test and demonstration; or
          (2) the Director does not believe that qualification 
        for application through successful test and 
        demonstration is reasonably achievable.
  (d) Responsibility of Project Bioshield.--For countermeasures 
identified under subsection (a)(4)(A) that are qualified for 
application through successful test and demonstration, 
including but not limited to those countermeasures certified to 
have qualified for application through successful test and 
demonstration by the Director of BARDA, the Assistant Secretary 
of Health and Human Services for Preparedness and Response 
shall use the Project BioShield special reserve fund to may 
procure the countermeasure if the countermeasure meets the 
requirements for emergency use authorization described in 
subsection (a)(3)(B).
  (e) No Requirement for Food and Drug Administration General 
Use Approval.--The Secretary shall ensure that the Directors of 
NIH and BARDA and the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human 
Services for Preparedness and Response do not discontinue any 
research, development, or procurement of a countermeasure 
identified under subsection (a)(4)(A) because the Food and Drug 
Administration has not, or decides against, approving or 
licensing the countermeasure for general use under chapter V of 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or section 351 of this 
Act, as applicable.
  (f) Innovation.--The Secretary shall require the Directors of 
NIH and BARDA and the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human 
Services for Preparedness and Response to aggressively pursue 
innovative research, development, and procurement of each 
countermeasure identified under subsection (a)(4)(A).
  (g) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) The term ``BARDA'' means the he Biomedical 
        Advanced Research and Development Authority established 
        under section 319L(c).
          (2) The term ``NIH'' means the National Institutes of 
        Health.
          (3) The term ``Project Bioshield'' means the Federal 
        medical countermeasure procurement program established 
        by Public Law 108-276.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Part F--Licensing--Biological Products and Clinical Laboratories

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subpart 1--Biological Products

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 351A. ENHANCED CONTROL OF DANGEROUS BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TOXINS.

  (a) Regulatory Control of Certain Biological Agents and 
Toxins.--
          (1) * * *
          (2) Tier i material threat agents.--
                  (A) Designation of tier i: material threat 
                agents.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
                of the enactment of this paragraph, the 
                Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary 
                of Homeland Security and other Federal 
                officials as appropriate, shall by regulation 
                designate as ``Tier I Material Threat Agents'' 
                those agents and toxins--
                          (i) that--
                                  (I) are determined by the 
                                Secretary of Homeland Security 
                                under section 319F-2(c)(2) to 
                                present a material threat 
                                against the United States 
                                population sufficient to affect 
                                national security; and
                                  (II) are determined to 
                                warrant designation after 
                                applying the criteria in 
                                subparagraph (B); or
                          (ii) that clearly present a material 
                        threat to the Nation as otherwise 
                        determined by the Secretary or the 
                        Secretary of Homeland Security.
                  (B) Criteria.--In determining whether to 
                designate an agent or toxin as a Tier I 
                Material Threat Agent under subparagraph 
                (A)(i), the Secretary, in coordination with the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security, shall 
                consider--
                          (i) whether the agent or toxin can be 
                        used effectively in a biological 
                        attack;
                          (ii) information available from any 
                        biological or bioterrorism risk 
                        assessments conducted by the Department 
                        of Homeland Security and relevant 
                        assessments by other agencies; and
                          (iii) such other criteria and 
                        information as the Secretary, in 
                        coordination with the Secretary of 
                        Homeland Security, determines 
                        appropriate and relevant.
                  (C) Inclusion of agents and toxins not 
                previously listed.--All agents or toxins 
                designated by the Secretary as Tier I Material 
                Threat Agents shall be included on the list 
                maintained by the Secretary pursuant to 
                paragraph (1).
                  (D) Evaluation of tier i material threat 
                agents.--The Secretary, in coordination with 
                the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall--
                          (i) on an ongoing basis, consider the 
                        inclusion of additional agents or 
                        toxins on the list of Tier I Material 
                        Threat Agents, as appropriate; and
                          (ii) at least biennially, review the 
                        list of Tier I Material Threat agents 
                        to determine whether any agents or 
                        toxins should be removed from the list.
          [(2)] (3) Biennial review.--The Secretary shall 
        review and republish the [list under paragraph (1)] 
        lists under paragraphs (1) and (2) biennially, or more 
        often as needed, and shall by regulation [revise the 
        list] revise the lists as necessary in accordance with 
        such paragraph.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Safeguard and Security Requirements for Registered 
Persons.--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (3) Submitted names; use of databases by attorney 
        general.--
                  (A) In general.--Upon the receipt of names 
                and other identifying information under 
                paragraph (2)(B), the Attorney General shall, 
                for the sole purpose of identifying whether the 
                individuals involved are within any of the 
                categories specified in subparagraph (B), 
                promptly use criminal, immigration, national 
                security, and other electronic databases that 
                are available to the Federal Government and are 
                appropriate for such purpose. In identifying 
                whether an individual is within a category 
                specified in subparagraph (B)(ii)(II), the 
                Attorney General shall coordinate with the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary 
                of Defense, and the Secretary of State to 
                determine whether these officials possess any 
                information relevant to the identification of 
                such an individual by the Attorney General.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


            AGRICULTURAL BIOTERRORISM PROTECTION ACT OF 2002

TITLE II--ENHANCING CONTROLS ON DANGEROUS BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TOXINS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle B--Department of Agriculture

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 212. REGULATION OF CERTAIN BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TOXINS.

  (a) Regulatory Control of Certain Biological Agents and 
Toxins.--
          (1) * * *
          (2) Tier i material threat agents.--
                  (A) Designation of tier i: material threat 
                agents.--Not later than one year after the date 
                of the enactment of this paragraph, the 
                Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary 
                of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Health 
                and Human Services, and other Federal officials 
                as appropriate, shall by regulation designate 
                as ``Tier I Material Threat Agents'' those 
                agents and toxins--
                          (i) that--
                                  (I) are determined by the 
                                Secretary of Homeland Security 
                                under section 319F-2(c)(2) of 
                                the Public Health Service Act 
                                to present a material threat 
                                against the United States 
                                population sufficient to affect 
                                national security; and
                                  (II) are determined to 
                                warrant designation after 
                                applying the criteria in 
                                subparagraph (B); or
                          (ii) that clearly present a material 
                        threat to the Nation as otherwise 
                        determined by the Secretary or the 
                        Secretary of Homeland Security.
                  (B) Criteria.--In determining whether to 
                designate an agent or toxin as a Tier I 
                Material Threat Agent under subparagraph 
                (A)(i), the Secretary, in coordination with the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security, shall 
                consider--
                          (i) whether the agent or toxin can be 
                        used effectively in a biological 
                        attack;
                          (ii) information available from any 
                        biological or bioterrorism risk 
                        assessments conducted by the Department 
                        of Homeland Security and relevant 
                        assessments by other agencies; and
                          (iii) such other criteria and 
                        information that the Secretary, in 
                        coordination with the Secretary of 
                        Homeland Security, determines 
                        appropriate and relevant.
                  (C) Inclusion of agents and toxins not 
                previously listed.--All agents or toxins 
                designated by the Secretary as Tier 1 Material 
                Threat Agents shall be included on the list 
                maintained by the Secretary pursuant to 
                paragraph (1).
                  (D) Evaluation of tier i material threat 
                agents.--The Secretary, in coordination with 
                the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall--
                          (i) on an ongoing basis, consider the 
                        inclusion of additional agents or 
                        toxins on the list of Tier I Material 
                        Threat Agents, as appropriate; and
                          (ii) at least biennially, review the 
                        list of Tier I Material Threat agents 
                        to determine whether any agents or 
                        toxins should be removed from the list.
          [(2)] (3) Biennial review.--The Secretary shall 
        review and republish the [list under paragraph (1)] 
        lists under paragraphs (1) and (2) biennially, or more 
        often as needed, and shall by regulation [revise the 
        list] revise the lists as necessary in accordance with 
        such paragraph.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *




               ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN PETE OLSON

    I was unavoidably absent for the consideration of H.R. 
5498, the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010. Had I 
been present I would have voted ``aye.'' Nonetheless, there are 
provisions of the legislation, specifically the provisions 
affecting our nation's National Labs that, I believe, warrant 
comment.
    First, and most notably, similar legislation introduced by 
Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins, S. 1649, mistakenly 
requires the Department of Homeland Security to inspect select 
agent labs currently overseen by HHS and USDA labs. Thankfully, 
H.R. 5498 makes a crucial and wise revision. H.R. 5498 permits 
HHS and USDA to continue to inspect labs housing select agents 
but requires them to provide DHS the data concerning 
inspections of laboratories that handle Tier 1 Material Threat 
Agents. This will ensure uniformity of enforcement of the 
enhanced biosecurity measures.
    The Houston-Galveston region--a region I represent in 
Congress--is the proud home of the Galveston National 
Laboratory (GNL). The GNL is an academic research center 
located on the campus of the University of Texas Medical Branch 
(UTMB) in Galveston, Texas. The GNL's renowned scientists work 
collaboratively, both locally and internationally, to tackle 
some of the world's most pressing health concerns. With 
strengths in infectious disease research and specialized 
programs in aerobiology, assay development, experimental 
pathology, imaging, and immunology, the GNL advances local 
discoveries on the diagnostic tests, treatments and vaccines 
for the infectious diseases impacting global health like 
tuberculosis, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus, 
West Nile virus, Ebola, Marburg, Plague, encephalitis, 
hepatitis, and influenza, among others. The science and study 
of these agents remains paramount to public health, and, as a 
country, we must find a way to equip scientists and researchers 
in studying these agents without broadening accessibility to 
potential bioterrorism or misuse of these agents. Global health 
is principal to national security. The majority of these agents 
themselves are not weapons of mass destruction. Rather, they 
occur routinely in nature. Hence, striking a balance between 
our ability to maintain groundbreaking research and rapidly 
responding when outbreaks occur, often in concert with our 
international partners, is vital.
    It is my belief that too many lists of regulated biological 
agents and toxins, with varying lead agencies of jurisdiction, 
will result in confusion along with ineffective implementation. 
It is of the utmost importance that the current relevant 
regulations be harmonized with the prospective Tier I 
regulations outlined in H.R. 5498. This, along with a well 
defined enforcement authority, is the key to the overall goal 
of safety and security.
    Additionally, H.R. 5498 removes the creation of a 
``registry agents'' category. I applaud this measure as I 
believe it provides the proper legislative focus and decreases 
the potential administrative burden placed on the scientific 
community. I also applaud this legislation's call for national 
and international training programs to enhance biosafety 
practices and biosecurity measures at laboratories conducting 
research with select agents.
    Finally, H.R. 5498 creates a High Containment Biological 
Laboratory Security Grant program. This is a welcome addition 
to any legislation regarding the security of U.S. high 
containment laboratories. The GNL alone spends approximately $2 
million per year on security personnel. The vast majority of 
academic centers and nonprofit organizations that engage in 
research with infectious diseases will only be able to shoulder 
the additional security costs mandated if it is supplemented 
with a sustained investment by the federal government.
    Because of these provisions, and because this legislation, 
as a whole, is vitally important to our nation's security, I 
support passage of H.R. 5498.