H. Rept. 112-445 - 112th Congress (2011-2012)

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House Report 112-445 - CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND PROTECTION ACT

[House Report 112-445]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


112th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     112-445

======================================================================



 
             CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND PROTECTION ACT

                                _______
                                

 April 17, 2012.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Rogers of Michigan, from the Permanent Select Committee on 
                 Intelligence, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 3523]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 3523) to provide for the sharing of 
certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber threat information 
between the intelligence community and cybersecurity entities, 
and for other purposes, having considered the same, report 
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill 
as amended do pass.
    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Cyber Intelligence Sharing and 
Protection Act''.

SEC. 2. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING.

  (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:
          ``cyber threat intelligence and information sharing
  ``Sec. 1104.  (a) Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber Threat 
Intelligence With Private Sector.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
        shall establish procedures to allow elements of the 
        intelligence community to share cyber threat intelligence with 
        private-sector entities and to encourage the sharing of such 
        intelligence.
          ``(2) Sharing and use of classified intelligence.--The 
        procedures established under paragraph (1) shall provide that 
        classified cyber threat intelligence may only be--
                  ``(A) shared by an element of the intelligence 
                community with--
                          ``(i) certified entities; or
                          ``(ii) a person with an appropriate security 
                        clearance to receive such cyber threat 
                        intelligence;
                  ``(B) shared consistent with the need to protect the 
                national security of the United States; and
                  ``(C) used by a certified entity in a manner which 
                protects such cyber threat intelligence from 
                unauthorized disclosure.
          ``(3) Security clearance approvals.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence shall issue guidelines providing that the head of 
        an element of the intelligence community may, as the head of 
        such element considers necessary to carry out this subsection--
                  ``(A) grant a security clearance on a temporary or 
                permanent basis to an employee or officer of a 
                certified entity;
                  ``(B) grant a security clearance on a temporary or 
                permanent basis to a certified entity and approval to 
                use appropriate facilities; and
                  ``(C) expedite the security clearance process for a 
                person or entity as the head of such element considers 
                necessary, consistent with the need to protect the 
                national security of the United States.
          ``(4) No right or benefit.--The provision of information to a 
        private-sector entity under this subsection shall not create a 
        right or benefit to similar information by such entity or any 
        other private-sector entity.
  ``(b) Private Sector Use of Cybersecurity Systems and Sharing of 
Cyber Threat Information.--
          ``(1) In general.--
                  ``(A) Cybersecurity providers.--Notwithstanding any 
                other provision of law, a cybersecurity provider, with 
                the express consent of a protected entity for which 
                such cybersecurity provider is providing goods or 
                services for cybersecurity purposes, may, for 
                cybersecurity purposes--
                          ``(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify 
                        and obtain cyber threat information to protect 
                        the rights and property of such protected 
                        entity; and
                          ``(ii) share such cyber threat information 
                        with any other entity designated by such 
                        protected entity, including, if specifically 
                        designated, the Federal Government.
                  ``(B) Self-protected entities.--Notwithstanding any 
                other provision of law, a self-protected entity may, 
                for cybersecurity purposes--
                          ``(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify 
                        and obtain cyber threat information to protect 
                        the rights and property of such self-protected 
                        entity; and
                          ``(ii) share such cyber threat information 
                        with any other entity, including the Federal 
                        Government.
          ``(2) Use and protection of information.--Cyber threat 
        information shared in accordance with paragraph (1)--
                  ``(A) shall only be shared in accordance with any 
                restrictions placed on the sharing of such information 
                by the protected entity or self-protected entity 
                authorizing such sharing, including appropriate 
                anonymization or minimization of such information;
                  ``(B) may not be used by an entity to gain an unfair 
                competitive advantage to the detriment of the protected 
                entity or the self-protected entity authorizing the 
                sharing of information; and
                  ``(C) if shared with the Federal Government--
                          ``(i) shall be exempt from disclosure under 
                        section 552 of title 5, United States Code;
                          ``(ii) shall be considered proprietary 
                        information and shall not be disclosed to an 
                        entity outside of the Federal Government except 
                        as authorized by the entity sharing such 
                        information; and
                          ``(iii) shall not be used by the Federal 
                        Government for regulatory purposes.
          ``(3) Exemption from liability.--No civil or criminal cause 
        of action shall lie or be maintained in Federal or State court 
        against a protected entity, self-protected entity, 
        cybersecurity provider, or an officer, employee, or agent of a 
        protected entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity 
        provider, acting in good faith--
                  ``(A) for using cybersecurity systems or sharing 
                information in accordance with this section; or
                  ``(B) for not acting on information obtained or 
                shared in accordance with this section.
          ``(4) Relationship to other laws requiring the disclosure of 
        information.--The submission of information under this 
        subsection to the Federal Government shall not satisfy or 
        affect any requirement under any other provision of law for a 
        person or entity to provide information to the Federal 
        Government.
  ``(c) Federal Government Use of Information.--
          ``(1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use cyber 
        threat information shared with the Federal Government in 
        accordance with subsection (b) for any lawful purpose only if--
                  ``(A) the use of such information is not for a 
                regulatory purpose; and
                  ``(B) at least one significant purpose of the use of 
                such information is--
                          ``(i) a cybersecurity purpose; or
                          ``(ii) the protection of the national 
                        security of the United States.
          ``(2) Affirmative search restriction.--The Federal Government 
        may not affirmatively search cyber threat information shared 
        with the Federal Government under subsection (b) for a purpose 
        other than a purpose referred to in paragraph (1)(B).
          ``(3) Anti-tasking restriction.--Nothing in this section 
        shall be construed to permit the Federal Government to--
                  ``(A) require a private-sector entity to share 
                information with the Federal Government; or
                  ``(B) condition the sharing of cyber threat 
                intelligence with a private-sector entity on the 
                provision of cyber threat information to the Federal 
                Government.
  ``(d) Report on Information Sharing.--
          ``(1) Report.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
        Community shall annually submit to the congressional 
        intelligence committees a report containing a review of the use 
        of information shared with the Federal Government under this 
        section, including--
                  ``(A) a review of the use by the Federal Government 
                of such information for a purpose other than a 
                cybersecurity purpose;
                  ``(B) a review of the type of information shared with 
                the Federal Government under this section;
                  ``(C) a review of the actions taken by the Federal 
                Government based on such information;
                  ``(D) appropriate metrics to determine the impact of 
                the sharing of such information with the Federal 
                Government on privacy and civil liberties, if any; and
                  ``(E) any recommendations of the Inspector General 
                for improvements or modifications to the authorities 
                under this section.
          ``(2) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
  ``(e) Federal Preemption.--This section supersedes any statute of a 
State or political subdivision of a State that restricts or otherwise 
expressly regulates an activity authorized under subsection (b).
  ``(f) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
limit any other authority to use a cybersecurity system or to identify, 
obtain, or share cyber threat intelligence or cyber threat information.
  ``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Certified entity.--The term `certified entity' means a 
        protected entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity 
        provider that--
                  ``(A) possesses or is eligible to obtain a security 
                clearance, as determined by the Director of National 
                Intelligence; and
                  ``(B) is able to demonstrate to the Director of 
                National Intelligence that such provider or such entity 
                can appropriately protect classified cyber threat 
                intelligence.
          ``(2) Cyber threat information.--The term `cyber threat 
        information' means information directly pertaining to a 
        vulnerability of, or threat to, a system or network of a 
        government or private entity, including information pertaining 
        to the protection of a system or network from--
                  ``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such 
                system or network; or
                  ``(B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, or 
                personally identifiable information.
          ``(3) Cyber threat intelligence.--The term `cyber threat 
        intelligence' means information in the possession of an element 
        of the intelligence community directly pertaining to a 
        vulnerability of, or threat to, a system or network of a 
        government or private entity, including information pertaining 
        to the protection of a system or network from--
                  ``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such 
                system or network; or
                  ``(B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, or 
                personally identifiable information.
          ``(4) Cybersecurity provider.--The term `cybersecurity 
        provider' means a non-governmental entity that provides goods 
        or services intended to be used for cybersecurity purposes.
          ``(5) Cybersecurity purpose.--The term `cybersecurity 
        purpose' means the purpose of ensuring the integrity, 
        confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguarding, a system 
        or network, including protecting a system or network from--
                  ``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such 
                system or network; or
                  ``(B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, or 
                personally identifiable information.
          ``(6) Cybersecurity system.--The term `cybersecurity system' 
        means a system designed or employed to ensure the integrity, 
        confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguard, a system or 
        network, including protecting a system or network from--
                  ``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such 
                system or network; or
                  ``(B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, or 
                personally identifiable information.
          ``(7) Protected entity.--The term `protected entity' means an 
        entity, other than an individual, that contracts with a 
        cybersecurity provider for goods or services to be used for 
        cybersecurity purposes.
          ``(8) Self-protected entity.--The term `self-protected 
        entity' means an entity, other than an individual, that 
        provides goods or services for cybersecurity purposes to 
        itself.''.
  (b) Procedures and Guidelines.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall--
          (1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
        this Act, establish procedures under paragraph (1) of section 
        1104(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
        subsection (a) of this section, and issue guidelines under 
        paragraph (3) of such section 1104(a); and
          (2) following the establishment of such procedures and the 
        issuance of such guidelines, expeditiously distribute such 
        procedures and such guidelines to appropriate Federal 
        Government and private-sector entities.
  (c) Initial Report.--The first report required to be submitted under 
subsection (d) of section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
added by subsection (a) of this section, shall be submitted not later 
than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
  (d) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding at 
the end the following new item:

``Sec. 1104. Cyber threat intelligence and information sharing.''.

                                Purpose

    The purpose of H.R. 3523 is to provide for the sharing of 
certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber threat information 
between the intelligence community and cybersecurity entities, 
and other purposes.

                     Committee Statement and Views

    At the beginning of the 112th Congress, the Committee, 
under the direction of Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member 
Ruppersberger, began a bipartisan effort to examine the issue 
of cybersecurity.\1\ The goal of this effort was to better 
understand the threats facing the nation in cyberspace--with 
respect to both the government and in the private sector--and 
to determine what the Intelligence Community could do to help 
better protect the nation. The results of this review were 
stunning: a number of advanced nation-state actors are actively 
engaged in a series of wide-ranging, aggressive efforts to 
penetrate American computer systems and networks; these efforts 
extend well beyond government networks, and reach deep into 
nearly every sector of the American economy, including 
companies serving critical infrastructure needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\This effort involved a series of briefings and hearings, 
including one open hearing, to inform Committee members and, where 
possible, the public, about the serious national security threat posed 
by nation-state actors and other adversaries in the cyber realm. These 
meetings, briefings, and hearings were in turn supported by numerous 
meetings and briefings conducted by Committee staff with agencies and 
individuals from the Executive Branch including, among others, the 
White House, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department 
of Defense, including the National Security Agency, and with experts 
from the academic and think-tank communities. The Committee staff also 
held numerous meetings with private sector companies and trade groups 
in industries including technology, telecommunications, financial 
services, utilities, aerospace, and defense. And the Committee staff 
met with representatives of privacy and civil liberties organizations 
including the Center for Democracy and Technology, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Constitution 
Project, and the CATO Institute, among others. In total, the Committee 
members and staff met with dozens of organizations in conducting its 
review over a nearly one-year period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Perhaps most troubling, these efforts are targeted not only 
at sensitive national security and infrastructure information, 
but are also often aimed at stealing the corporate research and 
development information that forms the very lifeblood of the 
American economy. China, in particular, is engaged in an 
extensive, day-in, day-out effort to pillage American corporate 
and government information. There can be no question that in 
today's modern world, economic security is national security, 
and the government must help the private sector protect itself.
    The Committee's review also revealed that while the 
government is already doing much to provide support and 
assistance to the private sector to address this threat, in 
particular through DHS and the FBI, more can and should be done 
in the immediate future. In particular, the Committee 
determined that the Intelligence Community is currently in 
possession of tremendously valuable intelligence and strategic 
insights derived from its extensive overseas intelligence 
collection efforts that can and should be provided--in both 
classified and unclassified form (when possible)--to the 
private sector in order to help the owners and operators of the 
vast majority of America's information infrastructure better 
protect themselves. The Committee believes that the recent 
Defense Industrial Base Pilot project (``DIB Pilot'') is a good 
model for demonstrating how sensitive government threat 
intelligence can be shared with the private sector in an 
operationally usable manner. Under the DIB Pilot, the 
government provides classified threat intelligence to key 
Internet Service Providers, who use the information to protect 
a limited number of companies in the defense industrial base, 
all on a voluntary basis.
    The Committee's review also determined that while much 
cybersecurity monitoring and threat information sharing takes 
place today within the private sector, real and perceived legal 
barriers substantially hamper the efforts of the private sector 
to protect itself. The Committee determined that these issues 
are best resolved in the first instance by providing clear, 
positive authority to permit the monitoring--by the private 
sector--of privately-owned and operated networks and systems 
for the purpose of detecting cybersecurity threats and to 
permit the voluntary sharing of information about those threats 
and vulnerabilities with others, including entities within the 
private sector and with the federal government.
    While some have suggested that the private sector needs 
more regulation or that the government ought to directly help 
defend certain portions of the private sector, the Committee's 
view is that the protection of the private sector is best left 
in private hands and that the government ought to provide as 
much intelligence as possible to the private sector before 
reaching for a regulatory ``stick.'' In the view of the 
Committee, such an approach--voluntary, private sector defense 
of private sector systems and networks informed by government 
intelligence information--best protects individual privacy and 
takes advantage of the natural incentives built into our 
economic system, including harnessing private sector drive and 
innovation.
    The Committee's review revealed that America's cyber 
infrastructure is distressingly vulnerable to espionage and 
attacks by nation-states and others with advanced capabilities. 
The Committee believes that immediate and serious action is 
necessary to staunch the bleeding of American corporate 
research and development information and to better protect our 
national security. In particular, the Committee believes that 
the Intelligence Community must take immediate and decisive 
action to provide intelligence to the private sector to help it 
better protect itself. In turn, the private sector must act 
aggressively to better monitor its own systems and to share 
information--both within the private sector and with the 
federal government on a purely voluntary basis. The Committee 
recognizes that because it focused on the issues within its 
jurisdiction, this legislation does not address many of the 
other issues facing the nation with respect to cybersecurity. 
At the same time, however, the Committee firmly believes that 
this legislation is an important first step in the effort to 
better protect the nation from advanced cyber threat actors.

               Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes

    On December 1, 2011, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered the bill H.R. 3523 favorably reported, as amended.

                              OPEN SESSION

    In open session, the Committee considered the text of the 
bill H.R. 3523.
    Chairman Rogers offered an amendment. The amendment places 
additional restrictions on the use by the government of 
information obtained pursuant to the bill. The amendment was 
agreed to by voice vote.
    Mr. Thompson offered an amendment. The amendment requires 
an annual report by the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community reviewing the use of cyber threat information 
provided to the government pursuant to the bill. The amendment 
was agreed to by voice vote.
    Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment providing that the 
Director of National Intelligence shall develop and 
periodically review policies and procedures governing the 
acquisition, retention, use, and disclosure of information 
obtained by the intelligence community pursuant to the bill. 
Subsequently, Ms. Schakowsky asked for and received unanimous 
consent to withdraw the amendment.
    The Committee then adopted a motion by the Chairman to 
favorably report the bill H.R. 3523 to the House, as amended. 
The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 17 ayes to 1 no:
    Voting Aye: Chairman Rogers, Mr. Thornberry, Mrs. Myrick, 
Mr. Miller, Mr. Conaway, Mr. King, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Nunes, Mr. 
Westmoreland, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Heck, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. 
Thompson, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Boren, Mr. Chandler.
    Voting No: Ms. Schakowsky.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis


                         SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

    The short title of the Act is the Cyber Intelligence 
Sharing and Protection Act.

      SECTION 2. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

Section 2(a): In General

    This subsection of the Act amends Title XI of the National 
Security Act of 1947 by adding a new section, Section 1104.

Section 1104(a) of Title 50: Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber 
        Threat Intelligence with Private Sector

    Subsection (a) of new Section 1104 provides for the sharing 
of cyber threat intelligence--both classified and 
unclassified--by elements of the Intelligence Community with 
entities in the private sector. It is the view of the Committee 
that the routine and fulsome sharing of such intelligence 
information with appropriate cleared entities and individuals 
within the private sector is critically important to protecting 
the nation from advanced cyber threats. It is critical that as 
much information as possible be shared at machine-speed, in 
real-time, and in a manner that the information--whether 
classified or not--is operationally usable by entities within 
the private sector.
    This subsection seeks to set forth a general framework and 
requires the establishment of specific procedures and 
guidelines to make such sharing happen in the immediate future 
and to permit such sharing to continue so long as the nation 
faces this significant threat to our national security. The 
Committee intends to engage in vigorous oversight of the 
Intelligence Community use of the authorities under this 
section and, in particular, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI), which is charged with 
promulgating appropriate procedures and guidelines under this 
subsection. The Committee expects to be consulted by ODNI in 
the formulation of these procedures and guidelines to ensure 
that the Committee's intent is achieved by them.
    While the term ``private sector'' is not defined in the 
legislation, the Committee intends that term to be given the 
broadest possible meaning and specifically intends the term to 
include utilities, whether organized as public, private, or 
quasi-public entities, to ensure at the entities that provide 
Americans with access to power, water, gas, and other critical 
services are also provided with access to critical federal 
government intelligence regarding cyber threats.
    In addition, the Committee expects that private sector 
entities receiving classified intelligence pursuant to this 
subsection will use this information not only to protect their 
own systems and networks, but also, where they find appropriate 
as a business matter, to sell cybersecurity goods and services 
appropriately incorporating this information to protect other 
corporate customers.
            Paragraph 1: In General
    Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) requires the Director of 
National Intelligence to establish procedures to allow 
intelligence community elements to share cyber threat 
intelligence with the private sector and to encourage the 
sharing of such intelligence. The Committee intends the DNI's 
procedures to create a sea change in the current intelligence 
sharing practices of the Intelligence Community with respect to 
the private sector.
    First, the DNI's procedures should ensure that as much 
cyber threat intelligence as possible is downgraded to the 
lowest classification level possible, including 
declassification where appropriate, and made available to as 
broad an audience in the private sector as possible, consistent 
with the need to protect the national security.
    Second, the DNI's procedures should ensure that cyber 
threat intelligence, including classified information, is 
routinely and consistently provided out to entities and 
individuals in the private sector with the appropriate 
clearances.
            Paragraph 2: Sharing and Use of Classified Information
    Paragraph (2) of subsection (a) requires that the DNI's 
procedures with respect to classified cyber threat intelligence 
require that classified information only be shared with 
certified entities, as defined by the legislation, or with 
individuals who possess appropriate security clearances, and be 
consistent with the need to protect national security. 
Certified entities are cybersecurity providers, protected 
entities, or self-protected entities that possess or are 
eligible to obtain a security clearance and can demonstrate to 
the Director of National Intelligence that they are able to 
appropriately protect such classified cyber threat 
intelligence.
    Paragraph (2) also requires that the DNI's procedures 
provide that classified cyber threat intelligence only be used 
by certified entities in a manner that protects the classified 
information from unauthorized disclosure. This provision 
ensures that when certified entities employ classified 
intelligence to protect unclassified systems or networks, they 
do so in a way that does not reveal classified information 
directly or indirectly.
    The Committee expects that the DNI's procedures will be 
flexible in nature and will take account of private sector 
innovation and incorporate current and future information 
sharing and security best practices. As a result, the Committee 
expects the DNI to work closely with the private sector to 
establish these procedures, to work with the private sector to 
meet the requirements of the procedures, and to ensure that 
these procedures result in the routine and consistent sharing 
of operationally-usable cyber threat intelligence. The 
Committee also expects the DNI to review and revise these 
procedures on a regular basis, at least annually, and to 
conduct such review in cooperation with the private sector, as 
well as to account for new technologies developed by the 
private sector in each set of revised procedures. The DNI 
should also strongly consider the establishment of a private-
sector advisory committee composed of senior executives at key 
private companies to advise on these procedures on a regular 
basis.
            Paragraph (3): Security Clearance Approvals
    Paragraph (3) requires the DNI to issue guidelines allowing 
the head of intelligence community elements to grant temporary 
or permanent security clearances to certified entities and 
their employees and officers (including non-employee officers 
such as board members) in order to allow the government to 
share classified cyber security threat intelligence with those 
certified entities. The Committee's intent is that the 
intelligence community grant security clearances to entities 
that are involved in protecting their own and their corporate 
customers' networks from cyber threats and that the 
intelligence community share cyber threat intelligence to 
protect the nation from advanced cyber threat actors. In 
particular, the Committee wishes to ensure that the private 
sector be able to receive highly classified cyber threat 
intelligence, including at the Top Secret/Sensitive 
Compartmented Information level, as appropriate to protect 
national security. The Committee is concerned that certain 
industries and entities may currently lack sufficient 
clearances at the appropriate level.
    Paragraph (3) also requires the DNI's guidelines to allow 
intelligence community elements to grant approval for the use 
of appropriate facilities and to expedite security clearances 
as necessary, consistent with the need to protect national 
security. The Committee's intent is that the approval process 
for the granting of security clearances and the use of 
facilities for the handling of classified information be 
expedited and broadened by these provisions.
    Because additional security clearances or facility 
approvals may be necessary to effectuate the goals of this 
legislation, it is further the Committee's intent that the cost 
for these security clearances and facility approvals, as well 
as the underlying investigations and adjudications necessary to 
obtain and maintain them, be fully borne by the private sector. 
As noted above, it is the Committee's intent that private 
sector entities that become certified entities will be able to 
better protect themselves, as well as to sell cybersecurity 
goods and services appropriately incorporating this information 
to protect other corporate customers in the private sector. It 
is therefore the Committee's view that these entities should 
bear the full cost of obtaining access to the valuable cyber 
threat intelligence the government will provide under the 
legislation to certified entities. The Committee therefore 
expects that the DNI's guidelines authorized by the legislation 
will provide for full payment of such costs by the private 
sector entity obtaining the security clearances or facility 
approvals.
            Paragraph 4: No Right or Benefit
    Paragraph (4) makes clear that while the Committee expects 
the Intelligence Community to work with private sector entities 
to help them meet the requirements to serve as a certified 
entity, no private sector entity is entitled to receive cyber 
threat intelligence from the government and that no right or 
benefit to cyber threat intelligence is created by the 
provision of such intelligence to a particular private sector 
entity or group of entities.

Section 1104(b) of Title 50: Private Sector Use of Cybersecurity 
        Systems and Sharing of Cyber Threat Information

    Subsection (b) of new Section 1104 provides clear, positive 
authority, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to 
private sector entities to monitor their own systems and 
networks or those of their corporate customers through the use 
of cybersecurity systems to identify and obtain cyber threat 
information, and to mitigate threat or vulnerabilities to their 
own systems or networks or those of their corporate customers. 
The Committee intends the notwithstanding clauses contained in 
subsection (b), as applied to this authority, to have the 
effect of removing any prohibition, real or perceived, to the 
monitoring, for cybersecurity purposes, of private sector 
systems and networks by the private sector entities that own 
the systems or networks or by security companies contracted by 
the system or network owner to protect those networks and 
systems. Potential barriers to such cybersecurity monitoring 
include federal laws governing electronic surveillance.
    Subsection (b) also provides clear, positive authority, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the private 
sector to share cyber threat information identified and 
obtained through such cybersecurity monitoring with other 
entities within the private sector, as well as with the Federal 
Government on a purely voluntary basis, at the discretion of 
the private sector entities whose systems or networks are being 
protected. The Committee intends the notwithstanding clauses 
contained in subsection (b), as applied to this authority, to 
have the effect of removing any prohibition, real or perceived, 
to the sharing of cyber threat information within the private 
sector, as well as with the Federal Government. Potential 
barriers to such sharing that would be addressed by this 
provision include, but are not limited to, provisions of 
federal antitrust law, which some believe may limit sharing of 
cyber threat information between competitors in the private 
sector, as well as provisions of other federal laws including 
the telecommunications laws. The Committee's intent in 
addressing antitrust issues, amongst others, is to permit 
information sharing about cyber threats that might be hampered 
by such laws, not to permit inappropriate and unlawful 
activity, such as the coordinated fixing of prices.
    The Committee notes that the protections related to the 
authorities provided in this section are fairly robust, even 
standing alone. First, as noted below, only cyber threat 
information--that is information about a threat to, or 
vulnerability of government or private systems or networks--may 
be identified, obtained, or shared. And any such monitoring or 
sharing may only take place for cybersecurity purposes. And 
finally, the liability protection provided in this subsection 
only applies when an entity is acting in good faith. These 
provisions, taken together and building on top of one another, 
in the Committee's view, are a strong step towards protecting 
the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.
            Paragraph 1: In General
    Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) provides the twin 
authorities discussed above to cybersecurity providers, who 
provide goods and services to their corporate customers for 
cybersecurity purposes and to self-protected entities, who 
provide such cybersecurity goods and services for themselves.
    In providing these authorities, the legislation makes clear 
that the monitoring and sharing of information either by a 
cybersecurity provider or a self-protected entity may only take 
place for cybersecurity purposes, a defined term that, as 
discussed below, limits the identification, obtaining, and 
sharing of cyber threat information to the protection of 
private or government systems or networks from threat to, or 
vulnerabilities, of those systems or networks.
    Similarly, the identification and obtaining of cyber threat 
information by a provider or a self-protected entity may only 
take place as part of an effort to protect the rights and 
properties of the provider's corporate customer or the self-
protected entity itself, as the case may be. In this context, 
it is the Committee's intent that the protection of the rights 
and property of a corporate entity includes, but is not limited 
to, the protection of the systems and networks that make up its 
own corporate internal and external information systems but 
also the systems and networks over which it provides services 
to its customers. For example, the Committee expects that an 
internet service provider or telecommunications company may 
seek to protect not only its own corporate networks but also 
the backbone communications systems and networks over which it 
provides services to its customers. Similarly, for example, the 
Committee expects that a utility may seek not only to protect 
its corporate network but may seek to protect the systems and 
networks over which it provides electricity, water, or gas 
services to its customers. The Committee specifically intends 
the authorities provided in subsection (b) to permit private 
sector entities to protect such systems and networks.
    Paragraph (1) also requires that a cybersecurity provider 
obtain the express consent, whether in writing, electronically, 
orally, or otherwise, of its corporate customer before 
conducting any cybersecurity monitoring or sharing under these 
authorities. It is the Committee's intent that express consent 
may be provided on a going-forward basis by a corporate 
customer to a provider for a specified period of time, to be 
determined by the corporate customer.
    In addition, paragraph (1) makes clear that the sharing of 
information either by a cybersecurity provider or a self-
protected entity is to be purely voluntary and at the 
discretion of the entity whose systems or networks are being 
protected. Moreover, the legislation requires that where a 
provider is doing the sharing on behalf of a corporate 
customer, the customer must designate the entities or group of 
entities it wishes to share information with, and that it must 
specifically designate the Federal Government if it wishes to 
share information with the government.
    It is the Committee's expectation that many entities will 
be able to take advantage of the authorities provided in 
paragraph (1) when acting both as a cybersecurity provider and 
as a self-protected entity. For example, an entity such as an 
internet service provider may act as a cybersecurity provider 
when providing managed security services to a corporate 
customer and may simultaneously be acting as a self-protected 
entity when protecting its own corporate systems and networks 
as well as the systems and networks over which it provides 
services to its customers. The Committee's intent is that 
private sector entities will be able to simultaneously take 
advantage of multiple authorities provided within the 
legislation.
            Paragraph 2: Use and Protection of Information
    Paragraph (2) of subsection (b) provides protections to 
promote the robust sharing of cyber threat information both 
within the private sector as well as from the private sector to 
the government on a purely voluntary basis.
    Paragraph (2) provides that cyber threat information shared 
pursuant to paragraph (1) may only be shared in accordance with 
restrictions placed upon such sharing by the protected entity 
or the self-protected entity whose systems and networks are 
being protected and who therefore authorized the sharing. 
Paragraph (2) further provides that these restrictions may 
include the appropriate anonymization or minimization as 
determined by the protected entity or self-protected entity 
authorizing the sharing.
    The Committee's intent is that through paragraph (1) and 
paragraph (2), a private sector entity choosing to share cyber 
threat information under these provisions has complete control 
over whom it shares with and what information it shares, 
including whether the information it shares is anonymized or 
minimized. The Committee believes that leaving the decision to 
share and the execution of desired anonymization and 
minimization in the hands of the private sector entities whose 
systems and networks are being protected, rather than in the 
hands of the party receiving the information, including the 
government, helps enhance privacy and civil liberties.
    Paragraph (2) also provides that information shared 
pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be used by a receiving entity 
to gain an unfair competitive advantage to the detriment of the 
entity sharing the information. The Committee intends this 
provision to highlight that cybersecurity is enhanced by robust 
threat information sharing within the private sector, both 
amongst partners and competitors, without fear that a 
competitor will use the cyber threat or vulnerability 
information to unfairly obtain greater market share rather than 
simply to protect itself. The situation the Committee intends 
this provision to address is best demonstrated by an example: 
Company A shares information about a cyber vulnerability in one 
of its products with Company B, a competitor in the same 
marketplace; Company B the next day puts out an advertisement 
saying, ``Don't buy Company A's product because it has the 
following vulnerability . . . instead, buy our product which 
doesn't have the same vulnerabilities.'' This example would, in 
the Committee's view, constitute gaining an unfair competitive 
advantage at the expense of the entity sharing the information. 
This provision does not prevent any company from obtaining a 
fair competitive advantage by, for example, using the shared 
information to build a better, more secure product that can be 
marketed without reference to a vulnerability shared by a 
particular entity.
    Paragraph (2) further provides that cyber threat 
information voluntarily shared with the Federal Government 
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be exempt from disclosure under 
the Freedom of Information Act, shall be considered proprietary 
information, shall not be disclosed by the Federal Government 
to an entity outside the Federal Government except as 
authorized by the entity sharing the information, and shall not 
be used by the Federal Government for regulatory purposes. The 
Committee intends this provision to address the key concerns 
expressed by the private sector regarding the sharing of their 
sensitive information with the federal government: first, that 
the government might expose its most sensitive threat and 
vulnerability information to a wide audience either through 
FOIA or by publishing the information, thereby providing a 
roadmap for attacks by cyber threat actors; second, that the 
government might take the information provided by the private 
sector and use it to regulate or impose sanctions upon them.
    The Committee determined that the best way to address these 
concerns and incentivize the sharing of cyber threat 
information with the government was to explicitly and clearly 
protect the information provided in this cybersecurity channel 
from being disclosed under FOIA, to require the government to 
carefully protect the information, and finally, to prohibit the 
government from using information provided in this 
cybersecurity channel from being used for regulatory purposes.
    The Committee was cognizant of the fact that cyber threat 
information provided to the government under these authorities 
might also be required to be provided by certain private sector 
entities to their regulators and therefore provided elsewhere 
in the legislation that the mere classification of the 
information as cyber threat information or its provision to the 
government under this mechanism does not satisfy those 
regulatory requirements nor override any appropriate regulation 
that may take place based on the provision of such information 
to the government through other channels. Nor would these 
provisions prevent a third party from obtaining appropriate 
information through an otherwise appropriate FOIA request to a 
regulator who obtained the information under other regulatory 
authorities. Rather, the limitations here were designed to 
provide a safe harbor where private sector entities could 
provide real-time cyber threat information to the government 
without fear that that particular information would be used to 
regulate them directly or be exploited by bad actors.
            Paragraph 3: Exemption from Liability
    Paragraph (3) provides a bar to civil or criminal causes of 
action being brought or maintained in federal or state court 
against an entity or its officers, employees, or agents acting 
in good faith to use cybersecurity systems for monitoring to 
identify and obtain cyber threat information in accordance with 
the provisions of the legislation. The Committee's intent is to 
provide strong liability protection for private sector entities 
when they act to take advantage of the authorities provided 
under paragraph (1) of subsection (b) to do what the statute 
seeks to encourage them to do: robustly monitor their own 
systems and networks and those of their corporate customers and 
share information about threats and vulnerabilities to better 
protect their systems. Specifically, the Committee intends that 
civil or criminal actions based on the use of cybersecurity 
systems to monitor systems or networks to identify and obtain 
cyber threat information using the authorities of this statute 
shall be dismissed immediately by the courts and prior to 
significant discovery and extensive motion practice.
    Paragraph (3) also provides an identical bar to actions 
against such entities acting in good faith for not acting on 
information obtained or shared in accordance with the 
provisions of the legislation. The Committee's intent is 
likewise to provide strong liability protection to entities 
when they engage in robust cyber threat information sharing so 
that they are not held liable for not acting on every piece of 
cyber threat intelligence provided by the government or every 
piece of cyber threat information that they detect or receive 
from another private sector entity. The Committee believes that 
if information sharing does become truly robust, the amount of 
cyber threat information and the speed with which such 
information will be shared will make it nearly impossible to 
always protect against every threat in real-time and, as such, 
private sector entities ought not be held liable for such 
actions. Similarly, the Committee recognizes that particular 
entities may engage in a cost-benefit analysis with respect to 
implementing protections against particular threats and the 
Committee intends this provision to help ensure that a private 
sector entity making such a judgment not be held liable for 
making such reasonable determinations.
    At the same time, the Committee was fully cognizant of the 
concern that it not create a moral hazard by providing too 
broad a liability protection provision and that it not 
incentivize bad acts. As a result, Paragraph (3) requires that 
the entity be acting in good faith to obtain the benefits of 
this liability protection. That is, where an entity acts in bad 
faith, it does not receive the benefit of the strong liability 
protection provided by the legislation. Of course, where an 
entity is seeking to take advantage of specific statutory 
authority provided by Congress and where Congress is seeking to 
incentivize cybersecurity activities, as with government action 
taken pursuant to statutory authority and the presumption of 
regularity that attaches to such actions, the Committee expects 
that good faith will be presumed in the absence of substantial 
evidence to the contrary.
            Paragraph 4: Relationship to Other Laws Requiring the 
                    Disclosure of Information
    Paragraph (4) provides that the provision of cyber threat 
information to the government under the voluntary system 
established by this statute does not satisfy or affect any 
requirement under other provisions of law to provide 
information to the Federal Government. As noted briefly 
earlier, the Committee intends this provision to ensure that 
while information provided to the government under this 
legislation is protected from use by the government for 
regulatory purposes, that information otherwise required to be 
provided to the government must still be provided and that such 
information--required by other law to be provided to the 
government--may still be used for all lawful purposes, 
including, as required by law, for regulatory purposes.

Section 1104(c) of Title 50: Federal Government Use of Information

    Subsection (c) of new Section 1104 provides certain 
limitations on the government's use of information provided by 
the private sector and ensures that the private sector's 
provision of information to the government is purely voluntary. 
The Committee intends these provisions, along with others in 
the legislation, to help protect the privacy and civil 
liberties of Americans.
            Paragraph (1): Limitation
    Paragraph (1) of subsection (c) limits the Federal 
Government's use of information shared with the government by 
the private sector by requiring at least one significant 
purpose of the government's use of such information to be 
either a cybersecurity purpose or the protection of the 
national security of the United States. As such, the Committee 
intends this provision not to create a wall between 
cybersecurity and national security uses of information on one 
hand and all other lawful government uses on the other, rather 
it intends this provision simply to ensure that the government 
is using the information at least for cybersecurity or national 
security, amongst the other uses it might make of the 
information.
            Paragraph (2): Affirmative Search Restriction
    Paragraph (2) limits the Federal Government's affirmative 
searching of data provided exclusively under this legislation 
to the government by the private sector to only conducting such 
searches for cybersecurity purposes or the protection of the 
national security. The Committee intends this provision to 
ensure that information provided under this authority not be 
affirmatively searched by the government for evidence of 
garden-variety crimes like tax evasion or money laundering.
            Paragraph 3: Anti-Tasking Restrictions
    Paragraph (3) makes clear that nothing in this legislation 
permits the government to require a private sector entity to 
share with the Federal Government nor to condition the sharing 
of cyber threat intelligence under subsection (a) on the 
provision of cyber threat information back to the Federal 
Government under subsection (b). The Committee intends this 
provision to ensure that cyber threat information sharing by 
the private sector with the Federal Government remains purely 
voluntary and that the government not attempt to compel such 
sharing by withholding valuable cyber threat intelligence. The 
Committee believes that this provision also prevents the 
government from ``tasking'' the collection of information as 
the government might do under appropriate criminal or foreign 
intelligence surveillance authority because it ensures that the 
private sector cannot be required to provide information back 
to the government.

Section 1104(d) of Title 50: Report on Information Sharing

    Subsection (d) of new Section 1104 requires the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community to report annually to the 
Congressional intelligence committees, in unclassified form 
accompanied by a classified annex as needed, on the use of the 
information shared with the Federal Government under this 
legislation. The report on the use of information shared with 
the Federal Government will include: (1) a review of the use of 
such information for purposes other than cybersecurity; (2) a 
review of the type of information shared with the Federal 
Government; (3) a review of the actions taken by the Federal 
Government based on the information shared; (4) appropriate 
metrics to determine the impact of such sharing on privacy and 
civil liberties, if any such impact exists; and (5) any 
recommendations of the Inspector General for improvements or 
modifications to the authorities provided under this 
legislation. It is the Committee's intent that this report 
provide the Committee with the information it needs to ensure 
that the privacy and civil liberties of Americans are being 
appropriately protected.

Section 1104(e) of Title 50: Federal Preemption

    Subsection (e) of new Section 1104 provides that the 
legislation supersedes any provision of state or local law that 
may prohibit the activities authorized by this legislation. The 
Committee's intent is to ensure, as with the federal provisions 
discussed above, that state and local law on wiretapping, 
antitrust, and public disclosure, to name but a few, do not 
stand as a bar to the kind of robust cyber threat intelligence 
and information sharing that the Committee hopes to engender 
through the process of legislation.

Section 1104(f) of Title 50: Savings Clause

    Subsection (f) of new Section 1104 makes clear that nothing 
in this legislation trumps existing laws or authorities 
permitting the use of cybersecurity systems or efforts to 
identify, obtain, or share cyber threat information. Many 
private sector entities today take advantage of certain 
provisions of federal law to conduct the limited monitoring for 
cybersecurity purposes. While this legislation provides much 
more robust authorities, the Committee believed it important to 
ensure that existing authorities remained in place and that 
those authorities could continue to be used by the appropriate 
government agencies and entities.

Section 1104(g) of Title 50: Definitions

    Subsection (g) of the new Section 1104 provides important 
definitions for the purpose of this legislation. The Committee 
notes that much of the work on limiting the scope and breadth 
of this legislation is done by the definitions and commends 
those interested in this legislation to carefully review these 
definitions in the context of the legislation.
            Paragraph 1: Certified Entity
    As noted briefly above, a certified entity is defined as a 
cybersecurity provider, a protected entity, or a self-protected 
entity that also possesses or is eligible to obtain a security 
clearance at the level appropriate to receive classified cyber 
threat intelligence, as determined by the DNI, and can 
demonstrate to the Director of National Intelligence that it 
can appropriately protect that classified information.
            Paragraph 2: Cyber Threat Information
    Cyber threat information is defined to mean information 
that directly pertains to a vulnerability of, or threat to, a 
system or network of a government or private entity. Such 
information includes, but is not limited to, information 
pertaining to the protection of a system or network from 
efforts to degrade, disrupt or destroy the network, as well as 
the protection of a system or network from the theft or 
misappropriation of private or government information, among 
other things.
            Paragraph 3: Cyber Threat Intelligence
    The definition of cyber threat intelligence is consistent 
with the definition of cyber threat information except that 
cyber threat intelligence is information that is originally in 
the possession of an element of the intelligence community. The 
Committee used different terms in this legislation with similar 
definitions in order to distinguish the origin of information. 
Cyber threat intelligence thus originates with the government 
while cyber threat information originates with the private 
sector.
            Paragraph 4: Cybersecurity Provider
    A cybersecurity provider is defined to be a non-
governmental entity that provides goods or services intended to 
be used for cybersecurity purposes. The Committee intentionally 
excluded governmental entities from this construct to avoid any 
concern that government agencies might serve as cybersecurity 
providers to private sector entities.
            Paragraph 5: Cybersecurity Purpose
    A cybersecurity purpose is defined as the purpose of 
ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of, 
or safeguarding, a system or network. This includes, but is not 
limited to, the protection of a system or network from efforts 
to degrade, disrupt or destroy the network, as well as the 
protection of a system or network from the theft or 
misappropriation of private or government information, among 
other things.
            Paragraph 6: Cybersecurity System
    A cybersecurity system is defined as a system designed or 
employed to ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and 
availability of, or safeguard, a system or network. This 
includes, but is not limited to, a system designed or employed 
to protect a system or network from efforts to degrade, disrupt 
or destroy the network, as well as a system designed or 
employed to protect a system or network from the theft or 
misappropriation of private or government information, among 
other things.
            Paragraph 7: Protected Entity
    A protected entity is defined as an entity, other than an 
individual, that contracts with a cybersecurity provider for 
goods or services to be used for cybersecurity purposes. The 
Committee intentionally excluded individuals from this 
definition so as to limit the direct scope of the legislation 
to the protection of corporate entities.
            Paragraph 8: Self-Protected Entity
    A self-protected entity is defined as an entity, other than 
an individual, that provides goods or services for 
cybersecurity purposes to itself. As with the definition of a 
protected entity, the Committee intentionally excluded 
individuals from this definition so as to limit the direct 
scope of the legislation to the protection of corporate 
entities.

Section 2(b): Procedures and Guidelines

    This subsection of the Act requires the DNI to establish 
the procedures for sharing of cyber threat intelligence and to 
issue the guidelines for granting security clearances within 60 
days of the date of enactment of the Act. This subsection of 
the Act also requires the DNI to expeditiously distribute the 
procedures and guidelines to appropriate federal government and 
private sector entities. The Committee intends to require the 
DNI to meet these deadlines and to broadly distribute the 
procedures and guidelines. As previously noted, the Committee 
expects the DNI to work closely with the private sector in 
developing these procedures and guidelines.

Section 2(c): Initial Report

    This subsection of the Act requires the first report to be 
provided to the Congressional intelligence committees by the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community under new 
subsection (d) of section 1104 to be provided no later than one 
year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Section 2(d): Table of Contents Amendment

    This subsection of the Act provides for amendments to the 
table of contents of the National Security Act of 1947.

                 Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee held two closed 
hearings, one open hearing, and four informal meetings or 
briefings relating to the subject matter of the legislation. 
The bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects conclusions 
reached by the Committee in light of this oversight activity.

                General Performance Goals and Objectives

    In accordance with clause 3(c) of House rule XIII, the 
Committee's performance goals and objectives are reflected in 
the descriptive portions of this report.

                       Unfunded Mandate Statement

    Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of 
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded 
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee 
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office 
included herein.

                  Statement on Congressional Earmarks

    Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 
of Representatives, the Committee states that the bill as 
reported contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax 
benefits, or limited tariff benefits.

           Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office 
                             Cost Estimate

    With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule 
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect 
to requirements of 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has received the following 
cost estimate for H.R. 3523 from the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                 Washington, DC, December 16, 2011.
Hon. Mike Rogers,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3523, the Cyber 
Intelligence Sharing Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason 
Wheelock.
            Sincerely,
                                              Douglas W. Elmendorf.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 3523--Cyber Intelligence Sharing Act

    H.R. 3523 would amend the National Security Act of 1947 to 
require the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to 
establish procedures to promote the sharing of information 
about cyberthreats between intelligence agencies and the 
private sector. The DNI also would be directed to establish 
guidelines for granting security clearances to employees of the 
private-sector entities with which the government shares such 
information. CBO estimates that implementing the bill would 
have a discretionary cost of $15 million over the 2012-2016 
period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. 
Enacting H.R. 3523 would not affect direct spending or 
revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
    CBO anticipates additional personnel would be needed to 
administer the program and to manage the exchange of 
information between intelligence agencies and the private 
sector. Based on information from the DNI and the Office of 
Personnel Management, CBO estimates that those activities would 
cost approximately $3 million annually over the 2012-2016 
period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.
    The bill would impose intergovernmental and private-sector 
mandates, as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
(UMRA), by extending civil and criminal liability protection to 
entities and cybersecurity providers that share or use 
cyberthreat information. The bill also would impose additional 
intergovernmental mandates by preempting state laws. Because 
CBO is uncertain about the number of cases that would be 
limited and any forgone compensation that would result, CBO 
cannot determine whether the costs of the mandate would exceed 
the annual threshold established in UMRA for private-sector 
mandates ($142 million in 2011, adjusted annually for 
inflation). However, CBO estimates that the aggregate costs of 
the mandates on public entities would fall below the threshold 
for intergovernmental mandates ($71 million in 2011, adjusted 
annually for inflation).
    The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Jason Wheelock 
(for federal costs), J'nell J. Blanco (for the 
intergovernmental impact), and Elizabeth Bass (for the private-
sector impact). This estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, 
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is 
printed in italic and existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                     NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947


                              SHORT TITLE

  That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of 
1947''.

                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
     * * * * * * *

                       TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 1104. Cyber threat intelligence and information sharing.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

  Sec. 1104. (a) Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber Threat 
Intelligence With Private Sector.--
          (1) In general.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence shall establish procedures to allow 
        elements of the intelligence community to share cyber 
        threat intelligence with private-sector entities and to 
        encourage the sharing of such intelligence.
          (2) Sharing and use of classified intelligence.--The 
        procedures established under paragraph (1) shall 
        provide that classified cyber threat intelligence may 
        only be--
                  (A) shared by an element of the intelligence 
                community with--
                          (i) certified entities; or
                          (ii) a person with an appropriate 
                        security clearance to receive such 
                        cyber threat intelligence;
                  (B) shared consistent with the need to 
                protect the national security of the United 
                States; and
                  (C) used by a certified entity in a manner 
                which protects such cyber threat intelligence 
                from unauthorized disclosure.
          (3) Security clearance approvals.--The Director of 
        National Intelligence shall issue guidelines providing 
        that the head of an element of the intelligence 
        community may, as the head of such element considers 
        necessary to carry out this subsection--
                  (A) grant a security clearance on a temporary 
                or permanent basis to an employee or officer of 
                a certified entity;
                  (B) grant a security clearance on a temporary 
                or permanent basis to a certified entity and 
                approval to use appropriate facilities; and
                  (C) expedite the security clearance process 
                for a person or entity as the head of such 
                element considers necessary, consistent with 
                the need to protect the national security of 
                the United States.
          (4) No right or benefit.--The provision of 
        information to a private-sector entity under this 
        subsection shall not create a right or benefit to 
        similar information by such entity or any other 
        private-sector entity.
  (b) Private Sector Use of Cybersecurity Systems and Sharing 
of Cyber Threat Information.--
          (1) In general.--
                  (A) Cybersecurity providers.--Notwithstanding 
                any other provision of law, a cybersecurity 
                provider, with the express consent of a 
                protected entity for which such cybersecurity 
                provider is providing goods or services for 
                cybersecurity purposes, may, for cybersecurity 
                purposes--
                          (i) use cybersecurity systems to 
                        identify and obtain cyber threat 
                        information to protect the rights and 
                        property of such protected entity; and
                          (ii) share such cyber threat 
                        information with any other entity 
                        designated by such protected entity, 
                        including, if specifically designated, 
                        the Federal Government.
                  (B) Self-protected entities.--Notwithstanding 
                any other provision of law, a self-protected 
                entity may, for cybersecurity purposes--
                          (i) use cybersecurity systems to 
                        identify and obtain cyber threat 
                        information to protect the rights and 
                        property of such self-protected entity; 
                        and
                          (ii) share such cyber threat 
                        information with any other entity, 
                        including the Federal Government.
          (2) Use and protection of information.--Cyber threat 
        information shared in accordance with paragraph (1)--
                  (A) shall only be shared in accordance with 
                any restrictions placed on the sharing of such 
                information by the protected entity or self-
                protected entity authorizing such sharing, 
                including appropriate anonymization or 
                minimization of such information;
                  (B) may not be used by an entity to gain an 
                unfair competitive advantage to the detriment 
                of the protected entity or the self-protected 
                entity authorizing the sharing of information; 
                and
                  (C) if shared with the Federal Government--
                          (i) shall be exempt from disclosure 
                        under section 552 of title 5, United 
                        States Code;
                          (ii) shall be considered proprietary 
                        information and shall not be disclosed 
                        to an entity outside of the Federal 
                        Government except as authorized by the 
                        entity sharing such information; and
                          (iii) shall not be used by the 
                        Federal Government for regulatory 
                        purposes.
          (3) Exemption from liability.--No civil or criminal 
        cause of action shall lie or be maintained in Federal 
        or State court against a protected entity, self-
        protected entity, cybersecurity provider, or an 
        officer, employee, or agent of a protected entity, 
        self-protected entity, or cybersecurity provider, 
        acting in good faith--
                  (A) for using cybersecurity systems or 
                sharing information in accordance with this 
                section; or
                  (B) for not acting on information obtained or 
                shared in accordance with this section.
          (4) Relationship to other laws requiring the 
        disclosure of information.--The submission of 
        information under this subsection to the Federal 
        Government shall not satisfy or affect any requirement 
        under any other provision of law for a person or entity 
        to provide information to the Federal Government.
  (c) Federal Government Use of Information.--
          (1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use cyber 
        threat information shared with the Federal Government 
        in accordance with subsection (b) for any lawful 
        purpose only if--
                  (A) the use of such information is not for a 
                regulatory purpose; and
                  (B) at least one significant purpose of the 
                use of such information is--
                          (i) a cybersecurity purpose; or
                          (ii) the protection of the national 
                        security of the United States.
          (2) Affirmative search restriction.--The Federal 
        Government may not affirmatively search cyber threat 
        information shared with the Federal Government under 
        subsection (b) for a purpose other than a purpose 
        referred to in paragraph (1)(B).
          (3) Anti-tasking restriction.--Nothing in this 
        section shall be construed to permit the Federal 
        Government to--
                  (A) require a private-sector entity to share 
                information with the Federal Government; or
                  (B) condition the sharing of cyber threat 
                intelligence with a private-sector entity on 
                the provision of cyber threat information to 
                the Federal Government.
  (d) Report on Information Sharing.--
          (1) Report.--The Inspector General of the 
        Intelligence Community shall annually submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report 
        containing a review of the use of information shared 
        with the Federal Government under this section, 
        including--
                  (A) a review of the use by the Federal 
                Government of such information for a purpose 
                other than a cybersecurity purpose;
                  (B) a review of the type of information 
                shared with the Federal Government under this 
                section;
                  (C) a review of the actions taken by the 
                Federal Government based on such information;
                  (D) appropriate metrics to determine the 
                impact of the sharing of such information with 
                the Federal Government on privacy and civil 
                liberties, if any; and
                  (E) any recommendations of the Inspector 
                General for improvements or modifications to 
                the authorities under this section.
          (2) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
        include a classified annex.
  (e) Federal Preemption.--This section supersedes any statute 
of a State or political subdivision of a State that restricts 
or otherwise expressly regulates an activity authorized under 
subsection (b).
  (f) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to limit any other authority to use a cybersecurity 
system or to identify, obtain, or share cyber threat 
intelligence or cyber threat information.
  (g) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Certified entity.--The term ``certified entity'' 
        means a protected entity, self-protected entity, or 
        cybersecurity provider that--
                  (A) possesses or is eligible to obtain a 
                security clearance, as determined by the 
                Director of National Intelligence; and
                  (B) is able to demonstrate to the Director of 
                National Intelligence that such provider or 
                such entity can appropriately protect 
                classified cyber threat intelligence.
          (2) Cyber threat information.--The term ``cyber 
        threat information'' means information directly 
        pertaining to a vulnerability of, or threat to, a 
        system or network of a government or private entity, 
        including information pertaining to the protection of a 
        system or network from--
                  (A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy 
                such system or network; or
                  (B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, 
                or personally identifiable information.
          (3) Cyber threat intelligence.--The term ``cyber 
        threat intelligence'' means information in the 
        possession of an element of the intelligence community 
        directly pertaining to a vulnerability of, or threat 
        to, a system or network of a government or private 
        entity, including information pertaining to the 
        protection of a system or network from--
                  (A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy 
                such system or network; or
                  (B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, 
                or personally identifiable information.
          (4) Cybersecurity provider.--The term ``cybersecurity 
        provider'' means a non-governmental entity that 
        provides goods or services intended to be used for 
        cybersecurity purposes.
          (5) Cybersecurity purpose.--The term ``cybersecurity 
        purpose'' means the purpose of ensuring the integrity, 
        confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguarding, a 
        system or network, including protecting a system or 
        network from--
                  (A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy 
                such system or network; or
                  (B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, 
                or personally identifiable information.
          (6) Cybersecurity system.--The term ``cybersecurity 
        system'' means a system designed or employed to ensure 
        the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of, or 
        safeguard, a system or network, including protecting a 
        system or network from--
                  (A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy 
                such system or network; or
                  (B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, 
                or personally identifiable information.
          (7) Protected entity.--The term ``protected entity'' 
        means an entity, other than an individual, that 
        contracts with a cybersecurity provider for goods or 
        services to be used for cybersecurity purposes.
          (8) Self-protected entity.--The term ``self-protected 
        entity'' means an entity, other than an individual, 
        that provides goods or services for cybersecurity 
        purposes to itself.

                             MINORITY VIEWS

        Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523

    As members of the Intelligence Committee, it is our 
responsibility to ensure that intelligence support to the 
cybersecurity of our nation is focused and robust. The 
Intelligence Community's unique insight and knowledge of 
cyberspace are critical to our nation's ability to defend, not 
only U.S. Government information technology, but also our 
Critical Infrastructure and Defense Industrial Base.
    This Bill is the culmination of a strong bipartisan effort 
and provides an innovative, yet pragmatic, approach to 
cybersecurity. It leverages the Intelligence Community's 
expertise and incentivizes the private sector to share cyber 
threat information in order to build an enduring private-public 
partnership for this strategic threat to our nation's security. 
Specifically, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act 
provides the authority for the Intelligence Community to share 
classified cyber threat intelligence with properly-vetted 
industry partners and encourages the voluntary sharing of cyber 
threat information with the U.S. Government.
    It is the Minority's strong intent in supporting this Bill 
to facilitate this private-public sharing of information 
regarding malevolent cyber activity in a way that ensures that 
the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons are respected 
and protected. An equitable and ethical balance between 
flexible information sharing and privacy must be established, 
maintained and vigilantly reviewed.
    We express continued interest in working with the Majority 
to further address concerns raised by the Administration and 
civil liberties organizations.
    We believe that this Bill and its amendments strike this 
delicate balance by requiring that any shared information used 
by the Government meet a cybersecurity or national security 
threshold and by prohibiting the Government's use of shared 
information for regulatory purposes. Moreover, in recognition 
that this Bill is a pioneering effort, this Committee is fully 
committed to diligent oversight of the parties' conduct 
pursuant to this Bill.
    The Bill directs the Intelligence Community Inspector 
General to be alert to and review any U.S. Government activity 
or use of shared information that goes beyond the cybersecurity 
focus of this Bill. Should that oversight identify significant 
concerns or abuse, the Minority is committed to working with 
the Majority to take all appropriate and timely action to 
further enhance privacy protections.
    To repeat: the Minority supported this Bill in the 
expectation that, both the participating private companies and 
the Government, will appreciate and not abuse the flexibility 
and liability protection afforded by this Bill. With the 
dedicated support of both government and industry--overlaid 
with Congressional oversight--we are optimistic that this Bill 
will work as envisioned to strengthen cybersecurity in a manner 
that respects American values.

                                   C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger.
                                   Mike Thompson.
                                   Jim Langevin.
                                   Adam B. Schiff.
                                   Dan Boren.
                                   Ben Chandler.

                             MINORITY VIEWS

        Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523

    The intent of this Bill is to authorize the U.S. Government 
to share classified cybersecurity intelligence with the private 
sector in a secure manner and to enable the private sector to 
share cybersecurity information with the U.S. Government in 
real-time, without fear of liability if acting in good faith.
    I agree that we are facing serious cyber threats and that 
all Americans will benefit from strong cybersecurity 
protections for our critical infrastructure. However, I believe 
we need to balance those concerns with measures to protect the 
privacy and civil liberties that Americans also deserve. While 
I appreciate the efforts of authors of this bipartisan bill and 
its focus on cybersecurity, I believe that balance has not yet 
been achieved.
    Although the Bill includes adequate protections for 
classified information and corporate proprietary information, 
its language does not provide commensurate protection for the 
personal accounts of U.S. persons or personal identifiable 
information (PII). For example, the Bill's language does not 
restrict the nature or volume of the information that the 
private sector can share with the Government, does not provide 
for mandatory minimization of PII, does not significantly 
curtail the Government's use of shared information, and does 
not include most of the privacy protections recommended by the 
White House in its proposed cybersecurity legislation.
    I am also concerned that the new liability shield provided 
in the Bill is overly broad and is less protective of consumers 
than similar shields provided under many state laws. We should 
be very careful whenever we limit injured consumers' ability to 
seek legal redress. If a good faith requirement is to be used, 
it should be based on clear and objective criteria. In no 
event, however, should cybersecurity entities be protected if 
injuries are the result of neglect, recklessness or misconduct.
    Accordingly, while I strongly agree with the need to enact 
effective cybersecurity legislation, and commend the 
constructive bipartisan effort underlying this Bill, I 
respectively dissent because the Bill does not sufficiently 
protect individual privacy rights and civil liberties.
                                   Janice D. Schakowsky.