Report text available as:

  • TXT
  • PDF   (PDF provides a complete and accurate display of this text.) Tip ?
                                                       Calendar No. 490
113th Congress   }                                           {   Report

 2d Session      }               SENATE                      {  113-270
_______________________________________________________________________



                       CYBERSECURITY ACT OF 2013

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 OF THE

           COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                                   on

                                S. 1353

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


               November 12, 2014.--Ordered to be printed
                               ________
                                                                  
                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

49-010                         WASHINGTON : 2014   
               
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
               
               
       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                    one hundred thirteenth congress
                             second session

            JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California            JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
BILL NELSON, Florida                 ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas                 MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             DEAN HELLER, Nevada
MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  DAN COATS, Indiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
ED MARKEY, Massachusetts             DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
CORY BOOKER, New Jersey              RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN WALSH, Montana
                     Ellen Doneski, Staff Director
                     John Williams, General Counsel
              David Schwietert, Republican Staff Director
              Nick Rossi, Republican Deputy Staff Director
               Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel











                                                       Calendar No. 490
113th Congress   }                                         {     Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session      }                                         {    113-270

======================================================================



 
                       CYBERSECURITY ACT OF 2013

                                _______
                                

               November 12, 2014.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

     Mr. Rockefeller, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                Transportation, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 135]

    The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, to 
which was referred the bill (S. 1353) to provide for an 
ongoing, voluntary public-private partnership to improve 
cybersecurity, and to strengthen cybersecurity research and 
development, workforce development and education, and public 
awareness and preparedness, and for other purposes, having 
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an 
amendment (in the nature of a substitute) and recommends that 
the bill (as amended) do pass.

                          Purpose of the Bill

  The purpose of S. 1353 is to help secure the Nation from 
cyber threats by clarifying the statutory authority of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to 
facilitate and support the development of a set of voluntary, 
industry-led standards and best practices to reduce cyber risks 
to critical infrastructure. The bill would also ensure that the 
Federal Government supports cutting-edge research, increases 
public awareness, and improves our workforce to better address 
cyber threats.

                          Background and Needs

              I. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE CYBER THREAT

  Over the past two decades, the growth of the Internet and our 
country's increasing use of interconnected networks have 
produced unprecedented economic growth and innovation. However, 
our ever-increasing reliance upon the Internet has also allowed 
new threats to develop. As individuals, businesses, and 
governments shift more of their activities and store more of 
their information online, they become vulnerable to attackers 
intent on conducting malicious surveillance, stealing 
information, or disrupting operations. These attackers range 
from amateur hackers, to criminals, to state sponsors. The type 
of attack could be untargeted malware, denial of service, or an 
advanced persistent threat.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\See e.g., Mandiant, APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber 
Espionage Units, February 18, 2013, at http://intelreport.mandiant.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Top government officials and cybersecurity experts have 
repeatedly warned about the seriousness of the threat cyber 
incidents pose to our economic and national security. In 
January 2012 testimony on worldwide threats before the Senate 
Select Intelligence Committee, Robert Mueller, then-Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, said that cyber threats 
will surpass the threat of terrorism in the foreseeable 
future.\2\ Former National Security Agency Director General 
Keith Alexander described the consequences of cyber espionage 
as the ``greatest transfer of wealth in history.''\3\ Former 
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Michael Leiter 
has described cyber attacks against the United States as ``a 
Pearl Harbor of slow moving deadly gas rather than blowing 
things up. We are being robbed blind.''\4\ With respect to 
economic security, a July 2013 joint Center for Strategic and 
International Studies-McAfee report estimates as much as a $100 
billion annual loss to the U.S. economy with as many as 508,000 
U.S. jobs lost or displaced due to malicious cyber activity.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\Testimony of Robert Mueller, Senate Select Intelligence 
Committee, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the 
United States, January 31, 2012, at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112shrg74790/pdf/CHRG-112shrg74790.pdf.
    \3\Josh Rogin, ``NSA Chief: Cybercrime constitutes the `greatest 
transfer of wealth in history','' Foreign Policy, July 9, 2012, at 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/07/09/nsachief_ 
cybercrime_constitutes_the_greatest_transfer_of_wealth_in_history.
    \4\Erin Mershon, ``Deal Possible on Cybersecurity if Senate Can 
Pass Similar Bill, Rogers Says,'' Communications Daily, September 26, 
2013.
    \5\James Andrew Lewis and Stewart Baker, The Economic Impact of 
Cybercrime and Espionage, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, McAfee, July 23, 2013, at http://csis.org/files/publication/
60396rpt_cybercrime-cost_0713_ph4_0.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  A growing cyber threat affects both the Federal Government 
and the U.S. economy. According to Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) data, the number of cyber incidents reported by 
Federal agencies to the United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team increased 782 percent between 2006 and 2012, 
with 48,562 incidents reported in 2012.\6\ Symantec estimates 
that targeted cyber attacks focused on individuals or specific 
companies increased 42 percent in 2012 compared with the 
preceding 12 months. Within that increase, targeted attacks 
specifically aimed at small businesses increased from 18 
percent in the same period.\7\ Verizon analysis of 2012 data 
breaches shows that 95 percent of targeted state-affiliated 
espionage incidents rely on the relatively simple technique of 
e-mail phishing, and, once attackers have gained access, 66 
percent of breaches go undiscovered for months or even 
years.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\U.S. Government Accountability Office, Cybersecurity: National 
Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better Defined and 
More Effectively Implemented, GAO-13-187, February 2013, at http://
www.gao.gov/assets/660/652170.pdf.
    \7\Symantec, Internet Security Threat Report, 2013, at http://
www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-istr_main--
report_v18_2012_21291018.en-us.pdf.
    \8\Verizon, 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report, 2013, at http:/
/www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-
investigations-report-2013_en_xg.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  National and homeland security officials are especially 
concerned about cyber attacks targeted at the industrial 
control systems (ICS) that operate and monitor large physical 
systems in the United States. The ICS managing some of our 
country's most critical infrastructure, including the electric 
grid, oil pipelines, transportation networks, and financial 
institutions, are now accessible via the Internet and, as a 
result, could potentially be manipulated or attacked by 
malicious actors using computers in other parts of the world. 
The vulnerabilities of our country's critical infrastructure 
create a potentially serious threat to the American public.\9\ 
Ninety percent of this infrastructure is owned and operated by 
private entities.\10\, \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\See e.g., Presidential Directive/NSC-63 (May 22, 1998) 
(``Because of our military strength, future enemies, whether nations, 
groups or individuals, may seek to harm us in non-traditional ways 
including attacks within the United States. Because our economy is 
increasingly reliant upon interdependent and cyber-supported 
infrastructures, non-traditional attacks on our infrastructure and 
information systems may be capable of significantly harming both our 
military power and our economy.'')
    \10\National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Critical 
Infrastructure Partnership Strategic Assessment, October 14, 2008, at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/niac/
niac_critical_infrastructure_protection_assessment_final_report.pdf, p. 
16.
    \11\Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, 
Control System Internet Accessibility, ICS-ALERT-10-301-01, October 28, 
2010, at https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/ICS-Alert-11-343-01A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  With access to an infrastructure operator's network, 
attackers could change control parameters to disable or destroy 
the infrastructure. U.S. infrastructure, as a ``system of 
systems,'' is potentially vulnerable to cascading damages, such 
as if an electricity blackout leads to disruptions in water 
treatment, emergency communications, and oil and gas 
production. In an op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal in 
2012, President Obama described such a scenario:
                It doesn't take much to imagine the 
                consequences of a successful cyber attack. In a 
                future conflict, an adversary unable to match 
                our military supremacy on the battlefield might 
                seek to exploit our computer vulnerabilities 
                here at home. Taking down vital banking systems 
                could trigger a financial crisis. The lack of 
                clean water or functioning hospitals could 
                spark a public health emergency. And as we've 
                seen in past blackouts, the loss of electricity 
                can bring businesses, cities and entire regions 
                to a standstill.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\Barack Obama, ``Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously,'' Wall 
Street Journal, July 19, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  News reports of cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, 
government systems, and businesses show that destructive 
attacks are not merely theoretical ``red-team'' scenarios. In 
Saudi Arabia, for example, 2012 media reports indicated that a 
cyber attack on Saudi Aramco, the world's largest exporter of 
oil, strategically erased data from 30,000 computers on the 
company's network.\13\ More recently, the press has reported 
sustained attacks on U.S. financial services companies,\14\ 
universities,\15\ and energy companies\16\ designed to take 
down websites, steal intellectual property, and destroy data or 
manipulate infrastructure, respectively. The press itself has 
also come under attack, including The New York Times, which was 
knocked offline for several hours in August 2013 by the so-
called Syrian Electronic Army.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\Wael Mahdi, ``Saudi Arabia Says Aramco Cyberattack Came From 
Foreign States,'' Bloomberg, December 9, 2012, at http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-09/saudi-arabia-says-aramco-cyberattack-
came-from-foreign-states.html.
    \14\Joseph Menn, ``Cyber attacks against banks more severe than 
most realize,'' Reuters, May 18, 2013, at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/05/18/us-cyber-summit-banks-idUSBRE94G0ZP20130518.
    \15\Richard Perez-Pena, ``Universities Face a Rising Barrage of 
Cyberattacks,'' The New York Times, July 16, 2013, at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/education/barrage-of-cyberattacks-
challenges-campus-culture.html?pagewanted=all.
    \16\David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, ``Cyberattacks Against 
U.S. Corporations Are on the Rise,'' The New York Times, May 12, 2013, 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/us/cyberattacks-on-rise-against-
us-corporations.html?pagewanted=all.
    \17\Lee Ferran, ``Who's The Syrian Group Allegedly Behind The New 
York Times Cyber Attack?,'' ABC News, August 28, 2013, at http://
abcnews.go.com/Blotter/syrian-electronic-army-group-allegedly-york-
times-cyber/story?id=20095458.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In response to the industry-wide and ever-changing cyber 
threat, title I of the Cybersecurity Act of 2013 would promote 
the development of a set of voluntary standards and best 
practices that critical infrastructure operators in the United 
States can adopt to improve the security of their systems and 
lower the risk of a cyber attack that causes serious damage to 
the United States. Title I would clarify the authority of NIST, 
the Federal Government's leading technical standards and 
measurement agency, to support an industry-led effort to 
develop these voluntary standards and best practices, and 
ensure this process will be ongoing to provide flexibility to 
meet evolving threats.

     II. CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND WORKFORCE NEEDS

  While warning about the vulnerabilities of our information 
networks to cyber attacks, policymakers have also expressed 
concerns that the United States is under-investing in 
cybersecurity research and not training a sufficient amount of 
workers capable of defending government agencies and private 
sector businesses from cyber attacks.
  In December 2011, the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) released ``Trustworthy Cyberspace: 
Strategic Plan for the Federal Cybersecurity Research and 
Development Program.'' The plan sought to strengthen the often 
piecemeal cybersecurity research and development conducted by 
Federal agencies under the auspices of the Networking and 
Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) 
Program. Four strategic goals have been set to guide research 
and development progress: inducing change, developing 
scientific foundations, maximizing research impact, and 
accelerating transition to practice.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\Executive Office of the President, Trustworthy Cyberspace: 
Strategic Plan for the Federal Cybersecurity Research and Development 
Program, National Science and Technology Council, December 2011, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/
fed_cybersecurity_rd_strategic_plan_2011.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  According to several reports, the Federal and private sector 
cybersecurity workforce is facing increasing demand and 
potential shortages. A 2013 study found that, over the past 5 
years, demand for cybersecurity professionals grew 3.5 times 
faster than general information technology jobs and 12 times 
faster than for all other jobs.\19\ A 2012 assessment by the 
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) in 
partnership with the Federal Chief Information Officers Council 
found that nearly 80 percent of Federal cybersecurity workers 
surveyed were over the age of 40, with the majority nearing 
retirement age.\20\ In 2013, the news reported that the 
Department of Defense has an intent to expand Cyber 
Command,\21\ yet security clearance and citizenship 
requirements, let alone education requirements, will make 
hiring those additional employees challenging. The National 
Science Foundation's (NSF) Scholarship for Service Program, 
which serves as a Federal Government pipeline for cybersecurity 
talent, currently graduates and places an average of just 150 
students per year in Federal agencies.\22\ Cynthia Dion-
Schwarz, former Deputy Assistant Director of the NSF's Computer 
& Information Science & Engineering Directorate, commented, 
``The outlook is grim because we are not producing, from an 
education perspective, the people with the right skills sets to 
just have the entry-level skills needed in order to make 
progress in cybersecurity.''\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\Burning Glass Technologies, Initial Findings on Cyber Security 
Jobs, February 2013, at http://www.burning-glass.com/cybersecurity/
BGTCyberSecurityReport.pdf.
    \20\National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education, 2012 
Information Technology Workforce Assessment for Cybersecurity, March 
14, 2013, at https://cio.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/04/
ITWAC-Summary-Report_04-01-2013.pdf.
    \21\Elisabeth Bumiller, ``Pentagon Expanding Cybersecurity Force to 
Protect Network Against Attacks,'' The New York Times, January 27, 
2013, at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/us/pentagon-to-beef-up-
cybersecurity-force-to-counter-attacks.html. See also, Cheryl Pellerin, 
``Rogers: Cybercom Defending Networks, Nation,'' DoD News, Defense 
Media Activity, August 18, 2014, at http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=122949.
    \22\Briefing by Victor P. Piotrowski, Lead Program Director, NSF, 
to Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Staff, July 29, 2013.
    \23\Amber Corrin, ``Desperately seeking cybersecurity pros,'' FCW, 
October 26, 2012, at http://fcw.com/articles/2012/10/26/cyber-
workforce.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Titles II through IV of the Cybersecurity Act of 2013 seek to 
address these challenges. Title II would task OSTP with 
coordinating Federal agencies' cybersecurity research and 
development and would support basic cybersecurity research at 
NSF, in collaboration with academia and industry. Title III of 
the bill would authorize cybersecurity education and workforce 
development initiatives, including competitions and challenges, 
the scholarship-for-service program, and a study examining the 
education, training, and certification needs of the 
cybersecurity workforce. Title IV of the bill would authorize 
and expand the work of the NIST-coordinated NICE.

                         Summary of Provisions

  The purpose of S. 1353 is to help improve the security of the 
Nation from cyber threats by clarifying NIST's statutory 
authority to facilitate and support the development of a set of 
voluntary, industry-led standards and best practices to reduce 
cyber risks to critical infrastructure. The bill would also 
ensure that the Federal Government supports cutting-edge 
research, increases public awareness, and improves our 
workforce to better address cyber threats.
  Title I of the bill would update the existing statutory 
authority of NIST to ensure that the agency will, on an ongoing 
basis, facilitate and support the development of a voluntary, 
industry-led set of standards and best practices to reduce 
cyber risks to critical infrastructure. It also would ensure 
that the information shared in this process may not be used for 
regulatory purposes. The set of standards and best practices 
that would be developed through this process must--
           be voluntary;
           be developed in close and continuous 
        coordination with industry;
           not conflict with or duplicate existing 
        regulatory requirements;
           incorporate voluntary consensus standards 
        and industry best practices and align with voluntary 
        international standards; and
           be technology neutral.
  This section also would call on the Comptroller General of 
the United States to assess the progress, voluntary nature, and 
adoption of the standards and best practices to reduce cyber 
risks to critical infrastructure.
  Because of its technical expertise and its well-earned 
reputation as an ``honest broker'' in the standards development 
process, NIST is particularly well positioned to coordinate the 
development of these cybersecurity standards and practices. 
NIST's role in the development of standards is not that of a 
regulator, but of a convener and facilitator. NIST brings 
together knowledgeable players from government and industry and 
supports their efforts to build consensus around common 
standards. Industries adopt NIST standards because the 
standards that emerge from the NIST process consistently have 
high technical quality and utility. There are many well-
documented cases where NIST standards have improved the quality 
of goods and services produced by U.S. companies while lowering 
transaction costs and promoting innovation.\24\ In addition to 
the important role it plays in developing standards in the 
United States, NIST also actively works to harmonize U.S.-based 
standards with international standards.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\See e.g., Erik Puskar, Selected Impacts of Documentary 
Standards Supported by NIST, 2008 Edition, NISTIR 7548, January 2009; 
David Leach and John T. Scott, The Economic Impacts of Documentary 
Standards: A Case Study of the Flat Panel Display Measurement Standard 
(FPDM), CGR G2012-0299, December 2011.
    \25\Maureen A. Breitenberg, The ABCs of Standards Activities, 
NISTIR 7614, August 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Title II of the bill would call for a Federal cybersecurity 
research and development plan to be developed by OSTP and the 
coordination of research and development activities at NSF, 
NIST, other Federal agencies, academia, and the private sector. 
The bill also would authorize coordinated research to address 
gaps in knowledge preventing the development of secure 
technologies. In addition, agencies participating in the NITRD 
Program would be tasked with supporting research on the science 
of cybersecurity.
  Title III of the bill would call for a National Academy of 
Sciences study of the current state of higher level 
cybersecurity education and professional certification; would 
enable support of innovative competitions and challenges under 
America COMPETES Act authority to identify, develop, and 
recruit talented professionals and to stimulate innovation in 
cybersecurity research and development; and would authorize an 
existing NSF-led cyber scholarship-for-service program.
  Title IV of the bill would call on NIST to continue to 
coordinate, in conjunction with other Federal agencies, a 
cybersecurity public awareness campaign, initiatives to support 
formal cybersecurity education, and an ongoing evaluation and 
forecast of the workforce needs of the Federal Government. 
Title IV also would require NIST to develop, implement, and 
transmit to Congress a strategic plan in support of this 
program.

                          Legislative History

  Since Senator Rockefeller became Chairman in early 2009, the 
Commerce Committee has devoted significant attention to the 
cybersecurity challenges facing the country. Chairman 
Rockefeller convened a Committee hearing on March 19, 2009, 
entitled, ``Cybersecurity: Assessing Our Vulnerabilities and 
Developing an Effective Response.'' On April 1, 2009, Chairman 
Rockefeller and Senator Snowe introduced S. 773, the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2009. S. 773 would have authorized the 
President and certain Federal agencies to take steps to protect 
government information systems and critical infrastructure from 
cyber attacks. It also would have ordered NIST to develop 
cybersecurity standards within one year and promoted 
cybersecurity research, training, and awareness.
  After a second hearing, entitled ``Cybersecurity: Next Steps 
to Protect Our Critical Infrastructure,'' on February 23, 2010, 
the Committee favorably reported an amended version of S. 773 
on March 24, 2010, by voice vote. Although S. 773 was never 
considered on the Senate floor, portions of the legislation 
were included in a bipartisan cybersecurity bill, S. 3414, that 
the Senate considered during the 112th Congress.
  In addition to legislation, in the 112th Congress, the 
Committee continued to actively gather information about the 
cybersecurity threats to our national and economic security. As 
part of this effort, on September 19, 2012, Chairman 
Rockefeller wrote letters to the chief executive officers of 
the 500 largest companies in the United States requesting 
information about the companies' cybersecurity practices and 
their view of how the public and private sectors should be 
working together to best address cybersecurity risks. More than 
300 companies responded to this letter. In a January 28, 2013, 
memorandum to Chairman Rockefeller summarizing the responses of 
these companies, Committee staff reported that the companies 
generally supported strengthening the public-private 
partnership to address our country's cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities, but were concerned about legislation that 
might result in an inflexible, ``one-size-fits-all'' set of 
practices that could potentially conflict with existing sector-
specific Federal regulations or slow down companies' responses 
to cyber attacks.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\Memorandum from Democratic Staff to Chairman Rockefeller of the 
Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, January 28, 
2013, at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/
?a=Files.Serve&File;_id=5a85f211-a5c9-4306-9c84-d3a6b88024f6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The Committee's cybersecurity work continued in the 113th 
Congress. After President Obama issued an Executive Order 
entitled, ``Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,'' 
on February 12, 2013 (Exec. Order No. 13636), the Committee 
held a joint hearing with the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs on March 7, 2013, entitled, ``The 
Cybersecurity Partnership Between the Private Sector and Our 
Government: Protecting Our National and Economic Security.'' 
This hearing examined the development and implementation of the 
February 12 Executive Order and discussed ways government and 
industry can work together to protect critical infrastructure 
from cyber attacks.
  Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Thune introduced S. 
1353, the Cybersecurity Act of 2013, on July 24, 2013, and on 
July 25, 2013, the Committee held a hearing entitled, ``The 
Partnership Between NIST and the Private Sector: Improving 
Cybersecurity.'' This hearing focused on the role NIST was 
playing in developing the Cybersecurity Framework, called for 
in the Executive Order, to reduce cyber risks to critical 
infrastructure. The hearing also examined the broader role NIST 
plays in developing information security standards and the 
clarifications of NIST's authority proposed in S. 1353.
  On July 30, 2013, the Committee met in open Executive Session 
and, by voice vote, ordered the bill to be reported favorably 
with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Several 
amendments--one from Senator Klobuchar, one jointly from 
Senator Klobuchar and Senator Blunt, one from Senator Warner, 
one from Senator Heinrich, and one from Senator Schatz--were 
agreed to as part of the substitute amendment.

                            Estimated Costs

  In accordance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate and section 403 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee provides the 
following cost estimate, prepared by the Congressional Budget 
Office:

S. 1353--Cybersecurity Act of 2013

    Summary: S. 1353 would direct several agencies within the 
federal government to take certain actions to facilitate 
public-private cooperation on cybersecurity standards, improve 
research and development in cybersecurity technologies, and 
further education and public awareness on cybersecurity 
matters. Several of the bill's requirements pertain to existing 
or planned programs and initiatives, while others create new 
requirements or expand the scope of existing efforts.
    CBO estimates that implementing S. 1353 would cost $56 
million over the 2014-2018 period, assuming appropriation of 
the necessary amounts. Pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply to 
this legislation because it would not affect direct spending or 
revenues.
    S. 1353 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 
and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal 
governments.
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of S. 1353 is shown in the following table. 
The costs of this legislation fall within budget functions 250 
(general science, space, and technology) and 370 (commerce and 
housing credit).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               By fiscal year, in millions of dollars 2014--
                                                         -------------------------------------------------------
                                                            2014     2015     2016     2017     2018   2014-2018
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
                                  
Cybersecurity Standards and Public-Private
 Collaboration:
    Estimated Authorization Level.......................        *        1        *        *        1         2
    Estimated Outlays...................................        *        1        *        *        1         2
Cybersecurity Research and Development:
    Estimated Authorization Level.......................        *       14       13       14       13        55
    Estimated Outlays...................................        *        2        8       12       12        35
Cybersecurity Education, Training, and Public Awareness:
    Estimated Authorization Level.......................        4        4        4        4        4        20
    Estimated Outlays...................................        3        4        4        4        4        19
    Total Changes:
        Estimated Authorization Level...................        5       19       17       18       18        77
        Estimated Outlays...............................        4        7       12       16       17       56
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Components may not sum to totals because of rounding. * = less than $500,000.

    Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the 
bill will be enacted early in 2014, the necessary amounts will 
be appropriated each year, and spending will follow historical 
patterns for similar activities.

Cybersecurity standards and public-private collaboration

    Title I would codify certain elements of Executive Order 
13636 by directing the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) to develop a framework of voluntary standards 
designed to reduce risks arising from cyberattacks on critical 
infrastructure that is privately owned and operated. The agency 
expects to spend about $6 million to develop the standards (the 
preliminary framework was completed in October 2013) and 
anticipates spending a similar amount annually to review and 
update the framework as required by the executive order. Based 
on information from the agency, CBO estimates that codifying 
the requirements of the executive order would not significantly 
increase the agency's costs.
    Title I also would require the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to assess progress made by NIST in developing the 
framework and the private sector in adopting the standards; GAO 
also would be required to prepare a summary of its findings and 
report to the Congress every two years. CBO estimates that 
implementing this provision would cost $2 million over the 
2014-2018 period, assuming the availability of appropriated 
funds.

Cybersecurity research and development

    Title II would require the Director of the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) to review existing infrastructure used to test 
cybersecurity technologies within one year of the bill's 
enactment. Based on the results of the review, the NSF would be 
authorized to award grants to establish additional 
infrastructure to test cybersecurity technologies. Based on 
information provided by the agency, CBO estimates that 
implementing this provision would cost $33 million over the 
2014-2018 period, assuming the appropriation of the necessary 
amounts.
    Title II also would require the Director of the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop a federal 
cybersecurity research and development plan in consultation 
with nonfederal entities. Under the legislation, the director 
would be required to update the plan and report to the Congress 
every three years. Based on information provided by OSTP, CBO 
estimates that implementing this provision would cost about $2 
million over the next five years.

Cybersecurity education, training, and public awareness

    Title III would require the Director of the NSF to contract 
with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study 
of education, training, and certification programs for the 
development of professionals in the areas of information 
infrastructure and cybersecurity. Based on information from the 
NAS, CBO estimates that implementing this provision of title 
III would cost $1 million over the 2014-2018 period, assuming 
appropriation of the necessary amounts.
    Other provisions of title III would require the Director of 
the NSF to continue a scholarship-for-service program to train 
professionals to meet the cybersecurity needs of federal, 
state, local, and tribal governments. This title also would 
require several agencies, including the Department of Commerce, 
NSF, and the Department of Homeland Security, to support 
competitions to identify and recruit individuals to enhance 
innovation in basic and applied cybersecurity that can be used 
to advance the mission of the agency. Based on information from 
those agencies, CBO estimates that implementing those 
provisions would not significantly increase discretionary 
spending over the 2014-2018 period because those activities are 
already occurring under current law.
    Title IV would require NIST to continue to coordinate a 
national campaign to increase public awareness of cybersecurity 
threats. The agency also would be required to develop and 
implement a strategic plan to guide federal agencies' support 
of the campaign. Based on information from NIST, CBO expects 
that implementing those requirements would cost $18 million 
over the 2014-2018 period, assuming appropriation of the 
necessary amounts, for personnel and administrative costs.
    Pay-As-You-Go Considerations: None.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 1353 
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as 
defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or 
tribal governments.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Susan Willie and 
Martin von Gnechten; Impact on state, local, and tribal 
governments: J'nell L. Blanco; Impact on the private sector: 
Marin Burnett.
    Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                      Regulatory Impact Statement

  In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the 
following evaluation of the regulatory impact of the 
legislation, as reported:

                       NUMBER OF PERSONS COVERED

  The bill would require NIST to, on an ongoing basis, 
facilitate and support the development of a voluntary, 
industry-led set of standards, guidelines, best practices, 
methodologies, procedures, and processes to reduce cyber risks 
to critical infrastructure. The bill would also authorize 
existing research and development activities, support 
cybersecurity workforce training and education, and support 
efforts to raise public awareness of the cyber threat. The bill 
would not subject any individuals or businesses affected by the 
bill to any additional regulations, as the product of NIST's 
and industry's work is voluntary.

                            ECONOMIC IMPACT

  The bill would not authorize new funding. It is anticipated 
that research conducted under the authority of title II and 
section 301 of the bill may lead to new technologies and 
solutions to evolving cyber threats. Section 302 would have a 
positive impact on the availability of qualified cybersecurity 
professionals to the Federal Government. Section 401 could also 
have a positive impact over time by reducing the number of 
individual victims of malicious cyber activities and associated 
costs.

                                PRIVACY

  The bill would not have any adverse impact on the personal 
privacy of individuals.

                               PAPERWORK

  The bill would not increase paperwork requirements for 
private individuals or businesses. The bill would require three 
reports from the Federal Government and one study to be carried 
out by the National Academy of Sciences on behalf of the 
Federal Government.
  The first report would be from the Comptroller General of the 
United States assessing the progress, voluntary nature, and 
adoption of the standards and best practices to reduce cyber 
risks to critical infrastructure. This report would be 
delivered to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation of the Senate, the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on 
Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives 
one year after enactment and every two years thereafter for six 
years.
  The second report would be a Federal cybersecurity research 
and development plan from the Director of OSTP. This plan would 
be delivered to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Science, 
Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives within 
one year of enactment and every three years thereafter.
  The third report would be a strategic plan for the national 
cybersecurity awareness and preparedness campaign from the 
Director of NIST. This plan would be delivered to the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of 
Representatives within one year of enactment and every five 
years thereafter.
  The National Academy of Sciences study, supported by the 
Director of NSF, the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM), and the Secretary of Homeland Security, would 
be a comprehensive study of government, academic, and private-
sector education, accreditation, training, and certification 
programs for the development of professionals in information 
infrastructure and cybersecurity. This study would be due to 
the President and Congress within one year of enactment, though 
it is possible more time may be required for the final draft.
  The bill also would require the Director of NSF, in 
coordination with the Director of OSTP, to conduct a review of 
cybersecurity test beds in existence on the date of enactment. 
This review would trigger the awarding of additional grants for 
test beds if needed to support the research and testing needs 
of the Federal cybersecurity research and development plan. The 
Committee envisions further assessments of effectiveness of 
these grants to be included in annual budget justifications 
after the initial two years given to allow any new test beds to 
begin operation.

                   Congressionally Directed Spending

  In compliance with paragraph 4(b) of rule XLIV of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides that no 
provisions contained in the bill, as reported, meet the 
definition of congressionally directed spending items under the 
rule.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis


Section 1. Short title; table of contents.

  This section would provide that the legislation may be cited 
as the Cybersecurity Act of 2013. This section would also 
provide the table of contents for the legislation.

Section 2. Definitions.

  This section would define three key terms.

Section 3. No regulatory authority.

  This section would clarify that no regulatory authority is 
conferred on any Federal, State, tribal, or local department or 
agency by the bill.

         TITLE I--PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION ON CYBERSECURITY

Sec. 101. Public-private collaboration on cybersecurity.

  This section would update the existing statutory authority of 
NIST to ensure that NIST would, consistent with existing 
authority, on an ongoing basis, facilitate and support the 
development of a voluntary, non-regulatory, industry-led set of 
standards and best practices to reduce cyber risks to critical 
infrastructure. The set of standards and best practices that 
would be developed through this process: must be voluntary; 
must be developed in close and continuous coordination with 
industry; must not conflict with or duplicate existing 
regulatory requirements; must incorporate voluntary consensus 
standards and industry best practices and align with voluntary 
international standards; and must be technology neutral.
  The Committee recognizes that several industries are subject 
to regulatory requirements, standards, and processes pertaining 
to security: therefore, this process must not duplicate 
regulatory processes and not conflict with or supercede 
requirements, mandatory standards, and related process. This 
limitation, however is not intended to prevent NIST from 
recognizing existing standards or best practices, or to impose 
an obligation upon NIST to resolve possible inconsistencies 
among existing standards and best practices that may be 
utilized by different entities. The aim of this legislation is 
not to create a single, one-size-fits-all standard or set of 
standards; rather, it is to identify on an ongoing basis 
industry-led standards and best practices that may mitigate 
dynamic cyber threats and vulnerabilities. Further, information 
shared with NIST in this process or for purposes of this 
process may not be used to regulate the activity of any entity.
  This section would also require a study and report from the 
Comptroller General assessing the progress made by NIST in 
facilitating the standards and best practices to reduce cyber 
risks to critical infrastructure, the extent to which such 
standards are voluntary and their development led by industry 
representatives, and the extent to which critical 
infrastructure sectors have adopted the voluntary standards and 
best practices, among other considerations. The report would be 
due to the relevant congressional committees one year after 
enactment and every two years thereafter for six years.

            TITLE II--CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Sec. 201. Federal cybersecurity research and development.

  This section would call on the Director of OSTP, in 
coordination with relevant Federal agencies, to develop a 
Federal cybersecurity research and development plan to identify 
and prioritize research needed to meet several key objectives, 
while recognizing that the Director of OSTP has flexibility in 
determining additional objectives. The Director of OSTP may 
coordinate with relevant stakeholders, including industry, 
academia, and appropriate national laboratories to determine 
additional objectives. This section would ensure Federal 
research as part of this plan is not duplicative of private 
sector efforts. The plan would be updated triennially. This 
section would also require the Director of NSF to support 
research to inform computer science programs and professional 
development, and would add several research areas to NSF's 
authority to address gaps in knowledge preventing the 
development of secure technologies. This section would also 
call on the Director of NSF to evaluate the need for additional 
cybersecurity test beds and would authorize the Director of 
NSF, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to support further development of test beds if 
necessary to meet the needs of the national cybersecurity 
research and development plan. This section would also require 
the Director of OSTP to coordinate cybersecurity research and 
development activities across the Federal Government. Agencies 
would also support research on the science of cybersecurity.

Sec. 202. Computer and network security research centers.

  This section would amend existing NSF authority to establish 
computer and network security research centers, especially 
criteria related to selection of new centers which would 
conduct research specific to improving security and resiliency 
of information infrastructure, reducing cyber vulnerabilities, 
and anticipating and mitigating consequences of cyber attacks 
on critical infrastructure. New criteria would also include the 
ability of research centers to transition new technologies into 
the private sector or Federal Government, among others. 
Research areas that centers may pursue would be enhanced in 
section 201 of the bill.

             TITLE III--EDUCATION AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT

Sec. 301. Cybersecurity competitions and challenges.

  This section would call on the Secretary of Commerce, 
Director of NSF, and Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
consultation with the Director of OPM, to support competitions 
and challenges to identify, develop, and recruit talented 
individuals who could secure government and private sector 
information infrastructure, as well as to stimulate innovation 
in basic and applied cybersecurity research. This authority 
would be derived from section 105 of the America COMPETES 
Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-358; 124 Stat. 3989), 
which adds section 24 of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3719). The participating 
agencies would seek the participation of high school, 
university, and graduate students, veterans, and other relevant 
organizations and individuals. This section would call on 
competitions and challenges to focus on certain skill gaps and 
would encourage cooperation with existing regional, State, 
school, and private sector initiatives.

Sec. 302. Federal cyber scholarship-for-service program.

  This section would authorize an existing NSF initiative, in 
coordination with the Director of OPM and Secretary of Homeland 
Security, to recruit, educate, and develop the next generation 
of Federal cybersecurity professionals. NSF would support 
scholarships for students enrolled at institutions of higher 
education studying for degrees or specialized program 
certifications in the cybersecurity field, under which a 
recipient would work in the cybersecurity mission of a Federal, 
State, local, or tribal agency for a period equal to the length 
of the scholarship following receipt of the student's degree. 
This section would define agency hiring authority and 
eligibility for the scholarship, and provide for repayment of 
the scholarship should a recipient fail to meet the terms of 
the program as established by the Director of NSF. NSF would 
evaluate and report periodically to Congress on the success of 
recruiting and retaining scholarship recipients in the public 
sector workforce. The Committee believes additional incentives 
within existing authority, such as loan repayment programs, 
should be considered by Federal agencies to attract and retain 
a talented workforce. The Committee will continue to examine 
the effectiveness of such incentives.

Sec. 303. Study and analysis of education, accreditation, training, and 
        certification of information infrastructure and cybersecurity 
        professionals.

  This section would call on the Director of NSF, the Director 
of OPM, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to jointly 
contract with the National Academy of Sciences for a 
comprehensive study of government, academic, and private-sector 
education, accreditation, training, and certification programs 
for the development of professionals in information 
infrastructure and cybersecurity. The study would include an 
evaluation of the knowledge needed for professionals to secure 
information systems; an assessment of whether existing 
education, accreditation, training, and certification programs 
provide the necessary body of knowledge; an evaluation of the 
state of cybersecurity education at U.S. institutions of higher 
education; an analysis of barriers to the Federal Government in 
recruiting and hiring cybersecurity talent; and an analysis of 
the capacity of U.S. institutions of higher education to 
provide current and future cybersecurity professionals to meet 
the needs of the Federal Government, State and local entities, 
and private sector. The study would be due to the President and 
Congress within one year of enactment. The Committee recognizes 
that the National Academy of Sciences released a report in 
September 2013 entitled ``Professionalizing the Nation's 
Cybersecurity Workforce'' and believes that the study in this 
section should not duplicate existing or prior work in this 
area.

           TITLE IV--CYBERSECURITY AWARENESS AND PREPAREDNESS

Sec. 401. National cybersecurity awareness and preparedness campaign.

  This section would call on the Director of NIST, in 
consultation with relevant Federal agencies, to continue 
coordination of a national cybersecurity awareness and 
preparedness campaign. This initiative would include a public 
awareness media campaign; a campaign to increase the 
understanding of State and local government and institutions of 
higher education of effective risk management; support for 
formal cybersecurity education programs; and initiatives to 
evaluate and forecast future cybersecurity workforce needs of 
the Federal Government, among others. This section would call 
for a strategic plan to guide the awareness and preparedness 
campaign.

                        Changes in Existing Law

  In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, 
as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be 
omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new material is printed 
in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown 
in roman):
  

           NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY ACT

                        [15 U.S.C. 271 et seq.]

SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT, FUNCTIONS, AND ACTIVITIES.

[15 U.S.C. 272]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  (c) Implementation Activities.--In carrying out the functions 
specified in subsection (b), the Secretary, acting through the 
Director may, among other things--
          (1) construct physical standards;
          (2) test, calibrate, and certify standards and 
        standard measuring apparatus;
          (3) study and improve instruments, measurement 
        methods, and industrial process control and quality 
        assurance techniques;
          (4) cooperate with the States in securing uniformity 
        in weights and measures laws and methods of inspection;
          (5) cooperate with foreign scientific and technical 
        institutions to understand technological developments 
        in other countries better;
          (6) prepare, certify, and sell standard reference 
        materials for use in ensuring the accuracy of chemical 
        analyses and measurements of physical and other 
        properties of materials;
          (7) in furtherance of the purposes of this Act, 
        accept research associates, cash donations, and donated 
        equipment from industry, and also engage with industry 
        in research to develop new basic and generic 
        technologies for traditional and new products and for 
        improved production and manufacturing;
          (8) study and develop fundamental scientific 
        understanding and improved measurement, analysis, 
        synthesis, processing, and fabrication methods for 
        chemical substances and compounds, ferrous and 
        nonferrous metals, and all traditional and advanced 
        materials, including processes of degradation;
          (9) investigate ionizing and nonionizing radiation 
        and radioactive substances, their uses, and ways to 
        protect people structures, and equipment from their 
        harmful effects;
          (10) determine the atomic and molecular structure of 
        matter, through analysis of spectra and other methods, 
        to provide a basis for predicting chemical and physical 
        structures and reactions and for designing new 
        materials and chemical substances, including 
        biologically active macromolecules;
          (11) perform research on electromagnetic waves, 
        including optical waves, and on properties and 
        performance of electrical, electronic, and 
        electromagnetic devices and systems and their essential 
        materials, develop and maintain related standards, and 
        disseminate standard signals through broadcast and 
        other means;
          (12) develop and test standard interfaces, 
        communication protocols, and data structures for 
        computer and related telecommunications systems;
          (13) study computer systems (as that term is defined 
        in section 20(d) of this Act) and their use to control 
        machinery and processes;
          (14) perform research to develop standards and test 
        methods to advance the effective use of computers and 
        related systems and to protect the information stored, 
        processed, and transmitted by such systems and to 
        provide advice in support of policies affecting Federal 
        computer and related telecommunications systems;
          (15) on an ongoing basis, facilitate and support the 
        development of a voluntary, industry-led set of 
        standards, guidelines, best practices, methodologies, 
        procedures, and processes to reduce cyber risks to 
        critical infrastructure (as defined under subsection 
        (e));
          [(15)] (16) determine properties of building 
        materials and structural elements, and encourage their 
        standardization and most effective use, including 
        investigation of fire-resisting properties of building 
        materials and conditions under which they may be most 
        efficiently used, and the standardization of types of 
        appliances for fire prevention;
          [(16)] (17) undertake such research in engineering, 
        pure and applied mathematics, statistics, computer 
        science, materials science, and the physical sciences 
        as may be necessary to carry out and support the 
        functions specified in this section;
          [(17)] (18) compile, evaluate, publish, and otherwise 
        disseminate general, specific and technical data 
        resulting from the performance of the functions 
        specified in this section or from other sources when 
        such data are important to science, engineering, or 
        industry, or to the general public, and are not 
        available elsewhere;
          [(18)] (19) collect, create, analyze, and maintain 
        specimens of scientific value;
          [(19)] (20) operate national user facilities;
          [(20)] (21) evaluate promising inventions and other 
        novel technical concepts submitted by inventors and 
        small companies and work with other Federal agencies, 
        States, and localities to provide appropriate technical 
        assistance and support for those inventions which are 
        found in the evaluation process to have commercial 
        promise;
          [(21)] (22) demonstrate the results of the 
        Institute's activities by exhibits or other methods of 
        technology transfer, including the use of scientific or 
        technical personnel of the Institute for part-time or 
        intermittent teaching and training activities at 
        educational institutions of higher learning as part of 
        and incidental to their official duties; and
          [(22)] (23) undertake such other activities similar 
        to those specified in this subsection as the Director 
        determines appropriate.
  (d) Management Costs.--In carrying out the extramural funding 
programs of the Institute, including the programs established 
under sections 25, 26, and 28 of this Act, the Secretary may 
retain reasonable amounts of any funds appropriated pursuant to 
authorizations for these programs in order to pay for the 
Institute's management of these programs.
  (e) Cyber Risks.--
          (1) In general.--In carrying out the activities under 
        subsection (c)(15), the Director--
                  (A) shall--
                          (i) coordinate closely and 
                        continuously with relevant private 
                        sector personnel and entities, critical 
                        infrastructure owners and operators, 
                        sector coordinating councils, 
                        Information Sharing and Analysis 
                        Centers, and other relevant industry 
                        organizations, and incorporate industry 
                        expertise;
                          (ii) consult with the heads of 
                        agencies with national security 
                        responsibilities, sector-specific 
                        agencies, State and local governments, 
                        the governments of other nations, and 
                        international organizations;
                          (iii) identify a prioritized, 
                        flexible, repeatable, performance-
                        based, and cost-effective approach, 
                        including information security measures 
                        and controls, that may be voluntarily 
                        adopted by owners and operators of 
                        critical infrastructure to help them 
                        identify, assess, and manage cyber 
                        risks;
                          (iv) include methodologies--
                                  (I) to identify and mitigate 
                                impacts of the cybersecurity 
                                measures or controls on 
                                business confidentiality; and
                                  (II) to protect individual 
                                privacy and civil liberties;
                          (v) incorporate voluntary consensus 
                        standards and industry best practices;
                          (vi) align with voluntary 
                        international standards to the fullest 
                        extent possible;
                          (vii) prevent duplication of 
                        regulatory processes and prevent 
                        conflict with or superseding of 
                        regulatory requirements, mandatory 
                        standards, and related processes; and
                          (viii) include such other similar and 
                        consistent elements as the Director 
                        considers necessary; and
                  (B) shall not prescribe or otherwise 
                require--
                          (i) the use of specific solutions;
                          (ii) the use of specific information 
                        or communications technology products 
                        or services; or
                          (iii) that information or 
                        communications technology products or 
                        services be designed, developed, or 
                        manufactured in a particular manner.
          (2) Limitation.--Information shared with or provided 
        to the Institute for the purpose of the activities 
        described under subsection (c)(15) shall not be used by 
        any Federal, State, tribal, or local department or 
        agency to regulate the activity of any entity.
          (3) Definitions.--In this subsection:
                  (A) Critical infrastructure.--The term 
                ``critical infrastructure'' has the meaning 
                given the term in section 1016(e) of the USA 
                PATRIOT Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
                  (B) Sector-specific agency.--The term 
                ``sector-specific agency'' means the Federal 
                department or agency responsible for providing 
                institutional knowledge and specialized 
                expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or 
                supporting the security and resilience programs 
                and associated activities of its designated 
                critical infrastructure sector in the all-
                hazards environment.

              CYBER SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACT

                        [15 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.)

SEC. 4. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION RESEARCH.

                            [15 U.S.C. 7403]

  (a) Computer and network security research grants.--
          (1) In general.--The Director shall award grants for 
        basic research on innovative approaches to the 
        structure of computer and network hardware and software 
        that are aimed at enhancing computer security. Research 
        areas may include--
                  (A) authentication, cryptography, and other 
                secure data communications technology;
                  (B) computer forensics and intrusion 
                detection;
                  (C) reliability of computer and network 
                applications, middleware, operating systems, 
                control systems, and communications 
                infrastructure;
                  (D) privacy and confidentiality;
                  (E) network security architecture, including 
                tools for security administration and analysis;
                  (F) emerging threats;
                  (G) vulnerability assessments and techniques 
                for quantifying risk;
                  (H) remote access and wireless security; 
                [and]
                  (I) enhancement of law enforcement ability to 
                detect, investigate, and prosecute cyber-
                crimes, including those that involve piracy of 
                intellectual property[.] ;
                  (J) secure fundamental protocols that are 
                integral to inter-network communications and 
                data exchange;
                  (K) secure software engineering and software 
                assurance, including--
                          (i) programming languages and systems 
                        that include fundamental security 
                        features;
                          (ii) portable or reusable code that 
                        remains secure when deployed in various 
                        environments;
                          (iii) verification and validation 
                        technologies to ensure that 
                        requirements and specifications have 
                        been implemented; and
                          (iv) models for comparison and 
                        metrics to assure that required 
                        standards have been met;
                  (L) holistic system security that--
                          (i) addresses the building of secure 
                        systems from trusted and untrusted 
                        components;
                          (ii) proactively reduces 
                        vulnerabilities;
                          (iii) addresses insider threats; and
                          (iv) supports privacy in conjunction 
                        with improved security;
                  (M) monitoring and detection;
                  (N) mitigation and rapid recovery methods;
                  (O) security of wireless networks and mobile 
                devices; and
                  (P) security of cloud infrastructure and 
                services.
          (2) Merit review; competition.--Grants shall be 
        awarded under this section on a merit-reviewed 
        competitive basis.
          (3) Authorization of appropriations.--There are 
        authorized to be appropriated to the National Science 
        Foundation to carry out this subsection--
                  (A) $35,000,000 for fiscal year 2003;
                  (B) $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2004;
                  (C) $46,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
                  (D) $52,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
                  (E) $60,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.
  (b) Computer and Network Security Research Centers.--
          (1) In general.--The Director shall award multiyear 
        grants, subject to the availability of appropriations, 
        to institutions of higher education, nonprofit research 
        institutions, or consortia thereof to establish 
        multidisciplinary Centers for Computer and Network 
        Security Research. Institutions of higher education, 
        nonprofit research institutions, or consortia thereof 
        receiving such grants may partner with 1 or more 
        government laboratories or for-profit institutions, or 
        other institutions of higher education or nonprofit 
        research institutions.
          (2) Merit review; competition.--Grants shall be 
        awarded under this subsection on a merit-reviewed 
        competitive basis.
          (3) Purpose.--The purpose of the Centers shall be to 
        generate innovative approaches to computer and network 
        security by conducting cutting-edge, multidisciplinary 
        research in computer and network security, including 
        [the research areas] improving the security and 
        resiliency of information infrastructure, reducing 
        cyber vulnerabilities, and anticipating and mitigating 
        consequences of cyber attacks on critical 
        infrastructure, by conducting research in the areas 
        described in subsection (a)(1).
          (4) Applications.--An institution of higher 
        education, nonprofit research institution, or consortia 
        thereof seeking funding under this subsection shall 
        submit an application to the Director at such time, in 
        such manner, and containing such information as the 
        Director may require. The application shall include, at 
        a minimum, a description of--
                  (A) the research projects that will be 
                undertaken by the Center and the contributions 
                of each of the participating entities;
                  (B) how the Center will promote active 
                collaboration among scientists and engineers 
                from different disciplines, such as computer 
                scientists, engineers, mathematicians, and 
                social science researchers;
                  (C) how the Center will contribute to 
                increasing the number and quality of computer 
                and network security researchers and other 
                professionals, including individuals from 
                groups historically underrepresented in these 
                fields; and
                  (D) how [the center] the Center will 
                disseminate research results quickly and widely 
                to improve cyber security in information 
                technology networks, products, and services.
          (5) Criteria.--In evaluating the applications 
        submitted under paragraph (4), the Director shall 
        consider, at a minimum--
                  (A) the ability of the applicant to generate 
                innovative approaches to computer and network 
                security and effectively carry out the research 
                program;
                  (B) the experience of the applicant in 
                conducting research on computer and network 
                security and the capacity of the applicant to 
                foster new multidisciplinary collaborations;
                  (C) the capacity of the applicant to attract 
                and provide adequate support for a diverse 
                group of undergraduate and graduate students 
                and postdoctoral fellows to pursue computer and 
                network security research; [and]
                  (D) the extent to which the applicant will 
                partner with government laboratories, for-
                profit entities, other institutions of higher 
                education, or nonprofit research institutions, 
                and the role the partners will play in the 
                research undertaken by the Center[.] ;
                  (E) the demonstrated capability of the 
                applicant to conduct high performance 
                computation integral to complex computer and 
                network security research, through on-site or 
                off-site computing;
                  (F) the applicant's affiliation with private 
                sector entities involved with industrial 
                research described in subsection (a)(1);
                  (G) the capability of the applicant to 
                conduct research in a secure environment;
                  (H) the applicant's affiliation with existing 
                research programs of the Federal Government;
                  (I) the applicant's experience managing 
                public-private partnerships to transition new 
                technologies into a commercial setting or the 
                government user community;
                  (J) the capability of the applicant to 
                conduct interdisciplinary cybersecurity 
                research, basic and applied, such as in law, 
                economics, or behavioral sciences; and
                  (K) the capability of the applicant to 
                conduct research in areas such as systems 
                security, wireless security, networking and 
                protocols, formal methods and high-performance 
                computing, nanotechnology, or industrial 
                control systems.
          (6) Annual meeting.--The Director shall convene an 
        annual meeting of the Centers in order to foster 
        collaboration and communication between Center 
        participants.
          (7) Authorization of appropriations.--There are 
        authorized to be appropriated for the National Science 
        Foundation to carry out this subsection--
                  (A) $12,000,000 for fiscal year 2003;
                  (B) $24,000,000 for fiscal year 2004;
                  (C) $36,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
                  (D) $36,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
                  (E) $36,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.

                                  [all]