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[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


114th Congress     }                                 {    Rept. 114-10
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session       }                                 {         Part 1
======================================================================
 
                  SECURE OUR BORDERS FIRST ACT OF 2015

                                _______
                                

January 27, 2015.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

              Mr. McCaul, from the Committee on Homeland 
                   Security, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 399]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 399) to require the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to gain and maintain operational control of the 
international borders of the United States, and for other 
purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon 
with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do 
pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................    22
Background and Need for Legislation..............................    22
Hearings.........................................................    23
Committee Consideration..........................................    26
Committee Votes..................................................    26
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    30
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures    30
Congressional Budget Office Estimate.............................    31
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............    33
Duplicative Federal Programs.....................................    33
Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff 
  Benefits.......................................................    33
Federal Mandates Statement.......................................    33
Preemption Clarification.........................................    33
Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings..............................    34
Advisory Committee Statement.....................................    34
Applicability to Legislative Branch..............................    34
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation...................    34
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    60
Committee Correspondence.........................................    62
Dissenting Views.................................................    67
    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Secure Our Borders 
First Act of 2015''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; Table of contents.
Sec. 2. Reports on current border security status.
Sec. 3. Operational control of the border.
Sec. 4. Establishment of Border Security Verification Commission.
Sec. 5. Required consequence.
Sec. 6. Patrol by the Border Patrol of physical land border.
Sec. 7. Tactical flexibility.
Sec. 8. Deployment of certain aviation assets to the southern land 
border.
Sec. 9. U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer and agent 
authorization.
Sec. 10. Office of Air and Marine flight hours.
Sec. 11. Air and Marine prioritization.
Sec. 12. Border Patrol flexibility.
Sec. 13. Prohibition on actions that impede border security on certain 
Federal land.
Sec. 14. Biometric exit data system.
Sec. 15. Northern border threat analysis.
Sec. 16. Operation Stonegarden program.
Sec. 17. Sale or donation of excess personal property for border 
security activities.
Sec. 18. Reimbursement of States for deployment of National Guard to 
the southern land border.
Sec. 19. Operation of the Border Patrol.
Sec. 20. Definitions.
Sec. 21. Authorization of appropriations.

SEC. 2. REPORTS ON CURRENT BORDER SECURITY STATUS.

  (a) In General.--
          (1) Reports.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit 
        to the appropriate congressional committees, the Border 
        Security Verification Commission (BSVC), and the Government 
        Accountability Office reports that assess and describe the 
        state of situational awareness and operational control along 
        the northern and southern land borders of the United States. 
        Such reports shall include an identification of the high 
        traffic areas and the unlawful border crossing effectiveness 
        rate for each sector along the northern and southern land 
        borders of the United States that are within the responsibility 
        of the Border Patrol.
          (2) Deadlines.--The reports required under paragraph (1) 
        shall be submitted as follows:
                  (A) The first such report shall be submitted by not 
                later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
                this Act.
                  (B) During the two-year period beginning on the date 
                of the submission of such first report, such reports 
                shall be submitted every 180 days.
                  (C) During the period beginning on the date that is 
                180 days after the date of the submission of last 
                report under subparagraph (B), such reports shall be 
                submitted every 360 days.
  (b) GAO Report.--Not later than 90 days after receiving the initial 
report required under subsection (a), the Comptroller General of the 
United States shall report to the appropriate congressional committees 
and the BSVC regarding the verification of the data and methodology 
used to determine high traffic areas and the unlawful border crossing 
effectiveness rate.

SEC. 3. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE BORDER.

  (a) Securing the Border.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
gain and maintain situational awareness, and operational control of 
high traffic areas, by the date that is not later than two years after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and operational control and 
situational awareness along the southern land border of the United 
States by the date that is not later than five years after such date of 
enactment.
  (b) Required Capability Deployment.--Not later than one year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, acting through the appropriate component of the Department of 
Homeland Security, shall, at a minimum, deploy to each sector or 
region, as the case may be, of the southern border, in a prioritized, 
risk-based manner to achieve situational awareness and operational 
control of the border the following additional capabilities:
          (1) San diego sector.--For the San Diego sector, the 
        following:
                  (A) Subterranean surveillance and detection 
                technologies.
                  (B) To increase coastal maritime domain awareness, 
                the following:
                          (i) Deployable, lighter than air surface 
                        surveillance equipment.
                          (ii) Unmanned aerial vehicles with maritime 
                        surveillance capability.
                          (iii) Maritime patrol aircraft.
                          (iv) Coastal radar surveillance systems.
                          (v) Maritime signals intelligence 
                        capabilities.
                  (C) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (D) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (E) A rapid reaction capability supported by aviation 
                assets.
          (2) El centro sector.--For the El Centro sector, the 
        following:
                  (A) Tower-based surveillance technology.
                  (B) Deployable, lighter than air ground surveillance 
                equipment.
                  (C) Man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles.
                  (D) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (E) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (F) A rapid reaction capability supported by aviation 
                assets.
          (3) Yuma sector.--For the Yuma sector, the following:
                  (A) Tower-based surveillance technology.
                  (B) Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable 
                surveillance systems.
                  (C) Deployable, lighter-than-air ground surveillance 
                equipment.
                  (D) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (E) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (F) A rapid reaction capability supported by aviation 
                assets.
          (4) Tucson sector.--For the Tucson sector, the following:
                  (A) Increased flight hours for aerial detection, 
                interdiction, and monitoring operations capability.
                  (B) Man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles.
                  (C) Tower-based surveillance technology.
                  (D) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (E) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (F) Deployable, lighter than air ground surveillance 
                equipment.
                  (G) A rapid reaction capability supported by aviation 
                assets.
          (5) El paso sector.--For the El Paso sector, the following:
                  (A) Tower-based surveillance technology.
                  (B) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (C) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (D) Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable 
                surveillance systems.
                  (E) Deployable, lighter than air ground surveillance 
                equipment.
                  (F) A rapid reaction capability supported by aviation 
                assets.
          (6) Big bend sector.--For the Big Bend sector, the following:
                  (A) Tower-based surveillance technology.
                  (B) Deployable, lighter than air ground surveillance 
                equipment.
                  (C) Improved agent communications capabilities.
                  (D) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (E) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (F) A rapid reaction capability supported by aviation 
                assets.
          (7) Del rio sector.--For the Del Rio sector, the following:
                  (A) Increased monitoring for cross-river dams, 
                culverts, and footpaths.
                  (B) Improved agent communications capabilities.
                  (C) Improved maritime capabilities in the Amistad 
                Recreation Area.
                  (D) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (E) A rapid reaction capability supported by aviation 
                assets.
          (8) Laredo sector.--For the Laredo sector, the following:
                  (A) Maritime detection resources for Falcon Lake 
                region.
                  (B) Increased flight hours for aerial detection, 
                interdiction, and monitoring operations capability.
                  (C) Increased monitoring for cross-river dams, 
                culverts, and footpaths.
                  (D) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (E) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (F) A rapid reaction capability supported by aviation 
                assets.
          (9) Rio grande valley sector.--For the Rio Grande Valley 
        sector, the following:
                  (A) Deployable, lighter than air ground surveillance 
                equipment.
                  (B) Increased flight hours for aerial detection, 
                interdiction and monitoring operations capability.
                  (C) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (D) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (E) Increased monitoring for cross-river dams, 
                culverts, footpaths.
                  (F) A rapid reaction capability supported by aviation 
                assets.
          (10) Eastern pacific maritime region.--For the Eastern 
        Pacific Maritime region, the following:
                  (A) Increased cutter and boat hours and operation 
                platforms to conduct interdiction operations.
                  (B) Increased maritime signals intelligence 
                capabilities.
                  (C) To increase maritime domain awareness, the 
                following:
                          (i) Deployable, lighter than air surface 
                        surveillance equipment.
                          (ii) Unmanned aerial vehicles with maritime 
                        surveillance capability.
                          (iii) Increased maritime aviation patrol 
                        hours.
                          (iv) Coastal radar surveillance systems.
                  (D) Increased operational hours for maritime security 
                components dedicated to joint counter-smuggling and 
                interdiction efforts with other Federal agencies, 
                including the Joint Interagency Task Forces, and the 
                United States Coast Guard Deployable Specialized 
                Forces.
          (11) Caribbean and gulf maritime region.--For the Caribbean 
        and Gulf Maritime region, the following:
                  (A) Increased cutter and boat hours and operation 
                platforms to conduct interdiction operations.
                  (B) Increased maritime signals intelligence 
                capabilities.
                  (C) Increased maritime domain awareness and 
                surveillance capabilities, including the following:
                          (i) Deployable, lighter than air surface 
                        surveillance equipment.
                          (ii) Unmanned aerial vehicles with maritime 
                        surveillance capability.
                          (iii) Increased maritime aviation patrol 
                        hours.
                          (iv) Coastal radar surveillance systems.
                  (D) Increased operational hours for maritime security 
                components dedicated to joint counter-smuggling and 
                interdiction efforts with other Federal agencies, 
                including the Joint Interagency Task Forces, and the 
                United States Coast Guard Deployable Specialized 
                Forces.
  (c) Fencing and Infrastructure.--
          (1) New fencing.--Not later than 18 months after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
        shall construct, at a minimum, each of the following:
                  (A) Seven miles of double layer fencing in the Border 
                Patrol's San Diego sector in addition to such fencing 
                in existence as of the date of the enactment of this 
                Act.
                  (B) Twenty-one miles of double layer pedestrian 
                fencing in the Border Patrol's Tucson sector in 
                addition to such fencing in existence as of the date of 
                the enactment of this Act.
                  (C) Ten miles of double layer pedestrian fencing in 
                the Border Patrol's Rio Grande Valley sector in 
                addition to such fencing in existence as of the date of 
                the enactment of this Act.
                  (D) Ten miles of double layer pedestrian fencing in 
                the Border Patrol's Del Rio sector in addition to such 
                fencing in existence as of the date of the enactment of 
                this Act.
          (2) Fence repair and replacement.--Not later than 18 months 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security shall replace, at a minimum, each of the 
        following:
                  (A) Thirty-one miles of landing mat fencing with 
                bollard style fencing in the Border Patrol's San Diego 
                sector.
                  (B) Five miles of landing mat fencing with bollard 
                style fencing in the Border Patrol's El Centro sector.
                  (C) Three miles of landing mat fencing with bollard 
                style fencing in the Border Patrol's Yuma sector.
                  (D) Twenty-five miles of landing mat fencing with 
                bollard style fencing in the Border Patrol's Tucson 
                sector.
                  (E) Two miles of landing mat fencing with bollard 
                style fencing in the Border Patrol's El Paso sector.
          (3) Road construction.--Not later than 18 months after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security shall complete, at a minimum, each of the following 
        road construction projects to allow greater access for the 
        Border Patrol:
                  (A) Seven miles of road construction in the Border 
                Patrol's San Diego sector.
                  (B) Ten miles of road construction in the Border 
                Patrol's El Centro sector.
                  (C) Sixteen miles of road construction in the Border 
                Patrol's Yuma sector.
                  (D) Fifty-four miles of road construction in the 
                Border Patrol's Tucson sector.
                  (E) One hundred ninety-two miles of road construction 
                in the Border Patrol's Big Bend sector.
                  (F) Two miles of road construction in the Border 
                Patrol's El Paso sector.
                  (G) Forty-two miles of road construction in the 
                Border Patrol's Del Rio sector.
                  (H) Sixty-five miles of road construction in the 
                Border Patrol's Laredo sector.
                  (I) Fifteen miles of road construction in the Border 
                Patrol's Rio Grande Valley sector.
          (4) Road maintenance.--Not later than 18 months after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security shall complete, at a minimum, each of the following:
                  (A) Thirty-seven miles of road maintenance in the 
                Border Patrol's San Diego sector.
                  (B) One thousand two hundred miles of road 
                maintenance in the Border Patrol's Del Rio sector.
                  (C) Twenty-six miles of road maintenance in the 
                Border Patrol's Laredo sector.
                  (D) Ninety-four miles of road maintenance in the 
                Border Patrol's Rio Grande Valley sector.
          (5) New vehicle fence.--Not later than one year after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security shall complete six miles of vehicle fencing in the 
        Border Patrol's Big Bend sector in addition to such fencing in 
        existence as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
          (6) Vehicle fence replacement.--Not later than one year after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security shall replace five miles of vehicle fencing 
        with new vehicle fencing in the Border Patrol's Tucson sector 
        in addition to such fencing in existence as of the date of the 
        enactment of this Act.
          (7) Boat ramps.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
        shall complete, at a minimum, the construction of each of the 
        following:
                  (A) Eight boat ramps in the Border Patrol's Del Rio 
                sector in addition to such ramps in existence as of the 
                date of the enactment of this Act.
                  (B) One boat ramp in the Border Patrol's Laredo 
                sector in addition to such ramps in existence as of the 
                date of the enactment of this Act.
                  (C) Twenty-one boat ramps in the Border Patrol's Rio 
                Grande Valley sector in addition to such ramps in 
                existence as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
          (8) Access gates.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
        shall construct 34 access gates in the Border Patrol's Rio 
        Grande Valley sector in addition to such gates in existence as 
        of the date of the enactment of this Act.
          (9) Forward operating bases.--Not later than one year after 
        the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security shall complete, at a minimum, construction of each of 
        the following:
                  (A) One forward operating base in the Border Patrol's 
                El Paso sector in addition to such bases in existence 
                as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
                  (B) Two forward operating bases in the Border 
                Patrol's Tucson sector in addition to such bases in 
                existence as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
                  (C) Three forward operating bases in the Border 
                Patrol's Big Bend sector in addition to such bases in 
                existence as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
                  (D) Two forward operating bases in the Border 
                Patrol's Del Rio sector in addition to such bases in 
                existence as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
                  (E) Two forward operating bases in the Border 
                Patrol's Laredo sector in addition to such bases in 
                existence as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
                  (F) Two forward operating bases in the Border 
                Patrol's Rio Grande Valley sector in addition to such 
                bases in existence as of the date of the enactment of 
                this Act.
          (10) Roads.--The roads referred to in paragraphs (3) and (4) 
        shall include border roads, patrol roads, access roads, and 
        Federal, State, local, and privately owned roads.
          (11) Minimum forward operating base requirements.--The 
        forward operating bases referred to in paragraph (9) shall be 
        equipped with each of the following:
                  (A) Perimeter security.
                  (B) Temporary detention space.
                  (C) An interview room.
                  (D) Water.
                  (E) Power.
                  (F) Adequate communications, including wide area 
                network connectivity.
                  (G) Helicopter landing zone.
  (d) Carrizo Cane Eradication.--
          (1) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
                  (A) Carrizo cane is a non-native, invasive plant 
                growing along the Rio Grande River in Texas, with 
                heights of up to 27 feet tall.
                  (B) According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
                ``the [Carrizo cane] plant causes serious officer 
                safety issues and operational concerns because it 
                hampers enforcement along the [Rio Grande] river. The 
                plant also provides concealment to criminals, drug 
                smugglers, illegal aliens, and potential terrorists who 
                could use it as an advantage to enter the United States 
                illegally. The obvious officer safety hazards created 
                by this situation are of grave concern to the Border 
                Patrol and need to be remedied''.
          (2) Eradication.--The Chief of the Border Patrol shall 
        coordinate with the heads of each relevant Federal and State 
        agency to eradicate, to the greatest extent practicable, the 
        Carrizo cane plant along the Rio Grande River.
  (e) Consultation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult 
with the governors of each southern land border State and each southern 
border maritime State, representatives of the Border Patrol and U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, and relevant Federal, State, local, and 
tribal agencies that have jurisdiction on the southern land border, or 
in the maritime environment, to develop the operational plan required 
under subsection (f) and the metrics required under subsections (h), 
(i), (j), and (k).
  (f) Operational Plan.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
        shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
        BSVC, and the Comptroller General of the United States a 
        comprehensive operational plan for each of the components of 
        the Department of Homeland Security responsible for border or 
        maritime security to gain and maintain situational awareness, 
        operational control of high traffic areas, and operational 
        control along the southern land border of the United States by 
        the dates, respectively, referred to in subsection (a).
          (2) Contents of plan.--The plan required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following:
                  (A) An assessment of principal border security 
                threats, including threats relating to the smuggling 
                and trafficking of humans, weapons, and illicit drugs.
                  (B) A description of the required capability 
                deployment under subsection (b).
                  (C) A plan to analyze and disseminate border security 
                and border threat information among the border security 
                components of the Department of Homeland Security, and 
                between the Department and other appropriate Federal 
                departments and agencies with missions associated with 
                the border.
                  (D) A plan to achieve situational awareness using the 
                capabilities deployed under subsection (b).
                  (E) A plan to ensure that any new border security 
                assets will be operationally integrated with assets in 
                use by the Department of Homeland Security as of the 
                date of the enactment of this Act.
                  (F) A plan to eradicate the Carrizo cane plant, as 
                required under subsection (d).
                  (G) Lessons learned from Operation Jumpstart and 
                Operation Phalanx.
                  (H) A description of border security information 
                received from consultation with border community 
                stakeholders, including representatives from 
                agricultural and ranching organizations and business 
                and civic organizations along the northern or southern 
                land borders.
                  (I) A description of the staffing requirements for 
                all border security functions of the border security 
                components of the Department of Homeland Security.
                  (J) A prioritized list of research and development 
                objectives to enhance the security of the international 
                land and maritime borders of the United States.
                  (K) An assessment of the relationship between border 
                security operations and crossing times.
                  (L) Metrics required under subsections (h), (i), (j), 
                and (k).
                  (M) An integrated master schedule and cost estimate, 
                including lifecycle costs, for the activities contained 
                in such operational plan.
                  (N) A documented justification and rationale for 
                technology choices.
                  (O) Deployment locations.
                  (P) A timetable for procurement and deployment.
                  (Q) Estimates of operation and maintenance costs.
                  (R) An identification of any impediments to the 
                deployment of such technologies.
          (3) Classified assessment.--The assessment required to be 
        included in the report under paragraph (2)(A) may be submitted 
        in classified form, if the Secretary of Homeland Security 
        determines that such is appropriate.
          (4) Implementation.--
                  (A) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
                shall commence the implementation of the operational 
                plan under paragraph (1) not later than 30 days after 
                the submission to the appropriate congressional 
                committees of the report by the Comptroller General of 
                the United States under subparagraph (C).
                  (B) Comptroller general review.--Not later than 90 
                days after receiving the operational plan under 
                paragraph (1), the Comptroller General of the United 
                States shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
                committees and the BSVC a report on the operational 
                plan required under paragraph (1) and such 
                congressional justification.
  (g) Periodic Updates.--Not later than 180 days after the submission 
of each Quadrennial Homeland Security Review required under section 707 
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 347) beginning with the 
first such Review that is due after the operational plan is submitted 
under subsection (f), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees, the BSVC, and the 
Comptroller General of the United States an updated operational plan 
under paragraph (1) of subsection (f).
  (h) Metrics for Securing the Border Between Ports of Entry.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Chief of 
        the Border Patrol shall develop metrics, informed by 
        situational awareness, to measure the effectiveness of security 
        between ports of entry, which shall include, at a minimum, the 
        following:
                  (A) An unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate, 
                informed by situational awareness.
                  (B) A probability of detection that measures the 
                estimated total unlawful border crossing attempts not 
                detected by the Border Patrol against the unlawful 
                border crossing effectiveness rate referred to in 
                subparagraph (A).
                  (C) A weight-to-frequency rate which measures the 
                average weight of marijuana seized per seizure by the 
                Border Patrol in any fiscal year compared to such a 
                weight-to-frequency rate for the immediately preceding 
                five fiscal years.
                  (D) A situational awareness achievement metric that 
                measures the amount of situational awareness achieved 
                in each Border Patrol sector.
                  (E) An illicit drugs seizure rate which measures the 
                amount and type of illicit drugs seized by the Border 
                Patrol in any fiscal year compared to an average of the 
                amount and type of illicit drugs seized by the Border 
                Patrol for the immediately preceding five fiscal years.
                  (F) In consultation with the Office of National Drug 
                Control Policy and the United States Southern Command, 
                a cocaine seizure effectiveness rate measured as a 
                percentage that results from dividing the amount of 
                cocaine seized by the Border Patrol by the total 
                documented cocaine flow rate between ports of entry 
                along the southern land border.
                  (G) Estimates, using alternative methodologies, 
                including recidivism data, survey data, known-flow 
                data, and technologically measured data, of total 
                attempted unlawful border crossings, the rate of 
                apprehension of attempted unlawful border crossers, and 
                the inflow into the United States of unlawful border 
                crossers who evade apprehension.
                  (H) Estimates of the impact of the Border Patrol's 
                Consequence Delivery System on the rate of recidivism 
                of unlawful border crossers.
          (2) Metrics consultation.--In developing the metrics required 
        under paragraph (1), the Chief of the Border Patrol shall 
        consult with staff members of the Office of Policy at the 
        Department of Homeland Security and staff members of the Office 
        of the Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Homeland 
        Security. Such staff members may not be political appointees.
          (3) Metrics not reviewable.--The metrics required under 
        paragraph (1) may not be reviewed or otherwise amended by the 
        President, any staff employed by the Executive Office of the 
        President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Deputy 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of U.S. 
        Customs and Border Protection, or the Deputy Commissioner of 
        U.S. Customs and Border Protection before the submission of 
        such metrics to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
        BSVC, and Comptroller General of the United States, as required 
        under subsection (m). The prohibition described in this 
        paragraph does not apply to the Office of National Drug Control 
        Policy.
  (i) Metrics for Securing the Border at Ports of Entry.--
          (1)  In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the 
        Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations in 
        U.S. Customs and Border Protection shall develop metrics, 
        informed by situational awareness, to measure the effectiveness 
        of security at ports of entry, which shall include, at a 
        minimum, the following:
                  (A) An inadmissible border crossing rate which 
                measures the number of known inadmissible border 
                crossers who are denied entry, excluding those border 
                crossers who voluntarily withdraw their applications 
                for admission, divided by the total estimated number of 
                inadmissible border crossers who attempt entry.
                  (B) An illicit drugs seizure rate which measures the 
                amount and type of illicit drugs seized by the Office 
                of Field Operations of U.S. Customs and Border 
                Protection in any fiscal year compared to an average of 
                the amount and type of illicit drugs seized by U.S. 
                Customs and Border Protection for the immediately 
                preceding five fiscal years.
                  (C) In consultation with the Office of National Drug 
                Control Policy and the United States Southern Command, 
                a cocaine seizure effectiveness rate measured as a 
                percentage that results from dividing the amount of 
                cocaine seized by the Office of Field Operations of 
                U.S. Customs and Border Protection by the total 
                documented cocaine flow rate at ports of entry along 
                the southern land border.
                  (D) Estimates, using alternative methodologies, 
                including survey data and randomized secondary 
                screening data, of total attempted inadmissible border 
                crossers, the rate of apprehension of attempted 
                inadmissible border crossers, and the inflow into the 
                United States of inadmissible border crossers who evade 
                apprehension.
                  (E) The number of infractions related to personnel 
                and cargo committed by major violators who are 
                apprehended by the Office of Field Operations of U.S. 
                Customs and Border Protection at ports of entry, and 
                the estimated number of such infractions committed by 
                major violators who are not apprehended.
                  (F) A measurement of how border security operations 
                affect crossing times.
                  (G) The amount and type of illicit drugs seized by 
                the Office of Field Operations of U.S. Customs and 
                Border Protection at United States seaports during the 
                previous fiscal year.
                  (H) A cargo scanning rate that measures the number of 
                cargo containers scanned by the Office of Field 
                Operations of U.S. Customs and Border Protection at 
                each United States seaport during the previous fiscal 
                year against the total number of cargo containers 
                entering the United States at each seaport during the 
                previous fiscal year.
          (2) Metrics consultation.--In developing the metrics required 
        under paragraph (1), the Assistant Commissioner for the Office 
        of Field Operations shall consult with staff members of the 
        Office of Policy at the Department of Homeland Security and 
        staff members of the Office of the Chief Financial Officer of 
        the Department of Homeland Security. Such staff members may not 
        be political appointees.
          (3) Metrics not reviewable.--The metrics required under 
        paragraph (1) may not be reviewed or otherwise amended by the 
        President, any staff employed by the Executive Office of the 
        President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Deputy 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of U.S. 
        Customs and Border Protection, or the Deputy Commissioner of 
        U.S. Customs and Border Protection before the submission of 
        such metrics to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
        BSVC, and the Comptroller General of the United States, as 
        required under subsection (m). The prohibition described in 
        this paragraph does not apply to the Office of National Drug 
        Control Policy.
  (j) Metrics for Securing the Maritime Border.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the 
        Commandant of the United States Coast Guard and the Assistant 
        Commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine for U.S. Customs 
        and Border Protection shall jointly implement metrics, informed 
        by situational awareness, to measure the effectiveness of 
        security in the maritime environment, which shall include, at a 
        minimum, the following:
                  (A) An estimate of the total number of undocumented 
                migrants the Department of Homeland Security's maritime 
                security components fail to interdict.
                  (B) An undocumented migrant interdiction rate which 
                measures the flow of undocumented migrants interdicted 
                against the total estimated number of undocumented 
                migrants the Department of Homeland Security's maritime 
                security components fail to interdict.
                  (C) An illicit drugs removal rate which measures the 
                amount and type of illicit drugs removed by the 
                Department of Homeland Security's maritime security 
                components inside a transit zone in any fiscal year 
                compared to an average of the amount and type of 
                illicit drugs removed by the Department of Homeland 
                Security's maritime security components inside a 
                transit zone for the immediately preceding five fiscal 
                years.
                  (D) An illicit drugs removal rate which measures the 
                amount and type of illicit drugs removed by the 
                Department of Homeland Security's maritime security 
                components outside a transit zone in any fiscal year 
                compared to an average of the amount and type of 
                illicit drugs removed by the Department of Homeland 
                Security's maritime security components outside a 
                transit zone for the immediately preceding five fiscal 
                years.
                  (E) A cocaine removal effectiveness rate inside a 
                transit zone.
                  (F) A cocaine removal effectiveness rate outside a 
                transit zone.
                  (G) A response rate which measures the ability of the 
                maritime security components of the Department of 
                Homeland Security to respond to and resolve known 
                maritime threats, both inside and outside a transit 
                zone, by placing assets on-scene, compared to the total 
                number of events with respect to which the Department 
                has known threat information.
          (2) Metrics consultation.--In developing the metrics required 
        under paragraph (1), the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the 
        Assistant Commissioner for Air and Marine shall consult with 
        staff members of the Office of Policy at the Department of 
        Homeland Security and staff members of the Office of the Chief 
        Financial Officer of the Department of Homeland Security. Such 
        staff members may not be political appointees.
          (3) Metrics not reviewable.--The metrics required under 
        paragraph (1) may not be reviewed or otherwise amended by the 
        President, any staff employed by the Executive Office of the 
        President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Deputy 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of U.S. 
        Customs and Border Protection, or the Deputy Commissioner of 
        U.S. Customs and Border Protection before the submission of 
        such metrics to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
        BSVC, and the Comptroller General of the United States, as 
        required under subsection (m). The prohibition described in 
        this paragraph does not apply to the Office of National Drug 
        Control Policy.
  (k) Air and Marine Security Metrics in the Land Domain.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the 
        Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine for 
        U.S. Customs and Border Protection shall implement metrics, 
        informed by situational awareness, to measure the effectiveness 
        of security in the aviation environment, which shall include, 
        at a minimum, the following:
                  (A) A requirement effectiveness rate which measures 
                U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Air and 
                Marine flight hours requirements against the number of 
                flight hours actually flown by such Office.
                  (B) A funded flight hours effectiveness rate which 
                measures the number of funded flight hours appropriated 
                to U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Air 
                and Marine against the number of actual flight hours 
                flown by such Office.
                  (C) A readiness rate which measures the number of 
                aviation missions flown by U.S. Customs and Border 
                Protection's Office of Air and Marine against the 
                number of aviation missions cancelled by such Office 
                due to weather, maintenance, operations, or other 
                causes.
                  (D) The number of subjects detected by U.S. Customs 
                and Border Protection's Office of Air and Marine 
                through the use of unmanned aerial systems.
                  (E) The number of apprehensions assisted by U.S. 
                Customs and Border Protection's Office of Air and 
                Marine through the use of unmanned aerial systems.
                  (F) The number and quantity of illicit drug seizures 
                assisted by U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office 
                of Air and Marine through the use of unmanned aerial 
                systems.
                  (G) A detailed description of how, where, and for how 
                long data and images collected through the use of 
                unmanned aerial systems by U.S. Customs and Border 
                Protection is collected and stored.
          (2) Metrics consultation.--In developing the metrics required 
        under paragraph (1), the Assistant Commissioner for Air and 
        Marine shall consult with staff members of the Office of Policy 
        at the Department of Homeland Security and staff members of the 
        Office of the Chief Financial Officer of the Department of 
        Homeland Security. Such staff members may not be political 
        appointees.
          (3) Metrics not reviewable.--The metrics required under 
        paragraph (1) may not be reviewed or otherwise amended by the 
        President, any staff employed by the Executive Office of the 
        President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Deputy 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of U.S. 
        Customs and Border Protection, or the Deputy Commissioner of 
        U.S. Customs and Border Protection before the submission to the 
        appropriate congressional committees, the BSVC, and the 
        Comptroller General of the United States, as required under 
        subsection (m). The prohibition described in this paragraph 
        does not apply to the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
  (l) Penalties for Failure To Submit Metrics.--
          (1) In general.--If any of the officials referred to in 
        subsection (h), (i), (j), or (k) fail to meet any of the 
        deadlines required under any of such subsections, no political 
        appointee of the Department of Homeland Security may perform 
        any function described in paragraph (2) until all such 
        officials have met all of such deadlines.
          (2) Functions described.--The functions described in this 
        paragraph are the following:
                  (A) Travel using Government aircraft.
                  (B) Receipt of any non-essential training.
                  (C) Receipt of bonus pay, excluding overtime pay.
                  (D) Receipt of any salary increase.
  (m) Evaluation by the Government Accountability Office.--
          (1) In general.--The metrics required under subsections (h), 
        (i), (j), and (k) shall be made available to the appropriate 
        congressional committees, the BSVC, and the Comptroller General 
        of the United States, together with the data and methodology 
        used to develop such metrics.
          (2) Report.--Not later than 270 days after receiving the data 
        and methodology referred to in paragraph (1), the Comptroller 
        General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees and the BSVC a report on the 
        suitability and statistical validity of such data and 
        methodology, and shall make recommendations to the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security for other suitable metrics that may be used 
        to measure the effectiveness of border security. Such report 
        shall inform the BSVC in reviewing the notifications required 
        under subsection (n)(2).
  (n) BSVC Certification of Metrics and Operational Control.--
          (1) Secretary of homeland security notifications.--
                  (A) Two years.--If the Secretary of Homeland Security 
                determines that situational awareness and operational 
                control of high traffic areas have been achieved by the 
                date that is not later than two years after the date of 
                the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall, under 
                penalty of perjury, submit to the appropriate 
                congressional committees and the BSVC a notification 
                that so attests.
                  (B) Five years.--If the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security determines that operational control along the 
                southern land border of the United States has been 
                achieved by the date that is not later than five years 
                after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
                Secretary shall, under penalty of perjury, submit to 
                the appropriate congressional committees and the BSVC a 
                notification that so attests.
                  (C) Annual updates.--Every year beginning with the 
                year after the Secretary of Homeland Security submits 
                the notification under subparagraph (B), if the 
                Secretary determines that operational control along the 
                southern land border of the United States is being 
                maintained, the Secretary shall submit to the 
                appropriate congressional committees and the BSVC a 
                notification that so attests.
          (2) BSVC certification.--
                  (A) Operational control reviews.--The BSVC shall 
                review the notifications of the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of 
                paragraph (1) to assess such notifications relating to 
                the achievement of situational awareness, operational 
                control, or both, as the case may be, in accordance 
                with such subparagraphs.
                  (B) Review of metrics.--Beginning with the second 
                annual submission of each of the metrics required under 
                subsection (m) and pursuant to subsections (h), (i), 
                (j), and (k) and annually thereafter until the 
                termination of the BSVC under section 4(q), the BSVC 
                shall review such metrics to assess the statistical 
                validity and methodology of the data used to implement 
                such metrics.
                  (C) Reports.--
                          (i) Operational control.--Not later than 120 
                        days after conducting a review described in 
                        subparagraph (A), the BSVC shall submit to the 
                        appropriate congressional committees a report 
                        on the results of each such review and a 
                        certification of the accuracy of the 
                        notification reviewed, in accordance with 
                        subparagraph (D).
                          (ii) Operational control not achieved.--If 
                        the BSVC determines that any notification 
                        required under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of 
                        paragraph (1) is not accurate, the BSVC shall 
                        include in the report under clause (i) an 
                        explanation of why situational awareness, 
                        operational control, or both, as the case may 
                        be, was not achieved. Such explanation shall 
                        include, at a minimum--
                                  (I) impediments incurred;
                                  (II) potential remedies; and
                                  (III) recommendations to achieve 
                                situational awareness, operational 
                                control, or both, as the case may be.
                          (iii) Metrics.--Not later than 120 days after 
                        conducting a review described in subparagraph 
                        (B), the BSVC shall submit to the appropriate 
                        congressional committees a report on the 
                        results of each such review and a determination 
                        of the accuracy of the metrics implemented 
                        under subsections (h), (i), (j), and (k).
                  (D) Operational control certification.--
                          (i) In general.--For purposes of subparagraph 
                        (C)(i), the BSVC shall certify the accuracy of 
                        a notification of the Secretary if four members 
                        of the BSVC vote that such certification is 
                        accurate.
                          (ii) Public voting.--A vote referred to under 
                        clause (i) shall be conducted in public.
                          (iii) Consultation.--Before conducting a vote 
                        referred to in clause (i), the BSVC shall 
                        consult with the governors of each southern 
                        land border State, representatives of the 
                        National Border Patrol Council, representatives 
                        of the ranching industry in each southern land 
                        border State, and relevant State and local 
                        government agencies that have jurisdiction on 
                        the southern land border.
                  (E) Metrics determination.--For purposes of 
                subparagraph (C)(iii), the BSVC shall concur in the 
                accuracy of the metrics required under subsections (h), 
                (i), (j), and (k) if four members of the BSVC vote that 
                such certification is accurate.
  (o) Failure to Achieve Operational Control.--
          (1) Penalties.--
                  (A) In general.--If the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security determines that situational awareness, 
                operational control, or both, as the case may be, has 
                not been achieved by the dates referred to in 
                subsection (n)(1) (and thus fails to submit a 
                notification to the BSVC), or if the BSVC determines 
                pursuant to subsection (n)(2) that the Secretary has 
                failed to achieve situational awareness and operational 
                control of high traffic areas or has failed to achieve 
                operational control along the southern land border by 
                such respective dates, no political appointee of the 
                Department of Homeland Security may perform any 
                function described in subparagraph (B) until the BSVC 
                certifies that the Secretary has achieved such 
                situational awareness, operational control, or both, as 
                the case may be.
                  (B) Functions described.--The functions described in 
                this subparagraph are each of the following:
                          (i) Travel using Government aircraft.
                          (ii) Receipt of any non-essential training, 
                        including conferences.
                          (iii) Receipt of bonus pay.
                          (iv) Receipt of any salary increase.
          (2) National security exception.--The Secretary of Homeland 
        Security may waive the travel prohibition in paragraph 
        (1)(B)(i) if the Secretary determines and notifies the 
        appropriate congressional committees that--
                  (A) such a waiver is in the national security 
                interests of the United States; or
                  (B) such travel is being carried out to achieve 
                operational control of the southern land border of the 
                United States.
          (3) Further action required.--If the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security determines that situational awareness, operational 
        control, or both, as the case may be, has not been achieved by 
        the dates referred to in subsection (n)(1) (and thus fails to 
        submit a notification to the BSVC), or if the BSVC determines 
        pursuant to subsection (n)(2) that the Secretary has failed to 
        achieve situational awareness and operational control of high 
        traffic areas or fails to achieve operational control along the 
        southern land border by such respective dates, the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security shall, within 180 days, submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees and the BSVC and implement 
        a revised plan to achieve situational awareness, operational 
        control, or both, as the case may be, that adopts the 
        recommendations of the BSVC referred to in subsection 
        (n)(2)(C)(ii)(III).
  (p) Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that 
includes each of the following:
          (1) A resource allocation model for current and future year 
        staffing requirements that includes optimal staffing levels at 
        all land, air, and sea ports of entry, and an explanation of 
        U.S. Customs and Border Protection methodology for aligning 
        staffing levels and workload to threats and vulnerabilities and 
        their effects on cross border trade and passenger travel across 
        all mission areas.
          (2) Detailed information on the level of manpower available 
        at all land, air, and sea ports of entry and between ports of 
        entry, including the number of canine and agricultural 
        specialists assigned to each such port of entry.
          (3) Detailed information describing the difference between 
        the staffing the model suggests and the actual staffing at each 
        port of entry and between the ports of entry.
          (4) Monthly per passenger wait times, including data on per 
        passenger processing wait times at all land, air, and sea ports 
        of entry.
          (5) A description of the infrastructure, security resources, 
        and other measures that are necessary to achieve substantial 
        reductions in the average wait times of vehicles at land border 
        ports of entry.
  (q) Adherence to Certain Standards.--The Under Secretary for 
Management of the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with 
the Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Administration of U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, shall ensure component program managers 
who are responsible for carrying out subsections (b) and (c) adhere to 
internal control standards identified by the Comptroller General of the 
United States. The Assistant Commissioner shall provide information, as 
needed, to assist the Under Secretary for Management in monitoring 
proper program management of border security programs carried out 
pursuant to such subsections.

SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF BORDER SECURITY VERIFICATION COMMISSION.

  (a) In General.--There is established a Border Security Verification 
Commission (in this Act referred to as the ``BSVC'').
  (b) Purpose.--The BSVC shall certify the accuracy of the 
notifications regarding situational awareness and operational control 
required from the Secretary pursuant to section 3(n).
  (c) Composition.--The BSVC shall be composed of--
          (1) the head of a national laboratory within the Department 
        of Homeland Security laboratory network with prior expertise in 
        border security, appointed by the President, in coordination 
        with the Speaker and minority leader of the House of 
        Representatives and the majority and minority leaders of the 
        Senate;
          (2) the head of a border security university-based center 
        within the Department of Homeland Security Centers of 
        Excellence network, appointed by the President, in coordination 
        with the Speaker and minority leader of the House of 
        Representatives and the majority and minority leaders of the 
        Senate; and
          (3) three individuals, appointed by the President, based on 
        the recommendations of the special congressional commission on 
        border security established pursuant to subsection (d).
  (d) Special Congressional Commission on Border Security.--
          (1) Establishment.--There is established a special 
        congressional commission on border security (in this subsection 
        referred to as the ``commission''). The commission shall 
        determine the criteria for making recommendations for the 
        individuals to be appointed by the President under subsection 
        (c)(3), and shall recommend not more than five individuals for 
        such appointments. The commission shall consist of--
                  (A) the Speaker and minority leader of the House of 
                Representatives;
                  (B) the majority and minority leaders of the Senate;
                  (C) the chairman and ranking member of the Committee 
                on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives; 
                and
                  (D) the chairman and ranking member of the Committee 
                on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 
                Senate.
          (2) Voting procedures.--
                  (A) In general.--The commission may make a 
                recommendation to the President concerning an 
                individual referred to in subsection (c)(3) only if 
                such recommendation is approved by a majority vote of 
                the full membership of the commission.
                  (B) Tie vote.--In the event of a tie vote of the 
                commission during its consideration of whether or not 
                to recommend an individual to the President under 
                paragraph (1), the Speaker of the House of 
                Representatives shall cast the deciding vote.
  (e) Qualifications.--The individuals referred to in subsection (c)(3) 
shall have a minimum of five years professional experience in law 
enforcement and border security.
  (f) Chair.--The BSVC shall be chaired by the individual referred to 
in subsection (c)(1).
  (g) Appointment.--The members of the BSVC shall be appointed not 
later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
  (h) Prohibition on Compensation.--Members of the BSVC may not receive 
pay, allowances, or benefits from the Federal Government by reason of 
their service on the BSVC.
  (i) Prohibition on Certain Membership.--Members of the BSVC may not 
be current Federal employees or current Members of Congress.
  (j) Security Clearances.--A member or employee of the BSVC shall 
receive an appropriate security clearance, as determined by the BSVC in 
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, that is 
commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to 
which such member or employee will be given access by reason of 
membership in or employment by the BSVC.
  (k) Meetings.--The BSVC shall meet on the call of the chairperson. 
The BSVC shall meet and begin operations not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act.
  (l) Public Hearings.--
          (1) In general.--The BSVC shall hold not fewer than two 
        public hearings each calendar year.
          (2) Witness testimony.--In holding the hearings required 
        under paragraph (1), the BSVC shall request the public 
        testimony of Federal, State, and local officials, and any 
        private citizen or organization the BSVC determines is relevant 
        to carrying out its mission.
  (m) Quorum.--Four members of the BSVC shall constitute a quorum to 
conduct business, but the BSVC may establish a lesser quorum for 
conducting hearings scheduled by the BSVC.
  (n) Rules.--The BSVC may establish by majority vote any other rules 
for the conduct of business, if such rules are not inconsistent with 
this Act.
  (o) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the membership of the BSVC shall be 
filled within 60 days and in the same manner as the original 
appointment.
  (p) Personnel Matters.--
          (1) Travel expenses.--The members of the BSVC shall be 
        allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 
        subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies 
        under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States 
        Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business 
        in the performance of service for the BSVC.
          (2) Detail of federal employees.--With the affirmative vote 
        of four of the members of the BSVC, any Federal Government 
        employee, with the approval of the head of the appropriate 
        Federal agency or congressional office, may be detailed to the 
        BSVC without reimbursement, and such detail shall be without 
        interruption or loss of civil service status, salary, benefits, 
        or privileges.
          (3) Office space and assistance.--Upon the request of the 
        BSVC, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide 
        reasonable and appropriate office space, supplies, and 
        administrative assistance.
  (q) Termination.--The BSVC shall terminate after determining the 
accuracy of the tenth annual metrics submission required under 
subsection (n)(2) of section 3.

SEC. 5. REQUIRED CONSEQUENCE.

  The Chief of the Border Patrol shall impose a consequence for each 
alien apprehended pursuant to the Border Patrol's Consequence Delivery 
System.

SEC. 6. PATROL BY THE BORDER PATROL OF PHYSICAL LAND BORDER.

  (a) In General.--The Chief of the Border Patrol shall direct agents 
of the Border Patrol to patrol as close to the physical land border as 
possible, consistent with the accessibility to such areas.
  (b) Forward Operating Base Personnel.--The Chief of the Border Patrol 
shall deploy the maximum practicable number of Border Patrol agents to 
forward operating bases along the southern land border of the United 
States to meet the requirements of this section.

SEC. 7. TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY.

  (a) Southern Land Border.--The Chief of the Border Patrol may alter 
the capability deployment referred to in subsection (b) of section 3 if 
the Chief determines, after consultation with the appropriate 
congressional committees, that the principal border security threats 
referred to in subsection (f)(2)(A) of such section require such 
alteration.
  (b) Northern Land Border.--The Chief of the Border Patrol may alter 
the capability deployment referred to in subsection (c) of section 15 
if the Chief determines, after consultation with the appropriate 
congressional committees, that the threat analysis referred to in 
subsection (a) of such section requires such alteration.

SEC. 8. DEPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN AVIATION ASSETS TO THE SOUTHERN LAND 
                    BORDER.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense, in collaboration with the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, may allocate additional aviation assets 
of the Department of Defense to the southern land border of the United 
States to assist the Secretary of Homeland Security in achieving 
situational awareness and operational control in accordance with 
section 3(a).
  (b) Additional Requirements.--
          (1) Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the BSVC 
        a plan for the Department of Homeland Security to acquire and 
        deploy aviation capabilities of the Department along the 
        southern land border of the United States.
          (2) DHS deployment.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        submission of the plan under paragraph (1), the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security shall begin acquiring and deploying to the 
        southern land border of the United States aviation capabilities 
        of the Department of Homeland Security acquired in accordance 
        with such plan.

SEC. 9. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICER AND AGENT 
                    AUTHORIZATION.

  (a) Border Patrol.--The Border Patrol shall maintain an active duty 
presence of not fewer than 21,370 full time equivalent agents.
  (b) Office of Field Operations.--The Office of Field Operations of 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection shall maintain not fewer than 23,775 
full time equivalent officers.
  (c) Office of Air and Marine.--The Office of Air and Marine of U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection shall maintain not fewer than 1,675 full 
time equivalent agents.

SEC. 10. OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE FLIGHT HOURS.

  (a) Increased Flight Hours.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
ensure not fewer than 130,000 annual flight hours of the Office of Air 
and Marine of U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
  (b) Unmanned Aerial Systems.--The Office of Air and Marine of U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection shall operate unmanned aerial systems not 
less than 16 hours per day, seven days per week.
  (c) Unmanned Aerial Systems Report.--The Office of Air and Marine of 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection shall annually submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report regarding the requirement 
referred to in subsection (b). Such report shall describe the number of 
hours the Office of Air and Marine operated unmanned aerial systems--
          (1) in a transit zone;
          (2) on a land border;
          (3) on a maritime border; and
          (4) to assist other Federal, State, local, and tribal law 
        enforcement agencies.

SEC. 11. AIR AND MARINE PRIORITIZATION.

  The Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine of U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection shall assign the greatest prioritization 
to support requests from the Chief of the Border Patrol to carry out 
the requirements of section 3(a).

SEC. 12. BORDER PATROL FLEXIBILITY.

  (a) Transfer.--The Chief of the Border Patrol may transfer Border 
Patrol agents, on a voluntary basis, to high traffic areas, as 
determined by the Chief.
  (b) Incentive Bonus.--At the discretion of the Chief of the Border 
Patrol, a Border Patrol agent may be eligible for an incentive bonus 
for any transfer carried out pursuant to subsection (a) if the Chief 
determines that such transfer is critical to the risk-based approach of 
the Border Patrol to patrolling the international borders of the United 
States.
  (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section $30,000,000 for each fiscal 
year.

SEC. 13. PROHIBITION ON ACTIONS THAT IMPEDE BORDER SECURITY ON CERTAIN 
                    FEDERAL LAND.

  (a) Prohibition on Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture.--The 
Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture shall not 
impede, prohibit, or restrict activities of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection on Federal land located within 100 miles of the United 
States border with Mexico and the United States border with Canada that 
is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior or the 
Secretary of Agriculture, to execute search and rescue operations, and 
to prevent all unlawful entries into the United States, including 
entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, 
narcotics, and other contraband through such international borders. 
These authorities of U.S. Customs and Border Protection on such Federal 
land apply whether or not a state of emergency exists.
  (b) Authorized Activities of U.S. Customs and Border Protection.--
U.S. Customs and Border Protection shall have immediate access to 
Federal land within 100 miles of the United States borders with Mexico 
and Canada that are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the 
Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture for purposes of conducting the 
following activities on such land to prevent all unlawful entries into 
the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful 
aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband 
through such international border:
          (1) Construction and maintenance of roads.
          (2) Construction and maintenance of barriers.
          (3) Use of vehicles to patrol, apprehend, or rescue.
          (4) Installation, maintenance, and operation of 
        communications and surveillance equipment and sensors.
          (5) Deployment of temporary tactical infrastructure.
  (c) Clarification Relating to Waiver Authority.--
          (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
        (including any termination date relating to the waiver referred 
        to in this subsection), the waiver by the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security on April 1, 2008, under section 102(c)(1) of the 
        Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
        1996 (8 U.S.C. 1103 note; Public Law 104-208) of the laws 
        described in paragraph (2) with respect to certain sections of 
        the international borders between the United States and Mexico 
        and the United States and Canada shall be considered to apply 
        to all Federal land under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of 
        the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture within 100 miles 
        of such international borders for the activities of U.S. 
        Customs and Border Protection described in subsection (b).
          (2) Description of laws waived.--The laws referred to in 
        paragraph (1) are limited to the Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. 1131 
        et seq.), the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 
        U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 
        U.S.C. 1531 et seq.), the National Historic Preservation Act 
        (16 U.S.C. 470 et seq.), Public Law 86-523 (16 U.S.C. 469 et 
        seq.), the Act of June 8, 1906 (commonly known as the 
        ``Antiquities Act of 1906''; 16 U.S.C. 431 et seq.), the Wild 
        and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1271 et seq.), the Federal 
        Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1701 et 
        seq.), the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act 
        of 1966 (16 U.S.C. 668dd et seq.), the Fish and Wildlife Act of 
        1956 (16 U.S.C. 742a et seq.), the Fish and Wildlife 
        Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. 661 et seq.), subchapter II of 
        chapter 5, and chapter 7, of title 5, United States Code 
        (commonly known as the ``Administrative Procedure Act''), the 
        National Park Service Organic Act (16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), the 
        General Authorities Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-383) (16 U.S.C. 
        1a-1 et seq.), sections 401(7), 403, and 404 of the National 
        Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-625, 92 Stat. 
        3467), and the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990 (16 U.S.C. 
        1132 note; Public Law 101-628).
  (d) Protection of Legal Uses.--This section may not be construed to 
provide--
          (1) authority to restrict legal uses, such as grazing, 
        hunting, mining, or public-use recreational and backcountry 
        airstrips on land under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of 
        the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture; or
          (2) any additional authority to restrict legal access to such 
        land.
  (e) Effect on State and Private Land.--This section shall--
          (1) have no force or effect on State or private lands; and
          (2) not provide authority on or access to State or private 
        lands.
  (f) Tribal Sovereignty.--Nothing in this section supersedes, 
replaces, negates, or diminishes treaties or other agreements between 
the United States and Indian tribes.

SEC. 14. BIOMETRIC EXIT DATA SYSTEM.

  (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
          (1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
        of this Act, submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
        the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
        and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
        and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate an 
        implementation plan to establish a biometric exit data system 
        to complete the integrated biometric entry and exit data system 
        required under section 7208 of the Intelligence Reform and 
        Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (8 U.S.C. 1365b), including--
                  (A) an integrated master schedule and cost estimate, 
                including requirements and design, development, 
                operational, and maintenance costs, of such a system 
                that takes into account prior reports on such matters 
                issued by the Government Accountability Office and the 
                Department of Homeland Security;
                  (B) cost-effective staffing and personnel 
                requirements of such a system that leverages existing 
                resources of the Department of Homeland Security that 
                takes into account prior reports on such matters issued 
                by the Government Accountability Office and the 
                Department of Homeland Security;
                  (C) a consideration of training programs necessary to 
                establish such a system that takes into account prior 
                reports on such matters issued by the Government 
                Accountability Office and the Department of Homeland 
                Security;
                  (D) a consideration of how such a system will affect 
                wait times that takes into account prior reports on 
                such matter issued by the Government Accountability 
                Office and the Department of Homeland Security;
                  (E) information received after consultation with 
                private sector stakeholders, including--
                          (i) the trucking industry;
                          (ii) the airport industry;
                          (iii) the airline industry;
                          (iv) the seaport industry;
                          (v) the travel industry; and
                          (vi) the biometric technology industry;
                  (F) a consideration of how trusted traveler programs 
                in existence as of the date of the enactment of this 
                Act may be impacted by, or incorporated into, such a 
                system;
                  (G) defined metrics of success and milestones;
                  (H) identified risks and mitigation strategies to 
                address such risks; and
                  (I) a consideration of how other countries have 
                implemented a biometric exit data system; and
          (2) not later than two years after the date of the enactment 
        of this Act, establish a biometric exit data system at--
                  (A) the 15 United States airports that support the 
                highest volume of international air travel, as 
                determined by available Federal flight data;
                  (B) the 15 United States seaports that support the 
                highest volume of international sea travel, as 
                determined by available Federal travel data; and
                  (C) the 15 United States land ports of entry that 
                support the highest volume of pedestrian crossings, as 
                determined by available Federal border crossing data.
  (b) Implementation.--
          (1) Pilot program at land ports of entry for non-pedestrian 
        outbound traffic.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
        in collaboration with industry stakeholders, shall establish a 
        six-month pilot program to test the biometric exit data system 
        referred to in subsection (a)(2) on non-pedestrian outbound 
        traffic at not fewer than three land ports of entry with 
        significant cross-border traffic, including at not fewer than 
        two land ports of entry on the southern land border and at 
        least one land port of entry on the northern land border. Such 
        pilot program may include a consideration of more than one 
        biometric mode, and shall be implemented to determine the 
        following:
                  (A) How a nationwide implementation of such biometric 
                exit data system at land ports of entry shall be 
                carried out.
                  (B) The infrastructure required to carry out 
                subparagraph (A).
                  (C) The effects of such pilot program on legitimate 
                travel and trade.
                  (D) The effects of such pilot program on wait times, 
                including processing times, for such non-pedestrian 
                traffic.
                  (E) Its effectiveness in combating terrorism.
                  (F) Its effectiveness in identifying visa holders who 
                violate the terms of their visas.
          (2) At land ports of entry for non-pedestrian outbound 
        traffic.--
                  (A) In general.--Not later than five years after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security shall expand the biometric exit data 
                system referred to in subsection (a)(2) to all land 
                ports of entry, and such system shall apply only in the 
                case of non-pedestrian outbound traffic.
                  (B) Extension.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
                may extend for a single two year period the date 
                specified in subparagraph (A) if the Secretary 
                certifies to the Committee on Homeland Security and the 
                Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security 
                and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on the 
                Judiciary of the Senate that the 15 land ports of entry 
                that support the highest volume of passenger vehicles, 
                as determined by available Federal data, do not have 
                the physical infrastructure or characteristics to 
                install the systems necessary to implement a biometric 
                exit data system.
          (3) At air and sea ports of entry.--Not later than five years 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security shall expand the biometric exit data system 
        referred to in subsection (a)(2) to all air and sea ports of 
        entry.
          (4) At land ports of entry for pedestrians.--Not later than 
        five years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security shall expand the biometric exit 
        data system referred to in subsection (a)(2) to all land ports 
        of entry, and such system shall apply only in the case of 
        pedestrians.
  (c) Effects on Air, Sea, and Land Transportation.--The Secretary of 
Homeland Security, in consultation with appropriate private sector 
stakeholders, shall ensure that the collection of biometric data under 
this section causes the least possible disruption to the movement of 
people or cargo in air, sea, or land transportation, while fulfilling 
the goals of improving counterterrorism efforts and identifying visa 
holders who violate the terms of their visas.
  (d) Termination of Proceeding.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, on the date of the 
enactment of this Act, terminate the proceeding entitled ``Collection 
of Alien Biometric Data Upon Exit From the United States at Air and Sea 
Ports of Departure'', issued on April 24, 2008 (73 C.F.R. 22065; DHS 
Docket No. 2008-0039).
  (e) Data-Matching.--The biometric exit data system established under 
this section shall--
          (1) require that the biometric data that is obtained for a 
        person upon entry to the United States is matched against the 
        biometric data of such person when such person exits the United 
        States;
          (2) leverage the infrastructure and databases of the current 
        entry system established pursuant to section 7208 of the 
        Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (8 
        U.S.C. 1365b) for the purpose described in paragraph (1); and
          (3) be interoperable with, and allow matching against, other 
        Federal databases that store biometrics of known or suspected 
        terrorists, and visa holders who have violated the terms of 
        their visas.
  (f) Scope.--
          (1) In general.--The biometric exit data system established 
        under this section shall include a requirement for the 
        collection of biometric exit data for all categories of 
        individuals who are required to provide biometric entry data.
          (2) Exception.--This section shall not apply in the case of a 
        citizen of the United States.
  (g) Collection of Data.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may not 
require any non-Federal person to collect biometric data pursuant to 
the biometric exit data system established under this section, except 
through a contractual agreement.
  (h) Multi-modal Collection.--In carrying out subsections (a)(1) and 
(b), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall make every effort to 
collect biometric data using additional modes of biometric technology.
  (i) Penalties for Failure to Meet Deadlines.--
          (1) Biometric exit data system.--If the Secretary fails to 
        meet any of the following requirements by the applicable 
        deadline, no political appointee of the Department of Homeland 
        Security may perform any function described in paragraph (2) 
        until the Secretary has complied with the requirement:
                  (A) The submission of the implementation plan under 
                subsection (a)(1).
                  (B) The establishment of a biometric exit data system 
                under subsection (a)(2).
                  (C) The establishment a six-month pilot program to 
                test such biometric exit data system under subsection 
                (b)(1)(A).
                  (D) The expansion of such biometric exit data system 
                under subsection (b)(2)(A).
                  (E) Any extension of the deadline for such expansion 
                authorized by the Secretary under subsection 
                (b)(2)(B)(ii).
          (2) Functions described.--The functions described in this 
        subparagraph are each of the following:
                  (A) Travel using government aircraft.
                  (B) Receipt of any non-essential training.
                  (C) Receipt of bonus pay.
                  (D) Receipt of any salary increase.
  (j) Congressional Review.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of 
the Senate reports and recommendations of the Department of Homeland 
Security Science and Technology Directorate's Air Entry and Exit Re-
Engineering Program and the reports and recommendations of the U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection entry and exit mobility program 
demonstrations.

SEC. 15. NORTHERN BORDER THREAT ANALYSIS.

  (a) In General.--Not later than six months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a northern border threat 
analysis. Such analysis, at a minimum, shall include the following:
          (1) An analysis of current and potential terrorism threats 
        posed by individuals seeking to enter the United States through 
        the northern border.
          (2) An analysis of improvements needed at ports of entry 
        along the northern border to prevent terrorists and instruments 
        of terror from entering the United States.
          (3) An analysis of gaps in law, policy, international 
        agreements, or tribal agreements that hinder the border 
        security and counter-terrorism efforts along the northern 
        border.
          (4) An analysis of unlawful cross border activity between 
        ports of entry, including the maritime borders of the Great 
        Lakes.
  (b) Classified Threat Analysis.--The threat analysis required under 
subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, if the Secretary of 
Homeland Security determines that such is appropriate.
  (c) Required Northern Border Capability Deployment.--Not later than 
18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, acting through the appropriate component of the 
Department of Homeland Security, shall, at a minimum, deploy to each 
sector of the northern border, in a prioritized, risk-based manner, the 
following additional capabilities:
          (1) Blaine sector.--For the Blaine sector, the following:
                  (A) Coastal radar surveillance systems.
                  (B) Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable 
                surveillance systems.
                  (C) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (D) Improved agent communications capabilities.
                  (E) Increased flight hours for aerial detection, 
                interdiction, and monitoring operations capability.
                  (F) Man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles.
                  (G) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (H) Modernized port of entry surveillance 
                capabilities.
                  (I) Increased maritime interdiction capabilities.
          (2) Spokane sector.--For the Spokane sector, the following:
                  (A) Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable 
                surveillance systems.
                  (B) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (C) Improved agent communications capabilities.
                  (D) Increased flight hours for aerial detection, 
                interdiction, and monitoring operations capability.
                  (E) Man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles.
                  (F) Completion of six miles of the Bog Creek road.
                  (G) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (H) Modernized port of entry surveillance 
                capabilities.
          (3) Havre sector.--For the Havre sector, the following:
                  (A) Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable 
                surveillance systems.
                  (B) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (C) Improved agent communications capabilities.
                  (D) Increased flight hours for aerial detection, 
                interdiction, and monitoring operations capability.
                  (E) Man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles.
                  (F) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (G) Modernized port of entry surveillance 
                capabilities.
          (4) Grand forks sector.--For the Grand Forks sector, the 
        following:
                  (A) Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable 
                surveillance systems.
                  (B) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (C) Improved agent communications capabilities.
                  (D) Increased flight hours for aerial detection, 
                interdiction, and monitoring operations capability.
                  (E) Man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles.
                  (F) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (G) Modernized port of entry surveillance 
                capabilities.
          (5) Detroit sector.--For the Detroit sector, the following:
                  (A) Coastal radar surveillance systems.
                  (B) Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable 
                surveillance systems.
                  (C) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (D) Improved agent communications capabilities.
                  (E) Increased flight hours for aerial detection, 
                interdiction, and monitoring operations capability.
                  (F) Man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles.
                  (G) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (H) Modernized port of entry surveillance 
                capabilities.
                  (I) Increased maritime interdiction capabilities.
          (6) Buffalo sector.--For the Buffalo sector, the following:
                  (A) Coastal radar surveillance systems.
                  (B) Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable 
                surveillance systems.
                  (C) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (D) Improved agent communications capabilities.
                  (E) Increased flight hours for aerial detection, 
                interdiction, and monitoring operations capability.
                  (F) Man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles.
                  (G) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (H) Modernized port of entry surveillance 
                capabilities.
                  (I) Increased maritime interdiction capabilities.
          (7) Swanton sector.--For the Swanton sector, the following:
                  (A) Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable 
                surveillance systems.
                  (B) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (C) Improved agent communications capabilities.
                  (D) Increased flight hours for aerial detection, 
                interdiction, and monitoring operations capability.
                  (E) Man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles.
                  (F) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (G) Modernized port of entry surveillance 
                capabilities.
          (8) Houlton sector.--For the Houlton sector, the following:
                  (A) Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable 
                surveillance systems.
                  (B) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.
                  (C) Improved agent communications capabilities.
                  (D) Increased flight hours for aerial detection, 
                interdiction, and monitoring operations capability.
                  (E) Man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles.
                  (F) Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities.
                  (G) Modernized port of entry surveillance 
                capabilities.
  (d) Adherence to Certain Standards.--The Under Secretary for 
Management of the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with 
the Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Administration of U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, shall ensure component program managers 
who are responsible for carrying out this section adhere to internal 
control standards identified by the Comptroller General of the United 
States. The Assistant Commissioner shall provide information, as 
needed, to assist the Under Secretary for Management in monitoring 
proper program management of border security programs carried out 
pursuant to this section.

SEC. 16. OPERATION STONEGARDEN PROGRAM.

  (a) In General.--Title XX of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
U.S.C. 601 et seq.) is amended by adding the following new subtitle:

                   ``Subtitle C--Other Grant Programs

``SEC. 2031. OPERATION STONEGARDEN.

  ``(a) Establishment.--There is established in the Department a 
program to be known as `Operation Stonegarden'. Under such program, the 
Secretary, acting through the Administrator, shall make grants to 
eligible law enforcement agencies to enhance border security in 
accordance with this section.
  ``(b) Eligible Recipients.--To be eligible to receive a grant under 
this section, a law enforcement agency shall--
          ``(1) be located in--
                  ``(A) a State bordering either Canada or Mexico; or
                  ``(B) a State or territory with a maritime border; 
                and
          ``(2) be involved in an active ongoing U.S. Customs and 
        Border Protection operation coordinated through a sector 
        office.
  ``(c) Permitted Uses.--The recipient of a grant under this section 
may use the grant for any of the following activities:
          ``(1) Equipment, including maintenance and sustainment costs.
          ``(2) Personnel, including overtime and backfill, in support 
        of enhanced border law enforcement activities.
          ``(3) Any activity permitted under the Department of Homeland 
        Security's Fiscal Year 2014 Funding Opportunity Announcement 
        for Operation Stonegarden.
          ``(4) Any other appropriate activity, as determined by the 
        Administrator.
  ``(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $110,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2015 through 2019 
for grants under this section.
  ``(e) Report.--The Administrator shall annually submit to the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate 
and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives 
a report containing information on the expenditure of grants made under 
this section by each grant recipient.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of 
such Act is amended by inserting after the items relating to subtitle B 
of title XX the following new items:

                   ``Subtitle C--Other Grant Programs

``Sec. 2031. Operation Stonegarden.''.

SEC. 17. SALE OR DONATION OF EXCESS PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR BORDER 
                    SECURITY ACTIVITIES.

  Section 2576a of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a)--
                  (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``counter-drug 
                and counter-terrorism activities'' and inserting 
                ``counterdrug, counterterrorism, and border security 
                activities''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Attorney 
                General and the Director of National Drug Control 
                Policy'' and inserting ``the Attorney General, the 
                Director of National Drug Control Policy, and the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security, as appropriate.''; and
          (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``counter-drug or counter-
        terrorism activities'' and inserting ``counterdrug, 
        counterterrorism, or border security activities''.

SEC. 18. REIMBURSEMENT OF STATES FOR DEPLOYMENT OF NATIONAL GUARD TO 
                    THE SOUTHERN LAND BORDER.

  Of the amounts authorized to be appropriate pursuant to section 21, 
not more than $35,000,000 may be used for any fiscal year to reimburse 
States for the cost of the deployment of any units or personnel of the 
National Guard to perform operations and missions under State Active 
Duty status in support of a southern land border mission.

SEC. 19. OPERATION OF THE BORDER PATROL.

  The Border Patrol shall operate using intelligence-based operations 
to combat terrorist and transnational criminal threats along the 
international borders of the United States. In carrying out this 
section, the Border Patrol shall coordinate with international, 
Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement partners.

SEC. 20. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act:
          (1) Advanced unattended surveillance sensors.--The term 
        ``advanced unattended surveillance sensors'' means sensors that 
        utilize an onboard computer to analyze detections in an effort 
        to discern between vehicles, humans, and animals, and 
        ultimately filter false positives prior to transmission.
          (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on 
        Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 
        Senate.
          (3) Cocaine removal effectiveness rate.--The term ``cocaine 
        removal effectiveness rate'' means the percentage that results 
        from dividing the amount of cocaine removed by the Department 
        of Homeland Security's maritime security components inside or 
        outside a transit zone, as the case may be, by the total 
        documented cocaine flow rate as contained in Federal drug 
        databases.
          (4) Consequence delivery system.--The term ``Consequence 
        Delivery System'' means the series of consequences applied to 
        persons unlawfully entering the United States by the Border 
        Patrol to prevent unlawful border crossing recidivism.
          (5) Got away.--The term ``got away'' means an unlawful border 
        crosser who, after making an unlawful entry into the United 
        States, is not turned back or apprehended.
          (6) High traffic areas.--The term ``high traffic areas'' 
        means sectors along the northern and southern land borders of 
        the United States that are within the responsibility of the 
        Border Patrol that have significant unlawful cross-border 
        activity, informed through situational awareness.
          (7) Unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate.--The term 
        ``unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate'' means the 
        percentage that results from dividing the number of 
        apprehensions and turn backs by the number of apprehensions, 
        turn backs, and got aways. The data used by the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security to determine such rate shall be collected and 
        reported in a consistent and standardized manner across all 
        Border Patrol sectors, informed by situational awareness.
          (8) Major violator.--The term ``major violator'' means a 
        person or entity that has engaged in serious criminal 
        activities at any land, air, or sea port of entry, including 
        possession of illicit drugs, smuggling of prohibited products, 
        human smuggling, weapons possession, use of fraudulent United 
        States documents, or other offenses serious enough to result in 
        arrest.
          (9) Operational control.--The term ``operational control'' 
        has the meaning given such term in section 2(b) of the Secure 
        Fence Act of 2006 (8 U.S.C. 1701 note; Public Law 109-367).
          (10) Situational awareness.--The term ``situational 
        awareness'' means knowledge and an understanding of current 
        unlawful cross-border activity, including cross-border threats 
        and trends concerning illicit trafficking and unlawful 
        crossings along the international borders of the United States, 
        the ability to forecast future shifts in such threats and 
        trends, and the operational capability to conduct continuous 
        and integrated surveillance of the international borders of the 
        United States.
          (11) Transit zone.--The term ``transit zone'' means the sea 
        corridors of the western Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, 
        the Caribbean Sea, and the eastern Pacific Ocean through which 
        undocumented migrants and illicit drugs transit, either 
        directly or indirectly, to the United States.
          (12) Turn back.--The term ``turn back'' means an unlawful 
        border crosser who, after making an unlawful entry into the 
        United States, returns to the country from which such crosser 
        entered.

SEC. 21. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2016 
through 2025 $1,000,000,000 to carry out this Act and the amendments 
made by this Act.

                          Purpose and Summary

    The purpose of H.R. 399 is to require the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to gain and maintain operational control of 
the international borders of the United States, and for other 
purposes.

                  Background and Need for Legislation

    Our homeland security hinges in part on how well we control 
who and what enters this country. A porous border is a conduit 
for drug smugglers and human traffickers, and a vulnerability 
terrorists may exploit. Supporting and overseeing the 
Department of Homeland Security's efforts to secure the 
Nation's borders is a principal responsibility of the Congress.
    Over ten years after the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the Department still lacks a National 
strategy to secure the borders or reliable metrics to measure 
border security progress. Since the attacks of September 11th, 
2001, Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to enhance 
border security, primarily through new investments in 
personnel, technology, and infrastructure. Despite billions of 
dollars and decades of policy debates, the border is not 
secure. Illegal entries into this country continue at an 
astounding pace, and criminal enterprises have continued to 
exploit our weaknesses to get drugs, weapons, and other illicit 
goods into our communities.
    The Committee believes that operational control must be 
achieved through smart deployments of technology and 
infrastructure and progress must be assessed using robust 
border security performance measures. The required operational 
plan should be a roadmap to enable the Department to achieve 
requirements set forth in the legislation.
    Achieving situational awareness and operational control 
must be based on a solid understanding of the border landscape, 
particularly as relates to illegal border crossings and 
trafficking of contraband. Increases in situational awareness 
through the use of sophisticated technologies and other means 
should give the Department an ability to predict and identify 
changes in illegal activity and respond accordingly. Gaining 
situational awareness over the vast areas of the northern and 
southern border will also increase confidence in the 
effectiveness standard the committee expects the Department to 
achieve.
    In the past, the Department has relied on incomplete or 
inconsistent measures of border security progress, such as the 
resources sent to the border or the number of people 
apprehended. The Committee believes that, going forward, border 
security progress must be assessed based on accurate, 
verifiable data. The development of border security metrics 
at--and between--the ports of entry, and in the maritime 
environment will increase confidence that the Nation's border 
security efforts are based on measurable data.
    The Committee does not agree that with the assertion that, 
``the border is more secure than ever.'' No valid statistical 
proof has ever been offered, by this administration or others, 
to verify such a statement. Therefore, the Committee is left 
with no choice but to mandate specific metrics from the 
Department, and create an independent, third party commission 
to review and verify the metrics and achievements of the 
Department.
    Rather than continue the flawed approaches of the past, 
this bill's emphasis on deploying the proper assets, planning, 
measuring, and achieving results, and a strong third party 
verification process, will help ensure the Department is on the 
path to gaining situational awareness and operational control 
of the borders.

                                Hearings

    No hearings were held on H.R. 399 in the 114th Congress. 
However, the Committee has held hearings related to issues 
examined in H.R. 399.
113th Congress
    On February 26, 2013, the Subcommittee pn Border and 
Maritime Security held a hearing entitled ``What Does a Secure 
Border Look Like?'' The Subcommittee received testimony from 
Mr. Michael J. Fisher, Chief, Border Patrol, Department of 
Homeland Security; Mr. Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Assistant 
Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; RAdm 
William D. Lee, Deputy, Operations Policy and Capabilities, 
U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Ms. 
Rebecca Gambler, Acting Director, Homeland Security and 
Justice, Government Accountability Office; and Marc R. 
Rosenblum, PhD, Specialist in Immigration Policy, Congressional 
Research Service, The Library of Congress.
    On March 20, 2013, the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 
Security held a hearing entitled ``Measuring Outcomes to 
Understand the State of Border Security.'' The Subcommittee 
received testimony from Mr. Michael J. Fisher, Chief, Border 
Patrol, Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Kevin K. 
McAleenan, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field 
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security; Mr. Mark Borkowski, Assistant 
Commissioner, Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition, 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security; and Hon. Veronica Escobar, County Judge, El Paso 
County, Texas.
    On May 21, 2013, the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 
Security held a hearing entitled ``Visa Security and Overstays: 
How Secure is America?'' The Subcommittee received testimony 
from Mr. John P. Wagner, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, 
Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mr. James A. Dinkins, 
Executive Associate Director, Homeland Security Investigations, 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security; Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director of the 
Homeland Security and Justice, Government Accountability 
Office; and Mr. Shonnie Lyon, Acting Director, Office of 
Biometric Identity Management, National Protection and Programs 
Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
    On June 23, 2013, the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 
Security held a hearing entitled ``A Study in Contrasts: House 
and Senate Approaches to Border Security.'' The Subcommittee 
received testimony from Hon. John Cornyn, Senator, State of 
Texas; Hon. Xavier Bercerra, a Representative in Congress from 
the 34th District, State of California; Mr. Jayson Ahern, 
Principal, Chertoff Group; Mr. Edward Alden, Bernard L. 
Schwartz Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; and Mr. 
Richard M. Stana, Former Director, Homeland Security and 
Justice, Government Accountability Office.
    On September 26, 2013, the Subcommittee on Border and 
Maritime Security held a hearing entitled ``Fulfilling A Key 9/
11 Commission Recommendation: Implementing Biometric Exit.'' 
The Subcommittee received testimony from Mr. John P. Wagner, 
Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field 
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security; Mr. John Woods, Assistant Director, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security; and Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland 
Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability 
Office.
    On November 19, 2013, the Subcommittee on Border and 
Maritime Security held a hearing entitled ``What Does a Secure 
Maritime Border Look Like?'' The Subcommittee received 
testimony from RADM William D. Lee, Deputy, Operations Policy 
and Capabilities, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security; Mr. Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security 
and Justice, Government Accountability Office; and Capt. Marcus 
Woodring, (Ret. USCG), Managing Director, Health, Safety, 
Security and Environmental, Port of Houston Authority.
    On February 4, 2014, the Subcommittee on Border and 
Maritime Security held a hearing entitled ``Future of the 
Homeland Security Missions of the Coast Guard.'' The 
Subcommittee received testimony from ADM Robert J. Papp, Jr., 
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security.
    On March 12, 2014, the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 
Security held a hearing entitled ``The Arizona Border 
Surveillance Technology Plan and its Impact on Border 
Security.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from Mr. Mark 
Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Technology 
Innovation and Acquisition, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Ms. Rebecca Gambler, 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government 
Accountability Office.
    On April 2, 2014, the Full Committee held a hearing 
entitled ``Taking Down the Cartels: Examining United States--
Mexico Cooperation.'' The Committee received testimony from Mr. 
James A. Dinkins, Executive Associate Director, Homeland 
Security Investigations, U.S. Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mr. John D. 
Feeley, Principal Deputy, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
U.S. Department of State; Mr. Christopher Wilson, Associate, 
Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars; and Hon. Alan D. Bersin, Assistant Secretary of 
International Affairs and Chief Diplomatic Officer, Office of 
International Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
    On April 8, 2014, the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 
Security held a hearing entitled ``Authorizing U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from Mr. 
Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 
and Mr. Daniel H. Ragsdale, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the first attempt by 
the Congress, since the HSA was enacted, to clearly delineate 
the current authorities and responsibilities of two of the 
largest law enforcement agencies in the Nation. The hearing 
focused on the Committee's authorizing legislation: H.R. 3846 
the United States U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
Authorization Act, which authorizes the border security 
functions and offices of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
including: the Office of Border Patrol, Office of Field 
Operations, Office of Air and Marine, the Office of 
Intelligence, and the Office of International Affairs; and H.R. 
4279, the United States U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement Authorization Act, which authorizes the basic 
functions and offices of U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, including: the Office of Homeland Security 
Investigations, the Office of Enforcement and Removal 
Operations, and the Office of Professional Responsibility.
    On June 24, 2014, the Full Committee held a hearing 
entitled ``Dangerous Passage: The Growing Problem of 
Unaccompanied Children Crossing the Border.'' The Committee 
received testimony from The Honorable Jeh C. Johnson, 
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; The Honorable 
W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Mr. Ronald D. 
Vitiello, Deputy Chief, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
    The Full Committee held a field hearing in McAllen, Texas 
on July 3, 2014, entitled ``Crisis on the Texas Border: Surge 
of Unaccompanied Minors.'' The Committee received testimony 
from Hon. Rick Perry, Governor, State of Texas; Mr. Kevin W. 
Oaks, Chief Patrol Agent, Rio Grande Valley Sector, Border 
Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security; Mr. Steven C. McCraw. Director, Texas 
Department of Public Safety; Mr. J. E. ``Eddie'' Guerra, 
Interim Sheriff, Sheriff's Office, Hidalgo County, Texas; The 
Honorable Ramon Garcia, Hidalgo County Judge, Hidalgo County, 
Texas; and the Most Reverend Mark J. Seitz, Bishop, Catholic 
Diocese of El Paso, Texas, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.
    On July 10, 2014, the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Management Efficiency held a hearing entitled ``The Executive 
Proclamation Designating the Organ Mountains-Desert Peaks a 
National Monument: Implications for Border Security.'' The 
Subcommittee received testimony from the Hon. Stevan Pearce, 
Representative in Congress from the 2nd District, State of New 
Mexico; Mr. Brandon Judd, President, National Border Patrol 
Council; Mr. Todd Garrison, Sheriff, Sheriff's Office, Donna 
Ana County, New Mexico; and Marc R. Rosenblum, Ph.D., Deputy 
Director, U.S. Immigration Policy Program, Migration Policy 
Institute.
    On July 16, 2014, the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 
Security held a hearing entitled ``Port of Entry 
Infrastructure: How Does the Federal Government Prioritize 
Investments?'' The Subcommittee received testimony from Mr. 
John P. Wagner, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field 
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security; accompanied by Mr. Eugene H. Schied, 
Assistant Commissioner, Office of Administration, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 
Hon. Michael Gelber, Deputy Commissioner, Public Buildings 
Service, U.S. General Services Administration; and Hon. Oscar 
Leeser, Mayor, City of El Paso, Texas.
    On December 2, 2014, the Full Committee held a hearing 
entitled ``Open Borders: The Impact of Presidential Amnesty on 
Border Security.'' The Committee received testimony from Hon. 
Jeh C. Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security.

                        Committee Consideration


    The Committee met on January 21, 2015, to consider H.R. 
399, and ordered the measure to be reported to the House with a 
favorable recommendation, amended, by a recorded vote of 18 
yeas and 12 nays (Roll No. 11). The Committee took the 
following actions:
    The following amendments were offered:

 An Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 399 offered 
by Mrs. Miller of Michigan (#1); was AGREED TO by a recorded 
vote of 18 yeas and 12 nays (Roll No. 10).

 An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to 
H.R. 399 offered by Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California (#1A); 
was NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays 
(Roll No. 5).

     Page 81, line 9, strike paragraph (9) and insert a new paragraph 
(9) entitled ``Operational Control''.

 An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to 
H.R. 399 offered by Mr. Langevin (#1B); was NOT AGREED TO by a 
recorded vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll No. 6).

     Strike section 13, redesignate the subsequent section accordingly, 
and conform the table of contents.

 An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to 
H.R. 399 offered by Mr. Vela (#1C); was NOT AGREED TO by a 
recorded vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll No. 7).

     In section 3, strike subsection (c).
     In section 3, redesignate subsections (d) through (q) as 
subsections (c) through (p), respectively, and conform all cross-
references accordingly.

 An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to 
H.R. 399 offered by Ms. Jackson Lee (#1D); was NOT AGREED TO by 
a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll No. 8).

     Page 51, line 9, strike ``The Chief of the Border Patrol'' and 
insert ``The Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the 
Commissioner for U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Chief of 
the Border Patrol''.

 An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 
offered by Mr. Higgins (#1E); was NOT AGREED TO by a recorded 
vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll No. 9).

     In section 14, add at the end a new subclause entitled ``(k) Rule 
of Construction.''

                            Committee Votes

    Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires the Committee to list the recorded 
votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments 
thereto.
    The Committee on Homeland Security considered H.R. 399 on 
January 21, 2015, and took the following votes:


On agreeing to the amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Ms. Loretta Sanchez of
 California (#1A); was NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 5). The vote
 was as follows:
Not Agreed to: 12 yeas and 18 nays.
 


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Representative                  Yea    Nay               Representative              Yea    Nay
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. McCaul, Chair............................            X   Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, Ranking      X
                                                              Member.
Mr. Smith of Texas...........................            X   Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California....     X
Mr. King of New York.........................            X   Ms. Jackson Lee......................     X
Mr. Rogers of Alabama........................            X   Mr. Langevin.........................     X
Mrs. Miller of Michigan......................            X   Mr. Higgins..........................     X
Mr. Duncan of South Carolina.................            X   Mr. Richmond.........................     X
Mr. Marino...................................            X   Mr. Keating..........................     X
Mr. Palazzo..................................            X   Mr. Payne............................     X
Mr. Barletta.................................            X   Mr. Vela.............................     X
Mr. Perry....................................            X   Mrs. Watson Coleman..................     X
Mr. Clawson of Florida.......................            X   Miss Rice............................     X
Mr. Katko....................................            X   Mrs. Torres..........................     X
Mr. Hurd of Texas............................            X
Mr. Carter of Georgia........................            X
Mr. Walker...................................            X
Mr. Loudermilk...............................            X
Ms. McSally..................................            X
Mr. Ratcliffe................................            X
                                                                                                   -------------
                                                             Vote Total:                              12     18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



On agreeing to the amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Langevin (#1B); was
 NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 6). The vote was as follows:.
Not Agreed to: 12 yeas and 18 nays.
 


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Representative                  Yea    Nay               Representative              Yea    Nay
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. McCaul, Chair............................            X   Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, Ranking      X
                                                              Member.
Mr. Smith of Texas...........................            X   Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California....     X
Mr. King of New York.........................            X   Ms. Jackson Lee......................     X
Mr. Rogers of Alabama........................            X   Mr. Langevin.........................     X
Mrs. Miller of Michigan......................            X   Mr. Higgins..........................     X
Mr. Duncan of South Carolina.................            X   Mr. Richmond.........................     X
Mr. Marino...................................            X   Mr. Keating..........................     X
Mr. Palazzo..................................            X   Mr. Payne............................     X
Mr. Barletta.................................            X   Mr. Vela.............................     X
Mr. Perry....................................            X   Mrs. Watson Coleman..................     X
Mr. Clawson of Florida.......................            X   Miss Rice............................     X
Mr. Katko....................................            X   Mrs. Torres..........................     X
Mr. Hurd of Texas............................            X
Mr. Carter of Georgia........................            X
Mr. Walker...................................            X
Mr. Loudermilk...............................            X
Ms. McSally..................................            X
Mr. Ratcliffe................................            X
                                                                                                   -------------
                                                             Vote Total:                              12     18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



On agreeing to the amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Vela (#1C); was NOT
 AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 7). The vote was as follows:.
Not Agreed to: 12 yeas and 18 nays.
 


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Representative                  Yea    Nay               Representative              Yea    Nay
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. McCaul, Chair............................            X   Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, Ranking      X
                                                              Member.
Mr. Smith of Texas...........................            X   Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California....     X
Mr. King of New York.........................            X   Ms. Jackson Lee......................     X
Mr. Rogers of Alabama........................            X   Mr. Langevin.........................     X
Mrs. Miller of Michigan......................            X   Mr. Higgins..........................     X
Mr. Duncan of South Carolina.................            X   Mr. Richmond.........................     X
Mr. Marino...................................            X   Mr. Keating..........................     X
Mr. Palazzo..................................            X   Mr. Payne............................     X
Mr. Barletta.................................            X   Mr. Vela.............................     X
Mr. Perry....................................            X   Mrs. Watson Coleman..................     X
Mr. Clawson of Florida.......................            X   Miss Rice............................     X
Mr. Katko....................................            X   Mrs. Torres..........................     X
Mr. Hurd of Texas............................            X
Mr. Carter of Georgia........................            X
Mr. Walker...................................            X
Mr. Loudermilk...............................            X
Ms. McSally..................................            X
Mr. Ratcliffe................................            X
                                                                                                   -------------
                                                             Vote Total:                              12     18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



On agreeing to the amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Ms. Jackson Lee (#1D);
 was NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 8). The vote was as follows:.
Not Agreed to: 12 yeas and 18 nays.
 


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Representative                  Yea    Nay               Representative              Yea    Nay
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. McCaul, Chair............................            X   Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, Ranking      X
                                                              Member.
Mr. Smith of Texas...........................            X   Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California....     X
Mr. King of New York.........................            X   Ms. Jackson Lee......................     X
Mr. Rogers of Alabama........................            X   Mr. Langevin.........................     X
Mrs. Miller of Michigan......................            X   Mr. Higgins..........................     X
Mr. Duncan of South Carolina.................            X   Mr. Richmond.........................     X
Mr. Marino...................................            X   Mr. Keating..........................     X
Mr. Palazzo..................................            X   Mr. Payne............................     X
Mr. Barletta.................................            X   Mr. Vela.............................     X
Mr. Perry....................................            X   Mrs. Watson Coleman..................     X
Mr. Clawson of Florida.......................            X   Miss Rice............................     X
Mr. Katko....................................            X   Mrs. Torres..........................     X
Mr. Hurd of Texas............................            X
Mr. Carter of Georgia........................            X
Mr. Walker...................................            X
Mr. Loudermilk...............................            X
Ms. McSally..................................            X
Mr. Ratcliffe................................            X
                                                                                                   -------------
                                                             Vote Total:                              12     18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



On agreeing to the amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Higgins (#1E); was
 NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 9). The vote was as follows:.
Not Agreed to: 12 yeas and 18 nays.
 


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Representative                  Yea    Nay               Representative              Yea    Nay
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. McCaul, Chair............................            X   Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, Ranking      X
                                                              Member.
Mr. Smith of Texas...........................            X   Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California....     X
Mr. King of New York.........................            X   Ms. Jackson Lee......................     X
Mr. Rogers of Alabama........................            X   Mr. Langevin.........................     X
Mrs. Miller of Michigan......................            X   Mr. Higgins..........................     X
Mr. Duncan of South Carolina.................            X   Mr. Richmond.........................     X
Mr. Marino...................................            X   Mr. Keating..........................     X
Mr. Palazzo..................................            X   Mr. Payne............................     X
Mr. Barletta.................................            X   Mr. Vela.............................     X
Mr. Perry....................................            X   Mrs. Watson Coleman..................     X
Mr. Clawson of Florida.......................            X   Miss Rice............................     X
Mr. Katko....................................            X   Mrs. Torres..........................     X
Mr. Hurd of Texas............................            X
Mr. Carter of Georgia........................            X
Mr. Walker...................................            X
Mr. Loudermilk...............................            X
Ms. McSally..................................            X
Mr. Ratcliffe................................            X
                                                                                                   -------------
                                                             Vote Total:                              12     18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



On agreeing to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mrs. Miller of Michigan (#1); was AGREED
 TO by a recorded vote of 18 yeas and 12 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 10). The vote was as follows:.
Agreed to: 18 yeas and 12 nays.
 


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Representative                  Yea    Nay               Representative              Yea    Nay
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. McCaul, Chair............................     X          Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, Ranking             X
                                                              Member.
Mr. Smith of Texas...........................     X          Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California....            X
Mr. King of New York.........................     X          Ms. Jackson Lee......................            X
Mr. Rogers of Alabama........................     X          Mr. Langevin.........................            X
Mrs. Miller of Michigan......................     X          Mr. Higgins..........................            X
Mr. Duncan of South Carolina.................     X          Mr. Richmond.........................            X
Mr. Marino...................................     X          Mr. Keating..........................            X
Mr. Palazzo..................................     X          Mr. Payne............................            X
Mr. Barletta.................................     X          Mr. Vela.............................            X
Mr. Perry....................................     X          Mrs. Watson Coleman..................            X
Mr. Clawson of Florida.......................     X          Miss Rice............................            X
Mr. Katko....................................     X          Mrs. Torres..........................            X
Mr. Hurd of Texas............................     X
Mr. Carter of Georgia........................     X
Mr. Walker...................................     X
Mr. Loudermilk...............................     X
Ms. McSally..................................     X
Mr. Ratcliffe................................     X
                                                                                                   -------------
                                                             Vote Total:                              18     12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



On ordering H.R. 399 to be reported to the House of Representatives with a favorable recommendation, as amended;
 was AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 18 yeas and 12 nays (Roll No. 11). The vote was as follows:
Agreed to: 18 yeas and 12 nays.
 


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Representative                  Yea    Nay               Representative              Yea    Nay
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. McCaul, Chair............................     X          Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, Ranking             X
                                                              Member.
Mr. Smith of Texas...........................     X          Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California....            X
Mr. King of New York.........................     X          Ms. Jackson Lee......................            X
Mr. Rogers of Alabama........................     X          Mr. Langevin.........................            X
Mrs. Miller of Michigan......................     X          Mr. Higgins..........................            X
Mr. Duncan of South Carolina.................     X          Mr. Richmond.........................            X
Mr. Marino...................................     X          Mr. Keating..........................            X
Mr. Palazzo..................................     X          Mr. Payne............................            X
Mr. Barletta.................................     X          Mr. Vela.............................            X
Mr. Perry....................................     X          Mrs. Watson Coleman..................            X
Mr. Clawson of Florida.......................     X          Miss Rice............................            X
Mr. Katko....................................     X          Mrs. Torres..........................            X
Mr. Hurd of Texas............................     X
Mr. Carter of Georgia........................     X
Mr. Walker...................................     X
Mr. Loudermilk...............................     X
Ms. McSally..................................     X
Mr. Ratcliffe................................     X
                                                                                                   -------------
                                                             Vote Total:                              18     12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                      Committee Oversight Findings

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee has held oversight 
hearings and made findings that are reflected in this report.

   New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee finds that H.R. 
399, the Border Security First Act of 2015, provides for the 
authorization of $1,000,000,000 in appropriations to enact this 
measure for each of fiscal years 2016 through 2025.

                  Congressional Budget Office Estimate

    The Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared 
by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to 
section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                  Washington, DC, January 26, 2015.
Hon. Michael McCaul,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 399, the Secure 
Our Borders First Act of 2015.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark 
Grabowicz.
            Sincerely,
                                              Douglas W. Elmendorf.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 399--Secure Our Borders First Act of 2015

    Summary: H.R. 399 would authorize the appropriation of $1 
billion for each of fiscal years 2016 through 2025 for the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to carry out a wide range 
of border security activities required by the bill. The bill 
also would authorize the appropriation of $110 million annually 
over the 2015-2019 period for Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) grants and $30 million annually to fund transfers 
of border patrol agents to new locations along the border.
    Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO 
estimates that implementing H.R. 399 would cost about $4.2 
billion over the 2015-2020 period. Pay-as-you-go procedures do 
not apply to this legislation because it would not affect 
direct spending or revenues.
    H.R. 399 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined 
in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA).
    H.R. 399 would impose a private-sector mandate, as defined 
in UMRA, on landowners if, in order to comply with provisions 
of the bill, DHS acquires property by means of condemnation. 
The cost of the mandate would be the fair-market value of the 
property taken from landowners and would depend on the location 
and size of the property. CBO expects DHS would make limited 
use of its authority to take land by condemnation and that, if 
the authority is used, the cost of the mandate in any one year 
would probably fall below the annual threshold established in 
UMRA for private-sector mandates ($154 million in 2015, 
adjusted annually for inflation).
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary effect of H.R. 399 is shown in the following table. 
The costs of this legislation fall within budget functions 750 
(administration of justice) and 450 (community and regional 
development).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   2015     2016     2017     2018     2019     2020   2015-2020
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
 
Authorization Level............................      140    1,140    1,140    1,140    1,140    1,030     5,730
Estimated Outlays..............................       15      290      620    1,000    1,120    1,135     4,180
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the 
bill will be enacted in the first half of 2015, that the 
specified amounts will be appropriated for each fiscal year, 
and that outlays will follow the historical rate of spending 
for similar activities and programs.
    H.R. 399 would authorize the appropriation of $1 billion 
annually over the 2016-2025 period for DHS to carry out many 
programs and activities aimed at increasing the security of 
U.S. borders, including the following major directives:
           Deploy tower-based surveillance technology, 
        subterranean detection technologies, radar surveillance 
        systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other assets 
        along the southern and northern U.S. borders;
           Construct or repair about 120 miles of 
        fencing, build or maintain about 1,800 miles of roads, 
        and construct 12 security bases along the southern U.S. 
        border;
           Maintain and increase, if necessary, certain 
        staffing levels for officers and agents in Customs and 
        Border Protection; and
           Increase the use of aircraft and unmanned 
        aerial systems by Customs and Border Protection.
    The bill would require DHS to carry out many of these 
activities in a prioritized, risk-based manner and to complete 
some of them within 18 months of the bill's enactment and 
others within one year of enactment. Based on the time needed 
to implement previous infrastructure improvements at U.S. 
borders, CBO expects that DHS will be unable to meet those 
deadlines for nearly all construction projects and our spending 
estimates reflect this expectation. CBO expects that attempting 
to meet all of the deadlines in the legislation would increase 
both the amounts that would have to be provided, particularly 
in the initial years following enactment, as well as the speed 
with which those funds would be spent.
    In addition, H.R. 399 would authorize the appropriation of 
$110 million annually over the 2015-2019 period for FEMA to 
make grants to state and local law enforcement agencies to 
enhance border security and $30 million annually for the border 
patrol to transfer agents to new locations along U.S. borders.
    Pay-As-You-Go considerations: None.
    Estimated impact on state, local, and tribal governments: 
H.R. 399 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in 
UMRA. State and local governments would benefit from assistance 
authorized in the bill for border activities. Any costs to 
those governments would be incurred voluntarily as a condition 
of federal assistance.
    Estimated impact on the private sector: H.R. 399 would 
impose a private-sector mandate, as defined in UMRA, on 
landowners if DHS acquires property by means of condemnation in 
the process of constructing additional fencing, roads, boat 
ramps, or operating bases along the border of the United States 
and Mexico. The cost of the mandate would be the fair-market 
value of the property taken from landowners and would depend on 
the location and size of the property. The use of condemnation 
for the construction projects would depend on several factors, 
and CBO cannot determine how often or whether the authority 
would be exercised. Therefore, the cost of the mandate is 
uncertain. However, CBO expects DHS would make limited use of 
its authority to take land by condemnation and that, if the 
authority is used, the cost of the mandate in any one year 
would probably fall below the annual threshold established in 
UMRA for private-sector mandates ($154 million in 2015, 
adjusted annually for inflation).
    Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Mark Grabowicz; Impact 
on state, local, and tribal governments: Melissa Merrell; 
Impact on the private sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
    Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

         Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, H.R. 399 contains the following 
general performance goals and objectives, including outcome 
related goals and objectives authorized.
    The performance goals and objectives of H.R. 399 are the 
requirements to achieve and maintain situational awareness and 
operational control of our Nation's borders through a strategic 
deployment of technology, fencing, and infrastructure.
    Additionally, the development of associated metrics at and 
between the ports of entry, and the maritime environment will 
inform and guide future investments in border security allowing 
the Congress to hold the Department accountable for the success 
or failure of border security operations.

                      Duplicative Federal Programs

    Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds 
that H.R. 399 does not contain any provision that establishes 
or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another 
Federal program.

   Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff 
                                Benefits

    In compliance with rule XXI of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of the rule 
XXI.

                       Federal Mandates Statement

    The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal 
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act.

                        Preemption Clarification

    In compliance with section 423 of the Congressional Budget 
Act of 1974, requiring the report of any Committee on a bill or 
joint resolution to include a statement on the extent to which 
the bill or joint resolution is intended to preempt State, 
local, or Tribal law, the Committee finds that H.R. 399 does 
not preempt any State, local, or Tribal law.

                  Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings

    The Committee estimates that H.R. 399 would require no 
directed rule makings.

                      Advisory Committee Statement

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                  Applicability to Legislative Branch

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to 
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of section 
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.

             Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation


Section 1.   Short Title; Table of Contents

    This section provides that bill may be cited as the 
``Border Security First Act of 2015.''
    This section also includes the table of contents for the 
bill.

Section 2.   Reports on Current Border Security Status

            (a) In General
    This subsection requires the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to provide a baseline report to Congress, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Border Security 
Verification Commission (BSVC) (see section 4 below) describing 
the level of situational awareness and operational control 
along the northern and southern borders of the United States. 
This report shall first be submitted 30 days after enactment, 
every 180 days within the first two years after the initial 
report, and annually thereafter.
    The Committee believes that it is vitally important for DHS 
to be open and transparent to account for the current state of 
the border as the first step on the path to achieve the 
mandates outlined in this bill. The Committee expects the 
frequency of the required reports to facilitate the necessary 
oversight to ensure steady progress is made toward the goal of 
achieving operational control.
            (b) GAO Report
    This subsection requires the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to conduct a review of the report provided by DHS 
and report to the appropriate congressional committees and the 
BSVC not later than 90 days after receiving the initial 
baseline report, regarding the verification of the data and 
methodology used to determine high traffic areas and unlawful 
border crossing effectiveness rate.
    The Committee expects the high traffic areas will consist 
of multiple sectors along the northern and southern borders. 
The GAO review of the data and methodology used by DHS in the 
baseline report is necessary to increase transparency and 
confidence in the illegal border crossing effectiveness rates 
required in this bill.

Section 3.   Operational Control of the Border

            (a) Securing the Border
    This subsection mandates that DHS achieve situational 
awareness and operational control of the high traffic areas not 
later than two years after enactment and achieve operational 
control and situational awareness along the southern land 
border not later than five years after enactment.
    The Committee expects the Department will comply with the 
mandates in this section by prioritizing the application of 
resources in subsection (b) and infrastructure in subsection 
(c) to the areas of greatest flow before applying resources to 
other sectors of the border. Further, the deadlines in this 
bill are a reflection of the time it will take to acquire, and 
deploy technology, infrastructure and move personnel to the 
high traffic sectors and then build on that progress in lower 
threat/flow areas. However, the Committee expects the 
Department to move as quickly as possible as situational 
awareness is the predicate for operational control of the 
border.
            (b) Required Capability Deployment
    This subsection requires DHS to deploy to each sector along 
the southern border, additional minimum capabilities to achieve 
situational awareness and operational control of the border.
    The Committee identifies the following resource needs to 
adequately secure the border. These capabilities are then 
evaluated and assigned in a specific risk-based, sector-by-
sector manner.
    Subterranean surveillance and detection technologies--This 
technology will provide the Border Patrol with situational 
awareness underground. The Committee believes that underground 
situational awareness is essential in stopping illicit cross-
border activity through tunnels.
    Deployable, lighter than air surface surveillance 
equipment--This technology will provide a persistent aerial 
view of the area on the border in which it is deployed. The 
Committee believes that the lighter than air surveillance is an 
important complement to aviation assets because it provides a 
more continuous picture of the region.
    Unmanned aerial vehicles with maritime surveillance 
capability--Unmanned aerial vehicles used over land differ from 
those that are used over water and the Committee believes that 
more maritime equipped UAVs are important to complement the 
manned aircraft that fly in the maritime domain because of the 
vast geographical area that must be monitored.
    Maritime patrol aircraft--Equipped with surface search 
radar and other sensors that make them well suited to identify 
illicit traffic in the maritime domain, maritime patrol 
aircraft are essential to developing situational awareness in 
the maritime domain. The Committee believes that more maritime 
patrol aircraft are necessary to obtain more persistent 
awareness because of the vast geographical area of the maritime 
domain.
    Coastal radar surveillance systems--The Committee believes 
that understanding illicit trends in the coastal regions of the 
maritime border requires persistent awareness of those regions. 
Coastal radar surveillance is important to developing that 
awareness.
    Maritime signals intelligence capabilities--Because of the 
unique challenges associated with the maritime domain, the 
Committee believes that maritime signals intelligence provides 
a significant force multiplier to the situational awareness of 
the maritime domain.
    Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities--The Committee 
understands the threat posed by low flying aircraft and 
specifically ultralight aircraft which are especially difficult 
to detect by radar. Enhanced detection capabilities for these 
aircraft are needed to minimize the threat.
    Advanced unattended surveillance sensors--The Committee 
believes that greater awareness of the remote areas of the 
border is necessary through advanced sensors which can be left 
unattended and used to identify threats and trends to which 
Border Patrol agents can respond, maximizing the efficiency of 
their operations.
    A rapid reaction capability supported by aviation assets--
The Committee expects air assets will be used to mobilize and 
deploy agents into areas where illegal activity is detected. 
The Committee firmly believes that these deployments should 
occur at the earliest point of detection to minimize the impact 
of illegal activity on border communities.
    Tower-based surveillance technology--The Committee 
identifies the need for fixed towers with sensors and radars 
that can be placed in remote regions of the border and provide 
awareness of the region by providing data back to command and 
control stations. These towers will provide more persistent 
awareness of these regions than that provided by aerial assets 
or agents on the ground.
    Man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles--The Committee 
understands the importance of the capabilities offered by 
unmanned aerial vehicles but also the limitations of larger 
UAVs that can only take off and land at certain facilities. 
Man-portable UAVs can be deployed and launched by hand to areas 
which require immediate aviation surveillance support.
    Increased flight hours for aerial detection, interdiction, 
and monitoring operations capability--The Committee understands 
the importance of aviation assets for aerial detection, 
interdiction, and monitoring operations and that increasing 
these capabilities equates to an increase in the numbers of 
hours flown in support of border operations. Understanding the 
flight limitations on many aircraft, the Committee expects that 
this will require prioritizing flight hours to support border 
security efforts.
    Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable surveillance 
systems--Because the high traffic areas of the border shift 
from region to region, the Committee realizes that not all 
surveillance systems should be permanently fixed to one region. 
This portable surveillance technology will allow Border Patrol 
to respond quickly and with the appropriate capabilities to 
shifts in threats or trends.
    Improved agent communications capabilities--In many remote 
areas of the border, communication between individual agents 
and with command and control centers is lacking. The Committee 
believes that agents deployed to these remote areas must have 
appropriate communications capabilities to ensure their 
effectiveness and safety.
    Increased monitoring for cross-river dams, culverts, and 
footpaths--The Committee understands the difficulties 
associated with border security along the Rio Grande and 
especially in monitoring the various and numerous smuggling 
routes across the river. Enhancing capabilities to monitor the 
physical cross-river paths is an important step in identifying 
and stopping illegal activity crossing the river.
    Increased cutter and boat hours and operation platforms to 
conduct interdiction operations--The maritime domain presents 
unique challenges because of the vast area in which illicit 
activities can take place. Specifically in the transit zones 
and coastal regions, more surface resources, both cutters and 
boats, are necessary to interdict this activity. The Committee 
recognizes the Coast Guard is an armed service charged with 11 
statutorily diverse missions. As such, while any deployment of 
Coast Guard assets made under this Act is to support 
situational awareness and operational control, the Committee 
acknowledges that such personnel and assets remain available to 
support all Coast Guard missions in these areas, as well as to 
respond to emergent threats elsewhere.
    Increased operational hours for maritime security 
components dedicated to joint counter-smuggling and 
interdiction efforts with other Federal agencies, including the 
Joint Interagency Task Forces, and US Coast Guard Deployable 
Specialized Forces--The Committee believes the Coast Guard's 
Deployable Specialized Forces, especially the Law Enforcement 
Detachment teams, are an important capability for border 
security because they provide interdiction resources to high 
traffic maritime regions and utilize other nations and agencies 
as force multipliers.
    The Committee expects these additional capabilities to be 
deployed in a risk-based manner, beginning with high traffic 
areas. These additional capabilities are required based on 
testimony received by the Committee, information gathered 
through site visits to the border, constituents, extensive 
meetings, and consultation with various front-line personnel 
and border security stakeholders. It is intended to align 
capabilities to terrain, personnel, technological and 
infrastructural needs of Border Patrol sectors and maritime 
regions, in order to gain operational control and situational 
awareness of the border.
            (c) Fencing and Infrastructure
    This subsection requires, on a specific sector-by-sector 
basis, a tactical infrastructure deployment of: New fencing; 
fence repair and replacement; road construction; road 
maintenance; new vehicle fencing; vehicle fence replacement; 
boat ramps; access gates; and forward operating basis.
    The Secretary shall construct new fencing in the following 
sectors: San Diego; Tucson; Rio Grande Valley; and Del Rio.
    The Committee believes additional fencing provides value in 
certain areas of border, where it can be extended to take 
advantage of adjacent terrain. While the Committee recognizes 
that fencing is not a panacea, additional double layer fencing, 
in certain sectors, will help gain operational control of the 
border, by providing the Border Patrol additional time to 
apprehend individuals attempting to cross in more densely 
populated areas.
    (2) Fence Repair and Replacement.--Not later than 18 months 
after the date of enactment, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
shall replace specific fencing at the following sectors: San 
Diego; El Centro; Yuma; Tucson; and El Paso.
    The Committee believes the replacement of outdated landing 
mat fencing, with modern bollard style pedestrian fencing, will 
provide added deterrence, increase agent safety and make it 
harder for unlawful border crossers to easily defeat existing 
ineffective fence. Landing mat fence was a cheap, effective 
option when it was installed in the mid-2000s; however, it 
should be replaced with robust pedestrian fencing, especially 
in areas where it serves as primary fencing.
    (3) Road Construction.--Not later than 18 months after 
enactment to allow greater access for the Border Patrol, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security shall complete specific road 
construction in the following sectors: San Diego; El Centro; 
Yuma; Tucson; Big Bend; El Paso; Del Rio; Laredo; and Rio 
Grande Valley.
    Access to remote areas of the border is a key challenge for 
Border Patrol agents across many sectors of the border. The 
Committee's intent is to provide agents with access roads to 
allow them to patrol remote areas of the border with more 
regularity and to increase effectiveness and response times.
    (4) Road Maintenance.--Not later than 18 months after 
enactment, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall complete 
road maintenance in the following sectors: San Diego; Del Rio; 
Laredo; and Rio Grande.
    In addition to the construction of new roads and 
infrastructure, the Committee recognizes that the maintenance 
of current roads is important to allowing access to certain 
areas of the border and will also help improve effectiveness 
and Border Patrol response times.
    (5) New Vehicle Fencing.--Not later than one year after 
enactment, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall complete an 
additional six miles of vehicle in the Big Bend sector.
    (6) Vehicle Fence Replacement.--Not later than one year 
after enactment, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
replace five miles of vehicle fencing in the Tucson sector.
    (7) Boat Ramps.--Not later than 180 days after enactment, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall complete construction 
of specified new boat ramps in the following sectors: Del Rio; 
Laredo; and Rio Grande Valley.
    The Committee understands that limited launching points are 
available to launch boats in the Rio Grande River. This has a 
detrimental impact on CBP's ability to patrol the international 
border with Mexico because without adequate launching points, 
Border Patrol agents have to trailer response boats many miles 
before being capable of responding to threats along the river.
    (8) Access Gates.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of enactment, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
construct 34 additional access gates in the Rio Grande Valley 
sector.
    Border fences are built several feet onto the United States 
side of the border which allows Border Patrol agents to conduct 
maintenance on the Mexican side of the fence. The Committee 
understands that a lack of access gates to allow Border Patrol 
agents to transit to the other side of a fence increases 
maintenance times and reduces the Border Patrol's ability to 
respond to illicit activity in a timely manner. Additional 
access gates will allow quicker access to areas of the border 
with long stretches of fencing.
    (9) Forward Operating Bases.--Not later than one year after 
the date of enactment, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
construct a specific number of Forward Operating Bases in the 
following sectors: El Paso; Tucson; Big Bend; Del Rio; Laredo; 
and Rio Grande Valley.
    The Committee believes it is important for the Border 
Patrol to patrol as close to the physical land borders as 
possible in order to protect American citizens who live near 
the border. The construction of additional forward operating 
bases will increase border security in the most remote areas of 
the border by reducing agent transit time to and from these 
locations. The Committee expects these bases will increase the 
number of patrol hours actually spent on the border and allow 
agents to respond to unlawful border crossers nearest to the 
point of illegal entry.
    (10) Roads.--This subsection specifies that roads referred 
to in this section include border roads, patrol roads, access 
roads, and Federal, State, local and privately owned roads.
    (11) Minimum Forward Operating Base Requirement.--This 
subsection requires the Forward Operating Bases described in 
this section to be equipped with certain requirements, 
including water, power, wide area network connectivity, 
temporary detention space, perimeter security, an interview 
room, and a helicopter landing zone.
    The Committee believes that Forward Operating Bases must 
meet certain minimum standards to adequately meet the needs of 
agents assigned to forward operating bases. These requirements 
ensure that agents can sustain operations in remote areas of 
the border.
            (d) Carrizo Cane Eradication
    This subsection includes findings on the safety and 
security hazards of Carrizo cane. The Carrizo cane is a non-
native invasive plant that has grown tall along the Rio Grande 
River and hampers enforcement by Border Patrol Agents. This 
subsection requires the Chief of the Border Patrol, in 
coordination with each Federal and State agency, to eradicate, 
to the greatest extent practicable, the Carrizo cane plant 
along the Rio Grande River.
    Carrizo cane is a non-native, invasive plant that grows 
along the Rio Grande River in Texas. Its unchecked growth 
provides concealment to criminals, drug smugglers, illegal 
aliens, and potential terrorists who could use it to their 
advantage to enter the United States. The Committee expects CBP 
to coordinate with relevant Federal and State agencies to 
eradicate the Carrizo cane plant along the Rio Grande.
            (e) Consultation
    This subsection requires the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to consult with each Governor representing a southern border 
state, including southern maritime border States, 
representatives of CBP and relevant Federal, State, local and 
tribal agencies that have jurisdiction on the southern border, 
in developing the operational plan and metrics described in 
this section.
    The Committee believes that stakeholder input is important 
for the Department to hear the perspectives of other relevant 
parties as they work to achieve operational control. The 
Committee expects the Secretary consult with the Governors of 
each border and southern maritime border state, and relevant 
Federal, State and tribalagency officials and to build such 
input into the development of the operational plan and metrics.
            (f) Operational Plan
    (1) In General.--This subsection requires the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the BSVC, and GAO, a comprehensive operational plan 
for each component of DHS, describing how the Department will 
meet the mandates in the bill and requirements to gain 
operational control and situational awareness not later than 
120 days after the date of enactment.
    The purpose of the operational plan is to describe in 
significant detail how the Department will operationalize the 
requirements outlined in this subsection as well as subsection 
(b) and (c) to achieve situational awareness and operational 
control of the border.
    (2) Contents of Plan--The plan shall include a border 
threat assessment, required capability deployments under 
subsection (b), a plan to analyze and disseminate threat 
information, a plan to achieve situational awareness using 
capabilities described in subsection (b), a plan to ensure any 
new assets will be operationally integrated, a plan to 
eradicate Carrizo cane as required in subsection (d), lessons 
learned from National Guard operations, a description of 
information received from consultation with border community 
stakeholders, a description of staffing requirements for all 
border security functions, a prioritized list of research and 
development objectives, an assessment of border security impact 
on crossing times, metrics required under this section, an 
integrated master schedule and cost estimates for activities 
contained in such operational plan, justification for 
technology choices, deployment locations, a timetable for 
procurement and deployment, estimates of operations and 
maintenance costs, and an identification of impediments.
    The Committee's intent is that the Department coordinates 
an operational plan that clearly outlines the role of major 
operational components with border security responsibilities 
that details how each will gain operational control and 
situational awareness in their area of responsibility. The 
Committee expects that this detailed operational plan will 
closely follow the requirements under this subsection.
    (3) Classified Assessment--The assessment of principal 
border security threats may be submitted in a classified form.
    The Committee expects that as much of the assessment as 
possible be published in an unclassified and transparent form. 
The Committee understands, however, that this assessment will 
contain sensitive information and stresses the need to balance 
properly classifying material with the need to share such 
information.
    (4) Implementation--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
shall commence the implementation of the operational plan under 
paragraph (1) not later than 30 days after the submission to 
the appropriate congressional committees of the GAO report 
required under subparagraph (C).
    Not later than 90 days after receiving the operational plan 
under paragraph (1) the GAO shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees and the BSVC a report on the 
operational plan required under paragraph (1).
    The Committee believes the Department must act in a swift, 
yet responsible manner while increasing efforts to gain 
situational awareness and operational control of the border as 
quickly as possible. The Department should not delay the 
process under the false assumption that it must wait until the 
GAO has completed its report on the operational plan.
            (g) Periodic Updates
    This subsection requires that the Operational Plan required 
under subsection (f) be updated and submitted to Congress every 
four years and not later than 180 days after the submission of 
each Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR).
    By requiring the update to follow the delivery of the QHSR, 
the Committee believes the Department will better coordinate 
the Operational Plans to gain and maintain situational 
awareness and operational control of the border with other 
strategic department guidance provided by the Department.
            (h) Metrics for Securing the Border Between the Ports of 
                    Entry
    (1) In General--The Chief of the Border Patrol is required 
to submit and implement eight separate metrics for securing the 
border between the Ports of Entry not later than 120 days after 
enactment. These metrics include: An unlawful border crossing 
effectiveness rate; a probability of detection; a weight-to-
frequency rate; a situational awareness achievement metric; an 
illicit drugs seizure rate; a cocaine seizure effectiveness 
rate; estimates of total attempted unlawful border crossings, 
the rate of apprehension of attempted unlawful border crossers, 
and the inflow into the United States of unlawful border 
crossers who evade apprehension; and estimates of the impact 
the Border Patrol's Consequence Deliver System has on the rate 
of unlawful border crossing recidivism.
    The Committee designed these metrics with insight from 
members of the Department and academic community to provide an 
objective, outcome-based perspective of the state of the border 
between the ports of entry. While there is no single metric 
that can show the totality of border security, each of these 
metrics provide a different data point to develop a more 
holistic picture of the state border security between ports of 
entry.
    The Committee believes DHS needs to develop comprehensive 
outcome-based metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of border 
security operations and to inform border security progress. DHS 
currently lacks a mechanism to effectively measure border 
security since it abandoned the use of the metric ``operational 
control'' in 2010. At the time, only 44 percent of the border 
was under some degree of ``operational control.'' Without a 
clearly-defined set of metrics, there is no means to measure 
the success or failure at our nation's borders.
    The Committee believes there is a need for additional 
outcome-based metrics to measure border security between ports 
of entry, at ports of entry, and along the maritime border. 
These metrics must be implemented consistently across all the 
departments and agencies that address border security.
    (2) Metrics Consultation--In developing the metrics 
required in this section, the Chief of the Border Patrol shall 
consult with certain staff members and offices at the 
Department of Homeland Security.
    The Committee understands that offices within the 
Department have significant expertise to offer in the 
development and calculation of metrics. The Committee expects 
that the Chief of the Border Patrol will interact with the non-
political members of these offices to develop statistically 
valid performance metrics that accurately reflect the state of 
border security.
    (3) Metrics Not Reviewable--In addition, the metrics 
described in subsection (1) may not be reviewed prior to the 
submission to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
BSVC, and GAO, by: The President; any staff employed by the 
Executive Office of the President (does not apply to Office of 
National Drug Control Policy); the Secretary of Homeland 
Security; the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security; the 
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection; or the Deputy 
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection.
    The Committee does not want the performance metrics to be 
influenced, altered, or otherwise changed by political leaders 
that may try to use this data for political purposes. The 
Committee intends that these metrics be used as an objective 
way to measure border security efforts.
            (i) Metrics for Securing the Border at the Ports of Entry
    (1) In General-CBP's Assistant Commissioner for Field 
Operations is required to develop and submit eight separate 
metrics for securing the border at the Ports of Entry not later 
than 120 days after enactment. These metrics include:An 
inadmissible border crossing rate; an illicit drugs seizure 
rate; a cocaine seizure effectiveness rate; estimates, using 
alternative methodologies, of total attempted inadmissible 
border crossings, the rate of apprehension, and the inflow of 
inadmissible border crossers who evade apprehension; the number 
of infractions related to personnel and cargo committed by 
major violators at ports of entry; a measurement of how border 
security operations affect crossing times; the amount and type 
of illicit drugs seized by the Office of Field Operations at 
each seaport; a cargo scanning rate at each seaport.
    The Committee requires these metrics with insight from 
members of the Department and as well as academic community to 
provide an objective, outcome-based perspective of the state of 
the security at the ports of entry. While there is no single 
metric that can show the totality of border security, each of 
these metrics provide a different data point to develop a more 
holistic picture of border security at the ports of entry.
    (2) Metrics Consultation--In developing the metrics 
required in this section, the Assistant Commissioner for OFO 
shall consult with certain staff members and offices at the 
Department of Homeland Security.
    The Committee understands that offices within the 
Department have significant expertise to offer in the 
development and calculation of metrics. The Committee expects 
that the Assistant Commissioner for OFO will interact with the 
non-political members of these offices to develop statistically 
valid performance metrics that accurately reflect the state of 
border security.
    (3) Metrics Not Reviewable--In addition, the metrics 
described in subsection (1) may not be reviewed prior to the 
submission to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
BSVC, and GAO, by: The President; any staff employed by the 
Executive Office of the President (does not apply to Office of 
National Drug Control Policy); the Secretary of Homeland 
Security; the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security; the 
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection; or the Deputy 
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection.
    The Committee does not want the performance metrics to be 
influenced, altered, or otherwise changed by political leaders 
that may try to use this data for political purposes. The 
Committee intends that these metrics be used as an objective 
way to measure border security efforts.
            (j) Metrics for Securing the Maritime Border
    (1) In General--The Commandant of the Coast Guard and the 
CBP Assistant Commissioner for Air and Marine are required to 
jointly submit seven separate metrics in for securing the 
border in the maritime environment not later than 120 days 
after enactment. These metrics include: An estimate of the 
total number of undocumented migrants the Department fails to 
interdict; an undocumented migrant interdiction rate; an 
illicit drugs removal rate inside a transit zone; an illicit 
drugs removal rate outside a transit zone; a cocaine removal 
effectiveness rate inside a transit zone; a cocaine removal 
effectiveness rate outside a transit zone; a maritime security 
response rate.
    The Committee designed these metrics with insight from 
members of the Department and members of the academic community 
to provide an objective, outcome-based perspective of the state 
of the border security in the maritime domain. While there is 
no single metric that can show the totality of border security, 
each of these metrics provides a different data point to 
develop a holistic picture of border security along the 
maritime border and better understand effectiveness of 
components responsible for border security.
    (2) Metrics Consultation--In developing the metrics 
required in this section, the Commandant of the Coast Guard and 
Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine shall 
consult with certain staff members and offices at the 
Department of Homeland Security.
    The Committee understands that offices within the 
Department have significant expertise to offer in the 
development and calculation of metrics. The Committee expects 
that the Commandant of the Coast Guard and Assistant 
Commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine will interact 
with the non-political members of these offices to develop 
statistically valid performance metrics that accurately reflect 
the state of border security.
    (3) Metrics Not Reviewable--In addition, the metrics 
described in subsection (1) may not be reviewed prior to the 
submission to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
BSVC, and GAO, by: the President; any staff employed by the 
Executive Office of the President (does not apply to Office of 
National Drug Control Policy); the Secretary of Homeland 
Security; the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security; the 
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection; or the Deputy 
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection.
    The Committee does not want the performance metrics to be 
influenced, altered, or otherwise changed by political leaders 
that may try to use this data for political purposes. The 
Committee intends that these metrics be used as an objective 
way to measure border security efforts.
            (k) Air and Marine Security Metrics in the Land Domain
    (1) In General--CBP's Assistant Commissioner for Air and 
Marine is required to submit seven separate metrics in for 
securing the border through the use of air assets not later 
than 120 days after enactment. These metrics include: A 
requirement effectiveness rate; a funded flight hours 
effectiveness rate; an aviation mission readiness rate; the 
number of subjects detected through the use of UAVs; the number 
of apprehensions assisted through the use of UAVs; the number 
and quantity of illicit drugs seizures assisted through the use 
of UAVs; and a detailed description of how, where, and for how 
long data images collected by unmanned aerial systems are 
collected and stored.
    The Committee designed these metrics with insight from 
members of the Department and the academic community to provide 
an objective, outcome-based perspective of the effectiveness of 
the Office of Air and Marine along the international land 
border. While there is no single metric that can show the 
totality of border security, each of these metrics provide a 
different data point to develop a more holistic picture of the 
Office of Air and Marine's effectiveness along the land border.
    (2) Metrics Consultation--In developing the metrics 
required in this section, the Commandant of the Coast Guard and 
Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine shall 
consult with certain staff members and offices at the 
Department of Homeland Security.
    The Committee understands that offices within the 
Department have significant expertise to offer in the 
development and calculation of metrics. The Committee expects 
that the Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Air and 
Marine will interact with the non-political members of these 
offices to develop statistically valid performance metrics that 
accurately reflect the state of border security.
    (3) Metrics Not Reviewable--In addition, the metrics 
described in subsection (1) may not be reviewed prior to the 
submission to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
BSVC, and GAO, by: The President; any staff employed by the 
Executive Office of the President (does not apply to Office of 
National Drug Control Policy); the Secretary of Homeland 
Security; the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security; the 
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection; or the Deputy 
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection.
    The Committee does not want the performance metrics to be 
influenced, altered, or otherwise changed by political leaders 
that may try to use this data for political purposes. The 
Committee intends that these metrics be used as an objective 
way to measure border security efforts.
            (l) Penalties for Failure to Submit Metrics
    This subsection prevents political appointees of the 
Department of Homeland Security from performing certain 
functions if any of the deadlines required under any subsection 
are not met. These functions include: Travel using Government 
aircraft; receipt of any non-essential training; receipt of any 
bonus pay, excluding overtime pay; or receipt of any salary 
increase.
    Penalties provided in the section are designed for one 
purpose: to encourage the political leadership of the 
Department to comply with the requirements of this bill as 
Congress intends. Far too often the Executive branch chooses 
not to comply with deadlines imposed by statute, and so the 
Committee has no choice but to ensure that significant 
penalties are brought to bear in that event. The Committee 
intends that the deadlines in this bill be respected by the 
Executive branch. The national security exception makes clear 
that the intent is not to prevent travel by political 
appointees to respond to events such as terrorist attacks, or 
natural disasters or travel connected to the requirement to 
achieve operational control.
            (m) Evaluation by the Government Accountability Office
    This subsection requires all metrics required under 
subsections (h), (i), (j), and (k) shall be made available to 
the appropriate congressional committees, the GAO, and the 
BSVC. This subsection also requires the GAO to submit a report 
to the appropriate congressional committees and the BSVC, not 
later than 270 days after receiving the data on the statistical 
validity of the metrics submitted by DHS, as well as make 
recommendations to the Secretary for other suitable metrics to 
measure border security effectiveness.
    The Committee understands that metrics and methodologies 
can be subject to various interpretations. While the metrics 
prescribed in this bill are designed to be objective and 
outcome-based, the Committee believes that an evaluation by the 
GAO of their statistical validity as well as recommendations 
for improvement of metrics will provide additional oversight 
and transparency to the metrics.
            (n) BSVC Certification of Metrics and Operational Control
    (1) Secretary of Homeland Security Notifications--This 
section authorizes the manner in which the Secretary of 
Homeland Security shall provide notifications to the 
appropriate congressional committees and the BSVC for 
determining whether situational awareness and operational 
control of high traffic areas have been achieved, not later 
than two years after enactment, and that operational control 
along the southwest border has been achieved by the date that 
is not later than five years after the date of enactment.
    This section also requires the Secretary to submit annual 
updates after the notification that operational control along 
the southwest border has been achieved, and make such 
notifications to the appropriate congressional committees and 
BSVC.
    The Committee understands that obtaining operational 
control and situational awareness is not a one-time event. Once 
the Department obtains full operational control and situational 
awareness of the high traffic areas and then of the entire 
border, it must sustain its border security efforts. Therefore 
the Committee believes the Secretary must continue to report 
the status of the border to Congress on an ongoing basis.
    (2) BSVC Certification--This section requires the BSVC to 
review the notifications provided by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, of operational control and situational awareness, and 
review such metrics to assess the statistical validity and 
methodology of such data.
    Not later than 120 days after conducting a review described 
in subparagraph (A), the BSVC shall submit a report on the 
results of such review certifying the accuracy of the 
notification. In addition, not later than 120 days after 
conducting the review described in subparagraph (B) the BSVC 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report to determine the accuracy of the metrics required for 
submission. If the BSVC determines that Operational Control has 
not been met, they must include in their report the impediments 
in the DHS plan, identify potential remedies, and make 
recommendations on how to achieve situational awareness going 
forward.
    The BSVC is authorized to certify the accuracy of a 
notification if four members of the BSVC vote that such 
certification is accurate. Similarly four members of the BSVC 
must concur in the accuracy of the metrics submitted to the 
BSVC for review. Before voting on whether Operational Control 
and Situational Awareness have been achieved, the BSVC must 
consult with each southern border state Governor, the National 
Border Patrol Council, and relevant State and local government 
agencies. All BSVC votes must be conducted in public.
    When the Department provides evidence of operational 
control or situational awareness of the border, the Committee 
expects the BSVC to thoroughly examine the state of the border, 
both through the evidence provided by the Department and 
through hearings, meetings with stakeholders, to determine 
whether the notification by the Department can be 
substantiated. If the BSVC does not substantiate the 
notification of the Secretary, the BSVC will provide 
recommendations to remedy any and all impediments that prevent 
the Department from achieving operational control. These could 
include organizational changes, additional authority, funding, 
or technological barriers.
            (o) Failure to Achieve Operational Control
    This section outlines the penalties for failing to achieve 
operational control of the border which are the same penalties 
for failing to implement the biometric exit data system within 
the prescribed timelines as described in Section (14), 
subparagraph (i). This section identifies the penalties as 
limitations on the ability of a political appointee of the 
Department of Homeland Security to travel using a government 
aircraft; receive non-essential training; receive bonus pay, 
excluding overtime pay; or receive any salary increase. In the 
event that travel is in the national security interests of the 
United States or is required to achieve operational control of 
the southern border of the United States, the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security may waive the travel 
prohibition after notifying Congress.
    If the Secretary determines that situational awareness, 
operational control, or both, has not been achieved by the 
dates referred to in subsection (n)(1) and thus fails to submit 
a notification to the BSVC, or if the BSVC determines pursuant 
to subsection (n)(2) that the Secretary has failed to achieve 
situational awareness and operational control, the Secretary 
must submit, within 180 days, to the appropriate congressional 
committees and the BSVC and implement a revised plan to achieve 
situational awareness and operational control that adopts the 
recommendations of the BSVC referred in subsection (n).
    Penalties provided in the section are designed for one 
purpose: to encourage the political leadership of the 
Department to comply with the requirements of this bill as 
Congress intends. Far too often the Executive branch chooses 
not to comply with deadlines imposed by statute, and so the 
Committee has no choice but to ensure that significant 
penalties are brought to bear in that event. The Committee 
intends that the deadlines in this bill be respected by the 
Executive branch. The national security exception makes clear 
that the intent is not to prevent travel by political 
appointees to respond to terrorist attacks, natural disasters 
or travel connected to the requirement to achieve operational 
control.
            (p) Reports
    This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees within 60 
days, and annually thereafter, a report including a resource 
allocation model for current and future year staffing 
requirements and an explanation of the methodology for aligning 
staffing levels and workload to mitigate threats and 
vulnerabilities; detailed information on the level of manpower 
available at all land, air, and sea ports of entry and between 
ports of entry; detailed information describing the difference 
between the staffing model and the actual staffing of each port 
of entry and between ports of entry; monthly per passenger wait 
times, including processing times, at all land, air and sea 
ports of entry; and a description of the infrastructure, 
security resources, and other measures necessary to reduce 
average vehicle wait times at land ports of entry.
    The Committee expects that the Department will continually 
review and update its staffing requirements for ports of entry 
and provide detailed information to Congress to allow proper 
oversight of CBP.
            (q) Adherence to Certain Standards
    This section requires the Under Secretary for Management of 
the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that internal 
control standards identified by the Comptroller General are 
adhered to in carrying out the capability and resource 
deployment along the southern border.
    The Committee believes that in carrying out the provisions 
of this bill, the Department should follow existing internal 
control standards to prevent fraud, waste and abuse and 
effectively expend the amounts authorized in this bill.

Section 4.   Establishment of Border Security Verification Commission

    (a) In General--This section establishes a Border Security 
Verification Commission (BSVC).
    (b) Purpose--The BSVC shall certify the accuracy of 
notifications from the Secretary regarding situational 
awareness and operational control.
    (c) Composition--The BSVC shall be composed of:
          (1) The head of a national laboratory within the 
        Department of Homeland Security laboratory network with 
        prior expertise in border security appointed by the 
        President, in coordination with the Speaker and 
        minority leader of the House of Representatives and the 
        majority and minority leaders of the Senate.
          (2) The head of a border security university-based 
        center within the Department of Homeland Security 
        Centers of Excellence network, appointed in the same 
        manner as above.
          (3) Three individuals, appointed by the President, 
        based on the recommendations of the special 
        congressional commission on border security established 
        pursuant to subsection (d).
    (d) Special Congressional Commission on Border Security.
    (1) Establishment--This section establishes a special 
congressional commission on border security (referred to in 
this section as the ``Commission''). The Commission shall 
determine the criteria for making recommendations for the 
individuals to be appointed by the President for the BSVC. The 
Commission shall recommend not more than five individuals for 
appointments.
    The Commission shall consist of the Speaker and minority 
leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and 
minority leaders of the Senate, the chairman and ranking member 
of the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
Representatives, and the chairman and ranking member of the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the 
Senate.
    (2) Voting Procedures--The section establishes voting 
procedures for the Commission to make recommendations for 
individuals to be referred to the BSVC. The Speaker of the 
House shall cast the deciding vote in the case of a tie vote.
    (e) Qualifications--This section establishes the minimum 
qualifications for individuals to be referred by the Commission 
to the BSVC. These qualifications include a minimum of five 
years professional experience in law enforcement and border 
security.
    (f) Chair--The BSVC shall be chaired by the head of the 
national laboratory described in paragraph (1) of subsection 
(c).
    (g) Appointment--Members of the BSVC shall be appointed not 
later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act.
    (h) Prohibition on Compensation--Members of the BSVC may 
not receive pay, allowances, or benefits from the Federal 
Government by reason of their service on the BSVC.
    (i) Prohibition on Certain Membership--Members of the BSVC 
may not be current Federal employees or current Members of 
Congress.
    (j) Security Clearances--A Member or employee of the BSVC 
shall receive an appropriate security clearance that is 
commensurate with the sensitivity of the information Member or 
employees of the BSVC will require access.
    (k) Meetings--The BSVC shall meet on the call of the 
chairperson and not later than 180 days after enactment of this 
Act.
    (l) Public Hearings--The BSVC shall carry out not less than 
two public hearings each calendar year and shall request public 
testimony of Federal, State, and local officials, and any 
private citizen or organization relevant to carry out its 
mission.
    (m) Quorum--This section establishes that four members of 
the BSVC shall constitute a quorum to conduct business, and may 
establish a lesser quorum for conducting scheduled hearings.
    (n) Rules--This section establishes that the BSVC may 
establish by majority vote any other rules which are consistent 
with this Act for the conduct of business.
    (o) Vacancies--This section establishes that any vacancy in 
the BSVC membership shall be filled within 60 days in the same 
manner as the original appointment.
    (p) Personnel Matters--This section establishes certain 
personnel related matters, including manner for receiving 
reimbursement for travel expenses, detail of Federal employees 
to the BSVC, and office space and supplies to assist the BSVC 
in carrying out their official duties.
    (q) Termination--This section establishes that the BSVC 
shall terminate after determining the accuracy of the seventh 
annual metrics submission required in section 3 of this bill.
    The Committee expects that the BSVC will consist of non-
partisan border security and law enforcement experts that can 
objectively evaluate the state of the border without bias from 
the Administration, Congress, or special interest groups. The 
BSVC will work transparently by conducting public hearings and 
making all votes public. While the Committee understands that 
some of the materials created by the BSVC may be classified or 
law enforcement sensitive and not releasable, the Committee 
does expect the work of the BSVC to be made available to the 
public to the greatest extent possible.
    The Committee's intent through the creation of the BSVC is 
to validate any claims by the Department that the border is 
secure and to ensure accountability and transparency throughout 
the process. The Committee is frustrated with the 
unsubstantiated comments that the border is ``more secure than 
ever'' and the BSVC is designed to take the certification of 
operational control and situational awareness out of the hands 
of the executive and legislative branches in order to bring an 
objective party into border security validation.

Section 5.  Required consequence

    This section requires the Chief of the Border Patrol to 
impose a consequence for each alien apprehended pursuant to the 
Border Patrol's Consequence Delivery System.
    The Committee believes efforts to reduce illicit border 
crossing recidivism are necessary to gain operational control 
of the border. The Committee supports the Border Patrol's use 
of a consequence delivery system to apply a consequence to each 
individual who is apprehended crossing the border illegally. 
The committee believes that voluntary return is not an 
appropriate consequence and does not deter recidivism.

Section 6.  U.S. Border Patrol of Physical Land Border

    (a) In General--This section requires the Chief of the 
Border Patrol to direct agents to patrol as close to the 
physical land border as possible, consistent with accessibility 
to such areas.
    The Border Patrol currently employs what is called a 
``defense in depth strategy,'' which instead of placing agents 
in close proximity to the border, funnels traffic to certain 
corridors preventing access to key transit points and highways, 
in some instances hundreds of miles from the border. While the 
Committee understands that such a strategy may allow the Border 
Patrol the time in certain circumstances to respond to threats, 
the Committee believes this strategy often puts residents who 
live on the border at risk, including ranchers and their 
families who have their property infiltrated by smuggling 
organizations on a regular basis. The Committee believes 
patrolling close to the border will allow for faster response 
times, and will better protect citizens along the border.
    (b) Forward Operating Base Personnel--This section requires 
the Chief of the Border Patrol to ensure that Border Patrol 
deploys the maximum practicable number of agents to forward 
operating bases along the southern land border of the United 
States to meet the requirements of this section.
    The Committee understands that the concentration of Border 
Patrol personnel near the border is limited in certain sectors, 
like Tucson, by the transit time from border patrol stations to 
the actual border, using up several hours of an agent's shift. 
Forward operating bases (FOBs) were built to address this 
challenge, and more need to be built as directed by this 
legislation, to reduce agent hours not spent on the border. The 
Committee believes that in these areas, the border patrol 
should be using intelligence driven operations consistent with 
section 19, and dedicate the maximum number of agents to patrol 
at the international boundary, instead of hundreds of miles 
away from the border. These provisions will reduce the public 
safety risk to ranchers and other residents who live and work 
along the border.

Section 7.  Tactical Flexibility

    This section authorizes the Chief of the Border Patrol to 
alter the capability deployment along the southern and northern 
borders referred to in sections 3(b) and 15(c) of this Act in 
consultation with the appropriate congressional committees if 
the principal border security threats require such alteration.
    While this legislation is prescriptive in its requirements 
for capability deployments, the Committee recognizes that 
threats along the border change, and therefore the Chief of the 
Border Patrol, as an operational commander, should have some 
flexibility altering capability deployments, in a risk-based 
manner, in order to achieve operational control. The Committee 
fully intends that this flexibility be provided to the 
operational leadership of the Border Patrol and has 
purposefully denied this flexibility to the political 
leadership of the Department.

Section 8.  Deployment of Certain Aviation Assets to the Southern Land 
        Border

    This section authorizes the Secretary of Defense, in 
collaboration with the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
allocate additional aviation assets of the Department of 
Defense to deploy to the southwest border to assist in 
achieving situational awareness and operational control.
    The section also requires the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to submit a plan to Congress and the BSVC within 180 
days, for the Department of Homeland Security to acquire and 
deploy additional aviation capabilities along the southwest 
border. Not later than 180 days after the submission of the 
plan, the Secretary shall begin acquiring and deploying 
acquired aviation capabilities to the southwest border.
    The Committee recognizes that the Department of Defense 
currently deploys aviation assets to the southwest border of 
the United States in support of Department of Homeland Security 
missions. In light of the ongoing security challenges at the 
border and during such time as may be required for the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to implement the plan required 
by subsection (b), the committee believes the Secretary of 
Defense should endeavor to maintain aviation assets allocated 
to the southwest border, consistent with the interests of 
national defense. National Guard aviation capabilities surpass 
those organic to CBP, and DOD assets should continue to be 
utilized along the border until CBP can sufficiently obtain its 
own organic capability.
    The Committee expects CBP Office of Air and Marine to 
quickly outline for both the authorizing and appropriating 
committees what it will take to develop an organic aviation 
capability to take over the role that is currently filled by 
the National Guard as well as fulfill the requirements in 
section 10.

Section 9.  U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer and Agent 
        Authorization

    This section requires the Border Patrol to maintain not 
fewer than 21,370 full time agents, the Office of Field 
Operations to maintain not less than 23,775 full time officers 
and the Office of Air and Marine to maintain not less than 
1,675 full time agents.
    The Committee intends this authorization to align with the 
current appropriated levels.

Section 10.  Office of Air and Maritime Flight Hours

    This section requires that the Office of Air and Marine 
conduct 130,000 flight hours each year with a minimum of not 
less than 16 hours of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles seven days a 
week.
    This section also requires the Office of Air and Marine to 
annually submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report which describes the number of hours the Office of Air 
and Marine (OAM) operated unmanned aerial systems in a transit 
zone, on a land border, on a maritime border, and to assist 
other Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement 
agencies.
    OAM is an essential component to achieving situational 
awareness of the border. In order to provide that situational 
awareness, however, OAM must keep its aircraft in the air as 
much as possible and maintain a high operational tempo. In 
Fiscal Year 2014, OAM assets flew only 90,700 hours, which with 
over 250 aircraft in its fleet, averages out to less than an 
hour per day for each asset. The Committee believes CBP should 
maintain a more persistent aviation presence along the border.
    The Committee is also concerned by reports from the 
Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector 
General, OIG-15-17, ``U.S. Customs and Border Protection's 
Unmanned Aircraft System Program Does Not Achieve Intended 
Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations.'' As a result, 
the Committee expects annual metrics from CBP on the 
effectiveness of the UAV program including detailed reporting 
on the number of hours UAVs are used in each domain.

Section 11.  Air and Maritime Prioritization

    This section directs the Assistant Commissioner for the 
Office of Air and Marine to prioritize the assignment of assets 
to meet requests from the Chief of the United States Border 
Patrol in gaining and maintaining situational awareness and 
operational control of the border in accordance with this Act.
    OAM often responds to support requests from various DHS law 
enforcement agencies. While the Committee believes OAM should 
continue to provide assistance to other law enforcement 
agencies, the committee also believes that obtaining and 
maintaining situational awareness and operational control 
should be the first priority of OAM.

Section 12.  Border Patrol Flexibility

    This section provides the Chief of the United States Border 
Patrol the authority to transfer Border patrol agents, 
voluntarily, to high traffic areas along the border and, at the 
Chief's discretion, to provide an incentive bonus for such a 
transfer if the transfer is determined to be critical to the 
risk-based approach of the Border Patrol in patrolling the 
international border. This section authorizes $30,000,000 to be 
appropriated each fiscal year to carry out this section.
    The committee acknowledges that the threats along the 
border are constantly changing and are never static. Previous 
border security efforts have only succeeded in shifting threats 
to other areas of the border. Transnational Criminal 
Organizations will always seek out areas of least resistance. 
The Border Patrol does not currently have the same agility to 
move personnel to address the threat.
    As a result, the Committee has authorized the Chief of the 
Border Patrol to provide incentive bonuses to permanently 
transfer agents to high-risk sectors of the border.

Section 13.  Prohibition on Actions that Impede Border Security on 
        Certain Federal Land

    This section provides U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
unimpeded access to conduct their missions on Federal land 
located within 100 miles of the U.S. border with Mexico and 
within 100 miles of the U.S. border with Canada that is under 
the jurisdiction of the Secretaries of the Interior or 
Agriculture. This section specifically provides U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection authority on this Federal land to: 
construct and maintain roads; construct and maintain barriers; 
use vehicles to patrol, apprehend, or rescue; install, 
maintain, and operate communications and surveillance equipment 
and sensors; and deploy temporary tactical infrastructure, to 
prevent illicit activities across the international land 
border.
    This section does not provide the authority to restrict 
legal uses of or access to the land under the jurisdiction of 
the Secretaries of the Interior or Agriculture and has no 
effect on and provides no specific authorities or access to 
State or private lands and does not impact treaties or 
agreements with respect to tribal sovereignties.
    The Committee remains concerned that longstanding 
disagreements between the Border Patrol and federal land 
managers within the Department of the Interior and the 
Department of Agriculture have put national security at risk. 
Currently, land management bureaus have the power to impede 
border security activities under authorities created by 
environmental laws such as the Wilderness Act and the 
Endangered Species Act. Unfortunately, these laws are used to 
restrict Border Patrol activity needed to protect these federal 
lands and control the border.
    The Committee believes the Border Patrol requires unimpeded 
access to patrol the remote landscapes found on much of the 
border. The legislation would facilitate access to federal 
lands by extending the waiver authority previously granted to 
the Department of Homeland Security and exercised to build 
portions of the border fence. This authority would only 
encompass federal land within the current jurisdiction of the 
Border Patrol, defined as 100 miles from the international 
border.

Section 14.  Biometric Exit Data System

    This section strengthens current law by establishing, 
deadlines for DHS to implement a biometric exit program 
required under section 7208 of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
    (a) Establishment--This section directs the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to submit not later than 180 days after the 
enactment of this Act to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
and to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate an 
implementation plan to establish a biometric exit data system 
to complete the integrated biometric entry and exit data system 
required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act.
    This section specifies that the implementation plan should 
include, an integrated master scheduled and cost estimate; 
cost-effective staffing and personnel requirements that 
leverage existing resources; a consideration of necessary 
training programs; a consideration of how the system will 
affect wait times; information received after consultation with 
private sector stakeholders; consideration of the impact to 
existing trusted traveler programs; defined metrics of success 
and milestones; identified risks and mitigation strategies; and 
a consideration of how other countries have implemented similar 
systems.
    This section also requires the establishment of a biometric 
exit data system at the 15 United States airports, 15 United 
States seaports, and 15 United States land ports of entry that 
support the highest volume of international travel in their 
respective domains as determined by available federal data 
within two years of the date of enactment.
    The Committee expects the Department to finally implement a 
biometric exit program, as was recommended by the 9/11 
commission and required by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act. The Committee believes that this bill 
strengthens current law by creating definitive timelines for 
completion of a biometric exit system and holds the Department 
accountable for failing to comply with the terms of the bill.
    (b) Implementation--
    (1) Pilot Program at Land Ports of Entry for Non-pedestrian 
Outbound Traffic--This section requires the Secretary of 
Homeland Security in collaboration with industry stakeholders, 
within one year after the date of enactment of this Act, to 
establish a six-month pilot program to test the biometric exit 
system on non-pedestrian outbound traffic. This pilot program 
must be implemented at no less than three significant land 
ports of entry, two on the southern border and one on the 
northern border. The pilot program shall be used to determine, 
how a nationwide implementation shall be carried out at land 
ports; the infrastructure required; the effects on legitimate 
travel and trade; the effects on wait times for non-pedestrian 
traffic; the effectiveness in combatting terrorism; and the 
effectiveness in identifying visa holders who violate the terms 
of their visas.
    (2) At Land Ports of Entry for Non-pedestrian Outbound 
Traffic--This section requires that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security expand the biometric exit data system to all land 
ports of entry, to apply to all non-pedestrian outbound 
traffic, not later than five years after enactment of this Act.
    This section provides the Secretary of Homeland Security 
authority to extend the completion date for non-pedestrian 
outbound traffic at land ports of entry for a single two year 
period if the Secretary certifies to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives and to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
Senate that the 15 land ports of entry that support the highest 
volume of passenger vehicles, do not have the physical 
infrastructure or characteristics to install the systems 
necessary to implement a biometric exit data system.
    (3) At Air and Sea Ports of Entry--This section requires 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to expand the biometric exit 
data system to all air and sea ports of entry within five years 
of enactment of this Act.
    (4) At Land Ports of Entry for Pedestrians--This section 
requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to expand the 
biometric exit data system to all land ports of entry for 
pedestrian traffic within five years of enactment of this Act.
    The Committee believes a staggered approach is necessary to 
quickly implement biometric exit, first at the highest volume 
air, land and sea ports, and then use the lessons learned to 
expand the system nationwide. The Committee believes that 
current mandates for biometric exit are being willfully ignored 
by the Executive Branch, and as a result, this bill provides 
clear direction and timelines to meet a long standing statutory 
requirement. The Committee is convinced that the technology 
exists to implement biometric exit quickly in air, sea and 
pedestrian lanes and looks forward to the completion of this 
system.
    (c) Effects on Air, Sea, and Land Transportation--This 
section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to consult 
with appropriate private sector stakeholders to minimize the 
disruption to the movement of people or cargo in air, sea, or 
land transportation while fulfilling the goals of improving 
counterterrorism efforts and identifying visa holders who 
violate the terms of their visas.
    (d) Termination of Proceeding--Not withstanding any other 
provision of law, this section requires the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to terminate the proceeding entitled 
``Collection of Alien Biometric Data Upon Exit From the United 
States at Air and Sea Ports of Departure'', issued on April 24, 
2008.
    (e) Data-Matching--This section requires that the biometric 
exit data system, match a person's exit data against available 
biometric entry data when the person exits the United States; 
leverage the infrastructure and databases of the current entry 
system; and be interoperable with Federal databases that store 
biometrics of known or suspected terrorists.
    (f) Scope--This section establishes the scope of the 
biometric exit data system to include the collection of 
biometric exit data for all categories of individuals who are 
required to provide such data but shall not apply to United 
States citizens.
    (g) Collection of Data--This section prohibits the 
Secretary of Homeland Security from requiring any non-federal 
person to collect biometric data pursuant to the biometric exit 
data system except through a contractual agreement.
    (h) Multi-modal Collection--This section requires the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to collect biometric data under 
this Act using various types of biometric technology.
    (i) Penalties for Failure to Meet Deadlines--This section 
establishes penalties if the Secretary of Homeland Security 
fails to meet the deadlines set forth in this section. These 
penalties are the same penalties established in paragraph (2) 
for political appointees. These deadlines relate to the 
submission of the implementation plan; establishment of a 
biometric exit system; establishment of a six-month pilot 
program; the expansion of such biometric exit data system; and 
any extension of the deadline for expansion authorized by the 
Secretary.
    Implementing a biometric exit system will allow border 
security officials to know with certainty who has left the 
country and who has violated the terms of their visa. The 
timelines provided by the Committee are the result of extensive 
consultation with, and full support of industry. The Committee 
intends to hold the Department accountable for meeting 
deadlines in the bill.
    (j) Congressional Review--This section requires the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to, not later than 90 days after 
the date of enactment, submit to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives and to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
Senate reports and recommendations from the Department's 
Science and Technology Directorate's Air Entry and Exit Re-
Engineering Program and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
entry and exit mobility program.
    The Department has several biometric pilots currently 
planned, or in process to evaluate the concept of operations 
for a biometric exit system. The Committee expects the 
Department to share the reports and recommendations of these 
projects to provide full accounting of these pilots.

Section 15.  Northern Border Threat Analysis

    (a) In General--This section requires the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees, within six months from the date of enactment of 
this Act, a northern border threat analysis. The threat 
analysis shall include, at a minimum, an analysis of current 
and potential terrorist threats posed by individuals seeking to 
enter the United States through the northern border; an 
analysis of improvements needed at ports of entry along the 
northern border to prevent terrorists and instruments of terror 
from crossing the border; an analysis of gaps in law, policy, 
international agreements, or tribal agreements that hinder 
border security efforts along the northern border; and an 
analysis of unlawful cross border activity between ports of 
entry, including the maritime border of the Great lakes.
    The Committee recognizes that while there is significant 
attention paid to the security of the southern border of the 
United States, there are also real terror threats to the 
northern border which cannot be neglected. The Committee 
believes a threat analysis of the unique challenges along the 
northern border is necessary to better determine capability 
deployment required in section (c).
    (b) Classified Threat Analysis--This threat analysis may be 
submitted in classified form if the Secretary of Homeland 
Security deems it appropriate.
    (c) Required Northern Border Capability Deployment--This 
subsection requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
deploy to each sector along the northern border, additional 
minimum capabilities to achieve situational awareness and 
operational control of the border. The capabilities are listed 
in a specific risk-based, sector-by-sector manner.
    The Committee identified the following additional 
capabilities as required based on testimony received by the 
Committee, information gathered through site visits to the 
border, constituents, extensive meetings, and consultation with 
various front-line personnel and border security stakeholder 
and experts.
    Coastal radar surveillance systems--The Committee believes 
that understanding illicit trends in the coastal regions of the 
maritime border requires persistent awareness of those regions. 
Coastal radar surveillance is important to developing that 
awareness.
    Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable surveillance 
systems--Because the high traffic areas of the border shift 
from region to region, the Committee realizes that not all 
surveillance systems should be permanently fixed to one region. 
This portable surveillance technology will allow Border Patrol 
to respond quickly and with the appropriate capabilities to 
shifts in threats or trends.
    Advanced unattended surveillance sensors--The Committee 
believes that greater awareness of the remote areas of the 
border is necessary through advanced sensors which can be left 
unattended and used to identify threats and trends to which 
Border Patrol agents can respond, maximizing the efficiency of 
their operations.
    Improved agent communications capabilities--In many remote 
areas of the border, communication between individual agents 
and with command and control centers is lacking. The Committee 
believes that agents deployed to these remote areas must have 
appropriate communications capabilities to ensure their 
effectiveness and safety.
    Increased flight hours for aerial detection, interdiction, 
and monitoring operations capability--The Committee understands 
the importance of aviation assets for aerial detection, 
interdiction, and monitoring operations and that increasing 
these capabilities equates to an increase in the numbers of 
hours flown in support of border operations. Understanding the 
flight limitations on many aircraft, the Committee understands 
that this will require prioritizing flight hours to support 
border security efforts.
    Man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles--The Committee 
understands the importance of the capabilities offered by 
unmanned aerial vehicles but also the limitations of larger 
UAVs that can only take off and land at certain facilities. 
Man-portable UAVs can be deployed and launched by hand to areas 
which require immediate aviation surveillance support.
    Ultralight aircraft detection capabilities--The Committee 
understands the threat posed by low flying aircraft and 
specifically ultralight aircraft which are especially difficult 
to detect by radar. Enhanced detection capabilities for these 
aircraft are needed to minimize the threat.
    Modernized port of entry surveillance capabilities--The 
Committee understands that securing the ports of entry along 
the northern border is an essential step to securing the 
border. Modernizing these ports of entry and updating the 
surveillance capabilities is an important component of securing 
the ports.
    Increased maritime interdiction capabilities--The maritime 
domain presents unique challenges because of its vast area in 
which illicit activities can take place. The Committee believes 
that more surface resources, both cutters and boats, are 
necessary to interdict this activity.
    The Committee expects these additional capabilities to be 
deployed in a risk-based manner, beginning with high traffic 
areas. The identified sector-by-sector approach is intended to 
align capabilities to geographic, personnel, technological and 
infrastructural needs of Border Patrol sectors and maritime 
regions, in order to gain operational control and situational 
awareness of the border. Each sector (Blaine, Spokane, Havre, 
Grand Forks, Detroit, Buffalo, Swanton, and Houlton) shall 
deploy appropriate systems appropriate for their sector 
including: Coastal radar surveillance systems; mobile vehicle-
mounted and man-portable surveillance systems; advanced 
unattended surveillance sensors; improved agent communications; 
increased flight hours for aerial detection, interdiction, and 
monitoring operations capability; man-portable unmanned aerial 
vehicles; ultralight aircraft detection capabilities; 
modernized port of entry surveillance capabilities; and 
increased maritime interdiction capabilities.
    (d) Adherence to Certain Standards--This section requires 
the Under Secretary for Management of the Department of 
Homeland Security to ensure that internal control standards 
identified by the Comptroller General are adhered to in 
carrying out the capability and resource deployment along the 
northern border.
    The Committee believes that in carrying out the provisions 
of this bill, the Department should follow existing internal 
control standards to prevent fraud, waste and abuse and 
effectively expend the amounts authorized in this bill.

Section 16.  Operation Stonegarden Program

    This section amends Title XX of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 by adding a new subtitle, entitled ``subtitle C--Other 
Grant Programs''
    (a) Establishment--This subsection establishes a Department 
program known as `Operation Stonegarden' and directs the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the 
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to 
make grants to eligible law enforcement agencies to enhance 
border security.
    (b) Eligible Recipients--This subsection limits eligibility 
for these grants to law enforcement agencies located in a state 
bordering either Canada or Mexico or in a state or territory 
with a maritime border; and involved in an active ongoing U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection operation coordinated through a 
sector office.
    (c) Permitted Uses--This subsection authorizes the 
Operation Stonegarden grant to be used for equipment, including 
maintenance and sustainment costs; personnel, including 
overtime and backfill, in support of enhanced border law 
enforcement activities; any activity permitted under the 
Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2014 Funding 
Opportunity Announcement for Operation Stonegarden; or any 
other appropriate activity, as determined by the grant 
administrator.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations--This subsection 
authorizes $110,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2015 through 
2019 for grants under this section.
    (e) Report--This subsection directs the grant administrator 
to annually submit a report to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and the Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the 
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives 
containing information on the expenditure of Operation 
Stonegarden grants by each grant recipient.
    (f) Clerical Amendment--This subsection amends the table of 
contents of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to include the 
added ``subtitle C''.
    The Committee believes state and local law enforcement are 
an effective force multiplier for border security. While the 
federal government bears the principal responsibility of 
securing the border, the local knowledge provided by state, 
local and tribal law enforcement partners is vital to obtaining 
operational control of the borders.
    The Committee supports authorization increases for 
Operation Stonegarden grants, which are intended to enhance and 
expand cooperation and interoperability between federal, state, 
and local law enforcement partners.

Section 17.  Sale or Donation of Excess Personal Property for Border 
        Security Activities

    This section amends Section 2576a of Title 10, United 
States Code, to allow the Secretary of Defense to transfer 
excess Department of Defense property to support border 
security activities and directs that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security shall also be consulted in the transfer of Department 
of Defense excess property to federal and state agencies.
    The Committee recognizes the capability that excess 
Department of Defense equipment can bring to the southern 
border. As a result, the Committee ensured that the Secretary 
of Homeland Security is given priority for such technology when 
it becomes available as excess. If declaring equipment suitable 
for border security excess is not feasible, the Committee 
expects the Department to pursue long-term leasing arrangements 
with the Department of Defense to leverage the entire universe 
of transferrable Department of Defense equipment.

Section 18.  Reimbursement of States for Deployment of National Guard 
        to the Southern Land Border

    This section authorizes up to $35,000,000 of the funds 
authorized by this Act to be used each fiscal year to reimburse 
States for the cost of deployment of National Guard units or 
personnel to perform operations in support of the southern land 
border.
    Securing the international borders of the United States is 
the responsibility of the Federal Government. However, the 
Committee believes that States who deploy their National Guards 
in support of border security operations, should be reimbursed. 
The Committee believes the National Guard is an effective force 
multiplier to deter illicit activity along the border; however, 
CBP should quickly acquire the ability to fill the role the 
National Guard performs on the border.

Section 19.  Operation of the Border Patrol

    This section requires the Border Patrol to operate using 
intelligence-based operations to combat terrorist and 
transnational criminal threats along the international borders. 
This section also requires Border Patrol to coordinate with 
international, Federal, State, local, and tribal law 
enforcement partners.
    The Committee expects that as surveillance along the border 
increases, the quality and type of intelligence will increase. 
The Committee believes the Border Patrol should use this 
intelligence to conduct operations that will combat the most 
dangerous threats to the homeland--Terror and Transnational 
Criminal Organizations. The Committee understands that absent 
intelligence, prior border security efforts have only been 
successful in shifting threats to other areas of the border. 
Therefore the Border Patrol must utilize intelligence-based 
operations. In addition, the Committee expects such 
intelligence will be coordinated and shared with State and 
local law enforcement partners who serve as force multipliers 
on the border.

Section 20.  Definitions

    This section sets forth the definitions of key terms as 
used in the bill including: ``advanced unattended surveillance 
sensors''; ``appropriate congressional committees''; ``cocaine 
removal effectiveness rate''; ``consequence delivery system''; 
``got away''; ``high traffic areas''; ``unlawful border 
crossing effectiveness rate''; ``major violator''; 
``operational control''; ``situational awareness''; ``transit 
zone''; and ``turn back''.

Sec. 21.  Authorization of Appropriations

    This section authorizes $1,000,000,000 to be appropriated 
for each of fiscal years 2016 through 2025 to carry out this 
Act and the amendments made by this Act.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                     HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002


SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Homeland 
Security Act of 2002''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is 
as follows:

     * * * * * * *

                   TITLE XX--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

     * * * * * * *

                    Subtitle C--Other Grant Programs

Sec. 2031. Operation Stonegarden.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XX--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    Subtitle C--Other Grant Programs

SEC. 2031. OPERATION STONEGARDEN.

  (a) Establishment.--There is established in the Department a 
program to be known as ``Operation Stonegarden''. Under such 
program, the Secretary, acting through the Administrator, shall 
make grants to eligible law enforcement agencies to enhance 
border security in accordance with this section.
  (b) Eligible Recipients.--To be eligible to receive a grant 
under this section, a law enforcement agency shall--
          (1) be located in--
                  (A) a State bordering either Canada or 
                Mexico; or
                  (B) a State or territory with a maritime 
                border; and
          (2) be involved in an active ongoing U.S. Customs and 
        Border Protection operation coordinated through a 
        sector office.
  (c) Permitted Uses.--The recipient of a grant under this 
section may use the grant for any of the following activities:
          (1) Equipment, including maintenance and sustainment 
        costs.
          (2) Personnel, including overtime and backfill, in 
        support of enhanced border law enforcement activities.
          (3) Any activity permitted under the Department of 
        Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2014 Funding 
        Opportunity Announcement for Operation Stonegarden.
          (4) Any other appropriate activity, as determined by 
        the Administrator.
  (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to 
be appropriated $110,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2015 
through 2019 for grants under this section.
  (e) Report.--The Administrator shall annually submit to the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 
Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
Representatives a report containing information on the 
expenditure of grants made under this section by each grant 
recipient.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                      TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL MILITARY LAW

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART IV--SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 153--EXCHANGE OF MATERIAL AND DISPOSAL OF OBSOLETE, SURPLUS, OR 
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2576a. Excess personal property: sale or donation for law 
                    enforcement activities

  (a) Transfer Authorized.--(1) Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law and subject to subsection (b), the Secretary 
of Defense may transfer to Federal and State agencies personal 
property of the Department of Defense, including small arms and 
ammunition, that the Secretary determines is--
          (A) suitable for use by the agencies in law 
        enforcement activities, including [counter-drug and 
        counter-terrorism activities] counterdrug, 
        counterterrorism, and border security activities; and
          (B) excess to the needs of the Department of Defense.
  (2) The Secretary shall carry out this section in 
consultation with [the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Drug Control Policy] the Attorney General, the 
Director of National Drug Control Policy, and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, as appropriate..
  (b) Conditions for Transfer.--The Secretary of Defense may 
transfer personal property under this section only if--
          (1) the property is drawn from existing stocks of the 
        Department of Defense;
          (2) the recipient accepts the property on an as-is, 
        where-is basis;
          (3) the transfer is made without the expenditure of 
        any funds available to the Department of Defense for 
        the procurement of defense equipment; and
          (4) all costs incurred subsequent to the transfer of 
        the property are borne or reimbursed by the recipient.
  (c) Consideration.--Subject to subsection (b)(4), the 
Secretary may transfer personal property under this section 
without charge to the recipient agency.
  (d) Preference for Certain Transfers.--In considering 
applications for the transfer of personal property under this 
section, the Secretary shall give a preference to those 
applications indicating that the transferred property will be 
used in the [counter-drug or counter-terrorism activities] 
counterdrug, counterterrorism, or border security activities of 
the recipient agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                        Committee Correspondence

                       Committee on Armed Services,
                                  House of Representatives,
                                  Washington, DC, January 23, 2015.
Hon. Michael T. McCaul,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: I write concerning H.R. 399, the Secure 
Our Borders First Act of 2015, as amended. This legislation was 
additionally referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and 
includes matters that fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of 
the committee.
    Our committee recognizes the importance of H.R. 399, and 
the need for the legislation to move expeditiously. Our 
committee also appreciates efforts by your staff to coordinate 
on matters that fall in our Rule X jurisdiction in advance. 
Therefore, while we have a valid claim to jurisdiction over 
this legislation, the Committee on Armed Services will waive 
further consideration of H.R. 399. By waiving consideration of 
the bill, the Committee on Armed Services does not waive any 
future jurisdictional claim over the subject matters contained 
in the bill which fall within its Rule X jurisdiction. I 
request that you urge the Speaker to name members of this 
committee to any conference committee which is named to 
consider the provisions over which we have jurisdiction.
    Please place this letter and your committee's response into 
the Congressional Record during consideration of the measure on 
the House floor. Thank you for the cooperative spirit in which 
you have worked regarding this matter and others between our 
respective committees.
            Sincerely,
                             William T. ``Mac'' Thornberry,
                                                          Chairman.
                                ------                                

                                  House of Representatives,
                            Committee on Homeland Security,
                                  Washington, DC, January 23, 2015.
Hon. Mac Thornberry,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
 Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
399, the Border Security First Act of 2015. I appreciate your 
support in bringing this legislation before the House of 
Representatives, and accordingly, understand that the Committee 
on Armed Services will forego action on the bill.
    The Committee on Homeland Security concurs with the mutual 
understanding that by foregoing consideration of this bill at 
this time, the Committee on Armed Services does not waive any 
jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this bill or 
similar legislation in the future. In addition, should a 
conference on this bill be necessary, I would support your 
request to have the Committee on Armed Services represented on 
the conference committee.
    I will insert copies of this exchange in the Congressional 
Record during consideration of this bill on the House floor, I 
appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look 
forward to continuing to work with the Armed Services Committee 
as the bill moves through the legislative process.
            Sincerely,
                                         Michael T. McCaul,
                          Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security.
                                ------                                

                             Congress of the United States,
                                  Washington, DC, January 22, 2015.
Hon. Michael T. McCaul,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: I write regarding H.R. 399, the Secure 
Our Borders First Act of 2015. This bill contains provisions 
under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Natural Resources.
    I recognize and appreciate your desire to bring this bill 
before the House of Representatives in an expeditious manner, 
and accordingly, I will agree that the Committee on Natural 
Resources be discharged from further consideration of the bill. 
I do so with the understanding that this action does not affect 
the jurisdiction of the Committee on Natural Resources, and 
that the Committee expressly reserves its authority to seek 
conferees on any provision within its jurisdiction during any 
House-Senate conference that may be convened on this, or any 
similar legislation. I ask that you support any such request.
    I also ask that a copy of this letter and your response be 
included in the Congressional Record during consideration of 
H.R. 399 bill on the House floor.
    Thank you for your work on this important issue, and I look 
forward to its enactment soon.
            Sincerely,
                                                Rob Bishop,
                          Chairman, Committee on Natural Resources.
                                ------                                

                          House of Representatives,
                            Committee on Homeland Security,
                                  Washington, DC, January 22, 2015.
Hon. Rob Bishop,
Chairman, Committee on Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
399, the Border Security First Act of 2015. I appreciate your 
support in bringing this legislation before the House of 
Representatives, and accordingly, understand that the Committee 
on Natural Resources will forego action on the bill.
    The Committee on Homeland Security concurs with the mutual 
understanding that by foregoing consideration of this bill at 
this time, the Committee on Natural Resources does not waive 
any jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this bill 
or similar legislation in the future. In addition, should a 
conference on this bill be necessary, I would support your 
request to have the Committee on Natural Resources represented 
on the conference committee.
    I will insert copies of this exchange in the Congressional 
Record during consideration of this bill on the House floor. I 
appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look 
forward to continuing to work with the Natural Resources 
Committee as the bill moves through the legislative process.
            Sincerely,
                                         Michael T. McCaul,
                          Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security.
                                ------                                

                          House of Representatives,
                                  Committee on Agriculture,
                                  Washington, DC, January 22, 2015.
Hon. Michael McCaul,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman McCaul: I am writing concerning H.R 399, 
``The Secure Our Border First Act of 2015,'' which was 
favorably reported out of your committee on January 21, 2015.
    As you know, provisions of H.R. 399 have been referred to 
the Committee on Agriculture. In order to expedite floor 
consideration of the bill, the Committee on Agriculture will 
forgo action on H.R. 399. This is also being done with the 
understanding that it does not in any way prejudice the 
Committee with respect to the appointment of conferees or its 
jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation.
    I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming 
this understanding with respect to H.R. 399, and would ask that 
a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in 
the Congressional Record during Floor consideration.
            Sincerely,
                                        K. Michael Conaway,
                                                          Chairman.
                                ------                                

                          House of Representatives,
                            Committee on Homeland Security,
                                  Washington, DC, January 22, 2015.
Hon. K. Michael Conaway,
Chairman, Committee on Agriculture,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman Conaway: Thank you for your letter regarding 
H.R. 399, the Border Security First Act of 2015. I appreciate 
your support in bringing this legislation before the House of 
Representatives, and accordingly, understand that the Committee 
on Agriculture will forego action on the bill.
    The Committee on Homeland Security concurs with the mutual 
understanding that by foregoing consideration of this bill at 
this time, the Committee on Agriculture does not waive any 
jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this bill or 
similar legislation in the future. In addition, should a 
conference on this bill be necessary, I would support your 
request to have the Committee on Agriculture represented on the 
conference committee.
    I will insert copies of this exchange in the Congressional 
Record during consideration of this bill on the House floor. I 
appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look 
forward to continuing to work with the Agriculture Committee as 
the bill moves through the legislative process.
            Sincerely,
                                         Michael T. McCaul,
                          Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security.
                                ------                                

                          House of Representatives,
                                Committee on the Judiciary,
                                  Washington, DC, January 22, 2015.
Hon. Michael McCaul,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman McCaul: I am writing concerning H.R. 399, the 
``Secure Our Borders First Act,'' which was ordered reported by 
your Committee yesterday. This bill contains provisions that 
fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on the 
Judiciary.
    As a result of your having consulted with me on the 
provisions in question, and in order to expedite the House's 
consideration of H.R. 399, the Committee on the Judiciary will 
not assert its jurisdictional claim over this bill by seeking a 
sequential referral. The Committee takes this action with our 
mutual understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 
399 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over subject 
matter contained in this or similar legislation, and that our 
Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as the 
bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may 
address any remaining issues in our jurisdiction. Our Committee 
also reserves the right to seek appointment of an appropriate 
number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving 
this or similar legislation, and requests your support for any 
such request.
    I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming 
this understanding with respect to H.R. 399, and would ask that 
a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in 
the Congressional Record during floor consideration.
            Sincerely,
                                             Bob Goodlatte,
                                                          Chairman.
                                ------                                

                          House of Representatives,
                            Committee on Homeland Security,
                                  Washington, DC, January 22, 2015.
Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman Goodlatte: Thank you for your letter 
regarding the Committee on the Judiciary's jurisdictional 
interest in H.R. 399, the ``Secure Our Borders First Act.'' I 
acknowledge that in foregoing a sequential referral on this 
legislation, your Committee is not diminishing or altering its 
jurisdiction.
    I also concur that your foregoing action on this bill does 
not in any way prejudice the Committee on the Judiciary with 
respect to its jurisdictional prerogatives on this or any 
similar legislation in the future, and I would support your 
effort to seek an appointment of conferees to a House-Senate 
conference involving this bill.
    Finally, I will include your letter and this response in 
the Congressional Record during consideration of this bill on 
the House floor. I appreciate your cooperation regarding H.R. 
399, and I look forward to working with the Committee on the 
Judiciary as the bill moves through the legislative process.
            Sincerely,
                                         Michael T. McCaul,
                                                          Chairman.

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

    The approval of H.R. 399, the so-called ``Secure Our 
Borders First Act of 2015,'' without a single Democratic vote 
on Wednesday night was an unfortunate and inauspicious 
beginning to the 114th Congress but should not have been a 
surprise to Chairman Michael McCaul (R-TX), given the manner in 
which the legislation was crafted and tactics utilized to 
advance it.
    Let the record reflect that the Committee officially 
organized, with ten new freshmen members joining this 30-member 
committee, on that morning. The decision by Chairman McCaul to 
schedule a Full Committee mark up of a 72-page border security 
measure that had never before been introduced, had never been 
the subject of a legislative hearing in this Congress or any 
other, had never been considered by the subcommittee with 
expertise on the matter--the Subcommittee on Border and 
Maritime Security, and was only available to Members on the 
evening of Friday, January 16th was not in keeping with the 
bipartisan, coordinated and collegial approach that has been 
the hallmark of this Committee.
    At the outset of the mark up, Democrats expressed their 
concern about the rushed manner in which the legislation was 
being advanced. Representative Filemon Vela (D-TX) made a 
motion that the bill be referred to the Subcommittee on Border 
and Maritime Security. That motion was tabled. Representative 
Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) then made a motion that consideration of 
the bill be postponed until February 11, 2015, to allow the 
Committee to take testimony from the Secretary of Homeland 
Security in advance of consideration of the measure. That 
motion was also tabled.
    Further eroding our confidence that the Committee can 
return to regular order and continue our tradition of 
bipartisan collaboration was the fact that the Majority, in 
order to adhere to its own rushed timeline, violated one of the 
Committee rules that was adopted earlier in the day. We, of 
course, are referring to the decision to have Representative 
Candice Miller (R-MI) offer an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute without prior notice--certainly not 48 hour notice--
as required under Rule V(A)(2)(a) of the Committee on Homeland 
Security Rules for the 114th Congress. Representative Sheila 
Jackson Lee (D-TX) raised a point of order that the Committee 
Rule had been violated. Chairman McCaul improperly ruled 
against Representative Jackson Lee and Ranking Member Bennie 
Thompson (D-MS) was forced to appeal the ruling of the Chair. 
By a straight party-line vote of 18-12, the Majority tabled 
Ranking Member Thompson's appeal, thereby embracing the 
violation of Committee Rule V. The decision to violate the 48-
hour notice rule raises larger questions about whether Members 
can rely on the Committee Rules to govern the activities within 
the Committee.
    Putting aside our significant procedural concerns, we have 
a number of substantive issues with H.R. 399. During the 
markup, Committee Democrats offered five amendments to address 
fundamental concerns with the bill. Each failed on a party line 
vote of 12-18.
    The amendments offered by Democratic Members were:
     An amendment offered by Representative Sanchez to 
replace the definition for ``operational control'' in the 
measure with language unanimously approved by the Committee in 
2013, when H.R. 1417, the McCaul-Thompson Border Security 
Results Act of 2013'' was approved. Representative Sanchez 
echoed the arguments, expressed by former Department of 
Homeland Security Secretaries Michael Chertoff and Janet 
Napolitano as well as DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson that the 100% 
mandate is unattainable as it would require the ``prevention of 
all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries 
by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, 
narcotics, and other contraband.''
     An amendment offered by Representatives Jim 
Langevin (D-RI) and Bill Keating (DMA) to strike the provision 
that waives a laundry list of environmental laws and gives the 
Border Patrol unfettered access to Federal lands.
     An amendment offered by Representative Vela to 
strike pages and pages of fencing infrastructure mandates, none 
of which have ever been requested by the Department to help 
secure the Southwest border.
     An amendment offered by Representative Jackson Lee 
to imbue the Secretary of Homeland Security with the authority 
to exercise tactical flexibility and move around resources 
insofar as the DHS Secretary is accountable, under the bill, 
for attaining operational control of the Southwest border with 
five years, under the bill.
     An amendment offered by Representative Brian 
Higgins (D-NY) to ensure that before the U.S. Visit biometric 
exit program is fully deployed at all land ports of entry, the 
Secretary certifies to Congress that significant delays to 
travel or trade are not expected to be caused by such action.
    In broad terms, our largest concerns about the measure, are 
three-fold.
    First, the bill requires DHS to achieve 100% operational 
control of the southwest border within five years, and would 
impose petty penalties on DHS political appointees when the 
Department is unable to achieve a standard that Chairman McCaul 
himself has deemed unrealistic. Second, despite its title, 
``Secure Our Borders First Act,'' the bill is nearly-
exclusively focused on the Southwest border, rather than taking 
a comprehensive approach where air, land, and maritime borders 
are protected. Finally, the bill directs $10 billion over ten 
years towards funding prescriptive sector-by-sector fencing, 
technology, and road projects and directs the Defense 
Department to reimburse States for National Guard deployments 
to the Southwest Border, regardless of whether assistance was 
sought. The Majority could not explain how these projects, 
which have never been officially requested, would protect our 
borders or thwart efforts of potential terrorists from entering 
the country.
    In conclusion, we would note that the approach taken to 
develop and advance H.R. 399 departs significantly the approach 
taken to border security in the previous Congress, where, after 
significant consultation with the Comptroller General, the 
Department of Homeland Security and border stakeholders, the 
Committee came together and unanimously approved H.R. 1417 the 
``Border Security Results Act'' in May 2013. H.R. 1417 was a 
thoughtful, commonsense bill that held the Department of 
Homeland Security accountable for improving border security. 
That bill went through regular order and was the subject of 
several hearings prior to consideration.
    As any observer of this Committee can tell you, despite our 
jurisdictional limitations, we are most effective when we put 
politics aside and act in a unified bipartisan manner to help 
improve the security of our constituents. Regrettably, the 
tactics employed by the Majority to develop and advance H.R. 
399 are not consistent with that approach. Further, as DHS 
Secretary Johnson stated, this measure will ``actually leave 
the border less secure.'' In substance, H.R. 399 is a 
fundamentally flawed bill. Accordingly, we dissent to the 
favorable reporting of H.R. 399 to the Full House of 
Representatives.
                                   Bennie G. Thompson.
                                   Donald M. Payne, Jr.
                                   Cedric L. Richmond.
                                   Brian Higgins.
                                   William R. Keating.
                                   James R. Langevin.
                                   Sheila Jackson Lee.
                                   Loretta Sanchez.
                                   Kathleen M. Rice.
                                   Norma J. Torres.
                                   Filemon Vela.
                                   Bonnie Watson Coleman.