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114th Congress   }                                        {      Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session     }                                        {       114-8

======================================================================



 
             STOP ADVERTISING VICTIMS OF EXPLOITATION ACT 
                                OF 2015

                                _______
                                

January 27, 2015.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Goodlatte, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 285]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 285) to amend title 18, United States Code, to 
provide a penalty for knowingly selling advertising that offers 
certain commercial sex acts, having considered the same, 
reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that 
the bill do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     2
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     2
Hearings.........................................................     3
Committee Consideration..........................................     3
Committee Votes..................................................     3
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     4
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     4
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................     5
Duplication of Federal Programs..................................     5
Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings..............................     5
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     5
Advisory on Earmarks.............................................     5
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................     5
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............     5
Dissenting Views.................................................     7

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R 285 clarifies that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1591, which 
criminalizes the knowing sex trafficking of minors and others 
through force, fraud, or coercion, can be violated when a 
defendant knowingly advertises a victim for a commercial sex 
act. This provision requires the government to prove that 
defendants accused of benefitting financially through the sale 
of such advertising knew that the victim was a minor or a 
victim of force, fraud, or coercion. The bill is technology 
neutral and applies to both advertisements online, as well as 
traditional advertisements.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    Pimps and traffickers sexually exploit children through 
street prostitution, in adult strip clubs, brothels, sex 
parties, motel rooms, hotel rooms, and other locations 
throughout the United States. The growth of the Internet and 
other technological advances, including mobile smartphones, has 
greatly facilitated the commercial sexual exploitation of 
children by providing a convenient way to market these victims 
to potential purchasers. Individuals can now use websites to 
advertise, schedule, and purchase sexual encounters with 
minors. According to the Polaris Project, U.S. law enforcement 
has identified online advertisements as the primary platform 
for buying and selling sex with minors, and an FBI study found 
more than 2,800 minor victims were advertised on just one 
online advertisement service in 2008.\1\ It is estimated that 
revenue from online advertisements of prostitution generally 
(not just involving minors) surpassed $45 million in 2012 
alone.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Polaris Project, Internet Based Human Trafficking, http://
www.polarisproject.org/
component/content/article/1-national-human-trafficking-hotline/257-
Internet-based.
    \2\Aim Group, Online prostitution-ad revenue crosses Craigslist 
benchmark, July 2013, available at http://aimgroup.com/2013/07/10/
online-prostitution-ad-revenue-crosses-craigslist-benchmark.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 285 clarifies that the existing Federal sex 
trafficking statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1591, extends to 
traffickers who knowingly sell sex with minors and victims of 
force, fraud, or coercion through advertising, as well as 
people or entities that knowingly benefit from such 
advertising. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, when a 
Federal statute contains an explicit mens rea provision, that 
standard applies to every element of the offense.\3\ Under 
current law, the government can show that a defendant either 
knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that a victim was a 
minor or involved through force, fraud, or coercion. H.R. 285 
requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a defendant who benefits from the advertising of a trafficking 
victim under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1591(a)(2) knew that the 
advertising involved a victim who the defendant knew was a 
minor or a victim of force, fraud, or coercion.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\See, e.g., Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 
(2009); United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
    \4\``Knowingly'' does not have a uniform Federal definition. The 
Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits define ``knowingly'' as meaning a 
defendant committed a criminal act ``voluntarily and intentionally, and 
not because of mistake or accident.'' Fifth Circuit Instruction 1.37; 
Tenth Circuit Instruction 1.37; Eleventh Circuit Instruction 9.1A. The 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits employ an instruction to the effect that 
```knowingly' . . . means that the defendant realized what he was doing 
and was aware of the nature of his conduct, and did not act through 
ignorance, mistake or accident.'' Seventh Circuit Instruction 4.10; 
Ninth Circuit Instruction 5.6. Other circuits have taken a case-by-case 
approach to the definition of ``knowingly.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 285 clarifies that people who advertise sex 
trafficking can face criminal liability. The bill is technology 
neutral and applies to both advertisements online, as well as 
traditional advertisements. Under current law, Section 1595 of 
Title 18 extends the possibility of civil liability to 
defendants who violate Section 1591. However, under Section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act,\5\ online publishers of 
third-party advertisements are generally immune from civil 
liability for such advertisements.\6\ H.R. 285 does nothing to 
disrupt or modify the civil immunity already provided by 
Section 230.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\47 U.S.C. Sec. 230.
    \6\Courts generally apply Section 230(c)(1) immunity where: (1) a 
defendant is a provider or user of an interactive computer service; (2) 
the defendant is being treated as a publisher or speaker of the 
challenged content for liability purposes; and (3) the content at issue 
is information provided by another information content provider. Courts 
have overwhelmingly found that defendants that provide access to online 
content are providers or users of an interactive computer service as 
broadly defined by section 230, and accordingly immune from civil 
liability. See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. 
v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During markup, the Committee rejected an amendment to 
exempt sex trafficking advertisers from the existing mandatory 
penalties in Section 1591. The amendment would have provided 
special treatment and potentially more lenient sentences to 
those who traffic children through advertising, rather than 
through other means. The trauma to the child is no less when 
they are trafficked through advertising--in fact, it is 
arguably worse, given that online advertising makes it easier 
to sell these children even more frequently.

                                Hearings

    The Committee on the Judiciary held no hearings on H.R. 
285.

                        Committee Consideration

    On January 21, 2015, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered the bill H.R. 285 favorably reported by voice vote, a 
quorum being present.

                            Committee Votes

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the 
following rollcall vote occurred during the Committee's 
consideration of H.R. 285.
    1. Amendment #1, offered by Mr. Johnson. The amendment 
exempts traffickers who committed their crime through 
advertising from the existing mandatory minimum sentences in 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 1591. Defeated 7 to 20.

                             ROLLCALL NO. 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Ayes    Nays   Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Goodlatte (VA), Chairman...................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI)....................              X
Mr. Smith (TX).................................              X
Mr. Chabot (OH)................................              X
Mr. Issa (CA)..................................              X
Mr. Forbes (VA)................................
Mr. King (IA)..................................              X
Mr. Franks (AZ)................................              X
Mr. Gohmert (TX)...............................              X
Mr. Jordan (OH)................................              X
Mr. Poe (TX)...................................              X
Mr. Chaffetz (UT)..............................              X
Mr. Marino (PA)................................
Mr. Gowdy (SC).................................              X
Mr. Labrador (ID)..............................      X
Ms. Farenthold (TX)............................              X
Mr. Collins (GA)...............................              X
Mr. DeSantis (FL)..............................              X
Ms. Walters (CA)...............................              X
Mr. Buck (CO)..................................              X
Mr. Ratcliffe (TX).............................              X
Mr. Trott (MI).................................              X
Mr. Bishop (MI)................................              X
 
Mr. Conyers, Jr. (MI), Ranking Member..........      X
Mr. Nadler (NY)................................      X
Ms. Lofgren (CA)...............................
Ms. Jackson Lee (TX)...........................      X
Mr. Cohen (TN).................................      X
Mr. Johnson (GA)...............................      X
Mr. Pierluisi (PR).............................
Ms. Chu (CA)...................................
Mr. Deutch (FL)................................
Mr. Gutierrez (IL).............................
Ms. Bass (CA)..................................
Mr. Richmond (LA)..............................
Ms. DelBene (WA)...............................      X
Mr. Jeffries (NY)..............................
Mr. Cicilline (RI).............................
Mr. Peters (CA)................................
                                                ------------------------
    Total......................................      7      20
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does 
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax 
expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    With respect to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, an estimate and comparison 
prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office 
under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was 
not submitted to the Committee before the of filing of the 
report.

                    Duplication of Federal Programs

    No provision of H.R. 285 establishes or reauthorizes a 
program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of 
another Federal program, a program that was included in any 
report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress 
pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program 
related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of 
Federal Domestic Assistance.

                  Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings

    No provision of H.R. 285 directs a specific rule making 
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 551.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 
285 clarifies that 18 U.S. C. Sec. 1591, which criminalizes the 
knowing sex trafficking of minors and others through force, 
fraud, or coercion, can be violated when a defendant advertises 
such a victim for a commercial sex act.

                          Advisory on Earmarks

    In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, H.R. 285 does not contain any 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of Rule XXI.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

    The following discussion describes the bill as reported by 
the Committee.
    Section 1. Short title. This section cites the short title 
of the bill as the ``Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation 
Act of 2015.''
    Section 2. Advertising that Offers Certain Commercial Sex 
Acts. This section expands 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1591 to include the 
advertising of commercial sex acts involving a minor or an 
individual engaged in such an act through force, fraud, or 
coercion. Additionally, this section adopts a knowing standard 
for those accused of benefitting financially or otherwise from 
the sale of advertising depicting these individuals under 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 1591(a)(2).

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change 
is proposed is shown in roman):

                      TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
PART I--CRIMES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 77--PEONAGE, SLAVERY, AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1591. Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion

    (a) Whoever knowingly--
            (1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, 
        or within the special maritime and territorial 
        jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, 
        harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, or 
        maintains by any means a person; or
            (2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything 
        of value, from participation in a venture which has 
        engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph 
        (1),
knowing, or, except where, in an offense under paragraph (2), 
the act constituting the violation of paragraph (1) is 
advertising, in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of 
force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in 
subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be 
used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or 
that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will 
be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished 
as provided in subsection (b).
    (b) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is--
            (1) if the offense was effected by means of force, 
        threats of force, fraud, or coercion described in 
        subsection (e)(2), or by any combination of such means, 
        or if the person recruited, enticed, harbored, 
        transported, provided, [or obtained] obtained, or 
        advertised had not attained the age of 14 years at the 
        time of such offense, by a fine under this title and 
        imprisonment for any term of years not less than 15 or 
        for life; or
            (2) if the offense was not so effected, and the 
        person recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, 
        provided, [or obtained] obtained, or advertised had 
        attained the age of 14 years but had not attained the 
        age of 18 years at the time of such offense, by a fine 
        under this title and imprisonment for not less than 10 
        years or for life.
    (c) In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the 
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person so 
recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained 
or maintained, the Government need not prove that the defendant 
knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.
    (d) Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way 
interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for a term not to 
exceed 20 years, or both.
    (e) In this section:
            (1) The term ``abuse or threatened abuse of law or 
        legal process'' means the use or threatened use of a 
        law or legal process, whether administrative, civil, or 
        criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for which 
        the law was not designed, in order to exert pressure on 
        another person to cause that person to take some action 
        or refrain from taking some action.
            (2) The term ``coercion'' means--
                    (A) threats of serious harm to or physical 
                restraint against any person;
                    (B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended 
                to cause a person to believe that failure to 
                perform an act would result in serious harm to 
                or physical restraint against any person; or
                    (C) the abuse or threatened abuse of law or 
                the legal process.
            (3) The term ``commercial sex act'' means any sex 
        act, on account of which anything of value is given to 
        or received by any person.
            (4) The term ``serious harm'' means any harm, 
        whether physical or nonphysical, including 
        psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is 
        sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding 
        circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the 
        same background and in the same circumstances to 
        perform or to continue performing commercial sexual 
        activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.
            (5) The term ``venture'' means any group of two or 
        more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a 
        legal entity.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                            Dissenting Views

                              INTRODUCTION

    H.R. 285, the ``Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation 
Act of 2015,'' amends the Federal sex trafficking statute\1\ to 
prohibit the advertising of certain commercial sex acts. We 
agree with the bill's laudable goal of prosecuting those who 
facilitate sex trafficking, but disagree with the bill's 
expansion of mandatory minimum sentencing because of the 
serious public policy concerns it presents. While the acts 
prohibited by the legislation will often warrant long 
sentences, mandatory minimum sentences are the wrong way to 
determine the punishment under this or any other criminal 
statute. Specifically, mandatory minimum sentencing distorts 
rational sentencing, wastes taxpayer money, and often leads to 
sentences that are not appropriate under the facts of 
particular cases, even when as applied to serious offenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1591 (2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    No matter how well-intentioned H.R. 285 may be, we do not 
believe these significant public policy concerns can be 
disregarded. An amendment rejected during the markup would have 
ameliorated our concerns by clarifying that mandatory minimum 
sentences would not apply to the new offense, while still 
providing that offenders could be punished under the statute's 
maximum penalty. Unfortunately, without this important change, 
we are unable to support this legislation and accordingly we 
dissent from the Committee views on this legislation.

                       DESCRIPTION AND BACKGROUND

    H.R. 285 is primarily intended to prevent the advertising 
of acts of commercial sex trafficking via the Internet. The 
bill amends section 1591 of title 18 of the United States Code, 
which deals with the Federal crime of sex trafficking, to 
include advertising of certain commercial sex acts as a 
punishable offense. Section 1591 currently prohibits conduct 
such as recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, and 
providing victims or benefitting financially from commercial 
sex acts involving minors, or adults who are forced or coerced 
into participating in the acts. H.R. 285 also amends section 
1591 to include advertising in its penalty provisions, which 
impose mandatory minimum sentences of 10 or 15 years, depending 
on the circumstances of the crime.
    For offenses under section 1591(a) of the current statute, 
one may be punished for acting ``knowingly'' or ``in reckless 
disregard'' of the fact that a victim is a minor or one whose 
participation in the acts was forced or coerced. For instances 
where one benefits from a sex trafficking venture in violation 
of section 1591(a)(2) when the conduct of the venture in 
violation of section 1591(a)(1) consists of advertising, 
section 2(b) of the bill requires knowledge as to these facts 
and the ``reckless disregard'' standard would not apply.

                         CONCERNS WITH H.R. 285

    By adding advertising to the list of prohibited conduct 
related to sex trafficking, H.R. 285 may subject a range of 
communications providers and facilitators to mandatory minimum 
sentences. Regardless of the nature and circumstances 
surrounding the offense, the role of the offender in the 
particular crime, and the history and characteristics of the 
offender, H.R. 285 would require a judge to impose a 10- or 15-
year sentence. Even if everyone involved in a case--the 
arresting officer, prosecutor, judge, and victim--believes that 
the mandatory minimum would be an unjust sentence for a 
particular defendant in a case, H.R. 285 would nevertheless 
mandate that it be imposed.
    The imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 or 15 
years is particularly troublesome when one considers the 
possible scope of defendants who could be prosecuted under H.R. 
285. Notably, the prohibition on advertising does not 
explicitly apply only to a sex trafficker who places an 
advertisement, and could conceivably be applied to individuals 
and entities who facilitate, but have a minor role in, 
publishing the advertisement. Those who are employed by a 
venture that benefits financially from the advertisement, but 
whose role in the organization does not place them in the chain 
of decision making with respect to acceptance or publishing of 
illegal advertisements could also be prosecuted under the 
bill.\2\ In the online context in which advertising networks 
are often complex and automated, there may be circumstances in 
which an employee of a communications company may be found 
liable under the statute, but whose role in the offense is so 
attenuated that it would not warrant a mandatory minimum 
sentence of 10 or 15 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1591(a)(2) (2015) subjects to liability ``whoever 
knowingly--(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, 
from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described 
in violation of paragraph (1).''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mandatory minimum sentences are the wrong way to determine 
punishment under the Federal sex trafficking statute, or any 
other statute. Mandatory minimums not only lead to unjust 
outcomes for individuals, but also have serious systemic 
consequences by contributing to the problem of 
overincarceration. As of September 2010, 75,579 Federal 
prisoners--more than one-third (39.4%)--were serving mandatory 
minimum sentences.\3\ This represents a 155% increase from the 
number of Federal prisoners serving mandatory minimum sentences 
in 1995 (29,603).\4\ Since Congress enacted harsh mandatory 
minimums in the 1980s, the Federal prison population has 
exploded by over 800% to more than 216,000 inmates today.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: 
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal System, at 148 
(Oct. 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-
minimum-penalties/201110
31-rtc-pdf/Chapter_07.pdf.
    \4\Id. at 81, available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/news/congressional-
testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/
Chapter_04.pdf.
    \5\Bureau of Prisons, Historical Information, at http://
www.bop.gov/about/history/ and Inmate Statistics: Offenses, at http://
www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, higher than warranted sentences resulting from 
mandatory minimum sentencing strain public finances. For 
example, the average cost of incarceration for a Federal inmate 
in fiscal year 2011 was $28,893.40.\6\ In fact, the U.S. 
Department of Justice has referred to the increased year-to-
year spending on Federal prisons as ``unsustainable'' and a 
threat to public safety.\7\ For fiscal year 2014, close to a 
third (28.8%) of the Justice Department's $27.7 billion budget 
was earmarked for Federal prisons and detention.\8\ Every 
dollar expended on lengthy mandatory minimum incarcerations is 
a dollar that cannot be spent on crime prevention, victim 
services, training, investigation, and prosecution.\9\ Absent 
smarter sentencing policies and reformation of mandatory 
minimum sentences, prison populations and their associated 
costs will continue to escalate.\10\ We need to take steps to 
ensure that sentences are appropriately severe, but are not set 
beyond levels that no longer serve legitimate criminal justice 
purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\Bureau of Prisons, Annual Determination of Average Cost of 
Incarceration, 78 Fed. Reg. No. 52 at 16711 (Mar. 18, 2013), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-03-18/pdf/2013-06139.pdf.
    \7\Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, Top Management and 
Performance Challenges Facing the Dep't of Justice--2013, at http://
www.justice.gov/oig/challenges/2013.htm.
    \8\U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Summary: Fiscal Year 
2014 Omnibus Appropriations Bill 5-7 (Jan. 13, 2014), at http://
www.appropriations.senate.gov/news.cfm?
method=news.view&id;=5aa8e660-f52e-4074-945f-9618eb963ae9.
    \9\Id.
    \10\Horowitz, supra n.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An amendment offered by Representative Henry C. ``Hank'' 
Johnson, Jr. (D-GA) that would have addressed these significant 
concerns was defeated by a vote of 7 to 20 during the markup. 
The amendment would have removed application of the statute's 
mandatory minimum prison sentences to advertising and instead 
allow a judge to apply an appropriate sentence under the 
circumstances of the case up to the statute's existing maximum 
penalty of life in prison. Given the complicated nature of 
internet communications networks and other forms of 
advertising, which would be affected by this bill, the role of 
the judge in evaluating each case is particularly important. 
While long sentences may be appropriate under the facts of a 
particular violation of law, Congress cannot know the facts of 
every case in advance. Removing mandatory minimums while still 
permitting the lengthy statutory maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment, as Representative Johnson's amendment would have 
done, would provide the appropriate spectrum of sentences for 
culpability and proportionate punishment.

                               CONCLUSION

    We must do more to combat sex trafficking by taking steps 
such as strengthening our laws and providing additional 
resources for law enforcement and victim services. In our haste 
to combat this tragic crime, however, we must also consider the 
public policy implications of our legislative actions. 
Unfortunately, the expansion of mandatory minimum penalties 
resulting from H.R. 285 would make it an inflexible and often 
inappropriate means of addressing the range of those who could 
be prosecuted under the statute.
    For the foregoing reasons, we must respectfully dissent.

                                   Mr. Conyers, Jr.
                                   Ms. Jackson Lee.
                                   Mr. Johnson, Jr.
                                   Mr. Gutierrez.

                                 [all]