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House Calendar No. 163
114th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { 114-848
_______________________________________________________________________
F I N A L R E P O R T
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
THE EVENTS SURROUNDING
THE 2012 TERRORIST
ATTACK IN BENGHAZI
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
December 7, 2016.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be
printed
FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE
EVENTS SURROUNDING THE 2012 TERRORIST ATTACK IN BENGHAZI
114th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { 114-848
_______________________________________________________________________
F I N A L R E P O R T
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
THE EVENTS SURROUNDING
THE 2012 TERRORIST
ATTACK IN BENGHAZI
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
December 7, 2016.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be
printed
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
22-867 WASHINGTON : 2016
____________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
Internet:bookstore.gpo.gov. Phone:toll free (866)512-1800;DC area (202)512-1800
Fax:(202) 512-2104 Mail:Stop IDCC,Washington,DC 20402-001
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Chairman
LYNN WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Ranking Member
PETER ROSKAM, Illinois ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas ADAM SCHIFF, California
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama LINDA SANCHEZ, California
SUSAN BROOKS, Indiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
------------
This report is dedicated to the memory and service of Glen A. Doherty,
Sean P. Smith, J. Christopher Stevens, and Tyrone S. Woods
COMMITTEE STAFF
Philip G. Kiko, Staff Director & General Counsel
Christopher A. Donesa, Deputy Staff Director
Dana Chipman, Chief Counsel
Sarah Adams, Senior Advisor Sheria Clarke, Counsel
Sara Barrineau, Investigator Carlton Davis, Counsel
Brian Beattie, Professional Staff Mark Grider, Deputy General
Member Counsel
Kimberly Betz, Member Liaison & Sharon Jackson, Deputy Chief
Counsel Counsel
Rob Borden, Senior Advisor Craig Missakian, Deputy Chief
Luke Burke, Investigator/Detailee Counsel
J. Mac Tolar, Senior Counsel
Jamal D. Ware, Communications Director
Amanda Duvall, Deputy Communications Director
Matt Wolking, Press Secretary
Douglas Alexander, Printing Clerk Abigail Helvering, Staff Assistant
Anne Binsted, Finance and Personnel Pat Knudsen, Shared Employee
Administrator Paige Lueken, Executive Assistant
Frank Chang, Legal Intern Barbara McCaffrey, Documents Clerk
George Gerbo, Staff Assistant Elizabeth McWhorter, Security
Elizabeth Gorman, Professional Manager
Staff Member William Sacripanti, Staff
Clark Hedrick, Legal Intern Assistant
Elizabeth Starek, Staff Assistant
Sharon Utz, Professional Staff
Member
Minority Staff
Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Staff Director & General Counsel
Heather Sawyer, Chief Counsel
Dave Rapallo, Senior Advisor to the Ranking Member
Krista Boyd, Senior Counsel Laura Rauch, Senior Professional
Peter Kenny, Senior Counsel Staff Member
Ronak Desai, Counsel Daniel Rebnord, Professional Staff
Shannon Green, Counsel Member
Valerie Shen, Counsel Brent Woolfork, Professional Staff
Jennifer Werner, Communications
Director Member
Paul Bell, Deputy Communications Erin O'Brien, Investigator/
Director Detailee
Linda Cohen, Senior Professional Kendal Robinson, Investigator/
Staff Member Detailee
Mone Ross, Staff Assistant
Majority Interns
J. Michael Abler Clay Bryan
Jeff Beck Amanda Gonzalez
Courtney Ballenger Francesca Savoia
Michelle Bowling Ivy Wilborn
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Select Committee on the
Events Surrounding The
2012 Terrorist Attack
in Benghazi,
Washington, December 7, 2016.
Hon. Karen L. Haas,
Clerk, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Ms. Haas:
Pursuant to H. Res. 567 of the 113th Congress and section
4(a) of H. Res. 5 of the 114th Congress, I hereby transmit the
attached report, ``Final Report of the Select Committee on the
Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi.''
Sincerely,
Trey Gowdy,
Chairman.
House Calendar No. 163
114th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { 114-848
======================================================================
FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE 2012
TERRORIST ATTACK IN BENGHAZI
_______
December 7, 2016.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be
printed
_______
Mr. Gowdy, from the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012
Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
On July 8, 2016, the Select Committee on the Events
Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, approved and
reported the following investigative report to the House,
pursuant to H. Res. 567 (113th Congress).
CONTENTS
Page
Illustrations.................................................... 3
Part I. Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi......... 9
Part II. Internal and Public Government Communications about the
Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi.................................. 133
Part III. Events Leading to the Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi.... 263
Part IV. Compliance with Congressional Investigations............ 353
Part V. Recommendations.......................................... 409
Additional Views of Rep. Jim Jordan and Rep. Mike Pompeo......... 415
Appendix A: Resolution Establishing the Select Committee on the
Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi....... 453
Appendix B: Significant Persons and Organizations................ 461
Appendix C: Questions for the President.......................... 467
Appendix D: Significant Events in Libya Prior to the Attacks..... 471
Appendix E: Security Incidents in Libya.......................... 475
Appendix F: Deterioration of Benghazi Mission Compound Security.. 531
Appendix G: Timelines of the Attacks............................. 559
Appendix H: The September 12 Situation Report and the President's
Daily Brief.................................................... 575
Appendix I: Witness Interview Summaries.......................... 587
Appendix J: Requests and Subpoenas for Documents................. 601
Appendix K: Analysis of Accountability Review Board, House Armed
Services Committee, and House Permanent Select Intelligence
Committee Reports.............................................. 617
Appendix L: Glen A. Doherty, Sean P. Smith, J. Christopher
Stevens, and Tyrone S. Woods................................... 643
Minority Views................................................... 645
ILLUSTRATIONS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
PART I:
Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities
in Benghazi
``If you guys don't get here, we're all going to f---ing
die.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Testimony of GRS 4, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 33 (Mar. 1,
2016) [hereinafter GRS 4 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Diplomatic Security Agent in Benghazi
during the
attacks
``I'm in Benghazi this week, lurking about with my eyes ever-
peeled for RPG's hurtling towards my motorcade!''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to
personal account of Dominic A.G. Asquith, U.K. Ambassador to Libya
(Sept. 11, 2012, 5:40 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05390150).
Ambassador Christopher Stevens, to the
U.K.
Ambassador on the morning of September
11, 2012
``We're under attack.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\Testimony of Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission, Libya, U.S.
Dep't of State at 18 (Apr. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Hicks Apr. 2013
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Ambassador Christopher Stevens, on the
evening of
September 11, 2012
BACKGROUND: SEPTEMBER 2012 AND THE AMBASSADOR'S TRIP TO BENGHAZI
Stevens' Decision to Travel to Benghazi
J. Christopher Stevens, a highly and widely respected
diplomat, was sworn in as the United States Ambassador to Libya
on May 14, 2012.\4\ Thirteen months earlier in 2011, while
Libya was still in the throes of a civil war, Stevens
courageously arrived in Benghazi, Libya on a Greek cargo ship
to serve as the United States' Special Representative to the
Transitional National Council [TNC].\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Public Schedule [for the Secretary of State] for May 14, 2012
found at www.State.gov/pa/prs/appt/2012/05/14/189814.htm.
\5\U.S. Representative to TNC Stevens provides an update on Libya,
DIPNOTE, Aug. 3, 2011 found at https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2011/08/
03/us-representative-t-n-c-stevens-provides-
update-libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens remained Special Representative to the TNC for more
than six months in 2011 and witnessed both the dictatorship of
Muammar Qadhafi topple and the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in
Tripoli, which had previously been evacuated at the beginning
of the Libyan revolution in February of 2011.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\A Guide to the U.S. History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and
Consular Relations, by Country, Since 1776: [State Department/Office of
the Historian] found at: https://history.state.gov/
countries/libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens left Benghazi in November of 2011, to return to the
United States, where he would be nominated and confirmed as
Ambassador to Libya the following May.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\Biography of J. Christopher Stevens, Ambassador, Libya, found
at: https://state.gov/r/pa/ec/biog/193075.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens had a deep affection for the Libyan people in
general and the people of Benghazi in particular. He also knew
Libya as well as anyone in the U.S. Foreign Service. He would
soon learn much had changed in Libya from the time he left as
Special Representative in November of 2011 until the time he
returned as Ambassador in May of 2012.
The Benghazi Mission compound where Stevens lived for
several months in 2011 remained open while he was in the U.S.
awaiting confirmation as Ambassador. The Benghazi Mission
compound was protected by Diplomatic Security Agents and
staffed by a Principal Officer who provided political reporting
on the changes occurring in Benghazi as the country attempted
to recover after the revolution.
In August of 2012, three months after Stevens returned to
Libya as the newly confirmed Ambassador, the Principal Officer
in Benghazi was nearing the end of his assignment. There would
be a two-week gap between the Principal Officer's departure
date and the arrival of the next Principal Officer.\8\ No one
was scheduled to fill this vacancy until September 15, 2012, so
Ambassador Stevens chose to send Principal Officer 4, to cover
the vacancy during the first week in September.\9\ Stevens
chose himself to cover the second week.\10\ According to
Gregory N. Hicks, who as the Deputy Chief of Mission was second
in command at the time, Stevens ``very much wanted to get back
to Benghazi . . . he had not been able to go since his own
arrival in Tripoli'' in May of 2012.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\See Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 9 (``[Principal Officer 3] left
at the end of August, and the new Principal Officer was not arriving
until--scheduled to arrive until September 15th or thereabouts.'').
\9\See id. at 57 (``And so basically Chris announces at the meeting
that [Principal Officer 4] is going to go to Benghazi to cover the
first week in the gap, first week in September, and that he would cover
the second week.'').
\10\Id.
\11\Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The timing of Stevens' visit to Benghazi was important for
another reason as well. He was spearheading an effort to make
Benghazi a permanent post, Hicks testified:
One of the things he [Stevens] said to me was that, in
his exit interview with Secretary Clinton, she
expressed the hope that we could make the special
mission in Benghazi a permanent constituent post. And
Chris said that one of the first things he intended to
do after his arrival was develop a proposal to move
forward on that project.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\Id. at 7.
A trip to Benghazi would allow Stevens to personally assess
the political and security situation and make a recommendation
regarding whether the U.S. should have a permanent presence
there. Discussions were already under way in Washington D.C. on
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
how to fund a permanent post. Hicks stated:
[W]e are only a month from the end of the fiscal year,
so we have to get a [sic] or, we have to help
Washington, the executive director's office of the Near
East Bureau to put together a package to get it to [the
Undersecretary for Management] Pat Kennedy for a
decision by September 30th. Otherwise, we lose the
money. Because we had surplus money available from
Iraq--I can't remember, Iraq contingency fund I think--
that had been notified by Pat Kennedy for transfer from
Iraq--it wasn't going to get spent in Iraq, and so we
were going to spend it in Libya and in Benghazi. But we
had to get the justification forward to do that.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\Id. at 16-17.
While the end of the fiscal year funding deadline was
looming, the Diplomatic Security Agent in charge at the Embassy
in Tripoli was, nonetheless, concerned about Stevens' trip to
Benghazi. Although his first planned trip to Benghazi in the
beginning of August 2012 had to be canceled because of
security,\14\ Stevens was adamant, however, about going in
September.\15\ The Diplomatic Security Agent testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\See Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to
Libya, to Principal Officer 3, Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Dep't of
State, (Aug. 2, 2012, 2:45 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390855).
\15\See Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 23, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. at 69-70 (Oct. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent
23 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Previous to this--to his decisions to going up there,
there was--we would meet weekly to discuss the security
situation in Libya. . . . [T]here was a specific
meeting regarding what was happening in Benghazi. In
that meeting, we reviewed incidents and probable
causes, what's initiating it. And a lot of discussion
was that it was the conflict or the incidents up there
were, you know, local population against local
population and that that they weren't specifically
targeting Americans . . . up there. I expressed my
concerns about the incidents that did involve us. And
the basic response was that they . . . were anomalies.
* * *
It was the persons attending the meeting. I believe it
was the Ambassador who actually said its anomalies; we
can't account for anomalies. And other members of the
group seemed to concur with that. And then this trip
was planned because there was a gap in principal
officer up there and the opening of the American
corner. . . . I knew he was bound and determined to go.
I've been wracking my memory trying to remember the
exact conversations I had with him on this. But I know
he knew I didn't--the idea of him traveling there. But
I knew he was determined to go. So doing everything I
can to make it as safe as possible, given my resources
and the environment--safety--compounds--both compounds,
all the Americans there.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\Id.
Not only was the looming funding deadline an impetus for
Stevens' trip, an upcoming trip by Hillary R. Clinton,
Secretary of State, in the fall of 2012 was also a motivating
factor for him to travel to Benghazi. The hope was to establish
a permanent consulate in Benghazi for the Secretary to present
to the Libyan government during her trip. Hicks discussed this
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
with the Committee:
Q: Okay. We know that Ambassador Stevens went to
Benghazi on September 10th. Was there anything about
his trip to Benghazi in September of 2012 that was sort
of a precursor for the Secretary's trip?
A: Well, you know, when we have a visit by a major
political figure, like the Secretary of State, like the
President, you know, we try to make that visit
important publicly. And so we generally will create a
list of what we call deliverables, items of importance
to the bilateral relationship. So we hoped for the
Secretary to announce the opening of a permanent
consulate in Benghazi during her visit[.]
Q: Was there any reason that--was there anything
related to making Benghazi a permanent post that was
part of the purpose of Ambassador Stevens going to
Benghazi in September?
A: Oh, absolutely. And so again, we had begun the
process of developing a political rationale for having
a permanent post in Benghazi. I sent in that rationale
at the end of August to the executive director of the
NEA [Near Eastern Affairs] bureau. We had begun a
process of identifying locations and drawing plans for
such a post.
* * *
And we understood that the situation in eastern Libya
was unstable and we wanted to--and Chris Stevens wanted
to make sure that what we were doing was going--was the
right course of action. And he personally, because he
had the contacts in the region, because he had their
trust. He was the only person that we felt could go to
Benghazi and get a clear picture of the political
situation there and the security situation there as
well.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\Testimony of Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 50-51 (Apr. 14, 2016)
[hereinafter Hicks Apr. 2016 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
The Secretary was planning to travel to Libya in October of
2012.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations,
U.S. Dep't of State, to Philippe Reines, Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Public
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 12, 2012, 9:15 AM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0075710).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi: September 1-September 10, 2012
Security deficiencies plagued the Benghazi Mission compound
in the lead-up to September 2012. With the departure of the
Diplomatic Security Agent in charge at the end of August, only
two Diplomatic Security Agents remained to secure the
compound.\19\ A Diplomatic Security Agent from Tripoli was
routed to Benghazi to serve temporarily during the month of
September putting three agents on the ground as of September 1,
2012.\20\ None of the Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi
had ever served at a high-threat post.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\See Email from Deputy Dir. for Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 27, 2012
4:47 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05394203) (``Thanks for your
call and clarification that DS has had no volunteers for Benghazi for
the upcoming few months.'').
\20\See Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 56.
\21\See id. at 14 (``Principal Officer 4 is chosen to be Acting
Principal Officer for the first week in September. And he goes to
Benghazi and is there with three Diplomatic Sec. special agents, all of
whom are brand new to the service and on temporary duty assignment.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Mission compound's contracted quick
reaction force, the February 17 Martyrs Brigade militia, which
provided interior armed security at the Benghazi Mission
compound, informed the Diplomatic Security Agents two days
before the Ambassador was scheduled to arrive it would no
longer provide off-compound security.\22\ This meant the three
Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground would have no security
support for any transport or for any meetings held off of the
compound during Stevens' visit. The Diplomatic Security Agents
attributed the change in policy to an inter-militia power
struggle.\23\ The next day, however, the Principal Officer in
Benghazi, joined a meeting with leading militia officials
during which time they told him they could no longer guarantee
the safety of the compound. The Principal Officer described the
meeting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 23 Testimony at 44-45.
\23\See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3, Diplomatic Sec.
Service, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Libya (Sept. 8, 2012 9:29 PM) (on file
with the Committee, C05396013).
[T]here was a--it was a growing and nascent group of
commanders who--militia commanders who were just
becoming kind of players on the security scene. And
some of the working assumptions were that they were
doing this mainly for personal profit; others for
religious and ideological reasons. It is trying to
understand motivations of groups of people who may or
may not become future leaders for the city of Benghazi
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
or the country of Libya.
So these folks were identified as people who fit that
billet, essentially, security official officials who
may or may not have aspirations for larger roles in
Benghazi.
* * *
Libya Shield was a brand new organization at that time
that was kind of emerging from the ranks of the
[Supreme Security Council] and from other official
organizations. They had numbers to them. What I
characterize in here was what was the most fascinating
part of the meeting to me. I was sitting with Wissam
bin Hamid and Jumaa and I forget his name al Gha'abi.
They were debating which militias they belonged to and
who was in control of them and what their ideology was
and what their ambitions were. And they weren't you
know, they disagreed on many of those things.
And one member was--one of the commanders was a member
of the other commander's brigade under that commander,
and that commander was a member of that commander's
brigade under that commander. So it was really
difficult to determine who was in charge, and I think
they right there in front of us were, you know, playing
that out, which is a great opportunity to really get a
sense of what's going on in the rest of the country.
* * *
Q: [I]t looks like it's the second to last sentence or
third to last sentence, it begins: They criticized the
[U.S. Government] for supporting National Forces
Alliance leader and prime minister candidate Mahmoud
Jibril. Do you recall what their criticism of the U.S.
Government was?
A: Yeah. So ``supporting'' is in quotations, right, and
which is a false accusation against the United States.
We don't support candidates in a foreign government's
internal domestic election. But the general perception,
because Mahmoud Jibril is an American citizen as well
as a Libyan, is that the United States Government was
backing him. He was a big political player, former
prime minister and someone who was gaining it seemed to
be at that time someone who may end up with another
very high ranking position in the Libyan Government.
That did not meet these particular militia commanders'
idea of a beneficial Libyan structure for them, and so
they were complaining about it.
Q: [Y]ou go on to write: If Jibril won, they said they
would not continue to guarantee security in Benghazi, a
critical function they asserted they were currently
providing. What was your understanding of what they
meant when they said they would not continue to
guarantee security in Benghazi?
A: Yeah, I did not take that as a threat against U.S.
interests, the U.S. compound, U.S. persons, or anything
else. I took that more as a general discussion of
Benghazi, the security situation in Benghazi is
generally deteriorating, if they at least their
assertion that the general condition in Benghazi would
deteriorate if they withdrew their security support.
Q: Did you understand what did they mean by withdrew
their security support?
A: Well, I mean, that's one of the questions I was
asking, right. What do you do? Who are you? Why are you
Libya 1? Why are you Libya 2? What's your role? How do
you fit into the security structure? And, as I said,
you know, they didn't really have a very good picture
of it themselves, so I couldn't come out with one.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\Testimony of Principal Officer 4, Foreign Service Officer, U.S.
Dep't of State, Tr. at 64-68 (May 8, 2015) (on file with the
Committee). See also, Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S.
Ambassador to Libya, to Principal Officer 4, Foreign Service Officer,
U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 10, 2012 1:51 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05395344).
The meeting underscored that the militias in Benghazi
controlled what little security environment existed there. Not
having off-compound support from a militia would significantly
threaten Stevens' safety.
Stevens' Trip to Benghazi: September 10, 2012
Stevens arrived by a commercial airplane in Benghazi on the
morning of September 10, 2012.\25\ Traveling with him were two
of the six Diplomatic Security Agents assigned to the Embassy
in Tripoli. Four Diplomatic Security Agents remained behind at
the Embassy along with four Department of Defense special
operators who had previously served as part of the Site
Security Team [SST].\26\ In addition, the special operators had
previously augmented security at the Benghazi Mission compound,
but they were no longer able to do so.\27\ Patrick F. Kennedy,
the Under Secretary for Management, State Department,
terminated the SST's responsibilities for the Embassy's
security in August of 2012.\28\ As a result, the SST was no
longer able to travel with Stevens or augment security in
Benghazi.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2, Tr. at 47 (Mar. 19, 2015)
[hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2].
\26\Testimony of Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 12-14 (Apr. 11, 2013)
[hereinafter Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\27\Hicks Apr. 2016 Testimony at 17.
\28\Id. at 20, 33-35; see also, Email from Patrick Kennedy, Under
Sec'y for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State, to Robert Neller, Lieutenant
General, U.S. Dep't of Defense (July 15, 2012,) (on file with the
Committee SCB0076533).
\29\See Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 12-13.
The August 6th attack, or incident, if you will, AFRICOM
decided to draw down the SST team from 16 members to 6.
Chris concurred in that decision because he didn't really
feel like he had, you know, much leverage other than that.
And so [the Commander of the Site Security Team] and nine
other members of the team left he may have discussed this
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in mid -August.
Full expectation was that when we, as the embassy, and
working with the Defense Attache, achieved the agreement of
the Libyan Government to proceed with the counterterrorism
mission under section 1208, and the training team was given
diplomatic immunity, they would return and begin the
training mission. So they left. So we have at the time,
then, six members of the SST left, divided in two different
locations, four and two. But they are still under AFRICOM
authority.
General Ham issued a letter after the negotiation in
Stuttgart over Eid al Fitr describing the relationship of
the SST to the embassy going forward. I honestly cannot
remember whether the contents of that letter are classified
or not. I know it was transmitted to us over classified
communications. But it was not Chief of Mission authority,
I can tell you that. They were not told that they were
under the authority of the Ambassador with respect to
security, although they were told to cooperate I believe it
told them to cooperate with the RSO for internal defense
matters, if I remember correctly.
In fact, during August 2012, the total number of State
Department security agents assigned to the Embassy in Tripoli
dropped from 34 individuals to six.\30\ Losing 28 security
agents reduced not only the security resources available to the
Embassy, but also those available to the Benghazi Mission
compound. With limited security agents in Tripoli, there were
no surplus security agents to send to augment security in
Benghazi--without leaving the Embassy in Tripoli at severe
risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\Id. at 13-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hicks described the impact of the reduction in personnel on
the overall security platform in Libya:
[W]hen I arrived on July 31st . . . we had the 16
members of the SST and we had about 14 or so State
security personnel, who were divided between either
special agents or MSD, members of the mobile security
detail teams.
Through August, the MSD personnel are withdrawn until,
by August 31st, . . . the security complement in Libya
at the time was: In Tripoli is an RSO plus 5 assistant
regional security officers protecting approximately 28
diplomatic personnel. And in Benghazi we have three DS
special agents protecting two State Department
personnel in our facilities.
So the answer to your question . . . we had nine people
to draw from when Chris decided you know, [Principal
Officer 4] is chosen to be Acting Principal Officer for
the first week in September. And he goes to Benghazi
and is there with three Diplomatic Security special
agents, all of whom are brand new to the service and on
temporary duty assignment.
So when Chris goes to Benghazi on the 10th of
September, [Diplomatic Security Agent 23], the RSO,
assigns two of our personnel in [Tripoli] to go with
him. [N]ow we have, on the morning of September 11th,
when [Principal Officer 4] flies back to Tripoli, we
now have five Diplomatic security special agents
protecting the Ambassador and Sean Smith. In Tripoli,
we have four we have a Regional Security Officer and
three Assistant Regional Security Officers to protect
28 diplomatic personnel.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\Id.
Publicity about Stevens' trip to Benghazi was reportedly
limited. He previously told his staff and contacts on the
ground ``for security reasons we'll need to be careful about
limiting moves off-compound and scheduling as many meetings as
possible in the villa.''\32\ Stevens said he wanted to ``avoid
the RPG reception that the UK Amb[assador] got. . . .''\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to
a Locally Employed Staff, U.S. Dep't of State, and Principal Officer 4,
U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 8, 2012, 4:37 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05390147).
\33\Email from Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep't of State, to J.
Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya (Aug. 1, 2012 10:49 AM)
(on file with the Committee, C05390814).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upon arriving in Benghazi on September 10, 2012, Stevens
received a security briefing at the nearby Central Intelligence
Agency [CIA] annex on the changing threat environment.\34\ Due
to the worsening security environment in Benghazi, the
Diplomatic Security Agents at the compound requested support
from the Annex's security team, the Global Response Staff
[GRS], to supplement Stevens' movements off-compound in
Benghazi.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 54.
\35\Id. at 59.
Q: You talked during the last hour about the
intelligence briefing that you provided to the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador the night before the attack.
What type of reaction did you get from the Ambassador
from your briefing?
A: He was interested. He took a lot of notes. It struck
me a little bit that he was surprised at how fast the
situation had deteriorated in eastern Libya.
Q: And what did he do to give you that impression that
he was surprised at how quickly----
A: He was called in to go to his next appointment
several times, and he refused to leave before we
finished.
Q: Okay, do you know who his next appointment was?
A: Yes.
Q: And what was that?
A: Benghazi City Council, I believe.
Q: Did the Ambassador ask any questions of you during
the briefing?
A: Yes, yeah, he asked a lot of questions.
Q: And what were his questions along the lines of if
you can recall?
A: Specifically about the extremist groups that
established presence in eastern Libya since the fall of
the regime.
Q: Okay, and do you recall at that time approximately
how many extremist groups there were that had
established a presence?
A: Several.
Q: Several?
A: Yes.
Q: Well, from what you can remember, what are the names
to the extent that you can remember?
A: Yes, AQIM; Al Qaeda; and Islamic Brethren; AQAP; Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; AQ Pakistan; EIJ,
Egyptian Islamic Jihad. By that time, Ansar al-Sharia
Derna had established a presence.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\Officer A, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 116-118. (Mar 2, 2016)
[hereinafter Officer A Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Later in the evening of September 10th, Stevens--with
Diplomatic Security Agents and GRS security--visited the
Benghazi Local Council. Media was present upon his arrival.\37\
One of the Diplomatic Security Agents testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 52.
Q: So, you knew prior to the council meeting that the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
press was going to show up?
A: Yes, and we tried to turn that off, but
unfortunately, we couldn't. They showed up, but we sent
them away.
Q: Okay. Were you surprised to learn that there would
be press at the council meeting?
A: I was.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\Id. at 52-53.
Stevens' visit to Benghazi therefore became public to the
extent it was not otherwise known.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens found the meeting with the Local Council fruitful,
but noted Council members seemed to feel slighted that no
sitting U.S. Ambassador had visited the city since the
revolution ended.\40\ This was a concern among the leaders in
Benghazi at the time, as they feared the Libyan Government's
control and power would remain in Tripoli as it had been during
the Qadhafi regime, thus marginalizing not just Benghazi, but
the whole of Eastern Libya. Stevens noted this concern in his
personal diary:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Personal
Diary, Unofficial Testimony prepared by Patrick F. Kennedy, et al.
(Sept. 10, 2012) (on file with the Committee, STATE-SCB0048881).
They're an impressive & sincere group of
professionals--proud of their service on committees,
all working as volunteers. Their main problem is a lack
of budget & authorities. Tripoli still runs the country
& its bureaucrats are an uneven quality. There was a
little sourness about why it has taken so long to get
to Benghazi, and about Ambassadors who came to talk but
don't do anything to follow up. But overall it was a
positive meeting.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\Id.
September 10 Phone Call on September 11 Preparedness
On September 10, 2012, the day Stevens arrived in Benghazi,
American military forces were reminded to ``do everything
possible to protect the American people, both at home and
abroad.''\42\ That day the President conducted a conference
call with key national security principals to discuss the steps
taken to protect U.S. persons and facilities abroad and force
protection. Leon E. Panetta, Secretary of Defense, one of the
conference call participants acknowledged they ``were already
tracking an inflammatory anti-Muslim video that was circulating
on the Internet and inciting anger across the Middle East
against the United States'' and that they ``braced for
demonstrations in Cairo and elsewhere across the region.''\43\
Due to the Arab Spring, it was a time of heightened concern for
that region in general. In particular, the discussion focused
on several areas including Cairo, Tripoli, Tunis, Khartoum, and
Sana'a, due to intelligence indicating potential demonstrations
could erupt in those areas.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\Readout of the President's Meeting with Senior Administration
Officials on Our Preparedness and Security Posture on the Eleventh
Anniversary of September 11th, dated Sept. 10, 2012.
\43\Leon E. Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War
and Peace 225 (2014).
\44\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the September 10 conference call with national
security principals and the President, the Defense Department
placed its forces on ``higher alert because of the potential
for what could happen.''\45\ Yet, the intelligence and the call
for a ``heightened alert'' did not cause any actual adjustment
in its posture for assets that could respond to a crisis in
North Africa.\46\ Some assets were in the middle of training
exercises, and others were in the middle of inspections. No
fighter jets or tankers were placed on a ``heightened alert''
status.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\Id.
\46\Id. See also, letter from Ashton B. Carter, Sec'y of Defense,
to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, House Select Committee on Benghazi, Apr. 8,
2015 (``However, it is worth noting that none of the military forces
listed above were placed on heightened alert ahead of the attacks on
Benghazi on September 11, 2012.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEPTEMBER 11, 2012
Morning in Benghazi: ``Never Ending Security Threats''
The September 10 visit to Benghazi was Stevens' first since
becoming Ambassador, and the city had changed since his
departure in the fall of 2011.\47\ A growing extremist movement
had taken hold within the city limits and Stevens spent part of
September 10th being briefed on what was happening from a
security standpoint. One CIA officer described the declining
security environment in Benghazi at the time:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Personal
Diary, Unofficial Transcript prepared by Patrick F. Kennedy, et al.
(Sept. 10, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048881).
It was a really unique and difficult environment to
operate in in eastern Libya. It was really a unique
environment. It's a country that we have not had--I
mean, as you know, it was a closed country and it was a
police state, and it's not like it's a country that we
had a ton of experience in how to operate in.
* * *
New groups are forming. New groups are dissolving.
Outside groups are interfering and starting to
establish presence. So it was an extremely dynamic and
fluid situation.
As I said, you know, we had the handicap of not having
good SIGINT coverage within the country. And that goes
back to the fact that Libya, in general, was a denied
area for a long, long time for us, and it's an area
that was very difficult to operate in.
Q: Now, [redacted text]. And I've noticed you've used
the same word three times, ``deteriorating.'' And one
would think that a post-revolutionary country probably
would be in not the greatest of positions to begin
with.
A: Right.
Q: And what you're saying is it deteriorated even from
that.
A: That's correct.
Q: And tell me why you have chosen to use that word and
what you mean by ``deteriorating''?
A: The level of armed conflict and fighting between the
various groups increased. The level of assassinations,
attacks on foreign entities increased. There were
entire towns, specifically Derna and around it, that
became very difficult to travel to; checkpoints that
were manned by individuals dressed in Afghan garb,
jihadi garb; a lot of evidence of foreign fighters
coming in from outside the country.
Specifically in June of 2012, right before the
elections, the Islamist militia had an overt show of
force, where they had a military parade roll in from
eastern Libya to downtown Benghazi. I mean, I guess it
was a message to the Libyan electorate that we are here
and we have a presence and we want to establish Islamic
State inside Libya and we want sharia to be the law of
the country. So there was, like, a lot of attempts to
intimidate the populace in Libya by these extremist
groups.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\Officer A Testimony at 147-49.
Security concerns and the anniversary of September 11 kept
Stevens on the Benghazi Mission compound for his day full of
meetings.
According to his prepared agenda Stevens had meetings with
the 17th February Brigade, the Arabian Gulf Oil Company, and
the head of the al-Marfa Shipping and Maritime Services
Company.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\Schedule for J. Christopher Stevens, Ambassador, Benghazi
Libya: September 10-14 (on file with the Committee, C05396585).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Early on the morning of September 11th, one of the
Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi was notified of an
individual dressed in a uniform typically worn by the local
police force conducting surveillance of the Mission.\50\ The
Diplomatic Security Agent in charge reported the incident to
the head security officer in country at the Embassy in Tripoli
and to staff at both the Benghazi Mission compound and the
Annex, including Stevens.\51\ The Diplomatic Security Agent
described the incident:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:00 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05271656).
\51\Id.; see also Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 104-105;
Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 80.
We received word from our local guards that this
morning they observed a member of the police force
assigned to the Mission at a construction site across
the street from our main gate taking pictures of our
compound. I briefed the Ambo and provided him drafts of
letters notifying the [Libyan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs] and police. Will let you know any further
details.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\Email from a Diplomatic Sec. Agent (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:00 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05271656).
In Benghazi, the Supreme Security Council was the ``most
prominent'' official police force, ``assembled from former
members of the various militias as an interim security
measure.''\53\ It was ``designed to be an interim security
measure'' following the revolution but had not coalesced into
an established force and had little impact on the security
incidents in Benghazi.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\U.S. Dep't of State, Cable, The Guns of August: security in
eastern Libya (Aug. 8, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C055782149).
\54\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens' last meeting of the day was with the Turkish
Consul General. He escorted the Turkish diplomat to the front
gate of the compound that evening at 7:39 p.m. [1:39 p.m. in
Washington D.C.].\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\Comprehensive Timeline of Events--Benghazi (on file with the
Committee, SCB0047843).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens' last entry in his personal journal, dated
September 11, 2012, read: ``Never ending security threats . . .
''\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Personal
Diary, Unofficial Transcript prepared by Patrick F. Kennedy, et al.
(Sept. 10, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048881).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Protest Begins at the U.S. Embassy in
Cairo, Egypt on September 11
In the hours preceding the attacks in Benghazi, a protest
of approximately 2,000 demonstrators assembled outside the U.S.
Embassy in Cairo, Egypt.\57\ Cairo is some 600 miles east of
Benghazi. Plans for a demonstration in Cairo first began to
coalesce in late August 2012 with the designated terrorist
organization, Jamaa Islamiya, calling upon its supporters to
protest the continued incarceration of its leader, Sheikh Omaar
abdel Rahman, also known as the ``Blind Sheik.''\58\ Rahman is
serving a life prison sentence for his role in the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing.\59\ Additionally, in the days preceding
the September 11 demonstration in Cairo, an Arabic version of a
trailer for a little known anti-Islamic film, produced in the
United States, was posted on YouTube.\60\ This trailer caught
the attention of Muslims in Egypt and calls were made on
television, in newspapers, and on social media, to protest the
denigration of the Muslim faith as depicted in the movie
trailer at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo on September 11, 2012.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390691)
(re: FOR SER INFO: More on Cairo Embassy Attack).
\58\See Larry Bell, Muslim Brotherhood Fox Was Hired To Protect Our
Benghazi Consulate Henhouse, Forbes (Dec. 2, 2012), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/12/02/muslim-
brotherhood-fox-was-hired-to-protect-our-benghazi-consulate-henhouse-
interview.
\59\Id.
\60\The original trailer, in English, was posted in July 2012. See
Phil Willon and Rebecca Keegan, Timeline: ``Innocence of Muslims''
Unrest, LA Times (Sept. 13, 2012), http://
articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/12/entertainment/la-et-mn-antiislam-film-
sparks-violence-20120912.
\61\Nancy A. Youssef and Amina Ismail, Anti-U.S. outrage over video
began with Christian activist's phone call to a reporter, McClatchy
Newspapers (Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24737101.html; see also,
Email from State Department Press Office, U.S. Dep't of State, to State
Department Press Office, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 13, 2012 4:54 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05580045) (The film trailer ``had
actually been circulating at a relatively low level for some months out
there in cyberspace and that it only caught fire in the region on the
day or just before that day that we began to see these various
protests.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multiple agencies of the U.S. government were aware of the
impending demonstration in Egypt. The U.S. Embassy in Cairo
notified the State Department, coordinated with Egyptian
leaders, and ordered most of its personnel not to report to
work that day.\62\ The Department of Homeland Security issued
an intelligence report on September 10, 2012 advising that the
Cairo Embassy might be targeted as a means to call for the
release of the Blind Sheik as well as in response to an anti-
Islam film.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\See id. (``in the day or days prior to the protests that became
violent at our Embassy in Cairo, the film had been shown on Egyptian
television and was being quite heavily watched, and our social media
tracking indicated that . . . we expected it to be localized to
Egypt.'').
\63\Catherine Herridge, DHS report warned last week of call for
`burning the embassy down' in Cairo, Fox News, (Sept. 19, 2012), http:/
/www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/09/19/dhs-report-warned-last-week-call-
for-burning-embassy-down-in-cairo.print.html; see also Intel agencies
warned U.S. embassy in Egypt of possible violence over film, Al Arabiya
News (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/18/
238658.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after noon in Cairo [6 a.m. in Washington D.C.] on
September 11, 2012, the U.S. Embassy in Cairo posted a tweet
condemning those who would ``hurt the religious feelings of
Muslims.''\64\ A few hours later, demonstrators began gathering
outside the perimeter wall of the Embassy in Cairo.\65\ The
crowd of demonstrators grew to nearly 2,000 people.\66\ Armed
with spray paint, a handful of demonstrators scaled the walls,
tore down the American flag, ripped it to shreds, and replaced
it with a black militant Islamic flag.\67\ According to
Kennedy, there were no weapons shown or used during the protest
in Cairo.\68\ Within hours, the Egyptian police were able to
``move the protesters off the compound peacefully.''\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\Email from Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Wendy Sherman, Under Sec'y for Political Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of State, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012, 6:08 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05580024) (Subject: Today's Benghazi backgrounding points) (``The
statement was issued from Embassy Cairo just after noon Cairo time on
September 11, well before the incident at the Embassy.''); see also
Karen Yourish and David A. Fahrenthold, Timeline
on Libya and Egypt: Attacks and response, Wash. Post, (Sept. 12, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/timeline-on-libya-
and-egypt-attacks-and-response/2012/09/12/85288638-fd03-11e1-a31e-
804fccb658f9_story.html?hpid=z1.
\65\Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390691)
(re: FOR SER INFO: More on Cairo Embassy Attack).
\66\Id.
\67\Id.
\68\Email from Legislative Mgmt. Officer, U.S. Dep't of State, to
H_Egypt, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05562234) (Subject: Write up of U/S Kennedy Call with Hill re Libya)
(``Attack in Cairo was a demonstration. There were no weapons shown or
used. A few cans of spray paint.'').
\69\Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390691)
(re: FOR SER INFO: More on Cairo Embassy Attack) (``Egyptian police did
finally move the protesters off the compound peacefully.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States Africa Command [AFRICOM] was the U.S
Combatant Command with responsibility for all of Africa, except
Egypt. Despite Egypt not being in its area of responsibility,
AFRICOM observed the Cairo protest throughout the day. Vice
Admiral Charles J. Leidig, the Deputy Commander for Military
Operations at AFRICOM, discussed AFRICOM's actions that day:
[W]e had been observing the events on that day in Cairo
and the protests, and we were concerned that those
protests would cause other protests throughout the
region, and particularly in North Africa. Even though
Egypt is not in our area of responsibility, it surely
has an affinity with the other countries that are in
Northern Africa. So we were watching that carefully.
So I actually recall staying at work until almost 1900
[7:00 p.m. in Libya] because we wanted to see if any
riots or protests would break out, and they didn't.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\Testimony of Vice Admiral Charles J. Leidig, Deputy Commander
for Military Operations, U.S. Africa Command, Tr. at 25-26 (Mar. 20,
2014) [hereinafter Leidig 2014 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Despite the size of the crowd of demonstrators in Cairo and
the length of the demonstration, the protest in Cairo prompted
no change in force laydown for the forces that might respond to
unrest in North Africa. In other words, neither the President's
meeting with his Cabinet which included a discussion of the
anti-Muslim film nor the anniversary of September 11, 2001, nor
the demonstration in Cairo prompted any change in U.S. military
posture or asset readiness in the region.
The Anti-Muslim Film was a ``Nonevent'' in Libya
The protests in Cairo had little to no impact on the
Benghazi Mission compound or throughout Libya. While the anti-
Muslim film was one of the reasons protests were called for in
Egypt, it was virtually unknown in Libya. Hicks testified
regarding the reaction in Libya to the film:
Q: Was it your understanding that the Cairo protest had
been planned and called for?
A: I believe I understood that at the time.
Q: Okay. Had there been any similar protest in Libya
that were planned and called for prior to that day?
A: No there were not. And so we were interested in
monitoring all our contacts, and monitoring social
media, news outlets, to see if anything erupted in
Libya that was comparable to what was happening in
Cairo. And we wanted to do that, but we wanted to do
that as safely as possible.
* * *
Q: Okay. We have heard reports that the demonstrations
in Cairo were at least in part if not solely based on
some sort of video or film trailer that was out that
was demeaning to the Prophet Mohammed. Did you have
that understanding at the time?
A: Of the Cairo----
Q: Yes.
A: --demonstrations?
Q: Yes.
A: I think maybe I did. I'm not sure.
Q: . Were you monitoring within Libya for any type of
reaction to this film?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And how long had you been monitoring in Libya
for any type of reaction to this film?
A: I think we had begun monitoring since about
September 8th.
Q: Okay. And had you had any reaction or hits on your
monitoring?
A: Very few, if any.
Q: So it appeared to be a nonevent in the country of
Libya?
A: It was a nonevent in the country of Libya.
Q: Did you have any conversations with Ambassador
Stevens regarding the demonstrations in Cairo and the
actions that you were taking in response to that?
A: I had texted him and said, hey, are you watching TV?
Embassy Cairo is under attack.
* * *
Q: And did he respond?
A: He said, really? And I can't remember exactly what
he said, but anyway it was, what's going on? And I
said, the embassy's been breached, the flag's been
taken down, the black flag has been raised in its
place.
Q: Was that the sum total of your communication back
and forth.
A: That was the sum total of our communication.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\Hicks Apr. 2016 Testimony at 64-68.
One of the Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi told the
Committee what happened after Stevens learned of the Cairo
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
protests:
Q: Did you hear at any point during the day at some
time about a protest in Cairo?
A: Yes. I can't remember exactly when, but I was made
aware of the protests in Cairo, and the Ambassador had
asked about it.
Q: And were you actually in a conversation with the
Ambassador?
A: I was in a conversation with the Ambassador when he
said, hey, something's going on in Cairo, and he asked
me if I would be able to find out something about it
for him.
Q: And were you able to?
A: I made some phone calls to the command center, in
D.C. but there was no other information that I received
other than that there was a protest, and they were
actually in the process of evaluating the
situation.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 82-83.
As in Tripoli, the agents in Benghazi monitored social
media for any planned or called-for demonstrations. On
September 11, there was no indication in Benghazi that any
protests over the film trailer were planned.\73\ With the film
being a virtual nonevent in Libya, the Diplomatic Security
Agents saw no reason to change their security posture that day.
One Diplomatic Security Agent recounted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\Email from Agent 5, Diplomatic Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of State,
to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya (Sept. 11, 2012
1:39 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393199) (Subject: Daily
Security Update).
Q: And do you remember any conversations about whether
or not, because of what the Ambassador had been hearing
and asked you to follow-up on, or any other reasons, of
potentially changing anything about the security setup
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
for that evening?
A: No, no I--no, I can't think of any changes that we
talked about making or made based on that.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 84-85.
Evening in Benghazi
On the evening of September 11, 2012, there were a total of
seven U.S. personnel, including Stevens, on the ground at the
compound at the time of the attack.\75\ Sean P. Smith, who
prior to working for the State Department served in the United
States Air Force, was one of the U.S. personnel there. Smith
was serving as the Information Management Officer. He had been
in Benghazi on a temporary tour of duty from The Hague for 30
days. He arrived on September 1 and his role was to run the
administrative component of the Mission. The other five U.S.
personnel at the compound that evening included the two
Diplomatic Security Agents who travelled with Stevens from
Tripoli to Benghazi, and the three Diplomatic Security Agents
assigned to Benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 142.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens' last event of the day was a meeting with the
Turkish Consul General, [redacted text]. The Consul General
departed at 7:39 p.m. local time, and four British security
team members departed at 8:27 p.m.\76\ No other visitors were
on the Mission compound that night. There was no evidence of
any group assembled outside the Mission compound gate: large,
small, peaceful or otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 1940 and
2027, respectively).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THERE WAS NO PROTEST
All five Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground that
night in Benghazi were consistent in their testimony--before
the attack began, there was no protest.
One agent testified:
Q: So the intelligence in and around Benghazi was that
there was no planned protest?
A: I did not hear of a planned protest, no.
Q: No one communicated that to you.
A: No, I did not hear that.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr.
at 50-51 (Mar. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony]
(on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another agent testified:
Q: Do you recall at any time during the day seeing any
type of crowd form outside of the mission compound.
A: Other than?
Q: Other than normal activity that would have occurred
in Benghazi, just people coming and going.
A: So other than the attack and the attackers, no.
Q: Okay. So there was no protest, to the best of your
knowledge, the day of the attack.
A: Not to my knowledge.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 123-124.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet another agent testified:
Q: From your perspective, had there been a protest?
A: No. There was nothing out there up until, well, up
until there was. I had been out of the gate at 8:30
that night. We had had personnel leaving the compound,
and they drove away from our compound and didn't report
anything, and I spoke with them subsequently, there was
nothing out there.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 31-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A fourth agent testified:
Q: Prior to the attack occurred [sic], did you hear
anything on the outside, such as chanting or any type
of sounds [that] would be a protest?
A: No, I never heard any sort of chanting or protest or
anything.
Q: Would it then be an accurate description to describe
the attack as a sort of stealth attack?
A: It was very sudden. As I had mentioned, conditions
immediately before the only warning that I had that
something was amiss was that--kind of that cry that I
heard at assault on the main gate.
Q: So it was very sudden. And the first attackers that
you saw enter, were they armed?
A: Yes.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr.
at 144 (Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony]
(on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fifth agent testified:
Q: If there had been something about a planned protest
in Benghazi, would that be the type of information that
you would have been interested in?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you recall any such information?
A: No.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr.
at 105 (Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony]
(on file with the Committee).
Hicks was asked ``if there was . . . a protest [outside the
facility], would that have been reported?''\82\ In his view:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 81.
[A]bsolutely, I mean, we're talking about both security
officers who know their trade, even though they are
brand new, and one of the finest political officers in
the history of the Foreign Service. You know, for there
to have been a demonstration on Chris Stevens' front
door and him not to have reported it is unbelievable.
And secondly, if he had reported it, he would have been
out the back door within minutes of any demonstration
appearing anywhere near that facility. And there was a
back gate to the facility, and, you know, it
worked.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\Id. at 81-82.
THE MISSION'S EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN
The Mission's emergency action plan relied on the
Diplomatic Security Agents as well as the two contracted
internal security support entities: The Blue Mountain Guard
Force and the February 17 Martyrs Brigade. The Blue Mountain
Guard Force consisted of unarmed guards whose primary role was
static surveillance of the three entrance gates as well as the
interior of the compound. These guards had access to an alarm
should any danger present itself. According to one Diplomatic
Security Agent:
The primary purpose of a local guard force is to man
the perimeter and the gates in order to delay and deter
potential security risks and to afford us additional
notice . . . if there were to be a security risk. In
addition, they were in charge of access control, so
screening people as they were coming in the compound,
screening vehicles as there were coming in the
compound.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 16.
The February 17 Martyrs Brigade consisted of a rotating set
of three to four armed guards who lived on compound to operate
as a quick reaction force to respond to any security incidents
against the Mission. Their role was to augment security
provided by the Diplomatic Security Agents. In addition, the
February 17 Martyrs Brigade was supposed to send additional
armed guards if an event occurred at the Mission compound.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to one Diplomatic Security Agent:
Q: And [how] did their role and responsibility differ
from the local guard force [Blue Mountain Group]?
A: Well, they were armed primarily. But really what we
counted on them to do was make a phone call to the 17th
February Martyrs Brigade so that we could receive
backup in case something happened.
Q: Okay. So you were aware that they had a larger
contingent of people that was to be available to----
A: Right. Right.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 22.
One Diplomatic Security Agent provided a description of the
emergency action plan at the compound and how the local guards
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
were expected to supplement this plan:
The reaction plan, whether it was something small on
the first or something larger ultimately on the 11th or
12th, and this is the plan that we actually followed,
but the reaction plan is to shelter in place. That you
would take the principal officers, you secure them in
Villa C. The agent or whoever was in the [Tactical
Operations Center] building would go operate the
communications and reach out to the security elements
that were supposed to react.
The security elements that were supposed to react
includes the local guard is supposed to just give us an
alert, a heads up of what's going on. The three to four
[February17 Martyrs Brigade] members that live on the
compound are supposed to take an active role in our
internal defense; additionally, the 20 person [February
17 Martyrs Brigade] with heavy weapons and heavy
vehicles 2 kilometers away that had responded in the
past and were expected to respond to any event that
necessitated them in the future. The security element
encompassing other Americans was part of the react plan
as well to support the [February 17 Martyrs Brigade]
elements that were going to come as well.
So we're talking almost 30 armed personnel where
arrangements were made for them to respond to our
location, and had done so in training and in actuality
in past events. So whether the attack had happened--
whether something had happened on the first, and it
didn't, although we had somebody armed armed personnel
on the roof all night, a rotating presence, or
something that did happen on the 11th or 12th, the
expectations were for these elements to respond as they
had done in the past.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 46-47 (for additional
details on the reaction plans); see also Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4
Testimony at 20 and 82, and Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 88 and
90.
The unarmed Blue Mountain Guard Force was fully staffed the
evening of September 11, 2012, with five guards. Two of those
guards were assigned to the main entrance of the Benghazi
Mission compound.\87\ Three of the four armed February 17
Martyrs Brigade guards were at the compound at the time of the
attack. One of the guards left early for a reported ``family
obligation'' with no replacement. The three remaining guards
were within the vicinity of the main gate just prior to the
attack.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\Letter from U.S. Dep't of State to Blue Mountain Group (Feb.
17, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05395135) (Subject: Notice of
Contract Award Contract No. SAQMMA-12-C-0092 Local Guard Services
Benghazi, Libya).
\88\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 147.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALL IS QUIET AT THE FRONT GATE
The Diplomatic Security Agents at the compound did not
observe any activity at the main gate during the hour leading
up to the attack.\89\ The only movement of note was the arrival
of a local police vehicle at the main gate at approximately
9:02 p.m. [3:02 p.m. in Washington D.C.].\90\ According to one
of the Diplomatic Security Agents, the one security component
consistently lacking at the compound on a regular basis ``was
the police support on the exterior of the compound.''\91\ On
September 6, 2012, in the lead-up to Stevens' visit, the
Mission requested the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
provide one vehicle at each gate of the Mission ``round the
clock (24 hours/day) from Sept 10, 2012 to September 15, 2012''
to supplement security during Stevens' visit.\92\ As the
morning began on September 11, no police vehicle was located at
any of the compound gates.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 127; see also Diplomatic
Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 113-114; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at
85; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 36 (``We did have visibility
issues, especially at night with our CCTV system. For that reason one
of the efforts that I tried to lead was having the ESO, Engineering
Sec. Office, come out to install new CCTV cameras that we had received.
Unfortunately, it wasn't to be. They were scheduled to arrive I believe
the week after the attack.'').
\90\DVR: Footage of the Mission. (Sept. 11, 2012).
\91\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 109.
\92\U.S. Dep't of State, Diplomatic Note #59 prepared for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Dir. of Gen.
Protocol Dep't Branch, Benghazi Office (Sept. 6, 2012) (on file with
the Committee, C05389670).
\93\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 7.
Q: Who was--what was your understanding of who the SSC
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
was?
A: The Supreme Security Council. I knew that it was a
pseudo militia/police force/military elements, of,
again, different militia groups.
Q: And do you know what the request had been for
increased security?
A: For at least two vehicles, I believe at each gate.
Q: And how--had that request been granted?
A: They told me the request went in. I don't know
specifics of whether it was granted. The first day
[September 10] I do remember two vehicles outside,
though.
Q: And did they express to you any concerns about the
status of their request, that it hadn't been granted
and that had caused concern for them?
A: That day, no, but the next day, there were--two
vehicles weren't on--on stations, at the mission, so
yeah, that was a concern.
Q: Okay. So that would have been on 9/11----
A: Yes.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\Id.
That evening, however, a vehicle arrived outside of the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission compound's front gate at 9:02 p.m.
WARNINGS AND INDICATORS PRIOR TO THE ATTACKS
Shortly before the attacks began, a [redacted text]
extremist indicated [redacted text] on their way to attack the
[Mission compound's front gate] in Benghazi.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\[Redacted text].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee also found evidence that a former TNC
security official also claimed he attempted to pass threat
information directly to the CIA Benghazi Annex prior to the
attack. A few days after the attacks, on September 15, 2012,
the [redacted text]\96\ [redacted text]\97\ [redacted text]\98\
[redacted text] the former TNC official tried to relay the
information to the Director of the Libyan Intelligence Service
and his assistant, who were both out of the country. [Redacted
text].''\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\[Redacted text].
\97\Id.
\98\Id.
\99\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Redacted text], however--but what the Committee has
uncovered and verified--was the former TNC security official
also claimed he attempted to pass this threat information
directly to the CIA Benghazi Annex prior to the attack. This
claim was acknowledged by both the Chief of Base in Benghazi
and another CIA officer:\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\Officer A Testimony at 100; see also, Testimony of Chief of
Base, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 130 (July 16, 2015) [hereinafter
Chief of Base Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to the attacks, [redacted text]\101\ [redacted
text]\102\ [redacted text].\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\Officer A Testimony at 57, 59-60.
\102\Officer A Testimony at 85.
\103\See Officer A Testimony at 86. But see, Chief of Base
Testimony at 139 ([redacted text].'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Redacted text], the CIA was unable to confirm whether or
not the former TNC security official's claim is true. A
[redacted text]\104\ [redacted text]\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\Officer A Testimony at 63-64.
\105\Id. at 64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CIA also reviewed [redacted text]\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\Attestation regarding [redacted text].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A third person also claimed he tried to contact the U.S.
government prior to the attack. A Libyan Special Advisor on
Security ``claimed he had tried to warn the U.S. government of
the potential for an attack on the Consulate prior to the
attack taking place.''\107\ This individual ``left Libya
immediately after the attack'' and ``was afraid of potential
threats against him, based in part on his assumption that there
were documents in the Consulate likely found by the attackers,
that they might interpret as him sympathizing with the U.S.
Government.''\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\See Email to [Tripoli Station], Sept. 21, 2012 [REQUEST
1000790 to REQUEST 1000795].
\108\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE FIRST ATTACK ON THE BENGHAZI MISSION BEGINS
At 9:42 p.m., the Libyan police vehicle at the front gate
of the Benghazi Mission compound rapidly departed at the same
time attackers advanced toward the main entrance.\109\ Prior to
that, the Libyan police did not warn the Diplomatic Security
Agents at the compound, the unarmed Blue Mountain Guards, or
the armed February 17 Martyrs Brigade members of the surging
attackers or of their own departure.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 at 140 (``I can say within 30 seconds
to a minute, before the attack started the single police car that was
out there was a truck and it departed the scene.''); see also, DVR
Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:42 PM).
\110\Id. at 141.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the police vehicle fled, dozens of armed men rushed the
compound and an explosion occurred near the main gate.\111\ It
was the beginning of what would be not one, but several attacks
on the Benghazi Mission compound.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 144. See also,
Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 at 85-86; DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11,
2012, 2142.53).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Diplomatic Security Agents recalled first hearing
taunts and chants when the attackers rushed the compound and
then a loud explosion. They knew they were in imminent danger.
According to one Diplomatic Security Agent:
Q: And how did you find out about the attack?
A: I heard a loud explosion and chanting outside.
Q: When you say chanting, what would be----
A: Yelling, screaming.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 55.
Attackers quickly breached the main gate pouring onto the
compound.\113\ One Diplomatic Security Agent described his
reaction:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2143.50).
I see the men on the compound. I immediately picked up
the PA system, and I say, attention on compound,
attention on compound, this is not a drill. Repeat,
this is not a drill.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 137.
The Diplomatic Security Agent immediately activated the
alarm in accordance with the Compound's Emergency Action Plan
calling for shelter in place.\115\ He stated: ``The react plan
is exactly what happened: shelter in place, contact your
support elements, and wait for their arrival.''\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\Id.
\116\Id. at 142.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the alarm was sounding, two unarmed Blue Mountain Guards
fled through the main gate.\117\ Immediately upon the initial
breach of the main gate, the attackers were engaged briefly by
gunfire by one or more February 17 Martyrs Brigade guards.
According to one Diplomatic Security Agent, one of the guards
was shot during this engagement:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2142).
At least one of them got shot. One of the local guards
at least one, if not two, of the local guards were
shot, as well, in the process. It was as this group
moved from building to building and we sheltered per
our react plan.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 147.
With minimal resistance at the main entrance, the attackers
quickly pushed onto the compound and cornered the armed
February 17 Martyrs Brigade guards inside their barracks and
set fire to the barracks.\119\ The guards incurred no
fatalities that evening. Besides the initial exchange of
gunfire at the main entrance, no additional gunfire was
directed toward the attackers on the compound prior to the end
of the first wave of attacks at the Benghazi Mission compound.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the alarm was initiated, the Diplomatic Security
Agent in the Tactical Operations Center [TOC] immediately
called the GRS personnel at the Annex, located approximately
one mile from the Benghazi Mission compound.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\Id. at 141.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Diplomatic Security Agents were able to establish an
open line of communication through a shared radio [redacted
text] with the Annex during the attack allowing the two
locations to have continuous communication.\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, another Diplomatic Security Agent
relocated to the TOC and tried to call the 17th February guards
on the Mission compound for help.\122\ After this attempt
failed, the Diplomatic Security Agent called the Annex compound
and asked them to contact the headquarters of the February 17
Martyrs Brigade to request support.\123\ The Diplomatic
Security Agent also called the Libyan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for support.\124\ The agents in the TOC then notified
the lead security officer in Tripoli.\125\ One Diplomatic
Security Agent described their actions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 129.
\123\Id.
\124\Id. at 148; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141.
\125\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141; see also, Email to
Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 14, 2012, 8:07 AM).
(Subject: Re: Log of events on 9/11/12-9/12/12) (on file with the
Committee, SCB00472640).
So we are in the TOC office. The other agent and I
began to make our calls. I notify the second American
compound via radio. The other agent notifies the
February 17 Martyrs Brigade members. And then I
subsequently notify Tripoli, who subsequently notifies
D.C.; it is either State ops or the command center. We
basically have an open line via radio with the other
Americans at the second compound. And I keep Tripoli on
speakerphone almost the whole time as we are working
through and relaying what is going on.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141; Diplomatic Sec.
Agent 4 Testimony at 128-29.
Meanwhile, Stevens, Smith, and one Diplomatic Security
Agent retreated to the safe haven of Villa C, a dedicated area
within the Villa that was reinforced with a metal barred-
door.\127\ The Diplomatic Security Agent who was with Stevens
and Smith described what happened:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141; see also Diplomatic
Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 114.
I remember hearing the chants. I mean, they were fairly
close already. I mean, yelling distance, which is
pretty close especially in a city setting. So my
impression is that I don't have much time. So I ran
right to my room, you know, put my helmet on, put my
vest on, grabbed my weapons, my additional weapons, and
I turned to lock the gate, and basically, it was a jail
cell door with three locks on it. I locked all three
locks. And at about that time Ambassador Stevens and
Sean Smith were coming out to their rooms. Sean Smith
was already, you know, donning his helmet and vest. I
guided them both into the safe haven, and set myself up
in the safe haven with--I was holding my M4.''\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 114.
Two other Diplomatic Security Agents attempted to ``go back
to Villa C to also provide protection for Stevens, but not to
shoot at this large group.''\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 142.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agents in Villa B attempted to go to Villa C, but they
were met with a very large hostile force of 7 to 10 attackers
with ``AKs and RPGs.''\130\ The two agents made the tactical
decision not to shoot at this large group because, ``if we
would have taken one of them out at the time, it could have
gone substantially worse.''\131\ The Agents believed the
attackers would have been ``out for blood'' and it would have
inflamed an already bad situation.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 58.
\131\Id.
\132\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 142.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of this concern, the agents chose to return to
Villa B, which also served as the cantina or cafeteria for the
Mission compound.\133\ After seeking refuge, one of the agents
in Villa B then contacted the TOC in Tripoli and the other
agent contacted the State Department's Diplomatic Security
Command Center [DSCC] in Washington D.C. at 9:49 p.m. Benghazi
time [3:49 p.m. in Washington, DC].\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\Id. at 141-142.
\134\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 86; see also, Email from
the Diplomatic Sec. Command Ctr. to the Special Assistants for the
Secretary, et al. (page 1) (Subject: Benghazi--Attack on Compound--
09112012) (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:34 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05578314).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unknown to the Diplomatic Security Agents on the Mission
compound, the attackers were a mix of local extremist groups,
including the Benghazi-based Ansar al-Sharia, al-Qaeda in the
Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, and the Muhammad Jamal Network
out of Egypt. Members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-
Qaeda in Iraq and Abu Ubaydah Ibn Jarah Battalion also
participated.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\The Committee found no evidence of involvement by the Iranian
government, specifically the Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force
(IRGC-QF) as has been reported. Email from the State Department
Operations Center (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:06 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05272001). At the time, there were two Ansar al-Sharia
(AAS) branches in Libya, the one in Benghazi that was involved in the
attack, and one in Darnah that was led by former Guantanamo detainee
Abu Sufyian bin Qumo. There is no evidence that Qumo had any direct
involvement in the attacks on the Mission or the Annex on 11 and 12
September 2012. See Terrorist Attack in Benghazi: The Secretary of
State's View, hearing before H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong.
35 (2013). The other Ansar al-Sharia, the Abu Ubaydah Ibn Jarah
Battalion, was led at the time by Ahmed Abu Khattalah, the lone person
charged in connection with the attack. NCTC: Libya: Terrorists and
Extremists Reportedly Associates with the Benghazi Attacks (Sept 9,
2013); NCTC Current: Libya: Update on Benghazi Suspects (Sept. 11,
2013); CIA WIRe: Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated
with the Benghazi Attacks (Jan 28, 2013); CIA WIRe: Libya: Terrorists
and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi Attacks (Feb 26,
2013); CIA WIRe: Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated
with the Benghazi Attacks (Aug. 12, 2013); CIA WIRe: Libya: Terrorists
and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi Attacks (Sept.
9, 2013); CIA WIRe Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly
Associated with the Benghazi Attacks, (Mar. 24, 2014); CIA WIRe: Libya:
Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi
Attacks (July 24, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Diplomatic Security Agent located in the safe haven
with Stevens and Smith described the weapons he saw during a
direct encounter with the attackers:
I could hear outside explosions, yelling, chanting,
screaming, gunfire, and I reported all of this on the
radio just saying, this is what my senses are telling
me. Then people started banging on the doors of the
building, so I reported that. Hey, there is banging on
the doors. They are trying to come in, you know, we
need immediate assistance. And there wasn't any
response on the radio. Shortly after that, to my
recollection, the doors were blown open. And about 70
individuals, you know, rushed into the building, all of
them carrying AK-47s, grenades, RPGs, you know, a
mixture throughout everyone.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 115.
The attackers were unable to gain access to the safe haven
because the access point had been fortified by the Diplomatic
Security Agent inside. Instead the attackers started a diesel
fire just outside the safe haven at approximately 10 p.m.\137\
At that time, the agents in the TOC reported to the Diplomatic
Security Command Center that Stevens and Smith were located in
the safe room.\138\ Meanwhile, notice of the attack was
disseminated in Washington D.C. at 4:05 p.m. [10:05 p.m. in
Benghazi] through an ``Ops Alert'' by the State Department
Operations Center, which notified senior Department officials,
the White House Situation Room, and others the Benghazi Mission
compound was under attack.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2202.07 and
2202.25, respectively).
\138\U.S. Dep't of State, DSCC's Timeline for Benghazi and Tripoli
Events [hereinafter DSCC Timeline] (on file with the Committee,
C05391498) (``Ambassador Stevens, who is currently in Benghazi, and for
[sic] COM personnel are in the compound safe room.'').
\139\Email from the State Department Operations Center (Sept. 11,
2012, 4:05 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05272001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As news of the attack spread in Washington D.C., Villa C,
the main diplomatic building, was quickly engrossed in flames
and heavy smoke.\140\ Within minutes, Diplomatic Security
Agents reported to the lead security agent in Tripoli that
contact with Stevens had been lost.\141\ A Diplomatic Security
Agent described what happened next inside the Villa:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2201-2207); see
also, Email to Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 14,
2012, 8:07 AM). (Subject: Re: Log of events on 9/11/12-
9/12/12) (on file with the Committee, SCB00472640).
\141\Email to Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 14,
2012, 8:07 AM). (Subject: Re: Log of events on 9/11/12-9/12/12) (on
file with the Committee, SCB00472640).
And then slowly, people started to kind of trickle out.
And then the lights started to kind of dim. My initial
response or my initial thought was, well, they just
knocked out the generators. You know, we have regular
city power, but we also have backup generators. So
flickering would be a likely, you know, cause of this.
But in reality, it was smoke. And it took me about, you
know, 2 or 3 seconds after that to determine that it
was smoke. As soon as I realized it was smoke, I turned
to the Ambassador and Sean Smith and I said, we are
moving to the bathroom.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 117.
As Villa C filled with smoke, the two Diplomatic Security
Agents in the TOC also realized it was on fire:\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 131-132.
Q: At what point did you notice that there was also--
buildings had been put on fire, and how did that come
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to your attention?
A: Well, as--it seemed like a long time. Of course, I
can't say exactly how much time elapsed between when we
began our call for help and to when help finally
arrived. I can't say certainly. But monitoring what was
going on on the ground via the security cameras, I
could see that Villa C--I could see flames starting to
lick out of the windows and black smoke started to pour
out of the windows, and that's when I became aware that
they were in very big trouble over there.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\Id.
The Diplomatic Security Agent inside Villa C with Stevens
and Smith attempted to lead them to the bathroom in the safe
haven.\145\ Once in the bathroom he realized Stevens and Smith
had not followed him. Due to the thick toxic smoke, he was
unable to see them and did not hear a response from them when
he called out.\146\ Because of the flames, the agent became
weak and overcome with smoke and heat. He left the bathroom and
crawled to his bedroom where he eventually escaped through a
window. After catching his breath, over and over again he
crawled back through the bedroom window of Villa C to search
for Stevens and Smith.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 117.
\146\Id. at 114; see also, Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at
147; Comprehensive Timeline of Events--Benghazi, produced by the U.S.
Dep't of State (Last Edit Nov. 1, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0047845); Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 25-26.
\147\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 117-120.
The last time I went out, you know, I decided that if I
went back into the building that I wasn't going to come
back out. The smoke and the heat were way too powerful,
and way too strong, and it was extremely confusing
feeling my way in a smoke-filled building. And I didn't
want to get lost, and so I decided to climb up the
ladder to the roof. I climbed up the ladder, and pulled
up the ladder behind me and that's the moment that I
knew the Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith were
probably dead.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 121.
As the agent retreated to the rooftop of Villa C, he began
taking gunfire.\149\ At 10:14 p.m. [4:14 p.m. in Washington
D.C.], he reported to the agent located in the TOC that Stevens
and Smith were missing and unaccounted for.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\Id. at 122; see also, Comprehensive Timeline of Events--
Benghazi, produced by the U.S. Dep't of State (Last Edit Nov. 1, 2012)
(on file with the Committee, SCB0047845).
\150\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 147.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While some of the attackers were trying to break into Villa
C's safe haven, other attackers broke through Villa B's main
door.\151\ The attackers were unable to gain access to the
Diplomatic Security Agents and local guard seeking refuge in
the back because they had successfully barricaded the
doors.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 61-62.
\152\Id.
Q: So you said that the attackers who tried to come
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
into the room were unsuccessful?
A: Yes, they tried to breach it one time.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE MISSION CALLS THE ANNEX FOR SUPPORT
When the attack started at 9:42 p.m. [3:42 p.m. in
Washington D.C.], the Diplomatic Security Agent in the TOC
immediately called the Annex for backup.\154\ The agent
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141.
Several requests were made. Unbeknownst to us at the
time, the situation outside our compound was hostile.
Apparently the militia that attacked us had set up
heavy gun trucks on all four corners of the block we
were on, had prohibited traffic from entering from any
location, and it was difficult for the reaction forces
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to get to us.
I can't tell you exactly when they arrived on compound.
It is my assessment that it was approximately an hour
and 5 minutes after. So if the attack started at 9:42,
I don't think we see them on compound until 10:00,
10:45, 10:50, something along those lines.
Now, it is my understanding that they fought their way
in, and they ultimately split up into two groups, one
of which literally fought their way in and climbed
blocks and blocks of 10 to 12 foot high concrete walls,
as well as the secondary group, who rallied with some
February 17 Martyrs Brigade elements to come in through
a different approach angle.
So it was not as if they literally could have just
walked across the street and walked in. The compound
was overtaken, it was overrun. And it is my
understanding it wasn't as simple as what it would have
seemed on the surface.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\Id. at 143-44.
Once the request for assistance was made to the Annex, the
security team there immediately began packing up and preparing
to respond.
The GRS Team Lead described what happened after the
Diplomatic Security Agent called and requested their help.
[A]pproximately 20 [minutes] to 10:00 [p.m.], I got a
cell phone call on my phone from one of the ARSOs,
State Department Regional Security Officers.
Give or take a few minutes or whatever it was, I'd get
that phone call from [Diplomatic Security Agent 3], and
he's obviously a bit worked up, and he says: Hey, we're
under attack. And he tells me he's sitting in the TOC,
their Tactical Operations Center, which is a separate
building at the facility. And he says: I can see
approximately 20 guys have come through the front gate,
they are armed, and they are amassing on the soccer
field, which is, you know, just in front of their--one
of the living quarters buildings.
And I said: Okay. Gotcha. I said: Look, do me a favor,
before you hang up or before I lose you on the cell
phone network--we had previously given them one of our
secure [redacted text] radios. I said: Pick up that
radio in the TOC and just start giving me a play by
play, just keep transmitting, and you know, once you
get that radio, hang up the phone, and you know, we'll
deal with it.
So once he hung up, I called--I made a radio call to
all the guys, the GRS guys to return to the team room,
and then, you know, within a few minutes guys start
trickling in. Some guys kind of, you know--you know,
it's in the evening, so some guys in shorts and T-
shirt, other guys, you know, clearly just, you know,
thrown pants, T-shirt or whatever on, you know, just
asking: Hey, what's going on? Hey, I don't know. I
don't have a lot of specifics other than I just got a
call from [Diplomatic Security Agent 3]. He said the
facility is under attack. So at that point, you know, I
don't need to tell anybody what to do. As the guys
trickle in, it's, you know, word of mouth, hey, start,
you know, gathering gear, start getting your kit, you
know, your helmet, night vision gear, ballistic armor,
you know, weapons, all that good stuff.
And you know, shortly thereafter, the deputy chief of
base walks in, and he says: Hey, what's going on. I
heard you say call the guys to the team room. I said:
Hey, Chief, not exactly sure, but the State facility, I
just got a call and they're under attack.
And he asked me, he said: Well, did you tell chief of
base yet?
I said: No, I'm just getting--he said: All right. Don't
worry about it. I'll go tell him.
So we continue to kit up. The guys, you know, are doing
their thing, start bringing our heavier weapons,
equipment out to the car. We get the linguist, kind of
get him--you know, get him some body armor, get him a
helmet, and you know, kind of give him a quick brief.
We kind of gravitate out to the vehicles.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\Testimony of GRS-Team Lead, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 20-23
(Apr. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Team Lead Testimony] (on file with the
Committee).
Once the Chief of Base was alerted, he met with the Team
Lead and the Deputy Chief of Base to determine if they had
received any additional information about what was happening at
the Mission. The Chief of Base then began calling partner
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
militia organizations for assistance.
So he starts working phones. I can hear him. You know,
sometimes he's able to get through to people, and you
know, I remember one conversation where he's given a
quick data dump, and the guys says: All right. Hey, you
know, call me back in 2 minutes.
So when he hangs up, he says: Hey, while--you know, I
don't remember who he said it was, but while that
person is making some phone calls, I'm going to call,
you know, the other guy and just--you know, I said:
Hey, look, Chief, what we want is technicals. So what
we want is, you know, the trucks with bigger guns than
what we have because I don't know what we're going
into. So whether it be Dishka-type weapons or some type
of heavy machine gun mounted on a truck, that's what I
definitely want.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\Id. at 23-24.
While the Chief of Base was trying to generate assistance
for the Annex team, the team members finished loading up their
gear into two vehicles. The Team Lead was standing outside of
the vehicles while the Chief of Base contacted their partner
organizations. Meanwhile, the Annex team members became anxious
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to depart.
So while this is going on, one of my--like I said, the
guys there are pretty much just kind of wrapping up,
getting, you know, the ammo, and you know, first aid
kits, all that stuff, and then they're basically
standing by loading in front of the building. And one
of the officers, my officers comes out, and he says:
Hey, look, you know, we got to get going. We got to go.
We got to go.
I said: Yeah, I know that, but I don't know what we're
getting into, and the chief's trying to make some phone
calls. I want to get some technicals to go with us
because I don't know what we're--what we're going to
get into.
* * *
So he goes back into the car. Chief continues to, you
know, work the phones. He makes contact with maybe
another two or three guys, and then he circles back
with that first person he made the phone call to, and
the phone is shut off. And he tells me: Hey, it's not
going through. It's shut off. I said: All right. Can
you try the other guys back?
So he proceeds to, you know, try to make follow up
phone calls. You know, [one Team Member] pops out
again, and he's like, hey, we got to go, we got to go,
and at that point Chief is like, hey. Yeah, I know. I'm
just trying--like, hang on. I'm trying to make some--
we're trying to get the technicals. We're trying to,
you know, get you guys some weapons.
* * *
And then one of the other officers,[] came out. He's
like, hey, you know, what do we got? I said: Look,
Chief's trying to make phone calls. I really want to
get some technicals.
* * *
So at some point, you know, whatever, couple of
minutes, it becomes kind of clear that there's nothing
readily coming, or there's--like Chief isn't making
positive coms with anybody who's saying, hey, I've got,
you know, two, three, four, five technicals, they're
going to meet you at whatever location. That's not
happening. So I tell the chief, I say: Hey, Chief,
look, we're going.
And to be honest with you, I don't recall Chief saying
anything. Deputy chief, you know, kind of looks at me,
and he's like, well, he's like, you know, [GRS-Team
Lead], God speed, hopefully we'll see you guys back
here shortly.
So at that point, we roll out. I can tell you between,
you know, the time stamp on our CCTV, like I said
roughly, I think my phone call came at like 21:43,
depending on what timestamp you look at, we roll out at
like 22:04, so 21, 23, 24 minutes, whatever.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\Id. at 24-26.
The Chief of Base described his actions after he learned
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
about the attacks.
I was calling everybody I could think of. I think I
called the police, LIS, other militia groups that--we
were, you know, in an information-gathering mode, and
trying to see who might be able to respond quickly to
the Consulate, to the mission.
Q: How much success were you having in actually getting
through to people at the police, at Libyan intel with
other militias?
A: I didn't get through to Libyan intel, I don't think.
They weren't actually very helpful to us in Benghazi at
all.
Q: Okay.
A: But otherwise, I was getting through to the people.
Q: Okay. And what kind of response were you getting on
the other end?
A: Well, there was a lot of disbelief and confusion,
and trying to understand what was happening, what--
basically, it was, as what you might, expect when
something like that happens.\159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\Testimony of the Chief of Base, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at
24-25 (Nov. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Chief of Base Testimony] (on file
with the Committee).
Despite multiple attempts, the Chief of Base found his
phone calls unfruitful. He was unable to generate any
additional assistance from the partner organizations he called.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
He described his conversations with the organizations.
A: Well, there was a lot of disbelief and confusion,
and trying to understand what was happening, what--
basically, it was, as you might, expect when something
like that happens.
Q: Did you hear anything that would give you any pause
or reason for concern?
A: Well, I was already concerned, to be honest with
you. I mean, you know, we could hear the gunfire. There
were even some tracer bullets flying overhead so we
were, again, I was trying to get as much information as
possible.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\Id. at 25.
The Chief of Base described what happened after the Annex
team members finished loading their gear and were ready to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
depart.
Q: So at some point, the GRS folks were kitted up, and
what happened at that point that you can recall? Do you
recall seeing them all kitted up?
A: I was standing right in the area that they were
getting their stuff. It took them, I would say, about
15 minutes to get ready. It was a very--to me, the time
passed by very quickly.
And people were going to CONEXes and getting ammunition
and water, and getting batteries and MPGs and such. At
one point, [the Team Lead] came to me, I would say
maybe 15 minutes into it and said that he wanted to see
if I could arrange a technical, or a gun truck, from
17th February. So I called back to 17th February and
was working on getting that gun truck. So I was in
contact with [the Team Lead].\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\Id. at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Well, their response was, okay, but I don't have one,
or it's going to be difficult. I have got to check. It
was--it was not like immediately we are going to be
able to--the person who I was talking to, who was one
of their commanders whose name I don't remember.
Q: And did you relay that back to [the Team Lead]?
A: Yes.
Q: What was his response?
A: That's when they left to go on the rescue.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\Id. at 29.
The Chief of Base was adamant that he never told the Annex
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
team members to ``stand down.''
You said that you let them go. Did you give them an
affirmative order for them to go?
A: I think I was working with [the Team Lead] the whole
time----
Q: Okay.
A: --in an effort to get them to get them gone, to have
them go. So whether or not I gave an affirmative order,
but I wanted them to go. They were cleared to go. And
they went.
Q: When you say they were cleared to go, is that you
giving the clearance?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you have any discussions--do you recall having
any discussions with the deputy chief of base about
allowing the guys to go?
A: I don't recall any. It was never--I never had any
doubt about the GRS people going to the State
Department compound. I had great concerns and great
worry about it but I did not, I did not tell anybody to
stand down.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\Id. at 31-32.
The Chief of Base acknowledged he may have told the team to
wait while he was attempting to secure additional resources for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
them.
I may have said wait because we were trying to get this
technical truck that the team lead wanted. But it wasn't 10
minutes, or 5 minutes. It was a short period of time. And the
only time I remember ever talking to [Annex team member] was
when he came up, and I said I'm trying to get a technical truck
for [the Team Lead]. There was nobody, myself or anybody else
in Benghazi, that did anything to hold up the GRS deploying.
The team lead was always cleared to go.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\Id. at 58-59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
He further added:
People were coming and going the entire time. But I did
not issue a stand-down order. And if there was a delay,
there was a very short delay, basically the team lead
we have to try to get this gun truck.
* * *
I was doing everything, and to my knowledge, everybody
on that base was doing everything. I think I carried an
ammo can at one time to get those guys out the door.
So it's, you know, our GRS folks were very brave that
night. But I, everything that I saw from during the
kitting up of the team, to their departure till their
return and heard in between, very much [the Team Lead]
was in charge of it. Listening to the radio, he was in
charge of it. So when [the Team Lead] was satisfied, I
think, that we weren't going to get the support that
we--that he wanted to get this gun truck to try to link
it up--although I think they did link up at some
point--that he left. He took the team and left.\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\Id. at 59-60.
One GRS agent did not recall the Chief of Base telling the
team to ``stand down'' but he did recall the Chief of Base
telling them to ``wait.''\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\Testimony of GRS 3, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 52 (May 29,
2015) [hereinafter GRS 3 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q: And what did you think when he told you to wait?
A: I believe at first I just said, okay, maybe he's
talking to somebody that can help, and, you know, I
respected the fact that he wanted us to wait and see if
he can gather additional fire power to help. At some
point, though, the wait was too long, and we decided,
you know, we couldn't wait any longer and we left. We
didn't know if that wait was going to be an indefinite
wait and you're-not-going wait or a real wait or--but
nothing was happening for several minutes.
And so we can hear the State Department's cries for
help on the radio, and we just reached a point where we
decided to leave on our own.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\Id. at 50.
The agent also acknowledged during the time the team was
``kitting up'' and after they loaded into the vehicles, the
Chief of Base and the Team Lead attempted to obtain additional
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
support from the Libyan partner organizations.
Q: When you said nothing happened--nothing was
happening for several minutes, you're referring to what
exactly? There were individuals on the phone?
A: Yes.
Q: So that was occurring, but for your purposes----
A: For our purposes, we were getting in and out of the
vehicles, ready to go. We were just waiting for someone
to say go. My understanding is they were trying to get
us to link up with 17 Feb or have 17 Feb go there
first, something to do with 17 Feb helping out. But
there was never a clear, definitive, this is what's
going on. Everything was chaotic. . . .\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\Id. at 50-51.
Another Annex Team Member also recalled that the team was
told to wait while the Chief of Base and the Team Lead were
making phone calls. This member testified that once the team
was ready to depart he approached the Chief of Base and the
Team Lead, who were both making phone calls at the time. He
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explained what happened.
A: Yep. Grab my machine gun, grab my night vision, grab
my helmet and get back outside, and everybody else is
doing their job. Cars are already staged. Looked at Ty.
His car was up. He gave me a thumbs up. Had [GRS 3] and
[GRS 1] in the car. And I went up to our chief of base
and team leader, and they're standing in the courtyard,
and I said, hey, we're ready to go.
Q: Now the team leader at this point, you said you saw
him on the way into the team room. He was not geared
up. You saw him with his phone. You didn't see him on
the phone?
A: Not at first. When I came back out they were both on
their phones.
Q: Now, team leader and----
A: And [the Chief of Base] were both on their phones. I
looked at [the Chief of Base] and the team leader and
said, hey, we're ready to go. [The Chief of Base]
looked at the team leader, and he said tell these guys
they need to wait. The team leader looks at me and says
you guys need to wait. It's about 9:37. It's no more
than 5 minutes if that.
* * *
So at this point in time, the chief told the team
leader to wait.
Q: Team leader told you to wait?
A: Yes.
Q: All right. What did you do next?
A: Waited. Went back to the car and just radioed, hey,
we got to wait guys. Just because the guys needed to
know the information.
* * *
Q: All right. So you go back in the car. You're in the
second car, in the SUV. You're with [GRS 5], and go to
the radio and say we got to wait?
A: And everybody is pretty cool about it. Nobody is
getting upset.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\Testimony of GRS 4, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 26-29 (Mar. 1,
2016) [hereinafter GRS 4 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
The team member was able to see what the Chief of Base and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Team Lead were doing when he returned to the vehicle:
What I'm seeing, and I'm looking at [the Chief of Base
and the Team Lead] off and on and they're just talking
on their phones. And all I can see, as time goes on and
we start getting calls, from [Diplomatic Security Agent
3] on the radio, saying, hey, the Consulate has been
overrun. GRS, where the bleep are you? We do start
getting a little bit more agitated.\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\Id. at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The team member continued:
Q: All right. So you said you heard [Diplomatic
Security Agent 3] on the radio, and what did he say?
A: [Diplomatic Security Agent 3], and I can't recall
his exact words. It's been 3 years, but I can recall
the gist of it, and I can recall the emotions of it. It
was, GRS, where are you? Consulate's been overrun.
Where are you? Where are you? Get your asses over here.
We need your help. Where are you? Another 10 minutes go
by, and that's when I see [GRS 1] get out of his car.
He goes to the driver's side. And I have my door
closed, and I see him yelling at [the Chief of Base].
He's going like this. Now, I didn't hear it, but I
asked him after what he said to him. He was just there.
Him and [the Chief of Base] are jaw jacking.
He gets in the car. I said what's going on, dude? He
said he's telling us to stand down. Now [GRS 1] told me
that on the radio, but I said my vehicle was doors were
closed, armored vehicle, but I remember seeing him go
to the driver's side and just----
Q: So it was just you and [GRS 5] in your vehicle?
A: Yeah. And then I also reconfirmed that when I asked
[GRS 1] later. He wasn't happy.
* * *
We waited another 10 minutes, so it's been about 25
minutes.
Q: The first time you said you were ready to go in 5
minutes. Then you said there was 10 minutes. Then you
waited another 10 minutes?
A: Close to 25 minutes.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\171\Id. at 30-32.
Although this team member's testimony regarding the amount
of time that elapsed between the Mission's request for help and
the team's departure was consistent with the testimony of other
witnesses and the time indicated by the surveillance footage of
the Annex, his testimony about when the attack began, and thus
when the Mission called for help, differed. The witness, one of
the co-authors of the book ``13 Hours: The Inside Account of
What Really Happened in Benghazi,'' testified that the attack
began at 9:32 p.m., ten minutes earlier than other witnesses,
documents and the surveillance footage indicates. He was asked
why he believed the attack began at 9:32 p.m. and provided this
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explanation:
A: I remember hearing a call on the radio that all GRS
needed to muster in the team room. I remember there was
not a sense of urgency in the voice. I remember looking
at my watch. I remember it saying 9:32. And I have said
that many times. I know it differs, but I know that's
what it said.
Q: So let me stop you there. I know you said it many
times. I've read that in the book. Everywhere else I've
seen it's 9:42. How do you account for the difference?
A: Differences of what people want to hear, want to
know. I was on the ground. I was looking. I was pissed
off because somebody was bothering me at 9:32 at night
because I wanted to go home.
Q: You were home.
A: I wanted to get the day over with. Nothing good
comes when you get bothered at night, especially if
you're in the military, and you're getting called by
your leadership at 9:00 at night, nothing good comes of
it. The difference, you'd have to ask the person that
says it's 9:42. I don't know. I didn't see anybody else
with me on that report there that night, though. We get
a call 30 seconds later, roughly.
* * *
Q: And I don't mean to pick apart your statement. So
the book I believe--let me just quote you from the
book. It says: At 9:02 p.m. an unexpected vehicle drove
down the gravel road outside the compound. And a little
bit later the SSC vehicle pulled away 40 minutes after
it arrived. A little while later. Almost the moment the
SSC pickup pulled away from the compound, shots and an
explosion rang out?
A: Sure. And what Mitchell was doing with that is he
was pulling stuff off the report. We had to get the
book cleared.
Q: Okay.
A: So if you read it, too, he also says that [GRS 4]
looked at his watch, and he has assured that it was
9:32 that he was called. So we're getting both what
other people were saying. That's what we were trying to
do, and [GRS 2] can help me out with the book here if I
get too far into it. But we're trying to show that
there are differences in what people saw. I know what I
saw. I'm not going to say what other people saw, and
what those other nine reports that went through, but I
know what I saw on my watch.\172\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\Id. at 22-24.
Another Annex Team member described his recollection of
what happened between the time the Mission called for help and
the Annex team departed. After the Team Lead told him the
Mission was under attack, he got dressed, packed his gear, and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
loaded into a vehicle.
[I] Ran back in, told [Annex Team Member], we got all
of our clothes on, ran out of the team room, got the
big weapons . . . and we loaded up in the vehicles. It
was probably about 5 minutes or so after we learned of
the ongoing attack. And we're probably sitting there
for a little while. We're sitting in the car, you know,
just going over, double checking our weapons, double
checking our gear, you know, kind of saying, hey, you
know, what's going on, what's taking so long.
We're probably sitting there a good 15 minutes, and I
get out of the car. I have the Chief of Base, the
Deputy Chief of Base, and the team leader on the front
porch. They're all three on the phone doing something.
And I just say: Hey, you know, we've got to get over
there. We're losing the initiative. The Chief of Base
looks at me, he says: Stand down, you need to wait. You
need to come up with a plan.
And I say: No, it's too late to come up with a plan. We
need to get over in the area, get eyes on, and then we
can come up with a plan.
And that's kind of where I left it because they left it
at that, and I got back in the car.\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\GRS 1 Testimony at 73.
The Annex Team Member's testimony was consistent with the
other witnesses that while the team was ``kitting up'' and
loading their gear into the vehicles, the Chief of Base and the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Team Lead were making phone calls.
Q: So you were the only one out of the lead vehicle.
And you got out of the vehicle and you said you saw the
chief of base, the deputy chief of base, and the team
lead. And where were they?
A: On the front porch of the building 3
* * *
Q: And what were each of them doing?
A: They were on the phone.
Q: Okay. They were all on the phone?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And you said that--I'm just paraphrasing:
We've got to get over there. We're losing the
initiative. Did you say that? Does that sound right?
A: Yes.
Q: And did you say that to anybody in particular or all
three of them?
A: Pretty much all three of them because I was looking
directly at them.
Q: Okay. And what was the response that you got from
all of them or any of them?
A: ``Stand down. You need to wait.'' That was from the
chief of base.
Q: Okay. Do you remember exactly what the chief--is
that a paraphrase? Did he use those exact words? Do you
remember?
A: He used those exact words.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\Id. at 78-79.
When asked why the team member had not disclosed the
``stand down'' order during previous testimony to Congress, he
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
stated:
A: At the time, because a lot of it was that no--I
mean, I didn't know why the stand down order was given.
I mean, I guess [GRS team member] got told to wait, you
know, that's what he says. I just know when we got told
to stand down and when [the Team Lead] kind of gave the
brief of kind of like why we're told to stand down, it
was kind of understandable, you know.
But, yes, it shouldn't take you 23 minutes or 50
minutes to link up with the QRF, because even after we
left there was still no link up. There was no
communication between us and the 17 Feb. that I knew
of. Because when we rolled in, we didn't know who we
were going to be meeting.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\Id. at 80.
The team member believed that no matter what phrase the
Chief of Base conveyed that night to direct the team, they
would not have left unless they made the decision on their own
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to leave at the moment they did.
A: I mean, just like for the stand down. I don't think
it came from anywhere else but [the Chief of Base]. . .
.
So my biggest thing, I think, it was--I don't believe,
you know, stand down. I think it was just like a heat-
of-the-moment kind of thing. But to me, no matter what,
when he said stand down, or wait, or don't go,
whatever, he still--I believe if we didn't leave on our
own, we would have never left.\176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\176\Id. at 130-31.
The Deputy Chief of Base also described what happened
between the time the Annex was notified of the attack and the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
time the GRS Team departed.
I was sitting in my--I was sitting at my desk in the
SCIF and I was working on--I was working on a cable I
was writing regarding a meeting I had been to earlier
in the day with the chief of base, and I remember
looking at the clock that was in the lower corner of
the computer screen noting that--for some reason it
just stuck out--that it was 9:40 or 9:42. I remember
looking at the time. And the GRS team leader, [redacted
text], came in, and grabbed me and pulled me out into
the GRS room and said--said he had just received
communication from [Agent 3] at the special mission
that they had people inside the wire there. They had
people inside the compound. And he said: We are going
to go, we are going to go over there, you know, and get
those guys, get them out of there. And I said: Okay,
you know, got that, but we got to let the boss know
about this and he needs to make the call before we do
that. And he said, ``yeah.'' So I went back in.
I got the Chief of Base, brought the Chief of Base out
into the GRS team room where we were. The GRS team
leader advised the chief of base what the situation was
and said: We got to go get those guys. And the chief of
base responded, ``Absolutely.'' ``Absolutely.'' Not,
``I got to go call the chief of station.'' Not, ``I got
to go check with somebody in Washington.'' All he said
was, ``Absolutely.'' So I want to make that very clear
because I know there's conflicting accounts about that
discussion. There were three people in that discussion:
myself, the GRS team leader, and the chief of base. And
anybody writing any books or making movies, or whatever
else, I can tell you none of those guys were in the
room when that discussion occurred.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\Testimony of Deputy Chief of Base, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at
101-02 (June 4, 2015) [hereinafter Deputy Chief of Base Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
The Deputy Chief of Base indicated the GRS team was loaded
and ready to depart approximately 10 minutes after the Team
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lead told them what was happening at the Mission.
So [the Team Lead] advised me that he had just gotten
the call from [Diplomatic Security Agent 3] and then
I--and then I told him, we got to, you know, we got to
check with the chief of base on this. And I went and
got him, and then we had that short discussion. And
then, shortly thereafter, he advised the GRS team
members to start gathering their equipment that they
were going over there.
* * *
And that took--that took about 10 minutes for them to
get everything together.\178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\Id. at 103.
The Deputy Chief of Base raised a concern with the Chief of
Base that they needed to attempt to confirm whether 17th
February or any other friendly militia was at the base or would
be arrive shortly in order to prevent that force from attacking
the GRS team or vice versa. The Deputy Chief noted because one
GRS team member was away from the base at the time, and the
remaining were preparing to go to the Mission compound, the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annex effectively was without any defensive capability.
But what happened was, I said to the chief of base:
Look it, you know, we got a real issue here with
potential green-on-blue because we were still operating
under the assumption that 17th February was going to
show up.
And, in fact, a bunch of them about did, although it
appears to be an uncoordinated response. They did, in
fact, show up. So you got to remember that these guys
that went over there, the GRS guys, the six of them,
[redacted text]. And I was really worried about that.
If the city is blowing up, I got to make sure we get
them back safely because what we were doing in making
this decision, again, which the chief of base made
instantly on the spot, without equivocation, was we
were giving up all of our shooters to go over there and
rescue the State Department people, as well as any QRF
capability we would have had to rescue the case officer
and the lone GRS guy [redacted text] if they got into
an in extremis situation.
Now, on top of that, what the GRS guys took with them
when they responded over there was every piece of heavy
automatic weapons, and every really solid defensive
weaponry capability that we had on the base. So while
the chief of base agreed to do this right away, this
was not a light--a decision taken lightly.
And, again, I feel like the narrative that I have seen
in public does not account for this and does not
account for the consideration that there was a green-
on-blue situation that could have wiped all of those
guys out. And then where would we have been? We
wouldn't have had the ability to do anything to help
the State Department people, and we wouldn't have had
the ability to evacuate ourselves or defend ourselves
if we came under attack.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\Id. at 104-05.
One GRS Agent explained it is not unusual for people to
have a different recollection of what happened during the time
the Diplomatic Security Agents called the Annex to request
help.\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\GRS 4 Testimony at 95.
Q: Is it unusual in your perspective to have
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
individuals with different accounts?
A: It's not--of course it's not unusual to have people
have different accounts.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\181\Id.
The Annex Team departed at 10:05 p.m., twenty-three minutes
after the Diplomatic Security Agent at the Mission called and
asked for their help.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After departing the Annex, the Annex Team faced a roadblock
at the intersection of the main road leading to the Benghazi
Mission compound. A militia was blocking the most direct route
to the Mission compound. One GRS Team Member described what
they encountered:
When we arrived, to the corner of the street that leads
to the front gate, there was at least a couple vehicles
there and some Libyans standing around outside. We
slowly approached. We didn't know if they were friendly
or hostile. They didn't appear to be a threat to us.
They didn't raise their weapons at us, so we got out of
the vehicles.
And at that time, the interpreter and [the Team Lead],
I believe, started talking to somebody. We were
receiving ineffective, sporadic fire. We returned fire
and moved up the street. At that point, that's when our
group split up.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\GRS 3 Testimony at 53-54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Team Lead also described the roadblock:
Q: And describe what happened when you left the base?
A: So we roll out, and at this point there obviously
was no communication via telephone that's got us
anything. So my plan now is the route that we're going
to take to get to the mission facility, I know there's
two--three militia and/or proper Army compounds on the
way. So my intentions are to basically stop into one of
those facilities along the way, get the technicals that
we were trying to get for support, and then roll to the
mission facility.
So we come out to one of the main roads. One of the
gates, back gates to one of the militia compounds,
which is always sealed up and closed, is wide open, and
there's militia guys moving all over the place.
I look up the street, and there is--I can see, you
know, a bunch of other movement and what have you,
personnel, militia guys, whatever, and we have to go
north anyways, so I said: Hey, push on to, at that
corner, there is what used to be a Libyan National Army
base or compound right at the corner. I said: Hey,
we're going to go to that compound because that's the
direction we have to travel.
We get to that corner, and as I'm looking to pull in--
and there's guys, you know, standing out in front. And
as I'm looking there, and then I look at--essentially
the path of the travel is across the main intersection
and across the street, and generally speaking, where we
would--the access road to the State facility is kind of
up a couple of 100 yards or so on the right, and as I
look up, there is--I can see a couple of technicals and
a bunch of dismounted personnel with AKs or some type
of rifle on them.
So I said: All right. You know what, guys, we're
pushing to--through the intersection to that corner.
Because there was already some type of force where we
need to be, so I figured with the linguist there, roger
that, we can try to utilize these guys to assist
us.\184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\184\GRS Team Lead Testimony at 32-34.
At the same time, the Diplomatic Security Agents at the
compound were working to clear it. After they cleared Villa B,
the Diplomatic Security Agents began searching Villa C, which
was still on fire, for Stevens and Smith.\185\ One Diplomatic
Security Agent described the smoke in Villa C as so thick it
prevented him ``from see[ing] your hand in front of your face.
There are no lights; the electricity [was] down.''\186\ Because
the toxic smoke and heat were so overwhelming, the Diplomatic
Security Agents retrieved gas masks, which were ineffective:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 98.
\186\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 150.
So I put the mask on. And we are being told repeatedly
through this whole time by the other Americans that are
there, ``There is no good air in there. The device that
you have does not provide air.'' I am aware of this.
All you are going to do is go in there and become a
victim, is what they are implying, which is
accurate.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\187\Id. at 155.
As the agents are making their second round of attempts in
and out of Villa C to locate Stevens, at 10:38 p.m. [4:38 p.m.
in Washington D.C.], a local force, arrived at the
Mission.\188\ A few minutes later, the Annex Team arrived on
the compound. After three of the Annex Team members cleared the
main road and the main gate they entered the compound.\189\ Two
minutes later, the Annex Team Lead and the CIA linguist arrived
through the main gate of the Mission.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\Comprehensive Timeline of Events--Benghazi, produced by the
U.S. Dep't of State. (Last Edit Nov. 1, 2012) (on file with the
committee, SCB0047843); see also, Video: DVR Footage of the Mission
(Sept. 11, 2012, 2239-2240).
\189\Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2245).
\190\Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2247).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the course of the next 20 minutes, members of the
Annex Team continued to clear portions of the compound while
other Annex Team members joined the Diplomatic Security Agents
in searching for Stevens and Smith.\191\ One of the Diplomatic
Security Agents described his attempts to find them:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 155.
One of my biggest concerns is one of us in this
recovery effort was going to go in there and become a
victim ourselves, requiring our elements to stay on the
X later, which is a bad situation. I would not want to
put our guys at risk, any greater risk, by having to
fish me out of that same situation where you are trying
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to pull somebody else out of.
So I go in there a fourth time. I got the mask on. I go
in as far as I have gone. I go directly in the safe
haven, and I stay there longer than I should. I am
stomping on the ground, I am feeling around, I am
yelling for the Ambassador. I got nothing. The only
and, again, the only guidance I had from the agent that
was in there at the time was that he had him in the
safe haven. I wasn't aware of any other location he may
have been at that point.
So I am in there, I don't know how long, a minute,
[two], I don't know. I couldn't tell you how long
exactly. But I start to feel the effects of oxygen
deprivation. You start feeling it in the back of your
head. Because I am just not getting air, because there
is no good air in there. So I start thinking about, you
know, putting our team in a worse position having to
come retrieve me. I back out.
So, as I come out, I am grabbed by the team leader of
the other Americans, who says, ``You guys need to'' . .
. ''get the fuck out of here.'' That is a quote.
And we pushed this off for the last 20 minutes,
basically, where they repeatedly told us, you need to
go, you need to go, and we have been adamant that we
need to stay and recover or locate the Ambassador and
Sean Smith. We have stayed up until this point.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\Id. at 155-156.
Diplomatic Security Agent 4 found Smith unresponsive inside
Villa C.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 136.
I go into the safe haven with the intention of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
recovering Smith and Stevens
Immediately upon entering the safe haven, it becomes
very clear to me that it would be a very--that would be
very difficult. The smoke is extremely thick and acrid.
From what I understand now, that was a result of the
accelerants used to start the fire. But open flame is
not so much an issue; it's the volume and the toxic
nature of the smoke that made it very difficult. Even
immediately entering the room, I became very
disoriented.
But using my internal map, my memory of the layout of
the safe-haven area, I make my way along the wall
searching and feeling my way. I make my way into the
safe-haven closet, the safe room, where, according to
our plan, everyone would've been staged. And I don't
find anybody there. I go and make sure that--I go and
work my way around the wall to the gate, the locked
gate of the safe haven itself. And I'm able to confirm
that the gate is still locked, it was locked by padlock
from the inside. So I can make the assumption that
nobody has entered the safe haven and nobody has left.
So that limits the search area.
So I continue to search. I just kind of follow along
the walls, calling out to the Ambassador and Smith and
doing my best to feel around for them.
Q: So, at this point, you have zero visual visibility
and you're feeling along the walls?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: And so did that mean that you were just necessarily
a little limited in the surface area you could cover in
terms of----
A: Right. Yeah. You're right; there was no visibility.
So I was just trying to feel with my limbs, my hands
and feet, and still maintain contract with the wall so
that I wouldn't lose myself. But, nevertheless, I
started to feel very disoriented myself. I started to
be worried that, you know, I was really craving oxygen
by that point, and I eventually found myself in the
bathroom. I broke a window out to try and ventilate the
space and to get some fresh air for myself. And I
cleared my head a little bit.
I was able to get lower to the ground, and then I
worked my way back out the way that I had come. And it
was at that point in the hallway that I came across the
body of Sean Smith. He was unresponsive. So I grabbed
him and dragged him back down the hallway to the safe-
haven window and then handed him off to the people
waiting outside. It was when we had him outside in the
clear air that--and we had a brief check of him, he
had--he was unresponsive, not breathing, no pulse, and
so felt that at that point he was already expired.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\Id. at 136-137.
At 11:01 p.m. [5:01 p.m. in Washington D.C.], Smith was
reported as killed in action.\195\ He was an only child, a
husband and father of two. He was posthumously awarded the
Thomas Jefferson Star for Foreign Service on May 3, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\Comprehensive Timeline of Events--Benghazi, produced by the
U.S. Dep't of State. (Last Edit Nov. 1, 2012) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0047843).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Embassy Tripoli
At the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, the Deputy Chief of
Mission, the most senior member of the State Department team in
Tripoli, and the Chief of Station, the most senior member of
the CIA team in Libya, learned of the attack soon after it
began.\196\ At 9:45 p.m., three minutes after the attacks
began, the senior Diplomatic Security Agent notified Hicks of
the attack. After realizing he had a few missed calls on his
cell phone, Hicks attempted to redial the number and reached
Stevens:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 18.
I jumped up and reached into my phone at the same time
I tried to connect with John which I did not do, he ran
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
out immediately.
And I looked at my phone, and I saw two missed phone
calls, one from a number I did not recognize, and the
second from the Ambassador's telephone.
I punched the number that I did not recognize and
called it back, to call it back, and I got Chris on the
line. And he said, ``Greg, we are under attack.''\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\Id.
The line went dead. Hicks was unable to reach Stevens
again.
Individuals in the tactical operations center, the command
center at the Embassy in Tripoli, quickly alerted other
relevant Embassy staff when the attack was first reported.\198\
Within minutes, the individuals in Tripoli took quick and
decisive actions to execute two steps in response to the
attacks that night. First, they submitted a request to divert
an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset--
colloquially referred to as a ``drone''--flying over another
location in eastern Libya to Benghazi to provide tactical
awareness of the situation on the ground. Second, the Chief of
Station of the Annex in Tripoli prepared a rescue team, called
``Team Tripoli,'' to respond forthwith to the attacks in
Benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\See Hicks Apr. 2016 Testimony at 72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Team Tripoli Response
In Tripoli, when word of the attacks reached the Embassy
and the CIA Station, a team consisting of four Tripoli Station
GRS members, one of whom was Glen Doherty, two Defense
Department special operators, and a CIA linguist sprang into
action. Using their initiative coupled with previously
established contacts, in less than an hour, they managed to
assemble a response team and acquire an aircraft for transport.
The Chief of Station authorized this team, dubbed Team Tripoli,
to respond to the attacks in Benghazi:
[M]y specific direction to Team Tripoli was to provide
quick reaction force to shore up base and to assist the
[Benghazi Mission compound], the consulate there, and
in so doing render any assistance to the Ambassador. So
that was all kind of--they were a complementary set of
objectives.
One of the things, on a more tactical level, was the
entire GRS contingent in Benghazi, save one officer,
was forward deployed to the temporary mission facility.
So they were, in my opinion, very vulnerable.
At that time, I made the decision to deploy all except
one of our GRS officers to Benghazi. That gave me
certainly a sense of trepidation because that left us
vulnerable to any sort of attack or follow on things.
So that was part of my thought calculus doing that. I
didn't hesitate, but I certainly thought about that and
the ensuing consequences of leaving one GRS.\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\Testimony of Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at
112-13 (July 16, 2015) [hereinafter Chief of Station Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
While the mission of Team Tripoli was supported by the
Department of State at Embassy Tripoli and supported by
AFRICOM, it was a mission orchestrated solely by the CIA Chief
of Station in Tripoli. As reported by one of the military
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
members of Team Tripoli to the Committee:
Q: Did AFRICOM headquarters or SOCAFRICA have any role
in planning your deployment from Tripoli to Benghazi?
A: No, sir.
* * *
Q: How about the Embassy itself there in Tripoli, were
they directing the deployment from Tripoli to Benghazi?
A: Not that I recall, sir.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\Testimony of Special Operator, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Tr. at
44-45 (Sept. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Special Operator Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
Fortuitously, earlier that day a CIA member of the team had
brokered an initial agreement with the owner of an aircraft to
charter the aircraft as needed.\201\ During the morning
meeting, the CIA officer had queried the operator of the
aircraft as to ``How fast can you respond?'' and the [redacted
text] owner replied, ``I am not sure; probably within 24
hours.''\202\ Because of this, Team Tripoli was able to quickly
secure the aircraft for transport from Tripoli to Benghazi that
night.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\Id. at 37.
\202\Id.
A: Called back again that night and said, ``We need you
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
right now,'' and he was there. He showed up.
Q: That was good timing, wasn't it?
A: It was good timing, sir, convenient.\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Q: And how long did it take from the time that call was
made to the aircraft owner, what did he say about his
ability to take off from Tripoli to Benghazi? How long
a timeframe do you recall?
A: I don't remember what time he said, but I know we
had got there around 11:30 or midnight, but he was
ready to go when we had gotten there. And they actually
had expedited us through the airport. We didn't go
through any--the actual airport procedures. We had
weapons and ammo, obviously.
* * *
Q: And was there no limitation on daylight only flight
ops with this [redacted text], as I understand was the
limitation on the Libyan military C-130?
A: I don't think they could fly at night, but he could
because he was a privately owned company. The [redacted
text] was privately owned.
Q: But your understanding was, at least with respect to
the Libya C-130----
A: Daytime, sir.
Q: That was limited to daytime ops?
A: Yes, sir.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\Id. at 47-48.
At 12:30 a.m. [6:30 p.m. in Washington D.C.], the Team
Tripoli departed the Tripoli Mitiga Airport with four GRS
officers, including former U.S. Navy SEAL Glen A. Doherty, two
military personnel, and a CIA officer acting as a
linguist.\205\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\See U.S. Dep't of Defense, Timeline of the Department of
Defense Actions on September 11-12, 2012 (May 1, 2013) (on file with
the Committee) [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline] (``A six-
man security team from U.S. Embassy Tripoli, including two DoD
personnel, departs for Benghazi''); see also, Special Operator
Testimony at 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Defense Department is Alerted of the Attack
News of the attack traveled at varying speeds within the
Defense Department. AFRICOM was the first combatant command to
receive an alert about the attacks. By 4:32 p.m. in Washington
D.C. [10:32 p.m. in Benghazi], news of the attack reached the
Pentagon.
AFRICOM ALERTED OF THE ATTACK
Members within the AFRICOM command structure learned of the
attack just more than 30 minutes after it began. At AFRICOM
headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, Vice Admiral Charles J.
Leidig Jr., the second in command for military operations,
learned of the attack just over a half hour after it
began.\206\ He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\206\Leidig 2014 Testimony at 20.
The night of the attack, when I received the initial
report at my quarters that night that there had been--I
remember it exactly. I got a report at [10:15]. I tell
people I saw the same Indiglo watch, and I was asleep
in my bed. I went to bed, got up early, and it was my
routine. So at [10:15], I rolled over and got a report
that . . . the facility in Benghazi [had been overrun],
but that the Ambassador was in a safe room and was
safe. And that was the initial report I got at
[10:15].\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\Id.
Following notification, Admiral Leidig recalled his command
center staff and returned to work.\208\ Although the initial
reports he received were that Stevens had been secured in a
safe haven, he learned shortly upon returning to work that
Stevens was missing:\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\Id. at 26.
\209\Id.
When I got to the command center, the focus was on
where is the Ambassador and trying to locate him. At
that point I didn't know where the location that folks
had went to. I didn't know who they were. I would later
learn over the intervening hours that that was some
folks from [the annex] who had come to move State
Department personnel to the other facility. Again, it
was several hours before I knew what the facility was,
or the location, or where they were at. I just knew
that they had moved to another location, and the
reports we were getting from--most of our reporting at
that point were coming from the defense attache', our
defense attache' in Tripoli--was that they were safe,
and they were fine, and that they were at this other
facility. Our focus was trying to help gather
information to see if we could locate where the
Ambassador was.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\Id. at 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PENTAGON ALERTED OF ATTACK
Almost an hour after the attacks started, at 4:32 p.m. in
Washington D.C. [10:32 p.m. in Benghazi], nearly the same time
the Diplomatic Security Agents and the Annex security team
members began clearing the Mission compound in Benghazi half a
world away, word of the attack finally reached the
Pentagon.\211\ Although the Embassy in Tripoli and the
Diplomatic Command Center at the State Department in Washington
received word almost immediately that the Benghazi Mission
compound was under attack, that notice did not make its way to
the National Military Command Center, the operations center at
the Pentagon, until 4:32 p.m. local time in Washington
D.C.\212\ Vice Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, the Director of Operations
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the attacks,
testified his staff immediately alerted him about the
attacks.\213\ His staff simultaneously contacted AFRICOM to
obtain additional information regarding the situation on the
ground, while he notified members of the Secretary of Defense's
staff.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline.
\212\U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline; see SCC Timeline (indicating
the Diplomatic Security Command Center received notification of the
attack at 3:49 PM EDT).
\213\Testimony of Vice Admiral Kurt Tidd, Assistant to the Chairman
of the J. Chiefs of Staff, Dir. for Operations (J3), U.S. Dep't of
Defense, Tr. at 8 (Apr. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Tidd Testimony] (on file
with the Committee).
\214\Id. at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASSETS IDENTIFIED TO DEPLOY
As officials in Washington D.C. began to react to the
attacks in Benghazi, it is important to describe and understand
the assets available to respond, the state of those assets, and
the military's policies and planning in force that applied to
the assets' use and deployment.
AFRICOM'S Posture and Force Laydown on September 11
In the days leading up to September 11, 2012, General
Carter F. Ham, the Commander of the United States Africa
Command [AFRICOM] conducted a ``deep dive'' into intelligence
reports to guide their decision regarding whether any
adjustment to the force posture needed to be made.\215\ Leidig
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\Leidig 2014 Testimony at 22.
[B]ased on General Ham's guidance, we actually did--we
had been--the military always does planning for
September 11th. We always know that there's a potential
for, you know, some sort of terrorist activity on
September 11th since its anniversary. General Ham had
actually directed in the days running up to it that we
do what we call a deep dive or a deep look at the
intelligence to see if there was anything to indicated
that there might be anything in our [area of
responsibility]. We found nothing in any intelligence
that would indicate that there was an attack or an
incident being planned by terrorists in our [area of
responsibility].\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\Id. at 22-23.
Although AFRICOM's area of responsibility consists of the
continent of Africa, with the exception of Egypt, its
headquarters are based in Stuttgart, Germany. With the
exception of a contingent stationed in Djibouti, a country on
the Horn of Africa approximately 2,000 miles from Libya,
AFRICOM did not have assigned forces.\217\ As a result, AFRICOM
had to use United States European Command troops, aircraft, and
bases in Europe including Ramstein, Germany; Sigonella and
Aviano, Italy; and Rota, Spain to respond to events occurring
on the African continent.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\Panetta Testimony at 13.
\218\Id. at 14-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Planned Assets
FAST PLATOONS
The assets AFRICOM would mostly likely call upon in
response to a crisis situation were the Fleet Antiterrorism
Security Team [FAST] platoons stationed in Rota, Spain. Those
platoons were required to be ready to deploy within a certain
time frame. FAST platoons, as of September 2012, were typically
used to reinforce embassy security and operated from a fixed
location within an embassy. FAST platoons did not deploy with
their own vehicles, so they were dependent on other means for
ground mobility. That reality made the FAST platoon less
capable to rapidly respond as a quick-reaction force. Moreover,
the FAST platoon's ability to move on a given timeline required
the allocation of aircraft for deployment in a timely manner.
At the time, FAST platoons did not have dedicated airlift.
This meant prior to being able to deploy, airlift would need to
arrive from some other location, most likely Ramstein, Germany,
to pick up the platoon for an onward deployment. The air base
in Ramstein, Germany housed C-130s, large transport airframes
that typically would be used to move the FAST platoons and
associated equipment. In the days leading up to the attack,
none of the C-130s in Ramstein were on any heightened alert. To
effectuate movement, the Commander of United States Air Forces
in Europe would need to take a series of steps to generate
aircraft and prepare an air crew for deployment.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\Testimony of General Philip G. Breedlove, Commander, U. S.
European Command, Tr. at 21-22 (Apr. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Breedlove
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMANDER'S IN EXTREMIS FORCE
Another asset AFRICOM could call upon when circumstances
warranted was the Commander's in Extremis Force [CIF] owned by
European Command; it is one of the most capable quick response
forces. General Ham described this force as ``the force of
first choice should there be an emergent situation.''\220\ It
is a special operations response team that offers capabilities
for emergency action in missions such as hostage rescue,
noncombatant evacuation when the security situation is
uncertain, or convoy security. The CIF can and does work with
the U.S.-based Special Operations Force that also ultimately
deployed the night of the attacks in Benghazi. Theoretically,
since any deployment from the U.S. to the Middle East or North
Africa will require significant time for the U.S.-based force
to reach its destination, the CIF provides a more responsive
capability when an emergency arises. It has dedicated aircraft
for transportation. The CIF is tasked to be airborne in a set
number of hours once alerted, and the military's air traffic
management system is supposed to provide two aircraft to ensure
the CIF is airborne on the specified timeline. Unlike other
assets deployed that night the CIF deploys with its own
vehicles giving it the ability to drive from an airfield where
deposited to a crisis site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\Testimony of General Carter F. Ham, Commander, U.S. Africa
Command.Tr. at 28 (June 8, 2016) [hereinafter Ham 2016 Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Typically stationed in Germany, in the days leading up to
September 11 the CIF was actually deployed to Croatia to
perform a joint exercise.\221\ This training exercise had been
planned for over a year.\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\Testimony of Army Major General Michael S. Repass, Commander,
Special Operations Command Europe, Tr. at 18 (Apr. 15, 2016)
[hereinafter Repass Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\222\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S.-BASED SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE
One other asset that can be used in events similar to the
attacks in Benghazi is a U.S.-based Special Operations Force
[U.S. SOF]. That force offers capabilities that complement and
expand upon the assets brought by the CIF.\223\ Secretary of
Defense Leon E. Panetta described the U.S. SOF as a ``hostage
rescue unit from our special operations team.''\224\ [redacted
text].\225\ By design, the CIF would typically be able to reach
an overseas target first, due to the distance required to
deploy from the U.S.\226\ If required, the CIF can assault a
target immediately. If time permits, the preferred option is to
hand the target over to the U.S. SOF, given its more robust
capabilities.\227\ Since the U.S. SOF deploys from the U.S.,
however, to respond to the attacks in Benghazi it must travel
much farther than the CIF and other assets closer to Libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\223\Id.
\224\Leon E. Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War
and Peace 225 (2014).
\225\Repass Testimony at 8.
\226\Id. at 8-9.
\227\Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Assets
F-16S AT AVIANO AIR BASE
Aviano Air Base--situated in Aviano, Italy, approximately
50 miles north of Venice--is home to the 31st Fighter Wing of
the United States Air Forces Europe. At the time of the attack,
two squadrons each consisting of 21 F-16s were stationed at
Aviano.\228\ No tankers to provide air refueling for these F-
16s were stationed at Aviano.\229\ The assigned tankers were
stationed in Mildenhall, England.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\Testimony of Brigadier General Scott Zobrist, Commander, 31st
Fighter Air Wing, U.S. Air Forces Europe, Tr. at 15 (Mar. 12, 2014)
[hereinafter Zobrist Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\229\Id. at 20.
\230\Id. at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 11, 2012, the air squadrons in Aviano were not
on any heightened alert status, despite the call for a
``heightened alert'' during the President's call with Cabinet
members--an alert sequence that would require the pilots and
the aircraft to be ready in a short amount of time. Rather,
they were in a training posture.\231\ In fact, on that day, the
31st Fighter Wing was in the middle of a two-week inspection to
ensure the Fighter Wing met Air Force requirements.\232\ The
aircraft were in a ``true training configuration'' which meant
nothing was pre-loaded on the aircraft.\233\ This also meant
any live ordnances available at Aviano were not assembled,
thus, prior to loading onto an F-16, the bomb had to be put
together piece by piece.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\Id. at 25.
\232\Id. at 32.
\233\Id. at 36.
\234\Id. at 29-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the fact that none of the F-16s was on any
alert status but rather in a true training configuration on the
anniversary of September 11, the distance between Aviano and
Libya is approximately 1,000 miles or the equivalent of two-
hour's flight time.\235\ Because of that distance, an F-16
would have needed two air refuelings by the tankers that were
stationed nearly 700 miles away in Mildenhall, England, at the
time.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\235\Id. at 56.
\236\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These impediments to any fighter aircraft response from
Aviano to North Africa were well known prior to September 11.
Yet the alert posture of the aircraft at Aviano did not change
in advance of that date, nor did the alert posture change after
the protests in Cairo, Egypt.
General Ham testified he had not ordered any fighter
aircraft at Aviano to be placed on alert in the days leading up
to September 11 based on his assessment of the threat
intelligence and the probability the type of attacks that would
most likely occur would be small scale attacks.\237\ Because of
this, he believed if any attack were to occur, fighter aircraft
would not be the right tool to respond.\238\ Some other
military officials agreed with General Ham's assessment that
fighter aircraft would likely not be the right tool to respond
to potential events in North Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\Ham Testimony at 28.
\238\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT ``DRONES''
At the time of the attacks, the Air Force operated four
remotely-piloted aircraft--colloquially referred to as
``drones''--from a base in southern Europe, approximately four
hours from Benghazi. These drones were flown by a United States
Air Force squadron located in the continental United States,
and conducted missions over several countries including
Libya.\239\ None of the drones were armed, [redacted
text].\240\ A pilot operating a drone on the night of the
attack explained why:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\239\Testimony of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pilot 1, U. S. Air
Force, Tr. at 10-11 (May 25, 2016) [hereinafter Drone Pilot 1
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\240\[Redacted text].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q: Was the aircraft armed?
A: No, the aircraft did not have Hellfires on it.
Q: Could it have been armed?
A: I guess ``could'' is a very subjective term in this
case. So the aircraft had pylons which you could put
Hellfires on, yes.
Q: If it was capable of being armed. Why wasn't it
armed?
A: So as far as, like, the details of that decision,
they're above my level as to why that wasn't armed. But
from my understanding, the two reasons were--one is the
political environment between Libya, Italy, America,
and Europe was that we no longer needed missiles on our
aircraft in Libya because it had stabilized from the
Qadhafi regime, post-Qadhafi regime.
The second reason is, whenever we don't need missiles
on the aircraft, we want to pull them off as soon as we
can, because it provides an opportunity to put more gas
on board, and with more gas on board, we can fly longer
missions and we can provide more intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance to the Combined Air
Operations Center.\241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\241\Drone Pilot 1 Testimony at 24-25.
Armed drones had not been flown out of southern Europe
since the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Another pilot who
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
operated the drone that night added:
A: [W]e hadn't been armed in Libya since at some point
after the Qadhafi stuff had happened. So at some point
after that, it was--we knew we were no longer going to
be armed in that theater.
Q: How did you know that?
A: I don't remember who mentioned it, but I remember
hearing at some point that the--my understanding of it
was that the [government hosting the drone base] did
not want us flying an unmanned aircraft that was armed
over their country, so therefore they restricted us
from having armed unmanned aircraft.
Q: And did you ever hear anything like--was that
through your chain of command or that was a fellow
pilot?
A: My best guess would be that it was probably our
operations supervisor who basically runs the mass brief
at the beginning of each shift, you know, would have
just mentioned one day: Hey, due to, you know, the
[government hosting the drone base] not wanting us to
have armed unmanned aircraft over their country, we're
no longer going to be armed in Libya.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\Testimony of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pilot 2, U.S. Air
Force, Tr. at 15 (May 25, 2016) [hereinafter Drone Pilot 2 Testimony]
(on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the pilots added:
To the best of my knowledge, that is my understanding
for what the trigger was for no longer arming the
remote-piloted aircraft flying over Libya, was the
takedown of Qadhafi.\243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\Id. at 27.
To utilize armed drones in a close air support environment,
such as in Benghazi, a pilot would typically receive targeting
instructions and clearance from a Joint Terminal Attack
Controller [JTAC] on the ground.\244\ One of the drone pilots
explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\244\Id. at 25-26.
In a close air support environment, which is more akin
to what [Benghazi] would be, that's where we would
coordinate with a joint terminal attack controller,
JTAC, on the ground, and he would give us what is
called a nine-line in order to strike in that close air
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
support environment. And that would be the clearance.
And then the only other option would be to get a nine-
line, which is equivalent to a strike clearance, from
the actual Combined Air Operations Center via a chariot
directed straight from the Combined Forces Air
Component commander.\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\Drone Pilot 1 Testimony at 23.
Although there were no JTAC's on the ground in Benghazi
that night, several of the GRS agents possessed the skillset
from their prior military experience.\246\ One agent testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\GRS 5 Testimony at 43-45; see also, Drone Pilot 1 Testimony at
67 (``there were no JTACs in all of Libya.'').
Q: And so how many of you had that, what [do] you call
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
it again? What did you call it again?
A: A nine line.
Q: Nine line?
A: Yes, sir. It's just calling for fire. Now they call
them JTACs. When most of us were in the military it
wasn't as specialized, but everyone on that team could
have called in, called for fire.
Q: Anybody----
A: On our team, yes.
Q: --could have called it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So how were you able to--I guess your capabilities--
I'm talking about you personally, you were able to
provide a nine line?
A: Sure.
Q: And how did you know how to do that?
A: From the military. From prior training in the
military.
Q: Okay. Would you have had any way to communicate with
the pilot if a pilot----
A: We could have, yes.
Q: All right. How could that have----
A: Through radio.
Q: Through radio. When you say we were all able to
provide precision fire, are you talking about the GRS
individuals?
A: Only the GRS individuals, yes.
Q: Okay. Do you know if everybody was able to do that
or----
A: Yes, I do.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\GRS 5 Testimony at 43-45.
When asked whether former military personnel were capable
of serving as a JTAC, one of the drone pilots acknowledged such
a person could possess the skills necessary to direct a
strike.\248\ According to the witness from his perspective, the
problem would be whether the military, without approval from
the President, would have the authority to launch a missile
toward a target at the direction of a skilled civilian.\249\
However, as the pilot pointed out, authority to strike without
a military JTAC on the ground could also have been provided by
the Combined Forces Air Component Commander.\250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\248\Drone Pilot 1 Testimony at 65-66.
\249\Id. This appears to be a concise statement from his
perspective of more complex legal and operational constraints.
\250\Id. at 30-31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The year before the attacks in Benghazi, the Defense
Department had operated drones over Libya during Operation
Odyssey Dawn, the U.S. led campaign against Qadhafi troops, and
Operation Unified Protector, the NATO mission against Qadhafi
troops. During both of those operations, the drones had been
used to launch missiles toward targets in Libya.\251\ During
these operations, the drones were pre-loaded with missiles
while stationed in southern Europe and always carried weapons
during missions over Libya. At some point after the fall of
Qadhafi, the drones operating over Libya no longer carried
missiles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\Testimony of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Sensor Operator, U. S.
Air Force, Tr. at 26 (June 9, 2016) [hereinafter Sensor Operator 1] (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the fall of Qadhafi, the Defense Department continued
to use drones and other ISR assets to gather intelligence
information in Libya, especially regarding the growing number
of Islamic extremist in country.
In August 2012, the Libyan government restricted the types
of missions that could be flown in Libyan air space, primarily
over Benghazi. General Ham explained:
Q: General, in the summer of 2012, August timeframe,
ISR missions over Benghazi and Tripoli were suspended
due to complaints from Libyans. I believe those ISR
assets were Predators and they were under your command.
Is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And what do you recall about the suspension or the
complaints from the Libyans about those ISR assets
operating in Libya?
A: There were complaints by the Libyan Government to
the Embassy about overflights. [Redacted text].
Q: Did those complaints impact your ability to operate
those Predator assets at all during that time?
A: I do not recall the complaints about the unmanned
systems. I do recall complaints about the manned
systems. And the manned systems, we would have to very
carefully manage the time slots and when they could
fly.
Q: Were those P-3s?
A: Yes.
General Ham described his assessment of the Libyans's
request:
Sir, I think there were some honest Libyans who didn't
like the noise. I mean, they're just kind of a constant
buzz. They're low, and they're intrusive.
I think there were some Libyans who voiced concern to
their government about a foreign power being intrusive.
And I believe there were Islamic terrorist
organizations who were influencing members of the
Libyan Government, because they knew what those
aircraft were doing.\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\Ham 2016 Testimony at 168.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASSETS AT SOUDA BAY, CRETE
While conducting oversight in Souda Bay, Members of the
Committee received a briefing regarding special operations
aircraft that were stationed at Souda Bay on the night of the
attacks in Benghazi and could have been utilized in response to
the attacks. The Committee sought confirmation of this
information through interviews and requests for information
from the Defense Department. The Defense Department has not
denied the presence of these assets.
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN LIBYA
The only Defense Department asset in Libya not considered
that night were the military members of Team Tripoli. This was
true because the Secretary was not even aware of their presence
in Libya. At the time of his meeting with the President and for
a period subsequent to that, the Secretary was not informed
military personnel were making their way to Benghazi. In fact,
he did not learn of this until the next day.\253\ This means
the only U.S. military asset to actually reach Benghazi during
the attacks was an asset the Secretary did not know about, was
not told about by his subordinates, and did not learn about
until after the fact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\Panetta Testimony at 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOREIGN EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM
The Foreign Emergency Support Team [FEST] is ``the U.S.
government's only interagency, on-call, short-notice team
poised to respond to terrorist incidents worldwide.''\254\
Consisting of representatives from the Defense Department and
other agencies, FEST deploys overseas at the request of the
Chief of Mission or the State Department, and can augment both
U.S. and host nation capabilities with specialized crisis
response expertise.\255\ Historically, it has deployed overseas
in response to attacks on U.S. interests. For example, in 2000,
after the USS Cole was attacked, a FEST team was deployed to
Aden, Yemen.\256\ Two years earlier, two FEST teams were
deployed to Kenya and Tanzania. FEST has also been deployed in
response to a hostage-taking crisis and abductions of
Americans.\257\ Typically, the State Department requests
deployment of the FEST in conjunction with the Joint Staff.
Once that decision is made, the FEST is capable of launching
within four hours.\258\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\254\Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) found at www.state.gov/
j/ct/programs/fest/index.htm.
\255\See id.
\256\Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16664.htm.
\257\Id.
\258\Email from Mark I. Thompson (Sept. 11, 2012 9:58 PM) (on file
with the Committee, C05562162) (``The team can launch within 4 hours of
Deputies Committee decision.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite all of these capabilities, the Secretary recalls no
discussion of a potential FEST deployment in response to the
Benghazi attacks.\259\ Mark I. Thompson, the person in charge
of the FEST, contacted Kennedy about deploying the FEST on the
night of the attacks. According to an email response sent to
Thompson that evening, Kennedy ``did not feel the dispatch of
such a team to Libya is the appropriate response to the current
situation.''\260\ Charlene R. Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Diplomatic Security, State Department also did not believe
the FEST was an appropriate asset to be deployed that evening.
Although in direct contrast to the State Department's own
description and the historical record of prior deployments of
the unit, Lamb described the FEST as ``primarily focus[ing] on
providing a strong communications package, policy experts, and
investigative abilities.''\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\259\Panetta Testimony at 182.
\260\Email to Mark I. Thompson (Sept. 11, 2012 10:43) (on file with
the Committee, C05562162).
\261\Testimony of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Diplomatic
Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 26 (Jan. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Lamb
testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
David H. Petraeus, Director, CIA, viewed the FEST as a
``support element for the conduct of an operation to do a
counter-terrorism or hostage rescue operation.''\262\ [Redacted
text].\263\ Yet with Stevens considered missing for hours in
Libya after the death of Smith, FEST expertise could have
augmented the capabilities of the U.S. Embassy in Libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\Petraeus Testimony at 49
\263\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tidd stated a FEST deployment was discussed briefly during
the 7:30 meeting with the White House, but dismissed.\264\
Kennedy and others at the State Department did not want to
deploy the FEST in response to the attacks in Benghazi. Tidd
indicated the State Department was concerned about putting
individuals in country who were not ``trigger pullers'' and
would potentially need rescuing.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\Tidd Testimony at 22.
\265\Id. at 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Practical and Policy Implications Associated with Deploying Assets
Throughout the course of the investigation, Defense
Department witnesses provided insight into how various assets
might have been employed to respond to the events in Benghazi,
and the constraints--whether imposed by policy or imposed by
capability--of employing such assets.
TIME AND DISTANCE
Given that the attacks occurred in Libya, military
officials repeatedly emphasized any asset that would respond to
the events would be necessarily constrained by the ``tyranny of
time and distance.'' The CIF commander described the
difficulties of responding to events in Africa:
So a lot of people that deploy to Africa or work on
AFRICOM--work for AFRICOM--use the term ``tyranny of
distance'' because it takes so long to move what could
seemingly look like smaller distances. And there's not
a robust network of airfields and staging points that
there are, say, in a more developed area of the world,
like Europe. So Europe is a much smaller area, and
there's many developed airfields, fueling sites.
Whereas, when you have Africa, it's, relatively
speaking, much more undeveloped and exponentially times
larger; so you are limited in your ability to move
around with fuel, with time. And we call it the
``tyranny of distance'' because it's hard to get from
point A to point B, and it takes a while.\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\266\Testimony of CIF Commander, Special Operations Command Europe,
Tr. at 98 (Aug. 26, 2015) [hereinafter CIF Commander Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
With respect to the response to Benghazi, the Secretary
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explained:
I knew it was going to take some time [to move an asset
into Libya], just because of the preparedness for the
units and then the time and distance involved. You
know, you've heard the term ``tyranny of time and
distance,'' and it's tough in this area.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\267\Panetta Testimony at 47.
Tidd discussed the challenges faced to move forces as
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
quickly as possible that night:
Q: Admiral, one of the lingering questions that we have
been trying to get a handle on is why it seemed to take
so long to get the response forces off the ground. The
FAST team was in Rota on a [specific] timeline. They
were ready to move prior to that. They sat on the
tarmac for about 6 hours before the planes got there.
A: That is because we had no alert aircraft in
Ramstein. So, literally, it was the middle of the night
there. And I don't know all of the exact actions that
they had to go to, but at Ramstein, they had to go and
generate the airplanes, get the air crews, wake them
up, brief them, tell them what we knew, and have the
planes ready to go. We did not have an alert posture
set for the aircraft.\268\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\Tidd Testimony at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Everybody wanted them there instantaneously. And we
were getting a lot of questions . . . Are they mov[ing]
yet, are they moving yet? It was just taking a long
time.\269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\269\Id.
Dr. James Miller, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
at the time, provided a civilian's perspective on the
logistical challenges faced by the Defense Department that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
night in response to the attacks:
The logistical issues were the tyranny of distance and
time, first and foremost. So moving an asset from the
[U.S.], the longest move, moving the FAST team, getting
it prepared to deploy--the FAST teams, I should say,
both from Rota--and then the EUCOM [CIF].
So there is, first, the distance to be traveled, the
fact that it takes time. Second, they need time to spin
up. And I later became deeply familiar with the various
postures and so forth, but it is challenging to sustain
a very short timeline for an extended period of time.
And so each of the individual units we're talking about
had a specific timeline for readiness. My impression
was they were all working to shorten that timeline and
to get prepared and to deploy even more rapidly than
their timelines. But that I would consider a matter of
logistics as well.\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\270\Testimony of Dr. James N. Miller, Under Sec'y of Defense for
Policy, Tr. at 71-72 (May 10, 2016) [hereinafter Miller Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
Several witnesses also talked about the logistical
obstacles to deploying F-16s in response to the attacks in
Benghazi. Being able to deploy an aircraft and being able to
actually utilize an aircraft in response to the events are
separate questions. From the Defense Department's perspective,
even if a F-16 was activated quickly and was able to fly to
Benghazi before the final mortar attack, logistical constraints
would still have impacted the capability to actually utilize
the F-16s that night. Admiral James A. Winnefeld, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed those
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
constraints:
But let's say you could just snap your fingers and
there were F-16s suddenly over Benghazi immediately.
It's the middle of the night; there's no joint tactical
air controller on the ground. You don't even have any
communications with the people on the ground. You don't
even know where this is happening. If you're lucky and
you've got a latitude and a longitude to point your
systems at, you might be able to see the action going
on on the ground, if there was action going on on the
ground, but for most of the night there wasn't.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\Testimony of Vice Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Vice Chairman,
J. Chiefs of Staff, Tr. at 35-36 (Mar. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Winnefeld
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Rear Admiral Richard B. Landolt, the Director of Operations
for AFRICOM also explained the logistical and policy
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
constraints of employing F-16s in response to the attack:
A: You still have 3 to 4 hours of the flight time to
get to, say, Benghazi. And then you need to spin up
tanker aircraft because it can't do a round trip
without them. And Admiral Leidig talked to General
Franklin on that, so there was nothing on strip alert
there in Aviano.
And tankers I believed were up in England, Mildenhall,
I believe.
* * *
Q: Were the F-16s--perhaps ``dismissed'' isn't the
right word, but--pick a better word if you have one--
but were they dismissed because of the [time it would
take to activate] issue, or were they dismissed because
there wasn't a viable mission for you to employ them?
A: I would almost say both reasons, because--yeah. So
we spin it up, what are we going to do with it? I mean,
you've got to put ordnance on it, you've got to refuel
it, you've got to brief a mission. We don't know what
the mission is. You know, this is an urban environment
so--and we don't have people on the ground that can
direct targeting. There were not tactical action
controllers in Benghazi, as far as I know.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\Testimony of Rear Admiral Richard B. Landolt, Dir. of
Operations for U.S. Africa Command, Tr. at 38 (May 5, 2016)
[hereinafter Landolt Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Even if F-16s were generated in a timely manner and were
able to arrive in Benghazi before the attacks ended, policy
restrictions would have impacted their utility that night. As
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Winnefeld explained:
No Air Force or Navy pilot will ever drop a bomb into
an area where they are not certain who's there and
what's going on unless there's communications with
people on the ground and a JTAC or what we call a
forward air controller airborne.
So I mean, it was highly unlikely that we were going to
be able to make a difference, even if we could get
there in time with air power, so we chose not to do
it.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\273\Winnefeld Testimony at 36.
As mentioned previously, many of the GRS agents on the
ground had the JTAC capabilities from prior military
experience. Of course all of what is laid out above was well
known beforehand. There was nothing new about the time and
distance concerns in Africa or the positioning of U.S. assets
that might be called upon to respond.
Not only did the Defense Department know any response to
events in North Africa would be hampered by distance, the State
Department also knew the military had such concerns because
they were constantly reminded. Winnefeld testified he
repeatedly warned the State Department of this issue:
The tyranny of distance, in particularly North Africa,
as I'm sure you've probably seen a picture of the U.S.
imposed upon--you know, the entire continental U.S.
fits neatly into North Africa. It's a big place. We've
constantly reminded State while I was the Vice Chairman
and also, you know, National Security Council staff,
gently, politely, that if you're counting on reactive
forces from DOD to pull your fat out of the fire,
basically, when there's an event going on, you're
kidding yourselves. It's just too hard to get there.
Usually, an event is over fairly quickly, and even in
the best alert posture we can be in, it's going to be a
couple of hours, two or three hours, before we can be
someplace.
So what you should really be counting on is using these
forces to either preemptively reinforce an area, like
an embassy, or preemptively evacuate an area, like an
embassy. Don't count on us to drop in in the middle of
the night and stop a situation that's going on.
Now that won't prevent us from trying, certainly. If
there's an event in a place that--you know, like a
Benghazi and if we're postured in order to get there,
we'll certainly try, we'll always try, but I've made it
very clear to them--and they understand this--that they
need to be very careful in their risk assessments. And
it's a lot easier to reinforce and get out early than
it is to save something that's under fire. And that has
a lot to do not only with the tyranny of distance and
how long it takes to get there, but you know, it's not
easy to take a force and just drop it into the middle
of an unknown area at night, and it's even harder when
you're under fire. You know, V-22s don't like to fly
when they're under fire, that sort of thing. So we've
tried to make it very, very clear to [State], try,
please, please, to do good risk assessment and evacuate
or reinforce so that we don't have to rescue you in the
middle of a firefight.\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\274\Winnefeld Testimony at 74-75.
The President's Directive and The Secretary's Order
Just minutes after word of the attack reached the
Secretary, he and General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, departed the Pentagon to attend a
previously scheduled 5:00 p.m. meeting at the White House with
President Obama and National Security Advisor Thomas E.
Donilon.\275\ The Secretary recalled two details about the
attack on the U.S. facility in Benghazi: a building was on fire
and Stevens was missing.\276\ As the Secretary and Dempsey
briefed the President on the evolving situation in Benghazi,
Libya, the Secretary recalled the following guidance:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\Panetta Testimony at 22.
\276\Id. at 22-23
The President made clear that we ought to use all of
the resources at our disposal to try to make sure we
did everything possible to try to save lives
there.\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\Id. at 24.
Immediately following the meeting with the President, at
roughly 6:00 p.m., the Secretary and Dempsey returned to the
Pentagon and convened a meeting that included Ham, who was in
Washington D.C. at the time, and relevant members of the
Secretary's staff and the Joint Staff.\278\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\Id. at 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the meeting, three distinct capabilities were
identified to deploy in response to the attacks in Benghazi:
two FAST platoons, the CIF, and the U.S. SOF, capable of
response to crises worldwide.\279\ Again, the Secretary was not
aware, and was not told, of any assets in Tripoli.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\279\Id. at 24-25
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Defense Department provided copies of maps identifying
assets present in European Command, AFRICOM, and Central
Command's areas of responsibility on September 11, September
12, and September 13 to the Committee. The assets identified on
the maps were purportedly considered during this meeting,
although the Joint Staff at the time did not keep a daily
updated list of assets and their locations.\280\ During its
investigation, the Committee determined the maps failed to
include assets that actually were deployed in response to
Benghazi. For example, a C-17 medical airplane was deployed to
Tripoli on September 12 to evacuate the wounded, deceased, and
other American citizens. That asset was not identified on the
maps provided by the Defense Department to the Committee. Given
this discrepancy, the Committee requested it confirm whether
there were any additional assets not identified on the maps or
any assets withheld due to special access programs
restrictions. It did not respond to the Committee's request.
This failure to respond unnecessarily and unadvisedly leaves
questions the Defense Department can easily answer, and it is
in the public interest that it do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\280\See Winnefeld Testimony at 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the Secretary, within an hour of his return to
the Pentagon, he issued an order to deploy the identified
assets.\281\ The testimony of record is that the President's
direction that night was clear: use all of the resources
available to try to make sure we did everything possible to try
to save lives there.\282\ When asked whether he expected or
needed the President to later extrapolate, clarify, or reissue
that order, the Secretary said ``no.''\283\ The Secretary
insisted he understood the President's directive and no further
communication with the President was necessary. Nor did any
further communication with the President take place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\281\Panetta Testimony at 25-26.
\282\Id. at 23.
\283\Id. at 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, the Secretary insists his own intentions and
actions that night, in the aftermath of the President's orders,
were also clear: deploy the identified assets immediately. The
Secretary said his orders were active tense. ``My orders were
to deploy those forces, period. . . . [I]t was very clear: They
are to deploy.''\284\ He did not order the preparation to
deploy or the planning to deploy or the contemplation of
deployment. His unequivocal testimony was that he ordered the
identified assets to ``deploy.''\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\284\Id. at 26.
\285\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By 7:00 p.m. in Washington [1:00 a.m. in Benghazi], nearly
three hours after the attacks began, the Secretary issued what
he believed, then and now, to be the only order needed to move
the FAST platoons, the CIF, and the U.S. SOF.\286\ Yet nearly
two more hours elapsed before the Secretary's orders were
relayed to those forces. Several more hours elapsed before any
of those forces moved. During those crucial hours between the
Secretary's order and the actual movement of forces, no one
stood watch to steer the Defense Department's bureaucratic
behemoth forward to ensure the Secretary's orders were carried
out with the urgency demanded by the lives at stake in
Benghazi. For much of the evening of September 11, principals
in Washington D.C. considered Stevens to be missing and
reliable information about his whereabouts was difficult to
come by. For those on the ground and in the fight in Libya, the
reality of a second American death was sinking in.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\Id. at 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE SECOND ATTACK ON THE COMPOUND
Evacuation to Annex
In Benghazi, the Diplomatic Security Agents determined
Stevens would not have survived the fire in Villa C, and they
were now engaged in a recovery mission.\287\ According to
Diplomatic Security Agent 4, ``[W]e were unable to find
Stevens. I was very--at that point, I think it was decided that
this was probably a recovery mission. We were looking to
recover his body.''\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\287\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 137-138.
\288\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 11:10 p.m. [5:10 p.m. in Washington], an explosive
device detonated several meters inside the back gate, starting
the second wave of attacks at the Benghazi Mission
compound.\289\ Around the same time, the drone arrived on
station over the compound.\290\ GRS officers returned fire
after being fired on by the attackers, while the Diplomatic
Security Agents loaded their vehicle and departed the compound
under fire at 11:16 p.m. [5:16 p.m.].\291\ Prior to leaving the
compound, the Diplomatic Security Agents did not fire their
weapons during the attacks. As one Diplomatic Security Agent
explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2310).
\290\See U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline (``[At 11:10 PM EET t]he
diverted surveillance aircraft arrives on station over the Benghazi
facility.'').
\291\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11,
2012, 2210 to 2216).
I feel now, and I felt then at the time, that I had the
support. At that time there was no opportunity to
shoot. There was a situation, it was a moment where it
was myself and [another Diplomatic Security Agent], and
we were very close quarters with an overwhelming force
of armed combatants, and at that situation it would not
have been the smart thing, it would not have been the
tactical thing to fire your weapon at that time.\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\292\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 156.
The Diplomatic Security Agents loaded Sean Smith's body in
their vehicle and departed the compound through the main gate.
One Diplomatic Security Agent described what they saw as they
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
exited the compound:
As we were turning left to go outside the compound, we
could see at the end of that access road a lot of cars
and lights and people milling about. I ascertained that
was probably a checkpoint or a blockade. And so we
turned around and went the other way. It was at that
point the attacking force kind of crossed paths with
us, had then they opened fire on our vehicle, and we
continued out.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\293\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 138.
Another Diplomatic Security Agent provided further detail
about the extensive attacks they encountered as they fled the
Mission compound.\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\294\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 158-162; See also,
Comprehensive Timeline of Events--Benghazi, produced by the U.S. Dep't
of State. (Last Edit Nov 01, 2012) (State-SCB0047846).
The situation on the perimeter was getting
substantially worse. As we loaded into the vehicle, the
agent that had been taking in the most smoke that was
in the safe haven with the Ambassador ultimately ends
up being the one to drive. I still don't know why we
allowed him to do that. He did a great job. That
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
adrenaline kicked in.
As we pull out of the compound . . . we start taking
fire. So, as we suspected, the individuals that
attacked us, some of them had remained hidden in the
fruit grove on the compound and were waiting for a
situation to kill us.
So as soon as we got out of the way of the Libyans,
they started shooting the side of our armored vehicle,
on my side of the car actually. Ting ting, ting ting. I
don't know, maybe 10 rounds is what hit us on our left
side.
As we exit the compound, we turn right . . . There is a
large crowd, 40, 50, 60 people. We can't tell if they
are facing us, we can't tell if they are waiting for
us, we don't know. We get, I don't know, 20 or 30 yards
down this road; we see this crowd. We decide it is
something we would rather not encounter. We turn
around.
We go back close to the compound, and there is someone
we presume to be a 17 February member waiting off to
the side by the wall who is waving at us, ``Don't go
this way.'' That is enough for us to turn around. So we
turn around again back toward the crowd, the large
crowd that we don't know their intentions.
* * *
Okay. So we are heading back in the direction we
initially attempted to go. As we get about probably a
third to two thirds to halfway down this road, we
encounter an individual that is pulled off from a small
group of people at a compound. . . . This individual is
waving us into his compound as if to say, you know,
this is somewhere safe, come in and we will protect
you. We decide this is a terrible idea. We all advise
for the driver to just keep going.
The second we pull alongside of this individual he
raises an AK 47 and shoots at pointblank range,
literally pointblank, inches. His gunfire impacts the
entire right side of the vehicle. The ballistic glass
and the armor proofing works, just like it is supposed
to.
He shoots through all the way around the right side, up
in the back window, breaks through the exterior glass,
which is just factory glass, and impacts the ballistic
resistant glass on the inside, which holds.
* * *
So, at the same time this individual is shooting us
with his AK 47, I don't think it is him but another
member of his group throws two grenades under our
vehicle. I specify that they were grenades because they
went off immediately as opposed to being a fuse-lit
explosive like the gelatin bombs we discussed earlier.
Those would have taken a few seconds for the fuse to
burn out. We didn't realize it at the time, but two of
our tires had been blown out.
So, as we pass this gun, possibly a full magazine of
AK-47 fire at pointblank range and two grenades under
our vehicle, and we continue on. We didn't realize it
at the time, but two of our tires had been blown out.
We approach the intersection with the next major road,
where the large group was positioned, and, to our
relief, they are not even paying attention to what is
going on down the road. They have their backs to
us.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\295\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 158-163.
As the Diplomatic Security Agents drove away from the
Mission compound toward the Annex, they noticed they were being
followed.\296\ The individuals following the agents detoured to
a warehouse in the vicinity of the Annex near the parking area
where attackers later staged the first attack on the
Annex.\297\ One Diplomatic Security Agent described what
happened when the team arrived at the Annex:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\Id.
\297\Id. See also, Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 74-75;
Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 138; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5
Testimony at 125.
Finally, we were able to turn, kind of get off the main
road there where it was a lot quieter, and then we made
our way to the Annex. Upon arrival at the Annex, you
know, we pulled in, and immediately people came out and
I parked the car, got out of the car, and you know,
their eyeballs were about the size of saucers, just
seeing the car, and seeing us. And immediately, they
brought me into kind of a, you know, the kitchen area,
which is where the med area was. And they just started
pumping me, you know, with fluids, just chugging water,
eating fruit, and my goal was just to get back up on my
feet, get back out and keep fighting.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\298\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 127.
The team of five Diplomatic Security Agents arrived with
Smith's body at the Annex at 11:23 p.m. [5:23 p.m. in
Washington].\299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 2338).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Back at the Benghazi Mission compound, the GRS team were no
longer facing direct fire. The GRS departed through the
compound's main gate and followed a different route to ensure
no attackers were tailing them.\300\ They arrived at the Annex
approximately 20 minutes later and quickly took up fighting
positions on the roofs of the Annex buildings.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\300\Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2219).
\301\GRS 2 Testimony at 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the agents and the GRS departed the compound, attacks
continued on the Mission compound with RPGs, small arms fire,
and unknown explosions.\302\ A mix of armed and unarmed
individuals re-entered the compound through the back gate and
subsequently looted the armored vehicles, removed paper and
gear from the TOC, reset fires, and stole an armored Land
Cruiser.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\302\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11,
2012, 2219).
\303\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11,
2012, 2219); see also Email to the DSCC Watch Team and the DSCC Mgmt.
Team (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:59 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05409685).
The Twitter account with handle @hadeelaish belonged to Hadeel al-
Shalchi, a journalist for Reuters news.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The First Attack on the Annex
As the situation continued to unfold in Benghazi, the
Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground were periodically
reporting back to the tactical operations center in Tripoli
about the events on the ground. The Tripoli Chief of Station
discussed requests for a medical evacuation:
So the initial question that I asked for our GRS team
lead: Do they need a Medevac, and what Medevac
assistance do they need? At that time they didn't know,
so that was one of our communications to AFRICOM was to
put a warning order or we may be needing Medevac
assistance.
At that time also the location of--we had no
indication--our main priority was the personnel at
the--at the temporary mission facility and the
whereabouts of the Ambassador.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\304\Chief of Station Testimony at 101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
A: I think there was a--and some of the decisions were
an ongoing conversation that I had with our rep in
Stuttgart was about do we need Medevac and where that
Medevac would go. So initially in that, when we were
still looking for the Ambassador and our team was at
the airport, they just got--I didn't say we wanted a
medical--a Medevac at that point because we didn't have
any--I did have conversations with the GRS team lead in
Benghazi: What is the status of your personnel? Do you
need Medevac? And that answer was no at that time, and
the Ambassador was unlocated.
But what played into some of my calculus at that time
was I didn't want to send a U.S. aircraft in Benghazi
and maybe have the same dynamic of getting off the
airport and not knowing what were going to be the
parameters of that situation.
So that was--and the Defense Attache was in that same
conversation with elements in AFRICOM.\305\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\Id. at 109.
Just before 12:30 a.m. [6:30 p.m. in Washington D.C.],
individuals congregated and staged gun trucks at the far east
intersection near the Annex. It was unclear to the agents at
the Annex if these individuals were friend or foe. The GRS
agents on the roof asked Annex management whether they were
able to determine who was congregating outside of the
Annex.\306\ The next wave of attackers then used the east field
as cover and concealment to advance toward the Annex wall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\306\GRS 1 Testimony at 94.
[B]y that time, we had started to see people massing on
that east side parking lot and starting to utilize that
little house that had the family in it. They were
coming through that front door. They would disappear
where the front door was, and you could see them coming
out the back door, and that's when we're trying to get
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
our lights turned off, all the lights, get them off.
Q: So were there floodlights looking out or lighting
the base?
A: Both. We were trying to get the ones looking in. We
were trying to get those floodlights turned off. And
the ones looking out, let them stay on. In the
meantime, I'm calling on the radio going are we
expecting friendlies from chief of base and our team
leader. Are we expecting any friendlies? Are we
expecting any friendlies? And I'm getting, I don't
know, maybe, I don't know. In the meantime, they're
coming towards us, and I'm asking [redacted text], I
said do you see any weapons? Because we're not going to
shoot anybody unless we see a weapon. And you could
tell they're moving tactically. They're moving
sideways. They're playing hide and go seek. They don't
realize we have night vision. Eventually, I'm not going
to call that we got bad guys coming.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\307\GRS 4 Testimony at 106-107.
The first assault on the Annex itself began at 12:34 a.m.
[6:34 p.m in Washington D.C.], when attackers directed small
arms fire at the Annex hitting the northeast portion of the
property, where Annex Building 2 was located.\308\ An IED was
thrown over the wall near the Annex north recreation area in
the vicinity of a GRS officer on the ground.\309\ One GRS
officer described the beginning of the first attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\308\Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0034).
\309\GRS 1 Testimony at 94. See also, Video: DVR Footage of the CIA
Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0036).
But then you could hear, like there's a mass of cars
that is forming. We're trying to figure out if it's 17
Feb. or if it was the police or who was it, you know.
Of course, we got nothing back from the TL or the Chief
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of Base.
But as I was walking the water back, something flew
over the wall, exploded about 15 feet or so away from
me. And at the same time, an RPG came up over the wall,
and that's when the first assault on our compound
happened.\310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\310\GRS 1 Testimony at 94.
For the next 10 minutes, rounds of small arms fire, RPG
fire and IED explosions impacted the Annex near the northeast
corner.\311\ Concurrently, starting at 12:41 a.m. [6:41 p.m. in
Washington D.C.] the Annex took small arms fire and likely IED
attacks from the east wall also aimed at Annex Building 2.\312\
Over the next 10 minutes, there were attackers that were
visible along the east wall and an explosive impacted against
the east side of the Annex.\313\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11,
2012, from approximately 0034 to 0045).
\312\Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0036 and
0041, respectively).
\313\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11,
2012, from approximately 0040 to 0052).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After being repelled from the first assault, attackers were
still visible in the east field at 12:59 a.m.; however, GRS
refused to fire on their location at this time because their
position was too close to a residence where a local family
lived including children.\314\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\314\GRS 4 Testimony at 119-120.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Second Attack on the Annex
After being overwhelmed in the first attack, the attackers
regrouped with a more aggressive second attack. At 1:10 a.m.,
this second attack was directed at the Annex, with a RPG
striking Building 2.\315\ The second attack included even
heavier sustained fire and a larger number of attackers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\315\Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0110).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the next five minutes, there was sustained and heavy
small arms fire from the east perimeter wall, small arms fire
from the northeast corner, RPG strikes from the east field, and
sustained fire.\316\ The attackers retreated after taking heavy
return fire from the Annex. One GRS agent described this
attack:\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11,
2012, from approximately 0110 to 0115).
\317\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11,
2012, from approximately 0110 to 0200).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q: Okay. So the second attack, what happened?
A: It was a lot more force, lasted probably twice as
long as the first one. I got a little bit of shrapnel
from something. I got a bunch of shrapnel from the
light. That was pretty much it. We just repelled that
one. And that was it until 5:15 when the mortars came
in.\318\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\318\GRS 1 Testimony at 97-98.
Local Libyans Find Stevens
Shortly before the second attack on the Annex began, at
approximately 1:00 a.m. [7:00 p.m. in Washington] local Libyans
found the remains of Stevens in a bedroom in the main
diplomatic building at the Benghazi Mission. One of the Libyans
asked a member of the Libyan Army to help pull Stevens out of
Villa C. A neighbor from a nearby compound who knew Stevens
interceded and transported Stevens to the hospital.
The Libyan Army officer who helped pull out Stevens'
remains kept the phone that had been with Stevens and began
calling the numbers listed in the phone to report that an
American was located at the hospital. These calls started
around 2:03 a.m [8:03 p.m. in Washington D.C.].\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\319\Officer A Testimony at 36-37.
I started receiving calls from somebody who claimed to
have the Ambassador's--well, he didn't know that it was
the Ambassador's phone, but he was calling from the
Ambassador's phone, claiming that, you know, he had
come in contact with some, what he suspected, Americans
and found their phone, and he wanted to return the
phone. So, at that point, I was also involved in trying
to find out about the Ambassador's fate at this point
and how this individual was in possession of his
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
telephone.
Q: All right. So you said you received a call from
somebody who allegedly had the Ambassador----
A: A Libyan, yes.
Q: Okay. And how did that person reach out to you? How
did they know to reach out to you?
A: He used the Ambassador's phone and dialed a phone
number that was stored on the phone. And that phone on
the other end belonged to one of the Diplomatic
Security----
* * *
So how did that first conversation go with the
individual on the other end of the line?
A: I tried to get as much information from him as
possible. Initially, he was coy, and he said several
Americans, and I said, okay, well, put them on the
phone. And he said, well, they're not around me right
now. And that was kind of odd. And I asked him if they
were injured or why can't you put them on the phone.
And eventually he said that, yeah, they are in the
hospital, and they cannot talk right now.\320\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\320\Id.
The Chief of Station described learning about Stevens'
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
location:
Q: So at some point in the evening you learned the
Ambassador is probably not being held hostage, is
probably deceased. Do you remember about when that was
and what--how you learned that?
A: I learned that--so I had two telephones for the two
different Libyan cellular services. So I learned that
from the Prime Minister's office representative who I
was in contact with. He previously said: Oh, we believe
the Ambassador is at a hospital, we believe he's
unconscious, we believe--you know, can I speak with
him? Oh, no. I'll try to get someone to speak with him.
That was that line.
And then I got indications from the Libyan intelligence
service, the President's office, and the charge or the
DCM at about the same time. We got indications at the
same time base was getting someone to go to identify a
person because we had a base officer in telephonic
communication with someone that had the Ambassador's
phone.
Q: Yeah.
A: So during that whole time we were--knew the
Ambassador's phone was located at that hospital. We had
people telling us the Ambassador's at that hospital. We
didn't know the status of the Ambassador, so--but all
of those things happened within a relatively narrow
timeframe.\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\321\Chief of Station Testimony at 122.
Team Tripoli Arrives at Benghazi Airport
At 1:30 a.m. [7:30 p.m. in Washington D.C.], Glen Doherty
and the other members of Team Tripoli landed at the Benghazi
Benina International Airport.\322\ Meanwhile at the Annex,
there was a lull in the fighting.\323\ One of the Team Tripoli
members explained to the Committee the steps taken to obtain
transportation from the Benghazi airport to the Annex:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\322\U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline.
\323\Special Operator Testimony at 52-53. See also, Video: DVR
Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0158).
Q: Was anyone present from the Libyan armed forces or
local militia that you could liaison with upon arrival
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in Benghazi?
A: Not as soon as we landed sir.
Q: Okay. And you arrived at Benina airport?
A: We did.
Q: And what was the nature of activity going on at
Benina at 02 in the morning?
A: It was completely dead. We were the only plane that
had landed in quite some time, it looked like, and the
guard actually came out in his pajamas and asked us
what was going on.
Q: Okay. So there was no airport personnel. This was
not a 24/7 airport?
A: I don't think so, sir. It didn't appear to be. Only
one individual came out to meet us once we had landed,
and it was clear that he had been sleeping before
that.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\Special Operator Testimony at 52-53.
When Team Tripoli arrived at the airport, ``the Ambassador
was still missing.''\325\ While trying to secure transport at
the airport, Team Tripoli was receiving information Stevens was
located at a hospital in Benghazi. One Team Tripoli member
said, ``One of the local militia had told us that he--they
thought he was at the hospital. Reporting had indicated he was
at the hospital.''\326\ The Chief of Station added details
about their concern regarding the information they were
receiving:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\325\Id. at 55.
\326\Id. at 55-56.
That whole atmosphere of getting drawn into that
correspondence that our officer had with that
individual who had the Ambassador's phone had a lot of
the hallmarks of some type of entrapment. It wasn't
straight up. It didn't--it wasn't: We have the
Ambassador here, you want to come and get him. It was
much more convoluted than that. So we were very leery
of--that was just a very high security posture as we
were going through.\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\327\Chief of Station Testimony at 125.
Based on their coordination and planning prior to leaving
Tripoli, the Team expected to be met at the airport by elements
of the Libyan Shield militia. When they arrived, however, no
one was present at the airport.\328\ One of the Team Tripoli
special operators described what they encountered:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\328\Special Operator Testimony at 52.
We didn't have a mode of transportation that was ours,
so we were depending on those local militias. So it
took us that long to find one that was capable of
taking us into town. Again, initially we were trying to
go to the hospital, which we were all being told, ``No,
we can't take you to the hospital. We can take you to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the annex.''
So that fight went on for a little while, with us
thinking that he could possibly be at the hospital
needing medical care. So we were pushing hard enough to
go there that it prolonged our time at the airport.
Then once we found out he was deceased, we had
obviously gave that up, and they had no problem taking
us to the annex.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\329\Id. at 58-59.
While at the airport, Team Tripoli was alerted that
Stevens' [redacted text] personal tracking device--was pinging
``within 25 meters of their current location on the
airfield.''\330\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\330\Request 1-004067 IntBook 6-044.
Q: Okay. So I want to direct your attention to the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
first page of exhibit 1, the last bullet?
A: Okay.
Q: It reads: ``Note: TF Green member informed [redacted
text] that the AMBOs [redacted text]''--does that mean
[personal tracking device]?
A: Correct.
Q: ``It was pinging, and its location was within 25
meters of their current location on the airfield.
Several militia members and vehicles were on the
airfield and vehicles at the time.'' So just to be
clear, how did you learn about that [personal tracking
device] pinging?
A: My TL told me at the time because when that militia
drove up, [redacted text] and I were unpacking gear,
and we were situating. And I was checking my gear and
that's when our TL came up and advised us what was
going on in reference to the ping.
Q: So the TF Green individual would have informed the
TL and he told you?
A: Could have been.
Q: What was your assessment at the time of the
significance of that attack?
A: That someone was near the Ambassador, or at least
recovered some of his gear or his phone or his
[personal tracking device] system. Somehow they had his
belongings.
Q: And they were standing very close to your team?
A: Correct.
* * *
Q: So obviously, you talked about how one of your
primary missions was to locate the Ambassador. And then
you learned while you were at the airport that the
Ambassador's [personal tracking device] is pinging
within 25 meters of your current location. Did you or
the other team members find that odd?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you elaborate on that?
A: It was unusual that somebody had some of the
Ambassador's belongings.
Q: Okay.
A: Especially his [personal tracking device]. I don't
know if it was his cell phone pinging, how they got the
ping, or his personal [tracking device], but it was odd
that they had some of his equipment.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\331\Testimony of GRS Tripoli, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 32-35
(June 23, 2015) [hereinafter GRS Tripoli Testimony] (on file with the
Committee).
For the next three-plus hours after their arrival in
Benghazi, Team Tripoli attempted to secure transportation from
the airport to the hospital. Because Team Tripoli did not have
full awareness of the local militias operating in Benghazi, nor
relationships with local militias to contact for assistance,
they relied on a Libya Shield official in Tripoli to vet the
local militia elements that showed up at the airport offering
assistance. Much of their time at the airport was spent
identifying the ``least of several bad options'' as it related
to choosing a militia for transport.\332\ The Team's Tripoli
contact recommended seeking transport with another branch of
the Libya Shield, as the branch prearranged to transport them
never arrived.\333\ One Team Tripoli member stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\332\Special Operator Testimony at 56-57.
\333\Id. at 57.
Q: Did you have any sense during the 2 and-a-half hours
that you spent at Benina airport that you were being
prevented from departing the airport? Could you have
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
left at any time from 02 to 0430?
A: We didn't have a mode of transportation that was
ours, so we were depending on those local militias. So
it took us that long to find one that was capable of
taking us unto town. Again, initially we were trying to
go to the hospital, which we were all being told, ``No,
we can't take you to the hospital. We can take you to
the Annex.'' So that fight went on for a little while,
with us thinking that he [the Ambassador] could
possibly be at the hospital needing medical care. So we
were pushing hard enough to go there that it prolonged
our time at the airport. Then once we found out he was
deceased, we had obviously gave that up, and they had
no problem taking us to the Annex.\334\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\334\Id. at 62-63.
The group that escorted Team Tripoli to the Annex was a
branch of Libya Shield operating that night under [redacted
text].\335\ According to a member of Team Tripoli, this was
their ``less bad'' option for transport that night given the
difficulty of trusting militias in a city where many have
Islamist leanings and an anti-Western sentiment after the
involvement of NATO in the Libya Revolution.\336\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\335\Id. at 55.
\336\Id.
Q: And how were you going to proceed? What was the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
nature of your transport from Benina to the Annex?
A: The Libya Shield commander had several gun trucks
that we were using, as well as some Land Cruisers, to
get us to the Annex.
Q: And this again, Libya Shield 2, the less bad element
of the militia?
A: Less bad, yes.\337\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\337\Id.
Team Tripoli left the airport at approximately 4:30
a.m.\338\ A team member provided the Committee the following
background information for their intended mission at the time,
as it had transitioned from locating and potentially rescuing
Stevens to an effort to start evacuating nonessential personnel
from Benghazi back to Tripoli.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\338\Id. at 51.
Q: [W]hat did you understand about your mission as you
were heading from Benina airport to the Annex? Was your
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mission then evacuation of nonessential personnel?
A: It was nonessential personnel only prior to the
mortar attack happening . . . we were going to take 14
personnel back with us to the airport, let the jet take
off, take them back to Tripoli. We were going to come
back to the Annex and help hold up with the GRS guys
until further notice . . . the majority of those people
[the GRS would have stayed there. Shooters, if you
will.\339\ . . . [W]e did not make the decisions for
that [airplane] to come back. We didn't know how long
we were going to have to stay at the Annex. We were
under the understanding they wanted to stay. They did
not want to leave. So we were just trying to get the
nonessential personnel out to get further direction
from Chief of Station back in Tripoli on what he wanted
them to do . . . I believe it was the Chief of Base
that wanted to keep some individuals there.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\339\Id. at 69-70.
\340\Id. at 70.
THE WHITE HOUSE CONVENES A MEETING
While Team Tripoli was urgently seeking transportation from
the Benghazi airport to either the hospital or the Annex, Denis
McDonough, the Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs convened a secure video teleconference meeting
at 7:30 p.m. in Washington with the State Department and the
Department of Defense.\341\ The State Department attendees
included: Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff; Jacob J. Sullivan,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Planning; Stephen D. Mull,
Executive Secretary; Wendy R. Sherman, Under Secretary for
Political Affairs; and Kennedy and the Secretary.\342\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\See Email from Cheryl D. Mills to Beth E. Jones et al. (Sept.
11, 2012 7:03 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0066272) (``SVTC AT
7:30PM WITH WHITE HOUSE'').
\342\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Defense Department was represented by Jeremy B. Bash,
Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, and Tidd.\343\ The
two representatives who normally would have participated in the
meeting--the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy--did not do so that
night.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the four hours since the initial attack on the Benghazi
Mission compound, the Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi,
with help from the team from the Annex, survived the initial
onslaught, located the remains of their fallen colleague Smith,
frantically searched for Stevens, escaped under heavy gunfire
from the Mission compound to the Annex, avoided an ambush along
the route, and arrived at the Annex only to withstand and repel
additional attacks there.\344\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\344\Email to Victoria Nuland, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 5:32 PM) (on
file with the Committee, SCB0068365-67) (forwarding chain of emails
regarding updates on the events in Libya).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Team Tripoli, after learning of the attack in Benghazi,
quickly developed a plan to render assistance, secured private
aircraft in Tripoli, packed gear, planned a mission, flew from
Tripoli to Benghazi, and urgently negotiated with unknown
militias seeking transportation to either the hospital or the
Annex.
By stark contrast, in those same four hours, principals in
Washington had merely managed to identify forces that could
potentially deploy to Libya and convened a meeting to discuss
those forces.
Despite the Secretary of Defense's clear directive and his
intention that forces would move and move quickly, no forces
had yet moved. Over 13 hours after the attack began, the first
force--the farthest away--deployed. It would take nearly 18
hours for the FAST team to move, and over 20 hours from the
beginning of the attack before the CIF moved.
Forces are ``Spinning Up As We Speak.''
Moments before the White House meeting began, Bash emailed
several people including Mills and Sullivan, notifying them of
the assets the Secretary had ordered to respond to the attacks.
He wrote:
After Consulting with General Dempsey, General Ham and
the Joint Staff, we have identified the forces that
could move to Benghazi. They are spinning up as we
speak. They include a SOF element that was in Croatia
(which can fly to Suda [sic] Bay, Crete) and a Marine
FAST team out of Roda [sic], Spain.
Assuming Principals agree to deploy these elements, we
will ask State to secure the approval from host nation.
Please advise how you wish to convey that approval to
us. Burns/Nides/Sherman to Miller/Winnefeld would be my
recommended course.\345\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\345\Email from Jeremy Bash to Jacob J. Sullivan (Sept. 11, 2012
7:19 PM) (on file with the Committee, STATE-SCB0060705).
Even though the Secretary had already issued the order to
deploy the identified forces and testified he fully expected
his order was being carried out at the time, the plan was to
``work through this issue'' during the White House
meeting.\346\ As the Secretary reinforced: ``I had the
authority to deploy those forces. And I didn't have to ask
anyone's permission to get those forces into place.''\347\ The
Secretary further said his approach was ``we need to move them
and move them as fast as we can in order to respond. So I
wanted no interference with those orders to get them
deployed.''\348\ In fact, the Secretary added that during the
meeting at the Pentagon, his orders were simultaneously being
conveyed to those forces.\349\ He noted: ``[T]hese are elite
units, and the purpose of these units is to move when I give
the order to move, and that's what I expected.''\350\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\346\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan to Jeremy Bash, et al. (Sept. 11,
2012 7:21 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075439).
\347\Panetta Testimony at 32.
\348\Id. at 33.
\349\Id. at 34.
\350\Id. at 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Curiously, the two members of the Defense Department Bash
identified in his ``spinning up'' email as the proper persons
to ``convey'' ``approval from the host nation''--Winnefeld and
Miller--were not part of the White House meeting. In fact,
Winnefeld was not even at the Pentagon. He had left to return
to his residence to host a dinner party for foreign dignitaries
and testified he received one update on the events during the
dinner. After the dinner concluded around 10 p.m., he went to
the secure communications facility in his home. An hour later,
the mortar attacks began. Likewise, Miller was not at the
Pentagon due to an unexpected family emergency. He asked Bash
to participate in the White House meeting in his stead.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\351\Miller Testimony at 63-64. Miller testified he attempted to
participate in the meeting from his home, but was unable to connect to
the call.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Purpose of Meeting
Despite the Secretary's expectation the assets he ordered
to deploy would move as fast as possible in order to respond,
the individuals who participated in the White House meeting,
nevertheless, felt the need to ``work through'' the assets the
Secretary had already ordered to deploy.\352\ At the time of
the White House meeting, the final decision about which assets
to deploy had apparently not been made, according to them,
despite the Secretary's recollection and testimony to the
contrary. Tidd testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\352\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan to Jeremy Bash, et al. (Sept. 11,
2012 7:21 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075439).
Q: And at the time of the meeting, what was the status
of the assets that you all discussed? Were they
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
preparing to deploy?
A: They were alerted. The final decision had not yet
been made definitively, as I recall, but we came out of
that meeting basically: send everything.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\353\Tidd Testimony at 23-24; see also, Email from Jacob J.
Sullivan to Jeremy Bash, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 7:21 PM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0075439) (``We should work through this issue in that
venue.'').
Tidd described the purpose of the meeting convened by the
White House as an opportunity to share information across
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
agencies.
It was an information exchange to cross-level what does
everybody know, is there any new information. The
intelligence community was obviously providing
information on other things that were going on, other
locations that State was providing information on,
other embassies where they had concerns. FBI. It was a
general kind of a roundtable and round robin of
everybody going around and passing out what information
they had, what did they know. And then what were the
asks. And then an opportunity for us to be able to say
-- when we got to the military, we talked about these
are the type of forces that we can deploy, and here's
what we know, here's what we think, and here's what our
recommendations are.\354\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\354\Tidd Testimony at 21-22.
Mills said essentially the same thing: ``[T]he [White House
meeting] was called because everyone was seeking both to
exchange information and figure out how to coordinate resources
to support our team.''\355\ Kennedy said this about the White
House meeting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\355\Mills Testimony at 47.
The [meeting] was mainly, to the best of my
recollection, simply a conforming of information, a
sharing of information. Make sure everybody had the
same understanding and everyone was doing whatever they
could in their lane of responsibility to proceed.\356\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\356\Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y for Mgmt., State
Dep't, Tr. at 112 (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Kennedy Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
He elaborated:
Conforming, conforming means, in effect, reconciling.
That I have heard this, you have heard that, what have
you heard? Trying to make sure that we all, meaning
across the entire U.S. Government, had the clearest
coherent understanding of what was going on in the fog
of war.\357\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\357\Id. at 155.
Winnefeld typically would have participated in the meeting
that night. However, after being notified of the attacks, he
departed the Pentagon that night to attend a dinner engagement.
Despite not participating in the discussion, Winnefeld
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explained why the White House meeting would be called:
[W]henever something like this happens, whether it's a
hostage rescue, or you name it, particularly an
emergent event, there's always a [meeting] like this,
and there are a lot of really good points brought up by
interagency partners about considerations and--in
stream. They're very useful events, and we can very
quickly resolve questions, like, does anybody have any
objections if we sent forces into Tripoli? My
supposition here is that that was a very quickly
resolved; nobody has objections.\358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\358\Winnefeld Testimony at 80-81.
From the Defense Department's perspective, it was an
opportunity to notify the State Department and the White House
of the assets it could deploy in response to the attacks as
ordered by the Secretary and to seek concurrence.\359\
Winnefeld explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\359\See Email from Jeremy Bash to Jacob J. Sullivan (Sept. 11,
2012 7:19 PM) (on file with the Committee, STATE-SCB0060705).
[M]y sense is that the deputies sort of coordinated on
what DOD intended to do. So the Secretary has decided
he wanted to deploy the CIF and the [U.S. Based SOF]
and the FAST platoons. That was exposed to the deputies
in the deputies SVTC, and they all concurred with that.
. . .\360\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\360\Winnefeld Testimony at 84. Winnefeld further explained that
had there been a disagreement ``the Secretary probably would have said:
Look, get them moving anyway. And then he would be on the phone with
the White House.'' Id. at 79-80.
Of course, Winnefeld did not participate in this particular
White House meeting. Witnesses who actually were present and
appeared before the Committee were surprisingly unable to
recall details regarding the various issues and discussions
during the White House meeting.
The Committee was, however, able to uncover several emails
from participants summarizing the meeting. In striking contrast
to the Secretary's testimony, one summary of the White House
Meeting listed the theme of the meeting, not as deploying
forces in an active tense, but as ``getting forces ready to
deploy'' in a future tense.\361\ Another summary described the
deployment of assets in response to Benghazi as ``likely'' and
``possibly'' that evening.\362\ According to these summaries,
the conclusion from the meeting was that forces were not going
to deploy ``until order comes, to go to either Tripoli or
Benghazi.''\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\Email from State Dep't Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037).
\362\Email to Harold Hongju Koh, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 10:40 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05528017) (``There is likely to be a
deployment very quickly, possibly this evening.'').
\363\Email from State Dep't Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But the Secretary was unequivocal the order had already
come: President Obama, as the Commander in Chief, said do
everything you can to help our people in Libya.\364\ As the
Secretary of Defense, he ordered assets to deploy--active tense
with no further explanation, amplification, or instruction
needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\364\Panetta Testimony at 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The two-hour ``meeting''--in which neither the Commander in
Chief nor the Secretary of Defense participated--was in fact
much more detailed and involved than witnesses suggested and
presents a new perspective on what was happening and being
discussed in Washington D.C. even while an Ambassador was
missing and a second U.S. facility was under attack half a
world away.
Discussions During the 7:30 White House Meeting
DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE
The issue of securing host nation approval, the last aspect
of Bash's email, was discussed during the 7:30 White House
meeting. According to a write-up of notes taken by Mull, the
State Department emphasized any deployment of U.S. Forces into
Libya needed approval from the Government of Libya.
Overall theme: getting forces ready to deploy in case
the crisis expands and a real threat materializes
against Embassy Tripoli. DOD will send the details to
U/S/Kennedy (i.e. plane numbers, troop numbers,
airfield support needs, etc.) for us to make request to
government of Libya (GOL).
* * *
Congressional angle: If any deployment is made,
Congress will need to be notified under the War Powers
Act . . . Libya must agree to any deployment.\365\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\365\Email from State Dep't Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037).
On the ground in Tripoli, the Defense Attache had already
begun working to obtain flight clearances from the Libyan
government before the White House meeting even began.\366\
Initially, he notified the Libyan government of a potential
request for flight clearances as the night progressed.\367\
Because he had given advance notice to the Libyan government
that potential flight clearances would be needed, he fully
expected the Libyan government to approve any formal request
when it was made. He noted, however, that to submit a formal
request, specific information about the tail numbers, expected
arrival of the aircraft, the number of personnel, and types of
weapons had to be conveyed to the Libyan government.\368\ Not
only did a formal request have to be made, a representative of
the Libyan government had to be available to receive the
paperwork for that request. There was no Libyan representative
on duty overnight.\369\ As to when formal approval was
received, the Defense Attache testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\366\Testimony of Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep't
of Defense, Tr. at 113-114 (Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Defense Attache
2014 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\367\Id.
\368\Id.
\369\Id. at 114.
Q: Can you recall when the actual--the relevant
information that was needed, like tail numbers and
things, when was that transmitted to the Government of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Libya?
A: I don't. But I would also come back to the fact that
we had a green light from the Government of Libya to
bring it in. It was just a question of when we were
going to know the specific information that goes into a
standard flight clearance request. So it had to have
been, I would say, sometime midmorning to noon on the
12th. It could have been, I would say, sometime
midmorning to noon on the 12th. It could have been a
little bit after that.
Q: And that's when you received the relevant
information you need to pass on, or what happened?
A: Probably both. In the course of the morning, leading
up to the afternoon, we got the information we
required, and then we were able to subsequently
transmit it to the Libyans.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\370\Defense Attache Testimony at 159-160.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIVILIAN CLOTHES
A request for the FAST Platoon to wear civilian attire
appears to have generated from Kennedy during the White House
meeting.\371\ Kennedy, during his interview with the Committee,
was unable to recall when the discussion regarding civilian
attire was held that evening, but provided the following
information about the substance of the discussion:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\371\See Email from Benjamin I. Fishman, Nat'l Sec. Council (Sept.
11, 2012 9:19 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB000029-30).
[Y]ou wanted to make sure that the steps we were taking
would enhance the security of our personnel, not
potentially diminish the security of our personnel. Our
personnel had been consolidated in Tripoli in one
location, and all of them were there with the
multiplied security forces of both the prime building
and the Annex building. And I recall this discussion,
generally speaking, and it was determined that the
delay was not going to be significant and it was better
to have the forces arrive in civilian clothes[.]\372\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\372\Kennedy Testimony at 173.
Tidd elaborated on the State Department's request for the
FAST platoon to arrive in Libya in civilian clothing. He
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
Again, like I said, they wanted to minimize the
signature that looked like a big military invasion, a
big military arrival there. And the reason that I
remember the discussion was I had to go back and find
and make sure, as the FAST had moved out and was
waiting for lift, and the question that I had to go
back and ask AFRICOM was: in their rucksacks did they
have civilian clothes that they could put on, or was
this going to entail having to go back to their
barracks and draw that equipment. They had what they
needed, and so they didn't have to go anyplace.
At the [White House] meeting, I couldn't speak for
them. And I wanted to go back and verify that. Because
what I wanted to know is: is it more important to get
them there or to have the signature in civilian
clothes? As it turned out, it didn't matter, because
they had the civilian clothes with them already.\373\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\373\Tidd Testimony at 28.
Tidd did not agree that requiring the FAST platoon to wear
civilian clothes was a step that would enhance security.\374\
The Defense Department assessed the impact of the requirement
as quite the opposite: it created an increased risk to the FAST
platoon members as they traveled through Tripoli.\375\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\374\See State Dep't Email (Sept. 11, 2012 10:40 PM) (on file with
the Committee, C05528017) (``[T]here was discussion of the option of
entering in plainclothes. . . .'').
\375\See id. (``[The Joint Chiefs of Staff] explained . . . that
the risks to the forces [] remaining in plainclothes increased as they
transited from point of entry to the relevant location of action'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summaries of the White House meeting did not, in fact,
highlight the potential security-enhancing benefit of the FAST
platoon wearing civilian clothes. Instead, the benefit of
having the FAST platoon wear civilian clothing was to cater to
unexpressed Libyan government concerns about military
appearances and to avoid ``any impression of a U.S. invasion of
Libya.''\376\ As Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy National Security
Advisor for Strategic Communications, stated in an email to his
colleague at the end of the meeting: ``[T]he time for being
overly sensitive to Libyan concerns about military appearances
seems to be over.''\377\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\376\Email from State Dep't Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037) (``We made a request that any
deployments should be in plain clothes to avoid any impression of a
U.S. invasion of Libya.''); see also State Dep't Email (Sept. 11, 2012
10:40 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05528017) (``Apparently Pat K
expressed concern on the SVTC about Libyan reaction if uniformed US
forces arrived in country in military aircraft''); Email from Benjamin
I. Fishman (Sept. 11, 2012 9:19 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB000029-30) (``I don't know why Pat Kennedy is so concerned about
what extra securit y [sic] folks are wearing. Does that come from Greg
[Hicks]? The time for being overly sensitive to Libyan concerns about
military appearances seems to be over.'').
\377\Email from Benjamin I. Fishman (Sept. 11, 2012 9:19 PM) (on
file with the Committee, SCB000029).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Plan from the Meeting
Although the Secretary told the Committee he fully expected
his order to deploy was the only step needed to move forces in
response to the attacks, records obtained by the Committee
reflect a different understanding by others on the night of the
attacks.
One email seems to indicate others may not have viewed the
order as being as clear and immediate as the Secretary
recalled. It read in relevant part:
Per Amb. Mull, ROUGH notes from the 1930 [7:30 p.m.]
EDT SVTC meeting:
Overall theme: getting forces ready to deploy in case
the crisis expands and a real threat materializes
against Embassy Tripoli. DOD will send the details to
U/S Kennedy (i.e. plane numbers, troop numbers,
airfield support needs, etc.) for us to make requests
to government of Libya (GOL).\378\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\Email from State Dep't Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037).
There were 10 Action items from the White House
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
meeting:
The first two action items in that email were redacted and
not provided to the Committee. The next three items read as
follows:
3) LFleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST): about
[redacted text] Marines, they need six hours to
prepare. They're currently at the Rota Air Base in
Spain and will wait to deploy. Will not deploy until
order comes to go to either Tripoli or Benghazi. We
made a request that any deployments should be in plain
clothes to avoid any impression of a U.S. invasion of
Libya.
4) LCongressional angle: If any deployment is made,
Congress would need to be notified under the War Powers
Act. Counselor Mills is working with L and H on this
and it may come through Ops. Libya must agree to any
deployment.
5) LEfforts are continuing to locate Ambassador
Stevens.
A/S Beth Jones will work to reach out to the hospital
to confirm the identity of the patient. . . .\379\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\379\Id.
Phrases such as ``getting forces ready to deploy'' and
forces ``will not deploy until order comes to go to either
Tripoli or Benghazi'' do not reflect an imminent deployment of
the assets as ordered by the Secretary and as he testified
before the Committee.
The declarative ``Libya must agree to any deployment'' is
also inconsistent with what the Secretary testified to and
similarly inconsistent with what the Secretary recalled
President Obama telling him. At no point, according the
Secretary of Defense, did a U.S. response to the attacks in
Benghazi hinge on Libya agreeing with the actions ordered.\380\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\380\Panetta Testimony at 67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mull's summary of the White House meeting is, however, more
consistent with Tidd's recollection of the meeting.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\381\Email from State Dep't Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another email regarding the meeting with the White House
reads in relevant part:
All, I just got off a conference call with [State
Department employee] who reported on a [White House
meeting] this evening concerning the violence against
USG facilities and personnel in Libya and Egypt, of
which you likely have gotten separate notice.
S[ecretary Clinton], Pat K[ennedy], and Beth Jones
(possibly among others) attended for State. In short,
there was a significant attack in Benghazi on the US
consulate where the US Ambassador and 7 other USG
employees were present[.]
There is likely to be a deployment very quickly,
possibly this evening, of forces to assist in Libya.
Beth Jones is tasked with seeking consent of the GOL
asap for entry into the country. Options under
consideration for the deployment include: (1) a FAST
team; (2) a [U.S.-Based SOF] . . . ; and (3) a
Commander's Force. . . . DOD indicated they would
circulate additional information on the options/
decisions in the morning and we will need to be
prepared to do a quick War Powers assessment and
probably report by COB tomorrow.
* * *
Apparently Pat K[ennedy] expressed concern on the
[White House meeting] about Libyan reaction if
uniformed US forces arrived in country in military
aircraft; there was discussion of the option of
entering in plainclothes, which JCS explained was
possible but noted that the risks to the forces to
remaining in plainclothes increased as they transited
from point of entry to the relevant location of
action.\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\382\State Dep't Email (Sept. 11, 2012 10:40 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05528017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another email framed the issue as follows:
4The U.S. military has begun notifying special units of
likely deployment, with ultimate disposition pending
State coordination with the Libyan government and final
approval by the White House.
State remains concerned that any U.S. military
intervention be fully coordinated with the Libyan
Government and convey Libyan concerns that [sic] about
U.S. military presence, to include concerns that
wheeled military vehicles should not be used and U.S.
Military Forces should consider deploying in civilian
attire.\383\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\383\Testimony of Jeremy Bash, Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep't of
Defense, Tr. at 98-99 (Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Bash Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
The plan described in this email was later conveyed to the
Combatant Commands. While Bash's ``spinning up'' email
indicated these forces were prepared to go to Benghazi vice
Tripoli, it was clear by the end of the White House meeting
that no forces were going to Benghazi.\384\ It is worth noting
that while this meeting was ongoing and even after it ended,
Diplomatic Security Agents, the team from the Annex, and Team
Tripoli were under attack at the Annex and Stevens was still
missing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\384\Email from Jeremy Bash, Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep't of Defense,
to Jacob Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy, U.S. Dep't of
State (Sept. 11, 2012 1919) (on file with the Committee: STATE-
SCB0060705).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These emails confirm the understanding among the
individuals participating in the White House meeting that
deployment to Benghazi was not imminent. As the Defense
Department timeline shows, none of the orders given to the
assets that night contained an order to deploy to
Benghazi.\385\ The FAST platoons were ordered to prepare to
deploy, not to deploy.\386\ The CIF and the U.S. based SOF were
ordered to deploy only to an intermediate staging base, not to
Benghazi or Tripoli.\387\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\385\See generally, U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline.
\386\Id.
\387\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, once the decision to activate the U.S. based SOF
was made, the CIF was no longer an option to deploy to Libya as
its mission then became to prepare for the arrival of the U.S.
based Special Operations Force at the intermediate staging
base.
Once the forces were ready to deploy, a subsequent execute
order would then have to be given by the Secretary of Defense.
This is inconsistent with the Secretary's belief that no
further order was necessary from either the President or
himself.
Admiral Tidd had this to say about deploying a FAST Team to
Benghazi:
We were looking at two FAST teams, but it very, very
soon became evident that everybody was leaving
Benghazi. And so I don't remember if it was just before
the [White House meeting] or during the [meeting] or
just right after. By the time we came out of the
[meeting], it was pretty clear that nobody was going to
be left in Benghazi. And so the decision--I think, at
the [meeting], there was some discussion--but as I
recall, we weren't going to send them to Benghazi,
because everybody was going to be back in Tripoli by
the time we could actually get them there.
* * *
And I think even at this point we knew that everybody
had moved--they had moved from the temporary diplomatic
facility, they moved to the Annex, and they were moving
or going to be moving, if they had not already begun
moving, from the Annex to the airport, and would be
leaving at the airport as quickly as they could.
So it was pretty clear we weren't going to be able to
get anything into Benghazi before the last people left.
So, I don't think we ever went beyond the notion of
moving the FAST into--the FAST platoon into
Tripoli.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\388\Tidd Testimony at 25-27.
While it may have been ``pretty clear'' to Tidd that
``nobody was going to be left in Benghazi,'' it was not at all
clear to those in Benghazi who were manning a rooftop
exchanging gunfire with attackers.\389\ Furthermore, the
Diplomatic Security Agents and team from the Annex had to fight
their way even from the Benghazi Mission compound to the Annex
a short distance away while Team Tripoli had to negotiate with
unknown militias for transportation from the Benghazi airport
to the Annex. So, how the principals in Washington were certain
U.S. personnel in Benghazi were going to be leaving Benghazi
and how they were going to be leaving is itself unclear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\Id. at 25-27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is uncertainty attached to other statements made
during the White House meeting too:
``State remains concerned that any U.S. military
intervention be fully coordinated with the Libyan
Government and convey Libyan concerns that [sic] about
U.S. military presence, to include concerns that
wheeled military vehicles should not be used and U.S.
Military Forces should consider deploying in civilian
attire.''
``DOD indicated they would circulate additional
information on the options/decisions in the morning and
we will need to be prepared to do a quick War Powers
assessment and probably report by COB tomorrow.''
``Libya must agree to any deployment.''
``Overall theme: getting forces ready to deploy in case
the crisis expands and a real threat materializes
against Embassy Tripoli.''
This sentence is illuminating on a number of levels,
including: ``getting forces ready to deploy in case the crisis
expands'' begs the question of expanding how and where? At the
time of the White House meeting, Sean Smith was dead,
Ambassador Stevens was missing, and the remaining State
Department personnel had to be rescued by the Team from the
Annex while sustaining gunfire en route back to the Annex.
Moreover the second clause in that sentence references a ``real
threat'' materializing against ``Embassy Tripoli.'' The real
threat at the time was and remained in Benghazi.
Among the questions left even in the aftermath of
investigating what happened before, during and after the
attacks in Benghazi is how so many decision makers in
Washington and elsewhere were unaware of the Annex in Benghazi
and how the Washington decision-makers expected U.S. personnel
remaining in Benghazi to evacuate or defend themselves for a
prolonged period of time without assistance.
The Orders: Prepare to Deploy and Deploy to an ISB
At 8:39 p.m., more than five hours after the attacks in
Benghazi began and more than two hours after the Secretary gave
his order to deploy, the Pentagon finally transmitted orders to
the combatant commands regarding the FAST platoons, the CIF,
and the U.S. Based Special Operations Force.\390\ Specifically,
the FAST platoons were ordered to ``prepare to deploy.''\391\
The CIF and the U.S. Based Special Operations Force were
ordered to deploy to an intermediate staging base.\392\ No
asset was ordered to deploy to Benghazi.\393\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\390\Email from Tidd (Sept. 11, 2012 8:53PM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB001376). See also, Letter from Ashton B. Carter, Sec'y of
Defense, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, House Select Committee on Benghazi,
Apr. 8, 2015, providing an explanation regarding the unclassified
timeline:
Has the U.S Department of Defense identified any
information that would warrant any adjustments, correction
or modification to the unclassified timeline it provide to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress on November 9, 2012?
One Point of clarification: the unclassified timeline has
the SecDef Vocal Order (VOCO) for moving response forces at
0000-0200. This authorization was relayed and recorded at
0239 for FAST and CIF and at 0253 for [the U.S. SOF]. This
is not to imply that timing of the VOCO as reflected in the
unclassified timeline is inaccurate, but rather that
receipt of this vocal order at [sic] was at 0239 and 0253,
respectively.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\391\Id.
\392\Id.
\393\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tidd provided authorization for each of those forces to
move in an email transmitting the orders at 8:53 p.m. [2:53
a.m. in Benghazi]. The email reads in relevant part:
discussions at Deputies, and followed up between [the
Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the Chairman--
--
[The Secretary of Defense] has directed deployment of
the CIF to the [intermediate staging base] determined
most suitable by AFRICOM . . .
[The Secretary of Defense] has directed deployment of
the [U.S. Based Special Operations Force] to the same
[intermediate staging base] as the CIF.
[The Secretary of Defense] has directed FAST to make
all preps to deploy but hold departure until we are
sure we have clearance to land in Tripoli. We'll work
with State to nail that down, but intent is to get
security force augmentation into [Tripoli/Tripoli] (not
Benghazi, at least not initially) ASAP. Embassy making
efforts to move all [American citizens] from [Annex]
Compound Benghazi to Tripoli, possibly using same
[commercial] Air that 5-pax team arrived on.
* * *
Remember [the Secretary of Defense] holds final
approval to deploy FAST, pending receipt of Tripoli
country clearance. But the point is to get the Marines
on the ground securing the embassy in Tripoli as
rapidly as we can move them.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\394\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tidd testified about his email:
I'm looking at the timelines here, and I'm--I am
thinking that--that [Deputy Director for Operations]
had a conference call with the various watch centers of
the commands that are listed here as a result of the
decisions that came out of the [White House] meeting.
And so the things that you see upfront--the [Secretary
of Defense] [vocal order], the things to move, and then
also forwarded request for information from AFRICOM and
EUCOM for the following--I am guessing at this point
now, but I think this might have been in response to--I
gave him a verbal dump from the Deputies Committee
meeting. He had this conference call. This is a report
back with the information from the conference call. And
then I turned around and replied on top of that with
subsequent information that had been provided from
phone calls that I had had at the same time.\395\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\Tidd Testimony at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Winnefeld also provided his understanding of Tidd's email:
All this is doing is reporting out what the Secretary
has directed to do. And [Tidd] would not put this out
unless the deputies had concurred with it. If the
deputies had not concurred with the SecDef deciding to
do these things, that would have been a big issue, but
it wasn't. The deputies obviously concurred, so [Tidd]
put it out: Hey, this is now official; Secretary says
do this.\396\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\396\Winnefeld Testimony at 85. Winnefeld further explained that
had there been a disagreement ``the Secretary probably would have said:
Look, get them moving anyway. And then he would be on the phone with
the White house.'' Id. at 87.
It is unclear why concurrence from anyone attending the
White House meeting was needed. The National Command Authority,
the lawful source of military orders, consists of two people:
the President and the Secretary of Defense.\397\ Neither of
them attended that meeting. Both the President and Secretary
Panetta had already issued their orders. As the Secretary made
clear:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\397\See Panetta Testimony at 32. Panetta elaborated, ``My
directions were clear; those forces were to be deployed, period. . . .
So I wanted no interference with those orders to get them deployed.''
Id. at 33.
I had the authority to deploy those forces. And I
ordered those forces to be deployed. And I didn't have
to ask anybody's permission to get those forces in
place.\398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PREPARE TO DEPLOY
The orders issued to the forces that night were different
from the orders the Secretary gave earlier that evening. The
Secretary had this to say about the orders he issued that
night:
Q: I just want to make sure this portion of the record
is fair to you and that your testimony has the clarity
that I think it has, but I'm going to give you an
opportunity if I'm wrong.
You did not issue an order to prepare to deploy. You
issued an order to deploy.
A: That's correct.
Q: So no one would have been waiting on you to issue a
subsequent order?
A: That's correct.\399\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\399\Id. at 49.
Leidig described the difference between a ``prepare to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
deploy'' order and an ``execute'' order:
They are two very distinct orders in the military. The
first is prepare to deploy. And that's basically
guidance from my boss, in this case, the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman, that you have permission to
make every preparation necessary to execute this
mission. But you do not have permission to actually to
deploy them yet--you don't have permission to execute
the mission.\400\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\400\Leidig 2014 Testimony at 64-65.
In contrast, Miller testified his understanding was an
order to deploy has no operational distinction from an order to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
prepare to deploy:
The initial order was to deploy to forward basing in
order to be able to then refuel if necessary, prepare
to any additional degree necessary, which can largely
be done in flight for these forces, to the extent that
they weren't already as they got on the plane, and then
to deploy into Libya.
[T]he order could have come in one of two ways, and
it's a technical difference that in this instance and
in any other instance has no operational impact, one
form of the order says deploy to the intermediate
staging base and prepare to deploy into Libya, and that
additional authorization will be given prior to
deployment into Libya; a second says deploy to the
intermediate staging base and proceed to Libya unless
given direction not to do so.
I don't know which of those--I don't recall which of
those was in the order, but in any event, it's well
understood that no time should elapse awaiting. In
other words, if the form was to go to the ISB, go to
the intermediate staging base and then get additional
authority, it's incumbent on the commander to request
that authority well in advance of when the force would
be prepared to then deploy into Libya, and it's
incumbent on the Secretary of Defense and the team
supporting him to ensure that he makes a timely
decision so that there's not additional time added to
the timeline.\401\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\401\Miller Testimony at 80-81.
Bash considered the orders that night a distinction without
a difference because the intent of the Secretary was clear: the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
forces were to move.
This was a real-time, very fluid, very dynamic set of
meetings in which the Secretary, with his senior
military, uniformed military advisers, the Chairman,
the Vice, and the combatant commanders and others, were
making real-time decisions
So I just want to set that context, because I'm sure
some people could look at this and say: Why were these
words used or that discussion or this phrase used,
``prepare to deploy'' or ``deploy''? My recollection
was he was told of the situation, he was told about
which units could respond, and he said: Go get them, do
it, move.
Q: So there would've been no further order necessary
from him?
A: Correct.
Q: Wheels could have taken off and he would not have
had to say another single, solitary word?
A: Correct, and I believe that actually was the case.
Q: All right. So he never amplified, clarified,
withdrew, changed his instructions, which were deploy?
A: He did not.\402\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\402\Bash Testimony at 26-27.
Leidig, whom Ham described as his ``most trusted advisor''
and an ``extraordinarily competent officer,'' testified because
he was moving forces between two combatant commands' areas of
responsibility he needed to receive a subsequent ``execute''
order to move the FAST Platoon into Libya.\403\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\403\See Ham Testimony at 51-52.
Q: At what point did you receive an order to execute?
At what point did you have the authority to launch
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
assets into Libya?
A: We were never given an execute order to move any
forces until we got to move in the C-17 to evacuate
folks out of Tripoli later that next morning. There was
never an execute order to move any forces from
Sigonella into Africa or from Rota into Africa until
later. So, I mean, we did get an order eventually to
move the FAST team into Tripoli to provide security,
but during that evening hour, that incident, there were
no execute orders to move forces into our AOR.
* * *
Q: You said that you were never given an execute order
until later. Who provides that execute order?
A: Execute order comes from the Secretary of Defense.
So we were not given an--there was an order given to
move forces to Sigonella. There was never an execute
order given to move those forces into Libya.
Q: And when you received the execute order later on to
deploy the forces into Libya, the FAST platoon into
Tripoli, and then the C-17 to evacuate the medically
injured, do you recall how that order was conveyed?
A: Do you mean, was it verbal, or was it in--usually in
every case--I don't know specifically for those, but
normally it's a VOCO, a vocal command, followed up by a
written command. And so, in that case, it was probably
both. It was probably a vocal command to get things
moving, followed by a written command----
Q: And do you----
A: --but I don't know for sure.
Q: And do you recall the timeframe for when you
received the vocal command to execute the movement of
the FAST platoon into Tripoli and the----
A: No, I don't recall. It's on the timeline.
Q: Do you recall if it was before or after the mortar
attacks occurred?
A: Oh, it was after.
Q: Okay. Thank you.
* * *
Q: And just to be clear for the record, prior to
receiving the vocal execute order, would you have----
A: Which vocal execute order?
Q: For either of the assets that were deployed into
Libya, the FAST platoon or the C-17, did you have the
authority to move those assets into Libya prior to
receiving that VOCO?
A: No. I wouldn't move those without a--without an
order from the Secretary or the Chairman. They're
moving across COCOM boundaries.
Q: Okay. Thank you.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\404\Testimony of Vice Admiral Charles J. Leidig, Deputy Commander
for Military Operations, US Africa Command, Tr. at 45-48 (Apr. 22,
2016) [hereinafter Leidig 2016 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
But see, Leidig 2016 Testimony at 48 (Q: There was some discussion
about the term ``prepare to deploy'' and an ``execute order,'' and I
just wanted to ask you a couple questions about that. Would a lack of
an execute order, or did a lack of an execute order on the night of the
attacks ever slow down your forces? A: No.).
Ham's recollection of the extent of the authority he had to
move forces that night differed from Leidig and differed from
the email Tidd sent to the combatant commands relaying the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary's order.
Q: Can you explain what he means by the [Secretary of
Defense] holding final approval to deploy FAST?
A: I think it means what it says. That is different
than my recollection. Again, my belief is the Secretary
had given authority to me to do that. So I think this
is the J3 issuing instructions, but my recollection is
different than what Vice Admiral Tidd has written here.
* * *
Yeah. Right. The last sentence there I think is the
important one.
* * *
A: ``But the point is to get the Marines on the ground
securing the embassy in Tripoli as rapidly as we can
move them.''
Q: Well, I think one thing that we would like to try to
kind of marry up is, even on the timeline, the orders
that were given to some of the--specifically the FAST
platoon was a prepare-to-deploy order. And there has
been testimony that a prepare-to-deploy order is
different from a deploy order. Perhaps you can provide
us what the distinction is and how that played out on
this night.
A: I can try to explain the distinction between the
two. A prepare-to-deploy order simply is notifying a
force that you must be prepared to deploy within a
specified timeframe, so that you have to adjust your
activities, whatever they may be, your personnel
posture, your readiness, your training, the prestaging
of equipment, depending on what the timeline is, so
that you are prepared to deploy on the designated
timeline. This is not an uncommon occurrence.
* * *
And a deploy order simply says, ``Go now,'' or whatever
the specified timeframe is. So it's prepare to deploy,
``I think I may need you, so I want you to be ready.''
A deploy order says, ``I do need you. Deploy.''
* * *
So the three units that were of highest importance to
me--the Commander's In-extremis Force, the Fleet
Antiterrorism Security Team, and the [U.S.-Based SOF]--
all already had prepared to--my understanding is all
had prepared to deploy. They were already on various
timelines to deploy. So that's what I believe their
status was.
And my belief is that--and my recollection differs a
bit from what Vice Admiral Tidd says--that when the
Secretary made his decisions, my understanding of that
was that the Secretary of Defense was transferring
operational control to me for those forces for their
deployment and employment.
Q: So if the Secretary of Defense's order was, in fact,
``prepare to deploy'' and not ``deploy,'' was there an
additional step needed to be--did the Secretary of
Defense have to do anything additional to deploy those
forces?
A: I don't know because I'm not familiar with the
specifics. Typically, in a prepare-to-deploy order,
there is a designated official who can order that unit
to deploy. It doesn't always have to go back to the
Secretary of Defense. It could be a combatant
commander, it could be the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, it could be a joint task force commander. But,
in this particular case, I'm just not familiar with the
specifics of the order.\405\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\405\Ham Testimony at 133-136.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPLOY TO AN ISB
The CIF, the force most capable of quickly responding to
the attacks in Benghazi, was ordered instead to go to an
intermediate staging base. Ham discussed this decision:
Q: Sir, given the fact that the CIF was on the
continent, per se, did you ever consider employing the
CIF for the hostage-rescue mission or the NEO by
sending them directly to either Benghazi or to Tripoli?
A: I don't recall specifically, but I feel confident in
saying that, as we weighed the options, the various
courses of action of how the Commander's In-extremis
Force might be employed, that there was some
consideration to, you know, do they go somewhere other
than the intermediate staging base. Should they go to
Benghazi? Should they go to Tripoli?
My recollection is that the situation was certainly
evolving. And, as previously discussed, my view was the
situation, after an initial spike, the fighting had
largely subsided, that Benghazi was probably not the
right place for them to go. Get them to the staging
base, where we now have many, many options.
One of the challenges, of course, is with a force like
the Commander's In-extremis Force, once you
operationally employ it someplace--so if you were to
deploy into any place and they're on the ground, you
now no longer have that force for other emergent
contingencies. So we're very careful about making a
decision as to where to go.
There are other complexities with inserting a force
into Benghazi, to be sure, but, for me, it was, where's
the best place for that force to be right now? And, in
my view, I believe that--you know, certainly supported
and with recommendations from the AFRICOM operations
and intelligence staff--that the best place for them
would be at the intermediate staging base so that they
would be well-postured for subsequent missions.\406\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\406\Id. at 93-94.
Tidd testified one reason the CIF and the U.S. SOF were
ordered to an intermediate staging base and not to Libya
directly was due to concerns expressed by the State Department
regarding the number of military personnel that would arrive in
country.\407\ He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\407\Tidd Testimony at 24.
Q: Sir, was it your decision, then, to send them back
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to an ISB first?
A: Yes . . . State was very, very concerned about what
the footprint would look like in Tripoli. They didn't
want it to look like we were invading.
That was the gist or that was the genesis of the
discussion that occurred over whether or not when the
FAST arrives at the airport in Tripoli--because they
wanted to reinforce security at the embassy--but there
was concern that it not have this image of a big,
invading force.
And we knew that the FAST, when it arrived, did not
have its own mobility. The embassy was going to have to
provide trucks and vehicles to move them from the
airport to the embassy. And there was just concern of
parading a bunch of trucks or buses full of Marines in
uniform, what kind of image that would present,
recognizing it was going to be daylight when they
arrived.\408\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\Id. at 22-23.
TEAM TRIPOLI NEGOTIATES TRANSPORTATION
Team Tripoli left the airport at approximately 4:30 a.m. A
team member provided the committee the following background
information for their intended mission at the time, as it had
transitioned from locating and potentially rescuing Stevens to
an effort to start evacuating nonessential personnel from
Benghazi back to Tripoli.
Q: What did you understand about your mission as you
were heading from Benina airport to the Annex? Was your
mission then evacuation of nonessential personnel?
A: It was nonessential personnel only prior to the
mortar attack happening . . . we were going to take 14
personnel back with us to the airport, let the jet take
off, take them back to Tripoli. We were going to come
back to the Annex and help hold up with the GRS guys
until further notice . . . the majority of those people
[the GRS] would have stayed there. Shooters, if you
will. . . . We did not make the decisions for that
[airplane] to come back. We didn't know how long we
were going to have to stay at the Annex. We were under
the understanding they wanted to stay. They did not
want to leave. So we were just trying to get the
nonessential personnel out to get further direction
from Chief of Station back in Tripoli on what he wanted
them to do . . . I believe it was the Chief of Base
that wanted to keep some individuals there.\409\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\409\Special Operators Testimony at 65.
FINAL STAGES OF THE ATTACK
Team Tripoli at the Annex
After Team Tripoli secured transportation, it arrived at
the Annex just after 5:05 a.m. Former U.S. Navy SEAL Glen A.
Doherty, one of the members of Team Tripoli, immediately joined
Tyrone S. Woods, Diplomatic Security Agent 4, and other GRS
agents on the rooftops of the Annex buildings. Within 10
minutes of the arrival of Team Tripoli, a new small arms attack
began. One member of Team Tripoli described the small arms
attack:
Once we had gotten to the annex, we called probably
three minutes out, and the GRS Team Lead was actually
out there to meet us with the gate open. We didn't take
any of the vehicles inside. We exited the vehicles and
walked inside.
We took the Libyan Shield commander inside with us so
his guys would stay there, ultimately. Went directly to
the main house where the TOC was. I think it was
Building Three. Team leader started talking to chief of
base, and I was talking to the [GRS Team Lead] on the
security situation, wounded personnel, what did he need
from us that he didn't have already, and how we could
help the security posture.
Shortly after us being there, we were all sitting
outside while we were talking about this on the front
patio of Building Three. We had some sporadic gunfire
over the top of Building Three, and immediately
following, the first mortar round hit. I believe it
went long, hit out in the road where our convoy had
been. The gate is obviously closed to the compound now.
Next one hit short just behind Building Three on the
wall towards the warehouse. The other three or four
mortars hit directly on top of Building Three.\410\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\410\Id. at 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One GRS agent described the mortar attack:
It was about 5:30 in the morning--the sun was just
coming up--because me and Tyrone had been talking
about, you know, if they're going to attack us, it's
going to happen here shortly because usually the time
to attack is right before the sun comes up. About that
time, [Doherty] came up on the roof after the guys from
Tripoli had came in. I never met [Doherty]. He walks
over to Tyrone and says hi to Tyrone. They had worked
together on the teams. Tyrone introduced him to me,
said that he was a sniper.
I told him: Well, that's good. I hope we don't need
you, but it will be great having another rifle up here.
He had turned to walk away, and it was about that time
that there was an explosion against the back wall, and
there was a mortar that hit the top of the back wall,
which from our building was maybe 8 or 10 yards from
the building.
[Agent 4] was in the corner where the ladder was at. Me
and Tyrone were in the opposite corner facing out
towards what we call Zombieland, and when that hit,
small arms fire started coming from that direction, and
Tyrone opened up with a machine gun. I started shooting
with my assault rifle. I heard [Agent 4] yell out that
he was hit.
I kind of glanced over. I saw his shadow sitting
because the wall at the top of our building was about 3
feet tall, so there was a box that you had to step on
to get up on to the ladder. So he was--I saw his image
or the silhouette of him sitting on that box, and he
was holding his head. What went through my mind is that
he's breathing, so his heart is beating . . .
We're shooting. I kneel down to change magazines. As I
come back up after changing magazines, the first mortar
hits the top of the roof, hits almost directly into the
wall, where the roof and the arc of the parapet or wall
comes up, right into the corner of that. When that hit,
it blew me back a little bit, knocked me back. I kind
of caught myself. I saw Tyrone go down. . . . The
mortar hit on my right.
As I come up, I bring my arm up to grab my gun, and
from about here down, it was kind of hanging off at a
90 degree angle. I continued to try to grab my gun.
Another mortar hit, and I kind of glanced over my right
shoulder, and I saw [Doherty] go straight down. . . .
As I tried to keep firing, my weapon is pretty much
inoperable. I can't grab it with my hand. The third
mortar hits and peppers me again with shrapnel. The
best way I can describe it is it felt like I got stung
by a thousand bees. At that point, I figured I might
better get to cover because if another one comes, I'll
be lucky if I survive that.
I kind of dove down to the wall, . . . and everything
had went quiet. I kind of sat up and thought I was
bleeding out because everything was wet around me. I
realized that it was water because it was cold, and
there was a water tank right there beside us that had
gotten perforated. I don't know what the timeframe was.
I pulled out a tourniquet, and I was trying to get the
tourniquet on. . . . At that point, I saw [GRS 1] come
up over top of the roof, which I didn't know it then--I
saw a shadow come up, and at that point, he had at
first put two tourniquets on [Agent 4]; one on his leg,
one on his arm. Then he come over to me, and he was
sitting there. He told me to quit messing with my arm
because I was trying to put it back in place. He
grabbed my tourniquet, put it on, stood me up, and
asked if I could walk myself over to the ladder so he
could tend to Tyrone and [Doherty], and I said, yeah.
He had called for help on the radio, that we had
wounded up there. By the time I got over to the ladder,
there was three guys that had come up on the roof. I
remember one later to find out it was one of the TF or
the task force guys. He asked me if I could get off the
roof.
I said, ``Yeah, I'm going to have to'' because I knew
they had to tend to the guys up there. So I kind of put
myself up on the parapet, hooked my good arm around the
ladder, and kind of scooted myself over. I ended up
climbing down the ladder.
I come around past the swimming pool to the front, and
that's when I ran into [GRS Tripoli]. [GRS Tripoli]
walked me in, laid me down in the building, building 3,
and he went back--I think at that time, he went back
out to help up top. Everybody inside was just kind of
looking at me. I told them somebody needs to cut my
clothes off because I know I'm bleeding from other
spots. [redacted text] case officer I was with earlier
that night, [redacted text], asked me where the shears
were. [redacted text] to cut my clothes off with.
[redacted text] got those, come back, cut my clothes
off. I wasn't bleeding profusely from anything else; I
just had a bunch of little holes in me that were kind
of oozing blood. And later they came down. I think [GRS
Tripoli] came in and gave me an IV. They finally got
[Diplomatic Security Agent 4] off, and that was pretty
much the night there.\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\411\GRS 2 Testimony at 57.
As GRS agents on Building 3 fired back in response to the
new attack, a well-aimed mortar attack commenced on the Annex
mortally wounding Woods and Doherty and severely wounding
another GRS agent and one Diplomatic Security Agent.\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0517.40).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In total, six 81-millimeter mortars assaulted the
Annex.\413\ Three mortars, including the first one, landed near
the north perimeter wall. Three additional mortars landed on
the roof of Building 3 within one minute at 5:18 a.m. Overall,
the six mortar attacks were launched within 1 minute and 13
seconds.\414\ A member of Team Tripoli testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\413\Special Operator Testimony at 61.
\414\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11,
2012, from 0517 to 0519).
Once the mortar round--the first mortar round hit
outside the gate where the convoy was, we saw the
vehicles driving away, the gun trucks that were out
there driving away.\415\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\Special Operator Testimony at 66.
Libya Shield sub-commander, [redacted text], who was left
behind during the mortar strike suggested, that attackers were
well-aware that Team Tripoli was held up at the Benghazi
airport while seeking transport and that the attackers may have
planned an ambush that coincided with the arrival of the Team
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tripoli members at the Annex:
``It began to rain down on us. I really believe that
this attack was planned. The accuracy with which the
mortars hit us was too good for any regular
revolutionaries.''\416\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\416\Libya Rescue Squad Ran Into Fierce, Accurate Ambush, Reuters
(Sept. 12, 2012; 17:11), http://www.reuters.com/article/libya-
ambassador-battle-idAFL5E8KCMYB20120912.
One witness told the Committee Libya Shield departed the
Annex when the mortar strike began at the direction of an
individual who was standing next to Abu Khattala during the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
attacks. He recounted what happened during the mortar attack:
Q: When Team Tripoli arrived, were you outside? Were
you inside?
A: No, when they arrived, I was outside.
Q: You were outside. Okay. And did you go inside at any
point after they arrived?
A: Yes. Luckily we went inside, because then the
mortars landed.
* * *
Q: Did anybody from the Libyan Shield militia go inside
as well?
A: Yes.
Q: All right. And can you explain the situation?
A: When the Tripoli team arrived, they brought with
them a commander of that force that escorted them from
the airport to the Annex.
Q: Okay. And he ended up going inside one of the
villas?
A: Yes.
* * *
I asked him to shut off his phone and stop talking on
the phone after the mortar--especially specifically
after the mortar landed.
* * *
He was talking to his force and wondering why they left
him behind and informed them that we had just got hit
with mortars, and he was trying to find out why they
left him behind.\417\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\417\Officer A Testimony at 118.
The witness stated the Commander of the force was frantic
and was ``surprised that the attack took place when he thought
that his force outside was securing the perimeter.''\418\ He
testified about the Commander's actions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\418\Id.
When he came inside, he was under the impression that
the force that he brought with him, the commander that
he left behind and his forces will secure the area. But
when he called them on the phone, he realized they had
departed the area. And he asked them, why did you
depart the area? And they said that the commander of
the militia, Wissam bin Hamid, gave them orders to
return to their base on the other side of town. And he
asked them, why are you going back to the base and
leaving me behind? And they told him that, oh, we are
going to get more weapons and more additional
forces.\419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\419\Id.
Wissam bin Hamid was standing with Abu Khattala during the
attack[.]\420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\420\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One GRS member of Team Tripoli provided his assessment of
the mortar attacks in an after-action interview conducted by
the CIA. The GRS member was:
100% confident that the enemy was waiting for the QRF
to arrive at the Annex so they could hit them upon
arrival. Communication was given to local militias and
police upon the arrival of the QRF team to Benghazi
airport. Many Libyan militia members and police knew of
the QRF team's arrival and movement to the annex.
He [was] confident it was a well-trained mortar team
that hit the compound.\421\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\421\CIA Document 1-004067 at 71.
A military member of Team Tripoli described his assessment
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of the mortar attacks that evening:
Q: And so what's your opinion on the skill of those who
were actually employing the mortars that evening in the
attack on the Benghazi Annex?
A: I would say personally that it was probably a
skilled mortar team. It's not easy. And you, being a
trained mortar man, know how hard that would be to
shoot inside the city and get something on the target
within two shots. That's difficult. I would say they
were definitely a trained mortar team or had been
trained to do something similar to that . . . I was
kind of surprised. I had not heard of or seen anybody
or talked to anyone that had been trained on mortars at
all [during my time in Tripoli]. So it was
unusual.\422\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\422\Special Operator Testimony at 82-83.
The mortar attack was reported at 5:32 a.m. and a medical
evacuation was requested.\423\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\423\DSCC Timeline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One CIA agent discussed his actions:
A: [M]inutes later is when we got attacked by the first
few mortars.
Q: And you were in the SCIF when the mortar attack
happened?
A: The initial, correct, yes, sir.
Q: Well, actually I was trying to go to the bathroom;
so I put my gear back on, and we were all stacked at
the front door, myself, the team leader, the two DOD
personnel, and there were several more volleys of
impacts on the building, mortar fire. And I heard small
arms going out from our team, and then small arms
coming in on our building. And as soon as it subsided,
I asked for [GRS Agent] because . . . he had [s]ome of
my gear . . . and that's when he didn't answer up. And
that's when one of the other GRS personnel said they
were all down on the roof. So as soon as it subsided,
we made our way to the roof.
Q: Okay, and then what actions did you take at that
point?
A: I came around a few seconds after the main element .
. . so I stepped back . . . and that's when I was met
halfway down the ladder by the GRS operator [GRS 2].
And I put my light on him because I heard a funny
noise, and it was obvious that he was severely injured.
And that's when he came down on top of me. I noticed he
was severely wounded, bleeding a lot and everything
like that.
* * *
Well, they actually put bathroom tile outside there,
and so it was real slick. He ended up falling on top of
me, and I ended up hyperextending my leg to the rear.
So now I'm injured, so I drug him out because we
started getting hit by small arms fire. So I dragged
him around the corner. I started putting a tourniquet
on his arm. He was bleeding from his left arm. He had a
hole in his neck, and he had a hole in his chest.
So I put tourniquets on his arm and started patching up
with the help of others from the shrapnel wounds. And
it seemed like seconds later when I heard somebody say
[GRS Tripoli] I have another one for you. That's when
the second State Department guy, [Agent 4] . . . came
down. And I pushed [GRS 2] up on to the couch, and
that's when [Agent 4] was there.
* * *
So I readjusted the tourniquet on his right leg, put
another one on his right leg, and ended up putting a
tourniquet on his left arm and packing his neck with
combat gauze to help stop the bleeding. I ended up
starting an IV on him. And then I went back to [GRS 2],
put an IV in him. That's one of the State Department
personnel--I don't know who it was--had morphine, and I
made the call to give [Agent 4] morphine because he was
in so much pain he started pawing at the tourniquets
and the gauzes, some of the dressings I put on. And
that seemed like seconds.
During this process is when [redacted text] asked me to
. . . contact Tripoli and give them a SITREP. That's
when I called Tripoli . . . [and] asked them for blood
for [Agent 4] because I didn't think he was going to
make it much longer.
* * *
We had two severely injured, so I asked for blood,
because I thought our plane, the one we rented, had
taken off already. . . . And then, right after that, I
went back in, made sure both patients were stable, and
I worked on [Agent 4] more. I started another IV
because he had sucked that one down so fast. And that's
when I went outside, and the sun was actually up. I
know it doesn't sound significant, but it was to me
because I really felt with the sun up, it would give us
time, room to breath, because hopefully it would drive
away the attackers.
I was still handling care of the patients . . . And I
was in the back of the truck with the wounded GRS guy
because I had no--there was no more room to sit inside
a vehicle, so we put a stretcher in the back of a small
truck. I jumped in the back with him and held on to
him, and we drove out the gate; and that's when we were
met by several gun trucks and militia that were there
to escort us. And we drove out, and it looked to be
several militias or several different groups because it
looked like they were trying to determine which way
they were going to go to the airport.
So there was a few minutes delay there before we
actually started to drive towards the airport. And
that's when we made it back to the airport. And I
loaded on a plane with the nonessential personnel, and
the two wounded, and made it back to Tripoli where we
landed in Tripoli because the hospital was close to the
Tripoli airport.
* * *
I gave [Agent 4] another morphine on the plane. I
adjusted [GRS 2] bandage. And then when I was moving
[Agent 4] off the plane--we were bring him off without
the stretcher because the stretcher was so big and the
plane was so small--he stopped breathing, so I had to
give him CPR. Got him back breathing, and that's when
the State Department nurse met me on the plane. . . .
And then we loaded them on to an ambulance, and at that
point, the ambulance took them to Afia Hospital in
Tripoli. And I went back in a Suburban with all the
other State Department personnel and gear. And that was
it. I received a call from the flight medic from
Ramstein, the military airlift, and I went over the
view of what I did and what I gave them as far as
tourniquets, morphine, and IV bags, how much, and the
times and stuff. And that was it in reference to my
medical service.
Q: You said they asked if the patients were capable of
going directly to Germany. Was that the request?
A: I believe, yeah. And I said, no, they need to go to
the hospital now. This is when I just got [Agent 4]
breathing again. But I made the suggestion, you know, I
remember they said can they wait for the Ramstein bird.
And I was like no, because I really think [the agent]
was going to die any minute.
Q: We're coming close to the end of our hour. This is
the last question. Setting modesty aside, do you
believe that [the agent] or [GRS 2] would have survived
to make it to Tripoli without your intervention?
A: No.\424\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\424\Officer A Testimony at 37-46.
At the Time of the Mortar Attacks,
No Asset was rn route to Libya
At 11:45 p.m. in Washington [5:45 a.m. in Benghazi], Denis
R. McDonough sent an email to Sullivan, Sherman, Rhodes, Bash,
Winnefeld, and other high level representatives of the
Executive Branch with the subject line, ``Quick level set
before we head into tomorrow AM SVTC.''\425\ McDonough wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\425\Email from Denis R. McDonough to Wendy R. Sherman, et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012 11:45 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562167).
The situation in Benghazi remains fluid. Amb. Chris
Stevens remains unaccounted for; one State Department
officer is confirmed dead (next of kin notification is
complete); five State Department officers are accounted
for and at another USG compound in Benghazi, which had
been taking fire earlier in the evening (until at least
2030 EDT). . . . Five DOD personnel arrived in Benghazi
about an hour ago from Tripoli to reinforce security
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
there.
On our people in Libya, the Joint Staff is deploying
three sets of teams into the region appropriate to the
mission(s).
* * *
And on getting the video(s) in question taken down, I
reached [out] to YouTube to ask them to take down two
videos: one that was not developed by Pastor Jones but
which he is promoting, and another--of him burning the
Prophet in effigy--that he did film. Sec. Panetta has
also reached out to Pastor Jones to ask him to pull
down his video, knowing that even if YouTube takes the
video down, Pastor Jones can put it up somewhere else.
. . .\426\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\Id.
This McDonough email was sent more than six hours after
President Obama and the Secretary first met to discuss the
initial attack in Benghazi, more than six hours after the
Commander in Chief said to do everything possible to help our
people, more than five hours after the Secretary of Defense
issued an order to deploy elements--active tense--and more than
four hours after the Secretary's Chief of Staff sent an email
saying elements were ``spinning up.'' McDonough writes: ``[T]he
Joint Staff is deploying three sets of teams into the region
appropriate to the mission(s).''\427\ This ``deploying'' was
supposed to occur hours earlier at the order of the Secretary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\427\Email from Denis R. McDonough, Dep. Nat'l Sec. Advisor, Nat'l
Sec. Council, to Wendy R. Sherman, Under Sec'y for Political Affairs,
U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 11:45 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05562167).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, McDonough references ``five DOD personnel arrived
in Benghazi about an hour ago from Tripoli to reinforce
security there.''\428\ This reference to DOD personnel is
noteworthy because this ``asset'' or ``element'' was not even
on the list of ``assets'' and ``elements'' provided to the
Secretary of Defense. As discussed above, these individuals
went to Benghazi from Tripoli at the direction of the Chief of
Station in Libya, not at the order of anyone in Washington,
D.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\428\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By this time, both McDonough and the Secretary of Defense
had made calls to have the YouTube video removed from the
internet.\429\ Yet, none of the forces the Secretary ordered to
deploy had actually moved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\429\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moments after McDonough sent this email, word of the mortar
attacks on the Annex would make its way through the State
Department, the White House, and the Defense Department.
At 1:40 a.m. in Washington, the assets the Secretary
ordered to deploy more than six hours earlier had still not
deployed, though Libya had finally given approval for assets to
fly into Tripoli.\430\ At that time, Winnefeld emailed
McDonough and others relaying to them diplomatic clearance had
been obtained from Libya allowing the FAST platoon to fly into
Tripoli.\431\ Of course, all State and CIA personnel had
already evacuated the Annex in Benghazi, and the first aircraft
evacuating the American personnel was preparing to depart for
Tripoli within minutes. Winnefeld wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\Email from James A. Winnefeld, Jr., Vice Chairman, J. Chiefs
of Staff, U.S. Dep't of Defense, to Benjamin J. Rhodes, Dep. Nat'l Sec.
Advisor, White House, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012 1:40 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05562167).
\431\Id.
Two C-130s will move to Rota then Tripoli. One departs
at 0600z, the other at 0700z. 3+40 transit time to
Rota, 1 hour load time. Estimated arrival at Tripoli is
1300z. We now have country clearances for Spain and
Libya. Working to expedite movement (for example,
faster load time than one hour), but not sure we can go
faster now that aircrews are on the ramp.\432\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\Id.
Winnefeld's email meant this: Now that host nation approval
had been obtained, the transport aircraft would depart Ramstein
Air Base in Germany in 20 minutes to pick up the FAST team that
was waiting in Rota, Spain.
Evacuation to Benghazi Airport
After the lethal mortar strikes, the team at the Annex was
determined to evacuate all personnel. A member of Team Tripoli
testified:
We decided that the situation we had was untenable to
stay at the compound. We didn't have enough shooters
and there were too many wounded, and we were definitely
going to lose our State Department wounded if we had
stayed there much longer. So we were pushing to get out
as fast as we could.\433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\433\Special Operator Testimony at 68.
A key issue remained in that, ``There was no security
vehicle, no gun trucks that would help us get to the airport.
And we determined we could probably not make it with the
vehicles we had inside the compound.''\434\ At 6:16 a.m., a 50-
vehicle motorcade arrived at the Annex to provide transport
support by the Libyan Military Intelligence. The motorcade
included technical, pick-up trucks retrofitted with mounted
machine gun-like weapons.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\Special Operator Testimony at 69.
\435\DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0616); LMI
insignia is printed on vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The forces that arrived at the Annex shortly after the
mortar attacks were able to transport all State Department and
CIA personnel safely to the airport. The forces, known as
Libyan Military Intelligence, arrived with 50 heavily-armed
security vehicles.\436\ Libyan Military Intelligence was not
part of the Libyan government, nor affiliated with any of the
militias the CIA or State Department had developed a
relationship with during the prior 18 months since the Libyan
revolution took place.\437\ Instead, Libya Military
Intelligence--whom the CIA did not even know existed until the
night of the attacks--were comprised of former military
officers under the Qadhafi regime who had gone into hiding in
fear of being assassinated, and wanted to keep their presence
in Benghazi as quiet as possible so as to not attract attention
from the militias in control of Benghazi.\438\ In other words,
some of the very individuals the United States had helped
remove from power during the Libyan revolution were the only
Libyans that came to the assistance of the United States on the
night of the Benghazi attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\TRIPOLI 27900, Sept. 19, 2012 [REQUEST 1-002982 to REQUEST 1-
002991].
\437\Officer A Testimony at 71.
\438\Id. at 71-72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The reason Libyan Military Intelligence was able to rescue
the Americans from the CIA base after the mortar attacks--
likely saving over two dozen lives--was due solely to the
extraordinary efforts of Officer A, [redacted text] stationed
in Benghazi. Officer A, [redacted text], spent a lot of time on
the night of the attacks trying to secure help. In the early
morning hours of September 12, a commander in the February 17
militia told Officer A that February 17 would be unable to
protect the Base and that they were leaving.\439\ This
commander referred Officer A to the National Police, who the
commander said was taking over their duties. Officer A
described the National Police as ``next to helpless.''\440\ An
officer in the National Police told Officer A ``There's nothing
I can do. . . . I cannot continue to secure the perimeter [of
the Base].''\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\439\Id. at 19-20.
\440\Id. at 20.
\441\Id.
After some convincing by Officer A, the police officer
referred Officer A to a colonel in Libyan Military
Intelligence.\442\ Officer A had never spoken to this
individual before, nor was he even aware of Libyan Military
Intelligence. Officer A first had a conversation with this
individual around 4:30 am, and testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\442\Id. at 23-24.
And I immediately made contact with this commander. He
asked how he could help, and I told him, again, our
general location, and I said, you know, we need you to
come and secure this area. He had an idea, at that
point, of events happening in that part of the city,
and he told me that he would need to put a big force
together, he cannot just come with one of his--I mean,
like, two or three vehicles, that he would need to put
a large force together and for me to give him some time
to put that force together.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\443\Id. at 24.
Immediately after the mortar attacks, Officer A called the
colonel back and said, ``[We] now really need you to come
here.''\444\ Within minutes, the 50-truck force from Libyan
Military Intelligence arrived and all American personnel safely
evacuated to the airport.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\444\Id. at 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The group that ultimately came to the rescue of and
facilitated the evacuation of the Americans in Benghazi was not
the Libyan Government the State Department had worked
tirelessly to appease; nor was it the February 17 Martyrs
Brigade, recommended by the Libyan Government and contractually
obligated to provide security to the Mission Compound. Instead,
the group that came to rescue the Americans that night, the
Libyan Military Intelligence, was a group most U.S. Government
personnel did not even know existed. This group, ironically,
had close ties to the former Qadhafi regime--the very regime
the United States had helped remove from power. It was also
this group, not groups previously given credit by previous
investigations, that came to the rescue of the Americans in
those early morning hours --likely saving dozens of lives as a
result.
It was the hard work and ingenuity of a single CIA case
officer that located and developed this evacuation lead--a
witness no other committee of Congress interviewed and a
witness the CIA was reluctant to allow the Committee to
interview.\445\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\445\Id. at 25-28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the ``assurance'' some principals in Washington had
that U.S. personnel in Benghazi were evacuating earlier, it was
not until the rescuing convoy actually arrived to at the Annex
that the evacuation of all U.S. personnel was fully understood
by those on the ground in Benghazi.
Officer A described what happened after the Libyan Military
Intelligence arrived: ``We lined up the trucks in order of
movement. And then everybody that was a non-shooter was in an
up-armored vehicle, and all the shooters were in thin-skinned
vehicles to be able to shoot out of their cars.''\446\ After
loading into the available vehicles at the Annex, at 6:34 a.m.
the majority of Annex personnel and all the Diplomatic Security
Agents evacuated in the LMI motorcade.\447\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\446\Special Operators Testimony at 71.
\447\DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0634).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A few minutes later, two GRS and two CIA Staff officers
evacuated the Annex alone in a Toyota pick-up truck after an
attempted destruction of the CIA equipment.\448\ One CIA
personnel described the actions he took to destroy sensitive
equipment:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\448\Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0637).
Q: So you said the last four folks there was yourself,
[GRS 5], it was the chief of base, it was the GRS team
lead. Did you see any type of interaction between the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRS team lead and the chief of base, any argument?
A: No, and actually I felt bad because once the stuff
detonated--whew.
* * *
A: You know, I looked down and I was kneeling in a
bunch of blood. I jumped in the truck, and the chief
didn't say a word, you know, but I was pretty happy,
you know, because the device went off and smoke was
already billowing out of the office. The door was
jammed open, and so I was pretty thrilled about that,
you know, and then I jumped in and said, let's go, you
know. And of course, the chief knew that [Woods] is
dead, and anyway, it is--I felt bad about that. And
then we took off and caught up with the rest of the
convoy.\449\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\449\Testimony of [redacted text], Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 61-
64 (Jun 19, 2015) [hereinafter [redacted text] Testimony] (on file with
the Committee).
AMERICANS IN BENGHAZI EVACUATE
Evacuation to Tripoli
The survivors and four Diplomatic Security Agents departed
at 7:31 a.m. local and landed in Tripoli at 8:38 p.m.
local.\450\ The same private aircraft secured by Team Tripoli
to come to the aid of those being attacked in Benghazi was the
aircraft used to evacuate the first wave of Americans from
Benghazi to Tripoli.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\450\See, U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 8:25 a.m. GRS and one Agent 3 received the body of
Stevens from individuals delegated by the Libyan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\451\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 170-172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second aircraft, a C-130 provided by the Libyan Air
Force, departed with the remaining security officers and the
remains of Stevens, Smith, Woods, and Doherty at 9:54 a.m. and
arrived in Tripoli at 11:33 a.m.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\452\U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline (estimating the times of
arrival and departure).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evacuation to Germany
At 2:15 p.m. on September 12, a C-17 departed Germany en
route to Tripoli to evacuate the Americans.\453\ This departure
occurred over eight hours after the 6:05 a.m. AFRICOM order to
deploy the C-17 for use as part of the Medevac (medical
evacuation).\454\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\453\U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline.
\454\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 7:17 p.m. the C-17 departed Tripoli returning to
Ramstein, Germany with the Benghazi-based U.S. personnel, non-
essential U.S. Embassy State Department personnel and the
remains of the fallen and arrived at 10:19p.m.\455\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\455\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOUR DIED. OTHER LIVES UNDOUBTEDLY SAVED
The initiative shown during the attacks by those on the
ground in Benghazi and Tripoli not only embodied the service
and sacrifice of those in military and the Foreign Service but
undoubtedly saved the lives of other Americans.
The Diplomatic Security Agents followed their training and
responded appropriately after the Mission compound was
attacked. The Diplomatic Security Agents showed heroism in
their efforts to protect Sean Smith and Chris Stevens and to
enter a burning building in search of their missing colleagues.
Team Annex moved quickly and decisively to help fellow
Americans at the Mission compound. Their actions during the
night/early morning hours provided not only much needed
intelligence about what was happening on the ground but also
helped secure their State Department colleagues and saved the
lives of fellow Americans.
Likewise, Team Tripoli, which included military personnel
based at the Tripoli Annex, acted with purpose, precision and
ingenuity that night. The Secretary and the Joint Staff did not
know those personnel were in Tripoli, much less were they
considered as one of the potential assets to respond to the
events in Benghazi. In fact, they represent the only military
``asset'' to reach Benghazi during the attacks. They deployed
themselves because fellow Americans needed them.
The creativity, valor and selfless sacrifice of the
Diplomatic Security Agents, the team from the Benghazi Annex
and Team Tripoli stand in some contrast to the discussions held
during the White House meeting occurring at roughly the same
time, half a world away, in the safe confines of the U.S.
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE ATTACK WAS INSUFFICIENT
When the attacks in Benghazi began, the Defense Department
was unprepared to respond. Despite there being a missing U.S.
Ambassador, its response--from the start of the attack at 9:42
p.m. in Libya, to the amount of time it took for the forces to
actually deploy late the next morning in Libya--at best
illustrates a rusty bureaucratic process not in keeping with
the gravity and urgency of the events happening on the ground.
The decisions made earlier in the year by senior State
Department officials to maintain a presence in Benghazi without
adequate security forces and an inadequately fortified Mission
compound contributed to what amounted to a worst case scenario
of circumstances that would test the military's preparedness
and ability to respond. Nevertheless, the Defense Department
did not pass the test. Whether this failure is shouldered by it
alone, or rests in part on decisions made by the State
Department in Washington D.C. or with the White House who
presided over a two hour meeting where half of the action items
related to an anti-Muslim video wholly unconnected to the
attacks, is one of the lingering questions about Benghazi.
To muster forces actually capable of responding to the
second lethal attack in Benghazi, the Defense Department needed
to overcome the ``tyranny of distance.'' From the moment the
first attack occurred, the clock began to tick, and with each
passing hour, the need to immediately deploy forces became more
crucial. Any forces deployed by AFRICOM faced two inherent
challenges.
First, AFRICOM did not have a significant number of
assigned forces. It had a standing arrangement with EUCOM to
enable it to have access to EUCOM forces when a contingency
arose. In essence, AFRICOM had to ask for help, creating
another level of bureaucracy that ultimately played out in the
orders to deploy forces.
Second, since any force AFRICOM would use in response to
the attack were EUCOM assets, those forces would deploy from
bases in Europe, not Northern Africa. In fact, elements of the
forces that were ordered to deploy, although based in southern
Europe, needed C-130s or other transport aircraft to fly from
central Europe to their location to transport them on to Libya.
Of course, these challenges were known well in advance and
came as no surprise. Whereas the facts and circumstances
surrounding security related events in North Africa may change,
the map and the time it takes to respond to the geographic
challenges does not.
Whether any of this was taken into account when no change
in force posture was ordered on September 10 following the
meeting with the President or on September 11 as the situation
in Cairo unfolded is unclear. What is clear is the Secretary of
Defense testified he was clear on both what the President
ordered and what he ordered subsequent to the initial attack.
Yet, no asset was ever ordered to respond to Benghazi and the
decisions made--and not made--coupled with a lack of urgency in
Washington D.C. delayed the response even, in some instances,
with an Ambassador missing.
The Forces did not Meet Timelines
ISSUES WITH FAST DEPLOYMENT
One of the FAST platoons ordered to deploy by the Secretary
arrived in Tripoli at 8:56 p.m. local time [2:56 p.m. in
Washington D.C.] the evening of September 12, nearly 24 hours
after the attacks began.\456\ As military witnesses have
posited on many occasions, the mission of a FAST Platoon is not
hostage rescue but to ``put that layer of steel around a
critical infrastructure of the United States to say to our
enemy, `Don't mess [with us].'''\457\ Nevertheless, the timing
of the FAST Platoon's arrival is problematic. When the
Secretary identified a FAST Platoon as an asset to deploy and
said ``go,'' one U.S. facility in Libya had already been
attacked, Sean Smith had been killed, Chris Stevens was
missing, and the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli was facing threats of
another attack. The fact that nearly 24 hours elapsed until
those forces actually arrived in Tripoli to reinforce the
security there belies the expectations of the American people
that the U.S. Military can and will move expeditiously. The
Secretary said this on the time it took for forces to arrive in
Libya:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\456\U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline.
\457\Testimony of FAST Platoon Commander, U.S. Marines, Tr. at 35
(Sept. 2, 2015) [hereinafter FAST Commander Testimony] (on file with
the Committee).
Q: Mr. Secretary, did you know it was going to take 23
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
hours to get the first assets in country?
A: No.
Q: So what did you expect it was going to take?
A: I knew it was going to take some time, just because
of the preparedness for the units and then the time and
distance involved. You know, you've heard the term
``tyranny of time and distance,'' and it's tough in
this area.
* * *
But I didn't--and I assumed these units moved as
quickly as possible and that, you know, we can get them
in place as quickly as possible, recognizing that there
is a time element that's involved. And, you know, I
understand the time element involved here just because
of the nature of moving the military.
I mean, as Secretary, I used to sit down with
deployment orders all the time of units. And you go
through a whole series of discussions about, you know,
units that have to be deployed. And, normally, the
timeframe to get these units deployed--it takes time.
It takes time to put them on a plane. It takes time for
them to locate, I understand that. But when you're
dealing with the kind of elite units we're talking
about here, my expectation is that they move as fast as
they can.\458\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\458\Panetta Testimony at 47-48.
The Commander of the FAST Platoon testified he first became
aware of the attack on the Mission compound in Benghazi through
reports on Fox News.\459\ At the time, the FAST Platoon was
stationed in Rota, Spain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\459\FAST Commander Testimony at 26.
So, that evening, I recall I was actually talking to my
dad on Skype, watching the Armed Forces Network news
channel, which rotates through news affiliates, and I
think it was Fox News that night. And all of a sudden
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
we see a consulate building on fire.
As soon as I hung up with him, I got on the phone with
my commanding officer, and we had a short talk. . . .
And he said something more or less in the lines of,
``Make sure you do your laundry and you got enough
soap.''
A couple of hours later, he was calling me, telling me
he was going to go down to the commander of CTF 68, who
is the higher headquarters of FAST Company Europe, and
that I needed to start getting my Marines together.
This was around midnight [local time in Rota, Spain],
so it would be on September 12.
Around midnight is when my platoon sergeant and I
initiated the recall.
* * *
Q: Let's back up a little bit. In terms of the Rota
Naval Station, were there any air assets typically
stationed at Rota?
A: No, sir. No. What we always planned upon is
primarily aircraft coming from Ramstein, because that's
where the preponderance of Air Force C-130s
were[.]\460\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\460\Id. at 27.
Almost three hours after the FAST Platoon Commander
initiated the recall order, which required his Marines to
return to base, he received official notification at 2:39 a.m.
[8:39 p.m. in Washington D.C.] the platoon was activated and he
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
was to prepared to deploy.
Q: When did you receive VOCO [vocal order] or a warning
order that the FAST platoon was going to be mobilized?
A: Around 0230 is when we got the official
notification. So that was our official [redacted]. We
already had some lead-in to it, obviously.
* * *
Q: --was it at 0239? Does that sound familiar?
A: Yes, sir.
* * *
Q: What were your specific orders at that time?
A: Prepare my platoon to deploy to Libya. We didn't
know where exactly we were going, but we knew through
open media sources of what was going on on the deck.
At that time, we started to make contact with the
embassy to gain S[ituational] A[wareness] of what was
happening and what our potential mission would be.\461\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\461\Id. at 31-32.
Three hours after he received official notification, at
5:45 a.m. local time [11:45 p.m. in Washington D.C.], the FAST
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander's platoon was prepped and ready to deploy.
Q: When was your platoon packed out and ready to get on
a plane?
A: I believe it was around 0545. I know it was before
6.
Q: Obviously your company commander is aware of that.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did they notify anybody up the food chain that at
0545 you're ready to go?
A: Yes, sir.\462\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\462\FAST Commander Testimony at 40.
Yet, another six hours would elapse before C-130s arrived
in Spain to transport the FAST Platoon to Libya. General Philip
Breedlove, the Commander of the United States Air Forces in
Europe, which is the component command which owned the C-130s
used to transport the FAST Platoon, told the Committee he began
generating C-130s on his own initiative after learning about
the attacks in Benghazi.\463\ Breedlove said repeatedly his C-
130s were ready to deploy before he received official
notification of deployment.\464\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\463\Breedlove Testimony at 21.
\464\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The C-130s arrived six hours later, and the FAST Platoon
loaded its gear within an hour.\465\ Yet, another three hours
would elapse before the FAST Platoon departed for Libya.\466\
The FAST Platoon commander explained the cause of the delay:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\465\FAST Commander Testimony at 39-41.
\466\Id. at 41.
A: After we were loaded, which was around [1:00 p.m.
local time], so about an hour after the C-130s were
there, we still did not lift off until [4:00 p.m. local
time] was when the first aircraft took off.
* * *
Q: Why was there another delay to get off the ground?
A: So we were told multiple times to change what we
were wearing, to change from cammies into civilian
attire, civilian attire into cammies, cammies into
civilian attire.
There was also some talk of whether or not we could
carry our personal weapons. I was basically holding
hard and fast to the point where we were carrying our
personal weapons. Like, we've got a very violent thing
going on the ground where we're going, so we're going
to be carrying something that can protect ourselves.
But as far as what the Marines were wearing, that
continually changed, and we had to make those changes
inside of the aircraft.\467\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\467\Id. at 40-41.
In fact, the FAST Platoon commander testified that during
the course of three hours, he and his Marines changed in and
out of their uniforms four times. Ham was not aware the FAST
Platoon had been directed to change out of their uniforms until
after the fact.\468\ When asked whether he had any explanation
for why it took so long for the FAST Platoon to arrive in
Tripoli, he replied, ``I do not.''\469\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\468\Ham Testimony at 90.
\469\Id. at 91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although Dempsey told the U.S. Senate that once forces
began moving, ``nothing stopped us, nothing slowed us,'' it
appears the U.S. Military's response that night was delayed--
because it started too late.\470\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\470\Department of Defense's Response to the Attack on U.S.
Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and the Findings of Its Internal Review
Following the Attack, Hearing before the S. Comm. on Armed Services,
113th Cong. 66 (2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Diplomatic Clearance
On the ground in Tripoli, the Defense Attache had already
begun working to obtain flight clearances from the Libyan
government before the White House meeting began.\471\
Initially, he notified the Libyan government of a potential
request for flight clearances as the night progressed.\472\
Because he had given advance notice to the Libyan government
potential flight clearances would be needed, he fully expected
the Libyan government to approve any formal request when it was
made. He noted, however, that to submit a formal request,
specific information about the tail numbers, expected arrival
of the aircraft, the number of personnel, and types of weapons
had to be conveyed to the Libyan government.\473\ Not only did
a formal request have to be made, a representative of the
Libyan government had to be available to receive the paperwork
for the request. There was no Libyan representative on duty
overnight.\474\ As to when formal approval was received, the
Defense Attache testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\471\Defense Attache 2014 Testimony at 113-114.
\472\Id.
\473\Id.
\474\Id.
Q: Can you recall when the actual--the relevant
information that was needed, like tail numbers and
things, when was that transmitted to the Government of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Libya?
A: I don't. But I would also come back to the fact that
we had a green light from the Government of Libya to
bring it in. It was just a question of when we were
going to know the specific information that goes into a
standard flight clearance request. So it had to have
been, I would say, sometime midmorning to noon on the
12th. It could have been, I would say, sometime
midmorning to noon on the 12th. It could have been a
little bit after that.
Q: And that's when you received the relevant
information you need to pass on, or what happened?
A: Probably both. In the course of the morning, leading
up to the afternoon, we got the information we
required, and then we were able to subsequently
transmit it to the Libyans.\475\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\475\Id. at 159-160.
An email from Winnefeld corroborates the Defense Attache's
recollection that the final relevant information needed to
obtain host nation approval was received sometime mid-morning
on September 12. In Washington, at 1:40 a.m. [7:40 a.m. in
Libya] on September 12, Winnefeld wrote, ``Understand we now
have dip clearance for the FAST platoon in Tripoli.''\476\ At
least six hours had transpired between the time the Secretary
ordered the deployment of forces and the Libyan Government
approved deployment of those forces into Libya. Prior to this
approval, no forces had begun moving.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\476\Email from Admiral James Winnefeld, Jr., Vice Chairman of the
J. Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Dep't of Defense, to Denis R. McDonough,
Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor, White House, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012 1:19 AM)
(on file with the Committee, C05562167).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Winnefeld did not believe the timing of host nation
approval from the Government of Libya prevented forces from
moving.\477\ Rather, from his perspective, what most impacted
the ability of the forces to move was the availability of
airlifts coming from Ramstein, Germany.\478\ Notably, Winnefeld
stated one lesson learned that night was the need to ``synch
up'' force deployment timelines with airlift availability
timelines.\479\ Nevertheless, the question still remains if the
request for host nation approval from Libya was merely pro
forma and did not delay deployment of forces, why did the
forces not move until approval was obtained?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\477\Winnefeld Testimony at 51.
\478\Id. at 90.
\479\Id. at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PROBLEMS WITH CIF DEPLOYMENT
Twenty-two hours after the initial attack in Benghazi
began, the CIF landed at the intermediate staging base in
Sigonella, Italy.\480\ On the night of the attacks, the CIF was
located in Croatia participating in a training exercise. The
CIF Commander provided the following information about his
instructions that night:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\480\See U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline (``[At 7:57 PM EET t]he
EUCOM special operations force, and associated equipment, arrives at an
intermediate staging base in southern Europe'').
A: The initial guidance was--I can't recall if someone
said prepare to deploy or you will deploy. The
notification we just operate under at all times, if
you're notified, we are operating under the premise
that we are going to deploy. But no one ever
specifically said you would; or that, we would. And as
the situation progressed from initial notification
around 02, through the early morning hours and
throughout the next day, there were various updates
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
along that timeline
Q: And as the night progressed and the morning
developed, at what point were you told you will deploy
and this is the N Hour? At what point do you recall
receiving an N Hour notification? Or did you receive
one?
A: I can't recall the official N Hour notification that
was set for official purposes. From my purview, when
someone told me, that is when I started working off it
at the tactical level so that we are prepared.
So, from my recollection, it was in the middle of the
night, but I can't recall when the official N Hour was
set.\481\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\481\CIF Commander Testimony at 58-59. Some forces that are
required to move within a pre-determined timeframe operate with a
notification hour or ``N-hour.'' The N-hour is the established time
that essentially starts the clock ticking for when the forces are
required to be airborne.
Notably, as he and his team were preparing after receiving
their orders, the CIF Commander was receiving updates from his
chain of command but never received any information about what
was happening on the ground until he received word Ambassador
Stevens had been killed.\482\ Despite the updates he was
receiving, he was never told State Department personnel had
evacuated to the Annex or even that the Annex had been struck
by mortars and two more Americans were killed.\483\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\482\Id. at 63, 65.
\483\Id. at 65-66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CIF faced several obstacles that slowed its ability to
deploy. First, before they could execute, they had to have a
fork-lift brought in from Zadar, Croatia, which was
approximately 180 miles away from their current location.\484\
Once the forklift arrived, the CIF was able to load their
pallets of gear and ammunition, then make the two-hour journey
to Zagreb International Airport, where they would await their
follow-on transportation.\485\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\484\General Repass Testimony at 54.
\485\Id. at 54-55
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these logistical obstacles, the CIF was packed and
ready to go at approximately 7:00 a.m. local time [1:00 a.m. in
Washington D.C.]. Yet, it was nearly another three hours until
it was airborne. The CIF Commander described the delay:
A: So in terms of the air, my recollection, I did not--
I was waiting on the aircraft. I wasn't involved in the
planning of the aircraft, is the best way to describe
it. So I don't recall the N Hour sequence for the air
movement. It was--for us, we packed up every quickly
and then we were waiting at the airfield.
And my comms--I packed up my comms and everything. So
once we were sitting at the airfield about seven
o'clock in the morning on September 12th, I had limited
communications with what was going on. I was just
waiting for the aircraft to show up.\486\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\486\CIF Commander Testimony at 76.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
A: But none of us knew--we weren't aware of the
aircraft deploying time. On that set N Hour to move
aircraft, I don't recall what that was.
Q: Do you recall any efforts to try to coordinate back
with SOECUER headquarters to say, ``Hey, is there an N
Hour Sequence in effect?
Were you tracking an N Hour sequence of any type or was
it more of a deliberate deployment sequence?
A: I was tracking--for me, as a ground assault force,
the second I heard what was going on, that was kind of
what I was tracking. And we moved as quickly as we
could. And once we found out that the crisis was not
what it was originally articulated in terms of a U.S.
Ambassador or any Am[erican] cit[izen] missing, and
that he was killed and nobody was--that crisis was no
longer occurring as originally discussed, then it
became deliberative.
So from my perspective, at that point the crisis was no
longer ongoing and it was more of a deliberate process.
So the N Hour sequence, I hate to use the term
irrelevant, but I didn't know what my mission was going
to be if there wasn't a crisis that we were prone to
look at.\487\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\487\Id. at 77-78.
In support of its training exercise, the CIF's two C-130
aircraft were located in Croatia.\488\ Based on reports
regarding the attack in Benghazi, and well before receiving an
order to deploy, at approximately midnight local time [6:00
p.m. in Washington D.C.] the commander of the aircraft placed
his pilots and air crews in ``crew rest'' in anticipation of a
potential mission.\489\ ``Crew rest'' is typically a 12-hour
period in which the pilots and air crew rest prior to engaging
in a mission. The 12-hour period can be waived to eight hours
(or more in exigent circumstances). General Repass, the SOCEUR
Commander, waived the crew rest to eight hours in order to
facilitate the CIFs movement to the intermediate staging base
at Sigonella, Italy.\490\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\488\Repass Testimony at page 29.
\489\Id. at 49.
\490\Id. at 62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Once he received word of Stevens's death, the CIF Commander
testified the mission transitioned from a crisis action
planning event to a deliberate planning event.\491\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\491\CIF Commander Testimony at 69.
Q: Why did it transition from a crisis action planning
event to a deliberate planning event? What was the
nature of what his death generated in terms of your
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
planning sequence?
A: From my recollection--and I wasn't in constant
communications about all of that; I just remember
hearing that he was killed, and there were no reports
of any other missing American citizens or any life,
limb, or eyesight threats to American personnel in the
original crisis point. Once we heard of that, and then
from that point we knew we were going to an ISB, for
sure. So there is no longer an in extremis, as we call
it, crisis, and personnel are safe, for a matter of
speaking, it became a much more deliberate planning
cycle.\492\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\492\Id. at 69-70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
I was waiting for orders, to be honest with you, from
that point forward, outside of deploying. I knew I was
going to deploy. Aside from that, the scope of that
deployment in terms of a mission statement, was still
unknown.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\493\Id. at 71.
Once the U.S. based Special Operations Force was activated,
the CIF--the closest military asset capable of quickly
deploying to Benghazi--transitioned to a supporting role to
help facilitate whatever mission was to be assigned to SOF
forces.\494\ As such, the CIF's primary responsibility was then
to simply get to the intermediate staging base prior to the
U.S. based Special Operations Force and assist them as
required.\495\ The CIF was essentially relegated to being an
enabler of the U.S. based SOF, unless they were subsequently
tasked otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\494\Repass Testimony at page 60.
\495\Id. at 70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ham disagreed that the CIF's sole role became to prepare
for the U.S.-based Special Operations Force. He testified:
Q: Did you anticipate as you did your planning that the
Commander's In-extremis Force was going to be relegated
to being nothing more than enablers for the National
Mission Force?
A: In my view, that's an incorrect characterization of
the Commander's In-extremis Force.
* * *
Q: [W]hat would be a more accurate characterization?
A: Mr. Chairman, in my view, the Commander's In-
extremis Force, again, these are specially trained,
equipped, prepared forces that can, as the name
implies, conduct missions in extremis. [Redacted text]
[Redacted text] but they can, in fact, accomplish that
mission.
And, Mr. Chairman, they do, in fact, have a mission to
receive and prepare for arrival of the National Mission
Force, but, in my view, their mission is much broader
than just that.
Q: I think the tension that we're trying--particularly
those of us who have never served before--the tension
we're trying to reconcile is, when General Repass
testified--and he did a fantastic job, but one of the
impressions we were all left with based on his
testimony was, once the [U.S. SOF] was deployed, the
CIF's role then became to go to the ISB and await the
[U.S. SOF], which, in effect, took them out of the
realm of other assets that could deploy otherwise. That
is a fair characterization of his testimony.
And I'm just wondering whether or not you agree that,
once both of those assets are put in place--the [U.S.
SOF], it's headed, it's got a longer travel time than
the CIF--that the CIF's job was to go to the ISB and
await the [U.S. SOF]?
A: Mr. Chairman, I would say that that was one of their
missions, certainly, to facilitate the arrival and the
staging of the [U.S. SOF]. But, in my mind, that was an
operational force that was available to me, a highly
capable special operations force that was
available.\496\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\496\Ham Testimony at 91-92.
Even still, Ham believed the CIF's failure to meet its
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
timeline was not justified and was inexcusable:
Though I know now in hindsight that had the CIF made
its timelines, they would not have been in position to
affect the outcome as things eventually played out on
the ground, the reality is, they should have made their
timelines. And that's--there's no excuse for that. They
should have made their timelines. They should have been
postured for subsequent use. As it turns out, they
would not have been needed, but we didn't know that at
the time. So that, as I look back on this, the
disappointment of the Commander's In-extremis Force not
meeting its timeline is, to me, significant, and I
believe the steps taken by the command and by the
Department of Defense after that have addressed that
situation.\497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\497\Id. at 108.
The Secretary had this to say about the CIF's deployment
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
timeline:
Q: Well that same unit then had to wait for aircraft
till about if you look at the timeline here, 10:21 a.m.
So that N-hour that was set at 11 o'clock east coast
time on the night of the 11th, it was not until 11
hours later that EUCOM CIF was actually transported
down to Sigonella from Croatia.
Does that timeframe seem reasonable to you, given what
you thought might be occurring in the region?
A: I think it's a legitimate area to ask why did it
take that long.\498\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\498\Panetta Testimony at 176-177.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PROBLEMS WITH US SOF DEPLOYMENT
The U.S. SOF force is required to deploy within a specific
number of hours after the order to deploy is given. As
reflected in the Defense Department's timeline and after-action
reviews, it actually took a significant amount of additional
time to launch the U.S. SOF. Even given this delay, the U.S.
SOF Force, which deployed from the United States, arrived at
the staging base in southern Europe only an hour and a half
after the CIF arrived.
By the time CIF and the U.S. SOF Force landed at Sigonella,
the crisis in Benghazi had ended. In fact, the units arrived in
Sigonella nearly 12 hours after all U.S. personnel had
evacuated from Benghazi. The assets ultimately deployed by the
Defense Department in response to the Benghazi attacks were not
positioned to arrive prior to the final lethal attack on the
Annex. The fact that this is true does not mitigate the
question of why the world's most powerful military was not
positioned to respond or why the urgency and ingenuity
displayed by team members at the Annex and Team Tripoli was
seemingly not shared by all decision makers in Washington.
What was disturbing from the evidence the Committee found
was that at the time of the final lethal attack at the Annex,
no asset ordered deployed by the Secretary had even left the
ground. Not a single asset had launched, save the military
personnel from Tripoli who did so on their own accord and whose
presence no one in Washington seemed aware of when discussing
which assets to deploy. Nothing was on its way to Benghazi as a
result of the Secretary's initial order to deploy.
More than 12 hours had passed since the first attack
happened at the Mission compound, resulting in the death of
Sean Smith (which was known) and Ambassador Stevens (which was
not then known), yet in that time, the greatest military on
earth was unable to launch one single asset toward the sound of
the guns.
The CIF's response timeline and the U.S. SOF's timeline
exposed flaws in a process designed to ensure that when a
crisis erupts, the military's decision and deployment cycles
will prove adequate to the challenge being confronted.
The U.S. Government's Response Lacked a Sense of Urgency
Perhaps given the timing of the 7:30 p.m. meeting with the
White House on September 11, shortly after all surviving State
Department personnel had evacuated from the Mission compound to
the Annex, there may have been a sense the worst of the attack
was over. Indeed, Winnefeld stated when he was first briefed
around 4:30 p.m. about the events in Benghazi, he recalled
being told there had been an attack and the attack was
over.\499\ The job left to be done was no longer a hostage
rescue situation but was, at best, recovering Stevens from a
hospital and, at worst, recovering Stevens's remains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\499\Winnefeld Testimony at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This sense, in fact, was false and should have been viewed
as limited, if not false, at the time. As the participants of
the White House meeting would soon learn, events were
continuing to unfold on the ground in Benghazi. Those leaving
the Benghazi Mission compound were attacked and ambushed en
route to the Annex and once the Diplomatic Security Agents and
Team Annex arrived at the Annex the attacks continued.
Moreover, preparing for what could theoretically happen in
Tripoli, or other cities and facilities was understandable.
However, the lack of urgency in responding to what was actually
happening on the ground in Benghazi is difficult to reconcile.
Some may seek to argue a transferred focus onto Tripoli may
explain why such topics as military attire, vehicles, and
country clearances--topics that may seem irrelevant in a crisis
situation--found their way into the discussions, and why other
topics, such as deployment of the FEST, received short shrift.
This belies the reality that--even as Bash indicated the assets
were ``spinning up'' and the ensuing meeting took place--
Ambassador Stevens was missing in Benghazi. There is no
evidence news of his death had reached Washington D.C. Indeed,
news of his death could not have reached Washington D.C.
because it was not known at the time. So, pivoting toward a
Tripoli security analysis and the possibilities of unrest and
violence there is hard to reconcile with the reality of what
had happened in Benghazi, what was currently happening in
Benghazi, and tragically what was soon to happen in Benghazi.
With the storming of the compound in Benghazi, the killing
of Smith, and Stevens missing, discussing the nature of the
vehicles to be used and the clothing to be worn by those
seeking to provide aid seemed to place a disproportionate
emphasis on how the Libyan government might respond. After all,
the Libyan government was supposed to play an active role in
preventing the attack in the first instance and certainly in
responding afterward.
In addition, a fair review of read-outs and summaries of
the White House meeting suggest the focus had already moved
away from responding to Benghazi and toward responding to
Tripoli and the broader region. Expressing concern about how
forces might be received in Tripoli seems difficult to
reconcile with an actively hostile security situation ongoing
in Benghazi.
The U.S. Government's Response Lacked Leadership
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT THOUGHT STATE WAS EVACUATING THE AMERICANS IN
BENGHAZI
The response to the attacks suffered from confusion and
misinformation circulating between the agencies underscoring
that no one effectively took charge of the U.S. Government's
response the night and early morning of September 11-12. From
the Defense Department's perspective, when the orders were
issued, the plan on the ground was for the people in Benghazi,
with the assistance from Team Tripoli, to make their way back
to Tripoli. It would provide assets to augment the security in
Tripoli where needed, and provide evacuation of the wounded and
deceased. Several witnesses indicated that despite the
Secretary's orders, the plan was not to insert any asset into
Benghazi; their understanding was that assets needed to be sent
to Tripoli to augment security at the Embassy, and that the
State Department was working to move the State personnel from
Benghazi to Tripoli.
Tidd confirmed this understanding of the response plan
following the 7:30 meeting with the White House:
By the time we came out of the [White House meeting],
it was pretty clear that nobody was going to be left in
Benghazi. And so the decision--I think at the [White
House meeting] there was some discussion--but as I
recall, we weren't going to send them to Benghazi,
because everybody was going to be back in Tripoli by
the time we could actually get them there.\500\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\500\Tidd Testimony at 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
He further added:
On the evening, at the time that all of this was
transpiring, our mindset, our sense was that everything
was going to Tripoli, that no one was left--or no one
would be left in Benghazi. So that--that's--that was
the mindset that we had.\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\501\Id. at 47.
Even the diplomatic security timeline of events reflected
this was the plan as understood by individuals on the ground in
Libya. At approximately 10:15 p.m. in Washington D.C., the
Diplomatic Security Command Center received a call from the CIA
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annex in Tripoli relaying the following information:
The Response Team has been on the ground for
approximately 60 minutes. They are waiting for to [sic]
escort them to the [redacted] annex.
* * *
Once the six-member Response Team arrives they will
have non-essential employees and the remains of Sean P.
Smith depart.\502\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\502\DSCC Timeline.
Word of the plan to evacuate the individuals from Benghazi
seemed to spread throughout the State Department. Susan E.
Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., received an
email update on the events of the evening which read:
``Apparently the Department is considering an ordered departure
of some personnel from both Tripoli and Benghazi.''\503\ One
member of Team Tripoli also testified the plan, as he
understood it, was to evacuate all non-essential personnel to
Tripoli.\504\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\503\Email from Senior Advisor to the U.S. Permanent Representative
to the U.N., to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012 10:37 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0051700).
\504\Special Operator Testimony at 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet several other witnesses believed a very different plan
was in place: No one was evacuating until Stevens was
found.\505\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\505\See DSCC Timeline (``[At 11:13 PM EDT] response team has
arrived at the [redacted] Annex. Station is telling him all DS staff
told to evacuate. [Redacted] has 3 people willing to stay behind.
Director Bultrowicz stated no, DS will not evacuate all members due to
the outstanding issue of the Ambassador.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Defense Department was working off of the premise
everyone in Benghazi was being evacuated, others were clear
that no one was leaving, and even State Department senior
officials did not authorize the Diplomatic Security Agents to
evacuate until Stevens was found. The Committee was also struck
by the sheer number of government officials involved in the
decision making the evening/early morning hours of September
11-12, who did not even know there was a separate U.S. facility
in Benghazi referred to as the ``Annex'' or where the Annex
was.
The first time it is clear all agencies understood the
people in Benghazi were evacuating to Tripoli was after the
final, lethal mortar attack at 11:15 p.m. in Washington D.C.,
[5:15 a.m. in Benghazi]--and over seven hours after the initial
attack.\506\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\506\See Email from Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff to the U.S.
Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, to Denis R. McDonough, Deputy
Nat'l Sec. Advisor, White House (Sept. 12, 2012 12:12 AM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0051706) (``we're pulling everyone out of Benghazi
[starting shortly]'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The lack of clarity on evacuation versus location of the
missing Ambassador was not the only example of conflicting and
confusing directives during the attacks and aftermath in
Benghazi.
The issue of military attire versus civilian clothes
illustrated no one seemed to be taking charge and making final
decisions. After the State Department request at the 7:30 p.m.
White House meeting, the Defense Department began working the
issue. Documents from the Defense Department show, and the FAST
Platoon Commander testified it was well into the next afternoon
on September 12th before the final decision was made. He
testified further the Marines changed in and out of uniform and
civilian clothes several times because the orders kept
changing.
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DID NOT ANTICIPATE
ADDITIONAL ATTACKS IN BENGHAZI
Several Defense Department witnesses testified that
following the attack at the Benghazi Mission compound, they did
not anticipate any additional attacks. Landolt explained:
But you also have to remember that the first firefight
was around midnight. We didn't anticipate a second one
at 5:00 in the morning.
* * *
Q: In terms of, though, after the first attack, was
there a sense that perhaps this thing had passed and
the dust had settled and---
A: There was that sense.
Q: Talk about that a little more. Was there a general
agreement amongst yourself and General Ham and Admiral
Leidig of that, well, we got through this thing with
minimal damage? Or what was the process? What was the
thought?
A: Yeah, there was a sense that we needed more
information, that it looked like the initial attack had
ended. We had the one dead body on our hands, but we
still had a missing Ambassador. And then the Embassy,
through the DAT, was telling us that they were able to
get a plane and they were going to fly people over. So
I thought, okay, well, that will give us better
situational awareness. So there was that lull where,
Okay, let's wait and see what happens here.\507\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\507\Landolt Testimony at 33-34.
Although the Defense Department did not anticipate an
additional attack, the people on the ground in Benghazi most
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
assuredly did. One GRS agent on the ground testified:
Q: Was there a sense from you that something was
building to something larger later in the evening?
A: Yes. And what we were worried about was an even
larger force with gun-mounted weapons, which are much
larger, overtaking the compound.
Q: Okay. But in terms of individuals with small arms,
that's something that you guys had sufficiently handled
and were able to continue handling based on your
defensive posture at the base?
A: Right, but there was a limit to it. Like it's not
something that we could have done for days. I mean, we
were able to do it for as long as we could, but it
wasn't--there had to be something else.
Q: Okay. Was there ever a sense throughout the evening
that the attacks were over and there was sort of a
calmness----
A: Absolutely not.
Q: --around the base?
A: No. There were lulls, which are normal, but no, none
of us, and when I say ``us,'' the team, none of us
thought it was over, no.\508\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\508\GRS 5 Testimony at 65-66.
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S FOCUS SHIFTED
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FROM BENGHAZI TO THE REGION
The Defense Department's lack of comprehension of the
events taking place in Benghazi, coupled with the emphasis on
resolving potentially extraneous policy matters, hampered the
administration's subsequent plan to respond to those events and
dictated the urgency with which forces moved that night. As the
CIF commander testified, their movements that night
transitioned from crisis action to deliberate planning.\509\
Winnefeld explained why:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\509\CIF Commander Testimony at 69.
I think there are a number of factors in play. One, it
wasn't a matter of not having enough urgency, I think
it was more a matter of posture, coupled with the fact
the focus was on regional challenges, not on something
additional was going to happen in Benghazi later that
night. And so when there was not the perception of an
immediate threat right there . . . people are going to
operate safely.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\510\Winnefeld Testimony at 39-40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
And remember, the reason we were moving the CIF, we
were moving it to, what, Sigonella. . . . It was not
because they were going to Benghazi.
* * *
We were worried about the copycat attacks elsewhere in
the region. And so I think they were more in a--it
wasn't a lack of urgency, but it was--you know, they
keep safety in mind. It was, okay, there could be a
copycat attack; we need to reposture ourselves in
theater. Let's do it, but let's not kill ourselves
doing it.
You know, in 20/20 hindsight, if anybody had known
there was going to be a second attack and that
potentially the CIF could end up going there, maybe
they would have asked that question that you're asking.
But again, their mindset was we're moving the CIF to
Sigonella because something else could happen in the
region.\511\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\511\Id. at 30-31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE LACKED URGENCY
Finally, the coordination for and deployment of the assets
identified and ordered deployed by the Secretary lacked any
real sense of urgency.
The Defense Department knew of the initial attack in
Benghazi, which killed Sean P. Smith, less than an hour after
the attack began.
Two hours after this initial attack began, the Secretary
had met with the President and been given all of the authority
he believed he needed to ``use all of the resources at our
disposal to try to make sure we did everything possible to try
to save lives there.''\512\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\512\Panetta Testimony at 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three hours after the initial attack began, Bash emailed
senior leaders at the State Department to inform them of the
assets that could be deployed in response to the attack.
Five hours after the initial attack began, formal
authorization to deploy the assets was issued.
Instead of setting the N hour at the time the Secretary of
Defense gave his order before Bash's email, or even setting the
N hour at the time orders were issued to the forces at 8:39
p.m., the Joint Staff coordinated with the U.S. SOF force to
ask, ``What would you like to set as N hour?''\513\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\513\Email from Vice Admiral Kurt Tidd, Dir. of Operations, J.
Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Dep't of Defense, to Deputy Dir. of Operations,
et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 8:53PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB001376).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the urgency of the Secretary's intended deployment of
these units and particularly in light of what was continuing to
happen in Benghazi, this cannot be justified, particularly
since it was already known the likelihood of further unrest in
the region was significant.
N hour was ultimately set at 11:00 p.m.--more than seven
hours after the attacks in Benghazi began, more than four hours
after the Secretary gave the order to deploy the forces, and
more than two hours after that order was finally relayed to the
forces. Though, Petraeus quipped to the Committee, ``N hour has
nothing to do with this whatsoever, with great respect. That is
completely irrelevant[,]'' the setting of the N hour was
symptomatic of a larger lack of urgency in responding to the
situation on the ground.\514\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\514\Testimony of General David A. Petraeus, Dir., Cent. Intel.
Agency, Tr. at 16 (Mar. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Petraeus Testimony 2]
(on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Almost six hours after first learning of the initial attack
on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, no asset had been deployed to
Benghazi or Tripoli. Moreover, no asset ordered by the
Secretary was even moving toward Benghazi or Tripoli aside from
military personnel in Tripoli who mustered the ingenuity,
courage, and resolve to ferry themselves toward danger. At the
White House, McDonough knew at 11:45 p.m. the situation in
Benghazi remained ``fluid,'' Stevens was still ``unaccounted
for,'' and one State Department officer had been killed. He
included this in his 11:45 p.m. email on September 11.
Despite the fact that more than six hours had lapsed
between the time the first attack was known and the time of
this email, McDonough was still speaking of assets
``deploying'' rather than assets deployed. If there is evidence
McDonough placed calls or sent emails inquiring about the
status of the deployment, the White House has not shared that
evidence with the Committee. Rather, what was learned is
McDonough made mention of calling ``YouTube'' to request the
taking down of two videos, and he references having had the
Secretary call ``Pastor Jones to ask him to pull down his
video.'' Why McDonough had time to concern himself with ``You
Tube'' videos while an Ambassador was missing and unaccounted
for remains unclear. And why the Secretary of Defense was used
to call ``You Tube'' and a ``pastor'' about a video--that had
not and would not be linked to the attacks in Benghazi--rather
than inquiring about the status of the asset deployment he
ordered five hours earlier is also unclear.
What is clear is the United States Government sent
personnel into a dangerous post-revolution environment in
Benghazi, Libya. Those sent displayed heroism and valor. They
also displayed a sense of urgency in discharging the mission
assigned to them. Chris Stevens had the urgency to travel to
Benghazi because decisions needed to be made before the end of
the fiscal year. Chris Stevens felt the urgency to assign
himself to cover a one-week gap in the Principal Officer
position in Benghazi.
Those Americans assigned to work at a nearby Annex had the
sense of urgency to fight their way onto the Benghazi Mission
compound because a sister U.S. agency was under attack.
Diplomatic Security Agents had the urgency to return time and
time again into a burning building in search of Smith and
Stevens. Diplomatic Security Agents and the team from the Annex
no doubt felt the urgency when they fought their way from the
compound to the Annex overcoming point-blank machine gun fire
and grenade attacks.
Team Tripoli sensed the urgency of what was happening in
Benghazi and negotiated for private aircraft to race toward the
danger in defense of fellow Americans. Tyrone S. Woods and Glen
A. Doherty felt the urgency of defending a second U.S. facility
against a series of coordinated attacks before ultimately being
killed by precision mortar attacks.
There was life and death urgency felt in Libya with split-
second decisions being made: Do I fire on this crowd or not? Do
we fire in the direction of a residence or not? Do we return to
a smoke and fire engulfed building yet again in search of
fallen colleagues? Do we go to the hospital to find Stevens or
to the Annex? How do we fly from Tripoli to Benghazi?
If that same degree of urgency was felt among the decision
makers in Washington it is not reflected in the time within
which decisions were made nor in the topics being debated in
and around the deployment.
The ``tyranny of time and distance'' may well explain why
no U.S. military asset--save the bravery of the men serving in
Tripoli--made it to Benghazi. It does not explain why no asset
was even headed toward Benghazi. The ``tyranny of time and
distance'' does not explain why Washington D.C. leaders were
preoccupied with ancillary issues when they were responsible
for sending our fellow Americans into harm's way in the first
instance.
Half of the action items that emerged from the White House
meeting convened in response to the killing of an American
Foreign Service officer and an attack on an American diplomatic
facility related to a video. Half. There is more of a record of
phone calls from White House officials to ``YouTube'' and a
virtually anonymous ``pastor'' than there were calls imploring
the Defense Department to move with greater urgency. The
preoccupation the administration felt with safeguarding the
feelings of the Libyan government and dealing with an anti-
Muslim video (which video prompted no change in force posture
or readiness even after protests erupted in Cairo) is a
foreshadowing of what would become an administration wide
effort to conflate that same video with the attacks in
Benghazi.
PART II:
Internal and Public Government
Communications about the Terrorist
Attacks in Benghazi
``Two of our officers were killed in Benghazi by an Al Queda-
like
[sic] group.''
The Secretary of State to her daughter,
September 11,
2012\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Chelsea Clinton (``Diane Reynolds'') (Sept. 11,
2012, 11:12 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05795467).
``We know that the attack in Libya had nothing to do with the
film. It was a planned attack--not a protest.''
Summary of a statement by the Secretary
of State
to the Egyptian Prime Minister,
September 12, 2012\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\Email from U.S. Dep't of State, to S_CallNotes, (Sept. 12, 2012,
7:11 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561911).
``To underscore that these protests are rooted in an Internet
video,
and not a broader failure of policy.''
Benjamin J. Rhodes, defining one of the
goals of Am-
bassador Susan E. Rice's appearances on
the Sun-
day news programs following the
Benghazi attacks,
September 14, 2012\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\Email from Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor for
Strategic Commc'cs, Nat'l Sec. Council, to Dagoberto Vega, Special
Ass't to the President and Dir. of Broadcast Media, White House, et al.
(Sept. 14, 2012, 8:09 PM) [hereinafter Rhodes Memo] (on file with the
Committee, C05415285).
``I gave Hillary a hug and shook her hand, and she said we are
going to have the filmmaker arrested who was responsible for
the death of my son.''
Diary entry of Charles Woods, father of
Tyrone Woods,
September 14, 2012\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Fox News Insider, Father of Benghazi Victim Reveals Journal
Entry Documenting Meeting With Hillary, YouTube (Jan. 13, 2016), http:/
/www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMx0huMabos.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Security Environment
The attacks in Benghazi did not occur in a vacuum. They
took place amidst a severely deteriorating security situation
in eastern Libya--a permissive environment where extremist
organizations were infiltrating the region, setting up camps,
and carrying out attacks against Western targets.\5\ In June
2012, State Department security officials were discussing ``an
active terrorist cell in Benghazi'' that was ``planning and
implementing attack operations against western interests
including the U.S. Mission in Benghazi[.]''\6\ That same month
another security official in Libya reported to Washington about
the ``increase in extremist activity'' and described his ``fear
that we have passed a threshold where we will see more
targeting, attacks, and incidents involving western
targets.''\7\ The official cited a series of recent attacks and
noted that a source had warned of a ``group attack'' on an
American facility.\8\ He specifically mentioned ``[t]argeting
[and] attacks by extremist groups particularly in the eastern
portion of Libya,'' where Benghazi is located.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\This deteriorating security environment is discussed in detail
in Section III of the report.
\6\Memorandum from James Bacigalupo, Regional Dir. of the Near East
Asia Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, to Charlene Lamb,
Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State (June 15,
2012) (on file with the Committee, C05578316).
\7\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 24, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25, U.S. Dep't of State (June 14, 2012) (on file
with the Committee, C05388987).
\8\Id.
\9\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the months leading up to September 11, 2012, several
major security incidents had taken place in Benghazi against
Western targets, including:
LApril 2, 2012: Attack on a United Kingdom [UK]
armored vehicle;
LApril 6, 2012: Improvised Explosive Device [IED]
attack on the State Department facility in Benghazi;
LApril 10, 2012: IED attack on the motorcade of
the United Nations Envoy;
LApril 27, 2012: IED attack on a courthouse in
Benghazi;
LMay 22, 2012: Rocket Propelled Grenade [RPG]
attack on the International Committee for the Red Cross [ICRC]
facility in Benghazi;
LJune 6, 2012: IED attack on the State Department
facility in Benghazi;
LJune 11, 2012: RPG attack on the UK Ambassador's
motorcade;
LJune 12, 2012: RPG attack on the ICRC;
LJuly 29, 2012: IED found at Tibesti Hotel; and
LAugust 5, 2012: Attack on the ICRC facility.
The threat environment in Benghazi was so severe that on
September 11, 2012, on the anniversary of September 11, one
Diplomatic Security agent in Benghazi feared an attack that
night and was not planning on going to sleep. He testified:
You know, I wasn't going to go to sleep that night. I
was probably going to stay up throughout the night just
because, one, it's September 11, you know, and what was
happening in Egypt. So if anything was to happen, it
would happen late at night, early morning. So I wasn't
going to go to bed. I believe [Agent 2] was along the
same mindset, but we hadn't ratified whether, yes, this
is what we are doing. It was just people are going to
stay up. I had taken my weapon and ammunition and put
it in my room. [Agent 2] had done the same thing. And I
believe they had--[Agent 5] had his weapon with him as
well in his room.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 1 [Agent 1], Diplomatic
Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 49-50 (Mar. 6, 2015)
[hereinafter Agent 1 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Sean P. Smith, the Information Management Officer at the
Benghazi Mission compound, also feared an attack, telling a
community of online gamers shortly before the attack:
``[A]ssuming we don't die tonight. We saw one of our `police'
that guard the compound taking pictures.''\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\Matt Smith, Ex-SEALs, Online Gaming Maven among Benghazi Dead,
CNN (Sept. 13, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/13/us/
benghazi-victims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was against this backdrop that the September 11, 2012
attacks against U.S. facilities in Benghazi took place.
THE PROTESTS IN CAIRO
In Cairo, Egypt earlier that day, approximately 2,000
protestors demonstrated outside the U.S. Embassy--a protest
that began in the middle of the day.\12\ A handful of
protestors scaled the embassy wall, tore down the American
flag, and sprayed graffiti inside the compound.\13\ Some
protestors were eventually removed by Egyptian police. No
Americans were injured or killed in the event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\See, e.g., Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.,
et al., (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05390691).
\13\See, e.g., id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Cairo, protests had been planned for days in advance on
social media as a result of a video posted on YouTube about the
prophet Muhammad.\14\ On September 10, 2012, the CIA warned of
social media chatter calling for a demonstration in front of
the Embassy in Cairo,\15\ and Americans at the Embassy were
sent home early due to the impending protests.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\Sara Lynch and Oren Dorell, Deadly embassy attacks were days in
the making, USA Today, (Sept. 12, 2012, 8:36 PM), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012/09/12/libyan-
officials-us-ambassador-killed-in-attack/57752828/1.
\15\See, e.g., email from Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Erin Pelton, Dir. of Commc'cs and Spokesperson, U.S.
Mission to the U.N. (Sept. 15, 2012, 7:18 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05622933).
\16\Egypt Protesters Scale U.S. Embassy Wall, Take Flag, CBS/AP
(Sept. 11, 2012, 5:16 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/egypt-
protesters-scale-us-embassy-wall-take-flag.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the attacks in Benghazi occurred later on the same
day, they had little else in common with the Cairo protests.
Significant differences included:
LIn Cairo, plans for the protest appeared on
social media well before the actual demonstration.\17\ In
Benghazi the attacks occurred without warnings on social
media;\18\
\17\Sara Lynch and Oren Dorell, Deadly embassy attacks were days in
the making, USA Today, Sept. 16, 2012.
\18\See, e.g., Testimony of Tripoli Chief of Station, Cent. Intel.
Ageny, Tr. at 42-45, July 16, 2015 [hereinafter Tripoli COS Testimony]
(on file with the Committee).
LIn Cairo, protestors did not brandish or use
weapons.\19\ In Benghazi, attackers were armed with assault
weapons, rocket propelled grenades, and sophisticated
mortars;\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\See, e.g., Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the
U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) [hereinafter 7:55 P.M. Rice Email] (on
file with Committee, C053906910).
\20\See, e.g., Benghazi Accountability Review Board at 4, U.S.
Dep't of State [hereinafter Benghazi ARB].
LIn Cairo, protestors spray painted walls and did
other minor damage.\21\ In Benghazi, the attackers burned down
buildings and pounded U.S. facilities with mortars and machine
gun fire;\22\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\7:55 P.M. Rice Email, supra note 19.
\22\Benghazi ARB, supra note 20, at 4.
LIn Cairo, the protest was confined to a single
location.\23\ In Benghazi, the attacks spanned nearly eight
hours over two different locations.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\See, e.g., 7:55 P.M. Rice Email, supra note 19.
\24\Benghazi ARB, supra note 20, at 4.
Diplomatic Security personnel in Washington D.C. recognized
differences as well. At 5:13 p.m. on September 11, 2012 James
Bacigalupo, Regional Director for Diplomatic Security, Near
Eastern Affairs Bureau, State Department, notified all regional
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
security officers:
Within the last few hours we have had one demonstration
in which protestors infiltrated the perimeter of the
compound in Cairo and an armed attack on our compound
in Benghazi. Both are currently on-going and may be in
response to the release of an anti-Islamic documentary
and upcoming demonstration by Terry Jones this
evening.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\Email from James Bacigalupo, Regional Dir. of the Near East
Asia Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, to DS-IP-NEA-RSO
(Sept. 11, 2012, 5:13 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048896).
The differences also were noted by senior State Department
officials as well. Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, State
Department, sent an email at 6:09 p.m. that included Jacob J.
Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy
Planning, State Department, and Patrick F. Kennedy, Under
Secretary for Management, State Department, among others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuland wrote:
[Please] put out as two separate statements to bullpen,
asap. On record, me.
We can confirm that our office in Benghazi, Libya has
been attacked by a group of militants. We are working
with the Libyans now to try to restore security.
In Cairo, we can confirm that Egyptian police have now
removed the demonstrators who had entered our Embassy
grounds earlier.
For [press] guidance, if pressed whether we see a
connection between these two.
We have no information regarding a connection between
these incidents.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\Email from Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State,
to Elizabeth Dibble, Deputy Ass't Sec'y in the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:09 PM) (on file
with the Committee, C05578255).
WHAT BENGHAZI REPORTED DURING THE ATTACKS
All five Diplomatic Security agents at the Benghazi Mission
spoke with the Diplomatic Security Command Center while the
attacks were ongoing. Agent 5, the Diplomatic Security agent
who was with Smith and Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher
Stevens during the attack, recounted his story:
Okay, so the evening started with [Agent 4], [Agent 2]
and I sitting at a table near the pool at the end of
the night. Ambassador Stevens had come by and said, I'm
going to bed. Sean Smith said the same thing and went,
you know, went inside the villa, and we were just
sitting out kind of relaxing at the end of the night.
While we were talking, I started hearing some kind of
chanting, I thought it was. So I told the others, you
know, I told the other two, hang on. Just listen for a
minute. And what we heard was chanting. And it was my
impression that it was coming closer. You know, so
immediately when I realized, you know, that this is a
potential security incident, or a potential something,
I said, you know, get your gear, right now. I ran into
Villa C where the Ambassador and Sean Smith were and
the other two ran in a different direction.
I remember hearing the chants. I mean, they were fairly
close already. I mean, yelling distance, which is
pretty close especially in a city setting. So my
impression is that I don't have much time. So I ran
right to my room, you know, put my helmet on, put my
vest on, grabbed my weapons, my additional weapons, and
I turned to lock the gate, and basically, it was a jail
cell door with three locks on it. I locked all three
locks.
And at about that time, Ambassador Stevens and Sean
Smith were coming out of their rooms. Sean Smith was
already, you know, donning his helmet and vest. I
guided them both into the safe haven, and I set myself
up in the safe haven with--I was holding my M4. I had a
pistol, a radio, a shotgun, and when we were, you know,
when we were in there, I radioed the other guy, hey, we
are all in the safe haven.
I could hear outside explosions, yelling, chanting,
screaming, gunfire, and I reported all of this on the
radio just saying, this is what my senses are telling
me. Then people started banging on the doors of the
building, so I reported that. Hey, there is banging on
the doors. They are trying to come in, you know, we
need immediate assistance. And there wasn't any
response on the radio. Shortly after that, to my
recollection, the doors were blown open. And about 70
individuals, you know, rushed into the building, all of
them carrying AK-47s, grenades, RPGs, you know, a
mixture throughout everyone. Different--there were a
couple of different assault rifles.
And with the number of individuals that came into the
building versus me, I chose just to stay in the shadow
that I was in. So I was partially in the safe haven,
partially outside the safe haven. This area was, you
know, there was a big shadow where I was sitting, and
my view through the jail cell door was into the common
area. So I could see where everybody was going, and
they began breaking everything. I could just hear glass
breaking. I could hear stuff being thrown around. I
could hear furniture being moved.
If I may just back up a little bit. When we made it
into the safe haven, I handed my cell phone to the
Ambassador. I said, call everybody on my cell phone.
Call everybody that you know that can help us. At one
point, I handed Sean Smith the shotgun, but just like
me and everybody else that was in the safe haven, we
were scared. But as a security professional with my
military training and my agent training, I'm trained to
remain more calm than a non-security professional.
So I took the weapon back from him seeing that he was
visibly shaken. And I just waited to see what was
unfolding. I was on the radio the whole time updating,
you know, whispering. Turned the volume way down, you
know, hey guys, they are in the building. Shortly after
that, two individuals came up to the jail cell door and
took out their AK-47s, and they are beating on the jail
cell door. They also had grenades on them. And I
thought they were going to take the grenades off and
pit them on the locks and blow the locks.
So I tuned to the Ambassador, and said, you know, if
they take their grenades off the door and put them on
the locks, I'm going to start shooting. And when I go
down, pick up the gun, and keep fighting. Thankfully,
they didn't put the grenades on the locks. And they
just kind of turned away, and walked to a different,
you know, part of the house that I couldn't really see.
And then slowly, people started to kind of trickle out.
And then the lights started to kind of dim. My initial
response or my initial thought was, well, they just
knocked out the generators. You know, we have regular
city power but we also have backup generators. So
flickering would be a likely, you know, cause of this.
But in reality, it was smoke. And it took me about, you
know, two or three seconds after that to determine that
it was smoke.
As soon as I realized it was smoke, I turned to the
Ambassador and Sean Smith and said, we are moving to
the bathroom. And at that time, grabbed the Ambassador,
Sean Smith was right behind him and we started crawling
towards the bathroom. It's about a three- to four--
meter crawl. And it only took seconds for us to reach--
to reach the hallway that the bathroom was in. But by
that time--seconds later, the smoke had already filled
the entire room and I began basically army crawling
like on my belly, and breathing though my hands like
this, the last, you know, centimeter of air that was
left.
And as soon as it became that thick, no light was
visible from the lights that were fully on. The sounds
were, you know, crackling and breaking of things from
heat. And so to lead them to the bathroom, I was
saying, Come on guys, follow me. And I was slapping my
hands on the floor, or you know, hitting stuff with my
hands if I felt anything. Like come on, you guys,
follow me. Come on. We are going to the bathroom.
So I make it to the bathroom and nobody follows me in.
The whole time I was slapping and saying, come on,
follow me. My intention of going to the bathroom is
because if we made it to the bathroom, I know there is
a window that we can open. So what we would do is go
into the bathroom, close the door, wet towels on the
floor and open the window. And we could last, you know
probably much longer in the bathroom than anywhere else
in the house.
But because nobody followed me in, I wasn't going to
close the door. So thinking about how I can better the
situation, I open the window. And I thought that that
could you know, provide some, you know, the lights in
the bathroom. I could provide some light, or I could
provide, you know, someplace with air and they could
see that. But by opening the window, I stood up to open
the window, and I thought my face was on fire. And I
opened the window anyway and it just became a chimney
and all the smoke started, you know, pouring out of the
window and being sucked in my direction.
Because at that point that--I started to pass out. I
could feel myself becoming weak and just overcome with
smoke and heat. So I got back on the floor, took off my
M4, because crawling with a slung weapon is extremely
difficult. It was getting hung up on things, and I
didn't want to be stuck in that building because of my
M4. So I threw it in the bathroom, just left it there
and started crawling towards my bedroom. And when I
decided to do that, I was very clear to anybody else
who could hear me, I'm moving to my bedroom. Come on
guys, I'm moving to my bedroom. The whole time I'm
hitting the floor, slapping, yelling. Come on, guys.
Come on, you can do it. Let's go. Let's go. We are
moving to my bedroom.
So I crawled to my bedroom. And as soon as I passed the
threshold to my bedroom, you know, I had seconds left
of life, essentially. And so I quickly went over to my
window and started to crank open the metal shutters,
but I was cranking the wrong way. So I had to turn back
and crank it the other way. Then I had to open up the
glass window, and then I had to pull a pin and push out
this big metal gate. And as soon as I did that, I
collapsed on to my little patio area.
And around the patio area was, you know, maybe a 2\1/
2\-foot tall cinderblock wall. And as soon as I went
out there, I just started taking fire immediately. I
remember hearing explosions, which I equate to
grenades. I remember feeling the cement exploding and
hitting me in the face. And I remember the sounds. So
after catching my breath, I jumped back into the
building and I searched for the Ambassador and Sean
Smith. I went as far as my threshold, and reached out
into the--into the area we had just come from to see if
I could feel anybody. But the smoke and heat were so
intense that, I mean, the smoke was coming in though my
eyes, even though they were closed. It was coming in
through my nose. And I stayed in there until I could--
physically couldn't do it any more.
When I was in the Navy, they engrain in you, 110
percent. And most people don't think you can do 110
percent, but it's part of my character. I do 110
percent and I stayed in there until--until I physically
could not and mentally could not stay in there any
longer.
I went back out of the building, caught my breath on
the patio again, immediately taking rounds, the same
stuff, whizzing, you know, jumped back into the
building, and I had intentions--you know, I was just
thinking of any way that I could possibly signal them
or let them know where I was besides yelling and
slapping and hitting stuff.
And I remembered that I had a lamp in my room, and I
went over to my lamp and I turned on my lamp, thinking
that they could see it in the smoke. But it didn't turn
on. And so I held it up to my eye to see if it was
working, and I remember seeing a very faint glow when
it was this close. I remember feeling the heat of the
lamp, and I could just barely see the actual light from
it.
That's how thick the smoke was. And I went back to my
threshold, searched around, still yelling, still
saying, ``Come on guys,'' you know, to my bedroom. No
response. Nothing. I went back out and caught my breath
again, still taking rounds. And I went back in one or
two more times to try and find them, and I couldn't.
The last time I went out, you know, I decided that if I
went back into the building that I wasn't going to come
back out. The smoke and heat were way too powerful, and
way too strong, and it was extremely confusing feeling
my way in a smoke-filled building. And I didn't want to
get lost, and so I decided to climb up the ladder up to
the roof.
I climbed up the ladder, and pulled up the ladder
behind me and that's the moment that I knew that
Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith were probably dead.
Immediately, upon getting up to the roof, I started
radioing for my colleagues, you know, telling them the
situation, you know, telling them my situation, you
know, I am exhausted. I am completely exhausted. I gave
everything I had. And I'm still thinking of ways to
help, still thinking of ways to get the guys out.
So I remember that we have a skylight in the top of the
building, and so I, you know, we had a little stash of
gear up on the roof. So I went over and I grabbed an M4
magazine and I climbed up on to this little platform
which is near the window. But it's protected by these
metal bars. And I couldn't break the window. But I
remember yelling and hitting it as hard as I possibly
could.
The bad guys saw me up there, started shooting at me
again. I remember seeing tracer fire right over my
head. I remember hearing the whizzing of the rounds
going past me. And so I climbed, you know, back down
off the ledge and just got on the radio. ``Hey, guys,
I'm on a frying pan. This thing is hot. The smoke is
coming out of the building and going right on to the
roof. If I pick my head up I'm getting shot at, and I
can't--I can't do this forever.''
Finally, over the radio, [Agent 4] says, ``[Agent 5],
we are coming to get you.'' You know, at that time a
couple of seconds were gone, and he was like, ``Hang
on. Hang on. We are coming to get you'' I don't know
how long I was up on the roof, but for me it was a
while.
Finally, the other guys came over in a fully-armored
vehicle and parked right at the base of kind of my
location and set up a small perimeter, called me down
off the roof. I climbed down and they were all amazed
to see me still alive. Just my condition was, you know,
my face was black. My eyeballs were black. My nose was
black. Everything I had was black. But as a security
professional, I said, ``Give me a gun.'' [Agent 2] gave
me a 9-millimeter pistol which I was a little unhappy
about, but I took it anyway and stood--stood a position
on the outside.
And [Agent 4]--[Agent 4] and [Agent 1] tried to go
inside the building and find them, but shortly after
that, their report was way too hot, way too smokey. You
know, we are going to get lost in there. Somebody is
going to die if we keep this up.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 5 [Agent 5], Diplomatic
Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 123 (Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter
Agent 5 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Agent 3, Diplomatic Security agent in charge at the
Benghazi Mission compound, testified he was in constant contact
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
with the Diplomatic Security Command Center:
I was in the best position to see the attacks happen,
unfold. I was in the TOC [Tactical Operations Center]
at the special mission compound. I manned the cameras.
You guys have seen the video. Any time you see the
camera moving, that's me. Subsequently, I was also in a
position to review the cameras and be aware of all the
situational awareness at the second compound, all of
which I have shared. Much of the attack was passed in
real-time through my phone to DS command center.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 3 [Agent 3], Diplomatic
Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 77 (Oct. 8, 2013) [hereinafter
Agent 3 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agent 3 also testified about what he saw:
It was 9:42 at night, and I was wrapping up work and
had some emails. My shift should have been done three
or four hours earlier. I'm in the TOC office in the TOC
building. I hear several, three to four, gunshots and
an explosion that seemed substantially closer than what
I heard earlier, which was the fireworks. The fireworks
I kind of expected to happen every night at about 9:30
give or take. Initially I thought they were just a
little bit late.
So I get up. I go to the window, which is actually
covered by two bookcases and has sandbags on the
outside, so not to see anything, but actually to hear a
little better I go to the window. I think I heard the
shots or explosions first and then something more
subsequent than that, either an additional explosion or
additional gunfire, that sounded very close. I turn. I
glance maybe a second, probably less, at the
surveillance camera monitors and see a large group of
personnel coming on. They're already on the compound,
effectively in the middle of compound C. Right where
this small roundabout is, there's a camera on a pole
there. And I saw a large group. My original assessment
was 16 to 20 armed men, a couple of them with
banners[.]\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\Id. at 135-136.
Agent 3 testified this information was being relayed back
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to the Diplomatic Security Command Center [DSCC]:
We are relaying what is going on via the cameras, where
slowly the barrack buildings [Villa C], which is one of
the villas on the compound on the map, is set on fire,
and then slowly those forces migrate over to our side,
where they pin us in, basically, in both of our
locations, in Villa B and the TOC building, where they
proceed to gain entry into Villa B and attempt to kick
the door in to the TOC building for 10 to 15 minutes. .
. . [t]he situation on the ground was rough out there.
There was heavy weapons. Some guys have grenades that
have already gone off. Everybody is armed with either a
pistol or a long gun. Somebody shows up at some point
with, like, a bazooka. So it is tough.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\Id. at 145-146.
Diplomatic Security Agent 1 called the DSCC when attackers
were attempting to break into the room where he and another
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
agent had barricaded themselves. He testified:
Q: You mentioned earlier that you used your BlackBerry
to call the DS Command Center. When did you first call
the DS Command Center during this sequence of events?
A: So before they breached, when they made the first
attempt, the first attempt they didn't breach into the
room yet. But it was imminent that they were going to
breach and they were going to come in. So at that point
we bunkered in and started to proceed making calls. So
[Agent 2] was calling Tripoli and I called the Command
Center. I believe it was 18 minutes after the
attack.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\Agent 1 Testimony at 62.
Diplomatic Security Agent 2 also spoke with the DSCC during
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the attacks. He testified:
I stayed on the roof of that building for the majority
of the night. I made several phone calls back and forth
to the DS Command Center in D.C. relaying information.
I also made phone calls to one of the Ambassador's
contacts to try to get some atmospherics about what was
going on in the rest of the city, should we need to do
a ground evac.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\Testimony of [Agent 2], Diplomatic Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. at 100 (Mar. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Agent 2 Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
Agent 2 told the Committee he was providing ``general
situational awareness'' to the DSCC so they could ``make
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
accurate decisions.'' He testified:
A: Yeah. He wanted to know the status of the
accountability of the Americans who were on post,
specifically the Ambassador, what information we had.
There were also additional reports coming in that the
Ambassador might have been at a hospital in a burn unit
and we were trying to verify the validity of those
claims. And then just general situational awareness for
the Command Center in D.C.
Q: So your sense of kind of your--what you were doing
there was kind of giving an ongoing as things were
unfolding so that they would have the information to
help assess how to continue responding?
A: Yes. My intent was to provide them the information
that I had so they had timely information so they could
make accurate decisions.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\Id. at 102.
Diplomatic Security Agent 4 testified it was his job to
``immediately'' contact the DSCC in the event of an attack.\34\
He testified about the beginning of the attack:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 4 [Agent 4], Diplomatic
Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 85 (Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter
Agent 4 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Q: Would it be then an accurate description to describe
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the attack as sort of a stealth attack?
A: It was very sudden. As I had mentioned, the only
warning that I had that something was amiss was that--
kind of that cry that I heard at the main gate. So it
was very sudden.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\Id. at 144.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agent 4 also testified of the attack:
A: No, I never told them that there was a protest.
Q: Was it your assessment that there was a protest?
A: No.
Q: Do you believe there was a protest?
A: I don't.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\Id. at 155.
At the Diplomatic Security Command Center, Charlene R.
Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs,
State Department, was monitoring the situation in real time and
was aware of the reports coming in from the agents under attack
in Benghazi. She testified she was in ``constant contact'' with
the agents on the ground and had an ``almost full-time
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
connection'' to them:
A: I was in my office, and I received a phone call, I
don't remember if it was directly from the command
center or if it was from the desk officer, but I
received a phone call that notified me that there was a
problem.
Q: And that's what they said, it was a problem? Did
they elaborate? Did they tell you anything more?
A: They said that they had the RSO on the phone and
that the compound was under attack. And I didn't ask
any more questions. I believe I notified Scott
Bultrowicz, [Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Diplomatic Security, State Department] and we both went
down to the command center.
* * *
Q: And so once you learned of the attack, then what did
you do?
A: I had a liaison officer that worked for me who had
employees that worked in the Annex there, so I
immediately called him on my way down to the command
center and asked him to join me in the command center.
And when we went in there, we initially tried to assess
the situation the best we could, and then we started
working on trying to identify security assets who could
help them with the situation that was unfolding.
Q: And what assets would those have been?
A: Assets that were at the Annex facility. We made
phone calls to Stuttgart, to AFRICOM [United States
Africa Command] and EUCOM [United States Europe
Command] to see if they had any assets in theater that
were nearby that could possibly be drawn on for
additional support.
Q: And did you discuss those assets and deployment with
PDAS [Principal Desputy Assistant Secretary] Bultrowicz
or Under Secretary Kennedy?
A: Yes. PDAS Scott Bultrowicz was in the room, he was
on the phone with Pat Kennedy and Eric Boswell, and he
was relaying information. As we were getting
information in, he would relay it to them----
* * *
Q: And was the DS command center your only source of
information that night or were you in constant contact
with the Annex as well via your liaison?
A: Yes. My liaison had constant contact with the Annex.
We had almost full-time connection to the DS agents
that were on the ground, and then we were--you know,
towards the end, we were getting information off of
Twitter and public media. So those were our primary
sources of information.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\Testimony of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Diplomatic
Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 14-16 (Jan. 7, 2016) [hereinafter
Lamb Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
A senior watch officer at the DSCC described the events as
``a full on attack against our compound.''\38\ The same
individual also said there was ``zip, nothing nada'' when asked
if there was any rioting in Benghazi reported prior to the
attack.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 27, U.S. Dep't of State, to
svcSMARTCrossLow (Sept. 12 2012, 10:20 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05389586).
\39\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 27, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept.
18, 2012, 1:16 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390678).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 6:34 p.m. on September 11, 2012, the DSCC sent a
``terrorism event information'' to the Office of the
Secretary.\40\ The update noted that ``host nation militia
forces have responded to the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi'' and
``were engaged with the attackers.''\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to S_SpecialAssistants (Sept.
11, 2012, 6:34 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05578699).
\41\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lamb testified information received by the DSCC--directly
from all of the agents on the ground--was relayed to
Kennedy.\42\ None of the Diplomatic Security agents on the
ground reported anything about a protest in Benghazi. None of
the Diplomatic Security agents on the ground reported anything
about a video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\Lamb Testimony at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kennedy testified that he passed on information from the
DSCC directly to Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton:
I stayed in my office, except for the SVTC [Secure
Video Teleconference] the chairman referred to,
monitoring my telephone, monitoring my emails, and
making telephone calls or coordinating activities as
were required. . . . I went up several times to brief
the Secretary on the latest information that I was
receiving from Diplomatic Security, which was receiving
it from the ground.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y for Mgmt., U.S.
Dep't of State, Tr. at 119 (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Kennedy
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
KNOWLEDGE BY SENIOR STATE
DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS
At 4:06 p.m. in Washington D.C. on September 11, 2012, 24
minutes after the attacks began in Benghazi, the State
Department Operations Center issued a widely disseminated email
to Department officials, including the Office of the Secretary,
indicating an attack was occurring. With the subject ``U.S.
Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi Under Attack,'' the email
stated:
The Regional Security Officer reports the diplomatic
mission is under attack. Embassy Tripoli reports
approximately 20 armed people fired shots; explosions
have been heard as well. Ambassador Stevens, who is
currently in Benghazi, and four COM [Chief of Mission]
personnel are in the compound safe haven. The 17th of
February militia is providing security support.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\Email from [email protected] to S_Special Assistants, et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 4:05 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05272001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forty eight minutes later, a 4:54 p.m. update email stated:
Embassy Tripoli reports the firing at the U.S.
Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi has stopped and the
compound has been cleared. A response team is on site
attempting to locate COM personnel.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\Email from [email protected] to S_SpecialAssistants, et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 4:54 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05272001).
A 6:07 p.m. update email with the subject ``Ansar al-Sharia
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Claims Responsibility for Benghazi Attack'' stated:
Embassy Tripoli reports the group claimed
responsibility on Facebook and Twitter and has called
for attack on Embassy Tripoli.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\Email from [email protected] to S_SpecialAssistants, et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 6:07 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05272001).
Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission in Tripoli, was
the United States' highest ranking official in Tripoli at the
time of the attacks in Benghazi. Hicks testified that he talked
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
with Ambassador Stevens moments after the attack started:
A: I punched the number that I did not recognize and
called it back, to call it back, and I got Chris on the
line. And he said, ``Greg, we are under attack.'' And I
am walking outside, trying to get outside, because we
have notoriously bad cell phone connectivity at our
residence, and usually it's better outside. So I say,
my response is, ``Okay,'' and I am about to say
something else, and the line clicks.
I try to reach him back on the--I begin walking
immediately to our tactical operations center, because
I knew that everybody would be gathering there, and I
could then also summon everybody that needed to be at
the--to begin the process of responding. And I am
trying to call back on those numbers to reconnect, and
not getting--either not getting a signal or not getting
a response.
Q: And did you ever make a connection with the
Ambassador again?
A: No. I never did.
Q: That was the last you spoke to him?
A: That was the last I spoke to him.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\Testimony of Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 18-19 (Apr. 11, 2013)
[hereinafter Hicks Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Hicks also testified that Stevens would have reported a
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
protest had one occurred prior to the attack:
Absolutely, I mean, we're talking about both security
officers who know their trade, even though they are
brand new, and one of the finest political officers in
the history of the Foreign Service. You know, for there
to have been a demonstration on Chris Stevens' front
door and him not to have reported it is unbelievable.
And secondly, if he had reported it, he would have been
out the back door within minutes of any demonstration
appearing anywhere near that facility. And there was a
back gate to the facility, and, you know, it
worked.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\Id. at 81-82.
Throughout the course of the evening, Hicks was on the
phone with Elizabeth Jones, Acting Assistant Secretary of
State, Near Eastern Affairs, State Department,who was in
Washington D.C. at the time, updating her about the events on
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the ground in Benghazi. Jones testified:
I sat down and called Greg Hicks and said, Tell me what
is going on. I have this report from my special
assistant, from the op[erations] center; what's going
on? He said, I talked to Chris 20 minutes ago. Chris
called me. He said, We're under attack.
I said, What do you mean we're under attack? He said
there are people firing guns at us, firing weapons,
firing at us. And I said, Where is Chris?
He said--he said that the RSO [Regional Security
Officer] told him that they had taken--that Chris had
said, We're going to the safe haven, and the regional
security officer in Tripoli have reported, yes, the
security officers in Benghazi had taken the ambassador
to the safe haven.
I said, Okay. You talked to him 20 minutes ago. Call
him again. He said, I've been trying. He doesn't answer
the phone.
I asked, Who else was in the--in the building, where
was Chris exactly, who else was in the building. He
explained that Sean Smith was, that's the communicator,
that there were three RSOs there and that they would--
they were moving the two to the safe haven and that the
others were trying to protect the building.
I immediately notified by email as many people as I
could think of off the top of my head on the Seventh
Floor [senior State Department leaders], that I had
spoken to Greg, that this is what the situation was,
that--that I would continue to stay in touch with him.
In the meantime, I had a secure call from my CIA
counterpart saying the same thing, We're hearing that
Benghazi is under attack. I said, Is your annex under
attack, which I knew to be a few minutes away.
He said, No. And I continued to be in touch with him,
the--my CIA colleague and my staff. I decided to not
work out of my office initially but work closer to
where the secure phone is, which is on the other end of
the suite and stayed in very close touch with Greg
essentially all night long till the next morning.
The--what I did in the second phone call, I believe it
was with Greg, I said, Okay. Who are you talking to in
the Libyan government?
He said, I've talked to--I've forgotten, the chief of
staff of various of the senior people.
I said, Talk to the President, talk to the Prime
Minister, don't just stay with the chief of staff. Talk
to the senior people yourself and ask them for help.
Tell them they've got to get their people up there,
not--get their people up there to go over to the
compound to render assistance to get the--get the
attackers out of there, and I kept asking, Have you
heard from Chris? Have you heard from Chris?
No, we can't find him. No, he's not--no, he's not
answering. That was the first. And I don't remember the
timeline anymore. It seemed like forever, but it
probably w[as]n't that long.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\Testimony of Elizabeth Jones, Acting Ass't Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. at 39-40 (July 11, 2013) [hereinafter Jones Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
Jones testified that she spoke with Hicks throughout the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
evening, almost every ten minutes:
Q: Okay. As the night wore on, was the phone just
essentially left almost in permanent communication with
Tripoli?
A: Yes.
Q: I mean, do you have that capability that you have an
open line that just essentially stays open, or is
this--or calling every 5 or 10 minutes? I'm just
curious how that works.
A: Yeah. No, that's a good question. I didn't have an
open line.
We did two things. I stayed in my office with my front
office team and with my staff assistants and with--
Agent 1 was there. We, at the same time, started a task
force in the Operations Center, so the Libya desk
officers were up there helping manage some of the more
routine issues, getting the evacuation going, working
with EX [logistics] on those kinds of issues and sort
of doing the--helping us with the nuts and bolts on
implementing the things that we were deciding that we
needed to do.
Because DS kept the open--Diplomatic Secretary kept an
open line--actually, I don't know that it was an open
line. They had communication directly with the RSO. I
basically worked primarily with Greg Hicks on his cell
phone because that worked better in terms of Embassy
communications and I could reach him wherever he was--
wherever he was in the compound when he was moving
around. So I communicated by my office manager dialing
him directly on his cell phone.
So it was not an open line, but it was--I don't know
that we talked every 10 minutes, but it seemed like it
was every 10 minutes. It was close to that.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\Id. at 79-80.
After some of Jones' discussions with Hicks, an assistant
from the Office of the Secretary drafted emails about Jones'
conversations with Hicks. These emails were disseminated to
senior officials within the State Department, including
Sullivan, Nuland, and William J. Burns, the Deputy Secretary of
State.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\See, e.g., Email from U.S. Dep't of State to Victoria J.
Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:32
PM) (on file with the Committee, C05391036).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 4:49 p.m., just over an hour after the attacks began, an
assistant in the Office of the Secretary wrote:
Beth Jones just spoke with DCM Tripoli Greg Hicks, who
advised a Libyan militia (we now know this is the 17th
Feb brigade, as requested by Emb[assy] office) is
responding to the attack on the diplomatic mission in
Benghazi. The QRF [Quick Reaction Force] is in the
compound, engaging the attackers, taking fire, and
working its way through the compound to get to the
villa, where Ambassador Stevens is in safe haven for
extraction. The ARSO [Assistant Regional Security
Officer] is also there in the compound. Greg spoke with
Amb Stevens by phone 20 minutes before my call (which
was about ten minutes ago). Greg will talk to the Prime
Minister's Chief of Staff, and then speak with the
Foreign Minister . . . Embassy is sending medical
assistance to Benghazi to be on stand-by. More updates
to follow.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to William J. Burns, Deputy
Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 4:49 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05391036).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 5:13 p.m. a new email was sent to the group. It stated:
Just spoke again with Greg Hicks, who confirmed the
party includes Ambassador Stevens plus three, not plus
four. Hicks has been in contact twice with the Libyan
President's office and twice with the Libyan PM's
[Prime Minister's] office; their offices assured him
they are fully engaged and consider themselves personal
friends of Ambassador Stevens. Hicks has been
coordinating with the [CIA] who has learned from the
QRF about the status of the compound--currently they
are clearing the compound and working to access the
party. I also urged Libyan Ambassador to the U.S.
Aujali to engage on this immediately at the highest
level.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy
Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 5:13 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05391036).
An email at 5:32 p.m., the first in the chain sent to
Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, State Department,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
stated:
The fighting has stopped, DCM Greg Hicks just confirmed
to me. He also confirmed one fatality: Sean Smith--a
TDY'er from The Hague--has died. His body has been
recovered. The five ARSO's are accounted for, but
they're still trying to find the Ambassador. The
Principal Officer's residence is still on fire with
toxic smoke. I have spoken to A/S [Assistant Secretary]
Gordon and Liz Dibble is contacting the Charge at The
Hague, [redacted text], to inform them.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of
Staff & Counselor to the U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, et
al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:32 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05391036).
A 5:55 p.m. email to the same chain sent by an assistant in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Office of the Secretary stated:
I just spoke again to Greg Hicks, who himself spoke
again to the offices of the Libyan President and Prime
Minister, asking them to provide firefighting equipment
to the Benghazi compound. He said the PD shop at
Embassy Tripoli has found postings on Facebook
indicating that the ``Tripoli Council'' plans to carry
out an attack on Embassy Tripoli. He said he was
promised increased police protection but it had not yet
materialized.
Greg said his team reports that the extremist group
Ansar Al Sharia has taken credit for the attack in
Benghazi. He heard reports that the February 17 Brigade
is currently engaged in a running battle with Ansar Al
Sharia; he asked the offices of the President and PM to
pursue Ansar al Sharia.
On working to locate Ambassador Stevens, the RSO team
and militia are still on compound, which is 50 acres--
Greg expressed the hope that Ambassador Stevens is in
hiding somewhere on the compound. The PO's residence is
still on fire.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to Victoria J. Nuland,
Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:55PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05391036).
These emails consistently used the term ``attack.'' None of
these emails mentioned anything about a protest. None of these
emails mentioned anything about a video.
Hicks also spoke directly with the Secretary while the
attacks were still ongoing. He testified:
A: No. I really didn't get--you know, about 2:00 a.m.
[8:00 p.m. in Washington D.C.], the Secretary called--
--
Q: Okay.
A: --along with--her senior staff was on the----
Q: Okay. Do you recall who was on that call?
A: It was Wendy Sherman, Cheryl Mills, Steve Mull, Beth
Jones, Liz--I am not sure whether Liz Dibble was on the
phone or not at that time. I know Beth Jones was. Jake
Sullivan.
And so I briefed her on what was going on, talked about
the situation. And at 2:00 a.m., of course, Chris
[Stevens] is in the hospital, although the Libyan
Government will not confirm that he's in the hospital.
All they will tell us is he's in a safe place, or they
will imply that he's with us at the [Annex] facility,
which, of course, we have to feed back to them and say,
no, we don't know where he is. It is a constant
conversation, and I'm still talking to the same people.
The Vice Minister of the Interior chimes in sometime
before midnight. And I'm pressing him to get their
firefighters to the building to put the fire out,
assuming that if they go to put the fire out, that they
will send some security people with the firefighters to
protect the firefighters. We tried everything that we
could.
So we brief her on what's going on. She asks, How can
we help? And I said, Well, we could use some
reinforcements. And we have--we know we have wounded.
And----
Q: What was the answer?
A: The answer was that the FAST team in Rota was being
mobilized to come to Tripoli, and there would be a
medevac flight coming down to pick up wounded.
And then we discussed also whether we were going to--
they asked me if we were going to stay in the
residential compound. And I said, no, we needed to
consolidate our facilities here, because we basically
sent everybody we have to protect us to Tripoli to
rescue them.
Q: To?
A: To Benghazi. Sorry. Benghazi. Apologies. And they
said, good.
Q: And how long does that call last?
A: Ten minutes.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\Hicks Testimony at 32-34.
None of the information coming directly from the agents on
the ground in Benghazi during the attacks mentioned anything
about a video or a protest. These first-hand accounts made
their way to the Office of the Secretary through multiple
channels quickly: through the Diplomatic Security Command
Center; through the State Department Operations Center; through
emails recounting Jones' phone calls with Hicks; through
Kennedy, who briefed the Secretary directly; and through Hicks
himself during a phone call with the Secretary.
THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT
The principal public statement from the U.S. government the
night of the Benghazi attacks, September 11, 2012, came from
the Secretary of State and was issued at 10:08 p.m. It stated
in full:
Statement on the Attack in Benghazi
I condemn in the strongest terms the attack on our
mission in Benghazi today. As we work to secure our
personnel and facilities, we have confirmed that one of
our State Department officers was killed. We are
heartbroken by this terrible loss. Our thoughts and
prayers are with his family and those who have suffered
in this attack.
This evening, I called Libyan President Magariaf to
coordinate additional support to protect Americans in
Libya. President Magariaf expressed his condemnation
and condolences and pledged his government's full
cooperation.
Some have sought to justify this vicious behavior as a
response to inflammatory material posted on the
Internet. The United States deplores any intentional
effort to denigrate the religious beliefs of others.
Our commitment to religious tolerance goes back to the
very beginning of our nation. But let me be clear:
There is never any justification for violent acts of
this kind.
In light of the events of today, the United States
government is working with partner countries around the
world to protect our personnel, our missions, and
American citizens worldwide.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Statement on the Attack in
Benghazi (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197628.htm [hereinafter September 11
Statement].
The decision for the Secretary to issue the statement
appears to have been made earlier that evening during a 7:30
p.m. secure video teleconference [SVTC], a meeting hosted by
the White House, that included senior officials from the State
Department, Intelligence Community, and Defense Department to
discuss the events unfolding in Benghazi.
Rough notes from the White House meeting describe ten
specific action items. One of these action items stated:
The Secretary will issue a statement tonight condemning
the attacks and stating an official American was
killed. . . . S may issue another statement to distance
the United States from the Pastor Jones video.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\Email from Watch Officer, U.S. Dep't of State, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037).
The Secretary did not, however, issue two statements that
evening. She issued one. And that single statement condemned
the attack, stated an American was killed, and distanced the
United States from an internet video. In doing so, the
statement--specifically the language ``[s]ome have sought to
justify this vicious behavior as a response to inflammatory
material posted on the Internet''--appeared to connect, or at
least conflate, the attacks in Benghazi with the video.\59\
This connection between the attacks and the video continued for
over a week, leading the public to believe that a video-
inspired protest led to the attacks that killed Ambassador
Chris Stevens and Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\September 11 Statement, supra note 57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 7:30 p.m. White House meeting was convened to discuss
the Benghazi attacks and included the Secretary of State and
other high level officials from the State Department, Defense
Department, and White House. The meeting, however, contained a
great deal of discussion regarding the video. Matt Olsen,
Director, National Counterterrorism Center, was a participant
in the meeting. He testified:
Q: Was there any discussion of sort of the video and
Benghazi being linked on the call?
A: I don't remember specifically, you know, how we
talked about it. I'm sure that we did, right, because
we were--the fact is that it came--the discussion of
taking the video down was part of our conversation in
this call that was really focused on what was going on
in Benghazi.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\Testimony of Matthew Olsen, Dir., Nat'l Counterterrorism
Center, Tr. at 17-18 (Feb. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Olsen Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Olsen also said:
And in my own mind, at the time, I recall linking the
two, you know, that this--we were thinking about what
had happened in Cairo, we were thinking, okay, now this
seems to be happening in Benghazi, and we're worried
about other, obviously, other diplomatic posts in the
Middle East and North Africa.
On that particular issue, one thing that I recall in
thinking, again, sort of preparing for coming here,
sort of trying to recollect as much as possible, one of
the issues that Denis [McDonough] asked me--and I think
Nick Rasmussen, my deputy, was there as well--was to
see if we could work with--if we could contact Google
to talk with them about enforcing their terms of
service, which was the way that we often thought about
offensive or problematic content.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\Id. at 18.
Five of the ten action items from the rough notes of the
7:30 p.m. meeting reference the video--including an item
mentioning Leon E. Panetta, Secretary of Defense, and Martin E.
Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reaching out to
``Pastor Jones'' directly.\62\ For nearly two years the White
House had been issuing public statements in the wake of actions
committed by ``Pastor Jones,''\63\ although no connection at
the time linked ``Pastor Jones'' or the video to the Benghazi
attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\Email from Watch Officer, U.S. Dep't of State, to
P_StaffAssistants and D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file
with the Committee, C05562037).
\63\See, e.g., Krissah Thompson and Tara Bahrampour, Obama renews
call for religious tolerance after Koran-burning canceled, Wash. Post,
Sept. 10, 2012 (``Obama denied that his administration's forceful
intervention--Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates made a personal appeal
to the Gainesville pastor, the Rev. Terry Jones--had unnecessarily
drawn attention to the pastor's plans.''); and Obama criticizes Quran
burning, Afghan attacks, NBC News, April 2, 2011, www.nbcnews.com/id/
42396945/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/t/obama-criticizes-quran-
burning-afghan-attacks/#.V1oSrvkjrJaR (``At least 10 people have been
killed and 83 injured in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar,
officials said on Saturday, on a second day of violent protests over
the actions of extremist Christian preacher Terry Jones . . . `No
religion tolerates the slaughter and beheading of innocent people, and
there is no justification for such a dishonorable and deplorable act,'
Obama said.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Avril Haines, Deputy Counsel to the President for National
Security Affairs, held a conference call after the 7:30 p.m.
meeting. Rough notes from the call stated:
There is likely to be a statement from S[ecretary
Clinton] this evening addressing the violence and
distancing the USG [United States government] from the
videos that are believed to have instigated it (at
least in part); while no one is sure of the cause,
exactly, there is reportedly a new Terry Jones video
threatening to burn Korans and a second film that
includes a number of insulting statement about
Mohamed.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\Email from Attorney, U.S. Dep't of State, to Harold Koh, Legal
Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 10:40 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05528017).
The fact the 7:30 p.m. White House meeting, which took
place while Ambassador Stevens was considered missing and
before Tyrone S. Woods and Glen A. Doherty were killed, was
about the attacks in Benghazi but much of the conversation
focused on the video is surprising given no direct link or
solid evidence existed connecting the attacks in Benghazi and
the video at the time the White House meeting took place. The
State Department senior officials at the White House meeting
had access to eyewitness accounts to the attack in real time.
The Diplomatic Security Command Center was in direct contact
with the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground in Benghazi
and sent out multiple updates about the situation, including a
``Terrorism Event Notification.''\65\ The State Department
Watch Center had also notified Sullivan and Mills that it was
setting up a direct telephone line to Benghazi.\66\ There was
no mention of the video from the agents on the ground. Hicks--
one of the last people to talk to Stevens before he died--said
there was virtually no discussion about the video in Libya
leading up to the attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\Email from DS Command Center to DSCC_C DS Seniors, DSCC_E TIA/
PII, DSCC_E TIA/ITA, and DS-IP (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:05 AM) (on file with
the Committee, C05389586).
\66\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy
Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 4:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561866).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That did not, however, deter participants at theWhite House
meeting--led by Denis McDonough, Deputy National Security
Advisor to the President--from extensively discussing the
video.
As a result of the White House meeting, the Secretary of
State issued a statement about the attacks later that evening.
Rather than relaying known facts from those experiencing the
attacks firsthand, however, the Secretary's statement created a
narrative tying the events in Benghazi to the video, despite a
dearth of actual evidence. This was done by mentioning the
video and the attacks in the same sentence: ``Some have sought
to justify this vicious behavior as a response to inflammatory
material posted on the Internet.''\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sullivan testified about the decision to include that
sentence in the statement:
Q: Do you recall whose idea it was to include that
sentence?
A: I believe that it was my idea to include that
sentence. It was either mine or Toria's [State
Department spokesperson] or a combination of the two of
us, but I thought it was important to include that
sentence.
Q: And why is that?
A: Well there are two aspects to this. One was we
didn't know the motivation of the actual attackers of
Benghazi, so I didn't want to say they did it because
of the video, and so I chose the words very carefully
to say that some have sought to justify it on that
basis.
But I thought it was really important for us to be able
to express our views on the video and to say there is
never any justification for violent acts of this kind,
as well as to say we deplore efforts to denigrate the
religious beliefs of others because I was deeply
concerned that we could potentially face attacks on our
embassies elsewhere. And, unfortunately, that's exactly
what happened.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\Testimony of Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 220 (Jan. 12, 2016)
[hereinafter Sullivan Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Sullivan did not say why it would not have been equally or
even more important to denounce the video when it began
circulating in the Middle East days earlier, or after the
protests in Cairo where the link to the video was clear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sullivan testified:
I thought very hard about exactly how to formulate
this. I didn't want to say the attackers did this
because of the video. That's why I chose to use the
phrase ``justify,'' because I just wanted to talk more
generally about people who might justify the attack on
the basis of the video. Who would those people be? They
would be the kind of people that would go try to gin up
protests elsewhere, whether in Benghazi again or in
Tripoli or anywhere else around the region.
And my first concern in getting this out was to do
everything we could do to try to prevent further
violence from happening. And I really thought it was
important for the Secretary to get on the record on
this issue. And in the days that followed, I thought it
was important for her to continue getting on the record
on this issue, especially as we dealt with these
assaults on our embassies across the region.
So I thought hard about this paragraph. I thought hard
about making sure we formulated it in a way that was
accurate to say that just some had sought to justify
it. Obviously, we have all seen a lot of public
reporting linking things as well. So this, to me, was
an important paragraph to include in this
statement.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\Id. at 221.
Sullivan apparently did not engage in nearly as much
thought about the video when it first appeared online, or even
when the U.S. Embassy was breached by protestors in Cairo
earlier on September 11, 2012. Where there was a known
connection to the video, Sullivan was silent. Where the video
was not connected by even a scintilla of reliable evidence at
the time, Sullivan thought it important enough to include.
Dan Schwerin, Speechwriter, Department of State, helped
draft the statement that went out that evening. Schwerin told
the Committee the statement was intended to speak to a global
audience. He testified:
Q: You talked about speaking to a global audience. What
did you mean by that?
A: I mean any time the Secretary of State speaks, the
world is listening. We had--it was a period of unrest
across the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond;
specifically, in the Muslim world, which was a source
of concern; and how to lower that temperature and speak
to that situation was an important issue.
Q: Was that focused on the video?
A: The video was the source of that unrest across the
world in that period. And so, you know, lowering the
temperature of that situation was one of our goals.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\Testimony of Daniel B. Schwerin, Staff Assistant and
Speechwriter, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 21 (Oct. 9, 2015)
[hereinafter Schwerin Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
While protests around the Middle East flared up in the
following days, at the time of the Benghazi attacks the protest
in Cairo represented the only instance of unrest.
Megan Rooney, Speechwriter, Department of State, also
worked on the statement and told the Committee that it was a
``commonsense conclusion'' that the video somehow sparked what
happened in Benghazi, because it had done so in Cairo. She
testified:
Q: Right. As you sit here today, do you recall anything
generally about the conversation specific to the video
that night?
A: No. Only that we thought it belonged in the
statement.
Q: Do you recall why you thought it belonged in the
statement?
* * *
A: . . . I believed that it played a role in sparking
the events of that night. And that any sort of
conversation about what had happened, and what has to
happen now would have to be taken into account in some
way.
Q: Okay, just so I understand, it was your view that
night that the video should be referred to in the
statement because in your mind, the video had played
some role in the attack in Benghazi?
A: Yeah, in sparking them or triggering them or
motivating some of the people that night. Yeah, yes.
Q: And so you were kind of going back to your point
about one of the goals for this speech was to explain
to the American people what had happened. For that
reason you wanted to refer to the video. Is that fair?
A: Yeah. I would say that's fair.
Q: And as best you can, could you just tell us what you
based that conclusion on, or that opinion that the
video somehow sparked what occurred in Benghazi?
A: Well, at the time it seems like the commonsense
conclusion. You know, there was this incident happening
in the same--not far from Benghazi, just a few
countries to the--well, shoot, one country to the east.
God, I'm failing on the geography--a nearby country,
Cairo, Egypt, on the same day there was this protest
that seemed--that was similarly targeting an American
facility that similarly had our facility breached in
this alarming way. And that seemed to be very clearly
connected to this video since, again, I believe that
not long before that protest broke out, the video had
been broadcast on Egyptian news. So, you know, I was
learning about what was happening in Egypt, and oh,
look, the same day, something is happening at an
American facility not far from there. . . .\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\Testimony of Megan E. Rooney, Policy Advisor and Speechwriter,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 48-51 (Oct. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Rooney
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
The gist is: a statement connecting the video with the
Benghazi attacks was included by a speechwriter because the
``thought''--half a world away--was that ``commonsense''
dictated it. But that same commonsense would not dictate
listening to and following the real time information being
provided by eyewitnesses who survived the initial attack and
were preparing for subsequent attacks.
Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor to the
President for Strategic Communications, spoke with Sullivan
about the statement before it was released. Rhodes testified
the sentence ``Some have sought to justify this vicious
behavior as a response to inflammatory material posted on the
Internet'' was not about Benghazi but served to respond ``to
the general events taking place in the region as a whole.''\72\
He also said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\Testimony of Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor for
Strategic Commc'cs, Nat'l Sec. Council, Tr. at 50-51 (Feb. 2, 2016)
[hereinafter Rhodes Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
A: Again, our concern--one of our concerns was that we
saw efforts to utilize the video to incite protests,
including the type of violent protests that we saw in
Cairo. And so I recall that we wanted to have messaging
in the statement that sought to reduce tensions
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
associated with the video.
Q: So was this sentence not meant to convey anything
regarding Benghazi and Libya?
A: No, I don't believe so.
Q: You don't think--this sentence was not about Libya
in any way, shape, or form?
A: Again, I believe that it was intended to address the
broader context in the region.
Q: So that's what has me wondering. Then was there
vicious behavior in other places that day?
A: Yes. Certainly in Cairo.
Q: But no--I mean, Pat Kennedy described Cairo as spray
paint and rocks. Obviously, Benghazi was much
different. So you're saying that vicious behavior
applies to Cairo but doesn't apply to Benghazi?
A: Again, I think it applies generally to the fact that
we had indications that there were individuals who
might seek to use this video to justify violence?
Q: I'm asking about the two terms: vicious behavior.
You said this sentence doesn't apply to Libya in a
general sense or Benghazi in a specific sense, but does
apply to other events in the region; namely, Cairo. Is
that accurate?
A: Again, this is taking place in the context where we
have a protest that turned violent at our Embassy in
Cairo, and we have the attacks in Benghazi. The
situation is fluid. There are indications that we are
getting from the State Department that there are other
actors who are seeking to incite people related to this
video. And so one of the objectives in our messaging
was to have a statement that, again, sought to minimize
our association with this video.
Q: And I understand you conveyed that is one of your
objectives, but I'm specifically, again, just for the
record, asking that sentence you said does not apply,
is not meant in any way to convey anything about Libya,
it's about Cairo and the rest of the region.
A: Again, it's not intended to assign responsibility
for what happened in Benghazi. It's meant to describe
the context of what happened, what's happening in the
region.
Q: You mentioned context a couple of times here. When I
look at context, I look at this document. The heading
is ``Statement on the Attack in Benghazi.'' Paragraph
one: I condemn in the strongest way the attack on our
mission in Benghazi. We are securing personnel and
facilities. One of our officers was killed in Benghazi.
Next paragraph: I have talked to the Libyan President.
So everything in this document is about Libya and
Benghazi except you're saying this sentence doesn't
apply to Libya and Benghazi.
A: Again, as I look at this statement, my recollection
is one of the objectives was to convey that we were
doing everything we could to secure our diplomats in
facilities around the world. If you look, for example,
at the last sentence of the statement, it's intended to
be about that general principle that we will work with
partner countries around the world to protect our
personnel, our missions, and our American citizens.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\Id. at 61-64.
Moreover, at Rhodes' direction, the Secretary's statement
was the only statement issued on behalf of the United States
government that night.\74\ This put additional emphasis on its
contents. Rhodes told the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\See Email from Benjamin Rhodes, Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor for
Strategic Commc'cs, Nat'l Sec. Council, to Steven Warren, Spokesman,
U.S. Dep't of Defense, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:53 PM) (on file with
the Committee, C05562046) (``[L]et the State Department' statement be
our [USG] comment for the night.'').
A: You know, I recall telling my staff that that would
be our comment for the night. So the people who work
for me in the NSC press office, you know, everybody was
being asked to respond to inquiries, and I remember
determining that, you know, we would just have that one
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
statement be our comment for the night.
Q: What was the thinking behind that, have that one
statement coming from the State Department be the sole
statement from the U.S. Government?
A: Again, my recollection is that this was an attack
that had targeted our Ambassador, that it was
appropriate for the Secretary of State to be speaking
for the U.S. Government given that this had happened to
people who worked in her department, and again, that
made them the appropriate agency to issue a
comment.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\Rhodes Testimony at 15.
The Secretary's private comments, however, were different
than her public comments. In a phone call with Libyan President
Mohammed el-Magariaf at approximately 6:00 p.m. in Washington
D.C., the Secretary did not mention the video nor did she
connect the video with the attacks. A summary of the phone call
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
is below:
Secretary Clinton: Mr. President.
Libyan General National Congress President Magarif:
Your Excellency.
S: I appreciate you taking my call at this late hour.
M: No problem. It's my duty.
S: As you know, our diplomatic mission in Benghazi was
attacked earlier this evening. We need your immediate
help, as one of our diplomats was killed and our
Ambassador, who you know, is missing. We have asked for
the Libyan government to provide additional security to
the compound immediately as there is a gun battle
ongoing, which I understand Ansar al Sharia is claiming
responsibility for. We also need to provide additional
capacity for firefighting as there are reports that the
principle officers residence has been bombed or set on
fire. We believe that it is important for your
government, as well as ours, to condemn this attack in
the strongest possible terms and promise these
criminals will be brought to justice. I also need you
to help us secure our mission in Tripoli. We have
serious threats on social media sites, like Facebook,
and it is important that your government take all
possible measures, in an urgent manner, to secure our
facilities. We need you to have people who you are
confident in, who will follow your direction, and that
your government trusts to secure our compounds.
M: Please accept my condolences for the death of the
American at the compound and our sincere apologies for
what has happened. We promise to find the criminals and
bring them to justice. We will do our utmost to protect
American buildings and every American citizen in Libya.
We were just in the midst of an emergency meeting with
the Prime Minister and all of his deputies to address
this situation.
S: If there is anything that you need or that I can do
please do not hesitate to call me at any time, day or
night.
M: Thank you.
S: Thank you.
M: Good Night.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to S_CallNotes (Sept. 11, 2012,
11:34 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561906).
In her call with the Libyan President, the Secretary
mentioned a number of key facts not included in her public
statement: that Stevens was still missing at the time;\77\ that
the extremist organization Ansar al Sharia had taken credit for
the attacks;\78\ that the compound may have been bombed and set
on fire;\79\ and that the administration intended to bring the
perpetrators to justice.\80\ Significantly, she also did not
mention the video she referred to in her public statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\Id. (``[O]ur Ambassador, who you know, is missing.'').
\78\Id. (``I understand Ansar al Sharia is claiming
responsibility[.]'').
\79\Id. (``[T]he principle officers residence has been bombed or
set on fire.'').
\80\Id. (``[I]t is important for your government, as well as ours,
to condemn this attack in the strongest possible terms and promise
these criminals will be brought to justice.'').
The Secretary also sent a private email to her daughter
that evening about an hour after her public statement. The
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
email said:
Two of our officers were killed in Benghazi by an Al
Queda-like [sic] group: The Ambassador, whom I
handpicked and a young communications officer on
temporary duty w a wife and two very young children.
Very hard day and I fear more of the same tomorrow.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Chelsea Clinton (``Diane Reynolds'') (Sept. 11,
2012, 11:12 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05795467).
In that email, the Secretary states two individuals had
been killed ``by an Al Queda-like [sic] group.''\82\ This key
fact had been omitted from the Secretary's public statement. In
sharing this fact with her daughter, the Secretary acknowledged
the attack--with a link to al-Qaeda--was in fact terrorism. In
omitting this fact from her public statement, however, the
Secretary sent a very different message to the public--a
message that suggested a protest over the video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was not until ten days later the Secretary told the
American people the events in Benghazi were terrorist
attacks.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\Glenn Kessler, From video to terrorist attack: a definitive
timeline of administration statements on the Libya attack, Wash. Post
(Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/
post/from-video-to-terrorist-attack-a-definitive-timeline-of-
administration-
statements-on-the-libya-attack/2012/09/26/86105782-0826-11e2-afff-
d6c7f20a83bf_blog.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE DAY AFTER THE ATTACKS
The day after the attacks was a day of mourning for the
families of the four Americans who lost their lives--Ambassador
J. Christopher Stevens, Sean P. Smith, Tyrone S. Woods, and
Glen A. Doherty. It was also a time of mourning and reflection
for America. However, the day after the attacks also saw a
marked difference in information shared by the administration
with the American people compared with information shared by
the administration privately.
Public Statements Conflated the Video and the Attacks
The following day brought additional press inquiries and
additional statements. After the Secretary's statement on the
evening of September 11, two more Americans, Tyrone Woods and
Glen Doherty, died in Benghazi as a result of the mortar
attacks on the Annex.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\Scott Neuman, U.S. Ambassador To Libya, Three Other Americans
Killed in Benghazi Attack, NPR (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:45 AM), http://
www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/09/12/160992840/u-s-ambassador-to-
libya-three-other-americans-killed-in-benghazi-attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration needed to act quickly to ensure each
agency was on the same page about how to message the attacks.
At 8:14 a.m. the morning after the attacks, Bernadette Meehan,
Deputy Spokesperson, National Security Council, sent an email
to nearly two dozen people from the White House, Defense
Department, State Department, and intelligence community
stating:
Both the President and Secretary Clinton released
statements this morning. Both are pasted below. Please
refer to those for any comments for the time being. To
ensure we are all in sync on messaging for the rest of
the day, Ben Rhodes will host a conference call for USG
communicators on this chain at 9:15 ET today. . . .\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\Email from Bernadette M. Meehan, Deputy Spokesperson, Nat'l
Sec. Council, to Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor for
Strategic Commc'cs, Nat'l Sec. Council, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012, 8:14
AM) (emphasis original) (on file with the Committee, SCB000897).
Rhodes responded, stating simply ``If possible, let's do
this at 9 to get a little ahead of potential statements by
S[ecretary Clinton] and POTUS [the President] later this
morning.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\Email from Mr. Rhodes to Ms. Meehan, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012,
8:31 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB000897).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The message emanating from the White House the morning
after the attacks--similar to the message delivered by the U.S.
government the night before through the Secretary's statement--
was that the video and the attack on U.S. facilities in
Benghazi would be mentioned in the same breath.\87\ This
therefore served the purpose of continuing to connect the two
issues. As a result, this created confusion among the American
public and the press as to whether or not these two events were
directly related.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press
Secretary, Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi (Sept.
12, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/
statement-president-attack-benghazi (``While the United States rejects
efforts to denigrate the religious beliefs of others, we must all
unequivocally oppose the kind of senseless violence that took the lives
of these public servants.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the President's statement announcing the deaths of four
Americans, he referred to ``efforts to denigrate the religious
beliefs of others''--i.e. the video--and the ``senseless
violence that took the lives of these public servants''--i.e.
the Benghazi attacks--in the same sentence.\88\ The statement,
titled ``Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi''
read:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Remarks by the President on the Deaths of U.S. Embassy Staff in Libya
(Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/
12/remarks-president-deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya.
I strongly condemn the outrageous attack on our
diplomatic facility in Benghazi, which took the lives
of four Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens.
Right now, the American people have the families of
those we lost in our thoughts and prayers. They
exemplified America's commitment to freedom, justice,
and partnership with nations and people around the
globe, and stand in stark contrast to those who
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
callously took their lives.
I have directed my Administration to provide all
necessary resources to support the security of our
personnel in Libya, and to increase security at our
diplomatic posts around the globe. While the United
States rejects efforts to denigrate the religious
beliefs of others, we must all unequivocally oppose the
kind of senseless violence that took the lives of these
public servants.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\Id.
Later that morning the President addressed the Nation in a
televised address from the Rose Garden about the attacks. The
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President said in part:
Yesterday, four of these extraordinary Americans were
killed in an attack on our diplomatic post in Benghazi.
Among those killed was our Ambassador, Chris Stevens,
as well as Foreign Service Officer Sean Smith. We are
still notifying the families of the others who were
killed. And today, the American people stand united in
holding the families of the four Americans in our
thoughts and in our prayers.
The United States condemns in the strongest terms this
outrageous and shocking attack. We're working with the
government of Libya to secure our diplomats. I've also
directed my administration to increase our security at
diplomatic posts around the world. And make no mistake,
we will work with the Libyan government to bring to
justice the killers who attacked our people.
Since our founding, the United States has been a nation
that respects all faiths. We reject all efforts to
denigrate the religious beliefs of others. But there is
absolutely no justification to this type of senseless
violence. None. The world must stand together to
unequivocally reject these brutal acts.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi (Sept. 12, 2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/statement-
president-attack-benghazi.
In the speech about the attacks, drafted by Rhodes and
similar to the President's statement about the attacks earlier
in the morning, the President refers to ``efforts to denigrate
the religious beliefs of others''\91\--i.e. the video. These
comments, in a public address, gave a strong and continually
reinforced impression to the public: the video was somehow
linked to the attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Secretary also made remarks about the attacks on the
morning of September 12, 2012. She said in part:
We are working to determine the precise motivations and
methods of those who carried out this assault. Some
have sought to justify this vicious behavior, along
with the protest that took place at our Embassy in
Cairo yesterday, as a response to inflammatory material
posted on the internet. America's commitment to
religious tolerance goes back to the very beginning of
our nation. But let me be clear--there is no
justification for this, none. Violence like this is no
way to honor religion or faith. And as long as there
are those who would take innocent life in the name of
God, the world will never know a true and lasting
peace.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\Secretary Clinton Delivers Remarks on the Deaths of U.S.
Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, DIPNOTE (Sept. 12, 2012), https://
blogs.state.gov/stories/2012/09/12/secretary-clinton-delivers-
remarks-deaths-us-personnel-benghazi-libya.
Rooney, who helped draft the speech, told the Committee it
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
was geared towards the American people:
We knew basically a few things that we wanted to
accomplish. If indeed some people had died, we knew
that we wanted to give her some material that she could
say about them, so she could say gracious things about
them, which we knew she would have wanted to do. We
knew that we would want to give her some sort of a--
something that she could say that would summarize what
had happened, anticipating that, you know, if Americans
were waking up and turning on their TV in the morning
and their Secretary of State was standing there, that
they would--one of the questions on their mind would be
what, what happened. We wanted to be able to give her
some language that would at least begin to answer
that.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\Rooney Testimony at 35-36.
The fact the speech served in part to answer a question on
the minds of many Americans--``what happened''--is interesting
because Rooney never talked with anybody in the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs (NEA) while she was drafting the speech. The
individuals in NEA had been on the phone all night with State
Department personnel in Benghazi receiving real-time updates
about what was transpiring.\94\ Rooney testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\Jones Testimony at 79-80.
Q: Did you speak to anybody in the NEA bureau about
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
what had happened in the attacks?
A: I don't recall speaking to anyone in the NEA bureau.
Q: Is that something you would have done? I mean, you
talked earlier about the process. If you're writing a
speech about China, you go to----
A: Right.
Q: --the China experts and ask them. I mean, did that
happen that night with regard to Libya?
A: No, I don't think so. I don't recall any
conversation with anyone from--no.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\Rooney Testimony at 39.
Instead, the only actual description in the statement of
what had occurred in Benghazi was a late addition to the speech
from Sullivan. Schwerin, who also worked on the speech,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explained:
A: He said, you know, we have to keep making edits. He
didn't tell me the substance of the conversations he
had had, just that there were more edits to make.
Q: Okay. What kind of edits?
A: I can't, you know, all these years later, tell you
which sentences we changed, but the only thing that I
remember is, I think the formulation ``heavily-armed
militants'' we added that morning in his office. But I
could not beyond that give you chapter and verse about
what we changed.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\Schwerin Testimony at 36.
The public statements by the President and Secretary of
State did not call the events in Benghazi a terrorist attack.
The President also conducted an interview with Steve Kroft
of 60 Minutes that same morning. Kroft began the interview by
asking the President about the attack and the President's
reluctance to call the attack a terrorist attack in his earlier
Rose Garden remarks. Again, the President did not call what had
transpired in Benghazi a terrorist attack:
Q: Mr. President, this morning you went out of your way
to avoid the use of the word ``terrorism'' in
connection with the Libya attack.
A: Right.
Q: Do you believe that this was a terrorist attack?
A: Well, it's too early to know exactly how this came
about, what group was involved, but obviously it was an
attack on Americans. And we are going to be working
with the Libyan government to make sure that we bring
these folks to justice, one way or the other.
Q: This has been described as a mob action, but there
are reports that they were very heavily armed with
grenades. That doesn't sound like your normal
demonstration.
A: As I said, we're still investigating exactly what
happened. I don't want to jump the gun on this. But
you're right that this is not a situation that was
exactly the same as what happened in Egypt, and my
suspicion is, is that there are folks involved in this
who were looking to target Americans from the
start.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\See Email from Bernadette M. Meehan, Spokesperson, Nat'l Sec.
Council, to Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, Dep't of State, & Patrick
H. Ventrell, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 13, 2012, 9:17
AM) (on file with the Committee, C05527907) (Attaching transcript of
the Interview of the President by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes).
Later in the interview, the President raised the issue of
the video while referring to the Benghazi attacks, implying the
film was an ``excuse for violence against Americans'' and
conflating the two issues.\98\ The President said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\Id.
And I do have to say that, more broadly, we believe in
the First Amendment. It is one of the hallmarks of our
Constitution that I'm sworn to uphold. And so we are
always going to uphold the rights for individuals to
speak their mind. On the other hand, this film is not
representative of who we are and our values, and I
think it's important for us to communicate that. That's
never an excuse for violence against Americans[.]\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\Id.
Private Statements Tell a Different Story
While administration officials may have been in sync with
their public messaging regarding the Benghazi attacks on
September 12, the messages shared privately told a completely
different story.
Minutes before the President delivered his speech in the
Rose Garden, Sullivan wrote in an email to Rhodes and others:
There was not really much violence in Egypt. And we are
not saying that the violence in Libya erupted ``over
inflammatory videos.''\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Senior Dir. for Commc'cs
and Public Diplomacy, Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Dep't of State, et
al. (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:30 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05578214).
Sullivan's private acknowledgement differs notably from the
consistent public remarks connecting the video and the attacks
in both the President's and the Secretary's statements that
day.
On September 12, 2012, the President made separate phone
calls to Libya President Mohamad Magariaf and Egyptian
President Mohamed Morsi. In his phone call with the Egyptian
President, the President ``said that he rejects efforts to
denigrate Islam, but underscored there is never any
justification for violence against innocents and acts that
endanger American personnel and facilities.''\101\ This is a
reference to the video, which was the cause of the protest
against the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Readout of the President's Call with Egyptian President Morsi (Sept.
13, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/13/
readout-president-s-call-egyptian-president-morsi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his phone call with the Libyan President, the President
said the two countries ``must work together to do whatever is
necessary to identify the perpetrators of this attack and bring
them to justice.''\102\ Notably, however, President Obama did
not make a reference to the video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Readout of the President's Call with Libyan President Magariaf (Sept.
13, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/13/
readout-president-s-call-libyan-president-magariaf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Secretary also had a phone call with an Egyptian
leader, Prime Minister Hisham Kandil, on the afternoon of
September 12. According to the call notes, the Secretary told
the Prime Minister the following:
We know that the attack in Libya had nothing to do with
the film. It was a planned attack--not a protest. . . .
Your [sic] not kidding. Based on the information we saw
today we believe the group that claimed responsibility
for this was affiliated with al-Qaeda.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to S_CallNotes (Sept. 12, 2012,
7:11 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561911).
Not only did the Secretary tell the Prime Minister ``the
attack in Libya had nothing to do with the film,'' she
strengthened the statement by prefacing it with ``we
know.''\104\ Such a definitive declaration made privately to
another world leader stands in stark contrast to her speech
earlier in the day to the American people where she mentioned
the attack--``this vicious behavior''--in the same breath as
the video--``inflammatory material posted on the
internet.''\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\Id.
\105\Though some may claim that ``vicious behavior'' also occurred
in Cairo, in the Secretary's September 12 speech she specifically
separates the ``vicious behavior'' from what transpired in Cairo by
saying ``this vicious behavior, along with the protest that took place
at our Embassy in Cairo yesterday . . .'' Secretary Clinton Delivers
Remarks on the Deaths of U.S. Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, DIPNOTE
(Sept. 12, 2012), https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2012/09/12/
secretary-clinton-delivers-remarks-deaths-us-personnel-benghazi-libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kennedy was also emphatic in privately conveying that no
protests had occurred prior to the attack. In a separate,
private briefing to congressional staff Kennedy was
specifically asked whether this was ``an attack under the cover
of a protest.''\106\ Kennedy, who oversaw the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security and had ready access to real-time
information from the Diplomatic Security agents on the ground
in Benghazi, replied ``[n]o this was a direct breaching
attack.''\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\Email from Legislative Management Officer for Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to H_Egypt, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:55
PM) (on file with the Committee, C05580110).
\107\Email from Legislative Management Officer, U.S. Dep't of
State, to H_Egypt, et al. (Sept 12, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05562234).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kennedy's assertions also aligned with the intelligence
product, the Executive Update, produced by the CIA analysts
earlier that day and shared with senior administration
officials. That piece stated ``the presence of armed assailants
from the outset suggests this was an intentional assault and
not the escalation of a peaceful protest.''\108\ This piece--
which was part of the President's Daily Brief and likely
discussed with the President's Chief of Staff on September 13,
2012--is discussed at length in Appendix H.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\Middle East and North Africa Situation Report, Sept. 12, 2012,
0700 EDT (on file with CIA, REQUEST 17-0345 to REQUEST 0346).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether or not a protest occurred prior to the attack was a
significant fact at the time because the absence of a protest
would clearly distinguish what happened in Benghazi from what
transpired in Cairo. If it therefore became clear no protests
occurred in Benghazi over the video, then the administration
would therefore no longer be able to connect the two events in
statements about Benghazi.
Privately, Kennedy did not hesitate to explain no protests
had occurred prior to the attack.\109\ Publicly, however, it
took the administration more than two weeks to do so.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\See Email to H_Egypt, et al. (Sept 12, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file
with the Committee, C05562234) (answering question about whether the
attack was under the cover of a protest, Kennedy responded ``[n]o this
was a direct breaching attack.'').
\110\Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., Statement
by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on the
intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate in
Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-releases/96-press-
releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-
on-
intelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-
benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEPTEMBER 13 INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
On September 11 and September 12, public comments by
administration officials had relied mainly on press reports and
eyewitness accounts. On September 13 the Central Intelligence
Agency [CIA] published its first intelligence assessment
exclusively regarding the Benghazi attacks. This assessment,
known as a WIRe [World Intelligence Review] was the key
intelligence piece produced by CIA analysts immediately
following the Benghazi attacks. It was titled ``Libya:
Government Poorly Positioned To Address Attacks.''\111\ As both
Michael J Morell, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
and the Director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA)--an
office of [redacted text] analysts focused on terrorism
issues--acknowledge, this was the first time the analysts had
coordinated a piece about the Benghazi attacks among the entire
intelligence community.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\Cent. Intel. Agency, Libya: Government Poorly Positioned to
Address Attacks, World Intelligence Review, Sept. 13, 2012 [hereinafter
September 13 WIRe] (on file with CIA, REQUEST 17-0067 to REQUEST 17-
0070).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OTA Director described the purposes of this piece to
the Committee:
This is something that by this point we would have been
writing on a regular basis trying to sort out. . . .
[T]o have done a WIRe would've been really the first
time where we said we're going to stand back, we're
going to really make sure this was fully IC
coordinated. We're going to work through this and say
this is a more formal look. So I don't believe it was
tasked so much as it was time for us to really take a
full look at where we were.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\Testimony of Dir. of the Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent.
Intel. Agency, Tr. at 105 (Nov. 13, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
Additionally, this particular piece was also included as
part of the President's Daily Brief [PDB].
Morell explained:
Q: So the PDB staff would have edited this particular
WIRe?
A: Yes, because it was a PDB.
Q: This particular WIRe was a PDB?
A: Yes.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\Testimony of Michael Morell, Deputy Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency,
Tr. at 39-41 (Sept. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Morell Testimony] (on file
with the Committee).
As a PDB, this piece received wide distribution throughout
the intelligence community. As Morell notes in his book, this
piece ``would be published and shown to senior policy-makers
and to Congress on the morning of September 13.''\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\Michael Morell, The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight
Against Terrorism--From al Qa'ida to ISIS 217 (2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This September 13 piece was the pivotal piece coming from
the intelligence community for several reasons. One, it was the
first time the analysts had taken a step back to assess what
had actually occurred in Benghazi; two, this piece was widely
distributed across the U.S. government;\115\ and three, Morell
viewed this piece as the ``assessment'' of the analysts when he
edited the talking points for the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence two days later.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\Id.
\116\Morell Testimony at 135.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the September 13 piece being heavily vetted, going
through the PDB process, and being widely distributed, the
piece was rife with errors as the analysts themselves would
later acknowledge. There were improper footnotes, poor and
confusing phrasing, and most importantly, headlines that were
not supported by any text. The result was a very poorly written
piece containing inaccurate information that was relied on by
those analyzing, discussing, and messaging the Benghazi
attacks.
The focus of the September 13 piece was twofold: the
ability of the Libyan government to respond to the attacks, and
the fact extremists had participated in the attacks. A timeline
of the attacks and the sequence of events leading up to the
attacks were not discussed in the piece. Whether or not a
protest occurred prior to the attacks was not a focal point of
the piece, nor was it an issue the analysts found to be
particularly germane. As the manager of the analysts who wrote
the piece testified:
A: We weren't particularly concerned, worried about, or
thinking about protests when we wrote this.
Q: That was the next question I was going to ask you.
Yeah.
A: I want to make that very, very clear. Because in CTC
[Counterterrorism Center] when something like this
happens, we look at who do we think did it and are they
about to do it again and is there anything we can do to
stop it.
So we did not think the question of protests was
particularly germane to answering that question. In
fact, it was fully probably a week. And we had several
conversations among ourselves and even with more senior
people in the DI [Directorate of Analysis] about, why
in the hell would everybody care about protests?
We just--we weren't tracking on it because it wasn't
germane to what we were trying to do, which it doesn't
really excuse our sloppy work, particularly in that
paragraph here. I mean the ticks are the ticks. They
are based on reporting. But our assessment was just
imprecisely written. We weren't careful enough about
it.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\Testimony of [redacted text] Team Chief, Ofice of Terrorism
Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 52-53 (Feb. 10, 2016)
[hereinafter [redacted text] Team Chief Testimony] (on file with the
Committee).
The fact the piece was not focused on protests--nor did the
analysts find the issue of protests germane--is ironic given
this piece has received so much attention by Morell and others
as supporting evidence that the analysts did in fact believe a
protest had occurred.\118\ That is because this is the only
intelligence assessment written by the CIA that can support the
analytic line that a protest had occurred prior to the
attacks.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\Morell Testimony at 50.
\119\The CIA notes that a September 15 WIRe ``includes reporting
that `members of an AAS-affiliated group stated that they took
advantage of a planned demonstration . . .''' However, citing a report
is different than crafting an assessment. A report is just that, a
report--citing information from somebody else. An assessment, however,
is the collective thoughts of analysts after synthesizing multiple
pieces of intelligence to reach an analytic conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, it was put in the intelligence piece by accident--
a mistake that was not caught during what was supposed to be a
rigorous and airtight editing process.
In his book, Morell says ``[t]he September 13 piece--the
first piece to go beyond a simple factual update--said four
things. First, that the assault on the [Benghazi Mission
compound] had been a spontaneous event that evolved from a
protest outside the [Benghazi Mission compound].''\120\ Except
Morell is wrong. The piece did not say this at all. In fact,
the exact language of the piece reads: ``We assess the attacks
on Tuesday against the US Consulate in Benghazi began
spontaneously following the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo
and evolved into a direct assault against the Consulate and a
separate US facility in the city.''\121\ In his book, Morell
alters the plain language of this piece, ``began spontaneously
following protests at the US Embassy in Cairo,'' with the
wording in his book, ``a spontaneous event that evolved from a
protest outside the [Benghazi Mission compound].''\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\Morell, supra note 114, at 218.
\121\Id. at 218.
\122\Id. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the first page of the September 13 piece, titled
``Libya: Government Poorly Positioned To Address Attacks,''
there is a single mention of ``the early stages of the
protest'' buried in one of the bullet points.\123\ The Director
of the Office of Terrorism Analysis acknowledged the supporting
evidence for this statement was incorrect. She testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\Cent. Intel. Agency, Libya: Government Poorly Positioned to
Address Attacks, World Intelligence Review, Sept. 13, 2012 [hereinafter
September 13 WIRe] (on file with CIA, REQUEST 17-0067 to REQUEST 17-
0070).
Q: ``I'm sorry. In the early stages of the protest''--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
so a direct reference to a protest----
A: Yes.
Q: ``Benghazi's top Ministry of Interior official
personally ordered the withdrawal of Libyan Security
Forces protecting the consulate saying he believed the
action would avoid violence, according to the press
reporting.''
A: Correct.
Q: And we talked about that earlier.
A: Yes.
Q: Just really quickly, flip back to footnote 16, can
you read the date on footnote 16? What's the date of
that?
A: That is 2012/09/04, so that would obviously be
wrong.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\OTA Dir. Testimony at 128.
The article cited to support the mention of a protest in
this instance was titled ``Libyan Parliament Speaker, Interior
Minister Discuss Country's Security'' and was from Doha Libya
TV in Arabic from September 4, 2012.\125\ In other words, the
analysts used an article from September 4, 2012--a full week
before the lethal attacks--to support the premise that a
protest had occurred just prior to the attack on September 11.
A simple source check by the reader--or during any of the
multiple levels of allegedly ``rigorous'' editing--would have
caught the blatantly obvious error of relying on a news article
from September 4 to support an event that occurred on September
11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet it was not this mention of a protest in the piece that
caught Morell's attention. Rather, it was a headline on the
following page titled ``Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi
Protests.'' This page was a text box, which the OTA Director
described as:
So a text box is material that we believe is related to
the storyline, to the analytic--to the arc of the story
but is something that we kind of separate out, because
sometimes it doesn't flow from the analytic argument
but it's information we think is important to include.
So think of it as an adjunct to the piece.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\OTA Dir. Testimony at 109.
While the title of this text box was ``Extremists
Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,'' nothing in the actual text
box supports that title.\127\ The summary paragraph in the text
box, through which the rest of the text box would flow, read:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123, at 2.
We assess the attacks on Tuesday against the US
Consulate in Benghazi began spontaneously following the
protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a
direct assault against the Consulate and a separate US
facility in the city. Extremists with ties to al-Qa-ida
were involved in the attacks, according to signals
intelligence.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\Id.
There is no mention--or even hint--of any protest in
Benghazi in that paragraph or in any other text in the text
box. Rather, the only mention of a protest relates to what had
transpired in Cairo.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After a discussion of this document during their interviews
with the Committee, both Morell and the OTA Director
acknowledged this fact. Morell testified:
Q: I'm trying to tie it all back to the headline----
A: Yep.
Q: --``Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,''
I'm having a hard time understanding how that headline
is supported by the evidence.
A: Right.
Q: So far, nothing in the actual text of the WIRe
supports that, and so now we're looking at each
footnote, footnote 29--source note 29, we've looked at
the New York Times article, the body of the article
doesn't support that, just the headline, and now we're
looking at source note 30, ``according to [redacted
text].'' You know, where in here does it support that
but for collateral, is my question to you.
A: And so--look, I don't know the answer to your
question, right, why they wrote it the way they
did.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\Morell Testimony at 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OTA Director testified:
Q: Okay. Let's look at the first bullet point. . . .
That's a lengthy sentence.
A: Not good trade craft. We try and make them shorter.
Q: Is there anything in that sentence or that bullet
point that denotes that there was a protest in Benghazi
that you can see?
A: ``After hearing how protesters breached the''--so,
no, not in Benghazi.
Q: Not in Benghazi, okay.
Let's look at the next tick. . . .
Is there anything in that tick that mentions a protest
in Benghazi?
A: No.
Q: All right. Let's look at the third tick. . . . Is
there anything in that tick that mentions a protest in
Benghazi?
A: No.
Q: And then I'm just going to read the last paragraph
here. . . .
Is there anything in that paragraph that mentions the
protest in Benghazi?
A: No.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\OTA Dir. Testimony at 110-12.
The OTA Director also told the Committee the text box in
the September 13 intelligence piece was not supposed to be
about whether or not protests had occurred in Benghazi prior to
the attack.\132\ Instead, it was supposed to focus on the
involvement of extremists in the attacks. That was the point
the analysts were trying to drive--extremists, not protests.
This was true of the headline of the text box, too. The key
word in that headline, according to the OTA Director, was
``extremists,'' not ``protests.'' She testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\Id. at 112-13.
Q: So the headline for this text box, ``Extremists
Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,'' do you see any
supporting evidence in the five paragraphs I've just
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
read that support that headline?
A: So the headline--and I admit that in retrospect, if
I could go back and change this headline, I would.
Because the headline, it was more meant to be about
the, we know extremists were involved and less about
whether or not there were protests.
So if you look at this idea that the first, the topic
sentence that talks--so, sorry, the second sentence,
where the bullets are then following immediately after,
about extremists with the ties to Al Qaeda were
involved. We then go on in the first bullet to talk
about we know that there was, you know [redacted text].
That bullet was to not only talk about AQIM but to also
talk a little bit about motivation.
The second bullet that talks about, you know, again,
extremists, as we were calling at that point, Ansar al-
Sharia in Benghazi claimed responsibility, and also
talked about the timing that this was spontaneous,
[redacted text]. So, again, this idea of preplanning,
timing, and those involved.
And the third bullet was, I think, meant to illustrate
that this was a series that the extremists were
involved at various points that was an opportunistic
attack sequence, as we talk about. They took advantage
of opportunities to attack U.S. facilities at various
points throughout the night.
So are those things directly supporting in the way we
would like the title of this? No. Was it meant--and as
I said, so if I could take back that title, I would.
Q: Sure. ``Extremists'' is the key word in the title?
A: Yes, not the protests.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\Id. at 112-13.
She later called the title of the text box the
``unfortunate title,''\134\ and, as the head of the Office of
Terrorism Analysis, ultimately took responsibility for it.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\Id. at 135.
\135\Id. at 112-113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While there may have been no text in the text box to
support the title, as it turns out, the title was intended to
be something different. According to the manager of the
analysts who wrote the piece, the title of the text box was
supposed to be ``Extremists Capitalized on Cairo
Protests.''\136\ That small but vital difference--from Cairo to
Benghazi--had major implications in how people in the
administration were able to message the attacks, and was used
as support in the days and weeks after this piece was published
for the claim that protests had occurred prior to the Benghazi
attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 49, 136.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even worse, this mistake was not caught until more than a
week later, when the analysts were updating their assessment.
The manager of the analysts who wrote the piece testified:
Q: The title here: ``Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi
Protests.'' So we talked to [the OTA Director] about
this. She called it an unfortunate title?
A: It was a--we made a mistake.
Q: Okay. So when you say ``we made a mistake,'' I mean,
where--how would that have been----
A: So, God, how do I begin?
* * *
A: . . . So ``Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi
Protests.'' Benghazi was supposed to be Cairo. So----
Q: Okay.
A: But let me explain that. So--and, frankly, it's a
mistake that we didn't even notice until we published
the WIRe on the 24th, where I was talking to a senior
person as he was reviewing it, and he was looking back
and asking, I thought: Oh, my God, we were talking
about Cairo.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\Id. at 48-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
She also testified:
Q: So I guess this is why I'm a little confused is you
say in the title Benghazi should have been Cairo?
A: The title probably should have read something like
extremists motivated to attack in Benghazi because of
protests in Cairo.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\Id. at 54.
In the end, Morell conceded the obvious--this piece could
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
have been written better. He testified:
Right. And if you want to get a bottom line from me,
from me, I don't think this was as well done as it
could have been for a lot of reasons. I have reasons
beyond yours as to why I don't think this is as well
done as it could be, and you're pointing out some
additional ones. So I don't think it is as well done as
it could have been.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\Morell Testimony at 56.
In addition to this piece being poorly written--
conveniently, in a way relied on by senior administration
officials with respect to a key point--it also contained
sourcing inaccuracies. One of these was described above. The
lack of attention paid to sourcing has implications on future
pieces shared with the President and other senior executive
branch officials.\140\ From papers in high school, theses in
college, law review articles to scientific research, assertions
made are expected to be properly documented with sources to
support them. Yet when it comes to CIA analysts and pieces they
write for the President, for some reason these footnotes do not
receive the scrutiny they deserve. Morell explains:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\Id.
A: So context number two, right, is that analysts don't
spend a lot of time making sure that these footnotes
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
match. Okay. They just don't. They just don't.
Q: Is that a problem?
A: It certainly is when you have a situation like this.
Q: I'm a lawyer. I mean, if you're writing a Law Review
article, those things are going to be footnoted to
death.
A: Is it a problem? Yes. Is it a problem? Yes. So those
are the few pieces of context, right, is they believed
is what they believed, right? They had a set of--they
believed they had a set of information, a set of data
points that took them there. Third, I think you've got
to be a little bit careful going through this sentence
by sentence and source by source, because analysts
aren't as careful as they need to be.
Q: Why aren't they as careful as they need to be? If
you're producing a piece for the [President], shouldn't
every sentence have a valid source note?
A: Yes, absolutely. You're absolutely right. I couldn't
agree with you more.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\Id. at 52-53.
The OTA Director also acknowledged there is not enough
emphasis on making sure the footnotes, known inside the CIA as
source attributions, are accurate--especially for pieces that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
become PDBs. She testified:
A: The editing process would have differed for a PDB in
that it would have also gone through an additional
layer of review or several additional layers of review.
So a WIRe ceases, the review ceases pretty much after
the office director, as I said, except for some
technical edits.
A PDB, our process is more--there are additional levels
that include a review within the organization we call
PASS. There's also then the DA [Directorate of
Analysis] front office would have reviewed a PDB, and
then it would also have gone to ODNI [Office of the
Director of National Intelligence].
* * *
Q: Okay. So there are more senior analysts that would
review a PDB?
A: Yes.
Q: Does it undergo a certain extra level of rigor for
attributing sources and making sure everything lines up
properly?
A: Attributing sources, not necessarily.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\OTA Dir. Testimony at 106-08.
Despite these myriad errors--the inaccurate title, the
faulty sourcing, the lack of evidence in the text to support a
headline--Morell and others have used this piece, and the title
of the text box specifically, as the ``assessment'' of the
analysts to buttress their statements that protests in Benghazi
had occurred prior to the attacks.\143\ In fact, the title
``Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests'' alone does
count as an ``assessment'' by the analysts. As the manager of
the analysts testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\See e.g. Morell Testimony at 50.
A: And our assessment--again, it's embarrassing, it's
poorly done--was that they had--really the title as it
stood was what our assessment was, but we didn't
explain it well--that they capitalized on these
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
protests in Benghazi.
Q: Okay. So your title is what the assessment was, but
that's not supported--and this is my analysis--not
supported, Benghazi protests, by anything underneath--
--
A: That's true.
Q: --in the ticks. Okay. So is that actually an
assessment, extremists capitalized on Benghazi
protests, or is the assessment sort of the body under
here, the paragraph, the three ticks, and then the
final paragraph?
A: Well, it's all assessment. It's just sloppily done.
Q: Okay. So extremists capitalized on Benghazi
protests, even though there's no supporting evidence
for that statement in this box----
A: Yeah. Like I said, we weren't thinking about the
protests or we would have been, frankly, far more
careful about how we couched them.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 55.
In other words, the title of the text box itself was an
assessment by the analysts. That title was inaccurate. That
title was an accident and was supposed to be something else
entirely, but nobody caught it. The analysts were not even
focused on the issue of protests. Yet it was that title the
administration could point to--and ultimately relied upon--to
say the analysts had assessed that protests had occurred prior
to the Benghazi attacks. That title is the only analytic piece
fully vetted by the intelligence community prior to Morell's
editing of the talking points and the appearance on the Sunday
talk shows by Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations, where she said protests had occurred in
Benghazi.
Nevertheless, despite the incorrect title and numerous
other faults with the September 13 piece, there is still no
assessment by the analysts that tied what transpired in
Benghazi to the internet video. Even among the legion of
mistakes made, the piece did not authoritatively connect
Benghazi with protests or an internet video.
THE CONFLATION CONTINUES
While the inaccurate and poorly written CIA analysis on
September 13 gave an opening for administration officials to
claim protests had occurred prior to the Benghazi attack, the
public connection and conflation by administration officials
between Benghazi and the video continued. This occurred despite
any assessment by the CIA analysts of the video playing a role
in the Benghazi attacks.
During her remarks at the opening plenary of the U.S.-
Morocco strategic dialogue on September 13, 2012, the Secretary
of State said there is ``no justification, none at all, for
responding to this video with violence. We condemn the violence
that has resulted in the strongest terms.''\145\ These comments
were similar to prior public comments she had made regarding
the video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State,
Remarks at the Opening Plenary of the U.S.-Morocco Strategic Dialogue
(Sept.13, 2012), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/
2012/09/197711.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A draft of the Secretary's comments, however, shows an
attempt to draw a stronger link between Benghazi and the
video--something unsupportable by the intelligence at the time,
and not part of the CIA's assessment--than she stated publicly.
A draft of the Secretary's speech states: ``But as I said
yesterday, there is no justification--none--for responding to
an Internet video with murder. We condemn the violence that has
resulted in the strongest terms.''\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Daniel B. Schwerin,
Speechwriter, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 13, 2012, 9:22 AM) (on
file with the Committee, SCB00100122).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This subtle change from the draft to her speech--from
``murder'' to ``violence''--is important. While some violence
had occurred at other United States diplomatic facilities
across the Arab World such as Cairo, murder had only occurred
at one: Benghazi.\147\ By changing that one word, from
``murder'' to ``violence,'' the Secretary did not draw an
irrebuttable, direct link between the video and Benghazi--a
link she had told the Egyptian Prime Minister she knew did not
exist\148\--but instead continued to indirectly connect and
conflate the two events to the American public, thus allowing
her to claim she did not make a direct public connection
between the video and the Benghazi attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\Benghazi was the only U.S. facility during this time period
where terrorists killed an American government official.
\148\See Email from U.S. Dep't of State to S_CallNotes (Sept. 12,
2012, 7:11 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561911) (attaching notes
from phone call with Egyptian Prime Minister).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That same day, Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Secretary of State
for Management and Resources, had a meeting with the new
Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. According to a summary of that
meeting, ``Nides said he understood the difference between the
targeted attack in Libya and the way the protest escalated in
Egypt.''\149\ While this message was shared privately by the
Deputy Secretary of State to the Egyptian Ambassador two days
after the attacks, it was not until two weeks later that the
administration finally shared this message publicly with the
American people.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\Email from Operations Center, U.S. Dep't of State to Prem G.
Kumar, Dir. for Israeli and Palestinian Affairs, White House (Sept. 13,
2012, 12:29 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562242).
\150\Press Release, Office of the Dir. of National Intel.,
Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on
the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate
in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-releases/96-press-
releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-
on-
intelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-
benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At a press briefing later in the day on September 13,
Nuland openly talked about the video while discussing the
Benghazi attacks.\151\ At the briefing, she was asked whether
any of the information she provided during the background
briefing the day before had changed; said she did not have
anything significantly different than what she had said
privately on background.\152\ Yet when asked about the Benghazi
attack, she answered the question, then pivoted to talking
about the video:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, Bureau
of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 13, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/09/197729.htm.
\152\Id.
Q: Toria, can you tell us whether there's been any
progress towards determining whether the Benghazi
attack was purely spontaneous or was premeditated by
militants, and also whether there's been any further
determination about the extent to which the Cairo,
Benghazi, and now Yemen attacks were related in some
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
way other than just theme?
A: Well, as we said yesterday when we were on
background, we are very cautious about drawing any
conclusions with regard to who the perpetrators were,
what their motivations were, whether it was
premeditated, whether they had any external contacts,
whether there was any link, until we have a chance to
investigate along with the Libyans. So I know that's
going to be frustrating for you, but we really want to
make sure that we do this right and we don't jump to
conclusions.
That said, obviously, there are plenty of people around
the region citing this disgusting video as something
that has been motivating. As the Secretary said this
morning, while we as Americans, of course, respect free
speech, respect free expression, there is never an
excuse for it to become violent.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\Id.
While the question addresses Cairo, Benghazi, and Yemen,
Nuland does not differentiate among the three events and
instead notes ``there are plenty of people around the region
citing this disgusting video as something that has been
motivating.''\154\ Nuland's failure to separate what transpired
in Benghazi from what transpired in Cairo on the same day and
Yemen one day later resulted in an administration official
connecting again, publicly, Benghazi with the other two
events--and thus Benghazi with the video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two days after the attacks ended, September 14, Jay Carney,
Press Secretary, White House, held a press briefing at the
White House. Reporters pressed on whether the administration
believed the events in Benghazi were a reaction to the video:
A: Jake, let's be clear, these protests were in
reaction to a video that had spread to the region----
Q: At Benghazi? What happened at Benghazi----
A: We certainly don't know. We don't know otherwise. We
have no information to suggest that it was a preplanned
attack. The unrest we've seen around the region has
been in reaction to a video that Muslims, many Muslims
find offensive. And while the violence is reprehensible
and unjustified, it is not a reaction to the 9/11
anniversary that we know of, or to U.S. policy.
Q: But the group around the Benghazi post was well
armed. It was a well-coordinated attack. Do you think
it was a spontaneous protest against a movie?
A: Look, this is obviously under investigation, and I
don't have----
Q: But your operating assumption is that that was in
response to the video, in Benghazi? I just want to
clear that up. That's the framework? That's the
operating assumption?
A: Look, it's not an assumption----
Q: Because there are administration officials who
don't--who dispute that, who say that it looks like
this was something other than a protest.
A: I think there has been news reports on this, Jake,
even in the press, which some of it has been
speculative. What I'm telling you is this is under
investigation. The unrest around the region has been in
response to this video. We do not, at this moment, have
information to suggest or to tell you that would
indicate that any of this unrest was preplanned.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, Office of the
Press Secretary, The White House (Sept. 14, 2012), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/14/press-briefing-press-
secretary-jay-carney-9142012.
In his response to a question about what happened at
Benghazi, Carney switches gears to talking about the general
unrest in the region as a whole--which was a result of the
video. Carney does not distinguish the events in Benghazi from
the events around the rest of the region thus connecting and
conflating the two issues and again giving the impression that
what happened in Benghazi happened as a result of the video.
Carney is also asked twice whether or not a protest had
occurred in Benghazi. Similar to his comments about the video,
Carney talks about unrest in the region as a whole, conflating
protests and Benghazi, and failing to distinguish Benghazi from
what had transpired elsewhere in the region.
Despite these public comments by senior administration
officials, those on the ground in Libya knew otherwise. That
same morning a public information officer from the Embassy in
Tripoli sent an email to colleagues in Tripoli and at the State
Department headquarters in Washington D.C. regarding
``messaging on the attacks in Libya.''\156\ The email said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\Email from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, to
Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept 14, 2012, 6:43 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05396788).
Colleagues, I . . . want to share with all of you, our
view at Embassy Tripoli that we must be cautious in our
local messaging with regard to the inflammatory film
trailer, adapting it to Libyan conditions. Our
monitoring of the Libyan media and conversations with
Libyans suggests that the film is not as explosive of
an issue here as it appears to be in other countries in
the region. The overwhelming majority of the FB
[Facebook] comments and tweets we're [sic] received
from Libyans since the Ambassador's death have
expressed deep sympathy, sorrow, and regret. They have
expressed anger at the attackers, and emphasized that
this attack does not represent Libyans or Islam.
Relatively few have even mentioned the inflammatory
video. So if we post messaging about the video
specifically, we may draw unwanted attention to it. And
it is becoming increasingly clear that the series of
events in Benghazi was much more terrorist attack than
a protest which escalated into violence. It is our
opinion that in our messaging, we want to distinguish,
not conflate, the events in other countries with this
well-planned attack by militant extremists. I have
discussed this with Charge Hicks and shares PAS's
view.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\Id.
The purpose of this email was to discuss messaging to the
Libyan people--similar to the part of the Secretary's September
11 statement where her aides noted she wanted to speak to the
region to ``lower the temperature.''\158\ What is significant
about this email, however, is that in discussing messaging to
the Libyans, the video is not emphasized at all--in fact the
messaging on the ground in Libya sought to distinguish what
happened from other countries.\159\ This again contrasts with
the statements of senior administration officials, speaking to
the American people, who consistently connect the video and
Benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\Schwerin Testimony at 17.
\159\Email from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, to
Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept 14, 2012, 6:43 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05396788).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE TALKING POINTS
The talking points provided by the CIA to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence [HPSCI] on September
15, 2012 were flawed. The individual who made the most
substantial changes to those talking points was Michael
Morell.\160\ While much has been written about these talking
points and the flawed process undertaken to create them, this
section focuses on what specific information Morell had at his
disposal when he made the changes to the talking points, how
this information affected his editing of the talking points,
and subsequent portrayal of the talking points by others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\White House e-mails on 2012 attacks in Benghazi, Libya,
Washington Post, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/white-
house-e-mails-on-2012-attacks-in-benghazi-libya/157.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information from Tripoli
While the September 13 WIRe represented an ``assessment''
that CIA analysts believed a protest had occurred prior to the
Benghazi attack, CIA case officers and security personnel in
Libya knew that was not the case. For the first two days after
the attacks, the Chief of Station in Tripoli had been
debriefing eyewitnesses to find out what happened and worked
with his CIA counterparts--who had been in Benghazi--to contact
their sources and collect as much information as possible about
the attacks.\161\ The Chief of Station knew no protests or
demonstrations occurred prior to the attack. None of the
eyewitnesses he spoke with mentioned anything about
protests.\162\ The Chief of Station testified he first learned
that Washington D.C. created a narrative that protests had
occurred around September 13 or 14:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\Testimony of Tripoli Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Agency,
Tr. at 129-31, 189 (July, 16, 2015) [hereinafter Chief of Station
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\162\Id. at 122-123.
Q: I guess the first question would be, when did you
first become aware that there was a belief back in
Washington that the Benghazi attack was carried out
without a significant degree of preplanning, and that
the attack had somehow evolved from a demonstration at
the consulate, or perhaps used a demonstration as
cover? About three things there, but when did you first
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
become aware of those misconceptions?
A: I want to say it was when--probably the 13th or 14th
we were asked to coordinate on that first intelligence
report that came out.
Q: Sure.
A: We provided our edits or our contributions to that.
They weren't incorporated or included.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\Id. at 178.
This was just the first time--in what would become a
pattern--of analysts and others at CIA headquarters relying on
accounts from the press and other sources over that of
America's highest ranking intelligence officer in Libya.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\The CIA told the Committee this part of the report ``suggests
the intelligence community had no information on which to base our
initial assessment that a protest preceded the attacks on the State
compound. To the contrary, a significant body of information available
immediately following the attacks indicated that there was a protest.''
This ``significant body of information,'' however, was almost
exclusively press reporting, and with one exception, this information
was not cited in either the September 13 or September 15 WIRe pieces.
On September 16, 2012, at the direction of Michael Morell, the CIA
analysts finally tackled the issue of protests head-on. They wrote:
``We have contradictory reporting about whether nonviolent
demonstrations occurred prior to the attack on the US Consulate. The
Station's assessment that there were no peaceful protests on the day of
the attack is in contrast to other reports that peaceful protests
preceded the violent assault.'' As supporting evidence for this
paragraph the analysts used only public news articles from the
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and National Public Radio--all of
which were at least three days old--in addition to articles by Al
Jazirah and the Guardian of London. They did not cite any intelligence
reports, instead relying on the Internet.
The earliest evidence the Committee has seen where the
Chief of Station told CIA headquarters a protest did not occur
in Benghazi came early in the morning on Friday September 14,
2012.\165\ A Worldwide Unrest Update sent to Morell's
assistants and chief of staff said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\Email from [EA to DDCIA] to DIR-EAs, (Sept. 14, 2012, 8:27 AM)
(on file with the CIA, REQUEST 1-001673 to 1-001674).
Tripoli: COS [Chief of Station] passed the following
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
update being formulated by NE [Near East] now.
1. LFighters were trained, not an undisciplined
militia. State compound was an assult/probe [sic] vice
flash mob. This is based on the observations of CIA
officers who were in the fight assessing the fighting
method of the attackers.
2. LMultiple militias and fluid political dynamics in
Benghazi. Central government not able to project
influence/power.
3. LMortar attack was precise on base location. Per
JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] operation on
the gorund [sic] one short, one long, two direct hits.
Their assessment this was a well-trained group--not
militia rabble. JSOC officer is training the Libyan
Special Forces and noted that they are not as capable
of precision mortar fire as was witness [sic] on 12
September.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\Id.
Morell explained the purpose of these Worldwide Unrest
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Updates:
When the unrest began across the Muslim world as a
result of the video, there was unrest, there were
protests, the administration was deeply concerned about
the prospect--possibility prospect of violence against
U.S. facilities and U.S. persons. We were having daily
deputies meetings to discuss the safety of Americans
and the safety of U.S. facilities overseas, two a day
deputies meetings, one in the morning and one at night.
One of the things the director and I did--and I don't
know which one of us in particular did--one of us asked
[redacted text] where there was unrest as a result of
the video to do a daily update, right? This is the
daily update from Tripoli for that day in response to
that request.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\Morell Testimony at 111.
In other words, the daily updates were done for Morell,
sent to his Executive Assistants, and written for his
consumption. Despite this, Morell assumed the analysts received
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
these updates as well. He testified:
Q: Did this actually go to the analysts?
A: I assume so. I assume so.
Q: Okay. Why would you assume it went to the analyst if
it was created for you?
A: Because I believe all the updates--the updates were
shared. I mean, that's something we can check, okay,
something we can check.
Q: So you believe that this worldwide unrest update was
shared with you?
A: Absolutely. And something you can ask [the OTA
Director].\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\Id. at 114-15.
The Committee asked the OTA Director, if she received this
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
document. She was not aware they did. She testified:
At the time, I was not aware. I have since become
aware. I believe this was part of the daily email that
was being done at the behest of DD/CIA.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\OTA Dir. Testimony at 130.
The manager of the analysts who conducted the analysis also
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
does not remember seeing this email. She testified:
Q: Is this something that would have made it to your
desk or your analysts' desks?
A: Not this email. . . .
Q: Okay. Under Tripoli it says ``COS [Chief of Station]
passed the following update being formulated by NE
now.'' And then there are seven, I guess, individual
updates. Those seven updates in this format, is that
something that would have been passed to your team?
A: No, I've never seen this.
Q: Okay. I'm just trying to understand----
A: Well, let me say, I don't remember seeing it. And I
don't know that my team would have passed it. I do know
[Chief of Station] was unhappy with our call on
protests because----\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 61-62.
When asked about this specific Worldwide Unrest Update from
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Chief of Station, Morell responded:
A: So, look, the point is--the point is--the point is
there is a flood of information coming in, right, and
it's not my job as the deputy director of CIA to assess
all this stuff. Right?
Q: Right.
A: It's the job of the analyst. So I'm looking at it
from the perspective of, geez, is there anything here
that's going to lead me to raise questions with the
analyst?
Q: Okay. And was there anything in this particular
email, the worldwide unrest update that caused you to
raise questions with the analyst?
A: So this is not the--this is not from the 14th. So,
no.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\171\Morell Testimony at 117-18.
As noted earlier, the email was sent at 8:27 a.m. on
September 14, 2012. It is unclear why Morell did not
acknowledge this fact.
That afternoon, the Chief of Station also wrote an email
directly to one of the analysts in the Office of Terrorism
Analysis.\172\ That email, in response to a request to
coordinate on talking points for a phone call for David
Petraeus, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on the Libya
attack, said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\Email from Tripoli Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Agency, to
[Office of Terrorism Analysis Analyst] (Sept. 14, 2012, 4:05 PM) (on
file with the CIA, REQUEST 15-0005).
We are verifying some of the events that took place in
fornt [sic] of the State department facility with some
of the embassy personnel. The RSO [Regional Security
Officer] noted that he was not aware of a protest in
front of the consulate (the DOS [Department of State]
facility where the Ambo and the ARSO's were staying.
(could it have been the AAmerican [sic] corner?) We
will be talking to the lead [redacted text] who was in
Benghazi to obtain additional background. I also do not
agree with the assessment that the attack was
opportunistic [sic] in origin. The GRS Agents and xx
operators on the scene noted that the fighters were
moving and shooting in a fashion that indicated
training--and set them apart for the militias fighters
typically found in Benghazi. Perhaps most compelling
point was the comment by the [redacted text] who noted
the percise [sic] and timing of mortar fire--one short,
one long two direct hits. He noted that the Libyan
special forces are unable to use mortars so effectively
and that U.S. forces mortar company would be hard
pressed to repeat the same performace [sic] as he
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
witnessed in Benghazi.
I am basing my assessment mostly on the data from the
guys on the ground (not all source) and dealing with
Libyan contacts. Thanks for letting [sic] have an
opportunity to co[o]rd[inate].\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\Id.
The Chief of Station noted he was relying on information
from ``guys on the ground'' and ``Libyan contacts.''\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though this email was written to an analyst, the
analysts sent it up the chain. The manager of the analysts
testified:
Q: Okay. So this email is from chief of station to her.
Do you recall whether or not she forwarded this to you
or disseminated this----
A: Oh yeah. She forwarded it. Everything from the
[Chief of Station] I saw.
Q: So when you received this email, is this something
you would have pushed up the chain?
A: Oh, yeah. Chief of Station, you know, disagreeing
with something is no small thing. I mean, the chiefs of
station are not required for coordination. But we
absolutely, and especially NCTC [National
Counterterrorism Center], take into account what they
have to say.
Q: All right. So you sounded confident that you pushed
this up the chain. I guess my question----
A: I don't remember doing it, but, I mean, I would
have.
Q: Okay. And you would have sent that to?
A: [OTA Director].
Q: [OTA Director]. Okay.
A: And my boss, my----
Q: Okay. And you don't know whether or not [the OTA
Director] would have sent it on further?
A: I'm sure [the OTA Director] would have sent it on
further. But I don't--well, I say that. I can't be sure
what any other person does. But [the OTA Director] has
excellent judgment and a whole ton of bureaucratic
savvy. So----\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 68-69.
The Chief of Station believes the email made its way up to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell. He testified:
Q: Do you know how high up the contents of your email
outlining your inform[ation] made it? Beyond the person
at CT that was coordinating it, do you have any idea?
Did it make it to Mr. Morell, for example?
A: I believe it made it to Mr. Morell.
Q: Okay.
A: Because this is one of the responses. The reason why
I say that----
Q: Yeah.
A: --it went--this was a response. He was aware of our
view that either--so I have all--I don't have any
reason to doubt it didn't make it to him.
Q: Yeah.
A: And his questions to us were consistent that he got
this specific information or something like it.\176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\176\Chief of Station Testimony at 208-09.
Morell, however, testified he does not remember receiving
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
this email. He told the committee:
Q: Okay. You don't believe this is something that you
have ever seen?
A: Not that I remember.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\Morell Testimony at 119.
Drafting the Talking Points
Petraeus testified the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence [HPSCI] did not ask for unclassified talking
points when he met with them on September 14, 2012, but rather
he offered to provide them to the Committee. Petraeus
testified:
A: Yeah. The Ranking Member asked: What can we say
about this publicly? And so I said: Okay, we'll come up
with something for you. And, frankly, the thinking was
we could do something very quickly, give it to him, he
could have it that afternoon, and he could know what he
could and could not say.
Q: So your expectations were this was something that
would be done internally at the CIA and knocked out
quickly and sent over in the afternoon?
A: Yeah, yeah. And, obviously, that would be
inappropriate in the end because it would need to be
sent through the intelligence community, so it had to
be an IC. And then, of course, since it's now going to
be used publicly, then the respective public affairs
offices of various organizations get involved. And then
since it has overall government implications, then you
end up having to get State and FBI. There's security
concerns and a variety of other issues that start to
get factored in. So it became quite an involved process
in the end.
Q: But what was your understanding of how the process
would evolve when the tasking was first issued by
HPSCI?
A: I'm not sure I had a very clear--yeah, staff come up
with some talking points.\178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\Testimony of David Petraeus, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at
50-51 (Mar. 19, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
The OTA Director accompanied Petraeus to the HPSCI meeting,
and upon returning to her office, drafted an initial set of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
talking points. She testified:
So as I said, the coffee was that morning. I
immediately came back. And knowing the sense of urgency
that the Members had, I took that as my, you know, top
task was to get them talking points because they had
all said they were going to be going out and speaking
to the media and to constituents and they wanted to
know what they could say.
So I put together the talking points. And I wanted them
to be reflective of what the Members, of course, had
just heard. Thinking back on this now, I think part of
this is I definitely had in my mind that the Members
had heard a fuller explanation from the director, but
that this was my attempt to try and say of what they
had heard what could they say in an unclassified
setting.
So I drafted these talking points immediately after
that. And then at 11:15, so it was pretty quickly, then
circulated them to make sure that everyone agreed with
both the content and that they were unclassified.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\OTA Dir. Testimony at 194-95.
The first draft of the talking points contained six bullet
points. Nowhere in any of these six bullet points is a mention
of demonstrations or protests in Benghazi. The OTA Director
acknowledged that these six bullet points were factually
accurate--both at the time they were crafted and today.\180\
The first bullet point was pulled almost verbatim from the
September 13 WIRe, published the day before.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\OTA Dir. Testimony at 197.
\181\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123. The September 13 WIRe said
``We assess the attacks on Tuesday against the US Consulate in Benghazi
began spontaneously following the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo
and evolved into a direct assault against the Consulate and a separate
US facility in the city.'' The first bullet point stated ``We believe
based on currently available information that the attacks in Benghazi
were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo
and evolved into a direct assault against the US Consulate and
subsequently its annex.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bullet points were:
LWe believe based on currently available
information that the attacks in Benghazi were spontaneously
inspired by the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved
into a direct assault against the US Consulate and subsequently
its annex. This assessment may change as additional information
is collected and analyzed and currently available information
continues to be evaluated.
LThe crowd almost certainly was a mix of
individuals from across many sectors of Libyan society. That
being said, we do know that Islamic extremists with ties to al-
Qa'ida participated in the attack.
LInitial press reporting linked the attack to
Ansar al-Sharia. The group has since released a statement that
the its [sic] leadership did not order the attacks, but did not
deny that some of its members were involved. Ansar al-Sharia's
facebook page aims to spread sharia in Libya and emphasizes the
need for jihad to counter what it views as false
interpretations of Islam, according to an open source study.
LThe wide availability of weapons and experienced
fighters in Libya almost certainly contributed to the lethality
of the attacks.
LSince April, there have been at least five other
attacks against foreign interests in Benghazi by unidentified
assailants, including the June attack against the British
Ambassador's convoy. We cannot rule out that individuals had
previously surveilled the US facilities, also contributing to
the efficacy of the attacks.
LWe are working with Libyan authorities and
intelligence partners in an effort to help bring to justice
those responsible for the deaths of US citizens.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%
20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last visited May 17, 2016).
The OTA Director sent these six talking points out for
coordination with other offices within the CIA at 11:15
a.m.\183\ A member of the National Clandestine Service--the
operators who work on the ground, as opposed to the analysts
who sit at headquarters--asked: ``Second tick says we know
extremists with ties to AQ participated in the attack, which
implies complicity in the deaths of the American officers. Do
we know this?''\184\ The OTA Director responds and says ``Good
point that it could be interpreted this way--perhaps better
stated that we know they participated in the protests. We do
not know who was responsible for the deaths.''\185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\See Email from [National Clandestine Service Officer] to [Near
East Division, et al.] (Sept. 14, 2012, 2:52 PM) (on file with the CIA,
REQUEST17-0443 to REQUEST 17-0449) (sending talking points to multiple
offices within the CIA).
\184\Email from [National Clandestine Service Officer] to [Near
East Division, et al.] (Sept. 14, 2012, 2:52 PM) (on file with the CIA,
REQUEST 17-0443 to REQUEST 17-0449) (emphasis original).
\185\Email from Dir., Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel.
Agency, to [National Clandestine Service Officer] (Sept. 14, 2012, 3:19
PM) (on file with the CIA, REQUEST 17-0443 to REQUEST 17-0449)
(emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given that no protests had occurred in Benghazi prior to
the attack, this change had the effect of transforming the
second bullet point from being accurate to being inaccurate.
The OTA Director testified:
Q: Sure. So I guess the way I read it is, you're trying
to appease legal, which is always a challenge, by
saying that--you wanted to back off the fact you know
they participated in the attack because you don't want
to interfere and potentially jeopardize the
investigation, showing complicity to the attacks. So
you altered it to we know they participated in protests
at the time you believe they were protests.
A: Correct.
Q: But you didn't know for a fact that they [Islamic
extremists with ties to al-Qa'ida] participated in the
protests. You just knew that they were there.
A: Right.
Q: So the change went from being accurate to being
inaccurate?
A: Correct.
Q: Okay and is that something you did solely on your
own?
A: Yes.\186\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\186\OTA Dir. Testimony at 205-06.
In a subsequent email, the word ``protests'' was changed to
``violent demonstrations'' in that same bullet point.\187\
Those changes made it all the way through to the final version
of the talking points, surviving the extensive deletions made
near the end of this process by Morell.\188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\187\See Email from [National Clandestine Service Officer] to [Near
East Division, et al.] (Sept. 14, 2012, 2:52 PM) (on file with the CIA,
REQUEST 17-0443 to REQUEST 17-0449).
\188\See Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%
20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last visited May 17, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after this change was made, a meeting took place to
discuss the talking points. The CIA's ``Lessons Learned'' after
action review described this meeting:
At some point between 4-5 p.m., a group of officers
from OCA [Office of Congressional Affairs] and OPA
[Office of Public Affairs] met in OPA spaces to discuss
the talking points. Those officers included C [Chief]/
OCA, COS [Chief of Staff]/OCA, D [Director]/OPA, the
Chief of OPA's Media Relations Branch and two OPA
spokespersons. Their efforts, over a period of
approximately 30 minutes, culminated in a revised
version of the talking points that was sent to CIA/COS
and the DDCIA's [Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Agency] office by OPA at 4:42 p.m.
Participants in this group editing session agree that
they did not have a complete picture of intelligence
regarding the events in Benghazi to guide them. Group
members were working under tremendous time pressure.
All agree that they were focused on several important
considerations, including ensuring that the talking
points contained no information that could compromise
sources and methods, and that nothing was said that
could compromise the then-nascent FBI investigation by
prematurely attributing responsibility for the attacks
on any one person or group.
The group had access to an e-mail from NCS [National
Clandestine Service] noting that the original talking
points statement that ``we do know that Islamic
extremists participated in the attack'' implied
complicity in the deaths of American officers. The
original drafter of the talking points agreed that we
did not know who was responsible for the deaths and
suggested that the language be changed to say ``we know
that they participated in the protests.'' While the
editing group did not make this change, ``attacks'' in
the second bullet was changed to ``violent
demonstration,'' effectively accomplishing the same
purpose.
In addition, the word ``attacks'' in the first bullet
of the talking points was changed to
``demonstrations.'' The group also deleted reference in
the second bullet to al-Qa'ida. The reasons underlying
both changes are not clear, and participants in the
editing session have incomplete recollections regarding
the decision. Some have suggested that they believed
the sentence was somewhat awkward and illogical as
written, making reference to ``attacks'' ``evolving
into an assault,'' with ``attacks'' and ``assault''
seeming to be synonyms. In addition to these changes,
the group added two sentences about CIA product
discussing threats, a statement noting that the
investigation was ongoing, and several non-substantive
word changes.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\Letter from Michael Morell, Deputy Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency,
to Sen. Richard M. Burr, S. Select Comm. on Intel., Lessons Learned
From Formulation of Unclassified Talking Points re the Events in
Benghazi, 11-12 September 2012 [hereinafter Lessons Learned] (Aug. 6,
2013) (on file with the Committee), at 4-5.
The meeting did not include the OTA Director, the drafter
of the original talking points, or any substantive experts on
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi. The OTA Director testified:
Q: So how did we go from ``attacks'' in bullet point
one at 3:33 to ``demonstrations'' in bullet point one
at 4:42?
A: At some point in this process this entered into--it
became opaque to me. At some point in this process, as
I----
Q: I'm sorry. Were you comfortable with it occur[ing]
that way given the fact that you were tasked with----
A: I didn't know it was occurring. So when I say it was
opaque to me, I did not know this was happening.
At some point in this process, as I know you have seen
from all this, there is a group from OPA, our Office of
Public Affairs, our Office of Congressional Affairs,
and others, took the talking points and made changes to
them. And I was not consulted on those changes. So I
cannot tell you how some of these changes took place. I
was not involved. I was not consulted beforehand.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\OTA Dir. Testimony at 209-10.
That change in the first bullet point--from ``attacks'' to
``demonstrations''--also survived Morell's extensive edits and
was in the final version of the talking points.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\See Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%
20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last visited May 17, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Around this same time, Morell first learned about the
existence of the talking points. He testified:
So there was a weekly meeting on Syria, followed by our
three-times-a-week meeting on counterterrorism. In
between those two meetings, the director's chief of
staff walked up to me in the director's conference room
and said, here, you need to see these. You need to be
aware of this, you need to get involved in this. I
said, what's this? And he explained the origin of the
talking points and he explained kind of where they were
in the process. I skimmed the talking points, and I
immediately reacted to the warning language [language
indicating that five prior attacks had ococurred in
Benghazi against foreign interests]. . . .
So I say to my EA [Executive Assistant], where is this
in the process? And he said, it's being coordinated. I
say, okay, I will deal with it in the morning.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\Morell Testimony at 124-25.
Morell testified he did not edit the talking points that
evening, nor did he speak with anybody about them.\193\
Instead, Morell edited them by himself the next morning,
Saturday, September 15. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\Id. at 128-29.
So I come in the next morning and my--and the next
morning, by the way, is a deputies meeting at eight.
Family day at CIA--once a year you allow families to
come on the compound, walk around, visit offices, et
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cetera, et cetera--is at nine.
And first thing my EA tells me is that Denis McDonough,
then the deputy National Security Advisor, wants to
talk about--wants to talk about the talking points in
the deputies meeting, and I say, okay. I have a
conversation with General Petraeus about the talking
points, and [Petraeus' Chief of Staff] was there, and I
believe he would--if he were here, he would agree with
what I'm about ready to tell you, that I told Director
Petraeus that the talking points were stuck, that the
State Department was objecting to the warning language,
and I told him that I agreed that the warning language
should be taken out, and the Director didn't say a word
to me. He didn't tell me that he was going to put it
in, he didn't say, keep--keep the warning language in
there, I think it's really important. He didn't say
anything.
We do our family day stuff, which includes literally
hundreds of people coming through my office and shaking
hands with me, and the whole time I'm thinking these
talking points are sitting on my desk, actually my EA's
desk.
So when the family thing is done, I go and edit the
talking points and I literally edit them in 5, 10
minutes and I fly through them. And as you know, I made
a bunch of changes, and the most significant of which
is taking out the warning language. So that's kind of
the--that's kind of the story there.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\Id. at 126-28.
New Information on September 15
When Morell edited the talking points on the morning of
September 15, new information was fresh in his mind regarding
the Benghazi attacks. That morning saw additional information
written about Benghazi. A New York Times article was published
that morning written by Peter Baker. It read in part:
According to a guard at the compound, the attack began
at about 9:30 p.m., without advance warning or any
peaceful protest. ``I started hearing, `God is great!
God is great!''' one guard said. ``I thought to myself,
maybe it is a passing funeral.'' (All the guards spoke
on the condition of anonymity for their safety)
``Attack, attack,'' the guard said as he heard an
American calling over his walkie-talkie as the chants
came closer. Suddenly, there came a barrage of gunfire,
explosions, and rocket-propelled grenades.\195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\Peter Baker, et al., Diplomats' Bodies Return to U.S., and
Libyan Guards Recount Deadly Riot, N.Y. Times (Sept. 15, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/09/15/world/middleeast/
ambassadors-body-back-in-us-libya-guards-recount-riot.html?_r=0.
The Chief of Station found this article compelling. He
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
Q: They told them attack or they told them fire, so I
mean--I don't know if you knew that at the time, but I
mean, in reading this, it seems like some of the folks
being interviewed here only know things that someone
who was there would know. Did you read this----
A: Oh yeah, I found this compelling.\196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\Chief of Station Testimony at 218.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell, however, did not. He testified:
Q: Are you familiar with Peter Baker at all?
A: Yes, I believe I have met him.
* * *
Q: Okay. All right. Your assessment of the New York
Times as a media organization?
A: My assessment of The New York Times is that, like
any media organization, it gets a lot of things wrong.
And my assessment of The New York Times is that its
reporting and editorials are fairly biased, in my
view.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\Morell Testimony at 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell then said:
Q: So the same paragraph we were talking about on page
two, here is the New York Times citing one guard from
the consulate. I mean, how would you assess that in
terms of credibility from what the guard said reported
in The New York Times article?
A: How would I assess it?
Q: How would you assess it?
A: Michael Morell?
Q: Yes.
A: I wouldn't give it great credibility.
Q: Okay.
A: Right? I mean, it's a data point. It's a data point.
It's one guard. You don't know who it is. You don't
know the conditions under which he was talking. I mean,
it's a data point. I wouldn't discount it totally, but
I wouldn't say this is absolute fact.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\Id. at 109.
The CIA analysts published another WIRe that morning,
September 15, with a new assessment.\199\ This piece, co-
written with the National Counterterrorism Center, had two main
focuses: the extremists who participated in the Benghazi
attacks, and Libyan authorities placing a high priority on
tracking down the perpetrators of the attack.\200\ Similar to
the September 13 WIRe two days earlier, the notion of a protest
and the discussion of a video were not central--or even minor--
focuses of the piece.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\Cent. Intel. Agency, Libya: Variety of Extremists Participated
in Benghazi Attacks, World Intelligence Review, Sept. 15, 2012 (on file
with CIA, REQUEST 17-0262 to REQUEST 17-0265).
\200\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first paragraph of the September 15 WIRe contains the
sentence ``The level of planning and exact sequence of events
leading to the attack remain intelligence gaps.''\201\ This
indicates the analysts did not know definitively what had
transpired prior to the attacks--perhaps whether or not
protests in Benghazi had occurred, or the motivation or level
of planning for the attacks--and signaled to the reader that
information still needed to be gleaned about these events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell also reviewed an email from the Chief of Station on
the morning of September 15. That email stated in part:
INTEL: Station notes the following information from the
past 24hrs, which strengthen Station's assessment that
the attacks were not/not spontaneous and not/not an
escalation of protests. Press reports noted that at the
time of the attack, circa 2130 local, guards posted at
the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi and Libyans residing in
the vicinity reported the absence of protests at the
consulate and specific that the attack began without
warning. A CIA officer on the scene noted that at
approximately 2200 [10:00 p.m.], there was no sign of a
protest at the Consulate. Libya General National
Congress (GNC) President Magaryaf stated in an
interview that the attacks were planned in advance by
experienced individuals, most likely al-Qa'ida (AQ) and
not former regime elements (FRE).\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\202\Email from Tripoli Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Agency, to
[Morell Assistant] (Sept. 15, 2012) (on file with the CIA, REQUEST 15-
0011 to REQUEST 15-0022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell testified about receiving this email:
I go through it, I read this, right, and the line in
there about, we don't think this was a protest, right,
jumps out at me. Why did it jump out at me? Because the
analysts believed there was a protest. So here I have
my analysts saying there was a protest, and I've got my
Chief of Station, a guy I've got a lot of confidence
in, right, telling me there was no protest.
The other thing that jumped out at me were that the
reasons he gave . . . why he thinks there was no
protest, the first is that there were press reports
saying no protest, but what goes through my mind,
right, is, look, I know that there's press reports that
say there were protests. Okay? . . .
And then the next reason he gives is that a CIA officer
on the scene noted that at approximately 2200, there
was no sign of a protest at the consulate. And what
goes through my mind then is, well, you know what,
that's--2200 is 20 minutes after the attack started,
right? Maybe everybody dispersed by then. What I react
to now is that they didn't get there at 2200. They got
to the corner, they got to the corner of the street
that the TMF [Benghazi Mission compound] was on at
about 10 minutes after 10:00. They didn't even--they
didn't get to the TM--to the front of the TMF itself
until 2240, an hour after the attack started. So not
compelling at all, right?\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\Morell Testimony at 146-47.
Morell also compared the language in this email from the
Chief of Station to the language in the email the Chief of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Station sent the day before.
Q: So [the September 15 email] is stronger than the
assessment given by the Chief of Station a day earlier?
A: I certainly remember it that way.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\Id. at 150.
Morell likely reviewed another piece of intelligence the
morning of September 15 titled ``Observations from the 11-12
September, 2012 Attacks Against the U.S. Consulate and a
Separate Facility in Benghazi, Libya.''\205\ Morell received
this piece of intelligence in an email at 8:50 a.m. and
testified that he ``almost certainly would not have not read an
email from the chief of staff [of the CIA].''\206\ This email
also noted there were ``no signs of a protest'' at 10:00 p.m.
in Benghazi--less than 20 minutes after the attacks began--
according to a CIA officer at the scene.\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\Email from Chief of Staff to Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, to
Michael Morell, Deputy Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Sept. 15, 2012)
[hereinafter Dir. COS Email] (on file with the CIA, (REQUEST 1-002167).
\206\Morell Testimony at 144.
\207\Dir. COS Email, supra note 205.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was with this information fresh in his mind--the two
September 15 emails and the September 15 WIRe--along with the
September 13 WIRe and the September 14 email from the Chief of
Station, that Morell edited the talking points. At the time he
edited the talking points, he had seen at least two reports
from the Chief of Station--and possibly more--indicating, in
increasingly forceful language, that no protests had taken
place. The analysts had not seen these emails. Morell therefore
was the only person who had both the analytic assessments about
Benghazi in addition to multiple emails from the Chief of
Station--somebody Morell had worked closely with during the
Arab Spring and recognized as an ``outstanding intelligence
officer.''\208\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\Morell Testimony at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was incumbent on Morell to take all of this information
at his disposal into account when he edited the talking points.
Morell, a former intelligence analyst who rose through the
ranks analyzing disparate information and formulating
assessments, disagreed. He testified:
A: It's not my job, it's not my job to be the analyst,
right? It's not my job to take all this information and
come to an analytic conclusion. That's the job of the
analysts. So when I--look, and had I done that, had I
played analyst, right, and started editing the talking
points and started changing them to reflect what the
COS said, the analysts would have protested, because
they--at that moment, they still believed that there
had been a protest. So for me to take it out because
the COS said there wasn't one would have gotten a
reaction from the analysts. They would have seen me as
politicizing analysis, all right?
Q: How would that have politicized the analysis, the
fact that you're----
A: They would have seen it that way.
Q: But you're taking judgments from somebody that you
had worked with very closely, somebody that you had
deemed an exemplary intelligence officer.
A: Look, managers at CIA don't do analysis. When they
are perceived to be doing the analysis, the analysts go
nuts, right? Bob Gates was accused of that, other
senior officials at CIA have been accused of that.
Analysts go nuts when they think that managers are
doing the analysis themselves, particularly when they
disagree with the analysis. So the last thing I was
going to do was change the analysts' analysis,
right?\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\Id. at 152-53.
Morell was not, however, creating an analytic assessment.
Morell was editing talking points that would be used for public
consumption. The process--and the product--is an inherently
different one from internal CIA processes for formulating
assessments. The analysts were not involved in the talking
points process--only managers were.\210\ The analysts did not
have the same emails Morell did from the Chief of Station--only
Morell had those.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\See, e.g., email from Dir., Office of Terrorism Analysis,
Cent. Intel. Agency, to [NE Division] (Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with
the CIA, REQUEST 17-0443 to 17-0444).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Talking points--something the CIA rarely produces--are
different from analytic assessments, which the CIA produces
every day. Petraeus acknowledged this when he testified:
I mean, that was where finally once it--this was not--
certainly no longer a CIA document. It wasn't even an
intelligence community document, although that rightly
should have been, and that's why it went to the IC
referral process, but then, of course, you know, it's
going to be interagency and not everyone has got a hand
in this.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\Testimony of David Petraeus, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at
62 (Jan. 6, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
The talking points were understood to be viewed as
representative of an authoritative analytical assessment. As
shown, however, this was not the case--no analysts worked on
these talking points, as they were created and edited only by
senior CIA managers and other senior officials in the
administration. The distinction was never manifested on the
document or otherwise made known to those relying on, or making
representations based on, the talking points.
No process was in place to create the talking points, and
no analysis was required to create them. The only expectation
was to produce accurate information to Congress for them to
share with the American people. That being the case, Morell--
the only person with the complete universe of information at
his disposal--could have edited the talking points to reflect
the most up-to-date information--or at the very least to caveat
the talking points with a reflection that different views
existed. Morell did neither of these things.
Panetta--whom Morell worked for when Panetta was Director
of the CIA--understands this concept well. He told the
Committee:
The last lesson I would tell you is don't use talking
points that don't include language that makes very
clear that the matter is under investigation and that
these results are only preliminary. As former chief of
staff, I've seen talking points, and I can understand
how trouble can result as a result of that. I used to
review those before anybody got a hold of them to make
sure that they reflected what we wanted to inform the
American people about, because the last thing you want
to do is to mislead the American people.\212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\Testimony of Leon Panetta, Sec'y of Defense, U.S. Dep't of
Defense, Tr. at 107 (Jan. 8, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE SUNDAY TALK SHOWS
Perhaps as much as any other subject surrounding Benghazi,
the appearance by Ambassador Rice on five Sunday morning talk
shows following the attacks has been the most politically
charged. After all, it was the fallout from her appearances
that ultimately caused her to withdraw her name as a
candidate--perhaps the leading candidate--to be the next
Secretary of State.\213\ Yet little is known about why she was
selected by the administration to represent the United States
government on the shows, what she did to prepare for those talk
shows, what materials she reviewed, who she spoke with to learn
information about the attacks, and most significantly why she
said what she said.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\Karen DeYoung & Anne Gearan, Susan Rice withdraws as candidate
for secretary of state, Wash. Post (Dec. 13, 2012), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/susan-rice-withdraws-as-
candidate-for-secretary-of-state/2012/12/13/17ad344e-4567-11e2-8e70-
e1993528222d_story.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was not until two days before the shows, on Friday,
September 14, when Rice learned she would be appearing on
behalf of the administration.\214\ She was the administration's
third choice to appear on the shows--the first being the
Secretary of State and the second being Tom Donilon, National
Security Advisor to the President.\215\ Rhodes was the White
House official responsible for reaching out to Rice and asking
her to appear. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\Testimony of Susan E. Rice, former U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N., Tr. at 30 (Feb. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Rice Testimony] (on file
with the Committee).
\215\See Rhodes Testimony at 65-66 (stating Sec'y Clinton and Tom
Donilon were first and second choices to appear).
A: I recall reaching out to Secretary Clinton first.
* * *
Q: Did you get an affirmative ``no'' or did you just
not hear back?
A: I don't remember hearing back.
Q: Did you call again and redouble your ask or did you
move on to your second draft choice?
A: I believe I moved on because I knew that she, again,
does not regularly appear on Sunday shows. So I don't
remember thinking that it was likely that she would
want to appear.
Q: And who else would you have asked after Secretary
Clinton?
A: I remember asking Tom Donilon, the National Security
Advisor.
Q: And what was his response?
A: He did not want to appear. And he too very rarely
appeared on the Sunday shows.
Q: All right. Who was number three?
A: I believe it was Susan Rice, is my
recollection.\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\Rhodes Testimony at 65-66.
Although Rhodes testified the Secretary ``does not
regularly appear on Sunday shows,'' she had in fact appeared on
multiple shows on two separate occasions within a seven month
period to discuss Libya. On March 27, 2011--barely a week after
the United States supported the UN in imposing a no fly zone
over Libya and authorizing all means necessary to protect
civilians--the Secretary appeared on Meet the Press, Face the
Nation, and This Week, to talk about the U.S. intervention in
Libya, which was being promoted as a civilian protection and
humanitarian mission.\217\ Seven months later--in the immediate
wake of Qadhafi's death--she appeared on Meet the Press, This
Week, State of the Union, and FoxNews Sunday to talk about
Qadhafi's death and the path forward in Libya.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\Meet the Press transcript for March 27, 2011, NBC News (Mar.
27, 2011), http://www.
nbcnews.com/id/42275424/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/meet-press-
transcript-march/#.VzoK0_
krJaQ; Face the Nation March 27, 2011 Transcript, CBS News (Mar. 27,
2011), http://www.
cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/FTN_032711.pdf;`This Week' Transcript: Hillary
Clinton, Robert Gates and Donald Rumsfeld, ABC News (Mar. 27, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/week-
transcript-hillary-clinton-robert-gates-donald-rumsfeld/
story?id=13232096.
\218\Meet the Press transcript for October 23, 2011, NBC (Oct. 23,
2011), http://www.
nbcnews.com/id/45000791/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/meet-press-
transcript-october/#.V1cU1
9UrJaQ., Clinton Warns Iran: U.S. Committed to Iraq, ABC's This Week
(Oct. 23, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/interview-
hillary-clinton-14796369; State of the Union with Candy Crowley, CNN
(Oct. 23, 2011), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1110/23/
sotu.01.html., and Clinton Talks Iraq, Libya; Sen. Graham Challenges
GOP Candidates; Bachmann Focused on Iowa, FOX News Sunday (Oct. 23,
2011), http://www.foxnews.com/on-
air/fox-news-sunday-chris-wallace/2011/10/23/clinton-talks-iraq-libya-
sen-graham-challenges-gop-candidates-bachmann-focused-iowa#p//v/
1234077958001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mills testified the decision not to appear on the Sunday
shows was the Secretary's:
Q: Since the Secretary didn't appear, who made the
decision that she wasn't going to appear?
A: Well, she would always decide what she would do, if
she was going to go on a show or not go on a show.
Q: Okay. Were there recommendations that she took from
you and others, such as Philippe Reines, Jake Sullivan,
others?
A: No. Candidly, the Secretary was so focused on what
had happened to our team and what was happening in the
region that I don't know that there was a moment's
thought about it. She didn't often go on the shows. And
she was, understandably, very concerned about how we
support our teams and the losses that we had
incurred.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\Testimony of Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff to the U.S. Sec'y
of State, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 123 (Sept. 3, 2015) [hereinafter
Mills Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
When Rhodes learned the Secretary would not represent the
administration on the talk shows, he then asked Donilon to
appear.\220\ He also declined.\221\ Rice--Rhodes' third choice
for the task--accepted.\222\ In doing so, the administration
selected someone to talk to the American people about the
Benghazi attacks who was neither involved in the security of
any U.S. facilities in Benghazi nor involved in any way with
the operational response to the attacks. In fact, the
administration selected an individual who did not even know
there was a CIA presence in Benghazi, let alone the fact that
two Americans had died there.\223\ She testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\Rhodes Testimony at 66.
\221\Id.
\222\Id.
\223\Rice Testimony at 107-08.
Q: Did you learn between September 11 and September 16
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that were was a CIA presence in Benghazi?
A: I think--no. I think I learned subsequently.
* * *
Q: So nobody told you between the dates of September 11
and September 16 that two of the four Americans who
were killed who were providing security actually worked
for the CIA and not the State Department?
A: Not that I recall.
Q: All right.
Q: And you learned that subsequently?
A: To the best of my recollection, I learned it
subsequently.\224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\224\Id.
In selecting Rice to appear on the Sunday talk shows,
Rhodes chose an individual with limited knowledge of, and
presumably limited participation in, the administration's
reponse to the Benghazi attacks. Instead, while the attacks
were happening, Rice was receiving--apparently in response to
an email chain about the attack on the Benghazi Mission
compound--a detailed update from staff about the number of
retweets her Twitter account had generated.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\225\See Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the U.N.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 7:43 P.M.) (on file with the Committee, C05561948)
(``Today, you tweeted 7 times on the anniversary of the September 11
attacks, generating more than 600 retweets. By this measure, your
twitter account had a big day--your second or third biggest since the
start of the summer--and your volunteering pics got a few nice
responses . . .'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How Rice Prepped for the Shows
On Friday, September 14, 2012, the Secretary's calendar
included a meeting with Rice.\226\ Both Rice and Mills
testified they believed that meeting took place, even though
neither had a specific recollection of it.\227\ That Friday
meeting was a standing meeting between the Secretary and Rice
that would take place when Rice was in Washington.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\Email from Special Ass't to the Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State (Sept. 14, 2012, 7:29 AM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0045306-SCB0045307).
\227\Rice Testimony at 28; Mills Testimony at 138.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite having no specific recollection of the meeting,
Rice is confident she did not discuss the Sunday shows with the
Secretary at the meeting.\228\ This is because Rice first
learned of her possible appearance on the Sunday shows in the
early afternoon of September 14, after the scheduled meeting.
She testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\Rice Testimony at 28.
I received a phone call as I was in my car on my way to
Andrews for the ceremony receiving our fallen
colleagues. And in that phone call from Ben [Rhodes], I
was asked whether it would be possible, if Secretary
Clinton were unable to appear on the shows, if I could
appear on the shows. It was a contingency question at
the time. And I said that, you know, I had other plans
for the weekend and that it would not be my preference
but if they needed me and there was not an alternative
that I would be willing to do it.\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\229\Rice Testimony at 26.
Both the Secretary and Rice attended the return of remains
ceremony at Andrews Air Force Base that afternoon, and later
that day, Friday September 14, Rhodes called Rice back to
inform her she needed to do the Sunday shows.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\230\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Rice did not begin preparing for the shows until
the following day, Saturday September 15. Her staff, led by
Erin Pelton, Communications Director and Spokesperson, prepared
a book of briefing materials for Rice.\231\ Rice testified she
began reviewing these briefing materials on Saturday:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\Testimony of Erin Pelton, Dir. of Commc'cs and Spokesperson,
U.S. Mission to the U.N., Tr. at 44 (Feb. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Pelton
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Q: So let's go forward to--did you do anything after
speaking to Mr. Rhodes on Friday night to begin
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
preparing?
A: No.
Q: What did you do the next morning to begin preparing?
A: I reviewed briefing materials.
Q: What briefing materials? Would that just be the same
daily briefing materials that you received in the
ordinary course, or was this different material?
A: It was both. I received my daily intelligence
briefing on Saturday morning, and I also began
reviewing a briefing book that had been prepared by my
staff for--in preparation for the Sunday shows.\232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\232\Rice Testimony at 31.
These briefing materials contained little to no information
about the Benghazi attacks. Pelton testified that in gathering
briefing materials for the Sunday shows she explicitly did not
focus on Benghazi, anticipating materials pertaining to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi would come at a later time. She said:
Q: In your list of areas where you were attempting to
collect the latest information, you left Benghazi out.
Was that intentional, or were you just giving me some
examples?
A: I don't recall preparing information about Benghazi.
What I do recall is understanding that we would have
access to talking points that would be provided by the
intelligence community that were unclassified and
consistent with our latest understanding of what had
transpired in Benghazi.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\Pelton Testimony at 45.
Pelton also testified she believed she would be receiving
talking points regarding Benghazi that would not require her to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
seek out briefing materials about Benghazi on her own:
Well, I recall that in the process of preparing
Ambassador Rice between Friday and Saturday, September
14th and 15th, that I was not focused on Benghazi
because I was going to receive talking points that were
appropriate for public use by the intelligence
community. I don't remember how I came to know that I
was going to get those materials.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\234\Id.
While Pelton did not include any information specific to
Benghazi in the briefing book, Rice recalled other material
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that was in the briefing book. She testified:
Q: As best you can, do you recall what was in that
briefing book that your staff provided?
A: I recall it included statements that other senior
administration officials had made, including the
President and the Secretary. I recall it including
background Q&A and top-line themes covering the wide
range of issues that we anticipated would come up on
the shows: the protests that occurred all around the
world that week; obviously, also what happened in
Benghazi.
And, also, because it was one week before the opening
of the U.N. General Assembly in New York and Iran was
expected to be a prominent issue, and Prime Minister
Netanyahu's visit also a prominent issue, I recall
preparing for that discussion as well.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\235\Rice Testimony at 33.
The ``background Q&A'' and ``top line themes'' came from
Rhodes.\236\ Pelton testified about how this information came
about:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\236\Rhodes Memo, supra note 3.
A: I don't recall all the specifics of our conversation
[with Ben Rhodes]. However, I do recall at one point
asking him to provide, for lack of a better term, a
memo regarding the objectives of the Sunday show
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
appearances.
Q: How did he respond to you?
A: He said he would write it.
Q: And did he eventually deliver that to you?
A: Yes.\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\Pelton Testimony at 42.
Rhodes delivered this memo at 8:09 p.m. on the evening of
September 14 in an email with the subject ``RE: PREP CALL with
Susan: Saturday at 4:00 pm ET.''\238\ The memo contained four
bullet points under ``Goals,'' six bullet points under ``Top-
lines,'' and contained five questions and suggested answers
regarding the Arab Spring, protests, and Benghazi, and an
additional four questions and suggested answers regarding
Israel and Iran.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\Rhodes Memo, supra note 3.
\239\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The four bullet points under the ``Goals'' section of the
memo were the following:
To convey that the United States is doing everything
that we can to protect our people and facilities
abroad;
To underscore that these protests are rooted in an
Internet video, and not a broader failure of policy;
To show that we will be resolute in bringing people who
harm Americans to justice, and standing steadfast
through these protests;
To reinforce the President and Administration's
strength and steadiness in dealing with difficult
challenges.\240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\240\Id.
The second point was one of the most explicit directions
from a senior administration official about the intent of the
adminstration's communications strategy. The Chairman had the
following exchange with Rhodes about these bullet points during
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhodes' testimony to the Committee:
Q: How about number two? They are not numbered, but
let's just go second bullet, okay? ``To underscore that
these protests are rooted in an Internet video, and not
a broader failure of policy.'' What policy were you
worried about being considered a failure?
A: My recollection over the course of that week is that
we were getting questions about whether this
represented a failure of our policy in the Middle East
and in response to the Arab Spring.
Q: And you wanted to underscore the point that it
wasn't any of that, it was just a video.
A: We were anticipating getting those questions, and we
wanted to convey that, again, the protests were rooted
in this video.
Q: Were there other options other than just those two,
a wholesale failure of the administration's policy or
an Internet video? Was there something else? Those are
your only two options?
A: Again, my recollection is that this reflects the way
in which we were getting questions over the course of
the week is it's a failure of policy. And we were at
the same time seeking to deal with the ongoing fallout
from the video. So those were the factors in play.
Q: I'm with you on wanting to explain to folks that it
wasn't a failure of policy. You essentially gave
yourself two choices: an Internet video or a broader
failure of policy. And my question is, were those your
only two options?
A: Again, that's what I recall being the subject of
discussion over the course of that week in terms of the
questions we were being asked.
Q: Well, with respect to Benghazi, it certainly would
have--it's possible that it was not just those two
options, right?
A: I'm not sure I understand the question.
Q: With respect to what happened in Benghazi, you're
not limiting us to just those two options, right, a
failure of policy or an Internet video?
A: Again, I believe in this specific bullet I'm
referring to the ongoing protests that are taking place
across the Middle East which were very much still going
forward on that Friday.
Q: Right. But you agree--you knew Benghazi was going to
come up when Ambassador Rice was going on the five
Sunday talk shows?
A: Yes.
Q: We haven't had an ambassador killed since when?
A: It had been a long time. I don't remember
specifically.
Q: So you knew that that was coming up?
A: I knew that was going to be one of the topics.
Q: Right. And your third bullet, which isn't numbered,
but it's number three, ``To show that we will be
resolute in bringing people who harm Americans to
justice.'' Can you think of a country where Americans
were harmed other than Libya that she might have been
asked about?
A: That would principally, I believe, refer to Libya.
Q: Okay. So you concede that the third item does apply
to Libya. Let's go back to the second one. How about
the second one? Are we to have drawn a contrast between
the second bullet and the third bullet, or are they all
interrelated?
A: Again, my recollection is she is going on to talk
about several different issues: the attacks in
Benghazi, the ongoing protests that were taking place
across the Middle East, and issues related to Iran and
Israel. And so these points refer to different elements
of the topic.
Q: Well, at the time, what did you think was the
impetus for the attack in Benghazi?
A: I did not have a judgment of my own at the time. I
was going to rely on the information provided by the
intelligence community.
Q: Did the intelligence community mention an Internet
video to you?
A: The intelligence community at this point had
suggested that it was an event that was motivated in
part by the protests in Cairo.
Q: That was a great answer to a question I didn't ask.
Did they mention the video?
A: No, what I'm saying is, my recollection is they at
that point had said that insofar as there was any
connection it was more to the events in Cairo being a
motivating factor for individuals.
Q: Right. So you are preparing the Ambassador to go on
five Sunday talk shows to talk about what you know is
going to involve Benghazi and you don't want her to be
stuck with the option of a failure of your policy. So
you give the option of the Internet video. And my
question is, who in the intelligence community told you
that the attacks in Benghazi were linked to the video?
A: Again, I prepared these points on a Friday in which
there were violent protests across the Middle East
because of the video, a violent breach of our facility
in Tunis, a violent breach of our facility at Khartoum,
violence against an American restaurant in Lebanon, at
the very least. So I very much was focused on the fact
that there were ongoing protests, and one of the
subjects that she was going to be asked about were
those protests. So insofar as I'm referring to protests
in the video, I'm referring to the many protests that
were continuing to take place over the course of that
week in response to the video.
Q: So is it your testimony that the second bullet and
the third bullet are totally unrelated?
A: They're referring to different elements of what
she's going to have to talk about on the Sunday shows.
Q: So bullet number two was not about Libya or Benghazi
at all.
A: It was not intended to assign responsibility for
Benghazi.
Q: But yet you jump in the very next bullet to those
who harm Americans. Can you see how someone reading
that memo might be vexed?
A: Well, again, these are several statements of
principle up top that I think speak to, again, all--in
different parts of the issues that she is going to have
to address. And then you can see in the actual contents
how we intended to respond to those individual
questions and instances.\241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\241\Rhodes Testimony at 75-80.
The fact Rhodes concedes the third bullet point references
Libya is important. The bullet point immediately prior
references the video, allowing for easy connection and
conflation of the video and the Benghazi attacks.\242\ This
occurred in public statements by the administration prior to
Rhodes' memo, and, having seen this memo, Rice appeared to
again connect the video and Benghazi the next day when she
appeared on the talk shows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\Rhodes Memo, supra note 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While this connection between the two events may have
favored a particular narrative, even Rhodes admitted that he
was not aware of any intelligence that existed to directly link
the video to the attacks. He testified:
A: And, again, my recollection of any connection to the
video was indirect through the fact that the protests
in Cairo may have been a motivating factor for the
events in Benghazi.
Q: Okay. So just to be clear, so there was no direct
connection made between the video and the attacks in
Benghazi from the intelligence community that you're
aware of at that time?
A: That's my recollection. I recall that there were
public reports of protests that were--that would have
been included in, you know, the information we were
receiving.
Q: But you certainly weren't relying on those public
reports, were you?
A: We were relying on the intelligence community's
assessment, and the intelligence community's assessment
was that these were events that were motivated in part
by the protests in Cairo.\243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\Rhodes Testimony at 106-07.
At 4:00 p.m. on Saturday September 15, 2012, a conference
call was convened with Rice to discuss her appearance on the
Sunday shows the following morning.\244\ Rice participated in
this conference call from Columbus, Ohio, where she was
spending the day.\245\ Rexon Ryu, Deputy to the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, State Department,
testified there were no State Department people on the call:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\244\Rhodes Memo, supra note 3.
\245\Rice Testimony at 38.
Q: Okay. Do you recall--so you said Ben Rhodes. Were
there any individuals, other than the USUN individual,
were there any other people from the State Department
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that participated in that call?
A: There were no State Department people.
Q: Do you recall if there were additional individuals
from the White House that participated?
A: Yes, there were.\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\Testimony of Rexon Y. Ryu, Deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to
the U.N., Tr. at 83 (Aug. 25, 2015) (on file with the Committee)
[hereinafter Ryu Testimony].
Rice testified David Plouffe, Senior Advisor to the
President, was on the call.\247\ Plouffe had previously served
as the campaign manager for the President's 2008 presidential
campaign.\248\ While Rhodes testified Plouffe would
``normally'' appear on the Sunday show prep calls,\249\ Rice
testified she did not recall him being on prior calls and did
not understand why he was on the call in this instance.\250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\Rice Testimony at 39.
\248\Wash. Speakers Bureau, https://www.washingtonspeakers.com/
speakers/biography.cfm?
SpeakerID=6495.
\249\Rhodes Testimony at 111.
\250\Rice Testimony at 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
No witness interviewed by the Committee was able to
specifically identify State Department individuals on the call
aside from Rice's staff.\251\ In addition, nobody from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], Department of Defense,
or Central Intelligence Agency participated in the call, which
apparently consisted of just a small circle of Rice's advisors
and communications staffers from the White House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\See, e.g. Ryu Testimony at 73-74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the time of her appearance on the talk shows, it had
been announced the FBI would take the lead on the investigation
into finding out what had occurred.\252\ The Department of
Defense, along with White House operators, had been involved in
sending troops towards Libya while the attacks were ongoing,
and analysts from the Central Intelligence Agency had taken the
lead on post-attack analysis of intelligence. The State
Department had its compound in Benghazi attacked and, as such,
it was the principal source of information from eyewitnesses to
the attack. The fact that no individuals from either the
Defense Department or White House operators participated in the
Saturday prep call therefore limited the information pertaining
to Benghazi provided to Rice. Moreover, it does not appear Rice
sought out any information about the attacks or worked to
ensure that she had a full understanding of the events outside
of the talking points she was provided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\U.S. launching apparent terrorist hunt in Libya, CBS News
(Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-launching-apparent-
terrorist-hunt-in-libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, multiple witnesses testified Benghazi was
barely mentioned on the prep call. This inattention is
consistent with the lack of information pertaining to Benghazi
in the briefing materials. Instead, Rhodes commented on the
call that the CIA was preparing unclassified talking points
pertaining to Benghazi, with the understanding that the talking
points would be shared with Rice when they were completed.\253\
Rice testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\Rice Testimony at 39-40; Rhodes Testimony at 76-78.
A: I don't recall us talking about the CIA talking
points. I recall being reminded that they were
forthcoming and that we would be relying on them
because they had been prepared for Members of Congress
and they were our best distillation of what we knew at
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the time.
Q: Okay. Who told you that?
A: I'm not certain, but I believe it was Ben. And so we
didn't talk about Benghazi, in fact, on the phone call,
as I remember. We just said that those were the points.
Q: Let's go into that a little bit more. If I
understood you correctly, you said during this prep
call for the Sunday talk shows you did not talk about
the attacks in Benghazi at all. Is that correct?
A: In any depth. I don't have any recollection of
talking about them in any depth.\254\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\254\Rice Testimony at 42.
Rice also testified it was her understanding these talking
points would be vetted and cleared by the CIA--in other words,
manifesting the subtext the talking points represented an
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
authoritative product.
A: As I said, to the best of my recollection, it was
Mr. Rhodes on the phone.
Q: And to the best of your recollection, what did he--
how did he characterize the CIA talking points?
A: As being carefully vetted and cleared, drafted by
the CIA, and provided--produced for the purpose of
being provided to Members of Congress and, thus, what
we would also utilize.
Q: So, as far as you were concerned or as far as you
understood, the CIA talking points represented the best
information about the attacks in Benghazi at the time.
A: Yes. That's how I--that's what I understood them to
be, and that's, in fact, what I knew them to be,
because they mirrored very precisely the intelligence
that I had also received.\255\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\255\Rice Testimony at 45-46.
No CIA witness the Committee interviewed had any knowledge
the HPSCI talking points were going to be shared with Rice to
be used on the Sunday talk shows.
As discussed above, Rice, the individual selected by the
White House to represent the administration on the Sunday talk
shows following the deaths of Ambassador Chris Stevens--the
first U.S. Ambassador to be killed in the field since 1979--
Sean Smith, Glen Doherty, and Tyrone Woods, was not a central
figure in the creation or management of the Benghazi compound,
or in the government's response to the attacks. She was unaware
at the time the CIA had a presence there and essentially relied
on just three bullet points of material--that none of the
authors of the bullet points knew would be provided to her--to
discuss the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk shows.
Rice took umbrage when she was confronted with the
suggestion that her role was to simply parrot the talking
points provided to her, testifying:
A: Sir, as I said earlier, I did not have any knowledge
of how these talking points were edited.
* * *
Q: I understand. So you were just the spokesman. You
had been given something, and they told you: Go on out
there and do your duty and repeat what you were
provided.
A: No sir. I was also a member of the President's
Cabinet and the National Security Council. I was a
recipient of the most refined intelligence products.
And I satisfied myself that what I had been asked to
say in the unclassified points were consistent with
what I had received in intelligence channels.
Otherwise, I wouldn't have said it.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\256\Rice Testimony at 157.
While Rice is mostly correct in noting the unclassified
talking points were consistent with what she had received
through intelligence channels, there was one major difference,
as discussed above. What Rice received through intelligence
channels said ``The currently available information suggests
that the attacks in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by
protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct
assault against the U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi and
subsequently its annex.''\257\ Yet the unclassified talking
points said ``The currently available information suggests that
the demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by
protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct
assault against the U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi and
subsequently its annex.''\258\ That change--from ``attacks'' to
``demonstrations''--significantly altered the meaning of the
entire sentence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123 (emphasis added).
\258\Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (emphasis
added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In her interview before the Committee, Rice maintained the
claim that the talking points were similar to the analysis. In
fact she had reviewed the two documents side by side ``very
recently.''\259\ She testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\259\Rice Testimony at 50.
Q: And do you know how closely those products mirrored
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that bullet point?
A: Virtually identical but not verbatim.
Q: Okay. And do you know, if it was not verbatim, what
the differences were between what you read----
A: I can't tell you precisely, but if you--I do recall
looking at them side-by-side and being comfortable that
they were--well, at the time, I didn't look at them
side-by-side, but I knew from having seen intelligence
as early as that previous morning, Saturday morning,
that this was very consistent with our latest
information.
Q: And you have since looked at them side-by-side?
A: Yes.
Q: And you're still comfortable that what was in the
intelligence is virtually identical to what's in that
bullet point?
A: Yes.
Q: And do you recall how recently you looked at them
side-by-side?
A: Very recently.
* * *
Q: Sure. My question is you said that you looked at
them recently side-by-side, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And you were comfortable that what was in the
finished intelligence is reflected here in this bullet
point.
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And did you recognize any differences between,
looking at them side-by-side, what you saw in the
intelligence versus what's in the bullet point?
A: Okay. So let me be precise. What's in this bullet
point closely mirrored a similar paragraph in the
finished intelligence product that I received at the
same time. I'm not saying this is the sum total of what
I saw.
Q: Sure. And you say it closely resembled or closely
mirrored. My question is, what are the differences
between what you reviewed and what's in here?
A: I don't recall any substantive differences.
Q: And you looked at this recently?
A: Yes.\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\260\Id. at 49-51.
Despite the precision by Rice and the fact she had compared
the documents side by side very recently, ``attacks'' and
``demonstrations'' are fundamentally different words with
fundamentally different meanings. The specific language Rice
received through intelligence channels relating to the attacks
here was accurate, and what she read from the talking points
based on demonstrations was not. The fact she testified she did
not recall any substantive differences does not mean no
substantive differences existed.
What Rice Said on the Shows
Despite Rice's limited knowledge about the Benghazi attacks
when she appeared on the Sunday talk shows, some of her
comments were conclusory, some were based neither in evidence
nor fact, and some went well beyond what even the flawed
talking points indicated. Two months after she appeared on the
talk shows, she stated publicly:
When discussing the attacks against our facilities in
Benghazi, I relied solely and squarely on the
information provided to me by the intelligence
community. I made clear that the information was
preliminary and that our investigations would give us
the definitive answers. Everyone, particularly the
intelligence community, has worked in good faith to
provide the best assessment based on the information
available. You know the FBI and the State Department's
Accountability Review Board are conducting
investigations as we speak, and they will look into all
aspects of this heinous terrorist attack to provide
what will become the definitive accounting of what
occurred.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\Krishnadev Calamur, Susan Rice Says Benghazi Claims Were Based
On Information From Intelligence, NPR (Nov. 21, 2012), http://
www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/11/21/165686269/susan-rice-says-
benghazi-claims-were-based-on-information-from-intelligence.
A close examination of what Rice actually did say on each
of the Sunday morning shows, however, along with the
Committee's interview with her, demonstrates she in fact went
well beyond ``solely and squarely'' relying on the information
provided to her by the intelligence community.\262\ In
addition, several aspects of her Benghazi remarks--conflating
the video with the attack, the status of the FBI investigation,
the number of attackers, and the amount of security present at
the State Department compound, to name a few--drifted even
farther from the information provided to her by the
intelligence community. An analysis of some of Rice's comments
is below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\Id. (``When discussing the attacks against our facilities in
Benghazi, I relied solely and squarely on the information provided to
me by the intelligence community.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FACE THE NATION
Face the Nation was unlike the other four shows in that
Libyan President Mohamed el-Magariaf appeared on the show
immediately prior to Rice. During his interview with Bob
Schieffer, Face the Nation host, el-Magariaf, who hailed from
Benghazi, attended university there, and had deep ties to the
city, said there was ``no doubt'' the attacks were preplanned.
El-Magariaf said of the attack:
Q: Was this a long-planned attack, as far as you know?
Or what--what do you know about that?
A: The way these perpetrators acted and moved, I think
we--and they're choosing the specific date for this so-
called demonstration, I think we have no--this leaves
us with no doubt that this was preplanned, determined--
predetermined.
Q: And you believe that this was the work of al-Qaeda
and you believe that it was led by foreigners. Is
that--is that what you are telling us?
A: It was planned--definitely, it was planned by
foreigners, by people who--who entered the country a
few months ago, and they were planning this criminal
act since their--since their arrival.
Schieffer also asked President el-Magariaf about the FBI
traveling to Benghazi to investigate the attacks:
Q: Will it be safe for the FBI investigators from the
United States to come in, are you advising them to stay
away for a while?
A: Maybe it is better for them to stay for a--for a
little while? For a little while, but until we--we--
we--we do what we--we have to do ourselves. But, again,
we'll be in need for--for their presence to help in
further investigation. And, I mean any hasty action
will--I think is not welcomed.
Rice appeared immediately after President el-Magariaf on
the show. She testified to the Committee she heard el-Magariaf
say the attacks were preplanned, and even though his comments
did not align with the talking points she was given, she was
unconcerned. She testified:
Q: My question was, how did you react to that?
A: I was surprised.
Q: And what did you do? Were you concerned that he may
have known something that you did not know?
A: I didn't know what he knew. I knew what we knew and
what the intelligence community's current best
assessment was. And so it was my responsibility to
faithfully relay that and not make something up on the
fly based on what he said.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\263\Rice Testimony at 147.
When asked about President el-Magariaf's comments by
Schieffer, though, Rice actually disagreed with him. She
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
responded:
Q: But you do not agree with him that this was
something that had been plotted out several months ago?
A: We do not--we do not have information at present
that leads us to conclude that this was premeditated or
preplanned.
Q: Do you agree or disagree with him that al-Qaeda had
some part in this?
A: Well, we'll have to find that out. I mean I think
it's clear that there were extremist elements that
joined in and escalated the violence. Whether they were
al-Qaeda affiliates, whether they were Libyan-based
extremists or al-Qaeda itself I think is one of the
things we'll have to determine.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\``Face the Nation'' transcripts, September 16, 2012: Libyan
Pres. Magariaf, Amb. Rice and Sen. McCain, CBS News (Sept. 16, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-
transcripts-september-16-2012-libyan-pres-magariaf-amb-rice-and-sen-
mccain.
Notwithstanding intelligence Rice had seen indicating that
al-Qaeda extremists were involved in the attacks\265\--and that
the first draft of the HPSCI talking points also noted this
fact\266\--the fallout of Rice's disagreement with President
el-Magariaf was large. According to Hicks, the top American
official in Libya at the time, Rice's comments prevented the
FBI from going to Benghazi for a number of weeks. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\265\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123; Rice Testimony at 42.
\266\Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last
visited May 17, 2016).
Q: Do you think those statements had an effect going
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
forward? What difference did those statements make?
A: I think that they affected cooperation with the
Libyans. I mean, I have heard from a friend who had
dinner with President Magariaf in New York City that he
was still angry at Ambassador Rice well after the
incident.
You know, the Libyan Government doesn't have a deep
bench. President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime
Minister, Minister. After that, nah, not much there.
Some ministries, yeah, you can go--it goes three deep,
it goes down three layers. Most ministries it's just
the Minister. So if the President of the country isn't
behind something, it's going to be pretty hard to make
it happen.
And I firmly believe that the reason it took us so long
to get the FBI to Benghazi is because of those Sunday
talk shows. And, you know, frankly, we never, ever had
official approval from the Libyan Government to send
the FBI to Benghazi. We stitched together a series of
lower-level agreements to support from relevant groups,
and we sat around in the meeting and we said, well,
guys, this is as good as it gets in Libya. And we
looked at the legat [legal attache] and said, call it
in, this is your shot. Call it in to D.C. and see if
they're ready--if they're willing to send a team. And
that's how--that's how the FBI got to Benghazi.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\267\Hicks Testimony at 232.
In her interview with Bob Schieffer, Rice also discussed
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the FBI investigation. She said:
Q: Madam Ambassador, he says this is something that has
been in the planning stages for months. I understand
you have been saying that you think it was spontaneous?
Are we not on the same page here?
A: Bob, let me tell you what we understand to be the
assessment at present. First of all, very importantly,
as you discussed with the President, there is an
investigation that the United States government will
launch led by the FBI, that has begun and----
Q: (overlapping) But they are not there.
A: They are not on the ground yet, but they have
already begun looking at all sorts of evidence of--of
various sorts already available to them and to us. And
they will get on the ground and continue the
investigation. So we'll want to see the results of that
investigation to draw any definitive conclusions. But
based on the best information we have to date, what our
assessment is as of the present is in fact what began
spontaneously in Benghazi as a reaction to what had
transpired some hours earlier in Cairo where, of
course, as you know, there was a violent protest
outside of our embassy----
In her comments Rice states the FBI has ``already begun
looking at all sorts of evidence.''\268\ Yet nobody from the
FBI or Justice Department was on the preparation call with her
the day before the shows, and she did not know what evidence
the FBI had already ``begun'' reviewing, despite her claim that
the FBI was doing so. In addition, she did not rely on the
HPSCI talking points here when discussing the FBI
investigation, as the talking points indicated only ``the
investigation is ongoing;''\269\ earlier she claimed she had
solely relied on those points when talking about Benghazi.\270\
The Chairman had the following exchange with her about this
topic:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\``Face the Nation'' transcripts, September 16, 2012: Libyan
Pres. Magariaf, Amb. Rice and Sen. McCain, CBS News (Sept. 16, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-
transcripts-september-16-2012-libyan-pres-magariaf-amb-rice-and-sen-
mccain.
\269\Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last
visited May 17, 2016).
\270\See, e.g., Krishnadev Calamur, Susan Rice Says Benghazi Claims
Were Based On Information From Intelligence, NPR (Nov. 21, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/11/21/165686269/susan-rice-
says-benghazi-claims-were-based-on-information-from-intelligence.
Q: If you go back when the issue was first broached.
``Well, Bob, let me tell you what we understand to be
the assessment at present. First of all, very
importantly, as you discussed with the president, there
is an investigation that the United States government
will launch, led by the FBI that has begun.'' Then your
next comment is, ``They are not on the ground yet but
they have already begun looking at all sorts of
evidence.'' What were they looking at that you knew
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
about?
A: I didn't know specifically what evidence, but I knew
that the investigation had begun and that they would do
as they customarily do, try to gather as much evidence
as possible.
Q: They do customarily try to do that; you are correct.
But your statement was, ``They have already begun
looking at all sorts of evidence.'' Who told you that?
A: I don't recall exactly who told me that.
Q: Do you know when you would have been told that?
A: I don't know exactly when but sometime between
September 11th and September 16th.
Q: And there was no one from law enforcement on the 4
p.m. call?
A: No, not to my knowledge.
Q: Do you recall talking to anyone with the Bureau
[FBI] before you went on the Sunday morning talk shows?
A: No.
Q: Well, this is what I'm trying to reconcile. If you
didn't talk to anyone with the FBI, who would have told
you that they had all sorts of evidence?
A: I didn't say they had--``they have begun looking at
all sorts of evidence.'' I was aware, as a senior U.S.
policymaker, that we had announced there was an FBI
investigation already underway and that that
investigation would involve gathering and looking at
all sorts of evidence.
Q: All right. But you go on to say ``already available
to them and to us.'' What evidence was already
available to you?
A: To me personally, none.
Q: Then why would you have said ``available to them and
to us''?
A: I meant to the administration.
Q: Do you know what was available to the
administration?
A: Not precisely at this point.
Q: Not at this point or not at the point that you----
A: At the time.
Q: You did not know at the time what evidence was
available to the administration.
A: That's correct.
Q: Then why would you say ``already available to them
and to us''?
A: Because I knew that we had already begun the process
of gathering information, both from an intelligence
side as well as from the law enforcement side.
Q: All right. I'm with you on the intelligence side,
but this--but I can't find an interview that you
conducted where you did not use ``the FBI.'' And what
I'm trying to understand is what was the source of your
information from the FBI.
A: I didn't have any specific information from the FBI.
I was aware of and what I was trying to convey is that
the FBI was in the process of beginning its
investigation.
Q: So if you were to say they already had begun looking
at all sorts of evidence of various sorts already
available to them and to us, in fact, you were not
available--you were not aware of what evidence they
had.
A: I knew they were looking at intelligence among other
sources of evidence.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\Rice Testimony at 96-98.
Rice used the imprimatur of the FBI as a highly respected
law enforcement agency and then conflated the fact they had
begun an investigation with her statement the Bureau was
``already looking at all sorts of evidence.'' In reality, Rice
had no idea what the FBI was doing and where the investigation
stood. The FBI would ultimately secure possession of the
surveillance video from cameras on the Benghazi compound over a
week later, but that video was not yet available to the
Bureau--or the U.S. government--and once it became available,
it impeached many aspects of the administration's initial
assessment about the attacks.
Other evidence available to the Bureau at the time of
Rice's Sunday morning talk show appearances would have included
eyewitness accounts from both State Department and CIA
witnesses who survived the attacks. The administration either
did not avail itself of these eyewitness accounts or completely
ignored what these witnesses had to say. These accounts would
contradict most of the administration's initial public
statements about both the existence of a protest and a link
between the attacks in Benghazi and an internet video.
Rice invoked the name of a premiere law enforcement agency,
indicated all sorts of evidence was available to them and then
proceeded to recite talking points that would later be utterly
impeached by the information that was gathered by the Bureau.
Currently, the FBI's investigative position is reflected in
both the charging instrument in U.S. v. Ahmed Abu Khattalah as
well as various pre-trial motions. Instead of validating Rice's
comments, the FBI's current assessment of what happened in
Benghazi is closer to being the opposite of what Rice described
on national television.
When discussing the spontaneity of the attack, Rice also
used definitive language about what had transpired. Such
definitive language was not consistent with the HPSCI talking
points. She had the following exchange with the Chairman about
that comment:
Q: ``Our best current assessment, based on the
information that we have at present, is that, in fact,
what this began as, it was a spontaneous''--what did
you mean by ``in fact''?
A: What I meant was that what we understood to be the
case at the time was as I described. It was
spontaneous, not premeditated, et cetera.
Q: But why would you use the--why would you use the
phrase ``in fact''? Ranking Member Schiff took great
pains to talk about all the qualifying language that
you used. ``In fact'' strikes me as being more
definitive than qualifying language.
A: Given all the qualifiers that I put in here, I was
not trying to convey that what I was saying was the
last and final word on this.
Q: Okay. What does the word ``premeditated'' mean to
you?
A: It means that whoever was involved had planned in
advance to do what they did.
Q: How much planning would need to have taken place for
it to qualify as premeditated or preplanned?
A: I don't have a clear answer to that.
Q: Well, you specifically said it was not preplanned
and not premeditated. So I'm trying to get an
understanding of how short a period of time something
would need to be planned to not be preplanned or
premeditated. What time period?
A: I don't have a definitive answer to that question.
What I was trying to do, sir, is to convey, consistent
with the talking points that this was, to the best of
our understanding, a spontaneous reaction. And, to me,
the antithesis of ``spontaneous'' is ``preplanned or
premeditated.'' I was trying to say the same thing in a
slightly different way.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\Id. at 101-102.
It is unclear why Rice used such definitive language when
the talking points she reviewed and relied on did not use
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
similarly strong language.
THIS WEEK WITH GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS
It was during her appearance on This Week when Rice made
the clearest link between the video and the Benghazi attacks.
She said:
Q: It just seems that the U.S. government is powerless
as this--as this maelstrom erupts.
A: It's actually the opposite. First of all, let's be
clear about what transpired here. What happened this
week in Cairo, in Benghazi, in many other parts of the
region . . .
Q: Tunisia, Khartoum . . .
A: . . .was a result--a direct result of a heinous and
offensive video that was widely disseminated, that the
U.S. government had nothing to do with, which we have
made clear is reprehensible and disgusting. We have
also been very clear in saying that there is no excuse
for violence, there is--that we have condemned it in
the strongest possible terms.
But let's look at what's happened. It's quite the
opposite of being impotent. We have worked with the
governments in Egypt. President Obama picked up the
phone and talked to President Morsi in Egypt. And as
soon as he did that, the security provided to our
personnel in our embassies dramatically increased.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\273\`This Week' Transcript: U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Susan Rice, ABC News (Sept. 16, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
week-transcript-us-ambassador-united-nations-susan-rice/
story?id=17240933.
In her comments, Rice stated ``what happened this week in
Cairo, in Benghazi, in many other parts of the region . . . was
a result--a direct result--of a heinous and video that was
widely disseminated.''\274\ Nowhere in the HPSCI talking
points--which Rice said she relied on ``solely and squarely''--
is there a mention of a direct link to the video. In fact,
there is no mention of a link to a video at all, and the
Committee is not aware of any mention of a direct link to the
video in any intelligence Rice reviewed prior to her appearance
on This Week. In mentioning a direct link to the video, Rice
strayed far beyond her talking points and provided incorrect
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\274\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rice told the Committee she was not trying to use the
talking points here, and may have misspoke. She testified:
Q: Okay. We will go through those transcripts. But to
the extent you were linking Benghazi and suggesting
that there were protests there, your statement--and
tell me if you disagree with this--your statement that
what occurred in Benghazi was a result, and then for
emphasis you say ``a direct result,'' of the heinous
and offensive video.'' I mean, do you believe that you
went a little bit beyond what was in the talking points
in making that statement?
A: I wasn't even trying to utilize the talking points
here. I was talking about what had happened around the
world. That's what I meant to be focused on.
Q: So when you included Benghazi, did you--was that--
did you misspeak?
A: Quite possibly.
Q: Because you would agree that, at the time you made
this statement on Mr. Tapper's show, the information
you had did not--did not state that there was a direct
connection between the video and what occurred in
Benghazi.
A: That's right. And that's why I was, I think, more
precise in the other transcripts.\275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\Rice Testimony at 115-16.
Rice later testified that she was ``very careful'' to link
the video to what happened in Cairo. Despite her comments on
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This Week, Rice told the Committee:
What I can say is that I--we have been through this,
but I was very careful to link the video to what
happened in Cairo and to other posts around the world.
I did not say that the attack on Benghazi was directly
caused by the video.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\276\Id. at 166.
Morell, a career CIA analyst who rose through the ranks to
become Deputy Director and Acting Director, disagrees with
Rice's analysis of her own comments. Morell said that a ``good
bit of what she said was consistent with the CIA points, but
she also said that the video had led to the protests in
Benghazi. Why she said this I do not know. It is a question
that only she can answer.''\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\Morell, supra note 114, at 228-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rice also stated on This Week that there was a
``substantial'' security presence at the United States
``consulate'' in Benghazi. She said:
Q: Why was there such a security breakdown? Why was
there not better security at the compound in Benghazi?
Why were there not U.S. Marines at the embassy in
Tripoli?
A: Well, first of all, we had a substantial security
presence with our personnel . . .
Q: Not substantial enough, though, right?
A: . . . with our personnel and the consulate in
Benghazi. Tragically, two of the four Americans who
were killed were there providing security. That was
their function. And indeed, there were many other
colleagues who were doing the same with them.
It obviously didn't prove sufficient to the--the nature
of the attack and sufficient in that--in that moment.
And that's why, obviously, we have reinforced our
remaining presence in Tripoli and why the president has
very--been very clear that in Libya and throughout the
region we are going to call on the governments, first
of all, to assume their responsibilities to protect our
facilities and our personnel, and we're reinforcing our
facilities and our--our embassies where possible...
The State Department facility in Benghazi was not a
consulate. The talking points provided to Rice about Benghazi
did not mention anything about a consulate. In fact, the term
``consulate'' was specifically edited out of the talking points
for accuracy before they were provided to Rice. A consulate is
formally notified to the host government--something the
Benghazi diplomatic post was not--and provides certain services
to citizens.
As a former Assistant Secretary of State, Rice knew there
was a difference between a consulate and diplomatic post. She
testified to the Committee that she may have misspoke on this
point and, with a statement of fact, acknowledged the
difference:
Q: So, following along, top of page 4, you say, ``With
our personnel and the consulate in Benghazi.'' Was
there a consulate in Benghazi?
A: It was a diplomatic post.
Q: Why did you say ``consulate'' if there was no
consulate in Benghazi?
A: I may have misspoke.
Q: Okay. Is there a difference between a consulate and
a diplomatic post?
A: Yes, in fact, there is.\278\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\Rice Testimony at 106.
In addition, the mention of a consulate may imply to some a
stronger fortification than a diplomatic post, perhaps
indicating an additional amount of security. While a
``substantial security presence'' is the point Rice was
attempting to convey--and as the Accountability Review Board
made clear--the security presence at the State Department
facility in Benghazi was nowhere near substantial.\279\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\279\Benghazi ARB, supra note 20, at 31-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell wrote in his book the ``harder statement'' for Rice
to explain is why she ``said that there was a `substantial
security presence' in Benghazi, as that point was not in either
CIA or the White House talking points.''\280\ Rice explained to
the Committee about what she meant when she said there was a
substantial security presence:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\280\Morell, supra note 114, at 229.
Q: What did you mean, you said, ``We had a substantial
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
security presence with our personnel''?
A: I meant what I just said.
Q: What does a substantial security presence mean to
you?
A: It means significant, more than one, more than two,
more than three.
Q: Did you have any indication of how many security
personnel were actually with the State Department in
Benghazi?
A: Did I have any indication?
Q: Did you have any indication at the time you made the
comments how many State Department personnel, security
personnel, were in Benghazi?
A: I knew we had a Diplomatic Security presence.
Q: Okay.
A: I knew we had contractors.
Q: Okay.
A: I knew that two of the people who had been killed
were there in a security capacity.
Q: Okay. But in terms of ``substantial security
presence,'' to you that means more than one individual?
A: It means--it can--certainly means more than one. But
it doesn't mean--I wasn't trying to say it means 10, it
means 20, it means 50. It was substantial.
Q: Is ``substantial security presence'' more than one?
Is that--in all situations, does a substantial security
presence mean more than one, or are you referring
specifically to Benghazi in this case?
A: I was referring to Benghazi.
Q: Okay.
A: But I was also making the point, as you'll see
subsequently, that it obviously didn't prove sufficient
to the attack.
Q: Okay. So I just want to make sure I'm clear.
``Substantial security presence,'' in your mind, can
mean two individuals.
A: I didn't say that.
Q: You said more than one.
A: I said more than one, more than two--we can keep
going. I didn't mean to imply.\281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\281\Rice Testimony at 103-05.
Rice was mistaken again in stating there were State
Department security contractors in Benghazi. The security
contractors who died in the Benghazi attacks worked for the
CIA--and their job was to protect the CIA facility in Benghazi,
not the State Department facility. Rice, whether intentionally
or negligently, presented misleading information about the size
of the security presence at the State Department facility in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi.
FOX NEWS SUNDAY
Rice also characterized the level of security in Benghazi
on Fox News Sunday--something that was not in her talking
points. She said:
Q: All right. And the last question, terror cells in
Benghazi had carried out five attacks since April,
including one at the same consulate, a bombing at the
same consulate in June. Should U.S. security have been
tighter at that consulate given the history of terror
activity in Benghazi?
A: Well, we obviously did have a strong security
presence. And, unfortunately, two of the four Americans
who died in Benghazi were there to provide security.
But it wasn't sufficient in the circumstances to
prevent the overrun of the consulate. This is among the
things that will be looked at as the investigation
unfolds and it's also why----
Q: Is there any feeling that it should have been
stronger beforehand?
A: It's also why we increased our presence, our
security presence in Tripoli in the aftermath of this,
as well as in other parts of the world. I can't judge
that, Chris. I'm--we have to see what the assessment
reveals. But, obviously, there was a significant
security presence defending our consulate and our other
facility in Benghazi and that did not prove sufficient
to the moment.\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\282\Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against
Americans in the Middle East, Fox News Sunday (Sept. 16, 2012), http://
www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chris-
wallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-
against-americans-middle-east#p//v/1843960658001.
When asked about the use of the word ``strong'' versus
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``substantial,'' as she said on This Week, Rice responded:
Q: Okay. Just a couple more questions about your
interview with Mr. Wallace. Your next response: ``Well,
we obviously did have a strong security presence.''
What did you mean when you said ``strong security
presence''?
A: I think we had this exchange over another adjective
I used.
Q: That was ``substantial.'' I'm asking you about
``strong.''
A: The same answer applies.
Q: Same answer? Okay. So more than one?
A: That wasn't my prior answer.\283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\283\Rice Testimony at 125.
In her appearance on Fox News Sunday¸ Rice noted
``two of the four Americans who died in Benghazi were there to
provide security. But it wasn't sufficient in the circumstances
to prevent the overrun of the consulate.''\284\ This statement
implies the two security officers who died were tasked with
protecting the State Department facility. They were not; their
job was solely to protect the CIA facility and CIA personnel.
In reality the two she referenced--Glen Doherty and Tyrone
Woods--were killed because the inadequate security at the State
Department facility in Benghazi was not sufficient to repel the
initial attack thus necessitating aid from CIA contractors at
the Annex in Benghazi and from Tripoli.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\284\Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against
Americans in the Middle East, Fox News Sunday (Sept. 16, 2012), http://
www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chris-
wallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-
against-americans-middle-east#p//v/1843960658001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case of Glen Doherty, not only was he not in
Benghazi to provide security for the Benghazi Mission compound,
he was not in Benghazi at all--at least initially. He left
Tripoli to respond to the attacks in Benghazi precisely because
State Department security proved inadequate. And neither
Doherty nor Tyrone Woods were killed in the ``overrun of the
consulate.'' As noted above, there was no ``consulate'' in
Benghazi and the Benghazi Mission compound was ``overrun''
hours before Doherty and Woods were killed.
Rice's appearance on Fox News Sunday is also where she was
imprecise--again--in discussing the FBI investigation.
Specifically, she said:
Q: Let's talk about the attack on the U.S. consulate in
Benghazi this week that killed four Americans,
including Ambassador Chris Stevens. The top Libyan
official says that the attack on Tuesday was, quote,
his words ''preplanned.'' Al Qaeda says the operation
was revenge for our killing a top Al Qaeda leader. What
do we know?
A: Well, first of all, Chris, we are obviously
investigating this very closely. The FBI has a lead in
this investigation. The information, the best
information and the best assessment we have today is
that in fact this was not a preplanned, premeditated
attack. That what happened initially was that it was a
spontaneous reaction to what had just transpired in
Cairo as a consequence of the video. People gathered
outside the embassy and then it grew very violent and
those with extremist ties joined the fray and came with
heavy weapons, which unfortunately are quite common in
post-revolutionary Libya and that then spun out of
control.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\285\Id.
Significantly, Rice noted the ``FBI has a lead in this
investigation.''\286\ This critical distinction may have
incorrectly implied to some the FBI was making significant
progress in the nascent investigation. The Chairman had the
following exchange with Rice about this topic:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\Id.
Q: On one of the occasions, you said--this is to Chris
Wallace--``The FBI has a lead in this investigation.''
How would you have learned that if you had not talked
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to the FBI?
A: Because I was aware, as a senior policymaker, that
the FBI has a lead role in conducting investigations in
this circumstance and others like it.
Q: But there's a tremendous difference between the FBI
has ``the lead'' and the FBI has ``a lead.'' ``A lead''
is a law enforcement term that we have a suspect, we
have a lead.
A: No, no, no. Excuse me. That was not what I was
trying to say. I was saying they had the lead, as in
the leadership role, not a lead on a suspect in the
investigation.
Q: All right. So at least with respect to that
transcript, you intended the article ``the'' instead of
the article ``a'' to modify the lead. You were not
suggesting that they had a lead but that they were
taking the lead in the investigation.
A: That's what I meant.
Q: Okay. All right.\287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\287\Rice Testimony at 95.
In her interview with the Committee, Rice said that in the
future, perhaps a ``no comment'' regarding an FBI investigation
would be more appropriate. She had the following exchange with
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Chairman:
Q: I guess this is what I am getting at, just from a
broader perspective. We all hear, whether it's Attorney
General Holder, Attorney General Lynch, really anybody
in the criminal justice realm just doesn't comment on
ongoing investigations. They don't make comments and
use qualifying predicates. They just say: Look, I don't
know. And I am not going to answer your question until
the investigation is complete. Why not respond that way
when you were asked on the Sunday morning talk shows?
A: Sir, I wasn't trying to qualify or characterize the
investigation. I was trying to indicate that there was
an investigation, that it was going to be thorough, and
that it would reveal the best information as to what
had transpired.
Q: I am not challenging that. I am just saying instead
of saying, ``Our best assessment at this time is that
it was not premeditated, not preplanned, that it was
spontaneous,'' one out of five references to the video,
why not just say, ``The investigation has just begun;
we don't know; and I am not going to guess''?
A: Because our intelligence community, in response to a
request from HPSCI, had provided talking points along
the lines that we have discussed multiple times now.
And those talking points, which you and your colleagues
would have gone out with, were more detailed than
simply saying, ``I don't know.''
Q: Right. But you and I both know in hindsight that the
talking points, at least to some degree, were wrong. So
I guess the lesson moving forward is maybe we should
just say, ``It's an ongoing investigation, and I am not
going to comment on it.''
A: Maybe we should.\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\288\Id. at 146-147.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rice also said the following on Fox News Sunday:
But we don't see at this point signs this was a
coordinated plan, premeditated attack. Obviously, we
will wait for the results of the investigation and we
don't want to jump to conclusions before then. But I do
think it's important for the American people to know
our best current assessment.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against
Americans in the Middle East, Fox News Sunday (Sept. 16, 2012), http://
www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chris-
wallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-
against-americans-middle-east#p//v/1843960658001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rice testified to the Committee about these comments:
Q: But when you said, ``We don't see at this point
signs,'' did you mean to say that there were no signs,
or did you mean to say that there was no conclusion
that it was a coordinated, premeditated attack?
A: I didn't purport to draw any final conclusions at
any point during these interviews. I was very careful
to underscore that I was providing the current best
information and that information could change.\290\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\290\Rice Testimony at 125.
Rather than noting that no final conclusions had been drawn
by the intelligence community about premeditation, however,
Rice instead chose to state there were ``no signs'' at all of
any premeditation.\291\ In this regard she not only went beyond
the talking points she was provided, but she was also
incorrect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\291\See Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against
Americans in the Middle East, Fox News Sunday (Sept. 16, 2012), http://
www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chris-wallace/2012/09/16/amb-
susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-against-americans-middle-
east#p//v/1843960658001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, multiple signs existed at the time she appeared on
Fox News Sunday that the attack may have been premeditated.
[redacted text]\292\ Another piece of intelligence from
September 13 indicated that an attack was imminent--mere
minutes away--and known by multiple parties.\293\ Rice could
have made her point by simply saying ``our current assessment
is that the attack was neither coordinated nor premeditated.''
Instead, she chose to go a step further and, inaccurately,
state ``we don't at this point see signs this was a coordinated
plan.''\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\292\[Redacted text].
\293\[Redacted text].
\294\Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against
Americans in the Middle East, Fox News Sunday (Sept. 16, 2012), http://
www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chris-
wallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-
against-americans-middle-east#p//v/1843960658001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEET THE PRESS
Rice's comments on Meet the Press are perhaps the most
egregious diversion from the talking points provided to her
about Benghazi. She said:
Well, let us--let me tell you the--the best information
we have at present. First of all, there's an FBI
investigation which is ongoing. And we look to that
investigation to give us the definitive word as to what
transpired. But putting together the best information
that we have available to us today, our current
assessment is that what happened in Benghazi was in
fact initially a spontaneous reaction to what had just
transpired hours before in Cairo, almost a copycat of--
of the demonstrations against our facility in Cairo,
which were prompted, of course, by the video. What we
think then transpired in Benghazi is that opportunistic
extremist elements came to the consulate as this was
unfolding. They came with heavy weapons which
unfortunately are readily available in post-
revolutionary Libya. And it escalated into a much more
violent episode. Obviously, that's--that's our best
judgment now. We'll await the results of the
investigation. And the president has been very clear--
we'll work with the Libyan authorities to bring those
responsible to justice.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\295\Meet the Press September 16: Benjamin Netanyahu, Susan Rice,
Keith Ellison, Peter King, Bob Woodward, Jeffrey Goldberg, Andrea
Mitchell, NBC News (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
49051097/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/september-benjamin-netanyahu-
susan-rice-keith-ellison-peter-king-bob-woodward-jeffrey-goldberg-
andrea-mitchell/#.Vzozl_krJaQ.
At the time of her appearance, Rice should have known what
transpired in Benghazi was not a ``copycat'' of what had
transpired in Cairo. On September 11, the day of the Cairo
demonstrations and Benghazi attacks, she received frequent
email updates about both events.\296\ Additionally, Rice
received daily intelligence briefings from the CIA, and she
received a briefing each day from September 12 to September 15.
Out of scores and scores of intelligence products pertaining to
Benghazi provided to the Committee, not a single one said what
transpired in Benghazi was ``almost a copycat of'' what
transpired in Cairo.\297\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\See, e.g., Email from U.S. Dep't of State, to Susan E. Rice,
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file
with the Committee, C05390691); Email from Senior Advisor to the U.S.
Permanent Representative to the U.N., U.S. Mission to the U.N., to
Susan E. Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., et al. (Sept. 11, 2012,
6:41 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561948); and Email from Senior
Advisor to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., U.S. Mission
to the U.N., to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 11:53 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0051721).
\297\Meet the Press September 16: Benjamin Netanyahu, Susan Rice,
Keith Ellison, Peter King, Bob Woodward, Jeffrey Goldberg, Andrea
Mitchell, NBC News (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
49051097/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/september-benjamin-netanyahu-
susan-rice-keith-ellison-peter-king-bob-woodward-jeffrey-goldberg-
andrea-mitchell/#.Vzozl_
krJaQ.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rice acknowledges that nowhere in the talking points was
information indicating the Benghazi attack was a copycat of the
Cairo protest. She testified:
Q: Now, you would agree with me that nowhere in the CIA
talking points does it describe what occurred in
Benghazi and what occurred in Cairo as almost a copycat
of each other? You would agree with me on that?
A: I would agree with you on that.
Q: So would you also agree with me that describing what
occurred in Benghazi as almost a copycat of Cairo was
really overstating what was known at the time and
certainly overstating what was in the talking points?
A: I don't know that it was overstating or even
misstating. But I would agree that the word ``copycat''
does not appear in the talking points.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\298\Rice Testimony at 129-130.
In a later portion of her Meet the Press appearance, Rice
connected the video with the Benghazi attacks, as she had with
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
other appearances on the talk shows. She said:
Q: The president and the secretary of state have talked
about a mob mentality. That's my words, not their
words, but they talked about the--the tyranny of mobs
operating in this part of the world. Here's the
reality, if you look at foreign aid--U.S. direct
foreign aid to the two countries involved here, in
Libya and Egypt, this is what you'd see: two hundred
million since 2011 to Libya, over a billion a year to
Egypt and yet Americans are seeing these kinds of
protests and attacks on our own diplomats. Would--what
do you say to members of congress who are now weighing
whether to suspend our aid to these countries if this
is the response that America gets?
A: Well, first of all, David, let's put this in
perspective. As I said, this is a response to a--a very
offensive video. It's not the first time that American
facilities have come under attack in the Middle East,
going back to 1982 in--in Beirut, going back to the
Khobar Towers in--in Saudi Arabia, or even the attack
on our embassy in 2008 in Yemen.
Q: Or Iran in 1979.
A: This has--this has happened in the past, but there--
and so I don't think that--that we should misunderstand
what this is. The reason we provide aid in Egypt and in
Libya is because it serves American interests because
the relationships . . .\299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\Meet the Press September 16: Benjamin Netanyahu, Susan Rice,
Keith Ellison, Peter King, Bob Woodward, Jeffrey Goldberg, Andrea
Mitchell, NBC News (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
49051097/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/september-benjamin-netanyahu-
susan-rice-keith-ellison-peter-king-bob-woodward-jeffrey-goldberg-
andrea-mitchell/#.Vzozl_krJaQ.
In this part of the conversation, David Gregory, Meet the
Press moderator, and Rice are discussing foreign aid to both
Egypt and Libya. Gregory mentions both countries twice in the
lead-in to his question. Rice responds and says to ``put this
in perspective . . . this is a response to a--a very offensive
video. It's not the first time American facilities have come
under attack in the Middle East . . .''\300\ She does not
distinguish what happened in Libya to what happened in Egypt in
her response, and ties the video to both incidents. After a
brief interjection by Gregory, Rice mentions providing aid to
both Libya and Egypt.\301\ Nowhere in Rice's comments is Libya
distinguished from Egypt, indicating she did not intend for her
comment about the video to apply to just Egypt, but rather both
countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\300\Id.
\301\See Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF THE UNION
On State of the Union, Rice spoke of the number of
attackers at the Benghazi Mission compound. Nowhere in the
talking points--on which she said she solely and squarely
relied--is there any mention of the number of protesters. Rice
said:
Q: But this was sort of a reset, was it not? It was
supposed to be a reset of U.S.-Muslim relations?
A: And indeed, in fact, there had been substantial
improvements. I have been to Libya and walked the
streets of Benghazi myself. And despite what we saw in
that horrific incident where some mob was hijacked
ultimately by a handful of extremists, the United
States is extremely popular in Libya and the outpouring
of sympathy and support for Ambassador Stevens and his
colleagues from the government, from people is evidence
of that . . .\302\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\302\State of the Union with Candy Crowley Interview with Susan
Rice, CNN (Sept. 16, 2012), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
1209/16/sotu.01.html.
In her interview with the Committee, Rice acknowledged this
information was not in the talking points and was unsure where
she got the information about the number of attackers. She
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
Q: Now, you respond, ``And indeed, in fact, there had
been substantial improvements. I have been to Libya and
walked the streets of Benghazi myself. And despite what
we saw in that horrific incident where some mob was
hijacked ultimately by a handful of extremists, the
United States is extremely popular in Libya and the
outpouring of sympathy and support for Ambassador
Stevens and his colleagues from the government, from
people is evidence of that.''
Where did you get the fact that there was a handful of
extremists that had hijacked what occurred in Benghazi?
I mean, our understanding, even at the time, the
information was that there were 20 attackers. That
went--that number went to 50-plus, and then it went to
over 100. Where did you get the number ``a handful,''
which, in my mind anyway, is about five?
A: I don't recall exactly where I got that from.
Q: It's not in the talking points, certainly.
A: Talking points say that ``the demonstrations in
Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at
the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct
assault against the diplomatic post in Benghazi and
subsequently its annex. There are indications that
extremists participated in the violent
demonstrations.''
Q: That's correct. But nowhere in what you just read
does the CIA or the intelligence community attribute a
number to the number of extremists that took place in--
took part in the attacks, correct?
A: Not in these talking points.
Q: Okay. Do you believe that you received that
information from another source?
A: I don't recall.
Q: But you do believe somebody told you that?
A: I don't recall exactly how I acquired that
information.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\303\Rice Testimony at 121-22.
Conveying a ``handful'' of individuals hijacked a mob had
significant implications. By claiming only a handful of
individuals, rather than a larger amount, were involved in the
attack, Rice may have conveyed to the audience a sense that
only a very small number of people were angry enough to attack
the U.S. facility. Had Rice said more than a ``handful'' of
people attacked the compound--which video evidence shows to be
the case--she may have conveyed more widespread problems in
Libya, potentially raising the very policy questions Rhodes
strove so specifically to avoid in his September 14 briefing
memo.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\304\See Rhodes Memo, supra note 3 (``[T]hese protests are rooted
in an Internet video, and not a broader failure of policy.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Rice was on message in the following clause of the
sentence--``the United States is extremely popular in Libya,''
indicating a successful Libya policy--unfortunately, the United
States evacuated its embassy in Tripoli in July 2014 and today
does not have an official diplomatic presence in Libya.
REACTIONS TO THE SUNDAY SHOWS
The reaction to Rice's comments on the Sunday talk shows
was as divided as it was quick. Many felt Rice presented
information not based in fact, while others believed she simply
stuck assiduously to the talking points she had been given.
``Off The Reservation on Five Networks!''
Even though the Secretary did not appear on the Sunday talk
shows, she monitored what Rice said on those shows. As the
transcript for each show became available late Sunday morning
into early Sunday afternoon, Sullivan sent a copy of the
transcript to the Secretary with an accompanying note. The
first transcript he sent her was from This Week. Sullivan
wrote:
Here is Susan on this week. She wasn't asked about
whether we had any intel. But she did make clear our
view that this started spontaneously and then evolved.
The only troubling sentence relates to the
investigation, specifically: ``And we'll see when the
investigation unfolds whether what was--what transpired
in Benghazi might have unfolded differently in
different circumstances.'' But she got pushed there.
Waiting on other transcripts.\305\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y
of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 16, 2012, 12:22 PM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0045373).
This note from Sullivan is interesting for two reasons.
First, he writes that Rice makes clear their ``view that this
started spontaneously and then evolved.''\306\ Second, Sullivan
expresses concern regarding Rice's comment on the
investigation, where she said ``[a]nd we'll see when the
investigation unfolds whether what was--what transpired in
Benghazi might have unfolded differently in different
circumstances.''\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\306\Id.
\307\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fact that Benghazi may have transpired differently--and
not spontaneously as a result of Cairo, as intelligence
indicated to be the case--contained serious policy
implications. If Benghazi started spontaneously and then
evolved--as Sullivan seemed to indicate he and the Secretary
believed--that would indicate a similarity with other areas in
the Middle East, where protests had transpired as a result of
the offensive video. If, on the other hand, Benghazi transpired
differently--as a premeditated terrorist attack, for instance--
such a scenario would call into question whether the United
States was defeating terrorism, and would raise doubts about
the government's policy towards Libya specifically, and perhaps
the Middle East generally. The fact Rice raised this as a
possibility appeared to be unsettling to Sullivan.
Sullivan later passed on the transcript to State of the
Union with an accompanying note saying ``Nothing to this
one.''\308\ Sullivan also forwarded the transcript for Meet the
Press, with an accompanying note simply saying ``[g]ood.''\309\
Just three minutes later, the Secretary responded and said
``[p]ls remind Panetta NOT to mention Tunisia--in fact no
specifics preferable.''\310\ This may have been in response to
the Meet the Press transcript, where moderator Gregory
mentioned the evacuation of all but emergency personnel from
diplomatic missions in Tunisia and Sudan, and that the
Secretary of Defense has deployed forces to several areas to
protect U.S. personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\308\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y
of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 16, 2012, 2:38 PM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0045387).
\309\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y
of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 16, 2012, 2:36 PM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0045390).
\310\Email from Sec'y Clinton to Mr. Sullivan (Sept. 16, 2012, 2:39
PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0045390).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Almost immediately after Rice's appearance on the shows,
Pelton highlighted conflicting statements between Rice and
Libya President el-Magariaf. At 9:41a.m. on Sunday, September
16, 2012 she wrote to Rhodes and others on the White House
communications team:
They open w Libyan President who says no doubt attack
preplanned/predetermined. Says planned by foreigners.
Says maybe better for FBI to stay away a little while
though they need their help w investigation. She said
in all other shows that no evidence this was
premeditated, as we discussed. Just fyi.\311\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\Email from Erin Pelton, Dir. of Commc'cs and Spokesperson,
U.S. Mission to the U.N., to Dagoberto Vega, Special Ass't to the
President and Dir. of Broadcast Media, White House, and Benjamin J.
Rhodes, Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor for Strategic Commc'cs, Nat'l Sec.
Council (Sept. 16, 2012, 9:41 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05622905).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pelton testified as to why she sent this email:
Q: Do you recall having drafted this email?
A: Yes.
Q: And what was the--why did you write this email?
A: I wrote this email to alert Ben that what the Libyan
President had said on CBS was inconsistent with what
Ambassador Rice had said on the other shows that we had
already taped.
Q: Did that inconsistency concern you?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: Because what Ambassador Rice said reflected the best
information that we had at the time.\312\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\312\Pelton Testimony at 114-15.
This email reflects the shortcomings of Rice's preparation
for the Sunday shows, which was reflected in some of her
comments. As described above, on her Saturday prep call were
people from her office and the White House messaging team. No
subject matter experts about Benghazi were on the call nor was
anybody from the intelligence community. Pelton wrote ``no
evidence this was premeditated, as we discussed''\313\--likely
indicating a discussion of this topic on the phone call the day
before. This is a significant difference from simply saying
``the current assessment does not indicate that this was
premeditated.'' In fact, as noted above, [redacted text]
intelligence existed at that point indicating the attack may
have in fact been premeditated.\314\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\313\Email from Ms. Pelton to Mr. Vega and Mr. Rhodes (Sept. 16,
2012, 9:41 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05622905).
\314\[Redacted text].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rice's comments on the Sunday talk shows were met with
shock and disbelief by those closest to the facts of the
situation. Subject matter experts with direct knowledge of the
attacks expressed immediate concern about what Rice had said on
the shows--and potential fallout as a result. Hicks--possibly
the last person to talk with Stevens, and the highest ranking
U.S. official in Libya on Sunday September 16, 2012--said he
was not asked for any information in advance of Rice's
appearance on the show. He testified:
Q: You became the charge on----
A: September 12th, 3 a.m.
Q: And you are the senior U.S. official, senior
diplomat in country starting September 12th. And you've
testified you had constant contact with Washington. So,
are you--as I understand what you are saying, before
the Sunday show--series of appearances on the Sunday
shows, you were not part of the preparation and
planning?
A: That's correct. I was not.
Q: You didn't get a chance to review talking points?
A: No, I did not.\315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\315\Hicks Testimony at 281.
Hicks also testified about Rice's appearance on Face the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nation:
So Magariaf, at great personal risk to himself, goes to
Benghazi to initiate an investigation and lend his own
personal gravitas. Remember he's from the Benghazi area
himself. So he goes to lend his own personal gravitas
and reputation to an investigation of what happens. And
he gets on--and he is on these programs speaking from
Benghazi, and he says this was an attack by Islamic
extremists, possibly with terrorist links. He describes
what happens. He tells the truth of what happened. And
so, you know, Ambassador Rice says what she says,
contradicting what the President of Libya says from
Benghazi.
There's a cardinal rule of diplomacy that we learn in
our orientation class, and that rule is never
inadvertently insult your interlocutor. The net impact
of what has transpired is the spokesperson of the most
powerful country in the world has basically said that
the President of Libya is either a liar or doesn't know
what he's talking about.
The impact of that is immeasurable. Magariaf has just
lost face in front of not only his own people, but the
world. And, you know, my jaw hit the floor as I watched
this. I've never been--I have been a professional
diplomat for 22 years. I have never been as embarrassed
in my life, in my career as on that day. There have
been other times when I've been embarrassed, but that's
the most embarrassing moment of my career.\316\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\Id. at 83-84.
Other subject matter experts within the State Department
also recognized problems with what Rice said on the talk shows.
State Department employees in Washington D.C. who had spoken
with those on the ground in Libya after the attack were
universal in their condemnation of Rice's statements. The
Senior Libya Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,
State Department, wrote: ``I think Rice was off the reservation
on this one.''\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\317\Email from Senior Libya Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Senior Advisor and Spokesperson,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Deputy Dir. for
the Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State & Deputy Dir. for Maghreb Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of State (Sept. 17, 2012, 2:16 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05580618).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Deputy Director, Office of Press and Public Diplomacy,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, responded:
``Off the reservation on five networks!''\318\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\318\Email from [redacted text] to [redacted text], [redacted text]
& [redacted text] (Sept. 17, 2012, 2:18 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05580618).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Bureau of
Near East Affairs, State Department, wrote: ``Yup. Luckily
there's enough in her language to fudge exactly what she said/
meant.''\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\319\Email from [redacted text] to [redacted text], [redacted text]
& [redacted text] (Sept. 17, 2012, 2:17 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05580618).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
He also wrote: ``WH [White House] very worried about the
politics. This was all their doing.''\320\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\320\Email from [redacted text] to [redacted text], [redacted text]
& [redacted text] (Sept. 17, 2012, 2:19 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05580618).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Snipe may not have known exactly what ``worried'' the
White House, he had extensive experience at the State
Department, and had been in contact with the Embassy in
Tripoli. Contrary to what Rice said on the talk shows, he did
not believe any protests or demonstrations had occurred prior
to the attacks. He testified:
Q: And then you made a statement that, you know, based
on your training and experience, essentially you had
never seen anyone bring an RPG to a protest.
A: I mean----
Q: Or that would be unusual.
A: I think what I said was ``bringing an RPG to a
spontaneous protest.'' I mean, I've been to Yemen
before, and, I mean, knives, AK-47s, RPGs. I mean, that
place is armed to the teeth, and I think people bring
an RPG to the toilet sometimes. But when I said that, I
was suggesting that, if you were spontaneously
protesting, an RPG might necessarily not be the first
thing you grab next to your car keys.\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\321\Testimony of Deputy Dir. for the Office of Press and Public
Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at
96-97 (Oct. 9, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
The Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, State
Department, was surprised of the connection made to the video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
She testified:
Q: Do you recall having any discussions with NEA about
the substance of what was said on the talk shows and
whether there was an agreement or disagreement with
what was conveyed?
A: Yes, ma'am. I recall that I was a little bit
surprised. The description of what was said--and,
again, I didn't watch the program myself--it just
sounded more definitive of what potentially had
happened. But, again, I didn't watch the show myself,
and I didn't read the full transcript. I was too busy
that day to do that.
Q: When you say you're a bit surprised, what were you
surprised regarding?
A: I was surprised in the way that they were described
in the press clips, that there was an indication that
there was some connection to the anti-Muslim video of
concern that had been circulating online, that there
was some connection to that. In the press clips that I
read, I remember seeing, like--okay.
Q: And I think, before, you just said that that was a
pretty definitive statement.
A: In the way that I saw it excerpted in the press
clips, it seemed like the connection had been made to
the video more definitively.\322\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\322\Testimony of Deputy Dir. for Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. 33-34 (Dec. 17, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
Diplomatic Security Agent 30, Diplomatic Security Command
Center, State Department, was in the Diplomatic Security
Command Center while the attacks transpired and aware of real-
time information coming straight from Benghazi during the
attack was asked if there was any rioting in Benghazi reported
prior to the attack. His response was: ``Zip, nothing
nada.''\323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\323\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 30 (Sept. 18, 2012, 1:16 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05390678).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Circling the Wagons
While many lower- and mid-level State Department employees
in contact with the Embassy in Tripoli believed Rice went too
far on the talk shows, senior officials at the State Department
and White House did not appear to share that sentiment.
Instead, these senior officials appeared concerned more about
supporting Rice's statements and ensuring any future statements
on the attacks were disciplined than ensuring they were
reflective of what had actually transpired.
The day after Rice's appearance, The Deputy Director,
Office of Maghreb Affairs, sent an email summarizing a meeting
with McDonough. She wrote:
DNSA McDonough apparently told the SVTS [Secure Video
Teleconference] group today that everyone was required
to ``shut their pieholes'' about the Benghazi attack in
light of the FBI investigation, due to start
tomorrow.''\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\Email from Deputy Dir. for Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State, to James N. Miller, Under Sec'y of Defense for Policy, U.S.
Dep't of Defense (Sept. 17, 2012, 6:52 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05580200).
McDonough's comments about the FBI investigation starting
the following day stand in stark contrast with Rice's
statements the day before that the FBI had already begun
collecting ``all sorts of evidence'' in their investigation and
had ``a lead.'' In addition, McDonough's remark about not
commenting in light of the FBI investigation directly address
the issue that Sullivan raised with the Secretary the day
before--the troubling sentence by Rice that the FBI
investigation could uncover ``Benghazi might have unfolded
differently in different circumstances'' from other protests
across the Middle East.\325\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\325\Email from Mr. Sullivan to Sec'y Clinton (Sept. 16, 2012,
12:22 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0045373).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That same day, during her daily press briefing, Nuland was
asked by reporters to comment on the Benghazi attacks even
though there was an FBI investigation. Nuland attempted to
address the dichotomy between her refusal to talk about
Benghazi and Rice's willingness to do so on the Sunday shows.
Nuland said:
Q: Toria, in Friday's briefing, Friday evening, you
essentially stated that all questions concerning any
aspect of the Benghazi attack--the circumstances
surrounding it, the outcome of it, et cetera--would
henceforth be directed by you to the FBI since it's
their investigation.
And yet, on five Sunday shows yesterday, Ambassador
Rice, who works for the same agency as you, was giving
the latest U.S. assessment of how this event unfolded,
specifically by saying we don't believe it was
premeditated or preplanned, and by saying that those
with heavy arms and so forth showed up, in essence, as
she put it, to hijack an ongoing demonstration.
So my first question for you is: Given that Ambassador
Rice is out there talking publicly about it and not
referring Bob Schieffer and Chris Wallace and the rest
to the FBI, may we consider that we can again begin
asking you questions at this podium about the
circumstances of the attack? If it's fair for the
Ambassador to discuss it, it should be fair in this
room, correct?
A: Well, let me start by reminding you that Ambassador
Rice outranks me, as does my own boss, so she is often
at liberty to say more than I am. And I guess that's
going to continue to be the case.
What I will say, though, is that Ambassador Rice, in
her comments on every network over the weekend, was
very clear, very precise, about what our initial
assessment of what happened is. And this was not just
her assessment. It was also an assessment that you've
heard in comments coming from the intelligence
community, in comments coming from the White House. I
don't have anything to give you beyond that.
She also made clear, as I had on Friday, that there is
an ongoing FBI investigation. So frankly, I'm not sure
that it's useful to go beyond that. I'm not capable of
going beyond that, and we'll have to just see what the
FBI investigation brings us.
Q: You would acknowledge, however, that the account of
the events, the preliminary account of the events that
Ambassador Rice offered, diverges starkly from the
account offered by the Libyan President, correct?
A: Well, we've heard a number of different things from
Libya. I would simply say that what--the comments that
Ambassador Rice made accurately reflect our
government's initial assessment.\326\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\326\Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, Bureau
of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 17, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/09/197821.htm [hereinafter Nuland Sept.
17 Briefing].
Nuland also addressed a question as to whether or not
protests had occurred outside the Benghazi compound. Her on-
the-record response, in the wake of Rice's talk show
appearances, was markedly different from what she told
reporters in an off-the-record briefing back on September 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuland said:
Q: And one last question, if I might, because
Ambassador Rice spoke to this. She suggested that there
had been an ongoing demonstration outside the Consulate
or in the proximity of the Consulate in Benghazi that
was, in essence, hijacked by more militant elements who
came armed to the affair. I just want to nail this down
with you. You are--you stand by this notion that there
was, in fact, an ongoing demonstration?
A: I'd simply say that I don't have any information
beyond what Ambassador Rice shared with you and that
her assessment does reflect our initial assessment as a
government.\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\327\Id.
Nuland, similar to the President in his 60 Minutes
interview five days prior, also refused to directly label what
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
had occurred as a terrorist act. She said:
Q: Simply on the basis of what Ambassador Rice has
publicly disclosed, does the United States Government
regard what happened in Benghazi as an act of terror?
A: Again, I'm not going to put labels on this until we
have a complete investigation, okay?
Q: You don't--so you don't regard it as an act of
terrorism?
A: I don't think we know enough. I don't think we know
enough. And we're going to continue to assess. She gave
our preliminary assessment. We're going to have a full
investigation now, and then we'll be in a better
position to put labels on things, okay?\328\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\328\Id.
Even the CIA appeared to take part in the effort to bolster
Rice's statements. Five days after the attack, a September 17,
2012 email exchange between officials at the White House, State
Department, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
[ODNI], and the CIA took place to craft a written response to
questions posed by Fox News reporter Catherine Herridge about
Rice's statements the day before. The first draft of the
response, which appears to have come from the CIA's Office of
Public Affairs, makes a number of misstatements--chiefly one in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the first paragraph:
Off the record, I reviewed the timeline of what is
known now, of course realizing that there will be
interviews of witnesses, people on the ground etc. . .
. to get the down to the minute details. Like you, we
have the attack kicking off reportedly after 9:30 PM
with small crowds gathering during that 9:00-10:00 PM
hour. It's pretty clear, as we discussed, that there
had been smaller protests during the day, nothing along
the scale of what we saw in Cairo or later on in the
week, but protests nonetheless.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\329\Email from Media Spokesperson, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Tommy
Vietor, Nat'l Sec. Spokesperson, Nat'l Sec. Council (Sept. 17, 2012,
4:01 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562137).
It is unclear what information, if any, the CIA public
affairs officer relied on to claim ``it's pretty clear . . .
that there had been smaller protests during the day''\330\--no
CIA intelligence product provided to the Committee contained
any such information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\330\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seven days after the attacks, on September 18, 2012, Meehan
sent an email to Patrick Ventrell, Director, Office of Press
Relations, State Department and Nuland about message
discipline. Her email said:
Focus today on reiterating that our initial assessment
stands, and was based on information available. Keeping
hard line about now waiting for the investigation to
run its course; we will of course provide info as it
comes to light. No discrepancy between what Rice said
and what State and WH said early on regarding
preplanned attack.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\331\Email from Bernadette M. Meehan, Spokesperson, Nat'l Sec.
Council, to Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State &
Patrick H. Ventrell, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 18, 2012,
11:03 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05561843).
Nuland appears to have followed that guidance. In her daily
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
press briefing later that day, Nuland said:
Q: Any more information on the investigation, on the
timeline? There continues to be some question about
whether the protests had all but dissipated before the
attack in Benghazi began, or whether or not the protest
was robust and ongoing and this attack at least used it
for cover. And there also continue to be, frankly, some
apparent differences between the characterization here
that it was a coordinated attack and Ambassador Rice's
assertion that it basically kind of grew out of the
protest.
A: Well, on your last point, I spoke to this
extensively yesterday, making clear that Ambassador
Rice was speaking on behalf of the government with
regard to our initial assessments. I don't have any
more details beyond those that we've already shared,
and I don't expect to because I think all of the
information is going to go to the FBI for their
investigation, and when they're completed, then we'll
have more information.
Q: The idea that it grew--that the protest may have
been used as cover, can you say whether or not the
protest had basically dissipated when the attacks
began?
A: I personally have no more information than what I've
given you, and I don't think that we as a government
will be talking about these details until the FBI has
completed its investigation so that we don't prejudice
it.\332\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\332\Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, Bureau
of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 18, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/09/197912.htm#LIBYA.
Carney also held a press briefing on September 18. During
that briefing, he was asked about the conflict between Libyan
officials and the administration as to what transpired in
Benghazi--a conflict on full display on Face the Nation when
Rice contradicted the Libyan President. Carney, like Rice on
the talk shows, also connected the protests and violence across
the region with the Benghazi attacks, linking the video to both
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
events. He said:
Q: I wanted to go back to the conflict between--the
conflicting reports I guess between the administration
and Libyan officials over what happened. On Friday, you
seemed to cite that the videos were definitely part of
it, but I get the sense that you're backing away from
that a little bit today. Is there something that you've
learned since?
A: No, no. I think what I am making clear and what
Ambassador Rice made clear on Sunday is that reaction
to the video was the precipitating factor in protests
in violence across the region. And what I'm also saying
is that we have--we made that assessment based on the
evidence that we have, and that includes all the
evidence that we have at this time.
I am not, unlike some others, going to prejudge the outcome
of an investigation and categorically assert one way or the
other what the motivations are or what happened exactly until
that investigation is complete. And there are a lot of
suppositions based on the number of weapons and other things
about what really happened in Benghazi and I'd rather wait, and
the President would rather wait, for that investigation to be
completed.
Q: So you're not ruling out that----
A: Of course not. I'm not ruling out--if more
information comes to light, that will obviously be a
part of the investigation and we'll make it available
when appropriate. But at this time, as Ambassador Rice
said and as I said, our understanding and our belief
based on the information we have is it was the video
that caused the unrest in Cairo, and the video and the
unrest in Cairo that helped--that precipitated some of
the unrest in Benghazi and elsewhere. What other
factors were involved is a matter of
investigation.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\333\Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, The White House
(Sept. 18, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/
18/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-9182012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eight days after the attacks, on September 19, 2012, the
Special Assistant to the Spokesperson, State Department, sent
Nuland an email, possibly in response to a press inquiry,
regarding Rice's statements regarding security personnel on the
Sunday shows. He wrote:
This is the only piece I can find that could possibly
be construed as the two security officials being there
w/responsibility to protect the mission compound vice
the annex. From the FOX News Sunday interview . .
.\334\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\334\Email from Special Ass't to the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept.
19, 2012, 5:20 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0052773).
Also on September 19, 2012, Sullivan drafted an ``ALDAC''--
a worldwide cable to all U.S. embassies--approved by the
Secretary in which guidance was given on ``outreach and
messaging'' about the widespread violence in the Middle
East.\335\ The cable continued to connect the attacks with the
video:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\335\Email from Special Ass't to the Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to SWO-Cables (Sept. 19, 2012,
7:13 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0052812-SCB0052813).
Since September 11, 2012, there have been widespread
protests and violence against U.S. and some other
diplomatic posts across the Muslim world. The proximate
cause of the violence was the release by individuals in
the United States of the video trailer for a film that
many Muslims find offensive. Diplomatic compounds have
been breached in several countries including Libya,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. In Benghazi, Libya four
U.S. personnel were killed in the violence[.]\336\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\336\Id.
Even as late as September 20, 2012, Nuland was still
supporting the claims made by Rice on the talk shows. When
reporter Jennifer Rubin asked Nuland to comment on a CBS news
report that ``there was NO protest outside Libya embassy,''
Nuland responded, ``Off: this does not square with our
info.''\337\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\337\Email from Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Jennifer Rubin (``J Rubin'') (Sept. 20, 2012, 9:59 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05412001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the week following her appearances on the Sunday talk
shows, Rice remained publicly silent about her comments.
Privately, however, she was ``constantly interested'' in new
information about the attacks. She testified:
Q: Did you have any conversations with anybody, either
on the night of September 16th or at any day thereafter
up to the point where you learned there were no
protests in Benghazi, on the issue of whether or not
President Magarief was correct or whether or not you
were correct in saying that the attack was spontaneous?
A: I don't recall specific conversations, but I recall
being constantly interested in understanding our
evolving best assessment, with a mind to caring about
its inconsistency with what I was--with what I said on
the 16th.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\338\Rice Testimony at 149.
The absence of protests prior to the Benghazi attacks,
however, remained a troubling issue for the administration. It
was only a matter of time before this fact became widely known
and disseminated publicly. Despite the best efforts by
administration spokespersons to publicly support Rice's
comments, however, the truth ultimately emerged to show much of
what she said on the talk shows was incorrect.
THE SHIFT
A week after the Benghazi attacks, administration officials
began telling the public yet a different story. It started with
Matthew G. Olsen, the Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center.
Matt Olsen's Testimony on September 19
On September 19, 2012, testifying before the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Olsen
firmly stated that what happened in Benghazi was in fact a
terrorist attack. Olsen also testified that individuals
affiliated with al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda's affiliates may have been
involved in the attack. Olsen said:
Q: So, let me begin by asking you whether you would say
that Ambassador Stevens and the three other Americans
died as a result of a terrorist attack.
A: Certainly on that particular question, I would say
yes, they were killed in the course of a terrorist
attack on our embassy.
Q: Right. And do we have reason to believe at this
point that that terrorist attack was preplanned for
September 11th or did the terrorists who were obviously
planning it because it certainly seemed to be a
coordinated terrorist attack just seize the moment of
the demonstrations or protests against the film to
carry out a terrorist attack?
A: A more complicated question, and one, Mr. Chairman,
that we are spending a great deal of time looking at
even as we speak. And it's a--it's a--obviously, an
investigation here is ongoing and facts are being
developed continually. The best information we have
now, the facts that we have now indicate that this was
an opportunistic attack on our embassy. The attack
began and evolved and escalated over several hours at
our embassy--our diplomatic post in Benghazi. It
evolved and escalated over several hours.
It appears that individuals who were certainly well-
armed seized on the opportunity presented as the events
unfolded that evening and into the--into the morning
hours of September 12th. We do know that a number of
militants in the area, as I mentioned, are well-armed
and maintain those arms. What we don't have at this
point is specific intelligence that there was a
significant advanced planning or coordination for this
attack.
Again, we're still developing facts and still looking
for any indications of substantial advanced planning;
we just haven't seen that at this point. So, I think
that's the most I would say at this point. I do want to
emphasize that there is a classified briefing for all
of Congress that will take place tomorrow.
Q: We'll be there. Let me come back to what you said--
that there was evidence or intelligence that, as you
indicated broadly a moment ago, that in eastern Libya,
in the Benghazi area, there were a number of militant
or violent extremist groups. Do we have any idea at
this point who was responsible among those groups for
the attack on the consulate?
A: This is the most important question that we're
considering.
Q: Right.
A: We are focused on who was responsible for this
attack. At this point, I would say is that a number of
different elements appear to have been involved in the
attack, including individuals connected to militant
groups that are prevalent in eastern Libya,
particularly in the Benghazi area, as well. We are
looking at indications that individuals involved in the
attack may have had connections to al-Qaeda or al-
Qaeda's affiliates; in particular, al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb.
Q: Right. So that question has not been determined
yet--whether it was a militant--or a Libyan group or a
group associated with al-Qaeda influence from abroad.
A: That's right. And I would--I would add that what--
the picture that is emerging is one where a number of
different individuals were involved, so it's not
necessarily an either/or proposition.
Q: OK. OK, good, well----
A: Again, as you know, the FBI is leading the
investigation and that's ongoing.\339\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\339\Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing before the S.
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 112th Cong.
(2012) (statement of Matthew Olsen, Dir., Nat'l Counterterrorism
Center).
Olsen's testimony that what had transpired in Benghazi was
a terrorist attack and that there may be links to al-Qaeda was
the first time an administration official had stated either of
those facts publicly. He said the attacks were
``opportunistic'' and did not mention anything about a video.
Olsen responded to Chairman Joseph I. Lieberman's questions
directly, concisely, confidently, and factually. He did not
couch his language, speculate, or go beyond the facts he knew.
Additionally, what he said was accurate. Such fact-centered
testimony stands in stark contrast to Rice's appearances on the
talk shows.
Olsen told the Committee he wanted to talk about the
connection to al-Qaeda at the Senate hearing; a possible al-
Qaeda connection was a large factor in the post-attack analysis
occurring within the intelligence community--a fact the IC had
known for nearly a week.\340\ Olsen testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\340\Olsen Testimony at 55-57 (discussing how long and from what
sources intelligence community knew of al-Qaeda connection).
But my thought at the time was this is not overly
sensitive, and it is the kind of information that I was
concerned, if we didn't--if I didn't say this in
response to a question about who was responsible for
this attack, it would be an omission that would be
glaring in the--you know, as, on, Congress Members,
themselves, were aware of this, right? Some of them
serving on HPSCI or SSCI may well have seen the
reporting. So it seemed to me the right thing to do to
avoid being, you know, viewed as not being as
forthcoming as I could be, even if it went beyond what
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
had been publicly stated.
So that was my thinking at the time, why I thought that
that was an important point to make and why I actually
focused on it in advance of the hearings, so that folks
would know that I was going to say it.\341\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\Id. at 57-58.
Olsen knew at the time the administration had yet to
publicly tie al-Qaeda to the Benghazi attacks. As such, he
directed his head of legislative affairs to alert other
Executive Branch agencies that he would likely make the
connection at the hearing.\342\ Meehan emailed Nuland about
this possibility on the morning of the hearing. In an email
with the subject ``Change of Language per the call''--perhaps
an indication of coordination between how the White House and
State Department were going to respond to press inquiries that
day about Benghazi--Meehan wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\342\Id. at 53-54.
I am rushing to Jay's prep, and will circle up with the
broader group after. But wanted to flag that Matt Olsen
from NCTC will be on the Hill this morning . . . Wanted
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to flag that IF ASKED, Matt will use the line:
There are indications some of the extremists involved
in the attack may be linked to al-Qa'ida or its
affiliates, but this assessment may change as
additional information is collected and analyzed. In
eastern Libya there are numerous armed groups, some of
whom have al-Qa'ida sympathies.
Flagging because it is an unclass session, so if he
makes that statement, word will likely leak, and it is
the first time someone from the USG will be saying that
there might be a link to al-Qaeda. Ben and I discussed,
and agreed that we refer questions to people involved
in the investigation, note the investigation is still
underway and no definitive conclusions yet, and if
pressed, can point out there is no discrepancy with our
original assessment because we always said our original
assessment was based on info available at the time and
that the investigation would provide further detail.
Hopefully won't come up, but wanted to flag just in
case.\343\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\Email from Bernadette M. Meehan, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State, &
Patrick H. Ventrell, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 19, 2012,
10:22 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05561987).
In her email, Meehan mentions a conversation with Rhodes
and notes that ``if pressed, can point out there is no
discrepancy with our original assessment because we always said
our original assessment was based on info available at the time
and that the investigation would provide further detail.''\344\
What Meehan does not say is that the link to al-Qaeda was
actually cited in the intelligence community's original
assessment.\345\ That was not new information, as Olsen
acknowledged.\346\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\344\Id.
\345\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123.
\346\Olsen Testimony at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, Meehan's email--reflecting other public
statements by administration officials up to that point--noted
she and Rhodes ``agreed that we refer questions to people
involved in the investigation.'' Olsen told the Committee the
investigation did not in fact prohibit him from talking about
what had been learned up to that point. He testified:
Q: Was there anything about the FBI investigation that
prohibited you from either, A, saying it was a
terrorist attack, or, B, drawing a link to AQIM?
A: No, nothing that I--no, I don't--certainly not the
question of whether it was a terrorist attack or the
way I phrased the answer to the question on who was
responsible--on the connections to--you know, potential
connections to terrorist groups.
Q: So if nothing about the ongoing investigation
prohibited you from saying that, then why would others
refer to the ongoing investigation when asked those
very same questions?
A: --You know, I, obviously, don't know exactly why others.
I do think there's a range of reasonable, you know, approaches
to this question. In other words, I don't think there is one
right approach.\347\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\347\Id. at 60.
Olsen also testified his background as a prosecutor helps
him create a fact-centered approach to sharing information. He
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
said:
Q: Sure. As a prosecutor, the facts are very important
to you. A fact is a fact, and you're going to share
what that fact may be--is that fair to say?--as opposed
to being concerned about public relations, in lack of a
better phrase, or the impression people might get?
A: That's basically right, and that's sort of--that is
the approach of being a prosecutor in terms of reliance
on facts. I'm not--I shouldn't, you know, lead you to
believe that I'm completely oblivious to----
Q: Of course
A: --the public impression that you can leave and the
importance that that has too.\348\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\348\Id. at 61-62
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though Olsen wanted to state publicly that al-Qaeda
sympathizers may have been involved in the attack, he did not
plan on saying definitively that it was a terrorist attack.
While Olsen knew from the outset it was a terrorist attack--
``all of those factors, you know, made it so that it was, to
me, there was not really a question of whether it was a
terrorist attack''\349\--he testified he had not given it a
great deal of thought, but when asked directly by Lieberman,
the logical response was to acknowledge that it was a terrorist
attack.\350\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\349\Id. at 100.
\350\Id. at 50-51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Olsen recognized almost immediately after the hearing he
may have made news with what he had said with respect to the
events being a terrorist attack. He told the Committee he wrote
an email to the White House alerting them of what he had said.
Olsen testified:
Q: So what were the repercussions of you saying it was
a terrorist attack?
A: So one of the things I did afterwards was I wrote an
email to both John Brennan and Denis McDonough--you
know, Denis was the Deputy National Security Advisor
and John was--John Brennan was the counterterrorism
advisor--and explained to them--you know, I said
something like, ``I made some news today with my
testimony. Here is why I testified that this was a
terrorist attack,'' was my thought process. And they
wrote back to me, saying, ``You did the right thing,''
essentially, in emails that day. You know, ``Understand
you made the right points,'' or something like that.
But again, look, I was aware, again, in a way I hadn't
really been before that what I was testifying to was
potentially newsworthy, and, in fact, it was. So that's
why I thought both let my press person think about what
we need to do, ask him to think about what we may need
to do, and then also, myself, reach out to John Brennan
and Denis McDonough.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\351\Id. at 71-72.
Private reaction from senior officials at the State
Department regarding Olsen's testimony, however, appeared less
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
supportive. Nuland wrote to Sullivan, Mills, and Kennedy:
Fysa, and for Jake's drafting exercise; NCTC also
called it a terrorist attack today: I had demurred on
that as had Jay, pending investigation.\352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\352\Email from Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy
Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff to the
U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, & Patrick F. Kennedy, Under
Sec'y for Management, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 19, 2012, 2:45 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05561975).
Sullivan called the White House to inform them he was
unaware Olsen was going to testify it was a terrorist attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meehan testified:
Q: Do you recall generally having any conversations
with [Jake Sullivan] that week? Or in the immediate
aftermath of the attack, that general period of
September 2012?
A: I do recall having one phone conversation with him.
I don't know whether it's in the scope of the 4 to 5
days that we're discussing.
Q: Okay. What was discussed in that conversation?
A: He raised that he had been unaware before Matt Olsen
testified on the Hill, that Matt Olsen was going to
make a link publicly to Al Qaeda in reference to the
Benghazi attack.
Q: Why did he raise that issue with you?
A: I can't say why I was the individual that he called.
I don't know.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\353\Testimony of Bernadette M. Meehan, Spokesperson, Nat'l Sec.
Council, Tr. at 28-29 (Dec. 16, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
Even the Secretary expressed surprise at Olsen's testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Olsen testified:
Q: Yeah. Did anybody express to you that they were
disappointed in what you said, they were perplexed by
what you said, that what you said may have thrown a
message off kilter?
* * *
A: . . . But, you know, to your question I did hear at
one point--and I don't remember exactly when--from
Director Clapper that he'd heard from Secretary
Clinton, you know, of some surprise about me saying
that it was a terrorist attack. And he basically said--
you know, I remember thinking he basically said, you
know, ``We're saying what we see,'' something like
that.
But I remember hearing from him. He told me directly--I
think we were either in a car or getting ready to get
in his car to come downtown--that he'd gotten a call or
had heard from Secretary Clinton about surprise that
one of his guys was talking about this being a
terrorist attack.\354\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\354\Olsen Testimony at 82-83.
The day after Olsen's testimony, September 20, 2012, the
President participated in a town hall with Univision at the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
University of Miami. The President had the following exchange:
Q: We have reports that the White House said today that
the attacks in Libya were a terrorist attack. Do you
have information indicating that it was Iran, or al-
Qaeda was behind organizing the protests?
A: Well, we're still doing an investigation, and there
are going to be different circumstances in different
countries. And so I don't want to speak to something
until we have all the information. What we do know is
that the natural protests that arose because of the
outrage over the video were used as an excuse by
extremists to see if they can also directly harm U.S.
interests----
Q: Al-Qaeda?
A: Well, we don't know yet. And so we're going to
continue to investigate this. We've insisted on, and
have received so far full cooperation from countries
like Egypt and Libya and Tunisia in not only protecting
our diplomatic posts, but also to make sure that we
discover who, in fact, is trying to take advantage of
this. . . .\355\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\355\Remarks by the President at Univision Town Hall with Jorge
Ramos and Maria Elena Salinas, Miami, FL, Sept. 20, 2012.
The President said the government wanted to ``discover who,
in fact, is trying to take advantage of this.'' It is unclear
if ``this'' is a reference to the video, protests, or something
else. However, no assessment from the CIA ever stated anybody
was ``trying to take advantage'' of the video, or even that
there was a direct link between the video and the Benghazi
attacks.
The President also stated, in response to a question that
mentioned only Libya, the ``natural protests that arose because
of the outrage over the video were used as an excuse by
extremists to see if they can also directly harm U.S.
interests--.'' This statement was made two days after the U.S.
government obtained access to the video footage from the
Benghazi Mission compound, which did not show a protest outside
the Benghazi Mission compound prior to the beginning of the
attacks.
When asked if al-Qaeda was involved, the President
responded ``we don't know yet.'' The day before, however, Olsen
testified under oath before Congress the government was
``looking at indiciations that individuals involved in the
attack may have had connections to al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda's
affiliates; in particular, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.''
Two days after Olsen's testimony, on September 21, 2012,
the Secretary said for the first time publicly that what
happened in Benghazi was a ``terrorist attack.''\356\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\356\Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State,
Remarks with Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar before Their
Meeting (Sept.25, 2012), http://www.state.gov/
secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/198060.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Four days later, on September 25, 2012, the President said,
during remarks to the United Nations General Assembly: ``There
are no words that excuse the killing of innocents. There's no
video that justifies an attack on an embassy.''\357\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\357\Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Remarks by the President to the UN General Assembly (Sept. 13, 2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/remarks-
president-un-general-assembly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was not until the following day--a full week after Olsen
made his comments and fifteen days after the attacks began--
Carney finally acknowledged the President's position was that a
terrorist attack occurred. Carney said:
Q: Can I ask one more--are criticizing the President
for not classifying what happened in Benghazi as a
terrorist attack, going as far as you did or the NCTC
director. Can you respond to that and explain why that
is?
A: The President spoke eloquently I believe about the
attack that took the lives of four Americans at the
United Nations General Assembly, and I think made very
clear that it is wholly unacceptable to respond to a
video, no matter how offensive, with violence, and it
is wholly unacceptable, regardless of the reason, to
attack embassies or diplomatic facilities and to kill
diplomatic personnel.
The President--our position is, as reflected by the
NCTC director, that it was a terrorist attack. It is, I
think by definition, a terrorist attack when there is a
prolonged assault on an embassy with weapons.
The broader questions here about who participated, what
led to the attack on the facility in Benghazi--all
those questions are under investigation at two levels,
by the FBI and by the Accountability Review Board
established by Secretary Clinton to look at issues of
security in Benghazi and security at other diplomatic
facilities.
So, let's be clear, it was a terrorist attack and it
was an inexcusable attack.\358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\358\Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jay Carney Aboard Air Force
One en route Ohio, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House
(Sept. 26, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/
26/press-gaggle-press-secretary-jay-carney-aboard-air-force-one-en-
route-oh.
September 24 Intelligence Assessment
Two days before Carney finally acknowledged publicly that
Benghazi was a terrorist attack, on September 24, 2012, the CIA
published its new ``assessment'' about the Benghazi attacks,
formally changing their old assessment which had been in place
since September 13. In the September 24 piece, which was
produced jointly with the National Counterterrorism Center, the
analysts wrote ``We now assess, based on new reporting, that
the assault was deliberate and organized. Our most credible
information indicates that there was not a protest ongoing at
the time of the attack as first reported.''\359\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\359\Cent. Intel. Agency, Libya: Updated Assessment of Benghazi
Attacks, World Intelligence Review, Sept. 24, 2012 (on file with CIA,
IntBook29-076 to IntBook29-079).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The supporting intelligence used in this piece to support
the new assessment was threefold. The first piece of
intelligence was from September 19, 2012 and noted that
attackers used fixed firing positions, capture or kill teams,
and blockades to impede the escape of US personnel,'' [redacted
text]\360\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\360\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second piece of intelligence [redacted text] suggesting
``the attack was put together at least several hours ahead of
time.''\361\ Although this piece of intelligence was available
as early as September 15--one day before Rice went on the
Sunday talk shows and nine days before the analysts published
their updated assessment--an internal CIA after action review
noted that this piece of intelligence was ``not viewed as
credible enough'' at the time to outweigh other reporting, such
as news reports.\362\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\Id.
\362\Intelligence Note, Memorandum for Acting Dir., Cent. Intel.
Agency, Jan. 4, 2013 [hereinafter Analytic Line Review] (on file with
CIA, REQUEST 17-0049 to REQUEST 17-0063).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The third piece of intelligence [redacted text] noted
simply that the attackers ``also employed effective mortar fire
against the Embassy annex later in the night after US return
fire repulsed their initial ground assault.''\363\ This piece
of intelligence was formally available to analysts as early as
September 14, and informally available to them as early as
September 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\363\[Redacted text].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, perhaps the most credible--and definitive--
piece of intelligence indicating no protest had occurred prior
to the Benghazi attacks was the video footage from the closed
circuit televisions at the Special Mission Compound in
Benghazi. The CIA had access to analysis of this footage by the
Libyan Intelligence Service as early as September 18, 2012, and
those in the CIA who saw the video on that date concluded
immediately no protest occurred prior to the attacks. This
intelligence was not cited in the update assessment.
The manager of the analysts testified the analysts began
working on the piece before September 18. Given that fact--and
that the information cited in the updated assessment as
rationale for changing the assessment was available on
September 14, September 15, and September 19--why did it take
the CIA until September 24 to publish the piece?
The answer appears to be the piece was held up in
interagency coordination. The analysts did not want an
interagency partner to file a formal dissent. The manager of
the analysts testified:
And, frankly, the WIRe that ran on the 24th actually
got held up for 2 days in Coordination, trying to
convince people in the IC [Intelligence Community], who
hadn't seen this video yet because it wasn't back in
country, that there were no protests.\364\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\364\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 75-77, 92-95.
Other interagency partners--specifically the State
Department--did not trust the Libyan government's assessment of
the video, even though CIA officials in Tripoli had seen the
actual video footage and concurred with the assessment.\365\
This distrust held up interagency coordination of the piece for
several days. It was not until September 24 when the actual
video footage arrived at CIA headquarters, allowing for
dissemination to other interagency partners.\366\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\365\Id. at 75-77.
\366\[Redacted text].
September 28 ODNI Statement
On September 28, 2012, Shawn Turner, Director of Public
Affairs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
released a statement on the intelligence related to the
Benghazi terrorist attacks. That statement read in full:
In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on U.S.
personnel and facilities in Benghazi, Libya, the
Intelligence Community launched a comprehensive effort
to determine the circumstances surrounding the assault
and to identify the perpetrators. We also reviewed all
available intelligence to determine if there might be
follow-on attacks against our people or facilities in
Libya or elsewhere in the world.
As the Intelligence Community collects and analyzes
more information related to the attack, our
understanding of the event continues to evolve. In the
immediate aftermath, there was information that led us
to assess that the attack began spontaneously following
protests earlier that day at our embassy in Cairo. We
provided that initial assessment to Executive Branch
officials and members of Congress, who used that
information to discuss the attack publicly and provide
updates as they became available. Throughout our
investigation we continued to emphasize that
information gathered was preliminary and evolving.
As we learned more about the attack, we revised our
initial assessment to reflect new information
indicating that it was a deliberate and organized
terrorist attack carried out by extremists. It remains
unclear if any group or person exercised overall
command and control of the attack, and if extremist
group leaders directed their members to participate.
However, we do assess that some of those involved were
linked to groups affiliated with, or sympathetic to al-
Qa'ida. We continue to make progress, but there remain
many unanswered questions. As more information becomes
available our analysis will continue to evolve and we
will obtain a more complete understanding of the
circumstances surrounding the terrorist attack.
We continue to support the ongoing FBI investigation
and the State Department review of the Benghazi
terrorist attack, providing the full capabilities and
resources of the Intelligence Community to those
efforts. We also will continue to meet our
responsibility to keep Congress fully and currently
informed. For its part, the Intelligence Community will
continue to follow the information about the tragic
events in Benghazi wherever it leads. The President
demands and expects that we will do this, as do
Congress and the American people. As the Intelligence
Community, we owe nothing less than our best efforts in
this regard, especially to the families of the four
courageous Americans who lost their lives at Benghazi
in service of their country.\367\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\367\Press Release, Office of the Dir. of National Intel.,
Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on
the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate
in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-
releases/96-press-releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-
of-public-affairs-on-
intelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-
benghazi.
Even though the issue of protests was heavily debated in
the public at the time, the statement does not specifically
address whether or not a protest occurred prior to the
attacks--doing so would have undercut Rice's statements on the
talk shows twelve days before. In addition, the issue of
protests was not an ``analytical focal point''\368\ for the
intelligence community and was more of a ``subsidiary issue''
to them.\369\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\368\Olsen Testimony at 119.
\369\Olsen Testimony at 67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rather, the statement only mentions it was a ``deliberate
and organized terrorist attack''\370\--still leaving open the
possibility protests may have occurred. The statement did not
mention anything about the internet video, let alone any
connection between the video and Benghazi attacks. The
statement, issued by the intelligence community and not the
White House or State Department, did not connect the two
events.\371\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\370\Press Release, Office of the Dir. of National Intel.,
Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on
the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate
in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-
releases/96-press-releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-
of-public-affairs-on-
intelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-
benghazi.
\371\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As public statements tend to be, this statement was
carefully worded. It notes only the initial intelligence
community assessment that it ``began spontaneously following
protests earlier that day at our embassy in Cairo.''\372\ This
wording can be directly tied to language in the September 13
WIRe.\373\ The statement does not say, however, the
intelligence community ever assessed that protests or
demonstrations had occurred prior to the Benghazi attacks--
something repeatedly mentioned by Rice on the talk shows. That
is because, aside from the errant title in the September 13
WIRe, the intelligence community never formally coordinated
such an assessment in writing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\372\Id.
\373\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The statement also says ``[a]s we learned more about the
attack, we revised our initial assessment to reflect new
information indicating that it was a deliberate and organized
terrorist attack carried out by extremists. . . . we do assess
that some of those involved were linked to groups affiliated
with, or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida.''\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\374\Press Release, Office of the Dir. of National Intel.,
Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on
the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate
in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-releases/96-press-
releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-
on-
intelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-
benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given that the intelligence leading to the new assessment
was more than a week old, and in some cases even older, why,
then, did ODNI wait until September 28, 2012 to issue this
statement? The answer lies in emails between senior
administration officials.
The genesis for ODNI's statement occurred the day before as
a result of a press report. The article, published on September
27, 2012 said the following:
URGENT: U.S. intelligence officials knew from Day One
that the assault on the U.S. Consulate in Libya was a
terrorist attack and suspect Al Qaeda-tied elements
were involved, sources told Fox News--though it took
the administration a week to acknowledge it.
The account conflicts with claims on the Sunday after
the attack by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Susan Rice that the administration believed the strike
was a ``spontaneous'' event triggered by protests in
Egypt over an anti-Islam film.
Sources said the administration internally labeled the
attack terrorism from the first day to enable a certain
type of policy response and that officials were looking
for one specific suspect.
In addition, sources confirm that FBI agents have not
yet arrived in Benghazi in the aftermath of the
attack.\375\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\375\Email from Peter Velz, Media Monitor, White House, to DL-WHO-
Press, et al. (Sept. 27, 2012, 10:15 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05415305).
Upon seeing the article that morning, McDonough forwarded
it to Robert Cardillo, Deputy Director, Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, Morell, and John Brennan,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Counterterrorism Advisor to the President. McDonough wrote:
Hey, guys,
This is the third report making this assertion. Is this
correct?
Thanks,
Denis\376\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\376\Email from Mr.McDonough, to Mr. Cardillo and Mr. Morell (Sept.
27, 2012, 10:57 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305).
Cardillo responded, including Olsen and Nick Rasmussen,
Deputy Director, National Counterterrorism Center. Cardillo
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
wrote:
I am fairly sure the answer is `no.' And I've asked
Matt and Nick to lay out on a timeline the evolution of
our IC assessments from 12 September on. They're on cc
so I'll ask when that can be ready. Robert.\377\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\377\Email from Mr. Cardillo to Mr. McDonough, et al. (Sept. 27,
2012, 11:23 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305).
It is unclear which assertion McDonough and Cardillo were
referring to, although Olsen told the Committee he believed
from the beginning the assault on the U.S. facilities in
Benghazi was a terrorist attack,\378\ and Morell testified that
``[i]n the minds of the [CIA] analysts from the get-go, this
was a terrorist attack, and I think that is reflected in what
they wrote.''\379\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\Olsen Testimony at 100.
\379\Morell Testimony at 74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Olsen responded to the email, writing:
All-
As Robert suggests, I think the best way to approach
this is to review and memorialize exactly what we were
saying from the onset of the attack going forward.
We've got a chronological catalog of all finished
intelligence on the attack. And we'll put together
today a time line summary that sets forth all key
points and analytic judgments as they developed from 9/
11 through the present. Nick and I will get started on
the time line right away.
--Matt\380\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\380\Email from Mr. Olsen to Mr. Cardillo, et al. (Sept. 27, 2012,
12:12 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305).
That evening, Cardillo responded. He sent his response to
the group, but also included Turner and Rexon Ryu. Cardillo
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
wrote:
NCTC has already made great progress in documenting the
chronology of what we knew and what we published. My
reading of that draft is that we can easily debunk Fox
and refute the hits on Susan's statements on Sunday, 16
Sep. As I read the laydown, her comments were
consistent with our intel assessment at that time. . .
.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\381\Email from Mr. Cardillo to Mr. Olsen, Mr. McDonough, & Mr.
Morell (Sept. 27, 2012, 7:47 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05415305).
McDonough responded to the email, and included Rhodes in
the email chain. In his response, McDonough included another
article from ABC News. The title of the ABC News article was
``Some Administration Officials Were Concerned About Initial
White House Push Blaming Benghazi Attack on Mob, Video'' and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
read, in part:
Even before Defense Secretary Leon Panetta contradicted
the initial story about the attack on the U.S.
consulate in Benghazi, Libya, today, Obama
administration officials told ABC News they were
concerned after the White House began pushing the line
that the attack was spontaneous and not the work of
terrorists. . . . Panetta today said that the attack
that killed four Americans on the anniversary of 9/11
was not only carried out by terrorists--it was pre-
meditated. . . .
The White House first suggested the attack was
spontaneous--the result of an anti-Muslim video that
incited mobs throughout the region. . . .
But sources told ABC News that intelligence officials
on the ground immediately suspected the attack was not
tied to the movie at all. . . .
As of Thursday afternoon, officials from the Obama
administration were not even 100 percent certain that
the protest of the anti-Muslim film in Benghazi
occurred outside the U.S. diplomatic post.\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\382\Email from Mr. McDonough to Mr. Cardillo, Mr. Olsen, Mr.
Rhodes, and Mr. Morell (Sept. 27, 2012, 7:49 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05415305).
McDonough wrote of this article, ``The piece immediately
below led ABC World News Tonight today. It is really
galling.''\383\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\383\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhodes responded three minutes later. He wrote:
I believe that we need something tomorrow. There is a
narrative that is being aggressively pushed that the
White House and Susan Rice deliberately misrepresented
facts, which is being confirmed by anonymous
intelligence sources and administration officials. In
the absence of an affirmative statement that this has
been an evolving set of facts guided by our increasing
understanding of what took place, that narrative will
only harden further. Already, it is a bell that is
going to be very difficult to unring.\384\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\384\Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. McDonough, Mr. Olsen, Mr.
Cardillo, and Mr. Morell (Sept. 27, 2012, 7:52 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05415305).
In essence, Rhodes wanted to put out a statement not for
the reason of informing the public about the updated
intelligence assessment relating to the attacks, but to refute
allegations Rice and the White House ``deliberately
misrepresented facts.''\385\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\385\Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. McDonough, Mr. Cardillo, Mr.
Olsen, and Mr. Morell (Sept. 27, 2012, 7:56 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05415305).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhodes emailed the group again less than twenty minutes
later, stating:
Again, I believe we have a very credible case that all
we have done is follow the facts and inform people of
those facts, while prioritizing the need for
investigations to run their course. However, that case
is being lost amidst the leaks of information (correct
and incorrect) and uninformed assertions coming from a
variety of places.\386\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\386\Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Cardillo, Mr. McDonough, Mr.
Olsen, and Mr. Morell (Sept. 27, 2012, 8:15 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05415305).
Two things about Rhodes' response are noteworthy. One, he
acknowledges some of the leaks are ``correct,'' although he
does not identify which ones; and two, he writes ``I believe we
have a very credible case that all we have done is follow the
facts.''\387\ ``Credible case'' is hardly a definitive, full-
throated defense of the administration's handling of the public
explanation for the attacks in Benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\387\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following morning Olsen emailed the group that he had
provided a draft statement to Turner for eventual release.
Rhodes responded, writing:
Thank you for working this, as the most important thing
is having a public baseline--informed by the facts--
that we can all point to. We are well synched up with
Shawn Turner as well.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\388\Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Cardillo, Mr. Olsen, Mr.
McDonough, Mr. Morell (Sept. 28, 2012, 10:43 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05415305).
Rhodes testified to the Committee about his recollection of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
this statement:
Well, my recollection is that there was an interest in
providing a statement that clarified our understanding
and the evolution of our understanding of the events in
Benghazi that that statement was to be prepared by the
intelligence community. I work with them in my
coordinating role as they were preparing that
statement.\389\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\Rhodes Testimony at 137.
Rhodes' email that they are ``synched up'' with
Turner,\390\ and his testimony that he was in his
``coordinating role'' as the statement was prepared,\391\
serves as a reminder the White House played a central role in
the drafting of this statement--a statement that, by Rhodes'
own admission, served not to inform the public but rather to
push back against a narrative that the White House and Rice
deliberately misrepresented facts. The statement itself,
however, according to Olsen, was ``speaking on behalf of the
intelligence community at that point and not really beyond
that.''\392\ The White House's involvement in the creation of
the statement--through McDonough, Brennan, and Rhodes--
continues to raise questions as to who ultimately controlled
the message regarding Benghazi coming out of not just the
intelligence community but the executive branch as a whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\390\Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Cardillo, Mr. Olsen, Mr.
McDonough, Mr. Morell (Sept. 28, 2012, 10:43 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05415305).
\391\Rhodes Testimony at 137.
\392\Olsen Testimony at 117.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE LANDSCAPE
The political import of the attacks on the presidential
campaign of 2012 is not a subject of the committee's
investigation. Nevertheless, the House of Representatives did
direct the Committee to investigate and study ``internal and
public executive branch communications about the
attacks.''\393\ It would be naive to assume this or any
administration's public statements about a significant foreign
policy event would be made without full awareness of the
political effect of those statements. It is necessary to place
the attacks and the administration's statements about them in
context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\393\H. Res. 567 113th Congress Section 3(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Benghazi terrorist attacks occurred not only on the
anniversary of the Sept 11, 2001 terrorist attacks but also in
the middle of the 2012 presidential campaign. The first
presidential debate was 22 days away and the election was 56
days away. The killing of a U.S. Ambassador in the line of
duty--which had not occurred in 33 years--and three other
Americans would inevitably become an issue in the campaign and
even be discussed at the presidential debate on October 16,
2012.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\394\October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript, Comm'n on Presidential
Debates (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-
16-2012-the-second-obama-romney-presidential-debate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to the attacks, the President and the Secretary of
State took credit for the Administration's record in the war on
terror, the perceived success of the intervention in Libya, and
the toppling of its dictator, Muammar Qadhafi.\395\ Nearly four
years had passed without a significant incident at home or
abroad, and killing Osama bin Laden represented an historic
victory.\396\ The President pointed to these successes in his
campaign, including in a speech five days prior to the attacks:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\See, e.g., Tom Cohen, Obama makes war policy an election
strength, CNN (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/24/politics/
obama-foreign-policy.
\396\Id.
In a world of new threats and new challenges, you can
choose leadership that has been tested and proven. Four
years ago, I promised to end the war in Iraq: We did. I
promised to refocus on the terrorists who actually
attacked us on 9/11. We have. We've blunted the
Taliban's momentum in Afghanistan, and in 2014, our
longest war will be over. A new tower rises above the
New York skyline, al-Qaeda is on the path to defeat,
and Osama bin Laden is dead.\397\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\397\President Barack Obama, Speech at 2012 Democratic National
Convention (Sept. 6, 2012).
The Benghazi attacks could certainly affect public
perception of the administration's record in the war on terror
and the narrative of success in Libya. Almost immediately, the
press began asking questions about whether Benghazi represented
a failure of the President's policies. In a press conference
the day after the attacks, a reporter asked Carney directly:
``Jay, is the U.S. doing something wrong policy-wise in Libya
that brings this [the attack] on? Or is the policy fine, it's
just this particular event?''\398\ One publication summed up
the situation by saying, ``with the American Presidential
election only two months away, the murder of four Americans
serving their government overseas could be a game changer so
far as Mr. Obama's re-election prospects are concerned.''\399\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jay Carney en route Las Vegas,
NV, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (Sept. 12, 2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/press-gaggle-
press-secretary-jay-carney-en-route-las-vegas-nv-9122012.
\399\Con Coughlin, The Murder of the US Ambassador to Libya is a
Wake-up Call for Obama, The Daily Telegraph (Sept. 12, 2012), http://
blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/concoughlin/100180611/murder-of-us-
ambassador-is-a-wake-up-call-for-obama.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The attacks remained an issue throughout the campaign
including at the second presidential debate where former
Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney used the attacks to question
the administration's Middle East policy generally:
And this [the Benghazi attacks] calls into question the
president's whole policy in the Middle East. Look
what's happening in Syria, in Egypt, now in Libya.
Consider the distance between ourselves and--and
Israel, the president said that--that he was going to
put daylight between us and Israel.
We have Iran four years closer to a nuclear bomb.
Syria--Syria's not just a tragedy of 30,000 civilians
being killed by a military, but also a strategic--
strategically significant player for America.
The president's policies throughout the Middle East
began with an apology tour and--and--and pursue a
strategy of leading from behind, and this strategy is
unraveling before our very eyes.\400\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\400\October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript, Commission on Presidential
Debates (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-
16-2012-the-second-obama-romney-presidential-debate
Shortly after this statement, the candidates and the
moderator debated whether the President called the Benghazi
attacks a terrorist attack from day one.\401\ The President's
Rose Garden remarks were not his only public comments about the
attacks on September 12. The President also taped a 60 Minutes
interview the same day, which aired on September 23.\402\
During the interview the President said it was ``too early to
tell'' when asked about his Rose Garden remarks and whether the
attacks were terrorism.\403\ The question and the President's
answer were not included in the broadcast version because the
interview was edited.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\401\October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript, Comm'n on Presidential
Debates (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-
16-2012-the-second-obama-romney-presidential-debate; Press Release, The
White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on
the Deaths of U.S. Embassy Staff in Libya (Sept. 12, 2012), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/remarks-president-
deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya.
\402\Dylan Byers & MacKenzie Weinger, CBS under fire for withhold
Obama's Benghazi remarks, Politico (Nov. 5, 2012), http://
www.politico.com/blogs/media/2012/11/cbs-under-fire-for-withholding-
obamas-benghazi-remarks-148513.
\403\Id.
\404\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three days after the second debate, CBS posted additional
portions of the 60 Minutes transcript from the interview with
the President on September 12, 2012.\405\ The portion of the
President refusing to call it a terrorist attack was still
absent. It was not until November 6, 2012, two days before the
election, when CBS finally posted publicly for the first time
the entire transcript of the President's interview on September
12, 2012.\406\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\405\Id.
\406\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The President of CBS News at the time, David Rhodes, is the
brother of Ben Rhodes, who helped prepare the President for the
second debate.\407\ While Ben Rhodes denied to the Committee he
talked with anybody at CBS prior to the September 23, 2012,
airing of the President's interview, he did not know whether
others in the White House did. Rhodes also did not testify as
to whether or not he spoke with anybody at CBS after September
23, 2012, regarding the posting of the transcript to CBS'
website. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\407\Helene Cooper, Obama's Prep Session Goal: Don't Repeat
Mistakes of Last Debate, N.Y. Times (Oct. 14, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/us/politics/a-serious-debate-prep-
session-for-obama.html?_r=0.
Q: And you may recall there was some bit of controversy
over the interview that was actually aired by CBS
because it did not include a portion of the President's
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
remarks. Do you remember that?
A: I have a recollection that there was some
controversy about that, yes.
Q: Did you or anybody else on your staff have any
conversations with CBS about that 60 Minutes interview?
A: I did not excuse me, what's the in what time period
are you talking about?
Q: Prior to it airing?
A: I did not have any conversations with CBS after the
interview taped prior to it aired.
Q: Did anybody on your staff?
A: Generally, when we have interviews like that with
the President, the contacts with the network are
handled by the White House press in the communications
office, not the NSC.
Q: Do you know if any of those communications actually
occurred?
A: I don't know.\408\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\Rhodes Testimony at 118-19.
On October 1, 2012, the Secretary of State forwarded a
Salon article titled ``GOP's October Surprise?'' which alleged
Romney planned to attack the President as weak on
terrorism.\409\ Sidney Blumenthal emailed the article to the
Secretary and took credit for it getting it ``done and
published.''\410\ The Secretary forwarded the email to Sullivan
with the instruction, ``Be sure Ben knows they need to be ready
for this line of attack.'' Sullivan responded: ``Will
do.''\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\409\Craig Unger, GOP's October surprise?, Salon (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://www.salon.com/2012/10/01/gops_october_surprise.
\410\See Email from Sidney Blumenthal to Hillary R. Clinton
(``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 1, 2012, 9:30 AM)
(on file with the Committee, SCB0045545) (``Got done and published.'').
\411\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''),
Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 1, 2012, 3:37 PM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0045545).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The White House told the Committee they would not allow the
Committee to ask about this email during the Committee's
interview with Rhodes, citing executive privilege and noting
that preparing for a debate was a ``core executive
function.''\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\Phone Call between Office of White House Counsel and Committee
Staff (Jan. 30, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIXING INTELLIGENCE WITH POLITICS
In the months after the Benghazi attacks, politics
continued to play a role in assigning blame for what had
occurred and who said what. In addition to the usual politics
of Republicans and Democrats lobbing accusations at one
another, however, a different, quieter, type of politics was
taking place regarding Benghazi: internal politics. At the
center of it all was Morell.
The Setup
On November 27, 2012, amid speculation the President would
nominate her to become the next Secretary of State, Rice
traveled to Capitol Hill to meet with three Senators to discuss
her September 16 appearances on the Sunday talk shows.\413\
Accompanying Rice to that meeting was Morell, who was at the
time Acting Director of the CIA. Morell described why he
attended the meeting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\413\Ed O'Keefe, Susan Rice, CIA director meet with GOP critics on
Libya, Wash. Post (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/2chambers/wp/2012/11/27/susan-rice-cia-
director-meet-with-gop-critics-on-libya.
Q: Can you just generally describe what the purpose of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that meeting was?
A: Yes. So I got a phone call from Denis McDonough, who
was then the deputy national security advisor. He told
me that--of course I knew from the media that Susan was
under attack for what she had said on the Sunday shows.
He told me that Susan wanted to go to the Hill and have
conversations with her critics. He told me that the
President wanted me to go along with her. He made very
clear to me that my job in going along with her was to
talk about the classified analysis, to talk about the
talking points, and importantly, to show, to actually
show the Senators the consistency between the talking
points and the classified analysis. That's what he told
me my job was. And I said yes and I went.\414\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\Morell Testimony at 202-203.
Morell agreed to the President's request and attended the
meeting with Rice. In his book, however, Morell wrote: ``In
retrospect, attending the meeting was a mistake. The meeting
was inherently political, and by attending, I inserted myself
into a political issue . . . That is not where an intelligence
officer should be.''\415\ Morell told the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\Morell, supra note 114, at 235.
Q: Did you think your presence there was requested to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
insulate or protect Susan Rice in any way?
A: I think my--I think my presence there was to show
that what she said, right, about Benghazi was
consistent, right, at least the protest, spontaneity
part, right, was consistent with what the analysts
really believed.
Q: I guess what I'm trying to get at it, do you think
in any way--I mean you're a career analyst, you're
known or so I've heard you're known around the
community as a very straight shooting, as a straight
shooter, you call it like you see it. So the fact that
you were accompanying her--did you know if the
Secretary of State at that point had announced that she
was going to step down? Do you know if Susan Rice at
that point----
A: Yes, I believe so, right? I believe that was the
whole point--in fact, that is what Denis said, right,
her possible nomination to be Secretary of State was at
risk, absolutely.
Q: --So it was a very inherently political meeting----
A: Yes, it was.
Q: --that you were inserting yourself or that you had
been asked to--it was a very inherently political
meeting that you had been asked to attend.
A: Yes. But, again, I didn't realize it at the time. I
really didn't. I didn't know I was walking myself into
this political setting.\416\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\416\Morell Testimony at 205-206.
In addition to explaining to the Senators how Rice's
comments on the Sunday shows aligned with the intelligence at
the time, Morell's attendance at the meeting served another
purpose--it kept him at the forefront of the controversy
surrounding the Benghazi talking points. While Rice was the
administration's representative on the Sunday talk shows,
Morell was the individual who edited the CIA talking points
Rice says she relied on.\417\ Having public criticism targeted
towards Morell, a career intelligence official, instead of
Rice, a political appointee in a politically charged
environment, could be beneficial for a potential Secretary of
State nominee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\417\See, e.g., HPSCI White Paper Talking Points for Use with the
Media at 63 (Sept. 14, 2012), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/701145/white-house-e-mails-on-benghazi-talking-points.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Execution
In late 2012, Morell directed two internal CIA reviews take
place regarding the talking points. One review, called the
Analytic Line Review, went through each piece of CIA analysis
after the Benghazi attacks to determine how strong the
supporting evidence was for each of the analytic
assessments.\418\ The second review was about ``Lessons
Learned'' from the internal process of creating the talking
points for HPSCI.\419\Morell wanted to send these two internal
reviews to Congress.\420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\418\Analytic Line Review, supra note 362.
\419\Lessons Learned, supra note 189.
\420\Morell Testimony at 208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell sent only the Analytic Line Review to Congress,
which was completed in January 2013. The White House would not
allow him to send the other document--containing drafts of the
talking points and the process through which they were
drafted--to Congress, ``citing executive privilege.''\421\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\421\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On March 19, 2013, Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, testified before
HPSCI.\422\ At the hearing, Litt provided the HPSCI Members two
packages of documents: one was a small package that contained
each draft version of the talking points, showing which changes
had been made from draft to draft; the other was a large
package of roughly 100 pages that contained interagency emails
regarding the drafting of the talking points. These documents
were shared with the HPSCI Members, yet Litt claimed they were
so sensitive that he took them back at the end of the
briefing;\423\ Members therefore would be unable to keep the
documents or make any copies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\422\Briefing--The Hon. Robert S. Litt (Benghazi Documents),
Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th
Cong. (2013).
\423\Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two months later, on May 15, 2013, however, everything
changed. The White House decided to release 100 pages of emails
related to the talking points.\424\ These were the same emails
Litt had provided to HPSCI two months prior yet took back at
the end of the hearing. In conjunction with the release, the
White House asked Morell to brief the press on the evolution of
the talking points. Just as he had when he accompanied Rice to
the November 2012 meeting, Morell complied.\425\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\424\Jake Tapper, et al., White House releases Benghazi e-mails,
CNN (May 16, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/15/politics/benghazi-
emails.
\425\Morell, supra note 114, at 207.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell talked to the Committee about the White House's
decision to release these emails:
Q: And so the fact that you were forbidden from sharing
an assessment with Congress over the possibility of
executive privilege and then all of a sudden the
documents were released publicly, did that seem to you
to be a pretty large turnaround?
A: So, you know, I don't remember, I simply don't
remember why, you know, why the shift, right, why all
of a sudden the administration decided to release these
publicly. I don't remember being part of those
discussions. I don't recall being part of those
discussions. So I don't know why they decided all of a
sudden to do it.
Q: Do you think it might have been politically
beneficial for them to all of a sudden release those
documents?
A: I think--I think--I'm speculating, now, okay, so
speculating--I think that the criticism kept going up
and up. The different theories about what was going on
kept on expanding right, and the White House wanted to
put that to rest by putting it all out there. That's my
guess.
Q: Did they put it all out there when they released
those talking points?
A: Not in my view.
Q: Can you elaborate on that?
A: Sure. So 2014, mid-2014, I open the newspaper and I
see Ben Rhodes' talking points from the 15th of
September, right, designed to prep Susan Rice for her
Sunday shows. And I say to myself, I have not seen
these things before. When I saw them in the media in
mid-2014 it was the first time I ever saw them.\426\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\Id. at 208-09.
The decision by the White House to release the talking
points pertaining to HPSCI and not the talking points drafted
by Rhodes had one major effect: it kept the spotlight on
Morell--who became front and center of this release by briefing
the press at the request of the White House--the CIA, and their
role in shaping the talking points. It also kept the spotlight
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
away from others. Morell acknowledged this in his testimony:
Q: And you said you feel that they should have been
released with the package of the CIA talking points.
What are the implications that they were not released
with the talking points, the package, and they're
coming out a year later? What does that mean?
A: I don't know, right, I don't know, the
counterfactual is hard to think through. I believe--I'm
speculating now, okay--I believe there would have been
less attention on CIA and more attention on the White
House.\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\427\Id. at 217.
Around the same time, Morell lobbied the White House to
release video footage of the attack from the State Department
compound in Benghazi. Morell, aware of the public debate over
whether or not protests had occurred prior to attack, wanted
the footage released to provide transparency to the American
people so they could judge for themselves what had transpired
and quell the political firestorm. After all, it was after a
description of this video footage was shared with the CIA that
CIA personnel began to definitively conclude no protest had
occurred.\428\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\428\Email from [Tripoli [redacted text]] to [Near East Division]
(Sept. 18, 2012, 1:14 PM) (``I know that we all agree as time has
passed the pieces are starting to unravel particularly where there was
protests earlier that day--I think we can officially say now that there
were none.'') (on file with CIA, REQUEST 1-002940 to REQUEST 1-002943).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to Morell, James Clapper, Director, Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, also wanted the
surveillance tapes to be made public. The White House refused,
however, and to this day, the tapes remain classified. Morell
told the Committee:
Q: So you had seen the videos of the TMF, you had seen
NCTC analysis of the videos. Did you want those videos
to be released as well?
A: I did, I did.
Q: And was there anybody who agreed with you that those
videos should be declassified and released?
A: Yes, the DNI agreed with me.
Q: The DNI. When you say DNI, you're talking about DNI
Clapper?
A: Yes.
Q: Were those videos released?
A: No.
Q: Why did you want those videos released?
A: Because look, my view, not only strongly today
because of all of this, but even at the time, my view
is when there's--when there are questions about--when
there are questions about what was done on a particular
issue, particularly when there's questions of
impropriety, the best thing to do is to get everything
out, the best thing to do is to get all the information
you can out. Let the American people see it all and let
the American people decide.
You know, I thought the video--the NCTC analysis told
the story of what actually happened that night and I
thought the American people deserved to see it.
Q: And who prevented the video from being publicly
released?
A: The White House--the White House never responded to
the DNI and my repeated suggestions that it be
released.
Q: So you were acting director of the CIA at the time?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: And Mr. Clapper was the director for national
intelligence. And you two repeatedly pushed the White
House to release this video?
A: Yes.
Q: And they did not.
A: Correct.
Q: And instead they released the package, so to speak,
they released the package----
A: I don't remember the timing of our suggestion,
right? But, yes, you're absolutely right.
Q: So they released the package and at the time they
released the package they did not release [the Ben
Rhodes talking points], which is----
A: The video.
Q: They did not release the video.
A: And they did not release [the Ben Rhodes talking
points].\429\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\429\Morell Testimony at 210-11.
The Fallout
On April 17, 2014, the Rhodes talking points--which, in
addition to the talking points provided to HPSCI and edited by
Morell, were used by Rice to prepare for the Sunday talk
shows--were released to Congress.\430\ Later that month, the
talking points became publicized for the first time.\431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\Letter from Thomas B. Gibbons, Acting Ass't Sec'y of
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Rep. Darrell Issa,
Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Gov. Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives (May 20, 2013) (on file with the Committee).
\431\Press Release, Judicial Watch, Benghazi Documents Point to
White House on Misleading Talking Points (Apr. 29, 2014), http://
www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/judicial-watch-
benghazi-documents-point-white-house-misleading-talking-points.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Around the time of the November 27, 2012 meeting between
Rice and the three Senators, Lieberman said of Ambassador Rice:
I asked if she was briefed by the White House, the
campaign, or the political operation, and she said she
had seen no message points from the White House.''\432\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\Ed O'Keefe, Susan Rice, CIA director meet with GOP critics on
Libya, Wash. Post (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/2chambers/wp/2012/11/27/susan-rice-cia-
director-meet-with-gop-critics-on-libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed above, Rice testified she only relied on the
talking points provided to HPSCI when discussing Benghazi on
the talk shows.\433\ Rhodes, however, conceded the third bullet
point in his talking points--``to show the U.S. would be
resolute in bringing to justice people who harm Americans, and
standing steadfast through these protests''--applied only to
Libya.\434\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\433\Krishnadev Calamur, Susan Rice Says Benghazi Claims Were Based
On Information From Intelligence, NPR (Nov. 21, 2012), http://
www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/11/21/165686269/susan-rice-says-
benghazi-claims-were-based-on-information-from-intelligence.
\434\Rhodes Testimony at 78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell said he first learned about Rhodes' talking points
when he opened the newspaper. Morell, an intelligence officer
for over three decades, also believed the talking points
related to Benghazi. He told the Committee:
Q: Okay. So let me take that first statement. You
thought that these were related to Benghazi. I'm just
reading through it here on the first page, I don't see
Benghazi listed. Why do you think that they were
related to Benghazi?
A: Two reasons. One is Benghazi was what was on
everyone's mind at the time. Benghazi had just
happened, right, the previous Tuesday. This was the
following Sunday, right, it was the kind of top-of-the-
list issue. And two, the--there is a tick in here--let
me find it--so the third tick under ``goals,'' third
tick under ``goals'' says: ``To show that we will be
resolute in bringing people to harm Americans to
justice.'' That only happened in one place.
Q: And that was in Benghazi?
A: Yes.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\435\Morell Testimony at 216-217.
After learning of the existence of these talking points,
Morell became bothered that Rhodes, a member of the National
Security Council staff, had drafted what Morell viewed as a
political document. Morell believes there should be a bright
line between national security and politics, and he views the
talking points drafted by Rhodes crossed that line. Morell
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
Q: Aside from the release of these talking points and
the release of the package, is there anything in, at
least under the goals and the top-lines, is there
anything about this document that makes you
uncomfortable as a CIA officer and career analyst?
A: Yeah. So, as you know, I'm on the record on this, so
the second goal, the second goal bothers me in two
ways. The first way it bothers me is that it has a
feeling of being political. It has a feeling of being
political, right? Blame it on this, not on that, right?
Just that concept of blame it on this and blame it on
that, not don't blame it on that, has a feeling of
being political to me.
Q: Ben Rhodes worked at the White House?
A: Yes.
Q: So what's the problem if he writes something that--
--
A: Because Ben is on the National Security Council
staff, right, and I believe, right, and there might be
different views out there, but I believe, as a 33-year
national security professional, that there should be a
very, very sharp line between national security and
politics. And I know that's not always the case, but
that's what I believe, right? And I believe that that
line was crossed here. That is a personal opinion,
right?
The second thing, right, the second thing I don't like
about that is the line, ``not a broader failure of
policy.'' The President himself is on the record as
saying that he has deep regrets about Libya. We all
have deep regrets about Libya. And I talked earlier
about the regrets that I have about what the
intelligence community should have written prior to the
intervention. There are policymakers have regrets about
what we did and didn't do in Libya, right, and the loss
of stability there.
And so, you know, I don't think ``and not a broader
failure of policy'' is correct as it relates to
Benghazi, as it relates to Libya. You can have a debate
about the rest of the region, but as it relates to
Libya and Benghazi I don't think that's right.\436\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\Id. at 218-19.
When asked about his central role in all of these events--
the meeting with Rice at the White House's request, briefing
the press at the White House's request after the release of the
drafts of the HPSCI talking points, and being in the dark for
nearly two years about the Rhodes talking points--Morell
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
Q: So we talked earlier about the meeting you had with
Senators McCain, Graham, Ayotte. We talked about how
the--at Denis McDonough's request, perhaps the
President's request, we talked about how you briefed
media members when the package was released. You have
been beaten up for a year and you briefed media members
at the request of the White House, is what I believe
you said. Did you feel in any way used by the White
House when you discovered that these talking points
also existed and you were completely kept in the dark
until the public found out about them?
A: Look, I wish I would have known about them, okay, I
wish I would have known about them.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\437\Id. at 222-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE FBI INVESTIGATION
Throughout the days and weeks after the attacks in
Benghazi, administration officials used the pending FBI
investigation as both a sword and a shield. When convenient,
officials such as Rice and Carney made reference to the
FBI.\438\ When inconvenient, administration officials cited the
ongoing FBI investigation as the reason they could not discuss
certain m
