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                                                      Calendar No. 560
114th Congress    }                                      {      Report
                                 SENATE
  2d Session      }                                      {     114-302
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     



                SECRET SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 2015

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                   COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

                          GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                              to accompany

                               H.R. 1656

           TO PROVIDE FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR THE SECRET
        SERVICE, AND TO IMPROVE PROTECTIONS FOR RESTRICTED AREAS

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                 July 13, 2016.--Ordered to be printed
                                   ______

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 

59-010                         WASHINGTON : 2016                  
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming             HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire          CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa                     GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska

                  Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
                Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Chief Counsel
             David S. Luckey, Director of Homeland Security
            Christopher S. Boness, Professional Staff Member
              Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
           John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
               Mary Beth Schultz, Minority Chief Counsel
     Stephen R. Vina, Minority Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
         Abigail A. Shenkle, Minority Professional Staff Member
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk














                                                      Calendar No. 560
114th Congress    }                                      {      Report
                                 SENATE
  2d Session      }                                      {     114-302

======================================================================



 
                SECRET SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 2015

                                _______
                                

                 July 13, 2016.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Johnson, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
                    Affairs, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 1656]

    The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (H.R. 1656) to provide 
for additional resources for the Secret Service, and to improve 
protections for restricted areas, having considered the same, 
reports favorably thereon with an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
 II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................5
 IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................6
  V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................7
 VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................8
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Act, as Reported.............9

                         I. Purpose and Summary

    The purpose of H.R. 1656, the Secret Service Improvement 
Act of 2016, is to assist the United States Secret Service 
(Secret Service or USSS) in fulfilling its protective and 
investigative missions. The act codifies a number of 
recommendations of the 2014 United States Secret Service 
Protective Mission Panel (the Panel), including increasing 
training and hiring, evaluating additional weaponry, and 
codifying an ethics program office. The act requires the Secret 
Service to evaluate and report to Congress within a year on 
measures Secret Service can take to address security 
vulnerabilities at the White House and extends protection to 
former Vice Presidents and their families. The act requires an 
evaluation of vulnerabilities and threats, including unmanned 
aerial systems, to the White House complex, and imposes 
criminal penalties for operating an autonomous or remotely 
operated vehicle or dangerous weapon on restricted buildings or 
grounds protected by the Secret Service.

              II. Background and the Need for Legislation

    The initial mission of the Secret Service was to 
investigate the counterfeiting of money under the Treasury 
Department.\1\ Since then, the agency has broadened its 
criminal investigations to encompass financial, banking, and 
cyber-related sectors of critical infrastructure.\2\ 
Additionally, the Secret Service's mission expanded to include 
the protection of the President and the Vice-President of the 
United States and their families, the White House complex, 
former presidents, major presidential candidates, and visiting 
foreign heads of states.\3\ The Secret Service also serves as 
the lead agency for National Special Security Events, such as 
the Papal visit in September 2015 and the annual United Nations 
General Assembly.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\USSS History, United States Secret Service, available at http://
www.secretservice.gov/about/history/events/.
    \2\The Investigative Mission, United States Secret Service, 
available at http://www.secretservice.gov/investigation.
    \3\The Protective Mission, United States Secret Service, available 
at http://www.secretservice.gov/protection.
    \4\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

White House and U.S. Capitol security incidents

    The Secret Service has had a number of security incidents 
that highlight the need for changes within the agency. 
According to a congressional report, on March 4, 2015, an 
individual dropped off a suspicious package outside a guard 
booth at the White House complex.\5\ On-duty members of the 
Secret Service Uniformed Division cordoned off the area while 
waiting for a bomb squad from the Washington Metropolitan 
Police Department.\6\ While the investigation was ongoing, two 
special agents drove from a downtown Washington bar into a 
White House barricade, disrupting the investigation of the 
package.\7\ The supervisor on duty did not issue a field 
sobriety test despite signs of intoxication, and instead 
allowed the two agents to leave the scene. Both agents drove 
home in their assigned government vehicles.\8\ Additionally, 
the event was not immediately reported to senior leadership.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform: United States Secret 
Service: An Agency In Crisis 55 (Dec. 2015), available at https://
oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Oversight-USSS-
Report.pdf [hereinafter United States Secret Service: An Agency In 
Crisis].
    \6\Id.
    \7\Id.
    \8\Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland 
Security. Investigation into the Incident at the White House Complex on 
March 4, 2015 (Redacted) 10-12 (May 6, 2015), available at https://
www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mga/OIG_mga-050615.pdf.
    \9\United States Secret Service: An Agency In Crisis at 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In May 2015, a drone landed on the front lawn of the White 
House; in response, Secret Service officers initiated a 
lockdown of the White House Complex and a shutdown of the 
surrounding areas.\10\ Prior to the incident, Congress was 
warned that the Secret Service lacked the ability to address 
the vulnerability of drones entering the White House 
grounds.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\Carol D. Leonnig and Craig Whitlock, Drone Incident at White 
House Highlights Long-Studied, Still-Unsolved Security Gap, Wash Post 
(Jan. 26, 2015), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
drone-incident-at-white-house-highlights-long-studied-still-unsolved-
security-gap/2015/01/26/ed2e7f9e-a594-11e4-a7c2-
03d37af98440_story.html.
    \11\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Separately, on April 24, 2015, Chairman Ron Johnson and 
Ranking Member Tom Carper sent letters to several agencies, 
including the United States Park Police, United States Capitol 
Police, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the United 
States Secret Service, as part of an inquiry into an April 15 
incident in which a lightweight aircraft entered restricted 
airspace and landed on the lawn of the United States Capitol 
Building.\12\ The Chairman and Ranking Member sought to gain an 
understanding of the protocols agencies have in place to 
prevent a breach of this nature.\13\ USSS is the agency with 
primary authority to grant permits to those requesting to 
lawfully enter the P-56 prohibited airspace.\14\ Following this 
inquiry, Committee staff released a bipartisan report with 
findings and recommendations to improve coordination relating 
to airspace security in the National Capital Region.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\Letters from Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman, and Hon. Tom Carper, 
Ranking Member, S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, to 
Hon. Joseph Clancy, Dir., U.S. Secret Service; Michael Huerta, 
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration; and Chief Kim Dine, 
U.S. Capitol Police (Apr. 24, 2016) (on file with Comm. staff).
    \13\Id.
    \14\S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs: Capital 
Airspace Security Breach: Inquiry Into the Landing of a Gyrocopter on 
the Capitol Lawn (Aug. 5, 2015).
    \15\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In September 2014, a man was able to scale the White House 
perimeter fence and successfully enter the White House through 
the front door, bypassing Secret Service officers.\16\ Numerous 
levels of security including a K-9 unit, Emergency Response 
Team (ERT), and alarms placed inside the front doors, were not 
properly triggered when the fence-jumper ran across the North 
Lawn and into the White House.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., OIG-16-
64, 2014 White House Fence Jumping Incident 5 (Apr. 12, 2016).
    \17\Id. at 5-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to security incidents, ethical misconduct has 
been a persistent issue at USSS for the past couple years, 
highlighted by the events that took place in Cartagena, 
Columbia,\18\ as well as reports of alcohol-related misconduct 
during protective missions.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., OIG-13-
24, Adequacy of USSS' Internal Investigation of Alleged Misconduct in 
Cartagena, Columbia (Jan. 2013).
    \19\Carol D. Leonnig and David Nakamura, Secret Service Agents Sent 
Home from Netherlands Were Warned to Avoid Trouble, Wash Post (March 
26, 2014), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/secret-
service-agents-on-obama-detail-sent-home-from-netherlands-after-night-
of-drinking/2014/03/26/86d1a8a6-b4e6-11e3-8020-b2d790b3c9e1_story.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel

    In the aftermath of the fence-jumping incident, the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
established the Panel on October 15, 2014, to undertake a 
review of security issues related to the White House compound 
and a more encompassing review of the Secret Service's 
protective mission--including recommendations regarding 
potential new directors.\20\ The Panel consisted of former 
White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph Hagin, former 
Associate Attorney General of the United States Thomas 
Perrelli, former Assistant to the President and White House 
Cabinet Secretary Danielle Gray, and former Deputy Attorney 
General Mark Filip.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\Joseph Hagin, Thomas Perrelli, Danielle Gray, & Mark Filip, 
Executive Summary to Report from the United States Secret Service 
Protective Mission Panel to the Secretary of Homeland Security, Dep't 
of Homeland Security 6 (Dec. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Panel Report Exec. 
Summary].
    \21\See generally, Letter from Joseph Hagin, Thomas Perrelli, 
Danielle Gray, Mark Filip, United States Secret Service Protective 
Mission Panel, to Hon. Jeh Johnson, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Dec. 
15, 2014) (on file with Comm. staff) (accompanying the report, signed 
by the panel members).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Panel publicly released an executive summary of its 
report on December 15, 2014, along with a summary of 
recommendations in the areas of training and personnel 
management; technology, perimeter security, and operations; and 
leadership.\22\ A number of the recommendations touched on how 
to effectively train, hire, and retain personnel in the Secret 
Service. Per the public summary, training and personnel 
recommendations included: reintroducing a ``fourth shift'' 
training regimen for agents and officers, integrating training 
between different teams protecting the White House, replicating 
the environment that officers and agents operate in to reflect 
a more realistic training experience, and increasing the number 
of positions in the Uniformed Division and Presidential 
Protective Division.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\Panel Report Exec. Summary at 2.
    \23\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Panel stated that the Secret Service should identify 
and update security systems that guard the White House.\24\ 
Additionally, the Panel recommended that the Secret Service 
develop ways to improve perimeter security at the White House, 
if needed, such as increasing the height of the White House 
perimeter fence.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\Id.
    \25\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Panel also expressed concern that Secret Service 
members were not receiving adequate training to fulfill their 
protective missions.\26\ Uniformed Division officers were 
spending on average 25 minutes each on training in Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2013.\27\ Accordingly, the Panel recommended that ten 
percent of an officer's time should be spent in training.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\Id. at 5.
    \27\Id.
    \28\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Proposed legislation

    The Secret Service Improvements Act of 2016 would codify 
some recommendations of the Panel and strengthen the Secret 
Service's ability to investigate threats against protectees and 
their immediate families. It would require the agency to 
evaluate potential vulnerabilities at the White House complex, 
improve security technology, and consider the use of additional 
weaponry for agents. This legislation is intended to assist the 
Secret Service in addressing security gaps and personnel issues 
that were the catalyst for creating the Panel.
    The act would also impose a criminal penalty for 
``knowingly throwing, operating, or placing an autonomous or 
remotely operated vehicle or dangerous weapon in a restricted 
building or grounds.''
    The act also codifies the recommendation of the Panel that 
the Secret Service increase its training requirements. The act 
includes a provision authorizing the Director of the Secret 
Service to improve and construct additional training facilities 
at the Rowley Training Center in Laurel, Maryland.
    The act also codifies the Panel's recommendation that the 
Secret Service increase the Uniformed Division by 200 positions 
and the Presidential Protective Division by 85 positions from 
the number of officers and agents employed by the agency as of 
December 15, 2014.\29\ According to a congressional report, 
Secret Service staffing peaked in FY 2011, and by FY 2015, 
staffing levels significantly decreased to 6,315.\30\ This is 
52 fewer positions than when the Panel issued their report 
recommending additional staffing, despite increased hiring by 
the agency.\31\ The loss of agents and officers over the past 
couple of years has overworked the current workforce, resulting 
in longer and more frequent shifts.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\Id.
    \30\United States Secret Service: An Agency In Crisis at 150.
    \31\Id.
    \32\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Events in Cartagena, Columbia in 2012 and other recent 
alcohol-related misconduct highlight the need for an ethics 
office within the Secret Service. The Office of Integrity was 
established within the agency in December 2013. The act would 
specifically authorize this office.
    As amended by the Committee, the act removes the House 
provision that would require the Senate to confirm the 
President's nominee for the Director of the Secret Service. The 
Committee has worked to limit the number of presidential 
appointees that require confirmation by the Senate. 
Additionally, the Committee feels that the importance the 
Director of the Secret Service plays in protecting the 
President, his or her family, and the White House complex, 
should allow the President to choose the head of the agency 
tasked with such a mission. The amended act would also strike a 
Sense of Congress that the National Capital Planning Commission 
should defer to the Secret Service, and update language 
referring to protection of ``the wife of a former vice 
president'' to refer instead to spouses of former vice 
presidents.

                        III. Legislative History

    Representative Bob Goodlatte, along with Representatives 
John Conyers Jr., Sheila Jackson Lee, Michael McCaul, and James 
F. Sensenbrenner Jr., introduced H.R. 1656 on March 26, 2015, 
which was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. The 
House Committee on the Judiciary considered H.R. 1656 at a 
business meeting on July 27, 2015. The House of Representatives 
passed the bill under suspension of the rules by a vote of 365-
16 (Roll no. 468) on July 27, 2015.
    The act was received in the Senate and referred to the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on July 
28, 2015. The Committee considered H.R. 1656 at a business 
meeting on February 10, 2016.
    Chairman Johnson offered a modified amendment in the nature 
of a substitute, which removed the clause that provided for the 
advice and consent of the Senate to the Presidentially-
appointed Director of the Secret Service, removed a Sense of 
Congress relating to security enhancements to the White House, 
and required the Government Accountability Office to report on 
the implementation of this bill and the implementation of 
recommendations by the United States Secret Service Protective 
Missions Panel Report no later than two years after enactment. 
The substitute also more clearly defines what constitutes a 
restricted building or grounds and extends Secret Service 
protection of former Vice Presidents and their immediate 
families, and replaces the term ``wife'' with ``spouse'' where 
it occurs in describing the families of former Vice Presidents. 
The Committee adopted the modified substitute amendment and 
ordered the act, as amended, reported favorably, both by voice 
vote. Senators present for both the vote on the amendment and 
the vote on the act were: Johnson, McCain, Portman, Paul, 
Lankford, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, 
Baldwin, Heitkamp, Booker, and Peters.

        IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Act, as Reported


Section 1. Short title

    This section provides the act's short title, the ``Secret 
Service Improvements Act of 2016.''

Section 2. Restricted building or grounds

    Section 2 amends Title 18 of the United States Code to 
ensure the Government can arrest and prosecute those who 
operate unmanned aerial devices over the White House and other 
restricted grounds. Specifically, it criminalizes the throwing, 
operating, or placing of an ``autonomous or remotely operated 
vehicle or dangerous weapon'' within a restricted building or 
grounds that disrupts Government business or official 
functions. This section also clarifies that otherwise entering 
the restricted building or grounds with a deadly or dangerous 
weapon or firearm is punishable under Title 18. The section 
amends the definition of ``restricted building or grounds'' in 
Title 18 to encompass properties designated as non-governmental 
by the President or another Secret Service protectee (such as 
the President's secondary residence, for example).

Section 3. Threats against former Vice Presidents

    Section 3 authorizes the Secret Service to investigate 
threats against former Vice Presidents and their immediate 
families, and extends the criminal penalties that apply to 
threats against Presidents and their families, former 
Presidents and their families, and others, to include former 
Vice Presidents and their immediate families. The section also 
changes the definition of the immediate family from the wife or 
widow of a former President to the spouse or widow or widower 
of a former President or Vice President to make the section 
gender neutral.

Section 4. Increased training

    The purpose of this section is to require training for 
United States Secret Service Protective Division Agents and 
Uniformed Division Officers per the recommendation of the 
Panel. The section requires the Secret Service to increase the 
number of training hours for officers and agents so that no 
less than ten percent of their time is spent on training, 
beginning the year after enactment. Additionally, USSS shall 
maintain enough staff to provide agents and officers a ``fourth 
shift'' of training. This is based on recommendations from the 
Panel.

Section 5. Training facilities

    Section 5 authorizes the Director of the Secret Service to 
construct facilities at the Rowley Training Center to improve 
training for Uniformed Division officers and Secret Service 
agents.

Section 6. Hiring of additional officers and agents

    Section 6 requires the Secret Service to implement the 
hiring requirement recommended in the Panel report. The section 
requires the Secret Service to hire 200 additional Uniformed 
Division officers and 85 additional agents for the Presidential 
Protective Detail.

Section 7. Evaluation of vulnerabilities and threats

    Section 7 requires the Secretary of DHS to adopt improved 
procedures for evaluating vulnerabilities and threats, 
including unmanned aerial systems, to the White House and other 
buildings or grounds protected by the Secret Service. This 
section also requires the Secretary to report these findings to 
the appropriate congressional committees within one year.

Section 8. Evaluation of use of technology

    Section 8 requires the Secret Service to work with the 
Science and Technology Directorate within DHS to evaluate new 
technology aimed at improving the security of the White House 
as well as Secret Service protectees. This section also 
requires the Secret Service to evaluate evidence retention 
procedures and report its findings to Congress.

Section 9. Evaluation of use of additional weaponry

    Section 9 requires the Secret Service to evaluate 
outfitting its officers and agents with additional weaponry 
including the use of non-lethal weapons.

Section 10. Security costs for secondary residences

    Section 10 allows the Secret Service to make necessary 
security upgrades to secondary residences of former Presidents.

Section 11. Establishment of Ethics Program

    Section 11 requires the creation of an Ethics Program 
Office under the Chief Counsel of the Secret Service.

Section 12. Report on implementation

    Section 12 requires the Comptroller General of the United 
States to report to Congress on the implementation of this act, 
as well as the implementation of recommendations reported from 
the Panel report.

                   V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule 
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has 
considered the regulatory impact of this act and determined 
that the act will have no regulatory impact within the meaning 
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional 
Budget Office's statement that the act contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs 
on state, local, or tribal governments.

             VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                                     March 3, 2016.
Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1656, the Secret 
Service Improvements Act of 2016.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark 
Grabowicz.
            Sincerely,
                                                        Keith Hall.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 1656--Secret Service Improvements Act of 2016

    CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 1656 would increase 
spending subject to appropriation by less than $500,000 
annually. Because enacting H.R. 1656 would affect direct 
spending and revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures apply, but CBO 
estimates that any such effects would be negligible. CBO also 
estimates that enacting the legislation would not increase net 
direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four 
consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027.
    H.R. 1656 would authorize the United States Secret Service 
to hire additional law enforcement personnel and construct 
facilities for training those individuals. The act also would 
direct the agency to establish an office to provide ethics 
training for employees. According to the Secret Service, the 
agency is already hiring the personnel and constructing the 
facilities that would be specifically authorized by the act. 
Consequently, implementing H.R. 1656 would not affect spending 
for those activities. Based on information from the Secret 
Service, CBO estimates that it would cost less than $500,000 
annually to operate the ethics office required by the 
legislation; such spending would be subject to the availability 
of appropriated funds.
    H.R. 1656 also would broaden the coverage of current laws 
against accessing restricted buildings and threatening a Vice 
President of the United States. Because CBO expects that the 
legislation would apply to a relatively small number of 
offenders, any increase in costs for law enforcement, court 
proceedings, or prison operations would not be significant.
    Because those prosecuted and convicted under H.R. 1656 
could be subject to criminal fines, the federal government 
might collect additional fines under the act. Criminal fines 
are recorded as revenues, deposited in the Crime Victims Fund, 
and are available to spend without further appropriation 
action. CBO expects that any additional revenues and subsequent 
direct spending would not be significant because of the small 
number of cases likely to be affected.
    H.R. 1656 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and 
would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal 
governments.
    On July 31, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 
1656, the Secret Service Improvements Act of 2015, as passed by 
the House of Representatives on July 27, 2015. The two versions 
of the act are similar and CBO's estimate of the budgetary 
effects are the same.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz. 
The estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy 
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

       VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Act, as Reported

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by 
H.R. 1656 as reported are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in brackets, new matter is 
printed in italic, and existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE 18--CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART I--CRIMES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 41--EXTORTION AND THREATS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 879. THREATS AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENTS AND CERTAIN OTHER PERSONS

    (a) Whoever knowingly and willfully threatens to kill, 
kidnap, or inflict bodily harm upon--
          (1) * * *
          (2) a former Vice President or a member of the 
        immediate family of a former Vice President;
          [(2)] (3) a member of the immediate family of the 
        President, the President-elect, the Vice President, or 
        the Vice President-elect;
          [(3)] (4) a major candidate for the office of 
        President or Vice President, or a member of the 
        immediate family of such candidate; or
          [(4)] (5) a person protected by the Secret Service 
        under section 3056(a)(6);
    (b) As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``immediate family'' means--
                  (A) with respect to [subsection (a)(1)] 
                paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of 
                this section, [the wife of a former President 
                during his lifetime, the widow of a former 
                President until her death or re-marriage, and 
                minor children of a former President] the 
                spouse of a former President or former Vice 
                President during the lifetime of the former 
                President or former Vice President, as the case 
                may be, the widow or widower of a former 
                President or former Vice President until the 
                death or remarriage of the widow or widower, 
                and minor children of a former President or 
                former Vice President until they reach sixteen 
                years of age; and
                  (B) with respect to [subsection (a)(2) and 
                (a)(3)] paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection 
                (a) of this section, a person to whom the 
                President, President-elect, Vice President, 
                Vice President-elect, or major candidate for 
                the office of President or Vice President--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    CHAPTER 84--PRESIDENTIAL AND PRESIDENTIAL STAFF ASSASSINATION, 
KIDNAPPING, AND ASSAULT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 1752. RESTRICTED BUILDING OR GROUNDS

    (a) Whoever--
          (1) * * *
          (2) * * *
          (3) knowingly, and with the intent to impede or 
        disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or 
        official functions, obstructs or impedes ingress or 
        egress to or from any restricted building or grounds; 
        [or]
          (4) knowingly engages in any act of physical violence 
        against any person or property in any restricted 
        building or grounds; or
          (5) knowingly causes any autonomous or remotely 
        operated vehicle or dangerous weapon to enter any 
        restricted building or grounds, with the intent for 
        such autonomous or remotely operated vehicle or 
        dangerous weapon to enter a restricted building or 
        grounds, when, or so that, such autonomous or remotely 
        operated vehicle or dangerous weapon, in fact, impedes 
        or disrupts the orderly conduct of Government business 
        or official functions;
or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b).
    (b) The punishment for a violation of subsection (a) is--
          (1) A fine under this title or imprisonment for not 
        more than 10 years, or both, if--
                  [(A) the person, during and in relation to 
                the offense, uses or carries a deadly or 
                dangerous weapon or firearm; or]
                  (A) during and in relation to the offense, a 
                deadly or dangerous weapon or firearm is used, 
                carried, or otherwise enters the restricted 
                building or grounds; or
                  (B) * * *
          (2) * * *
    (c) In this section--
          (1) the term ``restricted buildings or [grounds'' 
        means] grounds''--
                  (A) means any posted, cordoned off, or 
                otherwise restricted area--
                          [(A)] (i) of the White House or its 
                        grounds, or the Vice President's 
                        official residence or its grounds;
                          [(B)] (ii) of a building or grounds 
                        where the President or other person 
                        protected by the Secret Service is or 
                        will be temporarily visiting; [or]
                          (iii) of a building or grounds that 
                        the President or other person protected 
                        by the Secret Service has designated as 
                        a non-governmental property in 
                        accordance with the Presidential 
                        Protection Assistance Act of 1976 (18 
                        U.S.C. 3056 note); or
                          [(C)] (iv) of a building or grounds 
                        so restricted in conjunction with an 
                        event designated as a special event of 
                        national significance; and
                  (B) includes the airspace above any posted, 
                cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area 
                described in subparagraph (A); and
          (2) * * *

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PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1976

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    Sec. 3.
    (a) * * *
    (b) A protectee may thereafter designate a different non-
Governmental property in lieu of the non-Governmental property 
previously designated under subsection (a) (hereinafter in this 
Act referred to as the ``previously designated property'') as 
the one non-Governmental property to be fully secured by the 
Secret Service on a permanent basis under subsection (a). 
Thereafter, [any expenditures by the Secret Service to maintain 
a permanent guard detail or for permanent facilities, 
equipment, and services to secure the non-Governmental property 
previously designated under subsection (a) shall be subject to 
the limitations imposed under section 4] any expenditures by 
the Secret Service for permanent facilities, equipment, and 
services to secure the non-Governmental property previously 
designated under subsection (a) are subject to the requirements 
set forth in section 4.
    (c) * * *
    [Sec. 4. Expenditures by the Secret Service for maintaining 
a permanent guard detail and for permanent facilities, 
equipment, and services to secure any non-Governmental property 
in addition to the one non-Governmental property designated by 
each protectee under subsection 3(a) or 3(b) may not exceed a 
cumulative total of $10,000 at each such additional non-
Governmental property, unless expenditures in excess of that 
amount are specifically approved by resolutions adopted by the 
Committees on Appropriations of the House and Senate, 
respectively.]
    Sec. 4. Notification regarding expenditures on non-
governmental properties. The Secret Service shall notify the 
Committees on Appropriations of the House and Senate, the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 
Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
House of Representatives of any expenditures for permanent 
facilities, equipment, and services to secure any non-
Governmental property in addition to the one non-Governmental 
property designated by each protectee under subsection (a) or 
(b) of section 3.
    Sec. 5.
    (a) * * *
    (b) * * *
    (c) In the event that any non-Governmental property becomes 
a previously designated property and Secret Service protection 
at that property has not been terminated, all such improvements 
and other items which the Director determines are not necessary 
to secure the previously designated property [within the 
limitations imposed under section 4] shall be removed or 
compensated for in accordance with the procedures set forth 
under Subsection (b) of this section.

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