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                                                        Calendar No. 73
114th Congress      }                                    {       Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session        }                                    {       114-42

======================================================================



 
THE BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL TRADE PRIORITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 
                                  2015

                                _______
                                

                  May 12, 2015.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Hatch, from the Committee on Finance, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 995]

       Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office

    The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the bill 
(S. 995) to establish congressional trade negotiating 
objectives and enhanced consultation requirements for trade 
negotiations, to provide for consideration of trade agreements, 
and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon with 
amendments and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE..........................................2
 II. SUMMARY..........................................................2
III. GENERAL EXPLANATION..............................................2
          A. BACKGROUND..........................................     2
          B. ACTION IN COMMITTEE.................................     6
              1. Hearings........................................     6
              2. Consideration of Legislation....................     7
 IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS......................................7
          A. ADDENDUM............................................    47
  V. VOTES OF THE COMMITTEE..........................................48
 VI. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE BILL....................................51
VII. REGULATORY IMPACT AND OTHER MATTERS.............................53
VIII.ADDITIONAL VIEWS................................................54

 IX. MINORITY VIEWS..................................................55
  X. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED...........57

                       I. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

    The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the bill 
(S. 995) to establish congressional trade negotiating 
objectives and enhanced consultation requirements for trade 
negotiations, to provide for consideration of trade agreements, 
and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon with 
amendments and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

                              II. SUMMARY

    The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015 (S. 995) establishes rules for the 
implementation of international trade agreements that the 
President concludes prior to July 1, 2018, with the possibility 
of extension through July 1, 2021. The bill would provide the 
President with the authority to proclaim modifications to 
certain tariff rates in order to implement such agreements. 
Where specific conditions have been met, legislation to 
implement trade agreements--including tariff reductions not 
subject to proclamation authority and other changes to current 
U.S. law--would be subject to agreed upon procedures (known as 
``trade authorities procedures'') for consideration in the 
House of Representatives and the Senate. Under these trade 
authorities procedures, a bill to implement a qualifying trade 
agreement would not be subject to amendment and would be 
guaranteed a vote in each Chamber by a date certain.
    For implementing legislation to qualify for trade 
authorities procedures, the underlying trade agreement must 
make progress toward achieving the applicable objectives, 
policies, and priorities set forth in the bill. Furthermore, 
the President must consult regularly with Members of Congress 
regarding agreements under negotiation. Congress retains the 
right to withdraw the application of trade authorities 
procedures to an agreement or agreements in the event the 
President fails to consult as required.
    Trade authorities procedures for trade agreement 
implementing legislation were last enacted in 2002 and extended 
in 2005 with respect to agreements entered into before July 1, 
2007. It is expected that the present extension of trade 
authorities procedures will guide the President's efforts to 
conclude a free trade agreement with the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership countries, a free trade agreement with the European 
Union, agreements entered into under the auspices of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), agreements with respect to the 
international trade in services and with respect to 
environmental goods entered into with WTO members, as well as 
other agreements entered into under the auspices of the WTO and 
efforts to conclude additional agreements the President may 
identify during the period covered by the bill.

                        III. GENERAL EXPLANATION


                             A. Background

    Article I, section 8, clause 2 of the Constitution grants 
the power to regulate foreign commerce to Congress. Congress 
has historically exercised that power through legislation 
regulating imports of goods, services, and investment into the 
United States. For the first 145 years of the Republic, 
Congress exercised its power over trade policy by setting 
tariffs directly through frequent enactment of tariff acts, 
establishing in detail duty rates for individual imports.
    The high tariffs enacted in the Trade Act of 1930 (the 
Smoot-Hawley tariff) and the deepening economic depression of 
the early 1930s, however, led Congress to establish new tariff-
setting roles for the legislative and executive branches. Under 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (P.L. 73-316), 
Congress authorized the President to negotiate reciprocal 
reductions of tariffs, within a limited range and time period, 
and to implement them by proclamation without the need for 
implementing legislation.
    Under the Trade Agreements Program initiated by Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull under authority of the 1934 Act, the 
United States negotiated selective reciprocal tariff agreements 
with many countries prior to, and during, World War II. 
Following the war and for the next several decades, Congress 
extended the President's tariff-cutting authority a number of 
times. Under this authority, the President negotiated 
reductions in tariff levels multilaterally in five rounds under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and afterward 
proclaimed the lower tariffs under the authority Congress had 
delegated.
    The sixth round of multilateral trade negotiations, called 
the Kennedy Round (1964-67), involved negotiations on nontariff 
as well as tariff barriers. Congress had extended presidential 
tariff-cutting authority for the Kennedy Round under the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794). That authority did not 
include negotiation of nontariff barriers. Nonetheless, the 
Administration negotiated agreements that involved two 
nontariff barriers: (1) the American Selling Price (ASP), which 
was a relatively high U.S. import valuation based on domestic 
producer prices that primarily protected the U.S. chemical 
industry; and (2) a code, or set of rules, on antidumping. 
Although the 1962 Act, like the 1934 Act, authorized the 
President to negotiate a reduction of ``any existing duty or 
other import restriction,'' the view in Congress was that by 
entering into the antidumping agreement, the President had 
overstepped his delegated power. Congress subsequently did not 
enact legislation to implement the agreements with respect to 
the two nontariff barriers.
    The decision by Congress not to approve the nontariff 
commitments made by the President posed a dilemma in terms of 
the implementation of any agreement that called for reciprocal 
reductions in nontariff measures. Consistent with its 
constitutional responsibilities, Congress could not delegate 
authority to the President to revise U.S. domestic law by 
proclamation in the manner it had delegated the authority to 
proclaim changes in tariffs. At the same time, Congress 
recognized that the President, as a practical matter, might be 
unable to conclude future trade agreements unless he could 
assure U.S. trading partners that the agreement would be 
considered in a timely manner and would not be amended by 
Congress after the fact.
    In the early 1970s, in anticipation of a seventh round of 
multilateral negotiations that was to include nontariff 
barriers, Congress considered a new type of negotiating 
authority to grant the President proclamation authority for 
nontariff barriers much like the previously granted authority 
for tariffs. The proposed legislation would have allowed the 
President to reach a nontariff agreement, submit it to 
Congress, and unless Congress legislatively disapproved the 
agreement, the President would put the changes into effect by 
proclamation. There would be no need for implementing 
legislation. Legislation granting the President nontariff 
proclamation authority was passed by the House but stopped in 
the Senate.
    In the Trade Act of 1974, Congress enacted procedures that, 
in its view, properly balanced the objectives of enabling the 
President to negotiate reciprocal reductions of nontariff 
barriers while maintaining Congressional authority over changes 
to U.S. law. These procedures came to be known as the ``fast 
track,'' and more recently Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), 
procedures for the consideration of legislation implementing 
trade agreements. The procedures were designed to preserve 
Congress' constitutional role in the regulation of foreign 
commerce, while offering the President and U.S. trading 
partners the assurance that a trade agreement requiring changes 
in U.S. law would receive an up-or-down vote within a time 
certain when brought before Congress.
    In order for a trade agreement to qualify for these 
procedures, Congress required that the President would have to 
consult with the appropriate congressional committees before 
and during the negotiation of the agreement and to give notice 
to Congress at least 90 days before entering into the 
agreement. The President was also required to submit 
implementing legislation, a statement of administrative actions 
to be taken to implement the agreement, and reasons why the 
agreement serves the interests of U.S. commerce. At the time, 
there was little, if any, controversy about the procedures 
Congress had created; to the contrary, the commonly held view 
was that Congress had achieved an enlarged role in trade 
negotiations by imposing consultation and notification 
requirements.
    Congress has preserved the basic structure of the Trade Act 
of 1974 each time it has renewed the procedures for the 
consideration of trade agreements. These provisions are 
contained in Sections 151-154 of the 1974 Act, as amended. The 
trade agreement approval procedures under the 1974 Act are not 
subject to sunset provisions, but Congress must periodically 
reauthorize the President to negotiate agreements that will 
qualify for the procedures. Over the years, Congress has 
periodically renewed and revised the procedures.
    The negotiating authority in the 1974 Act enabled the 
Administration to negotiate the Tokyo Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations (1974-79) under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). After the Tokyo Round was completed, 
this Committee took the position that Congress should have an 
active role in drafting the legislation to implement the 
agreement. The result was that the Committee considered a draft 
of the implementing bill through a ``mock'' legislative 
process, with committee consideration, amendments, and 
conference committee. The President then submitted final 
legislation to Congress based on the results of the ``mock'' 
legislative process. Although not formally outlined in any 
document, the executive and legislative branches thus agreed on 
a process that allowed congressional involvement in crafting 
legislation that would eventually be formally considered under 
expedited procedures. The so-called ``mock-markup'' process 
continues to this day.
    In the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-39), the 
procedures for the consideration of trade agreements were 
renewed for eight years. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (P.L. 
98-573) amended the 1974 Act by providing for the negotiation 
of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). Agreements were 
subsequently negotiated with Israel and Canada.
    The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 extended 
the procedures for the consideration of trade agreements for an 
additional five years, during which time legislation to 
implement the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
1993 was enacted. The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations under the GATT, launched in 1986, was concluded 
after an extension to the 1988 Act, and the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465) was enacted under the authority 
of 1988 Act.
    The launch of the Doha Round of World Trade Organization 
(WTO) negotiations in November 2001, and the Bush 
Administration's interest in bilateral FTA negotiations, 
including with Chile and Singapore, led to the enactment of the 
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 on August 6, 
2002 (P.L. 107-210). Authority provided under this Act was used 
to implement eleven FTA implementing bills, including with 
respect to FTAs with Chile (2003), Singapore (2003), Australia 
(2004), Morocco (2004), the Dominican Republic-Central American 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) countries (2005), Bahrain 
(2006), and Oman (2006). FTAs with Colombia, Panama, Peru, and 
South Korea were concluded prior to the expiration of the 2002 
authorities on July 1, 2007, and legislation to implement these 
FTAs was enacted for Peru in 2008 and Colombia, Panama and 
South Korea in 2011. Negotiations for the WTO Doha Round have 
not yielded an agreement requiring congressional action.
    The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015 (S.995) is being considered for the 
ongoing negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
agreement, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(T-TIP) being negotiated with the European Union (EU), the 
Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) being negotiated with 
certain members of the WTO seeking to expand the scope of the 
WTO Trade in Services Agreement (GATS), and an Environmental 
Goods Agreement (EGA) being negotiated with certain members of 
the WTO. It may also be used to implement any agreement 
resulting from the WTO Doha Round of negotiations, or any other 
trade negotiations concluded by the President before July 1, 
2018 or July 1, 2021 if no extension disapproval resolution is 
adopted. Trade authorities procedures would also apply to 
additional trade negotiations that may begin after approval of 
this Act but have not yet been notified to Congress.
    The TPP is a proposed regional free trade agreement being 
negotiated among the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, 
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, 
and Vietnam. U.S. negotiators describe the TPP as a 
``comprehensive and high-standard'' FTA that aims to liberalize 
trade in nearly all goods, including agriculture, and services 
and contain rules-based commitments beyond those currently 
established in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 
negotiations have been underway since 2010, and a broad outline 
of an agreement was announced in November 2011. If concluded as 
envisioned, the TPP potentially could significantly reduce 
tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and investment among the 
parties and could serve as a template for a future trade pact 
among Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) members 
and potentially other countries.
    The T-TIP is a proposed ``comprehensive and high-standard'' 
FTA being negotiated between the United States and the European 
Union (EU). Formal negotiations commenced in July 2013. The 
United States and the EU seek to enhance trade and market 
access by addressing remaining transatlantic barriers to trade 
and investment in goods and services, while seeking to 
establish new rules-based commitments and to address nontariff 
regulatory barriers.
    TISA is a proposed sectoral trade agreement among 23 
countries, including the EU, launched in April 2013. It seeks 
to expand commitments to the WTO General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). While this negotiation is not being conducted 
under the auspices of the WTO, it may be incorporated into the 
GATS in the future.
    The Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) is a proposed 
sectoral trade agreement which was announced in January 2014 by 
14 countries, including the United States, representing 86% of 
global trade in goods such as wind turbines, solar panels or 
advanced batteries. The talks are expected to be handled as an 
open plurilateral, i.e., the agreed tariff reduction or 
elimination would be applied on a most-favored-nation (MFN) 
basis to all WTO members, similar to the 1996 WTO Information 
Technology Agreement.

                         B. Action in Committee


1. Hearings

    On January 22, 2015 the Committee held a hearing on Jobs 
and a Healthy Economy which discussed the important role of 
international trade in creating and sustaining a healthy U.S. 
economy as well as the need to renew Trade Promotion Authority. 
On January 27, 2015 the Committee discussed the role of Trade 
Promotion Authority in advancing America's international trade 
agenda during a hearing with United States Trade Representative 
Michael Froman on President Obama's 2015 Trade Policy Agenda.
    On April 16 and 21, 2015, the Committee held a hearing 
entitled Congress and U.S. Tariff Policy which included robust 
discussion on the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015. On April 16, 2015, the Committee 
heard testimony from Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew, 
Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, and United States Trade 
Representative Michael Froman. On April 21, 2015, the Committee 
heard testimony from Thomas Donahue, President and Chief 
Executive Officer of the United States Chamber of Commerce, and 
Richard Trumka, President of the AFL-CIO.
    In general, witnesses expressed support for creating high-
quality jobs and expanding opportunities for American 
businesses through increased U.S. trade taking advantage of 
U.S.-led trade agreements. Witnesses stated that increasing 
access to foreign markets for U.S. exports through enhanced 
trade opportunities should be a priority for the United States. 
Witnesses also noted that U.S. trade supports good jobs, spurs 
growth, and strengthens the American middle class, while 
sustaining American strength and influence abroad. The 
witnesses generally agreed that Trade Promotion Authority is a 
critical tool for achieving those objectives, and that there is 
a need to update Trade Promotion Authority since it was last 
enacted in 2002. One witness expressed a view in favor of an 
approach to trade and globalization based on including labor 
and environmental provisions that go beyond those found in 
recent U.S. FTAs., elimination of investor-state dispute 
settlement, and requiring enforceable currency provisions in 
trade agreements. The witness also favored changes to the 
process for considering trade agreements, including changes to 
rules on transparency, restrictions on expedited procedures for 
the consideration of bills implementing trade agreements, and 
other policies such as enforcement.
    Another witness noted that while the U.S. market is largely 
open to imports from around the world, foreign governments 
continue to maintain tariffs on U.S. exports that in some cases 
are quite high, and often erect other kinds of barriers against 
U.S. goods and services. The need for U.S. trade agreements to 
address these barriers and establish U.S.-led rules for 
international trade was agreed on by the witnesses.

2. Consideration of Legislation

    On April 16, 2015, S. 995 was read twice and referred to 
the Committee on Finance. The Committee held a meeting to 
consider the bill on April 22, 2015. A motion to report the 
bill as amended was approved by a vote of 20 to 6.

                    IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS


Section 1. Short title

    The short title of the bill is the ``Bipartisan 
Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 
2015.''

Section 2. Trade negotiating objectives

            Summary
    Section 2 of the bill sets forth the objectives, policies, 
and priorities of the United States in negotiating trade 
agreements. In order for legislation implementing a trade 
agreement to qualify for consideration under the trade 
authorities procedures set forth in section 3 of the bill, the 
President must state that the agreement makes progress in 
achieving the applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and 
objectives of the bill. Further, these purposes, policies, 
priorities, and objectives should serve as the basis for 
consultations between the President and Congress during the 
course of an agreement's negotiation.
    Section 2 is organized into three subsections defining the 
trade negotiating positions of the United States. Subsection 
(a) addresses overall objectives--that is, goals that cut 
across sectors and issue areas. Subsection (b) addresses 
objectives that are specific to particular sectors, such as 
goods, services, and agriculture, and particular issue areas, 
such as investment, intellectual property, digital trade in 
goods and services, the intersection between trade and core 
labor standards and trade and the environment, and currency 
practices. Subsection (c) addresses capacity building and other 
priorities that may have a bearing on the international trade 
of the United States and should be pursued in parallel to trade 
negotiations.
    It is the expectation of the Committee that in affirming 
that a trade agreement makes progress toward achieving the 
applicable purposes, policies, priorities and objectives of 
this bill, the President will address the purposes, policies, 
priorities, and objectives in each of the subsections of 
section 2.

Section 2(a). Overall trade negotiating objectives

    Section 2(a) identifies twelve overall trade negotiating 
objectives, as follows:
           Obtaining more open, equitable, and 
        reciprocal market access;
           Obtaining the reduction or elimination of 
        barriers related to trade and investment and other 
        trade-distorting policies and practices;
           Further strengthening the system of 
        international trade and investment disciplines and 
        procedures, including dispute settlement;
           Fostering economic growth, raising living 
        standards, enhancing the competitiveness of the United 
        States, promoting full employment in the United States, 
        and enhancing the global economy;
           Ensuring that trade and environmental 
        policies are mutually supportive, and seeking to 
        protect and preserve the environment and enhance the 
        international means of doing so, while optimizing the 
        use of the world's resources;
           Promoting respect for worker rights and the 
        rights of children, consistent with core labor 
        standards as defined in section 11(7) of the bill;
           Seeking provisions in trade agreement under 
        which parties to those agreements ensure that they do 
        not weaken or reduce protections afforded in domestic 
        environmental and labor laws in order to gain trade 
        advantages;
           Ensuring that trade agreements afford small 
        businesses equal access to international markets, 
        equitable trade benefits, and expanded export 
        opportunities, and provide for the elimination of 
        barriers that affect small businesses 
        disproportionately;
           Promoting universal ratification and full 
        compliance with ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the 
        Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 
        the Worst Forms of Child Labor;
           Ensuring that trade agreements reflect and 
        facilitate the interrelated, multi-sectoral nature of 
        trade and investment;
           Recognizing the significance of the Internet 
        as a trading platform in international commerce; and
           Taking into account other legitimate U.S. 
        domestic objectives, including the protection of 
        legitimate health or safety, essential security, and 
        consumer interests and the law and regulations related 
        thereto.
    These overall objectives have been updated to reflect the 
central importance of trade agreements in expanding U.S. access 
to foreign markets, strengthening the international trading 
system, and fostering growth and full employment in the United 
States, while making clear that trade agreements can and should 
be consistent with other priorities, such as protecting the 
environment, the rights of workers, and legitimate domestic 
regulatory objectives such as protecting health or safety and 
consumer interests. In addition, a new overall negotiating 
objective recognizing the significance of the Internet as a 
trading platform in international commerce makes clear that as 
negotiators seek to expand trading opportunities for U.S. 
producers of goods and services, they should be mindful of new 
opportunities and barriers arising from technological advances. 
This bill provides numerous related provisions that facilitate 
continued growth of digital trade, which includes both trade in 
digital goods and services and Internet-enabled trade in goods 
and services.

Section 2(b). Principal trade negotiating objectives

    Section 2(b) sets forth 20 objectives that are sector- or 
issue-specific, as follows:
            1. Trade in goods
    The principal negotiating objectives of the United States 
regarding trade in goods are:
           To expand competitive market opportunities 
        for exports of goods from the United States and to 
        obtain fairer and more open conditions of trade, 
        including through the utilization of global value 
        chains, by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff 
        barriers and policies and practices of foreign 
        governments directly related to trade that decrease 
        market opportunities for U.S. exports and distort U.S. 
        trade, and
           To obtain reciprocal tariff and nontariff 
        barrier elimination agreements, including with respect 
        to products covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay 
        Round Agreements Act.
    The negotiating objectives in section 2(b)(1) apply to 
goods exports of the United States, and direct U.S. negotiators 
to seek to reduce or eliminate tariff and nontariff barriers to 
U.S. products. Goods exports of the United States continue to 
be subject to often high duties at the borders of U.S. trading 
partners. The language directs the reduction or elimination of 
tariff barriers. The negotiating objectives also apply to 
nontariff barriers that restrict the export of U.S. goods. 
Nontariff barriers to U.S. exports are applied both at the 
border, such as quantitative restrictions and import licensing 
requirements, and behind the border, such as discriminatory 
trade-related regulations, standards, or conformity assessment 
procedures. The objective is directed at policies and 
practices, as well as formal statutes and regulations. The 
Committee recognizes that some of the most onerous foreign 
trade barriers faced by U.S. exporters consist of informal 
policies and practices that may not be as easy to identify as a 
written law that violates an international trade obligation.
    Section 2(b)(1)(B) directs the President to continue to 
seek the elimination of duties on a reciprocal basis, including 
for products covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act. It is the Committee's intention that the 
President pay particular attention to the elimination of 
tariffs on these products, which could result in substantial 
benefits to U.S. industry and workers. For many of these 
products, U.S. producers remain at a significant competitive 
disadvantage. In other sectors, tariff inequities are 
aggravated by tariff escalation, which occurs when a country 
establishes low or zero tariffs for raw materials but maintains 
relatively high tariffs for processed products. The Committee 
intends that the Administration pursue ending such practices 
for the sectors covered by the proclamation authority provided 
in section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
    The Committee intends this negotiating objective, in 
combination with other negotiating objectives, to support 
improvements in trade facilitation. Trade facilitation is 
critical to creating and sustaining a healthy U.S. economy. 
Thus, this negotiating objective is intended to be read 
consistently with the overall negotiating objective to ensure 
that trade agreements reflect the increasingly interrelated and 
multi-sectoral nature of trade and investment activity, and the 
negotiating objectives regarding capacity building, 
specifically relating to customs and trade facilitation.
            2. Trade in services
    Section 2(b)(2) reflects the view of this Committee that 
trade agreements should be structured to expand U.S. services 
trade substantially. Cross-border services exports now exceed 
$500 billion annually, generating large, consistent, trade 
surpluses in the sector. Yet cross-border U.S. services exports 
continue to comprise less than 15 percent of total U.S. 
exports, and the United States exports a much lower percentage 
of its overall services production than of its goods 
production. This Committee intends the parallelism between the 
objectives regarding trade in services and the objectives 
regarding trade in goods to signal the importance of expanding 
U.S. services exports as well, in the manner described in the 
bill.
    The principal negotiating objective of the United States 
regarding trade in services is to expand opportunities for U.S. 
services and obtain fairer and more open conditions of trade, 
including through utilization of global value chains, by 
reducing or eliminating regulatory and other barriers that deny 
national treatment and market access or unreasonably restrict 
the establishment or operations of service suppliers.
    Section 2(b)(2)(B) recognizes for the first time that the 
expansion of services opportunities generates benefits for all 
sectors of the economy and facilitates trade. Section 
2(b)(2)(B) also encourages the pursuit of this objective 
through all means, including through a plurilateral agreement 
with countries that are willing and able to undertake high 
standard services commitments for both existing and new 
services. It is the view of the Committee that the United 
States should not agree to the inclusion of any party in the 
Trade in Services Agreement unless that party has demonstrated 
a commitment to meeting the high standards of the agreement in 
a timely manner. It is also the view of the Committee that the 
Trade in Services Agreement not be delayed, and that the 
negotiations move forward only with parties willing and able to 
meet the negotiations' ambitious objectives.
    The Committee notes that there are four modes of trade in 
services: (1) delivery of a service from the territory of one 
country into the territory of other country; (2) supply of a 
service of one country to the service consumer of any other 
country; (3) services provided by a service supplier of one 
country in the territory of any other country, and (4) services 
provided by a service supplier of one country through the 
presence of natural persons in the territory of any other 
country.
    Congress has long held that trade agreements are not an 
appropriate vehicle for enacting immigration-related law or 
modifying immigration policy. Article I, section 8, clause 4 of 
the Constitution gives Congress the power to ``establish a 
uniform Rule of Naturalization,'' and the Supreme Court has 
long found that this provision of the Constitution grants 
Congress plenary power over immigration policy. For many years, 
Congress has made it abundantly clear that international trade 
agreements should not change, nor require any change, to U.S. 
immigration law and practice. For example, in July 2003 the 
Senate unanimously passed a resolution (S. Res. 211) stating 
that:
          (1) trade agreements are not the appropriate vehicle 
        for enacting immigration-related laws or modifying 
        current immigration policy; and
          (2) future trade agreements to which the United 
        States is a party and the legislation implementing the 
        agreements should not contain immigration-related 
        provisions.
    The Committee continues to believe that it is not 
appropriate to negotiate in a trade agreement any provision 
that would (1) require changes to U.S. immigration law, 
regulations, policy, or practice; (2) accord immigration-
related benefits to parties to trade agreements; (3) commit the 
United States to keep unchanged, with respect to nationals of 
parties to trade agreements, one or more existing provisions of 
U.S. immigration law, policy, or practice; or (4) expand to 
additional countries immigration-related commitments already 
made by the United States in earlier trade agreements.
            3. Trade in agriculture
    The principal negotiating objective of the United States 
with respect to agriculture is to obtain competitive market 
access opportunities for U.S. agricultural exports 
substantially equivalent to opportunities afforded foreign 
exports in U.S. markets and to achieve fairer and more open 
conditions of trade by:
           Securing more open and equitable market 
        access through robust rules on sanitary and 
        phytosanitary (SPS) measures that encourage the 
        adoption of international standards and require a 
        science-based justification for SPS measures, improving 
        regulatory coherence, requiring that SPS measures are 
        transparently developed and implemented, and based on 
        risk assessments that take into account relevant 
        international guidelines and scientific data, and are 
        not more restrictive on trade than necessary, while 
        recognizing that countries may protect human, animal, 
        or plant life or health in a manner consistent with 
        their international obligations;
           Reducing or eliminating tariffs that 
        decrease market opportunities for U.S. exports, while 
        providing adjustment periods for U.S. import-sensitive 
        products;
           Reducing tariffs to levels that are the same 
        as or lower than those in the United States;
           Reducing or eliminating subsidies that 
        decrease market opportunities for U.S. exports;
           Preserving non-trade distorting programs 
        that support family farms and rural communities;
           Eliminating government policies that create 
        price depressing surpluses;
           Eliminating state trading enterprises;
           Establishing and strengthening rules, 
        subject to dispute settlement, that decrease U.S. 
        market access opportunities or distort agricultural 
        markets, including: trade distorting activities of 
        state trading enterprises; unjustified trade 
        restrictions or commercial requirements, such as 
        labeling, that affect new technologies, including 
        biotechnology; unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary 
        restrictions, including restrictions not based on 
        scientific principles; other unjustified technical 
        barriers to trade; and restrictive rules in the 
        administration of tariff rate quotas;
           Eliminating practices that adversely affect 
        trade in perishable or cyclical products;
           Ensuring that import relief mechanisms for 
        perishable and cyclical agriculture are as accessible 
        and timely to growers in the United States as those 
        mechanisms that are used by other countries;
           Taking into account whether a party to the 
        negotiations has failed to adhere to existing 
        obligations;
           Taking into account whether a product is 
        subject to market distortions by reason of a failure of 
        a major producing country to adhere to existing 
        obligations;
           Ensuring that countries that accede to the 
        World Trade Organization have made meaningful market 
        liberalization commitments in agriculture;
           Taking into account the impact that 
        agreements covering agriculture to which the United 
        States is a party is having on U.S. agriculture;
           Maintaining bona fide food assistance 
        programs, market development programs, and export 
        credit programs;
           Securing the broadest market access possible 
        in multilateral, regional, and bilateral negotiations, 
        while recognizing the effect that negotiations in 
        multiple fora may have on United States import 
        sensitive commodities;
           Seeking to develop an international 
        consensus on the treatment of seasonal or perishable 
        agricultural products in investigations relating to 
        dumping and safeguards;
           Seeking to establish the common base year 
        for calculating the Aggregated Measurement of Support, 
        as defined in the Agreement on Agriculture;
           Ensuring transparency in the administration 
        of tariff rate quotas; and
           Eliminating and preventing the undermining 
        of market access for United States products through 
        improper use of a country's system for protecting or 
        recognizing geographical indications.
    The Committee recognizes that since the last enactment of 
Trade Promotion Authority in 2002, the nature of barriers to 
U.S. agricultural trade has continued to evolve. Advanced 
developing countries, such as Brazil, China, and India, have 
significantly increased their use of agricultural subsidies 
since 2002. Domestic support in many advanced developing 
countries is now higher than domestic support levels in many 
developed countries. In many cases, domestic support provided 
by advanced developing countries appears to exceed domestic 
support limits established under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Agreement on Agriculture. It is particularly important 
for the United States to press advanced developing countries to 
make domestic support programs transparent, including through 
complete and timely WTO notifications; to enforce agreed upon 
limits on domestic support, including the establishment of the 
common base year for calculating Aggregated Measurement of 
Support under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture as the end of 
each country's Uruguay Round implementation period, as reported 
in each country's Uruguay Round market access schedule; and to 
develop meaningful disciplines on the use of market-distorting 
domestic support by advanced developing countries.
    Barriers imposed through the improper use of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) barriers remains one of the most 
significant disruptions to U.S. agricultural exports. While the 
Committee recognizes that SPS measures may be used to address 
legitimate health and safety concerns, these measures must not 
be used as disguised barriers to trade. It is the expectation 
of the Committee that U.S. trade agreements to be considered 
under trade authorities procedures will achieve stronger rules 
on SPS measures than those contained in the WTO Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and 
that the SPS chapters of U.S. trade agreements will be subject 
to the same enforcement procedures and remedies as other 
enforceable chapters of the trade agreement.
    United States agricultural producers also face increasing 
use of regulatory restrictions, and political interference with 
science-based regulatory decisions, that impede the trade of 
innovative agricultural products, including biotechnology. The 
United States is the world's leader in research and development 
of innovative, safe technologies, but trade in these products 
is routinely being disrupted through the delay or denial of 
approvals, particularly in Europe and China. The Committee 
expects that U.S. negotiators will ensure that foreign 
regulatory approval processes are not used to prevent, deny, 
delay, or reduce foreign market access to U.S. agriculture 
exports with biotechnology traits, and the bill contains 
several negotiating objectives aimed at preventing foreign 
regulatory approval processes from being used as a trade 
barrier to new agriculture technologies. In particular, the 
Committee references the objectives in section 2(b)(1)(A); 
section 2(b)(3)(A)(i), 2(b)(3)(A)(ii), 2(b)(3)(A)(iv), 
2(b)(3)(I)(ii), and 2(b)(3)(I)(iv); section 2(b)(5)(A)(iii), 
and 2(b)(5)(B); and section 2(b)(7)(G).
    The Committee also recognizes the significance of the 
barriers imposed on U.S. agricultural producers by the misuse 
of systems of protection for geographical indications (GIs). 
Production of U.S. specialty agricultural products using common 
food names continues to grow at a significant rate. The 
continued growth in exports of these high value-added 
agricultural products represents a major opportunity for U.S 
producers. While reasonable rules for identifying and 
protecting GIs are appropriate and have benefits, certain 
trading partners misuse their systems of GI protection to 
discriminate against U.S. products by, for example, employing a 
registration process lacking in transparency or procedural 
fairness that results in the improper protection of generic 
terms. The bill directs U.S. negotiators to seek to eliminate 
or prevent such practices. The Committee also intends for this 
section to reflect the importance the Congress has placed on 
this issue, including in ensuring continued use of semi-generic 
terms as codified in 26 U.S.C. 5388(c). Lastly, the Committee 
also seeks to prevent further attempts to expand systems for 
protection of GIs to include terms commonly used as descriptors 
by claiming such terms are to be protected as traditional 
specialty or traditional quality terms.
            4. Foreign investment
    The principal negotiating objectives of the United States 
regarding foreign investment are to reduce barriers to foreign 
investment, while ensuring that foreign investors in the United 
States are not accorded greater substantive rights than U.S. 
investors in the United States, and to secure for U.S. 
investors rights comparable to those available in the United 
States, including by:
           Reducing or eliminating exceptions to 
        national treatment;
           Freeing the transfer of funds relating to 
        investments;
           Reducing or eliminating performance 
        requirements, forced technology transfers, and other 
        unreasonable barriers to investment;
           Establishing standards for expropriation and 
        compensation for expropriation, consistent with U.S. 
        legal principles and practice;
           Establishing standards for fair and 
        equitable treatment, consistent with U.S. legal 
        principles and practice, including the principle of due 
        process;
           Providing meaningful procedures for 
        resolving disputes;
           Improving investor-state dispute settlement 
        mechanisms through procedures to eliminate and deter 
        frivolous claims, ensure the efficient selection of 
        arbitrators and the expeditious disposition of claims, 
        enhance public input, and provide coherence to the 
        interpretation of investment provisions through an 
        appellate body or similar mechanism; and
           Ensuring the fullest measure of transparency 
        in investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, to the 
        extent consistent with the need to protect information 
        that is classified or business confidential.
    The Committee recognizes that U.S. law provides a high 
level of protection for U.S. and foreign investors in the 
United States, but that U.S. investors in foreign jurisdictions 
often do not receive the same level of basic protections 
available in the United States. The lack of adequate legal 
protections for U.S. investors is a significant barrier to U.S. 
exports. Foreign investment by U.S. companies spurs U.S. 
exports, as over 48 percent of U.S. large company exports are 
exports to foreign affiliates. Moreover, U.S. parent firms 
export more goods and services to their foreign affiliates than 
foreign affiliates export to the United States, thus improving 
the U.S. balance of trade. In order for these beneficial 
effects of foreign investment to continue, it is important that 
U.S. investors abroad receive legal protections similar to what 
U.S. and foreign investors receive in the United States.
    The negotiating objectives therefore direct U.S. 
negotiators to secure for U.S. investors rights comparable to 
those available in the United States. This includes protections 
against discriminatory treatment, similar to the guarantees set 
out in the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution; 
fair and equitable treatment, similar to the protection against 
arbitrary and capricious treatment in the Administrative 
Procedures Act; and against uncompensated expropriations, 
similar to U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the Takings 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
    Recent investment treaties and trade agreements of the 
United States include a number of important clarifications to 
ensure that the rights afforded to investors under those 
agreements do not go beyond those available under U.S. law. 
These provisions include an annex clarifying the standard for 
indirect expropriation to ensure consistency with U.S. law, and 
a provision clarifying the minimum standard of treatment to 
ensure that arbitral decisions reflect U.S. legal principles 
and practice. The Committee regards all of these provisions as 
important for ensuring investor-state obligations remain 
comparable to U.S. law.
    Additionally, investment treaties and trade agreements of 
the United States now provide more detailed guidance for both 
parties and tribunals with regard to procedural and other 
matters not included in earlier U.S. investment treaties, 
including the expedited review of claims, rules on frivolous 
claims, participation of non-disputing third parties in the 
arbitration, a statute of limitations, and consolidation of 
related claims. The 2012 Model BIT and recent FTAs also 
formalized the transparency and openness of arbitral 
proceedings. The Committee believes these provisions help 
ensure that investor-state dispute settlement meets high 
standards of due process and transparency.
    The United States has concluded bilateral investment 
agreements with more than fifty countries. For the past thirty 
years, those agreements have typically included provisions 
establishing a mechanism through which neutral arbitrators 
resolve disputes between investors and governments relating to 
government measures that violate the provisions of U.S. 
investment agreements. It is the Committee's view that it is a 
priority for negotiators to seek agreements that protect the 
rights of U.S. investors equally abroad, without product 
discrimination, while ensuring all U.S. investors the existence 
of an effective investor-state dispute settlement mechanism.
    Where such agreements include a mechanism for investors to 
seek redress through investor state dispute settlement, it is 
also the Committee's view that this mechanism should not 
impinge on the ability of governments to regulate in the public 
interest. The Committee believes that current U.S. investment 
agreements do not restrict the ability of government to 
regulate in the public interest. The Committee also believes 
the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty serves as a 
strong basis for the negotiation of provisions to deter 
frivolous challenges to legitimate public interest measures, to 
ensure independent and impartial arbitration, and to ensure 
high levels of transparency.
    In recognition of the particular importance the Committee 
places on ensuring that U.S. sovereignty is not impinged upon 
by U.S. trade agreement provisions, including provisions 
regarding investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, the 
bill for the first time includes a section setting out 
Congressional direction on sovereignty (see section 8, below). 
This section makes clear that no government can be compelled to 
change its law due to an adverse finding by an arbitration 
tribunal. The Committee notes that the United States has never 
lost a case.
            5. Intellectual property
    The principal negotiating objectives regarding intellectual 
property are to further promote adequate and effective 
protection for intellectual property rights through:
           ensuring full implementation of the WTO 
        Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
        Property (TRIPS), particularly with respect to the 
        enforcement obligations;
           ensuring that provisions of any trade 
        agreement governing intellectual property rights 
        reflect a standard of protection similar to that found 
        in U.S. law;
           providing strong protection for new 
        technologies and methods of transmitting and 
        distributing intellectual property, including in a 
        manner that facilitates legitimate digital trade;
           preventing or eliminating discrimination 
        regarding intellectual property rights;
           ensuring standards of protection and 
        enforcement keep pace with technological developments, 
        and in particular ensuring that rights holders have the 
        legal and technological means to control the use of 
        their works through the Internet and prevent the 
        unauthorized use of their works;
           providing strong enforcement of intellectual 
        property rights;
           and preventing or eliminating government 
        involvement in the violation of intellectual property 
        rights, including through cybertheft and piracy.
    The principal negotiating objectives also include securing 
fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory market access 
opportunities for U.S. persons that rely upon intellectual 
property protection, as well as respecting the 2001 Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and ensuring that 
trade agreements foster innovation and promote access to 
medicines.
    Protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) is 
critical to the U.S. economy, jobs, national security, and the 
health and safety of the American people. Much of the U.S. 
economy relies on some form of IPR because virtually every 
industry either produces or uses it. IPR infringement causes 
significant financial losses for U.S. right holders and 
businesses around the world. It undermines U.S. innovation and 
creativity, hurting U.S. economic competitiveness to the 
detriment of American businesses and workers. IPR infringement 
also endangers the public and harms national security, as 
counterfeit products may pose significant risks to consumer 
health and safety.
    For these reasons, the principal negotiating objective 
directs negotiators to ensure that all countries provide 
adequate and effective protection and enforcement of IPR. 
Intellectual property enforcement, however, remains inadequate 
in many countries around the world. The rates of counterfeiting 
and piracy in much of the world remain alarmingly high. The 
Committee, therefore, directs U.S. negotiators to ensure U.S. 
trading partners provide strong enforcement of intellectual 
property rights.
    In addition to more traditional forms of IPR infringement, 
such as sales of counterfeit and pirated goods by street 
vendors or in other physical markets, the increased 
availability of broadband Internet connections around the world 
has fueled the market for IPR infringing products online. To 
help address the challenges to IPR protection and enforcement 
related to the Internet, U.S. negotiators should ensure 
standards of protection and enforcement keep pace with 
technological developments, and in particular ensure that right 
holders have the legal and technological means to control the 
use of their works through the Internet and to prevent 
unauthorized use of their works.
    Inadequate protection for trade secrets and trade secret 
theft are increasing problems around the world. A trade secret 
is often among a company's core business assets, and protection 
of its trade secret is essential for that company's ability to 
compete. Trade secret theft, including industrial and economic 
espionage, imposes significant costs on the U.S. economy, 
weakens U.S. competitiveness, puts U.S. jobs at risk, and 
threatens national security. For these reasons, the Committee 
is concerned about inadequate protection for trade secrets and 
the rise in trade secret theft by U.S. trading partners.
    The Committee updated the intellectual property rights 
negotiating objectives to address the concern of trade secret 
theft by governments, directing U.S. negotiators to prevent or 
eliminate government theft of intellectual property rights, 
such as trade secret theft, including through cyber theft.
    The updated negotiating objective to prevent or eliminate 
government theft of intellectual property rights is also 
intended to direct U.S. negotiators to address another problem 
faced by U.S. right holders, which is foreign governments' 
continued use of pirated software. U.S. negotiators should 
ensure foreign governments do not use unauthorized software. 
The Committee has updated section (5)(A)(ii) to emphasize the 
critical importance of including in U.S. trade agreements IP 
provisions that facilitate legitimate digital trade. In 
particular, this section reflects the view of the Committee 
that U.S. trade agreements should contain copyright provisions 
that provide adequate and effective protection for U.S. right 
holders as well as foster an appropriate balance in copyright 
systems, inter alia by means of limitations and exceptions 
consistent with the internationally recognized 3-step test.
    Adequate and effective intellectual property protection is 
critical to provide the incentives necessary for is critical to 
provide the incentives necessary for the development and 
marketing of new medicines, including biologics. Without these 
innovative medicines, the market for generic medicines would 
not exist. U.S. negotiators must, therefore, ensure that trade 
agreements foster innovation so that patients around the world 
can benefit from access to lifesaving medicines. Strong 
regulatory data protection is a key factor to incentivize 
research and investment in biologics. Thus achieving terms of 
regulatory data protection similar to those found in U.S. law 
should continue to be a high priority for U.S. trade 
negotiators. The existence of a robust generic market increases 
the affordability of medicines. U.S. negotiators should promote 
access to innovative and generic medicines by addressing the 
market access barriers faced by U.S. producers of medicines, 
including those market access barriers that are discriminatory 
and non-transparent.
    While the TRIPS Agreement was an important milestone in the 
effort to raise standards of IPR protection and enforcement 
around the world, TRIPS provides only minimum standards. Nearly 
20 years after the TRIPS Agreement came into force, all WTO 
member countries should at least meet the minimum standards for 
protection and enforcement of IPR provided by the TRIPS 
Agreement. U.S. negotiators must ensure that U.S. trading 
partners have fully implemented the TRIPS Agreement, 
particularly the enforcement obligations.
    This Committee further intends for U.S. negotiators to seek 
bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral agreements that 
include intellectual property provisions that go beyond the 
TRIPS Agreement and reflect a high standard of intellectual 
property protection similar to that found in U.S. law.
    Finally, the Committee notes that U.S. industries that rely 
on intellectual property protection continue to suffer from 
unnecessary and discriminatory market access barriers around 
the globe. U.S. negotiators must remain vigilant in their 
efforts to eliminate these barriers, since they stunt the 
growth of otherwise highly productive industries.
            6. Digital trade in goods and services
    The principal negotiating objectives for digital trade in 
goods and services and cross-border data flows are:
           to ensure that current trade agreement 
        obligations, rules, disciplines, and commitments apply 
        to digital trade and cross-border data flows;
           to ensure that electronically delivered 
        goods and services are treated no less favorably than 
        products delivered in physical form and classified so 
        as to ensure the most liberal trade treatment possible;
           to ensure that governments do not impede 
        digital trade, restrict cross-border data flows, or 
        require local storage or processing of data, and to 
        ensure that domestic regulations required by legitimate 
        policy objectives are the least restrictive on trade, 
        non-discriminatory and transparent, and promote an open 
        market environment; and
           to extend the World Trade Organization 
        moratorium on duties on electronic transmissions.
    Digital trade in goods and services and cross-border data 
flows continues to grow in importance to the U.S. economy. U.S. 
companies move data over the Internet to provide digital goods 
and services to consumers around the world, as well as to 
enhance competitiveness by increasing productivity, 
streamlining operations, and facilitating creativity and 
problem solving. It is, therefore, critical that U.S. 
negotiators ensure that all trade agreement obligations, rules, 
disciplines, and commitments apply to digital trade and cross 
border data flows, that digitally traded goods and services 
receive no less favorable treatment than comparable goods and 
services, and that they are classified to ensure the most 
liberal trade treatment possible.
    U.S. companies depend on the free flow of data across 
borders to identify market opportunities, innovate and develop 
new goods and services, maintain supply chains, and serve their 
customers around the globe. Unfortunately, an increasing number 
of governments are considering or imposing restrictions on 
cross-border data flows or requirements to store and process 
data locally. This section directs negotiators to seek 
provisions in trade agreements to ensure that governments 
refrain from such restrictions and requirements, which are 
detrimental to all sectors of the economy, including the 
digital economy that is facilitated by the Internet. The 
Committee expects U.S. negotiators to pursue provisions that 
afford equal protection to all sectors, including financial 
services.
            7. Regulatory practices
    The principal negotiating objectives with regard to 
regulatory or other practices of foreign governments used to 
reduce market access for U.S. goods, services, and investments 
are:
           to achieve increased transparency and 
        opportunity for participation in the development of 
        regulations;
           to require proposed regulations be based on 
        sound science, cost benefit analysis, risk assessment, 
        or other objective evidence;
           to improve regulatory practices and promote 
        increased regulatory coherence;
           to seek greater openness, transparency, and 
        convergence of standards-development processes;
           to promote regulatory compatibility through 
        harmonization, equivalence, or mutual recognition and 
        to encourage the use of global and interoperable 
        standards, as appropriate;
           to achieve the elimination of government 
        measures such as price controls and reference pricing 
        which deny full market access for United States 
        products;
           to ensure that government regulatory 
        reimbursement regimes are transparent, provide 
        procedural fairness, are non-discriminatory, and 
        provide full market access for U.S. products; and
           to ensure that government collection of 
        undisclosed proprietary information is limited to that 
        necessary to satisfy a legitimate and justifiable 
        regulatory interest and that such information is 
        protected against disclosure.
    Foreign government regulatory practices may effectively 
constitute trade-distorting barriers that diminish or nullify 
negotiated trade agreement benefits. For example, market access 
for agricultural products accorded through tariff concessions 
may be substantially offset by non-scientifically based health 
and safety regulations that cause delay in getting the products 
to consumers. The problem of laws and regulations that act as 
disguised trade barriers is compounded when a government's 
processes for making its laws and regulations are not open to 
public view and are not receptive to public input.
    While the world's economies continue to grow more 
interconnected, trade flows are often disrupted by a myriad of 
regulations in multiple countries that may seek the same 
objectives and standard of protection, but are opaque, 
duplicative, or conflicting. Such confusing, duplicative, or 
incompatible regulations act as a trade barrier, and impose 
significant and unnecessary costs on U.S. businesses and 
consumers. Accordingly, the Committee updated these negotiating 
objectives to direct U.S. negotiators to use a variety of means 
to improve regulatory practices and promote increased 
regulatory coherence, to improve international standards 
development processes, and to promote regulatory compatibility.
    There is an increasing consensus across the spectrum of 
U.S. industry that binding commitments to remove or lower trade 
barriers abroad can be nullified by decisions, either of 
national and regional governments or industry standard setting 
and accrediting bodies, that are taken as part of regulatory 
processes. It has also become clear to the Committee that 
regulatory reform encompasses three important prongs: (1) 
transparency, including the ability of all affected parties to 
participate in rule-making processes; (2) the need to ensure 
that regulations are fair and that they are applied without 
regard to the nationality of the industry or company affected 
by them; and (3) the need to expand cooperative activities to 
encourage regulatory harmonization, cooperation, and coherence.
    It is the Committee's intent that each of these prongs 
should be pursued while maintaining the strong levels of 
protection embodied in U.S. law. To reflect this important 
concept, the legislation establishes an overall negotiating 
objective that ensures that the President continue to take into 
account legitimate United States domestic objectives, 
including, but not limited to, the protection of legitimate 
health or safety, essential security, and consumer interests. 
New provisions affirm that trade agreements cannot change U.S. 
law without Congressional action, nor prevent the United States 
from changing its law in the future, and confirm that U.S. law 
prevails in the event of a conflict.
    While it is taken for granted in the United States that 
government processes take place in the ``sunshine'', such is 
not the case in many other countries. Recent trade agreements 
have encouraged greater transparency and cooperation in 
regulatory processes, but the Committee believes that more 
needs to be done. It is imperative that U.S. stakeholders be 
given an opportunity for meaningful participation in the 
developing of regulations abroad. Thus, the Committee strongly 
urges USTR to pursue the negotiation of cross-cutting 
transparency disciplines, particularly in the areas of 
services, digital trade, and government procurement.
    The Act also includes new and expanded provisions directing 
the administration to seek greater openness, transparency, and 
convergence of standards-development processes and encouraging 
the use of international and interoperable standards. Such 
concepts are particularly important for high-tech and 
innovative industries.
    The objectives on regulatory practices also direct U.S. 
negotiators to seek the elimination of price controls and 
reference pricing which deny full market access for United 
States products. Under these barriers, the government of an 
importing country restricts market access by arbitrarily 
limiting the prices at which particular products can be sold. 
Examples of measures covered under Section 7(F) with regard to 
regulatory practices include the use by foreign governments of 
reference pricing classification systems for Customs valuation 
and other regulatory measures.
    The objectives were also updated to direct negotiators to 
ensure that government regulatory reimbursement regimes are 
transparent, provide procedural fairness, are 
nondiscriminatory, and provide full market access for United 
States products. The sale of certain U.S. products, such as 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices, in foreign markets very 
often depends on regulatory reimbursement regimes, which decide 
whether these products can be listed for reimbursement and the 
amount of the reimbursement. It is critical that regulatory 
reimbursement regimes make these listing and pricing decisions 
in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner. It is also critical 
that these reimbursement regimes provide full market access for 
U.S. products, which includes setting the reimbursement amount 
based on competitive, market-derived pricing or an equivalent 
process, such as one that appropriately recognizes the value of 
a patented product and allows the product manufacturer to apply 
for an increased amount of reimbursement based on factors such 
as safety and efficacy.
    A growing problem around the world is foreign governments' 
forcing the transfer of trade secrets and other technology from 
U.S. businesses. As a condition of doing business, some foreign 
governments require U.S. companies to provide them with 
unnecessary information, including trade secrets and other 
proprietary information. The foreign government will then steal 
the proprietary information to use it to compete against U.S. 
companies. Trade secrets are often among a company's core 
assets and once they are stolen the impact can be devastating 
for the company and for future innovation. This type of trade 
secret theft threatens to diminish U.S. competitiveness around 
the globe, puts American jobs at risk, and poses threats to 
U.S. national security as well. This negotiating objective has 
been updated to reflect the importance of this threat by 
directing U.S. negotiators to ensure foreign governments 
collect only undisclosed proprietary information that is 
necessary to satisfy a legitimate and justifiable regulatory 
interest, and protect any information collected against 
disclosure.
    The principal negotiating objectives of the United States 
regarding regulation or other practices to reduce market access 
for United States goods, services, and investments, include 
ensuring that foreign governments: (i) demonstrate that the 
collection of undisclosed proprietary information is limited to 
that necessary to satisfy a legitimate and justifiable 
regulatory interest; and (ii) protect such information against 
disclosure, except in exceptional circumstances to protect the 
public, or where such information is effectively protected 
against unfair competition. Undisclosed proprietary information 
includes all forms and types of financial, business, 
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, 
including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, 
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, 
procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, 
and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized 
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or 
in writing.
            8. State-owned and state-controlled enterprises
    The principal negotiating objective of the United States 
regarding competition by state-owned and state-controlled 
enterprises is to:
           Eliminate or prevent trade distortions and 
        unfair competition; and
           Ensure that the commercial activity of 
        state-owned and state-controlled enterprises is based 
        solely on commercial considerations.
    The negotiating objective specifically directs U.S. 
negotiators to seek disciplines in agreements that eliminate or 
prevent discrimination and market-distorting subsidies and that 
promote transparency.
    The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015 is the first time that U.S. 
negotiators have been directed to eliminate trade distortions 
and unfair competition by state-owned and state-controlled 
enterprises (SOEs) and ensure that they act based solely on 
commercial considerations. Since 2002, SOEs have increasingly 
entered commercial markets. It is the view of the Committee 
that U.S. trade agreements should ensure private firms are not 
disadvantaged by the participation of SOEs in commercial 
markets and that governments do not unfairly favor SOEs, 
including through measures such as subsidies and preferential 
financing, and selective regulation or enforcement of laws. 
These disciplines should also address measures including 
licensing requirements and discriminatory tax treatment.
            9. Localization barriers to trade
    The principal negotiating objective of the United States 
with respect to localization barriers to trade is to eliminate 
and prevent measures that require U.S. producers and service 
providers to locate facilities, intellectual property, or other 
assets in a country as a market access or investment condition, 
including indigenous innovation measures. This new negotiating 
objective reflects the view of this Committee that localization 
barriers to trade are a major and increasing impediment to a 
level playing field for U.S. exporters of both goods and 
services, as well as investors. Forced localization of 
facilities, as described in this provision, includes, but is 
not limited to, forced localization of computer servers and, 
thus, relates to the objectives on digital trade in goods and 
services and cross-border data flows, which identify the need 
for disciplines on measures that require local storage or 
processing of data.
            10. Labor and the environment
    The principal negotiating objectives with respect to labor 
and the environment are:
           To ensure that a party to a trade agreement 
        with the United States adopts and maintains measures 
        implementing internationally recognized core labor 
        standards and its obligations under common multilateral 
        environmental agreements in a manner affecting trade or 
        investment between the United States and that party 
        after entry into force of a trade agreement between 
        those countries.
           To ensure a party does not waive or 
        otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise 
        derogate from its statutes or regulations implementing 
        internationally recognized core labor standards, in a 
        manner affecting trade or investment between the United 
        States and that party, where the waiver or derogation 
        would be inconsistent with one or more such standards, 
        or its environmental laws in a manner that weakens or 
        reduces the protections afforded in those laws and in a 
        manner affecting trade or investment between the United 
        States and that party, except as provided in its law 
        and provided not inconsistent with its obligations 
        under common multilateral environmental agreements or 
        other provisions of the trade agreement specifically 
        agreed upon.
           To ensure a party does not fail to 
        effectively enforce its environmental or labor laws, 
        through a sustained or recurring course of action or 
        inaction in a manner affecting trade or investment 
        between the United States and that party after entry 
        into force of a trade agreement between those 
        countries.
           To recognize that, with respect to 
        environment, parties to a trade agreement retain the 
        right to exercise prosecutorial discretion and to make 
        decisions regarding the allocation of enforcement 
        resources with respect to other environmental laws 
        determined to have higher priorities, and a party is 
        effectively enforcing its laws if a course of action or 
        inaction reflects a reasonable, bona fide exercise of 
        such discretion, or results from a reasonable, bona 
        fide decision regarding the allocation of resources.
           To recognize that, with respect to labor, 
        decisions regarding the distribution of enforcement 
        resources are not a reason for not complying with a 
        party's labor obligations; a party to a trade agreement 
        retains the right to reasonable exercise of discretion 
        and to make bona fide decisions regarding the 
        allocation of resources between labor enforcement 
        activities among core labor standards, provided the 
        exercise of such discretion and such decisions are not 
        inconsistent with its obligations.
           To strengthen the capacity of United States 
        trading partners to promote respect for core labor 
        standards.
           To strengthen the capacity of United States 
        trading partners to protect the environment through the 
        promotion of sustainable development.
           To reduce or eliminate government practices 
        or policies that unduly threaten sustainable 
        development.
           To seek market access, through the 
        elimination of tariffs and nontariff barriers, for 
        United States environmental technologies, goods, and 
        services.
           To ensure that labor, environmental, health, 
        or safety policies and practices of the parties to 
        trade agreements with the United States do not 
        arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against 
        United States exports or serve as disguised barriers to 
        trade.
           To ensure that enforceable labor and 
        environment obligations are subject to the same dispute 
        settlement and remedies as other enforceable 
        obligations under the agreement.
           To ensure that a trade agreement is not 
        construed to empower a party's authorities to undertake 
        labor or environmental law enforcement activities in 
        the territory of the United States.
    For purposes of the bill, the term ``internationally 
recognized core labor standards'' means the core labor 
standards only as stated in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998).
    The bill also specifies the specific agreements that are 
considered common multilateral environmental agreement for 
purposes of the bill. Any common multilateral environmental 
agreement must include both the United States and one or more 
other parties to the negotiations as full parties, including 
any current or future mutually agreed upon protocols, 
amendments, annexes, or adjustments to such an agreement. The 
common multilateral environmental agreements specified by the 
bill are: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done at Washington March 3, 
1973 (27 UST 1087; TIAS 8249); the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done at Montreal 
September 16, 1987; the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, 1973, done at London February 17, 1978; the Convention 
on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat, done at Ramsar February 2, 1971 (TIAS 11084); the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources, done at Canberra May 20, 1980 (33 UST 3476); the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, done at 
Washington December 2, 1946 (62 Stat. 1716); the Convention for 
the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission, done at Washington May 31, 1949 (1 UST 230).
    The Committee notes with satisfaction that no changes to 
U.S. labor or environmental laws have been required to 
implement any of the four agreements to which the May 10th 
Agreement provisions have applied, and the Committee expects 
that agreements considered under these trade authorities 
procedures will achieve similar results.
            11. Currency
    The principal negotiating objective of the United States 
with respect to currency practices is that parties to a trade 
agreement with the United States avoid manipulating exchange 
rates in order to prevent effective balance of payments 
adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over 
other parties to the agreement, such as through cooperative 
mechanisms, enforceable rules, reporting, monitoring, 
transparency, or other means, as appropriate.
    The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015 is the first time TPA includes a 
principal negotiating objective addressing currency 
manipulation. The addition of this objective reflects the 
concern of the Committee that foreign countries gain an unfair 
advantage by undervaluing their currency. The negotiating 
objective establishes a strong standard for negotiators to 
achieve in trade agreements, and provides tools--including, 
where appropriate, enforceable provisions--for addressing 
currency manipulation.
            12. WTO and multilateral trade agreements
    Recognizing that the World Trade Organization is the 
foundation of the global trading system, the principal 
negotiating objectives of the United States regarding the World 
Trade Organization, the Uruguay Round Agreements, and other 
multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements are:
           To achieve full implementation and extend 
        the coverage of the World Trade Organization and 
        multilateral and plurilateral agreements to products, 
        sectors, and conditions of trade not adequately 
        covered;
           To expand country participation in and 
        enhancement of the Information Technology Agreement, 
        the Government Procurement Agreement, and other 
        plurilateral trade agreements of the World Trade 
        Organization;
           To expand competitive market opportunities 
        for United States exports and to obtain fairer and more 
        open conditions of trade, including through utilization 
        of global value chains, through the negotiation of new 
        WTO multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements, 
        such as an agreement on trade facilitation;
           To ensure that regional trade agreements to 
        which the United States is not a party fully achieve 
        the high standards of, and comply with, WTO 
        disciplines, including Article XXIV of GATT 1994, 
        Article V and V bis of the General Agreement on Trade 
        in Services, and the Enabling Clause, including through 
        meaningful WTO review of such regional trade 
        agreements;
           To enhance compliance by WTO members with 
        their obligations as WTO members through active 
        participation in the bodies of the World Trade 
        Organization by the United States and all other WTO 
        members, including in the trade policy review mechanism 
        and the committee system of the World Trade 
        Organization, and by working to increase the 
        effectiveness of such bodies; and
           To encourage greater cooperation between the 
        World Trade Organization and other international 
        organizations.
    The World Trade Organization has proven to be a successful 
mechanism for nations to monitor and enforce international 
trade commitments. The Committee expects our trade negotiators 
to continue to use all tools available under the WTO to expand 
market access for U.S. products, eliminate unjustified 
nontariff barriers, and hold member nations accountable for 
meeting their international trade commitments, including 
through formal consultations and dispute settlement as 
appropriate.
    With respect to the directive to increase cooperation with 
other international organizations, the Committee intends this 
to include, but not be limited to, CODEX Alimentarius, World 
Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, International Labor Organization, International 
Telecommunications Union, Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, World Organization for Animal Health, United 
Nations, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
United Nations Environment Program, World Bank, World Customs 
Organization, and World Intellectual Property Organization. 
This Committee expects increased cooperation between the WTO 
and these organizations to result in increased support for and 
consistency with WTO rules.
            13. Trade institution transparency
    The principal negotiating objective with respect to trade 
institution transparency is to seek improved transparency in 
the WTO, in institutions established through other trade 
agreements, and in other international trade for a through:
           Timely public access to information 
        regarding trade issues and activities of trade 
        institutions;
           Openness by ensuring public access to 
        meetings, proceedings, and submissions;
           Public access to all notifications and 
        supporting documents submitted by WTO members.
    The Committee believes that the success of the WTO and 
other trade institutions in setting and administering the rules 
of international trade requires that these institutions operate 
in transparent ways. This means that their decision making 
processes must be clear and, where practicable, open to public 
observation and to input by interested parties. These 
principles should govern all decisions international trade 
institutions make, whether in day-to-day administration, 
dispute settlement, or otherwise.
    The objectives regarding transparency reflect principles 
that govern decision making within the institutions of the 
United States and other democratic governments. Transparency 
reinforces support for democratic institutions, even though 
individuals may disagree with particular decisions by those 
institutions.
    Similarly, greater transparency will allow the WTO and 
other trade institutions to build confidence that they are 
operating fairly, even though individuals may disagree with 
particular decisions. Just as important, greater openness 
within these international institutions should encourage 
greater openness within countries that are members of these 
institutions. U.S. trade negotiators should seek improved 
transparency, which requires that trade institutions provide 
timely public access to information regarding trade issues and 
institution activities, provide openness by ensuring public 
access to meetings, proceedings, and submissions, and provide 
public access to written submissions.
            14. Anti-corruption
    A strengthened principal negotiating objective of the 
United States with respect to corruption affecting trade seeks 
to obtain high standards and effective domestic enforcement 
that prohibits attempts to influence acts, decisions, or 
omissions of foreign governments or officials or to secure an 
improper advantage; to ensure that such standards level the 
playing field for United States persons in international trade 
and investment; and to seek commitments to work jointly to 
encourage and support anti-corruption and anti-bribery 
initiatives in international trade fora, including through the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD Convention).
    The Committee is increasingly aware of the negative effects 
that corruption and weak rule of law has on the ability of U.S. 
companies to compete in foreign markets. Reducing corruption in 
international trade and investment is fundamental to the 
expansion of free and fair trade around the world. Trade is a 
vital force for economic development, democratization, social 
freedom, and political stability in countries struggling to 
achieve these objectives. Corruption involving the use of money 
and other things of value to influence acts, decisions, or 
omissions of foreign government officials or to secure any 
improper advantage in a manner affecting trade or investment 
undermines the objectives of this legislation.
    It is the Committee's view that ``high standards'' are 
those that are equivalent to those established under section 
30A of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and sections 104 
and 104A of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. Only 
standards equivalent to these will ensure that United States 
persons, who are bound by the FCPA, compete on a level playing 
field.
    The Committee believes it is particularly important for 
U.S. trading partners to participate in and take commitments 
under international anti-corruption and anti-bribery 
initiatives. The negotiating objectives on anti-corruption 
therefore directs U.S. trade negotiators to carefully consider 
how to more effectively utilize instruments such as the OECD 
Convention to advance high anti-corruption standards among our 
trading partners.
            15. Dispute settlement and enforcement
    The principal negotiating objectives regarding dispute 
settlement and enforcement are:
           To seek provisions in trade agreements 
        providing for resolution of disputes between 
        governments in an effective, timely, transparent, 
        equitable, and reasoned manner requiring determinations 
        based on facts and the principles of the agreement, 
        with the goal of increasing compliance;
           To seek to strengthen the capacity of the 
        WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism to review compliance 
        with commitments;
           To seek improved adherence by WTO dispute 
        settlement panels and the Appellate Body to the mandate 
        of those panels and the Appellate Body to apply the WTO 
        Agreement as written, and to apply the standard of 
        review in applicable WTO Agreements, including greater 
        deference to the fact finding and technical expertise 
        of national investigating authorities;
           To seek provisions encouraging the early 
        identification and settlement of disputes through 
        consultations;
           To seek provisions encouraging trade-
        expanding compensation;
           To seek provisions to impose a penalty that 
        encourages compliance, is appropriate to the parties, 
        nature, subject matter, and scope of the violation, and 
        has the aim of not adversely affecting parties or 
        interests not party to the dispute while maintaining 
        the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism; and
           To seek provisions that treat U.S. principal 
        negotiating objectives equally with respect to ability 
        to resort to dispute settlement and availability of 
        equivalent procedures and remedies.
    Fair and efficient dispute settlement mechanisms are 
essential to well-functioning trade agreements. An effective 
dispute settlement mechanism must be capable of interpreting 
the rights and obligations of disputing parties and rendering 
determinations that the parties treat as binding, including 
with respect to bringing national measures into compliance with 
trade agreements when a measure of a party is found to be 
inconsistent with its commitments under an international trade 
agreement.
    In order to be effective, a dispute settlement mechanism 
must maintain the trust of the parties that it is faithfully 
adhering to--and not adding to or diminishing--the rights and 
obligations of the parties to the agreement. A dispute 
settlement mechanism must therefore render equitable and 
reasoned decisions, based on the facts of cases presented and a 
faithful interpretation of agreements.
    The Committee has previously expressed concern with the 
standard of review that dispute settlement panels and the WTO 
Appellate Body have applied in cases involving measures taken 
by administrative agencies of the United States, in particular, 
the U.S. International Trade Commission and the Department of 
Commerce. Those concerns remain. The Committee is also 
concerned that WTO Appellate Body has made findings that appear 
to go beyond directly resolving the dispute before it, and at 
times making findings that appear to go beyond the text of the 
WTO Agreement by giving meaning to text that, interpreted 
properly, reflects the decision by WTO Members to not create an 
obligation with respect to certain measures.
    The Committee considers that the long-term effectiveness of 
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism depends on WTO dispute 
settlement panels and the Appellate Body faithfully adhering to 
Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, which state 
that the recommendations and rulings of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body ``cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the [WTO] agreements.'' The negotiating 
objective directs U.S. negotiators to ensure that the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism meets this standard, and to 
negotiators should address any systemic failure to do so.
            16. Trade remedy laws
    The principal negotiating objective with respect to trade 
remedies are:
           to preserve the ability to enforce 
        rigorously U.S. trade laws, including antidumping, 
        countervailing duty, and safeguard laws;
           to avoid agreements that lessen the 
        effectiveness of unfair trade disciplines or safeguards 
        provisions to ensure that U.S. workers, agricultural 
        producers, and firms can compete fully on fair terms 
        and enjoy the benefits of reciprocal trade concessions; 
        and
           to address and remedy market distortions 
        that lead to dumping and subsidization.
    The trade remedy laws of the United States provide firms 
the means to ensure that they and their workers are not harmed 
by unfair trade practices of U.S. trading partners. The 
Committee considers that the laws are essential for allowing 
U.S. firms to participate fairly in international trade, and 
that U.S. trade remedy laws help to maintain support for trade 
liberalization. U.S. trade negotiators should, therefore, 
ensure that trade agreements do not weaken the enforcement or 
the effectiveness of U.S. trade remedy laws.
            17. Border taxes
    The principal negotiating objective regarding border taxes 
is to obtain a revision of the WTO rules with respect to the 
treatment of border adjustments for internal taxes to redress 
the disadvantage to countries relying primarily on direct taxes 
for revenue rather than indirect taxes. The principle 
negotiating objective regarding border taxes directs U.S. 
negotiators to seek a revision of WTO rules that will eliminate 
the current disadvantage to countries, such as the United 
States, that rely primarily on direct taxes (such as income 
taxes), rather than indirect taxes (such as sales and value-
added taxes), and that tax income on a worldwide rather than a 
territorial basis. WTO subsidy rules as interpreted by dispute 
settlement panels and the Appellate Body give rise to a 
disparity that favors territorial tax jurisdictions over 
worldwide tax jurisdictions. The view of the Committee is that 
this disparity must be corrected to preserve the sovereign 
right of every country to choose its own rules of taxation.
            18. Textile negotiations
    The principal negotiating objectives of the United States 
with respect to trade in textiles and apparel articles are to 
obtain competitive opportunities for United States exports of 
textiles and apparel in foreign markets substantially 
equivalent to the competitive opportunities afforded foreign 
exports in United States markets and to achieve fairer and more 
open conditions of trade in textiles and apparel.
    The negotiating objectives seek to promote the export of 
U.S. made products. In 2013, approximately one-third of U.S. 
textile production was exported, with a value of $17.8 billion. 
More than half of this output was shipped to Western Hemisphere 
nations that are members of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central America Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI). Exports to the NAFTA and CAFTA-DR countries contributed 
to a U.S. trade surplus of $2.4 billion in yarns and fabrics in 
2013. The strong markets for U.S. yarn and fabric in free trade 
agreement countries underscores the importance of the 
negotiating objective.
    The textiles and apparel sector is highly integrated into 
international supply chains, many of which originate in the 
United States. The objective supports expanded participation in 
global value chains and seeks to ensure that trade agreements 
reflect the increasingly interrelated and multi-sectoral nature 
of trade and investment activity. Many of the world's largest 
apparel retailing and marketing firms are headquartered in the 
United States, where countless functions related to apparel are 
done domestically, such as design, branding, and marketing of 
finished products. By some estimates, nearly 70 percent of the 
value of a garment imported into the United States stays in the 
U.S. economy, supporting high-skill and high-pay jobs. As 
negotiations on textiles and apparel are undertaken, supply 
chains and support for new job growth in the United States 
should remain a significant goal.
            19. Commercial partnerships
    The principal negotiating objective of the United States 
with respect to an agreement under the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership countries regarding commercial 
partnerships is:
           To discourage actions by potential trading 
        partners that directly or indirectly prejudice or 
        otherwise discourage commercial activity solely between 
        the United States and Israel;
           To discourage politically motivated actions 
        to boycott, divest from, or sanction Israel and to seek 
        the elimination of politically motivated nontariff 
        barriers on Israeli goods, services, or other commerce 
        imposed on Israel.
           To seek the elimination of any boycott 
        fostered or imposed by a foreign country against Israel 
        and compliance with the Arab League Boycott of Israel 
        by prospective trading partners.
    Congress has previously expressed its sense that the Arab 
League Boycott of Israel is an impediment to peace in the 
region and to United States investment and trade in the Middle 
East and North Africa, and that the boycott should be 
immediately terminated. (See the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2014, P.L. 113-76). The Committee is concerned about 
support by potential trading partners of politically-motivated 
boycotts of, divestments from, sanctions of, or other 
discriminatory economic actions against Israel. The Committee 
is particularly concerned by retaliatory or discriminatory 
actions taken against U.S. businesses for the sole reason that 
the U.S. business has commercial ties with Israel. Such actions 
impair the ability of U.S. firms to export goods and services, 
and directly invest in foreign markets. The Committee therefore 
considers that negotiators should seek to ensure that 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership countries do not 
prejudice the ability of U.S. firms to engage in commercial 
activity in Israel or with Israeli persons, and that 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership countries do not 
support or engage in politically-motivated actions to boycott, 
divest from, or sanction Israel, or take other politically-
motivated nontariff barriers to Israeli commerce.
            20. Good governance, transparency, the effective operation 
                    of legal regimes, and the rule of law of trading 
                    partners
    The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015, for the first time, establishes 
principal negotiating objectives of the United States with 
respect to ensuring implementation of trade commitments and 
obligations by strengthening good governance, transparency, the 
effective operation of legal regimes and the rule of law of 
U.S. trading partners through capacity building and other 
appropriate means. These objectives are important parts of the 
broader effort to create more open democratic societies and to 
promote respect for internationally recognized human rights. 
Through these negotiating objectives, the Committee emphasizes 
that the effective implementation of and adherence to trade 
agreement obligations contribute to broader policy goals of the 
United States, such as the promotion of democracy and respect 
for internationally recognized human rights.
    The Committee understands that the Transpacific Partnership 
negotiations will seek to achieve this negotiating objective 
through rules on good governance, including the promotion of 
greater transparency, participation, and accountability in the 
development of regulations and other government decisions, 
including by promptly publishing laws, regulations, 
administrative rulings of general application, and other 
procedures that affect trade and investment, and providing 
opportunities for stakeholder comment on measures before they 
are adopted and finalized; and through commitments discouraging 
corruption and establishing codes of conduct to promote high 
ethical standards among public officials.

Section 2(c). Capacity building and other priorities

    The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015 establishes for the first time 
priorities related to capacity building for U.S. trading 
partners as a means of addressing and maintaining U.S. 
competitiveness in the global economy. Section 2(c) directs the 
heads of relevant Federal agencies to work to strengthen the 
capacity of U.S. trading partners to carry out obligations 
under trade agreements by consulting with any country seeking a 
trade agreement with the United States concerning that 
country's laws relating to customs and trade facilitation, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to 
trade, intellectual property rights, labor, and the 
environment, and to provide technical assistance if needed. It 
is the Committee's expectation that capacity building be 
directed to each of these elements. Relevant Federal agencies 
are also directed to seek to establish consultative mechanisms 
to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to develop 
and implement standards for the protection of the environment 
and human health based on sound science, and to promote 
consideration of multilateral trade agreements. The agencies 
are also to submit to the Committee on Finance of the Senate 
and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives an annual report on capacity-building 
activities undertaken in connection with trade agreements.

Section 3. Trade agreements authority

    Section 3 provides that the President may enter into trade 
agreements subject to the trade authorities procedures 
prescribed in the present bill before July 1, 2018 or, if such 
procedures are extended as provided in section 3(c), before 
July 1, 2021.
    Section 3 contains two different procedures for 
implementing trade agreements. The first procedure pertains to 
implementing the results of certain tariff-only negotiations; 
the second procedure pertains to implementing all the results 
of other tariff negotiations, as well as other changes to U.S. 
law required by trade agreements.
            Section 3(a). Tariff proclamation authority
    Section 3(a) contains the first of these two procedures, 
commonly referred to as ``tariff proclamation authority.'' 
Tariff proclamation authority permits the President to proclaim 
the results of certain tariff negotiations and commitments 
directly into U.S. law, without need for separate legislation. 
The President must notify Congress of his intention to enter 
into an agreement under section 3(a). One recent example of a 
commitment result that would fall within this authority is the 
commitment the United States is undertaking through APEC to 
reduce its tariffs on certain environmental goods to no more 
than 5% by the end of 2015.
    Section 3(a) imposes limits on the President's tariff 
proclamation authority: where a current duty rate exceeds 5 
percent ad valorem, the President would not be authorized to 
reduce it by more than 50 percent. Any greater reduction would 
have to be approved by Congress. Where a current duty rate is 5 
percent ad valorem or less, the President may reduce it or 
eliminate it without separate congressional approval.
    An additional restriction on proclamation authority 
pertains to tariffs on certain import-sensitive agricultural 
products. The President may not proclaim reductions of tariff 
rates on such products below the rates applicable under the 
Uruguay Round Agreements. Products subject to this restriction 
are those agricultural products as to which the U.S. rate of 
duty was lowered by no more than 2.5 percent on the day the WTO 
Agreements went into effect (January 1, 1995). Tariff 
reductions on these products must be approved in separate 
legislation, described in section 3(b).
    Finally, the President may not, by proclamation, increase 
any rate of duty above the rate applied on the date this bill 
is enacted. Any such increases would require separate 
legislation.
    To the extent that tariff reductions may be implemented by 
proclamation, the bill requires that, in general, such 
reductions take place in stages. The stages may vary in size 
from period to period. However, the aggregate reduction in 
place at any given time may not exceed the aggregate reduction 
that would have been in place if, beginning on the date an 
agreement is implemented, tariffs had been reduced in equal 
annual stages of the greater of either 3 percent ad valorem, or 
one-tenth of the total reduction. The bill permits the 
President to round numbers off, within limits, to simplify 
staging calculations.
    An exception to the staging requirements is made where the 
U.S. International Trade Commission determines that there is no 
domestic production of an article.
    Finally, the bill reaffirms the residual proclamation 
authority granted to the President in section 111(b) of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''). That provision 
authorizes the President to proclaim certain tariff rate 
changes for articles that were the subject of duty elimination 
or harmonization negotiations during the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations.
    The present bill (in section 3(a)(7)) also grants the 
President authority to modify any duty or the staged rate 
reduction of any duty, pursuant to a reciprocal elimination or 
harmonization of duties under the auspices of the WTO, 
regardless of whether the sector at issue had been subject to 
duty elimination or harmonization negotiations during the 
Uruguay Round. This authority is not subject to the ordinary 
limitations on the scope of proclaimed tariff reductions, the 
prohibition on proclaimed tariff increases, and the staging 
rules. However, this authority may not be used to proclaim the 
reduction or elimination of tariffs on import sensitive 
agricultural products as provided for in section 3(a)(3)(B).
    Tariff reductions proclaimed under section 3(a)(7) of the 
present bill, like tariff reductions proclaimed under section 
111(b) of the URAA, are subject to the layover and consultation 
requirements prescribed by section 115 of the URAA. That is, 
the President must receive advice from the appropriate industry 
advisory committee and the ITC on the proposed proclamation, 
and the proclamation must lie before the Senate Finance and 
House Ways and Means Committees for a period of 60 days before 
going into effect, in order to give the Committees an adequate 
opportunity to consult with the President on the proposed 
changes.
            Section 3(b). Agreements on tariff and nontariff barriers
    The second procedure for implementing trade agreements is 
found in Section 3(b) and is commonly referred to as ``trade 
authorities procedures.'' Section 3(b)(1) authorizes the 
President to enter into a trade agreement with a foreign 
country when the President determines that any duty or other 
import restriction, or any other barrier to or distortion of 
international trade, unduly burdens or restricts the foreign 
trade of the United States or adversely affects the U.S. 
economy, or that the imposition of any such barrier or 
distortion is likely to result in such a burden, restriction, 
or effect, and that entering into such agreement will promote 
the purposes, policies, priorities and objectives of this bill. 
The agreement must provide for the reduction or elimination of 
such duty, barrier or other distortion or prohibit or limit the 
imposition of such a barrier or distortion.
    Conditions. Section 3(b)(2) provides that the trade 
agreement approval procedures may be used only if the agreement 
makes progress in meeting the applicable objectives set forth 
in sections 2 (a) and (b) (Overall and Principal Trade 
Negotiating Objectives), and the President satisfies the 
requirements set forth in sections 4 and 5 (Congressional 
Oversight, Consultations, and Access to Information and Notice, 
Consultations, and Reports).
    Bills qualifying for trade authorities procedures. Section 
3(b)(3) provides that bills implementing trade agreements 
qualify for trade authorities procedures only if those bills 
consist solely of provisions approving the trade agreement and 
any statement of administrative action accompanying the 
agreement, and provisions strictly necessary or appropriate to 
implement the trade agreement.
    If the foregoing conditions are met, then the trade 
authorities procedures described in section 151 of the Trade 
Act of 1974 apply to the implementing bill. Section 151 of the 
Trade Act of 1974 sets forth a timetable for consideration of 
implementing bills in the Committees of jurisdiction and on the 
floor of each House of Congress. Ordinarily, the maximum time 
for consideration in both Chambers will be 90 legislative days. 
Section 151 also prohibits amendments to implementing bills and 
limits the time for debate on the floor of each House to 20 
hours (subject to further limitation).
    The Committee intends to extend authority to the President 
to negotiate agreements subject to the trade authorities 
procedures similar to that given to past Presidents. The 
Committee also intends to provide the President with the 
flexibility needed to negotiate strong trade agreements. 
However, the Committee believes that for constitutional 
reasons, it is important to make trade authorities procedures 
as tailored as possible, so as not to unnecessarily intrude on 
normal legislative procedures. Trade authorities procedures are 
exceptions to the ordinary rules of procedure, which are 
permitted only because of the co-equal status that the 
executive and legislative branches share in the area of trade. 
The President and Congress both have important powers with 
respect to trade and foreign affairs issues. Therefore, trade 
agreements do not readily fit the legislative model used to 
consider other types of legislation. Trade authorities 
procedures assure that trade relations with other countries are 
handled expeditiously and efficiently, with the involvement of 
the executive and legislative branches.
    The Committee believes that these procedures should apply 
only to meet the special requirements of trade agreements. 
Further, the trade authorities procedures should apply only to 
those provisions in an implementing bill that are strictly 
necessary or appropriate to implement the underlying agreement, 
as stated in the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means 
Committee reports accompanying the Trade Act of 2002. It is the 
Committee's intent that this authority is consistent with prior 
grants of authority. While the Committee considers that 
implementing bills introduced since the 2002 Act have met this 
standard, there are disagreements about some aspects of bills 
prior to 2002. As has been recognized in the past, to apply the 
procedures more broadly would encroach on Congress's 
constitutional authority to legislate. The Committee continues 
to take a strict interpretation of this requirement.
    Time period. Sections 3(a)(1)(A) and 3(b)(1)(C) grant trade 
promotion authority for agreements entered into before July 1, 
2018. An extension until July 1, 2021 would be permitted unless 
Congress passed a disapproval resolution, as described under 
section 3(c). New language is included in the bill to clarify 
that any substantial modifications or substantial additional 
provisions of a trade agreement entered after July 1, 2018 (or 
July 1, 2021 if trade authorities procedures are extended), 
shall not be eligible for approval under trade authorities 
procedures. This will ensure that trade agreements are 
concluded only within the time frame authorized by Congress and 
that substantial modifications or additions after that date are 
not eligible for approval under trade authorities procedures.
    Extension procedures. Section 3(c) outlines a process for 
extending the tariff proclamation authority of section 3(a) and 
the trade authorities procedures of section 3(b). Under this 
process, the President must request the extension from Congress 
and provide his reasons for that request, along with an 
explanation of the trade agreements for which he expects to 
need fast track authority, and a description of the progress he 
has made to date toward achieving the purposes, policies, 
priorities, and objectives of the present bill. The President 
must promptly notify an extension request to the Advisory 
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations established under 
section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974, which then must file its 
own report with Congress. The President also must promptly 
notify the International Trade Commission of his request for an 
extension. The International Trade Commission must file a 
report that contains a review and analysis of the economic 
impact on the United States of all trade agreements implemented 
between the date of enactment of this bill and the date upon 
which the President requests an extension.
    Consistent with prior law, the President's request for an 
extension to July 1, 2021 will be granted, unless either House 
of Congress passes a ``resolution of disapproval.'' Any Member 
of Congress may introduce such a resolution in his or her 
respective House of Congress. Such a resolution will be 
referred, in the Senate, to the Committee on Finance, and in 
the House, jointly to the Committee on Ways and Means and the 
Committee on Rules. Floor action on such a resolution will not 
be in order unless the resolution is reported by the 
aforementioned committees.
    In the event the Committee on Finance reports an extension 
disapproval resolution, the resolution will be considered on 
the Senate floor under the expedited procedures set forth in 
section 152(e) of the Trade Act of 1974. In the event the 
Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Rules report 
an extension disapproval resolution, the resolution will be 
considered on the House floor under the expedited procedures 
set forth in section 152(d) of that Act.
    Commencement of negotiations. In order to contribute to the 
continued economic expansion of the United States, section 3(d) 
directs the President to commence negotiations covering tariff 
and nontariff barriers where the President determines that such 
negotiations are feasible, timely, and would benefit the United 
States. In doing so, the President must take into account all 
of the trade negotiating objectives set out in section 2.

Section 4. Congressional oversight, consultations, and access to 
        information

    The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015 significantly strengthens the 
requirements on consultations and access to information the 
President must meet with respect to Congress and the public 
both during trade negotiations and before a trade agreement may 
enter into force. Section 4 contains new consultation and 
information sharing provision, establishing additional 
requirements not previously set out in trade promotion 
authority legislation. The enhanced consultation requirements 
of this section reflect the necessity of close and regular 
legislative-executive consultation and coordination to ensure 
that, during negotiations, the President seeks to achieve the 
trade negotiating objectives set out in section 2. Close 
consultation and coordination by the President with Congress 
during negotiations increases the likelihood that Congress will 
support a trade agreement concluded by the President. If the 
President fails to meet these new and expanded consultation 
requirements, and the requirements of sections 5 and 6 of the 
bill (discussed below), Congress can disallow application of 
trade authorities procedures to a bill implementing a trade 
agreement through a procedural disapproval resolution or a 
consultation and compliance resolution.
            Section 4(a). Consultation with Members of Congress
    Section 4(a) establishes new consultation requirements the 
United States Trade Representative must meet during 
negotiations and prior to a trade agreement entering into 
force. The bill for the first time requires the United States 
Trade Representative to meet upon request with any Member of 
Congress and provide pertinent documents relating to the 
negotiations, including classified materials. The Committee 
expects that these consultations will be held promptly and that 
they will be responsive in scope to the Member's request. The 
United States Trade Representative must consult closely with 
the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on 
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, and with 
respect to negotiations relating to agricultural trade, the 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the 
Senate, and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of 
Representatives. The United States Trade Representative must 
also consult closely with the Congressional Advisory Groups on 
Negotiations (discussed further below). While previous versions 
of TPA required close consultations with this Committee, the 
Committee specifically intends that these consultations and the 
sharing of negotiating text will be expansive in scope and as 
detailed as feasible. Such consultations must be meaningful and 
timely, including consulting on negotiating positions before 
those positions are shared with cleared advisors or our trading 
partners.
    For the first time, the bill establishes consultation 
requirements for the Administration to follow when determining 
whether to bring an agreement into force. Before a trade 
agreement enters into force, the United States Trade 
Representative must consult with Members of Congress, 
committees of jurisdiction, and the Congressional Advisory 
Groups and keep them fully apprised of the measures a trading 
partner has taken to comply with the provisions of the trade 
agreement. The Committee expects the Administration to maintain 
the same level of detailed and timely consultations prior to 
entry into force as it maintains in other stages of the 
negotiations.
    Additionally, within 120 days after this bill is enacted, 
the United States Trade Representative will be required, in 
consultation with the chairmen and ranking members of the 
Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways 
and Means of the House of Representatives, to develop written 
guidelines on enhanced coordination with Congress. The 
guidelines will establish procedures to ensure timely briefings 
with any Member of Congress and the sharing of information, 
including documents and classified information, with Members of 
Congress, and their staff with proper security clearances as 
appropriate, as well as cleared Committee staff as appropriate 
in light of Committee responsibilities. The Committee intends 
to play a substantial and meaningful role in the development 
and finalization of these guidelines.
    The expanded requirements set out in this section regarding 
the sharing of text with Members and appropriate staff reflects 
the importance of detailed engagement with Members to ensure 
that trade agreements reflect the priorities set out in this 
bill. The bill provides that staff members are entitled to 
receive information regarding trade negotiations, while 
acknowledging security clearances may be required of staff 
where classified information is being reviewed. It is the 
expectation of the Committee that the United States Trade 
Representative will carefully monitor its classification 
procedures to ensure that material is not overclassified. The 
Committee expects that consultations and the sharing of text 
will be prompt and responsive in scope to the Member's request.
            Section 4(b). Designated congressional advisers
    Designated congressional advisers are any Members of 
Congress so designated, in the Senate, by the President pro 
tempore, in consultation with the chairman and ranking member 
of the Committee on Finance, and in the House of 
Representatives, by the Speaker of the House, in consultations 
with the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Ways 
and Means. The United States Trade Representative must consult 
closely with any congressional adviser so designated. 
Additionally, the United States Trade Representative, on behalf 
of the President, must accredit designated congressional 
advisers as official advisers to the United States delegation 
to international conferences, meetings, and negotiating 
sessions relating to trade agreements.
            Section 4(c). Congressional advisory groups on negotiations
    Section 4(c) establishes the Senate and House Advisory 
Groups on Negotiations. The membership of the Senate Advisory 
Group on Negotiations is to be comprised of the chairmen and 
ranking member of the Committee on Finance, and three 
additional members of the Committee (with no more than two from 
the same political party), plus the chairman and ranking member 
of any committee with jurisdiction over provisions of law 
affected by a trade agreement. The House Advisory Group on 
Negotiations would be similarly comprised. Members of the 
Senate and House Advisory Groups on Negotiations will be 
accredited by the United States Trade Representative, on behalf 
of the President, as official advisers to the United States 
delegation in negotiations for any trade agreement subject to 
trade authorities procedures. Section 4(c) further provides 
that the House and Senate Advisory Groups on Negotiations will 
consult with and provide advice to the United States Trade 
Representative regarding the formulation of specific 
objectives, negotiating strategies and positions; the 
development of the applicable trade agreement; and the 
compliance with and enforcement of the negotiated commitments 
under the trade agreement.
    Within 120 days after this bill is enacted, the United 
States Trade Representative will be required, in consultation 
with the chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on 
Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of 
the House of Representatives, to develop written guidelines to 
facilitate the exchange of information with the House and 
Senate Advisory Groups on Negotiations. The guidelines will 
establish procedures concerning detailed briefings on a fixed 
timetable; access to pertinent documents, including classified 
materials; coordination between the United States Trade 
Representative and the House and Senate Advisory Groups on 
Negotiations, including at negotiation sites; and, after a 
trade agreement has been concluded, ongoing compliance and 
enforcement efforts. The Committee intends to play a 
substantial and meaningful role in the development and 
finalization of these guidelines.
            Section 4(d) and 4(e). Consultations with the public and 
                    with advisory committees
    Within 120 days after this bill is enacted, the United 
States Trade Representative, in consultation with the chairmen 
and ranking members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate 
and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives, is to develop guidelines on public access to 
information regarding negotiations with the purpose of 
facilitating transparency, encouraging public participation, 
and promoting collaboration. Also within 120 days, the United 
States Trade Representative, in consultation with the chairmen 
and ranking members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate 
and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives, is to develop guidelines regarding the 
advisory committees established under section 135 of the Trade 
Act of 1974. The guidelines are to ensure timely briefings and 
regular opportunities to provide input, and the sharing of 
detailed and timely information regarding negotiations, 
including pertinent documents. The Committee intends to play a 
substantial and meaningful role in the development and 
finalization of these guidelines.
            Section 4(f). Establishment of Chief Transparency Officer 
                    in the Office of the United States Trade 
                    Representative
    The bill amends Section 141(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 to 
create a Chief Transparency Officer at the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative with the responsibility of 
consulting with Congress regarding transparency policy, 
coordinating transparency in trade negotiations, engaging and 
assisting the public, and advising the United States Trade 
Representative on transparency policy. The addition of this 
requirement reflects the importance the Committee places on 
ensuring transparent engagement with the public and the role of 
Congress in overseeing USTR transparency policies.

Section 5. Notice, consultations, and reports

    Section 5 of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities 
and Accountability Act of 2015 establishes procedures for 
consultations between Congress and the President before 
negotiations on a trade agreement commence, during 
negotiations, and before a trade agreement enters into force. 
The purpose of the requirements established under section 5 is 
to help ensure close coordination and consultation at every 
stage of trade agreement negotiation.
    Section 5(a)(1) requires the President to provide written 
notice to Congress at least 90 calendar days prior to entering 
into negotiations with a country. In the notice, the President 
must set forth the date on which he intends to initiate 
negotiations, the specific objectives for the negotiations, and 
whether the President intends to seek a new agreement, or to 
change an existing agreement. Failure to provide notice may 
trigger the introduction and consideration of a procedural 
disapproval resolution or a consultation and compliance 
resolution under the provisions of section 6(b). If a 
procedural disapproval resolution or a consultation and 
compliance resolution were adopted, it would withdraw trade 
authorities procedures for legislation implementing the 
agreement at issue. The Committee intends that consultations 
should be robust and meaningful and that the Administration 
consult closely with Congress during the exploratory phase. The 
Committee believes that it is essential that the United States 
not join a consensus in favor of a new entrant to an agreement 
that is already being negotiated if that entrant is not willing 
and able to live up to the standard of the agreement, or if its 
entry would negatively affect, rather than advance, U.S. 
objectives of the agreement.
    Section 5(a)(1)(B) requires the President to consult with 
relevant Committees, and the Congressional Advisory Groups on 
Negotiations, regarding the negotiations before and after 
formal submission of the notice of intention to negotiate. 
Section 5(a)(1)(C) requires the President, upon the request of 
a majority of the members of either the House or Senate 
Advisory Group on Negotiations, to meet with the requesting 
advisory group before initiating negotiations or at any other 
time concerning the negotiations. Section 5(a)(1)(D) requires, 
for the first time, that the United States Trade Representative 
will publish, at least 30 calendar days before initiating 
negotiations with a country, a detailed and comprehensive 
summary of the objectives with respect to the negotiations, and 
thereafter regularly update the summary, as appropriate.
    Section 5(a)(2) establishes a special consultation 
requirement before the President initiates negotiations with a 
country concerning tariff reductions in agriculture. The 
provision requires the President to assess whether U.S. tariffs 
on agricultural products that were bound under the Uruguay 
Round Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound by that 
country. In his assessment, the President is also required to 
consider whether the tariff levels bound and applied throughout 
the world with respect to imports from the United States are 
higher than U.S. tariffs on like products, and whether the 
negotiation provides an opportunity to address any such 
disparity.
    The President is required to consult with the Committees on 
Ways and Means and Agriculture of the House, and the Committees 
on Finance and Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the 
Senate, concerning the results of this assessment, whether it 
is appropriate for the United States to agree to further tariff 
reductions under such circumstances, and how all applicable 
negotiating objectives will be met.
    Section 5(a)(2)(B) sets forth special consultation 
procedures for import-sensitive agricultural products. It 
requires the United States Trade Representative, before 
initiating agriculture negotiations, to identify import-
sensitive agricultural products, and consult with the Committee 
on Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House 
of Representatives, and the Committee on Finance and the 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate 
concerning whether further tariff reductions on these products 
would be appropriate, whether these products face unjustified 
sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions, and whether the 
countries participating in the negotiations maintain export 
subsidies or other programs that distort world trade in these 
products. The United States Trade Representative also must 
request that the International Trade Commission prepare an 
assessment of the probable economic effect of any tariff 
reduction on the U.S. industry producing an import-sensitive 
agricultural product. After complying with these provisions, 
the United States Trade Representative must notify the 
aforementioned Committees of his or her intention to seek 
tariff liberalization in the identified products. Further, if 
during the course of negotiations additional import-sensitive 
agricultural products become candidates for tariff reductions, 
the United States Trade Representative must notify the 
aforementioned Committees promptly and explain the reasons for 
seeking the proposed tariff reductions.
    Section 5(a)(3) requires the President, before initiating 
or continuing negotiations directly related to fish or 
shellfish trade, to consult with the Committee on Ways and 
Means and the Committee on Resources of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Finance and the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and to 
keep these Committees apprised of negotiations on an ongoing 
and timely basis.
    Section 5(a)(4) sets forth a special consultation 
requirement for negotiations regarding textiles. Before 
initiating trade negotiations with a country, the bill requires 
the President to assess whether U.S. textile and apparel 
tariffs bound under the Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than 
tariffs bound by that country, and whether the negotiation 
affords an opportunity to address that disparity. The President 
then must consult with the House Ways and Means Committee and 
the Senate Finance Committee about his assessment, whether the 
United States should agree to further textile and apparel 
tariff reductions, and how all applicable negotiating 
objectives will be met.
    The Committee believes that a country's demonstrated 
commitment, and demonstrated ability, to meet its current 
international trade and investment commitments is an important 
factor that should have a strong bearing on whether a 
prospective trading partners is ready and able to undertake 
trade obligations which will reflect the higher standards that 
a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States requires. 
Therefore, section 5(a)(5) requires the President, in 
determining whether to enter into a trade agreement with a 
particular country, to take into account the extent which the 
country has implemented its international trade and investment 
commitments to the United States.
    Section 5(b) sets forth consultation requirements the 
President must meet before entering into an agreement. The 
President, before entering into any trade agreement, must 
consult with the relevant Committees and the Congressional 
Advisory Groups on Negotiations concerning the nature of the 
agreement; how and to what extent the agreement will achieve 
the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives set forth in 
section 2; and all matters relating to implementation under 
section 6, including the general effect of the agreement on 
U.S. laws.
    Under section 5(b)(3), at least 180 calendar days before 
entering into a trade agreement, the President must notify the 
House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on 
Finance of any proposals that may be in the final agreement 
that could require changes to the antidumping, countervailing 
duty, or safeguard laws of the United States. At any time after 
receiving the report from the President, either Chamber of 
Congress may consider a resolution finding that the proposed 
changes to U.S. trade remedy laws are inconsistent with the 
negotiating objectives set out in section 2(b)(16).
    Section 5(c) requires the President, at least 90 days 
before entering into a trade agreement, to ask the 
International Trade Commission to assess the agreement, 
including the likely impact of the agreement on the U.S. 
economy as a whole, specific industry sectors, and U.S. 
consumers. The ITC's report of its assessment must be 
transmitted to Congress and the President not later than 105 
days from the date on which the President enters into the 
agreement. For the first time the report is required to be made 
public in the interest of greater transparency.
    Section 5(d)-(f) sets out reports that the President must 
submit to Congress with a trade agreement. The reports consist 
of an environmental review, an employment impact review, and a 
meaningful labor rights report on country with which the 
President is negotiating along with a detailed and 
comprehensive description of any provision that would require 
changes to the labor laws and labor practices of the United 
States. The reports are to be submitted to the Committee on 
Ways and Means of the House and the Committee on Finance of the 
Senate, and are to be made public.
    The President, at the same time he submits a copy of the 
final legal text to Congress, is also required to submit to 
Congress a plan for implementing and enforcing the agreement, 
including descriptions of additional personnel required at 
border entry points, additional personnel required by Federal 
agencies responsible for monitoring and implementing the trade 
agreement, additional equipment and facilities needed by U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, and the impact the trade 
agreement will have on State and local governments, with an 
analysis of the cost of each.
    The President must also submit, not later than one year 
after the United States imposes a penalty or remedy permitted 
by a trade agreement, a report on the effectiveness of the 
remedy, including whether the remedy was effective in changing 
the behavior of the targeted party and whether the remedy had 
any adverse impact on U.S. entities. The United States 
International Trade Commission, not later than one year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than 5 
years thereafter, is to submit a report on the economic impact 
on the United States of all trade agreements with respect to 
which Congress has enacted an implementing bill under trade 
authorities procedures since January 1, 1984. Prior to 
preparing these reports, it is expected that the International 
Trade Commission will consult with this Committee regarding the 
appropriate methodology to be used for purposes of these 
reports, and possible new approaches. The Committee expects 
that these reports will provide greater information and 
analysis about the benefits of trade agreements to the U.S. 
economy.
    The Committee believes it needs to be fully informed of the 
actions the Administration is taking to enforce obligations 
under the trade agreements. Therefore the bill requires the 
United States Trade Representative to consult with the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the House and the Committee on 
Finance of the Senate after acceptance of a petition for review 
or taking an enforcement action in regard to an obligation 
under a trade agreement, including a labor or environmental 
obligation. The Committee expects to be fully informed 
regarding the nature of the enforcement action, including the 
legal basis on which it is predicated, as part of these 
consultations.

Section 6. Implementation of Trade Agreements

    Section 6 sets forth conditions the President must meet for 
a trade agreement entered into under trade authorities 
procedures to enter into force, and establishes the conditions 
under which Congress may withdraw the application of trade 
authorities procedures to a trade agreement and the procedures 
for doing so.
    Section 6(a) specifies the documentation that the President 
must transmit to Congress to enable Congress to make a fully 
informed decision as to whether to approve a trade agreement. 
The requirement set out here complements the various 
requirements that the President consult with Congress during 
the course of an agreement's negotiation. Consultation during 
negotiation, combined with a complete accounting after 
negotiation, will enable Congress to participate in the trade 
policymaking process to the fullest extent of its 
constitutional authority.
    At least 90 days before entering into a trade agreement 
subject to this bill, the President must notify Congress of his 
intention to enter into the agreement and publish notice of 
that intention in the Federal Register. For the first time, the 
President, at least 60 days before entering into the agreement, 
must publish the text of the agreement on the website of the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative. Within 60 
days after entering into the agreement, the President must 
transmit to Congress a description of changes to U.S. law he 
believes would be necessary to bring the United States into 
compliance with the agreement. At least 30 days before 
submitting to Congress the materials required by the bill to 
accompany the submission to Congress of the final legal text of 
the agreement (i.e., the complete agreement, including any 
legal and technical corrections and clarifications made 
subsequent to the publication of the text on the USTR website), 
the President is to submit to Congress a draft statement of any 
administrative action proposed to implement the agreement, and 
a copy of the final legal text of the agreement.
    Collectively, these provisions help ensure that Congress is 
given adequate time and documentation to fully understand a 
trade agreement subject to this bill and inform the 
consideration of legislation to implement that agreement. In 
particular, by making the text of the agreement public 60 days 
before the President enters into the agreement, the public will 
have time to examine the agreement and inform Congress of their 
views. Furthermore, by requiring the receipt of a draft 
statement of administrative action and a copy of the final 
legal text of the agreement at least 30 days before the 
President provides the final legal text of the agreement to 
Congress, the bill ensures Congress will have adequate time to 
review the agreement and develop implementing legislation 
before the timeline for the consideration of implementing 
legislation set out in section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 
begins.
    Before Congress considers a bill implementing a trade 
agreement, the President must submit to Congress, on a day on 
which both Houses of Congress are in session: (1) the final 
legal text of the agreement, (2) a draft bill to implement the 
agreement; (3) a statement of administrative action proposed to 
implement the agreement; and (4) additional supporting 
information (described in greater detail, below).
    It is the expectation of the Committee that, for any 
agreement subject to trade authorities procedures under the 
present bill, the draft implementing bill and statement of 
administrative action will be developed by the President in 
close collaboration with the Committees of jurisdiction in both 
Houses of Congress. This has been the practice under trade 
promotion authority legislation. Because an implementing bill 
subject to trade authorities procedures is not subject to 
amendment, close cooperation between the executive branch and 
the Committees of jurisdiction prior to the bill's introduction 
is essential for positive consideration of the implementing 
bill. In addition to such cooperation, the Committee expects 
that other past practices--such as hearings, informal markups, 
and informal conferences between House and Senate Committees of 
jurisdiction--will precede formal transmittal of a trade 
agreement, draft implementing bill, and supporting 
documentation to Congress. To ensure that the legislative and 
executive branches have adequate time to complete these pre-
transmittal processes, the bill establishes no deadline for 
transmittal. It simply provides, in section 6(a)(1)(E), that 
this is to happen ``after entering into the agreement.''
    The supporting information that the President must transmit 
to Congress, along with the agreement, draft implementing bill, 
and statement of administrative action, consists of:
           An explanation as to how the bill and 
        proposed administrative action will change or affect 
        existing law.
           A statement asserting that the agreement 
        makes progress in achieving the applicable purposes, 
        policies, and objectives set forth in section 2 of the 
        bill, and an explanation of how and to what extent it 
        does so. This should be a detailed statement, 
        addressing each of the applicable purposes, policies, 
        and objectives in section 2 (recognizing that there may 
        be certain purposes, policies, and objectives that are 
        not applicable).
           A statement of whether and how the agreement 
        changes provisions of previously negotiated agreements.
           A statement of how the agreement serves the 
        interests of U.S. commerce.
           A statement of how the draft implementing 
        bill meets the requirements for the application of 
        trade authorities procedures, set out in section 
        3(b)(3) of the bill. Section 3(b)(3) provides that the 
        rules for the consideration of bills implementing a 
        trade agreement contained in section 151 of the Trade 
        Act of 1974 apply only if the implementing bill 
        contains certain provisions. As explained above, such 
        bills must (1) contain a provision approving the 
        underlying trade agreement and the proposed statement 
        of administrative action, and (2) only contain changes 
        to existing law that are strictly necessary or 
        appropriate to implement the underlying agreement. The 
        supporting information accompanying transmittal of the 
        bill must explain how the bill meets each of these 
        requirements. In particular, it is important that the 
        President explain his reasons for believing that the 
        changes to existing law contained in the bill are 
        strictly necessary or appropriate to implement the 
        agreement.
    To ensure that a trade agreement does not inadvertently 
bestow benefits on countries not party to the agreement, 
section 6(a)(3) requires that an implementing bill provide 
explicitly that benefits and obligations under the agreement 
apply only to the parties to the agreement. This section also 
provides that an implementing bill may treat different trade 
agreement partners other than uniformly, if such treatment is 
consistent with the underlying agreement.
    Section 6(a)(4) provides that in enacting a trade agreement 
implementing bill, any side agreements between governments that 
have not been disclosed to Congress will not be considered as 
part of the agreement approved by Congress. In other words, 
Congress's approval of a trade agreement is not an approval of 
any undisclosed deals that may be ancillary to that agreement. 
It is an approval only of those terms that have been expressly 
disclosed and identified to Congress.
    Section 6(b) sets forth certain conditions under which a 
trade agreement implementing bill's eligibility for 
consideration under trade authorities procedures may be 
withdrawn. Section 6(b) establishes three circumstances under 
which the trade authorities procedures described in section 
3(b)(3) of the bill will not apply to trade agreement 
implementing legislation. First, trade authorities procedures 
will not apply to a particular agreement if a procedural 
disapproval resolution has been adopted by Congress with 
respect to that agreement. Second, trade authorities procedures 
will not apply to an agreement if a consultation and compliance 
resolution has been adopted by either Chamber of Congress with 
respect to that agreement. Third, trade authorities procedures 
will not apply if the Secretary of Commerce fails to transmit 
to Congress, by December 15, 2015, a report identifying a 
strategy for the United States to redress past instances in 
which WTO dispute settlement panels have effectively added to 
obligations or diminished rights of the United States.
    A procedural disapproval resolution may be introduced at 
any time by any Member of either House. The language of the 
resolution is prescribed by section 6(b)(1)(B) of the bill. A 
procedural disapproval resolution, if adopted, withdraws 
application of trade authorities procedures to any implementing 
bill submitted with respect to a trade agreement or agreements 
as to which the President has failed or refused to notify or 
consult, as defined by the bill (and discussed in detail 
below). The Member introducing the resolution must identify in 
the resolution the agreement or agreements as to which that 
Member believes the President has failed or refused to notify 
or consult with Congress.
    Upon introduction, a procedural disapproval resolution will 
be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and the 
Committee on Rules in the House of Representatives, and to the 
Committee on Finance in the Senate. A procedural disapproval 
resolution may not be amended, and may not be considered on the 
floor of the House unless it has been reported by the Committee 
on Ways and Means and the Committee on Rules, or the floor of 
the Senate unless it has been reported by the Committee on 
Finance.
    If a procedural disapproval resolution is reported by the 
Committee or (in the House) Committees to which it has been 
referred, the procedural disapproval resolution will be 
considered under expedited procedures in the Chamber to which 
it has been reported, as set out in section 152(d) and (e) of 
the Trade Act of 1974. Under those rules, a motion to proceed 
to consideration of a qualifying procedural disapproval 
resolution is considered privileged (in the Senate) or highly 
privileged (in the House), and time for debate is limited. A 
procedural disapproval resolution with respect to a particular 
agreement may be considered under these rules in a given 
Chamber only once per Congress. For trade authorities 
procedures to be withdrawn pursuant to a disapproval 
resolution, both Houses of Congress must adopt the procedural 
disapproval resolution within 60 days of one another.
    Section 6(b)(3) and (4) creates a new Consultation and 
Compliance Resolution process for the Senate and House, 
respectively. The Consultation and Compliance Resolution is an 
additional mechanism to withdraw trade authorities procedures 
for legislation implementing a trade agreement when it does not 
comply with TPA, in particular because the President fails or 
refuses to consult, or the agreement fails to make progress in 
achieving the purposes, policies, priorities and objectives of 
the bill. This mechanism reflects the critical role that 
effective Congressional oversight plays in ensuring that the 
President secures trade agreements that reflect Congressional 
negotiating priorities. Furthermore, for Congressional 
oversight to be effective, the Administration must adhere to 
the consultation requirements established in the bill so that 
Members, cleared advisors, and the public are appropriately 
kept informed throughout the negotiation process. In that 
regard, the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate 
Committee on Finance play a particularly important role in 
engaging with the Administration and ensuring that negotiations 
reflect Congressional priorities.
    The Committee intends to fully perform its responsibility 
over the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements. It 
is expected that, for any trade agreement transmitted to 
Congress pursuant to this bill, the Committee will meet on 
whether to report the implementing bill before it is considered 
on the floor of the Chamber. When the Committee meets to 
consider an implementing bill, it plans to report that bill, 
either with a favorable recommendation, or with a 
recommendation that is other than favorable. For every trade 
agreement considered under expedited procedures since the Trade 
Act of 1974 became law, the Ways and Means Committee of the 
House and Finance Committee of the Senate have convened 
meetings prior to floor consideration of an implementing bill. 
These meetings have provided an important opportunity for 
members of the Committees to discuss the merits of the 
agreement and express their views on whether or not the 
agreement reflects Congressional negotiating priorities and the 
degree to which consultation requirements have been met. 
Furthermore, the Committees have always reported implementing 
bills to their respective chambers and expect to continue that 
practice.
    Under the new procedures in Section 6(b)(3) and (4), if 
either of the Committees fails to favorably report an 
implementing bill when the Committee meets on whether to report 
an implementing bill, it will report a Consultation and 
Compliance Resolution to its respective chamber that can result 
in the disqualification of a bill implementing the trade 
agreement from receiving trade authorities procedures in that 
chamber. The Consultation and Compliance Resolution will ensure 
that the Administration is particularly mindful of 
Congressional negotiating priorities and consultation 
requirements. As a result, the Administration will be more 
likely to negotiate agreements that accurately reflect the 
views of Congress and provide the greatest benefit to American 
workers, businesses, farmers, manufacturers and service 
providers.
    Both a procedural disapproval resolution and a consultation 
and compliance resolution withdraw trade authorities procedures 
for an implementing bill when the President has failed or 
refused to comply notify or consult in accordance with the 
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 
Act of 2015 with respect to negotiations of the trade agreement 
submitted with the implementing bill. The term ``failed or 
refused to notify or consult in accordance with the Bipartisan 
Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015'' 
is defined to make clear that the President has not met his 
obligations simply by going through the formalities of 
consultations. Section 6(b)(1)(B)(ii) establishes that the 
President has failed or refused to notify or consult if:
           The President has failed to consult in 
        compliance with the consultation requirements of 
        sections 4 through 6 of this bill;
           The U.S. Trade Representative has failed to 
        develop or meet the consultation guidelines required by 
        section 4 of the bill;
           The President has not met with the 
        Congressional Advisory Groups on Negotiations pursuant 
        to a request of the groups; or
           The agreement or agreements at issue fail to 
        make progress in achieving the purposes, policies, 
        priorities, and objectives of the bill.
    The bill also states that trade authorities procedures 
shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect 
to a trade agreement entered into under section 3(b) with a 
country to which the minimum standards for the elimination of 
trafficking (as set forth in section 108 of the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7106)) are applicable 
and the government of which does not fully comply with such 
standards and is not making significant efforts to bring the 
country into compliance, as determined in the most recent 
annual report on trafficking in persons submitted under section 
110(b)(1) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 
U.S.C. 7107(b)(1)).
    Section 6(c) affirms that the provisions for withdrawal of 
trade authorities procedures contained here and elsewhere in 
the bill are adopted pursuant to the constitutional authority 
of each House of Congress to determine the rules of its 
proceedings and to change those rules as it deems appropriate.

Section 7. Treatment of certain trade agreements for which negotiations 
        have already begun

    Section 7 provides that the requirements (set forth in 
section 4(a)) that the President notify and consult with 
Committees of jurisdiction in Congress before initiating trade 
agreement negotiations do not apply to certain negotiations 
already underway at date of enactment. Specifically, the pre-
negotiation notice and consultation requirements do not apply 
to negotiations commenced before enactment of the present bill. 
This section applies to agreements (1) entered into under the 
auspices of the World Trade Organization, (2) entered into with 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership countries, (3) entered into with 
the European Union, (4) entered into with respect to 
international trade in services entered into with WTO members, 
or (5) with respect to environmental goods entered into with 
WTO members.
    Since the foregoing negotiations already have commenced, 
the absence of the formal notification and consultation that 
ordinarily would be required before initiating negotiations 
will not preclude trade authorities procedures from being 
applied with respect to these agreements. Similarly, failure to 
formally notify and consult with Congress before initiating 
these agreements cannot form the basis for a disapproval 
resolution under section 5(b)(1)(B). However, all notification 
and consultation requirements that apply after negotiations 
have commenced will apply with equal force to the negotiations 
commenced and specified above.

Section 8. Sovereignty

    The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015 specifies, for the first time, that 
no provision of any trade agreement entered into under trade 
authorities procedures that is inconsistent with the laws of 
the United States or any State or locality will have effect. 
Section 8 further states that no provision of any trade 
agreement entered into under trade authorities procedures will 
prevent the United States or any State or locality from 
amending or modifying the laws of the United States or any 
State or locality, and that dispute settlement proceedings 
shall have no binding effect on the law of the United States or 
any State or locality.

Section 9. Interests of small businesses

    Section 9 expresses the sense of Congress that the United 
States Trade Representative should facilitate participation by 
small businesses in the trade negotiation process, and 
designates Assistant USTR for Small Business, Market Access, 
and Industrial Competitiveness in the Office of the United 
States Trade as responsible for ensuring the interests of small 
business in trade negotiations are considered.

                              A. Addendum

Hon. Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman Hatch: I am writing to express strong support 
for the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation introduced 
last week. The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015 is a critical step toward delivering 
high-quality trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (T-TIP).
    The Administration shares the concerns of many in Congress 
about the currency policies of some of our major trading 
partners. We know that unfair and inappropriate currency 
polices have hurt our workers and firms. This is why the 
Treasury Department remains strongly engaged with our trading 
partners, both bilaterally and through the G-7, the G-20, and 
the IMF. These efforts are showing real results: in particular, 
China's exchange rate is up nearly 30 percent on a real 
effective basis since 2010, and Japan has not intervened in the 
foreign exchange market for more than three years. Many Members 
of Congress and various stakeholders have made a strong case in 
favor of addressing currency in the context of trade agreements 
such as the TPP, and we support the current draft of the TPA 
that includes a strong currency negotiating objective.
    We are committed to continuing to work with you and with 
other Members of Congress to best address currency concerns 
through approaches that complement our ongoing engagement on 
currency issues and help to expand U.S. exports and the high-
quality jobs associated with trade.
    In light of the currency objective that is included in the 
current TPA legislation, we began formal consultation with our 
TPP partners and had a number of these conversations last week 
during the Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank. Our 
partners indicated a willingness to constructively discuss our 
concerns about inappropriate currency policies, providing an 
opportunity to work with them to develop an historic new 
approach to promote greater accountability. Nonetheless, all of 
the partners consulted have made clear that they will not 
support the introduction of enforceable currency provisions in 
the context of trade agreements, and specifically, the TPP. Our 
partners fear that a trade agreement with an enforceable 
currency discipline could constrain the ability of their 
monetary authorities to conduct appropriate macroeconomic 
policies, and that is a risk they are unwilling to take.
    We have a serious concern that in any trade negotiation 
other countries would insist that an enforceable currency 
provision be designed so it could be used to challenge 
legitimate U.S. monetary policy, an outcome we would find 
unacceptable. Seeking enforceable currency provisions would 
likely derail the conclusion of the TPP given the deep 
reservations held by our trading partners. As such, any 
amendment to TPA legislation requiring that the Administration 
only seek enforceable currency provisions as a principal 
negotiating objective would undermine our ability to 
successfully conclude a TPP negotiation.
    We also oppose the current legislation that would use the 
countervailing duty process to address currency undervaluation. 
The legislation raises questions about consistency with our 
international obligations, and other countries might pursue 
retaliatory measures that could hurt our exporters. Taking such 
a unilateral step would be counterproductive to our ongoing 
bilateral and multilateral engagement, as well as to our 
efforts to promote greater accountability on currency policies 
in the context of the TPP.
    We look forward to working with you to effectively address 
the currency issue in the context of our trade agreements. The 
passage of bipartisan TPA legislation will allow us to enter 
into trade agreements that expand opportunities for American 
businesses, create high-quality jobs, and further unlock the 
macroeconomic gains from expanded trade and investment. 
Reducing trade barriers and securing reforms abroad through 
well-crafted trade agreements benefit both U.S. economic 
competitiveness and global economic prosperity.
            Sincerely,
                                                      Jacob J. Lew.

                       V. VOTES OF THE COMMITTEE

    In compliance with paragraph 7(c) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the following statements are made 
concerning the roll call votes in the Committee's consideration 
of S. 995.

                      A. MOTION TO REPORT THE BILL

    S. 995, as amended, was ordered favorably reported on April 
22, 2015. The vote on the motion to report the bill was 20 to 
6.
    Ayes: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, Thune, 
Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, 
Cantwell, Nelson, Carper, Cardin, Bennet, Warner.
    Nays: Burr, Schumer, Stabenow, Menendez, Brown, Casey.

                         B. VOTES ON AMENDMENTS

    Amendments offered to S. 995 were considered and disposed 
of as follows:
    (1) Senators Cardin, Portman, Cantwell, Schumer, Menendez, 
Warner, Casey, and Heller offered an amendment to include, with 
respect to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
countries, a principal negotiating objective of the United 
States to discourage politically motivated actions to boycott, 
divest from, or sanction Israel or otherwise discourage 
commercial activity between the United States and Israel. The 
amendment was agreed to by a roll call vote, 26 ayes, 0 nays.
    Ayes: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi (proxy), 
Cornyn, Thune, Burr, Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller 
(proxy), Scott, Wyden, Schumer, Stabenow, Cantwell, Nelson, 
Menendez (proxy), Carper, Cardin, Brown, Bennet, Casey, Warner.
    (2) Senators Portman, Stabenow, Burr, Brown, Casey, and 
Schumer offered an amendment to include as a principal 
negotiating objective of the United States with regard to 
currency exchange practices to target exchange rate 
intervention undertaken to gain advantage in trade by 
establishing in trade agreements enforceable rules against 
exchange rate manipulation, subject to the same dispute 
settlement and remedies as other enforceable obligations under 
the agreement. The amendment was defeated by a roll call vote, 
11 ayes, 15 nays.
    Ayes: Grassley, Crapo, Enzi, Burr, Portman, Schumer, 
Stabenow, Menendez, Cardin, Brown, Casey.
    Nays: Hatch, Roberts, Cornyn, Thune, Isakson, Toomey, 
Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, Cantwell, Nelson, Carper, Bennet, 
Warner.
    (3) Senator Menendez offered an amendment to disallow the 
application of trade authorities procedures to trade agreements 
with countries included as a Tier III country on the State 
Department's Trafficking in Persons Report. The amendment was 
agreed to by a roll call vote, 16 ayes, 10 nays.
    Ayes: Cornyn, Burr, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Wyden, Schumer 
(proxy), Stabenow, Cantwell, Nelson, Menendez, Cardin, Brown, 
Bennet, Casey, Warner.
    Nays: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Thune, 
Isakson, Heller, Scott, Carper.
    (4) Senator Stabenow offered an amendment to disallow the 
application of trade authorities procedures to trade agreements 
with countries that engage in currency manipulation. The 
amendment was defeated by a roll call vote, 9 ayes, 17 nays.
    Ayes: Grassley, Burr, Portman, Schumer (proxy), Stabenow, 
Menendez, Cardin, Brown, Casey.
    Nays: Hatch, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, Thune, Isakson, 
Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, Cantwell, Nelson, Carper 
(proxy), Bennet, Warner.
    (5) Senators Stabenow, Cantwell, and Brown offered an 
amendment to include equal remuneration as a core labor 
standard. The amendment was defeated by a roll call vote, 10 
ayes, 16 nays.
    Ayes: Schumer (proxy), Stabenow, Cantwell, Nelson, 
Menendez, Cardin, Brown, Bennet, Casey, Warner.
    Nays: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, Thune, 
Burr, Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, 
Carper (proxy).
    (6) Senators Menendez and Brown offered an amendment to 
require parties to a trade agreement to implement measures to 
bring labor laws and regulations into compliance with the 
agreement before the agreement enters into force. The amendment 
was defeated by a roll call vote, 7 ayes, 19 nays.
    Ayes: Schumer, Stabenow, Menendez, Cardin, Brown, Bennet, 
Casey.
    Nays: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo (proxy), Roberts, Enzi, 
Cornyn, Thune, Burr, Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller, 
Scott, Wyden, Cantwell, Nelson, Carper, Warner.
    (7) Senators Casey, Schumer, Stabenow, Menendez, Brown, and 
Cardin offered an amendment to disallow the application of 
trade authorities procedures to a trade agreement that would 
weaken, undermine or necessitate the waiver of the Buy American 
Act and the Buy America provisions of the Surface 
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. The amendment was 
defeated by a voice vote.
    (8) Senator Brown offered an amendment to the principal 
negotiating objectives of the United States regarding foreign 
investment to strike language concerning investor-state dispute 
settlement. The amendment was defeated by a roll call vote, 9 
ayes, 17 nays.
    Ayes: Schumer, Stabenow, Cantwell, Nelson, Menendez, 
Cardin, Brown, Bennet, Casey.
    Nays: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo (proxy), Roberts, Enzi, 
Cornyn, Thune, Burr, Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller, 
Scott, Wyden, Carper, Warner.
    (9) Senators Brown, Menendez, Stabenow, Casey, and Schumer 
offered an amendment to prevent countries not already party to 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations from joining the 
negotiations without certification by Congress that the country 
meets the standards of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
negotiations. The amendment was defeated by a roll call vote, 
11 ayes, 15 nays.
    Ayes: Grassley, Portman, Schumer, Stabenow, Cantwell, 
Nelson, Menendez, Cardin, Brown, Bennet, Casey.
    Nays: Hatch, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, Thune, Burr, 
Isakson, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, Carper, Warner.
    (10) Senator Menendez offered an amendment to the principal 
negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade in 
goods to provide that new trade agreements should avoid 
negative effects on existing value chains established under 
previous trade agreements. The amendment was defeated by a roll 
call vote, 8 ayes, 18 nays.
    Ayes: Schumer, Stabenow, Nelson, Menendez, Cardin, Brown, 
Bennet, Casey.
    Nays: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, Thune, 
Burr, Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, 
Cantwell, Carper, Warner.
    (11) Senator Brown offered amendments, considered en bloc, 
to establish certain consultation requirements on automobiles, 
auto parts, and industrial products. The amendments were 
defeated by a roll call vote, 10 ayes, 16 nays.
    Ayes: Portman, Schumer, Stabenow, Cantwell, Menendez, 
Cardin, Brown, Bennet, Casey, Warner.
    Nays: Hatch, Grassley (proxy), Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, 
Cornyn, Thune, Burr, Isakson, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, 
Wyden, Nelson, Carper.
    (12) Senator Brown offered an amendment to require that, in 
order for a trade agreement to be considered under trade 
authorities procedures, the Senate Finance Committee and the 
House Ways and Means Committee must certify that trade 
agreement achieves the negotiating objectives of the United 
States. The amendment was defeated by a roll call vote, 7 ayes, 
19 nays.
    Ayes: Schumer, Stabenow, Cantwell, Menendez, Cardin, Brown, 
Casey.
    Nays: Hatch, Grassley (proxy), Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, 
Cornyn, Thune, Burr, Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller, 
Scott, Wyden, Nelson, Carper, Bennet, Warner.
    (13) Senator Cardin offered an amendment to establish as a 
principal negotiating objective of the United States with 
respect to ensuring implementation of trade commitments and 
obligations by strengthening good governance, transparency, the 
effective operation of legal regimes and the rule of law of 
trading partners of the United States is through capacity 
building and other appropriate means, which are important parts 
of the broader effort to create more open democratic societies 
and to promote respect for internationally recognized human 
rights. The amendment was agreed to by voice vote.

                    VI. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE BILL


                         A. Committee Estimates

    In compliance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate and section 308 of the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, as 
amended (the ``Budget Act''), the following statement is made 
concerning the estimated budget effects of the revenue 
provisions of the bill.
    Enacting S. 995 would have no budget impact.

                B. Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Budget authority. In compliance with section 308(a)(1) of 
the Budget Act, the Committee states that no provision of the 
bill as reported involves new or increased budget authority.
    Tax expenditures. In compliance with section 308(a)(1) of 
the Budget Act, the Committee states that the bill will result 
in no change in tax expenditures.

            C. Consultation With Congressional Budget Office

    In accordance with section 402 of the Budget Act, the 
Committee advises that the Congressional Budget Office has 
submitted the following statement on the budgetary impact of 
the bill.

                                                    April 30, 2015.
Hon. Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman, Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 995, the Bipartisan 
Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Ann E. 
Futrell.
            Sincerely,
                                                Keith Hall,
                                                          Director.
    Enclosure.

S. 995--Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 
        Act of 2015

    The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015 would restore the President's 
authority to enter into multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements. The authority would be extended through July 1, 
2018, with the possibility to extend for another three years at 
the President's request. Pay-as-you-go procedures apply because 
enacting the legislation could affect revenues. Enacting the 
bill would not affect direct spending.
    The bill would authorize two different methods for the 
United States to enter into multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements. First, the bill would reinstate a rarely used 
authority that would allow the President to reduce certain duty 
rates within specified limitations without further 
Congressional action. While this authority could result in a 
reduction in revenue, CBO has no basis for determining when or 
if the President would lower duty rates or the extent of such 
changes. Therefore, CBO cannot estimate the effect of enacting 
this provision.
    Second, the bill would restore the President's authority to 
propose trade agreements under an expedited procedure for 
Congressional approval, often referred to as ``fast track 
authority.'' For such trade agreements, the Congress would not 
be able to amend the implementing legislation once it was 
introduced. Furthermore, as long as the President met statutory 
requirements concerning Congressional consultation during the 
negotiation process, the Congress would be required to act on 
the legislation following a strict timetable. CBO estimates 
that enacting this authority would not affect revenues or 
direct spending because future trade agreements would require 
the Congress to pass implementing legislation.
    In addition, implementing the legislation would affect 
spending subject to appropriation. Based on information from 
the U.S. International Trade Commission, CBO estimates that 
implementing the reporting requirements under the bill would 
cost less than $500,000 over the 2015-2020 period, assuming the 
availability of appropriated amounts.
    The bill also would amend current law regarding oversight 
and consultations during trade agreements. Specifically, the 
bill would require a number of consultations by the U.S. Trade 
Representative with congressional advisory committees regarding 
trade talks. According to the U.S. Trade Representative, this 
provision would generally codify the agency's current policy 
and practice. Thus, CBO estimates implementing these 
requirements would cost less than $500,000 over the 2015-2020 
period.
    On April 29, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 
1890, the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015, as ordered reported by the House 
Committee on Ways and Means on April 23, 2015. This bill 
contains similar language to that of H.R. 1890 and CBO's 
estimates of the budgetary effects of the two pieces of 
legislation are the same.
    The bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and 
would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal 
governments.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Ann E. Futrell. 
The estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Assistant Director 
for Budget Analysis.

                VII. REGULATORY IMPACT AND OTHER MATTERS

    In compliance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states that the 
bill will not significantly regulate any individuals or 
businesses, will not affect the personal privacy of 
individuals, and will result in no significant additional 
paperwork.
    The following information is provided in accordance with 
section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. 
L. No. 104-4). The Committee has reviewed the provisions of S. 
995 as approved by the Committee on April 22, 2015. In 
accordance with the requirements of Pub. L. No. 104-04, the 
Committee has determined that the bill contains no 
intergovernmental mandates, as defined in the UMRA, and would 
not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

                         VIII. ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR HELLER

    One amendment of this report deserves further elaboration. 
On April 22, Senator Menendez's #1 amendment to S.995 passed by 
a vote of 16-10. The amendment passed as a part of legislation 
to establish congressional trade negotiating objectives and 
enhanced consultation requirements for trade negotiations.
    As someone who offered an amendment that was included in 
the Senate-passed human trafficking legislation, the Justice 
for Victims of Trafficking Act, this is a very important issue 
to Nevadans. That being said, I do not believe human 
trafficking should be the sole litmus test on expedited 
consideration of trade legislation. I look forward to working 
with my colleagues on the most effective ways to eradicate 
human trafficking in all countries.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

    I have one additional comment regarding this bill. With 
respect the investment negotiating objectives, I note that it 
may be appropriate in some circumstances to limit the scope of 
remedies available to investors in certain sectors or products 
in the interest of public health, and the negotiating 
objectives in the bill with respect to investment do not 
exclude that possibility. This understanding is consistent with 
the overall negotiating objective requiring negotiators to take 
into account legitimate domestic objectives such as the 
protection of legitimate health or safety.

                           IX. MINORITY VIEWS

  MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR BROWN, SENATOR CASEY, AND SENATOR STABENOW

    The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority provides fast 
track authority to the President for the purposes of completing 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, as well as other agreements. Together, 
TPP and TTIP account for more than 60 percent of the world's 
gross domestic product and will have an enormous impact on the 
United States economy. It is critical that we get these 
agreements right. Unfortunately, the negotiating objectives in 
the underlying bill are insufficient, and the fast track 
process leaves little room for Congress to ensure our trade 
agreement will create jobs and grow wages for American workers.
    First, the negotiating objectives outlined in the bill are 
not mandatory. The bill stipulates only that the President 
``make progress in achieving'' the negotiating objectives. As a 
result, the President is not required to negotiate an agreement 
that meets the priorities provided by Congress in the 
negotiating objectives. This is particularly convenient for the 
Administration with respect to TPP, for which negotiations are 
nearly complete. It is difficult to see how the priorities 
outlined by Congress in this bill could influence the trade 
talks at such a late stage.
    Second, the negotiating objectives are not strong enough, 
and efforts to strengthen them were blocked in committee. The 
labor and environment negotiating objective, for example, does 
not require U.S. trading partners to meet the labor and 
environmental standards before receiving the benefit of an 
agreement. This is of particular concern for TPP, which 
includes Vietnam where workers do not have the right to 
collectively bargain or choose their own representation. An 
amendment was offered in committee to ensure trading partners' 
compliance before an agreement is implemented, but it was 
defeated. Another amendment was offered to ensure the labor 
standards reflected in the bill include equal remuneration. 
This amendment was defeated as well.
    The negotiating objective with respect to currency in the 
underlying bill is weak and does not specify that currency 
disciplines in an agreement must be enforceable and subject to 
the same dispute settlement provisions as all other provisions 
in the agreement. An amendment was offered in committee to 
strengthen the provision but it was not adopted. Diplomatic 
efforts to address currency manipulation have been woefully 
insufficient because they have not been accompanied by any 
enforcement mechanisms. The TPP agreement includes countries 
that have a history of manipulating their currencies, and there 
have been discussions about China joining the agreement in the 
future. Strong and enforceable currency manipulation 
disciplines in TPP are necessary to ensure American workers and 
businesses compete on a level playing field. Without 
improvement, the negotiating objectives in the bill will not 
lead to strong and enforceable provisions in our trade 
agreements. And if the negotiating objectives are not 
mandatory, the President can continue to pick and choose which 
ones he or she tries to achieve.
    Third, the bill outlines a process by which trade 
agreements are to be considered in Congress, but this process 
relegates Congress' role in trade negotiations to that of a 
rubber stamp. In exchange for giving up its right to amend a 
trade agreement, Congress receives some assurances that they 
will be consulted by the President. The details of these 
consultation requirements, however, are left to the United 
States Trade Representative in guidelines. In addition, the 
process does not obligate the President to consult adequately 
on all important issues before trade negotiations. For example, 
an amendment was offered in committee that would require the 
President to consult with Congress on industrial products and 
automobiles and auto parts before negotiations begin. This 
amendment would have brought pre-negotiation consultation 
requirements for those goods in line with agricultural goods. 
The amendment was defeated. The bill also allows the President 
to certify that the agreement has made progress in achieving 
Congress' negotiating objectives. The President certainly will 
certify that the agreement he or she has negotiated has done 
so. An amendment was offered in committee that would have 
required Congress to certify that the negotiating objectives 
have been met, but it was not adopted.
    Lastly, the bill does not adequately address how future 
countries may join the TPP agreement. An amendment was offered 
in committee to require the House Ways and Means Committee and 
the Senate Finance Committee to certify that a potential TPP 
partner has met the standards of the agreement. The amendment 
also required both chambers of Congress to vote for that 
country to join the agreement. The amendment was defeated, and 
Congress' role in evaluating China's participation in TPP 
remains unclear. Underlying bill is the first trade promotion 
authority legislation that Congress has considered in 13 years, 
and the TPP agreement is the largest agreement the U.S. has 
ever negotiated. Careful consideration of fast track 
procedures, the negotiating objectives, and Congress' role in 
trade authority is needed to ensure TPP and TTIP are high 
standard agreements that create a level playing field for 
American businesses and workers. Unfortunately, efforts to 
strengthen the negotiating objective and expand Congress' role 
in trade negotiations were not accepted. As a result, the 
underlying bill will allow for expedited consideration of trade 
agreements that will further erode the American middle class.
        X. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

    In the opinion of the Committee, in order to expedite the 
business of the Senate, it is necessary to dispense with the 
requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules 
of the Senate (relating to the showing of changes in existing 
law made by the bill as reported by the Committee).

                                  [all]