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                                                      Calendar No. 264
115th Congress       }                                    {     Report
                                  SENATE
 1st Session         }                                    {    115-185
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

                                     

                                     


                     SECURELY EXPEDITING CLEARANCES
               THROUGH REPORTING TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2017

                               __________


                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                   COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

                          GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                              to accompany

                               H.R. 3210

           TO REQUIRE THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BACKGROUND
            INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU TO SUBMIT A REPORT ON THE
                BACKLOG OF PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE 
                 INVESTIGATIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES








[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


               November 27, 2017.--Ordered to be printed


                                   ______

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 

79-010                         WASHINGTON : 2017 
































        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming             GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota            MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
STEVE DAINES, Montana                KAMALA D. HARRIS, California

                  Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
                Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Chief Counsel
                       Courtney J. Allen, Counsel
               Margaret E. Daum, Minority Staff Director
               Stacia M. Cardille, Minority Chief Counsel
       Charles A. Moskowitz, Minority Senior Legislative Counsel
        Thomas J.R. Richards, Minority Professional Staff Member
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
















                                                      Calendar No. 264
115th Congress       }                                    {     Report
                                  SENATE
 1st Session         }                                    {    115-185

======================================================================



 
 SECURELY EXPEDITING CLEARANCES THROUGH REPORTING TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 
                                  2017

                                _______
                                

               November 27, 2017.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Johnson, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
                    Affairs, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 3210]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (H.R. 3210) to require 
the Director of the National Background Investigations Bureau 
to submit a report on the backlog of personnel security 
clearance investigations, and for other purposes, having 
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute and recommends that the 
bill, as amended, do pass.







                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
 II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................6
 IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................6
  V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................7
 VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................8
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Act, as Reported.............9

                         I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

    The purpose of H.R. 3210, the Securely Expediting 
Clearances Through Reporting Transparency Act, or SECRET Act of 
2017, is to require the Office of Personnel Management to 
report on the backlog of security clearance investigations, and 
for other purposes.

              II. BACKGROUND AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION

    In order to protect the American people, certain 
information considered important to national security, also 
known as classified information, requires protection against 
unauthorized disclosure.\1\ Access to this information is only 
granted to Federal employees, members of the Armed Forces, or 
individuals who act for or on behalf of a Federal agency, 
including contractors, subcontractors, and grantees.\2\ 
Additionally, access to classified information is limited to 
individuals in job positions who have a need to access specific 
classified information in order to perform or assist in a 
lawful and authorized government function.\3\ This ``need-to-
know'' requirement is determined by the employing or sponsoring 
Federal agency.\4\ The Federal agency also determines the level 
of access required for the job position--top secret, secret, 
and confidential--depending on ``the degree of protection 
required for information and the amount of damage that 
unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause 
to national defense.''\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Exec. Order No. 12968, 60 Fed. Reg. 151, 40245 (Aug. 7, 1995).
    \2\Id.
    \3\Id at 40246.
    \4\Id.
    \5\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Personnel Security Clearances: 
Actions Needed to Ensure Quality of Background Investigations and 
Resulting Decisions, GAO-14-138T, 8 (Feb. 11, 2014), available at 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660832.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To be granted access to classified information, an 
individual must undergo a background investigation and have a 
``personal and professional history [which] affirmatively 
indicates loyalty to the United States, strength of character, 
trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound 
judgment, as well as freedom from conflicting allegiances and 
potential for coercion, and willingness and ability to abide by 
regulations governing the use, handling, and protection of 
classified information.''\6\ This investigation and subsequent 
approval or disapproval by a Federal agency to grant the 
individual access to classified information at the required 
level must be completed prior to accessing classified 
information and can also occur at any time afterward to 
determine whether the individual continues to meet the 
requirements for access to classified information.\7\ A 
determination that an individual is eligible for access to 
classified information is commonly known as a ``security 
clearance.''\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\Exec. Order No. 12968, supra note 1 at 40250.
    \7\Id at 40246.
    \8\50 U.S.C. Sec. 3341. See also U.S. Dep't of Defense, Personnel 
Security Program, 10-11 (Jan. 1987), available at http://ogc.osd.mil/
doha/ 5200.2-R.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the background investigation for a security 
clearance, Federal investigators will search for records about 
the individual and conduct interviews in order to develop a 
report of investigation.\9\ Interviews can be conducted with 
the individual, as well as the individual's family, friends, 
co-workers, neighbors, and others to verify residency, 
education, employment, and other information.\10\ Investigators 
may search records from law enforcement entities, courts, 
creditors, and other entities.\11\ Once the investigation is 
complete, the sponsoring agency will receive the completed 
background investigation and determine whether the individual 
will be granted a security clearance.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\National Background Investigations Bureau, Investigations 
Process Details, available at https://nbib.opm.gov/about-us/about-
investigations/investigation-process.
    \10\Id.
    \11\Id.
    \12\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Executive Order 12968 mandated that individuals with 
security clearances undergo periodic reinvestigations ``because 
circumstances and characteristics may change dramatically over 
time and thereby alter the eligibility of employees for 
continued access to classified information.''\13\ Federal law 
requires a periodic reinvestigation every five years for a top 
secret clearance, every 10 years for a secret clearance, and 
every 15 years for a confidential clearance.\14\ In 2008, 
Executive Order 13467 further subjected individuals with 
security clearances to continuous evaluation.\15\ Continuous 
evaluation (CE) allows for monitoring to occur beyond re-
investigation periods and is:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Exec. Order No. 12968, supra note 1 at 40251.
    \14\ Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-458, Sec. 3001, 118 Stat. 3638, 3706. See also 50 U.S.C. 
Sec. 3341(a)(7).
    \15\ Exec. Order. No. 13467, 73 Fed. Reg. 128, 38107 (July 2, 
2008).

          a vetting process to review the background of an 
        individual who has been determined to be eligible for 
        access to classified information or to hold a sensitive 
        position at any time during the period of eligibility. 
        CE leverages a set of automated records checks and 
        business rules to assist in the on-going assessment of 
        an individual's continued eligibility. CE is intended 
        to complement continuous vetting efforts.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\Exec. Order No. 13764, 82 Fed. Reg. 13, 8119 (Jan. 23, 2017).

CE is being introduced government-wide in a phased approach, 
``due to the anticipated workload demands, technical 
complexities, and the unknown impact to agency workforce 
requirements.''\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\Security Clearance Investigation Challenges and Reforms: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Gov't Operations of the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Gov't Reform, 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter House 
Hearing] (statement of William Evanina, Director, National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center), available at https://
oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/
ODNI_Evanina_Testimony_Security-Clearance-Investigations.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 requires all agencies to accept ``all security clearance 
background investigations and determinations completed by an 
authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative 
agency.''\18\ Executive Order 13467 echoed this requirement by 
mandating that ``[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, 
background investigations and adjudications shall be mutually 
and reciprocally accepted by all agencies.''\19\ The National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) tracks and 
reports on security clearance reciprocity.\20\ In fiscal year 
2016, five intelligence community agencies reviewed and closed 
35,130 reciprocity requests of security clearances, with an 
87.2% acceptance rate.\21\ These reciprocity requests took only 
four days to review and accept the security clearance of 
another intelligence community agency.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, supra 
note 14 at 3707. See also 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3341.
    \19\Exec. Order No. 13467, supra note 15 at 38105.
    \20\House Hearing, supra note 17.
    \21\Id.
    \22\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2016, President Barack Obama established the National 
Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), which is housed in the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM).\23\ NBIB serves ``as the 
primary executive branch service provider for background 
investigations for eligibility for access to classified 
information; eligibility to hold a sensitive position; 
suitability or, for employees in positions not subject to 
suitability, fitness for Government employment; fitness to 
perform work for or on behalf of the Government as a 
contractor; fitness to work as a non-appropriated fund employee 
. . . and authorization to be issued a Federal credential for 
logical and physical access to federally controlled facilities 
or information systems.''\24\ NBIB began operations on October 
1, 2016, and currently conducts background investigations for 
nearly 95 percent of background investigations government-wide 
and across 100 Federal agencies.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\The White House, The Way Forward for Federal Background 
Investigations (Jan. 22, 2016), available at https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/01/22/way-forward-federal-
background-investigations.
    \24\Exec. Order No. 13764, supra note 16 at 8125-26.
    \25\National Background Investigations Bureau, About Us, available 
at https://nbib.opm.gov/about-us/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The current backlog of investigative products by NBIB, as 
of September 2017, is 707,000, which includes ``simple records 
checks, suitability and credentialing investigations, and more 
labor-intensive national security investigations.''\26\ 
Security clearance background investigations comprise 540,000 
of this backlog, with 330,000 for initial investigations and 
210,000 for periodic reinvestigations.\27\ Roughly 134,000 of 
these are for simple records checks that flow through NBIB on a 
daily basis.\28\ According to NBIB, the backlog recently ``has 
begun to stabilize and has even been reduced modestly . . . 
.''\29\ In fiscal year 2016, background investigations for all 
initial investigations for security clearances took an average 
of 123 days for the fastest 90 percent of investigations.\30\ 
This average was 108 days for initial investigations for secret 
clearances and 220 days for initial investigations for top 
secret clearances.\31\ These processing times are far in excess 
of a statutory mandate of 40 days or less for 90 percent of all 
investigations\32\ and of OPM's strategic goal of 80 days or 
less for top secret security clearances and 40 days or less for 
secret security clearances.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\House Hearing (statement of Charles S. Phalen, Jr., Director, 
National Background Investigations Bureau), available at https://
oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/
OPM_Phalen_Testimony_Security-Clearance-Investigations.pdf.
    \27\Id.
    \28\Id.
    \29\Id.
    \30\U.S. Off. of Personnel Mgmt., Annual Performance Report Fiscal 
Year 2016, 46, available at https://www.opm.gov/about-us/budget-
performance/performance/2016-annual-performance-report.pdf
    \31\Id.
    \32\Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, supra 
note 14 at 3709. See also 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3341(g)(2)(i).
    \33\U.S. Off. of Personnel Mgmt., supra note 30 at 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This substantial backlog arose from several events that 
occurred in recent years.\34\ First, OPM cancelled its contract 
with its largest investigation services provider, USIS, in 2014 
after the Department of Justice filed fraud charges against 
USIS for allegedly filing 650,000 background investigation 
reports without performing proper vetting procedures, as 
required by the contract.\35\ This termination of USIS's 
contract resulted in the loss of thousands of field 
investigators to conduct background investigations.\36\ In 
2015, OPM learned of cybersecurity breaches by foreign 
operatives that resulted in the theft of information about 21.5 
million current and retired federal employees, their family 
members, and others.\37\ This data breach caused OPM to cease 
some functions, like electronic processing, in order to respond 
to the breach and enhance security.\38\ Fiscal Year 2016 
yielded ``a higher than expected volume of fieldwork-intensive 
investigations'' which further exacerbated the backlog.\39\ 
Last, revisions to the Federal Investigative Standards\40\ 
established in 2012 were phased-in beginning in 2014 and 
``required new investigation types and different coverage 
requirements'' leading to a significant increase in the 
frequency of periodic reinvestigations.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\House Hearing, supra note 26.
    \35\Id. See also Charles S. Clark, OPM Terminates Controversial 
Background Check Contractor, Government Executive (Sept. 10, 2014), 
available at http://www.govexec.com/contracting/2014/09/opm-terminates-
controversial-background-check-contractor/93680/. See also Dion 
Nissenbaum, U.S. Accuses Security Background Check Firm of Fraud, Wall 
Street Journal (Jan. 22, 2014), available at https://www.wsj.com/
articles/us-accuses-security-background-check-firm-of-fraud-
1390447893?mg=prod/accounts-wsj.
    \36\Id.
    \37\Id. See also U.S. Off. of Personnel Mgmt., Cybersecurity 
Incidents, available at https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/
cybersecurity-incidents/.
    \38\Id.
    \39\Id.
    \40\The Federal Investigative Standards establish the requirements 
for conducting background investigations. The standards are divided 
into five tiers, based on the level of risk and sensitivity of the job 
position, with an Expandable Focused Investigation. An Expandable 
Focused Investigation focuses investigative fieldwork on potential 
issues detected but not resolved by information previously collected 
from the individual or records checks. See U.S. Off. of Personnel 
Mgmt., Implementation of Federal Investigative Standards for Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 Investigations (Nov. 4, 2014), available at https://
nbib.opm.gov/hr-security-personnel/federal-investigations-notices/2015/
fin-15-03.pdf. See also U.S. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Security and 
Suitability Process Reform, 11 (Dec. 17, 2008), available at https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/
reports/joint_security_dec2008.pdf.
    \41\House Hearing, supra note 26. See also U.S. Gov't 
Accountability Office, Personnel Security Clearances: Actions Needed to 
Ensure Quality of Background Investigations and Resulting Decisions, 
GAO-14-138T, 12 (Feb. 11, 2014), available at https://www.gao.gov/
assets/670/660832.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2016, Congress passed a provision that required the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to develop an implementation plan 
by August 1, 2017, to transfer background investigations for 
DOD personnel from OPM to DOD.\42\ DOD issued this 
implementation plan on August 22, 2017, which described a 
phased transfer over the course of three years.\43\ Industry 
stakeholders expressed opposition to this transfer, noting it 
``will create a parallel process and duplicative regime in the 
[DOD] that will increase costs and drain resources, cause 
further delays, hinder process improvements, and undermine 
efforts to move the government toward true reciprocity across 
all departments and agencies.''\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\National Defense Authorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-
328, Sec. 951, 130 Stat. 2000, 2371 (2016).
    \43\U.S. Dep't of Defense, The Department of Defense Response to 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 Section 
951: Implementation Plan for Potential Transfer of Background 
Investigation Responsibility to the Department of Defense.
    \44\House Hearing (statement of A.R. Hodgkins, III, Senior Vice 
President, IT Alliance for Public Sector), available at https://
oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/
ITAPS_Hodgkins_Testimony_Security-Clearance-Investigations.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    OPM ceased publicly reporting on the backlog of security 
clearance background investigations pursuant to instruction 
from the Office of Management and Budget for reporting priority 
goals quarterly to Performance.gov.\45\ While this is a 
temporary pause in quarterly reporting, the Committee believes 
it is essential for NBIB to continue detailed quarterly 
reporting in order to provide transparency in its efforts to 
address this substantial backlog. Additionally, the Committee 
recognizes that the backlog cannot be reduced without 
government-wide implementation of reciprocity and continuous 
evaluations. Therefore, it is important that those Federal 
agencies involved in these operations provide reports to 
Congress on the progress in implementing these vital practices. 
It is also critical for Congress to have a comprehensive 
understanding of the potential costs and effects that could 
result from bifurcating background investigations between NBIB 
and DOD before such a transfer is realized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\Memorandum from Mick Mulvaney, Director, Off. of Mgmt. and 
Budget, Reducing Burden for Federal Agencies by Rescinding and 
Modifying OMB Memoranda (June 15, 2017), available at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-
26.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 3210 would require NBIB to issue quarterly reports 
with detailed information about the background investigation 
backlog, as well as require reports on the implementation of 
continuous evaluation and on Federal agencies' use of security 
clearance reciprocity. H.R. 3210 would also require a report to 
Congress on the Federal government's reviews of sensitive 
position designations in order to ensure that the 
responsibilities for job positions are being appropriately 
assessed for sensitivity, national security, and a need to 
access classified information.

                        III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

    H.R. 3210 was introduced on July 12, 2017, by Reps. Stephen 
Knight (R-CA-5) and Gerald Connolly (D-VA-11). The Act as 
amended was passed by the House of Representatives on July 26, 
2017, by voice vote. The Act was received in the Senate and 
referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs on July 26, 2017.
    The Committee considered H.R. 3210 at a business meeting on 
October 4, 2017. During the business meeting, a substitute 
amendment offered by Ranking Member McCaskill on behalf of 
herself, Chairman Johnson, and Senator Tester was adopted. Both 
the amendment and the legislation as modified by the amendment 
were passed by voice vote en bloc with Senators Johnson, 
Lankford, Daines, McCaskill, Tester, Heitkamp, Hassan, and 
Harris present.

        IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE ACT, AS REPORTED

Section 1. Short title

    This section establishes the short title of the Act as the 
``Securely Expediting Clearances Through Reporting Transparency 
Act of 2017'' or the ``SECRET Act of 2017''.

Section 2. Report on backlog of personnel security clearance 
        investigations

    This section requires NBIB to submit a quarterly report to 
Congress on the backlog of security clearance background 
investigations. This report must include information on the 
size of the backlog for each sensitivity level, and the number 
of initial investigations and periodic reinvestigations in the 
backlog for Federal employees, employees of Federal 
contractors, and Department of Defense employees and employees 
of Department of Defense contractors. The report is also 
required to include information on the average length of time 
required to carry out an initial investigation and a periodic 
reinvestigation at each sensitivity level and the contributing 
factors to this processing time. The quarterly report is also 
required to include a backlog mitigation plan and a description 
on improvements to information and data security.

Section 3. Report on security clearance investigations of personnel of 
        the Executive Office of the President

    This section requires the Office of Administration of the 
Executive Office of the President to submit a report to 
Congress that describes the process for conducting and 
adjudicating security clearance background investigations for 
staff of the Executive Office of the President and of the White 
House. This report is required to be submitted within 90 days 
of enactment of this Act.

Section 4. Report of duplicative costs

    This section requires OMB to submit a report to Congress on 
the potential cost of duplicating NBIB resources to implement 
the plan issued under the FY 2017 NDAA to transfer background 
investigations for DOD personnel from NBIB to DOD. This report 
shall be issued within 120 days of enactment of this Act.

Section 5. Report on continuous evaluation and reciprocity

    This section requires ODNI and OPM to submit to Congress a 
report on the implementation of continuous evaluations 
government-wide, including the number of agencies with such 
programs, a risk assessment of replacing periodic 
reinvestigations with continuous evaluation programs by 2020, 
barriers to implementation of these programs, and plans to 
replace periodic reinvestigations with continuous evaluation 
programs government-wide by 2020. This section also requires 
ODNI and OPM to report on Federal agencies' efforts to grant 
reciprocal recognition of access to classified information, 
recommendations to improve the background investigation 
process, and a review of the schedule for processing security 
clearances under section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

Section 6. Review and update of position designation guidance

    This section requires the president to review and update 
guidance to agencies in determining position sensitivity 
designations and the type of background investigation needed 
for each position designation. This review is required within 
180 days of enactment of this Act and will be required every 
four years thereafter. Within 30 days of completing such 
reviews, the president will submit a report to Congress on 
issues identified with position sensitivity designations and 
the number of position designations revised as a result of the 
review.

                   V. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

    Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule 
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has 
considered the regulatory impact of this Act and determined 
that the Act will have no regulatory impact within the meaning 
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional 
Budget Office's statement that the Act contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs 
on state, local, or tribal governments.

             VI. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                  Washington, DC, October 18, 2017.
Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 
        Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3210, the SECRET 
Act of 2017.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew 
Pickford.
            Sincerely,
                                                Keith Hall,
                                                          Director.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 3210--SECRET Act of 2017

    H.R. 3210 would amend current law to require the National 
Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), within the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM), to provide various reports to the 
Congress. Those reports would cover information about the 
backlog in federal investigations for security clearances, the 
process for conducting security clearances for the Executive 
Office of the President, and the costs to NBIB and the 
Department of Defense for such investigations. In addition, OPM 
and the Director of National Intelligence would be directed to 
report on the status of modernizing security clearance 
procedures. Finally, H.R. 3210 would require OPM to review, 
update, and report on security clearance designations for 
federal employee and contractor employment positions.
    Information from OPM indicates that the information 
required for H.R. 3210 is already compiled for other efforts. 
Thus, CBO estimates it would cost less than $500,000 over the 
2018-2022 period to prepare the reports; such spending would be 
subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
    Enacting H.R. 3210 would not affect direct spending or 
revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
    CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3210 would not increase 
net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four 
consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028.
    H.R. 3210 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.
    On July 25, 2017, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 
3210, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform on July 19, 2017. The two pieces of 
legislation are similar, although the Senate version would 
require more reports; CBO's estimates of the budgetary effects 
of the two bills are the same.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Matthew 
Pickford. The estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, 
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

       VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE ACT, AS REPORTED

    Because this legislation would not repeal or amend any 
provision of current law, it would not make changes in existing 
law within the meaning of clauses (a) and (b) of paragraph 12 
of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate.

                                  [all]