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116th Congress } { Rept. 116-129
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { Part 1
======================================================================
SECURING AMERICA'S FEDERAL ELECTIONS ACT
_______
June 26, 2019.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Ms. Lofgren, from the Committee of the Committee on House
Administration, submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2722]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on House Administration, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 2722) to protect elections for public office by
providing financial support and enhanced security for the
infrastructure used to carry out such elections, and for other
purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon
with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do
pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Amendment........................................................ 2
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 19
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 20
Hearings......................................................... 29
Committee Consideration.......................................... 30
Committee Votes.................................................. 30
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 32
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 32
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures 32
Earmarks and Tax and Tariff Benefits............................. 32
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 32
Congressional Budget Office Estimate............................. 32
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 35
Non-Duplication of Federal Programs.............................. 35
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 35
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 35
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 35
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 46
Supplemental Views............................................... 88
Amendment
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Securing America's
Federal Elections Act'' or the ``SAFE Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
Subtitle A--Voting System Security Improvement Grants
Part 1--Promoting Accuracy, Integrity, and Security Through Voter-
Verified Permanent Paper Ballot
Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Paper ballot and manual counting requirements.
Sec. 103. Accessibility and ballot verification for individuals with
disabilities.
Sec. 104. Durability and readability requirements for ballots.
Sec. 105. Paper ballot printing requirements.
Sec. 106. Study and report on optimal ballot design.
Sec. 107. Effective date for new requirements.
Part 2--Grants to Carry Out Improvements
Sec. 111. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems
and carrying out voting system security improvements.
Sec. 112. Coordination of voting system security activities with use of
requirements payments and election administration requirements under
Help America Vote Act of 2002.
Sec. 113. Incorporation of definitions.
Subtitle B--Risk-Limiting Audits
Sec. 121. Risk-limiting audits.
Sec. 122. Funding for conducting post-election risk-limiting audits.
Sec. 123. GAO analysis of effects of audits.
TITLE II--PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY THROUGH IMPROVEMENTS IN ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION
Sec. 201. Voting system cybersecurity requirements.
Sec. 202. Testing of existing voting systems to ensure compliance with
election cybersecurity guidelines and other guidelines.
Sec. 203. Requiring use of software and hardware for which information
is disclosed by manufacturer.
Sec. 204. Treatment of electronic poll books as part of voting systems.
Sec. 205. Pre-election reports on voting system usage.
Sec. 206. Streamlining collection of election information.
TITLE III--USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES
Sec. 301. Use of voting machines manufactured in the United States.
TITLE IV--SEVERABILITY
Sec. 401. Severability.
TITLE I--FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
Subtitle A--Voting System Security Improvement Grants
PART 1--PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-
VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2019''.
SEC. 102. PAPER BALLOT AND MANUAL COUNTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) In General.--Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows:
``(2) Paper ballot requirement.--
``(A) Voter-verified paper ballots.--
``(i) Paper ballot requirement.--(I) The
voting system shall require the use of an
individual, durable, voter-verified paper
ballot of the voter's vote that shall be marked
and made available for inspection and
verification by the voter before the voter's
vote is cast and counted, and which shall be
counted by hand or read by an optical character
recognition device or other counting device.
For purposes of this subclause, the term
`individual, durable, voter-verified paper
ballot' means a paper ballot marked by the
voter by hand or a paper ballot marked through
the use of a nontabulating ballot marking
device or system, so long as the voter shall
have the option to mark his or her ballot by
hand.
``(II) The voting system shall provide the
voter with an opportunity to correct any error
on the paper ballot before the permanent voter-
verified paper ballot is preserved in
accordance with clause (ii).
``(III) The voting system shall not preserve
the voter-verified paper ballots in any manner
that makes it possible, at any time after the
ballot has been cast, to associate a voter with
the record of the voter's vote without the
voter's consent.
``(ii) Preservation as official record.--The
individual, durable, voter-verified paper
ballot used in accordance with clause (i) shall
constitute the official ballot and shall be
preserved and used as the official ballot for
purposes of any recount or audit conducted with
respect to any election for Federal office in
which the voting system is used.
``(iii) Manual counting requirements for
recounts and audits.--(I) Each paper ballot
used pursuant to clause (i) shall be suitable
for a manual audit, and shall be counted by
hand in any recount or audit conducted with
respect to any election for Federal office.
``(II) In the event of any inconsistencies or
irregularities between any electronic vote
tallies and the vote tallies determined by
counting by hand the individual, durable,
voter-verified paper ballots used pursuant to
clause (i), and subject to subparagraph (B),
the individual, durable, voter-verified paper
ballots shall be the true and correct record of
the votes cast.
``(iv) Application to all ballots.--The
requirements of this subparagraph shall apply
to all ballots cast in elections for Federal
office, including ballots cast by absent
uniformed services voters and overseas voters
under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act and other absentee voters.
``(B) Special rule for treatment of disputes when
paper ballots have been shown to be compromised.--
``(i) In general.--In the event that--
``(I) there is any inconsistency
between any electronic vote tallies and
the vote tallies determined by counting
by hand the individual, durable, voter-
verified paper ballots used pursuant to
subparagraph (A)(i) with respect to any
election for Federal office; and
``(II) it is demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence (as determined
in accordance with the applicable
standards in the jurisdiction involved)
in any recount, audit, or contest of
the result of the election that the
paper ballots have been compromised (by
damage or mischief or otherwise) and
that a sufficient number of the ballots
have been so compromised that the
result of the election could be
changed,
the determination of the appropriate remedy
with respect to the election shall be made in
accordance with applicable State law, except
that the electronic tally shall not be used as
the exclusive basis for determining the
official certified result.
``(ii) Rule for consideration of ballots
associated with each voting machine.--For
purposes of clause (i), only the paper ballots
deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered
in the calculation of whether or not the result
of the election could be changed due to the
compromised paper ballots.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment Clarifying Applicability of Alternative
Language Accessibility.--Section 301(a)(4) of such Act (52 U.S.C.
21081(a)(4)) is amended by inserting ``(including the paper ballots
required to be used under paragraph (2))'' after ``voting system''.
(c) Other Conforming Amendments.--Section 301(a)(1) of such Act (52
U.S.C. 21081(a)(1)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ``counted'' and
inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and
(3)'';
(2) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``counted'' and
inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and
(3)'';
(3) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking ``counted'' each
place it appears and inserting ``counted, in accordance with
paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and
(4) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``counted'' and
inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and
(3)''.
SEC. 103. ACCESSIBILITY AND BALLOT VERIFICATION FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES.
(a) Ballot Cybersecurity, Confidentiality, and Access for Individuals
With Disabilities.--
(1) In general.--Section 301(a)(3)(B) of the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read
as follows:
``(B)(i) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A)
through the use of at least 1 voting system at each
polling place that--
``(I) is equipped for individuals with
disabilities, including nonvisual and enhanced
visual accessibility for the blind and visually
impaired, and contains features to support
enhanced manual accessibility for the mobility
and dexterity impaired;
``(II) in the case of any election for
Federal office occurring after the date that is
6 years after the date of the enactment of the
Securing America's Federal Elections Act--
``(aa) marks ballots that are
identical in size, ink, and paper stock
to those ballots that would be marked
by hand or a ballot marking device used
by voters who do not have accessibility
needs;
``(bb) marks the ballot in such a way
that someone examining the ballot will
not be able to readily determine
whether the ballot was marked by hand
or machine; and
``(cc) combines ballots produced by
the voting system with ballots marked
by voters using other types of voting
systems used by the State or
jurisdiction in a way that prevents
identification of which ballots were
cast using each voting system; and
``(III) is made available for use by any
voter who requests to use it; and
``(ii) in the case of any election for Federal office
occurring after the date that is 6 years after the date
of the enactment of the Securing America's Federal
Elections Act, meet the requirements of subparagraph
(A) and paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that allows
the voter to privately and independently verify the
accuracy of the permanent paper ballot through the
presentation, in accessible form, of the printed or
marked vote selections from the same printed or marked
information that would be used for any vote tabulation
or auditing; and''.
(2) Clarification with respect to application of requirement
to ballots marked at home.--Section 301(a)(3) of such Act (52
U.S.C. 21081(a)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new flush sentence:
``Nothing in subparagraph (B) shall be construed to prohibit
the use of an accessible ballot that may be printed or marked
by the voter at home.''.
(b) Specific Requirement of Study, Testing, and Development of
Accessible Paper Ballot Verification Mechanisms.--
(1) Study and reporting.--Subtitle C of title II of such Act
(52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended--
(A) by redesignating section 247 as section 248; and
(B) by inserting after section 246 the following new
section:
``SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE PAPER BALLOT VERIFICATION
MECHANISMS.
``(a) Study and Report.--The Director of the National Science
Foundation shall make grants to not fewer than 3 eligible entities to
study, test, and develop accessible paper ballot voting, verification,
and casting mechanisms and devices and best practices to enhance the
accessibility of paper ballot voting and verification mechanisms for
individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary language is not
English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy, including best
practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes through which
the mechanisms are used.
``(b) Eligibility.--An entity is eligible to receive a grant under
this part if it submits to the Director (at such time and in such form
as the Director may require) an application containing--
``(1) certifications that the entity shall specifically
investigate enhanced methods or devices, including non-
electronic devices, that will assist such individuals and
voters in marking voter-verified paper ballots and presenting
or transmitting the information printed or marked on such
ballots back to such individuals and voters, and casting such
ballots;
``(2) a certification that the entity shall complete the
activities carried out with the grant not later than December
31, 2020; and
``(3) such other information and certifications as the
Director may require.
``(c) Availability of Technology.--Any technology developed with the
grants made under this section shall be treated as non-proprietary and
shall be made available to the public, including to manufacturers of
voting systems.
``(d) Coordination With Grants for Technology Improvements.--The
Director shall carry out this section so that the activities carried
out with the grants made under subsection (a) are coordinated with the
research conducted under the grant program carried out by the
Commission under section 271, to the extent that the Director and
Commission determine necessary to provide for the advancement of
accessible voting technology.
``(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $5,000,000, to remain
available until expended.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is
amended--
(A) by redesignating the item relating to section 247
as relating to section 248; and
(B) by inserting after the item relating to section
246 the following new item:
``Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible paper ballot verification
mechanisms.''.
(c) Clarification of Accessibility Standards Under Voluntary Voting
System Guidance.--In adopting any voluntary guidance under subtitle B
of title III of the Help America Vote Act with respect to the
accessibility of the paper ballot verification requirements for
individuals with disabilities, the Election Assistance Commission shall
include and apply the same accessibility standards applicable under the
voluntary guidance adopted for accessible voting systems under such
subtitle.
(d) Permitting Use of Funds for Protection and Advocacy Systems to
Support Actions to Enforce Election-related Disability Access.--Section
292(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21062(a)) is
amended by striking ``; except that'' and all that follows and
inserting a period.
SEC. 104. DURABILITY AND READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR BALLOTS.
Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C.
21081(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(7) Durability and readability requirements for ballots.--
``(A) Durability requirements for paper ballots.--
``(i) In general.--All voter-verified paper
ballots required to be used under this Act
shall be marked or printed on durable paper.
``(ii) Definition.--For purposes of this Act,
paper is `durable' if it is capable of
withstanding multiple counts and recounts by
hand without compromising the fundamental
integrity of the ballots, and capable of
retaining the information marked or printed on
them for the full duration of a retention and
preservation period of 22 months.
``(B) Readability requirements for paper ballots
marked by ballot marking device.--All voter-verified
paper ballots completed by the voter through the use of
a ballot marking device shall be clearly readable by
the voter without assistance (other than eyeglasses or
other personal vision enhancing devices) and by an
optical character recognition device or other device
equipped for individuals with disabilities.''.
SEC. 105. PAPER BALLOT PRINTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Requiring Paper Ballots to Be Printed on Recycled Paper
Manufactured in United States.--Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104, is amended
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(8) Printing requirements for ballots.--All paper ballots
used in an election for Federal office shall be printed in the
United States on recycled paper manufactured in the United
States.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply
with respect to elections occurring on or after January 1, 2021.
SEC. 106. STUDY AND REPORT ON OPTIMAL BALLOT DESIGN.
(a) Study.--The Election Assistance Commission shall conduct a study
of the best ways to design ballots used in elections for public office,
including paper ballots and electronic or digital ballots, to minimize
confusion and user errors.
(b) Report.--Not later than January 1, 2020, the Election Assistance
Commission shall submit to Congress a report on the study conducted
under subsection (a).
SEC. 107. EFFECTIVE DATE FOR NEW REQUIREMENTS.
Section 301(d) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C.
21081(d)) is amended to read as follows:
``(d) Effective Date.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), each
State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the
requirements of this section on and after January 1, 2006.
``(2) Special rule for certain requirements.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in section
105(b) of the Securing America's Federal Elections Act
and subparagraphs (B) and (C), the requirements of this
section which are first imposed on a State and
jurisdiction pursuant to the amendments made by the
Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of
2019 shall apply with respect to voting systems used
for any election for Federal office held in 2020 or any
succeeding year.
``(B) Delay for jurisdictions using certain paper
record printers or certain systems using or producing
voter-verified paper records in 2018.--
``(i) Delay.--In the case of a jurisdiction
described in clause (ii), subparagraph (A)
shall apply to a voting system in the
jurisdiction as if the reference in such
subparagraph to `2020' were a reference to
`2022', but only with respect to the following
requirements of this section:
``(I) Paragraph (2)(A)(i)(I) of
subsection (a) (relating to the use of
voter-verified paper ballots).
``(II) Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) and
(II) of subsection (a) (relating to
access to verification from and casting
of the durable paper ballot).
``(III) Paragraph (7) of subsection
(a) (relating to durability and
readability requirements for ballots).
``(ii) Jurisdictions described.--A
jurisdiction described in this clause is a
jurisdiction--
``(I) which used voter-verified paper
record printers attached to direct
recording electronic voting machines,
or which used other voting systems that
used or produced paper records of the
vote verifiable by voters but that are
not in compliance with paragraphs
(2)(A)(i)(I), (3)(B)(iii)(I) and (II),
and (7) of subsection (a) (as amended
or added by the Voter Confidence and
Increased Accessibility Act of 2019),
for the administration of the regularly
scheduled general election for Federal
office held in November 2018; and
``(II) which will continue to use
such printers or systems for the
administration of elections for Federal
office held in years before 2022.
``(iii) Mandatory availability of paper
ballots at polling places using grandfathered
printers and systems.--
``(I) Requiring ballots to be offered
and provided.--The appropriate election
official at each polling place that
uses a printer or system described in
clause (ii)(I) for the administration
of elections for Federal office shall
offer each individual who is eligible
to cast a vote in the election at the
polling place the opportunity to cast
the vote using a blank pre-printed
paper ballot which the individual may
mark by hand and which is not produced
by the direct recording electronic
voting machine or other such system.
The official shall provide the
individual with the ballot and the
supplies necessary to mark the ballot,
and shall ensure (to the greatest
extent practicable) that the waiting
period for the individual to cast a
vote is the lesser of 30 minutes or the
average waiting period for an
individual who does not agree to cast
the vote using such a paper ballot
under this clause.
``(II) Treatment of ballot.--Any
paper ballot which is cast by an
individual under this clause shall be
counted and otherwise treated as a
regular ballot for all purposes
(including by incorporating it into the
final unofficial vote count (as defined
by the State) for the precinct) and not
as a provisional ballot, unless the
individual casting the ballot would
have otherwise been required to cast a
provisional ballot.
``(III) Posting of notice.--The
appropriate election official shall
ensure there is prominently displayed
at each polling place a notice that
describes the obligation of the
official to offer individuals the
opportunity to cast votes using a pre-
printed blank paper ballot.
``(IV) Training of election
officials.--The chief State election
official shall ensure that election
officials at polling places in the
State are aware of the requirements of
this clause, including the requirement
to display a notice under subclause
(III), and are aware that it is a
violation of the requirements of this
title for an election official to fail
to offer an individual the opportunity
to cast a vote using a blank pre-
printed paper ballot.
``(V) Period of applicability.--The
requirements of this clause apply only
during the period in which the delay is
in effect under clause (i).
``(C) Special rule for jurisdictions using certain
nontabulating ballot marking devices.--In the case of a
jurisdiction which uses a nontabulating ballot marking
device which automatically deposits the ballot into a
privacy sleeve, subparagraph (A) shall apply to a
voting system in the jurisdiction as if the reference
in such subparagraph to `any election for Federal
office held in 2020 or any succeeding year' were a
reference to `elections for Federal office occurring
held in 2022 or each succeeding year', but only with
respect to paragraph (3)(B)(iii)(II) of subsection (a)
(relating to nonmanual casting of the durable paper
ballot).''.
PART 2--GRANTS TO CARRY OUT IMPROVEMENTS
SEC. 111. GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS
AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY
IMPROVEMENTS.
(a) Availability of Grants.--Subtitle D of title II of the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21001 et seq.) is amended by adding
at the end the following new part:
``PART 7--GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS
AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS
``SEC. 297. GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS
AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY
IMPROVEMENTS.
``(a) Availability and Use of Grant.--The Commission shall make a
grant to each eligible State--
``(1) to replace a voting system--
``(A) which does not meet the requirements which are
first imposed on the State pursuant to the amendments
made by the Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2019 with a voting system which
does meet such requirements, for use in the regularly
scheduled general elections for Federal office held in
November 2020, or
``(B) which does meet such requirements but which is
not in compliance with the most recent voluntary voting
system guidelines issued by the Commission prior to the
regularly scheduled general election for Federal office
held in November 2020 with another system which does
meet such requirements and is in compliance with such
guidelines;
``(2) to carry out voting system security improvements
described in section 297A with respect to the regularly
scheduled general elections for Federal office held in November
2020 and each succeeding election for Federal office; and
``(3) to implement and model best practices for ballot
design, ballot instructions, and the testing of ballots.
``(b) Amount of Grant.--The amount of a grant made to a State under
this section shall be such amount as the Commission determines to be
appropriate, except that such amount may not be less than the product
of $1 and the average of the number of individuals who cast votes in
any of the two most recent regularly scheduled general elections for
Federal office held in the State.
``(c) Pro Rata Reductions.--If the amount of funds appropriated for
grants under this part is insufficient to ensure that each State
receives the amount of the grant calculated under subsection (b), the
Commission shall make such pro rata reductions in such amounts as may
be necessary to ensure that the entire amount appropriated under this
part is distributed to the States.
``(d) Surplus Appropriations.--If the amount of funds appropriated
for grants authorized under section 297D(a)(2) exceed the amount
necessary to meet the requirements of subsection (b), the Commission
shall consider the following in making a determination to award
remaining funds to a State:
``(1) The record of the State in carrying out the following
with respect to the administration of elections for Federal
office:
``(A) Providing voting machines that are less than 10
years old.
``(B) Implementing strong chain of custody procedures
for the physical security of voting equipment and paper
records at all stages of the process.
``(C) Conducting pre-election testing on every voting
machine and ensuring that paper ballots are available
wherever electronic machines are used.
``(D) Maintaining offline backups of voter
registration lists.
``(E) Providing a secure voter registration database
that logs requests submitted to the database.
``(F) Publishing and enforcing a policy detailing use
limitations and security safeguards to protect the
personal information of voters in the voter
registration process.
``(G) Providing secure processes and procedures for
reporting vote tallies.
``(H) Providing a secure platform for disseminating
vote totals.
``(2) Evidence of established conditions of innovation and
reform in providing voting system security and the proposed
plan of the State for implementing additional conditions.
``(3) Evidence of collaboration between relevant
stakeholders, including local election officials, in developing
the grant implementation plan described in section 297B.
``(4) The plan of the State to conduct a rigorous evaluation
of the effectiveness of the activities carried out with the
grant.
``(e) Ability of Replacement Systems to Administer Ranked Choice
Elections.--To the greatest extent practicable, an eligible State which
receives a grant to replace a voting system under this section shall
ensure that the replacement system is capable of administering a system
of ranked choice voting under which each voter shall rank the
candidates for the office in the order of the voter's preference.
``SEC. 297A. VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS DESCRIBED.
``(a) Permitted Uses.--A voting system security improvement described
in this section is any of the following:
``(1) The acquisition of goods and services from qualified
election infrastructure vendors by purchase, lease, or such
other arrangements as may be appropriate.
``(2) Cyber and risk mitigation training.
``(3) A security risk and vulnerability assessment of the
State's election infrastructure which is carried out by a
provider of cybersecurity services under a contract entered
into between the chief State election official and the
provider.
``(4) The maintenance of election infrastructure, including
addressing risks and vulnerabilities which are identified under
either of the security risk and vulnerability assessments
described in paragraph (3), except that none of the funds
provided under this part may be used to renovate or replace a
building or facility which is used primarily for purposes other
than the administration of elections for public office.
``(5) Providing increased technical support for any
information technology infrastructure that the chief State
election official deems to be part of the State's election
infrastructure or designates as critical to the operation of
the State's election infrastructure.
``(6) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of the
information technology infrastructure described in paragraph
(4).
``(7) Enhancing the cybersecurity of voter registration
systems.
``(b) Qualified Election Infrastructure Vendors Described.--
``(1) In general.--For purposes of this part, a `qualified
election infrastructure vendor' is any person who provides,
supports, or maintains, or who seeks to provide, support, or
maintain, election infrastructure on behalf of a State, unit of
local government, or election agency, who meets the criteria
described in paragraph (2).
``(2) Criteria.--The criteria described in this paragraph are
such criteria as the Chairman, in coordination with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, shall establish and publish,
and shall include each of the following requirements:
``(A) The vendor must be owned and controlled by a
citizen or permanent resident of the United States.
``(B) The vendor must disclose to the Chairman and
the Secretary, and to the chief State election official
of any State to which the vendor provides any goods and
services with funds provided under this part, of any
sourcing outside the United States for parts of the
election infrastructure.
``(C) The vendor agrees to ensure that the election
infrastructure will be developed and maintained in a
manner that is consistent with the cybersecurity best
practices issued by the Technical Guidelines
Development Committee.
``(D) The vendor agrees to maintain its information
technology infrastructure in a manner that is
consistent with the cybersecurity best practices issued
by the Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
``(E) The vendor agrees to meet the requirements of
paragraph (3) with respect to any known or suspected
cybersecurity incidents involving any of the goods and
services provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant
under this part.
``(F) The vendor agrees to permit independent
security testing by the Commission (in accordance with
section 231(a)) and by the Secretary of the goods and
services provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant
under this part.
``(3) Cybersecurity incident reporting requirements.--
``(A) In general.--A vendor meets the requirements of
this paragraph if, upon becoming aware of the
possibility that an election cybersecurity incident has
occurred involving any of the goods and services
provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant under this
part--
``(i) the vendor promptly assesses whether or
not such an incident occurred, and submits a
notification meeting the requirements of
subparagraph (B) to the Secretary and the
Chairman of the assessment as soon as
practicable (but in no case later than 3 days
after the vendor first becomes aware of the
possibility that the incident occurred);
``(ii) if the incident involves goods or
services provided to an election agency, the
vendor submits a notification meeting the
requirements of subparagraph (B) to the agency
as soon as practicable (but in no case later
than 3 days after the vendor first becomes
aware of the possibility that the incident
occurred), and cooperates with the agency in
providing any other necessary notifications
relating to the incident; and
``(iii) the vendor provides all necessary
updates to any notification submitted under
clause (i) or clause (ii).
``(B) Contents of notifications.--Each notification
submitted under clause (i) or clause (ii) of
subparagraph (A) shall contain the following
information with respect to any election cybersecurity
incident covered by the notification:
``(i) The date, time, and time zone when the
election cybersecurity incident began, if
known.
``(ii) The date, time, and time zone when the
election cybersecurity incident was detected.
``(iii) The date, time, and duration of the
election cybersecurity incident.
``(iv) The circumstances of the election
cybersecurity incident, including the specific
election infrastructure systems believed to
have been accessed and information acquired, if
any.
``(v) Any planned and implemented technical
measures to respond to and recover from the
incident.
``(vi) In the case of any notification which
is an update to a prior notification, any
additional material information relating to the
incident, including technical data, as it
becomes available.
``SEC. 297B. ELIGIBILITY OF STATES.
``A State is eligible to receive a grant under this part if the State
submits to the Commission, at such time and in such form as the
Commission may require, an application containing--
``(1) a description of how the State will use the grant to
carry out the activities authorized under this part;
``(2) a certification and assurance that, not later than 5
years after receiving the grant, the State will carry out
voting system security improvements, as described in section
297A; and
``(3) such other information and assurances as the Commission
may require.
``SEC. 297C. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
``Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, the
Commission shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
committees, including the Committees on Homeland Security, House
Administration, and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and
the Committees on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the
Judiciary, and Rules and Administration of the Senate, on the
activities carried out with the funds provided under this part.
``SEC. 297D. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
``(a) Authorization.--There are authorized to be appropriated for
grants under this part--
``(1) $600,000,000 for fiscal year 2019; and
``(2) $175,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2020, 2022,
2024, and 2026.
``(b) Continuing Availability of Amounts.--Any amounts appropriated
pursuant to the authorization of this section shall remain available
until expended.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is amended
by adding at the end of the items relating to subtitle D of title II
the following:
``Part 7--Grants for Obtaining Compliant Paper Ballot Voting Systems
and Carrying Out Voting System Security Improvements
``Sec. 297. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems
and carrying out voting system security improvements.
``Sec. 297A. Voting system security improvements described.
``Sec. 297B. Eligibility of States.
``Sec. 297C. Reports to Congress.
``Sec. 297D. Authorization of appropriations.''.
SEC. 112. COORDINATION OF VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY ACTIVITIES WITH USE OF
REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS AND ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS UNDER HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002.
(a) Duties of Election Assistance Commission.--Section 202 of the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20922) is amended in the
matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``by'' and inserting ``and
the security of election infrastructure by''.
(b) Membership of Secretary of Homeland Security on Board of Advisors
of Election Assistance Commission.--Section 214(a) of such Act (52
U.S.C. 20944(a)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``37 members'' and inserting ``38 members'';
and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(17) The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary's
designee.''.
(c) Representative of Department of Homeland Security on Technical
Guidelines Development Committee.--Section 221(c)(1) of such Act (52
U.S.C. 20961(c)(1)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F);
and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new
subparagraph:
``(E) A representative of the Department of Homeland
Security.''.
(d) Goals of Periodic Studies of Election Administration Issues;
Consultation With Secretary of Homeland Security.--Section 241(a) of
such Act (52 U.S.C. 20981(a)) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``the
Commission shall'' and inserting ``the Commission, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security (as
appropriate), shall'';
(2) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (3);
(3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new
paragraph:
``(4) will be secure against attempts to undermine the
integrity of election systems by cyber or other means; and''.
(e) Requirements Payments.--
(1) Use of payments for voting system security
improvements.--Section 251(b) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21001(b))
is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) Permitting use of payments for voting system security
improvements.--A State may use a requirements payment to carry
out any of the following activities:
``(A) Cyber and risk mitigation training.
``(B) Providing increased technical support for any
information technology infrastructure that the chief
State election official deems to be part of the State's
election infrastructure or designates as critical to
the operation of the State's election infrastructure.
``(C) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of
the information technology infrastructure described in
subparagraph (B).
``(D) Enhancing the security of voter registration
databases.''.
(2) Incorporation of election infrastructure protection in
state plans for use of payments.--Section 254(a)(1) of such Act
(52 U.S.C. 21004(a)(1)) is amended by striking the period at
the end and inserting ``, including the protection of election
infrastructure.''.
(3) Composition of committee responsible for developing state
plan for use of payments.--Section 255 of such Act (52 U.S.C.
21005) is amended--
(A) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection
(c); and
(B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following
new subsection:
``(b) Geographic Representation.--The members of the committee shall
be a representative group of individuals from the State's counties,
cities, towns, and Indian tribes, and shall represent the needs of
rural as well as urban areas of the State, as the case may be.''.
(f) Ensuring Protection of Computerized Statewide Voter Registration
List.--Section 303(a)(3) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21083(a)(3)) is amended
by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, as well as other
measures to prevent and deter cybersecurity incidents, as identified by
the Commission, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Technical
Guidelines Development Committee.''.
SEC. 113. INCORPORATION OF DEFINITIONS.
(a) In General.--Section 901 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52
U.S.C. 21141) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 901. DEFINITIONS.
``In this Act, the following definitions apply:
``(1) The term `cybersecurity incident' has the meaning given
the term `incident' in section 227 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 148).
``(2) The term `election agency' means any component of a
State, or any component of a unit of local government in a
State, which is responsible for the administration of elections
for Federal office in the State.
``(3) The term `election infrastructure' means storage
facilities, polling places, and centralized vote tabulation
locations used to support the administration of elections for
public office, as well as related information and
communications technology, including voter registration
databases, voting machines, electronic mail and other
communications systems (including electronic mail and other
systems of vendors who have entered into contracts with
election agencies to support the administration of elections,
manage the election process, and report and display election
results), and other systems used to manage the election process
and to report and display election results on behalf of an
election agency.
``(4) The term `State' means each of the several States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is amended
by amending the item relating to section 901 to read as follows:
``Sec. 901. Definitions.''.
Subtitle B--Risk-Limiting Audits
SEC. 121. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.
(a) In General.-- Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52
U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 303 the
following new section:
``SEC. 303A. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Risk-limiting audit.--The term `risk-limiting audit'
means, with respect to any election contest, a post-election
process that--
``(A) has a probability of at least 95 percent of
correcting the reported outcome if the reported outcome
is not the correct outcome;
``(B) will not change the outcome if the reported
outcome is the correct outcome; and
``(C) involves a manual adjudication of voter intent
from some or all of the ballots validly cast in the
election contest.
``(2) Reported outcome; correct outcome; outcome.--
``(A) Reported outcome.--The term `reported outcome'
means the outcome of an election contest which is
determined according to the canvass and which will
become the official, certified outcome unless it is
revised by an audit, recount, or other legal process.
``(B) Correct outcome.--The term `correct outcome'
means the outcome that would be determined by a manual
adjudication of voter intent for all votes validly cast
in the election contest.
``(C) Outcome.--The term `outcome' means the winner
or set of winners of an election contest.
``(3) Manual adjudication of voter intent.--The term `manual
adjudication of voter intent' means direct inspection and
determination by humans, without assistance from electronic or
mechanical tabulation devices, of the ballot choices marked by
voters on each voter-verified paper record.
``(4) Ballot manifest.--The term `ballot manifest' means a
record maintained by each jurisdiction that--
``(A) is created without reliance on any part of the
voting system used to tabulate votes;
``(B) functions as a sampling frame for conducting a
risk-limiting audit; and
``(C) accounts for all ballots validly cast
regardless of how or whether they were tabulated and
includes a precise description of the manner in which
the ballots are physically stored, including the total
number of physical groups of ballots, the numbering
system for each group, a unique label for each group,
and the number of ballots in each such group.
``(b) Requirements.--
``(1) In general.--
``(A) Audits.--
``(i) In general.--Each State and
jurisdiction shall administer risk-limiting
audits of the results of all election contests
for Federal office held in the State in
accordance with the requirements of paragraph
(2).
``(ii) Exception.--Clause (i) shall not apply
to any election contest for which the State or
jurisdiction conducts a full recount through a
manual adjudication of voter intent.
``(B) Full manual tabulation.--If a risk-limiting
audit conducted under subparagraph (A) corrects the
reported outcome of an election contest, the State or
jurisdiction shall use the results of the manual
adjudication of voter intent conducted as part of the
risk-limiting audit as the official results of the
election contest.
``(2) Audit requirements.--
``(A) Rules and procedures.--
``(i) In general.--Not later than 1 year
after the date of the enactment of this
section, the chief State election official of
the State shall establish rules and procedures
for conducting risk-limiting audits.
``(ii) Matters included.--The rules and
procedures established under clause (i) shall
include the following:
``(I) Rules and procedures for
ensuring the security of ballots and
documenting that prescribed procedures
were followed.
``(II) Rules and procedures for
ensuring the accuracy of ballot
manifests produced by jurisdictions.
``(III) Rules and procedures for
governing the format of ballot
manifests and other data involved in
risk-limiting audits.
``(IV) Methods to ensure that any
cast vote records used in a risk-
limiting audit are those used by the
voting system to tally the results of
the election contest sent to the chief
State election official of the State
and made public.
``(V) Rules and procedures for the
random selection of ballots to be
inspected manually during each audit.
``(VI) Rules and procedures for the
calculations and other methods to be
used in the audit and to determine
whether and when the audit of each
election contest is complete.
``(VII) Rules and procedures for
testing any software used to conduct
risk-limiting audits.
``(B) Public report.--
``(i) In general.--After the completion of
the risk-limiting audit and at least 5 days
before the election contest is certified, the
State shall publish a report on the results of
the audit, together with such information as
necessary to confirm that the audit was
conducted properly.
``(ii) Format of data.--All data published
with the report under clause (i) shall be
published in machine-readable, open data
formats.
``(iii) Protection of anonymity of votes.--
Information and data published by the State
under this subparagraph shall not compromise
the anonymity of votes.
``(c) Effective Date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be required
to comply with the requirements of this section for the first regularly
scheduled election for Federal office held more than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of the Securing America's Federal Elections Act
and for each subsequent election for Federal office.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments Related to Enforcement.--Section 401 of
such Act (52 U.S.C. 21111) is amended by striking ``and 303'' and
inserting ``303, and 303A''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for such Act is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 303 the
following new item:
``Sec. 303A. Risk-limiting audits.''.
SEC. 122. FUNDING FOR CONDUCTING POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.
(a) Payments to States.-- Subtitle D of title II of the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21001 et seq.), as amended by section
111(a), is amended by adding at the end the following new part:
``PART 8--FUNDING FOR POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS
``SEC. 298. PAYMENTS FOR POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.
``(a) In General.--The Commission shall pay to States the amount of
eligible post-election audit costs.
``(b) Eligible Post-election Audit Costs.--For purposes of this
section, the term `eligible post-election audit costs' means, with
respect to any State, costs paid or incurred by the State or local
government within the State for--
``(1) the conduct of any risk-limiting audit (as defined in
section 303A) with respect to an election for Federal office
occurring after the date of the enactment of this part; and
``(2) any equipment, software, or services necessary for the
conduct of any such risk-limiting audit.
``(c) Special Rules.--
``(1) Rules and procedures.--The Commission shall establish
rules and procedures for submission of eligible post-election
audit costs for payments under this section.
``(2) Insufficient funds.--In any case in which the amounts
appropriated under subsection (d) are insufficient to pay all
eligible post-election audit costs submitted by States with
respect to any Federal election, the amount of such costs paid
under subsection (a) to any State shall be equal to the amount
that bears the same ratio to the amount which would be paid to
such State (determined without regard to this paragraph) as--
``(A) the number of individuals who voted in such
Federal election in such State; bears to
``(B) the total number of individuals who voted in
such Federal election in all States submitting a claim
for eligible post-election audit costs.
``(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
``(1) In general.--There is hereby authorized to be
appropriated to the Commission such sums as are necessary to
carry out this part.
``(2) Availability.--Any amounts appropriated pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall remain available without fiscal year
limitation until expended.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act, as
amended by section 111(b), is further amended by adding at the end of
the items relating to subtitle D of title II the following:
``Part 8--Funding for Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audits
``Sec. 298. Payments for post-election risk-limiting audits.''.
SEC. 123. GAO ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF AUDITS.
(a) Analysis.--Not later than 6 months after the first elections for
Federal office is held for which States must conduct risk-limiting
audits under section 303A of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (as
added by section 121), the Comptroller General of the United States
shall conduct an analysis of the extent to which such audits have
improved the administration of such elections and the security of
election infrastructure in the States receiving such grants.
(b) Report.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall
submit a report on the analysis conducted under subsection (a) to the
Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate.
TITLE II--PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY THROUGH IMPROVEMENTS IN ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION
SEC. 201. VOTING SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Ballot Tabulating Devices.-- Section 301(a) of the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104 and
section 105, is further amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(9) Ballot tabulating methods.--
``(A) In general.--The voting system tabulates
ballots by hand or through the use of an optical
scanning device that meets the requirements of
subparagraph (B).
``(B) Requirements for optical scanning devices.--
Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the
requirements of this subparagraph are as follows:
``(i) The device is designed and built in a
manner in which it is mechanically impossible
for the device to add or change the vote
selections on a printed or marked ballot.
``(ii) The device is capable of exporting its
data (including vote tally data sets and cast
vote records) in a machine-readable, open data
standard format required by the Commission, in
consultation with the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
``(iii) The device consists of hardware
that--
``(I) is certified under section 2216
of the Homeland Security Act; and
``(II) demonstrably conforms to a
hardware component manifest describing
point-of-origin information (including
upstream hardware supply chain
information for each component) that--
``(aa) has been provided to
the Commission, the Director of
Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security under
section 2215 of the Homeland
Security Act, and the chief
State election official for
each State in which the device
is used; and
``(bb) may be shared by any
entity to whom it has been
provided under item (aa) with
independent experts for
cybersecurity analysis.
``(iv) The device utilizes technology that
prevents the operation of the device if any
hardware components do not meet the
requirements of clause (iii).
``(v) The device operates using software--
``(I) for which the source code,
system build tools, and compilation
parameters--
``(aa) have been provided to
the Commission, the Director of
Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security under
section 2215 of the Homeland
Security Act, and the chief
State election official for
each State in which the device
is used; and
``(bb) may be shared by any
entity to whom it has been
provided under item (aa) with
independent experts for
cybersecurity analysis; and
``(II) that is certified under
section 2216 of the Homeland Security
Act.
``(vi) The device utilizes technology that
prevents the running of software on the device
that does not meet the requirements of clause
(v).
``(vii) The device utilizes technology that
enables election officials, cybersecurity
researchers, and voters to verify that the
software running on the device--
``(I) was built from a specific,
untampered version of the code that is
described in clause (v); and
``(II) uses the system build tools
and compilation parameters that are
described in clause (v).
``(viii) The device contains such other
security requirements as the Director of
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
requires.
``(C) Waiver.--
``(i) In general.--The Director of
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security, in
consultation with the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, may
waive one or more of the requirements of
subparagraph (B) (other than the requirement of
clause (i) thereof) with respect to any device
for a period of not to exceed 2 years.
``(ii) Publication.--Information relating to
any waiver granted under clause (i) shall be
made publicly available on the Internet.
``(D) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction
shall be required to comply with the requirements of
this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for
Federal office in November 2024, and for each
subsequent election for Federal office.''.
(b) Other Cybersecurity Requirements.-- Section 301(a) of such Act
(52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104, section 105, and
subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraphs:
``(10) Prohibition of use of wireless communications devices
in systems or devices.--
``(A) In general.--No system or device upon which
ballot marking devices or optical scanners are
configured, upon which ballots are marked by voters
(except as necessary for individuals with disabilities
to use ballot marking devices that meet the
accessibility requirements of paragraph (3)), or upon
which votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated shall
contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, power-
line, or concealed communication device.
``(B) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction
shall be required to comply with the requirements of
this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for
Federal office in November 2020, and for each
subsequent election for Federal office.
``(11) Prohibiting connection of system to the internet.--
``(A) In general.--No system or device upon which
ballot marking devices or optical scanners are
configured, upon which ballots are marked by voters, or
upon which votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated
shall be connected to the Internet or any non-local
computer system via telephone or other communication
network at any time.
``(B) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction
shall be required to comply with the requirements of
this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for
Federal office in November 2020, and for each
subsequent election for Federal office.''.
(c) Special Cybersecurity Rules for Certain Ballot Marking Devices.--
(1) In general.--Section 301(a) of such Act (52 U.S.C.
21081(a)), as amended by section 104, section 105, and
subsections (a) and (b), is further amended by adding at the
end the following new paragraph:
``(13) Ballot marking devices.--
``(A) In general.--In the case of a voting system
that uses a ballot marking device, the ballot marking
device shall be a device that--
``(i) is not capable of tabulating votes;
``(ii) except in the case of a ballot marking
device used exclusively to comply with the
requirements of paragraph (3), is certified in
accordance with section 232 as meeting the
requirements of subparagraph (B); and
``(iii) is certified under section 2216 of
the Homeland Security Act as meeting the
requirements of clauses (iii) through (viii) of
section 301(a)(9)(B).
``(B) Requirements.--
``(i) In general.--A ballot marking device
meets the requirements of this subparagraph if,
during a double-masked test conducted by a
qualified independent user experience research
laboratory (as defined in section 232(b)(4)) of
a simulated election scenario which meets the
requirements of clause (ii), there is less than
a 5 percent chance that an ordinary voter using
the device would not detect and report any
difference between the vote selection printed
on the ballot by the ballot marking device and
the vote selection indicated by the voter.
``(ii) Simulated election scenario.--A
simulated election scenario meets the
requirements of this clause if it is conducted
with--
``(I) a pool of subjects that are--
``(aa) diverse in age,
gender, education, and physical
limitations; and
``(bb) representative of the
communities in which the voting
system will be used; and
``(II) ballots that are
representative of ballots ordinarily
used in the communities in which the
voting system will be used.
``(C) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction
shall be required to comply with the requirements of
this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for
Federal office in November 2022, and for each
subsequent election for Federal office.''.
(2) Procedure for testing.--
(A) In general.--Subtitle B of title II of the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971 et seq.) is
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 232. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT MARKING DEVICES.
``(a) In General.--Any State or jurisdiction which intends to use a
ballot marking device (other than a ballot marking device used
exclusively to comply with the requirements of section 301(a)(3)) in an
election for Federal office may submit an application to the Commission
for testing and certification under this section.
``(b) Application, Assignment, and Testing.--
``(1) In general.--An application under subsection (a) shall
be submitted not later than 18 months before the date of the
election for Federal office in which the ballot marking device
is intended to be used and shall contain such information as
the Commission requires.
``(2) Assignment.--Upon receipt of an application for testing
under this section, the Commission shall contract with a
qualified independent user experience research laboratory for
the testing of whether the ballot marking device intended to be
used by the State or jurisdiction meets the requirements of
section 301(a)(10)(B).
``(3) Requirements for testing.--Any contract described in
paragraph (2) shall require the qualified independent user
experience research laboratory to--
``(A) not later than 30 days before testing begins,
submit to the Commission for approval the protocol for
the simulated election scenario used for testing the
ballot marking device;
``(B) use only protocols approved by the Commission
in conducting such testing; and
``(C) submit to the Commission a report on the
results of the testing.
``(4) Qualified independent user experience research
laboratory.--For purposes of this section:
``(A) In general.--The term `qualified independent
user experience research laboratory' means a laboratory
accredited under this subsection by the Election
Assistance Commission in accordance with standards
determined by the Commission, in consultation with the
Director of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
``(B) Criteria.--A laboratory shall not be accredited
under this subsection unless such laboratory
demonstrates that--
``(i) no employee of, or individual with an
ownership in, such laboratory has, or has had
during the 5 preceding years, any financial
relationship with a manufacturer of voting
systems; and
``(ii) any group of individuals conducting
tests under this section collectively meet the
following qualifications:
``(I) Experience designing and
running user research studies and
experiments using both qualitative and
quantitative methodologies.
``(II) Experience with voting
systems.
``(c) Review by Independent Board.--
``(1) In general.--The Commission shall submit for approval
to an independent review board established under paragraph (3)
the following:
``(A) Any protocol submitted to the Commission under
subsection (b)(3)(A).
``(B) Any report submitted to the Commission under
subsection (b)(3)(C).
``(2) Final approval.--Not later than the date that is 12
months before the date of the election for Federal office in
which a State or jurisdiction intends to use the ballot marking
device, the independent review board shall report to the
Commission on whether it has approved a report submitted under
paragraph (1)(B).
``(3) Independent review board.--
``(A) In general.--An independent review board
established under this paragraph shall be composed of 5
independent scientists appointed by the Commission, in
consultation with the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
``(B) Qualifications.--The members of the independent
review board--
``(i) shall have expertise and relevant peer-
reviewed publications in the following fields:
cognitive psychology, experimental design,
statistics, and user experience research and
testing; and
``(ii) may not have, or have had during the 5
preceding years, any financial relationship
with a manufacturer of voting systems.
``(4) Publication.--The Commission shall make public--
``(A) any protocol approved under this subsection;
``(B) any report submitted under subsection
(b)(3)(C); and
``(C) any determination made by an independent review
board under paragraph (2).
``(d) Certification.--If--
``(1) a ballot marking device is determined by the qualified
independent user experience research laboratory to meet the
requirements of section 301(a)(7); and
``(2) the report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(C) is
approved by a majority of the members of the independent review
board under subsection (d)(2),
then the Commission shall certify the ballot marking device.
``(e) Prohibition on Fees.--The Commission may not charge any fee to
a State or jurisdiction, a developer or manufacturer of a ballot
marking device, or any other person in connection with testing and
certification under this section.''.
(B) Conforming amendments.--
(i) Section 202(2) of the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20922(2)) is amended by
inserting ``and ballot marking devices'' after
``hardware and software'').
(ii) The heading for subtitle B of title II
of such Act is amended by inserting at the
end``; Ballot Marking Devices''.
(iii) The table of contents of such Act is
amended--
(I) by inserting ``; Ballot Marking
Devices'' at the end of the item
relating to subtitle B of title II; and
(II) by inserting after the item
related to section 231 the following:
``Sec. 232. Testing and certification of ballot marking devices.''.
SEC. 202. TESTING OF EXISTING VOTING SYSTEMS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH
ELECTION CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES AND OTHER
GUIDELINES.
(a) Requiring Testing of Existing Voting Systems.--
(1) In general.--Section 231(a) of the Help America Vote Act
of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971(a)) is amended by adding at the end
the following new paragraph:
``(3) Testing to ensure compliance with guidelines.--
``(A) Testing.--Not later than 9 months before the
date of each regularly scheduled general election for
Federal office, the Commission shall provide for the
testing by accredited laboratories under this section
of the voting system hardware and software which was
certified for use in the most recent such election, on
the basis of the most recent voting system guidelines
applicable to such hardware or software (including
election cybersecurity guidelines) issued under this
Act.
``(B) Decertification of hardware or software failing
to meet guidelines.--If, on the basis of the testing
described in subparagraph (A), the Commission
determines that any voting system hardware or software
does not meet the most recent guidelines applicable to
such hardware or software issued under this Act, the
Commission shall decertify such hardware or
software.''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1)
shall apply with respect to the regularly scheduled general
election for Federal office held in November 2020 and each
succeeding regularly scheduled general election for Federal
office.
(b) Issuance of Cybersecurity Guidelines by Technical Guidelines
Development Committee.--Section 221(b) of the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (52 U.S.C. 20961(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(3) Election cybersecurity guidelines.--Not later than 6
months after the date of the enactment of the Securing
America's Federal Elections Act, the Development Committee
shall issue election cybersecurity guidelines, including
standards and best practices for procuring, maintaining,
testing, operating, and updating election systems to prevent
and deter cybersecurity incidents.''.
SEC. 203. REQUIRING USE OF SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE FOR WHICH INFORMATION
IS DISCLOSED BY MANUFACTURER.
(a) Requirement.--Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002
(52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by sections 104 and 105, is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(9) Requiring use of software and hardware for which
information is disclosed by manufacturer.--
``(A) Requiring use of software for which source code
is disclosed by manufacturer.--
``(i) In general.--In the operation of voting
systems in an election for Federal office, a
State may only use software for which the
manufacturer makes the source code (in the form
in which will be used at the time of the
election) publicly available online under a
license that grants a worldwide, royalty-free,
non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable
license to all intellectual property rights in
such source code, except that the manufacturer
may prohibit a person who obtains the software
from using the software in a manner that is
primarily intended for or directed toward
commercial advantage or private monetary
compensation that is unrelated to carrying out
legitimate research or cybersecurity activity.
``(ii) Exceptions.--Clause (i) does not apply
with respect to--
``(I) widely-used operating system
software which is not specific to
voting systems and for which the source
code or baseline functionality is not
altered; or
``(II) widely-used cybersecurity
software which is not specific to
voting systems and for which the source
code or baseline functionality is not
altered.
``(B) Requiring use of hardware for which information
is disclosed by manufacturer.--
``(i) Requiring disclosure of hardware.--A
State may not use a voting system in an
election for Federal office unless the
manufacturer of the system publicly discloses
online the identification of the hardware used
to operate the system.
``(ii) Additional disclosure requirements for
custom or altered hardware.--To the extent that
the hardware used to operate a voting system or
any component thereof is not widely-used, or is
widely-used but is altered, the State may not
use the system in an election for Federal
office unless--
``(I) the manufacturer of the system
publicly discloses online the
components of the hardware, the design
of such components, and how such
components are connected in the
operation of the system; and
``(II) the manufacturer makes the
design (in the form which will be used
at the time of the election) publicly
available online under a license that
grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-
exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable
license to all intellectual property
rights in the design of the hardware or
the component, except that the
manufacturer may prohibit a person who
obtains the design from using the
design in a manner that is primarily
intended for or directed toward
commercial advantage or private
monetary compensation that is unrelated
to carrying out legitimate research or
cybersecurity activity.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply
with respect to elections for Federal office held in 2020 or any
succeeding year.
SEC. 204. TREATMENT OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOKS AS PART OF VOTING SYSTEMS.
(a) Inclusion in Definition of Voting System.--Section 301(b) of the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(b)) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``this
section'' and inserting ``this Act'';
(2) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1);
(3) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and
(4) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new
paragraph:
``(2) any electronic poll book used with respect to the
election; and''.
(b) Definition.--Section 301 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections
(d) and (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
``(c) Electronic Poll Book Defined.--In this Act, the term
`electronic poll book' means the total combination of mechanical,
electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the software,
firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support
the equipment) that is used--
``(1) to retain the list of registered voters at a polling
location, or vote center, or other location at which voters
cast votes in an election for Federal office; and
``(2) to identify registered voters who are eligible to vote
in an election.''.
(c) Effective Date.--Section 301(e) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081(e)),
as redesignated by subsection (b), is amended by striking the period at
the end and inserting the following: ``, or, with respect to any
requirements relating to electronic poll books, on and after January 1,
2020.''.
SEC. 205. PRE-ELECTION REPORTS ON VOTING SYSTEM USAGE.
(a) Requiring States to Submit Reports.--Title III of the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended by
inserting after section 301 the following new section:
``SEC. 301A. PRE-ELECTION REPORTS ON VOTING SYSTEM USAGE.
``(a) Requiring States to Submit Reports.--Not later than 120 days
before the date of each regularly scheduled general election for
Federal office, the chief State election official of a State shall
submit a report to the Commission containing a detailed voting system
usage plan for each jurisdiction in the State which will administer the
election, including a detailed plan for the usage of electronic poll
books and other equipment and components of such system.
``(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall apply with respect to the
regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in
November 2020 and each succeeding regularly scheduled general election
for Federal office.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment Relating to Enforcement.--Section 401 of
such Act (52 U.S.C. 21111) is amended by striking ``sections 301, 302,
and 303'' and inserting ``subtitle A of title III''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is amended
by inserting after the item relating to section 301 the following new
item:
``Sec. 301A. Pre-election reports on voting system usage.''.
SEC. 206. STREAMLINING COLLECTION OF ELECTION INFORMATION.
Section 202 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20922) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``The Commission'' and inserting ``(a) In
General.--The Commission''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(b) Waiver of Certain Requirements.--Subchapter I of chapter 35 of
title 44, United States Code, shall not apply to the collection of
information for purposes of maintaining the clearinghouse described in
paragraph (1) of subsection (a).''.
TITLE III--USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES
SEC. 301. USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES.
Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C.
21081(a)), as amended by section 104, section 105, and section 203, is
further amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(10) Voting machine requirements.--By not later than the
date of the regularly scheduled general election for Federal
office occurring in November 2022, each State shall seek to
ensure that any voting machine used in such election and in any
subsequent election for Federal office is manufactured in the
United States.''.
TITLE IV--SEVERABILITY
SEC. 401. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act, or the
application of a provision or amendment to any person or circumstance,
is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and
amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions and
amendment to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected by the
holding.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 2722, the ``Securing America's Federal Elections Act''
or the ``SAFE Act,'' will improve the resilience of election
infrastructure used in Federal elections.
The legitimacy of our representative system of self-
government rests on every eligible voter casting a ballot with
confidence that it will count as cast. Aging equipment, under-
resourced jurisdictions, and interference by foreign entities
or non-state actors leave the system vulnerable to exploitation
that undermines confidence in election outcomes. Ineffective
and vulnerable equipment can also discourage participation in
Federal elections.
H.R. 2722 provides critical resources to states and
localities to bolster election infrastructure, including
necessary funds to replace aging voting equipment with voter-
verified paper ballot voting systems and implement additional
cybersecurity protocols. The bill also helps states and
localities plan for future elections by providing ongoing
maintenance funding on a biannual basis. The legislation
provides grant programs for states to implement required risk-
limiting audits, a best practice audit system that confirms
election outcomes with a high degree of confidence.
The legislation also institutes accountability for election
technology vendors so that they abide by cybersecurity
standards, including agreeing to report known or suspect
security incidents involving election infrastructure.
The SAFE Act will also spur innovation by awarding grants
for research and development that will improve the
accessibility of election infrastructure. One such grant
program will study and report on accessible paper ballot
verification mechanisms for individuals with disabilities,
voters with difficulties in literacy, and voters whose primary
language is not English.
Background and Need for Legislation
Significant Vulnerabilities in Nation's Election Infrastructure
In 2016, Russian hackers targeted state voting systems, and
sought to infiltrate voter registration databases and the
networks of election technology vendors. This attack exposed
the numerous vulnerabilities in our nation's election
infrastructure. Many states have not kept pace with changing
voting technology. Some of the most significant vulnerabilities
are outlined below:
Paperless Machines
Although there is no evidence that vote counts were
altered in the 2016 election, voting machines remain
vulnerable to attack. In 2017, at DefCon, one of the
world's largest, longest-running, and best-known hacker
conferences, 25 pieces of election equipment were
successfully breached by participants with little prior
knowledge and limited tools.\1\ These issues are
exacerbated by the fact that in 2016, twenty percent of
Americans cast their ballot on voting machines that do
not have any kind of paper backup, according to the
Brennan Center for Justice.\2\ In other words, if these
paperless machines were hacked, it would be nearly
impossible to tell.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Matt Blaze et al., DEFCON 25 Voting Machine Hacking Village:
Rep. on Cyber Vulnerabilities in U.S. Election Equipment, Databases,
and Infrastructure, at pg. 4 (2017) https://www.defcon.org/images/
defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf.
\2\Lawrence Norden and Ian Vandewalker, Securing Elections From
Foreign Interference, at pg. 11 (June 29, 2017), https://
www.brennancenter.org/publication/securing-elections-foreign-
interference.
\3\Eric Geller, Virginia Bars Voting Machines Considered Top
Hacking Target, POLITICO (Sept. 8, 2017) http://www.politico.com/story/
2017/09/08/virginia-election-machines-hacking-target-242492.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need to Replace Aging Voting Equipment
In at least 40 states, elections are carried out
using voting machines that were purchased more than a
decade ago.\4\ Aging voting equipment creates at least
three problems. First, older systems are increasingly
difficult to maintain and are more likely to fail.\5\
Second, many use outdated hardware and software and
some are no longer manufactured.\6\ For example, some
state officials have ``had to turn to eBay to find
critical components like dot-matrix printer ribbons,
decades old storage devices and analog modems. Aging
systems also frequently rely on unsupported software,
like Windows XP and 2000, which may not receive regular
security patches and are thus more vulnerable to the
latest methods of cyberattack.''\7\ Finally, many
jurisdictions are using voting equipment that predates
federal certification and testing programs, which
render them particularly susceptible to major flaws and
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.\8\ These systems
disproportionately lack voter-marked paper ballots.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Brennan Center for Justice, New Analysis Shows Voting Machines
Remain Vulnerable Ahead of 2020 Elections, (Mar. 5, 2019) https://
www.brennancenter.org/press-release/new-analysis-shows-voting-machines-
remain-vulnerable-ahead-2020-election
\5\Written Testimony of Lawrence D. Norden, Deputy Director,
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Hearing: ``Election
Security,'' May 8, 2019, pg. 4 (hereinafter ``Norden Testimony'').
\6\Id.at 5.
\7\Id.
\8\Id.
\9\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need for Risk-Limiting Audits
The best way to determine whether a machine has been
hacked, or mis-programmed, is to conduct a post-
election, risk-limiting audit. Currently, 34 states and
the District of Columbia require post-election audits
of paper records; however, experts note that some of
those audits are insufficient to determine whether
anyone tampered with the election results.\10\ Instead,
experts recommend that states implement risk-limiting
audits. A risk-limiting audit is a process that
involves hand counting a certain number of ballots,
using advanced statistical methods, to determine with a
high degree of certainty that the reported election
outcome is accurate. The number of ballots that are
counted by hand is determined by many factors,
including the margin of victory in the election. If the
initial count determines that the election results are
accurate, the audit stops. If the initial count is
insufficient to confirm the election result, a larger
sample of ballots is hand counted. This process
continues until the election results can be confirmed.
If there is never enough evidence to confirm the
election results, a full hand count would be
conducted.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\National Conference of State Legislators, Post-Election Audits,
Jan. 3, 2019 available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx
\11\Risk-Limiting Audits Working Group, Risk-Limiting Post-Election
Audits: Why and How, at pg. 5, (Jennie Bretschneider et al. eds., 1.1
version, 2012) https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/ stark/Preprints/
RLAwhitepaper12.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Election Technology Vendors
Another significant vulnerability comes from election
technology vendors. Many states purchase their voting
systems from third-party vendors are not subject to
regulations requiring them to use cybersecurity best
practices. In addition, election vendors are not
currently required to inform any federal agency or
state election official in the event of a cyberattack.
The Congressional Task Force on Election Security found
that ``the election technology industry is dominated by
three firms whose products cover approximately 92% of
the total eligible voter population.''\12\ Accordingly,
this consolidation presents a security risk in that
``there is no meaningful competitive pressure from the
suppliers to the vendors,'' and ``no incentive for
election technology vendors to prioritize security.
This problem is compounded by the lack of regulation in
this area.''\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\Congressional Task Force on Election Security, Final Report
(January 2018), pg. 31, https://homeland.house.gov/sites/
democrats.homeland.house.gov/files/documents/TFESReport.pdf.
\13\Id. (citing Penn Warton Pub. Policy Initiative, The Warton
School, University of Pennsylvania, The Business of Voting, pgs. 11-13,
20 (2017) https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/files/270-the-
business-of-voting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cybersecurity Training:
States and localities also face the daunting task of
training hundreds, if not thousands, of election
officials, IT staff, and poll workers on cybersecurity
and risk mitigation. The success of spear-phishing
campaigns in the 2016 election demonstrate the urgent
need for better cybersecurity training. Finally, many
state chief information officers do not assist with
election systems, and states often cannot afford or
cannot find IT workers to help with state and local
election information technology infrastructure.
Maintaining and Upgrading IT Infrastructure
States need money to replace outdated technology,
including voter registration databases. The Help
America Vote Act (HAVA) requires states to create and
maintain a statewide, computerized voter registration
database.\14\ According to the Brennan Center, in at
least 41 states, these systems were created at least
ten years ago.\15\ In Illinois, for example, Russian
hackers successfully breached the databases and
attempted, but failed, to alter and delete voting
records.\16\ The most significant threat posed by
vulnerable voter registration databases is that an
attacker could alter, delete, or add voter registration
records which would then cause profound chaos on
Election Day and potentially change the results of the
election. Had the attackers successfully changed voting
records in Illinois, voters would have arrived at the
polls on Election Day to discover that they were not
registered. This could lead ``scores of voters to cast
provisional ballots, leading to long lines, undermining
faith in the fairness of an election, and creating a
major administrative headache to accurately count votes
after the polls closed.''\17\ Alternatively, an
attacker could add fake voters to the rolls, allowing
for fraudulent votes to be cast.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. Sec. 21083.
\15\Norden & Vandewalker, 19.
\16\Callum Borchers, What We Know About the 21 States Targeted by
Russian Hackers, The Washington Post (Sept. 23, 2017) https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/09/23/what-we-know-about-
the-21-states-targeted-by-russian-hackers/?utm_term=.c296117b25d4.
\17\Norden & Vandewalker, at pg. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of the threats and vulnerabilities facing state
election systems, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh
Johnson in January, 2017 designated election systems as
``critical infrastructure'' which gives state election
officials priority access to Department of Homeland Security
(``DHS'') services.
In response to the 2016 attacks, then-Leader Pelosi
established the Congressional Task Force on Election Security
led by Committee on House Administration then-Ranking Member
Robert Brady and then-Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson. The
Task Force engaged with election stakeholders, including
cybersecurity and election infrastructure experts, to ensure
the health and security of election systems. In February 2018,
the Task Force released its report recommending the replacement
of paperless voting machines with paper ballot voting systems;
risk-limiting audits; upgraded IT infrastructure (including
voter registration databases) with ongoing maintenance;
requirements that election technology vendors secure their
voting systems; Intelligence Community pre-election threat
assessments and coordination with federal and state officials;
ongoing DHS designation of election infrastructure as critical
infrastructure; and prioritized cybersecurity training at the
state level.
In March 2019, the Brennan Center for Justice issued an
analysis of the current state of voting technology in the
United States.\18\ Local election officials in 254
jurisdictions across 37 states confirmed to the report's
authors that they ``plan to purchase new voting equipment in
the near future. For some, the need to make these replacements
was extremely urgent: 121 officials in 31 states told [the
Brennan Center] they must replace their equipment before the
2020 election. Two-thirds of these officials reported that they
do not have the adequate funds to do so, even after the
distribution of additional HAVA funds from Congress.''\19\
Moreover, ``[a]lmost every election official who responded that
they planned on replacing voting equipment soon stated that
their hope was to find new machines that produce voter-verified
paper backups that could be used in a recount or audit.''\20\
Finally, per the Brennan Center survey, election officials said
their priority would be hiring more IT support staff,
particularly at the local level.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\Lawrence Norden and Andrea Cordova, Voting Machines at Risk:
Where We Stand Today (March 5, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/
analysis/voting-machines-risk-where-we-stand-today.
\19\Id.
\20\Id.
\21\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Post-2016 Developments
The Mueller Report\22\ largely confirmed what was already
known about Russian interference in the 2016 election. It also
revealed that at least one Florida county had been breached by
hackers. In recent months, several Trump administration
officials, and one former official, have made public comments
emphasizing the seriousness of the threat and urgent need for
action. They are unequivocal in their assessment that foreign
interference will continue in the lead up to the 2020 election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the
2016 Presidential Election, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III,
Washington, D.C., March, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Mueller Report
The Mueller Report confirmed that Russian hackers targeted
state election administrators and election vendors. An excerpt
of the redacted Mueller Report that addresses state election
infrastructure is reproduced below:
In addition to targeting individuals involved in the
Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also targeted
individuals and entities involved in the administration
of the elections. Victims included U.S. state and local
entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs),
secretaries of state, and county governments, as well
as individuals who worked for those entities. The GRU
also targeted private technology firms responsible for
manufacturing and administering election-related
software and hardware, such as voter registration
software and electronic polling stations. The GRU
continued to target these victims through the elections
in November 2016. While the investigation identified
evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and
entities, the Office did not investigate further. The
Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers
or other relevant items belonging to these victims. The
Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, and the states have separately
investigated that activity.
By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought
access to state and local computer networks by
exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites
of state and local governmental entities. GRU officers,
for example, targeted state and local databases of
registered voters using a technique known as ``SQL
injection,'' by which malicious code was sent to the
state or local website in order to run commands (such
as exfiltrating the database contents). In one instance
in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the
computer network of the Illinois State Board of
Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's
website. The GRU then gained access to a database
containing information on millions of registered
Illinois voters, and extracted data related to
thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity
was identified.
GRU officers [REDACTED] scanned state and local
websites for vulnerabilities. For example, over a two-
day period in July 2016, GRU officers [REDACTED] for
vulnerabilities on websites of more than two dozen
states. [REDACTED]. Similar [REDACTED] for
vulnerabilities continued through the election.
Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public
officials involved in election administration and
personnel at companies involved in voting technology.
In August 2016, GRU officers targeted employees of
[REDACTED], a voting technology company that developed
software used by numerous U.S. counties to manage voter
rolls, and installed malware on the company network.
Similarly, in November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing
emails to over 120 email accounts used by Florida
county officials responsible for administering the 2016
U.S. election. The spearphishing emails contained an
attached Word document coded with malicious software
(commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the
GRU to access the infected computer. The FBI was
separately responsible for this investigation. We
understand the FBI believes that this operation enabled
the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one
Florida county government. The Office did not
independently verify that belief and, as explained
above, did not undertake the investigative steps that
would have been necessary to do so.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\Ibid, Volume One, pg. 50-51 (March 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Director of National Intelligence ``Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.''
In January 2019, Dan Coats, the Director of National
Intelligence, offered the Intelligence Community's 2019
assessment of threats to national security.\24\ The report
states that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\Daniel R. Coats, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Jan. 29, 2019, pg. 7,
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf.
Our adversaries and strategic competitors probably
already are looking to the 2020 US elections as an
opportunity to advance their interests . . . [They]
also may seek to use cyber means to directly manipulate
or disrupt election systems--such as by tampering with
voter registration or disrupting the vote tallying
process--either to alter data or to call into question
our voting process. Russia in 2016 and unidentified
actors as recently as 2018 have already conducted cyber
activity that has targeted US election infrastructure,
but we do not have any intelligence reporting to
indicate any compromise of our nation's election
infrastructure that would have prevented voting,
changed vote counts, or disrupted the ability to tally
votes.
Former Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen
In April 2019, The New York Times reported that President
Trump's chief of staff, Mick Mulvaney, told former Homeland
Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen not to mention ``in front
of the president'' anything about her preparations for ``new
and different Russian forms of interference in the 2020
election.''\25\ In July 2018, she said in remarks to the
National Association of Secretaries of State that there were
``no indications that Russia is targeting the 2018 U.S.
midterms at a scale or scope to match their activities in
2016,'' but that she ``consistently observe[d] malicious cyber
activity from various actors against U.S. election
infrastructure.''\26\ She also said that ``there is little
doubt that adversaries and non-state actors continue to view
elections as a target for cyber and influence operations.''\27\
According to the Times, Nielsen ``eventually gave up on her
effort to organize a White House meeting of cabinet secretaries
to coordinate a strategy to protect next year's elections. As a
result, the issue did not gain the urgency or widespread
attention that a president can command. And it meant that many
Americans remain unaware of the latest versions of Russian
interference.''\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\Eric Schmitt et al., In Push for 2020 Election Security, Top
Official Was Warned: Don't Tell Trump, New York Times (April 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/us/politics/russia-2020-election-
trump.html.
\26\Department of Homeland Security, ``Secretary of Homeland
Security Kirstjen Nielsen NASS Conference Remarks: As Prepared for
Delivery,'' https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/07/16/nass-conference-
remarks-prepared-delivery (release date July 16, 2018).
\27\Id.
\28\Schmitt et al.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FBI Director Christopher Wray
Also in April 2019, FBI Director Christopher Wray called
Russia's interference efforts in American elections a
``significant counterintelligence threat.''\29\ The New York
Times reported that he said in remarks to the Council on
Foreign Relations that ``our adversaries are going to keep
adapting and upping their game. . . . So we are very much
viewing 2018 as just kind of a dress rehearsal for the big show
in 2020. . . . What has pretty much continued unabated is the
use of social media, fake news, propaganda, false personas,
etc. to spin us up, pit us against each other, to sow
divisiveness and discord, to undermine America's faith in
democracy. That is not just an election-cycle threat. It is
pretty much a 365-day-a-year-threat.''\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\Julian A. Barnes and Adam Goldman, F.B.I. Warns of Russian
Interference in 2020 Race and Boosts Counterintelligence Operations,
N.Y. Times (April 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/us/
politics/fbi-russian-election-interference.html.
\30\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attorney General William Barr's Testimony
At a May 1, 2019 hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Chairman Lindsey Graham asked Attorney General Barr if he would
recommend that the Judiciary Committee ``and every other
committee of Congress do our best to harden our infrastructure
against future Russian attacks?'' Barr replied, ``Absolutely,
yes.''\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing: ``The
Department of Justice's Investigation of Russian Interference with the
2016 Presidential Election,'' May 1, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Role of the Election Assistance Commission
On April 4, 2019, Committee on House Administration
Chairperson Lofgren sent a letter to the Election Assistance
Commission (EAC) seeking information about the Commission, with
a particular focus on the work the EAC was doing to help states
secure their elections. In response to that letter, the EAC
sent a letter to Chairperson Lofgren on May 1, 2019 and
reported the following regarding its election security
activities: ``As the 2020 Presidential Election approaches,
providing election security tools and resources to state and
local officials remains one of the EAC's most important
responsibilities.''\32\ In addition to distributing the $380
million in HAVA grants dedicated to election security in
FY2018, the EAC noted several other initiatives it has
undertaken in relation to election security. Specifically, it
notes its work testing and federally certifying voting systems,
``providing hands-on security and post-election audit
trainings, producing security-focused resources, disseminating
security best-practices information and checklists to state and
local election officials, as well as hosting widely attended
forums that feature security experts as speakers.''\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\Letter from the Election Assistance Commission to Chairperson
Zoe Lofgren, May 1, 2019.
\33\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The EAC has conducted a variety of these exercises
throughout the country. For example, the EAC provided 11
separate training sessions on Election Technology and Security
for 600 election officials in nine states, provided post-
election audit assistance and training across five states,
offered white papers and best-practices checklists on securing
election infrastructure to all states, and hosted two summits
attended by hundreds of attendees to hear first-hand from
election security and intelligence experts. In sum, the EAC's
role has been to convene local and state elections officials
with those experts positioned to aid them with their unique
concerns, while also serving as a clearinghouse for best
practices, and providing proactive analysis of what information
all states might need and benefit from, based on incoming
inquiries from some states.
The EAC also noted that staff and Commissioners routinely
take part in Critical Infrastructure activities; they also
serve as members of the Government Coordinating Council, and
work closely with the Sector Coordinating Council. They also
consistently coordinate with DHS and other federal partners,
such as the Department of Defense's Federal Voting Assistance
Program, to create and distribute resources for voters about
trusted sources for election information and other security
related topics.
H.R. 2722--The SAFE Act
H.R. 2272 provides the necessary resources to states to
begin the process of upgrading and maintaining safe, resilient
election infrastructure. Many of its provisions reflect the
recommendations of the Congressional Task Force on Election
Security.
First, H.R. 2260 authorizes $600 million in grants to
assist states in securing election infrastructure and
transitioning to required voter-verified paper-based systems.
The grants will require jurisdictions to use individual,
durable, voter-verified paper ballots that are counted by hand
or read by an optical character recognition device or other
counting device. The National Academy of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine concluded last year that systems lacking voter-
marked paper ballots ``should be removed from service as soon
as possible.''\34\ The Committee on House Administration heard
from various experts during an Election Security hearing that
replacing paperless systems with paper-based systems is a
critical policy priority.\35\ The ``bridge between the voter
and correctly reported outcomes requires a physical artifact as
evidence of the voter's intent, and a process for checking.
That artifact is typically the paper ballot,'' wrote Marian
Schneider of Verified Voting.\36\ Dr. Joseph Lorenzo Hall of
the Center for Democracy and Technology wrote that while
``states and local jurisdictions continue to make progress
updating their outdated voting technologies with newer systems
that keep an auditable voter verifiable paper record, it is
important to prioritize the continuing replacement of paperless
direct-recording electronic (DRE) systems. DRE systems are not
`software-independent' systems, are unauditable, and as such
unsuitable for government elections.''\37\ Moreover, until
there is adequate funding, some jurisdictions that use
paperless systems will continue to do so because ``1) some
jurisdictions have already purchased paperless systems in the
recent past and have no available resources to purchase new
systems, and/or 2) these kinds of systems are unfortunately
still available for sale.''\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\Norden Testimony at pg. 5.
\35\Written Testimony of Jocelyn Benson, Michigan Secretary of
State, Hearing: ``Election Security,'' May 8, 2019 (hereinafter
``Benson Testimony''); Written Testimony of Dr. Joseph Lorenzo Hall,
Chief Technologist, The Center for Democracy & Technology, Hearing:
``Election Security,'' May 8, 2019 (hereinafter ``Hall Testimony'');
Norden Testimony; Written Testimony of Marian K. Schneider, President,
Verified Voting, Hearing: ``Election Security,'' May 8, 2019
(hereinafter ``Schneider Testimony'').
\36\Schneider Testimony at pg. 4.
\37\Hall Testimony at pg. 4.
\38\Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The funding can also be used to carry out cyber and risk
mitigation training; security risk and vulnerability
assessments of a state's election infrastructure; maintenance
of election infrastructure, including addressing identified
risks and vulnerabilities; increased technical support for
information technology infrastructure; enhanced cybersecurity
and operations of information technology systems; and
enhancements to the cybersecurity of voter registration
systems, among other things.
The SAFE Act also provides states with an ongoing stream of
funding ($175 million biannually for fiscal years 2020, 2022,
2024, and 2026) to assist with maintenance of election
infrastructure. This will provide a predictable, stable, and
reliable source of funds to better secure our elections.
Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson testified before the
Committee on House Administration that ``[m]ost states
purchased new voting machines and established statewide voter
registration databases using funding made available through
HAVA in the years following the law's enactment. As those
resources ran out, however, election technology began to age at
the same time as technology was advancing at a rapid
pace.''\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\Benson Testimony, pg. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.R. 2722 also requires states to administer risk-limiting
audits, which the EAC shall pay to States the amount of the
costs. States ``vary widely in the effectiveness of post-
election audits processes.''\40\ Post-election audits are an
important corollary to using voter-verified paper ballots--
namely, because ``[p]aper records will not prevent programming
errors, software bugs, or the insertion of corrupt software
into voting systems. Voter-marked paper ballots will only have
real security value if they are used to check and confirm
electronic tallies.''\41\ The most robust type of audit are
risk-limiting audits.\42\ According to Jerome Lovato of the
Election Assistance Commission, ``a risk-limiting audit (RLA)
provides strong statistical evidence that the election outcome
is right and has a high probability of correcting a wrong
outcome.''\43\ One witness at the Committee on House
Administration's election security hearing compared the
importance of risk-limiting audits to the ``public policy
invention'' of the secret ballot at the turn of the 20th
century.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\Schneider Testimony, pg. 8.
\41\Norden Testimony, pg. 7.
\42\Schneider Testimony, pg. 4.
\43\Jerome Lovato, Defining and Piloting Risk-Limiting Audits,
Election Assistance Commission (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.eac.gov/
defining-and-piloting-risk-limiting-audits-/.
\44\Hall Testimony, pg. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.R. 2722 fosters accountability for election technology
vendors. This is important because ``there is almost no federal
oversight of private vendors that design and maintain the
systems that allow us to determine who can vote, how they vote,
what voters see when they cast their vote, how votes are
counted and how those vote totals are communicated to the
public. In fact, there are more federal regulations for
ballpoint pens and magic markers than there are for voting
systems and other parts of our election infrastructure.''\45\
H.R. 2722 address this by limiting state expenditures on goods
and services with grant monies to purchases from ``qualified
election infrastructure vendors.'' H.R. 2722 tasks the EAC, in
coordination with DHS, to establish criteria for ``qualified
election infrastructure vendor'' status, which must include
maintaining IT infrastructure in a manner that is consistent
with the best practices provided by the EAC's Technical
Guidelines Development Committee. Moreover, vendors must be
owned and controlled by a citizen or permanent resident of the
United States and disclose any sourcing outside the United
States for parts of the election infrastructure. It must also
agree to independent security testing by the EAC and DHS.
Finally, H.R. 2722 requires vendors to report any known or
suspected security incidents involving election infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\Norden Testimony, pg. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ongoing threat of interference in Federal elections
continues to demand robust guardrails to reinforce other
cybersecurity best practices. The legislation establishes
cybersecurity requirements that will apply equally to current
and future technology to protect the necessity that every vote
is counted as cast. For example, H.R. 2722 prohibits the use of
wireless communications devices and internet connectivity in
certain voting systems or devices involving ballot marking,
tabulation, or aggregation, or upon which ballots are marked by
voters.
H.R. 2722 also includes open source provisions, requiring
use of software and hardware for which information is disclosed
by manufacturers. This will allow cybersecurity experts--and
the public--to thoroughly vet the security of elections
systems, regardless of the technology used.
The legislation provides funds to study and report on
accessible paper ballot verification mechanisms, including for
individuals with disabilities, voters with difficulties in
literacy, and voters whose primary language is not English.
Ultimately, H.R. 2722 is an important investment in the
integrity of self-government. It reflects an ongoing commitment
to the security of the machinery of democracy--the
infrastructure and systems to ensure, with necessary
confidence, that votes are counted as cast at each Federal
election.
Hearings
For the purposes of section 103(i) of H. Res. 6 of the
116th Congress the following hearings were used to develop or
consider H.R. 2722:
(1) On Wednesday, May 8, 2019 the Committee held a hearing
titled ``Election Security.'' The following witnesses
testified: Mr. Larry Norden, Brennan Center for Justice; Ms.
Marian Schneider, Verified Voting; Mr. Joseph Lorenzo Hall,
Center for Democracy and Technology; The Honorable Jocelyn
Benson, Secretary of State, State of Michigan; and The
Honorable John Merrill, Secretary of State, State of Alabama.
(2) On Tuesday, May 21, 2019, the Committee held a hearing
titled ``Oversight of the Election Assistance Commission.'' The
following witnesses testified: The Honorable Christy McCormick,
Commissioner and Chairwoman, Election Assistance Commission,
accompanied by The Honorable Benjamin Hovland, Commissioner and
Vice Chair, Election Assistance Commission; The Honorable Don
Palmer, Commissioner, Election Assistance Commission; and The
Honorable Thomas Hicks, Commissioner, Election Assistance
Commission.
(3) On Thursday, February 14, 2019, the Committee held a
hearing titled ``For the People: Our American Democracy.'' The
following witnesses testified: Mr. Chiraag Bains, Director of
Legal Strategies, Demos; Ms. Wendy Weiser, Director, Democracy
Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law; Mr.
Fred Wertheimer, President, Democracy 21; The Honorable Kim
Wyman, Secretary of State, State of Washington; Mr. Alejandro
Rangel-Lopez, Senior at Dodge City High School, Dodge City
Kansas, and plaintiff in LULAC & Rangel-Lopez v. Cox; Mr. Peter
Earle, Wisconsin Civil Rights Trial Lawyer; Mr. Brandon A.
Jessup, Data Science and Information Systems Professional;
Executive Director, Michigan Forward; and David Keating,
President, Institute for Free Speech.
Committee Consideration
On Friday, June 21, 2019, the Committee met in open session
and ordered the bill, H.R. 2722, as amended, favorably reported
to the House by voice vote, a quorum being present.
Committee Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the
following rollcall votes occurred during the Committee's
consideration of H.R. 2722:
1. The Lofgren amendment in the nature of a substitute to
H.R. 2722 (H.R. 2722 as amended) agreed to by a rollcall vote
of 6 to 3. The vote was as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Yea Nay Present Representative Yea Nay Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren...................... X ....... ......... Mr. Davis (IL)..... ....... X .........
Mr. Raskin....................... X ....... ......... Mr. Walker......... ....... X .........
Ms. Davis (CA)................... X ....... ......... Mr. Loudermilk..... ....... X .........
Mr. Butterfield.................. X ....... .........
Ms. Fudge........................ X ....... .........
Mr. Aguilar...................... X ....... .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. A substitute amendment offered by Mr. Davis of Illinois
(Amendment 01) was defeated to by a rollcall vote of 5 to 3.
The vote was as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Yea Nay Present Representative Yea Nay Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren...................... ....... X ......... Mr. Davis (IL)..... X ....... .........
Mr. Raskin....................... ....... ....... ......... Mr. Walker......... X ....... .........
Ms. Davis (CA)................... ....... X ......... Mr. Loudermilk..... X ....... .........
Mr. Butterfield.................. ....... X .........
Ms. Fudge........................ ....... X .........
Mr. Aguilar...................... ....... X .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. An amendment offered by Mr. Davis of Illinois (Amendment
02) to strike subtitle A of title I was defeated by a rollcall
vote of 3 to 6. The vote was as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Yea Nay Present Representative Yea Nay Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren...................... ....... X ......... Mr. Davis (IL)..... X ....... .........
Mr. Raskin....................... ....... X ......... Mr. Walker......... X ....... .........
Ms. Davis (CA)................... ....... X ......... Mr. Loudermilk..... X ....... .........
Mr. Butterfield.................. ....... X .........
Ms. Fudge........................ ....... X .........
Mr. Aguilar...................... ....... X .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. An amendment offered by Mr. Loudermilk (Amendment 03) to
strike section 105 was defeated to by a rollcall vote of 6 to
2. The vote was as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Yea Nay Present Representative Yea Nay Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren...................... ....... X ......... Mr. Davis (IL)..... X ....... .........
Mr. Raskin....................... ....... X ......... Mr. Walker......... ....... ....... .........
Ms. Davis (CA)................... ....... X ......... Mr. Loudermilk..... X ....... .........
Mr. Butterfield.................. ....... X .........
Ms. Fudge........................ ....... X .........
Mr. Aguilar...................... ....... X .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. An amendment offered by Mr. Loudermilk (Amendment 04) to
strike subtitle B of title I and insert new subtitle B with was
defeated to by a rollcall vote of 6 to 2. The vote was as
follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Yea Nay Present Representative Yea Nay Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren...................... ....... X ......... Mr. Davis (IL)..... X ....... .........
Mr. Raskin....................... ....... X ......... Mr. Walker......... ....... ....... .........
Ms. Davis (CA)................... ....... X ......... Mr. Loudermilk..... X ....... .........
Mr. Butterfield.................. ....... X .........
Ms. Fudge........................ ....... X .........
Mr. Aguilar...................... ....... X .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. An amendment offered by Mr. Davis of Illinois (Amendment
05) to require a State match of 25 percent of any grant
received by a State for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting
systems and carrying out voting system security improvements
was defeated to by a rollcall vote of 6 to 3. The vote was as
follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Yea Nay Present Representative Yea Nay Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren...................... ....... X ......... Mr. Davis (IL)..... X ....... .........
Mr. Raskin....................... ....... X ......... Mr. Walker......... X ....... .........
Ms. Davis (CA)................... ....... X ......... Mr. Loudermilk..... X ....... .........
Mr. Butterfield.................. ....... X .........
Ms. Fudge........................ ....... X .........
Mr. Aguilar...................... ....... X .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. An amendment offered by Mr. Walker (Amendment 06) to add
new title IV ``Prohibiting Ballot Harvesting'' was defeated to
by a rollcall vote of 6 to 3. The vote was as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Yea Nay Present Representative Yea Nay Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren...................... ....... X ......... Mr. Davis (IL)..... X ....... .........
Mr. Raskin....................... ....... X ......... Mr. Walker......... X ....... .........
Ms. Davis (CA)................... ....... X ......... Mr. Loudermilk..... X ....... .........
Mr. Butterfield.................. ....... X .........
Ms. Fudge........................ ....... X .........
Mr. Aguilar...................... ....... X .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII and clause
(2)(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, the Committee's oversight findings and
recommendations are reflected in the descriptive portions of
this report
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives
The objective of H.R. 2722, as amended, is to protect
elections for public office by providing financial support and
enhanced security for the infrastructure used to carry out such
elections.
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures
In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its
own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement
authority, or tax expenditures or revenues contained in the
cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974.
Earmarks and Tax and Tariff Benefits
H.R. 2722 contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as described in clauses
9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of House rule XXI.
Committee Cost Estimate
The Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate on H.R.
2722, as amended, prepared by the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974.
Congressional Budget Office Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the following is the cost estimate
for H.R. 2722, as amended, provided by the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974.
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, June 25, 2019.
Hon. Zoe Lofgren,
Chairperson, Committee on House Administration,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Madam Chairperson: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2722, the SAFE
Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew
Pickford.
Sincerely,
Mark P. Hadley
(For Phillip L. Swagel, Director).
Enclosure.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The bill would
Authorize appropriations for grants to
improve voting systems
Amend federal statutes regarding the
security of elections
Impose an intergovernmental mandate by
requiring states to submit a report on the usage plan
for voting systems in each jurisdiction in the state
Estimated budgetary effects would primarily stem from
Authorizing appropriations for grants to
states to enhance the security of voting systems
Bill Summary
H.R. 2722 would authorize the appropriation of more than
$1.1 billion over the 2019-2024 period, primarily for states
and localities to improve voting technology. The bill also
would set standards for election technology vendors.
Estimated Federal Cost
The estimated budgetary effect of H.R. 2722 is shown in
Table 1. The costs of the legislation fall within budget
function 800 (general government).
TABLE 1.--ESTIMATED INCREASES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION UNDER H.R. 2722
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, millions of dollars--
----------------------------------------------------------
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2019-2024
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Voting System Grants:
Estimated Authorizationa......................... 0 775 0 175 0 175 1.125
Estimated Outlays................................ 0 580 195 130 45 130 1,080
Other Provisions:
Estimated Authorization.......................... 0 5 20 0 20 0 45
Estimated Outlays................................ 0 5 20 0 20 0 45
Total Changes:
Estimated Authorizationa..................... 0 780 20 175 20 175 1,170
Estimated Outlays............................ 0 585 215 130 65 130 1,125
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
aH.R. 2722 would authorize the appropriation of $600 million in fiscal year 2019. Because most appropriations
acts for 2019 have already been completed, for this cost estimate CBO has shown that authorized amount in 2020
along with $175 million specifically authorized for 2020.
Basis of Estimate
For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be
enacted near the end of 2019 and that the specified and
estimated amounts will be appropriated for each fiscal year
beginning in 2020. H.R. 2722 would authorize the appropriation
of $600 million in fiscal year 2019 for voting system grants.
CBO expects that H.R. 2722 will not be enacted until after the
appropriations acts for fiscal year 2019 are completed.
Therefore, CBO has assumed that the $600 million authorized to
be appropriated in 2019 would apply to fiscal year 2020.
Estimated outlays are based on historical patterns for existing
and similar activities.
Assuming appropriation of the specified and estimated
amounts, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost
about $1.1 billion over the 2019-2024 period.
Voting System Grants. Section 111 would authorize the
appropriation of $600 million in 2019 and $175 million in each
of fiscal years 2020, 2022, 2024, and 2026 for grants for state
and localities to improve voting systems. CBO estimates that
those grants would cost $1.1 billion over the 2020-2024 period,
and about $200 million after 2024.
Other Provisions. H.R. 2722 also would authorize
appropriations for several other activities aimed at improving
the security of elections. The bill would authorize grants for
states to audit elections by using statistical evidence to
determine whether election outcomes are accurate. Additionally,
the bill would require the National Science Foundation to study
paper ballots and the best practices associated with such
ballots and would require the Election Assistance Commission to
study the use of paper or digital ballots. H.R. 2722 would also
authorize the appropriation of $5 million to prepare the
required studies and whatever amounts are necessary for the
auditing grants to states. CBO estimates that implementing
those provisions would cost $45 million over the 2020-2024
period.
Pay-As-You-Go considerations: None.
Increase in long-term deficits: None.
Mandates
Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
excludes from the application of that act any legislative
provision that enforces constitutional rights of individuals.
CBO has determined that title III as well as certain provisions
of titles I and II fall within such exclusion because they
would enforce constitutionally-protected voting rights.
Section 205 would impose an intergovernmental mandate by
requiring states to submit a report on the usage plan for
voting systems in each jurisdiction in the state, which would
include details on how each jurisdiction would use electronic
poll books and other equipment. Because states report
extensively on their election activities and have previously
reported similar information, CBO estimates the cost of the
mandate would be small and fall below the threshold established
in UMRA ($82 million in 2019, adjusted annually for inflation).
H.R. 2722 contain no private-sector mandates as defined in
UMRA.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Matthew Pickford;
Mandates: Rachel Austin.
Estimate reviewed by: Kim Cawley, Chief, Natural and
Physical Resources; Susan Willie, Chief, Mandates Unit; H.
Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget
Analysis; Theresa Gullo, Assistant Director for Budget
Analysis.
Federal Mandates Statement
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates regarding H.R. 2722, as amended, prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.
Non-Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, the
committee states that no provision of this resolution
establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government
known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program
that was included in any report from the Government
Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of
Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a program
identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance.
Advisory Committee Statement
H.R. 2722 does not establish or authorize any new advisory
committees.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
H.R. 2722 does not apply to terms and conditions of
employment or to access to public services or accommodations
within the legislative branch.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title; table of contents
Subsection (a) of this section would provide the short
title of H.R. 2722, as amended, as the ``Securing America's
Federal Elections Act'' or the ``SAFE Act.'' Subsection (b)
would provide the table of contents
TITLE I--FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
Subtitle A--Voting System Security Improvement Grants
Part 1--Promoting Accuracy, Integrity, and Security Through Voter-
Verified Permanent Paper Ballot
Section 101. Short title
Would provide the short title for Subsection A as the
``Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019.''
Section 102. Paper ballot and manual counting requirements
This section would require individual, durable, voter-
verified, paper ballots. Votes must be counted by hand or read
by an optical character recognition device or other counting
device. In addition, this section would define ``individual,
durable, voter-verified, paper ballot'' as a paper ballot
marked by the voter by hand or marked through the use of a
nontabulating ballot marking device or system, so long as the
option exists to mark by hand. The voting system must provide
voters an opportunity to correct his or her ballot before the
ballot is preserved. Ballots would not be preserved in any
manner that makes it possible to associate a voter to the
ballot without the voter's consent. Further, a paper ballot
constitutes the official ballot and shall be used for any
recount or audit, and shall be counted by hand in the event of
a recount or audit for any federal election.
This section would require that paper ballots cast be
considered the true and correct record of votes cast in the
event of any inconsistency or irregularities between hand-
counted ballots and any electronic vote tallies. Applies paper
ballot requirement to all ballots cast in elections for federal
office, including ballots cast by absent uniformed services
voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act.
Finally, this section provides a special rule for treatment
of disputes when paper ballots have been shown, by clear and
convincing evidence, to be compromised, and where compromised
ballots exist in such numbers that the results of the election
could be changed by them. Provides that the appropriate remedy
shall be made in accordance with applicable state law, except
that the electronic tally may not be used as the exclusive
basis for determining the official certified result.
Section 103. Accessibility and ballot verification for individuals with
disabilities
This section would require the use of at least one voting
system at each polling place that is equipped for individuals
with disabilities (including nonvisual and enhanced visual
accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, and enhanced
manual accessibility for the mobility and dexterity impaired).
Further, it would require that, for federal elections occurring
six years or more after the enactment of the SAFE Act, each
polling place to have at least one voting system for voters
with disabilities that marks ballots identical in size, ink,
and paper stock to ballots used by voters without accessibility
needs, that also marks the ballot in a manner such that it is
not readily discernable whether the ballot was marked by
machine or hand, and that combines ballots produced from the
accessible voter system with other ballots in a manner that
prevents identification of which ballots were cast by which
system. It would require that such system be available for use
by any voter who requests its use, and, for federal elections
occurring six years or more after the enactment of the SAFE
Act, must allow the voter to privately and independently verify
the accuracy of the paper ballot by presenting, in an
accessible form, the vote selections in the same manner they
would appear for any vote tabulation or auditing. Clarifies
that nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the
use of an accessible ballot that may be printed or marked by
the voter at home.
Finally, this section would authorize to be appropriated
$5,000,000 for the Director of the National Science Foundation
to make grants to at least three entities to study, test, and
develop accessible paper ballot voting, verification, and
casting mechanisms, and best practices to enhance accessibility
of paper ballot voting and verification for voters with
disabilities, voters whose primary language is not English, and
voters who have difficulties with literacy. It would establish
grant eligibility requirements and provides that any technology
developed under these grants shall be treated as non-
proprietary and made available to the public. It would direct
the Director to coordinate these activities with grants for
technology improvements. It would require that when adopting
any voluntary guidance regarding accessibility of the paper
ballot verification requirements for individuals with
disabilities, the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) shall
apply the same accessibility standards applicable under this
subtitle. Finally, it would permit use of funds for protection
and advocacy systems to support actions to enforce election-
related disability access.
Section 104. Durability and readability requirements for ballots
This section would require that all voter-verified ballots
are printed on durable paper that is able to maintain the
accuracy and integrity of the ballot over repeated handling,
including retaining and preserving information printed on the
ballot for a period of 22 months. It would require that all
voter-verified paper ballots completed through the use of a
ballot marking device to be clearly readable by the voter
without assistance (other than eyeglasses or other personal
vision enhancing devices) and by an optical character
recognition device or other device equipped for individuals
with disabilities.
Section 105. Paper ballot printing requirements
This section would require that all paper ballots used in
an election for federal office shall be printed in the United
States on recycled paper manufactured in the United States.
Section 106. Study and report on optimal ballot design
This section would require the EAC to conduct a study of
the best ways to design election ballots, including paper
ballots and electronic or digital ballots, to minimize
confusion and user errors, and to provide a report to Congress
on the results of such study not later than January 1, 2020.
Section 107. Effective date for new requirements
This section would add an effective date to the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) relating to requirement first
imposed on a state or jurisdiction by the provisions of this
subtitle. It would also allow jurisdictions using certain
systems such as certain paper record printers (including voter-
verified paper record printers attached to direct recording
electronic voting machines) to delay implementation to 2022
regarding select requirements, so long as certain contingencies
are in place during the delay, including the option of having
voters cast a vote using a blank pre-printed paper ballot which
the voter may mark by hand and which is not produced by the
direct recording electronic voting machine or other such
system, and requiring that such paper ballot be counted as a
regular and not provisional ballot. It would further require
each polling place display notice of paper ballot option, and
training of poll workers about said option, all in effect so
long as delayed compliance is in effect.
Part 2--Grants to Carry Out Improvements
Section 111. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems
and carrying out voting system security improvements
This section would amend subtitle D of title II of HAVA by
adding the following new sections under Part 7--Grants for
obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems and carrying
out voting system security improvements, adding the following
new sections:
Section 297. Grants for Obtaining Compliant Paper Ballot
Voting Systems and Carrying Out Voting System
Security Improvements
This new section would directs the EAC to make
available grants for eligible states to (1) replace
voting systems that are not compliant paper ballot
voting systems under the Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2019, or those which are compliant
but do not meet the most recent voluntary voting system
guidelines promulgated by the EAC prior to the November
2020 federal elections, as well as (2) carry out voting
system security improvements, and (3) implement and
model best practices for ballot design, ballot
instructions, and ballot testing.
In addition, it would establish that grants made to
states under this section shall be of an amount the EAC
determines to be appropriate, except that a state shall
not receive less than the product of $1 and the average
of the number of individuals who cast votes in any of
the two most recent regularly scheduled general
elections for federal office held in the state. In the
event that Congress appropriates insufficient funds to
provide States the amount directed per the above, the
EAC shall make a pro rata reduction to ensure that the
entire appropriated amount is distributed to the
states. It would provide factors for the EAC to
consider in awarding excess funds to a state in the
event of a surplus of appropriated funds. It would also
provide that, to the greatest extent practicable, an
eligible state which receives a grant to replace a
voting system under this section shall ensure such
replacement system is capable of administering a system
of ranked choice voting.
Section 297A. Voting System Security Improvements Described
This new section would define voting system security
improvements as: (1) The acquisition of goods and
services from qualified election infrastructure vendors
by purchase, lease, or such other arrangements as may
be appropriate; (2) cyber and risk mitigation training;
(3) a security risk and vulnerability assessment of the
state's election infrastructure which is carried out by
a provider of cybersecurity services under a contract
entered into between the chief state election official
and the provider; (4) the maintenance of election
infrastructure, including addressing risks and
vulnerabilities which are identified under either of
the security risk and vulnerability assessments
described in paragraph (3), except that none of the
funds provided under this part may be used to renovate
or replace a building or facility which is used
primarily for purposes other than the administration of
elections for public office; (5) providing increased
technical support for any information technology
infrastructure that the chief state election official
deems to be part of the state's election infrastructure
or designates as critical to the operation of the
state's election infrastructure; (6) enhancing the
cybersecurity and operations of the information
technology infrastructure described in paragraph (4);
and (7) enhancing the cybersecurity of voter
registration systems.
Further, it would define a ``qualified election
infrastructure vendor'' as any person who provides,
supports, or maintains, or who seeks to provide,
support, or maintain, election infrastructure on behalf
of a state, unit of local government, or election
agency who meets certain criteria established by the
Chair of the EAC and the Secretary of Homeland
Security.
Additionally, this new section would direct the Chair
of the EAC and the Secretary of Homeland Security to
include the following in the criteria a person must
meet to be considered a ``qualified election
infrastructure vendor'': (A) the vendor must be owned
and controlled by a citizen or permanent resident of
the United States; (B) the vendor must disclose to the
Chair and the Secretary, and to the chief state
election official of any state to which the vendor
provides any goods and services with funds provided
under this part, of any sourcing outside the United
States for parts of the election infrastructure; (C)
the vendor agrees to ensure that the election
infrastructure will be developed and maintained in a
manner that is consistent with the cybersecurity best
practices issued by the Technical Guidelines
Development Committee; (D) the vendor agrees to
maintain its information technology infrastructure in a
manner that is consistent with the cybersecurity best
practices issued by the Technical Guidelines
Development Committee; (E) the vendor agrees to meet
the notification requirement defined herein with
respect to any known or suspected cybersecurity
incidents involving any of the goods and services
provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant under this
part; and (F) the vendor agrees to permit independent
security testing by the EAC and by the Secretary of the
goods and services provided by the vendor pursuant to a
grant under this part.
It would also establish cybersecurity incident
reporting requirements that a vendor meets if, upon
learning of a potential cybersecurity incident
involving any of the goods and services provided by the
vendor, the vendor promptly assesses whether such
incident occurred and notifies the Chair of the EAC and
the Secretary of Homeland Security as soon as
practicable but not later than three days after
becoming aware of the potential incident. The vendor
must also inform any potentially impacted election
agency within three days and cooperate with the agency
in providing any further notifications necessary. The
vendor must provide ongoing updates to the Chair of the
EAC, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
impacted election agency.
Finally, this new section would provide that the
notification the vendor must provide to the Chair of
the EAC, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
affected election agency must include the following:
(1) the date, time, and time zone when the election
cybersecurity incident began, if known; (2) the date,
time, and time zone when the election cybersecurity
incident was detected; (3) the date, time, and duration
of the election cybersecurity incident; (4) the
circumstances of the election cybersecurity incident,
including the specific election infrastructure systems
believed to have been accessed and information
acquired, if any; (5) any planned and implemented
technical measures to respond to and recover from the
incident; (6) in the case of any notification which is
an update to a prior notification, any additional
material information relating to the incident,
including technical data, as it becomes available.
Section 297B. Eligibility of States
This new section would provide that to be eligible
for a grant, in its application to the EAC, a state
must: (1) describe how it will use the grant to carry
out the activities authorized under this part; (2)
certify and assure that, not later than 5 years after
receiving the grant, the state will carry out voting
system security improvements as described above; and
(3) provide other information and assurances as the EAC
may require.
Section 297C. Reports to Congress
This new section would require the EAC to, not later
than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, submit
a report to the appropriate congressional committees,
including the Committees on Homeland Security, House
Administration, and the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Committees on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, the Judiciary, and Rules and
Administration of the Senate, on the activities carried
out with the funds provided under this part.
Section 297D. Authorization of Appropriations
This new section would provide an authorization of
appropriations of $600,000,000 for FY 2019 and further
authorize $175 million for each of the fiscal years
2020, 2022, 2024, and 2026. It would also provide that
any amounts appropriated shall remain available until
expended.
Section 112. Coordination of voting system security activities with use
of requirements payments and election administration
requirements under Help America Vote Act of 2002
This section would amend HAVA to add the Secretary of
Homeland Security or the Secretary's designee to the Board of
Advisors of the EAC. It would also add a representative from
the Department of Homeland Security to the Technical Guidelines
Development Committee.
It would direct the EAC to consult with the Department of
Homeland Security in conducting periodic studies on election
administration and adds to the objectives of the periodic
studies ensuring the integrity of elections against
interference through cyber means.
This section would amend the allowable uses of requirements
payments under HAVA to include voting system security
improvements, including cyber training for election officials,
technical support, enhancing cybersecurity of information
systems, and enhancing cybersecurity of voter registration
databases. Requires states to include protection of election
infrastructure into their state plans for use of payments
developed pursuant to 52 U.S.C. 21004.
Additionally, it would require that the Committee
responsible for composing the state plans developed pursuant to
52 U.S.C. 21004 be composed of a representative group from the
state's counties, cities, towns, Indian tribes, and to
represent rural as well as urban areas.
Finally, it would require states to undertake measures to
prevent and deter cybersecurity incidents, as identified by the
EAC, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Technical
Guidelines Development Committee, of computerized voter
registration databases.
Section 113. Incorporation of definitions
This section would amend HAVA to include the definitions of
``cybersecurity incident'' (6 U.S.C. 148), ``election
infrastructure,'' ``election agency,'', and ``State'' (States,
D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, U.S. Virgin Islands,
Northern Mariana Islands).
Subtitle B--Risk-Limiting Audits
Section 121. Risk-limiting audits
This section would amends title III of HAVA by adding the
following new section:
Section 303A. Risk-limiting audits
This new section would define, among other terms,
``risk-limiting audit'' to mean a post-election process
that has at least a 95% probability of correcting the
reported outcome of an election if the reported outcome
is incorrect; will not change the outcome if the
reported outcome is the correct outcome; and involves a
manual adjudication of voter intent (meaning a direct
inspection and determination, by humans, of ballot
choices marked by voters) from some or all validly-cast
ballots in an election.
It would require that, not later than one year after
the enactment of this section, each state's chief
election official must establish several specific rules
and procedures for conducting risk-limiting audits.
Establishes effective date by requiring that
requirements of this section, including risk-limiting
audits, be complied with for the first regularly
scheduled federal election held more than one year
following the enactment of the SAFE Act and for each
subsequent election.
It would require that if a risk-limiting audit
corrects the reported outcome of an election contest,
the state will use the results of the manual
adjudication of voter intent conducted within the risk-
limiting audit as the official results of the election.
Additionally, it would exempt from risk-limiting
audit requirement those election contests where a state
or jurisdiction conducts a full recount through a
manual adjudication of voter intent.
Finally, it would require states to publish public
report after completion of risk-limiting audit and at
least five days before the relevant election contest is
certified, demonstrating results of the audit and
information necessary to confirm that audit was
properly conducted. Notes all data must be published in
machine-readable, open data formats, and that data
published must not compromise the anonymity of votes.
Section 122. Funding for conducting post-election risk-limiting audits
This section would amend subtitle D of title II of HAVA by
adding the following:
Part 8--Funding for Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audits.
Section 298. Payments for post-election risk-limiting
audits.
This new section would establish that the EAC will
pay to states the amount of eligible post-election
audit costs, where such costs are those paid or
incurred by the state or local government for the
conduct of any risk-limiting audit for a federal
election occurring after the date of enactment of this
section, and any equipment, software, or services
needed to conduct such audit.
It would require the EAC to establish rules and
procedures for states to submit eligible costs, and
establishes a formula to adjust payments to states if
the amounts appropriated are insufficient to pay for
all eligible post-election costs submitted by states.
Authorizes the appropriation of such sums as are
necessary to carry out this part, and establishes that
appropriated amounts remain available until expended.
Section 123. GAO analysis of effects of audits
This section would provide that no later than 6 months
after the first federal elections held for which states must
conduct risk-limiting audits, requires that the Comptroller
General of the United States conduct an analysis of the extent
to which risk-limiting audits have improved election
administration and the security of election infrastructure in
states that received grants. It would direct the Comptroller
General to submit a report to relevant congressional committees
regarding such analysis.
TITLE II--Promoting Cybersecurity Through Improvements in Election
Administration
Section 201. Voting system cybersecurity requirements
This section would establish ballot tabulating methods
where voting systems must tabulate ballots by hand or use
optical scanning devices that meet enumerated criteria (except
in limited circumstances).
It would require that optical scanning devices must (1) be
designed and built in such a manner that it is impossible for
the device to add or change a voter's selection on a printed or
marked ballot; (2) be capable of exporting its data in a
machine-readable, open data standard format; (3) consist of
hardware components certified by section 2216 of the Homeland
Security Act that also conform to a hardware component manifest
that includes point-of-origin and upstream hardware supply
chain information that has been provided to the EAC, Department
of Homeland Security, and each state where the device is used,
and further may be shared with independent experts for
cybersecurity analysis; (4) utilize technology that prevents
device operation if any hardware requirements are not met; (5)
only operate using software for which the source code,
compilation parameters, and build tools have been provided to
the EAC, Department of Homeland Security, and the chief state
election official of each state where the device is used, and
such software may be shared with independent experts for
cybersecurity analysis; (5) utilize technology that prevents
the software running should requirements of (5) be unmet; (7)
utilizes technology that allows stakeholders to verify that the
software running on the device meets certain requirements; and
(8) contains such other security requirements as the Director
of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security require.
It would allow the Director to waive some requirements for
a period not to exceed two years, and requires internet
publication of information related to any such waiver.
Establishes effective date of these requirements for federal
elections in 2024 and federal elections thereafter.
This section would prohibit the use of wireless
communications devices in systems or devices. Specifically, it
would prohibit systems or devices on which ballots are
programmed or designed, or ballots are marked (except as
necessary for voting by individuals with disabilities), or upon
which votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated, from
containing, using, or being accessible by wireless, power-line,
or concealed communication device, effective in the federal
elections of 2020.
Additionally, it would prohibit connection of voting system
to the internet by requiring that no system or device upon
which ballot marking devices or optical scanners are
configured, or ballots are marked by voters, or votes cast,
tabulated, or aggregated, shall be connected to the internet or
any other communications network at any time, effective in the
federal elections of 2020.
Finally, it would establish additional cybersecurity
standards for certain ballot marking devices. It would prohibit
states from using ballot marking devices unless an independent
laboratory in a simulated election scenario finds there is less
than a five percent chance that an ordinary voter using the
device would not report any difference between her vote
selection and the vote selection printed on the ballot by the
ballot marking device. It would lay out the requirements for
valid simulated election scenario and establishes effective
date in the federal elections of November 2022 and each
subsequent federal election. It would establish procedures and
requirements for testing and certification of ballot marking
devices, per an application submitted to the EAC. It would
allow for the EAC to submit findings to an independent board
for review and prohibits the EAC from charging fees associated
with testing and certification to state or jurisdiction, or
developer or manufacturer of ballot marking device, or any
other relevant party.
Section 202. Testing of existing voting systems to ensure compliance
with election cybersecurity guidelines and other guidelines
This section would amend HAVA to require the EAC to
provide, not later than nine months before regularly scheduled
federal elections, for the testing by accredited laboratories
under this section of the voting system hardware and software
certified for use in the most recent such election, on the
basis of the most recent voting system guidelines applicable to
such hardware or software (including election cybersecurity
guidelines) issued under this Act. It would require the EAC to
decertify any hardware or software the EAC determines does not
meet the most recent guidelines. This section applies to the
regularly scheduled general election for federal office held in
November 2020 and each succeeding regularly scheduled general
election for federal office.
Additionally, it would amend HAVA to require the Technical
Guidelines Development Committee within the EAC, within six
months of enactment of the SAFE Act, to issue election
cybersecurity guidelines, including standards and best
practices for procuring, maintaining, testing, operating, and
updating election systems to prevent and deter cybersecurity
incidents.
Section 203. Requiring use of software and hardware for which
information is disclosed by manufacturer
This section would amend HAVA to establish that, in
operating voting systems relevant to federal elections, states
may only use software for which the source code is disclosed by
the manufacturer and made publicly available online for use,
excepting that the manufacturer may prohibit usage of the
software primarily intended for commercial advantage or private
compensation, unrelated to carrying out legitimate research or
cybersecurity activity. Further, it would except widely-used
operating system software and cybersecurity software not
specific to voting systems.
It would prohibit use of voting systems in federal
elections unless the manufacturer discloses online the hardware
used to operate the system. It would add additional
restrictions and disclosure requirements for custom-made or
altered hardware, including that the design of such hardware
must be made publicly available online for use, except that a
manufacturer may prohibit use for commercial advantage or
private compensation, unrelated to carrying out legitimate
research or cybersecurity activity. It would make this
requirement effective for federal elections held in 2020 or any
succeeding year.
Section 204. Treatment of electronic poll books as part of voting
systems
This section would amend HAVA to include electronic poll
books as part of voting systems. It would define electronic
poll books as the total combination of mechanical,
electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the
software, firmware, and documentation required to program,
control, and support the equipment) that is used: (1) to retain
the list of registered voters at a polling location, or vote
center, or other location at which voters cast votes in an
election for federal office; and (2) to identify registered
voters who are eligible to vote in an election. It would make
this requirement effective January 1, 2020.
Section 205. Pre-election reports on voting system usage
This section would require the chief state election
official of each state to submit a report to the EAC containing
a detailed voting system usage plan for each jurisdiction which
will administer an election, including a plan for usage of
electronic poll books and other system components, no later
than 120 days prior to any regularly scheduled election for
federal office, and would make this effective for November 2020
federal elections and subsequent elections.
Section 206. Streamlining collection of election information
This section would waive certain federal information policy
requirements of subchapter I of chapter 35 of title 44, United
States Code for purposes of maintaining the clearinghouse
described in this section.
TITLE III--Use of Voting Machines Manufactured in the United States
Section 301. Use of voting machines manufactured in the United States
This section would amend HAVA by establishing that, not
later than the regularly scheduled general election for federal
office of 2022, each state shall seek to ensure that any voting
machine used in that election and any election thereafter is
manufactured in the United States.
TITLE IV--Severability
Section 401. Severability
This section would establish severability such that the
application of the provisions of this Act and amendments made
by this Act shall not be affected by a holding finding any
provision of the Act or amendment made by the Act
unconstitutional.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Help America
Vote Act of 2002''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is
as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--COMMISSION
* * * * * * *
Subtitle B--Testing, Certification, Decertification, and Recertification
of Voting System Hardware and Software; Ballot Marking Devices
Sec. 231. Certification and testing of voting systems.
Sec. 232. Testing and certification of ballot marking devices.
Subtitle C--Studies and Other Activities To Promote Effective
Administration of Federal Elections
* * * * * * *
Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible paper ballot verification
mechanisms.
[Sec. 247.] Sec. 248. Consultation with Standards Board and Board of
Advisors.
Subtitle D--Election Assistance
* * * * * * *
Part 7--Grants for Obtaining Compliant Paper Ballot Voting Systems and
Carrying Out Voting System Security Improvements
Sec. 297. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems and
carrying out voting system security improvements.
Sec. 297A. Voting system security improvements described.
Sec. 297B. Eligibility of States.
Sec. 297C. Reports to Congress.
Sec. 297D. Authorization of appropriations.
Part 8--Funding for Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audits
Sec. 298. Payments for post-election risk-limiting audits.
TITLE III--UNIFORM AND NONDISCRIMINATORY ELECTION TECHNOLOGY AND
ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
Subtitle A--Requirements
Sec. 301. Voting systems standards.
Sec. 301A. Pre-election reports on voting system usage.
Sec. 302. Provisional voting and voting information requirements.
Sec. 303. Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements
and requirements for voters who register by mail.
Sec. 303A. Risk-limiting audits.
Subtitle B--Coverage of Commission Under Certain Laws and Programs
* * * * * * *
TITLE IX--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
[Sec. 901. State defined.]
Sec. 901. Definitions.
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--COMMISSION
Subtitle A--Establishment and General Organization
PART 1--ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
* * * * * * *
SEC. 202. DUTIES.
[The Commission] (a) In General._The Commission shall serve
as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of
information and review of procedures with respect to the
administration of Federal elections [by] and the security of
election infrastructure by--
(1) carrying out the duties described in part 3
(relating to the adoption of voluntary voting system
guidelines), including the maintenance of a
clearinghouse of information on the experiences of
State and local governments in implementing the
guidelines and in operating voting systems in general;
(2) carrying out the duties described in subtitle B
(relating to the testing, certification,
decertification, and recertification of voting system
hardware and software and ballot marking devices);
(3) carrying out the duties described in subtitle C
(relating to conducting studies and carrying out other
activities to promote the effective administration of
Federal elections);
(4) carrying out the duties described in subtitle D
(relating to election assistance), and providing
information and training on the management of the
payments and grants provided under such subtitle;
(5) carrying out the duties described in subtitle B
of title III (relating to the adoption of voluntary
guidance); and
(6) developing and carrying out the Help America Vote
College Program under title V.
(b) Waiver of Certain Requirements.--Subchapter I of chapter
35 of title 44, United States Code, shall not apply to the
collection of information for purposes of maintaining the
clearinghouse described in paragraph (1) of subsection (a).
* * * * * * *
PART 2--ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION STANDARDS BOARD AND BOARD OF
ADVISORS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 214. MEMBERSHIP OF BOARD OF ADVISORS.
(a) In General.--The Board of Advisors shall be composed of
[37 members] 38 members appointed as follows:
(1) Two members appointed by the National Governors
Association.
(2) Two members appointed by the National Conference
of State Legislatures.
(3) Two members appointed by the National Association
of Secretaries of State.
(4) Two members appointed by the National Association
of State Election Directors.
(5) Two members appointed by the National Association
of Counties.
(6) Two members appointed by the National Association
of County Recorders, Election Administrators, and
Clerks.
(7) Two members appointed by the United States
Conference of Mayors.
(8) Two members appointed by the Election Center.
(9) Two members appointed by the International
Association of County Recorders, Election Officials,
and Treasurers.
(10) Two members appointed by the United States
Commission on Civil Rights.
(11) Two members appointed by the Architectural and
Transportation Barrier Compliance Board under section
502 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 792).
(12) The chief of the Office of Public Integrity of
the Department of Justice, or the chief's designee.
(13) The chief of the Voting Section of the Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Justice or the
chief's designee.
(14) The director of the Federal Voting Assistance
Program of the Department of Defense.
(15) Four members representing professionals in the
field of science and technology, of whom--
(A) one each shall be appointed by the
Speaker and the Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) one each shall be appointed by the
Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the
Senate.
(16) Eight members representing voter interests, of
whom--
(A) four members shall be appointed by the
Committee on House Administration of the House
of Representatives, of whom two shall be
appointed by the chair and two shall be
appointed by the ranking minority member; and
(B) four members shall be appointed by the
Committee on Rules and Administration of the
Senate, of whom two shall be appointed by the
chair and two shall be appointed by the ranking
minority member.
(17) The Secretary of Homeland Security or the
Secretary's designee.
(b) Manner of Appointments.--Appointments shall be made to
the Board of Advisors under subsection (a) in a manner which
ensures that the Board of Advisors will be bipartisan in nature
and will reflect the various geographic regions of the United
States.
(c) Term of Service; Vacancy.--Members of the Board of
Advisors shall serve for a term of 2 years, and may be
reappointed. Any vacancy in the Board of Advisors shall be
filled in the manner in which the original appointment was
made.
(d) Chair.--The Board of Advisors shall elect a Chair from
among its members.
* * * * * * *
PART 3--TECHNICAL GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE
SEC. 221. TECHNICAL GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE.
(a) Establishment.--There is hereby established the Technical
Guidelines Development Committee (hereafter in this part
referred to as the ``Development Committee'').
(b) Duties.--
(1) In general.--The Development Committee shall
assist the Executive Director of the Commission in the
development of the voluntary voting system guidelines.
(2) Deadline for initial set of recommendations.--The
Development Committee shall provide its first set of
recommendations under this section to the Executive
Director of the Commission not later than 9 months
after all of its members have been appointed.
(3) Election cybersecurity guidelines.--Not later
than 6 months after the date of the enactment of the
Securing America's Federal Elections Act, the
Development Committee shall issue election
cybersecurity guidelines, including standards and best
practices for procuring, maintaining, testing,
operating, and updating election systems to prevent and
deter cybersecurity incidents.
(c) Membership.--
(1) In general.--The Development Committee shall be
composed of the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (who shall serve as its
chair), together with a group of 14 other individuals
appointed jointly by the Commission and the Director of
the National Institute of Standards and Technology,
consisting of the following:
(A) An equal number of each of the following:
(i) Members of the Standards Board.
(ii) Members of the Board of
Advisors.
(iii) Members of the Architectural
and Transportation Barrier Compliance
Board under section 502 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C.
792).
(B) A representative of the American National
Standards Institute.
(C) A representative of the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
(D) Two representatives of the National
Association of State Election Directors
selected by such Association who are not
members of the Standards Board or Board of
Advisors, and who are not of the same political
party.
(E) A representative of the Department of
Homeland Security.
[(E)] (F) Other individuals with technical
and scientific expertise relating to voting
systems and voting equipment.
(2) Quorum.--A majority of the members of the
Development Committee shall constitute a quorum, except
that the Development Committee may not conduct any
business prior to the appointment of all of its
members.
(d) No Compensation for Service.--Members of the Development
Committee shall not receive any compensation for their service,
but shall be paid travel expenses, including per diem in lieu
of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies
under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States
Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business
in the performance of services for the Development Committee.
(e) Technical Support From National Institute of Standards
and Technology.--
(1) In general.--At the request of the Development
Committee, the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology shall provide the Development
Committee with technical support necessary for the
Development Committee to carry out its duties under
this subtitle.
(2) Technical support.--The technical support
provided under paragraph (1) shall include intramural
research and development in areas to support the
development of the voluntary voting system guidelines
under this part, including--
(A) the security of computers, computer
networks, and computer data storage used in
voting systems, including the computerized list
required under section 303(a);
(B) methods to detect and prevent fraud;
(C) the protection of voter privacy;
(D) the role of human factors in the design
and application of voting systems, including
assistive technologies for individuals with
disabilities (including blindness) and varying
levels of literacy; and
(E) remote access voting, including voting
through the Internet.
(3) No private sector intellectual property rights in
guidelines.--No private sector individual or entity
shall obtain any intellectual property rights to any
guideline or the contents of any guideline (or any
modification to any guideline) adopted by the
Commission under this Act.
(f) Publication of Recommendations in Federal Register.--At
the time the Commission adopts any voluntary voting system
guideline pursuant to section 222, the Development Committee
shall cause to have published in the Federal Register the
recommendations it provided under this section to the Executive
Director of the Commission concerning the guideline adopted.
* * * * * * *
Subtitle B--Testing, Certification, Decertification, and
Recertification of Voting System Hardware and Software; Ballot Marking
Devices
SEC. 231. CERTIFICATION AND TESTING OF VOTING SYSTEMS.
(a) Certification and Testing.--
(1) In general.--The Commission shall provide for the
testing, certification, decertification, and
recertification of voting system hardware and software
by accredited laboratories.
(2) Optional use by states.--At the option of a
State, the State may provide for the testing,
certification, decertification, or recertification of
its voting system hardware and software by the
laboratories accredited by the Commission under this
section.
(3) Testing to ensure compliance with guidelines.--
(A) Testing.--Not later than 9 months before
the date of each regularly scheduled general
election for Federal office, the Commission
shall provide for the testing by accredited
laboratories under this section of the voting
system hardware and software which was
certified for use in the most recent such
election, on the basis of the most recent
voting system guidelines applicable to such
hardware or software (including election
cybersecurity guidelines) issued under this
Act.
(B) Decertification of hardware or software
failing to meet guidelines.--If, on the basis
of the testing described in subparagraph (A),
the Commission determines that any voting
system hardware or software does not meet the
most recent guidelines applicable to such
hardware or software issued under this Act, the
Commission shall decertify such hardware or
software.
(b) Laboratory Accreditation.--
(1) Recommendations by national institute of
standards and technology.--Not later than 6 months
after the Commission first adopts voluntary voting
system guidelines under part 3 of subtitle A, the
Director of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology shall conduct an evaluation of independent,
non-Federal laboratories and shall submit to the
Commission a list of those laboratories the Director
proposes to be accredited to carry out the testing,
certification, decertification, and recertification
provided for under this section.
(2) Approval by commission.--
(A) In general.--The Commission shall vote on
the accreditation of any laboratory under this
section, taking into consideration the list
submitted under paragraph (1), and no
laboratory may be accredited for purposes of
this section unless its accreditation is
approved by a vote of the Commission.
(B) Accreditation laboratories not on
director list.--The Commission shall publish an
explanation for the accreditation of any
laboratory not included on the list submitted
by the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology under paragraph (1).
(c) Continuing Review by National Institute of Standards and
Technology.--
(1) In general.--In cooperation with the Commission
and in consultation with the Standards Board and the
Board of Advisors, the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology shall monitor and
review, on an ongoing basis, the performance of the
laboratories accredited by the Commission under this
section, and shall make such recommendations to the
Commission as it considers appropriate with respect to
the continuing accreditation of such laboratories,
including recommendations to revoke the accreditation
of any such laboratory.
(2) Approval by commission required for revocation.--
The accreditation of a laboratory for purposes of this
section may not be revoked unless the revocation is
approved by a vote of the Commission.
(d) Transition.--Until such time as the Commission provides
for the testing, certification, decertification, and
recertification of voting system hardware and software by
accredited laboratories under this section, the accreditation
of laboratories and the procedure for the testing,
certification, decertification, and recertification of voting
system hardware and software used as of the date of the
enactment of this Act shall remain in effect.
SEC. 232. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT MARKING DEVICES.
(a) In General.--Any State or jurisdiction which intends to
use a ballot marking device (other than a ballot marking device
used exclusively to comply with the requirements of section
301(a)(3)) in an election for Federal office may submit an
application to the Commission for testing and certification
under this section.
(b) Application, Assignment, and Testing.--
(1) In general.--An application under subsection (a)
shall be submitted not later than 18 months before the
date of the election for Federal office in which the
ballot marking device is intended to be used and shall
contain such information as the Commission requires.
(2) Assignment.--Upon receipt of an application for
testing under this section, the Commission shall
contract with a qualified independent user experience
research laboratory for the testing of whether the
ballot marking device intended to be used by the State
or jurisdiction meets the requirements of section
301(a)(10)(B).
(3) Requirements for testing.--Any contract described
in paragraph (2) shall require the qualified
independent user experience research laboratory to--
(A) not later than 30 days before testing
begins, submit to the Commission for approval
the protocol for the simulated election
scenario used for testing the ballot marking
device;
(B) use only protocols approved by the
Commission in conducting such testing; and
(C) submit to the Commission a report on the
results of the testing.
(4) Qualified independent user experience research
laboratory.--For purposes of this section:
(A) In general.--The term ``qualified
independent user experience research
laboratory'' means a laboratory accredited
under this subsection by the Election
Assistance Commission in accordance with
standards determined by the Commission, in
consultation with the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology and the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
(B) Criteria.--A laboratory shall not be
accredited under this subsection unless such
laboratory demonstrates that--
(i) no employee of, or individual
with an ownership in, such laboratory
has, or has had during the 5 preceding
years, any financial relationship with
a manufacturer of voting systems; and
(ii) any group of individuals
conducting tests under this section
collectively meet the following
qualifications:
(I) Experience designing and
running user research studies
and experiments using both
qualitative and quantitative
methodologies.
(II) Experience with voting
systems.
(c) Review by Independent Board.--
(1) In general.--The Commission shall submit for
approval to an independent review board established
under paragraph (3) the following:
(A) Any protocol submitted to the Commission
under subsection (b)(3)(A).
(B) Any report submitted to the Commission
under subsection (b)(3)(C).
(2) Final approval.--Not later than the date that is
12 months before the date of the election for Federal
office in which a State or jurisdiction intends to use
the ballot marking device, the independent review board
shall report to the Commission on whether it has
approved a report submitted under paragraph (1)(B).
(3) Independent review board.--
(A) In general.--An independent review board
established under this paragraph shall be
composed of 5 independent scientists appointed
by the Commission, in consultation with the
Director of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology.
(B) Qualifications.--The members of the
independent review board--
(i) shall have expertise and relevant
peer-reviewed publications in the
following fields: cognitive psychology,
experimental design, statistics, and
user experience research and testing;
and
(ii) may not have, or have had during
the 5 preceding years, any financial
relationship with a manufacturer of
voting systems.
(4) Publication.--The Commission shall make public--
(A) any protocol approved under this
subsection;
(B) any report submitted under subsection
(b)(3)(C); and
(C) any determination made by an independent
review board under paragraph (2).
(d) Certification.--If--
(1) a ballot marking device is determined by the
qualified independent user experience research
laboratory to meet the requirements of section
301(a)(7); and
(2) the report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(C)
is approved by a majority of the members of the
independent review board under subsection (d)(2),
then the Commission shall certify the ballot marking device.
(e) Prohibition on Fees.--The Commission may not charge any
fee to a State or jurisdiction, a developer or manufacturer of
a ballot marking device, or any other person in connection with
testing and certification under this section.
Subtitle C--Studies and Other Activities To Promote Effective
Administration of Federal Elections
SEC. 241. PERIODIC STUDIES OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ISSUES.
(a) In General.--On such periodic basis as the Commission may
determine, [the Commission shall] the Commission, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security (as
appropriate), shall conduct and make available to the public
studies regarding the election administration issues described
in subsection (b), with the goal of promoting methods of voting
and administering elections which--
(1) will be the most convenient, accessible, and easy
to use for voters, including members of the uniformed
services and overseas voters, individuals with
disabilities, including the blind and visually
impaired, and voters with limited proficiency in the
English language;
(2) will yield the most accurate, secure, and
expeditious system for voting and tabulating election
results;
(3) will be nondiscriminatory and afford each
registered and eligible voter an equal opportunity to
vote and to have that vote counted; [and]
(4) will be secure against attempts to undermine the
integrity of election systems by cyber or other means;
and
[(4)] (5) will be efficient and cost-effective for
use.
(b) Election Administration Issues Described.--For purposes
of subsection (a), the election administration issues described
in this subsection are as follows:
(1) Methods and mechanisms of election technology and
voting systems used in voting and counting votes in
elections for Federal office, including the over-vote
and under-vote notification capabilities of such
technology and systems.
(2) Ballot designs for elections for Federal office.
(3) Methods of voter registration, maintaining secure
and accurate lists of registered voters (including the
establishment of a centralized, interactive, statewide
voter registration list linked to relevant agencies and
all polling sites), and ensuring that registered voters
appear on the voter registration list at the
appropriate polling site.
(4) Methods of conducting provisional voting.
(5) Methods of ensuring the accessibility of voting,
registration, polling places, and voting equipment to
all voters, including individuals with disabilities
(including the blind and visually impaired), Native
American or Alaska Native citizens, and voters with
limited proficiency in the English language.
(6) Nationwide statistics and methods of identifying,
deterring, and investigating voting fraud in elections
for Federal office.
(7) Identifying, deterring, and investigating methods
of voter intimidation.
(8) Methods of recruiting, training, and improving
the performance of poll workers.
(9) Methods of educating voters about the process of
registering to vote and voting, the operation of voting
mechanisms, the location of polling places, and all
other aspects of participating in elections.
(10) The feasibility and advisability of conducting
elections for Federal office on different days, at
different places, and during different hours, including
the advisability of establishing a uniform poll closing
time and establishing--
(A) a legal public holiday under section 6103
of title 5, United States Code, as the date on
which general elections for Federal office are
held;
(B) the Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in
November, in every even numbered year, as a
legal public holiday under such section;
(C) a date other than the Tuesday next after
the 1st Monday in November, in every even
numbered year as the date on which general
elections for Federal office are held; and
(D) any date described in subparagraph (C) as
a legal public holiday under such section.
(11) Federal and State laws governing the eligibility
of persons to vote.
(12) Ways that the Federal Government can best assist
State and local authorities to improve the
administration of elections for Federal office and what
levels of funding would be necessary to provide such
assistance.
(13)(A) The laws and procedures used by each State
that govern--
(i) recounts of ballots cast in elections for
Federal office;
(ii) contests of determinations regarding
whether votes are counted in such elections;
and
(iii) standards that define what will
constitute a vote on each type of voting
equipment used in the State to conduct
elections for Federal office.
(B) The best practices (as identified by the
Commission) that are used by States with respect to the
recounts and contests described in clause (i).
(C) Whether or not there is a need for more
consistency among State recount and contest procedures
used with respect to elections for Federal office.
(14) The technical feasibility of providing voting
materials in eight or more languages for voters who
speak those languages and who have limited English
proficiency.
(15) Matters particularly relevant to voting and
administering elections in rural and urban areas.
(16) Methods of voter registration for members of the
uniformed services and overseas voters, and methods of
ensuring that such voters receive timely ballots that
will be properly and expeditiously handled and counted.
(17) The best methods for establishing voting system
performance benchmarks, expressed as a percentage of
residual vote in the Federal contest at the top of the
ballot.
(18) Broadcasting practices that may result in the
broadcast of false information concerning the location
or time of operation of a polling place.
(19) Such other matters as the Commission determines
are appropriate.
(c) Reports.--The Commission shall submit to the President
and to the Committee on House Administration of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Rules and Administration
of the Senate a report on each study conducted under subsection
(a) together with such recommendations for administrative and
legislative action as the Commission determines is appropriate.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE PAPER BALLOT VERIFICATION
MECHANISMS.
(a) Study and Report.--The Director of the National Science
Foundation shall make grants to not fewer than 3 eligible
entities to study, test, and develop accessible paper ballot
voting, verification, and casting mechanisms and devices and
best practices to enhance the accessibility of paper ballot
voting and verification mechanisms for individuals with
disabilities, for voters whose primary language is not English,
and for voters with difficulties in literacy, including best
practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes
through which the mechanisms are used.
(b) Eligibility.--An entity is eligible to receive a grant
under this part if it submits to the Director (at such time and
in such form as the Director may require) an application
containing--
(1) certifications that the entity shall specifically
investigate enhanced methods or devices, including non-
electronic devices, that will assist such individuals
and voters in marking voter-verified paper ballots and
presenting or transmitting the information printed or
marked on such ballots back to such individuals and
voters, and casting such ballots;
(2) a certification that the entity shall complete
the activities carried out with the grant not later
than December 31, 2020; and
(3) such other information and certifications as the
Director may require.
(c) Availability of Technology.--Any technology developed
with the grants made under this section shall be treated as
non-proprietary and shall be made available to the public,
including to manufacturers of voting systems.
(d) Coordination With Grants for Technology Improvements.--
The Director shall carry out this section so that the
activities carried out with the grants made under subsection
(a) are coordinated with the research conducted under the grant
program carried out by the Commission under section 271, to the
extent that the Director and Commission determine necessary to
provide for the advancement of accessible voting technology.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to
be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $5,000,000, to
remain available until expended.
SEC. [247.] 248. CONSULTATION WITH STANDARDS BOARD AND BOARD OF
ADVISORS.
The Commission shall carry out its duties under this subtitle
in consultation with the Standards Board and the Board of
Advisors.
Subtitle D--Election Assistance
PART 1--REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS
SEC. 251. REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS.
(a) In General.--The Commission shall make a requirements
payment each year in an amount determined under section 252 to
each State which meets the conditions described in section 253
for the year.
(b) Use of Funds.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2)
and (3), a State receiving a requirements payment shall
use the payment only to meet the requirements of title
III.
(2) Other activities.--A State may use a requirements
payment to carry out other activities to improve the
administration of elections for Federal office if the
State certifies to the Commission that--
(A) the State has implemented the
requirements of title III; or
(B) the amount expended with respect to such
other activities does not exceed an amount
equal to the minimum payment amount applicable
to the State under section 252(c).
(3) Activities under uniformed and overseas citizens
absentee voting act.--A State shall use a requirements
payment made using funds appropriated pursuant to the
authorization under section 257(a)(4) only to meet the
requirements under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act imposed as a result of the
provisions of and amendments made by the Military and
Overseas Voter Empowerment Act.
(4) Permitting use of payments for voting system
security improvements.--A State may use a requirements
payment to carry out any of the following activities:
(A) Cyber and risk mitigation training.
(B) Providing increased technical support for
any information technology infrastructure that
the chief State election official deems to be
part of the State's election infrastructure or
designates as critical to the operation of the
State's election infrastructure.
(C) Enhancing the cybersecurity and
operations of the information technology
infrastructure described in subparagraph (B).
(D) Enhancing the security of voter
registration databases.
(c) Retroactive Payments.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of this subtitle, including the maintenance of effort
requirements of section 254(a)(7), a State may use a
requirements payment as a reimbursement for costs
incurred in obtaining voting equipment which meets the
requirements of section 301 if the State obtains the
equipment after the regularly scheduled general
election for Federal office held in November 2000.
(2) Special rule regarding multiyear contracts.--A
State may use a requirements payment for any costs for
voting equipment which meets the requirements of
section 301 that, pursuant to a multiyear contract,
were incurred on or after January 1, 2001, except that
the amount that the State is otherwise required to
contribute under the maintenance of effort requirements
of section 254(a)(7) shall be increased by the amount
of the payment made with respect to such multiyear
contract.
(d) Adoption of Commission Guidelines and Guidance Not
Required To Receive Payment.--Nothing in this part may be
construed to require a State to implement any of the voluntary
voting system guidelines or any of the voluntary guidance
adopted by the Commission with respect to any matter as a
condition for receiving a requirements payment.
(e) Schedule of Payments.--As soon as practicable after the
initial appointment of all members of the Commission (but in no
event later than 6 months thereafter), and not less frequently
than once each calendar year thereafter, the Commission shall
make requirements payments to States under this part.
(f) Limitation.--A State may not use any portion of a
requirements payment--
(1) to pay costs associated with any litigation,
except to the extent that such costs otherwise
constitute permitted uses of a requirements payment
under this part; or
(2) for the payment of any judgment.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 254. STATE PLAN.
(a) In General.--The State plan shall contain a description
of each of the following:
(1) How the State will use the requirements payment
to meet the requirements of title III, and, if
applicable under section 251(a)(2), to carry out other
activities to improve the administration of
elections[.], including the protection of election
infrastructure.
(2) How the State will distribute and monitor the
distribution of the requirements payment to units of
local government or other entities in the State for
carrying out the activities described in paragraph (1),
including a description of--
(A) the criteria to be used to determine the
eligibility of such units or entities for
receiving the payment; and
(B) the methods to be used by the State to
monitor the performance of the units or
entities to whom the payment is distributed,
consistent with the performance goals and
measures adopted under paragraph (8).
(3) How the State will provide for programs for voter
education, election official education and training,
and poll worker training which will assist the State in
meeting the requirements of title III.
(4) How the State will adopt voting system guidelines
and processes which are consistent with the
requirements of section 301.
(5) How the State will establish a fund described in
subsection (b) for purposes of administering the
State's activities under this part, including
information on fund management.
(6) The State's proposed budget for activities under
this part, based on the State's best estimates of the
costs of such activities and the amount of funds to be
made available, including specific information on--
(A) the costs of the activities required to
be carried out to meet the requirements of
title III;
(B) the portion of the requirements payment
which will be used to carry out activities to
meet such requirements; and
(C) the portion of the requirements payment
which will be used to carry out other
activities.
(7) How the State, in using the requirements payment,
will maintain the expenditures of the State for
activities funded by the payment at a level that is not
less than the level of such expenditures maintained by
the State for the fiscal year ending prior to November
2000.
(8) How the State will adopt performance goals and
measures that will be used by the State to determine
its success and the success of units of local
government in the State in carrying out the plan,
including timetables for meeting each of the elements
of the plan, descriptions of the criteria the State
will use to measure performance and the process used to
develop such criteria, and a description of which
official is to be held responsible for ensuring that
each performance goal is met.
(9) A description of the uniform, nondiscriminatory
State-based administrative complaint procedures in
effect under section 402.
(10) If the State received any payment under title I,
a description of how such payment will affect the
activities proposed to be carried out under the plan,
including the amount of funds available for such
activities.
(11) How the State will conduct ongoing management of
the plan, except that the State may not make any
material change in the administration of the plan
unless notice of the change--
(A) is developed and published in the Federal
Register in accordance with section 255 in the
same manner as the State plan;
(B) is subject to public notice and comment
in accordance with section 256 in the same
manner as the State plan; and
(C) takes effect only after the expiration of
the 30-day period which begins on the date
notice of the change is published in the
Federal Register in accordance with
subparagraph (A).
(12) In the case of a State with a State plan in
effect under this subtitle during the previous fiscal
year, a description of how the plan reflects changes
from the State plan for the previous fiscal year and of
how the State succeeded in carrying out the State plan
for such previous fiscal year.
(13) A description of the committee which
participated in the development of the State plan in
accordance with section 255 and the procedures followed
by the committee under such section and section 256.
(14) How the State will comply with the provisions
and requirements of and amendments made by the Military
and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act.
(b) Requirements for Election Fund.--
(1) Election fund described.--For purposes of
subsection (a)(5), a fund described in this subsection
with respect to a State is a fund which is established
in the treasury of the State government, which is used
in accordance with paragraph (2), and which consists of
the following amounts:
(A) Amounts appropriated or otherwise made
available by the State for carrying out the
activities for which the requirements payment
is made to the State under this part.
(B) The requirements payment made to the
State under this part.
(C) Such other amounts as may be appropriated
under law.
(D) Interest earned on deposits of the fund.
(2) Use of fund.--Amounts in the fund shall be used
by the State exclusively to carry out the activities
for which the requirements payment is made to the State
under this part.
(3) Treatment of states that require changes to state
law.--In the case of a State that requires State
legislation to establish the fund described in this
subsection, the Commission shall defer disbursement of
the requirements payment to such State until such time
as legislation establishing the fund is enacted.
(c) Protection Against Actions Based on Information in
Plan.--
(1) In general.--No action may be brought under this
Act against a State or other jurisdiction on the basis
of any information contained in the State plan filed
under this part.
(2) Exception for criminal acts.--Paragraph (1) may
not be construed to limit the liability of a State or
other jurisdiction for criminal acts or omissions.
SEC. 255. PROCESS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND FILING OF PLAN; PUBLICATION BY
COMMISSION.
(a) In General.--The chief State election official shall
develop the State plan under this subtitle through a committee
of appropriate individuals, including the chief election
officials of the two most populous jurisdictions within the
States, other local election officials, stake holders
(including representatives of groups of individuals with
disabilities), and other citizens, appointed for such purpose
by the chief State election official.
(b) Geographic Representation.--The members of the committee
shall be a representative group of individuals from the State's
counties, cities, towns, and Indian tribes, and shall represent
the needs of rural as well as urban areas of the State, as the
case may be.
[(b)] (c) Publication of Plan by Commission.--After receiving
the State plan of a State under this subtitle, the Commission
shall cause to have the plan posted on the Commissions's
website with a notice published in the Federal Register.
* * * * * * *
PART 5--PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 292. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General.--In addition to any other amounts authorized
to be appropriated under this subtitle, there are authorized to
be appropriated $10,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2003,
2004, 2005, and 2006, and for each subsequent fiscal year such
sums as may be necessary, for the purpose of making payments
under section 291(a)[; except that none of the funds provided
by this subsection shall be used to initiate or otherwise
participate in any litigation related to election-related
disability access, notwithstanding the general authorities that
the protection and advocacy systems are otherwise afforded
under subtitle C of title I of the Developmental Disabilities
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 15041 et
seq.).].
(b) Availability.--Any amounts appropriated pursuant to the
authority of this section shall remain available until
expended.
* * * * * * *
PART 7--GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS AND
CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS
SEC. 297. GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS
AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY
IMPROVEMENTS.
(a) Availability and Use of Grant.--The Commission shall make
a grant to each eligible State--
(1) to replace a voting system--
(A) which does not meet the requirements
which are first imposed on the State pursuant
to the amendments made by the Voter Confidence
and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019 with a
voting system which does meet such
requirements, for use in the regularly
scheduled general elections for Federal office
held in November 2020, or
(B) which does meet such requirements but
which is not in compliance with the most recent
voluntary voting system guidelines issued by
the Commission prior to the regularly scheduled
general election for Federal office held in
November 2020 with another system which does
meet such requirements and is in compliance
with such guidelines;
(2) to carry out voting system security improvements
described in section 297A with respect to the regularly
scheduled general elections for Federal office held in
November 2020 and each succeeding election for Federal
office; and
(3) to implement and model best practices for ballot
design, ballot instructions, and the testing of
ballots.
(b) Amount of Grant.--The amount of a grant made to a State
under this section shall be such amount as the Commission
determines to be appropriate, except that such amount may not
be less than the product of $1 and the average of the number of
individuals who cast votes in any of the two most recent
regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office held
in the State.
(c) Pro Rata Reductions.--If the amount of funds appropriated
for grants under this part is insufficient to ensure that each
State receives the amount of the grant calculated under
subsection (b), the Commission shall make such pro rata
reductions in such amounts as may be necessary to ensure that
the entire amount appropriated under this part is distributed
to the States.
(d) Surplus Appropriations.--If the amount of funds
appropriated for grants authorized under section 297D(a)(2)
exceed the amount necessary to meet the requirements of
subsection (b), the Commission shall consider the following in
making a determination to award remaining funds to a State:
(1) The record of the State in carrying out the
following with respect to the administration of
elections for Federal office:
(A) Providing voting machines that are less
than 10 years old.
(B) Implementing strong chain of custody
procedures for the physical security of voting
equipment and paper records at all stages of
the process.
(C) Conducting pre-election testing on every
voting machine and ensuring that paper ballots
are available wherever electronic machines are
used.
(D) Maintaining offline backups of voter
registration lists.
(E) Providing a secure voter registration
database that logs requests submitted to the
database.
(F) Publishing and enforcing a policy
detailing use limitations and security
safeguards to protect the personal information
of voters in the voter registration process.
(G) Providing secure processes and procedures
for reporting vote tallies.
(H) Providing a secure platform for
disseminating vote totals.
(2) Evidence of established conditions of innovation
and reform in providing voting system security and the
proposed plan of the State for implementing additional
conditions.
(3) Evidence of collaboration between relevant
stakeholders, including local election officials, in
developing the grant implementation plan described in
section 297B.
(4) The plan of the State to conduct a rigorous
evaluation of the effectiveness of the activities
carried out with the grant.
(e) Ability of Replacement Systems to Administer Ranked
Choice Elections.--To the greatest extent practicable, an
eligible State which receives a grant to replace a voting
system under this section shall ensure that the replacement
system is capable of administering a system of ranked choice
voting under which each voter shall rank the candidates for the
office in the order of the voter's preference.
SEC. 297A. VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS DESCRIBED.
(a) Permitted Uses.--A voting system security improvement
described in this section is any of the following:
(1) The acquisition of goods and services from
qualified election infrastructure vendors by purchase,
lease, or such other arrangements as may be
appropriate.
(2) Cyber and risk mitigation training.
(3) A security risk and vulnerability assessment of
the State's election infrastructure which is carried
out by a provider of cybersecurity services under a
contract entered into between the chief State election
official and the provider.
(4) The maintenance of election infrastructure,
including addressing risks and vulnerabilities which
are identified under either of the security risk and
vulnerability assessments described in paragraph (3),
except that none of the funds provided under this part
may be used to renovate or replace a building or
facility which is used primarily for purposes other
than the administration of elections for public office.
(5) Providing increased technical support for any
information technology infrastructure that the chief
State election official deems to be part of the State's
election infrastructure or designates as critical to
the operation of the State's election infrastructure.
(6) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of the
information technology infrastructure described in
paragraph (4).
(7) Enhancing the cybersecurity of voter registration
systems.
(b) Qualified Election Infrastructure Vendors Described.--
(1) In general.--For purposes of this part, a
``qualified election infrastructure vendor'' is any
person who provides, supports, or maintains, or who
seeks to provide, support, or maintain, election
infrastructure on behalf of a State, unit of local
government, or election agency, who meets the criteria
described in paragraph (2).
(2) Criteria.--The criteria described in this
paragraph are such criteria as the Chairman, in
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security,
shall establish and publish, and shall include each of
the following requirements:
(A) The vendor must be owned and controlled
by a citizen or permanent resident of the
United States.
(B) The vendor must disclose to the Chairman
and the Secretary, and to the chief State
election official of any State to which the
vendor provides any goods and services with
funds provided under this part, of any sourcing
outside the United States for parts of the
election infrastructure.
(C) The vendor agrees to ensure that the
election infrastructure will be developed and
maintained in a manner that is consistent with
the cybersecurity best practices issued by the
Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
(D) The vendor agrees to maintain its
information technology infrastructure in a
manner that is consistent with the
cybersecurity best practices issued by the
Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
(E) The vendor agrees to meet the
requirements of paragraph (3) with respect to
any known or suspected cybersecurity incidents
involving any of the goods and services
provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant
under this part.
(F) The vendor agrees to permit independent
security testing by the Commission (in
accordance with section 231(a)) and by the
Secretary of the goods and services provided by
the vendor pursuant to a grant under this part.
(3) Cybersecurity incident reporting requirements.--
(A) In general.--A vendor meets the
requirements of this paragraph if, upon
becoming aware of the possibility that an
election cybersecurity incident has occurred
involving any of the goods and services
provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant
under this part--
(i) the vendor promptly assesses
whether or not such an incident
occurred, and submits a notification
meeting the requirements of
subparagraph (B) to the Secretary and
the Chairman of the assessment as soon
as practicable (but in no case later
than 3 days after the vendor first
becomes aware of the possibility that
the incident occurred);
(ii) if the incident involves goods
or services provided to an election
agency, the vendor submits a
notification meeting the requirements
of subparagraph (B) to the agency as
soon as practicable (but in no case
later than 3 days after the vendor
first becomes aware of the possibility
that the incident occurred), and
cooperates with the agency in providing
any other necessary notifications
relating to the incident; and
(iii) the vendor provides all
necessary updates to any notification
submitted under clause (i) or clause
(ii).
(B) Contents of notifications.--Each
notification submitted under clause (i) or
clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall contain
the following information with respect to any
election cybersecurity incident covered by the
notification:
(i) The date, time, and time zone
when the election cybersecurity
incident began, if known.
(ii) The date, time, and time zone
when the election cybersecurity
incident was detected.
(iii) The date, time, and duration of
the election cybersecurity incident.
(iv) The circumstances of the
election cybersecurity incident,
including the specific election
infrastructure systems believed to have
been accessed and information acquired,
if any.
(v) Any planned and implemented
technical measures to respond to and
recover from the incident.
(vi) In the case of any notification
which is an update to a prior
notification, any additional material
information relating to the incident,
including technical data, as it becomes
available.
SEC. 297B. ELIGIBILITY OF STATES.
A State is eligible to receive a grant under this part if the
State submits to the Commission, at such time and in such form
as the Commission may require, an application containing--
(1) a description of how the State will use the grant
to carry out the activities authorized under this part;
(2) a certification and assurance that, not later
than 5 years after receiving the grant, the State will
carry out voting system security improvements, as
described in section 297A; and
(3) such other information and assurances as the
Commission may require.
SEC. 297C. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, the
Commission shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees, including the Committees on Homeland
Security, House Administration, and the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives and the Committees on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, the Judiciary, and Rules and
Administration of the Senate, on the activities carried out
with the funds provided under this part.
SEC. 297D. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Authorization.--There are authorized to be appropriated
for grants under this part--
(1) $600,000,000 for fiscal year 2019; and
(2) $175,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2020,
2022, 2024, and 2026.
(b) Continuing Availability of Amounts.--Any amounts
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of this section
shall remain available until expended.
PART 8--FUNDING FOR POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS
SEC. 298. PAYMENTS FOR POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.
(a) In General.--The Commission shall pay to States the
amount of eligible post-election audit costs.
(b) Eligible Post-election Audit Costs.--For purposes of this
section, the term ``eligible post-election audit costs'' means,
with respect to any State, costs paid or incurred by the State
or local government within the State for--
(1) the conduct of any risk-limiting audit (as
defined in section 303A) with respect to an election
for Federal office occurring after the date of the
enactment of this part; and
(2) any equipment, software, or services necessary
for the conduct of any such risk-limiting audit.
(c) Special Rules.--
(1) Rules and procedures.--The Commission shall
establish rules and procedures for submission of
eligible post-election audit costs for payments under
this section.
(2) Insufficient funds.--In any case in which the
amounts appropriated under subsection (d) are
insufficient to pay all eligible post-election audit
costs submitted by States with respect to any Federal
election, the amount of such costs paid under
subsection (a) to any State shall be equal to the
amount that bears the same ratio to the amount which
would be paid to such State (determined without regard
to this paragraph) as--
(A) the number of individuals who voted in
such Federal election in such State; bears to
(B) the total number of individuals who voted
in such Federal election in all States
submitting a claim for eligible post-election
audit costs.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There is hereby authorized to be
appropriated to the Commission such sums as are
necessary to carry out this part.
(2) Availability.--Any amounts appropriated pursuant
to paragraph (1) shall remain available without fiscal
year limitation until expended.
TITLE III--UNIFORM AND NONDISCRIMINATORY ELECTION TECHNOLOGY AND
ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
Subtitle A--Requirements
SEC. 301. VOTING SYSTEMS STANDARDS.
(a) Requirements.--Each voting system used in an election for
Federal office shall meet the following requirements:
(1) In general.--
(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
the voting system (including any lever voting
system, optical scanning voting system, or
direct recording electronic system) shall--
(i) permit the voter to verify (in a
private and independent manner) the
votes selected by the voter on the
ballot before the ballot is cast and
[counted] counted, in accordance with
paragraphs (2) and (3);
(ii) provide the voter with the
opportunity (in a private and
independent manner) to change the
ballot or correct any error before the
ballot is cast and [counted] counted,
in accordance with paragraphs (2) and
(3) (including the opportunity to
correct the error through the issuance
of a replacement ballot if the voter
was otherwise unable to change the
ballot or correct any error); and
(iii) if the voter selects votes for
more than one candidate for a single
office--
(I) notify the voter that the
voter has selected more than
one candidate for a single
office on the ballot;
(II) notify the voter before
the ballot is cast and
[counted] counted, in
accordance with paragraphs (2)
and (3) of the effect of
casting multiple votes for the
office; and
(III) provide the voter with
the opportunity to correct the
ballot before the ballot is
cast and [counted] counted, in
accordance with paragraphs (2)
and (3).
(B) A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper
ballot voting system, a punch card voting
system, or a central count voting system
(including mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in
ballots), may meet the requirements of
subparagraph (A)(iii) by--
(i) establishing a voter education
program specific to that voting system
that notifies each voter of the effect
of casting multiple votes for an
office; and
(ii) providing the voter with
instructions on how to correct the
ballot before it is cast and [counted]
counted, in accordance with paragraphs
(2) and (3) (including instructions on
how to correct the error through the
issuance of a replacement ballot if the
voter was otherwise unable to change
the ballot or correct any error).
(C) The voting system shall ensure that any
notification required under this paragraph
preserves the privacy of the voter and the
confidentiality of the ballot.
[(2) Audit capacity.--
[(A) In general.--The voting system shall
produce a record with an audit capacity for
such system.
[(B) Manual audit capacity.--
[(i) The voting system shall produce
a permanent paper record with a manual
audit capacity for such system.
[(ii) The voting system shall provide
the voter with an opportunity to change
the ballot or correct any error before
the permanent paper record is produced.
[(iii) The paper record produced
under subparagraph (A) shall be
available as an official record for any
recount conducted with respect to any
election in which the system is used.]
(2) Paper ballot requirement.--
(A) Voter-verified paper ballots.--
(i) Paper ballot requirement.--(I)
The voting system shall require the use
of an individual, durable, voter-
verified paper ballot of the voter's
vote that shall be marked and made
available for inspection and
verification by the voter before the
voter's vote is cast and counted, and
which shall be counted by hand or read
by an optical character recognition
device or other counting device. For
purposes of this subclause, the term
``individual, durable, voter-verified
paper ballot'' means a paper ballot
marked by the voter by hand or a paper
ballot marked through the use of a
nontabulating ballot marking device or
system, so long as the voter shall have
the option to mark his or her ballot by
hand.
(II) The voting system shall provide
the voter with an opportunity to
correct any error on the paper ballot
before the permanent voter-verified
paper ballot is preserved in accordance
with clause (ii).
(III) The voting system shall not
preserve the voter-verified paper
ballots in any manner that makes it
possible, at any time after the ballot
has been cast, to associate a voter
with the record of the voter's vote
without the voter's consent.
(ii) Preservation as official
record.--The individual, durable,
voter-verified paper ballot used in
accordance with clause (i) shall
constitute the official ballot and
shall be preserved and used as the
official ballot for purposes of any
recount or audit conducted with respect
to any election for Federal office in
which the voting system is used.
(iii) Manual counting requirements
for recounts and audits.--(I) Each
paper ballot used pursuant to clause
(i) shall be suitable for a manual
audit, and shall be counted by hand in
any recount or audit conducted with
respect to any election for Federal
office.
(II) In the event of any
inconsistencies or irregularities
between any electronic vote tallies and
the vote tallies determined by counting
by hand the individual, durable, voter-
verified paper ballots used pursuant to
clause (i), and subject to subparagraph
(B), the individual, durable, voter-
verified paper ballots shall be the
true and correct record of the votes
cast.
(iv) Application to all ballots.--The
requirements of this subparagraph shall
apply to all ballots cast in elections
for Federal office, including ballots
cast by absent uniformed services
voters and overseas voters under the
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act and other absentee
voters.
(B) Special rule for treatment of disputes
when paper ballots have been shown to be
compromised.--
(i) In general.--In the event that--
(I) there is any
inconsistency between any
electronic vote tallies and the
vote tallies determined by
counting by hand the
individual, durable, voter-
verified paper ballots used
pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i)
with respect to any election
for Federal office; and
(II) it is demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence
(as determined in accordance
with the applicable standards
in the jurisdiction involved)
in any recount, audit, or
contest of the result of the
election that the paper ballots
have been compromised (by
damage or mischief or
otherwise) and that a
sufficient number of the
ballots have been so
compromised that the result of
the election could be changed,
the determination of the appropriate
remedy with respect to the election
shall be made in accordance with
applicable State law, except that the
electronic tally shall not be used as
the exclusive basis for determining the
official certified result.
(ii) Rule for consideration of
ballots associated with each voting
machine.--For purposes of clause (i),
only the paper ballots deemed
compromised, if any, shall be
considered in the calculation of
whether or not the result of the
election could be changed due to the
compromised paper ballots.
(3) Accessibility for individuals with
disabilities.--The voting system shall--
(A) be accessible for individuals with
disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility
for the blind and visually impaired, in a
manner that provides the same opportunity for
access and participation (including privacy and
independence) as for other voters;
[(B) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph
(A) through the use of at least one direct
recording electronic voting system or other
voting system equipped for individuals with
disabilities at each polling place; and]
(B)(i) satisfy the requirement of
subparagraph (A) through the use of at least 1
voting system at each polling place that--
(I) is equipped for individuals with
disabilities, including nonvisual and
enhanced visual accessibility for the
blind and visually impaired, and
contains features to support enhanced
manual accessibility for the mobility
and dexterity impaired;
(II) in the case of any election for
Federal office occurring after the date
that is 6 years after the date of the
enactment of the Securing America's
Federal Elections Act--
(aa) marks ballots that are
identical in size, ink, and
paper stock to those ballots
that would be marked by hand or
a ballot marking device used by
voters who do not have
accessibility needs;
(bb) marks the ballot in such
a way that someone examining
the ballot will not be able to
readily determine whether the
ballot was marked by hand or
machine; and
(cc) combines ballots
produced by the voting system
with ballots marked by voters
using other types of voting
systems used by the State or
jurisdiction in a way that
prevents identification of
which ballots were cast using
each voting system; and
(III) is made available for use by
any voter who requests to use it; and
(ii) in the case of any election for Federal
office occurring after the date that is 6 years
after the date of the enactment of the Securing
America's Federal Elections Act, meet the
requirements of subparagraph (A) and paragraph
(2)(A) by using a system that allows the voter
to privately and independently verify the
accuracy of the permanent paper ballot through
the presentation, in accessible form, of the
printed or marked vote selections from the same
printed or marked information that would be
used for any vote tabulation or auditing; and
(C) if purchased with funds made available
under title II on or after January 1, 2007,
meet the voting system standards for disability
access (as outlined in this paragraph).
Nothing in subparagraph (B) shall be construed to
prohibit the use of an accessible ballot that may be
printed or marked by the voter at home.
(4) Alternative language accessibility.--The voting
system (including the paper ballots required to be used
under paragraph (2)) shall provide alternative language
accessibility pursuant to the requirements of section
203 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973aa-
1a).
(5) Error rates.--The error rate of the voting system
in counting ballots (determined by taking into account
only those errors which are attributable to the voting
system and not attributable to an act of the voter)
shall comply with the error rate standards established
under section 3.2.1 of the voting systems standards
issued by the Federal Election Commission which are in
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(6) Uniform definition of what constitutes a vote.--
Each State shall adopt uniform and nondiscriminatory
standards that define what constitutes a vote and what
will be counted as a vote for each category of voting
system used in the State.
(7) Durability and readability requirements for
ballots.--
(A) Durability requirements for paper
ballots.--
(i) In general.--All voter-verified
paper ballots required to be used under
this Act shall be marked or printed on
durable paper.
(ii) Definition.--For purposes of
this Act, paper is ``durable'' if it is
capable of withstanding multiple counts
and recounts by hand without
compromising the fundamental integrity
of the ballots, and capable of
retaining the information marked or
printed on them for the full duration
of a retention and preservation period
of 22 months.
(B) Readability requirements for paper
ballots marked by ballot marking device.--All
voter-verified paper ballots completed by the
voter through the use of a ballot marking
device shall be clearly readable by the voter
without assistance (other than eyeglasses or
other personal vision enhancing devices) and by
an optical character recognition device or
other device equipped for individuals with
disabilities.
(8) Printing requirements for ballots.--All paper
ballots used in an election for Federal office shall be
printed in the United States on recycled paper
manufactured in the United States.
(9) Ballot tabulating methods.--
(A) In general.--The voting system tabulates
ballots by hand or through the use of an
optical scanning device that meets the
requirements of subparagraph (B).
(B) Requirements for optical scanning
devices.--Except as provided in subparagraph
(C), the requirements of this subparagraph are
as follows:
(i) The device is designed and built
in a manner in which it is mechanically
impossible for the device to add or
change the vote selections on a printed
or marked ballot.
(ii) The device is capable of
exporting its data (including vote
tally data sets and cast vote records)
in a machine-readable, open data
standard format required by the
Commission, in consultation with the
Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
(iii) The device consists of hardware
that--
(I) is certified under
section 2216 of the Homeland
Security Act; and
(II) demonstrably conforms to
a hardware component manifest
describing point-of-origin
information (including upstream
hardware supply chain
information for each component)
that--
(aa) has been
provided to the
Commission, the
Director of
Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security
under section 2215 of
the Homeland Security
Act, and the chief
State election official
for each State in which
the device is used; and
(bb) may be shared by
any entity to whom it
has been provided under
item (aa) with
independent experts for
cybersecurity analysis.
(iv) The device utilizes technology
that prevents the operation of the
device if any hardware components do
not meet the requirements of clause
(iii).
(v) The device operates using
software--
(I) for which the source
code, system build tools, and
compilation parameters--
(aa) have been
provided to the
Commission, the
Director of
Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security
under section 2215 of
the Homeland Security
Act, and the chief
State election official
for each State in which
the device is used; and
(bb) may be shared by
any entity to whom it
has been provided under
item (aa) with
independent experts for
cybersecurity analysis;
and
(II) that is certified under
section 2216 of the Homeland
Security Act.
(vi) The device utilizes technology
that prevents the running of software
on the device that does not meet the
requirements of clause (v).
(vii) The device utilizes technology
that enables election officials,
cybersecurity researchers, and voters
to verify that the software running on
the device--
(I) was built from a
specific, untampered version of
the code that is described in
clause (v); and
(II) uses the system build
tools and compilation
parameters that are described
in clause (v).
(viii) The device contains such other
security requirements as the Director
of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security requires.
(C) Waiver.--
(i) In general.--The Director of
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security, in consultation with the
Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, may waive one
or more of the requirements of
subparagraph (B) (other than the
requirement of clause (i) thereof) with
respect to any device for a period of
not to exceed 2 years.
(ii) Publication.--Information
relating to any waiver granted under
clause (i) shall be made publicly
available on the Internet.
(D) Effective date.--Each State and
jurisdiction shall be required to comply with
the requirements of this paragraph for the
regularly scheduled election for Federal office
in November 2024, and for each subsequent
election for Federal office.
(9) Requiring use of software and hardware for which
information is disclosed by manufacturer.--
(A) Requiring use of software for which
source code is disclosed by manufacturer.--
(i) In general.--In the operation of
voting systems in an election for
Federal office, a State may only use
software for which the manufacturer
makes the source code (in the form in
which will be used at the time of the
election) publicly available online
under a license that grants a
worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive,
perpetual, sub-licensable license to
all intellectual property rights in
such source code, except that the
manufacturer may prohibit a person who
obtains the software from using the
software in a manner that is primarily
intended for or directed toward
commercial advantage or private
monetary compensation that is unrelated
to carrying out legitimate research or
cybersecurity activity.
(ii) Exceptions.--Clause (i) does not
apply with respect to--
(I) widely-used operating
system software which is not
specific to voting systems and
for which the source code or
baseline functionality is not
altered; or
(II) widely-used
cybersecurity software which is
not specific to voting systems
and for which the source code
or baseline functionality is
not altered.
(B) Requiring use of hardware for which
information is disclosed by manufacturer.--
(i) Requiring disclosure of
hardware.--A State may not use a voting
system in an election for Federal
office unless the manufacturer of the
system publicly discloses online the
identification of the hardware used to
operate the system.
(ii) Additional disclosure
requirements for custom or altered
hardware.--To the extent that the
hardware used to operate a voting
system or any component thereof is not
widely-used, or is widely-used but is
altered, the State may not use the
system in an election for Federal
office unless--
(I) the manufacturer of the
system publicly discloses
online the components of the
hardware, the design of such
components, and how such
components are connected in the
operation of the system; and
(II) the manufacturer makes
the design (in the form which
will be used at the time of the
election) publicly available
online under a license that
grants a worldwide, royalty-
free, non-exclusive, perpetual,
sub-licensable license to all
intellectual property rights in
the design of the hardware or
the component, except that the
manufacturer may prohibit a
person who obtains the design
from using the design in a
manner that is primarily
intended for or directed toward
commercial advantage or private
monetary compensation that is
unrelated to carrying out
legitimate research or
cybersecurity activity.
(10) Prohibition of use of wireless communications
devices in systems or devices.--
(A) In general.--No system or device upon
which ballot marking devices or optical
scanners are configured, upon which ballots are
marked by voters (except as necessary for
individuals with disabilities to use ballot
marking devices that meet the accessibility
requirements of paragraph (3)), or upon which
votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated shall
contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless,
power-line, or concealed communication device.
(B) Effective date.--Each State and
jurisdiction shall be required to comply with
the requirements of this paragraph for the
regularly scheduled election for Federal office
in November 2020, and for each subsequent
election for Federal office.
(11) Prohibiting connection of system to the
internet.--
(A) In general.--No system or device upon
which ballot marking devices or optical
scanners are configured, upon which ballots are
marked by voters, or upon which votes are cast,
tabulated, or aggregated shall be connected to
the Internet or any non-local computer system
via telephone or other communication network at
any time.
(B) Effective date.--Each State and
jurisdiction shall be required to comply with
the requirements of this paragraph for the
regularly scheduled election for Federal office
in November 2020, and for each subsequent
election for Federal office.
(10) Voting machine requirements.--By not later than
the date of the regularly scheduled general election
for Federal office occurring in November 2022, each
State shall seek to ensure that any voting machine used
in such election and in any subsequent election for
Federal office is manufactured in the United States.
(13) Ballot marking devices.--
(A) In general.--In the case of a voting
system that uses a ballot marking device, the
ballot marking device shall be a device that--
(i) is not capable of tabulating
votes;
(ii) except in the case of a ballot
marking device used exclusively to
comply with the requirements of
paragraph (3), is certified in
accordance with section 232 as meeting
the requirements of subparagraph (B);
and
(iii) is certified under section 2216
of the Homeland Security Act as meeting
the requirements of clauses (iii)
through (viii) of section 301(a)(9)(B).
(B) Requirements.--
(i) In general.--A ballot marking
device meets the requirements of this
subparagraph if, during a double-masked
test conducted by a qualified
independent user experience research
laboratory (as defined in section
232(b)(4)) of a simulated election
scenario which meets the requirements
of clause (ii), there is less than a 5
percent chance that an ordinary voter
using the device would not detect and
report any difference between the vote
selection printed on the ballot by the
ballot marking device and the vote
selection indicated by the voter.
(ii) Simulated election scenario.--A
simulated election scenario meets the
requirements of this clause if it is
conducted with--
(I) a pool of subjects that
are--
(aa) diverse in age,
gender, education, and
physical limitations;
and
(bb) representative
of the communities in
which the voting system
will be used; and
(II) ballots that are
representative of ballots
ordinarily used in the
communities in which the voting
system will be used.
(C) Effective date.--Each State and
jurisdiction shall be required to comply with
the requirements of this paragraph for the
regularly scheduled election for Federal office
in November 2022, and for each subsequent
election for Federal office.
(b) Voting System Defined.--In [this section] this Act, the
term ``voting system'' means--
(1) the total combination of mechanical,
electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including
the software, firmware, and documentation required to
program, control, and support the equipment) that is
used--
(A) to define ballots;
(B) to cast and count votes;
(C) to report or display election results;
and
(D) to maintain and produce any audit trail
information; [and]
(2) any electronic poll book used with respect to the
election; and
[(2)] (3) the practices and associated documentation
used--
(A) to identify system components and
versions of such components;
(B) to test the system during its development
and maintenance;
(C) to maintain records of system errors and
defects;
(D) to determine specific system changes to
be made to a system after the initial
qualification of the system; and
(E) to make available any materials to the
voter (such as notices, instructions, forms, or
paper ballots).
(c) Electronic Poll Book Defined.--In this Act, the term
``electronic poll book'' means the total combination of
mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment
(including the software, firmware, and documentation required
to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used--
(1) to retain the list of registered voters at a
polling location, or vote center, or other location at
which voters cast votes in an election for Federal
office; and
(2) to identify registered voters who are eligible to
vote in an election.
[(c)] (d) Construction.--
(1) In general.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prohibit a State or jurisdiction which
used a particular type of voting system in the
elections for Federal office held in November 2000 from
using the same type of system after the effective date
of this section, so long as the system meets or is
modified to meet the requirements of this section.
(2) Protection of paper ballot voting systems.--For
purposes of subsection (a)(1)(A)(i), the term
``verify'' may not be defined in a manner that makes it
impossible for a paper ballot voting system to meet the
requirements of such subsection or to be modified to
meet such requirements.
[(d) Effective Date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be
required to comply with the requirements of this section on and
after January 1, 2006.]
(e) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply
with the requirements of this section on and after
January 1, 2006.
(2) Special rule for certain requirements.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in
section 105(b) of the Securing America's
Federal Elections Act and subparagraphs (B) and
(C), the requirements of this section which are
first imposed on a State and jurisdiction
pursuant to the amendments made by the Voter
Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of
2019 shall apply with respect to voting systems
used for any election for Federal office held
in 2020 or any succeeding year.
(B) Delay for jurisdictions using certain
paper record printers or certain systems using
or producing voter-verified paper records in
2018.--
(i) Delay.--In the case of a
jurisdiction described in clause (ii),
subparagraph (A) shall apply to a
voting system in the jurisdiction as if
the reference in such subparagraph to
``2020'' were a reference to ``2022'',
but only with respect to the following
requirements of this section:
(I) Paragraph (2)(A)(i)(I) of
subsection (a) (relating to the
use of voter-verified paper
ballots).
(II) Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I)
and (II) of subsection (a)
(relating to access to
verification from and casting
of the durable paper ballot).
(III) Paragraph (7) of
subsection (a) (relating to
durability and readability
requirements for ballots).
(ii) Jurisdictions described.--A
jurisdiction described in this clause
is a jurisdiction--
(I) which used voter-verified
paper record printers attached
to direct recording electronic
voting machines, or which used
other voting systems that used
or produced paper records of
the vote verifiable by voters
but that are not in compliance
with paragraphs (2)(A)(i)(I),
(3)(B)(iii)(I) and (II), and
(7) of subsection (a) (as
amended or added by the Voter
Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2019), for
the administration of the
regularly scheduled general
election for Federal office
held in November 2018; and
(II) which will continue to
use such printers or systems
for the administration of
elections for Federal office
held in years before 2022.
(iii) Mandatory availability of paper
ballots at polling places using
grandfathered printers and systems.--
(I) Requiring ballots to be
offered and provided.--The
appropriate election official
at each polling place that uses
a printer or system described
in clause (ii)(I) for the
administration of elections for
Federal office shall offer each
individual who is eligible to
cast a vote in the election at
the polling place the
opportunity to cast the vote
using a blank pre-printed paper
ballot which the individual may
mark by hand and which is not
produced by the direct
recording electronic voting
machine or other such system.
The official shall provide the
individual with the ballot and
the supplies necessary to mark
the ballot, and shall ensure
(to the greatest extent
practicable) that the waiting
period for the individual to
cast a vote is the lesser of 30
minutes or the average waiting
period for an individual who
does not agree to cast the vote
using such a paper ballot under
this clause.
(II) Treatment of ballot.--
Any paper ballot which is cast
by an individual under this
clause shall be counted and
otherwise treated as a regular
ballot for all purposes
(including by incorporating it
into the final unofficial vote
count (as defined by the State)
for the precinct) and not as a
provisional ballot, unless the
individual casting the ballot
would have otherwise been
required to cast a provisional
ballot.
(III) Posting of notice.--The
appropriate election official
shall ensure there is
prominently displayed at each
polling place a notice that
describes the obligation of the
official to offer individuals
the opportunity to cast votes
using a pre-printed blank paper
ballot.
(IV) Training of election
officials.--The chief State
election official shall ensure
that election officials at
polling places in the State are
aware of the requirements of
this clause, including the
requirement to display a notice
under subclause (III), and are
aware that it is a violation of
the requirements of this title
for an election official to
fail to offer an individual the
opportunity to cast a vote
using a blank pre-printed paper
ballot.
(V) Period of
applicability.--The
requirements of this clause
apply only during the period in
which the delay is in effect
under clause (i).
(C) Special rule for jurisdictions using
certain nontabulating ballot marking devices.--
In the case of a jurisdiction which uses a
nontabulating ballot marking device which
automatically deposits the ballot into a
privacy sleeve, subparagraph (A) shall apply to
a voting system in the jurisdiction as if the
reference in such subparagraph to ``any
election for Federal office held in 2020 or any
succeeding year'' were a reference to
``elections for Federal office occurring held
in 2022 or each succeeding year'', but only
with respect to paragraph (3)(B)(iii)(II) of
subsection (a) (relating to nonmanual casting
of the durable paper ballot).
SEC. 301A. PRE-ELECTION REPORTS ON VOTING SYSTEM USAGE.
(a) Requiring States to Submit Reports.--Not later than 120
days before the date of each regularly scheduled general
election for Federal office, the chief State election official
of a State shall submit a report to the Commission containing a
detailed voting system usage plan for each jurisdiction in the
State which will administer the election, including a detailed
plan for the usage of electronic poll books and other equipment
and components of such system.
(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall apply with respect
to the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office
held in November 2020 and each succeeding regularly scheduled
general election for Federal office.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 303. COMPUTERIZED STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION LIST REQUIREMENTS
AND REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTERS WHO REGISTER BY MAIL.
(a) Computerized Statewide Voter Registration List
Requirements.--
(1) Implementation.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), each State, acting through
the chief State election official, shall
implement, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory
manner, a single, uniform, official,
centralized, interactive computerized statewide
voter registration list defined, maintained,
and administered at the State level that
contains the name and registration information
of every legally registered voter in the State
and assigns a unique identifier to each legally
registered voter in the State (in this
subsection referred to as the ``computerized
list''), and includes the following:
(i) The computerized list shall serve
as the single system for storing and
managing the official list of
registered voters throughout the State.
(ii) The computerized list contains
the name and registration information
of every legally registered voter in
the State.
(iii) Under the computerized list, a
unique identifier is assigned to each
legally registered voter in the State.
(iv) The computerized list shall be
coordinated with other agency databases
within the State.
(v) Any election official in the
State, including any local election
official, may obtain immediate
electronic access to the information
contained in the computerized list.
(vi) All voter registration
information obtained by any local
election official in the State shall be
electronically entered into the
computerized list on an expedited basis
at the time the information is provided
to the local official.
(vii) The chief State election
official shall provide such support as
may be required so that local election
officials are able to enter information
as described in clause (vi).
(viii) The computerized list shall
serve as the official voter
registration list for the conduct of
all elections for Federal office in the
State.
(B) Exception.--The requirement under
subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a State in
which, under a State law in effect continuously
on and after the date of the enactment of this
Act, there is no voter registration requirement
for individuals in the State with respect to
elections for Federal office.
(2) Computerized list maintenance.--
(A) In general.--The appropriate State or
local election official shall perform list
maintenance with respect to the computerized
list on a regular basis as follows:
(i) If an individual is to be removed
from the computerized list, such
individual shall be removed in
accordance with the provisions of the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993
(42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq.), including
subsections (a)(4), (c)(2), (d), and
(e) of section 8 of such Act (42 U.S.C.
1973gg-6).
(ii) For purposes of removing names
of ineligible voters from the official
list of eligible voters--
(I) under section 8(a)(3)(B)
of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-
6(a)(3)(B)), the State shall
coordinate the computerized
list with State agency records
on felony status; and
(II) by reason of the death
of the registrant under section
8(a)(4)(A) of such Act (42
U.S.C. 1973gg-6(a)(4)(A)), the
State shall coordinate the
computerized list with State
agency records on death.
(iii) Notwithstanding the preceding
provisions of this subparagraph, if a
State is described in section 4(b) of
the National Voter Registration Act of
1993 (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-2(b)), that
State shall remove the names of
ineligible voters from the computerized
list in accordance with State law.
(B) Conduct.--The list maintenance performed
under subparagraph (A) shall be conducted in a
manner that ensures that--
(i) the name of each registered voter
appears in the computerized list;
(ii) only voters who are not
registered or who are not eligible to
vote are removed from the computerized
list; and
(iii) duplicate names are eliminated
from the computerized list.
(3) Technological security of computerized list.--The
appropriate State or local official shall provide
adequate technological security measures to prevent the
unauthorized access to the computerized list
established under this section[.], as well as other
measures to prevent and deter cybersecurity incidents,
as identified by the Commission, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, and the Technical Guidelines
Development Committee.
(4) Minimum standard for accuracy of state voter
registration records.--The State election system shall
include provisions to ensure that voter registration
records in the State are accurate and are updated
regularly, including the following:
(A) A system of file maintenance that makes a
reasonable effort to remove registrants who are
ineligible to vote from the official list of
eligible voters. Under such system, consistent
with the National Voter Registration Act of
1993 (42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq.), registrants
who have not responded to a notice and who have
not voted in 2 consecutive general elections
for Federal office shall be removed from the
official list of eligible voters, except that
no registrant may be removed solely by reason
of a failure to vote.
(B) Safeguards to ensure that eligible voters
are not removed in error from the official list
of eligible voters.
(5) Verification of voter registration information.--
(A) Requiring provision of certain
information by applicants.--
(i) In general.--Except as provided
in clause (ii), notwithstanding any
other provision of law, an application
for voter registration for an election
for Federal office may not be accepted
or processed by a State unless the
application includes--
(I) in the case of an
applicant who has been issued a
current and valid driver's
license, the applicant's
driver's license number; or
(II) in the case of any other
applicant (other than an
applicant to whom clause (ii)
applies), the last 4 digits of
the applicant's social security
number.
(ii) Special rule for applicants
without driver's license or social
security number.--If an applicant for
voter registration for an election for
Federal office has not been issued a
current and valid driver's license or a
social security number, the State shall
assign the applicant a number which
will serve to identify the applicant
for voter registration purposes. To the
extent that the State has a
computerized list in effect under this
subsection and the list assigns unique
identifying numbers to registrants, the
number assigned under this clause shall
be the unique identifying number
assigned under the list.
(iii) Determination of validity of
numbers provided.--The State shall
determine whether the information
provided by an individual is sufficient
to meet the requirements of this
subparagraph, in accordance with State
law.
(B) Requirements for state officials.--
(i) Sharing information in
databases.--The chief State election
official and the official responsible
for the State motor vehicle authority
of a State shall enter into an
agreement to match information in the
database of the statewide voter
registration system with information in
the database of the motor vehicle
authority to the extent required to
enable each such official to verify the
accuracy of the information provided on
applications for voter registration.
(ii) Agreements with commissioner of
social security.--The official
responsible for the State motor vehicle
authority shall enter into an agreement
with the Commissioner of Social
Security under section 205(r)(8) of the
Social Security Act (as added by
subparagraph (C)).
(C) Access to federal information.--Section
205(r) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
405(r)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new paragraph:
``(8)(A) The Commissioner of Social Security shall, upon the
request of the official responsible for a State driver's
license agency pursuant to the Help America Vote Act of 2002--
``(i) enter into an agreement with such
official for the purpose of verifying
applicable information, so long as the
requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
paragraph (3) are met; and
``(ii) include in such agreement safeguards
to assure the maintenance of the
confidentiality of any applicable information
disclosed and procedures to permit such agency
to use the applicable information for the
purpose of maintaining its records.
``(B) Information provided pursuant to an agreement
under this paragraph shall be provided at such time, in
such place, and in such manner as the Commissioner
determines appropriate.
``(C) The Commissioner shall develop methods to
verify the accuracy of information provided by the
agency with respect to applications for voter
registration, for whom the last 4 digits of a social
security number are provided instead of a driver's
license number.
``(D) For purposes of this paragraph--
``(i) the term `applicable information' means
information regarding whether--
``(I) the name (including the first
name and any family forename or
surname), the date of birth (including
the month, day, and year), and social
security number of an individual
provided to the Commissioner match the
information contained in the
Commissioner's records, and
``(II) such individual is shown on
the records of the Commissioner as
being deceased; and
``(ii) the term `State driver's license
agency' means the State agency which issues
driver's licenses to individuals within the
State and maintains records relating to such
licensure.
``(E) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to
require the provision of applicable information with
regard to a request for a record of an individual if
the Commissioner determines there are exceptional
circumstances warranting an exception (such as safety
of the individual or interference with an
investigation).
``(F) Applicable information provided by the
Commission pursuant to an agreement under this
paragraph or by an individual to any agency that has
entered into an agreement under this paragraph shall be
considered as strictly confidential and shall be used
only for the purposes described in this paragraph and
for carrying out an agreement under this paragraph. Any
officer or employee or former officer or employee of a
State, or any officer or employee or former officer or
employee of a contractor of a State who, without the
written authority of the Commissioner, publishes or
communicates any applicable information in such
individual's possession by reason of such employment or
position as such an officer, shall be guilty of a
felony and upon conviction thereof shall be fined or
imprisoned, or both, as described in section 208.''.
(D) Special rule for certain states.--In the
case of a State which is permitted to use
social security numbers, and provides for the
use of social security numbers, on applications
for voter registration, in accordance with
section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C.
552a note), the provisions of this paragraph
shall be optional.
(b) Requirements for Voters Who Register by Mail.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding section 6(c) of the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C.
1973gg-4(c)) and subject to paragraph (3), a State
shall, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,
require an individual to meet the requirements of
paragraph (2) if--
(A) the individual registered to vote in a
jurisdiction by mail; and
(B)(i) the individual has not previously
voted in an election for Federal office in the
State; or
(ii) the individual has not previously voted
in such an election in the jurisdiction and the
jurisdiction is located in a State that does
not have a computerized list that complies with
the requirements of subsection (a).
(2) Requirements.--
(A) In general.--An individual meets the
requirements of this paragraph if the
individual--
(i) in the case of an individual who
votes in person--
(I) presents to the
appropriate State or local
election official a current and
valid photo identification; or
(II) presents to the
appropriate State or local
election official a copy of a
current utility bill, bank
statement, government check,
paycheck, or other government
document that shows the name
and address of the voter; or
(ii) in the case of an individual who
votes by mail, submits with the
ballot--
(I) a copy of a current and
valid photo identification; or
(II) a copy of a current
utility bill, bank statement,
government check, paycheck, or
other government document that
shows the name and address of
the voter.
(B) Fail-safe voting.--
(i) In person.--An individual who
desires to vote in person, but who does
not meet the requirements of
subparagraph (A)(i), may cast a
provisional ballot under section
302(a).
(ii) By mail.--An individual who
desires to vote by mail but who does
not meet the requirements of
subparagraph (A)(ii) may cast such a
ballot by mail and the ballot shall be
counted as a provisional ballot in
accordance with section 302(a).
(3) Inapplicability.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply
in the case of a person--
(A) who registers to vote by mail under
section 6 of the National Voter Registration
Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-4) and submits as
part of such registration either--
(i) a copy of a current and valid
photo identification; or
(ii) a copy of a current utility
bill, bank statement, government check,
paycheck, or government document that
shows the name and address of the
voter;
(B)(i) who registers to vote by mail under
section 6 of the National Voter Registration
Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-4) and submits
with such registration either--
(I) a driver's license number; or
(II) at least the last 4 digits of
the individual's social security
number; and
(ii) with respect to whom a State or local
election official matches the information
submitted under clause (i) with an existing
State identification record bearing the same
number, name and date of birth as provided in
such registration; or
(C) who is--
(i) entitled to vote by absentee
ballot under the Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act (42 U.S.C.
1973ff-1 et seq.);
(ii) provided the right to vote
otherwise than in person under section
3(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Voting
Accessibility for the Elderly and
Handicapped Act (42 U.S.C. 1973ee-
1(b)(2)(B)(ii)); or
(iii) entitled to vote otherwise than
in person under any other Federal law.
(4) Contents of mail-in registration form.--
(A) In general.--The mail voter registration
form developed under section 6 of the National
Voter Registration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C.
1973gg-4) shall include the following:
(i) The question ``Are you a citizen
of the United States of America?'' and
boxes for the applicant to check to
indicate whether the applicant is or is
not a citizen of the United States.
(ii) The question ``Will you be 18
years of age on or before election
day?'' and boxes for the applicant to
check to indicate whether or not the
applicant will be 18 years of age or
older on election day.
(iii) The statement ``If you
checked`no'in response to either of
these questions, do not complete this
form.''.
(iv) A statement informing the
individual that if the form is
submitted by mail and the individual is
registering for the first time, the
appropriate information required under
this section must be submitted with the
mail-in registration form in order to
avoid the additional identification
requirements upon voting for the first
time.
(B) Incomplete forms.--If an applicant for
voter registration fails to answer the question
included on the mail voter registration form
pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i), the registrar
shall notify the applicant of the failure and
provide the applicant with an opportunity to
complete the form in a timely manner to allow
for the completion of the registration form
prior to the next election for Federal office
(subject to State law).
(5) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to require a State that was not required
to comply with a provision of the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq.)
before the date of the enactment of this Act to comply
with such a provision after such date.
(c) Permitted Use of Last 4 Digits of Social Security
Numbers.--The last 4 digits of a social security number
described in subsections (a)(5)(A)(i)(II) and (b)(3)(B)(i)(II)
shall not be considered to be a social security number for
purposes of section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a
note).
(d) Effective Date.--
(1) Computerized statewide voter registration list
requirements.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), each State and jurisdiction
shall be required to comply with the
requirements of subsection (a) on and after
January 1, 2004.
(B) Waiver.--If a State or jurisdiction
certifies to the Commission not later than
January 1, 2004, that the State or jurisdiction
will not meet the deadline described in
subparagraph (A) for good cause and includes in
the certification the reasons for the failure
to meet such deadline, subparagraph (A) shall
apply to the State or jurisdiction as if the
reference in such subparagraph to ``January 1,
2004'' were a reference to ``January 1, 2006''.
(2) Requirement for voters who register by mail.--
(A) In general.--Each State and jurisdiction
shall be required to comply with the
requirements of subsection (b) on and after
January 1, 2004, and shall be prepared to
receive registration materials submitted by
individuals described in subparagraph (B) on
and after the date described in such
subparagraph.
(B) Applicability with respect to
individuals.--The provisions of subsection (b)
shall apply to any individual who registers to
vote on or after January 1, 2003.
SEC. 303A. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Risk-limiting audit.--The term ``risk-limiting
audit'' means, with respect to any election contest, a
post-election process that--
(A) has a probability of at least 95 percent
of correcting the reported outcome if the
reported outcome is not the correct outcome;
(B) will not change the outcome if the
reported outcome is the correct outcome; and
(C) involves a manual adjudication of voter
intent from some or all of the ballots validly
cast in the election contest.
(2) Reported outcome; correct outcome; outcome.--
(A) Reported outcome.--The term ``reported
outcome'' means the outcome of an election
contest which is determined according to the
canvass and which will become the official,
certified outcome unless it is revised by an
audit, recount, or other legal process.
(B) Correct outcome.--The term ``correct
outcome'' means the outcome that would be
determined by a manual adjudication of voter
intent for all votes validly cast in the
election contest.
(C) Outcome.--The term ``outcome'' means the
winner or set of winners of an election
contest.
(3) Manual adjudication of voter intent.--The term
``manual adjudication of voter intent'' means direct
inspection and determination by humans, without
assistance from electronic or mechanical tabulation
devices, of the ballot choices marked by voters on each
voter-verified paper record.
(4) Ballot manifest.--The term ``ballot manifest''
means a record maintained by each jurisdiction that--
(A) is created without reliance on any part
of the voting system used to tabulate votes;
(B) functions as a sampling frame for
conducting a risk-limiting audit; and
(C) accounts for all ballots validly cast
regardless of how or whether they were
tabulated and includes a precise description of
the manner in which the ballots are physically
stored, including the total number of physical
groups of ballots, the numbering system for
each group, a unique label for each group, and
the number of ballots in each such group.
(b) Requirements.--
(1) In general.--
(A) Audits.--
(i) In general.--Each State and
jurisdiction shall administer risk-
limiting audits of the results of all
election contests for Federal office
held in the State in accordance with
the requirements of paragraph (2).
(ii) Exception.--Clause (i) shall not
apply to any election contest for which
the State or jurisdiction conducts a
full recount through a manual
adjudication of voter intent.
(B) Full manual tabulation.--If a risk-
limiting audit conducted under subparagraph (A)
corrects the reported outcome of an election
contest, the State or jurisdiction shall use
the results of the manual adjudication of voter
intent conducted as part of the risk-limiting
audit as the official results of the election
contest.
(2) Audit requirements.--
(A) Rules and procedures.--
(i) In general.--Not later than 1
year after the date of the enactment of
this section, the chief State election
official of the State shall establish
rules and procedures for conducting
risk-limiting audits.
(ii) Matters included.--The rules and
procedures established under clause (i)
shall include the following:
(I) Rules and procedures for
ensuring the security of
ballots and documenting that
prescribed procedures were
followed.
(II) Rules and procedures for
ensuring the accuracy of ballot
manifests produced by
jurisdictions.
(III) Rules and procedures
for governing the format of
ballot manifests and other data
involved in risk-limiting
audits.
(IV) Methods to ensure that
any cast vote records used in a
risk-limiting audit are those
used by the voting system to
tally the results of the
election contest sent to the
chief State election official
of the State and made public.
(V) Rules and procedures for
the random selection of ballots
to be inspected manually during
each audit.
(VI) Rules and procedures for
the calculations and other
methods to be used in the audit
and to determine whether and
when the audit of each election
contest is complete.
(VII) Rules and procedures
for testing any software used
to conduct risk-limiting
audits.
(B) Public report.--
(i) In general.--After the completion
of the risk-limiting audit and at least
5 days before the election contest is
certified, the State shall publish a
report on the results of the audit,
together with such information as
necessary to confirm that the audit was
conducted properly.
(ii) Format of data.--All data
published with the report under clause
(i) shall be published in machine-
readable, open data formats.
(iii) Protection of anonymity of
votes.--Information and data published
by the State under this subparagraph
shall not compromise the anonymity of
votes.
(c) Effective Date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be
required to comply with the requirements of this section for
the first regularly scheduled election for Federal office held
more than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the
Securing America's Federal Elections Act and for each
subsequent election for Federal office.
* * * * * * *
TITLE IV--ENFORCEMENT
SEC. 401. ACTIONS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
The Attorney General may bring a civil action against any
State or jurisdiction in an appropriate United States District
Court for such declaratory and injunctive relief (including a
temporary restraining order, a permanent or temporary
injunction, or other order) as may be necessary to carry out
the uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and
administration requirements under sections 301, 302, [and 303]
303, and 303A.
* * * * * * *
TITLE IX--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
[SEC. 901. STATE DEFINED.
[In this Act, the term ``State'' includes the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American
Samoa, and the United States Virgin Islands.]
SEC. 901. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act, the following definitions apply:
(1) The term ``cybersecurity incident'' has the
meaning given the term ``incident'' in section 227 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 148).
(2) The term ``election agency'' means any component
of a State, or any component of a unit of local
government in a State, which is responsible for the
administration of elections for Federal office in the
State.
(3) The term ``election infrastructure'' means
storage facilities, polling places, and centralized
vote tabulation locations used to support the
administration of elections for public office, as well
as related information and communications technology,
including voter registration databases, voting
machines, electronic mail and other communications
systems (including electronic mail and other systems of
vendors who have entered into contracts with election
agencies to support the administration of elections,
manage the election process, and report and display
election results), and other systems used to manage the
election process and to report and display election
results on behalf of an election agency.
(4) The term ``State'' means each of the several
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States
Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands.
* * * * * * *
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEW
The Republicans of the Committee on House Administration
believe the integrity of our nation's elections and election
infrastructure is of the utmost importance. This should not be
a partisan issue. Unfortunately, the Majority, under pressure
from its leadership, stepped away from bipartisan discussions
for a joint election security bill. They rushed this partisan
election security bill to a House Administration Committee
markup in just over 48-hours, despite not having been
considered in a Committee hearing, while a premature notice for
a House Rules Committee hearing was released before the bill
was voted out of Committee.
Democrats seem to believe burdensome and ineffective
federal mandates, combined with an egregious amount of taxpayer
funds, will solve the problems within election security.
Unfortunately, this bill does very little to further secure our
election systems and its proposed policies only hurt the state
and local election officials it claims to help. Federally
mandating the use of paper ballots and manual hand counts is a
step backward for this country and erases all the hard work of
state and local election officials across this country.
Additionally, the Democrats are blindly committing $1.3 billion
over the course of 10 years. The Majority fails to remember
that the funding of elections is the primary responsibility of
the states.
Republicans introduced six amendments in the committee
markup, including the requirement of a 25% funding match from
states, which would force states receiving funds to have their
own skin-in-the-game; prohibiting the practice of ballot
harvestings; and introduced H.R. 3412, the Election Security
Assistance Act, which provides states the resources they need
to secure their elections, instead of burdensome and
ineffective federal mandates. Democrats rejected all six of the
Republicans' amendments.
Rodney Davis.
