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116th Congress }                                         { Rept. 116-129
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session   }                                         {    Part 1

======================================================================

 
                SECURING AMERICA'S FEDERAL ELECTIONS ACT

                                _______
                                

 June 26, 2019.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

       Ms. Lofgren, from the Committee of the Committee on House 
                Administration, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                           SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 2722]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on House Administration, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 2722) to protect elections for public office by 
providing financial support and enhanced security for the 
infrastructure used to carry out such elections, and for other 
purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon 
with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do 
pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Amendment........................................................     2
Purpose and Summary..............................................    19
Background and Need for Legislation..............................    20
Hearings.........................................................    29
Committee Consideration..........................................    30
Committee Votes..................................................    30
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    32
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............    32
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures    32
Earmarks and Tax and Tariff Benefits.............................    32
Committee Cost Estimate..........................................    32
Congressional Budget Office Estimate.............................    32
Federal Mandates Statement.......................................    35
Non-Duplication of Federal Programs..............................    35
Advisory Committee Statement.....................................    35
Applicability to Legislative Branch..............................    35
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation...................    35
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    46
Supplemental Views...............................................    88

                               Amendment

    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Securing America's 
Federal Elections Act'' or the ``SAFE Act''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

         TITLE I--FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE

         Subtitle A--Voting System Security Improvement Grants

   Part 1--Promoting Accuracy, Integrity, and Security Through Voter-
                    Verified Permanent Paper Ballot

Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Paper ballot and manual counting requirements.
Sec. 103. Accessibility and ballot verification for individuals with 
disabilities.
Sec. 104. Durability and readability requirements for ballots.
Sec. 105. Paper ballot printing requirements.
Sec. 106. Study and report on optimal ballot design.
Sec. 107. Effective date for new requirements.

                Part 2--Grants to Carry Out Improvements

Sec. 111. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems 
and carrying out voting system security improvements.
Sec. 112. Coordination of voting system security activities with use of 
requirements payments and election administration requirements under 
Help America Vote Act of 2002.
Sec. 113. Incorporation of definitions.

                    Subtitle B--Risk-Limiting Audits

Sec. 121. Risk-limiting audits.
Sec. 122. Funding for conducting post-election risk-limiting audits.
Sec. 123. GAO analysis of effects of audits.

  TITLE II--PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY THROUGH IMPROVEMENTS IN ELECTION 
                             ADMINISTRATION

Sec. 201. Voting system cybersecurity requirements.
Sec. 202. Testing of existing voting systems to ensure compliance with 
election cybersecurity guidelines and other guidelines.
Sec. 203. Requiring use of software and hardware for which information 
is disclosed by manufacturer.
Sec. 204. Treatment of electronic poll books as part of voting systems.
Sec. 205. Pre-election reports on voting system usage.
Sec. 206. Streamlining collection of election information.

  TITLE III--USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES

Sec. 301. Use of voting machines manufactured in the United States.

                         TITLE IV--SEVERABILITY

Sec. 401. Severability.

         TITLE I--FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE

         Subtitle A--Voting System Security Improvement Grants

   PART 1--PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-
                    VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

  This subtitle may be cited as the ``Voter Confidence and Increased 
Accessibility Act of 2019''.

SEC. 102. PAPER BALLOT AND MANUAL COUNTING REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) In General.--Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote Act of 
2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows:
          ``(2) Paper ballot requirement.--
                  ``(A) Voter-verified paper ballots.--
                          ``(i) Paper ballot requirement.--(I) The 
                        voting system shall require the use of an 
                        individual, durable, voter-verified paper 
                        ballot of the voter's vote that shall be marked 
                        and made available for inspection and 
                        verification by the voter before the voter's 
                        vote is cast and counted, and which shall be 
                        counted by hand or read by an optical character 
                        recognition device or other counting device. 
                        For purposes of this subclause, the term 
                        `individual, durable, voter-verified paper 
                        ballot' means a paper ballot marked by the 
                        voter by hand or a paper ballot marked through 
                        the use of a nontabulating ballot marking 
                        device or system, so long as the voter shall 
                        have the option to mark his or her ballot by 
                        hand.
                          ``(II) The voting system shall provide the 
                        voter with an opportunity to correct any error 
                        on the paper ballot before the permanent voter-
                        verified paper ballot is preserved in 
                        accordance with clause (ii).
                          ``(III) The voting system shall not preserve 
                        the voter-verified paper ballots in any manner 
                        that makes it possible, at any time after the 
                        ballot has been cast, to associate a voter with 
                        the record of the voter's vote without the 
                        voter's consent.
                          ``(ii) Preservation as official record.--The 
                        individual, durable, voter-verified paper 
                        ballot used in accordance with clause (i) shall 
                        constitute the official ballot and shall be 
                        preserved and used as the official ballot for 
                        purposes of any recount or audit conducted with 
                        respect to any election for Federal office in 
                        which the voting system is used.
                          ``(iii) Manual counting requirements for 
                        recounts and audits.--(I) Each paper ballot 
                        used pursuant to clause (i) shall be suitable 
                        for a manual audit, and shall be counted by 
                        hand in any recount or audit conducted with 
                        respect to any election for Federal office.
                          ``(II) In the event of any inconsistencies or 
                        irregularities between any electronic vote 
                        tallies and the vote tallies determined by 
                        counting by hand the individual, durable, 
                        voter-verified paper ballots used pursuant to 
                        clause (i), and subject to subparagraph (B), 
                        the individual, durable, voter-verified paper 
                        ballots shall be the true and correct record of 
                        the votes cast.
                          ``(iv) Application to all ballots.--The 
                        requirements of this subparagraph shall apply 
                        to all ballots cast in elections for Federal 
                        office, including ballots cast by absent 
                        uniformed services voters and overseas voters 
                        under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
                        Absentee Voting Act and other absentee voters.
                  ``(B) Special rule for treatment of disputes when 
                paper ballots have been shown to be compromised.--
                          ``(i) In general.--In the event that--
                                  ``(I) there is any inconsistency 
                                between any electronic vote tallies and 
                                the vote tallies determined by counting 
                                by hand the individual, durable, voter-
                                verified paper ballots used pursuant to 
                                subparagraph (A)(i) with respect to any 
                                election for Federal office; and
                                  ``(II) it is demonstrated by clear 
                                and convincing evidence (as determined 
                                in accordance with the applicable 
                                standards in the jurisdiction involved) 
                                in any recount, audit, or contest of 
                                the result of the election that the 
                                paper ballots have been compromised (by 
                                damage or mischief or otherwise) and 
                                that a sufficient number of the ballots 
                                have been so compromised that the 
                                result of the election could be 
                                changed,
                        the determination of the appropriate remedy 
                        with respect to the election shall be made in 
                        accordance with applicable State law, except 
                        that the electronic tally shall not be used as 
                        the exclusive basis for determining the 
                        official certified result.
                          ``(ii) Rule for consideration of ballots 
                        associated with each voting machine.--For 
                        purposes of clause (i), only the paper ballots 
                        deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered 
                        in the calculation of whether or not the result 
                        of the election could be changed due to the 
                        compromised paper ballots.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendment Clarifying Applicability of Alternative 
Language Accessibility.--Section 301(a)(4) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 
21081(a)(4)) is amended by inserting ``(including the paper ballots 
required to be used under paragraph (2))'' after ``voting system''.
  (c) Other Conforming Amendments.--Section 301(a)(1) of such Act (52 
U.S.C. 21081(a)(1)) is amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ``counted'' and 
        inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 
        (3)'';
          (2) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``counted'' and 
        inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 
        (3)'';
          (3) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking ``counted'' each 
        place it appears and inserting ``counted, in accordance with 
        paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and
          (4) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``counted'' and 
        inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 
        (3)''.

SEC. 103. ACCESSIBILITY AND BALLOT VERIFICATION FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH 
                    DISABILITIES.

  (a) Ballot Cybersecurity, Confidentiality, and Access for Individuals 
With Disabilities.--
          (1) In general.--Section 301(a)(3)(B) of the Help America 
        Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read 
        as follows:
                  ``(B)(i) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) 
                through the use of at least 1 voting system at each 
                polling place that--
                          ``(I) is equipped for individuals with 
                        disabilities, including nonvisual and enhanced 
                        visual accessibility for the blind and visually 
                        impaired, and contains features to support 
                        enhanced manual accessibility for the mobility 
                        and dexterity impaired;
                          ``(II) in the case of any election for 
                        Federal office occurring after the date that is 
                        6 years after the date of the enactment of the 
                        Securing America's Federal Elections Act--
                                  ``(aa) marks ballots that are 
                                identical in size, ink, and paper stock 
                                to those ballots that would be marked 
                                by hand or a ballot marking device used 
                                by voters who do not have accessibility 
                                needs;
                                  ``(bb) marks the ballot in such a way 
                                that someone examining the ballot will 
                                not be able to readily determine 
                                whether the ballot was marked by hand 
                                or machine; and
                                  ``(cc) combines ballots produced by 
                                the voting system with ballots marked 
                                by voters using other types of voting 
                                systems used by the State or 
                                jurisdiction in a way that prevents 
                                identification of which ballots were 
                                cast using each voting system; and
                          ``(III) is made available for use by any 
                        voter who requests to use it; and
                  ``(ii) in the case of any election for Federal office 
                occurring after the date that is 6 years after the date 
                of the enactment of the Securing America's Federal 
                Elections Act, meet the requirements of subparagraph 
                (A) and paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that allows 
                the voter to privately and independently verify the 
                accuracy of the permanent paper ballot through the 
                presentation, in accessible form, of the printed or 
                marked vote selections from the same printed or marked 
                information that would be used for any vote tabulation 
                or auditing; and''.
          (2) Clarification with respect to application of requirement 
        to ballots marked at home.--Section 301(a)(3) of such Act (52 
        U.S.C. 21081(a)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the 
        following new flush sentence:
        ``Nothing in subparagraph (B) shall be construed to prohibit 
        the use of an accessible ballot that may be printed or marked 
        by the voter at home.''.
  (b) Specific Requirement of Study, Testing, and Development of 
Accessible Paper Ballot Verification Mechanisms.--
          (1) Study and reporting.--Subtitle C of title II of such Act 
        (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended--
                  (A) by redesignating section 247 as section 248; and
                  (B) by inserting after section 246 the following new 
                section:

``SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE PAPER BALLOT VERIFICATION 
                    MECHANISMS.

  ``(a) Study and Report.--The Director of the National Science 
Foundation shall make grants to not fewer than 3 eligible entities to 
study, test, and develop accessible paper ballot voting, verification, 
and casting mechanisms and devices and best practices to enhance the 
accessibility of paper ballot voting and verification mechanisms for 
individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary language is not 
English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy, including best 
practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes through which 
the mechanisms are used.
  ``(b) Eligibility.--An entity is eligible to receive a grant under 
this part if it submits to the Director (at such time and in such form 
as the Director may require) an application containing--
          ``(1) certifications that the entity shall specifically 
        investigate enhanced methods or devices, including non-
        electronic devices, that will assist such individuals and 
        voters in marking voter-verified paper ballots and presenting 
        or transmitting the information printed or marked on such 
        ballots back to such individuals and voters, and casting such 
        ballots;
          ``(2) a certification that the entity shall complete the 
        activities carried out with the grant not later than December 
        31, 2020; and
          ``(3) such other information and certifications as the 
        Director may require.
  ``(c) Availability of Technology.--Any technology developed with the 
grants made under this section shall be treated as non-proprietary and 
shall be made available to the public, including to manufacturers of 
voting systems.
  ``(d) Coordination With Grants for Technology Improvements.--The 
Director shall carry out this section so that the activities carried 
out with the grants made under subsection (a) are coordinated with the 
research conducted under the grant program carried out by the 
Commission under section 271, to the extent that the Director and 
Commission determine necessary to provide for the advancement of 
accessible voting technology.
  ``(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $5,000,000, to remain 
available until expended.''.
          (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is 
        amended--
                  (A) by redesignating the item relating to section 247 
                as relating to section 248; and
                  (B) by inserting after the item relating to section 
                246 the following new item:

``Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible paper ballot verification 
mechanisms.''.

  (c) Clarification of Accessibility Standards Under Voluntary Voting 
System Guidance.--In adopting any voluntary guidance under subtitle B 
of title III of the Help America Vote Act with respect to the 
accessibility of the paper ballot verification requirements for 
individuals with disabilities, the Election Assistance Commission shall 
include and apply the same accessibility standards applicable under the 
voluntary guidance adopted for accessible voting systems under such 
subtitle.
  (d) Permitting Use of Funds for Protection and Advocacy Systems to 
Support Actions to Enforce Election-related Disability Access.--Section 
292(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21062(a)) is 
amended by striking ``; except that'' and all that follows and 
inserting a period.

SEC. 104. DURABILITY AND READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR BALLOTS.

  Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 
21081(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
          ``(7) Durability and readability requirements for ballots.--
                  ``(A) Durability requirements for paper ballots.--
                          ``(i) In general.--All voter-verified paper 
                        ballots required to be used under this Act 
                        shall be marked or printed on durable paper.
                          ``(ii) Definition.--For purposes of this Act, 
                        paper is `durable' if it is capable of 
                        withstanding multiple counts and recounts by 
                        hand without compromising the fundamental 
                        integrity of the ballots, and capable of 
                        retaining the information marked or printed on 
                        them for the full duration of a retention and 
                        preservation period of 22 months.
                  ``(B) Readability requirements for paper ballots 
                marked by ballot marking device.--All voter-verified 
                paper ballots completed by the voter through the use of 
                a ballot marking device shall be clearly readable by 
                the voter without assistance (other than eyeglasses or 
                other personal vision enhancing devices) and by an 
                optical character recognition device or other device 
                equipped for individuals with disabilities.''.

SEC. 105. PAPER BALLOT PRINTING REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) Requiring Paper Ballots to Be Printed on Recycled Paper 
Manufactured in United States.--Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote 
Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104, is amended 
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
          ``(8) Printing requirements for ballots.--All paper ballots 
        used in an election for Federal office shall be printed in the 
        United States on recycled paper manufactured in the United 
        States.''.
  (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply 
with respect to elections occurring on or after January 1, 2021.

SEC. 106. STUDY AND REPORT ON OPTIMAL BALLOT DESIGN.

  (a) Study.--The Election Assistance Commission shall conduct a study 
of the best ways to design ballots used in elections for public office, 
including paper ballots and electronic or digital ballots, to minimize 
confusion and user errors.
  (b) Report.--Not later than January 1, 2020, the Election Assistance 
Commission shall submit to Congress a report on the study conducted 
under subsection (a).

SEC. 107. EFFECTIVE DATE FOR NEW REQUIREMENTS.

  Section 301(d) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 
21081(d)) is amended to read as follows:
  ``(d) Effective Date.--
          ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), each 
        State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the 
        requirements of this section on and after January 1, 2006.
          ``(2) Special rule for certain requirements.--
                  ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in section 
                105(b) of the Securing America's Federal Elections Act 
                and subparagraphs (B) and (C), the requirements of this 
                section which are first imposed on a State and 
                jurisdiction pursuant to the amendments made by the 
                Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 
                2019 shall apply with respect to voting systems used 
                for any election for Federal office held in 2020 or any 
                succeeding year.
                  ``(B) Delay for jurisdictions using certain paper 
                record printers or certain systems using or producing 
                voter-verified paper records in 2018.--
                          ``(i) Delay.--In the case of a jurisdiction 
                        described in clause (ii), subparagraph (A) 
                        shall apply to a voting system in the 
                        jurisdiction as if the reference in such 
                        subparagraph to `2020' were a reference to 
                        `2022', but only with respect to the following 
                        requirements of this section:
                                  ``(I) Paragraph (2)(A)(i)(I) of 
                                subsection (a) (relating to the use of 
                                voter-verified paper ballots).
                                  ``(II) Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) and 
                                (II) of subsection (a) (relating to 
                                access to verification from and casting 
                                of the durable paper ballot).
                                  ``(III) Paragraph (7) of subsection 
                                (a) (relating to durability and 
                                readability requirements for ballots).
                          ``(ii) Jurisdictions described.--A 
                        jurisdiction described in this clause is a 
                        jurisdiction--
                                  ``(I) which used voter-verified paper 
                                record printers attached to direct 
                                recording electronic voting machines, 
                                or which used other voting systems that 
                                used or produced paper records of the 
                                vote verifiable by voters but that are 
                                not in compliance with paragraphs 
                                (2)(A)(i)(I), (3)(B)(iii)(I) and (II), 
                                and (7) of subsection (a) (as amended 
                                or added by the Voter Confidence and 
                                Increased Accessibility Act of 2019), 
                                for the administration of the regularly 
                                scheduled general election for Federal 
                                office held in November 2018; and
                                  ``(II) which will continue to use 
                                such printers or systems for the 
                                administration of elections for Federal 
                                office held in years before 2022.
                          ``(iii) Mandatory availability of paper 
                        ballots at polling places using grandfathered 
                        printers and systems.--
                                  ``(I) Requiring ballots to be offered 
                                and provided.--The appropriate election 
                                official at each polling place that 
                                uses a printer or system described in 
                                clause (ii)(I) for the administration 
                                of elections for Federal office shall 
                                offer each individual who is eligible 
                                to cast a vote in the election at the 
                                polling place the opportunity to cast 
                                the vote using a blank pre-printed 
                                paper ballot which the individual may 
                                mark by hand and which is not produced 
                                by the direct recording electronic 
                                voting machine or other such system. 
                                The official shall provide the 
                                individual with the ballot and the 
                                supplies necessary to mark the ballot, 
                                and shall ensure (to the greatest 
                                extent practicable) that the waiting 
                                period for the individual to cast a 
                                vote is the lesser of 30 minutes or the 
                                average waiting period for an 
                                individual who does not agree to cast 
                                the vote using such a paper ballot 
                                under this clause.
                                  ``(II) Treatment of ballot.--Any 
                                paper ballot which is cast by an 
                                individual under this clause shall be 
                                counted and otherwise treated as a 
                                regular ballot for all purposes 
                                (including by incorporating it into the 
                                final unofficial vote count (as defined 
                                by the State) for the precinct) and not 
                                as a provisional ballot, unless the 
                                individual casting the ballot would 
                                have otherwise been required to cast a 
                                provisional ballot.
                                  ``(III) Posting of notice.--The 
                                appropriate election official shall 
                                ensure there is prominently displayed 
                                at each polling place a notice that 
                                describes the obligation of the 
                                official to offer individuals the 
                                opportunity to cast votes using a pre-
                                printed blank paper ballot.
                                  ``(IV) Training of election 
                                officials.--The chief State election 
                                official shall ensure that election 
                                officials at polling places in the 
                                State are aware of the requirements of 
                                this clause, including the requirement 
                                to display a notice under subclause 
                                (III), and are aware that it is a 
                                violation of the requirements of this 
                                title for an election official to fail 
                                to offer an individual the opportunity 
                                to cast a vote using a blank pre-
                                printed paper ballot.
                                  ``(V) Period of applicability.--The 
                                requirements of this clause apply only 
                                during the period in which the delay is 
                                in effect under clause (i).
                  ``(C) Special rule for jurisdictions using certain 
                nontabulating ballot marking devices.--In the case of a 
                jurisdiction which uses a nontabulating ballot marking 
                device which automatically deposits the ballot into a 
                privacy sleeve, subparagraph (A) shall apply to a 
                voting system in the jurisdiction as if the reference 
                in such subparagraph to `any election for Federal 
                office held in 2020 or any succeeding year' were a 
                reference to `elections for Federal office occurring 
                held in 2022 or each succeeding year', but only with 
                respect to paragraph (3)(B)(iii)(II) of subsection (a) 
                (relating to nonmanual casting of the durable paper 
                ballot).''.

                PART 2--GRANTS TO CARRY OUT IMPROVEMENTS

SEC. 111. GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS 
                    AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY 
                    IMPROVEMENTS.

  (a) Availability of Grants.--Subtitle D of title II of the Help 
America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21001 et seq.) is amended by adding 
at the end the following new part:

 ``PART 7--GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS 
          AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS

``SEC. 297. GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS 
                    AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY 
                    IMPROVEMENTS.

  ``(a) Availability and Use of Grant.--The Commission shall make a 
grant to each eligible State--
          ``(1) to replace a voting system--
                  ``(A) which does not meet the requirements which are 
                first imposed on the State pursuant to the amendments 
                made by the Voter Confidence and Increased 
                Accessibility Act of 2019 with a voting system which 
                does meet such requirements, for use in the regularly 
                scheduled general elections for Federal office held in 
                November 2020, or
                  ``(B) which does meet such requirements but which is 
                not in compliance with the most recent voluntary voting 
                system guidelines issued by the Commission prior to the 
                regularly scheduled general election for Federal office 
                held in November 2020 with another system which does 
                meet such requirements and is in compliance with such 
                guidelines;
          ``(2) to carry out voting system security improvements 
        described in section 297A with respect to the regularly 
        scheduled general elections for Federal office held in November 
        2020 and each succeeding election for Federal office; and
          ``(3) to implement and model best practices for ballot 
        design, ballot instructions, and the testing of ballots.
  ``(b) Amount of Grant.--The amount of a grant made to a State under 
this section shall be such amount as the Commission determines to be 
appropriate, except that such amount may not be less than the product 
of $1 and the average of the number of individuals who cast votes in 
any of the two most recent regularly scheduled general elections for 
Federal office held in the State.
  ``(c) Pro Rata Reductions.--If the amount of funds appropriated for 
grants under this part is insufficient to ensure that each State 
receives the amount of the grant calculated under subsection (b), the 
Commission shall make such pro rata reductions in such amounts as may 
be necessary to ensure that the entire amount appropriated under this 
part is distributed to the States.
  ``(d) Surplus Appropriations.--If the amount of funds appropriated 
for grants authorized under section 297D(a)(2) exceed the amount 
necessary to meet the requirements of subsection (b), the Commission 
shall consider the following in making a determination to award 
remaining funds to a State:
          ``(1) The record of the State in carrying out the following 
        with respect to the administration of elections for Federal 
        office:
                  ``(A) Providing voting machines that are less than 10 
                years old.
                  ``(B) Implementing strong chain of custody procedures 
                for the physical security of voting equipment and paper 
                records at all stages of the process.
                  ``(C) Conducting pre-election testing on every voting 
                machine and ensuring that paper ballots are available 
                wherever electronic machines are used.
                  ``(D) Maintaining offline backups of voter 
                registration lists.
                  ``(E) Providing a secure voter registration database 
                that logs requests submitted to the database.
                  ``(F) Publishing and enforcing a policy detailing use 
                limitations and security safeguards to protect the 
                personal information of voters in the voter 
                registration process.
                  ``(G) Providing secure processes and procedures for 
                reporting vote tallies.
                  ``(H) Providing a secure platform for disseminating 
                vote totals.
          ``(2) Evidence of established conditions of innovation and 
        reform in providing voting system security and the proposed 
        plan of the State for implementing additional conditions.
          ``(3) Evidence of collaboration between relevant 
        stakeholders, including local election officials, in developing 
        the grant implementation plan described in section 297B.
          ``(4) The plan of the State to conduct a rigorous evaluation 
        of the effectiveness of the activities carried out with the 
        grant.
  ``(e) Ability of Replacement Systems to Administer Ranked Choice 
Elections.--To the greatest extent practicable, an eligible State which 
receives a grant to replace a voting system under this section shall 
ensure that the replacement system is capable of administering a system 
of ranked choice voting under which each voter shall rank the 
candidates for the office in the order of the voter's preference.

``SEC. 297A. VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS DESCRIBED.

  ``(a) Permitted Uses.--A voting system security improvement described 
in this section is any of the following:
          ``(1) The acquisition of goods and services from qualified 
        election infrastructure vendors by purchase, lease, or such 
        other arrangements as may be appropriate.
          ``(2) Cyber and risk mitigation training.
          ``(3) A security risk and vulnerability assessment of the 
        State's election infrastructure which is carried out by a 
        provider of cybersecurity services under a contract entered 
        into between the chief State election official and the 
        provider.
          ``(4) The maintenance of election infrastructure, including 
        addressing risks and vulnerabilities which are identified under 
        either of the security risk and vulnerability assessments 
        described in paragraph (3), except that none of the funds 
        provided under this part may be used to renovate or replace a 
        building or facility which is used primarily for purposes other 
        than the administration of elections for public office.
          ``(5) Providing increased technical support for any 
        information technology infrastructure that the chief State 
        election official deems to be part of the State's election 
        infrastructure or designates as critical to the operation of 
        the State's election infrastructure.
          ``(6) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of the 
        information technology infrastructure described in paragraph 
        (4).
          ``(7) Enhancing the cybersecurity of voter registration 
        systems.
  ``(b) Qualified Election Infrastructure Vendors Described.--
          ``(1) In general.--For purposes of this part, a `qualified 
        election infrastructure vendor' is any person who provides, 
        supports, or maintains, or who seeks to provide, support, or 
        maintain, election infrastructure on behalf of a State, unit of 
        local government, or election agency, who meets the criteria 
        described in paragraph (2).
          ``(2) Criteria.--The criteria described in this paragraph are 
        such criteria as the Chairman, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, shall establish and publish, 
        and shall include each of the following requirements:
                  ``(A) The vendor must be owned and controlled by a 
                citizen or permanent resident of the United States.
                  ``(B) The vendor must disclose to the Chairman and 
                the Secretary, and to the chief State election official 
                of any State to which the vendor provides any goods and 
                services with funds provided under this part, of any 
                sourcing outside the United States for parts of the 
                election infrastructure.
                  ``(C) The vendor agrees to ensure that the election 
                infrastructure will be developed and maintained in a 
                manner that is consistent with the cybersecurity best 
                practices issued by the Technical Guidelines 
                Development Committee.
                  ``(D) The vendor agrees to maintain its information 
                technology infrastructure in a manner that is 
                consistent with the cybersecurity best practices issued 
                by the Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
                  ``(E) The vendor agrees to meet the requirements of 
                paragraph (3) with respect to any known or suspected 
                cybersecurity incidents involving any of the goods and 
                services provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant 
                under this part.
                  ``(F) The vendor agrees to permit independent 
                security testing by the Commission (in accordance with 
                section 231(a)) and by the Secretary of the goods and 
                services provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant 
                under this part.
          ``(3) Cybersecurity incident reporting requirements.--
                  ``(A) In general.--A vendor meets the requirements of 
                this paragraph if, upon becoming aware of the 
                possibility that an election cybersecurity incident has 
                occurred involving any of the goods and services 
                provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant under this 
                part--
                          ``(i) the vendor promptly assesses whether or 
                        not such an incident occurred, and submits a 
                        notification meeting the requirements of 
                        subparagraph (B) to the Secretary and the 
                        Chairman of the assessment as soon as 
                        practicable (but in no case later than 3 days 
                        after the vendor first becomes aware of the 
                        possibility that the incident occurred);
                          ``(ii) if the incident involves goods or 
                        services provided to an election agency, the 
                        vendor submits a notification meeting the 
                        requirements of subparagraph (B) to the agency 
                        as soon as practicable (but in no case later 
                        than 3 days after the vendor first becomes 
                        aware of the possibility that the incident 
                        occurred), and cooperates with the agency in 
                        providing any other necessary notifications 
                        relating to the incident; and
                          ``(iii) the vendor provides all necessary 
                        updates to any notification submitted under 
                        clause (i) or clause (ii).
                  ``(B) Contents of notifications.--Each notification 
                submitted under clause (i) or clause (ii) of 
                subparagraph (A) shall contain the following 
                information with respect to any election cybersecurity 
                incident covered by the notification:
                          ``(i) The date, time, and time zone when the 
                        election cybersecurity incident began, if 
                        known.
                          ``(ii) The date, time, and time zone when the 
                        election cybersecurity incident was detected.
                          ``(iii) The date, time, and duration of the 
                        election cybersecurity incident.
                          ``(iv) The circumstances of the election 
                        cybersecurity incident, including the specific 
                        election infrastructure systems believed to 
                        have been accessed and information acquired, if 
                        any.
                          ``(v) Any planned and implemented technical 
                        measures to respond to and recover from the 
                        incident.
                          ``(vi) In the case of any notification which 
                        is an update to a prior notification, any 
                        additional material information relating to the 
                        incident, including technical data, as it 
                        becomes available.

``SEC. 297B. ELIGIBILITY OF STATES.

  ``A State is eligible to receive a grant under this part if the State 
submits to the Commission, at such time and in such form as the 
Commission may require, an application containing--
          ``(1) a description of how the State will use the grant to 
        carry out the activities authorized under this part;
          ``(2) a certification and assurance that, not later than 5 
        years after receiving the grant, the State will carry out 
        voting system security improvements, as described in section 
        297A; and
          ``(3) such other information and assurances as the Commission 
        may require.

``SEC. 297C. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

  ``Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, the 
Commission shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, including the Committees on Homeland Security, House 
Administration, and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and 
the Committees on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the 
Judiciary, and Rules and Administration of the Senate, on the 
activities carried out with the funds provided under this part.

``SEC. 297D. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  ``(a) Authorization.--There are authorized to be appropriated for 
grants under this part--
          ``(1) $600,000,000 for fiscal year 2019; and
          ``(2) $175,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2020, 2022, 
        2024, and 2026.
  ``(b) Continuing Availability of Amounts.--Any amounts appropriated 
pursuant to the authorization of this section shall remain available 
until expended.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is amended 
by adding at the end of the items relating to subtitle D of title II 
the following:

 ``Part 7--Grants for Obtaining Compliant Paper Ballot Voting Systems 
          and Carrying Out Voting System Security Improvements

``Sec. 297. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems 
and carrying out voting system security improvements.
``Sec. 297A. Voting system security improvements described.
``Sec. 297B. Eligibility of States.
``Sec. 297C. Reports to Congress.
``Sec. 297D. Authorization of appropriations.''.

SEC. 112. COORDINATION OF VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY ACTIVITIES WITH USE OF 
                    REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS AND ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 
                    REQUIREMENTS UNDER HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002.

  (a) Duties of Election Assistance Commission.--Section 202 of the 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20922) is amended in the 
matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``by'' and inserting ``and 
the security of election infrastructure by''.
  (b) Membership of Secretary of Homeland Security on Board of Advisors 
of Election Assistance Commission.--Section 214(a) of such Act (52 
U.S.C. 20944(a)) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``37 members'' and inserting ``38 members''; 
        and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
          ``(17) The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary's 
        designee.''.
  (c) Representative of Department of Homeland Security on Technical 
Guidelines Development Committee.--Section 221(c)(1) of such Act (52 
U.S.C. 20961(c)(1)) is amended--
          (1) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F); 
        and
          (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new 
        subparagraph:
                  ``(E) A representative of the Department of Homeland 
                Security.''.
  (d) Goals of Periodic Studies of Election Administration Issues; 
Consultation With Secretary of Homeland Security.--Section 241(a) of 
such Act (52 U.S.C. 20981(a)) is amended--
          (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``the 
        Commission shall'' and inserting ``the Commission, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security (as 
        appropriate), shall'';
          (2) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (3);
          (3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
          (4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new 
        paragraph:
          ``(4) will be secure against attempts to undermine the 
        integrity of election systems by cyber or other means; and''.
  (e) Requirements Payments.--
          (1) Use of payments for voting system security 
        improvements.--Section 251(b) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21001(b)) 
        is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
          ``(4) Permitting use of payments for voting system security 
        improvements.--A State may use a requirements payment to carry 
        out any of the following activities:
                  ``(A) Cyber and risk mitigation training.
                  ``(B) Providing increased technical support for any 
                information technology infrastructure that the chief 
                State election official deems to be part of the State's 
                election infrastructure or designates as critical to 
                the operation of the State's election infrastructure.
                  ``(C) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of 
                the information technology infrastructure described in 
                subparagraph (B).
                  ``(D) Enhancing the security of voter registration 
                databases.''.
          (2) Incorporation of election infrastructure protection in 
        state plans for use of payments.--Section 254(a)(1) of such Act 
        (52 U.S.C. 21004(a)(1)) is amended by striking the period at 
        the end and inserting ``, including the protection of election 
        infrastructure.''.
          (3) Composition of committee responsible for developing state 
        plan for use of payments.--Section 255 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 
        21005) is amended--
                  (A) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection 
                (c); and
                  (B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following 
                new subsection:
  ``(b) Geographic Representation.--The members of the committee shall 
be a representative group of individuals from the State's counties, 
cities, towns, and Indian tribes, and shall represent the needs of 
rural as well as urban areas of the State, as the case may be.''.
  (f) Ensuring Protection of Computerized Statewide Voter Registration 
List.--Section 303(a)(3) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21083(a)(3)) is amended 
by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, as well as other 
measures to prevent and deter cybersecurity incidents, as identified by 
the Commission, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Technical 
Guidelines Development Committee.''.

SEC. 113. INCORPORATION OF DEFINITIONS.

  (a) In General.--Section 901 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 
U.S.C. 21141) is amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 901. DEFINITIONS.

  ``In this Act, the following definitions apply:
          ``(1) The term `cybersecurity incident' has the meaning given 
        the term `incident' in section 227 of the Homeland Security Act 
        of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 148).
          ``(2) The term `election agency' means any component of a 
        State, or any component of a unit of local government in a 
        State, which is responsible for the administration of elections 
        for Federal office in the State.
          ``(3) The term `election infrastructure' means storage 
        facilities, polling places, and centralized vote tabulation 
        locations used to support the administration of elections for 
        public office, as well as related information and 
        communications technology, including voter registration 
        databases, voting machines, electronic mail and other 
        communications systems (including electronic mail and other 
        systems of vendors who have entered into contracts with 
        election agencies to support the administration of elections, 
        manage the election process, and report and display election 
        results), and other systems used to manage the election process 
        and to report and display election results on behalf of an 
        election agency.
          ``(4) The term `State' means each of the several States, the 
        District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, 
        American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and the 
        Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is amended 
by amending the item relating to section 901 to read as follows:

``Sec. 901. Definitions.''.

                    Subtitle B--Risk-Limiting Audits

SEC. 121. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.

  (a) In General.-- Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 
U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 303 the 
following new section:

``SEC. 303A. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.

  ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Risk-limiting audit.--The term `risk-limiting audit' 
        means, with respect to any election contest, a post-election 
        process that--
                  ``(A) has a probability of at least 95 percent of 
                correcting the reported outcome if the reported outcome 
                is not the correct outcome;
                  ``(B) will not change the outcome if the reported 
                outcome is the correct outcome; and
                  ``(C) involves a manual adjudication of voter intent 
                from some or all of the ballots validly cast in the 
                election contest.
          ``(2) Reported outcome; correct outcome; outcome.--
                  ``(A) Reported outcome.--The term `reported outcome' 
                means the outcome of an election contest which is 
                determined according to the canvass and which will 
                become the official, certified outcome unless it is 
                revised by an audit, recount, or other legal process.
                  ``(B) Correct outcome.--The term `correct outcome' 
                means the outcome that would be determined by a manual 
                adjudication of voter intent for all votes validly cast 
                in the election contest.
                  ``(C) Outcome.--The term `outcome' means the winner 
                or set of winners of an election contest.
          ``(3) Manual adjudication of voter intent.--The term `manual 
        adjudication of voter intent' means direct inspection and 
        determination by humans, without assistance from electronic or 
        mechanical tabulation devices, of the ballot choices marked by 
        voters on each voter-verified paper record.
          ``(4) Ballot manifest.--The term `ballot manifest' means a 
        record maintained by each jurisdiction that--
                  ``(A) is created without reliance on any part of the 
                voting system used to tabulate votes;
                  ``(B) functions as a sampling frame for conducting a 
                risk-limiting audit; and
                  ``(C) accounts for all ballots validly cast 
                regardless of how or whether they were tabulated and 
                includes a precise description of the manner in which 
                the ballots are physically stored, including the total 
                number of physical groups of ballots, the numbering 
                system for each group, a unique label for each group, 
                and the number of ballots in each such group.
  ``(b) Requirements.--
          ``(1) In general.--
                  ``(A) Audits.--
                          ``(i) In general.--Each State and 
                        jurisdiction shall administer risk-limiting 
                        audits of the results of all election contests 
                        for Federal office held in the State in 
                        accordance with the requirements of paragraph 
                        (2).
                          ``(ii) Exception.--Clause (i) shall not apply 
                        to any election contest for which the State or 
                        jurisdiction conducts a full recount through a 
                        manual adjudication of voter intent.
                  ``(B) Full manual tabulation.--If a risk-limiting 
                audit conducted under subparagraph (A) corrects the 
                reported outcome of an election contest, the State or 
                jurisdiction shall use the results of the manual 
                adjudication of voter intent conducted as part of the 
                risk-limiting audit as the official results of the 
                election contest.
          ``(2) Audit requirements.--
                  ``(A) Rules and procedures.--
                          ``(i) In general.--Not later than 1 year 
                        after the date of the enactment of this 
                        section, the chief State election official of 
                        the State shall establish rules and procedures 
                        for conducting risk-limiting audits.
                          ``(ii) Matters included.--The rules and 
                        procedures established under clause (i) shall 
                        include the following:
                                  ``(I) Rules and procedures for 
                                ensuring the security of ballots and 
                                documenting that prescribed procedures 
                                were followed.
                                  ``(II) Rules and procedures for 
                                ensuring the accuracy of ballot 
                                manifests produced by jurisdictions.
                                  ``(III) Rules and procedures for 
                                governing the format of ballot 
                                manifests and other data involved in 
                                risk-limiting audits.
                                  ``(IV) Methods to ensure that any 
                                cast vote records used in a risk-
                                limiting audit are those used by the 
                                voting system to tally the results of 
                                the election contest sent to the chief 
                                State election official of the State 
                                and made public.
                                  ``(V) Rules and procedures for the 
                                random selection of ballots to be 
                                inspected manually during each audit.
                                  ``(VI) Rules and procedures for the 
                                calculations and other methods to be 
                                used in the audit and to determine 
                                whether and when the audit of each 
                                election contest is complete.
                                  ``(VII) Rules and procedures for 
                                testing any software used to conduct 
                                risk-limiting audits.
                  ``(B) Public report.--
                          ``(i) In general.--After the completion of 
                        the risk-limiting audit and at least 5 days 
                        before the election contest is certified, the 
                        State shall publish a report on the results of 
                        the audit, together with such information as 
                        necessary to confirm that the audit was 
                        conducted properly.
                          ``(ii) Format of data.--All data published 
                        with the report under clause (i) shall be 
                        published in machine-readable, open data 
                        formats.
                          ``(iii) Protection of anonymity of votes.--
                        Information and data published by the State 
                        under this subparagraph shall not compromise 
                        the anonymity of votes.
  ``(c) Effective Date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be required 
to comply with the requirements of this section for the first regularly 
scheduled election for Federal office held more than 1 year after the 
date of the enactment of the Securing America's Federal Elections Act 
and for each subsequent election for Federal office.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendments Related to Enforcement.--Section 401 of 
such Act (52 U.S.C. 21111) is amended by striking ``and 303'' and 
inserting ``303, and 303A''.
  (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for such Act is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 303 the 
following new item:

``Sec. 303A. Risk-limiting audits.''.

SEC. 122. FUNDING FOR CONDUCTING POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.

  (a) Payments to States.-- Subtitle D of title II of the Help America 
Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21001 et seq.), as amended by section 
111(a), is amended by adding at the end the following new part:

        ``PART 8--FUNDING FOR POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS

``SEC. 298. PAYMENTS FOR POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.

  ``(a) In General.--The Commission shall pay to States the amount of 
eligible post-election audit costs.
  ``(b) Eligible Post-election Audit Costs.--For purposes of this 
section, the term `eligible post-election audit costs' means, with 
respect to any State, costs paid or incurred by the State or local 
government within the State for--
          ``(1) the conduct of any risk-limiting audit (as defined in 
        section 303A) with respect to an election for Federal office 
        occurring after the date of the enactment of this part; and
          ``(2) any equipment, software, or services necessary for the 
        conduct of any such risk-limiting audit.
  ``(c) Special Rules.--
          ``(1) Rules and procedures.--The Commission shall establish 
        rules and procedures for submission of eligible post-election 
        audit costs for payments under this section.
          ``(2) Insufficient funds.--In any case in which the amounts 
        appropriated under subsection (d) are insufficient to pay all 
        eligible post-election audit costs submitted by States with 
        respect to any Federal election, the amount of such costs paid 
        under subsection (a) to any State shall be equal to the amount 
        that bears the same ratio to the amount which would be paid to 
        such State (determined without regard to this paragraph) as--
                  ``(A) the number of individuals who voted in such 
                Federal election in such State; bears to
                  ``(B) the total number of individuals who voted in 
                such Federal election in all States submitting a claim 
                for eligible post-election audit costs.
  ``(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
          ``(1) In general.--There is hereby authorized to be 
        appropriated to the Commission such sums as are necessary to 
        carry out this part.
          ``(2) Availability.--Any amounts appropriated pursuant to 
        paragraph (1) shall remain available without fiscal year 
        limitation until expended.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act, as 
amended by section 111(b), is further amended by adding at the end of 
the items relating to subtitle D of title II the following:

        ``Part 8--Funding for Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audits

``Sec. 298. Payments for post-election risk-limiting audits.''.

SEC. 123. GAO ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF AUDITS.

  (a) Analysis.--Not later than 6 months after the first elections for 
Federal office is held for which States must conduct risk-limiting 
audits under section 303A of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (as 
added by section 121), the Comptroller General of the United States 
shall conduct an analysis of the extent to which such audits have 
improved the administration of such elections and the security of 
election infrastructure in the States receiving such grants.
  (b) Report.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall 
submit a report on the analysis conducted under subsection (a) to the 
Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives and 
the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate.

  TITLE II--PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY THROUGH IMPROVEMENTS IN ELECTION 
                             ADMINISTRATION

SEC. 201. VOTING SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) Ballot Tabulating Devices.-- Section 301(a) of the Help America 
Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104 and 
section 105, is further amended by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph:
          ``(9) Ballot tabulating methods.--
                  ``(A) In general.--The voting system tabulates 
                ballots by hand or through the use of an optical 
                scanning device that meets the requirements of 
                subparagraph (B).
                  ``(B) Requirements for optical scanning devices.--
                Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the 
                requirements of this subparagraph are as follows:
                          ``(i) The device is designed and built in a 
                        manner in which it is mechanically impossible 
                        for the device to add or change the vote 
                        selections on a printed or marked ballot.
                          ``(ii) The device is capable of exporting its 
                        data (including vote tally data sets and cast 
                        vote records) in a machine-readable, open data 
                        standard format required by the Commission, in 
                        consultation with the Director of the National 
                        Institute of Standards and Technology.
                          ``(iii) The device consists of hardware 
                        that--
                                  ``(I) is certified under section 2216 
                                of the Homeland Security Act; and
                                  ``(II) demonstrably conforms to a 
                                hardware component manifest describing 
                                point-of-origin information (including 
                                upstream hardware supply chain 
                                information for each component) that--
                                          ``(aa) has been provided to 
                                        the Commission, the Director of 
                                        Cybersecurity and 
                                        Infrastructure Security under 
                                        section 2215 of the Homeland 
                                        Security Act, and the chief 
                                        State election official for 
                                        each State in which the device 
                                        is used; and
                                          ``(bb) may be shared by any 
                                        entity to whom it has been 
                                        provided under item (aa) with 
                                        independent experts for 
                                        cybersecurity analysis.
                          ``(iv) The device utilizes technology that 
                        prevents the operation of the device if any 
                        hardware components do not meet the 
                        requirements of clause (iii).
                          ``(v) The device operates using software--
                                  ``(I) for which the source code, 
                                system build tools, and compilation 
                                parameters--
                                          ``(aa) have been provided to 
                                        the Commission, the Director of 
                                        Cybersecurity and 
                                        Infrastructure Security under 
                                        section 2215 of the Homeland 
                                        Security Act, and the chief 
                                        State election official for 
                                        each State in which the device 
                                        is used; and
                                          ``(bb) may be shared by any 
                                        entity to whom it has been 
                                        provided under item (aa) with 
                                        independent experts for 
                                        cybersecurity analysis; and
                                  ``(II) that is certified under 
                                section 2216 of the Homeland Security 
                                Act.
                          ``(vi) The device utilizes technology that 
                        prevents the running of software on the device 
                        that does not meet the requirements of clause 
                        (v).
                          ``(vii) The device utilizes technology that 
                        enables election officials, cybersecurity 
                        researchers, and voters to verify that the 
                        software running on the device--
                                  ``(I) was built from a specific, 
                                untampered version of the code that is 
                                described in clause (v); and
                                  ``(II) uses the system build tools 
                                and compilation parameters that are 
                                described in clause (v).
                          ``(viii) The device contains such other 
                        security requirements as the Director of 
                        Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
                        requires.
                  ``(C) Waiver.--
                          ``(i) In general.--The Director of 
                        Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security, in 
                        consultation with the Director of the National 
                        Institute of Standards and Technology, may 
                        waive one or more of the requirements of 
                        subparagraph (B) (other than the requirement of 
                        clause (i) thereof) with respect to any device 
                        for a period of not to exceed 2 years.
                          ``(ii) Publication.--Information relating to 
                        any waiver granted under clause (i) shall be 
                        made publicly available on the Internet.
                  ``(D) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction 
                shall be required to comply with the requirements of 
                this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for 
                Federal office in November 2024, and for each 
                subsequent election for Federal office.''.
  (b) Other Cybersecurity Requirements.-- Section 301(a) of such Act 
(52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104, section 105, and 
subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following 
new paragraphs:
          ``(10) Prohibition of use of wireless communications devices 
        in systems or devices.--
                  ``(A) In general.--No system or device upon which 
                ballot marking devices or optical scanners are 
                configured, upon which ballots are marked by voters 
                (except as necessary for individuals with disabilities 
                to use ballot marking devices that meet the 
                accessibility requirements of paragraph (3)), or upon 
                which votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated shall 
                contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, power-
                line, or concealed communication device.
                  ``(B) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction 
                shall be required to comply with the requirements of 
                this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for 
                Federal office in November 2020, and for each 
                subsequent election for Federal office.
          ``(11) Prohibiting connection of system to the internet.--
                  ``(A) In general.--No system or device upon which 
                ballot marking devices or optical scanners are 
                configured, upon which ballots are marked by voters, or 
                upon which votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated 
                shall be connected to the Internet or any non-local 
                computer system via telephone or other communication 
                network at any time.
                  ``(B) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction 
                shall be required to comply with the requirements of 
                this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for 
                Federal office in November 2020, and for each 
                subsequent election for Federal office.''.
  (c) Special Cybersecurity Rules for Certain Ballot Marking Devices.--
          (1) In general.--Section 301(a) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 
        21081(a)), as amended by section 104, section 105, and 
        subsections (a) and (b), is further amended by adding at the 
        end the following new paragraph:
          ``(13) Ballot marking devices.--
                  ``(A) In general.--In the case of a voting system 
                that uses a ballot marking device, the ballot marking 
                device shall be a device that--
                          ``(i) is not capable of tabulating votes;
                          ``(ii) except in the case of a ballot marking 
                        device used exclusively to comply with the 
                        requirements of paragraph (3), is certified in 
                        accordance with section 232 as meeting the 
                        requirements of subparagraph (B); and
                          ``(iii) is certified under section 2216 of 
                        the Homeland Security Act as meeting the 
                        requirements of clauses (iii) through (viii) of 
                        section 301(a)(9)(B).
                  ``(B) Requirements.--
                          ``(i) In general.--A ballot marking device 
                        meets the requirements of this subparagraph if, 
                        during a double-masked test conducted by a 
                        qualified independent user experience research 
                        laboratory (as defined in section 232(b)(4)) of 
                        a simulated election scenario which meets the 
                        requirements of clause (ii), there is less than 
                        a 5 percent chance that an ordinary voter using 
                        the device would not detect and report any 
                        difference between the vote selection printed 
                        on the ballot by the ballot marking device and 
                        the vote selection indicated by the voter.
                          ``(ii) Simulated election scenario.--A 
                        simulated election scenario meets the 
                        requirements of this clause if it is conducted 
                        with--
                                  ``(I) a pool of subjects that are--
                                          ``(aa) diverse in age, 
                                        gender, education, and physical 
                                        limitations; and
                                          ``(bb) representative of the 
                                        communities in which the voting 
                                        system will be used; and
                                  ``(II) ballots that are 
                                representative of ballots ordinarily 
                                used in the communities in which the 
                                voting system will be used.
                  ``(C) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction 
                shall be required to comply with the requirements of 
                this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for 
                Federal office in November 2022, and for each 
                subsequent election for Federal office.''.
          (2) Procedure for testing.--
                  (A) In general.--Subtitle B of title II of the Help 
                America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971 et seq.) is 
                amended by adding at the end the following new section:

``SEC. 232. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT MARKING DEVICES.

  ``(a) In General.--Any State or jurisdiction which intends to use a 
ballot marking device (other than a ballot marking device used 
exclusively to comply with the requirements of section 301(a)(3)) in an 
election for Federal office may submit an application to the Commission 
for testing and certification under this section.
  ``(b) Application, Assignment, and Testing.--
          ``(1) In general.--An application under subsection (a) shall 
        be submitted not later than 18 months before the date of the 
        election for Federal office in which the ballot marking device 
        is intended to be used and shall contain such information as 
        the Commission requires.
          ``(2) Assignment.--Upon receipt of an application for testing 
        under this section, the Commission shall contract with a 
        qualified independent user experience research laboratory for 
        the testing of whether the ballot marking device intended to be 
        used by the State or jurisdiction meets the requirements of 
        section 301(a)(10)(B).
          ``(3) Requirements for testing.--Any contract described in 
        paragraph (2) shall require the qualified independent user 
        experience research laboratory to--
                  ``(A) not later than 30 days before testing begins, 
                submit to the Commission for approval the protocol for 
                the simulated election scenario used for testing the 
                ballot marking device;
                  ``(B) use only protocols approved by the Commission 
                in conducting such testing; and
                  ``(C) submit to the Commission a report on the 
                results of the testing.
          ``(4) Qualified independent user experience research 
        laboratory.--For purposes of this section:
                  ``(A) In general.--The term `qualified independent 
                user experience research laboratory' means a laboratory 
                accredited under this subsection by the Election 
                Assistance Commission in accordance with standards 
                determined by the Commission, in consultation with the 
                Director of the National Institute of Standards and 
                Technology and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
                  ``(B) Criteria.--A laboratory shall not be accredited 
                under this subsection unless such laboratory 
                demonstrates that--
                          ``(i) no employee of, or individual with an 
                        ownership in, such laboratory has, or has had 
                        during the 5 preceding years, any financial 
                        relationship with a manufacturer of voting 
                        systems; and
                          ``(ii) any group of individuals conducting 
                        tests under this section collectively meet the 
                        following qualifications:
                                  ``(I) Experience designing and 
                                running user research studies and 
                                experiments using both qualitative and 
                                quantitative methodologies.
                                  ``(II) Experience with voting 
                                systems.
  ``(c) Review by Independent Board.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Commission shall submit for approval 
        to an independent review board established under paragraph (3) 
        the following:
                  ``(A) Any protocol submitted to the Commission under 
                subsection (b)(3)(A).
                  ``(B) Any report submitted to the Commission under 
                subsection (b)(3)(C).
          ``(2) Final approval.--Not later than the date that is 12 
        months before the date of the election for Federal office in 
        which a State or jurisdiction intends to use the ballot marking 
        device, the independent review board shall report to the 
        Commission on whether it has approved a report submitted under 
        paragraph (1)(B).
          ``(3) Independent review board.--
                  ``(A) In general.--An independent review board 
                established under this paragraph shall be composed of 5 
                independent scientists appointed by the Commission, in 
                consultation with the Director of the National 
                Institute of Standards and Technology.
                  ``(B) Qualifications.--The members of the independent 
                review board--
                          ``(i) shall have expertise and relevant peer-
                        reviewed publications in the following fields: 
                        cognitive psychology, experimental design, 
                        statistics, and user experience research and 
                        testing; and
                          ``(ii) may not have, or have had during the 5 
                        preceding years, any financial relationship 
                        with a manufacturer of voting systems.
          ``(4) Publication.--The Commission shall make public--
                  ``(A) any protocol approved under this subsection;
                  ``(B) any report submitted under subsection 
                (b)(3)(C); and
                  ``(C) any determination made by an independent review 
                board under paragraph (2).
  ``(d) Certification.--If--
          ``(1) a ballot marking device is determined by the qualified 
        independent user experience research laboratory to meet the 
        requirements of section 301(a)(7); and
          ``(2) the report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(C) is 
        approved by a majority of the members of the independent review 
        board under subsection (d)(2),
then the Commission shall certify the ballot marking device.
  ``(e) Prohibition on Fees.--The Commission may not charge any fee to 
a State or jurisdiction, a developer or manufacturer of a ballot 
marking device, or any other person in connection with testing and 
certification under this section.''.
                  (B) Conforming amendments.--
                          (i) Section 202(2) of the Help America Vote 
                        Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20922(2)) is amended by 
                        inserting ``and ballot marking devices'' after 
                        ``hardware and software'').
                          (ii) The heading for subtitle B of title II 
                        of such Act is amended by inserting at the 
                        end``; Ballot Marking Devices''.
                          (iii) The table of contents of such Act is 
                        amended--
                                  (I) by inserting ``; Ballot Marking 
                                Devices'' at the end of the item 
                                relating to subtitle B of title II; and
                                  (II) by inserting after the item 
                                related to section 231 the following:

``Sec. 232. Testing and certification of ballot marking devices.''.

SEC. 202. TESTING OF EXISTING VOTING SYSTEMS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 
                    ELECTION CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES AND OTHER 
                    GUIDELINES.

  (a) Requiring Testing of Existing Voting Systems.--
          (1) In general.--Section 231(a) of the Help America Vote Act 
        of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971(a)) is amended by adding at the end 
        the following new paragraph:
          ``(3) Testing to ensure compliance with guidelines.--
                  ``(A) Testing.--Not later than 9 months before the 
                date of each regularly scheduled general election for 
                Federal office, the Commission shall provide for the 
                testing by accredited laboratories under this section 
                of the voting system hardware and software which was 
                certified for use in the most recent such election, on 
                the basis of the most recent voting system guidelines 
                applicable to such hardware or software (including 
                election cybersecurity guidelines) issued under this 
                Act.
                  ``(B) Decertification of hardware or software failing 
                to meet guidelines.--If, on the basis of the testing 
                described in subparagraph (A), the Commission 
                determines that any voting system hardware or software 
                does not meet the most recent guidelines applicable to 
                such hardware or software issued under this Act, the 
                Commission shall decertify such hardware or 
                software.''.
          (2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) 
        shall apply with respect to the regularly scheduled general 
        election for Federal office held in November 2020 and each 
        succeeding regularly scheduled general election for Federal 
        office.
  (b) Issuance of Cybersecurity Guidelines by Technical Guidelines 
Development Committee.--Section 221(b) of the Help America Vote Act of 
2002 (52 U.S.C. 20961(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
new paragraph:
          ``(3) Election cybersecurity guidelines.--Not later than 6 
        months after the date of the enactment of the Securing 
        America's Federal Elections Act, the Development Committee 
        shall issue election cybersecurity guidelines, including 
        standards and best practices for procuring, maintaining, 
        testing, operating, and updating election systems to prevent 
        and deter cybersecurity incidents.''.

SEC. 203. REQUIRING USE OF SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE FOR WHICH INFORMATION 
                    IS DISCLOSED BY MANUFACTURER.

  (a) Requirement.--Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 
(52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by sections 104 and 105, is amended by 
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
          ``(9) Requiring use of software and hardware for which 
        information is disclosed by manufacturer.--
                  ``(A) Requiring use of software for which source code 
                is disclosed by manufacturer.--
                          ``(i) In general.--In the operation of voting 
                        systems in an election for Federal office, a 
                        State may only use software for which the 
                        manufacturer makes the source code (in the form 
                        in which will be used at the time of the 
                        election) publicly available online under a 
                        license that grants a worldwide, royalty-free, 
                        non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable 
                        license to all intellectual property rights in 
                        such source code, except that the manufacturer 
                        may prohibit a person who obtains the software 
                        from using the software in a manner that is 
                        primarily intended for or directed toward 
                        commercial advantage or private monetary 
                        compensation that is unrelated to carrying out 
                        legitimate research or cybersecurity activity.
                          ``(ii) Exceptions.--Clause (i) does not apply 
                        with respect to--
                                  ``(I) widely-used operating system 
                                software which is not specific to 
                                voting systems and for which the source 
                                code or baseline functionality is not 
                                altered; or
                                  ``(II) widely-used cybersecurity 
                                software which is not specific to 
                                voting systems and for which the source 
                                code or baseline functionality is not 
                                altered.
                  ``(B) Requiring use of hardware for which information 
                is disclosed by manufacturer.--
                          ``(i) Requiring disclosure of hardware.--A 
                        State may not use a voting system in an 
                        election for Federal office unless the 
                        manufacturer of the system publicly discloses 
                        online the identification of the hardware used 
                        to operate the system.
                          ``(ii) Additional disclosure requirements for 
                        custom or altered hardware.--To the extent that 
                        the hardware used to operate a voting system or 
                        any component thereof is not widely-used, or is 
                        widely-used but is altered, the State may not 
                        use the system in an election for Federal 
                        office unless--
                                  ``(I) the manufacturer of the system 
                                publicly discloses online the 
                                components of the hardware, the design 
                                of such components, and how such 
                                components are connected in the 
                                operation of the system; and
                                  ``(II) the manufacturer makes the 
                                design (in the form which will be used 
                                at the time of the election) publicly 
                                available online under a license that 
                                grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-
                                exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable 
                                license to all intellectual property 
                                rights in the design of the hardware or 
                                the component, except that the 
                                manufacturer may prohibit a person who 
                                obtains the design from using the 
                                design in a manner that is primarily 
                                intended for or directed toward 
                                commercial advantage or private 
                                monetary compensation that is unrelated 
                                to carrying out legitimate research or 
                                cybersecurity activity.''.
  (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply 
with respect to elections for Federal office held in 2020 or any 
succeeding year.

SEC. 204. TREATMENT OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOKS AS PART OF VOTING SYSTEMS.

  (a) Inclusion in Definition of Voting System.--Section 301(b) of the 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(b)) is amended--
          (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``this 
        section'' and inserting ``this Act'';
          (2) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1);
          (3) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and
          (4) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new 
        paragraph:
          ``(2) any electronic poll book used with respect to the 
        election; and''.
  (b) Definition.--Section 301 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081) is 
amended--
          (1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections 
        (d) and (e); and
          (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
        subsection:
  ``(c) Electronic Poll Book Defined.--In this Act, the term 
`electronic poll book' means the total combination of mechanical, 
electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the software, 
firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support 
the equipment) that is used--
          ``(1) to retain the list of registered voters at a polling 
        location, or vote center, or other location at which voters 
        cast votes in an election for Federal office; and
          ``(2) to identify registered voters who are eligible to vote 
        in an election.''.
  (c) Effective Date.--Section 301(e) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081(e)), 
as redesignated by subsection (b), is amended by striking the period at 
the end and inserting the following: ``, or, with respect to any 
requirements relating to electronic poll books, on and after January 1, 
2020.''.

SEC. 205. PRE-ELECTION REPORTS ON VOTING SYSTEM USAGE.

  (a) Requiring States to Submit Reports.--Title III of the Help 
America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended by 
inserting after section 301 the following new section:

``SEC. 301A. PRE-ELECTION REPORTS ON VOTING SYSTEM USAGE.

  ``(a) Requiring States to Submit Reports.--Not later than 120 days 
before the date of each regularly scheduled general election for 
Federal office, the chief State election official of a State shall 
submit a report to the Commission containing a detailed voting system 
usage plan for each jurisdiction in the State which will administer the 
election, including a detailed plan for the usage of electronic poll 
books and other equipment and components of such system.
  ``(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall apply with respect to the 
regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in 
November 2020 and each succeeding regularly scheduled general election 
for Federal office.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendment Relating to Enforcement.--Section 401 of 
such Act (52 U.S.C. 21111) is amended by striking ``sections 301, 302, 
and 303'' and inserting ``subtitle A of title III''.
  (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is amended 
by inserting after the item relating to section 301 the following new 
item:

``Sec. 301A. Pre-election reports on voting system usage.''.

SEC. 206. STREAMLINING COLLECTION OF ELECTION INFORMATION.

  Section 202 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20922) is 
amended--
          (1) by striking ``The Commission'' and inserting ``(a) In 
        General.--The Commission''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(b) Waiver of Certain Requirements.--Subchapter I of chapter 35 of 
title 44, United States Code, shall not apply to the collection of 
information for purposes of maintaining the clearinghouse described in 
paragraph (1) of subsection (a).''.

  TITLE III--USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES

SEC. 301. USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES.

  Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 
21081(a)), as amended by section 104, section 105, and section 203, is 
further amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
          ``(10) Voting machine requirements.--By not later than the 
        date of the regularly scheduled general election for Federal 
        office occurring in November 2022, each State shall seek to 
        ensure that any voting machine used in such election and in any 
        subsequent election for Federal office is manufactured in the 
        United States.''.

                         TITLE IV--SEVERABILITY

SEC. 401. SEVERABILITY.

  If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act, or the 
application of a provision or amendment to any person or circumstance, 
is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and 
amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions and 
amendment to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected by the 
holding.

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 2722, the ``Securing America's Federal Elections Act'' 
or the ``SAFE Act,'' will improve the resilience of election 
infrastructure used in Federal elections.
    The legitimacy of our representative system of self-
government rests on every eligible voter casting a ballot with 
confidence that it will count as cast. Aging equipment, under-
resourced jurisdictions, and interference by foreign entities 
or non-state actors leave the system vulnerable to exploitation 
that undermines confidence in election outcomes. Ineffective 
and vulnerable equipment can also discourage participation in 
Federal elections.
    H.R. 2722 provides critical resources to states and 
localities to bolster election infrastructure, including 
necessary funds to replace aging voting equipment with voter-
verified paper ballot voting systems and implement additional 
cybersecurity protocols. The bill also helps states and 
localities plan for future elections by providing ongoing 
maintenance funding on a biannual basis. The legislation 
provides grant programs for states to implement required risk-
limiting audits, a best practice audit system that confirms 
election outcomes with a high degree of confidence.
    The legislation also institutes accountability for election 
technology vendors so that they abide by cybersecurity 
standards, including agreeing to report known or suspect 
security incidents involving election infrastructure.
    The SAFE Act will also spur innovation by awarding grants 
for research and development that will improve the 
accessibility of election infrastructure. One such grant 
program will study and report on accessible paper ballot 
verification mechanisms for individuals with disabilities, 
voters with difficulties in literacy, and voters whose primary 
language is not English.

                  Background and Need for Legislation


Significant Vulnerabilities in Nation's Election Infrastructure

    In 2016, Russian hackers targeted state voting systems, and 
sought to infiltrate voter registration databases and the 
networks of election technology vendors. This attack exposed 
the numerous vulnerabilities in our nation's election 
infrastructure. Many states have not kept pace with changing 
voting technology. Some of the most significant vulnerabilities 
are outlined below:
            Paperless Machines
          Although there is no evidence that vote counts were 
        altered in the 2016 election, voting machines remain 
        vulnerable to attack. In 2017, at DefCon, one of the 
        world's largest, longest-running, and best-known hacker 
        conferences, 25 pieces of election equipment were 
        successfully breached by participants with little prior 
        knowledge and limited tools.\1\ These issues are 
        exacerbated by the fact that in 2016, twenty percent of 
        Americans cast their ballot on voting machines that do 
        not have any kind of paper backup, according to the 
        Brennan Center for Justice.\2\ In other words, if these 
        paperless machines were hacked, it would be nearly 
        impossible to tell.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Matt Blaze et al., DEFCON 25 Voting Machine Hacking Village: 
Rep. on Cyber Vulnerabilities in U.S. Election Equipment, Databases, 
and Infrastructure, at pg. 4 (2017) https://www.defcon.org/images/
defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf.
    \2\Lawrence Norden and Ian Vandewalker, Securing Elections From 
Foreign Interference, at pg. 11 (June 29, 2017), https://
www.brennancenter.org/publication/securing-elections-foreign-
interference.
    \3\Eric Geller, Virginia Bars Voting Machines Considered Top 
Hacking Target, POLITICO (Sept. 8, 2017) http://www.politico.com/story/
2017/09/08/virginia-election-machines-hacking-target-242492.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Need to Replace Aging Voting Equipment
          In at least 40 states, elections are carried out 
        using voting machines that were purchased more than a 
        decade ago.\4\ Aging voting equipment creates at least 
        three problems. First, older systems are increasingly 
        difficult to maintain and are more likely to fail.\5\ 
        Second, many use outdated hardware and software and 
        some are no longer manufactured.\6\ For example, some 
        state officials have ``had to turn to eBay to find 
        critical components like dot-matrix printer ribbons, 
        decades old storage devices and analog modems. Aging 
        systems also frequently rely on unsupported software, 
        like Windows XP and 2000, which may not receive regular 
        security patches and are thus more vulnerable to the 
        latest methods of cyberattack.''\7\ Finally, many 
        jurisdictions are using voting equipment that predates 
        federal certification and testing programs, which 
        render them particularly susceptible to major flaws and 
        cybersecurity vulnerabilities.\8\ These systems 
        disproportionately lack voter-marked paper ballots.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\Brennan Center for Justice, New Analysis Shows Voting Machines 
Remain Vulnerable Ahead of 2020 Elections, (Mar. 5, 2019) https://
www.brennancenter.org/press-release/new-analysis-shows-voting-machines-
remain-vulnerable-ahead-2020-election
    \5\Written Testimony of Lawrence D. Norden, Deputy Director, 
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Hearing: ``Election 
Security,'' May 8, 2019, pg. 4 (hereinafter ``Norden Testimony'').
    \6\Id.at 5.
    \7\Id.
    \8\Id.
    \9\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Need for Risk-Limiting Audits
          The best way to determine whether a machine has been 
        hacked, or mis-programmed, is to conduct a post-
        election, risk-limiting audit. Currently, 34 states and 
        the District of Columbia require post-election audits 
        of paper records; however, experts note that some of 
        those audits are insufficient to determine whether 
        anyone tampered with the election results.\10\ Instead, 
        experts recommend that states implement risk-limiting 
        audits. A risk-limiting audit is a process that 
        involves hand counting a certain number of ballots, 
        using advanced statistical methods, to determine with a 
        high degree of certainty that the reported election 
        outcome is accurate. The number of ballots that are 
        counted by hand is determined by many factors, 
        including the margin of victory in the election. If the 
        initial count determines that the election results are 
        accurate, the audit stops. If the initial count is 
        insufficient to confirm the election result, a larger 
        sample of ballots is hand counted. This process 
        continues until the election results can be confirmed. 
        If there is never enough evidence to confirm the 
        election results, a full hand count would be 
        conducted.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\National Conference of State Legislators, Post-Election Audits, 
Jan. 3, 2019 available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx
    \11\Risk-Limiting Audits Working Group, Risk-Limiting Post-Election 
Audits: Why and How, at pg. 5, (Jennie Bretschneider et al. eds., 1.1 
version, 2012) https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/ stark/Preprints/
RLAwhitepaper12.pdf. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Election Technology Vendors
          Another significant vulnerability comes from election 
        technology vendors. Many states purchase their voting 
        systems from third-party vendors are not subject to 
        regulations requiring them to use cybersecurity best 
        practices. In addition, election vendors are not 
        currently required to inform any federal agency or 
        state election official in the event of a cyberattack. 
        The Congressional Task Force on Election Security found 
        that ``the election technology industry is dominated by 
        three firms whose products cover approximately 92% of 
        the total eligible voter population.''\12\ Accordingly, 
        this consolidation presents a security risk in that 
        ``there is no meaningful competitive pressure from the 
        suppliers to the vendors,'' and ``no incentive for 
        election technology vendors to prioritize security. 
        This problem is compounded by the lack of regulation in 
        this area.''\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\Congressional Task Force on Election Security, Final Report 
(January 2018), pg. 31, https://homeland.house.gov/sites/
democrats.homeland.house.gov/files/documents/TFESReport.pdf.
    \13\Id. (citing Penn Warton Pub. Policy Initiative, The Warton 
School, University of Pennsylvania, The Business of Voting, pgs. 11-13, 
20 (2017) https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/files/270-the-
business-of-voting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Cybersecurity Training:
          States and localities also face the daunting task of 
        training hundreds, if not thousands, of election 
        officials, IT staff, and poll workers on cybersecurity 
        and risk mitigation. The success of spear-phishing 
        campaigns in the 2016 election demonstrate the urgent 
        need for better cybersecurity training. Finally, many 
        state chief information officers do not assist with 
        election systems, and states often cannot afford or 
        cannot find IT workers to help with state and local 
        election information technology infrastructure.
            Maintaining and Upgrading IT Infrastructure
          States need money to replace outdated technology, 
        including voter registration databases. The Help 
        America Vote Act (HAVA) requires states to create and 
        maintain a statewide, computerized voter registration 
        database.\14\ According to the Brennan Center, in at 
        least 41 states, these systems were created at least 
        ten years ago.\15\ In Illinois, for example, Russian 
        hackers successfully breached the databases and 
        attempted, but failed, to alter and delete voting 
        records.\16\ The most significant threat posed by 
        vulnerable voter registration databases is that an 
        attacker could alter, delete, or add voter registration 
        records which would then cause profound chaos on 
        Election Day and potentially change the results of the 
        election. Had the attackers successfully changed voting 
        records in Illinois, voters would have arrived at the 
        polls on Election Day to discover that they were not 
        registered. This could lead ``scores of voters to cast 
        provisional ballots, leading to long lines, undermining 
        faith in the fairness of an election, and creating a 
        major administrative headache to accurately count votes 
        after the polls closed.''\17\ Alternatively, an 
        attacker could add fake voters to the rolls, allowing 
        for fraudulent votes to be cast.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. Sec. 21083.
    \15\Norden & Vandewalker, 19.
    \16\Callum Borchers, What We Know About the 21 States Targeted by 
Russian Hackers, The Washington Post (Sept. 23, 2017) https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/09/23/what-we-know-about-
the-21-states-targeted-by-russian-hackers/?utm_term=.c296117b25d4.
    \17\Norden & Vandewalker, at pg. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In light of the threats and vulnerabilities facing state 
election systems, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh 
Johnson in January, 2017 designated election systems as 
``critical infrastructure'' which gives state election 
officials priority access to Department of Homeland Security 
(``DHS'') services.
    In response to the 2016 attacks, then-Leader Pelosi 
established the Congressional Task Force on Election Security 
led by Committee on House Administration then-Ranking Member 
Robert Brady and then-Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson. The 
Task Force engaged with election stakeholders, including 
cybersecurity and election infrastructure experts, to ensure 
the health and security of election systems. In February 2018, 
the Task Force released its report recommending the replacement 
of paperless voting machines with paper ballot voting systems; 
risk-limiting audits; upgraded IT infrastructure (including 
voter registration databases) with ongoing maintenance; 
requirements that election technology vendors secure their 
voting systems; Intelligence Community pre-election threat 
assessments and coordination with federal and state officials; 
ongoing DHS designation of election infrastructure as critical 
infrastructure; and prioritized cybersecurity training at the 
state level.
    In March 2019, the Brennan Center for Justice issued an 
analysis of the current state of voting technology in the 
United States.\18\ Local election officials in 254 
jurisdictions across 37 states confirmed to the report's 
authors that they ``plan to purchase new voting equipment in 
the near future. For some, the need to make these replacements 
was extremely urgent: 121 officials in 31 states told [the 
Brennan Center] they must replace their equipment before the 
2020 election. Two-thirds of these officials reported that they 
do not have the adequate funds to do so, even after the 
distribution of additional HAVA funds from Congress.''\19\ 
Moreover, ``[a]lmost every election official who responded that 
they planned on replacing voting equipment soon stated that 
their hope was to find new machines that produce voter-verified 
paper backups that could be used in a recount or audit.''\20\ 
Finally, per the Brennan Center survey, election officials said 
their priority would be hiring more IT support staff, 
particularly at the local level.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\Lawrence Norden and Andrea Cordova, Voting Machines at Risk: 
Where We Stand Today (March 5, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/
analysis/voting-machines-risk-where-we-stand-today.
    \19\Id.
    \20\Id.
    \21\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post-2016 Developments

    The Mueller Report\22\ largely confirmed what was already 
known about Russian interference in the 2016 election. It also 
revealed that at least one Florida county had been breached by 
hackers. In recent months, several Trump administration 
officials, and one former official, have made public comments 
emphasizing the seriousness of the threat and urgent need for 
action. They are unequivocal in their assessment that foreign 
interference will continue in the lead up to the 2020 election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 
2016 Presidential Election, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, 
Washington, D.C., March, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            The Mueller Report
    The Mueller Report confirmed that Russian hackers targeted 
state election administrators and election vendors. An excerpt 
of the redacted Mueller Report that addresses state election 
infrastructure is reproduced below:

          In addition to targeting individuals involved in the 
        Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also targeted 
        individuals and entities involved in the administration 
        of the elections. Victims included U.S. state and local 
        entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), 
        secretaries of state, and county governments, as well 
        as individuals who worked for those entities. The GRU 
        also targeted private technology firms responsible for 
        manufacturing and administering election-related 
        software and hardware, such as voter registration 
        software and electronic polling stations. The GRU 
        continued to target these victims through the elections 
        in November 2016. While the investigation identified 
        evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and 
        entities, the Office did not investigate further. The 
        Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers 
        or other relevant items belonging to these victims. The 
        Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of 
        Homeland Security, and the states have separately 
        investigated that activity.
          By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought 
        access to state and local computer networks by 
        exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites 
        of state and local governmental entities. GRU officers, 
        for example, targeted state and local databases of 
        registered voters using a technique known as ``SQL 
        injection,'' by which malicious code was sent to the 
        state or local website in order to run commands (such 
        as exfiltrating the database contents). In one instance 
        in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the 
        computer network of the Illinois State Board of 
        Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's 
        website. The GRU then gained access to a database 
        containing information on millions of registered 
        Illinois voters, and extracted data related to 
        thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity 
        was identified.
          GRU officers [REDACTED] scanned state and local 
        websites for vulnerabilities. For example, over a two-
        day period in July 2016, GRU officers [REDACTED] for 
        vulnerabilities on websites of more than two dozen 
        states. [REDACTED]. Similar [REDACTED] for 
        vulnerabilities continued through the election.
          Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public 
        officials involved in election administration and 
        personnel at companies involved in voting technology. 
        In August 2016, GRU officers targeted employees of 
        [REDACTED], a voting technology company that developed 
        software used by numerous U.S. counties to manage voter 
        rolls, and installed malware on the company network. 
        Similarly, in November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing 
        emails to over 120 email accounts used by Florida 
        county officials responsible for administering the 2016 
        U.S. election. The spearphishing emails contained an 
        attached Word document coded with malicious software 
        (commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the 
        GRU to access the infected computer. The FBI was 
        separately responsible for this investigation. We 
        understand the FBI believes that this operation enabled 
        the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one 
        Florida county government. The Office did not 
        independently verify that belief and, as explained 
        above, did not undertake the investigative steps that 
        would have been necessary to do so.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\Ibid, Volume One, pg. 50-51 (March 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Director of National Intelligence ``Worldwide Threat 
                    Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.''
    In January 2019, Dan Coats, the Director of National 
Intelligence, offered the Intelligence Community's 2019 
assessment of threats to national security.\24\ The report 
states that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\Daniel R. Coats, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Jan. 29, 2019, pg. 7, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf.

          Our adversaries and strategic competitors probably 
        already are looking to the 2020 US elections as an 
        opportunity to advance their interests . . . [They] 
        also may seek to use cyber means to directly manipulate 
        or disrupt election systems--such as by tampering with 
        voter registration or disrupting the vote tallying 
        process--either to alter data or to call into question 
        our voting process. Russia in 2016 and unidentified 
        actors as recently as 2018 have already conducted cyber 
        activity that has targeted US election infrastructure, 
        but we do not have any intelligence reporting to 
        indicate any compromise of our nation's election 
        infrastructure that would have prevented voting, 
        changed vote counts, or disrupted the ability to tally 
        votes.
            Former Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen
    In April 2019, The New York Times reported that President 
Trump's chief of staff, Mick Mulvaney, told former Homeland 
Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen not to mention ``in front 
of the president'' anything about her preparations for ``new 
and different Russian forms of interference in the 2020 
election.''\25\ In July 2018, she said in remarks to the 
National Association of Secretaries of State that there were 
``no indications that Russia is targeting the 2018 U.S. 
midterms at a scale or scope to match their activities in 
2016,'' but that she ``consistently observe[d] malicious cyber 
activity from various actors against U.S. election 
infrastructure.''\26\ She also said that ``there is little 
doubt that adversaries and non-state actors continue to view 
elections as a target for cyber and influence operations.''\27\ 
According to the Times, Nielsen ``eventually gave up on her 
effort to organize a White House meeting of cabinet secretaries 
to coordinate a strategy to protect next year's elections. As a 
result, the issue did not gain the urgency or widespread 
attention that a president can command. And it meant that many 
Americans remain unaware of the latest versions of Russian 
interference.''\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\Eric Schmitt et al., In Push for 2020 Election Security, Top 
Official Was Warned: Don't Tell Trump, New York Times (April 24, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/us/politics/russia-2020-election-
trump.html.
    \26\Department of Homeland Security, ``Secretary of Homeland 
Security Kirstjen Nielsen NASS Conference Remarks: As Prepared for 
Delivery,'' https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/07/16/nass-conference-
remarks-prepared-delivery (release date July 16, 2018).
    \27\Id.
    \28\Schmitt et al.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            FBI Director Christopher Wray
    Also in April 2019, FBI Director Christopher Wray called 
Russia's interference efforts in American elections a 
``significant counterintelligence threat.''\29\ The New York 
Times reported that he said in remarks to the Council on 
Foreign Relations that ``our adversaries are going to keep 
adapting and upping their game. . . . So we are very much 
viewing 2018 as just kind of a dress rehearsal for the big show 
in 2020. . . . What has pretty much continued unabated is the 
use of social media, fake news, propaganda, false personas, 
etc. to spin us up, pit us against each other, to sow 
divisiveness and discord, to undermine America's faith in 
democracy. That is not just an election-cycle threat. It is 
pretty much a 365-day-a-year-threat.''\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\Julian A. Barnes and Adam Goldman, F.B.I. Warns of Russian 
Interference in 2020 Race and Boosts Counterintelligence Operations, 
N.Y. Times (April 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/us/
politics/fbi-russian-election-interference.html.
    \30\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Attorney General William Barr's Testimony
    At a May 1, 2019 hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Chairman Lindsey Graham asked Attorney General Barr if he would 
recommend that the Judiciary Committee ``and every other 
committee of Congress do our best to harden our infrastructure 
against future Russian attacks?'' Barr replied, ``Absolutely, 
yes.''\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing: ``The 
Department of Justice's Investigation of Russian Interference with the 
2016 Presidential Election,'' May 1, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Role of the Election Assistance Commission

    On April 4, 2019, Committee on House Administration 
Chairperson Lofgren sent a letter to the Election Assistance 
Commission (EAC) seeking information about the Commission, with 
a particular focus on the work the EAC was doing to help states 
secure their elections. In response to that letter, the EAC 
sent a letter to Chairperson Lofgren on May 1, 2019 and 
reported the following regarding its election security 
activities: ``As the 2020 Presidential Election approaches, 
providing election security tools and resources to state and 
local officials remains one of the EAC's most important 
responsibilities.''\32\ In addition to distributing the $380 
million in HAVA grants dedicated to election security in 
FY2018, the EAC noted several other initiatives it has 
undertaken in relation to election security. Specifically, it 
notes its work testing and federally certifying voting systems, 
``providing hands-on security and post-election audit 
trainings, producing security-focused resources, disseminating 
security best-practices information and checklists to state and 
local election officials, as well as hosting widely attended 
forums that feature security experts as speakers.''\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\Letter from the Election Assistance Commission to Chairperson 
Zoe Lofgren, May 1, 2019.
    \33\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The EAC has conducted a variety of these exercises 
throughout the country. For example, the EAC provided 11 
separate training sessions on Election Technology and Security 
for 600 election officials in nine states, provided post-
election audit assistance and training across five states, 
offered white papers and best-practices checklists on securing 
election infrastructure to all states, and hosted two summits 
attended by hundreds of attendees to hear first-hand from 
election security and intelligence experts. In sum, the EAC's 
role has been to convene local and state elections officials 
with those experts positioned to aid them with their unique 
concerns, while also serving as a clearinghouse for best 
practices, and providing proactive analysis of what information 
all states might need and benefit from, based on incoming 
inquiries from some states.
    The EAC also noted that staff and Commissioners routinely 
take part in Critical Infrastructure activities; they also 
serve as members of the Government Coordinating Council, and 
work closely with the Sector Coordinating Council. They also 
consistently coordinate with DHS and other federal partners, 
such as the Department of Defense's Federal Voting Assistance 
Program, to create and distribute resources for voters about 
trusted sources for election information and other security 
related topics.

H.R. 2722--The SAFE Act

    H.R. 2272 provides the necessary resources to states to 
begin the process of upgrading and maintaining safe, resilient 
election infrastructure. Many of its provisions reflect the 
recommendations of the Congressional Task Force on Election 
Security.
    First, H.R. 2260 authorizes $600 million in grants to 
assist states in securing election infrastructure and 
transitioning to required voter-verified paper-based systems. 
The grants will require jurisdictions to use individual, 
durable, voter-verified paper ballots that are counted by hand 
or read by an optical character recognition device or other 
counting device. The National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, 
and Medicine concluded last year that systems lacking voter-
marked paper ballots ``should be removed from service as soon 
as possible.''\34\ The Committee on House Administration heard 
from various experts during an Election Security hearing that 
replacing paperless systems with paper-based systems is a 
critical policy priority.\35\ The ``bridge between the voter 
and correctly reported outcomes requires a physical artifact as 
evidence of the voter's intent, and a process for checking. 
That artifact is typically the paper ballot,'' wrote Marian 
Schneider of Verified Voting.\36\ Dr. Joseph Lorenzo Hall of 
the Center for Democracy and Technology wrote that while 
``states and local jurisdictions continue to make progress 
updating their outdated voting technologies with newer systems 
that keep an auditable voter verifiable paper record, it is 
important to prioritize the continuing replacement of paperless 
direct-recording electronic (DRE) systems. DRE systems are not 
`software-independent' systems, are unauditable, and as such 
unsuitable for government elections.''\37\ Moreover, until 
there is adequate funding, some jurisdictions that use 
paperless systems will continue to do so because ``1) some 
jurisdictions have already purchased paperless systems in the 
recent past and have no available resources to purchase new 
systems, and/or 2) these kinds of systems are unfortunately 
still available for sale.''\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\Norden Testimony at pg. 5.
    \35\Written Testimony of Jocelyn Benson, Michigan Secretary of 
State, Hearing: ``Election Security,'' May 8, 2019 (hereinafter 
``Benson Testimony''); Written Testimony of Dr. Joseph Lorenzo Hall, 
Chief Technologist, The Center for Democracy & Technology, Hearing: 
``Election Security,'' May 8, 2019 (hereinafter ``Hall Testimony''); 
Norden Testimony; Written Testimony of Marian K. Schneider, President, 
Verified Voting, Hearing: ``Election Security,'' May 8, 2019 
(hereinafter ``Schneider Testimony'').
    \36\Schneider Testimony at pg. 4.
    \37\Hall Testimony at pg. 4.
    \38\Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The funding can also be used to carry out cyber and risk 
mitigation training; security risk and vulnerability 
assessments of a state's election infrastructure; maintenance 
of election infrastructure, including addressing identified 
risks and vulnerabilities; increased technical support for 
information technology infrastructure; enhanced cybersecurity 
and operations of information technology systems; and 
enhancements to the cybersecurity of voter registration 
systems, among other things.
    The SAFE Act also provides states with an ongoing stream of 
funding ($175 million biannually for fiscal years 2020, 2022, 
2024, and 2026) to assist with maintenance of election 
infrastructure. This will provide a predictable, stable, and 
reliable source of funds to better secure our elections. 
Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson testified before the 
Committee on House Administration that ``[m]ost states 
purchased new voting machines and established statewide voter 
registration databases using funding made available through 
HAVA in the years following the law's enactment. As those 
resources ran out, however, election technology began to age at 
the same time as technology was advancing at a rapid 
pace.''\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\Benson Testimony, pg. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 2722 also requires states to administer risk-limiting 
audits, which the EAC shall pay to States the amount of the 
costs. States ``vary widely in the effectiveness of post-
election audits processes.''\40\ Post-election audits are an 
important corollary to using voter-verified paper ballots--
namely, because ``[p]aper records will not prevent programming 
errors, software bugs, or the insertion of corrupt software 
into voting systems. Voter-marked paper ballots will only have 
real security value if they are used to check and confirm 
electronic tallies.''\41\ The most robust type of audit are 
risk-limiting audits.\42\ According to Jerome Lovato of the 
Election Assistance Commission, ``a risk-limiting audit (RLA) 
provides strong statistical evidence that the election outcome 
is right and has a high probability of correcting a wrong 
outcome.''\43\ One witness at the Committee on House 
Administration's election security hearing compared the 
importance of risk-limiting audits to the ``public policy 
invention'' of the secret ballot at the turn of the 20th 
century.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\Schneider Testimony, pg. 8.
    \41\Norden Testimony, pg. 7.
    \42\Schneider Testimony, pg. 4.
    \43\Jerome Lovato, Defining and Piloting Risk-Limiting Audits, 
Election Assistance Commission (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.eac.gov/
defining-and-piloting-risk-limiting-audits-/.
    \44\Hall Testimony, pg. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 2722 fosters accountability for election technology 
vendors. This is important because ``there is almost no federal 
oversight of private vendors that design and maintain the 
systems that allow us to determine who can vote, how they vote, 
what voters see when they cast their vote, how votes are 
counted and how those vote totals are communicated to the 
public. In fact, there are more federal regulations for 
ballpoint pens and magic markers than there are for voting 
systems and other parts of our election infrastructure.''\45\ 
H.R. 2722 address this by limiting state expenditures on goods 
and services with grant monies to purchases from ``qualified 
election infrastructure vendors.'' H.R. 2722 tasks the EAC, in 
coordination with DHS, to establish criteria for ``qualified 
election infrastructure vendor'' status, which must include 
maintaining IT infrastructure in a manner that is consistent 
with the best practices provided by the EAC's Technical 
Guidelines Development Committee. Moreover, vendors must be 
owned and controlled by a citizen or permanent resident of the 
United States and disclose any sourcing outside the United 
States for parts of the election infrastructure. It must also 
agree to independent security testing by the EAC and DHS. 
Finally, H.R. 2722 requires vendors to report any known or 
suspected security incidents involving election infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\Norden Testimony, pg. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ongoing threat of interference in Federal elections 
continues to demand robust guardrails to reinforce other 
cybersecurity best practices. The legislation establishes 
cybersecurity requirements that will apply equally to current 
and future technology to protect the necessity that every vote 
is counted as cast. For example, H.R. 2722 prohibits the use of 
wireless communications devices and internet connectivity in 
certain voting systems or devices involving ballot marking, 
tabulation, or aggregation, or upon which ballots are marked by 
voters.
    H.R. 2722 also includes open source provisions, requiring 
use of software and hardware for which information is disclosed 
by manufacturers. This will allow cybersecurity experts--and 
the public--to thoroughly vet the security of elections 
systems, regardless of the technology used.
    The legislation provides funds to study and report on 
accessible paper ballot verification mechanisms, including for 
individuals with disabilities, voters with difficulties in 
literacy, and voters whose primary language is not English.
    Ultimately, H.R. 2722 is an important investment in the 
integrity of self-government. It reflects an ongoing commitment 
to the security of the machinery of democracy--the 
infrastructure and systems to ensure, with necessary 
confidence, that votes are counted as cast at each Federal 
election.

                                Hearings

    For the purposes of section 103(i) of H. Res. 6 of the 
116th Congress the following hearings were used to develop or 
consider H.R. 2722:
    (1) On Wednesday, May 8, 2019 the Committee held a hearing 
titled ``Election Security.'' The following witnesses 
testified: Mr. Larry Norden, Brennan Center for Justice; Ms. 
Marian Schneider, Verified Voting; Mr. Joseph Lorenzo Hall, 
Center for Democracy and Technology; The Honorable Jocelyn 
Benson, Secretary of State, State of Michigan; and The 
Honorable John Merrill, Secretary of State, State of Alabama.
    (2) On Tuesday, May 21, 2019, the Committee held a hearing 
titled ``Oversight of the Election Assistance Commission.'' The 
following witnesses testified: The Honorable Christy McCormick, 
Commissioner and Chairwoman, Election Assistance Commission, 
accompanied by The Honorable Benjamin Hovland, Commissioner and 
Vice Chair, Election Assistance Commission; The Honorable Don 
Palmer, Commissioner, Election Assistance Commission; and The 
Honorable Thomas Hicks, Commissioner, Election Assistance 
Commission.
    (3) On Thursday, February 14, 2019, the Committee held a 
hearing titled ``For the People: Our American Democracy.'' The 
following witnesses testified: Mr. Chiraag Bains, Director of 
Legal Strategies, Demos; Ms. Wendy Weiser, Director, Democracy 
Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law; Mr. 
Fred Wertheimer, President, Democracy 21; The Honorable Kim 
Wyman, Secretary of State, State of Washington; Mr. Alejandro 
Rangel-Lopez, Senior at Dodge City High School, Dodge City 
Kansas, and plaintiff in LULAC & Rangel-Lopez v. Cox; Mr. Peter 
Earle, Wisconsin Civil Rights Trial Lawyer; Mr. Brandon A. 
Jessup, Data Science and Information Systems Professional; 
Executive Director, Michigan Forward; and David Keating, 
President, Institute for Free Speech.

                        Committee Consideration

    On Friday, June 21, 2019, the Committee met in open session 
and ordered the bill, H.R. 2722, as amended, favorably reported 
to the House by voice vote, a quorum being present.

                            Committee Votes

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the 
following rollcall votes occurred during the Committee's 
consideration of H.R. 2722:
    1. The Lofgren amendment in the nature of a substitute to 
H.R. 2722 (H.R. 2722 as amended) agreed to by a rollcall vote 
of 6 to 3. The vote was as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Representative             Yea      Nay     Present      Representative      Yea      Nay     Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren......................       X   .......  .........  Mr. Davis (IL).....  .......       X   .........
Mr. Raskin.......................       X   .......  .........  Mr. Walker.........  .......       X   .........
Ms. Davis (CA)...................       X   .......  .........  Mr. Loudermilk.....  .......       X   .........
Mr. Butterfield..................       X   .......  .........
Ms. Fudge........................       X   .......  .........
Mr. Aguilar......................       X   .......  .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. A substitute amendment offered by Mr. Davis of Illinois 
(Amendment 01) was defeated to by a rollcall vote of 5 to 3. 
The vote was as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Representative             Yea      Nay     Present      Representative      Yea      Nay     Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren......................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Davis (IL).....       X   .......  .........
Mr. Raskin.......................  .......  .......  .........  Mr. Walker.........       X   .......  .........
Ms. Davis (CA)...................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Loudermilk.....       X   .......  .........
Mr. Butterfield..................  .......       X   .........
Ms. Fudge........................  .......       X   .........
Mr. Aguilar......................  .......       X   .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. An amendment offered by Mr. Davis of Illinois (Amendment 
02) to strike subtitle A of title I was defeated by a rollcall 
vote of 3 to 6. The vote was as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Representative             Yea      Nay     Present      Representative      Yea      Nay     Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren......................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Davis (IL).....       X   .......  .........
Mr. Raskin.......................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Walker.........       X   .......  .........
Ms. Davis (CA)...................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Loudermilk.....       X   .......  .........
Mr. Butterfield..................  .......       X   .........
Ms. Fudge........................  .......       X   .........
Mr. Aguilar......................  .......       X   .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. An amendment offered by Mr. Loudermilk (Amendment 03) to 
strike section 105 was defeated to by a rollcall vote of 6 to 
2. The vote was as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Representative             Yea      Nay     Present      Representative      Yea      Nay     Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren......................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Davis (IL).....       X   .......  .........
Mr. Raskin.......................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Walker.........  .......  .......  .........
Ms. Davis (CA)...................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Loudermilk.....       X   .......  .........
Mr. Butterfield..................  .......       X   .........
Ms. Fudge........................  .......       X   .........
Mr. Aguilar......................  .......       X   .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5. An amendment offered by Mr. Loudermilk (Amendment 04) to 
strike subtitle B of title I and insert new subtitle B with was 
defeated to by a rollcall vote of 6 to 2. The vote was as 
follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Representative             Yea      Nay     Present      Representative      Yea      Nay     Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren......................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Davis (IL).....       X   .......  .........
Mr. Raskin.......................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Walker.........  .......  .......  .........
Ms. Davis (CA)...................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Loudermilk.....       X   .......  .........
Mr. Butterfield..................  .......       X   .........
Ms. Fudge........................  .......       X   .........
Mr. Aguilar......................  .......       X   .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6. An amendment offered by Mr. Davis of Illinois (Amendment 
05) to require a State match of 25 percent of any grant 
received by a State for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting 
systems and carrying out voting system security improvements 
was defeated to by a rollcall vote of 6 to 3. The vote was as 
follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Representative             Yea      Nay     Present      Representative      Yea      Nay     Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren......................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Davis (IL).....       X   .......  .........
Mr. Raskin.......................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Walker.........       X   .......  .........
Ms. Davis (CA)...................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Loudermilk.....       X   .......  .........
Mr. Butterfield..................  .......       X   .........
Ms. Fudge........................  .......       X   .........
Mr. Aguilar......................  .......       X   .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    7. An amendment offered by Mr. Walker (Amendment 06) to add 
new title IV ``Prohibiting Ballot Harvesting'' was defeated to 
by a rollcall vote of 6 to 3. The vote was as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Representative             Yea      Nay     Present      Representative      Yea      Nay     Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lofgren......................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Davis (IL).....       X   .......  .........
Mr. Raskin.......................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Walker.........       X   .......  .........
Ms. Davis (CA)...................  .......       X   .........  Mr. Loudermilk.....       X   .......  .........
Mr. Butterfield..................  .......       X   .........
Ms. Fudge........................  .......       X   .........
Mr. Aguilar......................  .......       X   .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII and clause 
(2)(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, the Committee's oversight findings and 
recommendations are reflected in the descriptive portions of 
this report

         Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives

    The objective of H.R. 2722, as amended, is to protect 
elections for public office by providing financial support and 
enhanced security for the infrastructure used to carry out such 
elections.

   New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its 
own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement 
authority, or tax expenditures or revenues contained in the 
cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional 
Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974.

                  Earmarks and Tax and Tariff Benefits

    H.R. 2722 contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax 
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as described in clauses 
9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of House rule XXI.

                        Committee Cost Estimate

    The Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate on H.R. 
2722, as amended, prepared by the Director of the Congressional 
Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974.

                  Congressional Budget Office Estimate

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the following is the cost estimate 
for H.R. 2722, as amended, provided by the Congressional Budget 
Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act 
of 1974.

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, June 25, 2019.
Hon. Zoe Lofgren,
Chairperson, Committee on House Administration,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Madam Chairperson: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2722, the SAFE 
Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew 
Pickford.
            Sincerely,
                                             Mark P. Hadley
                                 (For Phillip L. Swagel, Director).
    Enclosure.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

    The bill would
           Authorize appropriations for grants to 
        improve voting systems
           Amend federal statutes regarding the 
        security of elections
           Impose an intergovernmental mandate by 
        requiring states to submit a report on the usage plan 
        for voting systems in each jurisdiction in the state
    Estimated budgetary effects would primarily stem from
           Authorizing appropriations for grants to 
        states to enhance the security of voting systems

Bill Summary

    H.R. 2722 would authorize the appropriation of more than 
$1.1 billion over the 2019-2024 period, primarily for states 
and localities to improve voting technology. The bill also 
would set standards for election technology vendors.

Estimated Federal Cost

    The estimated budgetary effect of H.R. 2722 is shown in 
Table 1. The costs of the legislation fall within budget 
function 800 (general government).

               TABLE 1.--ESTIMATED INCREASES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION UNDER H.R. 2722
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 By fiscal year, millions of dollars--
                                                      ----------------------------------------------------------
                                                        2019    2020    2021    2022    2023    2024   2019-2024
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Voting System Grants:
    Estimated Authorizationa.........................       0     775       0     175       0     175      1.125
    Estimated Outlays................................       0     580     195     130      45     130      1,080
Other Provisions:
    Estimated Authorization..........................       0       5      20       0      20       0         45
    Estimated Outlays................................       0       5      20       0      20       0         45
    Total Changes:
        Estimated Authorizationa.....................       0     780      20     175      20     175      1,170
        Estimated Outlays............................       0     585     215     130      65     130      1,125
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
aH.R. 2722 would authorize the appropriation of $600 million in fiscal year 2019. Because most appropriations
  acts for 2019 have already been completed, for this cost estimate CBO has shown that authorized amount in 2020
  along with $175 million specifically authorized for 2020.

Basis of Estimate

    For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be 
enacted near the end of 2019 and that the specified and 
estimated amounts will be appropriated for each fiscal year 
beginning in 2020. H.R. 2722 would authorize the appropriation 
of $600 million in fiscal year 2019 for voting system grants. 
CBO expects that H.R. 2722 will not be enacted until after the 
appropriations acts for fiscal year 2019 are completed. 
Therefore, CBO has assumed that the $600 million authorized to 
be appropriated in 2019 would apply to fiscal year 2020. 
Estimated outlays are based on historical patterns for existing 
and similar activities.
    Assuming appropriation of the specified and estimated 
amounts, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost 
about $1.1 billion over the 2019-2024 period.
    Voting System Grants. Section 111 would authorize the 
appropriation of $600 million in 2019 and $175 million in each 
of fiscal years 2020, 2022, 2024, and 2026 for grants for state 
and localities to improve voting systems. CBO estimates that 
those grants would cost $1.1 billion over the 2020-2024 period, 
and about $200 million after 2024.
    Other Provisions. H.R. 2722 also would authorize 
appropriations for several other activities aimed at improving 
the security of elections. The bill would authorize grants for 
states to audit elections by using statistical evidence to 
determine whether election outcomes are accurate. Additionally, 
the bill would require the National Science Foundation to study 
paper ballots and the best practices associated with such 
ballots and would require the Election Assistance Commission to 
study the use of paper or digital ballots. H.R. 2722 would also 
authorize the appropriation of $5 million to prepare the 
required studies and whatever amounts are necessary for the 
auditing grants to states. CBO estimates that implementing 
those provisions would cost $45 million over the 2020-2024 
period.
    Pay-As-You-Go considerations: None.
    Increase in long-term deficits: None.

Mandates

    Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 
excludes from the application of that act any legislative 
provision that enforces constitutional rights of individuals. 
CBO has determined that title III as well as certain provisions 
of titles I and II fall within such exclusion because they 
would enforce constitutionally-protected voting rights.
    Section 205 would impose an intergovernmental mandate by 
requiring states to submit a report on the usage plan for 
voting systems in each jurisdiction in the state, which would 
include details on how each jurisdiction would use electronic 
poll books and other equipment. Because states report 
extensively on their election activities and have previously 
reported similar information, CBO estimates the cost of the 
mandate would be small and fall below the threshold established 
in UMRA ($82 million in 2019, adjusted annually for inflation).
    H.R. 2722 contain no private-sector mandates as defined in 
UMRA.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Matthew Pickford; 
Mandates: Rachel Austin.
    Estimate reviewed by: Kim Cawley, Chief, Natural and 
Physical Resources; Susan Willie, Chief, Mandates Unit; H. 
Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget 
Analysis; Theresa Gullo, Assistant Director for Budget 
Analysis.

                       Federal Mandates Statement

    The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal 
mandates regarding H.R. 2722, as amended, prepared by the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 
423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.

                  Non-Duplication of Federal Programs

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, the 
committee states that no provision of this resolution 
establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government 
known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program 
that was included in any report from the Government 
Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of 
Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a program 
identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic 
Assistance.

                      Advisory Committee Statement

    H.R. 2722 does not establish or authorize any new advisory 
committees.

                  Applicability to Legislative Branch

    H.R. 2722 does not apply to terms and conditions of 
employment or to access to public services or accommodations 
within the legislative branch.

             Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation


Section 1. Short title; table of contents

    Subsection (a) of this section would provide the short 
title of H.R. 2722, as amended, as the ``Securing America's 
Federal Elections Act'' or the ``SAFE Act.'' Subsection (b) 
would provide the table of contents

         TITLE I--FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE


         Subtitle A--Voting System Security Improvement Grants


   Part 1--Promoting Accuracy, Integrity, and Security Through Voter-
                    Verified Permanent Paper Ballot


Section 101. Short title

    Would provide the short title for Subsection A as the 
``Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019.''

Section 102. Paper ballot and manual counting requirements

    This section would require individual, durable, voter-
verified, paper ballots. Votes must be counted by hand or read 
by an optical character recognition device or other counting 
device. In addition, this section would define ``individual, 
durable, voter-verified, paper ballot'' as a paper ballot 
marked by the voter by hand or marked through the use of a 
nontabulating ballot marking device or system, so long as the 
option exists to mark by hand. The voting system must provide 
voters an opportunity to correct his or her ballot before the 
ballot is preserved. Ballots would not be preserved in any 
manner that makes it possible to associate a voter to the 
ballot without the voter's consent. Further, a paper ballot 
constitutes the official ballot and shall be used for any 
recount or audit, and shall be counted by hand in the event of 
a recount or audit for any federal election.
    This section would require that paper ballots cast be 
considered the true and correct record of votes cast in the 
event of any inconsistency or irregularities between hand-
counted ballots and any electronic vote tallies. Applies paper 
ballot requirement to all ballots cast in elections for federal 
office, including ballots cast by absent uniformed services 
voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed and Overseas 
Citizens Absentee Voting Act.
    Finally, this section provides a special rule for treatment 
of disputes when paper ballots have been shown, by clear and 
convincing evidence, to be compromised, and where compromised 
ballots exist in such numbers that the results of the election 
could be changed by them. Provides that the appropriate remedy 
shall be made in accordance with applicable state law, except 
that the electronic tally may not be used as the exclusive 
basis for determining the official certified result.

Section 103. Accessibility and ballot verification for individuals with 
        disabilities

    This section would require the use of at least one voting 
system at each polling place that is equipped for individuals 
with disabilities (including nonvisual and enhanced visual 
accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, and enhanced 
manual accessibility for the mobility and dexterity impaired). 
Further, it would require that, for federal elections occurring 
six years or more after the enactment of the SAFE Act, each 
polling place to have at least one voting system for voters 
with disabilities that marks ballots identical in size, ink, 
and paper stock to ballots used by voters without accessibility 
needs, that also marks the ballot in a manner such that it is 
not readily discernable whether the ballot was marked by 
machine or hand, and that combines ballots produced from the 
accessible voter system with other ballots in a manner that 
prevents identification of which ballots were cast by which 
system. It would require that such system be available for use 
by any voter who requests its use, and, for federal elections 
occurring six years or more after the enactment of the SAFE 
Act, must allow the voter to privately and independently verify 
the accuracy of the paper ballot by presenting, in an 
accessible form, the vote selections in the same manner they 
would appear for any vote tabulation or auditing. Clarifies 
that nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the 
use of an accessible ballot that may be printed or marked by 
the voter at home.
    Finally, this section would authorize to be appropriated 
$5,000,000 for the Director of the National Science Foundation 
to make grants to at least three entities to study, test, and 
develop accessible paper ballot voting, verification, and 
casting mechanisms, and best practices to enhance accessibility 
of paper ballot voting and verification for voters with 
disabilities, voters whose primary language is not English, and 
voters who have difficulties with literacy. It would establish 
grant eligibility requirements and provides that any technology 
developed under these grants shall be treated as non-
proprietary and made available to the public. It would direct 
the Director to coordinate these activities with grants for 
technology improvements. It would require that when adopting 
any voluntary guidance regarding accessibility of the paper 
ballot verification requirements for individuals with 
disabilities, the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) shall 
apply the same accessibility standards applicable under this 
subtitle. Finally, it would permit use of funds for protection 
and advocacy systems to support actions to enforce election-
related disability access.

Section 104. Durability and readability requirements for ballots

    This section would require that all voter-verified ballots 
are printed on durable paper that is able to maintain the 
accuracy and integrity of the ballot over repeated handling, 
including retaining and preserving information printed on the 
ballot for a period of 22 months. It would require that all 
voter-verified paper ballots completed through the use of a 
ballot marking device to be clearly readable by the voter 
without assistance (other than eyeglasses or other personal 
vision enhancing devices) and by an optical character 
recognition device or other device equipped for individuals 
with disabilities.

Section 105. Paper ballot printing requirements

    This section would require that all paper ballots used in 
an election for federal office shall be printed in the United 
States on recycled paper manufactured in the United States.

Section 106. Study and report on optimal ballot design

    This section would require the EAC to conduct a study of 
the best ways to design election ballots, including paper 
ballots and electronic or digital ballots, to minimize 
confusion and user errors, and to provide a report to Congress 
on the results of such study not later than January 1, 2020.

Section 107. Effective date for new requirements

    This section would add an effective date to the Help 
America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) relating to requirement first 
imposed on a state or jurisdiction by the provisions of this 
subtitle. It would also allow jurisdictions using certain 
systems such as certain paper record printers (including voter-
verified paper record printers attached to direct recording 
electronic voting machines) to delay implementation to 2022 
regarding select requirements, so long as certain contingencies 
are in place during the delay, including the option of having 
voters cast a vote using a blank pre-printed paper ballot which 
the voter may mark by hand and which is not produced by the 
direct recording electronic voting machine or other such 
system, and requiring that such paper ballot be counted as a 
regular and not provisional ballot. It would further require 
each polling place display notice of paper ballot option, and 
training of poll workers about said option, all in effect so 
long as delayed compliance is in effect.

                Part 2--Grants to Carry Out Improvements


Section 111. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems 
        and carrying out voting system security improvements

    This section would amend subtitle D of title II of HAVA by 
adding the following new sections under Part 7--Grants for 
obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems and carrying 
out voting system security improvements, adding the following 
new sections:
            Section 297. Grants for Obtaining Compliant Paper Ballot 
                    Voting Systems and Carrying Out Voting System 
                    Security Improvements
          This new section would directs the EAC to make 
        available grants for eligible states to (1) replace 
        voting systems that are not compliant paper ballot 
        voting systems under the Voter Confidence and Increased 
        Accessibility Act of 2019, or those which are compliant 
        but do not meet the most recent voluntary voting system 
        guidelines promulgated by the EAC prior to the November 
        2020 federal elections, as well as (2) carry out voting 
        system security improvements, and (3) implement and 
        model best practices for ballot design, ballot 
        instructions, and ballot testing.
          In addition, it would establish that grants made to 
        states under this section shall be of an amount the EAC 
        determines to be appropriate, except that a state shall 
        not receive less than the product of $1 and the average 
        of the number of individuals who cast votes in any of 
        the two most recent regularly scheduled general 
        elections for federal office held in the state. In the 
        event that Congress appropriates insufficient funds to 
        provide States the amount directed per the above, the 
        EAC shall make a pro rata reduction to ensure that the 
        entire appropriated amount is distributed to the 
        states. It would provide factors for the EAC to 
        consider in awarding excess funds to a state in the 
        event of a surplus of appropriated funds. It would also 
        provide that, to the greatest extent practicable, an 
        eligible state which receives a grant to replace a 
        voting system under this section shall ensure such 
        replacement system is capable of administering a system 
        of ranked choice voting.
            Section 297A. Voting System Security Improvements Described
          This new section would define voting system security 
        improvements as: (1) The acquisition of goods and 
        services from qualified election infrastructure vendors 
        by purchase, lease, or such other arrangements as may 
        be appropriate; (2) cyber and risk mitigation training; 
        (3) a security risk and vulnerability assessment of the 
        state's election infrastructure which is carried out by 
        a provider of cybersecurity services under a contract 
        entered into between the chief state election official 
        and the provider; (4) the maintenance of election 
        infrastructure, including addressing risks and 
        vulnerabilities which are identified under either of 
        the security risk and vulnerability assessments 
        described in paragraph (3), except that none of the 
        funds provided under this part may be used to renovate 
        or replace a building or facility which is used 
        primarily for purposes other than the administration of 
        elections for public office; (5) providing increased 
        technical support for any information technology 
        infrastructure that the chief state election official 
        deems to be part of the state's election infrastructure 
        or designates as critical to the operation of the 
        state's election infrastructure; (6) enhancing the 
        cybersecurity and operations of the information 
        technology infrastructure described in paragraph (4); 
        and (7) enhancing the cybersecurity of voter 
        registration systems.
          Further, it would define a ``qualified election 
        infrastructure vendor'' as any person who provides, 
        supports, or maintains, or who seeks to provide, 
        support, or maintain, election infrastructure on behalf 
        of a state, unit of local government, or election 
        agency who meets certain criteria established by the 
        Chair of the EAC and the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security.
          Additionally, this new section would direct the Chair 
        of the EAC and the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
        include the following in the criteria a person must 
        meet to be considered a ``qualified election 
        infrastructure vendor'': (A) the vendor must be owned 
        and controlled by a citizen or permanent resident of 
        the United States; (B) the vendor must disclose to the 
        Chair and the Secretary, and to the chief state 
        election official of any state to which the vendor 
        provides any goods and services with funds provided 
        under this part, of any sourcing outside the United 
        States for parts of the election infrastructure; (C) 
        the vendor agrees to ensure that the election 
        infrastructure will be developed and maintained in a 
        manner that is consistent with the cybersecurity best 
        practices issued by the Technical Guidelines 
        Development Committee; (D) the vendor agrees to 
        maintain its information technology infrastructure in a 
        manner that is consistent with the cybersecurity best 
        practices issued by the Technical Guidelines 
        Development Committee; (E) the vendor agrees to meet 
        the notification requirement defined herein with 
        respect to any known or suspected cybersecurity 
        incidents involving any of the goods and services 
        provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant under this 
        part; and (F) the vendor agrees to permit independent 
        security testing by the EAC and by the Secretary of the 
        goods and services provided by the vendor pursuant to a 
        grant under this part.
          It would also establish cybersecurity incident 
        reporting requirements that a vendor meets if, upon 
        learning of a potential cybersecurity incident 
        involving any of the goods and services provided by the 
        vendor, the vendor promptly assesses whether such 
        incident occurred and notifies the Chair of the EAC and 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security as soon as 
        practicable but not later than three days after 
        becoming aware of the potential incident. The vendor 
        must also inform any potentially impacted election 
        agency within three days and cooperate with the agency 
        in providing any further notifications necessary. The 
        vendor must provide ongoing updates to the Chair of the 
        EAC, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the 
        impacted election agency.
          Finally, this new section would provide that the 
        notification the vendor must provide to the Chair of 
        the EAC, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the 
        affected election agency must include the following: 
        (1) the date, time, and time zone when the election 
        cybersecurity incident began, if known; (2) the date, 
        time, and time zone when the election cybersecurity 
        incident was detected; (3) the date, time, and duration 
        of the election cybersecurity incident; (4) the 
        circumstances of the election cybersecurity incident, 
        including the specific election infrastructure systems 
        believed to have been accessed and information 
        acquired, if any; (5) any planned and implemented 
        technical measures to respond to and recover from the 
        incident; (6) in the case of any notification which is 
        an update to a prior notification, any additional 
        material information relating to the incident, 
        including technical data, as it becomes available.
            Section 297B. Eligibility of States
          This new section would provide that to be eligible 
        for a grant, in its application to the EAC, a state 
        must: (1) describe how it will use the grant to carry 
        out the activities authorized under this part; (2) 
        certify and assure that, not later than 5 years after 
        receiving the grant, the state will carry out voting 
        system security improvements as described above; and 
        (3) provide other information and assurances as the EAC 
        may require.
            Section 297C. Reports to Congress
          This new section would require the EAC to, not later 
        than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, submit 
        a report to the appropriate congressional committees, 
        including the Committees on Homeland Security, House 
        Administration, and the Judiciary of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committees on Homeland Security 
        and Governmental Affairs, the Judiciary, and Rules and 
        Administration of the Senate, on the activities carried 
        out with the funds provided under this part.
            Section 297D. Authorization of Appropriations
          This new section would provide an authorization of 
        appropriations of $600,000,000 for FY 2019 and further 
        authorize $175 million for each of the fiscal years 
        2020, 2022, 2024, and 2026. It would also provide that 
        any amounts appropriated shall remain available until 
        expended.

Section 112. Coordination of voting system security activities with use 
        of requirements payments and election administration 
        requirements under Help America Vote Act of 2002

    This section would amend HAVA to add the Secretary of 
Homeland Security or the Secretary's designee to the Board of 
Advisors of the EAC. It would also add a representative from 
the Department of Homeland Security to the Technical Guidelines 
Development Committee.
    It would direct the EAC to consult with the Department of 
Homeland Security in conducting periodic studies on election 
administration and adds to the objectives of the periodic 
studies ensuring the integrity of elections against 
interference through cyber means.
    This section would amend the allowable uses of requirements 
payments under HAVA to include voting system security 
improvements, including cyber training for election officials, 
technical support, enhancing cybersecurity of information 
systems, and enhancing cybersecurity of voter registration 
databases. Requires states to include protection of election 
infrastructure into their state plans for use of payments 
developed pursuant to 52 U.S.C. 21004.
    Additionally, it would require that the Committee 
responsible for composing the state plans developed pursuant to 
52 U.S.C. 21004 be composed of a representative group from the 
state's counties, cities, towns, Indian tribes, and to 
represent rural as well as urban areas.
    Finally, it would require states to undertake measures to 
prevent and deter cybersecurity incidents, as identified by the 
EAC, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Technical 
Guidelines Development Committee, of computerized voter 
registration databases.

Section 113. Incorporation of definitions

    This section would amend HAVA to include the definitions of 
``cybersecurity incident'' (6 U.S.C. 148), ``election 
infrastructure,'' ``election agency,'', and ``State'' (States, 
D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, U.S. Virgin Islands, 
Northern Mariana Islands).

                    Subtitle B--Risk-Limiting Audits


Section 121. Risk-limiting audits

    This section would amends title III of HAVA by adding the 
following new section:
            Section 303A. Risk-limiting audits
          This new section would define, among other terms, 
        ``risk-limiting audit'' to mean a post-election process 
        that has at least a 95% probability of correcting the 
        reported outcome of an election if the reported outcome 
        is incorrect; will not change the outcome if the 
        reported outcome is the correct outcome; and involves a 
        manual adjudication of voter intent (meaning a direct 
        inspection and determination, by humans, of ballot 
        choices marked by voters) from some or all validly-cast 
        ballots in an election.
          It would require that, not later than one year after 
        the enactment of this section, each state's chief 
        election official must establish several specific rules 
        and procedures for conducting risk-limiting audits. 
        Establishes effective date by requiring that 
        requirements of this section, including risk-limiting 
        audits, be complied with for the first regularly 
        scheduled federal election held more than one year 
        following the enactment of the SAFE Act and for each 
        subsequent election.
          It would require that if a risk-limiting audit 
        corrects the reported outcome of an election contest, 
        the state will use the results of the manual 
        adjudication of voter intent conducted within the risk-
        limiting audit as the official results of the election.
          Additionally, it would exempt from risk-limiting 
        audit requirement those election contests where a state 
        or jurisdiction conducts a full recount through a 
        manual adjudication of voter intent.
          Finally, it would require states to publish public 
        report after completion of risk-limiting audit and at 
        least five days before the relevant election contest is 
        certified, demonstrating results of the audit and 
        information necessary to confirm that audit was 
        properly conducted. Notes all data must be published in 
        machine-readable, open data formats, and that data 
        published must not compromise the anonymity of votes.

Section 122. Funding for conducting post-election risk-limiting audits

    This section would amend subtitle D of title II of HAVA by 
adding the following:

        Part 8--Funding for Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audits.

            Section 298. Payments for post-election risk-limiting 
                    audits.
          This new section would establish that the EAC will 
        pay to states the amount of eligible post-election 
        audit costs, where such costs are those paid or 
        incurred by the state or local government for the 
        conduct of any risk-limiting audit for a federal 
        election occurring after the date of enactment of this 
        section, and any equipment, software, or services 
        needed to conduct such audit.
          It would require the EAC to establish rules and 
        procedures for states to submit eligible costs, and 
        establishes a formula to adjust payments to states if 
        the amounts appropriated are insufficient to pay for 
        all eligible post-election costs submitted by states. 
        Authorizes the appropriation of such sums as are 
        necessary to carry out this part, and establishes that 
        appropriated amounts remain available until expended.

Section 123. GAO analysis of effects of audits

    This section would provide that no later than 6 months 
after the first federal elections held for which states must 
conduct risk-limiting audits, requires that the Comptroller 
General of the United States conduct an analysis of the extent 
to which risk-limiting audits have improved election 
administration and the security of election infrastructure in 
states that received grants. It would direct the Comptroller 
General to submit a report to relevant congressional committees 
regarding such analysis.

  TITLE II--Promoting Cybersecurity Through Improvements in Election 
                             Administration


Section 201. Voting system cybersecurity requirements

    This section would establish ballot tabulating methods 
where voting systems must tabulate ballots by hand or use 
optical scanning devices that meet enumerated criteria (except 
in limited circumstances).
    It would require that optical scanning devices must (1) be 
designed and built in such a manner that it is impossible for 
the device to add or change a voter's selection on a printed or 
marked ballot; (2) be capable of exporting its data in a 
machine-readable, open data standard format; (3) consist of 
hardware components certified by section 2216 of the Homeland 
Security Act that also conform to a hardware component manifest 
that includes point-of-origin and upstream hardware supply 
chain information that has been provided to the EAC, Department 
of Homeland Security, and each state where the device is used, 
and further may be shared with independent experts for 
cybersecurity analysis; (4) utilize technology that prevents 
device operation if any hardware requirements are not met; (5) 
only operate using software for which the source code, 
compilation parameters, and build tools have been provided to 
the EAC, Department of Homeland Security, and the chief state 
election official of each state where the device is used, and 
such software may be shared with independent experts for 
cybersecurity analysis; (5) utilize technology that prevents 
the software running should requirements of (5) be unmet; (7) 
utilizes technology that allows stakeholders to verify that the 
software running on the device meets certain requirements; and 
(8) contains such other security requirements as the Director 
of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security require.
    It would allow the Director to waive some requirements for 
a period not to exceed two years, and requires internet 
publication of information related to any such waiver. 
Establishes effective date of these requirements for federal 
elections in 2024 and federal elections thereafter.
    This section would prohibit the use of wireless 
communications devices in systems or devices. Specifically, it 
would prohibit systems or devices on which ballots are 
programmed or designed, or ballots are marked (except as 
necessary for voting by individuals with disabilities), or upon 
which votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated, from 
containing, using, or being accessible by wireless, power-line, 
or concealed communication device, effective in the federal 
elections of 2020.
    Additionally, it would prohibit connection of voting system 
to the internet by requiring that no system or device upon 
which ballot marking devices or optical scanners are 
configured, or ballots are marked by voters, or votes cast, 
tabulated, or aggregated, shall be connected to the internet or 
any other communications network at any time, effective in the 
federal elections of 2020.
    Finally, it would establish additional cybersecurity 
standards for certain ballot marking devices. It would prohibit 
states from using ballot marking devices unless an independent 
laboratory in a simulated election scenario finds there is less 
than a five percent chance that an ordinary voter using the 
device would not report any difference between her vote 
selection and the vote selection printed on the ballot by the 
ballot marking device. It would lay out the requirements for 
valid simulated election scenario and establishes effective 
date in the federal elections of November 2022 and each 
subsequent federal election. It would establish procedures and 
requirements for testing and certification of ballot marking 
devices, per an application submitted to the EAC. It would 
allow for the EAC to submit findings to an independent board 
for review and prohibits the EAC from charging fees associated 
with testing and certification to state or jurisdiction, or 
developer or manufacturer of ballot marking device, or any 
other relevant party.

Section 202. Testing of existing voting systems to ensure compliance 
        with election cybersecurity guidelines and other guidelines

    This section would amend HAVA to require the EAC to 
provide, not later than nine months before regularly scheduled 
federal elections, for the testing by accredited laboratories 
under this section of the voting system hardware and software 
certified for use in the most recent such election, on the 
basis of the most recent voting system guidelines applicable to 
such hardware or software (including election cybersecurity 
guidelines) issued under this Act. It would require the EAC to 
decertify any hardware or software the EAC determines does not 
meet the most recent guidelines. This section applies to the 
regularly scheduled general election for federal office held in 
November 2020 and each succeeding regularly scheduled general 
election for federal office.
    Additionally, it would amend HAVA to require the Technical 
Guidelines Development Committee within the EAC, within six 
months of enactment of the SAFE Act, to issue election 
cybersecurity guidelines, including standards and best 
practices for procuring, maintaining, testing, operating, and 
updating election systems to prevent and deter cybersecurity 
incidents.

Section 203. Requiring use of software and hardware for which 
        information is disclosed by manufacturer

    This section would amend HAVA to establish that, in 
operating voting systems relevant to federal elections, states 
may only use software for which the source code is disclosed by 
the manufacturer and made publicly available online for use, 
excepting that the manufacturer may prohibit usage of the 
software primarily intended for commercial advantage or private 
compensation, unrelated to carrying out legitimate research or 
cybersecurity activity. Further, it would except widely-used 
operating system software and cybersecurity software not 
specific to voting systems.
    It would prohibit use of voting systems in federal 
elections unless the manufacturer discloses online the hardware 
used to operate the system. It would add additional 
restrictions and disclosure requirements for custom-made or 
altered hardware, including that the design of such hardware 
must be made publicly available online for use, except that a 
manufacturer may prohibit use for commercial advantage or 
private compensation, unrelated to carrying out legitimate 
research or cybersecurity activity. It would make this 
requirement effective for federal elections held in 2020 or any 
succeeding year.

Section 204. Treatment of electronic poll books as part of voting 
        systems

    This section would amend HAVA to include electronic poll 
books as part of voting systems. It would define electronic 
poll books as the total combination of mechanical, 
electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the 
software, firmware, and documentation required to program, 
control, and support the equipment) that is used: (1) to retain 
the list of registered voters at a polling location, or vote 
center, or other location at which voters cast votes in an 
election for federal office; and (2) to identify registered 
voters who are eligible to vote in an election. It would make 
this requirement effective January 1, 2020.

Section 205. Pre-election reports on voting system usage

    This section would require the chief state election 
official of each state to submit a report to the EAC containing 
a detailed voting system usage plan for each jurisdiction which 
will administer an election, including a plan for usage of 
electronic poll books and other system components, no later 
than 120 days prior to any regularly scheduled election for 
federal office, and would make this effective for November 2020 
federal elections and subsequent elections.

Section 206. Streamlining collection of election information

    This section would waive certain federal information policy 
requirements of subchapter I of chapter 35 of title 44, United 
States Code for purposes of maintaining the clearinghouse 
described in this section.

  TITLE III--Use of Voting Machines Manufactured in the United States


Section 301. Use of voting machines manufactured in the United States

    This section would amend HAVA by establishing that, not 
later than the regularly scheduled general election for federal 
office of 2022, each state shall seek to ensure that any voting 
machine used in that election and any election thereafter is 
manufactured in the United States.

                         TITLE IV--Severability


Section 401. Severability

    This section would establish severability such that the 
application of the provisions of this Act and amendments made 
by this Act shall not be affected by a holding finding any 
provision of the Act or amendment made by the Act 
unconstitutional.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, and existing law in which no 
change is proposed is shown in roman):

                     HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002


SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Help America 
Vote Act of 2002''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is 
as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
     * * * * * * *

                          TITLE II--COMMISSION

     * * * * * * *

Subtitle B--Testing, Certification, Decertification, and Recertification 
     of Voting System Hardware and Software; Ballot Marking Devices

Sec. 231. Certification and testing of voting systems.
Sec. 232. Testing and certification of ballot marking devices.

     Subtitle C--Studies and Other Activities To Promote Effective 
                   Administration of Federal Elections

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible paper ballot verification 
          mechanisms.
[Sec. 247.] Sec. 248. Consultation with Standards Board and Board of 
          Advisors.

                     Subtitle D--Election Assistance

     * * * * * * *

 Part 7--Grants for Obtaining Compliant Paper Ballot Voting Systems and 
            Carrying Out Voting System Security Improvements

Sec. 297. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems and 
          carrying out voting system security improvements.
Sec. 297A. Voting system security improvements described.
Sec. 297B. Eligibility of States.
Sec. 297C. Reports to Congress.
Sec. 297D. Authorization of appropriations.

         Part 8--Funding for Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audits

Sec. 298. Payments for post-election risk-limiting audits.

    TITLE III--UNIFORM AND NONDISCRIMINATORY ELECTION TECHNOLOGY AND 
                       ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

                        Subtitle A--Requirements

Sec. 301. Voting systems standards.
Sec. 301A. Pre-election reports on voting system usage.
Sec. 302. Provisional voting and voting information requirements.
Sec. 303. Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements 
          and requirements for voters who register by mail.
Sec. 303A. Risk-limiting audits.

   Subtitle B--Coverage of Commission Under Certain Laws and Programs

     * * * * * * *

                   TITLE IX--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

[Sec. 901. State defined.]
Sec. 901. Definitions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          TITLE II--COMMISSION

           Subtitle A--Establishment and General Organization

PART 1--ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 202. DUTIES.

   [The Commission] (a) In General._The Commission  shall serve 
as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of 
information and review of procedures with respect to the 
administration of Federal elections [by] and the security of 
election infrastructure by--
          (1) carrying out the duties described in part 3 
        (relating to the adoption of voluntary voting system 
        guidelines), including the maintenance of a 
        clearinghouse of information on the experiences of 
        State and local governments in implementing the 
        guidelines and in operating voting systems in general;
          (2) carrying out the duties described in subtitle B 
        (relating to the testing, certification, 
        decertification, and recertification of voting system 
        hardware and software and ballot marking devices);
          (3) carrying out the duties described in subtitle C 
        (relating to conducting studies and carrying out other 
        activities to promote the effective administration of 
        Federal elections);
          (4) carrying out the duties described in subtitle D 
        (relating to election assistance), and providing 
        information and training on the management of the 
        payments and grants provided under such subtitle;
          (5) carrying out the duties described in subtitle B 
        of title III (relating to the adoption of voluntary 
        guidance); and
          (6) developing and carrying out the Help America Vote 
        College Program under title V.
  (b) Waiver of Certain Requirements.--Subchapter I of chapter 
35 of title 44, United States Code, shall not apply to the 
collection of information for purposes of maintaining the 
clearinghouse described in paragraph (1) of subsection (a).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  PART 2--ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION STANDARDS BOARD AND BOARD OF 
ADVISORS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 214. MEMBERSHIP OF BOARD OF ADVISORS.

  (a) In General.--The Board of Advisors shall be composed of 
[37 members] 38 members appointed as follows:
          (1) Two members appointed by the National Governors 
        Association.
          (2) Two members appointed by the National Conference 
        of State Legislatures.
          (3) Two members appointed by the National Association 
        of Secretaries of State.
          (4) Two members appointed by the National Association 
        of State Election Directors.
          (5) Two members appointed by the National Association 
        of Counties.
          (6) Two members appointed by the National Association 
        of County Recorders, Election Administrators, and 
        Clerks.
          (7) Two members appointed by the United States 
        Conference of Mayors.
          (8) Two members appointed by the Election Center.
          (9) Two members appointed by the International 
        Association of County Recorders, Election Officials, 
        and Treasurers.
          (10) Two members appointed by the United States 
        Commission on Civil Rights.
          (11) Two members appointed by the Architectural and 
        Transportation Barrier Compliance Board under section 
        502 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 792).
          (12) The chief of the Office of Public Integrity of 
        the Department of Justice, or the chief's designee.
          (13) The chief of the Voting Section of the Civil 
        Rights Division of the Department of Justice or the 
        chief's designee.
          (14) The director of the Federal Voting Assistance 
        Program of the Department of Defense.
          (15) Four members representing professionals in the 
        field of science and technology, of whom--
                  (A) one each shall be appointed by the 
                Speaker and the Minority Leader of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                  (B) one each shall be appointed by the 
                Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the 
                Senate.
          (16) Eight members representing voter interests, of 
        whom--
                  (A) four members shall be appointed by the 
                Committee on House Administration of the House 
                of Representatives, of whom two shall be 
                appointed by the chair and two shall be 
                appointed by the ranking minority member; and
                  (B) four members shall be appointed by the 
                Committee on Rules and Administration of the 
                Senate, of whom two shall be appointed by the 
                chair and two shall be appointed by the ranking 
                minority member.
          (17) The Secretary of Homeland Security or the 
        Secretary's designee.
  (b) Manner of Appointments.--Appointments shall be made to 
the Board of Advisors under subsection (a) in a manner which 
ensures that the Board of Advisors will be bipartisan in nature 
and will reflect the various geographic regions of the United 
States.
  (c) Term of Service; Vacancy.--Members of the Board of 
Advisors shall serve for a term of 2 years, and may be 
reappointed. Any vacancy in the Board of Advisors shall be 
filled in the manner in which the original appointment was 
made.
  (d) Chair.--The Board of Advisors shall elect a Chair from 
among its members.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           PART 3--TECHNICAL GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

SEC. 221. TECHNICAL GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE.

  (a) Establishment.--There is hereby established the Technical 
Guidelines Development Committee (hereafter in this part 
referred to as the ``Development Committee'').
  (b) Duties.--
          (1) In general.--The Development Committee shall 
        assist the Executive Director of the Commission in the 
        development of the voluntary voting system guidelines.
          (2) Deadline for initial set of recommendations.--The 
        Development Committee shall provide its first set of 
        recommendations under this section to the Executive 
        Director of the Commission not later than 9 months 
        after all of its members have been appointed.
          (3) Election cybersecurity guidelines.--Not later 
        than 6 months after the date of the enactment of the 
        Securing America's Federal Elections Act, the 
        Development Committee shall issue election 
        cybersecurity guidelines, including standards and best 
        practices for procuring, maintaining, testing, 
        operating, and updating election systems to prevent and 
        deter cybersecurity incidents.
  (c) Membership.--
          (1) In general.--The Development Committee shall be 
        composed of the Director of the National Institute of 
        Standards and Technology (who shall serve as its 
        chair), together with a group of 14 other individuals 
        appointed jointly by the Commission and the Director of 
        the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
        consisting of the following:
                  (A) An equal number of each of the following:
                          (i) Members of the Standards Board.
                          (ii) Members of the Board of 
                        Advisors.
                          (iii) Members of the Architectural 
                        and Transportation Barrier Compliance 
                        Board under section 502 of the 
                        Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 
                        792).
                  (B) A representative of the American National 
                Standards Institute.
                  (C) A representative of the Institute of 
                Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
                  (D) Two representatives of the National 
                Association of State Election Directors 
                selected by such Association who are not 
                members of the Standards Board or Board of 
                Advisors, and who are not of the same political 
                party.
                  (E) A representative of the Department of 
                Homeland Security.
                  [(E)] (F) Other individuals with technical 
                and scientific expertise relating to voting 
                systems and voting equipment.
          (2) Quorum.--A majority of the members of the 
        Development Committee shall constitute a quorum, except 
        that the Development Committee may not conduct any 
        business prior to the appointment of all of its 
        members.
  (d) No Compensation for Service.--Members of the Development 
Committee shall not receive any compensation for their service, 
but shall be paid travel expenses, including per diem in lieu 
of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies 
under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States 
Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business 
in the performance of services for the Development Committee.
  (e) Technical Support From National Institute of Standards 
and Technology.--
          (1) In general.--At the request of the Development 
        Committee, the Director of the National Institute of 
        Standards and Technology shall provide the Development 
        Committee with technical support necessary for the 
        Development Committee to carry out its duties under 
        this subtitle.
          (2) Technical support.--The technical support 
        provided under paragraph (1) shall include intramural 
        research and development in areas to support the 
        development of the voluntary voting system guidelines 
        under this part, including--
                  (A) the security of computers, computer 
                networks, and computer data storage used in 
                voting systems, including the computerized list 
                required under section 303(a);
                  (B) methods to detect and prevent fraud;
                  (C) the protection of voter privacy;
                  (D) the role of human factors in the design 
                and application of voting systems, including 
                assistive technologies for individuals with 
                disabilities (including blindness) and varying 
                levels of literacy; and
                  (E) remote access voting, including voting 
                through the Internet.
          (3) No private sector intellectual property rights in 
        guidelines.--No private sector individual or entity 
        shall obtain any intellectual property rights to any 
        guideline or the contents of any guideline (or any 
        modification to any guideline) adopted by the 
        Commission under this Act.
  (f) Publication of Recommendations in Federal Register.--At 
the time the Commission adopts any voluntary voting system 
guideline pursuant to section 222, the Development Committee 
shall cause to have published in the Federal Register the 
recommendations it provided under this section to the Executive 
Director of the Commission concerning the guideline adopted.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       Subtitle B--Testing, Certification, Decertification, and 
Recertification of Voting System Hardware and Software; Ballot Marking 
                                Devices 

SEC. 231. CERTIFICATION AND TESTING OF VOTING SYSTEMS.

  (a) Certification and Testing.--
          (1) In general.--The Commission shall provide for the 
        testing, certification, decertification, and 
        recertification of voting system hardware and software 
        by accredited laboratories.
          (2) Optional use by states.--At the option of a 
        State, the State may provide for the testing, 
        certification, decertification, or recertification of 
        its voting system hardware and software by the 
        laboratories accredited by the Commission under this 
        section.
          (3) Testing to ensure compliance with guidelines.--
                  (A) Testing.--Not later than 9 months before 
                the date of each regularly scheduled general 
                election for Federal office, the Commission 
                shall provide for the testing by accredited 
                laboratories under this section of the voting 
                system hardware and software which was 
                certified for use in the most recent such 
                election, on the basis of the most recent 
                voting system guidelines applicable to such 
                hardware or software (including election 
                cybersecurity guidelines) issued under this 
                Act.
                  (B) Decertification of hardware or software 
                failing to meet guidelines.--If, on the basis 
                of the testing described in subparagraph (A), 
                the Commission determines that any voting 
                system hardware or software does not meet the 
                most recent guidelines applicable to such 
                hardware or software issued under this Act, the 
                Commission shall decertify such hardware or 
                software.
  (b) Laboratory Accreditation.--
          (1) Recommendations by national institute of 
        standards and technology.--Not later than 6 months 
        after the Commission first adopts voluntary voting 
        system guidelines under part 3 of subtitle A, the 
        Director of the National Institute of Standards and 
        Technology shall conduct an evaluation of independent, 
        non-Federal laboratories and shall submit to the 
        Commission a list of those laboratories the Director 
        proposes to be accredited to carry out the testing, 
        certification, decertification, and recertification 
        provided for under this section.
          (2) Approval by commission.--
                  (A) In general.--The Commission shall vote on 
                the accreditation of any laboratory under this 
                section, taking into consideration the list 
                submitted under paragraph (1), and no 
                laboratory may be accredited for purposes of 
                this section unless its accreditation is 
                approved by a vote of the Commission.
                  (B) Accreditation laboratories not on 
                director list.--The Commission shall publish an 
                explanation for the accreditation of any 
                laboratory not included on the list submitted 
                by the Director of the National Institute of 
                Standards and Technology under paragraph (1).
  (c) Continuing Review by National Institute of Standards and 
Technology.--
          (1) In general.--In cooperation with the Commission 
        and in consultation with the Standards Board and the 
        Board of Advisors, the Director of the National 
        Institute of Standards and Technology shall monitor and 
        review, on an ongoing basis, the performance of the 
        laboratories accredited by the Commission under this 
        section, and shall make such recommendations to the 
        Commission as it considers appropriate with respect to 
        the continuing accreditation of such laboratories, 
        including recommendations to revoke the accreditation 
        of any such laboratory.
          (2) Approval by commission required for revocation.--
        The accreditation of a laboratory for purposes of this 
        section may not be revoked unless the revocation is 
        approved by a vote of the Commission.
  (d) Transition.--Until such time as the Commission provides 
for the testing, certification, decertification, and 
recertification of voting system hardware and software by 
accredited laboratories under this section, the accreditation 
of laboratories and the procedure for the testing, 
certification, decertification, and recertification of voting 
system hardware and software used as of the date of the 
enactment of this Act shall remain in effect.

SEC. 232. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT MARKING DEVICES.

  (a) In General.--Any State or jurisdiction which intends to 
use a ballot marking device (other than a ballot marking device 
used exclusively to comply with the requirements of section 
301(a)(3)) in an election for Federal office may submit an 
application to the Commission for testing and certification 
under this section.
  (b) Application, Assignment, and Testing.--
          (1) In general.--An application under subsection (a) 
        shall be submitted not later than 18 months before the 
        date of the election for Federal office in which the 
        ballot marking device is intended to be used and shall 
        contain such information as the Commission requires.
          (2) Assignment.--Upon receipt of an application for 
        testing under this section, the Commission shall 
        contract with a qualified independent user experience 
        research laboratory for the testing of whether the 
        ballot marking device intended to be used by the State 
        or jurisdiction meets the requirements of section 
        301(a)(10)(B).
          (3) Requirements for testing.--Any contract described 
        in paragraph (2) shall require the qualified 
        independent user experience research laboratory to--
                  (A) not later than 30 days before testing 
                begins, submit to the Commission for approval 
                the protocol for the simulated election 
                scenario used for testing the ballot marking 
                device;
                  (B) use only protocols approved by the 
                Commission in conducting such testing; and
                  (C) submit to the Commission a report on the 
                results of the testing.
          (4) Qualified independent user experience research 
        laboratory.--For purposes of this section:
                  (A) In general.--The term ``qualified 
                independent user experience research 
                laboratory'' means a laboratory accredited 
                under this subsection by the Election 
                Assistance Commission in accordance with 
                standards determined by the Commission, in 
                consultation with the Director of the National 
                Institute of Standards and Technology and the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security.
                  (B) Criteria.--A laboratory shall not be 
                accredited under this subsection unless such 
                laboratory demonstrates that--
                          (i) no employee of, or individual 
                        with an ownership in, such laboratory 
                        has, or has had during the 5 preceding 
                        years, any financial relationship with 
                        a manufacturer of voting systems; and
                          (ii) any group of individuals 
                        conducting tests under this section 
                        collectively meet the following 
                        qualifications:
                                  (I) Experience designing and 
                                running user research studies 
                                and experiments using both 
                                qualitative and quantitative 
                                methodologies.
                                  (II) Experience with voting 
                                systems.
  (c) Review by Independent Board.--
          (1) In general.--The Commission shall submit for 
        approval to an independent review board established 
        under paragraph (3) the following:
                  (A) Any protocol submitted to the Commission 
                under subsection (b)(3)(A).
                  (B) Any report submitted to the Commission 
                under subsection (b)(3)(C).
          (2) Final approval.--Not later than the date that is 
        12 months before the date of the election for Federal 
        office in which a State or jurisdiction intends to use 
        the ballot marking device, the independent review board 
        shall report to the Commission on whether it has 
        approved a report submitted under paragraph (1)(B).
          (3) Independent review board.--
                  (A) In general.--An independent review board 
                established under this paragraph shall be 
                composed of 5 independent scientists appointed 
                by the Commission, in consultation with the 
                Director of the National Institute of Standards 
                and Technology.
                  (B) Qualifications.--The members of the 
                independent review board--
                          (i) shall have expertise and relevant 
                        peer-reviewed publications in the 
                        following fields: cognitive psychology, 
                        experimental design, statistics, and 
                        user experience research and testing; 
                        and
                          (ii) may not have, or have had during 
                        the 5 preceding years, any financial 
                        relationship with a manufacturer of 
                        voting systems.
          (4) Publication.--The Commission shall make public--
                  (A) any protocol approved under this 
                subsection;
                  (B) any report submitted under subsection 
                (b)(3)(C); and
                  (C) any determination made by an independent 
                review board under paragraph (2).
  (d) Certification.--If--
          (1) a ballot marking device is determined by the 
        qualified independent user experience research 
        laboratory to meet the requirements of section 
        301(a)(7); and
          (2) the report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(C) 
        is approved by a majority of the members of the 
        independent review board under subsection (d)(2),
then the Commission shall certify the ballot marking device.
  (e) Prohibition on Fees.--The Commission may not charge any 
fee to a State or jurisdiction, a developer or manufacturer of 
a ballot marking device, or any other person in connection with 
testing and certification under this section.

     Subtitle C--Studies and Other Activities To Promote Effective 
                  Administration of Federal Elections

SEC. 241. PERIODIC STUDIES OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ISSUES.

  (a) In General.--On such periodic basis as the Commission may 
determine, [the Commission shall] the Commission, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security (as 
appropriate), shall conduct and make available to the public 
studies regarding the election administration issues described 
in subsection (b), with the goal of promoting methods of voting 
and administering elections which--
          (1) will be the most convenient, accessible, and easy 
        to use for voters, including members of the uniformed 
        services and overseas voters, individuals with 
        disabilities, including the blind and visually 
        impaired, and voters with limited proficiency in the 
        English language;
          (2) will yield the most accurate, secure, and 
        expeditious system for voting and tabulating election 
        results;
          (3) will be nondiscriminatory and afford each 
        registered and eligible voter an equal opportunity to 
        vote and to have that vote counted; [and]
          (4) will be secure against attempts to undermine the 
        integrity of election systems by cyber or other means; 
        and
          [(4)] (5) will be efficient and cost-effective for 
        use.
  (b) Election Administration Issues Described.--For purposes 
of subsection (a), the election administration issues described 
in this subsection are as follows:
          (1) Methods and mechanisms of election technology and 
        voting systems used in voting and counting votes in 
        elections for Federal office, including the over-vote 
        and under-vote notification capabilities of such 
        technology and systems.
          (2) Ballot designs for elections for Federal office.
          (3) Methods of voter registration, maintaining secure 
        and accurate lists of registered voters (including the 
        establishment of a centralized, interactive, statewide 
        voter registration list linked to relevant agencies and 
        all polling sites), and ensuring that registered voters 
        appear on the voter registration list at the 
        appropriate polling site.
          (4) Methods of conducting provisional voting.
          (5) Methods of ensuring the accessibility of voting, 
        registration, polling places, and voting equipment to 
        all voters, including individuals with disabilities 
        (including the blind and visually impaired), Native 
        American or Alaska Native citizens, and voters with 
        limited proficiency in the English language.
          (6) Nationwide statistics and methods of identifying, 
        deterring, and investigating voting fraud in elections 
        for Federal office.
          (7) Identifying, deterring, and investigating methods 
        of voter intimidation.
          (8) Methods of recruiting, training, and improving 
        the performance of poll workers.
          (9) Methods of educating voters about the process of 
        registering to vote and voting, the operation of voting 
        mechanisms, the location of polling places, and all 
        other aspects of participating in elections.
          (10) The feasibility and advisability of conducting 
        elections for Federal office on different days, at 
        different places, and during different hours, including 
        the advisability of establishing a uniform poll closing 
        time and establishing--
                  (A) a legal public holiday under section 6103 
                of title 5, United States Code, as the date on 
                which general elections for Federal office are 
                held;
                  (B) the Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in 
                November, in every even numbered year, as a 
                legal public holiday under such section;
                  (C) a date other than the Tuesday next after 
                the 1st Monday in November, in every even 
                numbered year as the date on which general 
                elections for Federal office are held; and
                  (D) any date described in subparagraph (C) as 
                a legal public holiday under such section.
          (11) Federal and State laws governing the eligibility 
        of persons to vote.
          (12) Ways that the Federal Government can best assist 
        State and local authorities to improve the 
        administration of elections for Federal office and what 
        levels of funding would be necessary to provide such 
        assistance.
          (13)(A) The laws and procedures used by each State 
        that govern--
                  (i) recounts of ballots cast in elections for 
                Federal office;
                  (ii) contests of determinations regarding 
                whether votes are counted in such elections; 
                and
                  (iii) standards that define what will 
                constitute a vote on each type of voting 
                equipment used in the State to conduct 
                elections for Federal office.
          (B) The best practices (as identified by the 
        Commission) that are used by States with respect to the 
        recounts and contests described in clause (i).
          (C) Whether or not there is a need for more 
        consistency among State recount and contest procedures 
        used with respect to elections for Federal office.
          (14) The technical feasibility of providing voting 
        materials in eight or more languages for voters who 
        speak those languages and who have limited English 
        proficiency.
          (15) Matters particularly relevant to voting and 
        administering elections in rural and urban areas.
          (16) Methods of voter registration for members of the 
        uniformed services and overseas voters, and methods of 
        ensuring that such voters receive timely ballots that 
        will be properly and expeditiously handled and counted.
          (17) The best methods for establishing voting system 
        performance benchmarks, expressed as a percentage of 
        residual vote in the Federal contest at the top of the 
        ballot.
          (18) Broadcasting practices that may result in the 
        broadcast of false information concerning the location 
        or time of operation of a polling place.
          (19) Such other matters as the Commission determines 
        are appropriate.
  (c) Reports.--The Commission shall submit to the President 
and to the Committee on House Administration of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Rules and Administration 
of the Senate a report on each study conducted under subsection 
(a) together with such recommendations for administrative and 
legislative action as the Commission determines is appropriate.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE PAPER BALLOT VERIFICATION 
                    MECHANISMS.

  (a) Study and Report.--The Director of the National Science 
Foundation shall make grants to not fewer than 3 eligible 
entities to study, test, and develop accessible paper ballot 
voting, verification, and casting mechanisms and devices and 
best practices to enhance the accessibility of paper ballot 
voting and verification mechanisms for individuals with 
disabilities, for voters whose primary language is not English, 
and for voters with difficulties in literacy, including best 
practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes 
through which the mechanisms are used.
  (b) Eligibility.--An entity is eligible to receive a grant 
under this part if it submits to the Director (at such time and 
in such form as the Director may require) an application 
containing--
          (1) certifications that the entity shall specifically 
        investigate enhanced methods or devices, including non-
        electronic devices, that will assist such individuals 
        and voters in marking voter-verified paper ballots and 
        presenting or transmitting the information printed or 
        marked on such ballots back to such individuals and 
        voters, and casting such ballots;
          (2) a certification that the entity shall complete 
        the activities carried out with the grant not later 
        than December 31, 2020; and
          (3) such other information and certifications as the 
        Director may require.
  (c) Availability of Technology.--Any technology developed 
with the grants made under this section shall be treated as 
non-proprietary and shall be made available to the public, 
including to manufacturers of voting systems.
  (d) Coordination With Grants for Technology Improvements.--
The Director shall carry out this section so that the 
activities carried out with the grants made under subsection 
(a) are coordinated with the research conducted under the grant 
program carried out by the Commission under section 271, to the 
extent that the Director and Commission determine necessary to 
provide for the advancement of accessible voting technology.
  (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to 
be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $5,000,000, to 
remain available until expended.

SEC. [247.]  248. CONSULTATION WITH STANDARDS BOARD AND BOARD OF 
                    ADVISORS.

  The Commission shall carry out its duties under this subtitle 
in consultation with the Standards Board and the Board of 
Advisors.

                    Subtitle D--Election Assistance

                     PART 1--REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS

SEC. 251. REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS.

  (a) In General.--The Commission shall make a requirements 
payment each year in an amount determined under section 252 to 
each State which meets the conditions described in section 253 
for the year.
  (b) Use of Funds.--
          (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2) 
        and (3), a State receiving a requirements payment shall 
        use the payment only to meet the requirements of title 
        III.
          (2) Other activities.--A State may use a requirements 
        payment to carry out other activities to improve the 
        administration of elections for Federal office if the 
        State certifies to the Commission that--
                  (A) the State has implemented the 
                requirements of title III; or
                  (B) the amount expended with respect to such 
                other activities does not exceed an amount 
                equal to the minimum payment amount applicable 
                to the State under section 252(c).
          (3) Activities under uniformed and overseas citizens 
        absentee voting act.--A State shall use a requirements 
        payment made using funds appropriated pursuant to the 
        authorization under section 257(a)(4) only to meet the 
        requirements under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
        Absentee Voting Act imposed as a result of the 
        provisions of and amendments made by the Military and 
        Overseas Voter Empowerment Act.
          (4) Permitting use of payments for voting system 
        security improvements.--A State may use a requirements 
        payment to carry out any of the following activities:
                  (A) Cyber and risk mitigation training.
                  (B) Providing increased technical support for 
                any information technology infrastructure that 
                the chief State election official deems to be 
                part of the State's election infrastructure or 
                designates as critical to the operation of the 
                State's election infrastructure.
                  (C) Enhancing the cybersecurity and 
                operations of the information technology 
                infrastructure described in subparagraph (B).
                  (D) Enhancing the security of voter 
                registration databases.
  (c) Retroactive Payments.--
          (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
        of this subtitle, including the maintenance of effort 
        requirements of section 254(a)(7), a State may use a 
        requirements payment as a reimbursement for costs 
        incurred in obtaining voting equipment which meets the 
        requirements of section 301 if the State obtains the 
        equipment after the regularly scheduled general 
        election for Federal office held in November 2000.
          (2) Special rule regarding multiyear contracts.--A 
        State may use a requirements payment for any costs for 
        voting equipment which meets the requirements of 
        section 301 that, pursuant to a multiyear contract, 
        were incurred on or after January 1, 2001, except that 
        the amount that the State is otherwise required to 
        contribute under the maintenance of effort requirements 
        of section 254(a)(7) shall be increased by the amount 
        of the payment made with respect to such multiyear 
        contract.
  (d) Adoption of Commission Guidelines and Guidance Not 
Required To Receive Payment.--Nothing in this part may be 
construed to require a State to implement any of the voluntary 
voting system guidelines or any of the voluntary guidance 
adopted by the Commission with respect to any matter as a 
condition for receiving a requirements payment.
  (e) Schedule of Payments.--As soon as practicable after the 
initial appointment of all members of the Commission (but in no 
event later than 6 months thereafter), and not less frequently 
than once each calendar year thereafter, the Commission shall 
make requirements payments to States under this part.
  (f) Limitation.--A State may not use any portion of a 
requirements payment--
          (1) to pay costs associated with any litigation, 
        except to the extent that such costs otherwise 
        constitute permitted uses of a requirements payment 
        under this part; or
          (2) for the payment of any judgment.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 254. STATE PLAN.

  (a) In General.--The State plan shall contain a description 
of each of the following:
          (1) How the State will use the requirements payment 
        to meet the requirements of title III, and, if 
        applicable under section 251(a)(2), to carry out other 
        activities to improve the administration of 
        elections[.], including the protection of election 
        infrastructure.
          (2) How the State will distribute and monitor the 
        distribution of the requirements payment to units of 
        local government or other entities in the State for 
        carrying out the activities described in paragraph (1), 
        including a description of--
                  (A) the criteria to be used to determine the 
                eligibility of such units or entities for 
                receiving the payment; and
                  (B) the methods to be used by the State to 
                monitor the performance of the units or 
                entities to whom the payment is distributed, 
                consistent with the performance goals and 
                measures adopted under paragraph (8).
          (3) How the State will provide for programs for voter 
        education, election official education and training, 
        and poll worker training which will assist the State in 
        meeting the requirements of title III.
          (4) How the State will adopt voting system guidelines 
        and processes which are consistent with the 
        requirements of section 301.
          (5) How the State will establish a fund described in 
        subsection (b) for purposes of administering the 
        State's activities under this part, including 
        information on fund management.
          (6) The State's proposed budget for activities under 
        this part, based on the State's best estimates of the 
        costs of such activities and the amount of funds to be 
        made available, including specific information on--
                  (A) the costs of the activities required to 
                be carried out to meet the requirements of 
                title III;
                  (B) the portion of the requirements payment 
                which will be used to carry out activities to 
                meet such requirements; and
                  (C) the portion of the requirements payment 
                which will be used to carry out other 
                activities.
          (7) How the State, in using the requirements payment, 
        will maintain the expenditures of the State for 
        activities funded by the payment at a level that is not 
        less than the level of such expenditures maintained by 
        the State for the fiscal year ending prior to November 
        2000.
          (8) How the State will adopt performance goals and 
        measures that will be used by the State to determine 
        its success and the success of units of local 
        government in the State in carrying out the plan, 
        including timetables for meeting each of the elements 
        of the plan, descriptions of the criteria the State 
        will use to measure performance and the process used to 
        develop such criteria, and a description of which 
        official is to be held responsible for ensuring that 
        each performance goal is met.
          (9) A description of the uniform, nondiscriminatory 
        State-based administrative complaint procedures in 
        effect under section 402.
          (10) If the State received any payment under title I, 
        a description of how such payment will affect the 
        activities proposed to be carried out under the plan, 
        including the amount of funds available for such 
        activities.
          (11) How the State will conduct ongoing management of 
        the plan, except that the State may not make any 
        material change in the administration of the plan 
        unless notice of the change--
                  (A) is developed and published in the Federal 
                Register in accordance with section 255 in the 
                same manner as the State plan;
                  (B) is subject to public notice and comment 
                in accordance with section 256 in the same 
                manner as the State plan; and
                  (C) takes effect only after the expiration of 
                the 30-day period which begins on the date 
                notice of the change is published in the 
                Federal Register in accordance with 
                subparagraph (A).
          (12) In the case of a State with a State plan in 
        effect under this subtitle during the previous fiscal 
        year, a description of how the plan reflects changes 
        from the State plan for the previous fiscal year and of 
        how the State succeeded in carrying out the State plan 
        for such previous fiscal year.
          (13) A description of the committee which 
        participated in the development of the State plan in 
        accordance with section 255 and the procedures followed 
        by the committee under such section and section 256.
          (14) How the State will comply with the provisions 
        and requirements of and amendments made by the Military 
        and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act.
  (b) Requirements for Election Fund.--
          (1) Election fund described.--For purposes of 
        subsection (a)(5), a fund described in this subsection 
        with respect to a State is a fund which is established 
        in the treasury of the State government, which is used 
        in accordance with paragraph (2), and which consists of 
        the following amounts:
                  (A) Amounts appropriated or otherwise made 
                available by the State for carrying out the 
                activities for which the requirements payment 
                is made to the State under this part.
                  (B) The requirements payment made to the 
                State under this part.
                  (C) Such other amounts as may be appropriated 
                under law.
                  (D) Interest earned on deposits of the fund.
          (2) Use of fund.--Amounts in the fund shall be used 
        by the State exclusively to carry out the activities 
        for which the requirements payment is made to the State 
        under this part.
          (3) Treatment of states that require changes to state 
        law.--In the case of a State that requires State 
        legislation to establish the fund described in this 
        subsection, the Commission shall defer disbursement of 
        the requirements payment to such State until such time 
        as legislation establishing the fund is enacted.
  (c) Protection Against Actions Based on Information in 
Plan.--
          (1) In general.--No action may be brought under this 
        Act against a State or other jurisdiction on the basis 
        of any information contained in the State plan filed 
        under this part.
          (2) Exception for criminal acts.--Paragraph (1) may 
        not be construed to limit the liability of a State or 
        other jurisdiction for criminal acts or omissions.

SEC. 255. PROCESS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND FILING OF PLAN; PUBLICATION BY 
                    COMMISSION.

  (a) In General.--The chief State election official shall 
develop the State plan under this subtitle through a committee 
of appropriate individuals, including the chief election 
officials of the two most populous jurisdictions within the 
States, other local election officials, stake holders 
(including representatives of groups of individuals with 
disabilities), and other citizens, appointed for such purpose 
by the chief State election official.
  (b) Geographic Representation.--The members of the committee 
shall be a representative group of individuals from the State's 
counties, cities, towns, and Indian tribes, and shall represent 
the needs of rural as well as urban areas of the State, as the 
case may be.
  [(b)] (c) Publication of Plan by Commission.--After receiving 
the State plan of a State under this subtitle, the Commission 
shall cause to have the plan posted on the Commissions's 
website with a notice published in the Federal Register.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART 5--PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 292. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  (a) In General.--In addition to any other amounts authorized 
to be appropriated under this subtitle, there are authorized to 
be appropriated $10,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2003, 
2004, 2005, and 2006, and for each subsequent fiscal year such 
sums as may be necessary, for the purpose of making payments 
under section 291(a)[; except that none of the funds provided 
by this subsection shall be used to initiate or otherwise 
participate in any litigation related to election-related 
disability access, notwithstanding the general authorities that 
the protection and advocacy systems are otherwise afforded 
under subtitle C of title I of the Developmental Disabilities 
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 15041 et 
seq.).].
  (b) Availability.--Any amounts appropriated pursuant to the 
authority of this section shall remain available until 
expended.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART 7--GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS AND 
            CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS

SEC. 297. GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS 
                    AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY 
                    IMPROVEMENTS.

  (a) Availability and Use of Grant.--The Commission shall make 
a grant to each eligible State--
          (1) to replace a voting system--
                  (A) which does not meet the requirements 
                which are first imposed on the State pursuant 
                to the amendments made by the Voter Confidence 
                and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019 with a 
                voting system which does meet such 
                requirements, for use in the regularly 
                scheduled general elections for Federal office 
                held in November 2020, or
                  (B) which does meet such requirements but 
                which is not in compliance with the most recent 
                voluntary voting system guidelines issued by 
                the Commission prior to the regularly scheduled 
                general election for Federal office held in 
                November 2020 with another system which does 
                meet such requirements and is in compliance 
                with such guidelines;
          (2) to carry out voting system security improvements 
        described in section 297A with respect to the regularly 
        scheduled general elections for Federal office held in 
        November 2020 and each succeeding election for Federal 
        office; and
          (3) to implement and model best practices for ballot 
        design, ballot instructions, and the testing of 
        ballots.
  (b) Amount of Grant.--The amount of a grant made to a State 
under this section shall be such amount as the Commission 
determines to be appropriate, except that such amount may not 
be less than the product of $1 and the average of the number of 
individuals who cast votes in any of the two most recent 
regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office held 
in the State.
  (c) Pro Rata Reductions.--If the amount of funds appropriated 
for grants under this part is insufficient to ensure that each 
State receives the amount of the grant calculated under 
subsection (b), the Commission shall make such pro rata 
reductions in such amounts as may be necessary to ensure that 
the entire amount appropriated under this part is distributed 
to the States.
  (d) Surplus Appropriations.--If the amount of funds 
appropriated for grants authorized under section 297D(a)(2) 
exceed the amount necessary to meet the requirements of 
subsection (b), the Commission shall consider the following in 
making a determination to award remaining funds to a State:
          (1) The record of the State in carrying out the 
        following with respect to the administration of 
        elections for Federal office:
                  (A) Providing voting machines that are less 
                than 10 years old.
                  (B) Implementing strong chain of custody 
                procedures for the physical security of voting 
                equipment and paper records at all stages of 
                the process.
                  (C) Conducting pre-election testing on every 
                voting machine and ensuring that paper ballots 
                are available wherever electronic machines are 
                used.
                  (D) Maintaining offline backups of voter 
                registration lists.
                  (E) Providing a secure voter registration 
                database that logs requests submitted to the 
                database.
                  (F) Publishing and enforcing a policy 
                detailing use limitations and security 
                safeguards to protect the personal information 
                of voters in the voter registration process.
                  (G) Providing secure processes and procedures 
                for reporting vote tallies.
                  (H) Providing a secure platform for 
                disseminating vote totals.
          (2) Evidence of established conditions of innovation 
        and reform in providing voting system security and the 
        proposed plan of the State for implementing additional 
        conditions.
          (3) Evidence of collaboration between relevant 
        stakeholders, including local election officials, in 
        developing the grant implementation plan described in 
        section 297B.
          (4) The plan of the State to conduct a rigorous 
        evaluation of the effectiveness of the activities 
        carried out with the grant.
  (e) Ability of Replacement Systems to Administer Ranked 
Choice Elections.--To the greatest extent practicable, an 
eligible State which receives a grant to replace a voting 
system under this section shall ensure that the replacement 
system is capable of administering a system of ranked choice 
voting under which each voter shall rank the candidates for the 
office in the order of the voter's preference.

SEC. 297A. VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS DESCRIBED.

  (a) Permitted Uses.--A voting system security improvement 
described in this section is any of the following:
          (1) The acquisition of goods and services from 
        qualified election infrastructure vendors by purchase, 
        lease, or such other arrangements as may be 
        appropriate.
          (2) Cyber and risk mitigation training.
          (3) A security risk and vulnerability assessment of 
        the State's election infrastructure which is carried 
        out by a provider of cybersecurity services under a 
        contract entered into between the chief State election 
        official and the provider.
          (4) The maintenance of election infrastructure, 
        including addressing risks and vulnerabilities which 
        are identified under either of the security risk and 
        vulnerability assessments described in paragraph (3), 
        except that none of the funds provided under this part 
        may be used to renovate or replace a building or 
        facility which is used primarily for purposes other 
        than the administration of elections for public office.
          (5) Providing increased technical support for any 
        information technology infrastructure that the chief 
        State election official deems to be part of the State's 
        election infrastructure or designates as critical to 
        the operation of the State's election infrastructure.
          (6) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of the 
        information technology infrastructure described in 
        paragraph (4).
          (7) Enhancing the cybersecurity of voter registration 
        systems.
  (b) Qualified Election Infrastructure Vendors Described.--
          (1) In general.--For purposes of this part, a 
        ``qualified election infrastructure vendor'' is any 
        person who provides, supports, or maintains, or who 
        seeks to provide, support, or maintain, election 
        infrastructure on behalf of a State, unit of local 
        government, or election agency, who meets the criteria 
        described in paragraph (2).
          (2) Criteria.--The criteria described in this 
        paragraph are such criteria as the Chairman, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
        shall establish and publish, and shall include each of 
        the following requirements:
                  (A) The vendor must be owned and controlled 
                by a citizen or permanent resident of the 
                United States.
                  (B) The vendor must disclose to the Chairman 
                and the Secretary, and to the chief State 
                election official of any State to which the 
                vendor provides any goods and services with 
                funds provided under this part, of any sourcing 
                outside the United States for parts of the 
                election infrastructure.
                  (C) The vendor agrees to ensure that the 
                election infrastructure will be developed and 
                maintained in a manner that is consistent with 
                the cybersecurity best practices issued by the 
                Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
                  (D) The vendor agrees to maintain its 
                information technology infrastructure in a 
                manner that is consistent with the 
                cybersecurity best practices issued by the 
                Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
                  (E) The vendor agrees to meet the 
                requirements of paragraph (3) with respect to 
                any known or suspected cybersecurity incidents 
                involving any of the goods and services 
                provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant 
                under this part.
                  (F) The vendor agrees to permit independent 
                security testing by the Commission (in 
                accordance with section 231(a)) and by the 
                Secretary of the goods and services provided by 
                the vendor pursuant to a grant under this part.
          (3) Cybersecurity incident reporting requirements.--
                  (A) In general.--A vendor meets the 
                requirements of this paragraph if, upon 
                becoming aware of the possibility that an 
                election cybersecurity incident has occurred 
                involving any of the goods and services 
                provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant 
                under this part--
                          (i) the vendor promptly assesses 
                        whether or not such an incident 
                        occurred, and submits a notification 
                        meeting the requirements of 
                        subparagraph (B) to the Secretary and 
                        the Chairman of the assessment as soon 
                        as practicable (but in no case later 
                        than 3 days after the vendor first 
                        becomes aware of the possibility that 
                        the incident occurred);
                          (ii) if the incident involves goods 
                        or services provided to an election 
                        agency, the vendor submits a 
                        notification meeting the requirements 
                        of subparagraph (B) to the agency as 
                        soon as practicable (but in no case 
                        later than 3 days after the vendor 
                        first becomes aware of the possibility 
                        that the incident occurred), and 
                        cooperates with the agency in providing 
                        any other necessary notifications 
                        relating to the incident; and
                          (iii) the vendor provides all 
                        necessary updates to any notification 
                        submitted under clause (i) or clause 
                        (ii).
                  (B) Contents of notifications.--Each 
                notification submitted under clause (i) or 
                clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall contain 
                the following information with respect to any 
                election cybersecurity incident covered by the 
                notification:
                          (i) The date, time, and time zone 
                        when the election cybersecurity 
                        incident began, if known.
                          (ii) The date, time, and time zone 
                        when the election cybersecurity 
                        incident was detected.
                          (iii) The date, time, and duration of 
                        the election cybersecurity incident.
                          (iv) The circumstances of the 
                        election cybersecurity incident, 
                        including the specific election 
                        infrastructure systems believed to have 
                        been accessed and information acquired, 
                        if any.
                          (v) Any planned and implemented 
                        technical measures to respond to and 
                        recover from the incident.
                          (vi) In the case of any notification 
                        which is an update to a prior 
                        notification, any additional material 
                        information relating to the incident, 
                        including technical data, as it becomes 
                        available.

SEC. 297B. ELIGIBILITY OF STATES.

  A State is eligible to receive a grant under this part if the 
State submits to the Commission, at such time and in such form 
as the Commission may require, an application containing--
          (1) a description of how the State will use the grant 
        to carry out the activities authorized under this part;
          (2) a certification and assurance that, not later 
        than 5 years after receiving the grant, the State will 
        carry out voting system security improvements, as 
        described in section 297A; and
          (3) such other information and assurances as the 
        Commission may require.

SEC. 297C. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

  Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, the 
Commission shall submit a report to the appropriate 
congressional committees, including the Committees on Homeland 
Security, House Administration, and the Judiciary of the House 
of Representatives and the Committees on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, the Judiciary, and Rules and 
Administration of the Senate, on the activities carried out 
with the funds provided under this part.

SEC. 297D. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  (a) Authorization.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
for grants under this part--
          (1) $600,000,000 for fiscal year 2019; and
          (2) $175,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2020, 
        2022, 2024, and 2026.
  (b) Continuing Availability of Amounts.--Any amounts 
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of this section 
shall remain available until expended.

         PART 8--FUNDING FOR POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS

SEC. 298. PAYMENTS FOR POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.

  (a) In General.--The Commission shall pay to States the 
amount of eligible post-election audit costs.
  (b) Eligible Post-election Audit Costs.--For purposes of this 
section, the term ``eligible post-election audit costs'' means, 
with respect to any State, costs paid or incurred by the State 
or local government within the State for--
          (1) the conduct of any risk-limiting audit (as 
        defined in section 303A) with respect to an election 
        for Federal office occurring after the date of the 
        enactment of this part; and
          (2) any equipment, software, or services necessary 
        for the conduct of any such risk-limiting audit.
  (c) Special Rules.--
          (1) Rules and procedures.--The Commission shall 
        establish rules and procedures for submission of 
        eligible post-election audit costs for payments under 
        this section.
          (2) Insufficient funds.--In any case in which the 
        amounts appropriated under subsection (d) are 
        insufficient to pay all eligible post-election audit 
        costs submitted by States with respect to any Federal 
        election, the amount of such costs paid under 
        subsection (a) to any State shall be equal to the 
        amount that bears the same ratio to the amount which 
        would be paid to such State (determined without regard 
        to this paragraph) as--
                  (A) the number of individuals who voted in 
                such Federal election in such State; bears to
                  (B) the total number of individuals who voted 
                in such Federal election in all States 
                submitting a claim for eligible post-election 
                audit costs.
  (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
          (1) In general.--There is hereby authorized to be 
        appropriated to the Commission such sums as are 
        necessary to carry out this part.
          (2) Availability.--Any amounts appropriated pursuant 
        to paragraph (1) shall remain available without fiscal 
        year limitation until expended.

   TITLE III--UNIFORM AND NONDISCRIMINATORY ELECTION TECHNOLOGY AND 
                      ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

                        Subtitle A--Requirements

SEC. 301. VOTING SYSTEMS STANDARDS.

  (a) Requirements.--Each voting system used in an election for 
Federal office shall meet the following requirements:
          (1) In general.--
                  (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
                the voting system (including any lever voting 
                system, optical scanning voting system, or 
                direct recording electronic system) shall--
                          (i) permit the voter to verify (in a 
                        private and independent manner) the 
                        votes selected by the voter on the 
                        ballot before the ballot is cast and 
                        [counted] counted, in accordance with 
                        paragraphs (2) and (3);
                          (ii) provide the voter with the 
                        opportunity (in a private and 
                        independent manner) to change the 
                        ballot or correct any error before the 
                        ballot is cast and [counted] counted, 
                        in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 
                        (3) (including the opportunity to 
                        correct the error through the issuance 
                        of a replacement ballot if the voter 
                        was otherwise unable to change the 
                        ballot or correct any error); and
                          (iii) if the voter selects votes for 
                        more than one candidate for a single 
                        office--
                                  (I) notify the voter that the 
                                voter has selected more than 
                                one candidate for a single 
                                office on the ballot;
                                  (II) notify the voter before 
                                the ballot is cast and 
                                [counted] counted, in 
                                accordance with paragraphs (2) 
                                and (3) of the effect of 
                                casting multiple votes for the 
                                office; and
                                  (III) provide the voter with 
                                the opportunity to correct the 
                                ballot before the ballot is 
                                cast and [counted] counted, in 
                                accordance with paragraphs (2) 
                                and (3).
                  (B) A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper 
                ballot voting system, a punch card voting 
                system, or a central count voting system 
                (including mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in 
                ballots), may meet the requirements of 
                subparagraph (A)(iii) by--
                          (i) establishing a voter education 
                        program specific to that voting system 
                        that notifies each voter of the effect 
                        of casting multiple votes for an 
                        office; and
                          (ii) providing the voter with 
                        instructions on how to correct the 
                        ballot before it is cast and [counted] 
                        counted, in accordance with paragraphs 
                        (2) and (3) (including instructions on 
                        how to correct the error through the 
                        issuance of a replacement ballot if the 
                        voter was otherwise unable to change 
                        the ballot or correct any error).
                  (C) The voting system shall ensure that any 
                notification required under this paragraph 
                preserves the privacy of the voter and the 
                confidentiality of the ballot.
          [(2) Audit capacity.--
                  [(A) In general.--The voting system shall 
                produce a record with an audit capacity for 
                such system.
                  [(B) Manual audit capacity.--
                          [(i) The voting system shall produce 
                        a permanent paper record with a manual 
                        audit capacity for such system.
                          [(ii) The voting system shall provide 
                        the voter with an opportunity to change 
                        the ballot or correct any error before 
                        the permanent paper record is produced.
                          [(iii) The paper record produced 
                        under subparagraph (A) shall be 
                        available as an official record for any 
                        recount conducted with respect to any 
                        election in which the system is used.]
          (2) Paper ballot requirement.--
                  (A) Voter-verified paper ballots.--
                          (i) Paper ballot requirement.--(I) 
                        The voting system shall require the use 
                        of an individual, durable, voter-
                        verified paper ballot of the voter's 
                        vote that shall be marked and made 
                        available for inspection and 
                        verification by the voter before the 
                        voter's vote is cast and counted, and 
                        which shall be counted by hand or read 
                        by an optical character recognition 
                        device or other counting device. For 
                        purposes of this subclause, the term 
                        ``individual, durable, voter-verified 
                        paper ballot'' means a paper ballot 
                        marked by the voter by hand or a paper 
                        ballot marked through the use of a 
                        nontabulating ballot marking device or 
                        system, so long as the voter shall have 
                        the option to mark his or her ballot by 
                        hand.
                          (II) The voting system shall provide 
                        the voter with an opportunity to 
                        correct any error on the paper ballot 
                        before the permanent voter-verified 
                        paper ballot is preserved in accordance 
                        with clause (ii).
                          (III) The voting system shall not 
                        preserve the voter-verified paper 
                        ballots in any manner that makes it 
                        possible, at any time after the ballot 
                        has been cast, to associate a voter 
                        with the record of the voter's vote 
                        without the voter's consent.
                          (ii) Preservation as official 
                        record.--The individual, durable, 
                        voter-verified paper ballot used in 
                        accordance with clause (i) shall 
                        constitute the official ballot and 
                        shall be preserved and used as the 
                        official ballot for purposes of any 
                        recount or audit conducted with respect 
                        to any election for Federal office in 
                        which the voting system is used.
                          (iii) Manual counting requirements 
                        for recounts and audits.--(I) Each 
                        paper ballot used pursuant to clause 
                        (i) shall be suitable for a manual 
                        audit, and shall be counted by hand in 
                        any recount or audit conducted with 
                        respect to any election for Federal 
                        office.
                          (II) In the event of any 
                        inconsistencies or irregularities 
                        between any electronic vote tallies and 
                        the vote tallies determined by counting 
                        by hand the individual, durable, voter-
                        verified paper ballots used pursuant to 
                        clause (i), and subject to subparagraph 
                        (B), the individual, durable, voter-
                        verified paper ballots shall be the 
                        true and correct record of the votes 
                        cast.
                          (iv) Application to all ballots.--The 
                        requirements of this subparagraph shall 
                        apply to all ballots cast in elections 
                        for Federal office, including ballots 
                        cast by absent uniformed services 
                        voters and overseas voters under the 
                        Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
                        Absentee Voting Act and other absentee 
                        voters.
                  (B) Special rule for treatment of disputes 
                when paper ballots have been shown to be 
                compromised.--
                          (i) In general.--In the event that--
                                  (I) there is any 
                                inconsistency between any 
                                electronic vote tallies and the 
                                vote tallies determined by 
                                counting by hand the 
                                individual, durable, voter-
                                verified paper ballots used 
                                pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i) 
                                with respect to any election 
                                for Federal office; and
                                  (II) it is demonstrated by 
                                clear and convincing evidence 
                                (as determined in accordance 
                                with the applicable standards 
                                in the jurisdiction involved) 
                                in any recount, audit, or 
                                contest of the result of the 
                                election that the paper ballots 
                                have been compromised (by 
                                damage or mischief or 
                                otherwise) and that a 
                                sufficient number of the 
                                ballots have been so 
                                compromised that the result of 
                                the election could be changed,
                        the determination of the appropriate 
                        remedy with respect to the election 
                        shall be made in accordance with 
                        applicable State law, except that the 
                        electronic tally shall not be used as 
                        the exclusive basis for determining the 
                        official certified result.
                          (ii) Rule for consideration of 
                        ballots associated with each voting 
                        machine.--For purposes of clause (i), 
                        only the paper ballots deemed 
                        compromised, if any, shall be 
                        considered in the calculation of 
                        whether or not the result of the 
                        election could be changed due to the 
                        compromised paper ballots.
          (3) Accessibility for individuals with 
        disabilities.--The voting system shall--
                  (A) be accessible for individuals with 
                disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility 
                for the blind and visually impaired, in a 
                manner that provides the same opportunity for 
                access and participation (including privacy and 
                independence) as for other voters;
                  [(B) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph 
                (A) through the use of at least one direct 
                recording electronic voting system or other 
                voting system equipped for individuals with 
                disabilities at each polling place; and]
                  (B)(i) satisfy the requirement of 
                subparagraph (A) through the use of at least 1 
                voting system at each polling place that--
                          (I) is equipped for individuals with 
                        disabilities, including nonvisual and 
                        enhanced visual accessibility for the 
                        blind and visually impaired, and 
                        contains features to support enhanced 
                        manual accessibility for the mobility 
                        and dexterity impaired;
                          (II) in the case of any election for 
                        Federal office occurring after the date 
                        that is 6 years after the date of the 
                        enactment of the Securing America's 
                        Federal Elections Act--
                                  (aa) marks ballots that are 
                                identical in size, ink, and 
                                paper stock to those ballots 
                                that would be marked by hand or 
                                a ballot marking device used by 
                                voters who do not have 
                                accessibility needs;
                                  (bb) marks the ballot in such 
                                a way that someone examining 
                                the ballot will not be able to 
                                readily determine whether the 
                                ballot was marked by hand or 
                                machine; and
                                  (cc) combines ballots 
                                produced by the voting system 
                                with ballots marked by voters 
                                using other types of voting 
                                systems used by the State or 
                                jurisdiction in a way that 
                                prevents identification of 
                                which ballots were cast using 
                                each voting system; and
                          (III) is made available for use by 
                        any voter who requests to use it; and
                  (ii) in the case of any election for Federal 
                office occurring after the date that is 6 years 
                after the date of the enactment of the Securing 
                America's Federal Elections Act, meet the 
                requirements of subparagraph (A) and paragraph 
                (2)(A) by using a system that allows the voter 
                to privately and independently verify the 
                accuracy of the permanent paper ballot through 
                the presentation, in accessible form, of the 
                printed or marked vote selections from the same 
                printed or marked information that would be 
                used for any vote tabulation or auditing; and
                  (C) if purchased with funds made available 
                under title II on or after January 1, 2007, 
                meet the voting system standards for disability 
                access (as outlined in this paragraph).
        Nothing in subparagraph (B) shall be construed to 
        prohibit the use of an accessible ballot that may be 
        printed or marked by the voter at home.
          (4) Alternative language accessibility.--The voting 
        system (including the paper ballots required to be used 
        under paragraph (2)) shall provide alternative language 
        accessibility pursuant to the requirements of section 
        203 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973aa-
        1a).
          (5) Error rates.--The error rate of the voting system 
        in counting ballots (determined by taking into account 
        only those errors which are attributable to the voting 
        system and not attributable to an act of the voter) 
        shall comply with the error rate standards established 
        under section 3.2.1 of the voting systems standards 
        issued by the Federal Election Commission which are in 
        effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
          (6) Uniform definition of what constitutes a vote.--
        Each State shall adopt uniform and nondiscriminatory 
        standards that define what constitutes a vote and what 
        will be counted as a vote for each category of voting 
        system used in the State.
          (7) Durability and readability requirements for 
        ballots.--
                  (A) Durability requirements for paper 
                ballots.--
                          (i) In general.--All voter-verified 
                        paper ballots required to be used under 
                        this Act shall be marked or printed on 
                        durable paper.
                          (ii) Definition.--For purposes of 
                        this Act, paper is ``durable'' if it is 
                        capable of withstanding multiple counts 
                        and recounts by hand without 
                        compromising the fundamental integrity 
                        of the ballots, and capable of 
                        retaining the information marked or 
                        printed on them for the full duration 
                        of a retention and preservation period 
                        of 22 months.
                  (B) Readability requirements for paper 
                ballots marked by ballot marking device.--All 
                voter-verified paper ballots completed by the 
                voter through the use of a ballot marking 
                device shall be clearly readable by the voter 
                without assistance (other than eyeglasses or 
                other personal vision enhancing devices) and by 
                an optical character recognition device or 
                other device equipped for individuals with 
                disabilities.
          (8) Printing requirements for ballots.--All paper 
        ballots used in an election for Federal office shall be 
        printed in the United States on recycled paper 
        manufactured in the United States.
          (9) Ballot tabulating methods.--
                  (A) In general.--The voting system tabulates 
                ballots by hand or through the use of an 
                optical scanning device that meets the 
                requirements of subparagraph (B).
                  (B) Requirements for optical scanning 
                devices.--Except as provided in subparagraph 
                (C), the requirements of this subparagraph are 
                as follows:
                          (i) The device is designed and built 
                        in a manner in which it is mechanically 
                        impossible for the device to add or 
                        change the vote selections on a printed 
                        or marked ballot.
                          (ii) The device is capable of 
                        exporting its data (including vote 
                        tally data sets and cast vote records) 
                        in a machine-readable, open data 
                        standard format required by the 
                        Commission, in consultation with the 
                        Director of the National Institute of 
                        Standards and Technology.
                          (iii) The device consists of hardware 
                        that--
                                  (I) is certified under 
                                section 2216 of the Homeland 
                                Security Act; and
                                  (II) demonstrably conforms to 
                                a hardware component manifest 
                                describing point-of-origin 
                                information (including upstream 
                                hardware supply chain 
                                information for each component) 
                                that--
                                          (aa) has been 
                                        provided to the 
                                        Commission, the 
                                        Director of 
                                        Cybersecurity and 
                                        Infrastructure Security 
                                        under section 2215 of 
                                        the Homeland Security 
                                        Act, and the chief 
                                        State election official 
                                        for each State in which 
                                        the device is used; and
                                          (bb) may be shared by 
                                        any entity to whom it 
                                        has been provided under 
                                        item (aa) with 
                                        independent experts for 
                                        cybersecurity analysis.
                          (iv) The device utilizes technology 
                        that prevents the operation of the 
                        device if any hardware components do 
                        not meet the requirements of clause 
                        (iii).
                          (v) The device operates using 
                        software--
                                  (I) for which the source 
                                code, system build tools, and 
                                compilation parameters--
                                          (aa) have been 
                                        provided to the 
                                        Commission, the 
                                        Director of 
                                        Cybersecurity and 
                                        Infrastructure Security 
                                        under section 2215 of 
                                        the Homeland Security 
                                        Act, and the chief 
                                        State election official 
                                        for each State in which 
                                        the device is used; and
                                          (bb) may be shared by 
                                        any entity to whom it 
                                        has been provided under 
                                        item (aa) with 
                                        independent experts for 
                                        cybersecurity analysis; 
                                        and
                                  (II) that is certified under 
                                section 2216 of the Homeland 
                                Security Act.
                          (vi) The device utilizes technology 
                        that prevents the running of software 
                        on the device that does not meet the 
                        requirements of clause (v).
                          (vii) The device utilizes technology 
                        that enables election officials, 
                        cybersecurity researchers, and voters 
                        to verify that the software running on 
                        the device--
                                  (I) was built from a 
                                specific, untampered version of 
                                the code that is described in 
                                clause (v); and
                                  (II) uses the system build 
                                tools and compilation 
                                parameters that are described 
                                in clause (v).
                          (viii) The device contains such other 
                        security requirements as the Director 
                        of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
                        Security requires.
                  (C) Waiver.--
                          (i) In general.--The Director of 
                        Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
                        Security, in consultation with the 
                        Director of the National Institute of 
                        Standards and Technology, may waive one 
                        or more of the requirements of 
                        subparagraph (B) (other than the 
                        requirement of clause (i) thereof) with 
                        respect to any device for a period of 
                        not to exceed 2 years.
                          (ii) Publication.--Information 
                        relating to any waiver granted under 
                        clause (i) shall be made publicly 
                        available on the Internet.
                  (D) Effective date.--Each State and 
                jurisdiction shall be required to comply with 
                the requirements of this paragraph for the 
                regularly scheduled election for Federal office 
                in November 2024, and for each subsequent 
                election for Federal office.
          (9) Requiring use of software and hardware for which 
        information is disclosed by manufacturer.--
                  (A) Requiring use of software for which 
                source code is disclosed by manufacturer.--
                          (i) In general.--In the operation of 
                        voting systems in an election for 
                        Federal office, a State may only use 
                        software for which the manufacturer 
                        makes the source code (in the form in 
                        which will be used at the time of the 
                        election) publicly available online 
                        under a license that grants a 
                        worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, 
                        perpetual, sub-licensable license to 
                        all intellectual property rights in 
                        such source code, except that the 
                        manufacturer may prohibit a person who 
                        obtains the software from using the 
                        software in a manner that is primarily 
                        intended for or directed toward 
                        commercial advantage or private 
                        monetary compensation that is unrelated 
                        to carrying out legitimate research or 
                        cybersecurity activity.
                          (ii) Exceptions.--Clause (i) does not 
                        apply with respect to--
                                  (I) widely-used operating 
                                system software which is not 
                                specific to voting systems and 
                                for which the source code or 
                                baseline functionality is not 
                                altered; or
                                  (II) widely-used 
                                cybersecurity software which is 
                                not specific to voting systems 
                                and for which the source code 
                                or baseline functionality is 
                                not altered.
                  (B) Requiring use of hardware for which 
                information is disclosed by manufacturer.--
                          (i) Requiring disclosure of 
                        hardware.--A State may not use a voting 
                        system in an election for Federal 
                        office unless the manufacturer of the 
                        system publicly discloses online the 
                        identification of the hardware used to 
                        operate the system.
                          (ii) Additional disclosure 
                        requirements for custom or altered 
                        hardware.--To the extent that the 
                        hardware used to operate a voting 
                        system or any component thereof is not 
                        widely-used, or is widely-used but is 
                        altered, the State may not use the 
                        system in an election for Federal 
                        office unless--
                                  (I) the manufacturer of the 
                                system publicly discloses 
                                online the components of the 
                                hardware, the design of such 
                                components, and how such 
                                components are connected in the 
                                operation of the system; and
                                  (II) the manufacturer makes 
                                the design (in the form which 
                                will be used at the time of the 
                                election) publicly available 
                                online under a license that 
                                grants a worldwide, royalty-
                                free, non-exclusive, perpetual, 
                                sub-licensable license to all 
                                intellectual property rights in 
                                the design of the hardware or 
                                the component, except that the 
                                manufacturer may prohibit a 
                                person who obtains the design 
                                from using the design in a 
                                manner that is primarily 
                                intended for or directed toward 
                                commercial advantage or private 
                                monetary compensation that is 
                                unrelated to carrying out 
                                legitimate research or 
                                cybersecurity activity.
          (10) Prohibition of use of wireless communications 
        devices in systems or devices.--
                  (A) In general.--No system or device upon 
                which ballot marking devices or optical 
                scanners are configured, upon which ballots are 
                marked by voters (except as necessary for 
                individuals with disabilities to use ballot 
                marking devices that meet the accessibility 
                requirements of paragraph (3)), or upon which 
                votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated shall 
                contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, 
                power-line, or concealed communication device.
                  (B) Effective date.--Each State and 
                jurisdiction shall be required to comply with 
                the requirements of this paragraph for the 
                regularly scheduled election for Federal office 
                in November 2020, and for each subsequent 
                election for Federal office.
          (11) Prohibiting connection of system to the 
        internet.--
                  (A) In general.--No system or device upon 
                which ballot marking devices or optical 
                scanners are configured, upon which ballots are 
                marked by voters, or upon which votes are cast, 
                tabulated, or aggregated shall be connected to 
                the Internet or any non-local computer system 
                via telephone or other communication network at 
                any time.
                  (B) Effective date.--Each State and 
                jurisdiction shall be required to comply with 
                the requirements of this paragraph for the 
                regularly scheduled election for Federal office 
                in November 2020, and for each subsequent 
                election for Federal office.
          (10) Voting machine requirements.--By not later than 
        the date of the regularly scheduled general election 
        for Federal office occurring in November 2022, each 
        State shall seek to ensure that any voting machine used 
        in such election and in any subsequent election for 
        Federal office is manufactured in the United States.
          (13) Ballot marking devices.--
                  (A) In general.--In the case of a voting 
                system that uses a ballot marking device, the 
                ballot marking device shall be a device that--
                          (i) is not capable of tabulating 
                        votes;
                          (ii) except in the case of a ballot 
                        marking device used exclusively to 
                        comply with the requirements of 
                        paragraph (3), is certified in 
                        accordance with section 232 as meeting 
                        the requirements of subparagraph (B); 
                        and
                          (iii) is certified under section 2216 
                        of the Homeland Security Act as meeting 
                        the requirements of clauses (iii) 
                        through (viii) of section 301(a)(9)(B).
                  (B) Requirements.--
                          (i) In general.--A ballot marking 
                        device meets the requirements of this 
                        subparagraph if, during a double-masked 
                        test conducted by a qualified 
                        independent user experience research 
                        laboratory (as defined in section 
                        232(b)(4)) of a simulated election 
                        scenario which meets the requirements 
                        of clause (ii), there is less than a 5 
                        percent chance that an ordinary voter 
                        using the device would not detect and 
                        report any difference between the vote 
                        selection printed on the ballot by the 
                        ballot marking device and the vote 
                        selection indicated by the voter.
                          (ii) Simulated election scenario.--A 
                        simulated election scenario meets the 
                        requirements of this clause if it is 
                        conducted with--
                                  (I) a pool of subjects that 
                                are--
                                          (aa) diverse in age, 
                                        gender, education, and 
                                        physical limitations; 
                                        and
                                          (bb) representative 
                                        of the communities in 
                                        which the voting system 
                                        will be used; and
                                  (II) ballots that are 
                                representative of ballots 
                                ordinarily used in the 
                                communities in which the voting 
                                system will be used.
                  (C) Effective date.--Each State and 
                jurisdiction shall be required to comply with 
                the requirements of this paragraph for the 
                regularly scheduled election for Federal office 
                in November 2022, and for each subsequent 
                election for Federal office.
  (b) Voting System Defined.--In [this section] this Act, the 
term ``voting system'' means--
          (1) the total combination of mechanical, 
        electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including 
        the software, firmware, and documentation required to 
        program, control, and support the equipment) that is 
        used--
                  (A) to define ballots;
                  (B) to cast and count votes;
                  (C) to report or display election results; 
                and
                  (D) to maintain and produce any audit trail 
                information; [and]
          (2) any electronic poll book used with respect to the 
        election; and
          [(2)] (3) the practices and associated documentation 
        used--
                  (A) to identify system components and 
                versions of such components;
                  (B) to test the system during its development 
                and maintenance;
                  (C) to maintain records of system errors and 
                defects;
                  (D) to determine specific system changes to 
                be made to a system after the initial 
                qualification of the system; and
                  (E) to make available any materials to the 
                voter (such as notices, instructions, forms, or 
                paper ballots).
  (c) Electronic Poll Book Defined.--In this Act, the term 
``electronic poll book'' means the total combination of 
mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment 
(including the software, firmware, and documentation required 
to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used--
          (1) to retain the list of registered voters at a 
        polling location, or vote center, or other location at 
        which voters cast votes in an election for Federal 
        office; and
          (2) to identify registered voters who are eligible to 
        vote in an election.
  [(c)] (d) Construction.--
          (1) In general.--Nothing in this section shall be 
        construed to prohibit a State or jurisdiction which 
        used a particular type of voting system in the 
        elections for Federal office held in November 2000 from 
        using the same type of system after the effective date 
        of this section, so long as the system meets or is 
        modified to meet the requirements of this section.
          (2) Protection of paper ballot voting systems.--For 
        purposes of subsection (a)(1)(A)(i), the term 
        ``verify'' may not be defined in a manner that makes it 
        impossible for a paper ballot voting system to meet the 
        requirements of such subsection or to be modified to 
        meet such requirements.
  [(d) Effective Date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be 
required to comply with the requirements of this section on and 
after January 1, 2006.]
  (e) Effective Date.--
          (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
        each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply 
        with the requirements of this section on and after 
        January 1, 2006.
          (2) Special rule for certain requirements.--
                  (A) In general.--Except as provided in 
                section 105(b) of the Securing America's 
                Federal Elections Act and subparagraphs (B) and 
                (C), the requirements of this section which are 
                first imposed on a State and jurisdiction 
                pursuant to the amendments made by the Voter 
                Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 
                2019 shall apply with respect to voting systems 
                used for any election for Federal office held 
                in 2020 or any succeeding year.
                  (B) Delay for jurisdictions using certain 
                paper record printers or certain systems using 
                or producing voter-verified paper records in 
                2018.--
                          (i) Delay.--In the case of a 
                        jurisdiction described in clause (ii), 
                        subparagraph (A) shall apply to a 
                        voting system in the jurisdiction as if 
                        the reference in such subparagraph to 
                        ``2020'' were a reference to ``2022'', 
                        but only with respect to the following 
                        requirements of this section:
                                  (I) Paragraph (2)(A)(i)(I) of 
                                subsection (a) (relating to the 
                                use of voter-verified paper 
                                ballots).
                                  (II) Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) 
                                and (II) of subsection (a) 
                                (relating to access to 
                                verification from and casting 
                                of the durable paper ballot).
                                  (III) Paragraph (7) of 
                                subsection (a) (relating to 
                                durability and readability 
                                requirements for ballots).
                          (ii) Jurisdictions described.--A 
                        jurisdiction described in this clause 
                        is a jurisdiction--
                                  (I) which used voter-verified 
                                paper record printers attached 
                                to direct recording electronic 
                                voting machines, or which used 
                                other voting systems that used 
                                or produced paper records of 
                                the vote verifiable by voters 
                                but that are not in compliance 
                                with paragraphs (2)(A)(i)(I), 
                                (3)(B)(iii)(I) and (II), and 
                                (7) of subsection (a) (as 
                                amended or added by the Voter 
                                Confidence and Increased 
                                Accessibility Act of 2019), for 
                                the administration of the 
                                regularly scheduled general 
                                election for Federal office 
                                held in November 2018; and
                                  (II) which will continue to 
                                use such printers or systems 
                                for the administration of 
                                elections for Federal office 
                                held in years before 2022.
                          (iii) Mandatory availability of paper 
                        ballots at polling places using 
                        grandfathered printers and systems.--
                                  (I) Requiring ballots to be 
                                offered and provided.--The 
                                appropriate election official 
                                at each polling place that uses 
                                a printer or system described 
                                in clause (ii)(I) for the 
                                administration of elections for 
                                Federal office shall offer each 
                                individual who is eligible to 
                                cast a vote in the election at 
                                the polling place the 
                                opportunity to cast the vote 
                                using a blank pre-printed paper 
                                ballot which the individual may 
                                mark by hand and which is not 
                                produced by the direct 
                                recording electronic voting 
                                machine or other such system. 
                                The official shall provide the 
                                individual with the ballot and 
                                the supplies necessary to mark 
                                the ballot, and shall ensure 
                                (to the greatest extent 
                                practicable) that the waiting 
                                period for the individual to 
                                cast a vote is the lesser of 30 
                                minutes or the average waiting 
                                period for an individual who 
                                does not agree to cast the vote 
                                using such a paper ballot under 
                                this clause.
                                  (II) Treatment of ballot.--
                                Any paper ballot which is cast 
                                by an individual under this 
                                clause shall be counted and 
                                otherwise treated as a regular 
                                ballot for all purposes 
                                (including by incorporating it 
                                into the final unofficial vote 
                                count (as defined by the State) 
                                for the precinct) and not as a 
                                provisional ballot, unless the 
                                individual casting the ballot 
                                would have otherwise been 
                                required to cast a provisional 
                                ballot.
                                  (III) Posting of notice.--The 
                                appropriate election official 
                                shall ensure there is 
                                prominently displayed at each 
                                polling place a notice that 
                                describes the obligation of the 
                                official to offer individuals 
                                the opportunity to cast votes 
                                using a pre-printed blank paper 
                                ballot.
                                  (IV) Training of election 
                                officials.--The chief State 
                                election official shall ensure 
                                that election officials at 
                                polling places in the State are 
                                aware of the requirements of 
                                this clause, including the 
                                requirement to display a notice 
                                under subclause (III), and are 
                                aware that it is a violation of 
                                the requirements of this title 
                                for an election official to 
                                fail to offer an individual the 
                                opportunity to cast a vote 
                                using a blank pre-printed paper 
                                ballot.
                                  (V) Period of 
                                applicability.--The 
                                requirements of this clause 
                                apply only during the period in 
                                which the delay is in effect 
                                under clause (i).
                  (C) Special rule for jurisdictions using 
                certain nontabulating ballot marking devices.--
                In the case of a jurisdiction which uses a 
                nontabulating ballot marking device which 
                automatically deposits the ballot into a 
                privacy sleeve, subparagraph (A) shall apply to 
                a voting system in the jurisdiction as if the 
                reference in such subparagraph to ``any 
                election for Federal office held in 2020 or any 
                succeeding year'' were a reference to 
                ``elections for Federal office occurring held 
                in 2022 or each succeeding year'', but only 
                with respect to paragraph (3)(B)(iii)(II) of 
                subsection (a) (relating to nonmanual casting 
                of the durable paper ballot).

SEC. 301A. PRE-ELECTION REPORTS ON VOTING SYSTEM USAGE.

  (a) Requiring States to Submit Reports.--Not later than 120 
days before the date of each regularly scheduled general 
election for Federal office, the chief State election official 
of a State shall submit a report to the Commission containing a 
detailed voting system usage plan for each jurisdiction in the 
State which will administer the election, including a detailed 
plan for the usage of electronic poll books and other equipment 
and components of such system.
  (b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall apply with respect 
to the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office 
held in November 2020 and each succeeding regularly scheduled 
general election for Federal office.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 303. COMPUTERIZED STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION LIST REQUIREMENTS 
                    AND REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTERS WHO REGISTER BY MAIL.

  (a) Computerized Statewide Voter Registration List 
Requirements.--
          (1) Implementation.--
                  (A) In general.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), each State, acting through 
                the chief State election official, shall 
                implement, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory 
                manner, a single, uniform, official, 
                centralized, interactive computerized statewide 
                voter registration list defined, maintained, 
                and administered at the State level that 
                contains the name and registration information 
                of every legally registered voter in the State 
                and assigns a unique identifier to each legally 
                registered voter in the State (in this 
                subsection referred to as the ``computerized 
                list''), and includes the following:
                          (i) The computerized list shall serve 
                        as the single system for storing and 
                        managing the official list of 
                        registered voters throughout the State.
                          (ii) The computerized list contains 
                        the name and registration information 
                        of every legally registered voter in 
                        the State.
                          (iii) Under the computerized list, a 
                        unique identifier is assigned to each 
                        legally registered voter in the State.
                          (iv) The computerized list shall be 
                        coordinated with other agency databases 
                        within the State.
                          (v) Any election official in the 
                        State, including any local election 
                        official, may obtain immediate 
                        electronic access to the information 
                        contained in the computerized list.
                          (vi) All voter registration 
                        information obtained by any local 
                        election official in the State shall be 
                        electronically entered into the 
                        computerized list on an expedited basis 
                        at the time the information is provided 
                        to the local official.
                          (vii) The chief State election 
                        official shall provide such support as 
                        may be required so that local election 
                        officials are able to enter information 
                        as described in clause (vi).
                          (viii) The computerized list shall 
                        serve as the official voter 
                        registration list for the conduct of 
                        all elections for Federal office in the 
                        State.
                  (B) Exception.--The requirement under 
                subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a State in 
                which, under a State law in effect continuously 
                on and after the date of the enactment of this 
                Act, there is no voter registration requirement 
                for individuals in the State with respect to 
                elections for Federal office.
          (2) Computerized list maintenance.--
                  (A) In general.--The appropriate State or 
                local election official shall perform list 
                maintenance with respect to the computerized 
                list on a regular basis as follows:
                          (i) If an individual is to be removed 
                        from the computerized list, such 
                        individual shall be removed in 
                        accordance with the provisions of the 
                        National Voter Registration Act of 1993 
                        (42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq.), including 
                        subsections (a)(4), (c)(2), (d), and 
                        (e) of section 8 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
                        1973gg-6).
                          (ii) For purposes of removing names 
                        of ineligible voters from the official 
                        list of eligible voters--
                                  (I) under section 8(a)(3)(B) 
                                of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-
                                6(a)(3)(B)), the State shall 
                                coordinate the computerized 
                                list with State agency records 
                                on felony status; and
                                  (II) by reason of the death 
                                of the registrant under section 
                                8(a)(4)(A) of such Act (42 
                                U.S.C. 1973gg-6(a)(4)(A)), the 
                                State shall coordinate the 
                                computerized list with State 
                                agency records on death.
                          (iii) Notwithstanding the preceding 
                        provisions of this subparagraph, if a 
                        State is described in section 4(b) of 
                        the National Voter Registration Act of 
                        1993 (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-2(b)), that 
                        State shall remove the names of 
                        ineligible voters from the computerized 
                        list in accordance with State law.
                  (B) Conduct.--The list maintenance performed 
                under subparagraph (A) shall be conducted in a 
                manner that ensures that--
                          (i) the name of each registered voter 
                        appears in the computerized list;
                          (ii) only voters who are not 
                        registered or who are not eligible to 
                        vote are removed from the computerized 
                        list; and
                          (iii) duplicate names are eliminated 
                        from the computerized list.
          (3) Technological security of computerized list.--The 
        appropriate State or local official shall provide 
        adequate technological security measures to prevent the 
        unauthorized access to the computerized list 
        established under this section[.], as well as other 
        measures to prevent and deter cybersecurity incidents, 
        as identified by the Commission, the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security, and the Technical Guidelines 
        Development Committee.
          (4) Minimum standard for accuracy of state voter 
        registration records.--The State election system shall 
        include provisions to ensure that voter registration 
        records in the State are accurate and are updated 
        regularly, including the following:
                  (A) A system of file maintenance that makes a 
                reasonable effort to remove registrants who are 
                ineligible to vote from the official list of 
                eligible voters. Under such system, consistent 
                with the National Voter Registration Act of 
                1993 (42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq.), registrants 
                who have not responded to a notice and who have 
                not voted in 2 consecutive general elections 
                for Federal office shall be removed from the 
                official list of eligible voters, except that 
                no registrant may be removed solely by reason 
                of a failure to vote.
                  (B) Safeguards to ensure that eligible voters 
                are not removed in error from the official list 
                of eligible voters.
          (5) Verification of voter registration information.--
                  (A) Requiring provision of certain 
                information by applicants.--
                          (i) In general.--Except as provided 
                        in clause (ii), notwithstanding any 
                        other provision of law, an application 
                        for voter registration for an election 
                        for Federal office may not be accepted 
                        or processed by a State unless the 
                        application includes--
                                  (I) in the case of an 
                                applicant who has been issued a 
                                current and valid driver's 
                                license, the applicant's 
                                driver's license number; or
                                  (II) in the case of any other 
                                applicant (other than an 
                                applicant to whom clause (ii) 
                                applies), the last 4 digits of 
                                the applicant's social security 
                                number.
                          (ii) Special rule for applicants 
                        without driver's license or social 
                        security number.--If an applicant for 
                        voter registration for an election for 
                        Federal office has not been issued a 
                        current and valid driver's license or a 
                        social security number, the State shall 
                        assign the applicant a number which 
                        will serve to identify the applicant 
                        for voter registration purposes. To the 
                        extent that the State has a 
                        computerized list in effect under this 
                        subsection and the list assigns unique 
                        identifying numbers to registrants, the 
                        number assigned under this clause shall 
                        be the unique identifying number 
                        assigned under the list.
                          (iii) Determination of validity of 
                        numbers provided.--The State shall 
                        determine whether the information 
                        provided by an individual is sufficient 
                        to meet the requirements of this 
                        subparagraph, in accordance with State 
                        law.
                  (B) Requirements for state officials.--
                          (i) Sharing information in 
                        databases.--The chief State election 
                        official and the official responsible 
                        for the State motor vehicle authority 
                        of a State shall enter into an 
                        agreement to match information in the 
                        database of the statewide voter 
                        registration system with information in 
                        the database of the motor vehicle 
                        authority to the extent required to 
                        enable each such official to verify the 
                        accuracy of the information provided on 
                        applications for voter registration.
                          (ii) Agreements with commissioner of 
                        social security.--The official 
                        responsible for the State motor vehicle 
                        authority shall enter into an agreement 
                        with the Commissioner of Social 
                        Security under section 205(r)(8) of the 
                        Social Security Act (as added by 
                        subparagraph (C)).
                  (C) Access to federal information.--Section 
                205(r) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
                405(r)) is amended by adding at the end the 
                following new paragraph:
  ``(8)(A) The Commissioner of Social Security shall, upon the 
request of the official responsible for a State driver's 
license agency pursuant to the Help America Vote Act of 2002--
                  ``(i) enter into an agreement with such 
                official for the purpose of verifying 
                applicable information, so long as the 
                requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 
                paragraph (3) are met; and
                  ``(ii) include in such agreement safeguards 
                to assure the maintenance of the 
                confidentiality of any applicable information 
                disclosed and procedures to permit such agency 
                to use the applicable information for the 
                purpose of maintaining its records.
          ``(B) Information provided pursuant to an agreement 
        under this paragraph shall be provided at such time, in 
        such place, and in such manner as the Commissioner 
        determines appropriate.
          ``(C) The Commissioner shall develop methods to 
        verify the accuracy of information provided by the 
        agency with respect to applications for voter 
        registration, for whom the last 4 digits of a social 
        security number are provided instead of a driver's 
        license number.
          ``(D) For purposes of this paragraph--
                  ``(i) the term `applicable information' means 
                information regarding whether--
                          ``(I) the name (including the first 
                        name and any family forename or 
                        surname), the date of birth (including 
                        the month, day, and year), and social 
                        security number of an individual 
                        provided to the Commissioner match the 
                        information contained in the 
                        Commissioner's records, and
                          ``(II) such individual is shown on 
                        the records of the Commissioner as 
                        being deceased; and
                  ``(ii) the term `State driver's license 
                agency' means the State agency which issues 
                driver's licenses to individuals within the 
                State and maintains records relating to such 
                licensure.
          ``(E) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to 
        require the provision of applicable information with 
        regard to a request for a record of an individual if 
        the Commissioner determines there are exceptional 
        circumstances warranting an exception (such as safety 
        of the individual or interference with an 
        investigation).
          ``(F) Applicable information provided by the 
        Commission pursuant to an agreement under this 
        paragraph or by an individual to any agency that has 
        entered into an agreement under this paragraph shall be 
        considered as strictly confidential and shall be used 
        only for the purposes described in this paragraph and 
        for carrying out an agreement under this paragraph. Any 
        officer or employee or former officer or employee of a 
        State, or any officer or employee or former officer or 
        employee of a contractor of a State who, without the 
        written authority of the Commissioner, publishes or 
        communicates any applicable information in such 
        individual's possession by reason of such employment or 
        position as such an officer, shall be guilty of a 
        felony and upon conviction thereof shall be fined or 
        imprisoned, or both, as described in section 208.''.
                  (D) Special rule for certain states.--In the 
                case of a State which is permitted to use 
                social security numbers, and provides for the 
                use of social security numbers, on applications 
                for voter registration, in accordance with 
                section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 
                552a note), the provisions of this paragraph 
                shall be optional.
  (b) Requirements for Voters Who Register by Mail.--
          (1) In general.--Notwithstanding section 6(c) of the 
        National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 
        1973gg-4(c)) and subject to paragraph (3), a State 
        shall, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner, 
        require an individual to meet the requirements of 
        paragraph (2) if--
                  (A) the individual registered to vote in a 
                jurisdiction by mail; and
                  (B)(i) the individual has not previously 
                voted in an election for Federal office in the 
                State; or
                  (ii) the individual has not previously voted 
                in such an election in the jurisdiction and the 
                jurisdiction is located in a State that does 
                not have a computerized list that complies with 
                the requirements of subsection (a).
          (2) Requirements.--
                  (A) In general.--An individual meets the 
                requirements of this paragraph if the 
                individual--
                          (i) in the case of an individual who 
                        votes in person--
                                  (I) presents to the 
                                appropriate State or local 
                                election official a current and 
                                valid photo identification; or
                                  (II) presents to the 
                                appropriate State or local 
                                election official a copy of a 
                                current utility bill, bank 
                                statement, government check, 
                                paycheck, or other government 
                                document that shows the name 
                                and address of the voter; or
                          (ii) in the case of an individual who 
                        votes by mail, submits with the 
                        ballot--
                                  (I) a copy of a current and 
                                valid photo identification; or
                                  (II) a copy of a current 
                                utility bill, bank statement, 
                                government check, paycheck, or 
                                other government document that 
                                shows the name and address of 
                                the voter.
                  (B) Fail-safe voting.--
                          (i) In person.--An individual who 
                        desires to vote in person, but who does 
                        not meet the requirements of 
                        subparagraph (A)(i), may cast a 
                        provisional ballot under section 
                        302(a).
                          (ii) By mail.--An individual who 
                        desires to vote by mail but who does 
                        not meet the requirements of 
                        subparagraph (A)(ii) may cast such a 
                        ballot by mail and the ballot shall be 
                        counted as a provisional ballot in 
                        accordance with section 302(a).
          (3) Inapplicability.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply 
        in the case of a person--
                  (A) who registers to vote by mail under 
                section 6 of the National Voter Registration 
                Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-4) and submits as 
                part of such registration either--
                          (i) a copy of a current and valid 
                        photo identification; or
                          (ii) a copy of a current utility 
                        bill, bank statement, government check, 
                        paycheck, or government document that 
                        shows the name and address of the 
                        voter;
                  (B)(i) who registers to vote by mail under 
                section 6 of the National Voter Registration 
                Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 1973gg-4) and submits 
                with such registration either--
                          (I) a driver's license number; or
                          (II) at least the last 4 digits of 
                        the individual's social security 
                        number; and
                  (ii) with respect to whom a State or local 
                election official matches the information 
                submitted under clause (i) with an existing 
                State identification record bearing the same 
                number, name and date of birth as provided in 
                such registration; or
                  (C) who is--
                          (i) entitled to vote by absentee 
                        ballot under the Uniformed and Overseas 
                        Citizens Absentee Voting Act (42 U.S.C. 
                        1973ff-1 et seq.);
                          (ii) provided the right to vote 
                        otherwise than in person under section 
                        3(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Voting 
                        Accessibility for the Elderly and 
                        Handicapped Act (42 U.S.C. 1973ee-
                        1(b)(2)(B)(ii)); or
                          (iii) entitled to vote otherwise than 
                        in person under any other Federal law.
          (4) Contents of mail-in registration form.--
                  (A) In general.--The mail voter registration 
                form developed under section 6 of the National 
                Voter Registration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 
                1973gg-4) shall include the following:
                          (i) The question ``Are you a citizen 
                        of the United States of America?'' and 
                        boxes for the applicant to check to 
                        indicate whether the applicant is or is 
                        not a citizen of the United States.
                          (ii) The question ``Will you be 18 
                        years of age on or before election 
                        day?'' and boxes for the applicant to 
                        check to indicate whether or not the 
                        applicant will be 18 years of age or 
                        older on election day.
                          (iii) The statement ``If you 
                        checked`no'in response to either of 
                        these questions, do not complete this 
                        form.''.
                          (iv) A statement informing the 
                        individual that if the form is 
                        submitted by mail and the individual is 
                        registering for the first time, the 
                        appropriate information required under 
                        this section must be submitted with the 
                        mail-in registration form in order to 
                        avoid the additional identification 
                        requirements upon voting for the first 
                        time.
                  (B) Incomplete forms.--If an applicant for 
                voter registration fails to answer the question 
                included on the mail voter registration form 
                pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i), the registrar 
                shall notify the applicant of the failure and 
                provide the applicant with an opportunity to 
                complete the form in a timely manner to allow 
                for the completion of the registration form 
                prior to the next election for Federal office 
                (subject to State law).
          (5) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
        be construed to require a State that was not required 
        to comply with a provision of the National Voter 
        Registration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq.) 
        before the date of the enactment of this Act to comply 
        with such a provision after such date.
  (c) Permitted Use of Last 4 Digits of Social Security 
Numbers.--The last 4 digits of a social security number 
described in subsections (a)(5)(A)(i)(II) and (b)(3)(B)(i)(II) 
shall not be considered to be a social security number for 
purposes of section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a 
note).
  (d) Effective Date.--
          (1) Computerized statewide voter registration list 
        requirements.--
                  (A) In general.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), each State and jurisdiction 
                shall be required to comply with the 
                requirements of subsection (a) on and after 
                January 1, 2004.
                  (B) Waiver.--If a State or jurisdiction 
                certifies to the Commission not later than 
                January 1, 2004, that the State or jurisdiction 
                will not meet the deadline described in 
                subparagraph (A) for good cause and includes in 
                the certification the reasons for the failure 
                to meet such deadline, subparagraph (A) shall 
                apply to the State or jurisdiction as if the 
                reference in such subparagraph to ``January 1, 
                2004'' were a reference to ``January 1, 2006''.
          (2) Requirement for voters who register by mail.--
                  (A) In general.--Each State and jurisdiction 
                shall be required to comply with the 
                requirements of subsection (b) on and after 
                January 1, 2004, and shall be prepared to 
                receive registration materials submitted by 
                individuals described in subparagraph (B) on 
                and after the date described in such 
                subparagraph.
                  (B) Applicability with respect to 
                individuals.--The provisions of subsection (b) 
                shall apply to any individual who registers to 
                vote on or after January 1, 2003.

SEC. 303A. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Risk-limiting audit.--The term ``risk-limiting 
        audit'' means, with respect to any election contest, a 
        post-election process that--
                  (A) has a probability of at least 95 percent 
                of correcting the reported outcome if the 
                reported outcome is not the correct outcome;
                  (B) will not change the outcome if the 
                reported outcome is the correct outcome; and
                  (C) involves a manual adjudication of voter 
                intent from some or all of the ballots validly 
                cast in the election contest.
          (2) Reported outcome; correct outcome; outcome.--
                  (A) Reported outcome.--The term ``reported 
                outcome'' means the outcome of an election 
                contest which is determined according to the 
                canvass and which will become the official, 
                certified outcome unless it is revised by an 
                audit, recount, or other legal process.
                  (B) Correct outcome.--The term ``correct 
                outcome'' means the outcome that would be 
                determined by a manual adjudication of voter 
                intent for all votes validly cast in the 
                election contest.
                  (C) Outcome.--The term ``outcome'' means the 
                winner or set of winners of an election 
                contest.
          (3) Manual adjudication of voter intent.--The term 
        ``manual adjudication of voter intent'' means direct 
        inspection and determination by humans, without 
        assistance from electronic or mechanical tabulation 
        devices, of the ballot choices marked by voters on each 
        voter-verified paper record.
          (4) Ballot manifest.--The term ``ballot manifest'' 
        means a record maintained by each jurisdiction that--
                  (A) is created without reliance on any part 
                of the voting system used to tabulate votes;
                  (B) functions as a sampling frame for 
                conducting a risk-limiting audit; and
                  (C) accounts for all ballots validly cast 
                regardless of how or whether they were 
                tabulated and includes a precise description of 
                the manner in which the ballots are physically 
                stored, including the total number of physical 
                groups of ballots, the numbering system for 
                each group, a unique label for each group, and 
                the number of ballots in each such group.
  (b) Requirements.--
          (1) In general.--
                  (A) Audits.--
                          (i) In general.--Each State and 
                        jurisdiction shall administer risk-
                        limiting audits of the results of all 
                        election contests for Federal office 
                        held in the State in accordance with 
                        the requirements of paragraph (2).
                          (ii) Exception.--Clause (i) shall not 
                        apply to any election contest for which 
                        the State or jurisdiction conducts a 
                        full recount through a manual 
                        adjudication of voter intent.
                  (B) Full manual tabulation.--If a risk-
                limiting audit conducted under subparagraph (A) 
                corrects the reported outcome of an election 
                contest, the State or jurisdiction shall use 
                the results of the manual adjudication of voter 
                intent conducted as part of the risk-limiting 
                audit as the official results of the election 
                contest.
          (2) Audit requirements.--
                  (A) Rules and procedures.--
                          (i) In general.--Not later than 1 
                        year after the date of the enactment of 
                        this section, the chief State election 
                        official of the State shall establish 
                        rules and procedures for conducting 
                        risk-limiting audits.
                          (ii) Matters included.--The rules and 
                        procedures established under clause (i) 
                        shall include the following:
                                  (I) Rules and procedures for 
                                ensuring the security of 
                                ballots and documenting that 
                                prescribed procedures were 
                                followed.
                                  (II) Rules and procedures for 
                                ensuring the accuracy of ballot 
                                manifests produced by 
                                jurisdictions.
                                  (III) Rules and procedures 
                                for governing the format of 
                                ballot manifests and other data 
                                involved in risk-limiting 
                                audits.
                                  (IV) Methods to ensure that 
                                any cast vote records used in a 
                                risk-limiting audit are those 
                                used by the voting system to 
                                tally the results of the 
                                election contest sent to the 
                                chief State election official 
                                of the State and made public.
                                  (V) Rules and procedures for 
                                the random selection of ballots 
                                to be inspected manually during 
                                each audit.
                                  (VI) Rules and procedures for 
                                the calculations and other 
                                methods to be used in the audit 
                                and to determine whether and 
                                when the audit of each election 
                                contest is complete.
                                  (VII) Rules and procedures 
                                for testing any software used 
                                to conduct risk-limiting 
                                audits.
                  (B) Public report.--
                          (i) In general.--After the completion 
                        of the risk-limiting audit and at least 
                        5 days before the election contest is 
                        certified, the State shall publish a 
                        report on the results of the audit, 
                        together with such information as 
                        necessary to confirm that the audit was 
                        conducted properly.
                          (ii) Format of data.--All data 
                        published with the report under clause 
                        (i) shall be published in machine-
                        readable, open data formats.
                          (iii) Protection of anonymity of 
                        votes.--Information and data published 
                        by the State under this subparagraph 
                        shall not compromise the anonymity of 
                        votes.
  (c) Effective Date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be 
required to comply with the requirements of this section for 
the first regularly scheduled election for Federal office held 
more than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the 
Securing America's Federal Elections Act and for each 
subsequent election for Federal office.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                         TITLE IV--ENFORCEMENT

SEC. 401. ACTIONS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR DECLARATORY AND 
                    INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

  The Attorney General may bring a civil action against any 
State or jurisdiction in an appropriate United States District 
Court for such declaratory and injunctive relief (including a 
temporary restraining order, a permanent or temporary 
injunction, or other order) as may be necessary to carry out 
the uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and 
administration requirements under sections 301, 302, [and 303] 
303, and 303A.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   TITLE IX--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

[SEC. 901. STATE DEFINED.

  [In this Act, the term ``State'' includes the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American 
Samoa, and the United States Virgin Islands.]

SEC. 901. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act, the following definitions apply:
          (1) The term ``cybersecurity incident'' has the 
        meaning given the term ``incident'' in section 227 of 
        the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 148).
          (2) The term ``election agency'' means any component 
        of a State, or any component of a unit of local 
        government in a State, which is responsible for the 
        administration of elections for Federal office in the 
        State.
          (3) The term ``election infrastructure'' means 
        storage facilities, polling places, and centralized 
        vote tabulation locations used to support the 
        administration of elections for public office, as well 
        as related information and communications technology, 
        including voter registration databases, voting 
        machines, electronic mail and other communications 
        systems (including electronic mail and other systems of 
        vendors who have entered into contracts with election 
        agencies to support the administration of elections, 
        manage the election process, and report and display 
        election results), and other systems used to manage the 
        election process and to report and display election 
        results on behalf of an election agency.
          (4) The term ``State'' means each of the several 
        States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
        Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States 
        Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern 
        Mariana Islands.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                           SUPPLEMENTAL VIEW

    The Republicans of the Committee on House Administration 
believe the integrity of our nation's elections and election 
infrastructure is of the utmost importance. This should not be 
a partisan issue. Unfortunately, the Majority, under pressure 
from its leadership, stepped away from bipartisan discussions 
for a joint election security bill. They rushed this partisan 
election security bill to a House Administration Committee 
markup in just over 48-hours, despite not having been 
considered in a Committee hearing, while a premature notice for 
a House Rules Committee hearing was released before the bill 
was voted out of Committee.
    Democrats seem to believe burdensome and ineffective 
federal mandates, combined with an egregious amount of taxpayer 
funds, will solve the problems within election security. 
Unfortunately, this bill does very little to further secure our 
election systems and its proposed policies only hurt the state 
and local election officials it claims to help. Federally 
mandating the use of paper ballots and manual hand counts is a 
step backward for this country and erases all the hard work of 
state and local election officials across this country. 
Additionally, the Democrats are blindly committing $1.3 billion 
over the course of 10 years. The Majority fails to remember 
that the funding of elections is the primary responsibility of 
the states.
    Republicans introduced six amendments in the committee 
markup, including the requirement of a 25% funding match from 
states, which would force states receiving funds to have their 
own skin-in-the-game; prohibiting the practice of ballot 
harvestings; and introduced H.R. 3412, the Election Security 
Assistance Act, which provides states the resources they need 
to secure their elections, instead of burdensome and 
ineffective federal mandates. Democrats rejected all six of the 
Republicans' amendments.
                                                      Rodney Davis.