Report text available as:

  • TXT
  • PDF   (PDF provides a complete and accurate display of this text.) Tip ?
   116th Congress  }                                 {  Rept. 116-151
                         HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
     1st Session   }                                 {     Part 1
                                                       
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

                                                                       


DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION 
               ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020

                               ----------                              

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

            HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 
            

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


 July 11, 2019.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed
              
              
              
              
              
              


DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION 
               ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020 
               
               
               
               
               
               
116th Congress }                                        {   Rept. 116-151
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 1st Session   }                                        {     Part 1
                                                                 
_______________________________________________________________________                                   

                                                                       


DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION 
               ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

            HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
            

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


 July 11, 2019.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed            
              
              
              
                             _________ 
                                  
              U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
 37-060                 WASHINGTON : 2019                  
              
              
              
              



116th Congress  }                                       {   Rept. 116-151
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session    }                                       {     Part 1

======================================================================



 
DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION 
               ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020

                                _______
                                

 July 11, 2019.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Schiff, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 3494]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 3494) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2020 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with 
amendments and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
    The amendments are as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young 
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 
2020''.

SEC. 2. DIVISIONS AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Divisions.--This Act is organized into two divisions as follows:
          (1) Division A--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Year 
        2020.
          (2) Division B--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Years 
        2018 and 2019.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Divisions and table of contents.
Sec. 3. Definitions.

      DIVISION A--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence community management account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
law.
Sec. 303. Paid parental leave.
Sec. 304. Unfunded requirements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 305. Extending the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982.
Sec. 306. Intelligence community public-private talent exchange.
Sec. 307. Assessment of contracting practices to identify certain 
security and counterintelligence concerns.
Sec. 308. Required counterintelligence briefings and notifications.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Sec. 401. Establishment of Climate Security Advisory Council.
Sec. 402. Transfer of National Intelligence University to the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Sec. 501. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the 
United States by the Communist Party of China.
Sec. 502. Report on repression of ethnic Muslim minorities in the 
Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 503. Report on efforts by People's Republic of China to influence 
election in Taiwan.
Sec. 504. Assessment of legitimate and illegitimate financial and other 
assets of Vladimir Putin.
Sec. 505. Assessments of intentions of political leadership of the 
Russian Federation.
Sec. 506. Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi.

          TITLE VI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM

Sec. 601. Definitions.
Sec. 602. Annual strategic intelligence assessment of and comprehensive 
report on domestic terrorism.

                  TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 701. Modification of requirements for submission to Congress of 
certain reports.
Sec. 702. Increased transparency regarding counterterrorism budget of 
the United States.
Sec. 703. Task force on illicit financing of espionage and foreign 
influence operations.
Sec. 704. Study on role of retired and former personnel of intelligence 
community with respect to certain foreign intelligence operations.
Sec. 705. Report by Director of National Intelligence on fifth-
generation wireless network technology.
Sec. 706. Establishment of 5G prize competition.
Sec. 707. Establishment of deepfakes prize competition.

 DIVISION B--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019

                   TITLE XXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 2101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 2102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 2103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

   TITLE XXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY 
                                 SYSTEM

Sec. 2201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 2202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.

          TITLE XXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 2301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 2302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
law.
Sec. 2303. Modification of special pay authority for science, 
technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and addition of 
special pay authority for cyber positions.
Sec. 2304. Modification of appointment of Chief Information Officer of 
the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 2305. Director of National Intelligence review of placement of 
positions within the intelligence community on the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 2306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task 
Force.
Sec. 2307. Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and 
cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence with foreign 
governments and entities.
Sec. 2308. Cyber protection support for the personnel of the 
intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to cyber attack.
Sec. 2309. Elimination of sunset of authority relating to management of 
supply-chain risk.
Sec. 2310. Limitations on determinations regarding certain security 
classifications.
Sec. 2311. Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Sec. 2312. Intelligence community information technology environment.
Sec. 2313. Report on development of secure mobile voice solution for 
intelligence community.
Sec. 2314. Policy on minimum insider threat standards.
Sec. 2315. Submission of intelligence community policies.
Sec. 2316. Expansion of intelligence community recruitment efforts.

 TITLE XXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 2401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 2402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing 
environment.
Sec. 2403. Technical modification to the executive schedule.
Sec. 2404. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 2405. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 2411. Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for personnel 
assigned to austere locations.
Sec. 2412. Special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation 
payments and other payments for Central Intelligence Agency personnel.
Sec. 2413. Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of the 
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 2414. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for 
certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence Agency.

     Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of 
                          Department of Energy

Sec. 2421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
Sec. 2422. Establishment of Energy Infrastructure Security Center.
Sec. 2423. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive 
Committee and budget reporting requirement.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

Sec. 2431. Plan for designation of counterintelligence component of 
Defense Security Service as an element of intelligence community.
Sec. 2432. Notice not required for private entities.
Sec. 2433. Establishment of advisory board for National Reconnaissance 
Office.
Sec. 2434. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security 
personnel at field locations.

                      TITLE XXV--ELECTION MATTERS

Sec. 2501. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against 
United States election infrastructure.
Sec. 2502. Review of intelligence community's posture to collect 
against and analyze Russian efforts to influence the Presidential 
election.
Sec. 2503. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal 
elections.
Sec. 2504. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United 
States elections.
Sec. 2505. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns 
directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 2506. Information sharing with State election officials.
Sec. 2507. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and 
active measures campaigns directed at elections for Federal offices.
Sec. 2508. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead election 
security matters.

                    TITLE XXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES

Sec. 2601. Definitions.
Sec. 2602. Reports and plans relating to security clearances and 
background investigations.
Sec. 2603. Improving the process for security clearances.
Sec. 2604. Goals for promptness of determinations regarding security 
clearances.
Sec. 2605. Security Executive Agent.
Sec. 2606. Report on unified, simplified, Governmentwide standards for 
positions of trust and security clearances.
Sec. 2607. Report on clearance in person concept.
Sec. 2608. Reports on reciprocity for security clearances inside of 
departments and agencies.
Sec. 2609. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 2610. Periodic report on positions in the intelligence community 
that can be conducted without access to classified information, 
networks, or facilities.
Sec. 2611. Information sharing program for positions of trust and 
security clearances.
Sec. 2612. Report on protections for confidentiality of whistleblower-
related communications.

                 TITLE XXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

    Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers

Sec. 2701. Limitation relating to establishment or support of 
cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation.
Sec. 2702. Report on returning Russian compounds.
Sec. 2703. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia.
Sec. 2704. Notification of an active measures campaign.
Sec. 2705. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and consular 
personnel of the Russian Federation in the United States.
Sec. 2706. Report on outreach strategy addressing threats from United 
States adversaries to the United States technology sector.
Sec. 2707. Report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and 
Lebanon.
Sec. 2708. Annual report on Iranian expenditures supporting foreign 
military and terrorist activities.
Sec. 2709. Expansion of scope of committee to counter active measures 
and report on establishment of Foreign Malign Influence Center.

                          Subtitle B--Reports

Sec. 2711. Technical correction to Inspector General study.
Sec. 2712. Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer of 
the Department of Homeland Security.
Sec. 2713. Review of intelligence community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 2714. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with 
respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 2715. Report on surveillance by foreign governments against United 
States telecommunications networks.
Sec. 2716. Biennial report on foreign investment risks.
Sec. 2717. Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel of 
foreign diplomats.
Sec. 2718. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized 
disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 2719. Congressional notification of designation of covered 
intelligence officer as persona non grata.
Sec. 2720. Reports on intelligence community participation in 
vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government.
Sec. 2721. Inspectors General reports on classification.
Sec. 2722. Reports on global water insecurity and national security 
implications and briefing on emerging infectious disease and pandemics.
Sec. 2723. Annual report on memoranda of understanding between elements 
of intelligence community and other entities of the United States 
Government regarding significant operational activities or policy.
Sec. 2724. Study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline 
and wireless telephone calls.
Sec. 2725. Modification of requirement for annual report on hiring and 
retention of minority employees.
Sec. 2726. Reports on intelligence community loan repayment and related 
programs.
Sec. 2727. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 2728. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on 
senior executives of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.
Sec. 2729. Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation offering 
permanent residence to sources and cooperators.
Sec. 2730. Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue sources.
Sec. 2731. Report on possible exploitation of virtual currencies by 
terrorist actors.

                       Subtitle C--Other Matters

Sec. 2741. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 2742. Technical and clerical amendments to the National Security 
Act of 1947.
Sec. 2743. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.
Sec. 2744. Sense of Congress on notification of certain disclosures of 
classified information.
Sec. 2745. Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage activities 
when considering whether or not to provide visas to foreign individuals 
to be accredited to a United Nations mission in the United States.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act:
          (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
        ``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given 
        such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
        U.S.C. 3003).
          (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

      DIVISION A--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2020 
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the following elements of the United States Government:
          (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
          (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
          (3) The Department of Defense.
          (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (5) The National Security Agency.
          (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
        and the Department of the Air Force.
          (7) The Coast Guard.
          (8) The Department of State.
          (9) The Department of the Treasury.
          (10) The Department of Energy.
          (11) The Department of Justice.
          (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
          (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
          (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
          (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

  (a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be 
appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence 
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of 
section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
  (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--
          (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations 
        referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the 
        President.
          (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3), 
        the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
        classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection 
        (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the 
        executive branch.
          (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
        disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
        portion of such Schedule except--
                  (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
                Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 
                U.S.C. 3306(a));
                  (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; 
                or
                  (C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

  (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the 
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2020 the sum of 
$565,637,000.
  (b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to 
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for 
fiscal year 2020 such additional amounts as are specified in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 
2020.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed 
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity 
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of 
the United States.

SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY 
                    LAW.

  Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, 
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in 
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 303. PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.

  (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to--
          (1) help the intelligence community recruit and retain a 
        dynamic, multi-talented, and diverse workforce capable of 
        meeting the security goals of the United States; and
          (2) establish best practices and processes for other elements 
        of the Federal Government seeking to pursue similar policies.
  (b) Authorization of Paid Parental Leave for Intelligence Community 
Employees.--
          (1) In general.--Title III of the National Security Act of 
        1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
        section 304 the following:

``SEC. 305. PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.

  ``(a) Paid Parental Leave.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, a civilian employee of an element of the intelligence community 
shall have available a total of 12 administrative workweeks of paid 
parental leave in the event of the birth of a son or daughter of the 
employee, or placement of a son or daughter with the employee for 
adoption or foster care in order to care for such son or daughter. Such 
paid parental leave shall be used during the 12-month period beginning 
on the date of the birth or placement. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to modify or otherwise affect the eligibility of an employee 
of an element of the intelligence community for benefits relating to 
leave under any other provision of law.
  ``(b) Treatment of Parental Leave Request.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law--
          ``(1) an element of the intelligence community shall 
        accommodate an employee's leave request under subsection (a), 
        including a request to use such leave intermittently or to 
        create a reduced work schedule, to the extent that the 
        requested leave schedule does not unduly disrupt operations; 
        and
          ``(2) to the extent that an employee's requested leave 
        described in paragraph (1) arises out of medical necessity 
        related to a serious health condition connected to the birth of 
        a son or daughter, the employing element shall handle the 
        scheduling consistent with the treatment of employees who are 
        using leave under subparagraph (C) or (D) of section 6382(a)(1) 
        of title 5, United States Code.
  ``(c) Rules Relating to Paid Leave.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law--
          ``(1) an employee may not be required to first use all or any 
        portion of any unpaid leave available to the employee before 
        being allowed to use the paid parental leave described in 
        subsection (a); and
          ``(2) paid parental leave under subsection (a)--
                  ``(A) shall be payable from any appropriation or fund 
                available for salaries or expenses for positions within 
                the employing element;
                  ``(B) may not be considered to be annual or vacation 
                leave for purposes of section 5551 or 5552 of title 5, 
                United States Code, or for any other purpose;
                  ``(C) if not used by the employee before the end of 
                the 12-month period described in subsection (a) to 
                which the leave relates, may not be available for any 
                subsequent use and may not be converted into a cash 
                payment;
                  ``(D) may be granted only to the extent that the 
                employee does not receive a total of more than 12 weeks 
                of paid parental leave in any 12-month period beginning 
                on the date of a birth or placement;
                  ``(E) may not be granted--
                          ``(i) in excess of a lifetime aggregate total 
                        of 30 administrative workweeks based on 
                        placements of a foster child for any individual 
                        employee; or
                          ``(ii) in connection with temporary foster 
                        care placements expected to last less than 1 
                        year;
                  ``(F) may not be granted for a child being placed for 
                foster care or adoption if such leave was previously 
                granted to the same employee when the same child was 
                placed with the employee for foster care in the past;
                  ``(G) shall be used in increments of hours (or 
                fractions thereof), with 12 administrative workweeks 
                equal to 480 hours for employees with a regular full-
                time work schedule and converted to a proportional 
                number of hours for employees with part-time, seasonal, 
                or uncommon tours of duty; and
                  ``(H) may not be used during off-season (nonpay 
                status) periods for employees with seasonal work 
                schedules.
  ``(d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
the enactment of this section, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an 
implementation plan that includes--
          ``(1) processes and procedures for implementing the paid 
        parental leave policies under subsections (a) through (c);
          ``(2) an explanation of how the implementation of subsections 
        (a) through (c) will be reconciled with policies of other 
        elements of the Federal Government, including the impact on 
        elements funded by the National Intelligence Program that are 
        housed within agencies outside the intelligence community; and
          ``(3) all costs or operational expenses associated with the 
        implementation of subsections (a) through (c).
  ``(e) Directive.--Not later than 180 days after the Director of 
National Intelligence submits the implementation plan under subsection 
(d), the Director of National Intelligence shall issue a written 
directive to implement this section, which directive shall take effect 
on the date of issuance.
  ``(f) Annual Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report 
that--
          ``(1) details the number of employees of each element of the 
        intelligence community who applied for and took paid parental 
        leave under subsection (a) during the year covered by the 
        report;
          ``(2) details the number of--
                  ``(A) employees of each element of the intelligence 
                community stationed abroad who applied for and took 
                paid parental leave under subsection (a) during the 
                year covered by the report; and
                  ``(B) employees of each element of the intelligence 
                community stationed abroad who applied for paid 
                parental leave but such application was not granted 
                because of an undue impact on operations as specified 
                in subsection (b)(1); and
          ``(3) includes updates on major implementation challenges or 
        costs associated with paid parental leave.
  ``(g) Definition of Son or Daughter.--For purposes of this section, 
the term `son or daughter' has the meaning given the term in section 
6381 of title 5, United States Code.''.
          (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the matter 
        preceding section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
        U.S.C. 3002) is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
        section 304 the following:

``Sec. 305. Paid parental leave.''.

  (c) Applicability.--Section 305 of the National Security Act of 1947, 
as added by subsection (b), shall apply with respect to leave taken in 
connection with the birth or placement of a son or daughter that occurs 
on or after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence 
issues the written directive under subsection (e) of such section 305.

SEC. 304. UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:

``SEC. 512. UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  ``(a) Briefings.--Upon the request of an appropriate congressional 
committee, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the 
committee a briefing on the unfunded priorities of an element of the 
intelligence community.
  ``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        `appropriate congressional committees' means--
                  ``(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and
                  ``(B) the Committees on Appropriations of the House 
                of Representatives and the Senate.
          ``(2) Unfunded priority.--The term `unfunded priority', in 
        the case of a fiscal year, means a program, activity, or other 
        initiative of an element of the intelligence community that--
                  ``(A) was submitted by the head of the element to the 
                Director of National Intelligence in the budget 
                proposal for the element for that fiscal year, but was 
                not included by the Director in the consolidated budget 
                proposal submitted to the President for that fiscal 
                year; or
                  ``(B) was submitted by the Director in the 
                consolidated budget proposal submitted to the President 
                for that fiscal year, but was not included in the 
                budget of the President submitted to Congress for that 
                fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, 
                United States Code.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections in the first section 
of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
511 the following new item:

``Sec. 512. Unfunded priorities of the intelligence community.''.

SEC. 305. EXTENDING THE INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT OF 1982.

  Section 605(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3126(4)) is amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (A)--
                  (A) by striking clause (ii);
                  (B) in clause (i), by striking ``, and'' and 
                inserting ``;''; and
                  (C) by striking ``agency--'' and all that follows 
                through ``whose identity'' and inserting ``agency whose 
                identity''; and
          (2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``resides and acts 
        outside the United States'' and inserting ``acts''.

SEC. 306. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PUBLIC-PRIVATE TALENT EXCHANGE.

  (a) Policies, Processes, and Procedures Required.--Not later than 270 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall develop policies, processes, and procedures 
to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the intelligence community 
to the private sector, and personnel from the private sector to the 
intelligence community.
  (b) Detail Authority.--Under policies developed by the Director 
pursuant to subsection (a), pursuant to a written agreement with a 
private-sector organization, and with the consent of the employee, a 
head of an element of the intelligence community may arrange for the 
temporary detail of an employee of such element to such private-sector 
organization, or from such private-sector organization to such element 
under this section.
  (c) Agreements.--
          (1) In general.--A head of an element of the intelligence 
        community exercising the authority of the head under subsection 
        (a) shall provide for a written agreement among the element of 
        the intelligence community, the private-sector organization, 
        and the employee concerned regarding the terms and conditions 
        of the employee's detail under this section. The agreement--
                  (A) shall require that the employee of the element, 
                upon completion of the detail, serve in the element, or 
                elsewhere in the civil service if approved by the head 
                of the element, for a period that is at least equal to 
                the length of the detail;
                  (B) shall provide that if the employee of the element 
                fails to carry out the agreement, such employee shall 
                be liable to the United States for payment of all non-
                salary and benefit expenses of the detail, unless that 
                failure was for good and sufficient reason, as 
                determined by the head of the element;
                  (C) shall contain language informing such employee of 
                the prohibition on sharing, using, or otherwise 
                improperly handling classified of unclassified non-
                public information for the benefit or advantage of the 
                private-sector organization;
                  (D) shall contain language governing the handling of 
                classified information by such employee during the 
                detail; and
                  (E) shall contain language requiring the employee to 
                acknowledge the obligations of the employee under 
                section 1905 of title 18, United States Code.
          (2) Amount of liability.--An amount for which an employee is 
        liable under paragraph (1) shall be treated as a debt due the 
        United States.
          (3) Waiver.--The head of an element of the intelligence 
        community may waive, in whole or in part, collection of a debt 
        described in paragraph (2) based on a determination that the 
        collection would be against equity and good conscience and not 
        in the best interests of the United States, after taking into 
        account any indication of fraud, misrepresentation, fault, or 
        lack of good faith on the part of the employee.
  (d) Termination.--A detail under this section may, at any time and 
for any reason, be terminated by the head of the element of the 
intelligence community concerned or the private-sector organization 
concerned.
  (e) Duration.--
          (1) In general.--A detail under this section shall be for a 
        period of not less than 3 months and not more than 2 years, 
        renewable up to a total of 3 years.
          (2) Longer periods.--A detail under this section may be for a 
        period in excess of 2 years, but not more than 3 years, if the 
        head of the element making the detail determines that such 
        detail is necessary to meet critical mission or program 
        requirements.
          (3) Limitation.--No employee of an element of the 
        intelligence community may be detailed under this section for 
        more than a total of 5 years, inclusive of all such details.
  (f) Status of Federal Employees Detailed to Private-sector 
Organizations.--
          (1) In general.--An employee of an element of the 
        intelligence community who is detailed to a private-sector 
        organization under this section shall be considered, during the 
        period of detail, to be on a regular work assignment in the 
        element. The written agreement established under subsection 
        (c)(1) shall address the specific terms and conditions related 
        to the employee's continued status as a Federal employee.
          (2) Requirements.--In establishing a temporary detail of an 
        employee of an element of the intelligence community to a 
        private-sector organization, the head of the element shall--
                  (A) certify that the temporary detail of such 
                employee shall not have an adverse or negative impact 
                on mission attainment or organizational capabilities 
                associated with the detail; and
                  (B) in the case of an element of the intelligence 
                community in the Department of Defense, ensure that the 
                normal duties and functions of such employees are not, 
                as a result of and during the course of such temporary 
                detail, performed or augmented by contractor personnel 
                in violation of the provisions of section 2461 of title 
                10, United States Code.
  (g) Terms and Conditions for Private-sector Employees.--An employee 
of a private-sector organization who is detailed to an element of the 
intelligence community under this section--
          (1) shall continue to receive pay and benefits from the 
        private-sector organization from which such employee is 
        detailed and shall not receive pay or benefits from the 
        element, except as provided in paragraph (2);
          (2) is deemed to be an employee of the element for the 
        purposes of--
                  (A) chapters 73 and 81 of title 5, United States 
                Code;
                  (B) sections 201, 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 603, 606, 
                607, 643, 654, 1905, and 1913 of title 18, United 
                States Code;
                  (C) sections 1343, 1344, and 1349(b) of title 31, 
                United States Code;
                  (D) chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code 
                (commonly known as the ``Federal Tort Claims Act'') and 
                any other Federal tort liability statute;
                  (E) the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
                App.); and
                  (F) chapter 21 of title 41, United States Code;
          (3) may perform work that is considered inherently 
        governmental in nature only when requested in writing by the 
        head of the element;
          (4) may not be used to circumvent any limitation or 
        restriction on the size of the workforce of the element;
          (5) shall be subject to the same requirements applicable to 
        an employee performing the same functions and duties proposed 
        for performance by the private sector employee; and
          (6) in the case of an element of the intelligence community 
        in the Department of Defense, may not be used to circumvent the 
        provisions of section 2461 of title 10, United States Code.
  (h) Prohibition Against Charging Certain Costs to the Federal 
Government.--A private-sector organization may not charge an element of 
the intelligence community or any other agency of the Federal 
Government, as direct costs under a Federal contract, the costs of pay 
or benefits paid by the organization to an employee detailed to an 
element of the intelligence community under this section for the period 
of the detail and any subsequent renewal periods.
  (i) Additional Administrative Matters.--In carrying out this section, 
the Director, pursuant to procedures developed under subsection (a)--
          (1) shall, to the degree practicable, ensure that small 
        business concerns are represented with respect to details 
        authorized by this section;
          (2) may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
        establish criteria for elements of the intelligence community 
        to use appropriated funds to reimburse small business concerns 
        for the salaries and benefits of its employees during the 
        periods when the small business concern agrees to detail its 
        employees to the intelligence community under this section;
          (3) shall take into consideration the question of how details 
        under this section might best be used to help meet the needs of 
        the intelligence community, including with respect to the 
        training of employees;
          (4) shall take into consideration areas of private-sector 
        expertise that are critical to the intelligence community; and
          (5) shall establish oversight mechanisms to determine whether 
        the public-private exchange authorized by this section improves 
        the efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence community.
  (j) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Detail.--The term ``detail'' means, as appropriate in the 
        context in which such term is used--
                  (A) the assignment or loan of an employee of an 
                element of the intelligence community to a private-
                sector organization without a change of position from 
                the intelligence community element that employs the 
                individual; or
                  (B) the assignment or loan of an employee of a 
                private-sector organization to an element of the 
                intelligence community without a change of position 
                from the private-sector organization that employs the 
                individual.
          (2) Private-sector organization.--The term ``private-sector 
        organization'' means--
                  (A) a for-profit organization; or
                  (B) a not-for-profit organization.
          (3) Small business concern.--The term ``small business 
        concern'' has the meaning given such term in section 3703(e)(2) 
        of title 5, United States Code.

SEC. 307. ASSESSMENT OF CONTRACTING PRACTICES TO IDENTIFY CERTAIN 
                    SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONCERNS.

  (a) Assessment.--
          (1) Contracting practices.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence shall conduct an assessment of the authorities, 
        policies, processes, and standards used by the elements of the 
        intelligence community to ensure that the elements 
        appropriately weigh security and counterintelligence risks in 
        awarding a contract to a contractor that--
                  (A) carries out any joint research and development 
                activities with a covered foreign country; or
                  (B) performs any contract or other agreement entered 
                into with a covered foreign country.
          (2) Elements.--The assessment under paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                  (A) An assessment of whether the authorities, 
                policies, processes, and standards specified in 
                paragraph (1) sufficiently identify security and 
                counterintelligence concerns.
                  (B) Identification of any authority gaps in such 
                authorities, policies, processes, and standards that 
                prevent the intelligence community from considering the 
                activities specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 
                paragraph (1) when evaluating offers for a contract.
          (3) Consultation.--In carrying out paragraph (1), the 
        Director shall consult with each head of an element of the 
        intelligence community.
  (b) Report.--
          (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
        assessment under subsection (a)(1).
          (2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                  (A) The assessment under subsection (a)(1).
                  (B) An identification of any known contractors that 
                have--
                          (i) carried out activities specified in 
                        subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(1); 
                        and
                          (ii) submitted an offer for a contract with 
                        an element of the intelligence community.
                  (C) A description of the steps that the Director and 
                the heads of the elements of the intelligence community 
                took to identify contractors under subparagraph (B).
          (3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted 
        in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
  (c) Covered Foreign Country Defined.--In this section, the term 
``covered foreign country'' means the government, or any entity 
affiliated with the military or intelligence services of, the following 
foreign countries:
          (1) The People's Republic of China.
          (2) The Russian Federation.
          (3) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
          (4) The Islamic Republic of Iran.

SEC. 308. REQUIRED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS AND NOTIFICATIONS.

  (a) Foreign Counterintelligence and Cybersecurity Threats to Federal 
Election Campaigns.--
          (1) Reports required.--
                  (A) In general.--As provided in subparagraph (B), for 
                each Federal election, the Director of National 
                Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary 
                of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and 
                the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
                shall make publicly available on an Internet website an 
                advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and 
                cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal 
                offices. Each such report shall include, consistent 
                with the protection of sources and methods, each of the 
                following:
                          (i) A description of foreign 
                        counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats 
                        to election campaigns for Federal offices.
                          (ii) A summary of best practices that 
                        election campaigns for Federal offices can 
                        employ in seeking to counter such threats.
                          (iii) An identification of any publicly 
                        available resources, including United States 
                        Government resources, for countering such 
                        threats.
                  (B) Schedule for submittal.--A report under this 
                subsection shall be made available as follows:
                          (i) In the case of a report regarding an 
                        election held for the office of Senator or 
                        Member of the House of Representatives during 
                        2018, not later than the date that is 60 days 
                        after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                          (ii) In the case of a report regarding an 
                        election for a Federal office during any 
                        subsequent year, not later than the date that 
                        is 1 year before the date of the election.
                  (C) Information to be included.--A report under this 
                subsection shall reflect the most current information 
                available to the Director of National Intelligence 
                regarding foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity 
                threats.
          (2) Treatment of campaigns subject to heightened threats.--If 
        the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
        Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and 
        Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for 
        Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign 
        counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and 
        the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of sources 
        and methods, may make available additional information to the 
        appropriate representatives of such campaign.
  (b) Briefings on Counterintelligence Activities of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation.--
          (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 
        (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), as amended by section 304, is further 
        amended by adding at the end the following new section:

``SEC. 513. BRIEFINGS AND NOTIFICATIONS ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
                    ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

  ``(a) Quarterly Briefings.--In addition to, and without any 
derogation of, the requirement under section 501 to keep the 
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of 
the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the United 
States, not less frequently than once each quarter, the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to the congressional 
intelligence committees a briefing on the counterintelligence 
activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such briefings shall 
include, at a minimum, an overview and update of--
          ``(1) the counterintelligence posture of the Bureau;
          ``(2) counterintelligence investigations; and
          ``(3) any other information relating to the 
        counterintelligence activities of the Bureau that the Director 
        determines necessary.
  ``(b) Notifications.--In addition to the quarterly briefings under 
subsection (a), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
shall promptly notify the congressional intelligence committees of any 
counterintelligence investigation carried out by the Bureau with 
respect to any counterintelligence risk or threat that is related to an 
election or campaign for Federal office.
  ``(c) Guidelines.--
          ``(1) Development and consultation.--The Director shall 
        develop guidelines governing the scope of the briefings 
        provided under subsection (a), the notifications provided under 
        subsection (b), and the information required by section 
        308(a)(2) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 
        2020. The Director shall consult the congressional intelligence 
        committees during such development.
          ``(2) Submission.--The Director shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees--
                  ``(A) the guidelines under paragraph (1) upon 
                issuance; and
                  ``(B) any updates to such guidelines by not later 
                than 15 days after making such update.''.
          (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents at the 
        beginning of such Act, as amended by section 304, is further 
        amended by inserting after the item relating to section 512 the 
        following new item:

``Sec. 513. Briefings and notifications on counterintelligence 
activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

SEC. 401. ESTABLISHMENT OF CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.

  (a) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:

``SEC. 120. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.

  ``(a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
establish a Climate Security Advisory Council for the purpose of--
          ``(1) assisting intelligence analysts of various elements of 
        the intelligence community with respect to analysis of climate 
        security and its impact on the areas of focus of such analysts;
          ``(2) facilitating coordination between the elements of the 
        intelligence community and elements of the Federal Government 
        that are not elements of the intelligence community in 
        collecting data on, and conducting analysis of, climate change 
        and climate security; and
          ``(3) ensuring that the intelligence community is adequately 
        prioritizing climate change in carrying out its activities.
  ``(b) Composition of Council.--
          ``(1) Members.--The Council shall be composed of the 
        following individuals appointed by the Director of National 
        Intelligence:
                  ``(A) An appropriate official from the National 
                Intelligence Council, who shall chair the Council.
                  ``(B) The lead official with respect to climate and 
                environmental security analysis from--
                          ``(i) the Central Intelligence Agency;
                          ``(ii) the Bureau of Intelligence and 
                        Research of the Department of State;
                          ``(iii) the National Geospacial-Intelligence 
                        Agency;
                          ``(iv) the Office of Intelligence and 
                        Counterintelligence of the Department of 
                        Energy;
                          ``(v) the Office of the Under Secretary of 
                        Defense for Intelligence; and
                          ``(vi) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
                  ``(C) Three appropriate officials from elements of 
                the Federal Government that are not elements of the 
                intelligence community that are responsible for--
                          ``(i) providing decision-makers with a 
                        predictive understanding of the climate;
                          ``(ii) making observations of our Earth 
                        system that can be used by the public, 
                        policymakers, and to support strategic 
                        decisions; or
                          ``(iii) coordinating Federal research and 
                        investments in understanding the forces shaping 
                        the global environment, both human and natural, 
                        and their impacts on society.
                  ``(D) Any other officials as the Director of National 
                Intelligence or the chair of the Council may determine 
                appropriate.
          ``(2) Responsibilities of chair.--The chair of the Council 
        shall have responsibility for--
                  ``(A) identifying agencies to supply individuals from 
                elements of the Federal Government that are not 
                elements of the intelligence community;
                  ``(B) securing the permission of the relevant agency 
                heads for the participation of such individuals on the 
                Council; and
                  ``(C) any other duties that the Director of National 
                Intelligence may direct.
  ``(c) Duties and Responsibilities of Council.--The Council shall 
carry out the following duties and responsibilities:
          ``(1) To meet at least quarterly to--
                  ``(A) exchange appropriate data between elements of 
                the intelligence community and elements of the Federal 
                Government that are not elements of the intelligence 
                community;
                  ``(B) discuss processes for the routine exchange of 
                such data and implementation of such processes; and
                  ``(C) prepare summaries of the business conducted at 
                each meeting.
          ``(2) To assess and determine best practices with respect to 
        the analysis of climate security, including identifying 
        publicly available information and intelligence acquired 
        through clandestine means that enables such analysis.
          ``(3) To assess and identify best practices with respect to 
        prior efforts of the intelligence community to analyze climate 
        security.
          ``(4) To assess and describe best practices for identifying 
        and disseminating climate security indicators and warnings;
          ``(5) To recommend methods of incorporating analysis of 
        climate security and the best practices identified under 
        paragraphs (2) through (4) into existing analytic training 
        programs.
          ``(6) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements of the 
        intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change 
        or climate security and elements of the Federal Government that 
        are not elements of the intelligence community that conduct 
        analysis of climate change or climate security, for the purpose 
        of sharing information about ongoing efforts and avoiding 
        duplication of existing efforts.
          ``(7) To work with elements of the intelligence community 
        that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security and 
        elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the 
        intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change 
        or climate security--
                  ``(A) to exchange appropriate data between such 
                elements, establish processes, procedures and practices 
                for the routine exchange of such data, discuss the 
                implementation of such processes; and
                  ``(B) to enable and facilitate the sharing of 
                findings and analysis between such elements.
          ``(8) To assess whether the elements of the intelligence 
        community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate 
        security may inform the research direction of academic work and 
        the sponsored work of the United States Government.
          ``(9) At the discretion of the chair of the Council, to 
        convene conferences of analysts and non-intelligence community 
        personnel working on climate change or climate security on 
        subjects that the chair shall direct.
  ``(d) Sunset.--The Council shall terminate on the date that is 4 
years after the date of the enactment of this section.
  ``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Climate security.--The term `climate security' means 
        the effects of climate change on the following:
                  ``(A) The national security of the United States, 
                including national security infrastructure.
                  ``(B) Subnational, national, and regional political 
                stability.
                  ``(C) The security of allies and partners of the 
                United States.
                  ``(D) Ongoing or potential political violence, 
                including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, 
                insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, civil 
                war, and interstate war.
          ``(2) Climate intelligence indications and warnings.--The 
        term `climate intelligence indications and warnings' means 
        developments relating to climate security with the potential 
        to--
                  ``(A) imminently and substantially alter the 
                political stability or degree of human security in a 
                country or region; or
                  ``(B) imminently and substantially threaten--
                          ``(i) the national security of the United 
                        States;
                          ``(ii) the military, political, or economic 
                        interests of allies and partners of the United 
                        States; or
                          ``(iii) citizens of the United States 
                        abroad.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the 
item relating to section 119B the following new item:

``Sec. 120. Climate Security Advisory Council.''.

  (c) Initial Appointments.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
appoint the members of the Council under section 120 of the National 
Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).

SEC. 402. TRANSFER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY TO THE OFFICE OF 
                    THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

  (a) Transfer.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall 
transfer to the Director of National Intelligence the National 
Intelligence University, including the functions, personnel, assets, 
and liabilities of the University.
  (b) Degree-granting Authority.--
          (1) Regulations.--Under regulations prescribed by the 
        Director of National Intelligence, the President of the 
        National Intelligence University may, upon the recommendation 
        of the faculty of the University, confer appropriate degrees 
        upon graduates who meet the degree requirements.
          (2) Limitation.--A degree may not be conferred under this 
        section unless--
                  (A) the appropriate head of a Department of the 
                Federal Government has recommended approval of the 
                degree in accordance with any Federal policy applicable 
                to the granting of academic degrees by departments and 
                agencies of the Federal Government; and
                  (B) the University is accredited by the appropriate 
                civilian academic accrediting agency or organization to 
                award the degree, as determined by such appropriate 
                head of a Department.
  (c) Congressional Notification Requirements.--
          (1) Notification.--When seeking to establish degree-granting 
        authority under this section, the Director shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees--
                  (A) a copy of the self-assessment questionnaire 
                required by the Federal policy specified in subsection 
                (b)(2)(A); and
                  (B) any subsequent recommendations and rationale of 
                the appropriate head of a Department specified in such 
                subsection regarding establishing such degree-granting 
                authority.
          (2) Modification.--Upon any modification or redesignation of 
        existing degree-granting authority, the Director shall submit 
        to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
        containing the rationale for the proposed modification or 
        redesignation and any subsequent recommendation described in 
        paragraph (1)(B) with respect to the proposed modification or 
        redesignation.
          (3) Actions on nonaccreditation.--The Director shall submit 
        to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
        containing an explanation of any action by the appropriate 
        academic accrediting agency or organization not to accredit the 
        University to award any new or existing degree.
  (d) Conforming Repeal.--Effective 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, section 2161 of title 10, United States Code, is 
repealed, and the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 108 of 
such title is amended by striking the item relating to such section 
2161.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

SEC. 501. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE 
                    UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.

  (a) Reports.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 2718, is further amended by 
adding at the end the following new section:

``SEC. 1106. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN 
                    THE UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.

  ``(a) Requirement.--On an annual basis, the Director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the influence 
operations and campaigns in the United States conducted by the 
Communist Party of China.
  ``(b) Contents.--Each report under subsection (a) shall include the 
following:
          ``(1) A description of the organization of the United Front 
        Work Department of the People's Republic of China, or the 
        successors of the United Front Work Department, and the links 
        between the United Front Work Department and the Central 
        Committee of the Communist Party of China.
          ``(2) An assessment of the degree to which organizations that 
        are associated with or receive funding from the United Front 
        Work Department, particularly such entities operating in the 
        United States, are formally tasked by the Chinese Communist 
        Party or the Government of China.
          ``(3) A description of the efforts by the United Front Work 
        Department and subsidiary organizations of the United Front 
        Work Department to target, coerce, and influence foreign 
        populations, particularly those of ethnic Chinese descent.
          ``(4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy, 
        consulates, and organizations affiliated with the Chinese 
        Communist Party (including, at a minimum, the United Front Work 
        Department) to influence the United States-based Chinese 
        Student Scholar Associations.
          ``(5) A description of the evolution of the role of the 
        United Front Work Department under the leadership of the 
        President of China.
          ``(6) An assessment of the activities of the United Front 
        Work Department designed to influence the opinions of elected 
        leaders of the United States, or candidates for elections in 
        the United States, with respect to issues of importance to the 
        Chinese Communist Party.
          ``(7) A listing of all known organizations affiliated with 
        the United Front Work Department that are operating in the 
        United States as of the date of the report.
          ``(8) With respect to reports submitted after the first 
        report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, 
        techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and 
        campaigns conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
  ``(c) Coordination.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Director 
shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head 
of an element of the intelligence community.
  ``(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 2718, is 
further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1105 
the following new item:

``Sec. 1106. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in 
the United States by the Communist Party of China.''.

  (c) Initial Report.--The Director of the National Counterintelligence 
and Security Center shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees the first report under section 1106 of the National Security 
Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), by not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 502. REPORT ON REPRESSION OF ETHNIC MUSLIM MINORITIES IN THE 
                    XINJIANG REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

  (a) Report.--Not later than 150 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on activity by the 
People's Republic of China to repress ethnic Muslim minorities in the 
Xinjiang region of China.
  (b) Contents.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the 
following:
          (1) An assessment of the number of individuals detained in 
        ``political reeducation camps'', and the conditions in such 
        camps for detainees, in the Xinjiang region of China, including 
        whether detainees endure torture, forced renunciation of faith, 
        or other mistreatment.
          (2) A description, as possible, of the geographic location of 
        such camps.
          (3) A description, as possible, of the methods used by China 
        to ``reeducate'' detainees and the elements of China 
        responsible for such ``reeducation''.
          (4) A description of any forced labor in such camps, and any 
        labor performed in regional factories for low wages under the 
        threat of being sent back to ``political reeducation camps''.
          (5) An assessment of the level of access China grants to 
        foreign persons observing the situation in Xinjiang and a 
        description of measures used to impede efforts to monitor the 
        conditions in Xinjiang.
          (6) An assessment of the surveillance, detection, and control 
        methods used by China to target ethnic minorities, including 
        new ``high-tech'' policing models and a description of any 
        civil liberties or privacy protections provided under such 
        models.
  (c) Coordination.--The Director of National Intelligence shall carry 
out subsection (a) in coordination with the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the 
Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the head 
of any other agency of the Federal Government that the Director of 
National Intelligence determines appropriate.
  (d) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 503. REPORT ON EFFORTS BY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO INFLUENCE 
                    ELECTION IN TAIWAN.

  (a) Report.--Consistent with section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act 
(Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), not later than 45 days after the 
date of the election for the President and Vice President of Taiwan in 
2020, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on any--
          (1) influence operations conducted by China to interfere in 
        or undermine such election; and
          (2) efforts by the United States to disrupt such operations.
  (b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the 
following:
          (1) A description of any significant efforts by the 
        intelligence community to coordinate technical and material 
        support for Taiwan to identify, disrupt, and combat influence 
        operations specified in subsection (a)(1).
          (2) A description of any efforts by the United States 
        Government to build the capacity of Taiwan to disrupt external 
        efforts that degrade a free and fair election process.
          (3) An assessment of whether and to what extent China 
        conducted influence operations specified in subsection (a)(1), 
        and, if such operations occurred--
                  (A) a comprehensive list of specific governmental and 
                nongovernmental entities of China that were involved in 
                supporting such operations and a description of the 
                role of each such entity; and
                  (B) an identification of any tactics, techniques, and 
                procedures used in such operations.
  (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 504. ASSESSMENT OF LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FINANCIAL AND OTHER 
                    ASSETS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should do more to expose the corruption of Vladimir Putin, whose 
ill-gotten wealth is perhaps the most powerful global symbol of his 
dishonesty and his persistent efforts to undermine the rule of law and 
democracy in the Russian Federation.
  (b) Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment, based 
on all sources of intelligence, on the net worth and financial and 
other assets, legitimate as well as illegitimate, of Russian President 
Vladimir Putin and his family members, including--
          (1) the estimated net worth of Vladimir Putin and his family 
        members;
          (2) a description of their legitimately and illegitimately 
        obtained assets, including all real, personal, and intellectual 
        property, bank or investment or similar accounts, and any other 
        financial or business interests or holdings, including those 
        outside of Russia;
          (3) the details of the legitimately and illegitimately 
        obtained assets, including real, personal, and intellectual 
        property, bank or investment or similar accounts, and any other 
        financial or business interests or holdings, including those 
        outside of Russia, that are owned or controlled by, accessible 
        to, or otherwise maintained for the benefit of Vladimir Putin, 
        including their nature, location, manner of acquisition, value, 
        and publicly named owner (if other than Vladimir Putin);
          (4) the methods used by Vladimir Putin or others acting at 
        his direction, with his knowledge, or for his benefit, to 
        conceal Putin's interest in his accounts, holdings, or other 
        assets, including the establishment of ``front'' or shell 
        companies and the use of intermediaries; and
          (5) an identification of the most significant senior Russian 
        political figures, oligarchs, and any other persons who have 
        engaged in activity intended to conceal the true financial 
        condition of Vladimir Putin.
  (c) Form.--The assessment required under subsection (b) shall be 
submitted either--
          (1) in unclassified form to the extent consistent with the 
        protection of intelligence sources and methods, and may include 
        a classified annex; or
          (2) simultaneously as both an unclassified version and a 
        classified version.
  (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
          (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
        Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
          (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee 
        on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and 
        the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 505. ASSESSMENTS OF INTENTIONS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE 
                    RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

  (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, and the 
head of any element of the intelligence community that the Director 
determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees each of the assessments described in subsection (b).
  (b) Assessments Described.--The assessments described in this 
subsection are assessments based on intelligence obtained from all 
sources that assess the current intentions of the political leadership 
of the Russian Federation with respect to the following:
          (1) Potential military action against members of the North 
        Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
          (2) Potential responses to an enlarged United States or NATO 
        military presence in eastern Europe or to increased United 
        States military support for allies and partners in the region, 
        such as the provision of additional lethal military equipment 
        to Ukraine or Georgia.
          (3) Potential actions taken for the purpose of exploiting 
        perceived divisions among the governments of Russia's Western 
        adversaries.
  (c) Form.--Each assessment required under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form but shall also include an unclassified 
executive summary, consistent with the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods.
  (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, the term 
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
          (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed 
        Services of the House of Representatives; and
          (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        Senate.

SEC. 506. REPORT ON DEATH OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI.

  (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
death of Jamal Khashoggi. Such report shall include identification of 
those who carried out, participated in, ordered, or were otherwise 
complicit in or responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi, to the 
extent consistent with the protection of sources and methods.
  (b) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form.

          TITLE VI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM

SEC. 601. DEFINITIONS.

  In this title:
          (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                  (A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee 
                on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
                  (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
                Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
                Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
                Senate.
          (2) Domestic terrorism.--The term ``domestic terrorism'' has 
        the meaning given that term in section 2331 of title 18, United 
        States Code.
          (3) Hate crime.--The term ``hate crime'' means a criminal 
        offense under--
                  (A) sections 241, 245, 247, and 249 of title 18, 
                United States Code; and
                  (B) section 3631 of title 42, United States Code.
          (4) International terrorism.--The term ``international 
        terrorism'' has the meaning given that term in section 2331 of 
        title 18, United States Code.
          (5) Terms in attorney general's guidelines for domestic fbi 
        operations.--The terms ``assessments'', ``full 
        investigations'', ``enterprise investigations'',``predicated 
        investigations'', and ``preliminary investigations'' have the 
        meanings given those terms in the most recent, approved version 
        of the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI 
        Operations (or successor).
          (6) Terms in fbi budget materials.--The terms ``Consolidated 
        Strategy Guide'', ``Field Office Strategic Plan'', ``Integrated 
        Program Management Process'', and ``Threat Review and 
        Prioritization'' have the meanings given those terms in the 
        materials submitted to Congress by the Attorney General in 
        support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation budget for 
        fiscal year 2020.
          (7) Terrorism.--The term ``terrorism'' includes domestic 
        terrorism and international terrorism.
          (8) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism 
        information'' has the meaning given that term in section 
        1016(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
        of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485).
          (9) Time utilization and recordkeeping data.--The term ``time 
        utilization and recordkeeping data'' means data collected on 
        resource utilization and workload activity of personnel of the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with Federal law.

SEC. 602. ANNUAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF AND COMPREHENSIVE 
                    REPORT ON DOMESTIC TERRORISM.

  (a) Report Required.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 
        2025, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of 
        the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under Secretary of 
        Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall jointly 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
        domestic terrorism containing the following:
                  (A) Strategic intelligence assessment under 
                subsection (b).
                  (B) Discussion of activities under subsection (c).
                  (C) Data on domestic terrorism under subsection (d).
          (2) Responsibilities.--
                  (A) Coordination of reports and integration of 
                information.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
                acting through the Director of the National 
                Counterterrorism Center, shall be the lead official for 
                coordinating the production of and integrating 
                terrorism information into--
                          (i) each report under paragraph (1); and
                          (ii) each strategic intelligence assessment 
                        under subsection (b).
                  (B) Information sharing.--The Director of the Federal 
                Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of 
                Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall 
                provide to the Director of the National 
                Counterterrorism Center all appropriate information 
                requested by the Director of the National 
                Counterterrorism Center to carry out this section.
  (b) Strategic Intelligence Assessment.--The Director of National 
Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis 
shall include--
          (1) in the first report under subsection (a)(1), a strategic 
        intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism in the United 
        States during fiscal years 2017, 2018, and 2019; and
          (2) in each subsequent report under such subsection, a 
        strategic intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism in the 
        United States during the prior fiscal year.
  (c) Discussion of Activities.--Each report under subsection (a)(1) 
shall discuss and compare the following:
          (1) The criteria for opening, managing, and closing domestic 
        and international terrorism investigations by the Federal 
        Government.
          (2) Standards and procedures for the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the 
        Department of Homeland Security, and the National 
        Counterterrorism Center, with respect to the review, 
        prioritization, and mitigation of domestic and international 
        terrorism threats in the United States.
          (3) The planning, development, production, analysis, and 
        evaluation by the United States Government of intelligence 
        products relating to terrorism, including both raw and finished 
        intelligence.
          (4) The sharing of information relating to domestic and 
        international terrorism by and between--
                  (A) the Federal Government;
                  (B) State, local, Tribal, territorial, and foreign 
                governments;
                  (C) the appropriate congressional committees;
                  (D) non-governmental organizations; and
                  (E) the private sector.
          (5) The criteria and methodology used by the Federal Bureau 
        of Investigation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of 
        the Department of Homeland Security, and the National 
        Counterterrorism Center, to identify or assign terrorism 
        classifications to incidents of terrorism or investigations of 
        terrorism, including--
                  (A) a comparison of the criteria and methodology used 
                with respect to domestic terrorism and international 
                terrorism;
                  (B) the identification of any changes made to 
                investigative classifications; and
                  (C) a discussion of the rationale for any changes 
                identified under subparagraph (B).
  (d) Data on Domestic Terrorism.--
          (1) Data required.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
        the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
        Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and 
        Analysis shall include in each report under subsection (a)(1) 
        the following data:
                  (A) For each completed or attempted incident of 
                domestic terrorism that has occurred in the United 
                States during the applicable period--
                          (i) a description of such incident;
                          (ii) the number and type of completed and 
                        attempted Federal non-violent crimes committed 
                        during such incident;
                          (iii) the number and type of completed and 
                        attempted Federal and State property crimes 
                        committed during such incident, including an 
                        estimate of economic damages resulting from 
                        such crimes; and
                          (iv) the number and type of completed and 
                        attempted Federal violent crimes committed 
                        during such incident, including the number of 
                        people injured or killed as a result of such 
                        crimes.
                  (B) For the applicable period--
                          (i) an identification of each assessment, 
                        preliminary investigation, full investigation, 
                        and enterprise investigation with a nexus to 
                        domestic terrorism opened, pending, or closed 
                        by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
                          (ii) the number of assessments or 
                        investigations identified under clause (i) 
                        associated with each domestic terrorism 
                        investigative classification (including 
                        subcategories);
                          (iii) the number and domestic terrorism 
                        investigative classification (including 
                        subcategories) with respect to such 
                        investigations initiated as a result of a 
                        referral or investigation by a State, local, 
                        Tribal, territorial, or foreign government of a 
                        hate crime;
                          (iv) the number of Federal criminal charges 
                        with a nexus to domestic terrorism, including 
                        the number of indictments and complaints 
                        associated with each domestic terrorism 
                        investigative classification (including 
                        subcategories), a summary of the allegations 
                        contained in each such indictment, the 
                        disposition of the prosecution, and, if 
                        applicable, the sentence imposed as a result of 
                        a conviction on such charges;
                          (v) referrals of incidents of domestic 
                        terrorism by State, local, Tribal, or 
                        territorial governments to departments or 
                        agencies of the Federal Government for 
                        investigation or prosecution, including the 
                        number of such referrals associated with each 
                        domestic terrorism investigation classification 
                        (including any subcategories), and a summary of 
                        each such referral that includes the rationale 
                        for such referral and the disposition of the 
                        applicable Federal investigation or 
                        prosecution;
                          (vi) intelligence products produced by the 
                        intelligence community relating to domestic 
                        terrorism, including--
                                  (I) the number of such products 
                                associated with each domestic terrorism 
                                investigative classification (including 
                                any subcategories); and
                                  (II) with respect to the Federal 
                                Bureau of Investigation, at a minimum, 
                                all relevant data available through the 
                                Integrated Program Management Process;
                          (vii) with respect to the National 
                        Counterterrorism Center, the number of staff 
                        (expressed in terms of full-time equivalents 
                        and positions) working on matters relating to 
                        domestic terrorism described in clauses (i) 
                        through (vi); and
                          (viii) with respect to the Federal Bureau of 
                        Investigation--
                                  (I) the number of staff (expressed in 
                                terms of full-time equivalents and 
                                positions) working on matters relating 
                                to domestic terrorism described in 
                                clauses (i) through (vi); and
                                  (II) a summary of time utilization 
                                and recordkeeping data for personnel 
                                working on such matters, including the 
                                number or percentage of such personnel 
                                associated with each domestic terrorism 
                                investigative classification (including 
                                any subcategories) in the FBI 
                                Headquarters Operational Divisions and 
                                Field Divisions.
          (2) Applicable period.--For purposes of this subsection, the 
        applicable period is the following:
                  (A) For the first report required under subsection 
                (a)(1)--
                          (i) with respect to the data described in 
                        paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection, the period 
                        on or after April 19, 1995; and
                          (ii) with respect to the data described in 
                        paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, each of 
                        fiscal years 2017, 2018, and 2019.
                  (B) For each subsequent report required under 
                subsection (a)(1), the prior fiscal year.
  (e) Provision of Other Documents and Materials.--
          (1) In general.--Together with each report under subsection 
        (a)(1), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of 
        the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under Secretary of 
        Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall also 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees the 
        following documents and materials:
                  (A) With respect to the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation, at a minimum, the most recent, approved 
                versions of--
                          (i) the Attorney General's Guidelines for 
                        Domestic FBI Operations (or any successor);
                          (ii) the FBI Domestic Investigations and 
                        Operations Guide (or any successor);
                          (iii) the FBI Counterterrorism Policy Guide 
                        (or any successor);
                          (iv) materials relating to terrorism within 
                        the Threat Review and Prioritization process 
                        for the headquarters and field divisions of the 
                        Federal Bureau of Investigation;
                          (v) the Consolidated Strategy Guide (or any 
                        successor); and
                          (vi) the Field Office Strategic Plans (or any 
                        successor).
                  (B) With respect to the intelligence community, each 
                finished intelligence product described in subsection 
                (d)(1)(B)(vi).
          (2) Nonduplication.--If any documents or materials required 
        under paragraph (1) have been previously submitted to the 
        appropriate congressional committees under such paragraph and 
        have not been modified since such submission, the Director of 
        National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
        Intelligence and Analysis may provide a list of such documents 
        or materials in lieu of making the submission under paragraph 
        (1) for those documents or materials.
  (f) Format.--The information required under subsection (d) may be 
provided in a format that uses the marking associated with the Central 
Records System (or any successor system) of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.
  (g) Classification and Public Release.--Each report under subsection 
(a) shall be--
          (1) unclassified, but may contain a classified annex;
          (2) with respect to the unclassified portion of the report, 
        made available on the public internet website of the National 
        Counterterrorism Center in an electronic format that is fully 
        indexed and searchable; and
          (3) with respect to a classified annex, submitted to the 
        appropriate congressional committees in an electronic format 
        that is fully indexed and searchable.

                  TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 701. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF 
                    CERTAIN REPORTS.

  (a) Modification of Reports Relating to Guantanamo Bay.--
          (1) Modification.--Section 506I(b) of the National Security 
        Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105(b)) is amended by striking ``once 
        every 6 months'' and inserting ``annually''.
          (2) Modification.--Section 319(a) of the Supplemental 
        Appropriations Act, 2009 (10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended by 
        striking ``every 90 days'' and inserting ``annually''.
          (3) Repeal.--Section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115-31; 131 
        Stat. 827) is repealed.
  (b) Modification to Reports on Violations of Law or Executive 
Order.--Section 511(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3110(a)) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``The Director of National Intelligence'' and 
        inserting ``The head of each element of the intelligence 
        community''; and
          (2) by striking ``an element'' and inserting ``the element''.
  (c) Modification to Reports on Analytic Integrity.--Subsection (c) of 
section 1019 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364) is amended--
          (1) in the heading, by striking ``Reports'' and inserting 
        ``Briefings''; and
          (2) by striking ``submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees, the heads of the relevant elements of the 
        intelligence community, and the heads of analytic training 
        departments a report containing'' and inserting ``provide to 
        the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the 
        relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the heads 
        of analytic training departments a briefing with''.
  (d) Repeal of Reports Relating to Intelligence Functions.--Section 
506J of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105a) is repealed 
and the table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended 
by striking the item relating to section 506J.
  (e) Repeal of Reports Relating to Cuba.--Section 108 of the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 
6038) is repealed.
  (f) Repeal of Reports Relating to Entertainment Industry.--Section 
308 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (50 
U.S.C. 3332) is amended by striking subsection (c).

SEC. 702. INCREASED TRANSPARENCY REGARDING COUNTERTERRORISM BUDGET OF 
                    THE UNITED STATES.

  (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
          (1) Consistent with section 601(a) of the Implementing 
        Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
        3306(a)), the recent practice of the intelligence community has 
        been to release to the public--
                  (A) around the date on which the President submits to 
                Congress a budget for a fiscal year pursuant to section 
                1105 of title 31, United States Code, the ``top-line'' 
                amount of total funding requested for the National 
                Intelligence Program for such fiscal year; and
                  (B) the amount of requested and appropriated funds 
                for the National Intelligence Program and Military 
                Intelligence Program for certain prior fiscal years, 
                consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
                and methods.
          (2) The Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning of the 
        National Counterterrorism Center is responsible for producing 
        an annual National Counterterrorism Budget report, which 
        examines the alignment of intelligence and other resources in 
        the applicable fiscal year budget with the counterterrorism 
        goals and areas of focus in the National Strategy for 
        Counterterrorism.
  (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) despite the difficulty of compiling and releasing to the 
        public comprehensive information on the resource commitments of 
        the United States to counterterrorism activities and programs, 
        including with respect to such activities and programs of the 
        intelligence community, the United States Government could take 
        additional steps to enhance the understanding of the public 
        with respect to such resource commitments, in a manner 
        consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and 
        methods and other national security interests; and
          (2) the United States Government should release to the public 
        as much information as possible regarding the funding of 
        counterterrorism activities and programs, including activities 
        and programs of the intelligence community, in a manner 
        consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and 
        methods and other national security interests.
  (c) Briefing on Public Release of Information.--
          (1) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and not later than 90 days after the 
        beginning of each fiscal year thereafter, the President shall 
        ensure that the congressional intelligence committees receive a 
        briefing from appropriate personnel of the United States 
        Government on the feasibility of releasing to the public 
        additional information relating to counterterrorism efforts of 
        the intelligence community.
          (2) Elements.--Each briefing required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include a discussion of the feasibility of--
                  (A) subject to paragraph (3), releasing to the public 
                the National Counterterrorism Budget report described 
                in subsection (a)(2) for the prior fiscal year; and
                  (B) declassifying other reports, documents, or 
                activities of the intelligence community relating to 
                counterterrorism and releasing such information to the 
                public in a manner consistent with the protection of 
                intelligence sources and methods and other national 
                security interests.
          (3) Release of national counterterrorism budget report.--The 
        President may satisfy the requirement under paragraph (2)(A) 
        during a fiscal year by, not later than 90 days after the 
        beginning of the fiscal year, releasing to the public the 
        National Counterterrorism Budget report (with any redactions 
        the Director determines necessary to protect intelligence 
        sources and methods and other national security interests) for 
        the prior fiscal year.

SEC. 703. TASK FORCE ON ILLICIT FINANCING OF ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN 
                    INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.

  (a) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
establish a task force to study and assess the illicit financing of 
espionage and foreign influence operations directed at the United 
States.
  (b) Membership.--The task force shall be composed of the following 
individuals (or designees of the individual):
          (1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
          (2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          (3) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence 
        and Analysis.
          (4) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
        Research.
          (5) Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence 
        community that the Director of National Intelligence determines 
        appropriate.
  (c) Chairperson; Meetings.--
          (1) Chairperson.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
        appoint a senior official within the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence to serve as the chairperson of the task 
        force.
          (2) Meetings.--The task force shall meet regularly but not 
        less frequently than on a quarterly basis.
  (d) Reports.--
          (1) Initial report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, the task force shall submit to 
        the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
        illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence operations 
        directed at the United States. The report shall address the 
        following:
                  (A) The extent of the collection by the intelligence 
                community, from all sources (including the governments 
                of foreign countries), of intelligence and information 
                relating to illicit financing of espionage and foreign 
                influence operations directed at the United States, and 
                any gaps in such collection.
                  (B) Any specific legal, regulatory, policy, or other 
                prohibitions, or financial, human, technical, or other 
                resource limitations or constraints, that have affected 
                the ability of the Director of National Intelligence or 
                other heads of relevant elements of the intelligence 
                community in collecting or analyzing intelligence or 
                information relating to illicit financing of espionage 
                and foreign influence operations directed at the United 
                States.
                  (C) The methods, as of the date of the report, by 
                which hostile governments of foreign countries or 
                foreign organizations, and any groups or persons acting 
                on behalf of or with the support of such governments or 
                organizations, seek to disguise or obscure 
                relationships between such governments, organizations, 
                groups, or persons and United States persons, for the 
                purpose of conducting espionage or foreign influence 
                operations directed at the United States, including by 
                exploiting financial laws, systems, or instruments, of 
                the United States.
                  (D) The existing practices of the intelligence 
                community for ensuring that intelligence and 
                information relating to the illicit financing of 
                espionage and foreign influence operations is analyzed 
                and shared with other elements of the intelligence 
                community, and any recommendations for improving such 
                analysis and sharing.
          (2) Annual update.--Not later than November 1, 2020, and each 
        year thereafter through the date specified in subsection (e), 
        the task force shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees an update on the report under paragraph (1).
          (3) Form.--Each report submitted under this subsection may be 
        submitted in classified form, but if submitted in such form, 
        shall include an unclassified summary.
  (e) Termination.--The task force shall terminate on January 1, 2025.
  (f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
          (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
          (2) The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
          (3) The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

SEC. 704. STUDY ON ROLE OF RETIRED AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN 
                    INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

  (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a 
study on former intelligence personnel providing covered intelligence 
assistance.
  (b) Elements.--The study under subsection (a) shall include the 
following:
          (1) An identification of, and discussion of the effectiveness 
        of, existing laws, policies, procedures, and other measures 
        relevant to the ability of elements of the intelligence 
        community to prevent former intelligence personnel from 
        providing covered intelligence assistance--
                  (A) without proper authorization; or
                  (B) in a manner that would violate legal or policy 
                controls if the personnel performed such assistance 
                while working for the United States Government; and
          (2) Make recommendations for such legislative, regulatory, 
        policy, or other changes as may be necessary to ensure that the 
        United States consistently meets the objectives described in 
        paragraph (1).
  (c) Report and Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees--
          (1) a report on the findings of the Director with respect to 
        each element of the study under subsection (a); and
          (2) a plan to implement any recommendations made by the 
        Director that the Director may implement without changes to 
        Federal law.
  (d) Form.--The report and plan under subsection (c) may be submitted 
in classified form.
  (e) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Covered intelligence assistance.--The term ``covered 
        intelligence assistance'' means assistance--
                  (A) provided by former intelligence personnel 
                directly to, or for the benefit of, the government of a 
                foreign country or indirectly to, or for the benefit 
                of, such a government through a company or other 
                entity; and
                  (B) that relates to intelligence or law enforcement 
                activities of a foreign country, including with respect 
                to operations that involve abuses of human rights, 
                violations of the laws of the United States, or 
                infringements on the privacy rights of United States 
                persons.
          (2) Former intelligence personnel.--The term ``former 
        intelligence personnel'' means retired or former personnel of 
        the intelligence community, including civilian employees of 
        elements of the intelligence community, members of the Armed 
        Forces, and contractors of elements of the intelligence 
        community.

SEC. 705. REPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON FIFTH-
                    GENERATION WIRELESS NETWORK TECHNOLOGY.

  (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on--
          (1) the threat to the national security of the United States 
        posed by the global and regional adoption of fifth-generation 
        wireless network (in this section referred to as ``5G wireless 
        network'') technology built by foreign companies; and
          (2) possible efforts to mitigate the threat.
  (b) Contents.--The report under subsection (a) shall include--
          (1) the timeline and scale of global and regional adoption of 
        foreign 5G wireless network technology;
          (2) the implications of such global and regional adoption on 
        the cyber and espionage threat to the United States, the 
        interests of the United States, and the cyber and collection 
        capabilities of the United States; and
          (3) the effect of possible mitigation efforts, including with 
        respect to--
                  (A) a policy of the United States Government 
                promoting the use of strong, end-to-end encryption for 
                data transmitted over 5G wireless networks;
                  (B) a policy of the United States Government 
                promoting or funding free, open-source implementation 
                of 5G wireless network technology;
                  (C) subsidies or incentives provided by the United 
                States Government that could be used to promote the 
                adoption of secure 5G wireless network technology 
                developed by companies of the United States or 
                companies of allies of the United States; and
                  (D) a strategy by the United States Government to 
                reduce foreign influence and political pressure in 
                international standard-setting bodies.
  (c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 706. ESTABLISHMENT OF 5G PRIZE COMPETITION.

  (a) Prize Competition.--Pursuant to section 24 of the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3719), the Director 
of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the 
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, shall carry out a 
program to award prizes competitively to stimulate research and 
development relevant to 5G technology.
  (b) Prize Amount.--In carrying out the program under subsection (a), 
the Director may award not more than a total of $5,000,000 to one or 
more winners of the prize competition.
  (c) Consultation.--In carrying out the program under subsection (a), 
the Director may consult with the heads of relevant departments and 
agencies of the Federal Government.
  (d) 5G Technology Defined.--In this section, the term ``5G 
technology'' means hardware, software, or other technologies relating 
to fifth-generation wireless networks.

SEC. 707. ESTABLISHMENT OF DEEPFAKES PRIZE COMPETITION.

  (a) Prize Competition.--Pursuant to section 24 of the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3719), the Director 
of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the 
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, shall carry out a 
program to award prizes competitively to stimulate the research, 
development, or commercialization of technologies to automatically 
detect machine-manipulated media.
  (b) Prize Amount.--In carrying out the program under subsection (a), 
the Director may award not more than a total of $5,000,000 to one or 
more winners of the prize competition.
  (c) Consultation.--In carrying out the program under subsection (a), 
the Director may consult with the heads of relevant departments and 
agencies of the Federal Government.
  (d) Machine-manipulated Media Defined.--In this section, the term 
``machine-manipulated media'' means video, image, or audio recordings 
generated or substantially modified using machine-learning techniques 
in order to falsely depict events or to falsely depict the speech or 
conduct of an individual.

 DIVISION B--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019

                   TITLE XXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 2101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  (a) Fiscal Year 2019.--Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated 
for fiscal year 2019 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United 
States Government:
          (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
          (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
          (3) The Department of Defense.
          (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (5) The National Security Agency.
          (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
        and the Department of the Air Force.
          (7) The Coast Guard.
          (8) The Department of State.
          (9) The Department of the Treasury.
          (10) The Department of Energy.
          (11) The Department of Justice.
          (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
          (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
          (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
          (16) The Department of Homeland Security.
  (b) Fiscal Year 2018.--Funds that were appropriated for fiscal year 
2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the elements of the United States set forth in subsection 
(a) are hereby authorized.

SEC. 2102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

  (a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be 
appropriated under section 2101 for the conduct of the intelligence 
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of 
section 2101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
  (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--
          (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations 
        referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the 
        President.
          (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3), 
        the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
        classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection 
        (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the 
        executive branch.
          (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
        disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
        portion of such Schedule except--
                  (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
                Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 
                U.S.C. 3306(a));
                  (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; 
                or
                  (C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 2103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

  (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the 
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2019 the sum of 
$522,424,000.
  (b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to 
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for 
fiscal year 2019 such additional amounts as are specified in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 2102(a).

   TITLE XXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY 
                                 SYSTEM

SEC. 2201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 
2019.

SEC. 2202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) Computation of Annuities.--
          (1) In general.--Section 221 of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended--
                  (A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period 
                at the end and inserting ``, as determined by using the 
                annual rate of basic pay that would be payable for 
                full-time service in that position.'';
                  (B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking ``12-
                month'' and inserting ``2-year'';
                  (C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``one year'' 
                and inserting ``two years'';
                  (D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``one year'' 
                each place such term appears and inserting ``two 
                years'';
                  (E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), 
                and (l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), 
                respectively; and
                  (F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
  ``(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor Annuity by 
Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
          ``(1)  Authority to make designation.--Subject to the rights 
        of former spouses under subsection (b) and section 222, at the 
        time of retirement a married participant found by the Director 
        to be in good health may elect to receive an annuity reduced in 
        accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and designate in writing 
        an individual having an insurable interest in the participant 
        to receive an annuity under the system after the participant's 
        death, except that any such election to provide an insurable 
        interest survivor annuity to the participant's spouse shall 
        only be effective if the participant's spouse waives the 
        spousal right to a survivor annuity under this Act. The amount 
        of the annuity shall be equal to 55 percent of the 
        participant's reduced annuity.
          ``(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity 
        payable to the participant making such election shall be 
        reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection 
        (a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the 
        designated individual is younger than the participant. The 
        total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40 
        percent.
          ``(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity payable 
        to the designated individual shall begin on the day after the 
        retired participant dies and terminate on the last day of the 
        month before the designated individual dies.
          ``(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death of 
        designated individual.--An annuity that is reduced under this 
        subsection shall, effective the first day of the month 
        following the death of the designated individual, be recomputed 
        and paid as if the annuity had not been so reduced.''.
          (2) Conforming amendments.--
                  (A) Central intelligence agency retirement act.--The 
                Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 
                2001 et seq.) is amended--
                          (i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 
                        2052(b)(1)), by striking ``221(h),'' and 
                        inserting ``221(i),''; and
                          (ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 
                        2082(h)(4)), by striking ``221(k)'' and 
                        inserting ``221(l)''.
                  (B) Central intelligence agency act of 1949.--
                Subsection (a) of section 14 of the Central 
                Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is 
                amended by striking ``221(h)(2), 221(i), 221(l),'' and 
                inserting ``221(i)(2), 221(j), 221(m),''.
  (b) Annuities for Former Spouses.--Subparagraph (B) of section 
222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 
2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two 
years''.
  (c) Prior Service Credit.--Subparagraph (A) of section 252(b)(3) of 
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 
2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``October 1, 1990'' both places 
that term appears and inserting ``March 31, 1991''.
  (d) Reemployment Compensation.--Section 273 of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is amended--
          (1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections 
        (c) and (d), respectively; and
          (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
  ``(b) Part-Time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall have the 
authority to reemploy an annuitant on a part-time basis in accordance 
with section 8344(l) of title 5, United States Code.''.
  (e) Effective Date and Application.--The amendments made by 
subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as if enacted 
on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to computations or participants, 
respectively, as of such date.

          TITLE XXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

SEC. 2301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  The authorization of appropriations by this division shall not be 
deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence 
activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the 
laws of the United States.

SEC. 2302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY 
                    LAW.

  Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, 
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased 
by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 2303. MODIFICATION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR SCIENCE, 
                    TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, OR MATHEMATICS POSITIONS 
                    AND ADDITION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR CYBER 
                    POSITIONS.

  Section 113B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3049a) 
is amended--
          (1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:
  ``(a) Special Rates of Pay for Positions Requiring Expertise in 
Science, Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics.--
          ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding part III of title 5, 
        United States Code, the head of each element of the 
        intelligence community may, for 1 or more categories of 
        positions in such element that require expertise in science, 
        technology, engineering, or mathematics--
                  ``(A) establish higher minimum rates of pay; and
                  ``(B) make corresponding increases in all rates of 
                pay of the pay range for each grade or level, subject 
                to subsection (b) or (c), as applicable.
          ``(2) Treatment.--The special rate supplements resulting from 
        the establishment of higher rates under paragraph (1) shall be 
        basic pay for the same or similar purposes as those specified 
        in section 5305(j) of title 5, United States Code.'';
          (2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as 
        subsections (c) through (g), respectively;
          (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
  ``(b) Special Rates of Pay for Cyber Positions.--
          ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (c), the 
        Director of the National Security Agency may establish a 
        special rate of pay--
                  ``(A) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for 
                level II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 
                of title 5, United States Code, if the Director 
                certifies to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
                Intelligence, in consultation with the Under Secretary 
                of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, that the rate 
                of pay is for positions that perform functions that 
                execute the cyber mission of the Agency; or
                  ``(B) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for 
                the Vice President of the United States under section 
                104 of title 3, United States Code, if the Director 
                certifies to the Secretary of Defense, by name, 
                individuals that have advanced skills and competencies 
                and that perform critical functions that execute the 
                cyber mission of the Agency.
          ``(2) Pay limitation.--Employees receiving a special rate 
        under paragraph (1) shall be subject to an aggregate pay 
        limitation that parallels the limitation established in section 
        5307 of title 5, United States Code, except that--
                  ``(A) any allowance, differential, bonus, award, or 
                other similar cash payment in addition to basic pay 
                that is authorized under title 10, United States Code, 
                (or any other applicable law in addition to title 5 of 
                such Code, excluding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
                1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.)) shall also be counted as 
                part of aggregate compensation; and
                  ``(B) aggregate compensation may not exceed the rate 
                established for the Vice President of the United States 
                under section 104 of title 3, United States Code.
          ``(3) Limitation on number of recipients.--The number of 
        individuals who receive basic pay established under paragraph 
        (1)(B) may not exceed 100 at any time.
          ``(4) Limitation on use as comparative reference.--
        Notwithstanding any other provision of law, special rates of 
        pay and the limitation established under paragraph (1)(B) may 
        not be used as comparative references for the purpose of fixing 
        the rates of basic pay or maximum pay limitations of qualified 
        positions under section 1599f of title 10, United States Code, 
        or section 226 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
        147).'';
          (4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
        striking ``A minimum'' and inserting ``Except as provided in 
        subsection (b), a minimum'';
          (5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
        inserting ``or (b)'' after ``by subsection (a)''; and
          (6) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (2)--
                  (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Not later than 90 
                days after the date of the enactment of the 
                Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017'' 
                and inserting ``Not later than 90 days after the date 
                of the enactment of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew 
                Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
                Years 2018 and 2019''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting ``or (b)'' 
                after ``subsection (a)''.

SEC. 2304. MODIFICATION OF APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF 
                    THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3032(a)) is amended by striking ``President'' and inserting 
``Director''.

SEC. 2305. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF PLACEMENT OF 
                    POSITIONS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON THE 
                    EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

  (a) Review.--The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination 
with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, shall conduct 
a review of positions within the intelligence community regarding the 
placement of such positions on the Executive Schedule under subchapter 
II of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code. In carrying out such 
review, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the 
Director of the Office of Personnel Management, shall determine--
          (1) the standards under which such review will be conducted;
          (2) which positions should or should not be on the Executive 
        Schedule; and
          (3) for those positions that should be on the Executive 
        Schedule, the level of the Executive Schedule at which such 
        positions should be placed.
  (b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date on which the 
review under subsection (a) is completed, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, 
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 
Senate, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of 
Representatives an unredacted report describing the standards by which 
the review was conducted and the outcome of the review.

SEC. 2306. SUPPLY CHAIN AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RISK MANAGEMENT TASK 
                    FORCE.

  (a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
          (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
          (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
          (3) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
        Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of 
        the House of Representatives.
  (b) Requirement to Establish.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall establish a Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management 
Task Force to standardize information sharing between the intelligence 
community and the acquisition community of the United States Government 
with respect to the supply chain and counterintelligence risks.
  (c) Members.--The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk 
Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall be 
composed of--
          (1) a representative of the Defense Security Service of the 
        Department of Defense;
          (2) a representative of the General Services Administration;
          (3) a representative of the Office of Federal Procurement 
        Policy of the Office of Management and Budget;
          (4) a representative of the Department of Homeland Security;
          (5) a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
          (6) the Director of the National Counterintelligence and 
        Security Center; and
          (7) any other members the Director of National Intelligence 
        determines appropriate.
  (d) Security Clearances.--Each member of the Supply Chain and 
Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under 
subsection (b) shall have a security clearance at the top secret level 
and be able to access sensitive compartmented information.
  (e) Annual Report.--The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk 
Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees an annual report that 
describes the activities of the Task Force during the previous year, 
including identification of the supply chain and counterintelligence 
risks shared with the acquisition community of the United States 
Government by the intelligence community.

SEC. 2307. CONSIDERATION OF ADVERSARIAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 
                    CYBERSECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE WHEN SHARING 
                    INTELLIGENCE WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND ENTITIES.

  Whenever the head of an element of the intelligence community enters 
into an intelligence sharing agreement with a foreign government or any 
other foreign entity, the head of the element shall consider the 
pervasiveness of telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure, 
equipment, and services provided by adversaries of the United States, 
particularly China and Russia, or entities of such adversaries in the 
country or region of the foreign government or other foreign entity 
entering into the agreement.

SEC. 2308. CYBER PROTECTION SUPPORT FOR THE PERSONNEL OF THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN POSITIONS HIGHLY 
                    VULNERABLE TO CYBER ATTACK.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Personal accounts.--The term ``personal accounts'' means 
        accounts for online and telecommunications services, including 
        telephone, residential Internet access, email, text and 
        multimedia messaging, cloud computing, social media, health 
        care, and financial services, used by personnel of the 
        intelligence community outside of the scope of their employment 
        with elements of the intelligence community.
          (2) Personal technology devices.--The term ``personal 
        technology devices'' means technology devices used by personnel 
        of the intelligence community outside of the scope of their 
        employment with elements of the intelligence community, 
        including networks to which such devices connect.
  (b) Authority to Provide Cyber Protection Support.--
          (1) In general.--Subject to a determination by the Director 
        of National Intelligence, the Director may provide cyber 
        protection support for the personal technology devices and 
        personal accounts of the personnel described in paragraph (2).
          (2) At-risk personnel.--The personnel described in this 
        paragraph are personnel of the intelligence community--
                  (A) who the Director determines to be highly 
                vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information 
                collection activities because of the positions occupied 
                by such personnel in the intelligence community; and
                  (B) whose personal technology devices or personal 
                accounts are highly vulnerable to cyber attacks and 
                hostile information collection activities.
  (c) Nature of Cyber Protection Support.--Subject to the availability 
of resources, the cyber protection support provided to personnel under 
subsection (b) may include training, advice, assistance, and other 
services relating to cyber attacks and hostile information collection 
activities.
  (d) Limitation on Support.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed--
          (1) to encourage personnel of the intelligence community to 
        use personal technology devices for official business; or
          (2) to authorize cyber protection support for senior 
        intelligence community personnel using personal devices, 
        networks, and personal accounts in an official capacity.
  (e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on the provision of cyber protection 
support under subsection (b). The report shall include--
          (1) a description of the methodology used to make the 
        determination under subsection (b)(2); and
          (2) guidance for the use of cyber protection support and 
        tracking of support requests for personnel receiving cyber 
        protection support under subsection (b).

SEC. 2309. ELIMINATION OF SUNSET OF AUTHORITY RELATING TO MANAGEMENT OF 
                    SUPPLY-CHAIN RISK.

  Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2012 (Public Law 112-87; 50 U.S.C. 3329 note) is amended by striking 
subsection (g).

SEC. 2310. LIMITATIONS ON DETERMINATIONS REGARDING CERTAIN SECURITY 
                    CLASSIFICATIONS.

  (a) Prohibition.--An officer of an element of the intelligence 
community who has been nominated by the President for a position that 
requires the advice and consent of the Senate may not make a 
classification decision with respect to information related to such 
officer's nomination.
  (b) Classification Determinations.--
          (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), in a 
        case in which an officer described in subsection (a) has been 
        nominated as described in such subsection and classification 
        authority rests with the officer or another officer who reports 
        directly to such officer, a classification decision with 
        respect to information relating to the officer shall be made by 
        the Director of National Intelligence.
          (2) Nominations of director of national intelligence.--In a 
        case described in paragraph (1) in which the officer nominated 
        is the Director of National Intelligence, the classification 
        decision shall be made by the Principal Deputy Director of 
        National Intelligence.
  (c) Reports.--Whenever the Director or the Principal Deputy Director 
makes a decision under subsection (b), the Director or the Principal 
Deputy Director, as the case may be, shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report detailing the reasons for the 
decision.

SEC. 2311. JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.

  (a) Meetings.--Section 101A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3022(d)) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``regular''; and
          (2) by inserting ``as the Director considers appropriate'' 
        after ``Council''.
  (b) Report on Function and Utility of the Joint Intelligence 
Community Council.--
          (1) In general.--No later than 180 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
        in coordination with the Executive Office of the President and 
        members of the Joint Intelligence Community Council, shall 
        submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on 
        the function and utility of the Joint Intelligence Community 
        Council.
          (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                  (A) The number of physical or virtual meetings held 
                by the Council per year since the Council's inception.
                  (B) A description of the effect and accomplishments 
                of the Council.
                  (C) An explanation of the unique role of the Council 
                relative to other entities, including with respect to 
                the National Security Council and the Executive 
                Committee of the intelligence community.
                  (D) Recommendations for the future role and operation 
                of the Council.
                  (E) Such other matters relating to the function and 
                utility of the Council as the Director considers 
                appropriate.
          (3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 2312. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENT.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Core service.--The term ``core service'' means a 
        capability that is available to multiple elements of the 
        intelligence community and required for consistent operation of 
        the intelligence community information technology environment.
          (2) Intelligence community information technology 
        environment.--The term ``intelligence community information 
        technology environment'' means all of the information 
        technology services across the intelligence community, 
        including the data sharing and protection environment across 
        multiple classification domains.
  (b) Roles and Responsibilities.--
          (1) Director of national intelligence.--The Director of 
        National Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating the 
        performance by elements of the intelligence community of the 
        intelligence community information technology environment, 
        including each of the following:
                  (A) Ensuring compliance with all applicable 
                environment rules and regulations of such environment.
                  (B) Ensuring measurable performance goals exist for 
                such environment.
                  (C) Documenting standards and practices of such 
                environment.
                  (D) Acting as an arbiter among elements of the 
                intelligence community related to any disagreements 
                arising out of the implementation of such environment.
                  (E) Delegating responsibilities to the elements of 
                the intelligence community and carrying out such other 
                responsibilities as are necessary for the effective 
                implementation of such environment.
          (2) Core service providers.--Providers of core services shall 
        be responsible for--
                  (A) providing core services, in coordination with the 
                Director of National Intelligence; and
                  (B) providing the Director with information requested 
                and required to fulfill the responsibilities of the 
                Director under paragraph (1).
          (3) Use of core services.--
                  (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph 
                (B), each element of the intelligence community shall 
                use core services when such services are available.
                  (B) Exception.--The Director of National Intelligence 
                may provide for a written exception to the requirement 
                under subparagraph (A) if the Director determines there 
                is a compelling financial or mission need for such 
                exception.
  (c) Management Accountability.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall designate and maintain one or more accountable executives of the 
intelligence community information technology environment to be 
responsible for--
          (1) management, financial control, and integration of such 
        environment;
          (2) overseeing the performance of each core service, 
        including establishing measurable service requirements and 
        schedules;
          (3) to the degree feasible, ensuring testing of each core 
        service of such environment, including testing by the intended 
        users, to evaluate performance against measurable service 
        requirements and to ensure the capability meets user 
        requirements; and
          (4) coordinate transition or restructuring efforts of such 
        environment, including phaseout of legacy systems.
  (d) Security Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
develop and maintain a security plan for the intelligence community 
information technology environment.
  (e) Long-term Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and during each of the second and fourth fiscal 
quarters thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
to the congressional intelligence committees a long-term roadmap that 
shall include each of the following:
          (1) A description of the minimum required and desired core 
        service requirements, including--
                  (A) key performance parameters; and
                  (B) an assessment of current, measured performance.
          (2) implementation milestones for the intelligence community 
        information technology environment, including each of the 
        following:
                  (A) A schedule for expected deliveries of core 
                service capabilities during each of the following 
                phases:
                          (i) Concept refinement and technology 
                        maturity demonstration.
                          (ii) Development, integration, and 
                        demonstration.
                          (iii) Production, deployment, and 
                        sustainment.
                          (iv) System retirement.
                  (B) Dependencies of such core service capabilities.
                  (C) Plans for the transition or restructuring 
                necessary to incorporate core service capabilities.
                  (D) A description of any legacy systems and 
                discontinued capabilities to be phased out.
          (3) Such other matters as the Director determines 
        appropriate.
  (f) Business Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and during each of the second and fourth fiscal 
quarters thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
to the congressional intelligence committees a business plan that 
includes each of the following:
          (1) A systematic approach to identify core service funding 
        requests for the intelligence community information technology 
        environment within the proposed budget, including multiyear 
        plans to implement the long-term roadmap required by subsection 
        (e).
          (2) A uniform approach by which each element of the 
        intelligence community shall identify the cost of legacy 
        information technology or alternative capabilities where 
        services of the intelligence community information technology 
        environment will also be available.
          (3) A uniform effort by which each element of the 
        intelligence community shall identify transition and 
        restructuring costs for new, existing, and retiring services of 
        the intelligence community information technology environment, 
        as well as services of such environment that have changed 
        designations as a core service.
  (g) Quarterly Presentations.--Beginning not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees 
quarterly updates regarding ongoing implementation of the intelligence 
community information technology environment as compared to the 
requirements in the most recently submitted security plan required by 
subsection (d), long-term roadmap required by subsection (e), and 
business plan required by subsection (f).
  (h) Additional Notifications.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall provide timely notification to the congressional intelligence 
committees regarding any policy changes related to or affecting the 
intelligence community information technology environment, new 
initiatives or strategies related to or impacting such environment, and 
changes or deficiencies in the execution of the security plan required 
by subsection (d), long-term roadmap required by subsection (e), and 
business plan required by subsection (f).
  (i) Sunset.--The section shall have no effect on or after September 
30, 2024.

SEC. 2313. REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE MOBILE VOICE SOLUTION FOR 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and 
the Director of the National Security Agency, shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a classified report on the 
feasibility, desirability, cost, and required schedule associated with 
the implementation of a secure mobile voice solution for the 
intelligence community.
  (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include, 
at a minimum, the following:
          (1) The benefits and disadvantages of a secure mobile voice 
        solution.
          (2) Whether the intelligence community could leverage 
        commercially available technology for classified voice 
        communications that operates on commercial mobile networks in a 
        secure manner and identifying the accompanying security risks 
        to such networks.
          (3) A description of any policies or community guidance that 
        would be necessary to govern the potential solution, such as a 
        process for determining the appropriate use of a secure mobile 
        telephone and any limitations associated with such use.

SEC. 2314. POLICY ON MINIMUM INSIDER THREAT STANDARDS.

  (a) Policy Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
establish a policy for minimum insider threat standards that is 
consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum 
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs.
  (b) Implementation.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence 
community shall implement the policy established under subsection (a).

SEC. 2315. SUBMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICIES.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Electronic repository.--The term ``electronic 
        repository'' means the electronic distribution mechanism, in 
        use as of the date of the enactment of this Act, or any 
        successor electronic distribution mechanism, by which the 
        Director of National Intelligence submits to the congressional 
        intelligence committees information.
          (2) Policy.--The term ``policy'', with respect to the 
        intelligence community, includes unclassified or classified--
                  (A) directives, policy guidance, and policy memoranda 
                of the intelligence community;
                  (B) executive correspondence of the Director of 
                National Intelligence; and
                  (C) any equivalent successor policy instruments.
  (b) Submission of Policies.--
          (1) Current policy.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
        Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees using the electronic repository all nonpublicly 
        available policies issued by the Director of National 
        Intelligence for the intelligence community that are in effect 
        as of the date of the submission.
          (2) Continuous updates.--Not later than 15 days after the 
        date on which the Director of National Intelligence issues, 
        modifies, or rescinds a policy of the intelligence community, 
        the Director shall--
                  (A) notify the congressional intelligence committees 
                of such addition, modification, or removal; and
                  (B) update the electronic repository with respect to 
                such addition, modification, or removal.

SEC. 2316. EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RECRUITMENT EFFORTS.

  In order to further increase the diversity of the intelligence 
community workforce, not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, 
shall create, implement, and submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a written plan to ensure that rural and underrepresented 
regions are more fully and consistently represented in such elements' 
employment recruitment efforts. Upon receipt of the plan, the 
congressional committees shall have 60 days to submit comments to the 
Director of National Intelligence before such plan shall be 
implemented.

 TITLE XXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 2401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF 
                    THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE.

  Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``such personnel of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of 
National Intelligence may designate;'' and inserting ``current and 
former personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
and their immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence 
may designate;''.

SEC. 2402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION SHARING 
                    ENVIRONMENT.

  (a) Information Sharing Environment.--Section 1016(b) of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 
485(b)) is amended--
          (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``President'' and inserting 
        ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
          (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``President'' both places 
        that term appears and inserting ``Director of National 
        Intelligence''.
  (b) Program Manager.--Section 1016(f)(1) of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f)(1)) is amended by 
striking ``The individual designated as the program manager shall serve 
as program manager until removed from service or replaced by the 
President (at the President's sole discretion).'' and inserting 
``Beginning on the date of the enactment of the Damon Paul Nelson and 
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
2018, 2019 and 2020, each individual designated as the program manager 
shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.''.

SEC. 2403. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

  Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at 
the end the following:
  ``Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center.''.

SEC. 2404. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  Section 103I(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3034(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: 
``The Chief Financial Officer shall report directly to the Director of 
National Intelligence.''.

SEC. 2405. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3032(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: 
``The Chief Information Officer shall report directly to the Director 
of National Intelligence.''.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 2411. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SUBSISTENCE FOR PERSONNEL 
                    ASSIGNED TO AUSTERE LOCATIONS.

  Subsection (a) of section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506) is amended--
          (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a).,'' 
        and inserting ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a),'';
          (2) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the end;
          (3) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
          (4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph (8):
          ``(8) Upon the approval of the Director, provide, during any 
        fiscal year, with or without reimbursement, subsistence to any 
        personnel assigned to an overseas location designated by the 
        Agency as an austere location.''.

SEC. 2412. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN MONTHLY WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
                    PAYMENTS AND OTHER PAYMENTS FOR CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.

  (a) In General.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 19 the 
following new section:

``SEC. 19A. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY REASON OF 
                    WAR, INSURGENCY, HOSTILE ACT, OR TERRORIST 
                    ACTIVITIES.

  ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Covered dependent.--The term `covered dependent' means 
        a family member (as defined by the Director) of a covered 
        employee who, on or after September 11, 2001--
                  ``(A) accompanies the covered employee to an assigned 
                duty station in a foreign country; and
                  ``(B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying 
                injury.
          ``(2) Covered employee.--The term `covered employee' means an 
        officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency who, on 
        or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured by reason of a 
        qualifying injury.
          ``(3) Covered individual.--The term `covered individual' 
        means an individual who--
                  ``(A)(i) is detailed to the Central Intelligence 
                Agency from other agencies of the United States 
                Government or from the Armed Forces; or
                  ``(ii) is affiliated with the Central Intelligence 
                Agency, as determined by the Director; and
                  ``(B) who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes 
                injured by reason of a qualifying injury.
          ``(4) Qualifying injury.--The term `qualifying injury' means 
        the following:
                  ``(A) With respect to a covered dependent, an injury 
                incurred--
                          ``(i) during a period in which the covered 
                        dependent is accompanying the covered employee 
                        to an assigned duty station in a foreign 
                        country;
                          ``(ii) in connection with war, insurgency, 
                        hostile act, terrorist activity, or other 
                        incident designated by the Director; and
                          ``(iii) that was not the result of the 
                        willful misconduct of the covered dependent.
                  ``(B) With respect to a covered employee or a covered 
                individual, an injury incurred--
                          ``(i) during a period of assignment to a duty 
                        station in a foreign country;
                          ``(ii) in connection with a war, insurgency, 
                        hostile act, terrorist activity, or other 
                        incident designated by the Director; and
                          ``(iii) that was not the result of the 
                        willful misconduct of the covered employee or 
                        the covered individual.
  ``(b) Adjustment of Compensation for Certain Injuries.--
          ``(1) Increase.--The Director may increase the amount of 
        monthly compensation paid to a covered employee under section 
        8105 of title 5, United States Code. Subject to paragraph (2), 
        the Director may determine the amount of each such increase by 
        taking into account--
                  ``(A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
                  ``(B) the circumstances by which the covered employee 
                became injured; and
                  ``(C) the seniority of the covered employee.
          ``(2) Maximum.--Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5, United 
        States Code, the total amount of monthly compensation increased 
        under paragraph (1) may not exceed the monthly pay of the 
        maximum rate of basic pay for GS-15 of the General Schedule 
        under section 5332 of such title.
  ``(c) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--The Director may pay 
the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a covered employee, a 
covered individual, or a covered dependent, or may reimburse a covered 
employee, a covered individual, or a covered dependent for such costs, 
that are not otherwise covered by chapter 81 of title 5, United States 
Code, or other provision of Federal law.
  ``(d) Treatment of Amounts.--For purposes of section 104 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, amounts paid pursuant to this section 
shall be treated as amounts paid under chapter 81 of title 5, United 
States Code.''.
  (b) Regulations.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
shall--
          (1) prescribe regulations ensuring the fair and equitable 
        implementation of section 19A of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a); and
          (2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees such 
        regulations.
  (c) Application.--Section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
of 1949, as added by subsection (a), shall apply with respect to--
          (1) payments made to covered employees (as defined in such 
        section) under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code, 
        beginning on or after the date of the enactment of this Act; 
        and
          (2) treatment described in subsection (b) of such section 19A 
        occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 2413. EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICE JURISDICTION OF THE 
                    CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  Subsection (a)(1) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency 
Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)) is amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``500 feet;'' and 
        inserting ``500 yards;''; and
          (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``500 feet.'' and 
        inserting ``500 yards.''.

SEC. 2414. REPEAL OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT FOR 
                    CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) Repeal of Foreign Language Proficiency Requirement.--Section 104A 
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3036) is amended by 
striking subsection (g).
  (b) Conforming Repeal of Report Requirement.--Section 611 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-
487) is amended by striking subsection (c).

     Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of 
                          Department of Energy

SEC. 2421. CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICES OF 
                    INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

  (a) In General.--Section 215 of the Department of Energy Organization 
Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended to read as follows:
            ``office of intelligence and counterintelligence
  ``Sec. 215.  (a) Definitions.--In this section, the terms 
`intelligence community' and `National Intelligence Program' have the 
meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
  ``(b) In General.--There is in the Department an Office of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Such office shall be under the 
National Intelligence Program.
  ``(c) Director.--(1) The head of the Office shall be the Director of 
the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, who shall be an 
employee in the Senior Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence 
Service, the Senior National Intelligence Service, or any other Service 
that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National 
Intelligence, considers appropriate. The Director of the Office shall 
report directly to the Secretary.
  ``(2) The Secretary shall select an individual to serve as the 
Director from among individuals who have substantial expertise in 
matters relating to the intelligence community, including foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence.
  ``(d) Duties.--(1) Subject to the authority, direction, and control 
of the Secretary, the Director shall perform such duties and exercise 
such powers as the Secretary may prescribe.
  ``(2) The Director shall be responsible for establishing policy for 
intelligence and counterintelligence programs and activities at the 
Department.''.
  (b) Conforming Repeal.--Section 216 of the Department of Energy 
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144c) is hereby repealed.
  (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the beginning of 
the Department of Energy Organization Act is amended by striking the 
items relating to sections 215 and 216 and inserting the following new 
item:

``Sec. 215. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.''.

SEC. 2422. ESTABLISHMENT OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY CENTER.

  Section 215 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 
7144b), as amended by section 2421, is further amended by adding at the 
end the following:
  ``(e) Energy Infrastructure Security Center.--(1)(A) The President 
shall establish an Energy Infrastructure Security Center, taking into 
account all appropriate government tools to analyze and disseminate 
intelligence relating to the security of the energy infrastructure of 
the United States.
  ``(B) The Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence shall 
appoint the head of the Energy Infrastructure Security Center.
  ``(C) The Energy Infrastructure Security Center shall be located 
within the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
  ``(2) In establishing the Energy Infrastructure Security Center, the 
Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence shall 
address the following missions and objectives to coordinate and 
disseminate intelligence relating to the security of the energy 
infrastructure of the United States:
          ``(A) Establishing a primary organization within the United 
        States Government for analyzing and integrating all 
        intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States 
        pertaining to the security of the energy infrastructure of the 
        United States.
          ``(B) Ensuring that appropriate departments and agencies have 
        full access to and receive intelligence support needed to 
        execute the plans or activities of the agencies, and perform 
        independent, alternative analyses.
          ``(C) Establishing a central repository on known and 
        suspected foreign threats to the energy infrastructure of the 
        United States, including with respect to any individuals, 
        groups, or entities engaged in activities targeting such 
        infrastructure, and the goals, strategies, capabilities, and 
        networks of such individuals, groups, or entities.
          ``(D) Disseminating intelligence information relating to the 
        security of the energy infrastructure of the United States, 
        including threats and analyses, to the President, to the 
        appropriate departments and agencies, and to the appropriate 
        committees of Congress.
  ``(3) The President may waive the requirements of this subsection, 
and any parts thereof, if the President determines that such 
requirements do not materially improve the ability of the United States 
Government to prevent and halt attacks against the energy 
infrastructure of the United States. Such waiver shall be made in 
writing to Congress and shall include a description of how the missions 
and objectives in paragraph (2) are being met.
  ``(4) If the President decides not to exercise the waiver authority 
granted by paragraph (3), the President shall submit to Congress from 
time to time updates and plans regarding the establishment of an Energy 
Infrastructure Security Center.''.

SEC. 2423. REPEAL OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE 
                    COMMITTEE AND BUDGET REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

  Section 214 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 
7144a) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``(a)''; and
          (2) by striking subsections (b) and (c).

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

SEC. 2431. PLAN FOR DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COMPONENT OF 
                    DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE AS AN ELEMENT OF 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of National Intelligence and Under Secretary of Defense 
for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center, shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services 
of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives a plan to designate the counterintelligence component 
of the Defense Security Service of the Department of Defense as an 
element of the intelligence community by not later than January 1, 
2020. Such plan shall--
          (1) address the implications of such designation on the 
        authorities, governance, personnel, resources, information 
        technology, collection, analytic products, information sharing, 
        and business processes of the Defense Security Service and the 
        intelligence community; and
          (2) not address the personnel security functions of the 
        Defense Security Service.

SEC. 2432. NOTICE NOT REQUIRED FOR PRIVATE ENTITIES.

  Section 3553 of title 44, United States Code, is amended--
          (1) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k); and
          (2) by inserting after subsection (i) the following:
  ``(j) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to require the Secretary to provide notice to any private 
entity before the Secretary issues a binding operational directive 
under subsection (b)(2).''.

SEC. 2433. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADVISORY BOARD FOR NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 
                    OFFICE.

  (a) Establishment.--Section 106A of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3041a) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsection:
  ``(d) Advisory Board.--
          ``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the National 
        Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in this section 
        referred to as the `Board').
          ``(2) Duties.--The Board shall--
                  ``(A) study matters relating to the mission of the 
                National Reconnaissance Office, including with respect 
                to promoting innovation, competition, and resilience in 
                space, overhead reconnaissance, acquisition, and other 
                matters; and
                  ``(B) advise and report directly to the Director with 
                respect to such matters.
          ``(3) Members.--
                  ``(A) Number and appointment.--
                          ``(i) In general.--The Board shall be 
                        composed of 5 members appointed by the Director 
                        from among individuals with demonstrated 
                        academic, government, business, or other 
                        expertise relevant to the mission and functions 
                        of the National Reconnaissance Office.
                          ``(ii) Notification.--Not later than 30 days 
                        after the date on which the Director appoints a 
                        member to the Board, the Director shall notify 
                        the congressional intelligence committees and 
                        the congressional defense committees (as 
                        defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United 
                        States Code) of such appointment.
                  ``(B) Terms.--Each member shall be appointed for a 
                term of 2 years. Except as provided by subparagraph 
                (C), a member may not serve more than 3 terms.
                  ``(C) Vacancy.--Any member appointed to fill a 
                vacancy occurring before the expiration of the term for 
                which the member's predecessor was appointed shall be 
                appointed only for the remainder of that term. A member 
                may serve after the expiration of that member's term 
                until a successor has taken office.
                  ``(D) Chair.--The Board shall have a Chair, who shall 
                be appointed by the Director from among the members.
                  ``(E) Travel expenses.--Each member shall receive 
                travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 
                subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions 
                under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United 
                States Code.
                  ``(F) Executive secretary.--The Director may appoint 
                an executive secretary, who shall be an employee of the 
                National Reconnaissance Office, to support the Board.
          ``(4) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than 
        quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of the 
        Director.
          ``(5) Reports.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the 
        Board shall submit to the Director and to the congressional 
        intelligence committees a report on the activities and 
        significant findings of the Board during the preceding year.
          ``(6) Nonapplicability of certain requirements.--The Federal 
        Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the 
        Board.
          ``(7) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the date 
        that is 3 years after the date of the first meeting of the 
        Board.''.
  (b) Initial Appointments.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Reconnaissance 
Office shall appoint the initial 5 members to the advisory board under 
subsection (d) of section 106A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3041a), as added by subsection (a).

SEC. 2434. COLLOCATION OF CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
                    PERSONNEL AT FIELD LOCATIONS.

  (a) Identification of Opportunities for Collocation.--Not later than 
60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under 
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall 
identify, in consultation with the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, the Administrator of the Transportation Security 
Administration, the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, and the heads of such other elements of the Department of 
Homeland Security as the Under Secretary considers appropriate, 
opportunities for collocation of officers of the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis in the field outside of the greater Washington, District 
of Columbia, area in order to support operational units from U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security 
Administration, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other 
elements of the Department of Homeland Security.
  (b) Plan for Collocation.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report that includes a plan for 
collocation as described in subsection (a).

                      TITLE XXV--ELECTION MATTERS

SEC. 2501. REPORT ON CYBER ATTACKS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST 
                    UNITED STATES ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                  (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
                  (B) the Committee on Homeland Security and 
                Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
                  (C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House 
                of Representatives;
                  (D) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
                and
                  (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                Representatives.
          (2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional 
        leadership'' includes the following:
                  (A) The majority leader of the Senate.
                  (B) The minority leader of the Senate.
                  (C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
                  (D) The minority leader of the House of 
                Representatives.
          (3) State.--The term ``State'' means any State of the United 
        States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
        Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.
  (b) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to congressional leadership and 
the appropriate congressional committees a report on cyber attacks and 
attempted cyber attacks by foreign governments on United States 
election infrastructure in States and localities in connection with the 
2016 Presidential election in the United States and such cyber attacks 
or attempted cyber attacks as the Under Secretary anticipates against 
such infrastructure. Such report shall identify the States and 
localities affected and shall include cyber attacks and attempted cyber 
attacks against voter registration databases, voting machines, voting-
related computer networks, and the networks of Secretaries of State and 
other election officials of the various States.
  (c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 2502. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S POSTURE TO COLLECT 
                    AGAINST AND ANALYZE RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE 
                    THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

  (a) Review Required.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
          (1) complete an after action review of the posture of the 
        intelligence community to collect against and analyze efforts 
        of the Government of Russia to interfere in the 2016 
        Presidential election in the United States; and
          (2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
        report on the findings of the Director with respect to such 
        review.
  (b) Elements.--The review required by subsection (a) shall include, 
with respect to the posture and efforts described in paragraph (1) of 
such subsection, the following:
          (1) An assessment of whether the resources of the 
        intelligence community were properly aligned to detect and 
        respond to the efforts described in subsection (a)(1).
          (2) An assessment of the information sharing that occurred 
        within elements of the intelligence community.
          (3) An assessment of the information sharing that occurred 
        between elements of the intelligence community.
          (4) An assessment of applicable authorities necessary to 
        collect on any such efforts and any deficiencies in those 
        authorities.
          (5) A review of the use of open source material to inform 
        analysis and warning of such efforts.
          (6) A review of the use of alternative and predictive 
        analysis.
  (c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a)(2) shall 
be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees in a 
classified form.

SEC. 2503. ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREATS TO FEDERAL 
                    ELECTIONS.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                  (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
                  (B) the Committee on Homeland Security and 
                Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
                  (C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House 
                of Representatives.
          (2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional 
        leadership'' includes the following:
                  (A) The majority leader of the Senate.
                  (B) The minority leader of the Senate.
                  (C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
                  (D) The minority leader of the House of 
                Representatives.
          (3) Security vulnerability.--The term ``security 
        vulnerability'' has the meaning given such term in section 102 
        of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 
        1501).
  (b) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the 
heads of other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall--
          (1) commence not later than 1 year before any regularly 
        scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, 
        and complete not later than 180 days before such election, an 
        assessment of security vulnerabilities of State election 
        systems; and
          (2) not later than 180 days before any regularly scheduled 
        Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, submit a 
        report on such security vulnerabilities and an assessment of 
        foreign intelligence threats to the election to--
                  (A) congressional leadership; and
                  (B) the appropriate congressional committees.
  (c) Update.--Not later than 90 days before any regularly scheduled 
Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall--
          (1) update the assessment of foreign intelligence threats to 
        that election; and
          (2) submit the updated assessment to--
                  (A) congressional leadership; and
                  (B) the appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 2504. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING RUSSIAN CYBER THREATS TO UNITED 
                    STATES ELECTIONS.

  (a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
          (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
          (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
          (3) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
          (4) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
          (5) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives.
  (b) Requirement for a Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
of Defense, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall develop a whole-
of-government strategy for countering the threat of Russian cyber 
attacks and attempted cyber attacks against electoral systems and 
processes in the United States, including Federal, State, and local 
election systems, voter registration databases, voting tabulation 
equipment, and equipment and processes for the secure transmission of 
election results.
  (c) Elements of the Strategy.--The strategy required by subsection 
(b) shall include the following elements:
          (1) A whole-of-government approach to protecting United 
        States electoral systems and processes that includes the 
        agencies and departments indicated in subsection (b) as well as 
        any other agencies and departments of the United States, as 
        determined appropriate by the Director of National Intelligence 
        and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
          (2) Input solicited from Secretaries of State of the various 
        States and the chief election officials of the States.
          (3) Technical security measures, including auditable paper 
        trails for voting machines, securing wireless and Internet 
        connections, and other technical safeguards.
          (4) Detection of cyber threats, including attacks and 
        attempted attacks by Russian government or nongovernment cyber 
        threat actors.
          (5) Improvements in the identification and attribution of 
        Russian government or nongovernment cyber threat actors.
          (6) Deterrence, including actions and measures that could or 
        should be undertaken against or communicated to the Government 
        of Russia or other entities to deter attacks against, or 
        interference with, United States election systems and 
        processes.
          (7) Improvements in Federal Government communications with 
        State and local election officials.
          (8) Public education and communication efforts.
          (9) Benchmarks and milestones to enable the measurement of 
        concrete steps taken and progress made in the implementation of 
        the strategy.
  (d) Congressional Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and 
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly brief the appropriate 
congressional committees on the strategy developed under subsection 
(b).

SEC. 2505. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS 
                    DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA.

  (a) Russian Influence Campaign Defined.--In this section, the term 
``Russian influence campaign'' means any effort, covert or overt, and 
by any means, attributable to the Russian Federation directed at an 
election, referendum, or similar process in a country other than the 
Russian Federation or the United States.
  (b) Assessment Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing 
an analytical assessment of the most significant Russian influence 
campaigns, if any, conducted during the 3-year period preceding the 
date of the enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant 
current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any. Such 
assessment shall include--
          (1) a summary of such significant Russian influence 
        campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by which 
        such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or likely 
        will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific goal of 
        each such campaign;
          (2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such 
        Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the 
        elections or referenda;
          (3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the 
        intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of assisting 
        the government of such foreign state in defending against or 
        responding to such Russian influence campaigns; and
          (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and 
        responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
  (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) may be submitted in 
classified form, but if so submitted, shall contain an unclassified 
summary.

SEC. 2506. INFORMATION SHARING WITH STATE ELECTION OFFICIALS.

  (a) State Defined.--In this section, the term ``State'' means any 
State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.
  (b) Security Clearances.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
        shall support the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
        Intelligence and Analysis, and any other official of the 
        Department of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security, in sponsoring a security clearance up to the 
        top secret level for each eligible chief election official of a 
        State or the District of Columbia, and additional eligible 
        designees of such election official as appropriate, at the time 
        that such election official assumes such position.
          (2) Interim clearances.--Consistent with applicable policies 
        and directives, the Director of National Intelligence may issue 
        interim clearances, for a period to be determined by the 
        Director, to a chief election official as described in 
        paragraph (1) and up to 1 designee of such official under such 
        paragraph.
  (c) Information Sharing.--
          (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
        assist the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
        Intelligence and Analysis and the Under Secretary responsible 
        for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, 
        cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department (as 
        specified in section 103(a)(1)(H) of the Homeland Security Act 
        of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)(1)(H))) with sharing any appropriate 
        classified information related to threats to election systems 
        and to the integrity of the election process with chief 
        election officials and such designees who have received a 
        security clearance under subsection (b).
          (2) Coordination.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
        for Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with the 
        Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary 
        responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, 
        cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department (as 
        specified in section 103(a)(1)(H) of the Homeland Security Act 
        of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)(1)(H))) to facilitate the sharing of 
        information to the affected Secretaries of State or States.

SEC. 2507. NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER INTRUSIONS AND 
                    ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT ELECTIONS FOR 
                    FEDERAL OFFICES.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Active measures campaign.--The term ``active measures 
        campaign'' means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence 
        operation.
          (2) Candidate, election, and political party.--The terms 
        ``candidate'', ``election'', and ``political party'' have the 
        meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal 
        Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
          (3) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional 
        leadership'' includes the following:
                  (A) The majority leader of the Senate.
                  (B) The minority leader of the Senate.
                  (C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
                  (D) The minority leader of the House of 
                Representatives.
          (4) Cyber intrusion.--The term ``cyber intrusion'' means an 
        electronic occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, 
        without lawful authority, electronic election infrastructure, 
        or the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of 
        information within such infrastructure.
          (5) Electronic election infrastructure.--The term 
        ``electronic election infrastructure'' means an electronic 
        information system of any of the following that is related to 
        an election for Federal office:
                  (A) The Federal Government.
                  (B) A State or local government.
                  (C) A political party.
                  (D) The election campaign of a candidate.
          (6) Federal office.--The term ``Federal office'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 301 of the Federal Election 
        Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
          (7) High confidence.--The term ``high confidence'', with 
        respect to a determination, means that the determination is 
        based on high-quality information from multiple sources.
          (8) Moderate confidence.--The term ``moderate confidence'', 
        with respect to a determination, means that a determination is 
        credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or 
        corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of 
        confidence.
          (9) Other appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``other appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                  (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
                Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the 
                Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
                  (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
                Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations 
                of the House of Representatives.
  (b) Determinations of Significant Foreign Cyber Intrusions and Active 
Measures Campaigns.--The Director of National Intelligence, the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security shall jointly carry out subsection (c) if such 
Directors and the Secretary jointly determine--
          (1) that on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, a 
        significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign 
        intended to influence an upcoming election for any Federal 
        office has occurred or is occurring; and
          (2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion or 
        campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a foreign 
        nonstate person, group, or other entity.
  (c) Briefing.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 14 days after making a 
        determination under subsection (b), the Director of National 
        Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
        jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership, the 
        congressional intelligence committees and, consistent with the 
        protection of sources and methods, the other appropriate 
        congressional committees. The briefing shall be classified and 
        address, at a minimum, the following:
                  (A) A description of the significant foreign cyber 
                intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may 
                be, covered by the determination.
                  (B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign 
                nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such 
                intrusion or campaign has been attributed.
                  (C) The desirability and feasibility of the public 
                release of information about the cyber intrusion or 
                active measures campaign.
                  (D) Any other information such Directors and the 
                Secretary jointly determine appropriate.
          (2) Electronic election infrastructure briefings.--With 
        respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a 
        determination under subsection (b), the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security, in consultation with the Director of National 
        Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any 
        electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such 
        intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that 
        may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be 
        classified and made available only to individuals with 
        appropriate security clearances.
          (3) Protection of sources and methods.--This subsection shall 
        be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the 
        protection of sources and methods.

SEC. 2508. DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO LEAD ELECTION 
                    SECURITY MATTERS.

  (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
designate a national counterintelligence officer within the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and coordinate 
counterintelligence matters relating to election security.
  (b) Additional Responsibilities.--The person designated under 
subsection (a) shall also lead, manage, and coordinate 
counterintelligence matters relating to risks posed by interference 
from foreign powers (as defined in section 101 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801)) to the 
following:
          (1) The Federal Government election security supply chain.
          (2) Election voting systems and software.
          (3) Voter registration databases.
          (4) Critical infrastructure related to elections.
          (5) Such other Government goods and services as the Director 
        of National Intelligence considers appropriate.

                    TITLE XXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES

SEC. 2601. DEFINITIONS.

  In this title:
          (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                  (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
                  (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
                  (C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
                  (D) the Committee on Homeland Security and 
                Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
                  (E) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives;
                  (F) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives;
                  (G) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House 
                of Representatives; and
                  (H) the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the 
                House of Representatives.
          (2) Appropriate industry partners.--The term ``appropriate 
        industry partner'' means a contractor, licensee, or grantee (as 
        defined in section 101(a) of Executive Order 12829 (50 U.S.C. 
        3161 note; relating to National Industrial Security Program)) 
        that is participating in the National Industrial Security 
        Program established by such Executive Order.
          (3) Continuous vetting.--The term ``continuous vetting'' has 
        the meaning given such term in Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 
        3161 note; relating to reforming processes related to 
        suitability for government employment, fitness for contractor 
        employees, and eligibility for access to classified national 
        security information).
          (4) Council.--The term ``Council'' means the Security, 
        Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability 
        Council established pursuant to such Executive Order, or any 
        successor entity.
          (5) Security executive agent.--The term ``Security Executive 
        Agent'' means the officer serving as the Security Executive 
        Agent pursuant to section 803 of the National Security Act of 
        1947, as added by section 2605.
          (6) Suitability and credentialing executive agent.--The term 
        ``Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent'' means the 
        Director of the Office of Personnel Management acting as the 
        Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent in accordance 
        with Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to 
        reforming processes related to suitability for government 
        employment, fitness for contractor employees, and eligibility 
        for access to classified national security information), or any 
        successor entity.

SEC. 2602. REPORTS AND PLANS RELATING TO SECURITY CLEARANCES AND 
                    BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) ensuring the trustworthiness and security of the 
        workforce, facilities, and information of the Federal 
        Government is of the highest priority to national security and 
        public safety;
          (2) the President and Congress should prioritize the 
        modernization of the personnel security framework to improve 
        its efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability;
          (3) the current system for security clearance, suitability 
        and fitness for employment, and credentialing lacks 
        efficiencies and capabilities to meet the current threat 
        environment, recruit and retain a trusted workforce, and 
        capitalize on modern technologies; and
          (4) changes to policies or processes to improve this system 
        should be vetted through the Council to ensure standardization, 
        portability, and reciprocity in security clearances across the 
        Federal Government.
  (b) Accountability Plans and Reports.--
          (1) Plans.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees and make available to 
        appropriate industry partners the following:
                  (A) A plan, with milestones, to reduce the background 
                investigation inventory to 200,000, or an otherwise 
                sustainable steady-level, by the end of year 2020. Such 
                plan shall include notes of any required changes in 
                investigative and adjudicative standards or resources.
                  (B) A plan to consolidate the conduct of background 
                investigations associated with the processing for 
                security clearances in the most effective and efficient 
                manner between the National Background Investigation 
                Bureau and the Defense Security Service, or a successor 
                organization. Such plan shall address required funding, 
                personnel, contracts, information technology, field 
                office structure, policy, governance, schedule, 
                transition costs, and effects on stakeholders.
          (2) Report on the future of personnel security.--
                  (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the 
                Council, in coordination with the members of the 
                Council, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
                committees and make available to appropriate industry 
                partners a report on the future of personnel security 
                to reflect changes in threats, the workforce, and 
                technology.
                  (B) Contents.--The report submitted under 
                subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
                          (i) A risk framework for granting and 
                        renewing access to classified information.
                          (ii) A discussion of the use of technologies 
                        to prevent, detect, and monitor threats.
                          (iii) A discussion of efforts to address 
                        reciprocity and portability.
                          (iv) A discussion of the characteristics of 
                        effective insider threat programs.
                          (v) An analysis of how to integrate data from 
                        continuous evaluation, insider threat programs, 
                        and human resources data.
                          (vi) Recommendations on interagency 
                        governance.
          (3) Plan for implementation.--Not later than 180 days after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the 
        Council, in coordination with the members of the Council, shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make 
        available to appropriate industry partners a plan to implement 
        the report's framework and recommendations submitted under 
        paragraph (2)(A).
          (4) Congressional notifications.--Not less frequently than 
        quarterly, the Security Executive Agent shall make available to 
        the public a report regarding the status of the disposition of 
        requests received from departments and agencies of the Federal 
        Government for a change to, or approval under, the Federal 
        investigative standards, the national adjudicative guidelines, 
        continuous evaluation, or other national policy regarding 
        personnel security.

SEC. 2603. IMPROVING THE PROCESS FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES.

  (a) Reviews.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Security Executive Agent, in coordination with the 
members of the Council, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a report 
that includes the following:
          (1) A review of whether the information requested on the 
        Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Standard Form 
        86) and by the Federal Investigative Standards prescribed by 
        the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of the 
        Director of National Intelligence appropriately supports the 
        adjudicative guidelines under Security Executive Agent 
        Directive 4 (known as the ``National Security Adjudicative 
        Guidelines''). Such review shall include identification of 
        whether any such information currently collected is unnecessary 
        to support the adjudicative guidelines.
          (2) An assessment of whether such Questionnaire, Standards, 
        and guidelines should be revised to account for the prospect of 
        a holder of a security clearance becoming an insider threat.
          (3) Recommendations to improve the background investigation 
        process by--
                  (A) simplifying the Questionnaire for National 
                Security Positions (Standard Form 86) and increasing 
                customer support to applicants completing such 
                Questionnaire;
                  (B) using remote techniques and centralized locations 
                to support or replace field investigation work;
                  (C) using secure and reliable digitization of 
                information obtained during the clearance process;
                  (D) building the capacity of the background 
                investigation labor sector; and
                  (E) replacing periodic reinvestigations with 
                continuous evaluation techniques in all appropriate 
                circumstances.
  (b) Policy, Strategy, and Implementation.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive 
Agent shall, in coordination with the members of the Council, establish 
the following:
          (1) A policy and implementation plan for the issuance of 
        interim security clearances.
          (2) A policy and implementation plan to ensure contractors 
        are treated consistently in the security clearance process 
        across agencies and departments of the United States as 
        compared to employees of such agencies and departments. Such 
        policy shall address--
                  (A) prioritization of processing security clearances 
                based on the mission the contractors will be 
                performing;
                  (B) standardization in the forms that agencies issue 
                to initiate the process for a security clearance;
                  (C) digitization of background investigation-related 
                forms;
                  (D) use of the polygraph;
                  (E) the application of the adjudicative guidelines 
                under Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (known as 
                the ``National Security Adjudicative Guidelines'');
                  (F) reciprocal recognition of clearances across 
                agencies and departments of the United States, 
                regardless of status of periodic reinvestigation;
                  (G) tracking of clearance files as individuals move 
                from employment with an agency or department of the 
                United States to employment in the private sector;
                  (H) collection of timelines for movement of 
                contractors across agencies and departments;
                  (I) reporting on security incidents and job 
                performance, consistent with section 552a of title 5, 
                United States Code (commonly known as the ``Privacy Act 
                of 1974''), that may affect the ability to hold a 
                security clearance;
                  (J) any recommended changes to the Federal 
                Acquisition Regulations (FAR) necessary to ensure that 
                information affecting contractor clearances or 
                suitability is appropriately and expeditiously shared 
                between and among agencies and contractors; and
                  (K) portability of contractor security clearances 
                between or among contracts at the same agency and 
                between or among contracts at different agencies that 
                require the same level of clearance.
          (3) A strategy and implementation plan that--
                  (A) provides for periodic reinvestigations as part of 
                a security clearance determination only on an as-
                needed, risk-based basis;
                  (B) includes actions to assess the extent to which 
                automated records checks and other continuous 
                evaluation methods may be used to expedite or focus 
                reinvestigations; and
                  (C) provides an exception for certain populations if 
                the Security Executive Agent--
                          (i) determines such populations require 
                        reinvestigations at regular intervals; and
                          (ii) provides written justification to the 
                        appropriate congressional committees for any 
                        such determination.
          (4) A policy and implementation plan for agencies and 
        departments of the United States, as a part of the security 
        clearance process, to accept automated records checks generated 
        pursuant to a security clearance applicant's employment with a 
        prior employer.
          (5) A policy for the use of certain background materials on 
        individuals collected by the private sector for background 
        investigation purposes.
          (6) Uniform standards for agency continuous evaluation 
        programs to ensure quality and reciprocity in accepting 
        enrollment in a continuous vetting program as a substitute for 
        a periodic investigation for continued access to classified 
        information.

SEC. 2604. GOALS FOR PROMPTNESS OF DETERMINATIONS REGARDING SECURITY 
                    CLEARANCES.

  (a) Reciprocity Defined.--In this section, the term ``reciprocity'' 
means reciprocal recognition by Federal departments and agencies of 
eligibility for access to classified information.
  (b) In General.--The Council shall reform the security clearance 
process with the objective that, by December 31, 2021, 90 percent of 
all determinations, other than determinations regarding populations 
identified under section 2603(b)(3)(C), regarding--
          (1) security clearances--
                  (A) at the secret level are issued in 30 days or 
                fewer; and
                  (B) at the top secret level are issued in 90 days or 
                fewer; and
          (2) reciprocity of security clearances at the same level are 
        recognized in 2 weeks or fewer.
  (c) Certain Reinvestigations.--The Council shall reform the security 
clearance process with the goal that by December 31, 2021, 
reinvestigation on a set periodicity is not required for more than 10 
percent of the population that holds a security clearance.
  (d) Equivalent Metrics.--
          (1) In general.--If the Council develops a set of performance 
        metrics that it certifies to the appropriate congressional 
        committees should achieve substantially equivalent outcomes as 
        those outlined in subsections (b) and (c), the Council may use 
        those metrics for purposes of compliance within this provision.
          (2) Notice.--If the Council uses the authority provided by 
        paragraph (1) to use metrics as described in such paragraph, 
        the Council shall, not later than 30 days after communicating 
        such metrics to departments and agencies, notify the 
        appropriate congressional committees that it is using such 
        authority.
  (e) Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Council shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a plan 
to carry out this section. Such plan shall include recommended interim 
milestones for the goals set forth in subsections (b) and (c) for 2019, 
2020, and 2021.

SEC. 2605. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.

  (a) In General.--Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended--
          (1) by redesignating sections 803 and 804 as sections 804 and 
        805, respectively; and
          (2) by inserting after section 802 the following:

``SEC. 803. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.

  ``(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, or such 
other officer of the United States as the President may designate, 
shall serve as the Security Executive Agent for all departments and 
agencies of the United States.
  ``(b) Duties.--The duties of the Security Executive Agent are as 
follows:
          ``(1) To direct the oversight of investigations, 
        reinvestigations, adjudications, and, as applicable, polygraphs 
        for eligibility for access to classified information or 
        eligibility to hold a sensitive position made by any Federal 
        agency.
          ``(2) To review the national security background 
        investigation and adjudication programs of Federal agencies to 
        determine whether such programs are being implemented in 
        accordance with this section.
          ``(3) To develop and issue uniform and consistent policies 
        and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, timely, and 
        secure completion of investigations, polygraphs, and 
        adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for 
        access to classified information or eligibility to hold a 
        sensitive position.
          ``(4) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the 
        final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to 
        conduct investigations of persons who are proposed for access 
        to classified information or for eligibility to hold a 
        sensitive position to ascertain whether such persons satisfy 
        the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to classified 
        information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, as 
        applicable.
          ``(5) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the 
        final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to 
        determine eligibility for access to classified information or 
        eligibility to hold a sensitive position in accordance with 
        Executive Order 12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to access 
        to classified information).
          ``(6) To ensure reciprocal recognition of eligibility for 
        access to classified information or eligibility to hold a 
        sensitive position among Federal agencies, including acting as 
        the final authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes among 
        such agencies involving the reciprocity of investigations and 
        adjudications of eligibility.
          ``(7) To execute all other duties assigned to the Security 
        Executive Agent by law.
  ``(c) Authorities.--The Security Executive Agent shall--
          ``(1) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of 
        Federal agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity, 
        centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, timeliness, and 
        security in processes relating to determinations by such 
        agencies of eligibility for access to classified information or 
        eligibility to hold a sensitive position, including such 
        matters as investigations, polygraphs, adjudications, and 
        reciprocity;
          ``(2) have the authority to grant exceptions to, or waivers 
        of, national security investigative requirements, including 
        issuing implementing or clarifying guidance, as necessary;
          ``(3) have the authority to assign, in whole or in part, to 
        the head of any Federal agency (solely or jointly) any of the 
        duties of the Security Executive Agent described in subsection 
        (b) or the authorities described in paragraphs (1) and (2), 
        provided that the exercise of such assigned duties or 
        authorities is subject to the oversight of the Security 
        Executive Agent, including such terms and conditions (including 
        approval by the Security Executive Agent) as the Security 
        Executive Agent determines appropriate; and
          ``(4) define and set standards for continuous evaluation for 
        continued access to classified information and for eligibility 
        to hold a sensitive position.''.
  (b) Report on Recommendations for Revising Authorities.--Not later 
than 30 days after the date on which the Chairman of the Council 
submits to the appropriate congressional committees the report required 
by section 2602(b)(2)(A), the Chairman shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees such recommendations as the Chairman may have 
for revising the authorities of the Security Executive Agent.
  (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 103H(j)(4)(A) of such Act (50 
U.S.C. 3033(j)(4)(A)) is amended by striking ``in section 804'' and 
inserting ``in section 805''.
  (d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the matter 
preceding section 2 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3002) is amended by striking 
the items relating to sections 803 and 804 and inserting the following:

``Sec. 803. Security Executive Agent.
``Sec. 804. Exceptions.
``Sec. 805. Definitions.''.

SEC. 2606. REPORT ON UNIFIED, SIMPLIFIED, GOVERNMENTWIDE STANDARDS FOR 
                    POSITIONS OF TRUST AND SECURITY CLEARANCES.

  Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing 
Executive Agent, in coordination with the other members of the Council, 
shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees and 
make available to appropriate industry partners a report regarding the 
advisability and the risks, benefits, and costs to the Government and 
to industry of consolidating to not more than 3 tiers for positions of 
trust and security clearances.

SEC. 2607. REPORT ON CLEARANCE IN PERSON CONCEPT.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that to reflect 
the greater mobility of the modern workforce, alternative methodologies 
merit analysis to allow greater flexibility for individuals moving in 
and out of positions that require access to classified information, 
while still preserving security.
  (b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate 
industry partners a report that describes the requirements, 
feasibility, and advisability of implementing a clearance in person 
concept described in subsection (c).
  (c) Clearance in Person Concept.--The clearance in person concept--
          (1) permits an individual who once held a security clearance 
        to maintain his or her eligibility for access to classified 
        information, networks, and facilities for up to 3 years after 
        the individual's eligibility for access to classified 
        information would otherwise lapse; and
          (2) recognizes, unless otherwise directed by the Security 
        Executive Agent, an individual's security clearance and 
        background investigation as current, regardless of employment 
        status, contingent on enrollment in a continuous vetting 
        program.
  (d) Contents.--The report required under subsection (b) shall 
address--
          (1) requirements for an individual to voluntarily remain in a 
        continuous evaluation program validated by the Security 
        Executive Agent even if the individual is not in a position 
        requiring access to classified information;
          (2) appropriate safeguards for privacy;
          (3) advantages to government and industry;
          (4) the costs and savings associated with implementation;
          (5) the risks of such implementation, including security and 
        counterintelligence risks;
          (6) an appropriate funding model; and
          (7) fairness to small companies and independent contractors.

SEC. 2608. REPORTS ON RECIPROCITY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES INSIDE OF 
                    DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.

  (a) Reciprocally Recognized Defined.--In this section, the term 
``reciprocally recognized'' means reciprocal recognition by Federal 
departments and agencies of eligibility for access to classified 
information.
  (b) Reports to Security Executive Agent.--The head of each Federal 
department or agency shall submit an annual report to the Security 
Executive Agent that--
          (1) identifies the number of individuals whose security 
        clearances take more than 2 weeks to be reciprocally recognized 
        after such individuals move to another part of such department 
        or agency; and
          (2) breaks out the information described in paragraph (1) by 
        type of clearance and the reasons for any delays.
  (c) Annual Report.--Not less frequently than once each year, the 
Security Executive Agent shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees and make available to industry partners an annual report 
that summarizes the information received pursuant to subsection (b) 
during the period covered by such report.

SEC. 2609. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY CLEARANCES.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) despite sustained efforts by Congress and the executive 
        branch, an unacceptable backlog in processing and adjudicating 
        security clearances persists, both within elements of the 
        intelligence community and in other departments of the Federal 
        Government, with some processing times exceeding a year or even 
        more;
          (2) the protracted clearance timetable threatens the ability 
        of elements of the intelligence community to hire and retain 
        highly qualified individuals, and thus to fulfill the missions 
        of such elements;
          (3) the prospect of a lengthy clearance process deters some 
        such individuals from seeking employment with the intelligence 
        community in the first place, and, when faced with a long wait 
        time, those with conditional offers of employment may opt to 
        discontinue the security clearance process and pursue different 
        opportunities;
          (4) now more than ever, therefore, the broken security 
        clearance process badly needs fundamental reform; and
          (5) in the meantime, to ensure the ability of elements of the 
        intelligence community to hire and retain highly qualified 
        personnel, elements should consider, to the extent possible and 
        consistent with national security, permitting new employees to 
        enter on duty immediately or nearly so, and to perform, on a 
        temporary basis pending final adjudication of their security 
        clearances, work that either does not require a security 
        clearance or requires only a low-level interim clearance.
  (b) In General.--Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a)(1)--
                  (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``and'' 
                after the semicolon;
                  (B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``; and'' 
                and inserting a period; and
                  (C) by striking subparagraph (C);
          (2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
          (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
        subsection (b):
  ``(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than March 1 of 
each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on 
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report on the 
security clearances processed by each element of the intelligence 
community during the preceding fiscal year. Each such report shall 
separately identify security clearances processed for Federal employees 
and contractor employees sponsored by each such element.
  ``(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include each of 
the following for each element of the intelligence community for the 
fiscal year covered by the report:
          ``(A) The total number of initial security clearance 
        background investigations sponsored for new applicants.
          ``(B) The total number of security clearance periodic 
        reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.
          ``(C) The total number of initial security clearance 
        background investigations for new applicants that were 
        adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the 
        prospective applicant, including--
                  ``(i) the total number that were adjudicated 
                favorably and granted access to classified information; 
                and
                  ``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated 
                unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a 
                security clearance.
          ``(D) The total number of security clearance periodic 
        background investigations that were adjudicated with notice of 
        a determination provided to the existing employee, including--
                  ``(i) the total number that were adjudicated 
                favorably; and
                  ``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated 
                unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a 
                security clearance.
          ``(E) The total number of pending security clearance 
        background investigations, including initial applicant 
        investigations and periodic reinvestigations, that were not 
        adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained 
        pending as follows:
                  ``(i) For 180 days or less.
                  ``(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 
                months.
                  ``(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 
                months.
                  ``(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 
                months.
                  ``(v) For 24 months or longer.
          ``(F) In the case of security clearance determinations 
        completed or pending during the year preceding the year for 
        which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12 
        months to complete--
                  ``(i) an explanation of the causes for the delays 
                incurred during the period covered by the report; and
                  ``(ii) the number of such delays involving a 
                polygraph requirement.
          ``(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations, 
        including initial and periodic reinvestigations, that resulted 
        in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
          ``(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations 
        that resulted in incomplete information.
          ``(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations 
        that did not result in enough information to make a decision on 
        potentially adverse information.
  ``(3) The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''; and
          (4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
        striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and inserting ``subsections 
        (a)(1) and (b)''.

SEC. 2610. PERIODIC REPORT ON POSITIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                    THAT CAN BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED 
                    INFORMATION, NETWORKS, OR FACILITIES.

  Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act 
and not less frequently than once every 5 years thereafter, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report that reviews the intelligence 
community for which positions can be conducted without access to 
classified information, networks, or facilities, or may only require a 
security clearance at the secret level.

SEC. 2611. INFORMATION SHARING PROGRAM FOR POSITIONS OF TRUST AND 
                    SECURITY CLEARANCES.

  (a) Program Required.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the 
        Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall establish 
        and implement a program to share between and among agencies of 
        the Federal Government and industry partners of the Federal 
        Government relevant background information regarding 
        individuals applying for and currently occupying national 
        security positions and positions of trust, in order to ensure 
        the Federal Government maintains a trusted workforce.
          (2) Designation.--The program established under paragraph (1) 
        shall be known as the ``Trusted Information Provider Program'' 
        (in this section referred to as the ``Program'').
  (b) Privacy Safeguards.--The Security Executive Agent and the 
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall ensure that the 
Program includes such safeguards for privacy as the Security Executive 
Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent consider 
appropriate.
  (c) Provision of Information to the Federal Government.--The Program 
shall include requirements that enable investigative service providers 
and agencies of the Federal Government to leverage certain pre-
employment information gathered during the employment or military 
recruiting process, and other relevant security or human resources 
information obtained during employment with or for the Federal 
Government, that satisfy Federal investigative standards, while 
safeguarding personnel privacy.
  (d) Information and Records.--The information and records considered 
under the Program shall include the following:
          (1) Date and place of birth.
          (2) Citizenship or immigration and naturalization 
        information.
          (3) Education records.
          (4) Employment records.
          (5) Employment or social references.
          (6) Military service records.
          (7) State and local law enforcement checks.
          (8) Criminal history checks.
          (9) Financial records or information.
          (10) Foreign travel, relatives, or associations.
          (11) Social media checks.
          (12) Such other information or records as may be relevant to 
        obtaining or maintaining national security, suitability, 
        fitness, or credentialing eligibility.
  (e) Implementation Plan.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the 
        Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make 
        available to appropriate industry partners a plan for the 
        implementation of the Program.
          (2) Elements.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                  (A) Mechanisms that address privacy, national 
                security, suitability or fitness, credentialing, and 
                human resources or military recruitment processes.
                  (B) Such recommendations for legislative or 
                administrative action as the Security Executive Agent 
                and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent 
                consider appropriate to carry out or improve the 
                Program.
  (f) Plan for Pilot Program on Two-way Information Sharing.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the 
        Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make 
        available to appropriate industry partners a plan for the 
        implementation of a pilot program to assess the feasibility and 
        advisability of expanding the Program to include the sharing of 
        information held by the Federal Government related to contract 
        personnel with the security office of the employers of those 
        contractor personnel.
          (2) Elements.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                  (A) Mechanisms that address privacy, national 
                security, suitability or fitness, credentialing, and 
                human resources or military recruitment processes.
                  (B) Such recommendations for legislative or 
                administrative action as the Security Executive Agent 
                and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent 
                consider appropriate to carry out or improve the pilot 
                program.
  (g) Review.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and 
Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry 
partners a review of the plans submitted under subsections (e)(1) and 
(f)(1) and utility and effectiveness of the programs described in such 
plans.

SEC. 2612. REPORT ON PROTECTIONS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY OF WHISTLEBLOWER-
                    RELATED COMMUNICATIONS.

  Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Security Executive Agent shall, in coordination with the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community, submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report detailing the controls employed by 
the intelligence community to ensure that continuous vetting programs, 
including those involving user activity monitoring, protect the 
confidentiality of whistleblower-related communications.

                 TITLE XXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

    Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers

SEC. 2701. LIMITATION RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT OR SUPPORT OF 
                    CYBERSECURITY UNIT WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

  (a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
          (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
          (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; 
        and
          (3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
  (b) Limitation.--
          (1) In general.--No amount may be expended by the Federal 
        Government, other than the Department of Defense, to enter into 
        or implement any bilateral agreement between the United States 
        and the Russian Federation regarding cybersecurity, including 
        the establishment or support of any cybersecurity unit, unless, 
        at least 30 days prior to the conclusion of any such agreement, 
        the Director of National Intelligence submits to the 
        appropriate congressional committees a report on such agreement 
        that includes the elements required by subsection (c).
          (2) Department of defense agreements.--Any agreement between 
        the Department of Defense and the Russian Federation regarding 
        cybersecurity shall be conducted in accordance with section 
        1232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
        2017 (Public Law 114-328), as amended by section 1231 of the 
        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public 
        Law 115-91).
  (c) Elements.--If the Director submits a report under subsection (b) 
with respect to an agreement, such report shall include a description 
of each of the following:
          (1) The purpose of the agreement.
          (2) The nature of any intelligence to be shared pursuant to 
        the agreement.
          (3) The expected value to national security resulting from 
        the implementation of the agreement.
          (4) Such counterintelligence concerns associated with the 
        agreement as the Director may have and such measures as the 
        Director expects to be taken to mitigate such concerns.
  (d) Rule of Construction.--This section shall not be construed to 
affect any existing authority of the Director of National Intelligence, 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or another head of an 
element of the intelligence community, to share or receive foreign 
intelligence on a case-by-case basis.

SEC. 2702. REPORT ON RETURNING RUSSIAN COMPOUNDS.

  (a) Covered Compounds Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered 
compounds'' means the real property in New York, the real property in 
Maryland, and the real property in San Francisco, California, that were 
under the control of the Government of Russia in 2016 and were removed 
from such control in response to various transgressions by the 
Government of Russia, including the interference by the Government of 
Russia in the 2016 election in the United States.
  (b) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives (only with respect to 
the unclassified report), a report on the intelligence risks of 
returning the covered compounds to Russian control.
  (c) Form of Report.--The report required by this section shall be 
submitted in classified and unclassified forms.

SEC. 2703. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO RUSSIA.

  (a) Threat Finance Defined.--In this section, the term ``threat 
finance'' means--
          (1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence 
        campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation, 
        terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;
          (2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move, 
        raise, conceal, or launder money or value, on behalf of threat 
        actors;
          (3) sanctions evasion; and
          (4) other forms of threat finance activity domestically or 
        internationally, as defined by the President.
  (b) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report containing an assessment of Russian 
threat finance. The assessment shall be based on intelligence from all 
sources, including from the Office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence of the Department of the Treasury.
  (c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include 
each of the following:
          (1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period 
        preceding the date of the submittal of the report of threat 
        finance activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the 
        behest of--
                  (A) officials of the Government of Russia;
                  (B) persons subject to sanctions under any provision 
                of law imposing sanctions with respect to Russia;
                  (C) Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any 
                other provision of law; or
                  (D) Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.
          (2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in 
        threat finance activities relating to Russia, including common 
        methods of conducting such activities and global nodes of money 
        laundering used by Russian threat actors described in paragraph 
        (1) and associated entities.
          (3) An assessment of any connections between Russian 
        individuals involved in money laundering and the Government of 
        Russia.
          (4) A summary of engagement and coordination with 
        international partners on threat finance relating to Russia, 
        especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement and 
        coordination.
          (5) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.
          (6) An identification of--
                  (A) entry points of money laundering by Russian and 
                associated entities into the United States;
                  (B) any vulnerabilities within the United States 
                legal and financial system, including specific sectors, 
                which have been or could be exploited in connection 
                with Russian threat finance activities; and
                  (C) the counterintelligence threat posed by Russian 
                money laundering and other forms of threat finance, as 
                well as the threat to the United States financial 
                system and United States efforts to enforce sanctions 
                and combat organized crime.
          (7) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.
  (d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (b) may be 
submitted in classified form.

SEC. 2704. NOTIFICATION OF AN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                  (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
                  (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
                the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                  (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
                and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                Representatives.
          (2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional 
        leadership'' includes the following:
                  (A) The majority leader of the Senate.
                  (B) The minority leader of the Senate.
                  (C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
                  (D) The minority leader of the House of 
                Representatives.
  (b) Requirement for Notification.--The Director of National 
Intelligence, in cooperation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the head of any other relevant agency, shall notify 
the congressional leadership and the Chairman and Vice Chairman or 
Ranking Member of each of the appropriate congressional committees, and 
of other relevant committees of jurisdiction, each time the Director of 
National Intelligence determines there is credible information that a 
foreign power has, is, or will attempt to employ a covert influence or 
active measures campaign with regard to the modernization, employment, 
doctrine, or force posture of the nuclear deterrent or missile defense.
  (c) Content of Notification.--Each notification required by 
subsection (b) shall include information concerning actions taken by 
the United States to expose or halt an attempt referred to in 
subsection (b).

SEC. 2705. NOTIFICATION OF TRAVEL BY ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR 
                    PERSONNEL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE UNITED 
                    STATES.

  In carrying out the advance notification requirements set out in 
section 502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 
(division N of Public Law 115-31; 131 Stat. 825; 22 U.S.C. 254a note), 
the Secretary of State shall--
          (1) ensure that the Russian Federation provides notification 
        to the Secretary of State at least 2 business days in advance 
        of all travel that is subject to such requirements by 
        accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of the Russian 
        Federation in the United States, and take necessary action to 
        secure full compliance by Russian personnel and address any 
        noncompliance; and
          (2) provide notice of travel described in paragraph (1) to 
        the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation within 1 hour of receiving 
        notice of such travel.

SEC. 2706. REPORT ON OUTREACH STRATEGY ADDRESSING THREATS FROM UNITED 
                    STATES ADVERSARIES TO THE UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY 
                    SECTOR.

  (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
          (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
          (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
          (3) the Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Homeland 
        Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the 
        House of Representatives.
  (b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing 
outreach by the intelligence community and the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise to United States industrial, commercial, scientific, 
technical, and academic communities on matters relating to the efforts 
of adversaries of the United States to acquire critical United States 
technology, intellectual property, and research and development 
information.
  (c) Contents.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include 
the following:
          (1) A review of the current outreach efforts of the 
        intelligence community and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise 
        described in subsection (b), including the type of information 
        conveyed in the outreach.
          (2) A determination of the appropriate element of the 
        intelligence community to lead such outreach efforts.
          (3) An assessment of potential methods for improving the 
        effectiveness of such outreach, including an assessment of the 
        following:
                  (A) Those critical technologies, infrastructure, or 
                related supply chains that are at risk from the efforts 
                of adversaries described in subsection (b).
                  (B) The necessity and advisability of granting 
                security clearances to company or community leadership, 
                when necessary and appropriate, to allow for tailored 
                classified briefings on specific targeted threats.
                  (C) The advisability of partnering with entities of 
                the Federal Government that are not elements of the 
                intelligence community and relevant regulatory and 
                industry groups described in subsection (b), to convey 
                key messages across sectors targeted by United States 
                adversaries.
                  (D) Strategies to assist affected elements of the 
                communities described in subparagraph (C) in 
                mitigating, deterring, and protecting against the broad 
                range of threats from the efforts of adversaries 
                described in subsection (b), with focus on producing 
                information that enables private entities to justify 
                business decisions related to national security 
                concerns.
                  (E) The advisability of the establishment of a United 
                States Government-wide task force to coordinate 
                outreach and activities to combat the threats from 
                efforts of adversaries described in subsection (b).
                  (F) Such other matters as the Director of National 
                Intelligence may consider necessary.
  (d) Consultation Encouraged.--In preparing the report required by 
subsection (b), the Director is encouraged to consult with other 
government agencies, think tanks, academia, representatives of the 
financial industry, or such other entities as the Director considers 
appropriate.
  (e) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex as necessary.

SEC. 2707. REPORT ON IRANIAN SUPPORT OF PROXY FORCES IN SYRIA AND 
                    LEBANON.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                  (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
                Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the Senate; and
                  (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
                Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
          (2) Arms or related material.--The term ``arms or related 
        material'' means--
                  (A) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological 
                weapons or materials or components of such weapons;
                  (B) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials 
                or components of such weapons;
                  (C) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced 
                conventional weapons;
                  (D) defense articles or defense services, as those 
                terms are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), 
                respectively, of section 47 of the Arms Export Control 
                Act (22 U.S.C. 2794);
                  (E) defense information, as that term is defined in 
                section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
                U.S.C. 2403); or
                  (F) items designated by the President for purposes of 
                the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) 
                of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
  (b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on Iranian 
support of proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon and the threat posed to 
Israel, other United States regional allies, and other specified 
interests of the United States as a result of such support.
  (c) Matters for Inclusion.--The report required under subsection (b) 
shall include information relating to the following matters with 
respect to both the strategic and tactical implications for the United 
States and its allies:
          (1) A description of arms or related materiel transferred by 
        Iran to Hizballah since March 2011, including the number of 
        such arms or related materiel and whether such transfer was by 
        land, sea, or air, as well as financial and additional 
        technological capabilities transferred by Iran to Hizballah.
          (2) A description of Iranian and Iranian-controlled 
        personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's 
        Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating within Syria, 
        including the number and geographic distribution of such 
        personnel operating within 30 kilometers of the Israeli borders 
        with Syria and Lebanon.
          (3) An assessment of Hizballah's operational lessons learned 
        based on its recent experiences in Syria.
          (4) A description of any rocket-producing facilities in 
        Lebanon for nonstate actors, including whether such facilities 
        were assessed to be built at the direction of Hizballah 
        leadership, Iranian leadership, or in consultation between 
        Iranian leadership and Hizballah leadership.
          (5) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains 
        that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid 
        Hizballah's acquisition or development of missile production 
        facilities, including the geographic distribution of such 
        foreign and domestic supply chains.
          (6) An assessment of the provision of goods, services, or 
        technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah 
        to indigenously manufacture or otherwise produce missiles.
          (7) An identification of foreign persons that are based on 
        credible information, facilitating the transfer of significant 
        financial support or arms or related materiel to Hizballah.
          (8) A description of the threat posed to Israel and other 
        United States allies in the Middle East by the transfer of arms 
        or related material or other support offered to Hizballah and 
        other proxies from Iran.
  (d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (b) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 2708. ANNUAL REPORT ON IRANIAN EXPENDITURES SUPPORTING FOREIGN 
                    MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

  (a) Annual Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once each year 
thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
Congress a report describing Iranian expenditures in the previous 
calendar year on military and terrorist activities outside the country, 
including each of the following:
          (1) The amount spent in such calendar year on activities by 
        the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including activities 
        providing support for--
                  (A) Hizballah;
                  (B) Houthi rebels in Yemen;
                  (C) Hamas;
                  (D) proxy forces in Iraq and Syria; or
                  (E) any other entity or country the Director 
                determines to be relevant.
          (2) The amount spent in such calendar year for ballistic 
        missile research and testing or other activities that the 
        Director determines are destabilizing to the Middle East 
        region.
  (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 2709. EXPANSION OF SCOPE OF COMMITTEE TO COUNTER ACTIVE MEASURES 
                    AND REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN MALIGN 
                    INFLUENCE CENTER.

  (a) Scope of Committee to Counter Active Measures.--
          (1) In general.--Section 501 of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 115-31; 50 
        U.S.C. 3001 note) is amended--
                  (A) in subsections (a) through (h)--
                          (i) by inserting ``, the People's Republic of 
                        China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
                        Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other 
                        nation state'' after ``Russian Federation'' 
                        each place it appears; and
                          (ii) by inserting ``, China, Iran, North 
                        Korea, or other nation state'' after ``Russia'' 
                        each place it appears; and
                  (B) in the section heading, by inserting ``, the 
                people's republic of china, the islamic republic of 
                iran, the democratic people's republic of korea, or 
                other nation state'' after ``russian federation''.
          (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section 
        1(b) of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to 
        section 501 and inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 501. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian 
Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation states 
to exert covert influence over peoples and governments.''.

  (b) Report Required.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
        Intelligence, in coordination with such elements of the 
        intelligence community as the Director considers relevant, 
        shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
        report on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a 
        center, to be known as the ``Foreign Malign Influence Response 
        Center'', that--
                  (A) is comprised of analysts from all appropriate 
                elements of the intelligence community, including 
                elements with related diplomatic and law enforcement 
                functions;
                  (B) has access to all intelligence and other 
                reporting acquired by the United States Government on 
                foreign efforts to influence, through overt and covert 
                malign activities, United States political processes 
                and elections;
                  (C) provides comprehensive assessment, and 
                indications and warning, of such activities; and
                  (D) provides for enhanced dissemination of such 
                assessment to United States policy makers.
          (2) Contents.--The Report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                  (A) A discussion of the desirability of the 
                establishment of such center and any barriers to such 
                establishment.
                  (B) Such recommendations and other matters as the 
                Director considers appropriate.

                          Subtitle B--Reports

SEC. 2711. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO INSPECTOR GENERAL STUDY.

  Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
          (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Audit'' and 
        inserting ``Review'';
          (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``audit'' and inserting 
        ``review''; and
          (3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``audit'' and inserting 
        ``review''.

SEC. 2712. REPORTS ON AUTHORITIES OF THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF 
                    THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                  (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
                  (B) the Committee on Homeland Security and 
                Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
                  (C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House 
                of Representatives.
          (2) Homeland security intelligence enterprise.--The term 
        ``Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise'' has the meaning 
        given such term in Department of Homeland Security Instruction 
        Number 264-01-001, or successor authority.
  (b) Report Required.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
consultation with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report on the authorities of the Under Secretary.
  (c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include 
each of the following:
          (1) An analysis of whether the Under Secretary has the legal 
        and policy authority necessary to organize and lead the 
        Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise, with respect to 
        intelligence, and, if not, a description of--
                  (A) the obstacles to exercising the authorities of 
                the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department and 
                the Homeland Security Intelligence Council, of which 
                the Chief Intelligence Officer is the chair; and
                  (B) the legal and policy changes necessary to 
                effectively coordinate, organize, and lead intelligence 
                activities of the Department of Homeland Security.
          (2) A description of the actions that the Secretary has taken 
        to address the inability of the Under Secretary to require 
        components of the Department, other than the Office of 
        Intelligence and Analysis of the Department to--
                  (A) coordinate intelligence programs; and
                  (B) integrate and standardize intelligence products 
                produced by such other components.

SEC. 2713. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS.

  (a) Review of Whistleblower Matters.--The Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, in consultation with the inspectors general for 
the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review 
of the authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other 
practices and procedures relating to intelligence community 
whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors general.
  (b) Objective of Review.--The objective of the review required under 
subsection (a) is to identify any discrepancies, inconsistencies, or 
other issues, which frustrate the timely and effective reporting of 
intelligence community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors 
general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and the fair 
and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.
  (c) Conduct of Review.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community shall take such measures as the Inspector General determines 
necessary in order to ensure that the review required by subsection (a) 
is conducted in an independent and objective fashion.
  (d) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written report 
containing the results of the review required under subsection (a), 
along with recommendations to improve the timely and effective 
reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to inspectors 
general and to the congressional intelligence committees and the fair 
and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.

SEC. 2714. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITH 
                    RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.

  (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined 
appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on the role of the Director in 
preparing analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the 
Federal Government of national security risks associated with potential 
foreign investments into the United States.
  (b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall include--
          (1) a description of the current process for the provision of 
        the analytic materials described in subsection (a);
          (2) an identification of the most significant benefits and 
        drawbacks of such process with respect to the role of the 
        Director, including the sufficiency of resources and personnel 
        to prepare such materials; and
          (3) recommendations to improve such process.

SEC. 2715. REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST UNITED 
                    STATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS.

  (a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
          (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
          (2) The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on 
        Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
          (3) The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on 
        Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
  (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in 
coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing--
          (1) any attempts known to the intelligence community by 
        foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities in 
        United States telecommunications networks (including Signaling 
        System No. 7) to target for surveillance United States persons, 
        including employees of the Federal Government; and
          (2) any actions, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, 
        taken by the intelligence community to protect agencies and 
        personnel of the United States Government from surveillance 
        conducted by foreign governments.

SEC. 2716. BIENNIAL REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISKS.

  (a) Intelligence Community Interagency Working Group.--
          (1) Requirement to establish.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence shall establish an intelligence community 
        interagency working group to prepare the biennial reports 
        required by subsection (b).
          (2) Chairperson.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
        serve as the chairperson of such interagency working group.
          (3) Membership.--Such interagency working group shall be 
        composed of representatives of each element of the intelligence 
        community that the Director of National Intelligence determines 
        appropriate.
  (b) Biennial Report on Foreign Investment Risks.--
          (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once 
        every 2 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence 
        shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the 
        Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 
        Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
        Representatives a report on foreign investment risks prepared 
        by the interagency working group established under subsection 
        (a).
          (2) Elements.--Each report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include identification, analysis, and explanation of the 
        following:
                  (A) Any current or projected major threats to the 
                national security of the United States with respect to 
                foreign investment.
                  (B) Any strategy used by a foreign country that such 
                interagency working group has identified to be a 
                country of special concern to use foreign investment to 
                target the acquisition of critical technologies, 
                critical materials, or critical infrastructure.
                  (C) Any economic espionage efforts directed at the 
                United States by a foreign country, particularly such a 
                country of special concern.

SEC. 2717. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENT ON TRAVEL OF 
                    FOREIGN DIPLOMATS.

  Section 502(d)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2017 (Public Law 115-31) is amended by striking ``the number'' and 
inserting ``a best estimate''.

SEC. 2718. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED 
                    DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

  (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:

``SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED 
                    DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

  ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Covered official.--The term `covered official' means--
                  ``(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence 
                community; and
                  ``(B) the inspectors general with oversight 
                responsibility for an element of the intelligence 
                community.
          ``(2) Investigation.--The term `investigation' means any 
        inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an 
        unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.
          ``(3) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.--The 
        term `unauthorized disclosure of classified information' means 
        any unauthorized disclosure of classified information to any 
        recipient.
          ``(4) Unauthorized public disclosure of classified 
        information.--The term `unauthorized public disclosure of 
        classified information' means the unauthorized disclosure of 
        classified information to a journalist or media organization.
  ``(b) Intelligence Community Reporting.--
          ``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6 
        months, each covered official shall submit to the congressional 
        intelligence committees a report on investigations of 
        unauthorized public disclosures of classified information.
          ``(2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
        shall include, with respect to the preceding 6-month period, 
        the following:
                  ``(A) The number of investigations opened by the 
                covered official regarding an unauthorized public 
                disclosure of classified information.
                  ``(B) The number of investigations completed by the 
                covered official regarding an unauthorized public 
                disclosure of classified information.
                  ``(C) Of the number of such completed investigations 
                identified under subparagraph (B), the number referred 
                to the Attorney General for criminal investigation.
  ``(c) Department of Justice Reporting.--
          ``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6 
        months, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security of 
        the Department of Justice, in consultation with the Director of 
        the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the 
        Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of 
        the House of Representatives a report on the status of each 
        referral made to the Department of Justice from any element of 
        the intelligence community regarding an unauthorized disclosure 
        of classified information made during the most recent 365-day 
        period or any referral that has not yet been closed, regardless 
        of the date the referral was made.
          ``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
        shall include, for each referral covered by the report, at a 
        minimum, the following:
                  ``(A) The date the referral was received.
                  ``(B) A statement indicating whether the alleged 
                unauthorized disclosure described in the referral was 
                substantiated by the Department of Justice.
                  ``(C) A statement indicating the highest level of 
                classification of the information that was revealed in 
                the unauthorized disclosure.
                  ``(D) A statement indicating whether an open criminal 
                investigation related to the referral is active.
                  ``(E) A statement indicating whether any criminal 
                charges have been filed related to the referral.
                  ``(F) A statement indicating whether the Department 
                of Justice has been able to attribute the unauthorized 
                disclosure to a particular entity or individual.
  ``(d) Form of Reports.--Each report submitted under this section 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may have a classified 
annex.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the 
item relating to section 1104 the following new item:

``Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized 
disclosures of classified information.''.

SEC. 2719. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATION OF COVERED 
                    INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AS PERSONA NON GRATA.

  (a) Covered Intelligence Officer Defined.--In this section, the term 
``covered intelligence officer'' means--
          (1) a United States intelligence officer serving in a post in 
        a foreign country; or
          (2) a known or suspected foreign intelligence officer serving 
        in a United States post.
  (b) Requirement for Reports.--Not later than 72 hours after a covered 
intelligence officer is designated as a persona non grata, the Director 
of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a notification of that 
designation. Each such notification shall include--
          (1) the date of the designation;
          (2) the basis for the designation; and
          (3) a justification for the expulsion.

SEC. 2720. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN 
                    VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS OF FEDERAL 
                    GOVERNMENT.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.--
        The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process 
        document'' means the executive branch document entitled 
        ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process'' dated November 
        15, 2017.
          (2) Vulnerabilities equities process.--The term 
        ``Vulnerabilities Equities Process'' means the interagency 
        review of vulnerabilities, pursuant to the Vulnerabilities 
        Equities Policy and Process document or any successor document.
          (3) Vulnerability.--The term ``vulnerability'' means a 
        weakness in an information system or its components (for 
        example, system security procedures, hardware design, and 
        internal controls) that could be exploited or could affect 
        confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information.
  (b) Reports on Process and Criteria Under Vulnerabilities Equities 
Policy and Process.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
        shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
        written report describing--
                  (A) with respect to each element of the intelligence 
                community--
                          (i) the title of the official or officials 
                        responsible for determining whether, pursuant 
                        to criteria contained in the Vulnerabilities 
                        Equities Policy and Process document or any 
                        successor document, a vulnerability must be 
                        submitted for review under the Vulnerabilities 
                        Equities Process; and
                          (ii) the process used by such element to make 
                        such determination; and
                  (B) the roles or responsibilities of that element 
                during a review of a vulnerability submitted to the 
                Vulnerabilities Equities Process.
          (2) Changes to process or criteria.--Not later than 30 days 
        after any significant change is made to the process and 
        criteria used by any element of the intelligence community for 
        determining whether to submit a vulnerability for review under 
        the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, such element shall submit 
        to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
        describing such change.
          (3) Form of reports.--Each report submitted under this 
        subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
        include a classified annex.
  (c) Annual Reports.--
          (1) In general.--Not less frequently than once each calendar 
        year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a classified report 
        containing, with respect to the previous year--
                  (A) the number of vulnerabilities submitted for 
                review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process;
                  (B) the number of vulnerabilities described in 
                subparagraph (A) disclosed to each vendor responsible 
                for correcting the vulnerability, or to the public, 
                pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
                  (C) the aggregate number, by category, of the 
                vulnerabilities excluded from review under the 
                Vulnerabilities Equities Process, as described in 
                paragraph 5.4 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy 
                and Process document.
          (2) Unclassified information.--Each report submitted under 
        paragraph (1) shall include an unclassified appendix that 
        contains--
                  (A) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed 
                to vendors or the public pursuant to the 
                Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
                  (B) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed 
                to vendors or the public pursuant to the 
                Vulnerabilities Equities Process known to have been 
                patched.
          (3) Non-duplication.--The Director of National Intelligence 
        may forgo submission of an annual report required under this 
        subsection for a calendar year, if the Director notifies the 
        intelligence committees in writing that, with respect to the 
        same calendar year, an annual report required by paragraph 4.3 
        of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document 
        already has been submitted to Congress, and such annual report 
        contains the information that would otherwise be required to be 
        included in an annual report under this subsection.

SEC. 2721. INSPECTORS GENERAL REPORTS ON CLASSIFICATION.

  (a) Reports Required.--Not later than October 1, 2019, each Inspector 
General listed in subsection (b) shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report that includes, with respect to the 
department or agency of the Inspector General, analyses of the 
following:
          (1) The accuracy of the application of classification and 
        handling markers on a representative sample of finished 
        reports, including such reports that are compartmented.
          (2) Compliance with declassification procedures.
          (3) The effectiveness of processes for identifying topics of 
        public or historical importance that merit prioritization for a 
        declassification review.
  (b) Inspectors General Listed.--The Inspectors General listed in this 
subsection are as follows:
          (1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
          (2) The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.
          (3) The Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
          (4) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (5) The Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance 
        Office.
          (6) The Inspector General of the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency.

SEC. 2722. REPORTS ON GLOBAL WATER INSECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
                    IMPLICATIONS AND BRIEFING ON EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
                    DISEASE AND PANDEMICS.

  (a) Reports on Global Water Insecurity and National Security 
Implications.--
          (1) Reports required.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once 
        every 5 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence 
        shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
        report on the implications of water insecurity on the national 
        security interest of the United States, including consideration 
        of social, economic, agricultural, and environmental factors.
          (2) Assessment scope and focus.--Each report submitted under 
        paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of water insecurity 
        described in such subsection with a global scope, but focus on 
        areas of the world--
                  (A) of strategic, economic, or humanitarian interest 
                to the United States--
                          (i) that are, as of the date of the report, 
                        at the greatest risk of instability, conflict, 
                        human insecurity, or mass displacement; or
                          (ii) where challenges relating to water 
                        insecurity are likely to emerge and become 
                        significant during the 5-year or the 20-year 
                        period beginning on the date of the report; and
                  (B) where challenges relating to water insecurity are 
                likely to imperil the national security interests of 
                the United States or allies of the United States.
          (3) Consultation.--In researching a report required by 
        paragraph (1), the Director shall consult with--
                  (A) such stakeholders within the intelligence 
                community, the Department of Defense, and the 
                Department of State as the Director considers 
                appropriate; and
                  (B) such additional Federal agencies and persons in 
                the private sector as the Director considers 
                appropriate.
          (4) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
  (b) Briefing on Emerging Infectious Disease and Pandemics.--
          (1) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                  (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
                  (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations 
                of the House of Representatives; and
                  (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations 
                of the Senate.
          (2) Briefing.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
        shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a 
        briefing on the anticipated geopolitical effects of emerging 
        infectious disease (including deliberate, accidental, and 
        naturally occurring infectious disease threats) and pandemics, 
        and their implications on the national security of the United 
        States.
          (3) Content.--The briefing under paragraph (2) shall include 
        an assessment of--
                  (A) the economic, social, political, and security 
                risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious 
                diseases on the United States and the international 
                political and economic system;
                  (B) the economic, social, political, and security 
                risks, costs, and impacts of a major transnational 
                pandemic on the United States and the international 
                political and economic system; and
                  (C) contributing trends and factors to the matters 
                assessed under subparagraphs (A) and (B).
          (4) Examination of response capacity.--In examining the 
        risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious disease and a 
        possible transnational pandemic under paragraph (3), the 
        Director of National Intelligence shall also examine in the 
        briefing under paragraph (2) the response capacity within 
        affected countries and the international system. In considering 
        response capacity, the Director shall include--
                  (A) the ability of affected nations to effectively 
                detect and manage emerging infectious diseases and a 
                possible transnational pandemic;
                  (B) the role and capacity of international 
                organizations and nongovernmental organizations to 
                respond to emerging infectious disease and a possible 
                pandemic, and their ability to coordinate with affected 
                and donor nations; and
                  (C) the effectiveness of current international 
                frameworks, agreements, and health systems to respond 
                to emerging infectious diseases and a possible 
                transnational pandemic.
          (5) Form.--The briefing under paragraph (2) may be 
        classified.

SEC. 2723. ANNUAL REPORT ON MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ELEMENTS 
                    OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND OTHER ENTITIES OF THE 
                    UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REGARDING SIGNIFICANT 
                    OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OR POLICY.

  Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017 (50 U.S.C. 3313) is amended--
          (1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
          (2) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:
  ``(a) In General.--Each year, concurrent with the annual budget 
request submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of 
title 31, United States Code, each head of an element of the 
intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report that lists each memorandum of understanding or 
other agreement regarding significant operational activities or policy 
entered into during the most recently completed fiscal year between or 
among such element and any other entity of the United States 
Government.
  ``(b) Provision of Documents.--Each head of an element of an 
intelligence community who receives a request from the Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives for a copy of a memorandum 
of understanding or other document listed in a report submitted by the 
head under subsection (a) shall submit to such committee the requested 
copy as soon as practicable after receiving such request.''.

SEC. 2724. STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ENCRYPTING UNCLASSIFIED WIRELINE 
                    AND WIRELESS TELEPHONE CALLS.

  (a) Study Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
complete a study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline 
and wireless telephone calls between personnel in the intelligence 
community.
  (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date on which the 
Director completes the study required by subsection (a), the Director 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on 
the Director's findings with respect to such study.

SEC. 2725. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON HIRING AND 
                    RETENTION OF MINORITY EMPLOYEES.

  (a) Expansion of Period of Report.--Subsection (a) of section 114 of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3050) is amended by 
inserting ``and the preceding 5 fiscal years'' after ``fiscal year''.
  (b) Clarification on Disaggregation of Data.--Subsection (b) of such 
section is amended, in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking 
``disaggregated data by category of covered person from each element of 
the intelligence community'' and inserting ``data, disaggregated by 
category of covered person and by element of the intelligence 
community,''.

SEC. 2726. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LOAN REPAYMENT AND RELATED 
                    PROGRAMS.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) there should be established, through the issuing of an 
        Intelligence Community Directive or otherwise, an intelligence 
        community-wide program for student loan repayment, student loan 
        forgiveness, financial counseling, and related matters, for 
        employees of the intelligence community;
          (2) creating such a program would enhance the ability of the 
        elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire, and 
        retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect to 
        mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions;
          (3) such a program, including with respect to eligibility 
        requirements, should be designed so as to maximize the ability 
        of the elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire, 
        and retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect 
        to mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions; and
          (4) to the extent possible, such a program should be uniform 
        throughout the intelligence community and publicly promoted by 
        each element of the intelligence community to both current 
        employees of the element as well as to prospective employees of 
        the element.
  (b) Report on Potential Intelligence Community-wide Program.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
        Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of the elements of 
        the intelligence community and the heads of any other 
        appropriate department or agency of the Federal Government, 
        shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
        report on potentially establishing and carrying out an 
        intelligence community-wide program for student loan repayment, 
        student loan forgiveness, financial counseling, and related 
        matters, as described in subsection (a).
          (2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall 
        include, at a minimum, the following:
                  (A) A description of the financial resources that the 
                elements of the intelligence community would require to 
                establish and initially carry out the program specified 
                in paragraph (1).
                  (B) A description of the practical steps to establish 
                and carry out such a program.
                  (C) The identification of any legislative action the 
                Director determines necessary to establish and carry 
                out such a program.
  (c) Annual Reports on Established Programs.--
          (1) Covered programs defined.--In this subsection, the term 
        ``covered programs'' means any loan repayment program, loan 
        forgiveness program, financial counseling program, or similar 
        program, established pursuant to title X of the National 
        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) or any other 
        provision of law that may be administered or used by an element 
        of the intelligence community.
          (2) Annual reports required.--Not less frequently than once 
        each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
        to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
        covered programs. Each such report shall include, with respect 
        to the period covered by the report, the following:
                  (A) The number of personnel from each element of the 
                intelligence community who used each covered program.
                  (B) The total amount of funds each element expended 
                for each such program.
                  (C) A description of the efforts made by each element 
                to promote each covered program pursuant to both the 
                personnel of the element of the intelligence community 
                and to prospective personnel.

SEC. 2727. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) Correcting Long-standing Material Weaknesses.--Section 368 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 110-
259; 50 U.S.C. 3051 note) is hereby repealed.
  (b) Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group.--Section 
210D of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124k) is amended--
          (1) by striking subsection (c); and
          (2) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as 
        subsections (c) through (h), respectively; and
          (3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
                  (A) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and 
                inserting a period; and
                  (B) by striking paragraph (9).
  (c) Inspector General Report.--Section 8H of the Inspector General 
Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
          (1) by striking subsection (g); and
          (2) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as subsections 
        (g) and (h), respectively.

SEC. 2728. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORT ON 
                    SENIOR EXECUTIVES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                    NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

  (a) Senior Executive Service Position Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``Senior Executive Service position'' has the meaning given that 
term in section 3132(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, and includes 
any position above the GS-15, step 10, level of the General Schedule 
under section 5332 of such title.
  (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
number of Senior Executive Service positions in the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence.
  (c) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (b) shall include 
the following:
          (1) The number of required Senior Executive Service positions 
        for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
          (2) Whether such requirements are reasonably based on the 
        mission of the Office.
          (3) A discussion of how the number of the Senior Executive 
        Service positions in the Office compare to the number of senior 
        positions at comparable organizations.
  (d) Cooperation.--The Director of National Intelligence shall provide 
to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community any information 
requested by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that 
is necessary to carry out this section by not later than 14 calendar 
days after the date on which the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community makes such request.

SEC. 2729. BRIEFING ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OFFERING 
                    PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO SOURCES AND COOPERATORS.

  Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to 
the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the ability of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to offer, as an inducement to 
assisting the Bureau, permanent residence within the United States to 
foreign individuals who are sources or cooperators in 
counterintelligence or other national security-related investigations. 
The briefing shall address the following:
          (1) The extent to which the Bureau may make such offers, 
        whether independently or in conjunction with other agencies and 
        departments of the United States Government, including a 
        discussion of the authorities provided by section 101(a)(15)(S) 
        of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
        1101(a)(15)(S)), section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency 
        Act (50 U.S.C. 3508), and any other provision of law under 
        which the Bureau may make such offers.
          (2) An overview of the policies and operational practices of 
        the Bureau with respect to making such offers.
          (3) The sufficiency of such policies and practices with 
        respect to inducing individuals to cooperate with, serve as 
        sources for such investigations, or both.
          (4) Whether the Director recommends any legislative actions 
        to improve such policies and practices, particularly with 
        respect to the counterintelligence efforts of the Bureau.

SEC. 2730. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF NORTH KOREA REVENUE SOURCES.

  (a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
Research and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence 
and Analysis, shall produce an intelligence assessment of the revenue 
sources of the North Korean regime. Such assessment shall include 
revenue from the following sources:
          (1) Trade in coal, iron, and iron ore.
          (2) The provision of fishing rights to North Korean 
        territorial waters.
          (3) Trade in gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper, 
        silver, nickel, zinc, or rare earth minerals, and other stores 
        of value.
          (4) Trade in textiles.
          (5) Sales of conventional defense articles and services.
          (6) Sales of controlled goods, ballistic missiles, and other 
        associated items.
          (7) Other types of manufacturing for export, as the Director 
        of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
          (8) The exportation of workers from North Korea in a manner 
        intended to generate significant revenue, directly or 
        indirectly, for use by the government of North Korea.
          (9) The provision of nonhumanitarian goods (such as food, 
        medicine, and medical devices) and services by other countries.
          (10) The provision of services, including banking and other 
        support, including by entities located in the Russian 
        Federation, China, and Iran.
          (11) Online commercial activities of the Government of North 
        Korea, including online gambling.
          (12) Criminal activities, including cyber-enabled crime and 
        counterfeit goods.
  (b) Elements.--The assessment required under subsection (a) shall 
include an identification of each of the following:
          (1) The sources of North Korea's funding.
          (2) Financial and non-financial networks, including supply 
        chain management, transportation, and facilitation, through 
        which North Korea accesses the United States and international 
        financial systems and repatriates and exports capital, goods, 
        and services; and
          (3) the global financial institutions, money services 
        business, and payment systems that assist North Korea with 
        financial transactions.
  (c) Submittal to Congress.--Upon completion of the assessment 
required under subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a copy of 
such assessment.

SEC. 2731. REPORT ON POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES BY 
                    TERRORIST ACTORS.

  (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Stop Terrorist 
Use of Virtual Currencies Act''.
  (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with 
the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to Congress a report on the 
possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist actors. Such 
report shall include the following elements:
          (1) An assessment of the means and methods by which 
        international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of 
        terrorism use virtual currencies.
          (2) An assessment of the use by terrorist organizations and 
        State sponsors of terrorism of virtual currencies compared to 
        the use by such organizations and States of other forms of 
        financing to support operations, including an assessment of the 
        collection posture of the intelligence community on the use of 
        virtual currencies by such organizations and States.
          (3) A description of any existing legal impediments that 
        inhibit or prevent the intelligence community from collecting 
        information on or helping prevent the use of virtual currencies 
        by international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of 
        terrorism and an identification of any gaps in existing law 
        that could be exploited for illicit funding by such 
        organizations and States.
  (c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

                       Subtitle C--Other Matters

SEC. 2741. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.

  Section 710(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 
(Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note) is amended by striking 
``December 31, 2018'' and inserting ``December 31, 2028''.

SEC. 2742. TECHNICAL AND CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
                    ACT OF 1947.

  (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents at the beginning of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended--
          (1) by inserting after the item relating to section 2 the 
        following new item:

``Sec. 3. Definitions.'';

          (2) by striking the item relating to section 107;
          (3) by striking the item relating to section 113B and 
        inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology, 
engineering, or mathematics positions.'';

          (4) by striking the items relating to sections 202, 203, 204, 
        208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, and 214; and
          (5) by inserting after the item relating to section 311 the 
        following new item:

``Sec. 312. Repealing and saving provisions.''.

  (b) Other Technical Corrections.--Such Act is further amended--
          (1) in section 102A--
                  (A) in subparagraph (G) of paragraph (1) of 
                subsection (g), by moving the margins of such 
                subparagraph 2 ems to the left; and
                  (B) in paragraph (3) of subsection (v), by moving the 
                margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left;
          (2) in section 106--
                  (A) by inserting ``sec. 106.'' before ``(a)''; and
                  (B) in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (2) of 
                subsection (b), by moving the margins of such 
                subparagraph 2 ems to the left;
          (3) by striking section 107;
          (4) in section 108(c), by striking ``in both a classified and 
        an unclassified form'' and inserting ``to Congress in 
        classified form, but may include an unclassified summary'';
          (5) in section 112(c)(1), by striking ``section 103(c)(7)'' 
        and inserting ``section 102A(i)'';
          (6) by amending section 201 to read as follows:

``SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

  ``Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this Act 
or other provisions of law, the provisions of title 5, United States 
Code, shall be applicable to the Department of Defense.'';
          (7) in section 205, by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) 
        as subsections (a) and (b), respectively;
          (8) in section 206, by striking ``(a)'';
          (9) in section 207, by striking ``(c)'';
          (10) in section 308(a), by striking ``this Act'' and 
        inserting ``sections 2, 101, 102, 103, and 303 of this Act'';
          (11) by redesignating section 411 as section 312;
          (12) in section 503--
                  (A) in paragraph (5) of subsection (c)--
                          (i) by moving the margins of such paragraph 2 
                        ems to the left; and
                          (ii) by moving the margins of subparagraph 
                        (B) of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
                  (B) in paragraph (2) of subsection (d), by moving the 
                margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
          (13) in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) 
        of section 504, by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 
        ems to the right.

SEC. 2743. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.

  (a) National Nuclear Security Administration Act.--
          (1) Clarification of functions of the administrator for 
        nuclear security.--Subsection (b) of section 3212 of the 
        National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 
        2402(b)) is amended--
                  (A) by striking paragraphs (11) and (12); and
                  (B) by redesignating paragraphs (13) through (19) as 
                paragraphs (11) through (17), respectively.
          (2) Counterintelligence programs.--Section 3233(b) of the 
        National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 
        2423(b)) is amended--
                  (A) by striking ``Administration'' and inserting 
                ``Department''; and
                  (B) by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``the 
                Office of''.
  (b) Atomic Energy Defense Act.--Section 4524(b)(2) of the Atomic 
Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended by inserting 
``Intelligence and'' after ``The Director of''.
  (c) National Security Act of 1947.--Paragraph (2) of section 106(b) 
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is 
amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and 
        Counterintelligence'' after ``Office of Intelligence'';
          (2) by striking subparagraph (F); and
          (3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as 
        subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively.

SEC. 2744. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURES OF 
                    CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Adversary foreign government.--The term ``adversary 
        foreign government'' means the government of any of the 
        following foreign countries:
                  (A) North Korea.
                  (B) Iran.
                  (C) China.
                  (D) Russia.
                  (E) Cuba.
          (2) Covered classified information.--The term ``covered 
        classified information'' means classified information that 
        was--
                  (A) collected by an element of the intelligence 
                community; or
                  (B) provided by the intelligence service or military 
                of a foreign country to an element of the intelligence 
                community.
          (3) Established intelligence channels.--The term 
        ``established intelligence channels'' means methods to exchange 
        intelligence to coordinate foreign intelligence relationships, 
        as established pursuant to law by the Director of National 
        Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
        the Director of the National Security Agency, or other head of 
        an element of the intelligence community.
          (4) Individual in the executive branch.--The term 
        ``individual in the executive branch'' means any officer or 
        employee of the executive branch, including individuals--
                  (A) occupying a position specified in article II of 
                the Constitution;
                  (B) appointed to a position by an individual 
                described in subparagraph (A); or
                  (C) serving in the civil service or the Senior 
                Executive Service (or similar service for senior 
                executives of particular departments or agencies).
  (b) Findings.--Congress finds that section 502 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires elements of the 
intelligence community to keep the congressional intelligence 
committees ``fully and currently informed'' about all ``intelligence 
activities'' of the United States, and to ``furnish to the 
congressional intelligence committees any information or material 
concerning intelligence activities * * * which is requested by either 
of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its 
authorized responsibilities.''.
  (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
        U.S.C. 3092), together with other intelligence community 
        authorities, obligates an element of the intelligence community 
        to submit to the congressional intelligence committees written 
        notification, by not later than 7 days after becoming aware, 
        that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed 
        covered classified information to an official of an adversary 
        foreign government using methods other than established 
        intelligence channels; and
          (2) each such notification should include--
                  (A) the date and place of the disclosure of 
                classified information covered by the notification;
                  (B) a description of such classified information;
                  (C) identification of the individual who made such 
                disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure 
                was made; and
                  (D) a summary of the circumstances of such 
                disclosure.

SEC. 2745. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONSIDERATION OF ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES 
                    WHEN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT TO PROVIDE VISAS TO 
                    FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS TO BE ACCREDITED TO A UNITED 
                    NATIONS MISSION IN THE UNITED STATES.

  It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State, in 
considering whether or not to provide a visa to a foreign individual to 
be accredited to a United Nations mission in the United States, should 
consider--
          (1) known and suspected intelligence activities, espionage 
        activities, including activities constituting precursors to 
        espionage, carried out by the individual against the United 
        States, foreign allies of the United States, or foreign 
        partners of the United States; and
          (2) the status of an individual as a known or suspected 
        intelligence officer for a foreign adversary.

    Amend the title so as to read:
    A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2018, 
2019, and 2020 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

                                Purpose

    The purpose of H.R. 3494 is to authorize the intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government for Fiscal Years (FY) 2018, 2019, and 2020.

                 Classified Annex and Committee Intent

    The classified annex to this report includes the classified 
schedule of authorizations and associated explanatory and 
directive language. The classified schedule of authorizations 
is incorporated directly into the legislation by Sections 102 
and 2102 of the bill. It is the Committee's intent that 
elements of the Intelligence Community shall strictly comply 
with all Committee direction and other guidance set forth in 
the classified annex.
    The classified annex and classified schedule of 
authorizations have been made available for review by all 
Members of the House of Representatives, on conditions set by 
the Committee at the time of its consideration of H.R. 3494.

                       Scope of Committee Review

    The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities within the jurisdiction of the Committee, 
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the 
Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the Homeland Security 
Intelligence Program (HSIP), and the Information Systems 
Security Program (ISSP). The NIP consists of all activities of 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), as 
well as intelligence, intelligence-related, and 
counterintelligence activities conducted by: the Central 
Intelligence Agency; the Department of Defense, including the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National 
Reconnaissance Office, and certain activities of the 
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Department of 
Energy; the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration; the 
Department of Homeland Security, including the U.S. Coast Guard 
and intelligence elements of DHS; Department of State; and the 
Department of the Treasury. The Committee has exclusive or 
concurrent legislative, authorizing, and oversight jurisdiction 
of these activities--and exclusive jurisdiction to study the 
sources and methods of the Intelligence Community.

         Committee Statement, Views, and Unclassified Direction

    H.R. 3494, the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2020 
(the Act) authorizes the activities of, and funding for, the 17 
agencies that comprise the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). 
Because most of the intelligence budget involves classified 
programs, the bulk of the Committee's recommendations each year 
are found in the classified annex accompanying the bill.
    The Act's unclassified legislative text is divided into two 
divisions: Division A and Division B. Division A contains the 
FY20 Intelligence Authorization Act. Division B contains the 
FY18 and FY19 Intelligence Authorization Acts. Unclassified 
direction for both Division A and Division B is set out below.

   Unclassified Direction to Accompany Division A: The Intelligence 
                 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020


Increasing Data Security

    The Committee is aware the Intelligence Community (IC) 
faces challenges while trying to balance mission and enterprise 
needs with IT modernization, including the migration of data 
and applications to the cloud. With this in mind, the Committee 
encourages the IC to identify and implement technologies that 
increase the security posture of data and workloads and reduce 
cyber risks.
    The Committee further recommends that:
          1. IC elements identify, develop, and implement tools 
        for bi-directional data migration and division 
        interoperability between data center and cloud 
        environments;
          2. these tools include, but not be limited to, 
        encryption of data while both at rest and in motion, 
        and micro-segmentation of networks and workloads; and
          3. IC elements prioritize shifting resources towards 
        automation as a way to respond more quickly to cyber 
        threats.

Anonymous Annual Survey Regarding Workplace Climate

    Intelligence Community elements obtain mission-critical 
information from the results of anonymous, annual surveys of 
their employees, on issues related to workplace climate and 
retention. As necessary as they are to the elements' own 
activities, survey results are also vital to the Committee's 
continuing oversight of elements' efforts to address workplace 
climate and retention issues, and to propose legislative and 
other remedies where appropriate.
    The need for reliable information is especially acute with 
respect to sexual harassment and discrimination, given that--
established policy and legal protections notwithstanding--an 
employee may fear that directly raising concerns about such 
matters risks exposing the employee to retaliatory personnel, 
security clearance, or other actions. The anonymous survey 
affords the element, and the committee, a mechanism for 
inquiring further about the extent of this well-documented 
chilling effect against reporting; and about the effectiveness 
(or not) of ongoing programs to uncover and stamp out sexual 
harassment, discrimination, and other illegal and/or 
inappropriate activities at the workplace.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that no later than 180 
days after enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence must certify in writing to the congressional 
intelligence committees that:
          (1) at least once a year, each element of the 
        Intelligence Community submits a survey to its 
        employees regarding workplace climate and retention 
        matters, and affords employees completing such surveys 
        the option to remain anonymous;
          (2) such survey includes questions regarding 
        employees' experiences with sexual assault, 
        discrimination, harassment, including sexual 
        harassment, and related retaliation, including, at a 
        minimum, the following questions:
                  a. Have you witnessed sexual harassment or 
                sexual assault?
                          i. Did you report it?
                          ii. If not, why not?
                  b. Have you experienced sexual harassment or 
                sexual assault?
                          i. Did you report it?
                          ii. If not, why not?
                  c. Have you experienced retaliation for 
                reporting harassment, discrimination, or sexual 
                assault?
                          i. Have you faced retribution for 
                        taking leave for family, medical, or 
                        other personal reasons?
                          ii. Did you fear retribution for 
                        taking leave?
          (3) each element includes in its survey questions 
        regarding the job series, position, age, gender, race 
        or ethnicity, field, and job location at the time of 
        the survey's completion;
          (4) each element tracks employees' responses 
        according to job series, position, age, gender, race or 
        ethnicity, field, and location at the time of the 
        survey's completion; and
          (5) each element reports the results of its survey 
        annually to the congressional intelligence committees.

Report to Congress on the Representation of Women and Minorities in the 
        Workforce

    The Committee continues to strongly support Intelligence 
Community (IC) efforts to identify, recruit, and retain a 
highly diverse and highly qualified workforce--including, in 
particular, its efforts to increase the representation within 
elements of the Intelligence Community of women and minorities.
    This is a data driven exercise. Bolstering and adjusting IC 
workforce diversity programs depends in part on the Committee's 
regularly obtaining current, detailed and reliable information, 
and about specific matters relevant to the broader subject of 
workforce diversity--such as rates and areas of promotion of 
women and minority employees. But some elements may produce 
such information only from time to time; others may make 
regular submissions to the Committee but include only general 
information.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that every six months, the 
head of each element of the Intelligence Community shall submit 
to the Committee a written report which shall include, at a 
minimum:
          1. The total number of women and minorities hired by 
        that element during the reporting period and a 
        calculation of that figure as a percentage of the 
        agency's total hiring for that period;
          2. The distribution of women and minorities at that 
        element by grade level and by job series in the 
        element's total workforce during the reporting period, 
        together with comparisons from the immediately 
        preceding two years;
          3. The number of women and minorities who applied for 
        promotion at the element and the final number selected 
        for promotion during the reporting period;
          4. The proportion of the total workforce of the 
        element occupied by each group or class protected by 
        law, as of the last day of the reporting period;
          5. The numbers of minorities and women serving in 
        positions at the element requiring advanced, 
        specialized training or certification and the 
        proportion of the workforce those groups occupy; and
    To the extent that such element deploys civilian employees 
to hazardous duty locations, the number of women and minority 
employees who departed government service subsequent to a 
deployment undertaken by an employee in the previous two years. 
Report on Geospatial Commercial Activities for Basic and 
Applied Research and Development
    The Committee directs the Director of NGA, in coordination 
with the DNI, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, within 
90 days of enactment of this Act, to submit to the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees a report on 
the feasibility, risks, costs, and benefits of providing the 
private sector and academia, on a need-driven and limited 
basis--consistent with the protection of sources and methods, 
as well as privacy and civil liberties--access to data in the 
possession of the NGA for the purpose of assisting the efforts 
of the private sector and academia in basic research, applied 
research, data transfers, and the development of automation, 
artificial intelligence, and associated algorithms. Such report 
shall include:
          1. Identification of any additional authorities that 
        the Director of NGA would require to provide the 
        private sector and academia with access to relevant 
        data on a need-driven and limited basis, consistent 
        with applicable laws and procedures relating to the 
        protection of sources, methods, privacy and civil 
        liberties; and
          2. Market research to assess the commercial and 
        academic interest in such data and determine likely 
        private-sector entities and institutions of higher 
        education interested in public-private partnerships 
        relating to such data.

NRO Contracting Restrictions

    The Committee continues to be very concerned that NRO 
imposes unnecessary contractual restrictions that prohibits or 
discourages a contractor from contacting or meeting with a 
congressional intelligence committee or intelligence committee 
Member offices. Therefore, the Committee directs NRO to remove 
all restrictions that impacts contractors from contacting or 
meeting with the congressional intelligence committees or 
member offices in all current and future contracts to include 
pre-coordination with executive branch agencies.

Enhancing Automation at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

    The Committee strongly supports efforts to leverage 
commercial advances in automation of imagery such as electro-
optical, infrared, Wide Area Motion Imagery (WAMI), Full Motion 
Video (FMV), and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) products to 
reduce manual processing and improve information flow to users. 
However, the Committee is concerned that NGA does not dedicate 
adequate resources to integrate new automation techniques which 
have resulted in years of research into the issue, but limited 
operation gains during day to day imagery processing.
    Therefore, the Committee directs NGA, within 90 days of 
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
and defense committees on an updated plan to reduce manual 
processing of imagery such as electro-optical, infrared, WAMI, 
FMV, and SAR to improve information flow to users. The briefing 
shall also address:
          1. NGA's strategy to leverage commercial advances;
          2. The various GEOINT automated exploitation 
        development programs across the National System for 
        Geospatial-Intelligence, and the associated funding and 
        specific purpose of said programs;
          3. Any similar efforts by government entities outside 
        the National System for Geospatial-Intelligence of 
        which NGA is aware; and
          4. Which of these efforts are duplicative?

Redundant Organic Software Development

    The Committee is concerned that NGA is developing software 
solutions that are otherwise available for purchase on the 
commercial market. This practice most always, increases the 
time it takes to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter; 
increases the overall cost of the solution through expensive 
operational and maintenance costs; and undermines the U.S. 
software industrial base.
    Therefore, the Committee directs NGA, within 60 days of 
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
committees, to identify all NGA developed software programs and 
explain why they are being developed organically instead of 
leveraging commercially available products.

Critical Skills Recruiting for Automation

    Although cutting edge sensors have provided the 
Intelligence Community and Department of Defense with exquisite 
imagery, full motion video (FMV), and wide area motion imagery 
(WAMI), intelligence analysts are unable to keep pace with the 
volume of data being generated. This demands a transformation 
in the way the intelligence enterprise processes, organizes, 
and presents data. For that reason, the committee fully 
supports the NGA's efforts to attract, recruit, and retain a 
highly competent workforce that can acquire and integrate new 
data automation tools.
    Therefore, the Committee directs NGA, within 60 days of 
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
and defense committees on NGA's efforts to recruit critical 
skills such as mathematicians, data scientists, and software 
engineers that possess critical skills needed to support NGA's 
objectives in automation.

Common Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

    The Committee has become aware of several major impediments 
for companies to perform work for agencies and organizations 
like the NRO. For example, businesses without ownership of a 
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) find it 
very difficult to perform classified work. Additionally, these 
small businesses are challenged with basic obstacles such as 
becoming aware of classified work opportunities because it is 
difficult to obtain access to the IC's and DoD's classified 
marketplaces such as the Acquisition Resource Center (ARC). 
Construction and accreditation of SCIF spaces is cost-
prohibitive for my small business and non-traditional 
government contractors. Additionally, construction timeline 
often exceeds the period of performance of a contract.
    A modern trend for innovative and non-traditional 
government contractors is the increase use of co-working space 
environments. Additionally, public and private entities are 
partnering to create emerging regional innovation hubs to help 
identify technology solutions and products in the private 
sector that can be utilized by the IC and DoD. These innovation 
hubs currently produce an agile, neutral, but largely 
unclassified development environment.
    Therefore, the Committee directs DNI, within 90 days of 
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
committees on the following:
          1. Steps necessary to establish new `Common SCIFs' in 
        areas of high demand;
          2. What approaches allow for SCIF spaces to be 
        certified and accredited outside of a traditional 
        contractual arrangement;
          3. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
        issuing Department of Defense Contract Security 
        Specification (DD Form 254s) to ``Facilities'' as 
        opposed to ``Contracts'';
          4. Options for classified co-use and shared workspace 
        environments such as: innovation, incubation, catalyst, 
        and accelerator environments;
          5. Pros and cons for public, private, government, or 
        combination owned classified neutral facilities; and
          6. Any other opportunities to support hose without 
        ownership of a SCIF effective access to a neutral SCIF.

Improving Use of the Unclassified Marketplaces

    Another area where the Committee has become aware of major 
impediments for companies to perform work for agencies and 
organizations like the NRO are unclassified marketplaces such 
as the Acquisition Resource Center (ARC). Instead of posting 
data to unclassified marketplaces, unclassified NRO postings 
often refer to the classified side for critical yet 
unclassified information. If the NRO is serious about embracing 
commercial innovation, unclassified marketplace postings should 
remain on the unclassified side.
    Therefore, the Committee directs NRO, within 90 days of 
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
committees on options for improving the unclassified 
marketplace process.

Satellite Servicing

    No later than one year after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Director of national Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall jointly 
provide the Intelligence Community and to the congressional 
defense committees upon request, a briefing detailing the 
costs, risks, and operation benefits of leveraging commercial 
satellite servicing capabilities for national security 
satellite systems. The briefing shall include the following:
          1. A prioritized list, with a rationale, of 
        operational and planned assets of the Intelligence 
        Community that could be enhanced by satellite servicing 
        missions.
          2. The costs, risks, and benefits of integrating 
        satellite servicing capabilities as part of operational 
        resilience.
          3. Potential strategies that could allow future 
        national security space systems to leverage commercial 
        in-orbit servicing capabilities where appropriate and 
        feasible.

Commercial RF Mapping and SAR

    U.S. commercial companies are now offering space-based 
geolocation and GEOINT analysis of radio frequency (RF) 
emitters as well as synthetic aperture radar (SAR) products. 
These companies can identify, locate, and analyze previously 
undetected activity, providing new insights for U.S. national 
security and defense. The Intelligence Community currently has 
contracts that leverage commercial electro-optical satellites, 
however it does not have a program in place to take full 
advantage of these emerging commercial space-based RF GEOINT 
and SAR capabilities.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the NRO and NGA to brief 
the committee on how it will leverage these commercial 
companies in the FY20 and beyond timeframe, to include funding 
for, as well as test and evaluation efforts.

Commercial Remote Sensing

    The Committee supports efforts to establish a light-touch 
regulatory structure that enables the rapidly evolving 
commercial space-based imagery, radio-frequency (RF) sensing 
and radar industry markets promote U.S. leadership in these 
areas. However, the Committee also supports the needs of the 
USG to protect both IC and DoD personnel and assets. The 
Committee believes there can be a balance that supports both 
national security interests and the promotion of U.S. 
innovation and leadership.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense, to brief the Committee by 1 Dec 
2019, on efforts that help address this balance and which 
streamline the IC and DoD involvement in the rapidly evolving 
U.S. commercial space-based imagery, radio-frequency (RF) 
sensing and radar industries.

Deception detection techniques

    The U.S. Government does not have sufficient security 
screening capabilities available to determine deception in 
individuals that intend to harm the United States. Polygraph 
has been the most effective investigative tool at our disposal 
to detect deception, but the cost and time required to 
administer a polygraph examination is a major cause for 
security clearance backlogs, and often limits the frequency of 
periodic examinations to every 5-7 years. Entities within DoD/
IC including DIA, SOCOM, NGA, DSS, Air Force and others have 
expressed a desire to begin piloting new systems such as ocular 
deception detection systems. However, progress is being 
hindered by DoD Directive 5210.91 and ODNI Security Agent 
Directive 2, which direct some oversight of new deception 
detection technologies to the DoD National Center of 
Credibility Assessment (NCCA), which does not have sufficient 
budget or resources to expeditiously evaluate non-polygraph 
technologies.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI in coordination 
with the DoD a briefing on what steps they are taking to ensure 
pilot programs are established to evaluate these new 
technologies to help reduce our backlog, improve efficiency and 
reduce overall cost. Pilots program shall evaluate current and 
emerging technologies to efficiently and rapidly verify the 
accuracy and truthfulness of statements of candidates for 
employment within the DoD/IC, including for interim security 
clearances, for periodic screening of cleared DoD/IC personnel, 
to screen foreign national collaborators and contractors 
overseas to prevent Green-on-Blue attacks, for immigration 
screening and for other purposes.

IC Industry Rotational Program

    The Education With Industry (EWI) Program is a highly 
selective, competitive, non-degree educational assignment 
within an industry related to the fellow's career field. EWI 
supports the USAF mission by providing Air Force officers and 
civil service employees with on-the-job education, experience, 
and exposure to private sectors of the economy or other 
government agencies not available through formal courses of 
instruction.
    The EWI program is designed to improve the technical, 
professional, and management competencies of participating 
students by partnering with top tier public and private sector 
innovative companies. During the ten-month tour, students are 
embedded within an industry team to meet their career specific 
desired learning objectives. Through hands on exposure to 
industry best practices, students develop the necessary 
competencies, skills, knowledge, and abilities to build, 
sustain and retain a mission-ready workforce. In addition to 
this, students learn how to better partner with industry, thus 
developing Air Force leaders with greater business acumen and 
empathy. The ultimate goal of the program is to provide 
students the expertise to implement innovative practices when 
they return to the Air Force as well as understand how to 
better partner with industry in the future. Upon completion, 
graduates are assigned to Air Force duty consistent with the 
education. Unfortunately, the IC does not leverage this program 
to its fullest extent.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to establish a 
more robust EWI program for IC personnel. This would entail 
sending IC technically skilled ambassadors (GS11-GS14) to be 
embedded in U.S. companies for a one to two-year rotation. The 
Committee further directs the DNI to brief the Committee on its 
plans by 1 December 2019.

List of Foreign Entities That Pose a Threat to Critical Technologies

    The Committee directs the Director of National 
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to 
identify, compose, and maintain a list of foreign entities, 
including governments, corporations, nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an 
entity, that the Director determines pose a threat of espionage 
with respect to critical technologies or research projects, 
including research conducted at institutions of higher 
education.
    Maintenance of this list will be critical to ensuring the 
security of the most sensitive projects relating to U.S. 
national security, such as defense and intelligence-related 
research projects. The initial list shall be available to the 
head of each qualified agency funding applicable projects and 
will include the following entities already identified as 
threatening: Huawei Technologies Company, ZTE Corporation, 
Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital 
Technology Company, Dahua Technology Company, Kaspersky Lab. 
The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of 
Defense, or a delegate from both agencies, shall brief the 
findings to the House Committee on Armed Services and the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence no later than six 
months following the enactment of this provision.

Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operational 
        Assessment

    The Committee recognizes the critical role that Department 
of Defense airborne intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities play supporting military 
operations worldwide. The committee understands that 
responsive, persistent, and precise collection of operational 
information from the air will continue to provide an asymmetric 
and decisive advantage to operational commanders and tactical 
forces. The committee also recognizes that to meet the 
objectives described in the National Defense Strategy, the 
Department of Defense must modernize and adapt its ISR 
operating concepts and joint force structure to ensure it can 
maneuver, fight, and prevail in highly contested environments. 
However, the committee notes that there is an apparent lack of 
an integrated joint approach to the Department's ISR 
modernization strategy. The committee is concerned by recent 
military service decisions to reduce certain airborne ISR 
collection platforms without a clear transition plan or 
approved risk mitigation strategy, despite facing significant 
deficiencies in collection capacity.
    The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a 
stress test of joint intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance enterprise capabilities required to achieve the 
operational objectives of its highest priority global campaign 
plans and evaluate the capability and capacity of existing 
service programs of record to satisfy joint force requirements 
for critical categories of intelligence. The committee also 
directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the 
House Committee on Armed Services and House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence by March 1, 2020, on the results of 
this stress test. The briefing shall include capability and 
capacity shortfalls in platforms, sensors, and personnel, as 
well as address proposed risk mitigation strategies to address 
critical deficiencies.

Protection of National Security Research

    The Committee believes that institutes of higher learning, 
laboratories, and other entities and organizations play 
critical roles in advancing national security within the U.S. 
science and technology ecosystem that is charged with 
delivering the best capabilities to the warfighter in the near, 
mid, and long-term. The Committee understands that near-peer 
competitors such as China and Russia attempt to exploit and 
benefit from the open and collaborative global research 
environment created by the Reagan Administration's National 
Security Decision Directive 189 on the National Policy on the 
transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information, 
which established that the products of ``fundamental 
research''--defined as ``basic and applied research in science 
and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published 
and shared''--should re-main unrestricted.
    The Committee is also aware that academia is not always 
kept apprised by the interagency of a complete picture of 
potential activities and threats in the research community, 
such as improper technology transfer, intellectual property 
theft, and cyber-attacks directly affiliated with nation-state 
governments. Elsewhere in this bill and report, the Committee 
includes measures to promote increased information sharing 
across the interagency and with academia.
    The Committee therefore directs the Secretary of Defense to 
provide to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 
House of Representatives and Congressional Intelligence 
Committees, not later than January 1, 2020, a report listing 
Chinese and Russian academic institutions that have a history 
of improper technology transfer, intellectual property theft, 
cyber espionage, or operate under the direction of their 
respective armed forces or intelligence agencies. The report 
should be in unclassified form, though it may contain a 
classified annex.

Congressional Notification

    The Secretary of Defense maintains a responsibility to keep 
the congressional intelligence and defense committees fully and 
currently informed of all defense intelligence capabilities and 
activities to support DOD operational strategic requirements. 
The Committee is aware that the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence (USDI) issued a memorandum in January 2017 
providing guidance to defense intelligence components on the 
necessity of providing timely and accurate notification to 
Congress of all defense intelligence and counterintelligence 
activities.
    The Committee supports additional efforts to enhance the 
Department's ability to provide timely, comprehensive, and 
accurate congressional intelligence notification of 
intelligence and counterintelligence activities by the defense 
intelligence components listed in the January 2017 memorandum, 
to include; the Deputy Chief of staff for Intelligence, U.S. 
Army; Deputy Chief of staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and 
reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force; Director of Naval Intelligence, 
U.S. Navy; Directors of Intelligence, Combatant Commands; 
Director, NSA; Director, DIA; Director, NGA; Director, NRO; 
Director, Defense Security Service; and designated DOD 
officials as reporting officials for defense intelligence and 
counterintelligence.
    Therefore, the Committee directs each of the Defense 
Intelligence Components listed in the January 2017 memo to 
provide, in writing, their internal guidance and delineated 
compliance to the principles of timeliness of reporting, means 
of reporting, completeness and accuracy of reporting as well as 
to outline any restrictions, complications or limiting factors, 
in fully satisfying the direction and intent of the Defense 
Intelligence Component Reporting of Defense Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence Activities Memorandum. For those elements 
that are also IC elements, written explanation shall include 
relevant processes and coordination with the ODNI.
    The Committee further directs the USD(I) to provide a 
briefing to the intelligence and defense committees by October 
4, 2019, on DOD's current congressional notification policies 
and procedures regarding defense intelligence activities and 
support by defense intelligence components supporting DOD. The 
briefing shall include:
          1. Plans to strengthen this notification process by 
        the defense intelligence components, to include 
        notification of new and updated intelligence-sharing 
        arrangements and basic exchange and cooperation 
        agreements with second- and third-party international 
        allies and partners to support DOD requirements; and
          2. A description of current and planned coordination 
        efforts with the interagency, specifically the ODNI, to 
        include any dispute resolution processes in regard to 
        conflicting use of defense intelligence capabilities to 
        support defense priorities and objectives.

Strengthening the Integrity of the MIP

    The Committee recognizes the Department of Defense's (DOD) 
efforts to comply with the direction in the committee report 
accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2019 (H. Rept. 115-676) to review the Military 
Intel1igence Program (MIP) budget to more clearly define 
guidance about which programs, projects, or activities should 
be assigned to the MIP. The Committee supports the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's action to enhance DOD's 
ability to make more informed decisions to balance appropriate 
resourcing against program, projects, or activities on behalf 
of the Secretary of Defense, while strengthening the overall 
integrity of the MIP.

Reviewing the Integrated Defense Intelligence Priorities

    The committee notes that the Department of Defense is a 
major provider of intelligence capabilities to the intelligence 
community, as well as a major consumer of intelligence 
information. The committee is aware of the operational 
constraints on the joint force that using the National 
Intelligence Priorities Framework to guide the allocation of 
Defense Intelligence Enterprise assets presents, especially for 
those that are integral to warfighting functions. The committee 
is concerned that the Integrated Defense Intelligence 
Priorities (IDIP) activity is not providing the intelligence 
support to defense operations that section 922 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-
66) intended.
    Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence to provide a briefing to the House 
Committee on Armed Services and House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence by December 27, 2019, with the 
current status of the IDIP activity, how the IDIP highlights 
gaps in defense and national intelligence priorities, and the 
measures in place to mitigate these gaps. The briefing shall 
also include details on why the IDIP is distinct from the 
National Intelligence Priorities Framework, an activity in 
which IDIP customers currently participate. Finally, the 
briefing shall also include a recommendation on whether the 
Department of Defense will continue or suspend the IDIP 
requirement.

Section 804 Authority

    The Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Amendments Act 
provided DOD accelerated acquisition authority under Section 
804. This authority enhances the ability to streamline a number 
of processes within the acquisition structure.
    The Committee supports effective and efficient acquisition 
of military intelligence platforms, though wants to ensure this 
authority is being used in instances where it can be most 
effective.
    Therefore, the Committee directs DOD to provide a list of 
those acquisition programs funded in whole or in part with MIP 
that are utilizing authorities under Section 804. The list 
should be provided to the intelligence and defense committees 
by December 15, 2019.

Budget Track Presentation

    It is important the military services have visibility on 
all Congressional action which may impact their programs and 
platforms. The Committee supports a robust and continuing 
dialog with DOD on intelligence programs.
    The budget roll outs are an important inflection point in 
the dialog between the Congress and DOD. It has been the case 
that DOD and the Services have not had the complete picture of 
Congressional action and intent.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that budget presentation 
materials track action from all committees on jurisdiction, be 
they within the MIP or NIP. Materials should be updated as 
necessary and ready for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 budget cycle 
and presentations.

Comprehensive Assessment of the Roles, Responsibilities, and 
        Organization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
        for Intelligence

    The Committee recognizes the importance of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's (USD(I)) management and 
oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and commends 
the Under Secretary's continued efforts to mature the 
organization's support to the operational requirements and 
strategic priorities of the Secretary of Defense. However, the 
committee notes the shift in priorities and focus of the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), 
and potential impacts to the organization's ability to 
effectively execute oversight of the policy, processes, and 
procedures that guide the Department of Defense's intelligence 
organizations. The committee further acknowledges that the 
USD(I) is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all intelligence, 
intelligence-related, counterintelligence, and security 
matters, and is responsible for exercising authority, 
direction, and control over all associated defense intelligence 
organizations and activities.
    Since the establishment of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Intelligence (USD(I)) by the Bob Stump National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-314), 
the roles and responsibilities assigned to the position and 
office continue to evolve. In 2018, the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense augmented the responsibilities of USD(I) to include the 
protection of Department of Defense physical properties and 
personnel. Additionally, the committee further clarified the 
security related responsibilities of USD(I) in the John S. 
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 
(Public Law 115-232) to include enterprise-wide management and 
execution of the planning and resourcing for the personnel, 
physical, and industrial security components of the Department 
of Defense, as well as the protections required of Department 
classified information and controlled unclassified information. 
Most recently, in April 2019, the President directed the 
transfer of personnel background investigations from the 
National Background Investigations Bureau to the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), 
inclusive of the transition of associated operations, 
personnel, and resources.
    As a result, the Defense Security Service, an organization 
responsible to the USD(I), will be renamed the Defense 
Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) and will serve 
as the primary federal entity for conducting background 
investigations for the federal government. DCSA will also 
execute the responsibilities relating to continuous evaluation, 
insider threat programs, and any other responsibilities 
assigned to it by the Secretary of Defense. As such, the 
committee is interested in better understanding how these 
recent developments might impact the roles and responsibilities 
of OUSD(I), and the ability of the organization to execute 
objective oversight and management of the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise, as the organization continues to balance the range 
of priorities specified by the National Defense Strategy.
    Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General 
of the United States provide the congressional defense and 
intelligence committees with an assessment of the roles, 
missions, and responsibilities of Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Intelligence. The assessment should include 
details regarding USD(I)'s roles and responsibilities, if and 
how they have changed, and how the USD(I) addressed these 
changes; to what extent has the USD(I) developed processes for 
exercising authority, direction, and control over the Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise (DIE); actions the USD(I) has taken to 
adapt its approach to executing oversight and governance of the 
DIE, to include resource management across the aligned defense 
intelligence agencies; and to what extent the USD(I) has 
identified any misalignment of its roles and responsibilities 
regarding the DIE and efforts made to address such mismatch.
    The committee further directs the Comptroller General of 
the United States to provide a briefing to the House Committee 
on Armed Services and House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence on preliminary findings with a report to follow to 
the congressional defense and intelligence committees no later 
than April 30, 2020.

Development and Integration of Project MAVEN Services

    The Committee believes in the importance of developing 
artificial intelligence capabilities to enhance and augment 
execution of Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) activities 
in support of DOD priorities. Activities such as Project MAVEN 
are important efforts to modernize intelligence tradecraft and 
develop capabilities that can create efficiencies across the 
DIE and enhance effectiveness of defense operations. However, 
the Committee is concerned about the broad scope of Project 
MAVEN, and the totality of requirements increasingly levied 
against the activity, without a comprehensive understanding of 
the key milestones to track and measure progress and alignment 
of MAVEN accomplishments against evolving DOD capabilities and 
activities.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the USD(I) to provide a 
briefing to the congressional intelligence and defense 
committees by January 3, 2020 on Project MAVEN's strategy for 
tracking and aligning the activity's milestones against key DIE 
efforts, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency's Machine-
assisted Analytic Rapid-repository System (MARS) and the 
service-wide Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS), and 
continued development of Department of Defense advanced 
analytic tradecraft and foundational intelligence against 
advance weapons systems and capabilities.

Governance of Data and Service Acquisitions Supporting Defense 
        Intelligence Requirements

    The committee recognizes initiatives across the Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise to collect, analyze, and share data to 
support critical foundation intelligence mission needs through 
various modernization initiatives like Project Maven and the 
Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid-repository System (MARS). 
However, the committee is concerned there is a lack of 
coordination and alignment of individual activities ongoing 
throughout the enterprise.
    The committee lacks a comprehensive understanding of how 
data, information, and services procured in support of defense 
intelligence requirements are tracked, governed, and made 
available across the enterprise. The committee is concerned 
that as defense intelligence organizations move to cloud-based 
data management infrastructures, there is not enough emphasis 
on deconflicting these efforts to maximize investment and use 
across the enterprise and foreign partner coalitions. The 
committee notes that every effort should be made to ensure 
acquisition strategies that support these procurements make 
these products and services available to the entire enterprise, 
including U.S. allies and partners.
    Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence to provide a briefing to the House 
Committee on Armed Services and House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence not later than December 6, 2019, on 
an enterprise level strategy for data, information, and 
services acquisitions. The briefing shall detail a strategy to 
ensure these acquisitions are widely available across the 
Defense Intelligence Enterprise, thus reducing duplicative 
investments and creating efficiencies in the acquisition and 
capability management process.

MAVEN Senior Steering Group

    Project MAVEN is one of the leading US government programs 
leveraging commercial technology, however neither the MAVEN 
Senior Steering Group or the MAVEN Executive Steering Group 
have representatives from the commercial sector.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the MAVEN team to 
establish a position for a senior commercial executive as an 
advisor on the Senior Steering Group. The appointment shall be 
for no longer than a period of two years. Such individual shall 
comply with MAVEN conflict of interest protocols, file 
necessary and required documents, and may not maintain a 
financial interest in any company with a current MAVEN 
contract.

Investments in Scientific and Technological Intelligence

    The Committee remains interested in the continued efforts 
of the Department of Defense to improve scientific and 
technological intelligence (S&TI) capabilities and tradecraft 
across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. The Committee 
recognizes S&TI is critical to strategic competition with near-
peer competitors by ensuring comprehensive understanding of 
adversary capabilities and ability to inform development of 
joint force fifth-generation advanced weapons systems and other 
emerging technologies.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence in collaboration with the Director of 
the Defense Intelligence Agency, to provide a briefing to the 
House Committee on Armed Services and House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence by December 6, 2019, on the alignment 
of current and planned Defense Intelligence Enterprise S&TI 
investments and activities to Department of Defense operational 
and strategic requirements.
    The briefing shall also include information on how the 
Department of Defense will continue the maturation of S&TI 
capabilities and tradecraft across the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise.

Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program

    The Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program 
(TENCAP) services as the centralized lead to identify and 
execute national intelligence cross-agency solutions to 
evaluate, enhance, prototype, and transition technologies 
across the national intelligence enterprise into military 
service systems and architectures to create tactical 
intelligence effects. The Committee supports TENCAP and the 
flexibility these programs require to mature, but believes that 
DOD must develop metrics for measuring the impact of affiliated 
and incubated programs, to more accurately capture which 
activities and capabilities have successfully transitioned to 
programs of record and substantiate effectiveness of the joint 
force. Further, the Committee notes that failure is an 
intrinsic, and sometimes necessary component of the innovation 
process, and does not necessarily view failure to transition to 
a program of record as a negative issue.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the directors of 
the military service TENCAP offices, to provide a briefing to 
the intelligence and defense committees by October 29, 2019 on 
the plan to develop track, and evaluate metrics associated with 
the TENCAP program for those projects which transition to a 
program of record.

Intelligence Support to Defense Operations in the Information 
        Environment

    The committee supports Department of Defense efforts to 
improve capabilities and tradecraft to operate in the 
information environment. The committee is concerned about the 
Defense Intelligence Enterprise's (DIE) ability to provide the 
information operations community with all-source intelligence 
support, consistent with the support provided to operations in 
other domains.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Joint Staff 
Director for Intelligence and the Director of National 
Intelligence, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on 
Armed Services and House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence by November 1, 2019, on intelligence support to 
information operations. The briefing should include 
standardized defense intelligence lexicon for intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield for information operations, 
efforts to develop a process to ensure the full scope of 
emerging defense information operations threat requirements are 
structured to be addressed through the entirety of DIE 
capabilities, and how the Department perceives the future of 
defense operations in the information environment.
    The briefing shall also include a description of how the 
national intelligence community, through the National 
Intelligence Priorities Framework, will account for a more 
dynamic use of defense intelligence capabilities to augment and 
enhance support to Department of Defense operations in the 
information environment.

ROTC IC Recruitment Trial Program

    The Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program, 
with units or affiliates at approximately 1,600 U.S. colleges 
and universities, is DOD's largest commissioning source, 
providing approximately 6,500 new active duty officers to the 
military each year.
    Officer candidates enrolled in ROTC programs must meet all 
graduation requirements of their academic institutions, enroll 
in military, naval, or aerospace education courses, and attend 
summer military training, making them ideal candidates for IC 
placement. Currently, ROTC cadets only have the option to 
utilize their training by joining one of the military services. 
The Committee believes the government can find cost savings and 
provide a wider range of opportunities to ROTC recruits by 
leveraging the ROTC's existing training program for the IC.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the USDI, in coordination 
with ODNI, to conduct a feasibility study on creating a pathway 
for ROTC recruits to find job placement in the IC, on a 
reimbursable basis. The study should examine:
          1. Pros and cons of instituting an ROTC IC 
        recruitment pipeline;
          2. Approximate reimbursement cost per recruit; and
          3. Legislative requirements for program execution.
    The study results must be submitted via report to the 
intelligence and defense committees by December 15, 2019.

Explosive Ordinance Disposal Intelligence

    The Committee is concerned that the expertise of Explosive 
Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel is not adequately accessible 
and therefore, not sufficiently utilized by the Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise and IC to provide the combatant 
commands with the required intelligence to identify, combat, 
and deter violent extremism and other asymmetric threats.
    Explosive ordnance includes all munitions, improvised 
explosive devices, devices containing explosives, propellants, 
nuclear fission or fusion materials, biological, and chemical 
agents. The primary consumer of this information are military 
tactical explosive ordnance disposal units that employ the data 
for threat identification and neutralization. However, the 
required analysis to determine appropriate render-safe 
capabilities requires operational and strategic intelligence to 
process and analyze the data, and data management processes to 
promulgate the resulting information. The Committee believes 
DOD should modernize the processes and procedures to more 
comprehensively track, manage, and coordinate the capability 
and capacity of EOD intelligence within the IC and the DIE to 
support all levels of render-safe capabilities.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the DNI, to 
provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence and 
defense committees by March 6, 2020 on the capability and 
capacity of EOD intelligence expertise across the DIE and IC. 
The briefing shall include:
  1. An assessment of the coordination and integration of 
defense and national intelligence capabilities against EOD 
intelligence requirements, to include a mitigation strategy to 
address any identified gaps or deficiencies, information-
sharing challenges, or any other impediments to integration of 
EOD expertise across the defense and intelligence communities; 
and
  2. An assessment of the technical skills needed to address 
EOD intelligence requirements, while identifying any gaps or 
deficiencies in current personnel hiring and training 
structures, and a long-term plan to develop proficiency of EOD 
intelligence expertise in the defense and intelligence 
communities.

Information-Sharing Arrangements with India, Japan, and the Republic of 
        Korea

    International alliances and partnerships are critical to 
the pursuit and sustainment of the United States national 
security objectives, built upon foundations of shared values 
and intent. The Committee recognizes the importance of the 
Department of Defense sharing information with international 
allies and partners in support of the planning and execution of 
the National Defense Strategy, as allies and third-party 
international partners enhance strategic stability across the 
Department's purview while increasing effectiveness of 
operations. The Committee believes the mechanisms to share 
information across the ``Five Eyes'' alliance continue to 
mature through established exercises, exchange of personnel, 
and virtual data sharing, while that cooperation is potentially 
less robust with third-party partners.
    The Committee supports the roles and contributions of 
third-party partners such as India, Japan, and the Republic of 
Korea, and recognizes their ongoing contribution toward 
maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The 
Committee is interested in understanding the policies and 
procedures governing the collaboration and information sharing 
with India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the ``Five Eyes'' 
alliance, and if opportunities exist to strengthen those 
arrangements.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of 
National Intelligence, to provide a briefing to the House 
Committee on Armed Services and House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence by December 1, 2019, on the benefits, 
challenges, and risks of broadening the information-sharing 
mechanisms between India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the 
``Five Eyes'' alliance.

Transitioning the Function of Background Investigations to the 
        Department of Defense

    Presidential Executive Order 13869 transitions the 
background investigation functions of the Federal Government 
from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), National 
Background Investigations Bureau, to the Department of Defense, 
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency. The committee 
recognizes the importance of ensuring timely and efficient 
background investigations to overcome workforce staffing 
challenges of cleared individuals across the whole of 
government and private sector, and to vet personnel who come 
into contact with the Department's personnel, installations, 
and technology. The committee is aware of the temporary 
establishment of the Personnel Vetting Transformation Office in 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
to manage the transition of this activity from OPM to the 
Department and improve the processes and procedures related to 
vetting personnel for clearances across the whole of government 
and private sector.
    However, the Committee is concerned about the potential 
risks to personnel management and mission such a transfer may 
present, and believes that appropriate protections of civil 
liberties and privacy must be prioritized throughout the 
transition, through the implementation of modern and efficient 
vetting measures. The Committee recognizes the Department's 
leadership, through sharing best practices with the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, in reforming the vetting 
process using modern techniques such as continuous evaluation, 
and expects regular updates on the Department's progress in 
addressing the current background investigations backlog.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of 
the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, to provide 
a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services and House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by December 27, 
2019, on how the Department of Defense will transfer the 
background investigation mission and establish an effective 
personnel vetting capability to provide for the security of the 
Department, while maintaining the civil liberties and privacy 
protections of personnel under consideration to receive a 
clearance.

Language Capability and Capacity

    The Committee has long supported a robust Army training 
language capability and capacity and renews that support in 
light of the new National Defense Strategy and pivot to hard 
targets. As is the rest of DOD and the IC, the Army is 
challenged to meet the language requirement of 2+/2+ as set out 
by the National Language Board.
    Therefore, the Committee directs DOD to prioritize language 
capability and fully execute the 2+/2+ Plan requirement. The 
Committee further directs that OSDPR brief the committee on any 
limiting factors on implementing the 2+/2+ Plan and intended 
steps for mitigation which shall be briefed to the intelligence 
and defense committees by October 29, 2019.

Terrestrial Layer System

    The Committee has questions about what capabilities the TLS 
will incorporate and how the platform will balance its signals 
intelligence, electronic warfare, and cyber operations 
capabilities.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Army to provide a 
report and briefing on changes to the Army's doctrine, 
organization, training, material, leadership, education, 
personnel and facilities required to develop, procure and 
employ the Terrestrial Layer System. The report and briefing 
should be provided to the intelligence and defense committees 
by December 15, 2019.

Triton Multi-Intelligence Fleet

    Critical to the Triton unmanned aerial system is the 
milestone C update, which added multi-INT capability to the key 
system attributes. The FY 2020 funding supports aircraft and 
ground station kit procurements for the Triton Multi INT 
configuration and resources required to complete modification 
of the fleet to a Multi-INT capability.
    Regrettably, the retrofit to Multi-INT for Low rate initial 
production 1 and Low rate initial production 2 slipped from 3QT 
FY18 to 4th QT 19. This slip represents an unacceptable delay 
of crucial Multi-INT capability for the fleet, particularly in 
the face of increasing focus on the Pacific. There is little 
which can be done to buy back the schedule; however, the Multi-
INT capability remains a priority for the Committee and should 
be aggressively pursued by the Navy.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Navy to immediately 
notify the intelligence and defense committees of any potential 
delay fielding the Multi-INT capability to the Triton fleet.

Future of Cable Laying and Repair

    The USNS ZEUS is the Navy's only cable laying and repair 
ship and is nearing the end of its service life. The USNS ZEUS 
is a key component of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance 
System with primary missions to transport, deploy, retrieve and 
repair submarine cables and test underwater sound devices and 
secondary missions to conduct acoustic, hydrographic and 
bathymetric surveys. The T-ARC(X) supports the fixed 
surveillance systems and are a key part of the IUSS.
    A Cable Capacity Study in 2015 and Maritime Surveillance 
System Capacity Study completed in 2017 determined that two T-
ARC's are required to meet US Government worldwide demand. 
However, the USNS ZEUS decommission date of 2026 and the 
bridging solution of a long term charter ships is only leased 
through 2024, leaving cable laying and ship repair requirements 
unmet.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Navy to provide to the 
intelligence and defense committees its plan to meet the 
current and future for cable laying and repair requirements by 
October 29, 2019.

Maritime Surveillance Evolution Plan

    The Navy is undertaking a comprehensive review of the 
future of maritime surveillance. This plan is critical to 
understanding the needs of the Navy as they relate to maritime 
surveillance.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Navy to deliver the 
report to the congressional intelligence and defense committees 
within 30 days of completion and signature of the Maritime 
Surveillance Evolution Plan.

RQ-21 Blackjack

    The Committee has long supported aggressive development and 
deployment of the RQ-21 Blackjack system, including approving 
reprogramming funds for development of a v3 next generation 
engine. The capability differences between the v2 and v3 engine 
are significant and delay in the v3 engine remains a limiting 
factor for more expansive deployment of the RQ-21 Blackjack. 
The Committee is additionally concerned about divergent 
requirements for capability for the RQ-21 which may be 
detracting from development of the next generation engine.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Navy to provide to the 
intelligence and defense committees the timeline for 
development, integration and deployment of the v3 engine noting 
limiting factors and suggested mitigation.

Recapitalization of Navy Reserve P-3C Squadrons

    The budget request contained $1.2 billion for six P-8A 
Poseidon aircraft. The budget request for fiscal year 2020 did 
not take into account the increased warfighter requirement of 
21 additional P-- 8A aircraft. This increase is driven by the 
proliferation of adversarial submarine fleets and their 
increasingly active operational tempo. The new requirement 
includes 12 aircraft to recapitalize the two maritime patrol 
and reconnaissance squadrons assigned to the Navy Reserve. 
These squadrons currently operate legacy P-3C Orion aircraft 
and the Chief of Navy Reserve estimates they will decommission 
by 2023 unless they are outfitted with new aircraft. The 
Committee is encouraged by the Navy's recognition of the Navy 
Reserve force and the contribution they can provide to the 
increased requirement for the P-8A. However, the Committee was 
discouraged that the Navy failed to budget for the additional 
aircraft to meet the warfighting requirement.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy 
to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services 
and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by March 
1, 2020, that outlines a plan to recapitalize the two Navy 
Reserve squadrons with P-8A aircraft prior to 2023. The 
briefing should include estimated acquisition costs, 
acquisition timelines, aircraft fielding schedules, and 
manpower impacts to the Navy Reserve. The committee also notes 
that this information should have been briefed at the beginning 
of the budget cycle.

Navy Research Lab FAR Requirements

    The Committee is concerned that government programs too 
often compete with widely available commercial technological 
solutions, and in some cases work to duplicate existing and 
more advanced commercial capabilities. Often, government 
programs are underperforming, lacking capability, missing 
delivery milestones, and vastly more expensive than commercial 
solutions. Perhaps most concerning, this practice almost always 
increases the time it takes to deliver new capabilities to the 
warfighter.
    In particular, Navy Research Labs (NRL) 7442 Geospatial 
Computing Section has several programs that are competing with 
commercial industry, even in some cases responding to mission 
user requirements to provide a ``company X-like capability''. 
The Committee is disturbed by such overt duplication of 
commercial capabilities. Not only does this create a barrier to 
entry for innovative small businesses and non-traditional 
companies, the markedly higher expense of organic government 
programs-which include labor, benefits, infrastructure, 
hardware, sustainment, operations and maintenance, and 
cybersecurity-does a disservice to the American taxpayer.
    The Federal Acquisition Regulations System (FAR) aims to 
address this issue, by requiring participants in the 
acquisition process to deliver on a timely basis the best value 
product or service to the customer, while maintaining the 
public's trust and fulfilling policy objectives by: maximizing 
the use of commercial products and services; using contractors 
who have a track record of successful past performance or who 
demonstrate a current superior ability to perform; promoting 
competition; minimizing administrative operating costs; and 
conducting business with integrity, fairness, and openness.
    Therefore, the Committee expects that authorities within 
the IC and DOD adhere to the FAR when making acquisition 
decisions.
    Furthermore, the Committee directs NRL to brief the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees on its 
identification of all NRL developed software programs and 
elaborate reasoning for these organically developed programs, 
vice leveraging commercially available products. Briefing shall 
be completed by October 29, 2019.

Agile Operations Visualization

    The Air Force has made great strides in utilizing agile 
operations development for a variety of their programs, 
including Distributed Common Ground System-Air Force. Agile 
Operations create a nimble model for acquisition and 
flexibility in programming and fielding capability.
    However, the Air Force still struggles to represent the 
acquisition updates on the traditional waterfall chart. Failure 
to effectively display and explain the agile operations 
environment creates confusion and potentially a failure to 
accurately reflect changes in schedule and performance.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Air Force to create a 
new format to represent and visualize programs which utilize 
agile development models. Materials should be ready for the FY 
2021 budget cycle and presentation.

Compass Call

    The Air Force has made the decision to re-host the COMPASS 
CALL mission from a C-130 aircraft to a commercial aircraft. In 
addition, the mission will be 100% contractor logistics 
support.
    The implications of the re-host include increased costs for 
logistics support, requirement of Federal Aviation Certificates 
and potential challenges from transitioning a large aircraft to 
a smaller platform. Additionally, there may be a capability or 
capacity decrease in the intervening years during the 
transition.
    Therefore, the Committee directs a report on the transition 
between platforms for the COMPASS CALL mission, due to the 
intelligence and defense committees by December 15, 2019.

Unified Air Force Airborne Signals Intelligence Enterprise

    The Committee notes the goal of the Air Force Airborne 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Enterprise (ASE) program is to 
produce an integrated, service-wide, capability-focused SIGINT 
architecture and investment strategy for the U.S. Air Force 
(USAF). However, the committee observes that while investment 
in the ASE program has produced significant advances in Air 
Force SIGINT capability, particularly within the RC-135 Rivet 
Joint program, the establishment of a true integrated airborne 
SIGINT enterprise architecture continues to elude the USAF. The 
committee is aware that significant capability gaps exist in 
MQ-9 SIGINT sensor relevancy against current threats, and the 
Air Force has not yet successfully addressed vanishing vendor 
issues with the high-altitude Airborne Signals Intelligence 
Payload (ASIP) program. Additionally, the USAF has not yet 
achieved a unified enterprise for SIGINT processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination (PED), despite having a 
distributed technical architecture within both the RC-135 Rivet 
Joint and Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF-DCGS) 
programs. The committee believes the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Intelligence should lead synchronization efforts with the 
intelligence community to integrate like data sources to enable 
more comprehensive analysis and exploitation on behalf of the 
military services.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Air Force to provide a 
report to the House Committee on Armed Services and House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by March 1, 2020, 
containing the Air Force's vision, strategy, and implementation 
plan to utilize Air Force airborne SIGINT program resources to 
establish a unified airborne SIGINT enterprise based on shared 
joint and intelligence community standards. The committee looks 
forward to additional clarification on how this enterprise will 
allow RC-135, U-2, RQ-4, MQ-9, Air Force DCGS SIGINT systems, 
and future SIGINT capabilities to operate as an integrated 
enterprise using cloud-based technologies and distributed crew 
concepts to directly deliver SIGINT data to the joint force 
from a global Air Force SIGINT system.

OC-135B Open Skies Treaty aircraft recapitalization

    The Committee notes that the current fleet of OC-135B 
aircraft conducting the Open Skies Treaty flights are over 55 
years old and experience significant sustainment and 
reliability issues, resulting in an average mission completion 
rate of 65 percent between 2007 and 2017. Further, the range of 
the legacy OC-135 aircraft is insufficient to fully execute 
mission options within the treaty's 96-hour in-country 
observation period. In addition to maintenance and range 
limitations, the current wet-film imaging used to collect data 
will become obsolete sometime around 2022. To avoid any gap in 
Open Skies Treaty collection capability, the committee supports 
the Air Force's plan to upgrade the fleet with digital visual 
imaging systems (DVIS) for the near-term, and ultimately 
replace the OC-135 Open Skies aircraft with two commercially-
available small airliner class aircraft with integrated DVIS 
sensors.
    The committee supports recapitalization of the OC-35 but 
remains concerned about the Air Force's ability to stay on 
schedule and meet the fiscal year 2022 aircraft certification 
and treaty compliance date. Unanticipated technical challenges 
with the DVIS sensors have already affected the schedule and 
could cause additional delays if not remedied soon.
    Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air 
Force to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed 
Services and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
by October 1, 2019, on the Open Skies Treaty aircraft 
recapitalization. The report shall include:
          1. an assessment of the DVIS data technical package 
        maturity and the cost and feasibility of integrating it 
        onto the replacement commercial aircraft;
          2. the plan for and status of developing or acquiring 
        associated ground processing systems;
          3. the plan for management of programmatic risk and 
        an assessment of the ability to meet the fiscal year 
        2022 deadline for an upgraded, treaty-compliant system;
          4. existing or planned mitigation options should the 
        Air Force not be able to achieve current DVIS and 
        treaty compliance milestones, and should there be any 
        future delay to the upgrade or replacement of the OC-
        135; and
          5. a copy of any assessment conducted by an 
        independent organization employed by the program for 
        technical assistance.

Budget Implications of the C4 Restructure

    The Committee supports the restructure of the Marines' C4 
apparatus, which integrates intelligence and operations. 
However, the Committee has concerns about the impact on the 
agility of those intelligence activities.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Marine Corps to 
provide to the intelligence and defense committees for the 
implementation for the C4 Restructure to include budget 
implications for the future year defense plan by October 29, 
2019.

Security Certificate Requirements for DCGS-MC

    Distributed Common Ground System--Marine Corps provides 
core critical information for military intelligence corps. 
DCGS-MC must stay compliant with cyber security certifications 
and requirements to operate on the network. Schedule for 
waivers and tech refresh. Staying current with dynamic cyber 
threats and rapid updates to certifications can be 
accomplished, however may impact the ability to properly budget 
effectively to stay current in certifications.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Marines to provide and 
brief the DCGS cyber security certificate requirement for the 
future year defense plan (FYDP) to the congressional 
intelligence and defense committees by October 29, 2019.

Joint Intelligence Operations Center Staffing

    The Committee recognizes the evolving operational and 
strategic priorities of the Department of Defense will impact 
Defense Intelligence Enterprise capabilities and resources. The 
committee recognizes the ongoing efforts by the Under Secretary 
for Intelligence (USDI) to comply with direction specified by 
the John. S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232) to reduce and prevent 
imbalances in priorities and mitigate against insufficient or 
misaligned resources within the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise.
    While the Committee supports the efforts by the USDI to 
create efficiencies across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise 
organizations, to include the Service Intelligence Centers and 
combatant command Joint Operations Intelligence Centers, and 
enable those elements to plan and posture staffing requirements 
accordingly, the committee is concerned that the shifts in 
current and future resourcing are lacking coherence to support 
the global mandate of the Department.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Undersecretary for 
Defense Intelligence, in coordination with DIA, to provide a 
briefing to the congressional intelligence and defense 
committees by December 27, 2019 on how the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and DIA are managing 
resourcing requirements to the combatant command Joint 
Intelligence Operations Centers to meet current and future 
needs of the combatant commanders and DOD.

China's Biological Weapons Program

    The Committee remains interested in ensuring the Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise is providing timely, accurate, and 
effective intelligence to support information needs of the 
Department of Defense, and is aware of a recent Government 
Accountability Office report on long-range emerging threats 
facing the United States that highlighted potential pursuit by 
near-peer competitors of biological weapons using genetic 
engineering and synthetic biology.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of 
the Defense Intelligence Agency, to provide a briefing to the 
House Committee on Armed Services and House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence by November 1, 2019, on an assessment 
of China's current and projected biological weapons program, 
the risks presented to the joint force, and the mitigation 
strategies to protect U.S. military forces against said 
threats.

Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid Repository System Government 
        Accountability Office Review

    The re-emergence of great power competition will stress 
DIA's ability to provide foundational military intelligence for 
the IC and warfighters. As such, the Committee is supportive of 
DIA's intent to replace the Modernized Integrated Database 
(MIDB) with the Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid Repository 
System (MARS).
    However, the Committee is concerned that DIA has not 
completed an information technology development and procurement 
project of this scope in the thirty years since MIDB's 
adoption. MARS's development and procurement will entail a 
complex and extensive transformation that will impact the DIA's 
delivery of foundational military intelligence.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to provide a report to the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees no later than 
September 30, 2020 that describes:
          1. The envisioned MIDB users and customer base and 
        how they would use the repository;
          2. The extent to which DIA has gathered input from 
        current and historic MIDB users, as well as customers 
        about the capabilities that will be needed for the 
        transition to MARS;
          3. The extent to which DIA has planned for MARS's 
        expected new capabilities and the corresponding 
        resources, to include funding and personnel 
        implications;
          4. DIA's acquisition strategy for MARS to include the 
        use of any rapid acquisition or prototyping 
        authorities;
          5. The extent to which DIA has identified challenges, 
        if any, that it will face in transitioning from MIDB to 
        MARS, and whether it has developed mitigation plans for 
        addressing any of these challenges.
    The Committee expects DIA's full cooperation with the GAO 
study.

The National Intelligence University

    In the 115th Congress, the Committee recommended that DIA 
transfer ancillary, though vital enterprise functions, such as 
operation of the National Intelligence University (NIU) to the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The 
Committee is aware the NIU will transfer to ODNI in FY 2021 and 
is supportive of that effort.
    However, the Committee is concerned that DIA will be unable 
to complete the transfer during fiscal year 2021 due to the 
unique role NIU serves within DOD's officer education system.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation 
with the USD(I) and Director of DIA, to submit a report with 
its FY 2021 budget request outlining the DIA to ODNI NIU 
transition plan. At a minimum the report must provide a 
timeline for the NIU transition, identify any statutory changes 
required to support the transition, and assess risks to 
completion of the transfer to include actions ODNI, DOD, or DIA 
have taken to mitigate identified risks.

Update on the DIA Strategic Approach

    In September 2018, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
adopted a Strategic Approach to enhance workforce development, 
improve foundational military intelligence data management, 
address perennial intelligence issues and realign roles and 
missions. Improvements in these issue areas will enhance the 
Agency's ability to support both the National Security Strategy 
and National Defense Strategy.
    The Committee supports the DIA's initiative to improve 
those structures it assesses are critical to providing 
warfighters the information needed to prevent and, if 
necessary, decisively win wars, such as intelligence on foreign 
militaries' capabilities.
    Therefore, the Committee directs DIA to provide quarterly 
briefings to the Congressional intelligence and defense 
committees on its efforts to enhance workforce development, 
improve foundational military intelligence data management, 
address perennial intelligence issues and realign roles and 
missions.

Report on Chinese Efforts Targeting Democratic Elections and U.S. 
        Alliances and Partnerships and Strategy to Counter Chinese 
        Election Interference

    The committee directs the Director of National Intelligence 
in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
State, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to provide a 
report to the congressional defense committees, the 
congressional intelligence committees, the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
House Committee on Homeland Security, and the Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on China's 
influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic 
elections.
    The report shall be divided into two sections, which 
respectively address influence operations and campaigns 
targeting: (1) recent and upcoming elections in the United 
States (dating back to January 1, 2017), and (2) military 
alliances and partnerships of which the United States is a 
member. The report should also include a strategy to counter 
these activities. The committee further directs the Secretary 
of Defense to provide an interim report not later than November 
5, 2019, and a final report not later than September 30, 2020.
    The report shall be unclassified and appropriate for 
release to the public but may include a classified annex. At a 
minimum, the report should include:
          1. An assessment of China's objectives in influence 
        operations and campaigns targeting democratic elections 
        and military alliances and partnerships of which the 
        United States is a member, and how such objectives 
        relate to the China's broader strategic aims;
          2. The United States' strategy and capabilities for 
        detecting, deterring, countering, and disrupting such 
        Chinese influence operations (including recommended 
        authorities and activities) and campaigns and a 
        discussion of the Department of Defense's and 
        intelligence community's respective roles in the 
        strategy;
          3. A comprehensive list of specific Chinese state and 
        non-state entities involved in supporting such Chinese 
        influence operations and campaigns and the role of each 
        entity in supporting them;
          4. An identification of the tactics, techniques, and 
        procedures used in previous Chinese influence 
        operations and campaigns;
          5. A comprehensive identification of countries with 
        democratic election systems that have been targeted by 
        Chinese influence operations and campaigns since 
        January 1, 2017;
          6. An assessment of the impact of previous Chinese 
        influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic 
        elections and military alliances and partnerships of 
        which the United States is a member, including the 
        views of senior Chinese officials about their 
        effectiveness in achieving Chinese objectives;
          7. An identification of countries with democratic 
        elections systems that may be targeted in future 
        Chinese influence operations and campaigns and an 
        assessment of the likelihood that each such country 
        will be targeted;
          8. An identification of all U.S. military alliances 
        and partnerships that have been targeted by Chinese 
        influence operations and campaigns since January 1, 
        2017;
          9. An identification of all U.S. military alliances 
        and partnerships that may be targeted in future Chinese 
        influence operations and campaigns and an assessment of 
        the likelihood that each such country will be targeted; 
        and
          10. An identification of tactics, techniques, and 
        procedures likely to be used in future Chinese 
        influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic 
        elections and military alliances and partnerships of 
        which the United States is a member.

Report on Russian Efforts Targeting Democratic Elections and U.S. 
        Alliances and Partnerships and Strategy to Counter Russian 
        Election Interference

    The Committee directs the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, 
the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
to provide a report to the congressional defense committees, 
the congressional intelligence committees, the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
the House Committee on Homeland Security, and the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on 
Russia's influence operations and campaigns targeting 
democratic elections.
    The report shall be divided into two sections, which 
respectively address influence operations and campaigns 
targeting: (1) recent and upcoming elections in the United 
States (dating back to January 1, 2017), and (2) military 
alliances and partnerships of which the United States is a 
member. The report should also include a strategy to counter 
these activities. The committee further directs the Secretary 
of Defense to provide an interim report not later than November 
5, 2019, and a final report not later than September 30, 2020.
    The report shall be unclassified and appropriate for 
release to the public but may include a classified annex. At a 
minimum, the report should include:
          1. An assessment of Russia's objectives in influence 
        operations and campaigns targeting democratic elections 
        and military alliances and partnerships of which the 
        United States is a member, and how such objectives 
        relate to Russia's broader strategic aims;
          2. The United States strategy and capabilities for 
        detecting, deterring, countering, and disrupting such 
        Russian influence operations (including recommended 
        authorities and activities) and campaigns and a 
        discussion of the Department of Defense's and 
        intelligence community's respective roles in the 
        strategy;
          3. A comprehensive list of specific Russian state and 
        non-state entities involved in supporting such Russian 
        influence operations and campaigns and the role of each 
        entity in supporting them;
          4. An identification of the tactics, techniques, and 
        procedures used in previous Russian influence 
        operations and campaigns;
          5. A comprehensive identification of countries with 
        democratic election systems that have been targeted by 
        Russian influence operations and campaigns since 
        January 1, 2017;
          6. An assessment of the impact of previous Russian 
        influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic 
        elections and military alliances and partnerships of 
        which the United States is a member, including the 
        views of senior Russian officials about their 
        effectiveness in achieving Russian objectives;
          7. An identification of countries with democratic 
        elections systems that may be targeted in future 
        Russian influence operations and campaigns and an 
        assessment of the likelihood that each such country 
        will be targeted;
          8. An identification of all U.S. military alliances 
        and partnerships that have been targeted by Russian 
        influence operations and campaigns since January 1, 
        2017;
          9. An identification of all U.S. military alliances 
        and partnerships that may be targeted in future Russian 
        influence operations and campaigns and an assessment of 
        the likelihood that each such country will be targeted; 
        and
          10. An identification of tactics, techniques, and 
        procedures likely to be used in future Russian 
        influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic 
        elections and military alliances and partnerships of 
        which the United States is a member.

   Unclassified Direction to Accompany Division B: The Intelligence 
           Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019


Management of Intelligence Community Workforce

    The Committee repeats direction from the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 that IC elements should 
build, develop, and maintain a workforce appropriately balanced 
among its civilian, military, and contractor workforce sectors 
to meet the missions assigned to it in law and by the 
president. Starting in Fiscal Year 2019, the Committees no 
longer authorize position ceiling levels in the annual Schedule 
of Authorizations.
    The Committees look forward to working with the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as it develops an 
implementation strategy and sets standards for workforce cost 
analysis tools.

Countering Russian Propaganda

    The Committee supports the IC's role in countering Russian 
propaganda and other active measures. The Committee is 
committed to providing the appropriate legal authorities, 
financial resources, and personnel necessary to address these 
hostile acts. The Committee specifically finds that language 
capabilities are important to the IC's efforts in countering 
Russia's hostile acts. The Committee encourages the IC to 
commit considerable resources in the future to bolstering 
officers' existing Russian language skills, recruiting Russian 
language speakers, and training officers in Russian, in 
particular key technical language skills. This effort will 
require strategic planning both in recruiting and rotating 
officers through language training. The Committee expects to 
see these priorities reflected in future IC budget requests.

Protection of the Supply Chain in Intelligence Community Acquisition 
        Decisions

    The Committee continues to have significant concerns about 
risks to the supply chain in IC acquisitions. The report to 
accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017 directed the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to 
review and consider changes to Intelligence Community Directive 
(ICD) 801 (``Acquisition'') to reflect issuance in 2013 of ICD 
731 (``Supply Chain Risk Management'') and issues associated 
with cybersecurity. It specifically recommended the review 
examine whether to: expand risk management criteria in the 
acquisition process to include cyber and supply chain threats; 
require counterintelligence and security assessments as part of 
the acquisition and procurement process; propose and adopt new 
education requirements for acquisition professionals on cyber 
and supply chain threats; and factor in the cost of cyber and 
supply chain security. This review was due in November 2017, 
with a report on the process for updating ICD 801 in December 
2017. The report was completed on June 18, 2018.
    As a follow-on to this review, the Committees direct DNI to 
address three other considerations: changes in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation that may be necessary; how changes 
should apply to all acquisition programs; and how security 
risks must be addressed across development, procurement, and 
operational phases of acquisition. The Committees further 
direct the DNI to submit a plan to implement necessary changes 
within 60 days of completion of this review.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Use of VERA and VSIP 
        Authorities

    The Committee encourages the use by the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) of Voluntary Early 
Retirement Authority (VERA) and Voluntary Separation Incentive 
Program (VSIP) offers to meet future goals of building a 
workforce more attuned to automation of data production, 
automation of analytic processes, and establishment of 
development and operations (``DevOps'') software development 
processes.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the NGA to report to the 
congressional intelligence committees, within 120 days of 
enactment of the Act, on its use to date of VERA and VSIP 
incentives, to include how they have been used to develop an 
acquisition cadre skilled in ``DevOps'' software development 
processes, as well as a plan for further use of these 
incentives. The report should specify metrics for retooling its 
workforce, including how it measures data literacy and 
computational skills in potential hires, and an accounting of 
the numbers of new hires who have met these higher standards.

Report on Engagement of National Reconnaissance Office with University 
        Community

    The Committee recognizes that the survivability and 
resiliency of United States satellites is critically important 
to the United States intelligence and defense communities. 
While the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) engages with the 
university community in support of basic research and 
developing an education workforce pipeline to help advance new 
technologies and produce skilled professionals, it can do more 
in this regard to focus on space survivability.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the NRO to report, within 
120 days of enactment of the Act, on NRO's current efforts and 
future strategies to engage with university partners that are 
strategically located, host secure information facilities, and 
offer a strong engineering curriculum, with a particular focus 
on space survivability and resiliency. This report should 
provide a summary of NRO's current and planned university 
engagement programs, levels of funding, and program research 
and workforce objectives and metrics. The report should also 
include an assessment of the strategic utility of chartering a 
University Affiliated Research Center in this domain.

Clarification of Oversight Responsibilities

    The Committee reinforces the requirement for all IC 
agencies funded by the NIP to respond in a full, complete, and 
timely manner to any request for information made by a member 
of the congressional intelligence committees. In addition, the 
Committees direct the DNI to issue guidelines, within 90 days 
of enactment of the Act, to ensure that the intent of Section 
501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091) is 
carried out.

Clarification on Cooperation with Investigation on Russian Influence in 
        the 2016 Election

    The Committee continues to reinforce the obligation for all 
IC elements to cooperate in a full, complete, and timely manner 
with the Committee's ongoing investigation into Russian 
meddling in the 2016 Presidential election and related issues.

Supervisory Feedback as Part of Continuous Evaluation Program

    The Committee directs the DNI to review the results of 
ongoing pilot programs regarding the use of supervisory 
feedback as part of the periodic reinvestigation and continuous 
evaluation process and report, within 180 days of enactment of 
the Act, on the establishment of a policy for its use across 
the IC.

National Security Threats to Critical Infrastructure

    The Committee is aware of significant threats to our 
critical infrastructure and industrial control systems posed by 
foreign adversaries. The sensitive nature of the information 
related to these threats make the role of the IC of vital 
importance to United States defensive efforts. The Committee 
has grave concerns that current IC resources dedicated to 
analyzing and countering these threats are neither sufficient 
nor closely coordinated.

Framework for Cybersecurity and Intelligence Collection Doctrine

    The Committees directs the ODNI, in coordination with 
appropriate IC elements, to develop an analytic framework that 
could support the eventual creation and execution of a 
Government-wide cybersecurity and intelligence collection 
doctrine. The ODNI shall provide this framework, which may 
contain a classified annex, to the congressional intelligence 
committees, within 180 days of enactment of the Act.
    This framework shall include:
          1. An assessment of the current and medium-term cyber 
        threats to the protection of the United States' 
        national security systems and critical infrastructure;
          2. IC definitions of key cybersecurity concepts, to 
        include cyberespionage, cyber theft, cyber acts of 
        aggression, and cyber deterrence;
          3. Intelligence collection requirements to ensure 
        identification of cyber actors targeting U.S. national 
        security interests, and to inform policy responses to 
        cyberattacks and computer network operations directed 
        against the United States;
          4. The IC's methodology for assessing the impacts of 
        cyberattacks and computer network operations incidents 
        directed against the United States, taking into account 
        differing levels of severity of incidents;
          5. Capabilities that the IC could employ in response 
        to cyberattacks and computer network operations 
        incidents, taking into account differing levels of 
        severity of incidents;
          6. A policy and architecture for sharing 
        cybersecurity-related intelligence with government, 
        private sector, and international partners, including 
        existing statutory and other authorities which may be 
        exercised in pursuit of that goal; and
          7. Any necessary changes in IC authorities, 
        governance, technology, resources, and policy to 
        provide more capable and agile cybersecurity.

Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Role and 
        Responsibilities.

    The position of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community (IC IG) was codified by the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 to ``conduct independent 
reviews investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews on 
programs and activities within the responsibility and authority 
of the Director of National Intelligence'' and to lead the IC's 
IG community in its activities. The Committee is concerned that 
this intent is not fully exercised by the IC IG and reiterates 
the Congress's intent that the IC IG's role be over all IC-wide 
activities in addition to the ODNI. To support this intent, the 
Committee has directed a number of requirements to strengthen 
the IC IG's role and expects full cooperation from all Offices 
of Inspector General across the IC.
    The Committee also remains concerned about the level of 
protection afforded to whistleblowers within the IC and the 
level of insight congressional committees have into their 
disclosures. It is the Committee's expectation that all Offices 
of IG across the IC will fully cooperate with the direction 
provided elsewhere in the bill to ensure both the DNI and the 
congressional committees have more complete awareness of the 
disclosures made to any IG about any NIP-funded activity.

Space Launch Facilities

    The Committee continues to believe it is critical to 
preserve a variety of launch range capabilities to support 
national security space missions, and encourages planned 
launches such as the U.S. Air Force Orbital/Sub-Orbital Program 
(OSP)-3 NRO-111 mission, to be launched in 2019 on a Minotaur 1 
from the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport at Wallops Flight 
Facility. In the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017, the Committee directed a brief from the ODNI, in 
consultation with the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. 
Air Force, on their plans to utilize state-owned and operated 
spaceports, which leverage non-federal public and private 
investments to bolster United States launch capabilities and 
provide access to mid-to-low or polar-to-high inclination 
orbits for national security missions.
    The Committee directs that the ODNI supplement this brief 
with how state investments in these spaceports may support 
infrastructure improvements, such as payload integration and 
launch capabilities, for national security launches.

Acquisition Research Center Postings

    The Committee supports a flexible NRO acquisition process 
that allows the NRO to choose the most appropriate contracting 
mechanism, whether for small research and development efforts 
or large acquisitions. The NRO's Acquisition Research Center 
(ARC), a classified contracting and solicitation marketplace 
that NRO and other agencies use, enables this flexible 
acquisition process for classified efforts.
    The Committee directs the NRO, within 60 days of enactment 
of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence and defense 
committees on options for modifying ARC posting procedures to 
ensure fair and open competition. Those options should include 
ensuring that unclassified NRO solicitations are posted on the 
unclassified FEDBIZOPS site and identifying ways to better 
utilize the ARC to encourage contract opportunities for a more 
diverse industrial base that includes smaller and non-
traditional companies.

Ensuring Strong Strategic Analytical Tradecraft

    The DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has 
taken steps to improve the quality of its analysis, to identify 
its core customers, and to tailor its production to meet 
customer needs. The Committee concurs with I&A's implementation 
of analytic standards and review mechanisms that have improved 
the tradecraft behind I&A productions. The bedrock of these 
efforts has been the development of a yearly program of 
analysis (POA) and key intelligence questions, which are 
essential tools for providing a roadmap and boundaries for the 
office's production efforts.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Office of I&A to 
continue to prioritize, develop and hone its strategic 
intelligence capabilities and production, including the annual 
development of a POA. Within 90 day of enactment of the Act, 
and on an annual basis thereafter for two years, I&A shall 
brief the congressional intelligence committees on the 
development and execution of its POA. These briefings should 
provide an overview of the POA, how customer needs have been 
incorporated into the POA, and an update on execution against 
the POA.

Cyber/Counterintelligence Analysis

    DHS's Office of I&A's Counterintelligence Mission Center 
analysis focuses on counterintelligence threats posed by 
foreign technology companies and fills a gap in IC intelligence 
production. Advanced technologies are increasingly ubiquitous 
and necessary to the function of modern society. Consequently, 
the scope of the threats from countries intent on using these 
technologies as a vector for collecting intelligence from 
within the United States will continue to expand. The Office of 
I&A is well positioned to conduct a niche analysis critical to 
national security that combines foreign intelligence with 
domestic threat information.
    The Committee strongly supports I&A's Counterintelligence 
Mission Center's continued focus on these topics and the 
increased resources the Fiscal Year 2019 dedicated to this 
analysis. Therefore, the Committee directs the I&A, in 
coordination with ODNI, to provide an update within 90 days of 
enactment of the Act on its recent analytic production related 
to counterintelligence threats posed by foreign technology 
companies, including a review of the countries and companies 
that present the greatest risks in this regard.

Intelligence Support to the Export Control Process

    The Committee has significant concerns that China poses a 
growing threat to United States national security, due in part 
to its relentless efforts to acquire United States technology. 
China purposely blurs the distinction between its military and 
civilian activities through its policy of ``military-civilian 
fusion,'' which compounds the risks of diversion of United 
States technology to the Chinese military.
    The Committee concludes that the United States Government 
currently lacks a comprehensive policy and the tools needed to 
address this problem. China exploits weaknesses in existing 
U.S. mechanisms aimed at preventing dangerous technology 
transfers, including the U.S. export control system, which is 
run by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS). The Committee has specific concerns about the 
lack of adequate and effective IC support to BIS's export 
license application review process and believes more robust IC 
support could have prevented many of the ill-advised technology 
transfers that have occurred in recent years.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to submit a plan, 
within 120 days of enactment of the Act, to describe how the IC 
will provide BIS with, at a minimum, basic but timely analysis 
of any threat to U.S. national security posed by any proposed 
export, re-export, or transfer of export-controlled technology. 
The plan shall include detailed information on the appropriate 
organizational structure, including how many IC personnel would 
be required, where they would be located (including whether 
they would be embedded at BIS to coordinate IC support), and 
the amounts of necessary funding. In formulating the plan, the 
DNI should study the ``National Security Threat Assessment'' 
process that the National Intelligence Council uses to inform 
the actions of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States. The DNI shall submit the plan to the 
congressional intelligence committees in classified form.

Social Media

    The Committees encourages the IC, notably the FBI, to both 
continue and enhance its efforts to assist in detecting, 
understanding, and warning about foreign influence operations 
using social media tools to target the United States. 
Additionally, within the scope of the IC's authorities, and 
with all necessary protections for U.S. person information, the 
Committees encourage the IC to augment and prioritize these 
ongoing efforts.

Trade-Based Money Laundering

    Threats to our national security posed by trade-based money 
laundering are concerning. Therefore, the Committee directs the 
DNI, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to submit a report 
to the congressional intelligence committees on these threats, 
including an assessment of the severity of the threats posed to 
the United States' national security by trade-based money 
laundering conducted inside and outside the United States; an 
assessment of the scope of the financial threats to the U.S. 
economy and financial systems posed by trade-based money 
laundering; a description of how terrorist financing and drug 
trafficking organizations are advancing their illicit 
activities through the use of licit trade channels; an 
assessment of the adequacy of the systems and tools available 
to the Federal Government for combating trade-based money 
laundering; and a description and assessment of the current 
structure and coordination between Federal agencies, as well as 
with foreign governments, to combat trade-based money 
laundering. The report shall be submitted in classified form 
with an unclassified summary to be made available to the 
public.

Expansions of Security Protective Service Jurisdiction of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    The Committee directs the Central Intelligence Agency, in 
connection with the expansion of its security protective 
service jurisdiction as set forth in Section 2413, to engage 
with Virginia state and local law enforcement authorities to 
ensure that a memorandum of understanding, akin to those in 
place at other agencies setting forth the appropriate 
allocation of duties and responsibilities, is in effect.

Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information

    The Committee is concerned by the recent widespread media 
reports that purport to contain unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information. Protecting the nation's secrets from 
unauthorized disclosure is essential to safeguarding our 
nation's intelligence sources and methods. An unlawful 
disclosure of classified information can destroy sensitive 
collection capabilities and endanger American lives, including 
those individuals who take great personal risks to assist the 
United States in collecting vital foreign intelligence.
    Federal law prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information, but enforcement is often lacking or 
inconsistent. Accordingly, the Committee desires to better 
understand the number of potential unauthorized disclosures 
discovered and investigated on a routine basis. Moreover, the 
Committee has little visibility into the number of 
investigations initiated by each IC agency or the number of 
criminal referrals to the Department of Justice. Accordingly, 
Section 2718 of the Act requires all IC agencies to provide the 
congressional intelligence committees with a semi-annual report 
of the number of investigations of unauthorized disclosures to 
journalists or media organizations, including subsequent 
referrals made to the United States Attorney General.
    Additionally, the Committee wishes to better understand the 
role of Inspectors General (IGs) within elements of the IC, 
with respect to unauthorized disclosures of classified 
information at those elements.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the IC IG, within 180 days 
of enactment of the Act, to provide the congressional 
intelligence committees with a report regarding the role of IGs 
with respect to investigating unauthorized disclosures. The 
report shall address: the roles of IC elements' security 
personnel and law enforcement regarding unauthorized 
disclosures; the current role of IGs within IC elements 
regarding such disclosures; what, if any, specific actions 
could be taken by such IGs to increase their involvement in the 
investigation of such matters; any laws, rules or procedures 
that currently prevent IGs from increasing their involvement; 
and the benefits and drawbacks of increased IG involvement, to 
include potential impacts to IG's roles and missions.

Presidential Policy Guidance

    The Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) dated May 22, 2013, 
and entitled ``Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against 
Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas 
of Active Hostilities'' provides for the participation by 
elements of the IC in reviews of certain proposed 
counterterrorism operations. The Committees expect to remain 
fully and currently informed about the status of the PPG and 
its implementation.
    Therefore, the Committee directs ODNI, within five days of 
any change to the PPG, or to any successor policy guidance, to 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written 
notification thereof, that shall include a summary of the 
change and the specific legal and policy justification(s) for 
the change.

Centers for Academic Excellence

    The Committee commends the commitment demonstrated by 
ODNI's Centers for Academic Excellence (CAE) program managers, 
IC agencies that sponsored CAE interns, and all other personnel 
who contributed to the inaugural edition of the CAE Internship 
Program in recent summers.
    The Committees expect the CAE Program to build on this 
foundation by showing measurable, swift progress, and 
ultimately fulfilling Congress's intent that the Program serve 
as a pipeline of the next generation of IC professionals.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that the IC take all 
viable action to expand the CAE Program by increasing, to the 
fullest extent possible:
          1. The number and racial and gender diversity of CAE 
        interns;
          2. The number of CAE academic institutions and their 
        qualified internship candidates participating in the 
        CAE Program; and
          3. The number of IC elements that sponsor CAE 
        interns.

Report on Violent Extremist Groups

    Violent extremist groups like ISIS continue to exploit the 
Internet for nefarious purposes: to inspire lone wolves; to 
spread propaganda; to recruit foreign fighters; and to plan and 
publicize atrocities. As a former Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has stated publicly:

          [W]e need to counter our adversaries' successful use 
        of social media platforms to advance their propaganda 
        goals, raise funds, recruit, coordinate travel and 
        attack plans, and facilitate operations. . . . Our 
        future work must focus on denying our adversaries the 
        capability to spread their messages to at-risk 
        populations that they can reach through the use of 
        these platforms.

    Section 403 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 required the DNI, consistent with the 
protection of sources and methods, to assist public and private 
sector entities in recognizing online violent extremist 
content--specifically, by making publicly available a list of 
insignias and logos associated with foreign extremist groups 
designated by the Secretary of State. The Committees believe 
the IC can take additional steps.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of NCTC, in 
coordination with other appropriate officials designated by the 
DNI, within 180 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the 
congressional intelligence committees on options for a pilot 
program to develop and continually update best practices for 
private technology companies to quickly recognize and lawfully 
take down violent extremist content online. Such briefing shall 
address:
          1. The feasibility, risks, costs, and benefits of 
        such a program;
          2. The U.S. Government agencies and private sector 
        entities that would participate; and
          3. Any additional authorities that would be required 
        by the program's establishment.

South China Sea

    The South China Sea is an area of great geostrategic 
importance to the United States and its allies. However, 
China's controversial territorial claims and other actions 
stand to undercut international norms and erode the region's 
stability. It is thus imperative the United States uphold 
respect for international law in the South China Sea. 
Fulfilling that objective in turn will require an optimal 
intelligence collection posture.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DoD, in coordination 
with DNI, within 30 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees on known 
intelligence collection gaps, if any, with respect to adversary 
operations and aims in the South China Sea. The briefing shall 
identify the gaps and whether those gaps are driven by lack of 
access, lack of necessary collection capabilities or legal or 
policy authorities, or by other factors. The briefing shall 
also identify IC judgments that assess which intelligence 
disciplines would be best-suited to answer the existing gaps, 
and current plans to address the gaps over the Future Years 
Defense Program.

Military Occupational Specialty-to-Degree Program

    The Committee supports the Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS)-to-Degree program, which is an innovative framework that 
enables enlisted Marines to receive credits towards an 
associate's or a bachelor's degree while earning required MOS 
credentials. The program partners with colleges and 
universities to map a Marine's experience and training to 
equivalent credit, and provides Marines with an awareness of 
tuition assistance and scholarship programs to enable them to 
complete the remaining credits towards their degree. The 
Committees encourage the Marine Corps to expand the MOS-to-
Degree program through further curriculum development and 
enhanced management of the program.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Marine Corps 
Intelligence Activity (MCIA), within 90 days of the enactment 
of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence and defense 
committees on the Marine Corps' progress towards expanding the 
MOS-to-Degree program.

Unmanned Aircraft System Pilot Retention

    The Committee supports the Marine Corps' vision to grow a 
more diverse, lethal, amphibious, and middleweight 
expeditionary force by leveraging emerging technologies, 
particularly in the area of unmanned and manned-unmanned 
teaming. Additionally, the Committee is enthusiastic about the 
Marine Corps' efforts to equip operating forces down to the 
squad level with a Small Unit Remote Scouting System Family of 
Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) capable of operating in all 
weather conditions across the full spectrum of conflict. The 
Committee is also aware of the service's concept for a Marine 
Air Ground Task Force Unmanned Expeditionary (MUX) capability.
    However, the Committee is concerned with the projected cost 
and delays associated with developing this new technology and 
believe the Marine Corps is ill-prepared to address the growing 
deficiency in expertise and the manpower challenges that will 
accompany expansion of the unmanned fleet. Based on 
observations of the Air Force's and Army's efforts, the 
Committee believes the Marine Corps' UAS programs will 
experience pilot and maintainer shortages based on inadequate 
training, lack of reliable equipment, and the absence of 
incentive.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Deputy Commandant of 
Aviation, within 120 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees on potential 
interim solutions to the gap exposed by the long development 
time for MUX. Such briefing should also address the Marine 
Corps' UAS talent management plan, including a strategy for 
pilot retention and a plan to unify unmanned training that will 
build a base of instructors and encourage the professionalism 
of the community.

Remotely Piloted Aircraft Training Strategy

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC)-passed FY 2018 National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) (H. Rept. 115-200), the Committee directs the 
Secretary of the Air Force, no later than 30 days after 
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
and defense committees on the Air Force's approach to remotely 
piloted aircraft (RPA) aircrew training, with a particular 
focus on how the Air Force plans to field simulator capability 
and training capacity among active and reserve component units 
supporting RPA operations.

Wide-area Motion Imagery Intelligence Capability

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the HASC-passed FY 2018 NDAA (H. 
Rept. 115-200), the Committee directs the Secretary of the Air 
Force no later than March 1, 2020, to provide to the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees a report that 
describes in detail the lifecycle weapon system sustainment and 
modernization strategy for maintaining an enduring wide-area 
motion imagery capability for the geographic combatant 
commanders.

MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft System

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the HASC-passed FY 2018 NDAA (H. 
Rept. 115-200), the Committee directs the Secretary of the 
Navy, no later than 45 days after enactment of the Act, to 
brief the congressional intelligence and defense committees on 
MQ-4C mission execution and tasking, collection, processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination (TCPED) processes. The briefing 
shall include or explain:
          1. A framework description of the manning, equipping, 
        and training requirements for the MQ-4C system;
          2. A description of the baseline architecture of the 
        mission support infrastructure required to support MQ-
        4C operations;
          3. How the Navy plans to support and execute the 
        TCPED processes;
          4. How the Navy plans to support flying operations 
        from either line-of-sight or beyond-line-of-sight 
        locations;
          5. How many aircraft the Navy plans to dedicate 
        annually to the ISR Global Force Management Allocation 
        Process of the DoD; and
          6. How many hours of collection the MQ-4C will be 
        able to provide annually in each of the intelligence 
        disciplines for combatant commanders.

E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the HASC-passed FY 2018 NDAA (H. 
Rept. 115-200), the Committee directs the Secretary of the Air 
Force, no later than March 1, 2020, to provide to the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees a report that 
explains in detail all aspects of how and when the Air Force 
will transition from legacy Joint Surveillance and Target 
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft capability to JSTARS 
recapitalization aircraft capability.

Acceleration of Increment 2 of Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 
        Program

    Referring to Section 111 of H.R. 2810, the HASC-passed FY 
2018 NDAA, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Army, no 
later than January 30, 2020, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence and defense committees a report detailing 
potential options for the acceleration of procurement and 
fielding of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 
Increment 2 program.

Cost-benefit Analysis of Upgrades to MQ-9

    Referring to Section 134 of H.R. 2810, the HASC-passed FY 
2018 NDAA, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, within 180 
days of enactment of the Act, to provide the congressional 
intelligence and defense committees an analysis that compares 
the costs and benefits of the following:
          1. Upgrading fielded MQ-9 Reaper aircraft to a Block 
        5 configuration; and
          2. Proceeding with the procurement of MQ-9B aircraft 
        instead of upgrading fielded MQ-9 Reaper aircraft to a 
        Block 5 configuration.

Policy on Minimum Insider Threat Standards

    Executive Order 13587 and the National Insider Threat Task 
Force established minimum insider threat standards. Such 
standards are required for the sharing and safeguarding of 
classified information on computer networks while ensuring 
consistent, appropriate protections for privacy and civil 
liberties. The Committee understands there are policies in 
place to attempt implementation of such standards; however, the 
Committee has found that several elements of the IC have not 
fully implemented such standards. Therefore, given the several 
high-profile insider threat issues, the Committee emphasizes 
the importance of such minimums by statutorily requiring the 
DNI to establish a policy on minimum insider threat standards, 
consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum 
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, and IC 
elements should expeditiously establish their own policies and 
implement the DNI guidance.
    Further, referring to the directive language found in the 
committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-passed FY 
2019 NDAA, the Committee directs the Chief Management Officer 
to provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence 
committees and the congressional armed services committees, no 
later than 90 days after enactment of the Act, on the outcomes 
of its cost and technical analyses required by this report, and 
the Department's efforts to implement enterprise-wide programs 
and policies for insider threat detection, user activity 
monitoring, and cyber-attack detection and remediation.

Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment

    The Committee remains supportive of the goals of 
Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment (IC 
ITE) and the importance of the common, secure sharing 
infrastructure it creates. The Committee further understands 
that the path to implement a complex, technical environment 
such as IC ITE needs to be sufficiently flexible and agile. 
However, the Committee remains concerned with the lack of 
consistency and substance in previous reports and briefings on 
IC ITE. Therefore, Section 2312 requires a long-term roadmap, 
business plan, and security plan that shall be reported to the 
congressional intelligence committees at least quarterly with 
additional notifications as necessary.

Intelligence Community Chief Financial Officer

    The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 mandated 
best practices for decision-making and accountability, as well 
as improved decision-makers' access to reliable and timely 
financial and performance information. The CFO Act, as amended, 
requires that the chief financial officers of 24 departments 
and agencies ``report directly to the head of the agency 
regarding financial management matters.'' Section 2404 brings 
the ODNI in line with the best practices implemented in the CFO 
Act.

Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer

    As codified in 44 U.S.C. 3506(a)(1)(A), each federal agency 
head is responsible for `carrying out the information resources 
management activities to improve agency productivity, 
efficiency, and effectiveness.' Accordingly, Section 2405 
expresses the Committee's intent to emphasize the importance of 
the IC Chief Information Officer (CIO), as defined in 50 U.S.C. 
3032(a), in assisting the DNI with information resource 
management by requiring the IC CIO to report directly to the 
DNI.

Central Intelligence Agency Subsistence for Personnel Assigned to 
        Austere Locations

    Section 2411 permits the Director of the CIA to allow 
subsistence for personnel assigned to austere locations. 
Although the statute does not define ``austere,'' the Committee 
believes that utilization of this authority should be minimal. 
Therefore, within 180 days after the enactment of the Act, the 
CIA shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on 
the CIA's definition of ``austere'' and the CIA regulations in 
place governing this authority.

Collocation of Certain Department of Homeland Security Personnel at 
        Field Locations

    The Committee supports DHS I&A's intent to integrate into 
operations across the broader DHS enterprise. Accordingly, 
Section 2434 requires I&A to identify opportunities for 
collocation of I&A field officers and to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a plan for deployment.

Limitations on Intelligence Community Elements' Communications with 
        Congress

    Effective oversight of the IC requires unencumbered 
communications between representatives of the agencies, members 
of Congress, and congressional staff. The Committee directs the 
DNI not to limit any element of the IC from having interactions 
with the congressional intelligence committees, including but 
not limited to, preclearance by the DNI of remarks, briefings, 
discussions of agency resources or authorities requirements, or 
mandatory reports to the DNI on conversations with the 
congressional intelligence committees.

Intelligence Community Support to the National Vetting Center

    On February 6, 2018, the President issued National Security 
Policy Memorandum (NSPM)-9, ``Presidential Memorandum on 
Optimizing the Use of Federal Government Information in Support 
of National Vetting Enterprise.'' The memorandum directs the 
DHS, in coordination with the ODNI and other agencies, to 
establish the National Vetting Center. The memorandum also 
requires agencies to ``provide the Center access to relevant 
biographic, biometric, and related derogatory information.'' It 
further directs DNI, in coordination with the heads of relevant 
IC elements, to ``establish a support element to facilitate, 
guide, and coordinate all IC efforts to use classified 
intelligence and other relevant information within the IC 
holdings in support of the center.'' The Committee wishes to 
obtain regular updates and the most current information about 
the activities of that support element.
    Therefore, no later than 180 days after the enactment of 
the Act and annually thereafter, the Committee directs the DNI 
and the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at DHS to 
brief the congressional intelligence committees on the status 
of IC support to the National Vetting Center, as established by 
NSPM-9.

Update on Status of Attorney General-approved U.S. Person Procedures 
        under Executive Order 12333

    The Committee acknowledges the difficult, labor-intensive 
work undertaken by certain IC elements, to ensure the current 
effectiveness of, and in some cases to substantially revise, 
final Attorney General-approved procedures regarding the 
collection, dissemination, and retention of United States 
persons information. The Committees wish to better understand 
the status of this project, throughout the IC.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that, not later than 60 
days after enactment of the Act, the DNI and the Attorney 
General shall brief the congressional intelligence committees 
on the issuance of final, Attorney General-approved procedures 
by elements of the IC. Specifically, the briefing shall 
identify (1) any such elements that have not yet issued final 
procedures; and (2) with respect to such elements, the status 
of the procedures' development, and any interim guidance or 
procedures on which those elements currently rely.

Homegrown Violent Extremists Imprisoned in Department of Defense 
        Facilities

    The Committee is concerned about an evident gap in 
information sharing about individuals imprisoned in DoD 
facilities who are categorized by the FBI as homegrown violent 
extremists (HVEs). A recent FBI report underscores this gap, 
highlighting the case of an individual who has been convicted 
and sentenced to death by a U.S. military court martial and 
remains incarcerated in a U.S. military facility. The Committee 
understands that, despite his incarceration, this inmate openly 
communicates with the outside world through written 
correspondence and has continued to inspire extremists 
throughout the world. The Committee further understands that 
the FBI is unable to determine the full scope of this inmate's 
contacts with the outside world because only a portion of his 
communications have been provided by the DoD.
    Therefore, no later than 180 days after the enactment of 
the Act, the Committee directs the FBI to work with the DoD to 
create a process by which the DoD provides to the FBI the 
complete communications of individuals imprisoned in DoD 
facilities and who are categorized by the FBI as HVEs.

Naming of Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters

    According to statute enacted in 1972, the current FBI 
headquarters building in Washington, D.C. must be ``known and 
designated'' as the ``J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.'' That 
tribute has aged poorly. It should be reconsidered, in view of 
Hoover's record on civil liberties--including the effort to 
disparage and undermine Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Even today, 
Hoover's name evokes the Bureau's sordid ``COINTELPRO'' 
activities.
    The Committee believes Congress should consider repealing 
the provision requiring the existing Pennsylvania Avenue 
building to be known as the ``J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.'' A 
new name should be determined, through a joint dialogue among 
Bureau leadership, law enforcement personnel, elected 
officials, and civil rights leaders.

Foundational Intelligence Analysis Modernization

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-passed FY 2019 NDAA, 
the Committee directs the Joint Staff Director for 
Intelligence, in coordination with the USD(I) and the Director 
of the DIA, to develop a plan within 60 days of enactment of 
the Act, to modernize systems used to provide foundational 
intelligence.
    Further, the Committee directs the Joint Staff Director for 
Intelligence, in coordination with the DIA Director, to provide 
a briefing to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
congressional armed services committees, within 90 days after 
enactment of the Act, on such plan to modernize foundational 
intelligence systems. If a determination is made that a new 
system is required, the Committees expect the Battlespace 
Awareness Functional Capabilities Board to validate the 
requirements for any new system, and that the acquisition plan 
will follow best practices for the rapid acquisition and 
improvement of technology dependent systems.

Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math careers in Defense 
        Intelligence

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-passed FY 2019 NDAA, 
the Committee directs the Director of DIA to provide a briefing 
to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
congressional armed services committees, within 90 days after 
enactment of the Act, on a plan to develop a Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Math career program that attracts 
and maintains the defense intelligence cadre of Science and 
Technical Intelligence analysts to meet tomorrow's threats.

Security and Intelligence Role in Export Control

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-passed FY 2019 NDAA, 
the Committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, in coordination with the USD(I), within 60 days of 
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
committees and the congressional armed services committees, on 
security support to export control.

Security Clearance Background Investigation Reciprocity

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-passed FY 2019 NDAA, 
the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination 
with the DNI and the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management, within 60 days of enactment of the Act, to brief 
the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 
armed services committees on efforts to ensure seamless 
transition of investigations between authorized investigative 
agencies, as required by law.
    Further, referring to the directive language found in the 
committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-passed FY 
2019 NDAA, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with the DNI and the Director of the Office of 
Personnel Management, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, 
to brief the congressional intelligence committees on efforts 
to ensure reciprocity is a consideration for implementation of 
continuous evaluation and continuous vetting across the federal 
government.

Foreign Influence Task Force

    The IC has warned of active measures taken by foreign 
actors to interfere with and undermine the U.S. democratic 
process, most recently and brazenly by the Russian Federation. 
The Committee appreciates FBI efforts to confront this 
challenge in part through creation of its Foreign Influence 
Task Force. The Committee believes that confronting foreign 
influence directed at the United States is of fundamental 
importance, and thus desires to engage in a close and regular 
dialogue with the FBI about the task force's activities.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the FBI to provide 
detailed, quarterly briefings to the congressional intelligence 
committees, regarding the task force's activities, to include 
its progress and any significant challenges.

Joint System Integration Lab Annual Briefing

    The Joint System Integration Lab (JSIL) at Redstone 
Arsenal, Alabama enables testing of critical military 
intelligence capabilities, including unmanned aerial system 
(UAS) sensors, modeling and simulation, and integration between 
and among service UASs. The Committee seeks to remain fully and 
currently informed about this important work.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the JSIL, within 180 days 
of enactment and annually for two years thereafter, to brief 
the congressional intelligence and defense committees, on 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by 
the JSIL.

Enhanced Oversight of IC Contractors

    A topic of sustained congressional intelligence committee 
interest has been improving the federal government's oversight 
of IC acquisition and procurement practices, including 
activities by poorly performing IC contractors.
    A framework exists to ensure that IC elements do not award 
IC contracts to businesses that engage in negligence or even 
gross negligence, consistently fail to appropriately safeguard 
classified information, maintain poor financial practices, or 
other issues. For example, an IC element may maintain a list of 
contractors of concern, in order to ensure that proposals from 
such contractors are rejected or subjected to additional 
scrutiny. The Committee wishes to build on these practices and 
is concerned about the existing framework's adequacy.
    Therefore, the Committee directs all elements of the IC, to 
the fullest extent consistent with applicable law and policy, 
to share with one another information about contractors with 
track records of concern--such as the commission of negligence 
or gross negligence in the performance of IC contracts, or the 
repeated failure to appropriately safeguard classified 
information in a fashion that the contractor reasonably could 
have been expected to prevent.
    Additionally, no later than 30 days after enactment of the 
Act, the DNI shall brief the congressional intelligence 
committees on the authorities of IC elements with respect to 
contractors with track records of concern--before, during, and 
after procurement. An objective of the briefing will be to 
discuss information sharing practices in this regard, and to 
identify specific areas where the oversight framework can be 
strengthened.

              Committee Consideration and Roll Call Votes

    On June 27, 2019, the Committee met in open session to 
consider H.R. 3494 and ordered the bill favorably reported.
    In open session, the Committee considered an amendment in 
the nature of a substitute, offered by Mr. Schiff to H.R. 3494. 
The amendment was adopted by unanimous voice vote.
    Mr. Schiff then moved to make the classified Fiscal Year 
2020 schedule of authorizations available for Members of the 
House to review. The motion was agreed to by a recorded vote of 
20 ayes to 0 noes:
          Voting aye: Schiff; Himes; Sewell; Carson; Speier; 
        Quigley; Heck; Welch; Maloney; Demings; Krishnamoorthi; 
        Nunes; Conaway; Turner; Wenstrup; Stewart; Crawford; 
        Stefanik; Hurd; Ratcliffe
          Voting no: None
    The Committee then agreed to a motion by the Chairman to 
favorably report H.R. 3494, as amended, to the House, including 
by reference the classified schedules of authorizations. The 
motion was agreed to by a unanimous voice vote.

        Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Amendment


Section 1--Short Title; Table of contents

    Section 1 lists the short title of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, 2019, and 2020 (the 
Act).

Section 2--Divisions and table of contents

    Section 2 sets out the divisions of the bill and the table 
of contents for the bill. Division A consists of authorizations 
for Fiscal Year 2020. Division B consists of authorizations 
that were previously introduced for Fiscal Year 2018 and Fiscal 
Year 2019.

Section 3--Definitions

    Section 3 defines the terms ``congressional intelligence 
committees'' and the ``Intelligence Community'' (IC) that will 
be used in the Act.

                               DIVISION A


                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101--Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the U.S. Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for Fiscal Year 2020.

Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the amounts authorized to be 
appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities and the personnel levels for Fiscal Year 2020 are 
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that 
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103--Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201--Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2018 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability Fund.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 301 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 302--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 303--Paid parental leave

    Section 303 establishes a paid parental leave program for 
employees of elements of the IC. Each IC element that receives 
a request is required to grant that request unless the 
requested leave would unduly disrupt operations. The IC 
elements must each submit to the intelligence committees an 
implementation plan that reports on the changes in processes to 
implement the new benefit and explains how agencies contain a 
mix of IC and non-IC offices are implementing this IC benefit. 
The section requires the DNI to issue an Intelligence Community 
Directive (ICD) implementing this benefit within 180 days of 
the enactment of the statute.

Section 304--Unfunded requirements of the intelligence community

    Section 304 requires the DNI, upon request, to provide a 
briefing to the congressional intelligence and appropriations 
committees about an IC element's unfunded priorities--i.e., an 
element head's request that was not included in the DNI's 
budget request to the President or that was requested by the 
DNI but was not in the President's budget request that was sent 
to Congress.

Section 305--Extending the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 
        1982

    Section 305 amends the definition of ``covert agent'' in 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3126(4)) so 
as to protect all intelligence officers whose identities as 
such are currently classified, and all United States citizens 
whose relationship to the United States is currently 
classified--regardless of the location of the individuals' 
government service or activities or time since separation from 
service.
    The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (IIPA) 
had amended the National Security Act to permit prosecution 
only if, among other things, an individual disclosed the 
classified identities of intelligence officers who were 
currently serving overseas or had within the past five years; 
or those of U.S. citizens having a classified intelligence 
relationship to the United States and residing and acting for a 
U.S. intelligence agency overseas. Section 305 removes the 
IIPA's temporal and geographic limitations, both to account for 
a changing threat environment, and to address the fact that 
undercover IC officers and others assisting the IC can and 
often do perform highly sensitive work warranting protection by 
the IIPA--though without serving abroad in recent years.

Section 306--Intelligence community public-private talent exchange

    Section 306 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
to develop policies, processes, and procedures to allow for the 
detail of IC employees to the private sector and the detail of 
private sector employees to the IC. The section also provides 
the heads of IC elements with authorities to detail employees 
under the terms of the DNI's policies.

Section 307--Assessment of contracting practices to identify certain 
        security and counterintelligence concerns

    Section 307 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
to conduct an assessment of the authorities, policies, 
processes, and standards used by the IC to ensure that the IC 
is weighing security and counterintelligence risks in 
contracting with companies that contract--or carry out joint 
research and development--with the People's Republic of China, 
the Russian Federation, the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, or the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Section 308--Required counterintelligence briefings and notifications

    Section 308 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
to post publicly advisory reports on foreign 
counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to federal 
election campaigns. It also requires quarterly briefings 
regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 
counterintelligence activities and prompt notification of an 
investigation carried out regarding a counterintelligence risk 
related to a federal election or campaign.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Section 401--Establishment of the Climate Security Advisory Council

    Section 401 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
to establish an advisory council to assist analytic components 
of the IC with incorporating analysis of climate security into 
their work. The council will also facilitate coordination and 
sharing of data between the IC and non-IC elements related to 
climate change.

Section 402--Transfer of National Intelligence University to the Office 
        of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 402 requires the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency to transfer to the Director of National 
Intelligence the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities 
of the National Intelligence University.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Section 501--Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in 
        the United States by the Communist Party of China

    Section 501 requires the Director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center to submit an annual 
report to the congressional intelligence committees concerning 
the influence operations and campaigns in the United States 
conducted by the Communist Party of China.

Section 502--Report on repression of ethnic Muslim minorities in the 
        Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China

    Section 502 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees 
concerning activity by the People's Republic of China to 
repress ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region of 
China.

Section 503--Report on efforts by People's Republic of China to 
        influence election in Taiwan

    Section 503 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
to submit a report within 45 days of the 2020 Taiwan 
Presidential and Vice Presidential elections concerning any 
influence operations by China to interfere in or undermine the 
election and efforts by the United States to disrupt those 
operations.

Section 504--Assessment of legitimate and illegitimate financial and 
        other assets of Vladimir Putin

    Section 504 expresses the sense of Congress that the United 
States should do more to expose the corruption of Russian 
President Vladimir Putin and directs the Director of National 
Intelligence to submit to appropriate congressional committees 
an assessment on the net worth and financial and other assets 
of President Putin and his family members.

Section 505--Assessments of intentions of political leadership of the 
        Russian Federation

    Section 505 directs the Intelligence Community to submit 
assessments to certain congressional committees of the current 
intentions of the political leadership of the Russian 
Federation concerning potential military action against members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), responses to 
an enlarged United States or NATO military presence in Eastern 
Europe, and potential actions taken for the purpose of 
exploiting perceived divisions among the governments of 
Russia's Western adversaries.

Section 506--Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi

    Section 506 directs the Director of National Intelligence 
to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees 
concerning the death of Jamal Khashoggi within thirty days of 
the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act.

          TITLE VI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM

Section 601--Definitions

    Section 601 sets forth certain definitions that apply to 
Title VI.

Section 602--Annual strategic intelligence assessment of and 
        comprehensive report on domestic terrorism

    Section 602 requires the annual submission of a joint 
report to certain congressional committees on domestic 
terrorism by the Director of National Intelligence, the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under 
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis. 
The report must contain a strategic intelligence assessment on 
domestic terrorism; a discussion of the activities undertaken 
by the federal government related to domestic terrorism 
investigations; and data concerning domestic terrorism 
incidents, investigations, the filing of federal or non-federal 
charges against suspects, and the personnel levels and 
intelligence products produced by the executive branch. 
Finally, Section 602 requires the executive branch to provide 
to the congressional committees certain policy documents.

                  TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Section 701--Modification of requirements for submission to congress of 
        certain reports

    Section 701 amends or cancels numerous reporting 
requirements under current law.

Section 702--Increased transparency regarding counterterrorism budget 
        of the United States

    Section 702 makes several findings regarding the 
transparency of the IC's counterterrorism budget and directs a 
briefing from the executive branch on the feasibility of 
releasing additional information to the public concerning the 
IC's efforts on counterterrorism.

Section 703--Task force on illicit financing of espionage and foreign 
        influence operations

    Section 703 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
to establish a task force to study and assess the illicit 
financing of espionage and foreign influence operations 
directed at the United States and requires the task force to 
issue a report on this subject to the appropriate congressional 
committees.

Section 704--Study on role of retired and former personnel of 
        intelligence community with respect to certain foreign 
        intelligence operations

    Section 704 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
to conduct a study on former intelligence community personnel 
providing intelligence assistance to or for the benefit of a 
foreign country and to provide the study to the congressional 
intelligence committees.

Section 705--Report by Director of National Intelligence on fifth-
        generation wireless network technology

    Section 705 directs the Director of National Intelligence 
to submit to the intelligence committees a report on the threat 
to the national security of the United States posed by adoption 
of fifth-generation wireless network built by foreign companies 
and possible efforts to mitigate the threat.

Section 706--Establishment of 5G prize competition

    Section 706 establishes a program to award prizes to 
stimulate research and development relevant to fifth-generation 
wireless technology.

Section 707--Establishment of deepfakes prize competition

    Section 707 establishes a program to award prizes to 
stimulate the research, development, or commercialization of 
technologies to automatically detect machine-manipulated media.

                               DIVISION B


                   TITLE XXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 2101--Authorization of appropriations

    Section 2101 lists the United States Government 
departments, agencies, and other elements for which the Act 
authorizes appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities for Fiscal Year 2019. The bill deems 
authorized the funds already appropriated for Fiscal Year 2018.

Section 2102--Classified schedule of authorizations

    Section 2102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2019 are 
contained in classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available 
to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives and to the President.

Section 2103--Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal Year 
2019.

   TITLE XXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY 
                                 SYSTEM

Section 2201--Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$514,000,000 for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for 
Fiscal Year 2019.

Section 2202--Computation of annuities for employees of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 2202 makes technical changes to the CIA Retirement 
Act to conform with various statutes governing the Civil 
Service Retirement System.

          TITLE XXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 2301--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 2301 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 2302--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 2302 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 2303--Modification of special pay authority for science, 
        technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and addition 
        of special pay authority for cyber positions

    Section 2303 provides an increased yearly cap for Science, 
Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics (STEM) employee 
positions in the IC that support critical cyber missions. 
Section 303 also permits the National Security Agency (NSA) to 
establish a special rate of pay for positions that perform 
functions that execute the agency's cyber mission.

Section 2304--Modification of appointment of chief information officer 
        of the intelligence community

    Section 2304 changes the position of IC Chief Information 
Officer from being subject to presidential appointment to being 
subject to appointment by the DNI.

Section 2305--Director of national intelligence review of placement of 
        positions within the intelligence community on the executive 
        schedule

    Section 2305 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Office of Personnel Management, to conduct a review of the 
positions within the IC that may be appropriate for inclusion 
on the Executive Schedule, and the appropriate levels for 
inclusion.

Section 2306--Supply chain and counterintelligence risk management task 
        force

    Section 2306 requires the DNI to establish a task force to 
standardize information sharing between the IC and the United 
States Government acquisition community with respect to supply 
chain and counterintelligence risks. Section 2306 further 
provides requirements for membership, security clearances, and 
annual reports.

Section 2307--Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and 
        cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence with 
        foreign governments and entities

    Section 2307 requires the IC, when entering into foreign 
intelligence sharing agreements, to consider the pervasiveness 
of telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure, 
equipment, and services provided by United States adversaries 
or entities thereof.

Section 2308--Cyber protection support for the personnel of the 
        intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to cyber 
        attack

    Section 2308 permits the DNI to provide cyber protection 
support for the personal technology devices and personal 
accounts of IC personnel whom the DNI determines to be highly 
vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information collection 
activities.

Section 2309--Elimination of sunset authority relating to management of 
        supply-chain risk

    Section 2309 eliminates the sunset of certain IC 
procurement authorities to manage and protect against supply 
chain risks.

Section 2310--Limitations on determinations regarding certain security 
        classifications

    Section 2310 prohibits an officer of the IC who is 
nominated to a Senate-confirmed position from making certain 
classification determinations posing potential conflicts of 
interest regarding that nominee.

Section 2311--Joint intelligence community council

    Section 2311 amends Section 101A of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022(d)) as to the Joint Intelligence 
Community Council meetings and to require a report on its 
activities.

Section 2312--Intelligence community information technology environment

    Section 2312 defines the roles and responsibilities for the 
performance of the Intelligence Community Information 
Technology Environment (IC ITE). Section 2312 requires certain 
reporting and briefing requirements to the congressional 
intelligence committees regarding the IC's ongoing 
implementation of IC ITE.

Section 2313--Report on development of secure mobile voice solution for 
        intelligence community

    Section 2313 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Directors of the CIA and NSA, provide the congressional 
intelligence committees with a classified report on the 
feasibility, desirability, cost, and required schedule 
associated with the implementation of a secure mobile voice 
solution for the intelligence community.

Section 2314--Policy on minimum insider threat standards

    Section 2314 requires the DNI to develop minimum insider 
threat standards to be followed by each element of the IC, 
consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum 
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs.

Section 2315--Submission of intelligence community policies

    Section 2315 requires the DNI to make all ODNI policies and 
procedures available to the congressional intelligence 
committees. Section 2315 also requires ODNI to notify the 
congressional committees of any new or rescinded policies.

Section 2316--Expansion of intelligence community recruitment efforts

    Section 2316 requires the DNI, in consultation with IC 
elements, to submit a plan to congressional intelligence 
committees as to each element's efforts in recruitment from 
rural and underrepresented regions.

 TITLE XXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Section 2401--Authority for protection of current and former employees 
        of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 2401 amends Title 50, section 3506, to provide 
protection for current and former ODNI personnel and designated 
immediate family members, if there is a national security 
threat that warrants such protection.

Section 2402--Designation of the Program Manager-Information Sharing 
        environment

    Section 2402 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Protection Act of 2004 so that the Program Manager-Information 
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) is subject to appointment by the 
DNI, not the President.

Section 2403--Technical modification to the Executive Schedule

    Section 2403 amends the Executive Schedule to make the 
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center a Level IV position on the Executive Schedule.

Section 2404--Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community

    Section 2404 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by 
requiring the Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence 
Community to directly report to the DNI.

Section 2405--Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community

    Section 2405 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by 
requiring the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
Community to directly report to the DNI.

                SUBTITLE B--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Section 2411--Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for personnel 
        assigned to austere locations

    Section 2411 authorizes the Director of the CIA to approve, 
with or without reimbursement, subsistence to personnel 
assigned to an austere overseas location.

Section 2412--Special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation 
        payments and other payments for Central Intelligence Agency 
        Personnel

    Section 2412 authorizes the Director of the CIA to provide 
enhanced injury benefits to a covered employee or qualifying 
dependents who suffer an injury overseas due to war, 
insurgency, hostile act, or terrorist activities.

Section 2413--Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 2413 expands the security perimeter jurisdiction at 
CIA facilities from 500 feet to 500 yards.

Section 2414--Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for 
        certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence 
        Agency

    Section 2414 repeals Title 50, section 3036(g), with 
conforming amendments to section 611 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487).

     SUBTITLE C--OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OF 
                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Section 2421--Consolidation of Department of Energy Office of 
        Intelligence and Counterintelligence

    Section 2421 amends the Department of Energy Organization 
Act to consolidate the offices of intelligence and 
counterintelligence into the DOE Office of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence.

Section 2422--Establishment of Energy Infrastructure Security Center

    Section 2422 establishes the Energy Infrastructure Security 
Center under the Department of Energy Office of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence that will be responsible for 
coordinating intelligence regarding the to the protection of 
U.S. energy infrastructure.

Section 2423--Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive 
        Committee and Budget Reporting Requirement

    Section 2423 amends the Department of Energy Organization 
Act by repealing the Department of Energy Intelligence 
Executive Committee, as well as certain budgetary reporting 
requirements.

                       SUBTITLE D--OTHER ELEMENTS

Section 2431--Plan for designation of counterintelligence component of 
        defense security service as an element of intelligence 
        community

    Section 2431 directs the DNI and the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of 
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, to 
provide the congressional intelligence and defense committees 
with an implementation plan to make the Defense Security 
Service's (DSS's) Counterintelligence component an element of 
the IC as defined in paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)), by January 1, 2021. 
Section 2431 further provides that the plan shall not address 
the DSS's personnel security functions.

Section 2432--Notice not required for private entities

    Section 2432 provides a Rule of Construction that the 
Secretary of the DHS is not required to provide notice to 
private entities before issuing directives on agency 
information security policies and practices.

Section 2433--Establishment of advisory board for National 
        Reconnaissance Office

    Section 2433 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
authorize the Director of the NRO to establish an advisory 
board to study matters related to space, overhead 
reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters. Section 2433 
provides that the board shall terminate three years after the 
Director declares the board's first meeting.

Section 2434--Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security 
        personnel at field locations

    Section 2434 requires DHS I&A to identify opportunities for 
collocation of I&A field officers and to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a plan for deployment.

                      TITLE XXV--ELECTION MATTERS

Section 2501--Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against 
        United States election infrastructure

    Section 2501 directs the DHS Under Secretary for I&A to 
submit a report on cyberattacks and attempted cyberattacks by 
foreign governments on United States election infrastructure, 
in connection with the 2016 presidential election. Section 2501 
further requires this report to include identification of the 
States and localities affected and include efforts to attack 
voter registration databases, voting machines, voting-related 
computer networks, and the networks of Secretaries of State and 
other election officials.

Section 2502--Review of Intelligence Community's posture to collect 
        against and analyze Russian efforts to influence the 
        presidential election

    Section 2502 requires the DNI to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, within one year of 
enactment of the Act, a report on the Director's review of the 
IC's posture to collect against and analyze Russian efforts to 
interfere with the 2016 United States presidential election. 
Section 2502 further requires the review to include assessments 
of IC resources, information sharing, and legal authorities.

Section 2503--Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal 
        elections

    Section 2503 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the FBI, 
Secretary of DHS, and heads of other relevant IC elements, to 
commence assessments of security vulnerabilities of State 
election systems one year before regularly scheduled Federal 
elections. Section 2503 further requires the DNI to submit a 
report on such assessments 180 days before regularly scheduled 
Federal elections, and an updated assessment 90 days before 
regularly scheduled Federal elections.

Section 2504--Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United 
        States elections

    Section 2504 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Secretary of DHS, Director of the FBI, Director of the CIA, 
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of the 
Treasury, to develop a whole-of-government strategy for 
countering Russian cyber threats against United States 
electoral systems and processes. Section 2504 further requires 
this strategy to include input from solicited Secretaries of 
State and chief election officials.

Section 2505--Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns 
        directed at foreign elections and referenda

    Section 2505 requires the DNI to provide a report assessing 
past and ongoing Russian influence campaigns against foreign 
elections and referenda, to include a summary of the means by 
which such influence campaigns have been or are likely to be 
conducted, a summary of defenses against or responses to such 
Russian influence campaigns, a summary of IC activities to 
assist foreign governments against such campaigns, and an 
assessment of the effectiveness of such foreign defenses and 
responses.

Section 2506--Information sharing with state election officials

    Section 2506 requires the DNI, within 30 days of enactment 
of the Act, to support security clearances for each eligible 
chief election official of a State, territory, or the District 
of Columbia (and additional eligible designees), up to the Top 
Secret level. Section 2506 also requires the DNI to assist with 
sharing appropriate classified information about threats to 
election systems.

Section 2507--Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and 
        active measures campaigns directed at elections for federal 
        offices

    Section 2507 requires the Director of the FBI, and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to brief the congressional 
intelligence committees, congressional leadership, the armed 
services committees, the appropriations committees, and the 
homeland security committees (consistent with sources and 
methods) not later than 14 days after a determination has been 
made with moderate or high confidence that a significant 
foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended to 
influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has taken 
place by a foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or 
other entity. The briefing shall provide a description of the 
significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures 
campaign, including an identification of the foreign state or 
foreign nonstate person or group.

Section 2508--Designation of Counterintelligence Officer to lead 
        election security matters

    Section 2508 requires the DNI to designate a national 
counterintelligence officer within the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and 
coordinate election security-related counterintelligence 
matters, including certain risks from foreign power 
interference.

                      TITLE XXVI--ELECTION MATTERS

Section 2601--Definitions

    Section 2601 provides definitions for terminology used 
throughout this Title.

Section 2602--Reports and plans relating to security clearances and 
        background investigations

    Section 2602 requires the interagency Performance 
Accountability Council (Council) to provide plans to reduce the 
background investigation inventory and best align the 
investigation function between the Department of Defense and 
the National Background Investigation Bureau. Section 2602 
further requires the Council to report on the future of the 
clearance process and requires the DNI to notify the 
appropriate committees upon determining requests to change 
clearance standards, and the status of those requests' 
disposition.

Section 2603--Improving the process for security clearances

    Section 2603 requires the DNI to review the Questionnaire 
for National Security positions (SF-86) and the Federal 
Investigative Standards to determine potential unnecessary 
information required and assess whether revisions are necessary 
to account for insider threats. Section 2603 further requires 
the DNI, in coordination with the Council, to establish 
policies on interim clearances and consistency between the 
clearance process for contract and government personnel.

Section 2604--Goals for promptness of determinations regarding security 
        clearances

    Section 2604 requires the Council to implement a plan to be 
able to process 90 percent of clearance requests at the Secret 
level in thirty days, and at the Top Secret level in 90 days. 
The plan shall also address how to recognize reciprocity in 
accepting clearances among agencies within two weeks, and to 
require that ninety percent of clearance holders not be subject 
to a time-based periodic investigation.

Section 2605--Security Executive Agent

    Section 2605 establishes the DNI as the government's 
Security Executive Agent, consistent with Executive Order 
13467, and sets forth relevant authorities.

Section 2606--Report on unified, simplified, governmentwide standards 
        for positions of trust and security clearances

    Section 2606 directs the DNI and the Director of the Office 
of Personnel Management to report on the advisability and 
implications of consolidating the tiers for positions of trust 
and security clearances from five to three tiers.

Section 2607--Report on clearance in person concept

    Section 2607 requires the DNI to submit a report on a 
concept whereby an individual can maintain eligibility for 
access to classified information for up to three years after 
access may lapse.

Section 2608--Reports on reciprocity for security clearances inside of 
        departments and agencies

    Section 2608 requires each federal agency to submit a 
report to the DNI that identifies the number of clearances that 
take more than two weeks to reciprocally recognize and set 
forth the reason for any delays. Section 2608 further requires 
the DNI to submit an annual report summarizing reciprocity.

Section 2609--Intelligence Community reports on security clearances

    Section 2609 requires the DNI to submit a report on each IC 
element's security clearance metrics, segregated by Federal 
employees and contractor employees.

Section 2610--Periodic report on positions in the Intelligence 
        Community that can be conducted without access to classified 
        information, networks, or facilities

    Section 2610 requires the DNI to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on positions 
that can be conducted without access to classified information, 
networks, or facilities, or may require only a Secret-level 
clearance.

Section 2611--Information sharing program for positions of trust and 
        security clearances

    Section 2611 requires the Security Executive Agent and the 
Suitability/Credentialing Executive Agent to establish a 
program to share information between and among government 
agencies and industry partners to inform decisions about 
positions of trust and security clearances.

Section 2612--Report on protections for confidentiality of 
        whistleblower-related communications

    Section 2612 requires the Security Executive Agent, in 
coordination with the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community, to submit a report detailing the IC's controls used 
to ensure continuous evaluation programs protect the 
confidentiality of whistleblower-related communications.

                 TITLE XXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

    SUBTITLE A--MATTERS RELATING TO RUSSIA AND OTHER FOREIGN POWERS

Section 2701--Limitation relating to establishment or support of 
        cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation

    Section 2701 prohibits the Federal government from 
expending any funds to establish or support a cybersecurity 
unit or other cyber agreement that is jointly established or 
otherwise implemented by the United States Government and the 
Russian Federation, unless the DNI submits a report to the 
appropriate congressional committees at least 30 days prior to 
any such agreement. The report shall include the agreement's 
purpose, intended shared intelligence, value to national 
security, counterintelligence concerns, and any measures taken 
to mitigate such concerns.

Section 2702--Report on returning Russian compounds

    Section 2702 requires the IC to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees, within 180 days of enactment of the 
Act, both classified and unclassified reports on the 
intelligence risks of returning the diplomatic compounds--in 
New York, Maryland, and California--taken from Russia as a 
reprisal for Russian meddling in the 2016 United States 
presidential election. Section 2702 also establishes an ongoing 
requirement for producing similar assessments for future 
assignment of diplomatic compounds within the United States.

Section 2703--Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia

    Section 2703 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and 
Analysis, to submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees, within 60 days of enactment of the Act, an 
assessment of Russian threat finance, based on all-source 
intelligence from both the IC and the Office of Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence of the Treasury Department. Section 2703 
further requires the assessment to include global nodes and 
entry points for Russian money laundering; United States 
vulnerabilities; connections between Russian individuals 
involved in money laundering and the Russian Government; 
counterintelligence threats to the United States posed by 
Russian money laundering and other forms of threat finance; and 
challenges to United States Government efforts to enforce 
sanctions and combat organized crime.

Section 2704--Notification of an active measures campaign

    Section 2704 requires the DNI to notify congressional 
leadership, and the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking 
Member of the appropriate congressional committees, each time 
the DNI has determined there is credible information that a 
foreign power has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt to 
employ a covert influence or active measures campaign with 
regard to the modernization, employment, doctrine, or force 
posture of the nuclear deterrent or missile defense. Section 
2704 further requires that such notification must include 
information on any actions that the United States has taken to 
expose or halt such attempts.

Section 2705--Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and 
        consular personnel of the Russian Federation in the United 
        States

    Section 2705 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that 
the Russian Federation provides notification at least two 
business days in advance of all travel that is subject to such 
requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of 
the Russian Federation in the United States, and take necessary 
action to secure full compliance by Russian personnel and 
address any noncompliance.

Section 2706--Report on outreach strategy addressing threats from 
        United States adversaries to the United States technology 
        sector

    Section 2706 requires the DNI to submit a report to 
appropriate committees on the IC's and the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise's outreach to United States non-government entities 
(including private businesses and academia), regarding the 
United States' adversaries' efforts to acquire critical United 
States infrastructure technology, intellectual property, and 
research and development information.

Section 2707--Report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and 
        Lebanon

    Section 2707 requires the DNI to submit a report to 
appropriate congressional committees on Iranian support of 
proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon and the threat posed to 
Israel and other United States regional allies and interests.

Section 2708--Annual report on Iranian expenditures supporting foreign 
        military and terrorist activates

    Section 2708 requires the DNI to submit a report to 
Congress describing Iranian expenditures on military and 
terrorist activities outside the country.

Section 2709--Expansion of scope of Committee to Counter Active 
        Measures and report on establishment of Foreign Malign 
        Influence Center

    Section 2709 amends a provision in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 to expand the scope of 
the Committee to Counter Active Measures to add China, Iran, 
North Korea, and other nation states. Section 2709 further 
requires DNI, in coordination with relevant intelligence 
community elements, to submit to congressional intelligence 
committees a report on establishing a center to assess and 
disseminate foreign influence activities, including the 
desirability and barriers to such establishment.

                          SUBTITLE B--REPORTS

Section 2711--Technical correction to Inspector General study

    Section 2711 amends Title 50, section 11001(d), by 
replacing the IC IG's ``audit'' requirement for Inspectors 
General with employees having classified material access, with 
a ``review'' requirement.

Section 2712--Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer 
        of the Department of Homeland Security

    Section 2712 requires the Secretary of DHS, in consultation 
with the Under Secretary for I&A, to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the adequacy 
of the Under Secretary's authorities required as the Chief 
Intelligence Officer to organize the Homeland Security 
Intelligence Enterprise, and the legal and policy changes 
necessary to coordinate, organize, and lead DHS intelligence 
activities.

Section 2713--Review of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters

    Section 2713 directs the Inspector General of the IC (IC 
IG), in consultations with the IGs of other IC agencies, to 
conduct a review of practices and procedures relating to IC 
whistleblower matters.

Section 2714--Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with 
        respect to certain foreign investments

    Section 2714 directs the DNI to submit a report on ODNI's 
role in preparing analytic materials in connection with the 
United States Government's evaluation of national security 
risks associated with potential foreign investments.

Section 2715--Report on surveillance by foreign governments against 
        United States telecommunications networks

    Section 2715 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the FBI, 
and Secretary of DHS, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence, judiciary, and homeland security committees, 
within 180 days of enactment of the Act, a report on known 
attempts by foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in United States telecommunications networks to 
surveil United States persons, and any actions that the IC has 
taken to protect United States Government agencies and 
personnel from such surveillance.

Section 2716--Biennial report on foreign investment risks

    Section 2716 requires the DNI to establish an IC working 
group on foreign investment risks and prepare a biennial report 
that includes an identification, analysis, and explanation of 
national security vulnerabilities, foreign investment trends, 
foreign countries' strategies to exploit vulnerabilities 
through the acquisition of either critical technologies 
(including components or items essential to national defense), 
critical materials (including physical materials essential to 
national security), or critical infrastructure (including 
physical or virtual systems and assets whose destruction or 
incapacity would have a debilitating impact on national 
security), and market distortions caused by foreign countries. 
Technologies, materials, and infrastructure are deemed to be 
``critical'' under this provision if their exploitation by a 
foreign government could cause severe harm to the national 
security of the United States.

Section 2717--Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel 
        of foreign diplomats

    Section 2717 amends a provision in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, to require reporting of 
``a best estimate'' of known or suspected violations of certain 
travel requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular 
personnel of the Russian Federation.

Section 2718--Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized 
        disclosures of classified information

    Section 2718 requires the Assistant Attorney General for 
National Security at the Department of Justice, in consultation 
with the Director of the FBI, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence and judiciary committees a semiannual report on 
the status of IC referrals to the Department regarding 
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Section 
2718 also directs IC elements to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a semiannual report on the number of 
investigations opened and completed by each agency regarding an 
unauthorized public disclosure of classified information to the 
media, and the number of completed investigations referred to 
the Attorney General.

Section 2719--Congressional notification of designation of covered 
        intellgience officer as persona non grata

    Section 2719 requires, not later than 72 hours after a 
covered intelligence officer is designated as persona non 
grata, that the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State, submit to the designated committees a notification of 
that designation, to include the basis for the designation and 
justification for the expulsion.

Section 2720--Reports on Intelligence Community participation in 
        vulnerabilities equities process of Federal government

    Section 2720 requires the DNI to submit, within 90 days of 
enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report describing the Vulnerabilities Equities 
Process (VEP) roles and responsibilities for each IC element. 
Section 2720 further requires each IC element to report to the 
congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of a 
significant change to that respective IC element's VEP process 
and criteria. Section 2720 also requires the DNI to submit an 
annual report to the congressional intelligence committees with 
specified information on certain VEP metrics.

Section 2721--Inspectors General reports on classification

    Section 2721 requires each designated IG to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the accuracy 
in the application of classification and handling markings on a 
representative sample of finished products, to include those 
with compartments. Section 2721 also directs analyses of 
compliance with declassification procedures and a review of the 
effectiveness of processes for identifying topics of public or 
historical importance that merit prioritization for 
declassification review.

Section 2722--Reports on global water insecurity and national security 
        implications and briefing on emerging infectious disease and 
        pandemics

    Section 2722 requires the DNI to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report every five years 
on the implications of global water insecurity on the United 
States' national security interests. Section 2722 further 
requires the DNI to provide a briefing to appropriate 
congressional committees on the geopolitical effects of 
emerging infectious disease and pandemics, and their 
implications on the United States' national security.

Section 2722--Reports on global water insecurity and national security 
        implications and briefing on emerging infectious disease and 
        pandemics

    Section 2722 requires the DNI to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report every five years 
on the implications of global water insecurity on the United 
States' national security interests. Section 2722 further 
requires the DNI to provide a briefing to appropriate 
congressional committees on the geopolitical effects of 
emerging infectious disease and pandemics, and their 
implications on the United States' national security.

Section 2723--Annual report on memoranda of understanding between 
        elements of intelligence community and other entities of the 
        United States government regarding significant operational 
        activities or policy

    Section 2723 amends a provision in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, instead requiring each 
IC element to submit an annual report to the congressional 
intelligence committees that lists each significant memorandum 
of understanding or other agreement entered into during the 
preceding fiscal year. Section 2723 further requires each IC 
element to provide such documents if an intelligence committee 
so requests.

Section 2724--Study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified 
        wireline and wireless telephone calls

    Section 2724 requires the DNI to complete a study and 
report on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline 
and wireless telephone calls between personnel in the IC.

Section 2725--Modification of requirement for annual report on hiring 
        and retention of minority employees

    Section 2725 expands and clarifies current IC reporting 
requirements on diversity of IC personnel to include five prior 
fiscal years and to disaggregate data by IC element.

Section 2726--Reports on Intelligence Community loan repayment and 
        related programs

    Section 2726 requires the DNI, in cooperation with the 
heads of the elements of the IC, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on potentially establishing an 
IC-wide program for student loan repayment and forgiveness.

Section 2727--Repeal of certain reporting requirements

    Section 2727 repeals certain intelligence community 
reporting requirements.

Section 2728--Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on 
        senior executives of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Section 2728 directs the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community to submit a report to the congressional 
intelligence committees regarding senior executive service 
staffing at the ODNI.

Section 2729--Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation offering 
        permanent residence to sources and cooperators

    Section 2729 directs the FBI within 30 days of enactment of 
this Act to provide a briefing to the congressional 
intelligence committees regarding the FBI's ability to provide 
permanent U.S. residence to foreign individuals who serve as 
cooperators in national security-related investigations.

Section 2730--Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue sources

    Section 2730 requires the DNI, in coordination with other 
relevant IC elements, to produce to the congressional 
intelligence committees an intelligence assessment of the North 
Korean regime's revenue sources.

Section 2731--Report on possible exploitation of virtual currencies by 
        terrorist actors

    Section 2731 requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Treasury, to submit to Congress a report on the 
possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist 
actors.

                       SUBTITLE C--OTHER MATTERS

Section 2741--Public Interest Declassification Board

    Section 2741 reauthorizes the Public Interest 
Declassification Board administered by the National Archives 
for a term of ten years, expiring on December 31, 2028.

Section 2742--Technical and clerical amendments to the National 
        Security Act of 1947

    Section 2742 makes certain edits to the National Security 
Act of 1947 as amended for technical or clerical purposes.

Section 2743--Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy

    Section 2743 provides technical corrections to certain 
provisions regarding the Department of Energy's Office of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

Section 2744--Sense of Congress on notifications of certain disclosures 
        of classified information

    Section 2744 expresses the sense of Congress that, pursuant 
to the requirement for the IC to keep the congressional 
intelligence committees fully and currently informed'' in 
Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, IC agencies 
must submit prompt written notification after becoming aware 
that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed 
certain classified information outside established intelligence 
channels to foreign adversaries--North Korea, Iran, China, 
Russia, or Cuba.

Section 2745--Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage 
        activities when considering whether or not to provide visas to 
        foreign individuals to be accredited to a United Nations 
        Mission in the United States

    Section 2745 provides a Sense of Congress that, as to 
foreign individuals to be accredited to a United Nations 
mission, the Secretary of State should consider known and 
suspected intelligence and espionage activities, including 
activities constituting precursors to espionage, carried out by 
such individuals against the United States, or against foreign 
allies or partners of the United States. Section 2745 further 
provides that the Secretary of State should consider an 
individual's status as a known or suspected intelligence 
officer for a foreign adversary.

                 Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee held multiple 
hearings on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R. 
3494. The bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects 
conclusions reached by the Committee in light of this oversight 
activity.

                General Performance Goals and Objectives

    The goals and objectives of H.R. 3494 are to authorize the 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020. These 
activities enhance the national security of the United States, 
support and assist the armed forces of the United States, and 
support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of 
the United States.
    The classified annex that accompanies this report reflects 
in great detail the Committee's specific performance goals and 
objectives at the programmatic level with respect to classified 
programs.

                       Unfunded Mandate Statement

    Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of 
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded 
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee 
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office 
included herein.
                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, July 11, 2019.
Hon. Adam Schiff,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3494, the Damon 
Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is William Ma.
            Sincerely,
                                         Phillip L. Swagel,
                                                          Director.
    Enclosure.

     
    
    Bill summary: H.R. 3494 would authorize appropriations for 
fiscal years 2019 and 2020 for intelligence activities of the 
U.S. government, including the Intelligence Community 
Management Account and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS). The bill also would 
modify the security clearance process for federal agencies, 
expand personnel benefits for employees of the intelligence 
community, and create or modify other intelligence programs.
    CBO does not provide estimates for classified programs; 
therefore, this estimate addresses only the unclassified 
aspects of the bill. In addition, CBO cannot provide estimates 
for certain provisions in the unclassified portion of the bill 
because they concern classified programs. On that limited 
basis, CBO estimates that implementing the unclassified 
provisions of the bill would cost about $5.9 billion over the 
2020-2024 period; that spending would be subject to the 
appropriation of the specified and estimated amounts.
    In addition, several provisions of the bill also would 
increase and decrease direct spending; therefore, pay-as-you-go 
procedures apply. On net, however, CBO estimates that those 
effects would be insignificant over the 2020-2029 period. 
Enacting the bill would not affect revenues.
    CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3494 would not 
significantly increase net direct spending or on-budget 
deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods 
beginning in 2030.
    H.R. 3494 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.
    Estimated Federal cost: The estimated budgetary effect of 
H.R. 3494 is shown in Table 1. The costs of the legislation 
fall within all budget functions that fund security and 
suitability investigations.

 TABLE 1--ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF H.R. 3494, AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
                                        ON INTELLIGENCE ON JUNE 27, 2019
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           By fiscal year, millions of dollarsa_
                                          ----------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             2019      2020      2021      2022      2023      2024    2019-2024
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
 
Security Clearances:
    Estimated Authorization Level                 0       411       840     1,310     1,350     1,400      5,311
    Estimated Outlays                             0       361       800     1,260     1,350     1,400      5,171
Intelligence Community Management
 Account:
    Authorization Level                           0       566         0         0         0         0        566
    Estimated Outlays                             0       368       158        20         8         3        557
Pay and Benefits:
    Estimated Authorization Level                 0         1        23        47        49        51        171
    Estimated Outlays                             0         1        23        47        49        51        171
Task Forces and Other Advisory Bodies:
    Estimated Authorization Level                 0         5         5         5         4         3         22
    Estimated Outlays                             0         5         5         5         4         3         22
Prize Competitions:
    Estimated Authorization Level                 0        11         *         0         0         0         11
    Estimated Outlays                             0         1        10         0         0         0         11
Assessments, and Briefings:
    Estimated Authorization Level                 0         5         *         *         *         *          6
    Estimated Outlays                             0         5         *         *         *         *          6
    Totals:..............................
        Estimated Authorization Level             0       999       868     1,362     1,403     1,454      6,087
        Estimated Outlays                         0       741       996     1,332     1,411     1,457      5,938
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Components may not sum to totals because of rounding; * = between -$500,000 and $500,000.
a. In addition to the budgetary effects shown above, enacting H.R. 3494 would affect direct spending by between
  $500,000 and $500,000 over the 2020-2029 period.

    Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 
3494 will be enacted near the beginning of fiscal year 2020. 
Outlays are based on historical spending patterns for existing 
or similar programs.

Spending subject to appropriation

    CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost about 
$5.9 billion over the 2020-2024 period. Such spending would be 
subject to appropriation of the estimated and specified 
amounts.
    Security Clearances. Title XXVI of the bill would require 
the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance 
Accountability Council (the Council) to achieve the following 
performance goals by December 31, 2021:\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\The Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance 
Accountability Council was established by Executive Order 13467, as 
amended, to oversee reform of the federal government's system for 
determining the eligibility of individuals to access classified 
information, hold sensitive positions (positions in which an individual 
could affect national security or trust in the federal government 
regardless of whether the individual has access to classified 
information), and gain physical or logical access to federal facilities 
or information systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Issue 90 percent of initial determinations for 
secret and top secret clearances within 30 and 90 days, 
respectively;
     Accept 90 percent of security clearances for 
employees moving between federal agencies within two weeks if 
the clearances are equivalent; and
     Reinvestigate not more than 10 percent of all 
clearance holders at set intervals.
    Title XXVI also would require the Council, the Director of 
National Intelligence, and other federal entities to develop 
plans, policies, and strategies, to perform reviews, and to 
prepare reports on different aspects of the security clearance 
process. In total, CBO estimates that implementing title XXVI 
would cost about $5.2 billion over the 2020-2024 period.
    Timeliness. Current law sets a goal of completing 90 
percent of security-clearance determinations within an average 
of 60 days from the date that the completed application is 
received. The Administration only applies that timeliness 
standard to initial determinations for secret clearances and 
has adopted other standards for top secret clearances and 
periodic reinvestigations. The current timeliness goals for the 
fastest 90 percent of security-clearance determinations are:
     An average of 60 days for initial secret 
clearances (40 days to complete the investigative phase and 20 
days to complete the adjudicative phase),
     An average of 100 days for initial top secret 
clearances (80 days to complete the investigative phase and 20 
days to complete the adjudicative phase), and
     An average of 180 days for periodic 
reinvestigations regardless of clearance level (150 days to 
complete the investigative phase and 30 days to complete the 
adjudicative phase).
    Those goals, whether determined by statute or policy, 
however, currently are not being met. At the end of May 2019, 
the backlog of pending cases totaled 433,000. CBO estimates 
that the Administration will spend about $1.5 billion on all 
investigative services and another $0.1 billion on adjudicative 
services in 2019. With that backlog, and under those resource 
levels, the average time it took to complete the investigative 
and adjudicative phases for the fastest 90 percent of 
clearances at the end of May 2019 was:
     169 days for initial secret clearances (139 days 
to complete the investigative phase and 30 days to complete the 
adjudicative phase).
     338 days for initial top secret clearances (296 
days to complete the investigative phase and 42 days to 
complete the adjudicative phase).
     425 days for periodic reinvestigations (325 days 
to complete the investigative phase and 100 days to complete 
the adjudicative phase).
    In order to meet the 30 and 90-day requirements of title 
XXVI, the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB) must 
first reduce the backlog to a level that would allow the 
federal government to meet the existing investigative and 
adjudicative processing goals. The bureau has been steadily 
expanding its workforce and reports that it expects to reduce 
the backlog to a manageable level in a couple of years. 
Concurrently, as NBIB works to reduce the backlog, the bureau's 
background-investigation program is being transferred to the 
Department of Defense (DoD).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\Section 925 of Public Law 115-91, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, authorized DoD to conduct 
security, suitability, and credentialing background investigations for 
DoD personnel. The Administration has since decided to transfer NBIB's 
investigation program to DoD. Executive Order 13869, signed April 24, 
2019, makes the newly formed Defense Counterintelligence and Security 
Agency of DoD responsible for conducting background investigations for 
the federal government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CBO expects that the current and upcoming initiatives will 
continue to reduce the backlog as planned and allow the current 
timeliness goals to be met by 2022. We also assume that the 
transfer of NBIB's responsibilities to DoD will be completed as 
planned.
    The difference between the current timeliness goals and 
those prescribed by the bill is significant. The current 
structure establishes goals for an average processing time for 
the fastest 90 percent of cases. By contrast, the bill would 
establish maximum processing times for the fastest 90 percent 
of cases. Those targets would be significantly shorter than the 
current average processing times. Taking that into 
consideration, we estimate that the capacity to investigate and 
adjudicate initial secret and top secret clearances would need 
to increase by about 200 percent and 67 percent, respectively, 
to meet the faster processing requirements of title XXVI. For 
2019, CBO estimates that the executive branch will spend about 
$0.4 billion and $0.6 billion on investigating and adjudicating 
initial secret clearances and initial top secret clearances, 
respectively. Thus, spending on those activities would 
ultimately need to increase by about $1.2 billion annually. 
Under title XXVI, DoD would have three years to hire and train 
the necessary number of investigators and adjudicators to meet 
the prescribed timeliness goals in fiscal year 2022. Accounting 
for that implementation phase, CBO estimates that it would cost 
about $0.4 billion in 2020 and about $5.2 billion over the 
2020-2024 period.
    Administrative Costs. Title XXVI would require federal 
entities to develop policies, perform assessments, and prepare 
reports on several aspects of the security-clearance process. 
For entities in the intelligence community, CBO expects that 
the administrative costs of those requirements would be covered 
by the amounts authorized to be appropriated in the classified 
annex and for the ICMA. For federal entities that are not part 
of the intelligence community, CBO estimates total costs of $1 
million over the 2020-2024 period.
    Periodic Reinvestigations. Title XXVI would encourage the 
Council to limit reinvestigations conducted on the schedules 
set by the Administration to not more than 10 percent of all 
clearance holders. In 2017, about 4 million individuals held 
clearances, and this provision would require the federal 
government to use methods other than periodic reinvestigations 
on about 3.6 million of them to ensure that they remain 
eligible to access classified information. CBO expects that the 
method used to replace periodic reinvestigations would include, 
but not be limited to, the use of automated records checks.
    Any costs or savings realized by using automated records 
checks as part of a larger effort to replace periodic 
investigations would depend on the frequency (e.g. daily, 
weekly, monthly, annually) with which they are conducted and 
the methods used to obtain information they cannot provide. 
Because CBO does not know how the Council would implement this 
provision, we cannot estimate its effects on spending.
    While most agencies are funded by annual appropriations, 
some agencies are authorized to spend monies collected from 
other sources, such as user fees. In addition to the increases 
in spending subject to appropriation described above, any 
increase in costs to process security clearances and satisfy 
the requirements of this title incurred by those agencies would 
be considered direct spending. Those effects are described 
below in the ``Direct Spending'' section of this estimate.
    Intelligence Community Management Account. Section 103 
would authorize the appropriation of $566 million for fiscal 
year 2020 for the ICMA. The ICMA is the principal source of 
funding for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
and for coordinating the intelligence activities of the federal 
government. CBO estimates that implementing section 103 would 
cost about $557 million over the 2020-2024 period, subject to 
appropriation of the authorized amount.
    Pay and Benefits. Sections 303 and 2303 would expand pay 
and benefits offered to employees of the intelligence 
community. In total, CBO estimates that implementing those 
provisions would cost $171 million over the 2020-2024 period.
    Paid Parental Leave. Section 303 would provide 12 weeks of 
paid leave to employees of the intelligence community following 
the birth or adoption of a child or the initial placement of a 
foster child. Such leave would be available during the 12-month 
period beginning on the date of the child's birth or placement. 
DNI would have 18 months from the date of enactment of the bill 
to implement the new leave program. Employees of the 
intelligence community would become entitled to paid leave for 
the birth or placement of a child that occurs on or after the 
date of such implementation.
    Under current law, federal employees are entitled to up to 
12 weeks of leave without pay after the birth or adoption of a 
child or the initial placement of a foster child. Employees may 
get paid during that 12-week period by using any annual or sick 
leave that they have accrued. The leave provided by this bill 
would be in addition to any leave available to, or taken by, 
those employees during the 12-week period provided by the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). CBO expects that employees 
entitled to paid leave provided under H.R. 3494 would 
substitute that leave for annual or sick leave they otherwise 
would have taken during the 12-week FMLA leave period.
    CBO estimates that implementing section 303 would cost $163 
million over the 2020-2024 period. Because the exact number of 
employees in each element of the intelligence community is 
classified, CBO relied on publicly available information about 
the amounts appropriated to DoD and the intelligence community, 
as well as the number of people employed by DoD as the basis of 
this estimate.
    In addition to the increases in spending subject to 
appropriation described above, enacting section 303 also would 
affect direct spending. Those effects are described below in 
the ``Direct Spending'' section of this estimate.
    National Security Agency (NSA) Pay Authority. Section 2303 
would authorize the NSA to establish higher pay rates for 
employees in cybersecurity fields at the agency. In general, 
the rates of pay established under that authority could not 
exceed the rate of basic pay for level II of the Executive 
Schedule ($192,300, in 2019); however, in certain 
circumstances, up to 100 NSA employees at any given time could 
receive up to the rate of basic pay for the Vice President of 
the United States ($246,900, in 2019).
    On the basis of information from DoD, CBO estimates that 
about two to three dozen employees would receive an average of 
$15,800 more in compensation in fiscal year 2020 under section 
2303. That estimate is based on CBO's expectation that the new 
pay rates would take effect six months following enactment 
(halfway into the fiscal year) to allow NSA time to develop and 
apply those higher rates of pay. After accounting for annual 
pay increases and the expectation that NSA would expand its use 
of this authority over time, CBO estimates that by 2024 the 
average increase in annual compensation would be about $35,100 
and the number of NSA employees receiving such increases would 
double. Thus, CBO estimates that increasing pay for those NSA 
employees would cost $8 million over the 2020-2024 period.
    Task Forces and Other Advisory Bodies. Several sections of 
the bill would require elements of the intelligence community 
to establish task forces and other oversight and advisory 
bodies; a handful of those would disband after a few years 
while others would operate permanently. CBO estimates that 
salaries for about two dozen full-time equivalents plus other 
support costs to establish and carry out the responsibilities 
of those groups would total $5 million in 2020 and $22 million 
over the 2020-2024 period.
    Prize Competitions. Sections 706 and 707 would authorize 
the Director of National Intelligence to organize two 
competitions to encourage research. In each of those 
competitions, the Director could award prizes totaling up to $5 
million. The competition authorized by section 706 would be 
used to promote research and development of fifth-generation 
wireless technology. The competition authorized by section 707 
would be used to promote research and development of 
technologies to detect forged or manipulated digital content.
    CBO expects that it would take the Director one year to 
organize those competitions and to publicly announce, 
advertise, and publish the terms in advance of each 
competition. Those efforts would cost $1 million in 2020 and as 
competitions occurred, an additional $10 million in 2021, for a 
total of $11 million over the 2020-2024 period, CBO estimates.
    Reports, Briefings, and Assessments. Division B of the bill 
would require several agencies to complete more than 60 
reports, briefings, and assessments and to deliver those 
products and findings to the Congress. On the basis of the 
costs of similar activities, satisfying those requirements 
would cost $6 million over the 2020-2024 period, CBO estimates.

Direct spending

    H.R. 3494 would extend workers' compensation benefits to 
certain private-sector employees, enhance the benefits offered 
to certain annuitants of the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and authorize appropriations 
for 2019 and 2020. The bill also would affect spending by 
agencies not funded through annual appropriations. On net, and 
excluding provisions related to classified programs, CBO 
estimates that enacting H.R. 3494 would have an insignificant 
effect on direct spending over the 2020-2029 period.
    Public-Private Talent Exchange. Section 306 would establish 
a program for temporarily exchanging employees of elements of 
the intelligence community and employees of entities in the 
private sector. That exchange would increase direct spending 
for compensation for private-sector employees who are injured 
in the course of their work in the intelligence community. 
Those related medical expenses would be paid through the 
federal workers' compensation program; such payments are 
classified as direct spending. CBO expects that few private-
sector employees would become injured while participating in 
the program established by section 306; thus, the additional 
liability would increase direct spending by less than $500,000 
over the 2020-2029 period.
    CIARDS Benefits Adjustments. Section 2202 would make a 
number of changes to CIARDS to align the benefits offered to 
employees, retirees, or survivors under CIARDS with the 
benefits currently offered to employees, retirees, or survivors 
under the Civil Service Retirement System. Those changes would 
both increase and decrease spending on retirement benefits. For 
example, the bill would increase retirement benefits for 
employees who worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
before April 7, 1986, and at some point during their career, 
worked on a part-time basis. The bill also would allow married 
employees retiring under CIARDS after enactment to provide a 
survivor annuity to someone with an insurable interest. (An 
insurable interest exists when an individual derives financial 
benefit from the retiring employee continuing to be alive.) 
Total annuity payments for retirees who elect to provide a 
survivor annuity to someone with an insurable interest would be 
reduced or increased depending on how long they and the 
designated beneficiary live. On the basis of information from 
the CIA, CBO estimates that only a small number of individuals 
would benefit from the changes in section 2202. On net, CBO 
estimates that the difference in direct spending from enacting 
the section would be less than $500,000 over the 2020-2029 
period.
    Security Clearances. Implementing any actions necessary to 
comply with the requirements of title XXVI and preparing the 
required reports would increase the administrative expenses for 
agencies not funded through annual appropriations. Such 
spending is considered direct spending. Because those agencies 
are able to increase the fees that provide their funding as 
necessary to cover their costs, CBO estimates that the net 
difference in spending by those agencies would be insignificant 
over the 2020-2029 period. (More information about the 
requirements of title XXVI of the bill is provided above under 
the heading, ``Spending Subject to Appropriation.'')
    Paid Parental Leave. Section 303 would provide up to 12 
weeks of paid leave to employees of the intelligence community 
following the birth or adoption of a child or the initial 
placement of a foster child. Once implemented, CBO estimates 
that section 303 would increase balances of sick leave for 
those employees who now would defer the use of some sick leave 
they otherwise would have taken for child care under current 
law. Any additional sick leave carried through to retirement 
would be used in the computation of those employees' or 
survivors' annuities; increases in annuity payments are 
classified as direct spending. Because the effect on the 
payment of future retirement annuities would be small, CBO 
estimates that enacting section 303 would increase direct 
spending by less than $500,000 over the 2020-2029 period. (More 
information about Paid Parental Leave is provided above under 
the heading, ``Spending Subject to Appropriation.'')
    CIARDS Fund Payment. Sections 201 and 2201 would authorize 
the appropriation of $514 million for CIARDS for fiscal years 
2020 and 2019, respectively, to maintain the necessary funding 
level for operating that retirement and disability system. 
Appropriations to CIARDS are treated as direct spending in the 
budget and are projected to continue at the authorized levels 
in CBO's baseline pursuant to section 257 of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. Because the 
amount that would be authorized by the bill is included in 
CBO's baseline, that authorization would have no budgetary 
effect relative to the baseline.

Uncertainty

    The most significant area of uncertainty arises from 
estimating the costs of changing the process for granting 
security clearances. The bill would give the Council broad 
latitude in reforming that process; thus, the steps taken by 
the Council to meet the processing goals of security clearance 
investigations and other matters could differ significantly 
from CBO's estimate.
    Additionally, the actual number of personnel employed by 
the intelligence community is classified. The costs of 
additional personnel benefits are also uncertain because the 
number of personnel that would receive those benefits could 
differ significantly from CBO's estimate.
    Pay-As-You-Go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go 
Act of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement 
procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or 
revenues. Pay-as-you-go procedures apply to this legislation 
because enacting it would affect direct spending; however, CBO 
estimates that those effects would be insignificant.
    Increase in long-term deficits: CBO estimates that enacting 
H.R. 3494 would not increase on-budget deficits by more than $5 
billion in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods 
beginning in 2030.
    Mandates: None.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: William Ma, Dan Ready 
(federal pay), and Meredith Decker (workers' compensation); 
Mandates: Brandon Lever.
    Estimate reviewed by: David Newman, Chief, Defense, 
International Affairs, and Veterans' Affairs Cost Estimates 
Unit; Susan Willie, Chief, Mandates Unit; Leo Lex, Deputy 
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis; Theresa Gullo, 
Assistant Director for Budget.

                  Statement on Congressional Earmarks

    Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 
of Representatives, the Committee states that the bill as 
reported contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax 
benefits, or limited tariff benefits.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, and existing law in which no 
change is proposed is shown in roman):

                     NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947


                              short title

  That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of 
1947''.

                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 3. Definitions.

               Title I--Coordination for National Security

     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 107. National Security Resources Board.]
     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology, engineering, 
          or math positions.]
Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology, engineering, 
          or mathematics positions.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 120. Climate Security Advisory Council.

                   Title II--The Department of Defense

     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 202. Secretary of Defense.
[Sec. 203. Military Assistants to the Secretary.
[Sec. 204. Civilian personnel.]
     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 208. United States Air Force.
[Sec. 209. Effective date of transfers.
[Sec. 210. War Council.
[Sec. 211. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[Sec. 212. Joint Staff.
[Sec. 213. Munitions Board.
[Sec. 214. Research and Development Board.]

                        Title III--Miscellaneous

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 305. Paid parental leave.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 312. Repealing and saving provisions.
     * * * * * * *

           Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities

     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 506J. Annual assessment of intelligence community performance by 
          function.]
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 512. Unfunded priorities of the intelligence community.
Sec. 513. Briefings and notifications on counterintelligence activities 
          of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
     * * * * * * *

              TITLE VIII--ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 803. Exceptions.
[Sec. 804. Definitions.]
Sec. 803. Security Executive Agent.
Sec. 804. Exceptions.
Sec. 805. Definitions.
     * * * * * * *

                       TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized 
          disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 1106. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the 
          United States by the Communist Party of China.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  joint intelligence community council

  Sec. 101A. (a) Joint Intelligence Community Council.--There 
is a Joint Intelligence Community Council.
  (b) Membership.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council 
shall consist of the following:
          (1) The Director of National Intelligence, who shall 
        chair the Council.
          (2) The Secretary of State.
          (3) The Secretary of the Treasury.
          (4) The Secretary of Defense.
          (5) The Attorney General.
          (6) The Secretary of Energy.
          (7) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
          (8) Such other officers of the United States 
        Government as the President may designate from time to 
        time.
  (c) Functions.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council 
shall assist the Director of National Intelligence in 
developing and implementing a joint, unified national 
intelligence effort to protect national security by--
          (1) advising the Director on establishing 
        requirements, developing budgets, financial management, 
        and monitoring and evaluating the performance of the 
        intelligence community, and on such other matters as 
        the Director may request; and
          (2) ensuring the timely execution of programs, 
        policies, and directives established or developed by 
        the Director.
  (d) Meetings.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
convene [regular] meetings of the Joint Intelligence Community 
Council as the Director considers appropriate.
  (e) Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman.--(1) 
A member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council (other 
than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an 
opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in 
addition to, the advice presented by the Director of National 
Intelligence to the President or the National Security Council, 
in the role of the Chairman as Chairman of the Joint 
Intelligence Community Council. If a member submits such advice 
or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of 
such member at the same time the Chairman presents the advice 
of the Chairman to the President or the National Security 
Council, as the case may be.
  (2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that 
the presentation of the advice of the Chairman to the President 
or the National Security Council is not unduly delayed by 
reason of the submission of the individual advice or opinion of 
another member of the Council.
  (f) Recommendations to Congress.--Any member of the Joint 
Intelligence Community Council may make such recommendations to 
Congress relating to the intelligence community as such member 
considers appropriate.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


     responsibilities and authorities of the director of national 
                              intelligence

  Sec. 102A. (a) Provision of Intelligence.--(1) The Director 
of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that 
national intelligence is provided--
          (A) to the President;
          (B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the 
        executive branch;
          (C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
        senior military commanders;
          (D) to the Senate and House of Representatives and 
        the committees thereof; and
          (E) to such other persons as the Director of National 
        Intelligence determines to be appropriate.
  (2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective, 
independent of political considerations, and based upon all 
sources available to the intelligence community and other 
appropriate entities.
  (b) Access to Intelligence.--Unless otherwise directed by the 
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall have 
access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to 
the national security which is collected by any Federal 
department, agency, or other entity, except as otherwise 
provided by law or, as appropriate, under guidelines agreed 
upon by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (c) Budget Authorities.--(1) With respect to budget requests 
and appropriations for the National Intelligence Program, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall--
          (A) based on intelligence priorities set by the 
        President, provide to the heads of departments 
        containing agencies or organizations within the 
        intelligence community, and to the heads of such 
        agencies and organizations, guidance for developing the 
        National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such 
        agencies and organizations;
          (B) based on budget proposals provided to the 
        Director of National Intelligence by the heads of 
        agencies and organizations within the intelligence 
        community and the heads of their respective departments 
        and, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the 
        Joint Intelligence Community Council, develop and 
        determine an annual consolidated National Intelligence 
        Program budget; and
          (C) present such consolidated National Intelligence 
        Program budget, together with any comments from the 
        heads of departments containing agencies or 
        organizations within the intelligence community, to the 
        President for approval.
  (2) In addition to the information provided under paragraph 
(1)(B), the heads of agencies and organizations within the 
intelligence community shall provide the Director of National 
Intelligence such other information as the Director shall 
request for the purpose of determining the annual consolidated 
National Intelligence Program budget under that paragraph.
  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall 
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of 
the annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any 
successor program or programs.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide 
guidance for the development of the annual budget for each 
element of the intelligence community that is not within the 
National Intelligence Program.
  (4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the 
effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities.
  (5)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall be 
responsible for managing appropriations for the National 
Intelligence Program by directing the allotment or allocation 
of such appropriations through the heads of the departments 
containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence 
community and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
with prior notice (including the provision of appropriate 
supporting information) to the head of the department 
containing an agency or organization receiving any such 
allocation or allotment or the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.
  (B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, pursuant to 
relevant appropriations Acts for the National Intelligence 
Program, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
shall exercise the authority of the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget to apportion funds, at the exclusive 
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, for 
allocation to the elements of the intelligence community 
through the relevant host executive departments and the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Department comptrollers or appropriate 
budget execution officers shall allot, allocate, reprogram, or 
transfer funds appropriated for the National Intelligence 
Program in an expeditious manner.
  (C) The Director of National Intelligence shall monitor the 
implementation and execution of the National Intelligence 
Program by the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community that manage programs and activities that are part of 
the National Intelligence Program, which may include audits and 
evaluations.
  (6) Apportionment and allotment of funds under this 
subsection shall be subject to chapter 13 and section 1517 of 
title 31, United States Code, and the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
  (7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide a 
semi-annual report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April 
1, 2007, to the President and the Congress regarding 
implementation of this section.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence shall report to the 
President and the Congress not later than 15 days after 
learning of any instance in which a departmental comptroller 
acts in a manner inconsistent with the law (including permanent 
statutes, authorization Acts, and appropriations Acts), or the 
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, in carrying 
out the National Intelligence Program.
  (d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and 
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) No funds made available under 
the National Intelligence Program may be transferred or 
reprogrammed without the prior approval of the Director of 
National Intelligence, except in accordance with procedures 
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.
  (B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director 
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming 
funds made available under the Military Intelligence Program or 
any successor program or programs.
  (2) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, 
the Director of National Intelligence may transfer or reprogram 
funds appropriated for a program within the National 
Intelligence Program--
          (A) to another such program;
          (B) to other departments or agencies of the United 
        States Government for the development and fielding of 
        systems of common concern related to the collection, 
        processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination 
        of intelligence information; or
          (C) to a program funded by appropriations not within 
        the National Intelligence Program to address critical 
        gaps in intelligence information sharing or access 
        capabilities.
  (3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer 
or reprogram funds referred to in paragraph (1)(A)--
          (A) with the approval of the Director of the Office 
        of Management and Budget; and
          (B) after consultation with the heads of departments 
        containing agencies or organizations within the 
        intelligence community to the extent such agencies or 
        organizations are affected, and, in the case of the 
        Central Intelligence Agency, after consultation with 
        the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (4) The amounts available for transfer or reprogramming in 
the National Intelligence Program in any given fiscal year, and 
the terms and conditions governing such transfers and 
reprogrammings, are subject to the provisions of annual 
appropriations Acts and this subsection.
  (5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds may be made under 
this subsection only if--
          (i) the funds are being transferred to an activity 
        that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
          (ii) the transfer or reprogramming supports an 
        emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or 
        increases efficiency;
          (iii) the transfer or reprogramming does not involve 
        a transfer or reprogramming of funds to a Reserve for 
        Contingencies of the Director of National Intelligence 
        or the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency;
          (iv) the transfer or reprogramming results in a 
        cumulative transfer or reprogramming of funds out of 
        any department or agency, as appropriate, funded in the 
        National Intelligence Program in a single fiscal year--
                  (I) that is less than $150,000,000, and
                  (II) that is less than 5 percent of amounts 
                available to a department or agency under the 
                National Intelligence Program; and
          (v) the transfer or reprogramming does not terminate 
        an acquisition program.
  (B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to 
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph 
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the 
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The 
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by 
the head of the department involved or the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central 
Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
  (6) Funds transferred or reprogrammed under this subsection 
shall remain available for the same period as the 
appropriations account to which transferred or reprogrammed.
  (7) Any transfer or reprogramming of funds under this 
subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing 
procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the 
appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer or 
reprogramming for which notice is given to the appropriate 
congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report 
explaining the nature of the proposed transfer or reprogramming 
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In 
addition, the congressional intelligence committees shall be 
promptly notified of any transfer or reprogramming of funds 
made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the 
transfer or reprogramming would not have otherwise required 
reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of the 
date of the enactment of this subsection.
  (e) Transfer of Personnel.--(1)(A) In addition to any other 
authorities available under law for such purposes, in the first 
twelve months after establishment of a new national 
intelligence center, the Director of National Intelligence, 
with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget and in consultation with the congressional 
committees of jurisdiction referred to in subparagraph (B), may 
transfer not more than 100 personnel authorized for elements of 
the intelligence community to such center.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly 
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to 
this paragraph to--
          (i) the congressional intelligence committees;
          (ii) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
        and the House of Representatives;
          (iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or 
        from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed 
        Services of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives; and
          (iv) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or 
        from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on 
        the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives.
  (C) The Director shall include in any notice under 
subparagraph (B) an explanation of the nature of the transfer 
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
  (2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence, with the 
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
and in accordance with procedures to be developed by the 
Director of National Intelligence and the heads of the 
departments and agencies concerned, may transfer personnel 
authorized for an element of the intelligence community to 
another such element for a period of not more than 2 years.
  (B) A transfer of personnel may be made under this paragraph 
only if--
          (i) the personnel are being transferred to an 
        activity that is a higher priority intelligence 
        activity; and
          (ii) the transfer supports an emergent need, improves 
        program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.
  (C) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly 
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to 
this paragraph to--
          (i) the congressional intelligence committees;
          (ii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or 
        from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed 
        Services of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives; and
          (iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or 
        from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on 
        the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives.
  (D) The Director shall include in any notice under 
subparagraph (C) an explanation of the nature of the transfer 
and how it satisfies the requirements of this paragraph.
  (3)(A) In addition to the number of full-time equivalent 
positions authorized for the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence for a fiscal year, there is authorized for such 
Office for each fiscal year an additional 100 full-time 
equivalent positions that may be used only for the purposes 
described in subparagraph (B).
  (B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of 
National Intelligence may use a full-time equivalent position 
authorized under subparagraph (A) only for the purpose of 
providing a temporary transfer of personnel made in accordance 
with paragraph (2) to an element of the intelligence community 
to enable such element to increase the total number of 
personnel authorized for such element, on a temporary basis--
          (i) during a period in which a permanent employee of 
        such element is absent to participate in critical 
        language training; or
          (ii) to accept a permanent employee of another 
        element of the intelligence community to provide 
        language-capable services.
  (C) Paragraph (2)(B) shall not apply with respect to a 
transfer of personnel made under subparagraph (B).
  (D) For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the 
use of authorities under this paragraph. Each such report shall 
include a description of--
          (i) the number of transfers of personnel made by the 
        Director pursuant to subparagraph (B), disaggregated by 
        each element of the intelligence community;
          (ii) the critical language needs that were fulfilled 
        or partially fulfilled through the use of such 
        transfers; and
          (iii) the cost to carry out subparagraph (B).
  (4) It is the sense of Congress that--
          (A) the nature of the national security threats 
        facing the United States will continue to challenge the 
        intelligence community to respond rapidly and flexibly 
        to bring analytic resources to bear against emerging 
        and unforeseen requirements;
          (B) both the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence and any analytic centers determined to be 
        necessary should be fully and properly supported with 
        appropriate levels of personnel resources and that the 
        President's yearly budget requests adequately support 
        those needs; and
          (C) the President should utilize all legal and 
        administrative discretion to ensure that the Director 
        of National Intelligence and all other elements of the 
        intelligence community have the necessary resources and 
        procedures to respond promptly and effectively to 
        emerging and unforeseen national security challenges.
  (f) Tasking and Other Authorities.--(1)(A) The Director of 
National Intelligence shall--
          (i) establish objectives, priorities, and guidance 
        for the intelligence community to ensure timely and 
        effective collection, processing, analysis, and 
        dissemination (including access by users to collected 
        data consistent with applicable law and, as 
        appropriate, the guidelines referred to in subsection 
        (b) and analytic products generated by or within the 
        intelligence community) of national intelligence;
          (ii) determine requirements and priorities for, and 
        manage and direct the tasking of, collection, analysis, 
        production, and dissemination of national intelligence 
        by elements of the intelligence community, including--
                  (I) approving requirements (including those 
                requirements responding to needs provided by 
                consumers) for collection and analysis; and
                  (II) resolving conflicts in collection 
                requirements and in the tasking of national 
                collection assets of the elements of the 
                intelligence community; and
          (iii) provide advisory tasking to intelligence 
        elements of those agencies and departments not within 
        the National Intelligence Program.
  (B) The authority of the Director of National Intelligence 
under subparagraph (A) shall not apply--
          (i) insofar as the President so directs;
          (ii) with respect to clause (ii) of subparagraph (A), 
        insofar as the Secretary of Defense exercises tasking 
        authority under plans or arrangements agreed upon by 
        the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
        Intelligence; or
          (iii) to the direct dissemination of information to 
        State government and local government officials and 
        private sector entities pursuant to sections 201 and 
        892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121, 
        482).
  (2) The Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the 
National Counterterrorism Center, the National 
Counterproliferation Center, and the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center and may establish such 
other national intelligence centers as the Director determines 
necessary.
  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe, 
in consultation with the heads of other agencies or elements of 
the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective 
departments, personnel policies and programs applicable to the 
intelligence community that--
          (i) encourage and facilitate assignments and details 
        of personnel to national intelligence centers, and 
        between elements of the intelligence community;
          (ii) set standards for education, training, and 
        career development of personnel of the intelligence 
        community;
          (iii) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and 
        retention by the intelligence community of highly 
        qualified individuals for the effective conduct of 
        intelligence activities;
          (iv) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence 
        community are sufficiently diverse for purposes of the 
        collection and analysis of intelligence through the 
        recruitment and training of women, minorities, and 
        individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and 
        linguistic backgrounds;
          (v) make service in more than one element of the 
        intelligence community a condition of promotion to such 
        positions within the intelligence community as the 
        Director shall specify; and
          (vi) ensure the effective management of intelligence 
        community personnel who are responsible for 
        intelligence community-wide matters.
  (B) Policies prescribed under subparagraph (A) shall not be 
inconsistent with the personnel policies otherwise applicable 
to members of the uniformed services.
  (4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure 
compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States 
by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such 
compliance by other elements of the intelligence community 
through the host executive departments that manage the programs 
and activities that are part of the National Intelligence 
Program.
  (5) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the 
elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication within the 
intelligence community.
  (6) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish 
requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence 
information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and provide 
assistance to the Attorney General to ensure that information 
derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches under 
that Act is disseminated so it may be used efficiently and 
effectively for national intelligence purposes, except that the 
Director shall have no authority to direct or undertake 
electronic surveillance or physical search operations pursuant 
to that Act unless authorized by statute or Executive order.
  (7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the 
Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a 
congressional intelligence committee, conduct an accountability 
review of an element of the intelligence community or the 
personnel of such element in relation to a failure or 
deficiency within the intelligence community.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and 
procedures for conducting an accountability review under 
subparagraph (A).
  (C)(i) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide 
the findings of an accountability review conducted under 
subparagraph (A) and the Director's recommendations for 
corrective or punitive action, if any, to the head of the 
applicable element of the intelligence community. Such 
recommendations may include a recommendation for dismissal of 
personnel.
  (ii) If the head of such element does not implement a 
recommendation made by the Director under clause (i), the head 
of such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a notice of the determination not to implement the 
recommendation, including the reasons for the determination.
  (D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not be construed 
to limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence 
under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the 
Central Intelligence Agency.
  (8) The Director of National Intelligence shall perform such 
other functions as the President may direct.
  (9) Nothing in this title shall be construed as affecting the 
role of the Department of Justice or the Attorney General under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
  (g) Intelligence Information Sharing.--(1) The Director of 
National Intelligence shall have principal authority to ensure 
maximum availability of and access to intelligence information 
within the intelligence community consistent with national 
security requirements. The Director of National Intelligence 
shall--
          (A) establish uniform security standards and 
        procedures;
          (B) establish common information technology 
        standards, protocols, and interfaces;
          (C) ensure development of information technology 
        systems that include multi-level security and 
        intelligence integration capabilities;
          (D) establish policies and procedures to resolve 
        conflicts between the need to share intelligence 
        information and the need to protect intelligence 
        sources and methods;
          (E) develop an enterprise architecture for the 
        intelligence community and ensure that elements of the 
        intelligence community comply with such architecture;
          (F) have procurement approval authority over all 
        enterprise architecture-related information technology 
        items funded in the National Intelligence Program; and
          (G) in accordance with Executive Order No. 13526 (75 
        Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified national security 
        information) (or any subsequent corresponding executive 
        order), and part 2001 of title 32, Code of Federal 
        Regulations (or any subsequent corresponding 
        regulation), establish--
                  (i) guidance to standardize, in appropriate 
                cases, the formats for classified and 
                unclassified intelligence products created by 
                elements of the intelligence community for 
                purposes of promoting the sharing of 
                intelligence products; and
                  (ii) policies and procedures requiring the 
                increased use, in appropriate cases, and 
                including portion markings, of the 
                classification of portions of information 
                within one intelligence product.
  (2) The President shall ensure that the Director of National 
Intelligence has all necessary support and authorities to fully 
and effectively implement paragraph (1).
  (3) Except as otherwise directed by the President or with the 
specific written agreement of the head of the department or 
agency in question, a Federal agency or official shall not be 
considered to have met any obligation to provide any 
information, report, assessment, or other material (including 
unevaluated intelligence information) to that department or 
agency solely by virtue of having provided that information, 
report, assessment, or other material to the Director of 
National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism Center.
  (4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a timely 
manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation, policy, or 
practice that the Director believes impedes the ability of the 
Director to fully and effectively ensure maximum availability 
of access to intelligence information within the intelligence 
community consistent with the protection of the national 
security of the United States.
  (h) Analysis.--To ensure the most accurate analysis of 
intelligence is derived from all sources to support national 
security needs, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
  (1) implement policies and procedures--
  (A) to encourage sound analytic methods and tradecraft 
throughout the elements of the intelligence community;
  (B) to ensure that analysis is based upon all sources 
available; and
  (C) to ensure that the elements of the intelligence community 
regularly conduct competitive analysis of analytic products, 
whether such products are produced by or disseminated to such 
elements;
          (2) ensure that resource allocation for intelligence 
        analysis is appropriately proportional to resource 
        allocation for intelligence collection systems and 
        operations in order to maximize analysis of all 
        collected data;
  (3) ensure that differences in analytic judgment are fully 
considered and brought to the attention of policymakers; and
          (4) ensure that sufficient relationships are 
        established between intelligence collectors and 
        analysts to facilitate greater understanding of the 
        needs of analysts.
  (i) Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.--(1) The 
Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence 
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
  (2) Consistent with paragraph (1), in order to maximize the 
dissemination of intelligence, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall establish and implement guidelines for the 
intelligence community for the following purposes:
          (A) Classification of information under applicable 
        law, Executive orders, or other Presidential 
        directives.
          (B) Access to and dissemination of intelligence, both 
        in final form and in the form when initially gathered.
          (C) Preparation of intelligence products in such a 
        way that source information is removed to allow for 
        dissemination at the lowest level of classification 
        possible or in unclassified form to the extent 
        practicable.
  (3) The Director may only delegate a duty or authority given 
the Director under this subsection to the Principal Deputy 
Director of National Intelligence.
  (j) Uniform Procedures for Classified Information.--The 
Director of National Intelligence, subject to the direction of 
the President, shall--
  (1) establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant 
of access to sensitive compartmented information to any officer 
or employee of any agency or department of the United States 
and to employees of contractors of those agencies or 
departments;
          (2) ensure the consistent implementation of those 
        standards and procedures throughout such agencies and 
        departments;
  (3) ensure that security clearances granted by individual 
elements of the intelligence community are recognized by all 
elements of the intelligence community, and under contracts 
entered into by those agencies;
          (4) ensure that the process for investigation and 
        adjudication of an application for access to sensitive 
        compartmented information is performed in the most 
        expeditious manner possible consistent with applicable 
        standards for national security;
          (5) ensure that the background of each employee or 
        officer of an element of the intelligence community, 
        each contractor to an element of the intelligence 
        community, and each individual employee of such a 
        contractor who has been determined to be eligible for 
        access to classified information is monitored on a 
        continual basis under standards developed by the 
        Director, including with respect to the frequency of 
        evaluation, during the period of eligibility of such 
        employee or officer of an element of the intelligence 
        community, such contractor, or such individual employee 
        to such a contractor to determine whether such employee 
        or officer of an element of the intelligence community, 
        such contractor, and such individual employee of such a 
        contractor continues to meet the requirements for 
        eligibility for access to classified information; and
          (6) develop procedures to require information sharing 
        between elements of the intelligence community 
        concerning potentially derogatory security information 
        regarding an employee or officer of an element of the 
        intelligence community, a contractor to an element of 
        the intelligence community, or an individual employee 
        of such a contractor that may impact the eligibility of 
        such employee or officer of an element of the 
        intelligence community, such contractor, or such 
        individual employee of such a contractor for a security 
        clearance.
  (k) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the 
direction of the President and in a manner consistent with 
section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 
3927), the Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the 
coordination of the relationships between elements of the 
intelligence community and the intelligence or security 
services of foreign governments or international organizations 
on all matters involving intelligence related to the national 
security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine 
means.
  (l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1)(A) The Director of 
National Intelligence shall, under regulations prescribed by 
the Director, provide incentives for personnel of elements of 
the intelligence community to serve--
          (i) on the staff of the Director of National 
        Intelligence;
          (ii) on the staff of the national intelligence 
        centers;
          (iii) on the staff of the National Counterterrorism 
        Center; and
          (iv) in other positions in support of the 
        intelligence community management functions of the 
        Director.
  (B) Incentives under subparagraph (A) may include financial 
incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as 
the Director considers appropriate.
  (2)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
personnel of an element of the intelligence community who are 
assigned or detailed under paragraph (1)(A) to service under 
the Director of National Intelligence shall be promoted at 
rates equivalent to or better than personnel of such element 
who are not so assigned or detailed.
  (B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this 
paragraph.
  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe 
mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the 
intelligence community through various elements of the 
intelligence community in the course of their careers in order 
to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such 
personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods, 
users, and capabilities.
  (B) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) may 
include the following:
          (i) The establishment of special occupational 
        categories involving service, over the course of a 
        career, in more than one element of the intelligence 
        community.
          (ii) The provision of rewards for service in 
        positions undertaking analysis and planning of 
        operations involving two or more elements of the 
        intelligence community.
          (iii) The establishment of requirements for 
        education, training, service, and evaluation for 
        service involving more than one element of the 
        intelligence community.
  (C) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms 
prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent 
practical, seek to duplicate for civilian personnel within the 
intelligence community the joint officer management policies 
established by chapter 38 of title 10, United States Code, and 
the other amendments made by title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 
99-433).
  (D) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) and any 
other policies of the Director--
          (i) may not require an employee of an office of 
        inspector general for an element of the intelligence 
        community, including the Office of the Inspector 
        General of the Intelligence Community, to rotate to a 
        position in an office or organization of such an 
        element over which such office of inspector general 
        exercises jurisdiction; and
          (ii) shall be implemented in a manner that exempts 
        employees of an office of inspector general from a 
        rotation that may impact the independence of such 
        office.
  (4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and 
subparagraph (D), this subsection shall not apply with respect 
to personnel of the elements of the intelligence community who 
are members of the uniformed services.
  (B) Mechanisms that establish requirements for education and 
training pursuant to paragraph (3)(B)(iii) may apply with 
respect to members of the uniformed services who are assigned 
to an element of the intelligence community funded through the 
National Intelligence Program, but such mechanisms shall not be 
inconsistent with personnel policies and education and training 
requirements otherwise applicable to members of the uniformed 
services.
  (C) The personnel policies and programs developed and 
implemented under this subsection with respect to law 
enforcement officers (as that term is defined in section 
5541(3) of title 5, United States Code) shall not affect the 
ability of law enforcement entities to conduct operations or, 
through the applicable chain of command, to control the 
activities of such law enforcement officers.
  (D) Assignment to the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence of commissioned officers of the Armed Forces shall 
be considered a joint-duty assignment for purposes of the joint 
officer management policies prescribed by chapter 38 of title 
10, United States Code, and other provisions of that title.
  (m) Additional Authority With Respect to Personnel.--(1) In 
addition to the authorities under subsection (f)(3), the 
Director of National Intelligence may exercise with respect to 
the personnel of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence any authority of the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the 
Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence 
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other 
applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment 
of this subsection to the same extent, and subject to the same 
conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect to 
personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (2) Employees and applicants for employment of the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence shall have the same 
rights and protections under the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence as employees of the Central Intelligence 
Agency have under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 
and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the 
enactment of this subsection.
  (n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) In carrying out 
the responsibilities and authorities under this section, the 
Director of National Intelligence may exercise the acquisition 
and appropriations authorities referred to in the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) other 
than the authorities referred to in section 8(b) of that Act 
(50 U.S.C. 403j(b)).
  (2) For the purpose of the exercise of any authority referred 
to in paragraph (1), a reference to the head of an agency shall 
be deemed to be a reference to the Director of National 
Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (3)(A) Any determination or decision to be made under an 
authority referred to in paragraph (1) by the head of an agency 
may be made with respect to individual purchases and contracts 
or with respect to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall 
be final.
  (B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of 
National Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of 
National Intelligence may, in such official's discretion, 
delegate to any officer or other official of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence any authority to make a 
determination or decision as the head of the agency under an 
authority referred to in paragraph (1).
  (C) The limitations and conditions set forth in section 3(d) 
of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
403c(d)) shall apply to the exercise by the Director of 
National Intelligence of an authority referred to in paragraph 
(1).
  (D) Each determination or decision required by an authority 
referred to in the second sentence of section 3(d) of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 shall be based upon 
written findings made by the official making such determination 
or decision, which findings shall be final and shall be 
available within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence for a period of at least six years following the 
date of such determination or decision.
  (4)(A) In addition to the authority referred to in paragraph 
(1), the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the 
head of an element of the intelligence community to exercise an 
acquisition authority referred to in section 3 or 8(a) of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and 
403j(a)) for an acquisition by such element that is more than 
50 percent funded under the National Intelligence Program.
  (B) The head of an element of the intelligence community may 
not exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) 
until--
          (i) the head of such element (without delegation) 
        submits to the Director of National Intelligence a 
        written request that includes--
                  (I) a description of such authority requested 
                to be exercised;
                  (II) an explanation of the need for such 
                authority, including an explanation of the 
                reasons that other authorities are 
                insufficient; and
                  (III) a certification that the mission of 
                such element would be--
                          (aa) impaired if such authority is 
                        not exercised; or
                          (bb) significantly and measurably 
                        enhanced if such authority is 
                        exercised; and
          (ii) the Director of National Intelligence issues a 
        written authorization that includes--
                  (I) a description of the authority referred 
                to in subparagraph (A) that is authorized to be 
                exercised; and
                  (II) a justification to support the exercise 
                of such authority.
  (C) A request and authorization to exercise an authority 
referred to in subparagraph (A) may be made with respect to an 
individual acquisition or with respect to a specific class of 
acquisitions described in the request and authorization 
referred to in subparagraph (B).
  (D)(i) A request from a head of an element of the 
intelligence community located within one of the departments 
described in clause (ii) to exercise an authority referred to 
in subparagraph (A) shall be submitted to the Director of 
National Intelligence in accordance with any procedures 
established by the head of such department.
  (ii) The departments described in this clause are the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department 
of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department 
of State, and the Department of the Treasury.
  (E)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community 
may not be authorized to utilize an authority referred to in 
subparagraph (A) for a class of acquisitions for a period of 
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National 
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize the use of such 
an authority for not more than 6 years.
  (ii) Each authorization to utilize an authority referred to 
in subparagraph (A) may be extended in accordance with the 
requirements of subparagraph (B) for successive periods of not 
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National 
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize an extension 
period of not more than 6 years.
  (F) Subject to clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (E), the 
Director of National Intelligence may only delegate the 
authority of the Director under subparagraphs (A) through (E) 
to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or a 
Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
  (G) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit--
          (i) to the congressional intelligence committees a 
        notification of an authorization to exercise an 
        authority referred to in subparagraph (A) or an 
        extension of such authorization that includes the 
        written authorization referred to in subparagraph 
        (B)(ii); and
          (ii) to the Director of the Office of Management and 
        Budget a notification of an authorization to exercise 
        an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for an 
        acquisition or class of acquisitions that will exceed 
        $50,000,000 annually.
  (H) Requests and authorizations to exercise an authority 
referred to in subparagraph (A) shall remain available within 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a 
period of at least 6 years following the date of such request 
or authorization.
  (I) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to alter or 
otherwise limit the authority of the Central Intelligence 
Agency to independently exercise an authority under section 3 
or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)).
  (o) Consideration of Views of Elements of Intelligence 
Community.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities 
under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
take into account the views of a head of a department 
containing an element of the intelligence community and of the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (p) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence 
Regarding National Intelligence Program Budget Concerning the 
Department of Defense.--Subject to the direction of the 
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall, after 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that the 
National Intelligence Program budgets for the elements of the 
intelligence community that are within the Department of 
Defense are adequate to satisfy the national intelligence needs 
of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the 
unified and specified commands, and wherever such elements are 
performing Government-wide functions, the needs of other 
Federal departments and agencies.
  (q) Acquisitions of Major Systems.--(1) For each intelligence 
program within the National Intelligence Program for the 
acquisition of a major system, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall--
          (A) require the development and implementation of a 
        program management plan that includes cost, schedule, 
        and performance goals and program milestone criteria, 
        except that with respect to Department of Defense 
        programs the Director shall consult with the Secretary 
        of Defense;
          (B) serve as exclusive milestone decision authority, 
        except that with respect to Department of Defense 
        programs the Director shall serve as milestone decision 
        authority jointly with the Secretary of Defense or the 
        designee of the Secretary; and
          (C) periodically--
                  (i) review and assess the progress made 
                toward the achievement of the goals and 
                milestones established in such plan; and
                  (ii) submit to Congress a report on the 
                results of such review and assessment.
  (2) If the Director of National Intelligence and the 
Secretary of Defense are unable to reach an agreement on a 
milestone decision under paragraph (1)(B), the President shall 
resolve the conflict.
  (3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the 
authority of the Director of National Intelligence to delegate 
to any other official any authority to perform the 
responsibilities of the Director under this subsection.
  (4) In this subsection:
          (A) The term ``intelligence program'', with respect 
        to the acquisition of a major system, means a program 
        that--
                  (i) is carried out to acquire such major 
                system for an element of the intelligence 
                community; and
                  (ii) is funded in whole out of amounts 
                available for the National Intelligence 
                Program.
          (B) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given 
        such term in section 4(9) of the Federal Property and 
        Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 403(9)).
  (r) Performance of Common Services.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of 
departments and agencies of the United States Government 
containing elements within the intelligence community and with 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinate the 
performance by the elements of the intelligence community 
within the National Intelligence Program of such services as 
are of common concern to the intelligence community, which 
services the Director of National Intelligence determines can 
be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner.
  (s) Pay Authority for Critical Positions.--(1) 
Notwithstanding any pay limitation established under any other 
provision of law applicable to employees in elements of the 
intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence 
may, in coordination with the Director of the Office of 
Personnel Management and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, grant authority to the head of a 
department or agency to fix the rate of basic pay for one or 
more positions within the intelligence community at a rate in 
excess of any applicable limitation, subject to the provisions 
of this subsection. The exercise of authority so granted is at 
the discretion of the head of the department or agency 
employing the individual in a position covered by such 
authority, subject to the provisions of this subsection and any 
conditions established by the Director of National Intelligence 
when granting such authority.
  (2) Authority under this subsection may be granted or 
exercised only--
          (A) with respect to a position that requires an 
        extremely high level of expertise and is critical to 
        successful accomplishment of an important mission; and
          (B) to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an 
        individual exceptionally well qualified for the 
        position.
  (3) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of 
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate 
payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section 
5313 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written 
approval of the Director of National Intelligence or as 
otherwise authorized by law.
  (4) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of 
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate 
payable for level I of the Executive Schedule under section 
5312 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written 
approval of the President in response to a request by the 
Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by 
law.
  (5) Any grant of authority under this subsection for a 
position shall terminate at the discretion of the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  (6)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
congressional intelligence committees not later than 30 days 
after the date on which the Director grants authority to the 
head of a department or agency under this subsection.
  (B) The head of a department or agency to which the Director 
of National Intelligence grants authority under this subsection 
shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the 
Director of the exercise of such authority not later than 30 
days after the date on which such head exercises such 
authority.
  (t) Award of Rank to Members of the Senior National 
Intelligence Service.--(1) The President, based on the 
recommendation of the Director of National Intelligence, may 
award a rank to a member of the Senior National Intelligence 
Service or other intelligence community senior civilian officer 
not already covered by such a rank award program in the same 
manner in which a career appointee of an agency may be awarded 
a rank under section 4507 of title 5, United States Code.
  (2) The President may establish procedures to award a rank 
under paragraph (1) to a member of the Senior National 
Intelligence Service or a senior civilian officer of the 
intelligence community whose identity as such a member or 
officer is classified information (as defined in section 
606(1)).
  (u) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--The Director of 
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the 
Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations 
prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the 
intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if 
such employment creates a conflict of interest or appearance 
thereof.
  (v) Authority To Establish Positions in Excepted Service.--
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence 
of the head of the covered department concerned and in 
consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management, may--
          (A) convert competitive service positions, and the 
        incumbents of such positions, within an element of the 
        intelligence community in such department, to excepted 
        service positions as the Director of National 
        Intelligence determines necessary to carry out the 
        intelligence functions of such element; and
          (B) establish new positions in the excepted service 
        within an element of the intelligence community in such 
        department, if the Director of National Intelligence 
        determines such positions are necessary to carry out 
        the intelligence functions of such element.
  (2) An incumbent occupying a position on the date of the 
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2012 selected to be converted to the excepted service under 
this section shall have the right to refuse such conversion. 
Once such individual no longer occupies the position, the 
position may be converted to the excepted service.
  (3) A covered department may appoint an individual to a 
position converted or established pursuant to this subsection 
without regard to the civil-service laws, including parts II 
and III of title 5, United States Code.
  (4) In this subsection, the term ``covered department'' means 
the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, 
the Department of State, or the Department of the Treasury.
  (w) Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements Intelligence 
Community Addendum.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the heads of the appropriate elements of the 
intelligence community and the Secretary of State, shall 
provide to the President, the congressional intelligence 
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate an addendum to each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment 
Statement accompanying a civilian nuclear cooperation 
agreement, containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's 
export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters, 
including interactions with other countries of proliferation 
concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or 
missile-related transfers to such countries.
  (x) Requirements for Intelligence Community Contractors.--The 
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
head of each department of the Federal Government that contains 
an element of the intelligence community and the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, shall--
  (1) ensure that--
  (A) any contractor to an element of the intelligence 
community with access to a classified network or classified 
information develops and operates a security plan that is 
consistent with standards established by the Director of 
National Intelligence for intelligence community networks; and
  (B) each contract awarded by an element of the intelligence 
community includes provisions requiring the contractor comply 
with such plan and such standards;
          (2) conduct periodic assessments of each security 
        plan required under paragraph (1)(A) to ensure such 
        security plan complies with the requirements of such 
        paragraph; and
  (3) ensure that the insider threat detection capabilities and 
insider threat policies of the intelligence community apply to 
facilities of contractors with access to a classified network.
  (y) Fundraising.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence 
may engage in fundraising in an official capacity for the 
benefit of nonprofit organizations that--
          (A) provide support to surviving family members of a 
        deceased employee of an element of the intelligence 
        community; or
          (B) otherwise provide support for the welfare, 
        education, or recreation of employees of an element of 
        the intelligence community, former employees of an 
        element of the intelligence community, or family 
        members of such employees.
  (2) In this subsection, the term ``fundraising'' means the 
raising of funds through the active participation in the 
promotion, production, or presentation of an event designed to 
raise funds and does not include the direct solicitation of 
money by any other means.
  (3) Not later than 7 days after the date the Director engages 
in fundraising authorized by this subsection or at the time the 
decision is made to participate in such fundraising, the 
Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees 
of such fundraising.
  (4) The Director, in consultation with the Director of the 
Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations to carry 
out the authority provided in this subsection. Such regulations 
shall ensure that such authority is exercised in a manner that 
is consistent with all relevant ethical constraints and 
principles, including the avoidance of any prohibited conflict 
of interest or appearance of impropriety.
  (z) Analyses and Impact Statements Regarding Proposed 
Investment Into the United States.--(1) Not later than 20 days 
after the completion of a review or an investigation of any 
proposed investment into the United States for which the 
Director has prepared analytic materials, the Director shall 
submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
of Representative copies of such analytic materials, including 
any supplements or amendments to such analysis made by the 
Director.
  (2) Not later than 60 days after the completion of 
consideration by the United States Government of any investment 
described in paragraph (1), the Director shall determine 
whether such investment will have an operational impact on the 
intelligence community, and, if so, shall submit a report on 
such impact to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the House of Representatives. Each such report shall--
          (A) describe the operational impact of the investment 
        on the intelligence community; and
          (B) describe any actions that have been or will be 
        taken to mitigate such impact.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                       chief information officer

  Sec. 103G. (a) Chief Information Officer.--To assist the 
Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the 
responsibilities of the Director under this Act and other 
applicable provisions of law, there shall be within the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence a Chief Information 
Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be appointed by 
the [President] Director. The Chief Information Officer shall 
report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.
  (b) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to the direction of 
the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Information 
Officer of the Intelligence Community shall--
          (1) manage activities relating to the information 
        technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture 
        requirements of the intelligence community;
          (2) have procurement approval authority over all 
        information technology items related to the enterprise 
        architectures of all intelligence community components;
          (3) direct and manage all information technology-
        related procurement for the intelligence community; and
          (4) ensure that all expenditures for information 
        technology and research and development activities are 
        consistent with the intelligence community enterprise 
        architecture and the strategy of the Director for such 
        architecture.
  (c) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service as Other Chief 
Information Officer.--An individual serving in the position of 
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community may 
not, while so serving, serve as the chief information officer 
of any other department or agency, or component thereof, of the 
United States Government.

            inspector general of the intelligence community

  Sec. 103H. (a) Office of Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community.--There is within the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community.
  (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community is--
          (1) to create an objective and effective office, 
        appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and 
        conduct independent investigations, inspections, 
        audits, and reviews on programs and activities within 
        the responsibility and authority of the Director of 
        National Intelligence;
          (2) to provide leadership and coordination and 
        recommend policies for activities designed--
                  (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and 
                effectiveness in the administration and 
                implementation of such programs and activities; 
                and
                  (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in 
                such programs and activities;
          (3) to provide a means for keeping the Director of 
        National Intelligence fully and currently informed 
        about--
                  (A) problems and deficiencies relating to the 
                administration of programs and activities 
                within the responsibility and authority of the 
                Director of National Intelligence; and
                  (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, 
                corrective actions; and
          (4) in the manner prescribed by this section, to 
        ensure that the congressional intelligence committees 
        are kept similarly informed of--
                  (A) significant problems and deficiencies 
                relating to programs and activities within the 
                responsibility and authority of the Director of 
                National Intelligence; and
                  (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, 
                corrective actions.
  (c) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.--(1) 
There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 
who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
  (2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as 
Inspector General shall be made--
          (A) without regard to political affiliation;
          (B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with 
        security standards of the intelligence community, and 
        prior experience in the field of intelligence or 
        national security; and
          (C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in 
        accounting, financial analysis, law, management 
        analysis, public administration, or investigations.
  (3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be 
under the general supervision of the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by 
the President. The President shall communicate in writing to 
the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the 
removal not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of 
such removal. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to 
prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other 
than transfer or removal.
  (d) Assistant Inspectors General.--Subject to the policies of 
the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community shall--
          (1) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Audit 
        who shall have the responsibility for supervising the 
        performance of auditing activities relating to programs 
        and activities within the responsibility and authority 
        of the Director;
          (2) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for 
        Investigations who shall have the responsibility for 
        supervising the performance of investigative activities 
        relating to such programs and activities; and
          (3) appoint other Assistant Inspectors General that, 
        in the judgment of the Inspector General, are necessary 
        to carry out the duties of the Inspector General.
  (e) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and 
responsibility of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community--
          (1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, 
        conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the 
        investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews 
        relating to programs and activities within the 
        responsibility and authority of the Director of 
        National Intelligence;
          (2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence 
        fully and currently informed concerning violations of 
        law and regulations, fraud, and other serious problems, 
        abuses, and deficiencies relating to the programs and 
        activities within the responsibility and authority of 
        the Director, to recommend corrective action concerning 
        such problems, and to report on the progress made in 
        implementing such corrective action;
          (3) to take due regard for the protection of 
        intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of 
        all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to 
        the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of 
        such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate 
        to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and 
        methods described in such reports; and
          (4) in the execution of the duties and 
        responsibilities under this section, to comply with 
        generally accepted government auditing.
  (f) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or 
completing any investigation, inspection, audit, or review if 
the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to 
protect vital national security interests of the United States.
  (2) Not later than seven days after the date on which the 
Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the 
Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees an appropriately classified statement of the reasons 
for the exercise of such authority.
  (3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the 
time a statement under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the 
extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such 
statement.
  (4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees any comments on the statement of which 
the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the 
Inspector General considers appropriate.
  (g) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to 
the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any 
purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the 
Inspector General.
  (2)(A) The Inspector General shall, subject to the 
limitations in subsection (f), make such investigations and 
reports relating to the administration of the programs and 
activities within the authorities and responsibilities of the 
Director as are, in the judgment of the Inspector General, 
necessary or desirable.
  (B) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, 
or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the 
intelligence community needed for the performance of the duties 
of the Inspector General.
  (C) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all 
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 
recommendations, or other materials that relate to the programs 
and activities with respect to which the Inspector General has 
responsibilities under this section.
  (D) The level of classification or compartmentation of 
information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient 
rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any 
materials under subparagraph (C).
  (E) The Director, or on the recommendation of the Director, 
another appropriate official of the intelligence community, 
shall take appropriate administrative actions against an 
employee, or an employee of a contractor, of an element of the 
intelligence community that fails to cooperate with the 
Inspector General. Such administrative action may include loss 
of employment or the termination of an existing contractual 
relationship.
  (3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and 
investigate, pursuant to subsection (h), complaints or 
information from any person concerning the existence of an 
activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the 
Director of National Intelligence constituting a violation of 
laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of 
funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger 
to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or 
information has been received from an employee of the 
intelligence community--
          (A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the 
        identity of the employee without the consent of the 
        employee, unless the Inspector General determines that 
        such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the 
        investigation or the disclosure is made to an official 
        of the Department of Justice responsible for 
        determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken, 
        and this provision shall qualify as a withholding 
        statute pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of section 552 of 
        title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the 
        ``Freedom of Information Act''); and
          (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
        reprisal, for making such complaint or disclosing such 
        information to the Inspector General may be taken by 
        any employee in a position to take such actions, unless 
        the complaint was made or the information was disclosed 
        with the knowledge that it was false or with willful 
        disregard for its truth or falsity.
  (4) The Inspector General shall have the authority to 
administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or 
affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties 
of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit 
when administered or taken by or before an employee of the 
Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force 
and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an 
officer having a seal.
  (5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector 
General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of 
all information, documents, reports, answers, records, 
accounts, papers, and other data in any medium (including 
electronically stored information, as well as any tangible 
thing) and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of 
the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
  (B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements 
of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall 
obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, 
accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose 
specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by 
subpoenas.
  (C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on 
behalf of, any component of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence or any element of the intelligence 
community, including the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena 
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable 
by order of any appropriate district court of the United 
States.
  (6) The Inspector General may obtain services as authorized 
by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates for 
individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum 
annual rate of basic pay payable for grade GS-15 of the General 
Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.
  (7) The Inspector General may, to the extent and in such 
amounts as may be provided in appropriations, enter into 
contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses, 
and other services with public agencies and with private 
persons, and to make such payments as may be necessary to carry 
out the provisions of this section.
  (h) Coordination Among Inspectors General.--(1)(A) In the 
event of a matter within the jurisdiction of the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject to an 
investigation, inspection, audit, or review by both the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and an 
inspector general with oversight responsibility for an element 
of the intelligence community, the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community and such other inspector general shall 
expeditiously resolve the question of which inspector general 
shall conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review 
to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities of the 
inspectors general.
  (B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph 
(A), the inspectors general concerned may request the 
assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General 
Forum established under paragraph (2). In the event of a 
dispute between an inspector general within a department or 
agency of the United States Government and the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community that has not been 
resolved with the assistance of such Forum, the inspectors 
general shall submit the question to the Director of National 
Intelligence and the head of the affected department or agency 
for resolution.
  (2)(A) There is established the Intelligence Community 
Inspectors General Forum, which shall consist of all statutory 
or administrative inspectors general with oversight 
responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.
  (B) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall 
serve as the Chair of the Forum established under subparagraph 
(A). The Forum shall have no administrative authority over any 
inspector general, but shall serve as a mechanism for informing 
its members of the work of individual members of the Forum that 
may be of common interest and discussing questions about 
jurisdiction or access to employees, employees of contract 
personnel, records, audits, reviews, documents, 
recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be of 
assistance to more than one of its members.
  (3) The inspector general conducting an investigation, 
inspection, audit, or review covered by paragraph (1) shall 
submit the results of such investigation, inspection, audit, or 
review to any other inspector general, including the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to 
conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review who 
did not conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or 
review.
  (i) Counsel to the Inspector General.--(1) The Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community shall--
          (A) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who 
        shall report to the Inspector General; or
          (B) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and 
        directly reporting to another inspector general or the 
        Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
        Efficiency on a reimbursable basis.
  (2) The counsel appointed or obtained under paragraph (1) 
shall perform such functions as the Inspector General may 
prescribe.
  (j) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community with appropriate and adequate office 
space at central and field office locations, together with such 
equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and 
communications facilities and services as may be necessary for 
the operation of such offices.
  (2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall 
select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may 
be necessary to carry out the functions, powers, and duties of 
the Inspector General. The Inspector General shall ensure that 
any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed has 
security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such 
officer or employee.
  (B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the 
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees 
have the requisite training and experience to enable the 
Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector 
General effectively.
  (C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the 
Inspector General shall create within the Office of the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre 
of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and 
objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties 
of the Inspector General.
  (3) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources 
allocated by the Director of National Intelligence, the 
Inspector General has final approval of--
          (A) the selection of internal and external candidates 
        for employment with the Office of the Inspector 
        General; and
          (B) all other personnel decisions concerning 
        personnel permanently assigned to the Office of the 
        Inspector General, including selection and appointment 
        to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all 
        security-based determinations that are not within the 
        authority of a head of a component of the Office of the 
        Director of National Intelligence.
  (4)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director of National 
Intelligence, the Inspector General may request such 
information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out 
the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from 
any Federal, State (as defined [in section 804] in section 
805), or local governmental agency or unit thereof.
  (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or 
assistance from a department, agency, or element of the Federal 
Government under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, 
agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable 
and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction 
or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to 
the Inspector General, such information or assistance.
  (C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, 
upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the 
intelligence community and in coordination with that element's 
inspector general pursuant to subsection (h), conduct, as 
authorized by this section, an investigation, inspection, 
audit, or review of such element and may enter into any place 
occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of the 
duties of the Inspector General.
  (k) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community shall, not later than October 31 and 
April 30 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of 
National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate, 
unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of 
the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community during the immediately preceding 6-month period 
ending September 30 and March 31, respectively. The Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community shall provide any portion 
of the report involving a component of a department of the 
United States Government to the head of that department 
simultaneously with submission of the report to the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  (B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a 
minimum, the following:
          (i) A list of the title or subject of each 
        investigation, inspection, audit, or review conducted 
        during the period covered by such report.
          (ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, 
        and deficiencies relating to the administration of 
        programs and activities of the intelligence community 
        within the responsibility and authority of the Director 
        of National Intelligence, and in the relationships 
        between elements of the intelligence community, 
        identified by the Inspector General during the period 
        covered by such report.
          (iii) A description of the recommendations for 
        corrective action made by the Inspector General during 
        the period covered by such report with respect to 
        significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies 
        identified in clause (ii).
          (iv) A statement of whether or not corrective action 
        has been completed on each significant recommendation 
        described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a 
        case where corrective action has been completed, a 
        description of such corrective action.
          (v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector 
        General has had full and direct access to all 
        information relevant to the performance of the 
        functions of the Inspector General.
          (vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena 
        authority under subsection (g)(5) by the Inspector 
        General during the period covered by such report.
          (vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General 
        considers appropriate for legislation to promote 
        economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 
        administration and implementation of programs and 
        activities within the responsibility and authority of 
        the Director of National Intelligence, and to detect 
        and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and 
        activities.
  (C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a 
report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the 
report to the congressional intelligence committees together 
with any comments the Director considers appropriate. The 
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of 
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a 
department of the United States Government any portion of the 
report involving a component of such department simultaneously 
with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
  (2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the 
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of 
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or 
deficiencies relating to programs and activities within the 
responsibility and authority of the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional 
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) 
within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together with 
such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The 
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of 
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a 
department of the United States Government any portion of each 
report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse, 
or deficiency related to a component of such department 
simultaneously with transmission of the report to the 
congressional intelligence committees.
  (3)(A) In the event that--
          (i) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any 
        differences with the Director affecting the execution 
        of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector 
        General;
          (ii) an investigation, inspection, audit, or review 
        carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any 
        current or former intelligence community official who--
                  (I) holds or held a position in an element of 
                the intelligence community that is subject to 
                appointment by the President, whether or not by 
                and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
                including such a position held on an acting 
                basis;
                  (II) holds or held a position in an element 
                of the intelligence community, including a 
                position held on an acting basis, that is 
                appointed by the Director of National 
                Intelligence; or
                  (III) holds or held a position as head of an 
                element of the intelligence community or a 
                position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of 
                section 106;
          (iii) a matter requires a report by the Inspector 
        General to the Department of Justice on possible 
        criminal conduct by a current or former official 
        described in clause (ii);
          (iv) the Inspector General receives notice from the 
        Department of Justice declining or approving 
        prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current 
        or former official described in clause (ii); or
          (v) the Inspector General, after exhausting all 
        possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant 
        documentary information in the course of an 
        investigation, inspection, audit, or review,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify, and submit a 
report to, the congressional intelligence committees on such 
matter.
  (B) The Inspector General shall submit to the committees of 
the Senate and of the House of Representatives with 
jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government 
any portion of each report under subparagraph (A) that involves 
an investigation, inspection, audit, or review carried out by 
the Inspector General focused on any current or former official 
of a component of such department simultaneously with 
submission of the report to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
  (4) The Director shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees any report or findings and 
recommendations of an investigation, inspection, audit, or 
review conducted by the office which has been requested by the 
Chairman or Vice Chairman or ranking minority member of either 
committee.
  (5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence 
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of 
the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to 
the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a 
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may 
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General.
  (B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period 
beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a 
complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector 
General shall determine whether the complaint or information 
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the 
Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a notice of 
that determination, together with the complaint or information.
  (C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General 
under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar 
days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the 
congressional intelligence committees, together with any 
comments the Director considers appropriate.
  (D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under 
subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under 
subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or 
information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph 
(B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the 
complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or 
both of the congressional intelligence committees directly.
  (ii) An employee may contact the congressional intelligence 
committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the 
employee--
          (I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the 
        Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of 
        the employee's complaint or information and notice of 
        the employee's intent to contact the congressional 
        intelligence committees directly; and
          (II) obtains and follows from the Director, through 
        the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the 
        congressional intelligence committees in accordance 
        with appropriate security practices.
  (iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional 
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information 
under this subparagraph does so in that member or employee's 
official capacity as a member or employee of such committee.
  (E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who 
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General 
under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph 
with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall 
be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is 
taken.
  (F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General 
under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
  (G) In this paragraph, the term ``urgent concern'' means any 
of the following:
          (i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation 
        of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to 
        the funding, administration, or operation of an 
        intelligence activity within the responsibility and 
        authority of the Director of National Intelligence 
        involving classified information, but does not include 
        differences of opinions concerning public policy 
        matters.
          (ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful 
        withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact 
        relating to the funding, administration, or operation 
        of an intelligence activity.
          (iii) An action, including a personnel action 
        described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United 
        States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of 
        reprisal prohibited under subsection (g)(3)(B) of this 
        section in response to an employee's reporting an 
        urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.
  (H) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the 
protections afforded to an employee under section 17(d) of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)) or 
section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
App.).
  (I) An individual who has submitted a complaint or 
information to the Inspector General under this section may 
notify any member of either of the congressional intelligence 
committees, or a staff member of either of such committees, of 
the fact that such individual has made a submission to the 
Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was 
made.
  (6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States 
Code, the Inspector General shall expeditiously report to the 
Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint 
received by the Inspector General relating to violations of 
Federal criminal law that involves a program or operation of an 
element of the intelligence community, or in the relationships 
between the elements of the intelligence community, consistent 
with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General 
pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each 
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
  (l) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence 
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (h), the 
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an 
element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to 
modify or affect the duties and responsibilities of any other 
inspector general having duties and responsibilities relating 
to such element.
  (m) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures issued by the 
Director in consultation with the congressional intelligence 
committees, include in the National Intelligence Program budget 
a separate account for the Office of the Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community.
  (n) Budget.--(1) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General 
of the Intelligence Community shall transmit a budget estimate 
and request to the Director of National Intelligence that 
specifies for such fiscal year--
          (A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations 
        of the Inspector General;
          (B) the amount requested for all training 
        requirements of the Inspector General, including a 
        certification from the Inspector General that the 
        amount requested is sufficient to fund all training 
        requirements for the Office of the Inspector General; 
        and
          (C) the amount requested to support the Council of 
        the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, 
        including a justification for such amount.
  (2) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a 
fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
include for such fiscal year--
          (A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector 
        General of the Intelligence Community;
          (B) the amount requested for Inspector General 
        training;
          (C) the amount requested to support the Council of 
        the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and
          (D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any, 
        with respect to such proposed budget.
  (3) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives for each fiscal 
year--
          (A) a separate statement of the budget estimate 
        transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1);
          (B) the amount requested by the Director for the 
        Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (2)(A);
          (C) the amount requested by the Director for the 
        training of personnel of the Office of the Inspector 
        General pursuant to paragraph (2)(B);
          (D) the amount requested by the Director for support 
        for the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity 
        and Efficiency pursuant to paragraph (2)(C); and
          (E) the comments of the Inspector General under 
        paragraph (2)(D), if any, on the amounts requested 
        pursuant to paragraph (2), including whether such 
        amounts would substantially inhibit the Inspector 
        General from performing the duties of the Office of the 
        Inspector General.
  (o) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of 
the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence information relating to the Office of 
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community including 
methods to contact the Inspector General.
  (2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be 
obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related 
to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community.

         chief financial officer of the intelligence community

  Sec. 103I. (a) Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence 
Community.--To assist the Director of National Intelligence in 
carrying out the responsibilities of the Director under this 
Act and other applicable provisions of law, there is within the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence a Chief 
Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be 
appointed by the Director. The Chief Financial Officer shall 
report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.
  (b) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to the direction of 
the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Financial 
Officer of the Intelligence Community shall--
          (1) serve as the principal advisor to the Director of 
        National Intelligence and the Principal Deputy Director 
        of National Intelligence on the management and 
        allocation of intelligence community budgetary 
        resources;
          (2) participate in overseeing a comprehensive and 
        integrated strategic process for resource management 
        within the intelligence community;
          (3) ensure that the strategic plan of the Director of 
        National Intelligence--
                  (A) is based on budgetary constraints as 
                specified in the Future Year Intelligence Plans 
                and Long-term Budget Projections required under 
                section 506G; and
                  (B) contains specific goals and objectives to 
                support a performance-based budget;
          (4) prior to the obligation or expenditure of funds 
        for the acquisition of any major system pursuant to a 
        Milestone A or Milestone B decision, receive 
        verification from appropriate authorities that the 
        national requirements for meeting the strategic plan of 
        the Director have been established, and that such 
        requirements are prioritized based on budgetary 
        constraints as specified in the Future Year 
        Intelligence Plans and the Long-term Budget Projections 
        for such major system required under section 506G;
          (5) ensure that the collection architectures of the 
        Director are based on budgetary constraints as 
        specified in the Future Year Intelligence Plans and the 
        Long-term Budget Projections required under section 
        506G;
          (6) coordinate or approve representations made to 
        Congress by the intelligence community regarding 
        National Intelligence Program budgetary resources;
          (7) participate in key mission requirements, 
        acquisitions, or architectural boards formed within or 
        by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 
        and
          (8) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by 
        the Director of National Intelligence.
  (c) Other Law.--The Chief Financial Officer of the 
Intelligence Community shall serve as the Chief Financial 
Officer of the intelligence community and, to the extent 
applicable, shall have the duties, responsibilities, and 
authorities specified in chapter 9 of title 31, United States 
Code.
  (d) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service as Other Chief 
Financial Officer.--An individual serving in the position of 
Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community may not, 
while so serving, serve as the chief financial officer of any 
other department or agency, or component thereof, of the United 
States Government.
  (e) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given 
        that term in section 506A(e).
          (2) The term ``Milestone A'' has the meaning given 
        that term in section 506G(f).
          (3) The term ``Milestone B'' has the meaning given 
        that term in section 506C(e).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              director of the central intelligence agency

  Sec. 104A. (a) Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--
There is a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who 
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.
  (b) Supervision.--The Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency shall report to the Director of National Intelligence 
regarding the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (c) Duties.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
shall--
          (1) serve as the head of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency; and
          (2) carry out the responsibilities specified in 
        subsection (d).
  (d) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency shall--
          (1) collect intelligence through human sources and by 
        other appropriate means, except that the Director of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, 
        subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal 
        security functions;
          (2) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to 
        the national security and provide appropriate 
        dissemination of such intelligence;
          (3) provide overall direction for and coordination of 
        the collection of national intelligence outside the 
        United States through human sources by elements of the 
        intelligence community authorized to undertake such 
        collection and, in coordination with other departments, 
        agencies, or elements of the United States Government 
        which are authorized to undertake such collection, 
        ensure that the most effective use is made of resources 
        and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to 
        the United States and those involved in such 
        collection; and
          (4) perform such other functions and duties related 
        to intelligence affecting the national security as the 
        President or the Director of National Intelligence may 
        direct.
  (e) Termination of Employment of CIA Employees.--(1) 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency may, in the discretion of 
the Director, terminate the employment of any officer or 
employee of the Central Intelligence Agency whenever the 
Director deems the termination of employment of such officer or 
employee necessary or advisable in the interests of the United 
States.
  (2) Any termination of employment of an officer or employee 
under paragraph (1) shall not affect the right of the officer 
or employee to seek or accept employment in any other 
department, agency, or element of the United States Government 
if declared eligible for such employment by the Office of 
Personnel Management.
  (f) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the 
direction of the Director of National Intelligence and in a 
manner consistent with section 207 of the Foreign Service Act 
of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency shall coordinate the relationships between 
elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence or 
security services of foreign governments or international 
organizations on all matters involving intelligence related to 
the national security or involving intelligence acquired 
through clandestine means.
  [(g) Foreign Language Proficiency for Certain Senior Level 
Positions in Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Except as 
provided pursuant to paragraph (2), an individual in the 
Directorate of Intelligence career service or the National 
Clandestine Service career service may not be appointed or 
promoted to a position in the Senior Intelligence Service in 
the Directorate of Intelligence or the National Clandestine 
Service of the Central Intelligence Agency unless the Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency determines that the 
individual has been certified as having a professional speaking 
and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such proficiency 
being at least level 3 on the Interagency Language Roundtable 
Language Skills Level or commensurate proficiency level using 
such other indicator of proficiency as the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate.
  [(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may, in 
the discretion of the Director, waive the application of 
paragraph (1) to any position, category of positions, or 
occupation otherwise covered by that paragraph if the Director 
determines that foreign language proficiency is not necessary 
for the successful performance of the duties and 
responsibilities of such position, category of positions, or 
occupation.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


     appointment of officials responsible for intelligence-related 
                               activities

  Sec. 106. (a) Recommendation of DNI in Certain 
Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position 
referred to in paragraph (2), the Director of National 
Intelligence shall recommend to the President an individual for 
nomination to fill the vacancy.
  (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
          (A) The Principal Deputy Director of National 
        Intelligence.
          (B) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (b) Concurrence of DNI in Appointments to Positions in the 
Intelligence Community.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a 
position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the 
department or agency having jurisdiction over the position 
shall obtain the concurrence of the Director of National 
Intelligence before appointing an individual to fill the 
vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be 
nominated to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur 
in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency 
concerned may not fill the vacancy or make the recommendation 
to the President (as the case may be). In the case in which the 
Director does not concur in such a recommendation, the Director 
and the head of the department or agency concerned may advise 
the President directly of the intention to withhold concurrence 
or to make a recommendation, as the case may be.
  (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
          (A) The Director of the National Security Agency.
          (B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance 
        Office.
          (C) The Director of the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency.
          (D) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence 
        and Research.
          (E) The Director of the Office of Intelligence and 
        Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.
          [(F) The Director of the Office of 
        Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.]
          [(G)] (F) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence 
        and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
          [(H)] (G) The Executive Assistant Director for 
        Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or 
        any successor to that position.
          [(I)] (H) The Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
        for Intelligence and Analysis.
  (c) Consultation With DNI in Certain Positions.--(1) In the 
event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), 
the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over 
the position shall consult with the Director of National 
Intelligence before appointing an individual to fill the 
vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be 
nominated to fill the vacancy.
  (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
          (A) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (B) The Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for 
        Intelligence.
          (C) The Assistant Attorney General designated as the 
        Assistant Attorney General for National Security under 
        section 507A of title 28, United States Code.

SEC. 106A. DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

  (a) In General.--There is a Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office.
  (b) Appointment.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance 
Office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.
  (c) Functions and Duties.--The Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office shall be the head of the National 
Reconnaissance Office and shall discharge such functions and 
duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law or 
executive order.
  (d) Advisory Board.--
          (1) Establishment.--There is established in the 
        National Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in 
        this section referred to as the ``Board'').
          (2) Duties.--The Board shall--
                  (A) study matters relating to the mission of 
                the National Reconnaissance Office, including 
                with respect to promoting innovation, 
                competition, and resilience in space, overhead 
                reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters; 
                and
                  (B) advise and report directly to the 
                Director with respect to such matters.
          (3) Members.--
                  (A) Number and appointment.--
                          (i) In general.--The Board shall be 
                        composed of 5 members appointed by the 
                        Director from among individuals with 
                        demonstrated academic, government, 
                        business, or other expertise relevant 
                        to the mission and functions of the 
                        National Reconnaissance Office.
                          (ii) Notification.--Not later than 30 
                        days after the date on which the 
                        Director appoints a member to the 
                        Board, the Director shall notify the 
                        congressional intelligence committees 
                        and the congressional defense 
                        committees (as defined in section 
                        101(a) of title 10, United States Code) 
                        of such appointment.
                  (B) Terms.--Each member shall be appointed 
                for a term of 2 years. Except as provided by 
                subparagraph (C), a member may not serve more 
                than 3 terms.
                  (C) Vacancy.--Any member appointed to fill a 
                vacancy occurring before the expiration of the 
                term for which the member's predecessor was 
                appointed shall be appointed only for the 
                remainder of that term. A member may serve 
                after the expiration of that member's term 
                until a successor has taken office.
                  (D) Chair.--The Board shall have a Chair, who 
                shall be appointed by the Director from among 
                the members.
                  (E) Travel expenses.--Each member shall 
                receive travel expenses, including per diem in 
                lieu of subsistence, in accordance with 
                applicable provisions under subchapter I of 
                chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
                  (F) Executive secretary.--The Director may 
                appoint an executive secretary, who shall be an 
                employee of the National Reconnaissance Office, 
                to support the Board.
          (4) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than 
        quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of 
        the Director.
          (5) Reports.--Not later than March 31 of each year, 
        the Board shall submit to the Director and to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
        activities and significant findings of the Board during 
        the preceding year.
          (6) Nonapplicability of certain requirements.--The 
        Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall 
        not apply to the Board.
          (7) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the 
        date that is 3 years after the date of the first 
        meeting of the Board.

                   [national security resources board

  [Sec. 107. (a) The Director of the Office of Defense 
Mobilization, subject to the direction of the President, is 
authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the 
Classification Act of 1949, to appoint and fix the compensation 
of such personnel as may be necessary to assist the Director in 
carrying out his functions.
  [(b) It shall be the function of the Director of the Office 
of Defense Mobilization to advise the President concerning the 
coordination of military, industrial, and civilian 
mobilization, including--
          [(1) policies concerning industrial and civilian 
        mobilization in order to assure the most effective 
        mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's 
        manpower in the event of war.
          [(2) programs for the effective use in time of war of 
        the Nation's natural and industrial resources for 
        military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and 
        stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war, 
        and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and 
        conditions;
          [(3) policies for unifying, in time of war, the 
        activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged 
        in or concerned with production, procurement, 
        distribution, or transportation of military or civilian 
        supplies, materials, and products;
          [(4) the relationship between potential supplies of, 
        and potential requirements for, manpower, resources, 
        and productive facilities in time of war;
          [(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of 
        strategic and critical material, and for the 
        conservation of these reserves;
          [(6) the strategic relocation of industries, 
        services, government, and economic activities, the 
        continuous operation of which is essential to the 
        Nation's security.
  [(c) In performing his functions, the Director of the Office 
of Defense Mobilization shall utilize to the maximum extent the 
facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the 
Government.]

                annual national security strategy report

  Sec. 108. (a)(1) The President shall transmit to Congress 
each year a comprehensive report on the national security 
strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section 
referred to as a national security strategy report'').
  (2) The national security strategy report for any year shall 
be transmitted on the date on which the President submits to 
Congress the budget for the next fiscal year under section 1105 
of title 31, United States Code.
  (3) Not later than 150 days after the date on which a new 
President takes office, the President shall transmit to 
Congress a national security strategy report under this 
section. That report shall be in addition to the report for 
that year transmitted at the time specified in paragraph (2).
  (b) Each national security strategy report shall set forth 
the national security strategy of the United States and shall 
include a comprehensive description and discussion of the 
following:
          (1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of 
        the United States that are vital to the national 
        security of the United States.
          (2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and 
        national defense capabilities of the United States 
        necessary to deter aggression and to implement the 
        national security strategy of the United States.
          (3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the 
        political, economic, military, and other elements of 
        the national power of the United States to protect or 
        promote the interests and achieve the goals and 
        objectives referred to in paragraph (1).
          (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United 
        States to carry out the national security strategy of 
        the United States, including an evaluation of the 
        balance among the capabilities of all elements of the 
        national power of the United States to support the 
        implementation of the national security strategy.
          (5) Such other information as may be necessary to 
        help inform Congress on matters relating to the 
        national security strategy of the United States.
  (c) Each national security strategy report shall be 
transmitted [in both a classified and an unclassified form] to 
Congress in classified form, but may include an unclassified 
summary.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      restrictions on intelligence sharing with the united nations

  Sec. 112. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to the 
United Nations.--(1) No United States intelligence information 
may be provided to the United Nations or any organization 
affiliated with the United Nations, or to any officials or 
employees thereof, unless the President certifies to the 
appropriate committees of Congress that the Director of 
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State and the Secretary of Defense, has established and 
implemented procedures, and has worked with the United Nations 
to ensure implementation of procedures, for protecting from 
unauthorized disclosure United States intelligence sources and 
methods connected to such information.
  (2) Paragraph (1) may be waived upon written certification by 
the President to the appropriate committees of Congress that 
providing such information to the United Nations or an 
organization affiliated with the United Nations, or to any 
officials or employees thereof, is in the national security 
interests of the United States.
  (b) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or 
assign the duties of the President under this section.
  (c) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to--
          (1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the 
        Director of National Intelligence to protect 
        intelligence sources and 
        methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to 
        [section 103(c)(7)] section 102A(i) of this Act; or
          (2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of 
        title V of this Act.
  (d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 113B. SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, 
                    OR MATHEMATICS POSITIONS.

  [(a) Authority to Set Special Rates of Pay.--Notwithstanding 
part III of title 5, United States Code, the head of each 
element of the intelligence community may establish higher 
minimum rates of pay for 1 or more categories of positions in 
such element that require expertise in science, technology, 
engineering, or mathematics (STEM).]
  (a) Special Rates of Pay for Positions Requiring Expertise in 
Science, Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics.--
          (1) In general.--Notwithstanding part III of title 5, 
        United States Code, the head of each element of the 
        intelligence community may, for 1 or more categories of 
        positions in such element that require expertise in 
        science, technology, engineering, or mathematics--
                  (A) establish higher minimum rates of pay; 
                and
                  (B) make corresponding increases in all rates 
                of pay of the pay range for each grade or 
                level, subject to subsection (b) or (c), as 
                applicable.
          (2) Treatment.--The special rate supplements 
        resulting from the establishment of higher rates under 
        paragraph (1) shall be basic pay for the same or 
        similar purposes as those specified in section 5305(j) 
        of title 5, United States Code.
  (b) Special Rates of Pay for Cyber Positions.--
          (1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (c), the 
        Director of the National Security Agency may establish 
        a special rate of pay--
                  (A) not to exceed the rate of basic pay 
                payable for level II of the Executive Schedule 
                under section 5313 of title 5, United States 
                Code, if the Director certifies to the Under 
                Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in 
                consultation with the Under Secretary of 
                Defense for Personnel and Readiness, that the 
                rate of pay is for positions that perform 
                functions that execute the cyber mission of the 
                Agency; or
                  (B) not to exceed the rate of basic pay 
                payable for the Vice President of the United 
                States under section 104 of title 3, United 
                States Code, if the Director certifies to the 
                Secretary of Defense, by name, individuals that 
                have advanced skills and competencies and that 
                perform critical functions that execute the 
                cyber mission of the Agency.
          (2) Pay limitation.--Employees receiving a special 
        rate under paragraph (1) shall be subject to an 
        aggregate pay limitation that parallels the limitation 
        established in section 5307 of title 5, United States 
        Code, except that--
                  (A) any allowance, differential, bonus, 
                award, or other similar cash payment in 
                addition to basic pay that is authorized under 
                title 10, United States Code, (or any other 
                applicable law in addition to title 5 of such 
                Code, excluding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
                1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.)) shall also be 
                counted as part of aggregate compensation; and
                  (B) aggregate compensation may not exceed the 
                rate established for the Vice President of the 
                United States under section 104 of title 3, 
                United States Code.
          (3) Limitation on number of recipients.--The number 
        of individuals who receive basic pay established under 
        paragraph (1)(B) may not exceed 100 at any time.
          (4) Limitation on use as comparative reference.--
        Notwithstanding any other provision of law, special 
        rates of pay and the limitation established under 
        paragraph (1)(B) may not be used as comparative 
        references for the purpose of fixing the rates of basic 
        pay or maximum pay limitations of qualified positions 
        under section 1599f of title 10, United States Code, or 
        section 226 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
        U.S.C. 147).
  [(b)] (c) Maximum Special Rate of Pay.--[A minimum] Except as 
provided in subsection (b), a minimum rate of pay established 
for a category of positions under subsection (a) may not exceed 
the maximum rate of basic pay (excluding any locality-based 
comparability payment under section 5304 of title 5, United 
States Code, or similar provision of law) for the position in 
that category of positions without the authority of subsection 
(a) by more than 30 percent, and no rate may be established 
under this section in excess of the rate of basic pay payable 
for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of 
title 5, United States Code.
  [(c)] (d) Notification of Removal From Special Rate of Pay.--
If the head of an element of the intelligence community removes 
a category of positions from coverage under a rate of pay 
authorized by subsection (a) or (b) after that rate of pay 
takes effect--
          (1) the head of such element shall provide notice of 
        the loss of coverage of the special rate of pay to each 
        individual in such category; and
          (2) the loss of coverage will take effect on the 
        first day of the first pay period after the date of the 
        notice.
  [(d)] (e) Revision of Special Rates of Pay.--Subject to the 
limitations in this section, rates of pay established under 
this section by the head of the element of the intelligence 
community may be revised from time to time by the head of such 
element and the revisions have the force and effect of statute.
  [(e)] (f) Regulations.--The head of each element of the 
intelligence community shall promulgate regulations to carry 
out this section with respect to such element, which shall, to 
the extent practicable, be comparable to the regulations 
promulgated to carry out section 5305 of title 5, United States 
Code.
  [(f)] (g) Reports.--
          (1) Requirement for reports.--[Not later than 90 days 
        after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017] Not later than 
        90 days after the date of the enactment of the Damon 
        Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019, the 
        head of each element of the intelligence community 
        shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees a report on any rates of pay established for 
        such element under this section.
          (2) Contents.--Each report required by paragraph (1) 
        shall contain for each element of the intelligence 
        community--
                  (A) a description of any rates of pay 
                established under subsection (a) or (b); and
                  (B) the number of positions in such element 
                that will be subject to such rates of pay.

      annual report on hiring and retention of minority employees

  Sec. 114.
  (a) The Director of National Intelligence shall, on an annual 
basis, submit to Congress a report on the employment of covered 
persons within each element of the intelligence community for 
the preceding fiscal year and the preceding 5 fiscal years.
  (b) Each such report shall include [disaggregated data by 
category of covered person from each element of the 
intelligence community] data, disaggregated by category of 
covered person and by element of the intelligence community, on 
the following:
          (1) Of all individuals employed in the element during 
        the fiscal year involved, the aggregate percentage of 
        such individuals who are covered persons.
          (2) Of all individuals employed in the element during 
        the fiscal year involved at the levels referred to in 
        subparagraphs (A) and (B), the percentage of covered 
        persons employed at such levels:
                  (A) Positions at levels 1 through 15 of the 
                General Schedule.
                  (B) Positions at levels above GS-15.
          (3) Of all individuals hired by the element involved 
        during the fiscal year involved, the percentage of such 
        individuals who are covered persons.
  (c) Each such report shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
but may contain a classified annex.
  (d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as providing 
for the substitution of any similar report required under 
another provision of law.
  (e) In this section the term ``covered persons'' means--
          (1) racial and ethnic minorities;
          (2) women; and
          (3) individuals with disabilities.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 120. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.

  (a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall establish a Climate Security Advisory Council for the 
purpose of--
          (1) assisting intelligence analysts of various 
        elements of the intelligence community with respect to 
        analysis of climate security and its impact on the 
        areas of focus of such analysts;
          (2) facilitating coordination between the elements of 
        the intelligence community and elements of the Federal 
        Government that are not elements of the intelligence 
        community in collecting data on, and conducting 
        analysis of, climate change and climate security; and
          (3) ensuring that the intelligence community is 
        adequately prioritizing climate change in carrying out 
        its activities.
  (b) Composition of Council.--
          (1) Members.--The Council shall be composed of the 
        following individuals appointed by the Director of 
        National Intelligence:
                  (A) An appropriate official from the National 
                Intelligence Council, who shall chair the 
                Council.
                  (B) The lead official with respect to climate 
                and environmental security analysis from--
                          (i) the Central Intelligence Agency;
                          (ii) the Bureau of Intelligence and 
                        Research of the Department of State;
                          (iii) the National Geospacial-
                        Intelligence Agency;
                          (iv) the Office of Intelligence and 
                        Counterintelligence of the Department 
                        of Energy;
                          (v) the Office of the Under Secretary 
                        of Defense for Intelligence; and
                          (vi) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
                  (C) Three appropriate officials from elements 
                of the Federal Government that are not elements 
                of the intelligence community that are 
                responsible for--
                          (i) providing decision-makers with a 
                        predictive understanding of the 
                        climate;
                          (ii) making observations of our Earth 
                        system that can be used by the public, 
                        policymakers, and to support strategic 
                        decisions; or
                          (iii) coordinating Federal research 
                        and investments in understanding the 
                        forces shaping the global environment, 
                        both human and natural, and their 
                        impacts on society.
                  (D) Any other officials as the Director of 
                National Intelligence or the chair of the 
                Council may determine appropriate.
          (2) Responsibilities of chair.--The chair of the 
        Council shall have responsibility for--
                  (A) identifying agencies to supply 
                individuals from elements of the Federal 
                Government that are not elements of the 
                intelligence community;
                  (B) securing the permission of the relevant 
                agency heads for the participation of such 
                individuals on the Council; and
                  (C) any other duties that the Director of 
                National Intelligence may direct.
  (c) Duties and Responsibilities of Council.--The Council 
shall carry out the following duties and responsibilities:
          (1) To meet at least quarterly to--
                  (A) exchange appropriate data between 
                elements of the intelligence community and 
                elements of the Federal Government that are not 
                elements of the intelligence community;
                  (B) discuss processes for the routine 
                exchange of such data and implementation of 
                such processes; and
                  (C) prepare summaries of the business 
                conducted at each meeting.
          (2) To assess and determine best practices with 
        respect to the analysis of climate security, including 
        identifying publicly available information and 
        intelligence acquired through clandestine means that 
        enables such analysis.
          (3) To assess and identify best practices with 
        respect to prior efforts of the intelligence community 
        to analyze climate security.
          (4) To assess and describe best practices for 
        identifying and disseminating climate security 
        indicators and warnings;
          (5) To recommend methods of incorporating analysis of 
        climate security and the best practices identified 
        under paragraphs (2) through (4) into existing analytic 
        training programs.
          (6) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements 
        of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of 
        climate change or climate security and elements of the 
        Federal Government that are not elements of the 
        intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate 
        change or climate security, for the purpose of sharing 
        information about ongoing efforts and avoiding 
        duplication of existing efforts.
          (7) To work with elements of the intelligence 
        community that conduct analysis of climate change or 
        climate security and elements of the Federal Government 
        that are not elements of the intelligence community 
        that conduct analysis of climate change or climate 
        security--
                  (A) to exchange appropriate data between such 
                elements, establish processes, procedures and 
                practices for the routine exchange of such 
                data, discuss the implementation of such 
                processes; and
                  (B) to enable and facilitate the sharing of 
                findings and analysis between such elements.
          (8) To assess whether the elements of the 
        intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate 
        change or climate security may inform the research 
        direction of academic work and the sponsored work of 
        the United States Government.
          (9) At the discretion of the chair of the Council, to 
        convene conferences of analysts and non-intelligence 
        community personnel working on climate change or 
        climate security on subjects that the chair shall 
        direct.
  (d) Sunset.--The Council shall terminate on the date that is 
4 years after the date of the enactment of this section.
  (e) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Climate security.--The term ``climate security'' 
        means the effects of climate change on the following:
                  (A) The national security of the United 
                States, including national security 
                infrastructure.
                  (B) Subnational, national, and regional 
                political stability.
                  (C) The security of allies and partners of 
                the United States.
                  (D) Ongoing or potential political violence, 
                including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, 
                insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, 
                civil war, and interstate war.
          (2) Climate intelligence indications and warnings.--
        The term ``climate intelligence indications and 
        warnings'' means developments relating to climate 
        security with the potential to--
                  (A) imminently and substantially alter the 
                political stability or degree of human security 
                in a country or region; or
                  (B) imminently and substantially threaten--
                          (i) the national security of the 
                        United States;
                          (ii) the military, political, or 
                        economic interests of allies and 
                        partners of the United States; or
                          (iii) citizens of the United States 
                        abroad.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  TITLE II--THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

  [Sec. 201.
  [(d) Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Act, the provisions of title IV of the Revised Statutes as 
now of hereafter amended shall be applicable to the Department 
of Defense.]

SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

  Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Act or other provisions of law, the provisions of title 5, 
United States Code, shall be applicable to the Department of 
Defense.

                         department of the army

  Sec. 205.
  [(b)] (a) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions 
relating to the Department of War or to any officer or activity 
whose title is changed under this section shall, insofar as 
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be 
deemed to relate to the Department of the Army within the 
Department of Defense or to such officer or activity designated 
by his or its new title.
  [(c)] (b) the term ``Department of the Army'' as used in this 
Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Army at 
the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, 
reserve components, installations, activities, and functions 
under the control or supervision of the Department of the Army.

                         department of the navy

  Sec. 206. [(a)] The term ``Department of the Navy'' as used 
in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the 
Navy at the seat of government; the headquarters, United States 
Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the United States 
Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United States Marine 
Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all 
field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, 
activities and functions under the control or supervision of 
the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard 
when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.

                      department of the air force

  Sec. 207.
  [(c)] The term ``Department of the Air Force'' as used in 
this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air 
Force at the seat of government and all field headquarters, 
forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and 
functions under the control or supervision of the Department of 
the Air Force.

TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 305. PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.

  (a) Paid Parental Leave.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, a civilian employee of an element of the intelligence 
community shall have available a total of 12 administrative 
workweeks of paid parental leave in the event of the birth of a 
son or daughter of the employee, or placement of a son or 
daughter with the employee for adoption or foster care in order 
to care for such son or daughter. Such paid parental leave 
shall be used during the 12-month period beginning on the date 
of the birth or placement. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to modify or otherwise affect the eligibility of an 
employee of an element of the intelligence community for 
benefits relating to leave under any other provision of law.
  (b) Treatment of Parental Leave Request.--Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law--
          (1) an element of the intelligence community shall 
        accommodate an employee's leave request under 
        subsection (a), including a request to use such leave 
        intermittently or to create a reduced work schedule, to 
        the extent that the requested leave schedule does not 
        unduly disrupt operations; and
          (2) to the extent that an employee's requested leave 
        described in paragraph (1) arises out of medical 
        necessity related to a serious health condition 
        connected to the birth of a son or daughter, the 
        employing element shall handle the scheduling 
        consistent with the treatment of employees who are 
        using leave under subparagraph (C) or (D) of section 
        6382(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code.
  (c) Rules Relating to Paid Leave.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law--
          (1) an employee may not be required to first use all 
        or any portion of any unpaid leave available to the 
        employee before being allowed to use the paid parental 
        leave described in subsection (a); and
          (2) paid parental leave under subsection (a)--
                  (A) shall be payable from any appropriation 
                or fund available for salaries or expenses for 
                positions within the employing element;
                  (B) may not be considered to be annual or 
                vacation leave for purposes of section 5551 or 
                5552 of title 5, United States Code, or for any 
                other purpose;
                  (C) if not used by the employee before the 
                end of the 12-month period described in 
                subsection (a) to which the leave relates, may 
                not be available for any subsequent use and may 
                not be converted into a cash payment;
                  (D) may be granted only to the extent that 
                the employee does not receive a total of more 
                than 12 weeks of paid parental leave in any 12-
                month period beginning on the date of a birth 
                or placement;
                  (E) may not be granted--
                          (i) in excess of a lifetime aggregate 
                        total of 30 administrative workweeks 
                        based on placements of a foster child 
                        for any individual employee; or
                          (ii) in connection with temporary 
                        foster care placements expected to last 
                        less than 1 year;
                  (F) may not be granted for a child being 
                placed for foster care or adoption if such 
                leave was previously granted to the same 
                employee when the same child was placed with 
                the employee for foster care in the past;
                  (G) shall be used in increments of hours (or 
                fractions thereof), with 12 administrative 
                workweeks equal to 480 hours for employees with 
                a regular full-time work schedule and converted 
                to a proportional number of hours for employees 
                with part-time, seasonal, or uncommon tours of 
                duty; and
                  (H) may not be used during off-season (nonpay 
                status) periods for employees with seasonal 
                work schedules.
  (d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 1 year after the 
date of the enactment of this section, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees an implementation plan that includes--
          (1) processes and procedures for implementing the 
        paid parental leave policies under subsections (a) 
        through (c);
          (2) an explanation of how the implementation of 
        subsections (a) through (c) will be reconciled with 
        policies of other elements of the Federal Government, 
        including the impact on elements funded by the National 
        Intelligence Program that are housed within agencies 
        outside the intelligence community; and
          (3) all costs or operational expenses associated with 
        the implementation of subsections (a) through (c).
  (e) Directive.--Not later than 180 days after the Director of 
National Intelligence submits the implementation plan under 
subsection (d), the Director of National Intelligence shall 
issue a written directive to implement this section, which 
directive shall take effect on the date of issuance.
  (f) Annual Report.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an 
annual report that--
          (1) details the number of employees of each element 
        of the intelligence community who applied for and took 
        paid parental leave under subsection (a) during the 
        year covered by the report;
          (2) details the number of--
                  (A) employees of each element of the 
                intelligence community stationed abroad who 
                applied for and took paid parental leave under 
                subsection (a) during the year covered by the 
                report; and
                  (B) employees of each element of the 
                intelligence community stationed abroad who 
                applied for paid parental leave but such 
                application was not granted because of an undue 
                impact on operations as specified in subsection 
                (b)(1); and
          (3) includes updates on major implementation 
        challenges or costs associated with paid parental 
        leave.
  (g) Definition of Son or Daughter.--For purposes of this 
section, the term ``son or daughter'' has the meaning given the 
term in section 6381 of title 5, United States Code.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                              definitions

  Sec. 308. (a) As used in [this Act] sections 2, 101, 102, 
103, and 303 of this Act, the term ``function'' includes 
functions, powers, and duties.
  (b) As used in this Act, the term, ``Department of Defense'' 
shall be deemed to include the military departments of the 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and all agencies created 
under title II of this Act.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    repealing and saving provisions

  Sec. [411.]  312. All laws, orders, and regulations 
inconsistent with the provisions of this title are repealed 
insofar as they are inconsistent with the powers, duties, and 
responsibilities enacted hereby: Provided, That the powers, 
duties, and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense under 
this title shall be administered in conformance with the policy 
and requirements for administration of budgetary and fiscal 
matters in the Government generally, including accounting and 
financial reporting, and that nothing in this title shall be 
construed as eliminating or modifying the powers, duties, and 
responsibilities of any other department, agency, or officer of 
the Government in connection with such matters, but no such 
department, agency, or officer shall exercise any such powers, 
duties, or responsibilities in a manner that will render 
ineffective the provisions of this title.

TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         presidential approval and reporting of covert actions

  Sec. 503. (a) The President may not authorize the conduct of 
a covert action by departments, agencies, or entities of the 
United States Government unless the President determines such 
an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy 
objectives of the United States and is important to the 
national security of the United States, which determination 
shall be set forth in a finding that shall meet each of the 
following conditions:
          (1) Each finding shall be in writing, unless 
        immediate action by the United States is required and 
        time does not permit the preparation of a written 
        finding, in which case a written record of the 
        President's decision shall be contemporaneously made 
        and shall be reduced to a written finding as soon as 
        possible but in no event more than 48 hours after the 
        decision is made.
  (2) Except as permitted by paragraph (1), a finding may not 
authorize or sanction a covert action, or any aspect of any 
such action, which already has occurred.
          (3) Each finding shall specify each department, 
        agency, or entity of the United States Government 
        authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any 
        significant way in such action. Any employee, 
        contractor, or contract agent of a department, agency, 
        or entity of the United States Government other than 
        the Central Intelligence Agency directed to participate 
        in any way in a covert action shall be subject either 
        to the policies and regulations of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency, or to written policies or 
        regulations adopted by such department, agency, or 
        entity, to govern such participation.
          (4) Each finding shall specify whether it is 
        contemplated that any third party which is not an 
        element of, or a contractor or contract agent of, the 
        United States Government, or is not otherwise subject 
        to United States Government policies and regulations, 
        will be used to fund or otherwise participate in any 
        significant way in the covert action concerned, or be 
        used to undertake the covert action concerned on behalf 
        of the United States.
  (5) A finding may not authorize any action that would violate 
the Constitution or any statute of the United States.
  (b) To the extent consistent with due regard for the 
protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and 
methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director 
of National Intelligence and the heads of all departments, 
agencies, and entities of the United States Government involved 
in a covert action--
          (1) shall keep the congressional intelligence 
        committees fully and currently informed of all covert 
        actions which are the responsibility of, are engaged in 
        by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any 
        department, agency, or entity of the United States 
        Government, including significant failures; and
  (2) shall furnish to the congressional intelligence 
committees any information or material concerning covert 
actions (including the legal basis under which the covert 
action is being or was conducted) which is in the possession, 
custody, or control of any department, agency, or entity of the 
United States Government and which is requested by either of 
the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out 
its authorized responsibilities.
  (c)(1) The President shall ensure that any finding approved 
pursuant to subsection (a) shall be reported in writing to the 
congressional intelligence committees as soon as possible after 
such approval and before the initiation of the covert action 
authorized by the finding, except as otherwise provided in 
paragraph (2) and paragraph (3).
  (2) If the President determines that it is essential to limit 
access to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances 
affecting vital interests of the United States, the finding may 
be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority 
leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and 
minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or 
members of the congressional leadership as may be included by 
the President.
  (3) Whenever a finding is not reported pursuant to paragraph 
(1) or (2) of this section, the President shall fully inform 
the congressional intelligence committees in a timely fashion 
and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving 
prior notice.
  (4) In a case under paragraph (1), (2), or (3), a copy of the 
finding, signed by the President, shall be provided to the 
chairman of each congressional intelligence committee.
  (5)(A) When access to a finding, or a notification provided 
under subsection (d)(1), is limited to the Members of Congress 
specified in paragraph (2), a written statement of the reasons 
for limiting such access shall also be provided.
  (B) Not later than 180 days after a statement of reasons is 
submitted in accordance with subparagraph (A) or this 
subparagraph, the President shall ensure that--
          (i) all members of the congressional intelligence 
        committees are provided access to the finding or 
        notification; or
          (ii) a statement of reasons that it is essential to 
        continue to limit access to such finding or such 
        notification to meet extraordinary circumstances 
        affecting vital interests of the United States is 
        submitted to the Members of Congress specified in 
        paragraph (2).
  (d)(1) The President shall ensure that the congressional 
intelligence committees, or, if applicable, the Members of 
Congress specified in subsection (c)(2), are notified in 
writing of any significant change in a previously approved 
covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a 
previously approved finding, in the same manner as findings are 
reported pursuant to subsection (c).
  (2) In determining whether an activity constitutes a 
significant undertaking for purposes of paragraph (1), the 
President shall consider whether the activity--
          (A) involves significant risk of loss of life;
          (B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, 
        including authorities relating to research, 
        development, or operations;
          (C) results in the expenditure of significant funds 
        or other resources;
          (D) requires notification under section 504;
          (E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing 
        intelligence sources or methods; or
          (F) presents a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious 
        damage to the diplomatic relations of the United States 
        if such activity were disclosed without authorization.
  (e) As used in this title, the term ``covert action'' means 
an activity or activities of the United States Government to 
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, 
where it is intended that the role of the United States 
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but 
does not include--
          (1) activities the primary purpose of which is to 
        acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence 
        activities, traditional activities to improve or 
        maintain the operational security of United States 
        Government programs, or administrative activities;
  (2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine 
support to such activities;
          (3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted 
        by United States Government law enforcement agencies or 
        routine support to such activities; or
          (4) activities to provide routine support to the 
        overt activities (other than activities described in 
        paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States 
        Government agencies abroad.
  (f) No covert action may be conducted which is intended to 
influence United States political processes, public opinion, 
policies, or media.
  (g)(1) In any case where access to a finding reported under 
subsection (c) or notification provided under subsection (d)(1) 
is not made available to all members of a congressional 
intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2), 
the President shall notify all members of such committee that 
such finding or such notification has been provided only to the 
members specified in subsection (c)(2).
  (2) In any case where access to a finding reported under 
subsection (c) or notification provided under subsection (d)(1) 
is not made available to all members of a congressional 
intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2), 
the President shall provide to all members of such committee a 
general description regarding the finding or notification, as 
applicable, consistent with the reasons for not yet fully 
informing all members of such committee.
  (3) The President shall maintain--
          (A) a record of the members of Congress to whom a 
        finding is reported under subsection (c) or 
        notification is provided under subsection (d)(1) and 
        the date on which each member of Congress receives such 
        finding or notification; and
          (B) each written statement provided under subsection 
        (c)(5).
  (h) For each type of activity undertaken as part of a covert 
action, the President shall establish in writing a plan to 
respond to the unauthorized public disclosure of that type of 
activity.

                   funding of intelligence activities

  Sec. 504. (a) Appropriated funds available to an intelligence 
agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or 
intelligence-related activity only if--
          (1) those funds were specifically authorized by the 
        Congress for use for such activities; or
          (2) in the case of funds from the Reserve for 
        Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency and 
        consistent with the provisions of section 503 of this 
        Act concerning any significant anticipated intelligence 
        activity, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency has notified the appropriate congressional 
        committees of the intent to make such funds available 
        for such activity; or
          (3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by 
        the Congress for a different activity--
                  (A) the activity to be funded is a higher 
                priority intelligence or intelligence-related 
                activity;
                  (B) the use of such funds for such activity 
                supports an emergent need, improves program 
                effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and
                  (C) the Director of National Intelligence, 
                the Secretary of Defense, or the Attorney 
                General, as appropriate, has notified the 
                appropriate congressional committees of the 
                intent to make such funds available for such 
                activity;
          (4) nothing in this subsection prohibits obligation 
        or expenditure of funds available to an intelligence 
        agency in accordance with sections 1535 and 1536 of 
        title 31, United States Code.
  (b) Funds available to an intelligence agency may not be made 
available for any intelligence or intelligence-related activity 
for which funds were denied by the Congress.
  (c) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any 
department, agency, or entity of the United States Government 
may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any 
covert action, as defined in section 503(e), unless and until a 
Presidential finding required by subsection (a) of section 503 
has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance with that 
subsection.
  (d)(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, 
funds available to an intelligence agency that are not 
appropriated funds may be obligated or expended for an 
intelligence or intelligence-related activity only if those 
funds are used for activities reported to the appropriate 
congressional committees pursuant to procedures which 
identify--
          (A) the types of activities for which nonappropriated 
        funds may be expended; and
          (B) the circumstances under which an activity must be 
        reported as a significant anticipated intelligence 
        activity before such funds can be expended.
  (2) Procedures for purposes of paragraph (1) shall be jointly 
agreed upon by the congressional intelligence committees and, 
as appropriate, the Director of National Intelligence or the 
Secretary of Defense.
  (e) As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``intelligence agency'' means any 
        department, agency, or other entity of the United 
        States involved in intelligence or intelligence-related 
        activities;
          (2) the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
        and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives and the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate; and
          (3) the term ``specifically authorized by the 
        Congress'' means that--
                  (A) the activity and the amount of funds 
                proposed to be used for that activity were 
                identified in a formal budget request to the 
                Congress, but funds shall be deemed to be 
                specifically authorized for that activity only 
                to the extent that the Congress both authorized 
                the funds to be appropriated for that activity 
                and appropriated the funds for that activity; 
                or
                  (B) although the funds were not formally 
                requested, the Congress both specifically 
                authorized the appropriation of the funds for 
                the activity and appropriated the funds for the 
                activity.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     reports on security clearances

  Sec. 506H. (a) Report on Security Clearance Determinations.--
(1) Not later than February 1 of each year, the President shall 
submit to Congress a report on the security clearance process. 
Such report shall include, for each security clearance level--
          (A) the number of employees of the United States 
        Government who--
                  (i) held a security clearance at such level 
                as of October 1 of the preceding year; and
                  (ii) were approved for a security clearance 
                at such level during the preceding fiscal year; 
                and
          (B) the number of contractors to the United States 
        Government who--
                  (i) held a security clearance at such level 
                as of October 1 of the preceding year; and
                  (ii) were approved for a security clearance 
                at such level during the preceding fiscal 
                year[; and].
          [(C) for each element of the intelligence community--
                  [(i) the total amount of time it took to 
                process the security clearance determination 
                for such level that--
                          [(I) was among the 80 percent of 
                        security clearance determinations made 
                        during the preceding fiscal year that 
                        took the shortest amount of time to 
                        complete; and
                          [(II) took the longest amount of time 
                        to complete;
                  [(ii) the total amount of time it took to 
                process the security clearance determination 
                for such level that--
                          [(I) was among the 90 percent of 
                        security clearance determinations made 
                        during the preceding fiscal year that 
                        took the shortest amount of time to 
                        complete; and
                          [(II) took the longest amount of time 
                        to complete;
                  [(iii) the number of pending security 
                clearance investigations for such level as of 
                October 1 of the preceding year that have 
                remained pending for--
                          [(I) 4 months or less;
                          [(II) between 4 months and 8 months;
                          [(III) between 8 months and one year; 
                        and
                          [(IV) more than one year;
                  [(iv) the percentage of reviews during the 
                preceding fiscal year that resulted in a denial 
                or revocation of a security clearance;
                  [(v) the percentage of investigations during 
                the preceding fiscal year that resulted in 
                incomplete information;
                  [(vi) the percentage of investigations during 
                the preceding fiscal year that did not result 
                in enough information to make a decision on 
                potentially adverse information; and
                  [(vii) for security clearance determinations 
                completed or pending during the preceding 
                fiscal year that have taken longer than one 
                year to complete--
                          [(I) the number of security clearance 
                        determinations for positions as 
                        employees of the United States 
                        Government that required more than one 
                        year to complete;
                          [(II) the number of security 
                        clearance determinations for 
                        contractors that required more than one 
                        year to complete;
                          [(III) the agencies that investigated 
                        and adjudicated such determinations; 
                        and
                          [(IV) the cause of significant delays 
                        in such determinations.]
  (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the President may 
consider--
          (A) security clearances at the level of confidential 
        and secret as one security clearance level; and
          (B) security clearances at the level of top secret or 
        higher as one security clearance level.
  (b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than March 
1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 
Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
Representatives a report on the security clearances processed 
by each element of the intelligence community during the 
preceding fiscal year. Each such report shall separately 
identify security clearances processed for Federal employees 
and contractor employees sponsored by each such element.
  (2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include 
each of the following for each element of the intelligence 
community for the fiscal year covered by the report:
          (A) The total number of initial security clearance 
        background investigations sponsored for new applicants.
          (B) The total number of security clearance periodic 
        reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.
          (C) The total number of initial security clearance 
        background investigations for new applicants that were 
        adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to 
        the prospective applicant, including--
                  (i) the total number that were adjudicated 
                favorably and granted access to classified 
                information; and
                  (ii) the total number that were adjudicated 
                unfavorably and resulted in a denial or 
                revocation of a security clearance.
          (D) The total number of security clearance periodic 
        background investigations that were adjudicated with 
        notice of a determination provided to the existing 
        employee, including--
                  (i) the total number that were adjudicated 
                favorably; and
                  (ii) the total number that were adjudicated 
                unfavorably and resulted in a denial or 
                revocation of a security clearance.
          (E) The total number of pending security clearance 
        background investigations, including initial applicant 
        investigations and periodic reinvestigations, that were 
        not adjudicated as of the last day of such year and 
        that remained pending as follows:
                  (i) For 180 days or less.
                  (ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 
                months.
                  (iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 
                18 months.
                  (iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 
                24 months.
                  (v) For 24 months or longer.
          (F) In the case of security clearance determinations 
        completed or pending during the year preceding the year 
        for which the report is submitted that have taken 
        longer than 12 months to complete--
                  (i) an explanation of the causes for the 
                delays incurred during the period covered by 
                the report; and
                  (ii) the number of such delays involving a 
                polygraph requirement.
          (G) The percentage of security clearance 
        investigations, including initial and periodic 
        reinvestigations, that resulted in a denial or 
        revocation of a security clearance.
          (H) The percentage of security clearance 
        investigations that resulted in incomplete information.
          (I) The percentage of security clearance 
        investigations that did not result in enough 
        information to make a decision on potentially adverse 
        information.
  (3) The report required under this subsection shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex.
  [(b)] (c) Form.--The reports required under [subsection 
(a)(1)] subsections (a)(1) and (b) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

 summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of detainees 
       held at united states naval station, guantanamo bay, cuba

  Sec. 506I. (a) In General.--The Director of National 
Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an 
unclassified summary of--
          (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees 
        currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention 
        Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of 
        Defense; and
          (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such 
        detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with 
        persons in terrorist organizations.
  (b) Updates.--Not less frequently than [once every 6 months] 
annually, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make 
publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the 
information required by subsection (a) and the number of 
individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist 
activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.

[SEC. 506J. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERFORMANCE BY 
                    FUNCTION.

  [(a) in General.--Not later than April 1, 2016, and each year 
thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in 
consultation with the Functional Managers, submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on covered 
intelligence functions during the preceding year.
  [(b) Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall 
include for each covered intelligence function for the year 
covered by such report the following:
          [(1) An identification of the capabilities, programs, 
        and activities of such intelligence function, 
        regardless of the element of the intelligence community 
        that carried out such capabilities, programs, and 
        activities.
          [(2) A description of the investment and allocation 
        of resources for such intelligence function, including 
        an analysis of the allocation of resources within the 
        context of the National Intelligence Strategy, 
        priorities for recipients of resources, and areas of 
        risk.
          [(3) A description and assessment of the performance 
        of such intelligence function.
          [(4) An identification of any issues related to the 
        application of technical interoperability standards in 
        the capabilities, programs, and activities of such 
        intelligence function.
          [(5) An identification of the operational overlap or 
        need for de-confliction, if any, within such 
        intelligence function.
          [(6) A description of any efforts to integrate such 
        intelligence function with other intelligence 
        disciplines as part of an integrated intelligence 
        enterprise.
          [(7) A description of any efforts to establish 
        consistency in tradecraft and training within such 
        intelligence function.
          [(8) A description and assessment of developments in 
        technology that bear on the future of such intelligence 
        function.
          [(9) Such other matters relating to such intelligence 
        function as the Director may specify for purposes of 
        this section.
  [(c) Definitions.--In this section:
          [(1) The term ``covered intelligence functions'' 
        means each intelligence function for which a Functional 
        Manager has been established under section 103J during 
        the year covered by a report under this section.
          [(2) The term ``Functional Manager'' means the 
        manager of an intelligence function established under 
        section 103J.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 511. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE ORDER.

  (a) Annual Reports Required.--[The Director of National 
Intelligence] The head of each element of the intelligence 
community shall annually submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on violations of law or 
executive order relating to intelligence activities by 
personnel of [an element] the element of the intelligence 
community that were identified during the previous calendar 
year.
  (b) Elements.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) 
shall, consistent with the need to preserve ongoing criminal 
investigations, include a description of, and any action taken 
in response to, any violation of law or executive order 
(including Executive Order No. 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note)) 
relating to intelligence activities committed by personnel of 
an element of the intelligence community in the course of the 
employment of such personnel that, during the previous calendar 
year, was--
          (1) determined by the director, head, or general 
        counsel of any element of the intelligence community to 
        have occurred;
          (2) referred to the Department of Justice for 
        possible criminal prosecution; or
          (3) substantiated by the inspector general of any 
        element of the intelligence community.

SEC. 512. UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Briefings.--Upon the request of an appropriate 
congressional committee, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall provide to the committee a briefing on the unfunded 
priorities of an element of the intelligence community.
  (b) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                  (A) the congressional intelligence 
                committees; and
                  (B) the Committees on Appropriations of the 
                House of Representatives and the Senate.
          (2) Unfunded priority.--The term ``unfunded 
        priority'', in the case of a fiscal year, means a 
        program, activity, or other initiative of an element of 
        the intelligence community that--
                  (A) was submitted by the head of the element 
                to the Director of National Intelligence in the 
                budget proposal for the element for that fiscal 
                year, but was not included by the Director in 
                the consolidated budget proposal submitted to 
                the President for that fiscal year; or
                  (B) was submitted by the Director in the 
                consolidated budget proposal submitted to the 
                President for that fiscal year, but was not 
                included in the budget of the President 
                submitted to Congress for that fiscal year 
                pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United 
                States Code.

SEC. 513. BRIEFINGS AND NOTIFICATIONS ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
                    OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

  (a) Quarterly Briefings.--In addition to, and without any 
derogation of, the requirement under section 501 to keep the 
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently 
informed of the intelligence and counterintelligence activities 
of the United States, not less frequently than once each 
quarter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a 
briefing on the counterintelligence activities of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. Such briefings shall include, at a 
minimum, an overview and update of--
          (1) the counterintelligence posture of the Bureau;
          (2) counterintelligence investigations; and
          (3) any other information relating to the 
        counterintelligence activities of the Bureau that the 
        Director determines necessary.
  (b) Notifications.--In addition to the quarterly briefings 
under subsection (a), the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation shall promptly notify the congressional 
intelligence committees of any counterintelligence 
investigation carried out by the Bureau with respect to any 
counterintelligence risk or threat that is related to an 
election or campaign for Federal office.
  (c) Guidelines.--
          (1) Development and consultation.--The Director shall 
        develop guidelines governing the scope of the briefings 
        provided under subsection (a), the notifications 
        provided under subsection (b), and the information 
        required by section 308(a)(2) of the Damon Paul Nelson 
        and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020. The Director 
        shall consult the congressional intelligence committees 
        during such development.
          (2) Submission.--The Director shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees--
                  (A) the guidelines under paragraph (1) upon 
                issuance; and
                  (B) any updates to such guidelines by not 
                later than 15 days after making such update.

TITLE VI--PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                              definitions

  Sec. 605. For the purposes of this title:
          (1) The term ``classified information'' means 
        information or material designated and clearly marked 
        or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of a 
        statute or Executive order (or a regulation or order 
        issued pursuant to a statute or Executive order), as 
        requiring a specific degree of protection against 
        unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national 
        security.
          (2) The term ``authorized'', when used with respect 
        to access to classified information, means having 
        authority, right, or permission pursuant to the 
        provisions of a statute, Executive order, directive of 
        the head of any department or agency engaged in foreign 
        intelligence or counterintelligence activities, order 
        of any United States court, or provisions of any Rule 
        of the House of Representatives or resolution of the 
        Senate which assigns responsibility within the 
        respective House of Congress for the oversight of 
        intelligence activities.
          (3) The term ``disclose'' means to communicate, 
        provide, impart, transmit, transfer, convey, publish, 
        or otherwise make available.
          (4) The term ``covert agent'' means--
                  (A) a present or retired officer or employee 
                of an intelligence agency or a present or 
                retired member of the Armed Forces assigned to 
                duty with an intelligence [agency--]
                          [(i) whose identity] agency whose 
                        identity as such an officer, employee, 
                        or member is classified information[, 
                        and];
                          [(ii) who is serving outside the 
                        United States or has within the last 
                        five years served outside the United 
                        States; or]
                  (B) a United States citizen whose 
                intelligence relationship to the United States 
                is classified information, and--
                          (i) who [resides and acts outside the 
                        United States] acts as an agent of, or 
                        informant or source of operational 
                        assistance to, an intelligence agency, 
                        or
                          (ii) who is at the time of the 
                        disclosure acting as an agent of, or 
                        informant to, the foreign 
                        counterintelligence or foreign 
                        counterterrorism components of the 
                        Federal Bureau of Investigation; or
                  (C) an individual, other than a United States 
                citizen, whose past or present intelligence 
                relationship to the United States is classified 
                information and who is a present or former 
                agent of, or a present or former informant or 
                source of operational assistance to, an 
                intelligence agency.
          (5) The term ``intelligence agency'' means the 
        elements of the intelligence community, as that term is 
        defined in section 3(4).
          (6) The term ``informant'' means any individual who 
        furnishes information to an intelligence agency in the 
        course of a confidential relationship protecting the 
        identity of such individual from public disclosure.
          (7) The terms ``officer'' and ``employee'' have the 
        meanings given such terms by section 2104 and 2105, 
        respectively, of title 5, United States Code.
          (8) The term ``Armed Forces'' means the Army, Navy, 
        Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
          (9) The term ``United States'', when used in a 
        geographic sense, means all areas under the territorial 
        sovereignty of the United States and the Trust 
        Territory of the Pacific Islands.
          (10) The term ``pattern of activities'' requires a 
        series of acts with a common purpose or objective.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE VIII--ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 803. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.

  (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, or 
such other officer of the United States as the President may 
designate, shall serve as the Security Executive Agent for all 
departments and agencies of the United States.
  (b) Duties.--The duties of the Security Executive Agent are 
as follows:
          (1) To direct the oversight of investigations, 
        reinvestigations, adjudications, and, as applicable, 
        polygraphs for eligibility for access to classified 
        information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position 
        made by any Federal agency.
          (2) To review the national security background 
        investigation and adjudication programs of Federal 
        agencies to determine whether such programs are being 
        implemented in accordance with this section.
          (3) To develop and issue uniform and consistent 
        policies and procedures to ensure the effective, 
        efficient, timely, and secure completion of 
        investigations, polygraphs, and adjudications relating 
        to determinations of eligibility for access to 
        classified information or eligibility to hold a 
        sensitive position.
          (4) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as 
        the final authority to designate a Federal agency or 
        agencies to conduct investigations of persons who are 
        proposed for access to classified information or for 
        eligibility to hold a sensitive position to ascertain 
        whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining 
        and retaining access to classified information or 
        eligibility to hold a sensitive position, as 
        applicable.
          (5) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as 
        the final authority to designate a Federal agency or 
        agencies to determine eligibility for access to 
        classified information or eligibility to hold a 
        sensitive position in accordance with Executive Order 
        12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to access to 
        classified information).
          (6) To ensure reciprocal recognition of eligibility 
        for access to classified information or eligibility to 
        hold a sensitive position among Federal agencies, 
        including acting as the final authority to arbitrate 
        and resolve disputes among such agencies involving the 
        reciprocity of investigations and adjudications of 
        eligibility.
          (7) To execute all other duties assigned to the 
        Security Executive Agent by law.
  (c) Authorities.--The Security Executive Agent shall--
          (1) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of 
        Federal agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity, 
        centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, timeliness, 
        and security in processes relating to determinations by 
        such agencies of eligibility for access to classified 
        information or eligibility to hold a sensitive 
        position, including such matters as investigations, 
        polygraphs, adjudications, and reciprocity;
          (2) have the authority to grant exceptions to, or 
        waivers of, national security investigative 
        requirements, including issuing implementing or 
        clarifying guidance, as necessary;
          (3) have the authority to assign, in whole or in 
        part, to the head of any Federal agency (solely or 
        jointly) any of the duties of the Security Executive 
        Agent described in subsection (b) or the authorities 
        described in paragraphs (1) and (2), provided that the 
        exercise of such assigned duties or authorities is 
        subject to the oversight of the Security Executive 
        Agent, including such terms and conditions (including 
        approval by the Security Executive Agent) as the 
        Security Executive Agent determines appropriate; and
          (4) define and set standards for continuous 
        evaluation for continued access to classified 
        information and for eligibility to hold a sensitive 
        position.

                               exceptions

  Sec. [803.]  804. Except as otherwise specifically provided, 
the provisions of this title shall not apply to the President 
and Vice President, Members of the Congress, Justices of the 
Supreme Court, and Federal judges appointed by the President.

                              definitions

  Sec. [804.]  805. For purposes of this title--
          (1) the term ``authorized investigative agency'' 
        means an agency authorized by law or regulation to 
        conduct a counterintelligence investigation or 
        investigations of persons who are proposed for access 
        to classified information to ascertain whether such 
        persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and 
        retaining access to such information;
          (2) the term ``classified information'' means any 
        information that has been determined pursuant to 
        Executive Order No. 12356 of April 2, 1982, or 
        successor orders, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to 
        require protection against unauthorized disclosure and 
        that is so designated;
          (3) the term ``consumer reporting agency'' has the 
        meaning given such term in section 603 of the Consumer 
        Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a);
          (4) the term ``employee'' includes any person who 
        receives a salary or compensation of any kind from the 
        United States Government, is a contractor of the United 
        States Government or an employee thereof, is an unpaid 
        consultant of the United States Government, or 
        otherwise acts for or on behalf of the United States 
        Government, except as otherwise determined by the 
        President;
          (5) the terms ``financial agency'' and ``financial 
        institution'' have the meanings given to such terms in 
        section 5312(a) of title 31, United States Code, and 
        the term ``holding company'' has the meaning given to 
        such term in section 1101(6) of the Right to Financial 
        Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401);
          (6) the terms ``foreign power'' and ``agent of a 
        foreign power'' have the same meanings as set forth in 
        sections 101 (a) and (b), respectively, of the Foreign 
        Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801);
          (7) the term ``State'' means each of the several 
        States of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
        the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of 
        the Northern Mariana Islands, the United States Virgin 
        Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Republic of the 
        Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
        and the Republic of Palau, and any other possession of 
        the United States; and
          (8) the term ``computer'' means any electronic, 
        magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed 
        data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, 
        or storage functions, and includes any data storage 
        facility or communications facility directly related to 
        or operating in conjunction with such device and any 
        data or other information stored or contained in such 
        device.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED 
                    DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Covered official.--The term ``covered official'' 
        means--
                  (A) the heads of each element of the 
                intelligence community; and
                  (B) the inspectors general with oversight 
                responsibility for an element of the 
                intelligence community.
          (2) Investigation.--The term ``investigation'' means 
        any inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the 
        existence of an unauthorized public disclosure of 
        classified information.
          (3) Unauthorized disclosure of classified 
        information.--The term ``unauthorized disclosure of 
        classified information'' means any unauthorized 
        disclosure of classified information to any recipient.
          (4) Unauthorized public disclosure of classified 
        information.--The term ``unauthorized public disclosure 
        of classified information'' means the unauthorized 
        disclosure of classified information to a journalist or 
        media organization.
  (b) Intelligence Community Reporting.--
          (1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 
        6 months, each covered official shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report on 
        investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of 
        classified information.
          (2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph 
        (1) shall include, with respect to the preceding 6-
        month period, the following:
                  (A) The number of investigations opened by 
                the covered official regarding an unauthorized 
                public disclosure of classified information.
                  (B) The number of investigations completed by 
                the covered official regarding an unauthorized 
                public disclosure of classified information.
                  (C) Of the number of such completed 
                investigations identified under subparagraph 
                (B), the number referred to the Attorney 
                General for criminal investigation.
  (c) Department of Justice Reporting.--
          (1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 
        6 months, the Assistant Attorney General for National 
        Security of the Department of Justice, in consultation 
        with the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, shall submit to the congressional 
        intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary 
        of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of 
        the House of Representatives a report on the status of 
        each referral made to the Department of Justice from 
        any element of the intelligence community regarding an 
        unauthorized disclosure of classified information made 
        during the most recent 365-day period or any referral 
        that has not yet been closed, regardless of the date 
        the referral was made.
          (2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph 
        (1) shall include, for each referral covered by the 
        report, at a minimum, the following:
                  (A) The date the referral was received.
                  (B) A statement indicating whether the 
                alleged unauthorized disclosure described in 
                the referral was substantiated by the 
                Department of Justice.
                  (C) A statement indicating the highest level 
                of classification of the information that was 
                revealed in the unauthorized disclosure.
                  (D) A statement indicating whether an open 
                criminal investigation related to the referral 
                is active.
                  (E) A statement indicating whether any 
                criminal charges have been filed related to the 
                referral.
                  (F) A statement indicating whether the 
                Department of Justice has been able to 
                attribute the unauthorized disclosure to a 
                particular entity or individual.
  (d) Form of Reports.--Each report submitted under this 
section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may have a 
classified annex.

SEC. 1106. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE 
                    UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.

  (a) Requirement.--On an annual basis, the Director of the 
National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit 
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
influence operations and campaigns in the United States 
conducted by the Communist Party of China.
  (b) Contents.--Each report under subsection (a) shall include 
the following:
          (1) A description of the organization of the United 
        Front Work Department of the People's Republic of 
        China, or the successors of the United Front Work 
        Department, and the links between the United Front Work 
        Department and the Central Committee of the Communist 
        Party of China.
          (2) An assessment of the degree to which 
        organizations that are associated with or receive 
        funding from the United Front Work Department, 
        particularly such entities operating in the United 
        States, are formally tasked by the Chinese Communist 
        Party or the Government of China.
          (3) A description of the efforts by the United Front 
        Work Department and subsidiary organizations of the 
        United Front Work Department to target, coerce, and 
        influence foreign populations, particularly those of 
        ethnic Chinese descent.
          (4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy, 
        consulates, and organizations affiliated with the 
        Chinese Communist Party (including, at a minimum, the 
        United Front Work Department) to influence the United 
        States-based Chinese Student Scholar Associations.
          (5) A description of the evolution of the role of the 
        United Front Work Department under the leadership of 
        the President of China.
          (6) An assessment of the activities of the United 
        Front Work Department designed to influence the 
        opinions of elected leaders of the United States, or 
        candidates for elections in the United States, with 
        respect to issues of importance to the Chinese 
        Communist Party.
          (7) A listing of all known organizations affiliated 
        with the United Front Work Department that are 
        operating in the United States as of the date of the 
        report.
          (8) With respect to reports submitted after the first 
        report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, 
        techniques, and procedures of the influence operations 
        and campaigns conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
  (c) Coordination.--In carrying out subsection (a), the 
Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security 
Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the 
intelligence community.
  (d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex.
                              ----------                              


                      TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL MILITARY LAW

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART III--TRAINING AND EDUCATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               CHAPTER 108--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SCHOOLS

Sec.
[2161. Degree granting authority for National Intelligence University.]
     * * * * * * *

[Sec. 2161. Degree granting authority for National Intelligence 
                    University

  [(a) Authority.--Under regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary of Defense, the President of the National 
Intelligence University may, upon the recommendation of the 
faculty of the National Intelligence University, confer 
appropriate degrees upon graduates who meet the degree 
requirements.
  [(b) Limitation.--A degree may not be conferred under this 
section unless--
          [(1) the Secretary of Education has recommended 
        approval of the degree in accordance with the Federal 
        Policy Governing Granting of Academic Degrees by 
        Federal Agencies; and
          [(2) the National Intelligence University is 
        accredited by the appropriate civilian academic 
        accrediting agency or organization to award the degree, 
        as determined by the Secretary of Education.
  [(c) Congressional Notification Requirements.--(1) When 
seeking to establish degree granting authority under this 
section, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of 
Representatives--
          [(A) a copy of the self assessment questionnaire 
        required by the Federal Policy Governing Granting of 
        Academic Degrees by Federal Agencies, at the time the 
        assessment is submitted to the Department of 
        Education's National Advisory Committee on 
        Institutional Quality and Integrity; and
          [(B) the subsequent recommendations and rationale of 
        the Secretary of Education regarding the establishment 
        of the degree granting authority.
  [(2) Upon any modification or redesignation of existing 
degree granting authority, the Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 
House of Representatives a report containing the rationale for 
the proposed modification or redesignation and any subsequent 
recommendation of the Secretary of Education on the proposed 
modification or redesignation.
  [(3) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees 
on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a 
report containing an explanation of any action by the 
appropriate academic accrediting agency or organization not to 
accredit the National Intelligence University to award any new 
or existing degree.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2009



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
                               TITLE III

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


(INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  Sec. 319. (a) Reports Required.--Not later than 60 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act and [every 90 days] 
annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the members 
and committees of Congress specified in subsection (b) a report 
on the prisoner population at the detention facility at Naval 
Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
  (b) Specified Members and Committees of Congress.--The 
members and committees of Congress specified in this subsection 
are the following:
          (1) The majority leader and minority leader of the 
        Senate.
          (2) The Chairman and Ranking Member on the Committee 
        on Armed Services of the Senate.
          (3) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
          (4) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee 
        on Appropriations of the Senate.
          (5) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
          (6) The minority leader of the House of 
        Representatives.
          (7) The Chairman and Ranking Member on the Committee 
        on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
          (8) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Permanent 
        Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
        Representatives.
          (9) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee 
        on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
  (c) Matters To Be Included.--Each report submitted under 
subsection (a) shall include the following:
          (1) The name and country of origin of each detainee 
        at the detention facility at Naval Station Guantanamo 
        Bay, Cuba, as of the date of such report.
          (2) A current summary of the evidence, intelligence, 
        and information used to justify the detention of each 
        detainee listed under paragraph (1) at Naval Station 
        Guantanamo Bay.
          (3) A current accounting of all the measures taken to 
        transfer each detainee listed under paragraph (1) to 
        the individual's country of citizenship or another 
        country.
          (4) A current description of the number of 
        individuals released or transferred from detention at 
        Naval Station Guantanamo Bay who are confirmed or 
        suspected of returning to terrorist activities after 
        release or transfer from Naval Station Guantanamo Bay.
          (5) An assessment of any efforts by al Qaeda to 
        recruit detainees released from detention at Naval 
        Station Guantanamo Bay.
          (6) A summary of all known contact between any 
        individual formerly detained at Naval Station 
        Guantanamo Bay and any individual known or suspected to 
        be associated with a foreign terrorist group, which 
        contact included information or discussion about 
        planning for or conduct of hostilities against the 
        United States or its allies or the organizational, 
        logistical, or resource needs or activities of any 
        terrorist group or activity.
          (7) For each individual described in paragraph (4), 
        the date on which such individual was released or 
        transferred from Naval Station Guantanamo Bay and the 
        date on which it is confirmed that such individual is 
        suspected or confirmed of reengaging in terrorist 
        activities.
          (8) The average period of time described in paragraph 
        (7) for all the individuals described in paragraph (4).
  (d) Additional Matters To Be Included in Initial Report.--The 
first report submitted under subsection (a) shall also include 
the following:
          (1) A description of the process that was previously 
        used for screening the detainees described by 
        subsection (c)(4) prior to their release or transfer 
        from detention at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
          (2) An assessment of the adequacy of that screening 
        process for reducing the risk that detainees previously 
        released or transferred from Naval Station Guantanamo 
        Bay would return to terrorist activities after release 
        or transfer from Naval Station Guantanamo Bay.
          (3) An assessment of lessons learned from previous 
        releases and transfers of individuals who returned to 
        terrorist activities for reducing the risk that 
        detainees released or transferred from Naval Station 
        Guantanamo Bay will return to terrorist activities 
        after their release or transfer.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
    DIVISION N--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the 
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this 
division is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
     * * * * * * *

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

[Sec. 501. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian 
          Federation to exert covert influence over peoples and 
          governments.]
Sec. 501. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian 
          Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic 
          Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
          and other nation states to exert covert influence over peoples 
          and governments.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 308. GUIDANCE AND REPORTING REQUIREMENT REGARDING THE INTERACTIONS 
                    BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND 
                    ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Engagement.--The term ``engagement''--
                  (A) means any significant interaction between 
                an element of the intelligence community and an 
                entertainment industry entity for the purposes 
                of contributing to an entertainment product 
                intended to be heard, read, viewed, or 
                otherwise experienced by the public; and
                  (B) does not include routine inquiries made 
                by the press or news media to the public 
                affairs office of an intelligence community.
          (2) Entertainment industry entity.--The term 
        ``entertainment industry entity'' means an entity that 
        creates, produces, promotes, or distributes a work of 
        entertainment intended to be heard, read, viewed, or 
        otherwise experienced by an audience, including--
                  (A) theater productions, motion pictures, 
                radio broadcasts, television broadcasts, 
                podcasts, webcasts, other sound or visual 
                recording, music, or dance;
                  (B) books and other published material; and
                  (C) such other entertainment activity, as 
                determined by the Director of National 
                Intelligence.
  (b) Director of National Intelligence Guidance.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
        National Intelligence shall issue, and release to the 
        public, guidance regarding engagements by elements of 
        the intelligence community with entertainment industry 
        entities.
          (2) Criteria.--The guidance required by paragraph (1) 
        shall--
                  (A) permit an element of the intelligence 
                community to conduct engagements, if the head 
                of the element, or a designee of such head, 
                provides prior approval; and
                  (B) require an unclassified annual report to 
                the congressional intelligence committees 
                regarding engagements.
  [(c) Annual Report.--Each report required by subsection 
(b)(2)(B) shall include the following:
          [(1) A description of the nature and duration of each 
        engagement included in the review.
          [(2) The cost incurred by the United States 
        Government for each such engagement.
          [(3) A description of the benefits to the United 
        States Government for each such engagement.
          [(4) A determination of whether any information was 
        declassified, and whether any classified information 
        was improperly disclosed, or each such engagement.
          [(5) A description of the work produced through each 
        such engagement.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 311. NOTIFICATION OF MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING.

  [(a) In general.--The head of each element of the 
intelligence community shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a copy of each memorandum of 
understanding or other agreement regarding significant 
operational activities or policy between or among such element 
and any other entity or entities of the United States 
Government--
          [(1) for such a memorandum or agreement that is in 
        effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, not 
        later than 60 days after such date; and
          [(2) for such a memorandum or agreement entered into 
        after such date, in a timely manner and not more than 
        60 days after the date such memorandum or other 
        agreement is entered into.]
  (a) In General.--Each year, concurrent with the annual budget 
request submitted by the President to Congress under section 
1105 of title 31, United States Code, each head of an element 
of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report that lists each memorandum of 
understanding or other agreement regarding significant 
operational activities or policy entered into during the most 
recently completed fiscal year between or among such element 
and any other entity of the United States Government.
  (b) Provision of Documents.--Each head of an element of an 
intelligence community who receives a request from the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives for a 
copy of a memorandum of understanding or other document listed 
in a report submitted by the head under subsection (a) shall 
submit to such committee the requested copy as soon as 
practicable after receiving such request.
  [(b)] (c) Administrative Memorandum or Agreement.--Nothing in 
this section may be construed to require an element of the 
intelligence community to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees any memorandum or agreement that is 
solely administrative in nature, including a memorandum or 
agreement regarding joint duty or other routine personnel 
assignments.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

SEC. 501. COMMITTEE TO COUNTER ACTIVE MEASURES BY THE RUSSIAN 
                    FEDERATION, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE 
                    ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S 
                    REPUBLIC OF KOREA, OR OTHER NATION STATE TO EXERT 
                    COVERT INFLUENCE OVER PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Active measures by russia to exert covert 
        influence.--The term ``active measures by Russia, 
        China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to 
        exert covert influence'' means activities intended to 
        influence a person or government that are carried out 
        in coordination with, or at the behest of, political 
        leaders or the security services of the Russian 
        Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic 
        Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea, or other nation state and the role of the 
        Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the 
        Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea, or other nation state has been 
        hidden or not acknowledged publicly, including the 
        following:
                  (A) Establishment or funding of a front 
                group.
                  (B) Covert broadcasting.
                  (C) Media manipulation.
                  (D) Disinformation and forgeries.
                  (E) Funding agents of influence.
                  (F) Incitement and offensive 
                counterintelligence.
                  (G) Assassinations.
                  (H) Terrorist acts.
          (2) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                  (A) the congressional intelligence 
                committees;
                  (B) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
                Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
                and
                  (C) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
                Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                Representatives.
  (b) Establishment.--There is established within the executive 
branch an interagency committee to counter active measures by 
the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence.
  (c) Membership.--
          (1) In general.--
                  (A) Appointment.--Each head of an agency or 
                department of the Government set out under 
                subparagraph (B) shall appoint one member of 
                the committee established by subsection (b) 
                from among officials of such agency or 
                department who occupy a position that is 
                required to be appointed by the President, with 
                the advice and consent of the Senate.
                  (B) Head of an agency or department.--The 
                head of an agency or department of the 
                Government set out under this subparagraph are 
                the following:
                          (i) The Director of National 
                        Intelligence.
                          (ii) The Secretary of State.
                          (iii) The Secretary of Defense.
                          (iv) The Secretary of the Treasury.
                          (v) The Attorney General.
                          (vi) The Secretary of Energy.
                          (vii) The Director of the Federal 
                        Bureau of Investigation.
                          (viii) The head of any other agency 
                        or department of the United States 
                        Government designated by the President 
                        for purposes of this section.
  (d) Meetings.--The committee shall meet on a regular basis.
  (e) Duties.--The duties of the committee established by 
subsection (b) shall be as follows:
          (1) To counter active measures by Russia, China, 
        Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert 
        covert influence, including by exposing falsehoods, 
        agents of influence, corruption, human rights abuses, 
        terrorism, and assassinations carried out by the 
        security services or political elites of the Russian 
        Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic 
        Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea, or other nation state or their proxies.
          (2) Such other duties as the President may designate 
        for purposes of this section.
  (f) Staff.--The committee established by subsection (b) may 
employ such staff as the members of such committee consider 
appropriate.
  (g) Budget Request.--A request for funds required for the 
functioning of the committee established by subsection (b) may 
be included in each budget for a fiscal year submitted by the 
President pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United 
States Code.
  (h) Annual Report.--
          (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
        thereafter, and consistent with the protection of 
        intelligence sources and methods, the committee 
        established by subsection (b) shall submit to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress a report describing 
        steps being taken by the committee to counter active 
        measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other 
        nation state to exert covert influence.
          (2) Content.--Each report required by paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following:
                  (A) A summary of the active measures by the 
                Russian Federation, the People's Republic of 
                China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
                Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other 
                nation state to exert covert influence during 
                the previous year, including significant 
                incidents and notable trends.
                  (B) A description of the key initiatives of 
                the committee.
                  (C) A description of the implementation of 
                the committee's initiatives by the head of an 
                agency or department of the Government set out 
                under subsection (c)(1)(B).
                  (D) An analysis of the impact of the 
                committee's initiatives.
                  (E) Recommendations for changes to the 
                committee's initiatives from the previous year.
          (3) Separate reporting requirement.--The requirement 
        to submit an annual report under paragraph (1) is in 
        addition to any other reporting requirements with 
        respect to Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other 
        nation state.

SEC. 502. STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF TRAVEL PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES OF 
                    ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL OF THE 
                    RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

  (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
          (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
          (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
          (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
        Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
        Representatives.
  (b) Advance Notification Requirement.--The Secretary of State 
shall, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and the Director of National Intelligence, 
establish a mandatory advance notification regime governing all 
travel by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of the 
Russian Federation in the United States and take necessary 
action to secure full compliance by Russian personnel and 
address any noncompliance.
  (c) Interagency Cooperation.--The Secretary of State, the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
Director of National Intelligence shall develop written 
mechanisms to share information--
          (1) on travel by accredited diplomatic and consular 
        personnel of the Russian Federation who are in the 
        United States; and
          (2) on any known or suspected noncompliance by such 
        personnel with the regime required by subsection (b).
  (d) Quarterly Reports.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter, and 
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and 
methods--
          (1) the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress a written report 
        detailing the number of notifications submitted under 
        the regime required by subsection (b); and
          (2) the Secretary of State and the Director of the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation shall jointly submit to 
        the appropriate committees of Congress a written report 
        detailing [the number] a best estimate of known or 
        suspected violations of such requirements by any 
        accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of the 
        Russian Federation.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

[SEC. 601. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW WITH RESPECT TO DETAINEES 
                    TRANSFERRED FROM UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, 
                    GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

  [(a) In general.--For each individual detained at United 
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who was transferred 
or released from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
          [(1)(A) complete a declassification review of 
        intelligence reports regarding past terrorist 
        activities of that individual prepared by the National 
        Counterterrorism Center for the individual's Periodic 
        Review Board sessions, transfer, or release; or
          [(B) if the individual's transfer or release occurred 
        prior to the date on which the National 
        Counterterrorism Center first began to prepare such 
        reports regarding detainees, such other intelligence 
        report or reports that contain the same or similar 
        information regarding the individual's past terrorist 
        activities;
          [(2) make available to the public--
                  [(A) any intelligence reports declassified as 
                a result of the declassification review; and
                  [(B) with respect to each individual 
                transferred or released, for whom intelligence 
                reports are declassified as a result of the 
                declassification review, an unclassified 
                summary which shall be prepared by the 
                President of measures being taken by the 
                country to which the individual was transferred 
                or released to monitor the individual and to 
                prevent the individual from carrying out future 
                terrorist activities; and
          [(3) submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees a report setting out the results of the 
        declassification review, including a description of 
        intelligence reports covered by the review that were 
        not declassified.
  [(b) Schedule.--
          [(1) Transfer or release prior to enactment.--Not 
        later than 210 days after the date of the enactment of 
        this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
        submit the report required by subsection (a)(3), which 
        shall include the results of the declassification 
        review completed for each individual detained at United 
        States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who was 
        transferred or released from United States Naval 
        Station, Guantanamo Bay, prior to the date of the 
        enactment of this Act.
          [(2) Transfer or release after enactment.--Not later 
        than 120 days after the date an individual detained at 
        United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, on or 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act is 
        transferred or released from United States Naval 
        Station, Guantanamo Bay, the Director shall submit the 
        report required by subsection (a)(3) for such 
        individual.
  [(c) Past Terrorist Activities.--For purposes of this 
section, the past terrorist activities of an individual shall 
include all terrorist activities conducted by the individual 
before the individual's transfer to the detention facility at 
United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, including, at a 
minimum, the following:
          [(1) The terrorist organization, if any, with which 
        affiliated.
          [(2) The terrorist training, if any, received.
          [(3) The role in past terrorist attacks against 
        United States interests or allies.
          [(4) The direct responsibility, if any, for the death 
        of United States citizens or members of the Armed 
        Forces.
          [(5) Any admission of any matter specified in 
        paragraphs (1) through (4).
          [(6) A description of the intelligence supporting any 
        matter specified in paragraphs (1) through (5), 
        including the extent to which such intelligence was 
        corroborated, the level of confidence held by the 
        intelligence community, and any dissent or reassessment 
        by an element of the intelligence community.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


        INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1016. INFORMATION SHARING.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Homeland security information.--The term 
        ``homeland security information'' has the meaning given 
        that term in section 892(f) of the Homeland Security 
        Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 482(f)).
          (2) Information sharing council.--The term 
        ``Information Sharing Council'' means the Information 
        Systems Council established by Executive Order 13356, 
        or any successor body designated by the President, and 
        referred to under subsection (g).
          (3) Information sharing environment.--The terms 
        ``information sharing environment'' and ``ISE'' mean an 
        approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism and 
        homeland security information, which may include any 
        method determined necessary and appropriate for 
        carrying out this section.
          (4) Program manager.--The term ``program manager'' 
        means the program manager designated under subsection 
        (f).
          (5) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism 
        information''--
                  (A) means all information, whether collected, 
                produced, or distributed by intelligence, law 
                enforcement, military, homeland security, or 
                other activities relating to--
                          (i) the existence, organization, 
                        capabilities, plans, intentions, 
                        vulnerabilities, means of finance or 
                        material support, or activities of 
                        foreign or international terrorist 
                        groups or individuals, or of domestic 
                        groups or individuals involved in 
                        transnational terrorism;
                          (ii) threats posed by such groups or 
                        individuals to the United States, 
                        United States persons, or United States 
                        interests, or to those of other 
                        nations;
                          (iii) communications of or by such 
                        groups or individuals; or
                          (iv) groups or individuals reasonably 
                        believed to be assisting or associated 
                        with such groups or individuals; and
                  (B) includes weapons of mass destruction 
                information.
          (6) Weapons of mass destruction information.--The 
        term ``weapons of mass destruction information'' means 
        information that could reasonably be expected to assist 
        in the development, proliferation, or use of a weapon 
        of mass destruction (including a chemical, biological, 
        radiological, or nuclear weapon) that could be used by 
        a terrorist or a terrorist organization against the 
        United States, including information about the location 
        of any stockpile of nuclear materials that could be 
        exploited for use in such a weapon that could be used 
        by a terrorist or a terrorist organization against the 
        United States.
  (b) Information Sharing Environment.--
          (1) Establishment.--The [President] Director of 
        National Intelligence shall--
                  (A) create an information sharing environment 
                for the sharing of terrorism information in a 
                manner consistent with national security and 
                with applicable legal standards relating to 
                privacy and civil liberties;
                  (B) designate the organizational and 
                management structures that will be used to 
                operate and manage the ISE; and
                  (C) determine and enforce the policies, 
                directives, and rules that will govern the 
                content and usage of the ISE.
          (2) Attributes.--The [President] Director of National 
        Intelligence shall, through the structures described in 
        subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (1), ensure that 
        the ISE provides and facilitates the means for sharing 
        terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, 
        State, local, and tribal entities, and the private 
        sector through the use of policy guidelines and 
        technologies. The [President] Director of National 
        Intelligence shall, to the greatest extent practicable, 
        ensure that the ISE provides the functional equivalent 
        of, or otherwise supports, a decentralized, 
        distributed, and coordinated environment that--
                  (A) connects existing systems, where 
                appropriate, provides no single points of 
                failure, and allows users to share information 
                among agencies, between levels of government, 
                and, as appropriate, with the private sector;
                  (B) ensures direct and continuous online 
                electronic access to information;
                  (C) facilitates the availability of 
                information in a form and manner that 
                facilitates its use in analysis, investigations 
                and operations;
                  (D) builds upon existing systems capabilities 
                currently in use across the Government;
                  (E) employs an information access management 
                approach that controls access to data rather 
                than just systems and networks, without 
                sacrificing security;
                  (F) facilitates the sharing of information at 
                and across all levels of security;
                  (G) provides directory services, or the 
                functional equivalent, for locating people and 
                information;
                  (H) incorporates protections for individuals' 
                privacy and civil liberties;
                  (I) incorporates strong mechanisms to enhance 
                accountability and facilitate oversight, 
                including audits, authentication, and access 
                controls;
                  (J) integrates the information within the 
                scope of the information sharing environment, 
                including any such information in legacy 
                technologies;
                  (K) integrates technologies, including all 
                legacy technologies, through Internet-based 
                services, consistent with appropriate security 
                protocols and safeguards, to enable 
                connectivity among required users at the 
                Federal, State, and local levels;
                  (L) allows the full range of analytic and 
                operational activities without the need to 
                centralize information within the scope of the 
                information sharing environment;
                  (M) permits analysts to collaborate both 
                independently and in a group (commonly known as 
                ``collective and noncollective 
                collaboration''), and across multiple levels of 
                national security information and controlled 
                unclassified information;
                  (N) provides a resolution process that 
                enables changes by authorized officials 
                regarding rules and policies for the access, 
                use, and retention of information within the 
                scope of the information sharing environment; 
                and
                  (O) incorporates continuous, real-time, and 
                immutable audit capabilities, to the maximum 
                extent practicable.
  (c) Preliminary Report.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the program manager shall, 
in consultation with the Information Sharing Council--
          (1) submit to the President and Congress a 
        description of the technological, legal, and policy 
        issues presented by the creation of the ISE, and the 
        way in which these issues will be addressed;
          (2) establish an initial capability to provide 
        electronic directory services, or the functional 
        equivalent, to assist in locating in the Federal 
        Government intelligence and terrorism information and 
        people with relevant knowledge about intelligence and 
        terrorism information; and
          (3) conduct a review of relevant current Federal 
        agency capabilities, databases, and systems for sharing 
        information.
  (d) Guidelines and Requirements.--As soon as possible, but in 
no event later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the President shall--
          (1) leverage all ongoing efforts consistent with 
        establishing the ISE and issue guidelines for 
        acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using information, 
        including guidelines to ensure that information is 
        provided in its most shareable form, such as by using 
        tearlines to separate out data from the sources and 
        methods by which the data are obtained;
          (2) in consultation with the Privacy and Civil 
        Liberties Oversight Board established under section 
        1061, issue guidelines that--
                  (A) protect privacy and civil liberties in 
                the development and use of the ISE; and
                  (B) shall be made public, unless 
                nondisclosure is clearly necessary to protect 
                national security; and
          (3) require the heads of Federal departments and 
        agencies to promote a culture of information sharing 
        by--
                  (A) reducing disincentives to information 
                sharing, including over-classification of 
                information and unnecessary requirements for 
                originator approval, consistent with applicable 
                laws and regulations; and
                  (B) providing affirmative incentives for 
                information sharing.
  (e) Implementation Plan Report.--Not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
shall, with the assistance of the program manager, submit to 
Congress a report containing an implementation plan for the 
ISE. The report shall include the following:
          (1) A description of the functions, capabilities, 
        resources, and conceptual design of the ISE, including 
        standards.
          (2) A description of the impact on enterprise 
        architectures of participating agencies.
          (3) A budget estimate that identifies the incremental 
        costs associated with designing, testing, integrating, 
        deploying, and operating the ISE.
          (4) A project plan for designing, testing, 
        integrating, deploying, and operating the ISE.
          (5) The policies and directives referred to in 
        subsection (b)(1)(C), as well as the metrics and 
        enforcement mechanisms that will be utilized.
          (6) Objective, systemwide performance measures to 
        enable the assessment of progress toward achieving the 
        full implementation of the ISE.
          (7) A description of the training requirements needed 
        to ensure that the ISE will be adequately implemented 
        and properly utilized.
          (8) A description of the means by which privacy and 
        civil liberties will be protected in the design and 
        operation of the ISE.
          (9) The recommendations of the program manager, in 
        consultation with the Information Sharing Council, 
        regarding whether, and under what conditions, the ISE 
        should be expanded to include other intelligence 
        information.
          (10) A delineation of the roles of the Federal 
        departments and agencies that will participate in the 
        ISE, including an identification of the agencies that 
        will deliver the infrastructure needed to operate and 
        manage the ISE (as distinct from individual department 
        or agency components that are part of the ISE), with 
        such delineation of roles to be consistent with--
                  (A) the authority of the Director of National 
                Intelligence under this title, and the 
                amendments made by this title, to set standards 
                for information sharing throughout the 
                intelligence community; and
                  (B) the authority of the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security and the Attorney General, and 
                the role of the Department of Homeland Security 
                and the Department of Justice, in coordinating 
                with State, local, and tribal officials and the 
                private sector.
          (11) The recommendations of the program manager, in 
        consultation with the Information Sharing Council, for 
        a future management structure for the ISE, including 
        whether the position of program manager should continue 
        to remain in existence.
  (f) Program Manager.--
          (1) Designation.--Not later than 120 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, with notification to 
        Congress, the President shall designate an individual 
        as the program manager responsible for information 
        sharing across the Federal Government. [The individual 
        designated as the program manager shall serve as 
        program manager until removed from service or replaced 
        by the President (at the President's sole discretion).] 
        Beginning on the date of the enactment of the Damon 
        Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019 and 2020, 
        each individual designated as the program manager shall 
        be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. 
        The program manager, in consultation with the head of 
        any affected department or agency, shall have and 
        exercise governmentwide authority over the sharing of 
        information within the scope of the information sharing 
        environment, including homeland security information, 
        terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction 
        information, by all Federal departments, agencies, and 
        components, irrespective of the Federal department, 
        agency, or component in which the program manager may 
        be administratively located, except as otherwise 
        expressly provided by law.
          (2) Duties and responsibilities.--
                  (A) In general.--The program manager shall, 
                in consultation with the Information Sharing 
                Council--
                          (i) plan for and oversee the 
                        implementation of, and manage, the ISE;
                          (ii) assist in the development of 
                        policies, as appropriate, to foster the 
                        development and proper operation of the 
                        ISE;
                          (iii) consistent with the direction 
                        and policies issued by the President, 
                        the Director of National Intelligence, 
                        and the Director of the Office of 
                        Management and Budget, issue 
                        governmentwide procedures, guidelines, 
                        instructions, and functional standards, 
                        as appropriate, for the management, 
                        development, and proper operation of 
                        the ISE;
                          (iv) identify and resolve information 
                        sharing disputes between Federal 
                        departments, agencies, and components; 
                        and
                          (v) assist, monitor, and assess the 
                        implementation of the ISE by Federal 
                        departments and agencies to ensure 
                        adequate progress, technological 
                        consistency and policy compliance; and 
                        regularly report the findings to 
                        Congress.
                  (B) Content of policies, procedures, 
                guidelines, rules, and standards.--The 
                policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and 
                standards under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall--
                          (i) take into account the varying 
                        missions and security requirements of 
                        agencies participating in the ISE;
                          (ii) address development, 
                        implementation, and oversight of 
                        technical standards and requirements;
                          (iii) take into account ongoing and 
                        planned efforts that support 
                        development, implementation and 
                        management of the ISE;
                          (iv) address and facilitate 
                        information sharing between and among 
                        departments and agencies of the 
                        intelligence community, the Department 
                        of Defense, the homeland security 
                        community and the law enforcement 
                        community;
                          (v) address and facilitate 
                        information sharing between Federal 
                        departments and agencies and State, 
                        tribal, and local governments;
                          (vi) address and facilitate, as 
                        appropriate, information sharing 
                        between Federal departments and 
                        agencies and the private sector;
                          (vii) address and facilitate, as 
                        appropriate, information sharing 
                        between Federal departments and 
                        agencies with foreign partners and 
                        allies; and
                          (viii) ensure the protection of 
                        privacy and civil liberties.
  (g) Information Sharing Council.--
          (1) Establishment.--There is established an 
        Information Sharing Council that shall assist the 
        President and the program manager in their duties under 
        this section. The Information Sharing Council shall 
        serve until removed from service or replaced by the 
        President (at the sole discretion of the President) 
        with a successor body.
          (2) Specific duties.--In assisting the President and 
        the program manager in their duties under this section, 
        the Information Sharing Council shall--
                  (A) advise the President and the program 
                manager in developing policies, procedures, 
                guidelines, roles, and standards necessary to 
                establish, implement, and maintain the ISE;
                  (B) work to ensure coordination among the 
                Federal departments and agencies participating 
                in the ISE in the establishment, 
                implementation, and maintenance of the ISE;
                  (C) identify and, as appropriate, recommend 
                the consolidation and elimination of current 
                programs, systems, and processes used by 
                Federal departments and agencies to share 
                information, and recommend, as appropriate, the 
                redirection of existing resources to support 
                the ISE;
                  (D) identify gaps, if any, between existing 
                technologies, programs and systems used by 
                Federal departments and agencies to share 
                information and the parameters of the proposed 
                information sharing environment;
                  (E) recommend solutions to address any gaps 
                identified under subparagraph (D);
                  (F) recommend means by which the ISE can be 
                extended to allow interchange of information 
                between Federal departments and agencies and 
                appropriate authorities of State and local 
                governments;
                  (G) assist the program manager in identifying 
                and resolving information sharing disputes 
                between Federal departments, agencies, and 
                components;
                  (H) identify appropriate personnel for 
                assignment to the program manager to support 
                staffing needs identified by the program 
                manager; and
                  (I) recommend whether or not, and by which 
                means, the ISE should be expanded so as to 
                allow future expansion encompassing other 
                relevant categories of information.
          (3) Consultation.--In performing its duties, the 
        Information Sharing Council shall consider input from 
        persons and entities outside the Federal Government 
        having significant experience and expertise in policy, 
        technical matters, and operational matters relating to 
        the ISE.
          (4) Inapplicability of federal advisory committee 
        act.--The Information Sharing Council (including any 
        subsidiary group of the Information Sharing Council) 
        shall not be subject to the requirements of the Federal 
        Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).
          (5) Detailees.--Upon a request by the Director of 
        National Intelligence, the departments and agencies 
        represented on the Information Sharing Council shall 
        detail to the program manager, on a reimbursable basis, 
        appropriate personnel identified under paragraph 
        (2)(H).
  (h) Performance Management Reports.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than two years after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than 
        June 30 of each year thereafter, the President shall 
        submit to Congress a report on the state of the ISE and 
        of information sharing across the Federal Government.
          (2) Content.--Each report under this subsection shall 
        include--
                  (A) a progress report on the extent to which 
                the ISE has been implemented, including how the 
                ISE has fared on the performance measures and 
                whether the performance goals set in the 
                preceding year have been met;
                  (B) objective system-wide performance goals 
                for the following year;
                  (C) an accounting of how much was spent on 
                the ISE in the preceding year;
                  (D) actions taken to ensure that procurement 
                of and investments in systems and technology 
                are consistent with the implementation plan for 
                the ISE;
                  (E) the extent to which all terrorism watch 
                lists are available for combined searching in 
                real time through the ISE and whether there are 
                consistent standards for placing individuals 
                on, and removing individuals from, the watch 
                lists, including the availability of processes 
                for correcting errors;
                  (F) the extent to which State, tribal, and 
                local officials are participating in the ISE;
                  (G) the extent to which private sector data, 
                including information from owners and operators 
                of critical infrastructure, is incorporated in 
                the ISE, and the extent to which individuals 
                and entities outside the government are 
                receiving information through the ISE;
                  (H) the measures taken by the Federal 
                government to ensure the accuracy of 
                information in the ISE, in particular the 
                accuracy of information about individuals;
                  (I) an assessment of the privacy and civil 
                liberties protections of the ISE, including 
                actions taken in the preceding year to 
                implement or enforce privacy and civil 
                liberties protections; and
                  (J) an assessment of the security protections 
                used in the ISE.
  (i) Agency Responsibilities.--The head of each department or 
agency that possesses or uses intelligence or terrorism 
information, operates a system in the ISE, or otherwise 
participates (or expects to participate) in the ISE shall--
          (1) ensure full department or agency compliance with 
        information sharing policies, procedures, guidelines, 
        rules, and standards established under subsections (b) 
        and (f);
          (2) ensure the provision of adequate resources for 
        systems and activities supporting operation of and 
        participation in the ISE;
          (3) ensure full department or agency cooperation in 
        the development of the ISE to implement governmentwide 
        information sharing; and
          (4) submit, at the request of the President or the 
        program manager, any reports on the implementation of 
        the requirements of the ISE within such department or 
        agency.
  (j) Report on the Information Sharing Environment.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of enactment of the Implementing Recommendations 
        of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the President shall 
        report to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
        Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Committee 
        on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, 
        and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
        the House of Representatives on the feasibility of--
                  (A) eliminating the use of any marking or 
                process (including ``Originator Control'') 
                intended to, or having the effect of, 
                restricting the sharing of information within 
                the scope of the information sharing 
                environment, including homeland security 
                information, terrorism information, and weapons 
                of mass destruction information, between and 
                among participants in the information sharing 
                environment, unless the President has--
                          (i) specifically exempted categories 
                        of information from such elimination; 
                        and
                          (ii) reported that exemption to the 
                        committees of Congress described in the 
                        matter preceding this subparagraph; and
                  (B) continuing to use Federal agency 
                standards in effect on such date of enactment 
                for the collection, sharing, and access to 
                information within the scope of the information 
                sharing environment, including homeland 
                security information, terrorism information, 
                and weapons of mass destruction information, 
                relating to citizens and lawful permanent 
                residents;
                  (C) replacing the standards described in 
                subparagraph (B) with a standard that would 
                allow mission-based or threat-based permission 
                to access or share information within the scope 
                of the information sharing environment, 
                including homeland security information, 
                terrorism information, and weapons of mass 
                destruction information, for a particular 
                purpose that the Federal Government, through an 
                appropriate process established in consultation 
                with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
                Board established under section 1061, has 
                determined to be lawfully permissible for a 
                particular agency, component, or employee 
                (commonly known as an ``authorized use'' 
                standard); and
                  (D) the use of anonymized data by Federal 
                departments, agencies, or components 
                collecting, possessing, disseminating, or 
                handling information within the scope of the 
                information sharing environment, including 
                homeland security information, terrorism 
                information, and weapons of mass destruction 
                information, in any cases in which--
                          (i) the use of such information is 
                        reasonably expected to produce results 
                        materially equivalent to the use of 
                        information that is transferred or 
                        stored in a non-anonymized form; and
                          (ii) such use is consistent with any 
                        mission of that department, agency, or 
                        component (including any mission under 
                        a Federal statute or directive of the 
                        President) that involves the storage, 
                        retention, sharing, or exchange of 
                        personally identifiable information.
          (2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term 
        ``anonymized data'' means data in which the individual 
        to whom the data pertains is not identifiable with 
        reasonable efforts, including information that has been 
        encrypted or hidden through the use of other 
        technology.
  (k) Additional Positions.--The program manager is authorized 
to hire not more than 40 full-time employees to assist the 
program manager in--
          (1) activities associated with the implementation of 
        the information sharing environment, including--
                  (A) implementing the requirements under 
                subsection (b)(2); and
                  (B) any additional implementation initiatives 
                to enhance and expedite the creation of the 
                information sharing environment; and
          (2) identifying and resolving information sharing 
        disputes between Federal departments, agencies, and 
        components under subsection (f)(2)(A)(iv).
  (l) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to 
be appropriated to carry out this section $30,000,000 for each 
of fiscal years 2008 and 2009.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1019. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO ANALYTIC 
                    INTEGRITY.

  (a) Assignment of Responsibilities.--For purposes of carrying 
out section 102A(h) of the National Security Act of 1947 (as 
added by section 1011(a)), the Director of National 
Intelligence shall, not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, assign an individual or entity to be 
responsible for ensuring that finished intelligence products 
produced by any element or elements of the intelligence 
community are timely, objective, independent of political 
considerations, based upon all sources of available 
intelligence, and employ the standards of proper analytic 
tradecraft.
  (b) Responsibilities.--(1) The individual or entity assigned 
responsibility under subsection (a)--
          (A) may be responsible for general oversight and 
        management of analysis and production, but may not be 
        directly responsible for, or involved in, the specific 
        production of any finished intelligence product;
          (B) shall perform, on a regular basis, detailed 
        reviews of finished intelligence product or other 
        analytic products by an element or elements of the 
        intelligence community covering a particular topic or 
        subject matter;
          (C) shall be responsible for identifying on an annual 
        basis functional or topical areas of analysis for 
        specific review under subparagraph (B); and
          (D) upon completion of any review under subparagraph 
        (B), may draft lessons learned, identify best 
        practices, or make recommendations for improvement to 
        the analytic tradecraft employed in the production of 
        the reviewed product or products.
  (2) Each review under paragraph (1)(B) should--
          (A) include whether the product or products concerned 
        were based on all sources of available intelligence, 
        properly describe the quality and reliability of 
        underlying sources, properly caveat and express 
        uncertainties or confidence in analytic judgments, 
        properly distinguish between underlying intelligence 
        and the assumptions and judgments of analysts, and 
        incorporate, where appropriate, alternative analyses; 
        and
          (B) ensure that the analytic methodologies, 
        tradecraft, and practices used by the element or 
        elements concerned in the production of the product or 
        products concerned meet the standards set forth in 
        subsection (a).
  (3) Information drafted under paragraph (1)(D) should, as 
appropriate, be included in analysis teaching modules and case 
studies for use throughout the intelligence community.
  (c) Annual [Reports] Briefings.--Not later than December 1 
each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall [submit 
to the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the 
relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the heads 
of analytic training departments a report containing] provide 
to the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the 
relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the heads 
of analytic training departments a briefing with a description, 
and the associated findings, of each review under subsection 
(b)(1)(B) during such year.
  (d) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' 
means--
          (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate; and
          (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
        the House of Representatives.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


     CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) ACT OF 1996

SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   TITLE I--STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE CASTRO 
GOVERNMENT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


[SEC. 108. REPORTS ON COMMERCE WITH, AND ASSISTANCE TO, CUBA FROM OTHER 
                    FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

  [(a) Reports Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and by January 1 of each year 
thereafter until the President submits a determination under 
section 203(c)(l), the President shall submit a report to the 
appropriate congressional committees on commerce with, and 
assistance to, Cuba from other foreign countries during the 
preceding 12-month period.
  [(b) Contents of Reports.--Each report required by subsection 
(a) shall, for the period covered by the report, contain the 
following, to the extent such information is available:
          [(1) A description of all bilateral assistance 
        provided to Cuba by other foreign countries, including 
        humanitarian assistance.
          [(2) A description of Cuba's commerce with foreign 
        countries, including an identification of Cuba's 
        trading partners and the extent of such trade.
          [(3) A description of the joint ventures completed, 
        or under consideration, by foreign nationals and 
        business firms involving facilities in Cuba, including 
        an identification of the location of the facilities 
        involved and a description of the terms of agreement of 
        the joint. ventures and the names of the parties that 
        are involved.
          [(4) A determination as to whether or not any of the 
        facilities described in paragraph (3) is the subject of 
        a claim against Cuba by a United States national.
          [(5) A determination of the amount of debt of the 
        Cuban Government that is owed to each foreign country, 
        including--
                  [(A) the amount of debt exchanged, forgiven, 
                or reduced under the terms of each investment 
                or operation in Cuba involving foreign 
                nationals; and
                  [(B) the amount of debt owed the foreign 
                country that has been exchanged, forgiven, or 
                reduced in return for a grant by the Cuban 
                Government of an equity interest in a property, 
                investment, or operation of the Cuban 
                Government or of a Cuban national.
          [(6) A description of the steps taken to assure that 
        raw materials and semifinished or finished goods 
        produced by facilities in Cuba involving foreign 
        nationals do not enter the United States market, either 
        directly or through third countries or parties.
          [(7) An identification of countries that purchase, or 
        have purchased, arms or military supplies from Cuba or 
        that otherwise have entered into agreements with Cuba 
        that have a military application, including--
                  [(A) a description of the military supplies, 
                equipment, or other material sold, bartered, or 
                exchanged between Cuba and such countries,
                  [(B) a listing of the goods, services, 
                credits, or other consideration received by 
                Cuba in exchange for military supplies, 
                equipment, or material, and
                  [(C) the terms or conditions of any such 
                agreement.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                     HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
                     TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS

Subtitle A--Information and Analysis; Access to Information

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 210D. INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT AND COORDINATION GROUP.

  (a) In General.--To improve the sharing of information within 
the scope of the information sharing environment established 
under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) with State, local, 
tribal, and private sector officials, the Director of National 
Intelligence, through the program manager for the information 
sharing environment, in coordination with the Secretary, shall 
coordinate and oversee the creation of an Interagency Threat 
Assessment and Coordination Group (referred to in this section 
as the ``ITACG'').
  (b) Composition of ITACG.--The ITACG shall consist of--
          (1) an ITACG Advisory Council to set policy and 
        develop processes for the integration, analysis, and 
        dissemination of federally-coordinated information 
        within the scope of the information sharing 
        environment, including homeland security information, 
        terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction 
        information; and
          (2) an ITACG Detail comprised of State, local, and 
        tribal homeland security and law enforcement officers 
        and intelligence analysts detailed to work in the 
        National Counterterrorism Center with Federal 
        intelligence analysts for the purpose of integrating, 
        analyzing, and assisting in the dissemination of 
        federally-coordinated information within the scope of 
        the information sharing environment, including homeland 
        security information, terrorism information, and 
        weapons of mass destruction information, through 
        appropriate channels identified by the ITACG Advisory 
        Council.
  [(c) Responsibilities of Program Manager.--The program 
manager shall--
          [(1) monitor and assess the efficacy of the ITACG;
          [(2) not later than 180 days after the date of the 
        enactment of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/
        11 Commission Act of 2007, and at least annually 
        thereafter, submit to the Secretary, the Attorney 
        General, the Director of National Intelligence, the 
        Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
        of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of 
        the House of Representatives a report on the progress 
        of the ITACG; and
          [(3) in each report required by paragraph (2) 
        submitted after the date of the enactment of the 
        Reducing Over-Classification Act, include an assessment 
        of whether the detailees under subsection (d)(5) have 
        appropriate access to all relevant information, as 
        required by subsection (g)(2)(C).]
  [(d)] (c) Responsibilities of Secretary.--The Secretary, or 
the Secretary's designee, in coordination with the Director of 
the National Counterterrorism Center and the ITACG Advisory 
Council, shall--
          (1) create policies and standards for the creation of 
        information products derived from information within 
        the scope of the information sharing environment, 
        including homeland security information, terrorism 
        information, and weapons of mass destruction 
        information, that are suitable for dissemination to 
        State, local, and tribal governments and the private 
        sector;
          (2) evaluate and develop processes for the timely 
        dissemination of federally-coordinated information 
        within the scope of the information sharing 
        environment, including homeland security information, 
        terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction 
        information, to State, local, and tribal governments 
        and the private sector;
          (3) establish criteria and a methodology for 
        indicating to State, local, and tribal governments and 
        the private sector the reliability of information 
        within the scope of the information sharing 
        environment, including homeland security information, 
        terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction 
        information, disseminated to them;
          (4) educate the intelligence community about the 
        requirements of the State, local, and tribal homeland 
        security, law enforcement, and other emergency response 
        providers regarding information within the scope of the 
        information sharing environment, including homeland 
        security information, terrorism information, and 
        weapons of mass destruction information;
          (5) establish and maintain the ITACG Detail, which 
        shall assign an appropriate number of State, local, and 
        tribal homeland security and law enforcement officers 
        and intelligence analysts to work in the National 
        Counterterrorism Center who shall--
                  (A) educate and advise National 
                Counterterrorism Center intelligence analysts 
                about the requirements of the State, local, and 
                tribal homeland security and law enforcement 
                officers, and other emergency response 
                providers regarding information within the 
                scope of the information sharing environment, 
                including homeland security information, 
                terrorism information, and weapons of mass 
                destruction information;
                  (B) assist National Counterterrorism Center 
                intelligence analysts in integrating, 
                analyzing, and otherwise preparing versions of 
                products derived from information within the 
                scope of the information sharing environment, 
                including homeland security information, 
                terrorism information, and weapons of mass 
                destruction information that are unclassified 
                or classified at the lowest possible level and 
                suitable for dissemination to State, local, and 
                tribal homeland security and law enforcement 
                agencies in order to help deter and prevent 
                terrorist attacks;
                  (C) implement, in coordination with National 
                Counterterrorism Center intelligence analysts, 
                the policies, processes, procedures, standards, 
                and guidelines developed by the ITACG Advisory 
                Council;
                  (D) assist in the dissemination of products 
                derived from information within the scope of 
                the information sharing environment, including 
                homeland security information, terrorism 
                information, and weapons of mass destruction 
                information, to State, local, and tribal 
                jurisdictions only through appropriate channels 
                identified by the ITACG Advisory Council;
                  (E) make recommendations, as appropriate, to 
                the Secretary or the Secretary's designee, for 
                the further dissemination of intelligence 
                products that could likely inform or improve 
                the security of a State, local, or tribal 
                government, (including a State, local, or 
                tribal law enforcement agency) or a private 
                sector entity; and
                  (F) report directly to the senior 
                intelligence official from the Department under 
                paragraph (6);
          (6) detail a senior intelligence official from the 
        Department of Homeland Security to the National 
        Counterterrorism Center, who shall--
                  (A) manage the day-to-day operations of the 
                ITACG Detail;
                  (B) report directly to the Director of the 
                National Counterterrorism Center or the 
                Director's designee; and
                  (C) in coordination with the Director of the 
                Federal Bureau of Investigation, and subject to 
                the approval of the Director of the National 
                Counterterrorism Center, select a deputy from 
                the pool of available detailees from the 
                Federal Bureau of Investigation in the National 
                Counterterrorism Center;
          (7) establish, within the ITACG Advisory Council, a 
        mechanism to select law enforcement officers and 
        intelligence analysts for placement in the National 
        Counterterrorism Center consistent with paragraph (5), 
        using criteria developed by the ITACG Advisory Council 
        that shall encourage participation from a broadly 
        representative group of State, local, and tribal 
        homeland security and law enforcement agencies; and
          (8) compile an annual assessment of the ITACG 
        Detail's performance, including summaries of customer 
        feedback, in preparing, disseminating, and requesting 
        the dissemination of intelligence products intended for 
        State, local and tribal government (including State, 
        local, and tribal law enforcement agencies) and private 
        sector entities[; and].
          [(9) provide the assessment developed pursuant to 
        paragraph (8) to the program manager for use in the 
        annual reports required by subsection (c)(2).]
  [(e)] (d) Membership.--The Secretary, or the Secretary's 
designee, shall serve as the chair of the ITACG Advisory 
Council, which shall include--
          (1) representatives of--
                  (A) the Department;
                  (B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
                  (C) the National Counterterrorism Center;
                  (D) the Department of Defense;
                  (E) the Department of Energy;
                  (F) the Department of State; and
                  (G) other Federal entities as appropriate;
          (2) the program manager of the information sharing 
        environment, designated under section 1016(f) of the 
        Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
        2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f)), or the program manager's 
        designee; and
          (3) executive level law enforcement and intelligence 
        officials from State, local, and tribal governments.
  [(f)] (e) Criteria.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and 
the program manager of the information sharing environment 
established under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), shall--
          (1) establish procedures for selecting members of the 
        ITACG Advisory Council and for the proper handling and 
        safeguarding of products derived from information 
        within the scope of the information sharing 
        environment, including homeland security information, 
        terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction 
        information, by those members; and
          (2) ensure that at least 50 percent of the members of 
        the ITACG Advisory Council are from State, local, and 
        tribal governments.
  [(g)] (f) Operations.--
          (1) In general.--Beginning not later than 90 days 
        after the date of enactment of the Implementing 
        Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the 
        ITACG Advisory Council shall meet regularly, but not 
        less than quarterly, at the facilities of the National 
        Counterterrorism Center of the Office of the Director 
        of National Intelligence.
          (2) Management.--Pursuant to section 119(f)(E) of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o(f)(E)), 
        the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, 
        acting through the senior intelligence official from 
        the Department of Homeland Security detailed pursuant 
        to subsection (d)(6), shall ensure that--
                  (A) the products derived from information 
                within the scope of the information sharing 
                environment, including homeland security 
                information, terrorism information, and weapons 
                of mass destruction information, prepared by 
                the National Counterterrorism Center and the 
                ITACG Detail for distribution to State, local, 
                and tribal homeland security and law 
                enforcement agencies reflect the requirements 
                of such agencies and are produced consistently 
                with the policies, processes, procedures, 
                standards, and guidelines established by the 
                ITACG Advisory Council;
                  (B) in consultation with the ITACG Advisory 
                Council and consistent with sections 
                102A(f)(1)(B)(iii) and 119(f)(E) of the 
                National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et 
                seq.), all products described in subparagraph 
                (A) are disseminated through existing channels 
                of the Department and the Department of Justice 
                and other appropriate channels to State, local, 
                and tribal government officials and other 
                entities;
                  (C) all detailees under subsection (d)(5) 
                have appropriate access to all relevant 
                information within the scope of the information 
                sharing environment, including homeland 
                security information, terrorism information, 
                and weapons of mass destruction information, 
                available at the National Counterterrorism 
                Center in order to accomplish the objectives 
                under that paragraph;
                  (D) all detailees under subsection (d)(5) 
                have the appropriate security clearances and 
                are trained in the procedures for handling, 
                processing, storing, and disseminating 
                classified products derived from information 
                within the scope of the information sharing 
                environment, including homeland security 
                information, terrorism information, and weapons 
                of mass destruction information; and
                  (E) all detailees under subsection (d)(5) 
                complete appropriate privacy and civil 
                liberties training.
  [(h)] (g) Inapplicability of the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall 
not apply to the ITACG or any subsidiary groups thereof.
  [(i)] (h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for 
each of fiscal years 2008 through 2012 to carry out this 
section, including to obtain security clearances for the State, 
local, and tribal participants in the ITACG.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


               CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
  TITLE II--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY 
SYSTEM

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    Part C--Computation of Annuities

SEC. 221. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES.

  (a) Annuity of Participant.--
          (1) Computation of annuity.--The annuity of a 
        participant is the product of--
                  (A) the participant's high-3 average pay (as 
                defined in paragraph (4)); and
                  (B) the number of years, not exceeding 35, of 
                service credit (determined in accordance with 
                sections 251 and 252) multiplied by 2 percent.
          (2) Credit for unused sick leave.--The total service 
        of a participant who retires on an immediate annuity 
        (except under section 231) or who dies leaving a 
        survivor or survivors entitled to an annuity shall 
        include (without regard to the 35-year limitation 
        prescribed in paragraph (1)) the days of unused sick 
        leave to the credit of the participant. Days of unused 
        sick leave may not be counted in determining average 
        basic pay or eligibility for an annuity under this 
        title. A deposit shall not be required for days of 
        unused sick leave credited under this paragraph.
          (3) Crediting of part-time service.--
                  (A) In general.--In the case of a participant 
                whose service includes service on a part-time 
                basis performed after April 6, 1986, the 
                participant's annuity shall be the sum of the 
                amounts determined under subparagraphs (B) and 
                (C).
                  (B) Computation of pre-april 7, 1986, 
                annuity.--The portion of an annuity referred to 
                in subparagraph (A) with respect to service 
                before April 7, 1986, shall be the amount 
                computed under paragraph (1) using the 
                participant's length of service before that 
                date (increased by the unused sick leave to the 
                credit of the participant at the time of 
                retirement) and the participant's high-3 
                average pay[.], as determined by using the 
                annual rate of basic pay that would be payable 
                for full-time service in that position.
                  (C) Computation of post-april 6, 1986, 
                annuity.--The portion of an annuity referred to 
                in subparagraph (A) with respect to service 
                after April 6, 1986, shall be the product of--
                          (i) the amount computed under 
                        paragraph (1), using the participant's 
                        length of service after that date and 
                        the participant's high-3 average pay, 
                        as determined by using the annual rate 
                        of basic pay that would be payable for 
                        full-time service; and
                          (ii) the ratio which the 
                        participant's actual service after 
                        April 6, 1986 (as determined by 
                        prorating the participant's total 
                        service after that date to reflect the 
                        service that was performed on a part-
                        time basis) bears to the total service 
                        after that date that would be 
                        creditable for the participant if all 
                        the service had been performed on a 
                        full-time basis.
                  (D) Treatment of employment on temporary or 
                intermittent basis.--Employment on a temporary 
                or intermittent basis shall not be considered 
                to be service on a part-time basis for purposes 
                of this paragraph.
          (4) High-3 average pay defined.--For purposes of this 
        subsection, a participant's high-3 average pay is the 
        amount of the participant's average basic pay for the 
        highest 3 consecutive years of the participant's 
        service for which full contributions have been made to 
        the fund.
          (5) Computation of service.--In determining the 
        aggregate period of service upon which an annuity is to 
        be based, any fractional part of a month shall not be 
        counted.
  (b) Spouse or Former Spouse Survivor Annuity.--
          (1) Reduction in participant's annuity to provide 
        spouse or former spouse survivor annuity.--
                  (A) General rule.--Except to the extent 
                provided otherwise under a written election 
                under subparagraph (B) or (C), if at the time 
                of retirement a participant or former 
                participant is married (or has a former spouse 
                who has not remarried before attaining age 55), 
                the participant shall receive a reduced annuity 
                and provide a survivor annuity for the 
                participant's spouse under this subsection or 
                former spouse under section 222(b), or a 
                combination of such annuities, as the case may 
                be.
                  (B) Joint election for waiver or reduction of 
                spouse survivor annuity.--A married participant 
                or former participant and the participant's 
                spouse may jointly elect in writing at the time 
                of retirement to waive a survivor annuity for 
                that spouse under this section or to reduce 
                such survivor annuity under this section by 
                designating a portion of the annuity of the 
                participant as the base for the survivor 
                annuity. If the marriage is dissolved following 
                an election for such a reduced annuity and the 
                spouse qualifies as a former spouse, the base 
                used in calculating any annuity of the former 
                spouse under section 222(b) may not exceed the 
                portion of the participant's annuity designated 
                under this subparagraph.
                  (C) Joint election of participant and former 
                spouse.--If a participant or former participant 
                has a former spouse, such participant and the 
                participant's former spouse may jointly elect 
                by spousal agreement under section 264(b) to 
                waive, reduce, or increase a survivor annuity 
                under section 222(b) for that former spouse. 
                Any such election must be made (i) before the 
                end of the [12-month] 2-year period beginning 
                on the date on which the divorce or annulment 
                involving that former spouse becomes final, or 
                (ii) at the time of retirement of the 
                participant, whichever is later.
                  (D) Unilateral elections in absence of spouse 
                or former spouse.--The Director may prescribe 
                regulations under which a participant or former 
                participant may make an election under 
                subparagraph (B) or (C) without the 
                participant's spouse or former spouse if the 
                participant establishes to the satisfaction of 
                the Director that the participant does not 
                know, and has taken all reasonable steps to 
                determine, the whereabouts of the spouse or 
                former spouse.
          (2) Amount of reduction in participant's annuity.--
        The annuity of a participant or former participant 
        providing a survivor annuity under this section (or 
        section 222(b)), excluding any portion of the annuity 
        not designated or committed as a base for any survivor 
        annuity, shall be reduced by 2\1/2\ percent of the 
        first $3,600 plus 10 percent of any amount over $3,600. 
        The reduction under this paragraph shall be calculated 
        before any reduction under section 222(a)(5).
          (3) Amount of surviving spouse annuity.--
                  (A) In general.--If a retired participant 
                receiving a reduced annuity under this 
                subsection dies and is survived by a spouse, a 
                survivor annuity shall be paid to the surviving 
                spouse. The amount of the annuity shall be 
                equal to 55 percent of (i) the full amount of 
                the participant's annuity computed under 
                subsection (a), or (ii) any lesser amount 
                elected as the base for the survivor annuity 
                under paragraph (1)(B).
                  (B) Limitation.--Notwithstanding subparagraph 
                (A), the amount of the annuity calculated under 
                subparagraph (A) for a surviving spouse in any 
                case in which there is also a surviving former 
                spouse of the retired participant who qualifies 
                for an annuity under section 222(b) may not 
                exceed 55 percent of the portion (if any) of 
                the base for survivor annuities which remains 
                available under section 222(b)(4)(B).
                  (C) Effective date and termination of 
                annuity.--An annuity payable from the fund to a 
                surviving spouse under this paragraph shall 
                commence on the day after the retired 
                participant dies and shall terminate on the 
                last day of the month before the surviving 
                spouse's death or remarriage before attaining 
                age 55. If such survivor annuity is terminated 
                because of remarriage, it shall be restored at 
                the same rate commencing on the date such 
                remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or 
                divorce if any lump sum paid upon termination 
                of the annuity is returned to the fund.
  (c)  18-Month Open Period After Retirement To Provide Spouse 
Coverage.--
          (1) Survivor annuity elections.--
                  (A) Election when spouse coverage waived at 
                time of retirement.--A participant or former 
                participant who retires after March 31, 1992 
                and who--
                          (i) is married at the time of 
                        retirement; and
                          (ii) elects at that time (in 
                        accordance with subsection (b)) to 
                        waive a survivor annuity for the 
                        spouse,
                may, during the 18-month period beginning on 
                the date of the retirement of the participant, 
                elect to have a reduction under subsection (b) 
                made in the annuity of the participant (or in 
                such portion thereof as the participant may 
                designate) in order to provide a survivor 
                annuity for the participant's spouse.
                  (B) Election when reduced spouse annuity 
                elected.--A participant or former participant 
                who retires after March 31, 1992, and--
                          (i) who, at the time of retirement, 
                        is married, and
                          (ii) who, at that time designates (in 
                        accordance with subsection (b)) that a 
                        portion of the annuity of such 
                        participant is to be used as the base 
                        for a survivor annuity,
                may, during the 18-month period beginning on 
                the date of the retirement of such participant, 
                elect to have a greater portion of the annuity 
                of such participant so used.
          (2) Deposit required.--
                  (A) Requirement.--An election under paragraph 
                (1) shall not be effective unless the amount 
                specified in subparagraph (B) is deposited into 
                the fund before the end of that 18-month 
                period.
                  (B) Amount of deposit.--The amount to be 
                deposited with respect to an election under 
                this subsection is the amount equal to the sum 
                of the following:
                          (i) Additional cost to system.--The 
                        additional cost to the system that is 
                        associated with providing a survivor 
                        annuity under subsection (b) and that 
                        results from such election, taking into 
                        account--
                                  (I) the difference (for the 
                                period between the date on 
                                which the annuity of the 
                                participant or former 
                                participant commences and the 
                                date of the election) between 
                                the amount paid to such 
                                participant or former 
                                participant under this title 
                                and the amount which would have 
                                been paid if such election had 
                                been made at the time the 
                                participant or former 
                                participant applied for the 
                                annuity; and
                                  (II) the costs associated 
                                with providing for the later 
                                election.
                          (ii) Interest.--Interest on the 
                        additional cost determined under clause 
                        (i), computed using the interest rate 
                        specified or determined under section 
                        8334(e) of title 5, United States Code, 
                        for the calendar year in which the 
                        amount to be deposited is determined.
          (3) Voiding of previous elections.--An election by a 
        participant or former participant under this subsection 
        voids prospectively any election previously made in the 
        case of such participant under subsection (b).
          (4) Reductions in annuity.--An annuity that is 
        reduced in connection with an election under this 
        subsection shall be reduced by the same percentage 
        reductions as were in effect at the time of the 
        retirement of the participant or former participant 
        whose annuity is so reduced.
          (5) Rights and obligations resulting from reduced 
        annuity election.--Rights and obligations resulting 
        from the election of a reduced annuity under this 
        subsection shall be the same as the rights and 
        obligations that would have resulted had the 
        participant involved elected such annuity at the time 
        of retirement.
  (d) Annuities for Surviving Children.--
          (1) Participants dying before april 1, 1992.--In the 
        case of a retired participant who died before April 1, 
        1992, and who is survived by a child or children--
                  (A) if the retired participant was survived 
                by a spouse, there shall be paid from the fund 
                to or on behalf of each such surviving child an 
                annuity determined under paragraph (3)(A); and
                  (B) if the retired participant was not 
                survived by a spouse, there shall be paid from 
                the fund to or on behalf of each such surviving 
                child an annuity determined under paragraph 
                (3)(B).
          (2) Participants dying on or after april 1, 1992.--In 
        the case of a retired participant who dies on or after 
        April 1, 1992, and who is survived by a child or 
        children--
                  (A) if the retired participant is survived by 
                a spouse or former spouse who is the natural or 
                adoptive parent of a surviving child of the 
                participant, there shall be paid from the fund 
                to or on behalf of each such surviving child an 
                annuity determined under paragraph (3)(A); and
                  (B) if the retired participant is not 
                survived by a spouse or former spouse who is 
                the natural or adoptive parent of a surviving 
                child of the participant, there shall be paid 
                to or on behalf of each such surviving child an 
                annuity determined under paragraph (3)(B).
          (3) Amount of annuity.--
                  (A) The annual amount of an annuity for the 
                surviving child of a participant covered by 
                paragraph (1)(A) or (2)(A) of this subsection 
                (or covered by paragraph (1)(A) or (2)(A) of 
                section 232(c)) is the smallest of the 
                following:
                          (i) 60 percent of the participant's 
                        high-3 average pay, as determined under 
                        subsection (a)(4), divided by the 
                        number of children.
                          (ii) $900, as adjusted under section 
                        291.
                          (iii) $2,700, as adjusted under 
                        section 291, divided by the number of 
                        children.
                  (B) The amount of an annuity for the 
                surviving child of a participant covered by 
                paragraph (1)(B) or (2)(B) of this subsection 
                (or covered by paragraph (1)(B) or (2)(B) of 
                section 232(c)) is the smallest of the 
                following:
                          (i) 75 percent of the participant's 
                        high-3 average pay, as determined under 
                        subsection (a)(4), divided by the 
                        number of children.
                          (ii) $1,080, as adjusted under 
                        section 291.
                          (iii) $3,240, as adjusted under 
                        section 291, divided by the number of 
                        children.
          (4) Recomputation of child annuities.--
                  (A) In the case of a child annuity payable 
                under paragraph (1), upon the death of a 
                surviving spouse or the termination of the 
                annuity of a child, the annuities of any 
                remaining children shall be recomputed and paid 
                as though the spouse or child had not survived 
                the retired participant.
                  (B) In the case of a child annuity payable 
                under paragraph (2), upon the death of a 
                surviving spouse or former spouse or 
                termination of the annuity of a child, the 
                annuities of any remaining children shall be 
                recomputed and paid as though the spouse, 
                former spouse, or child had not survived the 
                retired participant. If the annuity of a 
                surviving child who has not been receiving an 
                annuity is initiated or resumed, the annuities 
                of any other children shall be recomputed and 
                paid from that date as though the annuities of 
                all currently eligible children were then being 
                initiated.
          (5) Definition of former spouse.--For purposes of 
        this subsection, the term ``former spouse'' includes 
        any former wife or husband of the retired participant, 
        regardless of the length of marriage or the amount of 
        creditable service completed by the participant.
  (e) Commencement and Termination of Child Annuities.--
          (1) Commencement.--An annuity payable to a child 
        under subsection (d), or under section 232(c), shall 
        begin on the day after the date on which the 
        participant or retired participant dies or, in the case 
        of an individual over the age of 18 who is not a child 
        within the meaning of section 102(b), shall begin or 
        resume on the first day of the month in which the 
        individual later becomes or again becomes a student as 
        described in section 102(b). Such annuity may not 
        commence until any lump-sum that has been paid is 
        returned to the fund.
          (2) Termination.--Such an annuity shall terminate on 
        the last day of the month before the month in which the 
        recipient of the annuity dies or no longer qualifies as 
        a child (as defined in section 102(b)).
  (f) Participants Not Married at Time of Retirement.--
          (1) Designation of persons with insurable interest.--
                  (A) Authority to make designation.--Subject 
                to the rights of former spouses under sections 
                221(b) and 222, at the time of retirement an 
                unmarried participant found by the Director to 
                be in good health may elect to receive an 
                annuity reduced in accordance with subparagraph 
                (B) and designate in writing an individual 
                having an insurable interest in the participant 
                to receive an annuity under the system after 
                the participant's death. The amount of such an 
                annuity shall be equal to 55 percent of the 
                participant's reduced annuity.
                  (B) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The 
                annuity payable to the participant making such 
                election shall be reduced by 10 percent of an 
                annuity computed under subsection (a) and by an 
                additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the 
                designated individual is younger than the 
                participant. The total reduction under this 
                subparagraph may not exceed 40 percent.
                  (C) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The 
                annuity payable to the designated individual 
                shall begin on the day after the retired 
                participant dies and terminate on the last day 
                of the month before the designated individual 
                dies.
                  (D) Recomputation of participant's annuity on 
                death of designated individual.--An annuity 
                which is reduced under this paragraph shall, 
                effective the first day of the month following 
                the death of the designated individual, be 
                recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not 
                been so reduced.
          (2) Election of survivor annuity upon subsequent 
        marriage.--A participant who is unmarried at the time 
        of retirement and who later marries may irrevocably 
        elect, in a signed writing received by the Director 
        within [one year] two years after the marriage, to 
        receive a reduced annuity as provided in section 
        221(b). Such election and reduction shall be effective 
        on the first day of the month beginning 9 months after 
        the date of marriage. The election voids prospectively 
        any election previously made under paragraph (1).
  (g) Effect of Divorce After Retirement.--
          (1) Recomputation of retired participant's annuity 
        upon divorce.--An annuity which is reduced under this 
        section (or any similar prior provision of law) to 
        provide a survivor annuity for a spouse shall, if the 
        marriage of the retired participant to such spouse is 
        dissolved, be recomputed and paid for each full month 
        during which a retired participant is not married (or 
        is remarried, if there is no election in effect under 
        paragraph (2)) as if the annuity had not been so 
        reduced, subject to any reduction required to provide a 
        survivor annuity under subsection (b) or (c) of section 
        222 or under section 226.
          (2) Election of survivor annuity upon subsequent 
        remarriage.--
                  (A) In general.--Upon remarriage, the retired 
                participant may irrevocably elect, by means of 
                a signed writing received by the Director 
                within [one year] two years after such 
                remarriage, to receive a reduced annuity for 
                the purpose of providing an annuity for the new 
                spouse of the retired participant in the event 
                such spouse survives the retired participant. 
                Such reduction shall be equal to the reduction 
                in effect immediately before the dissolution of 
                the previous marriage (unless such reduction is 
                adjusted under section 222(b)(5) or elected 
                under subparagraph (B)).
                  (B) When annuity previously not (or not 
                fully) reduced.--
                          (i) Election.--If the retired 
                        participant's annuity was not reduced 
                        (or was not fully reduced) to provide a 
                        survivor annuity for the participant's 
                        spouse or former spouse as of the time 
                        of retirement, the retired participant 
                        may make an election under the first 
                        sentence of subparagraph (A) upon 
                        remarriage to a spouse other than the 
                        spouse at the time of retirement. For 
                        any remarriage that occurred before 
                        August 14, 1991, the retired 
                        participant may make such an election 
                        within 2 years after such date.
                          (ii) Deposit required.--
                                  (I) The retired participant 
                                shall, within [one year] two 
                                years after the date of the 
                                remarriage (or by August 14, 
                                1993 for any remarriage that 
                                occurred before August 14, 
                                1991), deposit in the fund an 
                                amount determined by the 
                                Director, as nearly as may be 
                                administratively feasible, to 
                                reflect the amount by which the 
                                retired participant's annuity 
                                would have been reduced if the 
                                election had been in effect 
                                since the date the annuity 
                                commenced, plus interest.
                                  (II) The annual rate of 
                                interest for each year during 
                                which the retired participant's 
                                annuity would have been reduced 
                                if the election had been in 
                                effect since the date the 
                                annuity commenced shall be 6 
                                percent.
                                  (III) If the retired 
                                participant does not make the 
                                deposit, the Director shall 
                                collect such amount by offset 
                                against the participant's 
                                annuity, up to a maximum of 25 
                                percent of the net annuity 
                                otherwise payable to the 
                                retired participant, and the 
                                retired participant is deemed 
                                to consent to such offset.
                                  (IV) The deposit required by 
                                this subparagraph may be made 
                                by the surviving spouse of the 
                                retired participant.
                  (C) Effects of election.--An election under 
                this paragraph and the reduction in the 
                participant's annuity shall be effective on the 
                first day of the month beginning 9 months after 
                the date of remarriage. A survivor annuity 
                elected under this paragraph shall be treated 
                in all respects as a survivor annuity under 
                subsection (b).
  (h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor 
Annuity by Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
          (1)  authority to make designation.--Subject to the 
        rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and 
        section 222, at the time of retirement a married 
        participant found by the Director to be in good health 
        may elect to receive an annuity reduced in accordance 
        with subsection (f)(1)(B) and designate in writing an 
        individual having an insurable interest in the 
        participant to receive an annuity under the system 
        after the participant's death, except that any such