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                                                 House Calendar No. 60
116th Congress    }                                      {      Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session      }                                      {     116-335
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     
                                     


 
                                     

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                         HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
                       COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                   on

              THE TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]









 December 11, 2019.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed






















                                                 House Calendar No. 60
116th Congress    }                                      {      Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session      }                                      {     116-335
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     


                                     

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                         HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT

                       COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                   on

              THE TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS










              [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]










 December 11, 2019.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed
                                _______

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                      
38-600                     WASHINGTON : 2019 
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
            HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                   Rep. ADAM B. SCHIFF (CA), Chairman
Rep. JIM HIMES (CT)                  Rep. DEVIN NUNES (CA), Ranking 
Rep. TERRI SEWELL (AL)                   Member
Rep. ANDRE CARSON (IN)               Rep. MIKE CONAWAY (TX)
Rep. JACKIE SPEIER (CA)              Rep. MICHAEL TURNER (OH)
Rep. MIKE QUIGLEY (IL)               Rep. BRAD WENSTRUP (OH)
Rep. ERIC SWALWELL (CA)              Rep. CHRIS STEWART (UT)
Rep. JOAQUIN CASTRO (TX)             Rep. ELISE STEFANIK (NY)
Rep. DENNY HECK (WA)                 Rep. WILL HURD (TX)
Rep. PETER WELCH (VT)                Rep. JOHN RATCLIFFE (TX)
Rep. SEAN PATRICK MALONEY (NY)       Rep. JIM JORDAN (OH)
Rep. VAL DEMINGS (FL)
Rep. RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHI (IL)

                                 ------                                

                             Majority Staff

                  Timothy S. Bergreen, Staff Director
             Daniel S. Goldman, Director of Investigations
                      Maher Bitar, General Counsel
          Rheanne Wirkkala, Deputy Director of Investigations
               Patrick M. Boland, Communications Director
               
                                 ------                                

                Impeachment Inquiry Investigative Staff

William M. Evans                     Daniel S. Noble
Patrick Fallon                       Diana Y. Pilipenko
Sean A. Misko                        Ariana N. Rowberry
Nicolas A. Mitchell
                 Carly A. Blake, Deputy Staff Director
                 William Wu, Budget and Policy Director
                Wells C. Bennett, Deputy General Counsel
                
                                 ------                                

                            Oversight Staff

Linda D. Cohen                       Lucian D. Sikorskyj
Thomas Eager                         Conrad Stosz
Abigail C. Grace                     Kathy L. Suber
Kelsey M. Lax                        Aaron A. Thurman
Amanda A. Rogers Thorpe              Raffaela L. Wakeman

         Non-Partisan Security and Information Technology Staff

Kristin Jepson                       Claudio Grajeda 
Kimberlee Kerr                         
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM

                Rep. CAROLYN B. MALONEY (NY), Chairwoman
                 Rep. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS (MD), Chairman
Rep. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON (DC)      Rep. JIM JORDAN (OH),
Rep. WM. LACY CLAY (MO)                Ranking Member
Rep. STEPHEN LYNCH (MA)              Rep. PAUL GOSAR (AZ)
Rep. JIM COOPER (TN)                 Rep. THOMAS MASSIE (KY)
Rep. GERALD E. CONNOLLY (VA)         Rep. VIRGINIA FOXX (NC)
Rep. RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHI (IL)        Rep. MARK MEADOWS (NC)
Rep. JAMIE RASKIN (MD)               Rep. JODY HICE (GA)
Rep. HARLEY ROUDA (CA)               Rep. GLENN GROTHMAN (WI)
Rep. DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ (FL)   Rep. JAMES COMER (KY)
Rep. JOHN SARBANES (MD)              Rep. MICHAEL CLOUD (TX)
Rep. PETER WELCH (VT)                Rep. BOB GIBBS (OH)
Rep. JACKIE SPEIER (CA)              Rep. CLAY HIGGINS (LA)
Rep. ROBIN KELLY (IL)                Rep. RALPH NORMAN (SC)
Rep. MARK DESAULNIER (CA)            Rep. CHIP ROY (TX)
Rep. BRENDA LAWRENCE (MI)            Rep. CAROL MILLER (WV)
Rep. STACEY PLASKETT (VI)            Rep. MARK GREEN (TN)
Rep. RO KHANNA (CA)                  Rep. KELLY ARMSTRONG (ND)
Rep. JIMMY GOMEZ (CA)                Rep. GREG STEUBE (FL)
Rep. ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ (NY)   Rep. FRED KELLER (PA)
Rep. AYANNA PRESSLEY (MA)
Rep. RASHIDA TLAIB (MI)

                             Majority Staff

                      Dave Rapallo, Staff Director
     Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Deputy Staff Director & Chief Counsel
                Peter Kenny, Chief Investigative Counsel
                    Krista A. Boyd, General Counsel
             Janet H. Kim, Chief Counsel for Investigations
                Russell Anello, Chief Oversight Counsel
                Aryele Bradford, Communications Director

                          Investigative Staff

S. Tori Anderson                     Gina Kim
Aaron D. Blacksberg                  Jason Powell
Chioma Chukwu                        Dan Rebnord
Cassie Fields                        Ricardo Brandon Rios
Greta Gao                            Erinn L. Sauer, Detailee
Michael Gordon                       Amish A. Shah
Jessica L. Heller                    Laura Waters

                       Operations and Press Team

Zachary Barger, Intern               Elisa LaNier
Jamitress Bowden                     Kellie Larkin
Kristen Charley, Intern              Olivia Letts, Intern
Kenyatta Collins                     Anna Rose Marx, Inter
James Darlson, Intern                Courtney Miller
Emma Dulaney                         Noah Steimel, Intern
Evan Elizabeth Freeman, Intern       Travis Stoller, Intern
Christopher Godshall, Intern         Amy Stratton
Trinity Goss                         Laura Trevisani, Intern
Brandon Jacobs                       Joshua Zucker 









                   HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   Rep. ELIOT L. ENGEL (NY), Chairman
Rep. BRAD SHERMAN (CA)               Rep. MICHAEL MCCAUL (TX),
Rep. GREGORY MEEKS (NY)                Ranking Member
Rep. ALBIO SIRES (NJ)                Rep. CHRISTOPHER SMITH (NJ)
Rep. GERALD E. CONNOLLY (VA)         Rep. STEVE CHABOT (OH)
Rep. THEODORE DEUTCH (FL)            Rep. JOE WILSON (SC)
Rep. KAREN BASS (CA)                 Rep. SCOTT PERRY (PA)
Rep. WILLIAM KEATING (MA)            Rep. TED YOHO (FL)
Rep. DAVID CICILLINE (RI)            Rep. ADAM KINZINGER (IL)
Rep. AMI BERA (CA)                   Rep. LEE ZELDIN (NY)
Rep. JOAQUIN CASTRO (TX)             Rep. JAMES SENSENBRENNER (WI)
Rep. DINA TITUS (NV)                 Rep. ANN WAGNER (MO)
Rep. ADRIANO ESPAILLAT (NY)          Rep. BRIAN MAST (FL)
Rep. TED LIEU (CA)                   Rep. FRANCIS ROONEY (FL)
Rep. SUSAN WILD (PA)                 Rep. BRIAN FITZPATRICK (PA)
Rep. DEAN PHILLIPS (MN)              Rep. JOHN CURTIS (UT)
Rep. ILHAN OMAR (MN)                 Rep. KEN BUCK (CO)
Rep. COLIN ALLRED (TX)               Rep. RON WRIGHT (TX)
Rep. ANDY LEVIN (MI)                 Rep. GUY RESCHENTHALER (PA)
Rep. ABIGAIL SPANBERGER (VA)         Rep. TIM BURCHETT (TN)
Rep. CHRISSY HOULAHAN (PA)           Rep. GREG PENCE (IN)
Rep. TOM MALINOWSKI (NJ)             Rep. STEVE WATKINS (KS)
Rep. DAVID TRONE (MD)                Rep. MICHAEL GUEST (MS)
Rep. JIM COSTA (CA)
Rep. JUAN VARGAS (CA)
Rep. VICENTE GONZALEZ (CA)

                             Majority Staff

                    Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
                  Doug Campbell, Deputy Staff Director
                    Janice Kaguyutan, Chief Counsel
    Laura Carey, Senior Professional Staff Member, State Department 
                               Oversight
                  Tim Mulvey, Communications Director
 Jacqueline Ramos, Senior Professional Staff Member, Europe and Russia

                       Operations and Press Staff

Evan Bursey                          Rachel Levitan
Jacqueline Colvett














                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                 Washington, DC, December 11, 2019.
Hon. Cheryl L. Johnson,
Clerk, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mrs. Johnson: I present herewith an unclassified 
report entitled, ``The Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Inquiry 
Report''.
            Sincerely,
                                            Adam B. Schiff,
                                                          Chairman. 
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
PREFACE..........................................................    IX
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................     1
KEY FINDINGS OF FACT.............................................    22
SECTION I. THE PRESIDENT'S MISCONDUCT............................    25
    1. The President Forced Out the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine...    25
    2. The President Put Giuliani and the Three Amigos in Charge 
      of Ukraine Issues..........................................    38
    3. The President Froze Military Assistance to Ukraine........    54
    4. The President's Meeting with the Ukrainian President Was 
      Conditioned on an Announcement of Investigations...........    70
    5. The President Asked the Ukrainian President to Interfere 
      in the 2020 U.S. Election by Investigating the Bidens and 
      2016 Election Interference.................................    85
    6. The President Wanted Ukraine to Announce the 
      Investigations Publicly....................................   101
    7. The President's Conditioning of Military Assistance and a 
      White House Meeting on Announcement of Investigations 
      Raised Alarm...............................................   111
    8. The President's Scheme Was Exposed........................   125
SECTION II. THE PRESIDENT'S OBSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE OF 
  REPRESENTATIVES' IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY...........................   167
    1. Constitutional Authority for Congressional Oversight and 
      Impeachment................................................   167
    2. The President's Categorical Refusal to Comply.............   172
    3. The President's Refusal to Produce Any and All Subpoenaed 
      Documents..................................................   180
    4. The President's Refusal to Allow Top Aides to Testify.....   193
    5. The President's Unsuccessful Attempts to Block Key 
      Witnesses..................................................   206
    6. The President's Intimidation of Witnesses.................   217
APPENDIX A: KEY PEOPLE AND ENTITIES..............................   245
APPENDIX B: ABBREVIATIONS AND COMMON TERMS.......................   248

                                PREFACE

    This report reflects the evidence gathered thus far by the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in 
coordination with the Committee on Oversight and Reform and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, as part of the House of 
Representatives' impeachment inquiry into Donald J. Trump, the 
45th President of the United States.
    The report is the culmination of an investigation that 
began in September 2019 and intensified over the past three 
months as new revelations and evidence of the President's 
misconduct towards Ukraine emerged. The Committees pursued the 
truth vigorously, but fairly, ensuring the full participation 
of both parties throughout the probe.
    Sustained by the tireless work of more than three dozen 
dedicated staff across the three Committees, we issued dozens 
of subpoenas for documents and testimony and took more than 100 
hours of deposition testimony from 17 witnesses. To provide the 
American people the opportunity to learn and evaluate the facts 
themselves, the Intelligence Committee held seven public 
hearings with 12--witnesses including three requested by the 
Republican Minority--that totaled more than 30 hours.
    At the outset, I want to recognize my late friend and 
colleague Elijah E. Cummings, whose grace and commitment to 
justice served as our North Star throughout this investigation. 
I would also like to thank my colleagues Eliot L. Engel and 
Carolyn B. Maloney, chairs respectively of the Foreign Affairs 
and Oversight and Reform Committees, as well as the Members of 
those Committees, many of whom provided invaluable 
contributions. Members of the Intelligence Committee, as well, 
worked selflessly and collaboratively throughout this 
investigation. Finally, I am grateful to Speaker Nancy Pelosi 
for the trust she placed in our Committees to conduct this work 
and for her wise counsel throughout.
    I also want to thank the dedicated professional staff of 
the Intelligence Committee, who worked ceaselessly and with 
remarkable poise and ability. My deepest gratitude goes to 
Daniel Goldman, Rheanne Wirkkala, Maher Bitar, Timothy 
Bergreen, Patrick Boland, Daniel Noble, Nicolas Mitchell, Sean 
Misko, Patrick Fallon, Diana Pilipenko, William Evans, Ariana 
Rowberry, Wells Bennett, and William Wu. Additional 
Intelligence Committee staff members also assured that the 
important oversight work of the Committee continued, even as we 
were required to take on the additional responsibility of 
conducting a key part of the House impeachment inquiry. 
Finally, I would like to thank the devoted and outstanding 
staff of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, including but 
not limited to Dave Rapallo, Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Peter 
Kenny, Krista Boyd, and Janet Kim, as well as Laura Carey from 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

                                 * * *

    In his farewell address, President George Washington warned 
of a moment when ``cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men 
will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp 
for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards 
the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.''
    The Framers of the Constitution well understood that an 
individual could one day occupy the Office of the President who 
would place his personal or political interests above those of 
the nation. Having just won hard-fought independence from a 
King with unbridled authority, they were attuned to the dangers 
of an executive who lacked fealty to the law and the 
Constitution.
    In response, the Framers adopted a tool used by the British 
Parliament for several hundred years to constrain the Crown--
the power of impeachment. Unlike in Britain, where impeachment 
was typically reserved for inferior officers but not the King 
himself, impeachment in our untested democracy was specifically 
intended to serve as the ultimate form of accountability for a 
duly-elected President. Rather than a mechanism to overturn an 
election, impeachment was explicitly contemplated as a remedy 
of last resort for a president who fails to faithfully execute 
his oath of office ``to preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States.''
    Accordingly, the Constitution confers the power to impeach 
the president on Congress, stating that the president shall be 
removed from office upon conviction for ``Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' While the Constitutional 
standard for removal from office is justly a high one, it is 
nonetheless an essential check and balance on the authority of 
the occupant of the Office of the President, particularly when 
that occupant represents a continuing threat to our fundamental 
democratic norms, values, and laws.
    Alexander Hamilton explained that impeachment was not 
designed to cover only criminal violations, but also crimes 
against the American people. ``The subjects of its 
jurisdiction,'' Hamilton wrote, ``are those offenses which 
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, 
from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a 
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated 
political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately 
to the society itself.''
    Similarly, future Associate Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court James Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania at the 
Constitutional Convention, distinguished impeachable offenses 
from those that reside ``within the sphere of ordinary 
jurisprudence.'' As he noted, ``impeachments are confined to 
political characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and 
to political punishments.''

                                 * * *

    As this report details, the impeachment inquiry has found 
that President Trump, personally and acting through agents 
within and outside of the U.S. government, solicited the 
interference of a foreign government, Ukraine, to benefit his 
reelection. In furtherance of this scheme, President Trump 
conditioned official acts on a public announcement by the new 
Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, of politically-
motivated investigations, including one into President Trump's 
domestic political opponent. In pressuring President Zelensky 
to carry out his demand, President Trump withheld a White House 
meeting desperately sought by the Ukrainian President and 
critical U.S. military assistance to fight Russian aggression 
in eastern Ukraine.
    The President engaged in this course of conduct for the 
benefit of his own presidential reelection, to harm the 
election prospects of a political rival, and to influence our 
nation's upcoming presidential election to his advantage. In 
doing so, the President placed his own personal and political 
interests above the national interests of the United States, 
sought to undermine the integrity of the U.S. presidential 
election process, and endangered U.S. national security.
    At the center of this investigation is the memorandum 
prepared following President Trump's July 25, 2019, phone call 
with Ukraine's President, which the White House declassified 
and released under significant public pressure. The call record 
alone is stark evidence of misconduct; a demonstration of the 
President's prioritization of his personal political benefit 
over the national interest. In response to President Zelensky's 
appreciation for vital U.S. military assistance, which 
President Trump froze without explanation, President Trump 
asked for ``a favor though'': two specific investigations 
designed to assist his reelection efforts.
    Our investigation determined that this telephone call was 
neither the start nor the end of President Trump's efforts to 
bend U.S. foreign policy for his personal gain. Rather, it was 
a dramatic crescendo within a months-long campaign driven by 
President Trump in which senior U.S. officials, including the 
Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Acting Chief of 
Staff, the Secretary of Energy, and others were either 
knowledgeable of or active participants in an effort to extract 
from a foreign nation the personal political benefits sought by 
the President.
    The investigation revealed the nature and extent of the 
President's misconduct, notwithstanding an unprecedented 
campaign of obstruction by the President and his Administration 
to prevent the Committees from obtaining documentary evidence 
and testimony. A dozen witnesses followed President Trump's 
orders, defying voluntary requests and lawful subpoenas, and 
refusing to testify. The White House, Department of State, 
Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and 
Department of Energy refused to produce a single document in 
response to our subpoenas.
    Ultimately, this sweeping effort to stonewall the House of 
Representatives' ``sole Power of Impeachment'' under the 
Constitution failed because witnesses courageously came forward 
and testified in response to lawful process. The report that 
follows was only possible because of their sense of duty and 
devotion to their country and its Constitution.
    Nevertheless, there remain unanswered questions, and our 
investigation must continue, even as we transmit our report to 
the Judiciary Committee. Given the proximate threat of further 
presidential attempts to solicit foreign interference in our 
next election, we cannot wait to make a referral until our 
efforts to obtain additional testimony and documents wind their 
way through the courts. The evidence of the President's 
misconduct is overwhelming, and so too is the evidence of his 
obstruction of Congress. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine a 
stronger or more complete case of obstruction than that 
demonstrated by the President since the inquiry began.
    The damage the President has done to our relationship with 
a key strategic partner will be remedied over time, and Ukraine 
continues to enjoy strong bipartisan support in Congress. But 
the damage to our system of checks and balances, and to the 
balance of power within our three branches of government, will 
be long-lasting and potentially irrevocable if the President's 
ability to stonewall Congress goes unchecked. Any future 
President will feel empowered to resist an investigation into 
their own wrongdoing, malfeasance, or corruption, and the 
result will be a nation at far greater risk of all three.

                                 * * *

    The decision to move forward with an impeachment inquiry is 
not one we took lightly. Under the best of circumstances, 
impeachment is a wrenching process for the nation. I resisted 
calls to undertake an impeachment investigation for many months 
on that basis, notwithstanding the existence of presidential 
misconduct that I believed to be deeply unethical and damaging 
to our democracy. The alarming events and actions detailed in 
this report, however, left us with no choice but to proceed.
    In making the decision to move forward, we were struck by 
the fact that the President's misconduct was not an isolated 
occurrence, nor was it the product of a naive president. 
Instead, the efforts to involve Ukraine in our 2020 
presidential election were undertaken by a President who 
himself was elected in 2016 with the benefit of an 
unprecedented and sweeping campaign of election interference 
undertaken by Russia in his favor, which the President welcomed 
and utilized.
    Having witnessed the degree to which interference by a 
foreign power in 2016 harmed our democracy, President Trump 
cannot credibly claim ignorance to its pernicious effects. Even 
more pointedly, the President's July call with Ukrainian 
President Zelensky, in which he solicited an investigation to 
damage his most feared 2020 opponent, came the day after 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller testified to Congress about 
Russia's efforts to damage his 2016 opponent and his urgent 
warning of the dangers of further foreign interference in the 
next election. With this backdrop, the solicitation of new 
foreign intervention was the act of a president unbound, not 
one chastened by experience. It was the act of a president who 
viewed himself as unaccountable and determined to use his vast 
official powers to secure his reelection.
    This repeated and pervasive threat to our democratic 
electoral process added urgency to our work. On October 3, 
2019, even as our Committee was engaged in this inquiry, 
President Trump publicly declared anew that other countries 
should open investigations into his chief political rival, 
saying, ``China should start an investigation into the 
Bidens,'' and ``President Zelensky, if it were me, I would 
recommend that they start an investigation into the Bidens.'' 
When a reporter asked the President what he hoped Ukraine's 
President would do following the July 25 call, President Trump, 
seeking to dispel any doubt as to his continuing intention, 
responded: ``Well, I would think that, if they were honest 
about it, they'd start a major investigation into the Bidens. 
It's a very simple answer.''
    By doubling down on his misconduct and declaring that his 
July 25 call with President Zelensky was ``perfect,'' President 
Trump has shown a continued willingness to use the power of his 
office to seek foreign intervention in our next election. His 
Acting Chief of Staff, Mick Mulvaney, in the course of 
admitting that the President had linked security assistance to 
Ukraine to the announcement of one of his desired 
investigations, told the American people to ``get over it.'' In 
these statements and actions, the President became the author 
of his own impeachment inquiry. The question presented by the 
set of facts enumerated in this report may be as simple as that 
posed by the President and his chief of staff's brazenness: is 
the remedy of impeachment warranted for a president who would 
use the power of his office to coerce foreign interference in a 
U.S. election, or is that now a mere perk of the office that 
Americans must simply ``get over''?

                                 * * *

    Those watching the impeachment hearings might have been 
struck by how little discrepancy there was between the 
witnesses called by the Majority and Minority. Indeed, most of 
the facts presented in the pages that follow are uncontested. 
The broad outlines, as well as many of the details of the 
President's scheme, have been presented by the witnesses with 
remarkable consistency. There will always be some variation in 
the testimony of multiple people witnessing the same events, 
but few of the differences here go to the heart of the matter. 
And so, it may have been all the more surprising to the public 
to see very disparate reactions to the testimony by the Members 
of Congress from each party.
    If there was one ill the Founders feared as much as that of 
an unfit president, it may have been that of excessive 
factionalism. Although the Framers viewed parties as necessary, 
they also endeavored to structure the new government in such a 
way as to minimize the ``violence of faction.'' As George 
Washington warned in his farewell address, ``the common and 
continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to 
make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage 
and restrain it.''
    Today, we may be witnessing a collision between the power 
of a remedy meant to curb presidential misconduct and the power 
of faction determined to defend against the use of that remedy 
on a president of the same party. But perhaps even more 
corrosive to our democratic system of governance, the President 
and his allies are making a comprehensive attack on the very 
idea of fact and truth. How can a democracy survive without 
acceptance of a common set of experiences?
    America remains the beacon of democracy and opportunity for 
freedom-loving people around the world. From their homes and 
their jail cells, from their public squares and their refugee 
camps, from their waking hours until their last breath, 
individuals fighting human rights abuses, journalists 
uncovering and exposing corruption, persecuted minorities 
struggling to survive and preserve their faith, and countless 
others around the globe just hoping for a better life look to 
America. What we do will determine what they see, and whether 
America remains a nation committed to the rule of law.
    As Benjamin Franklin departed the Constitutional 
Convention, he was asked, ``what have we got? A Republic or a 
Monarchy?'' He responded simply: ``A Republic, if you can keep 
it.''
                                            Adam B. Schiff,
        Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.















                                                 House Calendar No. 60
116th Congress    }                                      {      Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session      }                                      {     116-335
======================================================================



 
              THE TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT

                                _______
                                

 December 11, 2019.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed

                                _______
                                

Mr. Schiff, from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                           THE TRUMP-UKRAINE 
                       IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT

    Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Pursuant to H. Res. 660 in Consultation with the 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform and the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs

                           EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    The impeachment inquiry into Donald J. Trump, the 45th 
President of the United States, uncovered a months-long effort 
by President Trump to use the powers of his office to solicit 
foreign interference on his behalf in the 2020 election. As 
described in this executive summary and the report that 
follows, President Trump's scheme subverted U.S. foreign policy 
toward Ukraine and undermined our national security in favor of 
two politically motivated investigations that would help his 
presidential reelection campaign. The President demanded that 
the newly-elected Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, 
publicly announce investigations into a political rival that he 
apparently feared the most, former Vice President Joe Biden, 
and into a discredited theory that it was Ukraine, not Russia, 
that interfered in the 2016 presidential election. To compel 
the Ukrainian President to do his political bidding, President 
Trump conditioned two official acts on the public announcement 
of the investigations: a coveted White House visit and critical 
U.S. military assistance Ukraine needed to fight its Russian 
adversary.
    During a July 25, 2019, call between President Trump and 
President Zelensky, President Zelensky expressed gratitude for 
U.S. military assistance. President Trump immediately responded 
by asking President Zelensky to ``do us a favor though'' and 
openly pressed for Ukraine to investigate former Vice President 
Biden and the 2016 conspiracy theory. In turn, President 
Zelensky assured President Trump that he would pursue the 
investigation and reiterated his interest in the White House 
meeting. Although President Trump's scheme intentionally 
bypassed many career personnel, it was undertaken with the 
knowledge and approval of senior Administration officials, 
including the President's Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Secretary of Energy Rick 
Perry. In fact, at a press conference weeks after public 
revelations about the scheme, Mr. Mulvaney publicly 
acknowledged that the President directly tied the hold on 
military aid to his desire to get Ukraine to conduct a 
political investigation, telling Americans to ``get over it.''
    President Trump and his senior officials may see nothing 
wrong with using the power of the Office of the President to 
pressure a foreign country to help the President's reelection 
campaign. Indeed, President Trump continues to encourage 
Ukraine and other foreign countries to engage in the same kind 
of election interference today. However, the Founding Fathers 
prescribed a remedy for a chief executive who places his 
personal interests above those of the country: impeachment. 
Accordingly, as part of the House of Representatives' 
impeachment inquiry, the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, in coordination with the Committees on Oversight 
and Reform and Foreign Affairs, was compelled to undertake a 
serious, sober, and expeditious investigation into whether the 
President's misconduct warrants that remedy.
    In response, President Trump engaged in an unprecedented 
campaign of obstruction of this impeachment inquiry. 
Nevertheless, due in large measure to patriotic and courageous 
public servants who provided the Committees with direct 
evidence of the President's actions, the Committees uncovered 
significant misconduct on the part of the President of the 
United States. As required under House Resolution 660, the 
Intelligence Committee, in consultation with the Committees on 
Oversight and Reform and Foreign Affairs, has prepared this 
report to detail the evidence uncovered to date, which will now 
be transmitted to the Judiciary Committee for its 
consideration.

                 SECTION I--THE PRESIDENT'S MISCONDUCT

  The President Conditioned a White House Meeting and Military Aid to 
 Ukraine on a Public Announcement of Investigations Beneficial to his 
                          Reelection Campaign

             The President's Request for a Political Favor

    On the morning of July 25, 2019, President Donald Trump 
settled in to the White House Executive Residence to join a 
telephone call with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine. It 
had been more than three months since President Zelensky, a 
political neophyte, had been swept into office in a landslide 
victory on a platform of rooting out corruption and ending the 
war between his country and Russia. The day of his election, 
April 21, President Zelensky spoke briefly with President 
Trump, who had called to congratulate him and invite him to a 
visit at the White House. As of July 25, no White House meeting 
had materialized.
    As is typical for telephone calls with other heads of 
state, staff members from the National Security Council (NSC) 
convened in the White House Situation Room to listen to the 
call and take notes, which would later be compiled into a 
memorandum that would constitute the U.S. government's official 
record of the call. NSC staff had prepared a standard package 
of talking points for the President based on official U.S. 
policy. The talking points included recommendations to 
encourage President Zelensky to continue to promote anti-
corruption reforms in Ukraine, a pillar of American foreign 
policy in the country as far back as its independence in the 
1990s when Ukraine first rid itself of Kremlin control.
    This call would deviate significantly from that script. 
Shortly before he was patched through to President Zelensky, 
President Trump spoke with Gordon Sondland, who had donated $1 
million to President Trump's 2016 presidential inauguration and 
whom the President had appointed as the United States 
Ambassador to the European Union. Ambassador Sondland had 
helped lay the groundwork for a very different kind of call 
between the two Presidents.
    Ambassador Sondland had relayed a message to President 
Zelensky six days earlier that ``assurances to run a fully 
transparent investigation'' and ``turn over every stone'' were 
necessary in his call with President Trump. Ambassador Sondland 
understood these phrases to refer to two investigations 
politically beneficial to the President's reelection campaign: 
one into former Vice President Joe Biden and a Ukrainian gas 
company called Burisma, of which his son sat on the board, and 
the other into a discredited conspiracy theory alleging that 
Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. The 
allegations about Vice President Biden were without evidence, 
and the U.S. Intelligence Community had unanimously determined 
that Russia, not Ukraine, interfered in the 2016 election to 
help the candidacy of Donald Trump. Despite the falsehoods, 
Ambassador Sondland would make it clear to Ukrainian officials 
that the public announcement of these investigations was a 
prerequisite for the coveted White House meeting with President 
Trump, an effort that would help the President's reelection 
campaign.
    The White House meeting was not the only official act that 
President Trump conditioned on the announcement of these 
investigations. Several weeks before his phone call with 
President Zelensky, President Trump ordered a hold on nearly 
$400 million of congressionally-appropriated security 
assistance to Ukraine that provided Kyiv essential support as 
it sought to repel Russian forces that were occupying Crimea 
and inflicting casualties in the eastern region of the country. 
The President's decision to freeze the aid, made without 
explanation, sent shock waves through the Department of Defense 
(DOD), the Department of State, and the NSC, which uniformly 
supported providing this assistance to our strategic partner. 
Although the suspension of aid had not been made public by the 
day of the call between the two Presidents, officials at the 
Ukrainian embassy in Washington had already asked American 
officials about the status of the vital military assistance.
    At the outset of the conversation on July 25, President 
Zelensky thanked President Trump for the ``great support in the 
area of defense'' provided by the United States to date. He 
then indicated that Ukraine would soon be prepared to purchase 
additional Javelin anti-tank missiles from the United States as 
part of this defense cooperation. President Trump immediately 
responded with his own request: ``I would like you to do us a 
favor though,'' which was ``to find out what happened'' with 
alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election.
    President Trump then asked President Zelensky ``to look 
into'' former Vice President Biden's role in encouraging 
Ukraine to remove a prosecutor widely viewed by the United 
States and numerous European partners to be corrupt. In so 
doing, President Trump gave currency to a baseless allegation 
that Vice President Biden wanted to remove the corrupt 
prosecutor because he was investigating Burisma, a company on 
whose board the Vice President's son sat at the time.
    Over the course of the roughly thirty-minute call, 
President Trump repeated these false allegations and pressed 
the Ukrainian President to consult with his personal attorney, 
Rudy Giuliani, who had been publicly advocating for months for 
Ukraine to initiate these specific investigations. President 
Zelensky promised that he would ``work on the investigation of 
the case.'' Later in the call, he thanked President Trump for 
his invitation to join him at the White House, following up 
immediately with a comment that, ``[o]n the other hand,'' he 
would ``ensure'' that Ukraine pursued ``the investigation'' 
that President Trump had requested.
    During the call, President Trump also disparaged Marie 
Yovanovitch, the former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, who 
championed anti-corruption reforms in the country, and whom 
President Trump had unceremoniously removed months earlier 
following a smear campaign waged against her by Mr. Giuliani 
and others. President Trump claimed that she was ``bad news'' 
and was ``going to go through some things.'' He praised the 
current prosecutor at the time, who was widely viewed as 
corrupt and who helped initiate the smear campaign against her, 
calling him ``very good'' and ``very fair.''
    Hearing the call as it transpired, several White House 
staff members became alarmed. Far from giving the ``full-
throated endorsement of the Ukraine reform agenda'' that had 
been hoped for, the President instead demanded a political 
investigation into an American--the presidential candidate he 
evidently feared most, Joe Biden.
    Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman, an NSC staff member 
responsible for Ukraine policy who listened to the call, 
immediately reported his concerns to NSC lawyers. His 
supervisor, NSC Senior Director for Europe and Russia Timothy 
Morrison, also reported the call to the lawyers, worrying that 
the call would be ``damaging'' if leaked publicly. In response, 
the lawyers placed the memorandum summarizing the call onto a 
highly classified server, significantly limiting access to the 
materials.
    The call record would not remain hidden forever. On 
September 25, 2019, facing immense public pressure to reveal 
the contents of the call and following the announcement the 
previous day of a formal impeachment inquiry in the House of 
Representatives into President Trump's actions toward Ukraine, 
the White House publicly released the memorandum of the July 25 
call.
    The record of the call would help explain for those 
involved in Ukraine policy in the U.S. government, the 
Congress, and the public why President Trump, his personal 
attorney, Mr. Giuliani, his hand-picked appointees in charge of 
Ukraine issues, and various senior Administration officials 
would go to great lengths to withhold a coveted White House 
meeting and critical military aid from Ukraine at a time when 
it served as a bulwark against Russian aggression in Europe.
    The answer was as simple as it was inimical to our national 
security and election integrity: the President was withholding 
officials acts while soliciting something of value to his 
reelection campaign--an investigation into his political rival.
    The story of that scheme follows.

                                 * * *

 The President Removed Anti-Corruption Champion Ambassador Yovanovitch

    On April 24, 2019, President Trump abruptly called back to 
Washington the United States Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie 
``Masha'' Yovanovitch, after a ruthless smear campaign was 
waged against her. She was known throughout Ukraine and among 
her peers for aggressively advocating for anti-corruption 
reforms consistent with U.S. foreign policy and only recently 
had been asked to extend her stay in Ukraine. Her effectiveness 
in anti-corruption efforts earned her enemies in Kyiv and in 
Washington. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent 
testified in praising Ambassador Yovanovitch: ``You can't 
promote principled anticorruption action without pissing off 
corrupt people.''
    Beginning on March 20, The Hill newspaper published several 
op-eds attacking Ambassador Yovanovitch and former Vice 
President Joe Biden, relying on information from a Ukrainian 
prosecutor, Yuriy Lutsenko, who was widely viewed to be 
corrupt. Mr. Lutsenko had served as the chief prosecutor in 
Ukraine under the then-incumbent president who lost to 
Volodymyr Zelensky in April 2019. Although he would later 
recant many of his allegations, Mr. Lutsenko falsely accused 
Ambassador Yovanovitch of speaking negatively about President 
Trump and giving Mr. Lutsenko a ``do-not-prosecute list.''
    The attacks against Ambassador Yovanovitch were amplified 
by prominent, close allies of President Trump, including Mr. 
Giuliani and his associates, Sean Hannity, and Donald Trump Jr. 
President Trump tweeted the smears himself just a month before 
he recalled the Ambassador from Ukraine. In the face of attacks 
driven by Mr. Lutsenko and the President's allies, Ambassador 
Yovanovitch and other senior State Department officials asked 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to issue a statement of support 
for her and for the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine. The Secretary 
declined, fearing that President Trump might publicly undermine 
those efforts, possibly through a tweet.
    Following a ceremony in which she presented an award of 
courage to the family of a young female anti-corruption 
activist killed in Ukraine for her work, Ambassador Yovanovitch 
received an urgent call from the State Department regarding her 
``security,'' and imploring her to take the first plane back to 
Washington. When she arrived, she was informed that she had 
done nothing wrong, but that the President had lost confidence 
in her. She was told to leave her post as soon as possible.
    In her place, the President would designate three new 
agents to spearhead Ukraine policy, political appointees far 
more willing to engage in an improper ``domestic political 
errand'' than an ambassador known for her efforts to fight 
corruption.

          The President's Hand-Picked Agents Began the Scheme

    Just three days before Ambassador Yovanovitch's abrupt 
recall to Washington, President Trump had his first telephone 
call with President-elect Zelensky. During that conversation, 
President Trump congratulated the Ukrainian leader on his 
victory, complimented him on his country's Miss Universe 
Pageant contestants, and invited him to visit the White House. 
A White House meeting would help demonstrate the United States' 
strong support for Ukraine as it fought a hot war with Russia 
and attempted to negotiate an end to the conflict with Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, as well as to bolster President-elect 
Zelensky's standing with his own people as he sought to deliver 
on his promised anti-corruption agenda. Although the White 
House's public summary of the call included some discussion of 
a commitment to ``root out corruption,'' President Trump did 
not mention corruption at all.
    Shortly after the conversation, President Trump asked Vice 
President Mike Pence to attend President Zelensky's 
inauguration. Vice President Pence confirmed directly to 
President Zelensky his intention to attend during a phone 
conversation on April 23, and Vice President Pence's staff and 
the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv began preparations for the trip.
    At the same time, President Trump's personal attorney, Mr. 
Giuliani, intensified his campaign to pressure Ukraine's newly-
elected President to initiate investigations into Joe Biden, 
who had officially entered the race for the Democratic 
nomination on April 25, and the baseless conspiracy theory 
about Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election. On May 9, 
the New York Times published an article in which Mr. Giuliani 
declared that he intended to travel to Ukraine on behalf of his 
client, President Trump, in order to meddle in an 
investigation. After public backlash, Mr. Giuliani canceled the 
trip, blaming ``some bad people'' around President Zelensky. 
Days later, President Trump rescinded the plans for Vice 
President Pence to attend President Zelensky's inauguration, 
which had not yet been scheduled. The staff member planning the 
trip was not provided an explanation for the about-face, but 
staff in the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv were disappointed that 
President Zelensky would not receive a ``high level'' show of 
support from the United States.
    In Vice President Pence's stead, Secretary of Energy Rick 
Perry led the American delegation to the Ukrainian President's 
inauguration. Ambassador Sondland, Special Representative for 
Ukraine Negotiations Ambassador Kurt Volker, and Lt. Col. 
Vindman also attended. In comments that would foreshadow 
troubling events to come, Lt. Col. Vindman warned President 
Zelensky to stay out of U.S. domestic politics to avoid 
jeopardizing the bipartisan support Ukraine enjoyed in 
Congress.
    The delegation returned to the United States impressed with 
President Zelensky, especially his focus on anti-corruption 
reforms. Ambassador Sondland quickly organized a meeting with 
President Trump in the Oval Office on May 23, attended by most 
of the other members of the delegation. The three political 
appointees, who would describe themselves as the ``Three 
Amigos,'' relayed their positive impression of President 
Zelensky to President Trump and encouraged him to schedule the 
Oval Office meeting he promised in his April 21 phone call with 
the new leader.
    President Trump reacted poorly to the suggestion, claiming 
that Ukraine ``tried to take me down'' in 2016. In order to 
schedule a White House visit for President Zelensky, President 
Trump told the delegation that they would have to ``talk to 
Rudy.'' Ambassador Sondland testified that he understood the 
President's instruction to be a directive to work with Mr. 
Giuliani if they hoped to advance relations with Ukraine. 
President Trump directed the three senior U.S. government 
officials to assist Mr. Giuliani's efforts, which, it would 
soon become clear, were exclusively for the benefit of the 
President's reelection campaign.
    As the Three Amigos were given responsibility over the U.S. 
government's Ukraine portfolio, Bill Taylor, a former 
Ambassador to Ukraine, was considering whether to come out of 
retirement to accept a request to succeed Ambassador 
Yovanovitch in Kyiv. As of May 26, Ambassador Taylor was 
``still struggling with the decision,'' and, in particular, 
whether anyone can ``hope to succeed with the Giuliani-Biden 
issue swirling.'' After receiving assurances from Secretary 
Pompeo that U.S. policy toward Ukraine would not change, 
Ambassador Taylor accepted the position and arrived in Kyiv on 
June 17. Ambassador Taylor would quickly come to observe an 
``irregular channel'' led by Mr. Giuliani that, over time, 
began to undermine the official channel of diplomatic relations 
with Ukraine. Mr. Giuliani would prove to be, as the 
President's National Security Advisor Ambassador John Bolton 
would tell a colleague, a ``hand grenade that was going to blow 
everyone up.''

             The President Froze Vital Military Assistance

    For fiscal year 2019, Congress appropriated and authorized 
$391 million in security assistance to Ukraine: $250 million in 
funds administered by DOD and $141 million in funds 
administered by the State Department. On June 18, DOD issued a 
press release announcing its intention to provide $250 million 
in taxpayer-funded security assistance to Ukraine following the 
certification that all legitimate conditions on the aid, 
including anti-corruption reforms, had been met. Shortly after 
this announcement, however, both the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) and DOD received inquiries from the President 
related to the funds. At that time, and throughout the next few 
months, support for Ukraine security assistance was 
overwhelming and unanimous among all of the relevant agencies 
and within Congress.
    By July 3, OMB blocked a Congressional notification which 
would have cleared the way for the release of $141 million in 
State Department security assistance funds. By July 12, 
President Trump had placed a hold on all military support 
funding for Ukraine. On July 18, OMB announced the hold to all 
of the relevant agencies and indicated that it was directed by 
the President. No other reason was provided.
    During a series of policy meetings involving increasingly 
senior officials, the uniform and consistent position of all 
policymaking agencies supported the release of funding. Ukraine 
experts at DOD, the State Department, and the NSC argued that 
it was in the national security interest of the United States 
to continue to support Ukraine. As Mr. Morrison testified, 
``The United States aids Ukraine and her people so that they 
can fight Russia over there, and we don't have to fight Russia 
here.''
    Agency officials also expressed concerns about the legality 
of President Trump's direction to withhold assistance to 
Ukraine that Congress had already appropriated for this express 
purpose. Two OMB career officials, including one of its legal 
counsels, would resign, in part, over concerns regarding the 
hold.
    By July 25, the date of President Trump's call with 
President Zelensky, DOD was also receiving inquiries from 
Ukrainian officials about the status of the security 
assistance. Nevertheless, President Trump continued to withhold 
the funding to Ukraine without explanation, against the 
interests of U.S. national security, and over the objections of 
these career experts.

   The President Conditioned a White House Meeting on Investigations

    By the time Ukrainian officials were first learning about 
an issue with the anticipated military assistance, the 
President's hand-picked representatives to Ukraine had already 
informed their Ukrainian counterparts that President Zelensky's 
coveted White House meeting would only happen after Ukraine 
committed to pursuing the two political investigations that 
President Trump and Mr. Giuliani demanded.
    Ambassador Sondland was unequivocal in describing this 
conditionality, testifying, ``I know that members of this 
committee frequently frame these complicated issues in the form 
of a simple question: Was there a quid pro quo? As I testified 
previously with regard to the requested White House call and 
the White House meeting, the answer is yes.'' Ambassadors 
Sondland and Volker worked to obtain the necessary assurance 
from President Zelensky that he would personally commit to 
initiate the investigations in order to secure both.
    On July 2, in Toronto, Canada, Ambassador Volker conveyed 
the message directly to President Zelensky, specifically 
referencing the ``Giuliani factor'' in President Zelensky's 
engagement with the United States. For his part, Mr. Giuliani 
made clear to Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, who were 
directly communicating with the Ukrainians, that a White House 
meeting would not occur until Ukraine announced its pursuit of 
the two political investigations. After observing Mr. 
Giuliani's role in the ouster of a U.S. Ambassador and learning 
of his influence with the President, Ukrainian officials soon 
understood that ``the key for many things is Rudi [sic].''
    On July 10, Ambassador Bolton hosted a meeting in the White 
House with two senior Ukrainian officials, several American 
officials, including Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, Secretary 
Perry, Dr. Fiona Hill, Senior Director for Europe and Russia at 
the NSC, and Lt. Col. Vindman. As had become customary each 
time Ukrainian officials met with their American counterparts, 
the Ukrainians asked about the long-delayed White House 
meeting. Ambassador Bolton demurred, but Ambassador Sondland 
spoke up, revealing that he had worked out an arrangement with 
Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney to schedule the White House 
visit after Ukraine initiated the ``investigations.'' 
Ambassador Bolton ``stiffened'' and quickly ended the meeting.
    Undaunted, Ambassador Sondland ushered many of the 
attendees to the Ward Room downstairs to continue their 
discussion. In the second meeting, Ambassador Sondland 
explained that he had an agreement with Mr. Mulvaney that the 
White House visit would come only after Ukraine announced the 
Burisma/Biden and 2016 Ukraine election interference 
investigations. At this second meeting, both Lt. Col. Vindman 
and Dr. Hill objected to intertwining a ``domestic political 
errand'' with official foreign policy, and they indicated that 
a White House meeting would have to go through proper channels.
    Following these discussions, Dr. Hill reported back to 
Ambassador Bolton, who told her to ``go and tell [the NSC Legal 
Advisor] that I am not part of whatever drug deal Sondland and 
Mulvaney are cooking up on this.'' Both Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. 
Vindman separately reported the incident to the NSC Legal 
Advisor.

             The President's Agents Pursued a ``Drug Deal''

    Over the next two weeks, Ambassadors Sondland and Volker 
worked closely with Mr. Giuliani and senior Ukrainian and 
American officials to arrange a telephone call between 
President Trump and President Zelensky and to ensure that the 
Ukrainian President explicitly promised to undertake the 
political investigations required by President Trump to 
schedule the White House meeting. As Ambassador Sondland would 
later testify: ``Mr. Giuliani was expressing the desires of the 
President of the United States, and we knew these 
investigations were important to the President.''
    On July 19, Ambassador Volker had breakfast with Mr. 
Giuliani and his associate, Lev Parnas, at the Trump Hotel in 
Washington, D.C. Mr. Parnas would subsequently be indicted for 
campaign finance violations as part of an investigation that 
remains ongoing. During the conversation, Ambassador Volker 
stressed his belief that the attacks being leveled publicly 
against Vice President Biden related to Ukraine were false and 
that the former Vice President was ``a person of integrity.'' 
He counseled Mr. Giuliani that the Ukrainian prosecutor pushing 
the false narrative, Mr. Lutsenko, was promoting ``a self-
serving narrative to preserve himself in power.'' Mr. Giuliani 
agreed, but his promotion of Mr. Lutsenko's false accusations 
for the benefit of President Trump did not cease. Ambassador 
Volker also offered to help arrange an in-person meeting 
between Mr. Giuliani and Andriy Yermak, one of President 
Zelensky's most trusted advisors, which would later take place 
in Madrid, Spain in early August.
    After the breakfast meeting at the Trump Hotel, Ambassador 
Volker reported back to Ambassadors Sondland and Taylor about 
his conversation with Mr. Giuliani, writing in a text message 
that, ``Most impt [sic] is for Zelensky to say that he will 
help investigation and address any specific personnel issues if 
there are any,'' likely referencing President Zelensky's 
decision to remove Mr. Lutsenko as prosecutor general, a 
decision with which Mr. Giuliani disagreed. The same day, 
Ambassador Sondland spoke with President Zelensky and 
recommended that the Ukrainian leader tell President Trump that 
he ``will leave no stone unturned'' regarding the political 
investigations during the upcoming presidential phone call.
    Ambassador Sondland emailed several top Administration 
officials, including Secretary of State Pompeo, Acting Chief of 
Staff Mulvaney, and Secretary Perry, stating that President 
Zelensky confirmed that he would ``assure'' President Trump 
that ``he intends to run a fully transparent investigation and 
will `turn over every stone.''' According to Ambassador 
Sondland, he was referring in the email to the Burisma/Biden 
and 2016 election interference investigations. Secretary Perry 
and Mr. Mulvaney responded affirmatively that the call would 
soon take place, and Ambassador Sondland testified later that 
``everyone was in the loop'' on plans to condition the White 
House meeting on the announcement of political investigations 
beneficial to President Trump. The arrangement troubled the 
Ukrainian President, who ``did not want to be used as a pawn in 
a U.S. reelection campaign.''

    The President Pressed President Zelensky to Do a Political Favor

    On the morning of July 25, Ambassador Volker sent a text 
message to President Zelensky's top aide, Mr. Yermak, less than 
30 minutes before the presidential call. He stated: ``Heard 
from White House--assuming President Z convinces trump he will 
investigate`get to the bottom of what happened' in 2016, we 
will nail down date for visit to Washington. Good luck!'' 
Shortly before the call, Ambassador Sondland spoke directly 
with President Trump.
    President Zelensky followed this advice during his 
conversation with President Trump. President Zelensky assured 
that he would pursue the investigations that President Trump 
had discussed--into the Bidens and 2016 election interference--
and, in turn, pressed for the White House meeting that remained 
outstanding.
    The following day, Ambassadors Volker, Sondland, and Taylor 
met with President Zelensky in Kyiv. The Ukrainian President 
told them that President Trump had mentioned ``sensitive 
issues'' three times during the previous day's phone call. 
Following the meeting with the Ukrainian leader, Ambassador 
Sondland had a private, one-on-one conversation with Mr. Yermak 
in which they discussed ``the issue of investigations.'' He 
then retired to lunch at an outdoor restaurant terrace with 
State Department aides where he called President Trump directly 
from his cellphone. The White House confirmed that the 
conversation lasted five minutes.
    At the outset of the call, President Trump asked Ambassador 
Sondland whether President Zelensky ``was going to do the 
investigation'' that President Trump had raised with President 
Zelensky the day before. Ambassador Sondland stated that 
President Zelensky was ``going to do it'' and ``would do 
anything you ask him to.'' According to David Holmes, the State 
Department aide sitting closest to Ambassador Sondland and who 
overheard the President's voice on the phone, Ambassador 
Sondland and President Trump spoke only about the investigation 
in their discussion about Ukraine. The President made no 
mention of other major issues of importance in Ukraine, 
including President Zelensky's aggressive anti-corruption 
reforms and the ongoing war it was fighting against Russian-led 
forces in eastern Ukraine.
    After hanging up the phone, Ambassador Sondland explained 
to Mr. Holmes that President Trump ``did not give a shit about 
Ukraine.'' Rather, the President cared only about ``big stuff'' 
that benefited him personally, like ``the Biden investigation 
that Mr. Giuliani was pitching,'' and that President Trump had 
pushed for in his July 25 call with the Ukrainian leader. 
Ambassador Sondland did not recall referencing Biden 
specifically, but he did not dispute Mr. Holmes' recollection 
of the call with the President or Ambassador Sondland's 
subsequent discussion with Mr. Holmes.

The President's Representatives Ratcheted up Pressure on the Ukrainian 
                               President

    In the weeks following the July 25 call, the President's 
hand-picked representatives increased the President's pressure 
campaign on Ukrainian government officials--in person, over the 
phone, and by text message--to secure a public announcement of 
the investigations beneficial to President Trump's reelection 
campaign.
    In discussions with Ukrainian officials, Ambassador 
Sondland understood that President Trump did not require that 
Ukraine conduct investigations as a prerequisite for the White 
House meeting so much as publicly announce the investigations--
making clear that the goal was not the investigations, but the 
political benefit Trump would derive from their announcement 
and the cloud they might put over a political opponent.
    On August 2, President Zelensky's advisor, Mr. Yermak, 
traveled to Madrid to meet Mr. Giuliani in person. There, they 
agreed that Ukraine would issue a public statement, and they 
discussed potential dates for a White House meeting. A few days 
later, Ambassador Volker told Mr. Giuliani that it ``would be 
good'' if Mr. Giuliani would report to ``the boss,'' President 
Trump, about ``the results'' of his Madrid discussion so that 
President Trump would finally agree to a White House visit by 
President Zelensky.
    On August 9, Ambassador Volker and Mr. Giuliani spoke twice 
by phone, and Ambassador Sondland spoke twice to the White 
House for a total of about 20 minutes. In a text message to 
Ambassador Volker later that day, Ambassador Sondland wrote, 
``I think potus [sic] really wants the deliverable,'' which 
Ambassador Sondland acknowledged was the public statement 
announcing the two political investigations sought by President 
Trump and Mr. Giuliani.
    The following day, Ambassador Sondland briefed State 
Department Counselor Ulrich Brechbuhl, a top advisor to 
Secretary Pompeo, on these discussions about President Zelensky 
issuing a statement that would include an announcement of the 
two political investigations. Ambassador Sondland also emailed 
Secretary Pompeo directly, copying the State Department's 
executive secretary and Mr. Brechbuhl, to inform them about the 
agreement for President Zelensky to give the press conference. 
He expected to see a draft of the statement, which would be 
``delivered for our review in a day or two.'' Ambassador 
Sondland noted his hope that the draft statement would ``make 
the boss happy enough to authorize an invitation.''
    On August 12, Mr. Yermak sent the proposed statement to 
Ambassador Volker, but it lacked specific references to the two 
investigations politically beneficial to President Trump's 
reelection campaign. The following morning, Ambassadors 
Sondland and Volker spoke with Mr. Giuliani, who made clear 
that if the statement ``doesn't say Burisma and 2016, it's not 
credible.'' Ambassador Volker revised the statement following 
this direction to include those references and returned it to 
the Ukrainian President's aide.
    Mr. Yermak balked at getting drawn into U.S. politics and 
asked Ambassador Volker whether the United States had inquired 
about investigations through any appropriate Department of 
Justice channels. The answer was no, and several witnesses 
testified that a request to a foreign country to investigate a 
U.S. citizen ``for political reasons'' goes ``against 
everything'' the United States sought to promote in eastern 
Europe, specifically the rule of law. Ambassador Volker 
eventually agreed with Mr. Yermak that the announcement of the 
Biden/Burisma and 2016 elections investigations would ``look 
like it would play into our domestic politics,'' so the 
statement was temporarily ``shelved.''
    Nevertheless, Ambassador Sondland, in accordance with 
President Trump's wishes, continued to pursue the statement 
into early September 2019.

 Ukrainians Inquired about the President's Hold on Security Assistance

    Once President Trump placed security assistance on hold in 
July, ``it was inevitable that it was eventually going to come 
out.'' On July 25, DOD officials learned that diplomats at the 
Ukrainian Embassy in Washington had made multiple overtures to 
DOD and the State Department ``asking about security 
assistance.'' Separately, two different contacts at the 
Ukrainian Embassy approached Ambassador Volker's special 
advisor, Catherine Croft, to ask her in confidence about the 
hold. Ms. Croft was surprised at the effectiveness of their 
``diplomatic tradecraft,'' noting that they ``found out very 
early on'' that the United States was withholding critical 
military aid to Ukraine. By mid-August, before the freeze on 
aid became public, Lt. Col. Vindman had also received inquiries 
from an official at the Ukrainian Embassy.
    The hold remained in place throughout August against the 
unanimous judgment of American officials focused on Ukraine 
policy. Without an explanation for the hold, which ran contrary 
to the recommendation of all relevant agencies, and with 
President Trump already conditioning a White House visit on the 
announcement of the political investigations, it became 
increasingly apparent to multiple witnesses that the military 
aid was also being withheld in exchange for the announcement of 
them. As both Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Holmes would later 
testify, it became as clear as ``two plus two equals four.''
    On August 22, Ambassador Sondland emailed Secretary Pompeo 
again, recommending a plan for a potential meeting between 
President Trump and President Zelensky in Warsaw, Poland on 
September 1. Ambassador Sondland noted that President Zelensky 
should ``look him in the eye'' and tell President Trump that 
once new prosecutorial officials were in place in Ukraine, 
``Zelensky should be able to move forward publicly and with 
confidence on those issues of importance to Potus and the 
U.S.'' Ambassador Sondland testified that this was a reference 
to the political investigations that President Trump discussed 
on the July 25 call, which Secretary Pompeo had listened to. 
Ambassador Sondland hoped this would ``break the logjam''--the 
hold on critical security assistance to Ukraine. Secretary 
Pompeo replied three minutes later: ``Yes.''

         The President's Security Assistance Hold Became Public

    On August 28, Politico published a story revealing 
President Trump's weeks-long hold on U.S. military assistance 
to Ukraine. Senior Ukrainian officials expressed grave concern, 
deeply worried about the practical impact on their efforts to 
fight Russian aggression, but also about the public message it 
sent to the Russian government, which would almost certainly 
seek to exploit any real or perceived crack in U.S. resolve 
toward Ukraine.
    On August 29, at the urging of National Security Advisor 
Bolton, Ambassador Taylor wrote a first-person cable to 
Secretary Pompeo. This was the only first-person cable the 
Ambassador had ever sent in his decades of government service. 
He explained the ``folly'' of withholding security assistance 
to Ukraine as it fought a hot war against Russia on its 
borders. He wrote that he ``could not and would not defend such 
a policy.'' Ambassador Taylor stated that Secretary Pompeo may 
have carried the cable with him to a meeting at the White 
House.
    The same day that Ambassador Taylor sent his cable, 
President Trump cancelled his planned trip to Warsaw for a 
World War II commemoration event, where he was scheduled to 
meet with President Zelensky. Vice President Pence traveled in 
his place. Ambassador Sondland also traveled to Warsaw and, at 
a pre-briefing discussion with the Vice President before he met 
President Zelensky, Ambassador Sondland raised the issue of the 
hold on security assistance. He told Vice President Pence that 
he was concerned that the security assistance ``had become tied 
to the issue of investigations'' and that ``everything is being 
held up until these statements get made.'' Vice President Pence 
nodded in response, apparently expressing neither surprise nor 
dismay at the linkage between the two.
    At the meeting, President Zelensky expressed concern that 
even an appearance of wavering support from the United States 
for Ukraine could embolden Russia. Vice President Pence 
reiterated U.S. support for Ukraine, but could not promise that 
the hold would be lifted. Vice President Pence said he would 
relay his support for lifting the hold to President Trump so a 
decision could be made on security assistance as soon as 
possible. Vice President Pence spoke with President Trump that 
evening, but the hold was not lifted.
    Following this meeting, Ambassador Sondland pulled aside 
President Zelensky's advisor, Mr. Yermak, to explain that the 
hold on security assistance was conditioned on the public 
announcement of the Burisma/Biden and the 2016 election 
interference investigations. After learning of the 
conversation, Ambassador Taylor texted Ambassador Sondland: 
``Are we now saying that security assistance and WH meeting are 
conditioned on investigations?''
    The two then spoke by phone. Ambassador Sondland explained 
that he had previously made a ``mistake'' in telling Ukrainian 
officials that only the White House meeting was conditioned on 
a public announcement of the political investigations 
beneficial to President Trump. He clarified that 
``everything''--the White House meeting and hundreds of 
millions of dollars of security assistance to Ukraine--was now 
conditioned on the announcement. President Trump wanted 
President Zelensky in a ``public box,'' which Ambassador Taylor 
understood to mean that President Trump required that President 
Zelensky make a public announcement about the investigations 
and that a private commitment would not do.
    On September 7, President Trump and Ambassador Sondland 
spoke. Ambassador Sondland stated to his colleagues that the 
President said, ``there was no quid pro quo,'' but that 
President Zelensky would be required to announce the 
investigations in order for the hold on security assistance to 
be lifted, ``and he should want to do it.'' Ambassador Sondland 
passed on a similar message directly to President Zelensky and 
Mr. Yermak that, ``although this was not a quid pro quo, if 
President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would 
be at a stalemate,'' referring to the hold on security 
assistance. Arrangements were made for the Ukrainian President 
to make a public statement during an interview on CNN.
    After speaking with Ambassador Sondland, Ambassador Taylor 
texted Ambassadors Sondland and Volker: ``As I said on the 
phone, I think it's crazy to withhold security assistance for 
help with a political campaign.'' Notwithstanding his long-held 
understanding that the White House meeting was conditioned on 
the public announcement of two political investigations desired 
by President Trump--and not broader anti-corruption concerns--
Ambassador Sondland responded hours later:

          Bill, I believe you are incorrect about President 
        Trump's intentions. The President has been crystal 
        clear: no quid pro quo's of any kind. The President is 
        trying to evaluate whether Ukraine is truly going to 
        adopt the transparency and reforms that President 
        Zelensky promised during his campaign. I suggest we 
        stop the back and forth by text. If you still have 
        concerns, I recommend you give Lisa Kenna or [Secretary 
        Pompeo] a call to discuss with them directly. Thanks.

    Ambassador Sondland's subsequent testimony revealed this 
text to be a false exculpatory--an untruthful statement that 
can later be used to conceal incriminating information. In his 
public testimony, Ambassador Sondland testified that the 
President's direction to withhold a presidential telephone call 
and a White House meeting for President Zelensky were both quid 
pro quos designed to pressure Ukraine to announce the 
investigations. He also testified that he developed a clear 
understanding that the military aid was also conditioned on the 
investigations, that it was as simple as 2+2=4. Sondland 
confirmed that his clear understanding was unchanged after 
speaking with President Trump, which he then communicated to 
the Ukrainians--President Zelensky had to publicly announce the 
two investigations if he wanted to get the meeting or the 
military aid.
    In Ambassador Sondland's testimony, he was not clear on 
whether he had one conversation with the President in which the 
subject of a quid pro quo came up, or two, or on precisely 
which date the conversation took place during the period of 
September 6 through 9. In one version of the conversation, 
which Ambassador Sondland suggested may have taken place on 
September 9, he claimed that the President answered an open 
question about what he wanted from Ukraine with an immediate 
denial--``no quid pro quo.'' In another, he admitted that the 
President told him that President Zelensky should go to a 
microphone and announce the investigations, and that he should 
want to do so--effectively confirming a quid pro quo.
    Both Ambassador Taylor and Mr. Morrison, relying on their 
contemporaneous notes, testified that the call between 
Ambassador Sondland and President Trump occurred on September 
7, which is further confirmed by Ambassador Sondland's own text 
message on September 8, in which he wrote that he had 
``multiple convos'' with President Zelensky and President 
Trump. A call on September 9, which would have occurred in the 
middle of the night, is at odds with the weight of the evidence 
and not backed up by any records the White House was willing to 
provide Ambassador Sondland. Regardless of the date, Ambassador 
Sondland did not contest telling both Mr. Morrison and 
Ambassador Taylor of a conversation he had with the President 
in which the President reaffirmed Ambassador Sondland's 
understanding of the quid pro quo for the military aid.
    As Ambassador Sondland acknowledged bluntly in his 
conversation with Mr. Holmes, President Trump's sole interest 
with respect to Ukraine was the ``big stuff'' that benefited 
him personally, such as the investigations into former Vice 
President Biden, and not President Zelensky's promises of 
transparency and reform.

                    The President's Scheme Unraveled

    By early September, President Zelensky was ready to make a 
public announcement of the two investigations to secure a White 
House meeting and the military assistance his country 
desperately needed. He proceeded to book an interview on CNN, 
during which he could make such an announcement, but other 
events soon intervened.
    On September 9, the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, the Committees on Oversight and Reform, and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs announced an investigation into 
the scheme by President Trump and his personal attorney, Mr. 
Giuliani, ``to improperly pressure the Ukrainian government to 
assist the President's bid for reelection.'' The Committees 
sent document production and preservation requests to the White 
House and the State Department related to the investigation. 
NSC staff members believed this investigation might have had 
``the effect of releasing the hold'' on Ukraine military 
assistance because it would have been ``potentially politically 
challenging'' to ``justify that hold.''
    Later that day, the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community (ICIG) sent a letter to Chairman Schiff and Ranking 
Member Nunes notifying the Committee that a whistleblower had 
filed a complaint on August 12 that the ICIG had determined to 
be both an ``urgent concern'' and ``credible.'' Nevertheless, 
the Acting Director of National Intelligence (DNI) took the 
unprecedented step of withholding the complaint from the 
Congressional Intelligence Committees, in coordination with the 
White House and the Department of Justice.
    The White House had been aware of the whistleblower 
complaint for several weeks, and press reports indicate that 
the President was briefed on it in late August. The ICIG's 
notification to Congress of the complaint's existence, and the 
announcement of a separate investigation into the same subject 
matter, telegraphed to the White House that attempts to 
condition the security assistance on the announcement of the 
political investigations beneficial to President Trump--and 
efforts to cover up that misconduct--would not last.
    On September 11, in the face of growing public and 
Congressional scrutiny, President Trump lifted the hold on 
security assistance to Ukraine. As with the implementation of 
the hold, no clear reason was given. By the time the President 
ordered the release of security assistance to Ukraine, DOD was 
unable to spend approximately 14 percent of the funds 
appropriated by Congress for Fiscal Year 2019. Congress had to 
pass a new law to extend the funding in order to ensure the 
full amount could be used by Ukraine to defend itself.
    Even after the hold was lifted, President Zelensky still 
intended to sit for an interview with CNN in order to announce 
the investigations--indeed, he still wanted the White House 
meeting. At the urging of Ambassador Taylor, President Zelensky 
cancelled the CNN interview on September 18 or 19. The White 
House meeting, however, still has not occurred.

    The President's Chief of Staff Confirmed Aid was Conditioned on 
                             Investigations

    The conditioning of military aid to Ukraine on the 
investigations sought by the President was as clear to 
Ambassador Sondland as ``two plus two equals four.'' In fact, 
the President's own Acting Chief of Staff, someone who meets 
with him daily, admitted that he had discussed security 
assistance with the President and that his decision to withhold 
it was directly tied to his desire to get Ukraine to conduct a 
political investigation.
    On October 17, at a press briefing in the White House, 
Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney confirmed that President 
Trump withheld the essential military aid for Ukraine as 
leverage to pressure Ukraine to investigate the conspiracy 
theory that Ukraine had interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. 
As Dr. Hill made clear in her testimony, this false narrative 
has been promoted by President Putin to deflect away from 
Russia's systemic interference in our election and to drive a 
wedge between the United States and a key partner.
    According to Mr. Mulvaney, President Trump ``[a]bsolutely'' 
mentioned ``corruption related to the DNC server'' in 
connection with the security assistance during his July 25 
call. Mr. Mulvaney also stated that the server was part of 
``why we held up the money.'' After a reporter attempted to 
clarify this explicit acknowledgement of a quid pro quo, Mr. 
Mulvaney replied: ``We do that all the time with foreign 
policy.'' He added, ``I have news for everybody: get over it. 
There is going to be political influence in foreign policy.''
    Ambassador Taylor testified that in his decades of military 
and diplomatic service, he had never seen another example of 
foreign aid conditioned on the personal or political interests 
of the President. Rather, ``we condition assistance on issues 
that will improve our foreign policy, serve our foreign policy, 
ensure that taxpayers'' money is well-spent,'' not specific 
investigations designed to benefit the political interests of 
the President of the United States.
    In contrast, President Trump does not appear to believe 
there is any such limitation on his power to use White House 
meetings, military aid or other official acts to procure 
foreign help in his reelection. When asked by a reporter on 
October 3 what he had hoped President Zelensky would do 
following their July 25 call, President Trump responded: 
``Well, I would think that, if they were honest about it, 
they'd start a major investigation into the Bidens. It's a very 
simple answer.''

        SECTION II--THE PRESIDENT'S OBSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE OF 
                  REPRESENTATIVES' IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY


    The President Obstructed the Impeachment Inquiry by Instructing 
 Witnesses and Agencies to Ignore Subpoenas for Documents and Testimony


       An Unprecedented Effort to Obstruct an Impeachment Inquiry

    Donald Trump is the first President in the history of the 
United States to seek to completely obstruct an impeachment 
inquiry undertaken by the House of Representatives under 
Article I of the Constitution, which vests the House with the 
``sole Power of Impeachment.'' He has publicly and repeatedly 
rejected the authority of Congress to conduct oversight of his 
actions and has directly challenged the authority of the House 
to conduct an impeachment inquiry into his actions regarding 
Ukraine.
    President Trump ordered federal agencies and officials to 
disregard all voluntary requests for documents and defy all 
duly authorized subpoenas for records. He also directed all 
federal officials in the Executive Branch not to testify--even 
when compelled.
    No other President has flouted the Constitution and power 
of Congress to conduct oversight to this extent. No President 
has claimed for himself the right to deny the House's authority 
to conduct an impeachment proceeding, control the scope of a 
power exclusively vested in the House, and forbid any and all 
cooperation from the Executive Branch. Even President Richard 
Nixon--who obstructed Congress by refusing to turn over key 
evidence--accepted the authority of Congress to conduct an 
impeachment inquiry and permitted his aides and advisors to 
produce documents and testify to Congressional committees.
    Despite President Trump's unprecedented and categorical 
commands, the House gathered overwhelming evidence of his 
misconduct from courageous individuals who were willing to 
follow the law, comply with duly authorized subpoenas, and tell 
the truth. In response, the President engaged in a brazen 
effort to publicly attack and intimidate these witnesses.
    If left unanswered, President Trump's ongoing effort to 
thwart Congress' impeachment power risks doing grave harm to 
the institution of Congress, the balance of power between our 
branches of government, and the Constitutional order that the 
President and every Member of Congress have sworn to protect 
and defend.

  Constitutional Authority for Congressional Oversight and Impeachment

    The House's Constitutional and legal authority to conduct 
an impeachment inquiry is clear, as is the duty of the 
President to cooperate with the House's exercise of this 
authority.
    Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives the House of 
Representatives the ``sole Power of Impeachment.'' The Framers 
intended the impeachment power to be an essential check on a 
President who might engage in corruption or abuse of power. 
Congress is empowered to conduct oversight and investigations 
to carry out its authorities under Article I. Because the 
impeachment power is a core component of the nation's 
Constitutional system of checks and balances, Congress' 
investigative authority is at its zenith during an impeachment 
inquiry.
    The Supreme Court has made clear that Congress' authority 
to investigate includes the authority to compel the production 
of information by issuing subpoenas, a power the House has 
delegated to its committees pursuant to its Constitutional 
authority to ``determine the Rules of its Proceedings.''
    Congress has also enacted statutes to support its power to 
investigate and oversee the Executive Branch. These laws impose 
criminal and other penalties on those who fail to comply with 
inquiries from Congress or block others from doing so, and they 
reflect the broader Constitutional requirement to cooperate 
with Congressional investigations.
    Unlike President Trump, past Presidents who were the 
subject of impeachment inquiries--including Presidents Andrew 
Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton--recognized and, to 
varying degrees, complied with information requests and 
subpoenas.
    President Nixon, for example, agreed to let his staff 
testify voluntarily in the Senate Watergate investigation, 
stating: ``All members of the White House Staff will appear 
voluntarily when requested by the committee. They will testify 
under oath, and they will answer fully all proper questions.'' 
President Nixon also produced documents in response to the 
House's subpoenas as part of its impeachment inquiry, including 
more than 30 transcripts of White House recordings and notes 
from meetings with the President. When President Nixon withheld 
tape recordings and produced heavily edited and inaccurate 
records, the House Judiciary Committee approved an article of 
impeachment for obstruction.

             The President's Categorical Refusal to Comply

    Even before the House of Representatives launched its 
investigation regarding Ukraine, President Trump rejected the 
authority of Congress to investigate his actions, proclaiming, 
``We're fighting all the subpoenas,'' and ``I have an Article 
II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as 
president.''
    When the Intelligence, Oversight and Reform, and Foreign 
Affairs Committees began reviewing the President's actions as 
part of the House's impeachment inquiry, the President 
repeatedly challenged the legitimacy of the investigation in 
word and deed. His rhetorical attacks appeared intended not 
only to dispute reports of his misconduct, but to persuade the 
American people that the House lacks authority to investigate 
the President.
    On September 26, President Trump argued that Congress 
should not be ``allowed'' to impeach him under the Constitution 
and that there ``should be a way of stopping it--maybe legally, 
through the courts.'' A common theme of his defiance has been 
his claims that Congress is acting in an unprecedented way and 
using unprecedented rules. However, the House has been 
following the same investigative rules that Republicans 
championed when they were in control.
    On October 8, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone sent a 
letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the Chairmen of the 
investigating Committees confirming that President Trump 
directed his entire Administration not to cooperate with the 
House's impeachment inquiry. Mr. Cipollone wrote: ``President 
Trump cannot permit his Administration to participate in this 
partisan inquiry under these circumstances.''
    Mr. Cipollone's letter advanced remarkably politicized 
arguments and legal theories unsupported by the Constitution, 
judicial precedent, and more than 200 years of history. If 
allowed to stand, the President's defiance, as justified by Mr. 
Cipollone, would represent an existential threat to the 
nation's Constitutional system of checks and balances, 
separation of powers, and rule of law.

  The President's Refusal to Produce Any and All Subpoenaed Documents

    Following President Trump's categorical order, not a single 
document has been produced by the White House, the Office of 
the Vice President, the Office of Management and Budget, the 
Department of State, the Department of Defense, or the 
Department of Energy in response to 71 specific, individualized 
requests or demands for records in their possession, custody, 
or control. These subpoenas remain in full force and effect. 
These agencies and offices also blocked many current and former 
officials from producing records directly to the Committees.
    Certain witnesses defied the President's sweeping, 
categorical, and baseless order and identified the substance of 
key documents. For example, Ambassador Gordon Sondland attached 
ten exhibits to his written hearing testimony reflecting 
reproductions of certain communications with high-level 
Administration officials, including Acting White House Chief of 
Staff Mick Mulvaney, former National Security Advisor John 
Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Secretary of Energy 
Rick Perry. Other witnesses identified numerous additional 
documents that the President and various agencies are 
withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment 
inquiry.
    Like the White House, the Department of State refused to 
produce a single document in response to its subpoena, even 
though there is no legal basis for the Department's actions. In 
fact, on November 22, the Department was forced to produce 99 
pages of emails, letters, notes, timelines, and news articles 
to a non-partisan, nonprofit ethics watchdog organization 
pursuant to a court order in a lawsuit filed under the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA). Although limited in scope, this 
production affirms that the Department is withholding 
responsive documents from Congress without any valid legal 
basis.

         The President's Refusal to Allow Top Aides to Testify

    No other President in history has issued an order 
categorically directing the entire Executive Branch not to 
testify before Congress, including in the context of an 
impeachment inquiry. President Trump issued just such an order.
    As reflected in Mr. Cipollone's letter, President Trump 
directed government witnesses to violate their legal 
obligations and defy House subpoenas--regardless of their 
offices or positions. President Trump even extended his order 
to former officials no longer employed by the federal 
government. This Administration-wide effort to prevent all 
witnesses from providing testimony was coordinated and 
comprehensive.
    At President Trump's direction, twelve current or former 
Administration officials refused to testify as part of the 
House's impeachment inquiry, ten of whom did so in defiance of 
duly authorized subpoenas:
     Mick Mulvaney, Acting White House Chief of Staff
     Robert B. Blair, Assistant to the President and 
Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff
     Ambassador John Bolton, Former National Security 
Advisor
     John A. Eisenberg, Deputy Counsel to the President 
for National Security Affairs and Legal Advisor, National 
Security Council
     Michael Ellis, Senior Associate Counsel to the 
President and Deputy Legal Advisor, National Security Council
     Preston Wells Griffith, Senior Director for 
International Energy and Environment, National Security Council
     Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant 
to the President for National Security Affairs, National 
Security Council
     Russell T. Vought, Acting Director, Office of 
Management and Budget
     Michael Duffey, Associate Director for National 
Security Programs, Office of Management and Budget
     Brian McCormack, Associate Director for Natural 
Resources, Energy, and Science, Office of Management and Budget
     T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, Department of 
State
     Secretary Rick Perry, Department of Energy
    These witnesses were warned that their refusal to testify 
``shall constitute evidence that may be used against you in a 
contempt proceeding'' and ``may be used as an adverse inference 
against you and the President.''

   The President's Unsuccessful Attempts to Block Other Key Witnesses

    Despite President Trump's orders that no Executive Branch 
employees should cooperate with the House's impeachment 
inquiry, multiple key officials complied with duly authorized 
subpoenas and provided critical testimony at depositions and 
public hearings. These officials not only served their nation 
honorably, but they fulfilled their oath to support and defend 
the Constitution of the United States.
    In addition to the President's broad orders seeking to 
prohibit all Executive Branch employees from testifying, many 
of these witnesses were personally directed by senior political 
appointees not to cooperate with the House's impeachment 
inquiry. These directives frequently cited or enclosed copies 
of Mr. Cipollone's October 8 letter conveying the President's 
order not to comply.
    For example, the State Department, relying on President 
Trump's order, attempted to block Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch 
from testifying, but she fulfilled her legal obligations by 
appearing at a deposition on October 11 and a hearing on 
November 15. More than a dozen current and former officials 
followed her courageous example by testifying at depositions 
and public hearings over the course of the last two months. The 
testimony from these witnesses produced overwhelming and clear 
evidence of President Trump's misconduct, which is described in 
detail in the first section of this report.

               The President's Intimidation of Witnesses

    President Trump publicly attacked and intimidated witnesses 
who came forward to comply with duly authorized subpoenas and 
testify about his misconduct, raising grave concerns about 
potential violations of criminal laws intended to protect 
witnesses appearing before Congressional proceedings. For 
example, the President attacked:
     Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, who served the 
United States honorably for decades as a U.S. diplomat and 
anti-corruption advocate in posts around the world under six 
different Presidents;
     Ambassador Bill Taylor, who graduated at the top 
of his class at West Point, served as an infantry commander in 
Vietnam, and earned a Bronze Star and an Air Medal with a V 
device for valor;
     Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman, an active-
duty Army officer for more than 20 years who earned a Purple 
Heart for wounds he sustained in an improvised explosive device 
attack in Iraq, as well as the Combat Infantryman Badge; and
     Jennifer Williams, who is Vice President Mike 
Pence's top advisor on Europe and Russia and has a 
distinguished record of public service under the Bush, Obama, 
and Trump Administrations.
    The President engaged in this effort to intimidate these 
public servants to prevent them from cooperating with Congress' 
impeachment inquiry. He issued threats, openly discussed 
possible retaliation, made insinuations about their character 
and patriotism, and subjected them to mockery and derision--
when they deserved the opposite. The President's attacks were 
broadcast to millions of Americans--including witnesses' 
families, friends, and coworkers.
    It is a federal crime to intimidate or seek to intimidate 
any witness appearing before Congress. This prohibition applies 
to anyone who knowingly ``uses intimidation, threatens, or 
corruptly persuades'' another person in order to ``influence, 
delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official 
proceeding.'' Violations of this law can carry a criminal 
sentence of up to 20 years in prison.
    In addition to his relentless attacks on witnesses who 
testified in connection with the House's impeachment inquiry, 
the President also repeatedly threatened and attacked a member 
of the Intelligence Community who filed an anonymous 
whistleblower complaint raising an ``urgent concern'' that 
``appeared credible'' regarding the President's conduct. The 
whistleblower filed the complaint confidentially with the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, as authorized 
by the relevant whistleblower law. Federal law prohibits the 
Inspector General from revealing the whistleblower's identity. 
Federal law also protects the whistleblower from retaliation.
    In more than 100 public statements about the whistleblower 
over a period of just two months, the President publicly 
questioned the whistleblower's motives, disputed the accuracy 
of the whistleblower's account, and encouraged others to reveal 
the whistleblower's identity. Most chillingly, the President 
issued a threat against the whistleblower and those who 
provided information to the whistleblower regarding the 
President's misconduct, suggesting that they could face the 
death penalty for treason.
    The President's campaign of intimidation risks discouraging 
witnesses from coming forward voluntarily, complying with 
mandatory subpoenas for documents and testimony, and disclosing 
potentially incriminating evidence in this inquiry and future 
Congressional investigations.

                          KEY FINDINGS OF FACT

    Based on witness testimony and evidence collected during 
the impeachment inquiry, the Intelligence Committee has found 
that:
    I. Donald J. Trump, the 45th President of the United 
States--acting personally and through his agents within and 
outside of the U.S. government--solicited the interference of a 
foreign government, Ukraine, in the 2020 U.S. presidential 
election. The President engaged in this course of conduct for 
the benefit of his reelection, to harm the election prospects 
of a political opponent, and to influence our nation's upcoming 
presidential election to his advantage. In so doing, the 
President placed his personal political interests above the 
national interests of the United States, sought to undermine 
the integrity of the U.S. presidential election process, and 
endangered U.S. national security.
    II. In furtherance of this scheme, President Trump--
directly and acting through his agents within and outside the 
U.S. government--sought to pressure and induce Ukraine's newly-
elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, to publicly announce 
unfounded investigations that would benefit President Trump's 
personal political interests and reelection effort. To advance 
his personal political objectives, President Trump encouraged 
the President of Ukraine to work with his personal attorney, 
Rudy Giuliani.
    III. As part of this scheme, President Trump, acting in his 
official capacity and using his position of public trust, 
personally and directly requested from the President of Ukraine 
that the government of Ukraine publicly announce investigations 
into (1) the President's political opponent, former Vice 
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and his son, Hunter Biden, and 
(2) a baseless theory promoted by Russia alleging that 
Ukraine--rather than Russia--interfered in the 2016 U.S. 
election. These investigations were intended to harm a 
potential political opponent of President Trump and benefit the 
President's domestic political standing.
    IV. President Trump ordered the suspension of $391 million 
in vital military assistance urgently needed by Ukraine, a 
strategic partner, to resist Russian aggression. Because the 
aid was appropriated by Congress, on a bipartisan basis, and 
signed into law by the President, its expenditure was required 
by law. Acting directly and through his subordinates within the 
U.S. government, the President withheld from Ukraine this 
military assistance without any legitimate foreign policy, 
national security, or anti-corruption justification. The 
President did so despite the longstanding bipartisan support of 
Congress, uniform support across federal departments and 
agencies for the provision to Ukraine of the military 
assistance, and his obligations under the Impoundment Control 
Act.
    V. President Trump used the power of the Office of the 
President and exercised his authority over the Executive 
Branch, including his control of the instruments of the federal 
government, to apply increasing pressure on the President of 
Ukraine and the Ukrainian government to announce the 
politically-motivated investigations desired by President 
Trump. Specifically, to advance and promote his scheme, the 
President withheld official acts of value to Ukraine and 
conditioned their fulfillment on actions by Ukraine that would 
benefit his personal political interests:
          A. President Trump--acting through agents within and 
        outside the U.S. government--conditioned a head of 
        state meeting at the White House, which the President 
        of Ukraine desperately sought to demonstrate continued 
        United States support for Ukraine in the face of 
        Russian aggression, on Ukraine publicly announcing the 
        investigations that President Trump believed would aid 
        his reelection campaign.
          B. To increase leverage over the President of 
        Ukraine, President Trump, acting through his agents and 
        subordinates, conditioned release of the vital military 
        assistance he had suspended to Ukraine on the President 
        of Ukraine's public announcement of the investigations 
        that President Trump sought.
          C. President Trump's closest subordinates and 
        advisors within the Executive Branch, including Acting 
        Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, Secretary of State Mike 
        Pompeo, Secretary of Energy J. Richard Perry, and other 
        senior White House and Executive Branch officials had 
        knowledge of, in some cases facilitated and furthered 
        the President's scheme, and withheld information about 
        the scheme from the Congress and the American public.
    VI. In directing and orchestrating this scheme to advance 
his personal political interests, President Trump did not 
implement, promote, or advance U.S. anti-corruption policies. 
In fact, the President sought to pressure and induce the 
government of Ukraine to announce politically-motivated 
investigations lacking legitimate predication that the U.S. 
government otherwise discourages and opposes as a matter of 
policy in that country and around the world. In so doing, the 
President undermined U.S. policy supporting anti-corruption 
reform and the rule of law in Ukraine, and undermined U.S. 
national security.
    VII. By withholding vital military assistance and 
diplomatic support from a strategic foreign partner government 
engaged in an ongoing military conflict illegally instigated by 
Russia, President Trump compromised national security to 
advance his personal political interests.
    VIII. Faced with the revelation of his actions, President 
Trump publicly and repeatedly persisted in urging foreign 
governments, including Ukraine and China, to investigate his 
political opponent. This continued solicitation of foreign 
interference in a U.S. election presents a clear and present 
danger that the President will continue to use the power of his 
office for his personal political gain.
    IX. Using the power of the Office of the President, and 
exercising his authority over the Executive Branch, President 
Trump ordered and implemented a campaign to conceal his conduct 
from the public and frustrate and obstruct the House of 
Representatives' impeachment inquiry by:
          A. refusing to produce to the impeachment inquiry's 
        investigating Committees information and records in the 
        possession of the White House, in defiance of a lawful 
        subpoena;
          B. directing Executive Branch agencies to defy lawful 
        subpoenas and withhold the production of all documents 
        and records from the investigating Committees;
          C. directing current and former Executive Branch 
        officials not to cooperate with the Committees, 
        including in defiance of lawful subpoenas for 
        testimony; and
          D. intimidating, threatening, and tampering with 
        prospective and actual witnesses in the impeachment 
        inquiry in an effort to prevent, delay, or influence 
        the testimony of those witnesses.
    In so doing, and despite the fact that the Constitution 
vests in the House of Representatives the ``sole Power of 
Impeachment,'' the President sought to arrogate to himself the 
right to determine the propriety, scope, and nature of an 
impeachment inquiry into his own misconduct, and the right to 
deny any and all information to the Congress in the conduct of 
its constitutional responsibilities.
                               SECTION I.


                       THE PRESIDENT'S MISCONDUCT


       1. The President Forced Out the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine


The President forced out the United States Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie 
        Yovanovitch, following a baseless smear campaign promoted by 
        President Trump's personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, and others. 
        The campaign publicized conspiracy theories that benefited the 
        President's personal political interests and undermined 
        official U.S. policy, some of which the President raised during 
        his July 25 call with the President of Ukraine.

                                Overview

    On April 24, 2019, President Donald J. Trump abruptly 
recalled the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch. 
Ambassador Yovanovitch, an award-winning 33-year veteran 
Foreign Service officer, aggressively advocated for anti-
corruption reforms in Ukraine consistent with U.S. foreign 
policy. President Trump forced her out following a baseless 
smear campaign promoted by his personal attorney, Rudy 
Giuliani, associates of Mr. Giuliani, and corrupt Ukrainians.
    Ambassador Yovanovitch was told by the State Department 
that President Trump had lost confidence in her, but she was 
never provided a substantive justification for her removal. Her 
ouster set the stage for other U.S. officials appointed by 
President Trump to work in cooperation with Mr. Giuliani to 
advance a scheme in support of the President's reelection.
    Mr. Giuliani and his associates promoted false conspiracy 
theories about Ukraine colluding with Democrats to interfere in 
the 2016 U.S. election. This false claim was promoted by 
Russian President Vladimir Putin in February 2017--less than a 
month after the unanimous U.S. Intelligence Community 
assessment that Russia alone was responsible for a covert 
influence campaign aimed at helping President Trump during the 
2016 election. Mr. Giuliani also made discredited public 
allegations about former Vice President Joe Biden and his son, 
Hunter, in an apparent effort to hurt President Trump's 
political rival in the 2020 presidential election. Mr. 
Giuliani's associates, with their own ties to President Trump, 
also worked to enter into arrangements with current and former 
corrupt Ukrainian officials to promote these false 
allegations--the same unfounded allegations President Trump 
requested that Ukraine investigate on his July 25 call with 
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
    President Trump amplified these baseless allegations by 
tweeting them just a month before he recalled Ambassador 
Yovanovitch. Despite requests from Ambassador Yovanovitch and 
other senior State Department officials, Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo refused to issue a statement of support for the 
Ambassador or the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine for fear of being 
undermined by a tweet by President Trump.
    The removal of Ambassador Yovanovitch left a vacuum in the 
leadership of the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine at an important time. 
A new president had just been elected on an anti-corruption 
platform, and the country was in a period of transition as it 
continued to defend itself against Russia-led military 
aggression in the east.

    Anti-Corruption Ceremony Interrupted to Recall Anti-Corruption 
                               Ambassador

    Ambassador Yovanovitch represented the United States of 
America as the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine from 2016 to 2019. 
She is a non-partisan career public servant, first selected for 
the American Foreign Service in 1986. President George W. Bush 
named her as an Ambassador twice, to the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Armenia, and President Barack Obama nominated her for the 
posting in Kyiv.\1\
    On the evening of April 24, Ambassador Yovanovitch 
approached a podium in front of gold drapes at the U.S. 
Ambassador's residence in Ukraine's capital city. She was 
hosting an event to present an award of courage to the father 
of Kateryna Handziuk, who was brutally murdered by people who 
opposed her efforts to expose and root out public corruption in 
Ukraine. In 2018, attackers threw sulfuric acid at Ms. 
Handziuk, burning more than 30 percent of her body. After 
months of suffering and nearly a dozen surgeries, she died at 
the age of 33.\2\ Her attackers have still not been held to 
account.\3\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch began her speech by noting that Ms. 
Handziuk ``was a woman of courage who committed herself to 
speaking out against wrongdoing.'' She lamented how Ms. 
Handziuk had ``paid the ultimate price for her fearlessness in 
fighting against corruption and for her determined efforts to 
build a democratic Ukraine.'' She pledged that the United 
States would ``continue to stand with those engaged in the 
fight for a democratic Ukraine free of corruption, where people 
are held accountable'' and commended Ukrainians who ``have 
demonstrated to the world that they are willing to fight for a 
better system.''\4\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch concluded her remarks by holding Ms. 
Handziuk's story up as an inspiration to the many Ukrainians 
striving to chart a new course for their country in the face of 
Russian interference and aggression:

          I think we can all see what a remarkable woman 
        Kateryna Handziuk was, but she continues to inspire all 
        of us to fight for justice. She was a courageous woman, 
        who wanted to make Ukraine a better place. And she is 
        continuing to do so. And I'll just leave you with one 
        thought that was expressed in Washington at the 
        ceremony--that courage is contagious. I think we saw 
        that on the Maidan in 2014, we see that on the front 
        lines every day in the Donbas, we see it in the work 
        that Kateryna Handziuk did here in Ukraine. And we see 
        it in the work of all of you--day in, day out--fighting 
        for Ukraine and the future of Ukraine.\5\

    Ambassador Yovanovitch's evening was interrupted around 
10:00 p.m. by a telephone call from the State Department's 
headquarters in Washington, D.C.
    Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of 
Human Resources Ambassador Carol Perez warned that the 
Department's leaders had ``great concern'' and ``were worried'' 
about her. Ambassador Yovanovitch testified that it is ``hard 
to know how to react to something like that.'' Ambassador Perez 
said she did not know what the concerns were but pledged she 
would ``try to find out more'' and would try to call back ``by 
midnight.''\6\
    Finally, at 1:00 a.m. in Kyiv, Ambassador Perez called 
again: The ``concerns'' were from ``up the street'' at the 
White House. Ambassador Perez said that Ambassador Yovanovitch 
needed to ``come home immediately, get on the next plane to the 
U.S.'' She warned that there were concerns about Ambassador 
Yovanovitch's ``security.'' When Ambassador Yovanovitch asked 
if Ambassador Perez was referring to her physical safety, 
Ambassador Perez relayed that she ``hadn't gotten that 
impression that it was a physical security issue,'' but that 
Ambassador Yovanovitch ``needed to come home right away.''\7\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch asked Ambassador Perez specifically 
whether this order had anything to do with President Trump's 
personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, who had been making unfounded 
allegations against her in the media. Ambassador Perez said she 
``didn't know.''\8\ Ambassador Yovanovitch argued that this 
order to return to Washington, D.C. was ``extremely irregular'' 
and that no one had provided her a reason.\9\ In the end, 
however, Ambassador Yovanovitch swiftly returned to 
Washington.\10\

 Rudy Giuliani, on Behalf of President Trump, Led a Smear Campaign to 
                      Oust Ambassador Yovanovitch

    Ambassador Yovanovitch's recall followed a concerted smear 
campaign by Mr. Giuliani and his associates, promoted by 
President Trump. The campaign was largely directed by Mr. 
Giuliani, President Trump's personal attorney since early 
2018.\11\ A cast of supporting characters, which included 
corrupt Ukrainian prosecutors, now-indicted middlemen, 
conservative media pundits, and attorneys close to President 
Trump, assisted Mr. Giuliani. Among those associates were two 
U.S. citizens, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman. Mr. Parnas and Mr. 
Fruman were Florida-based businessmen who were represented by 
Mr. Giuliani ``in connection with their personal and business 
affairs'' and who also ``assisted Mr. Giuliani in connection 
with his representation of President Trump.''\12\ Both Mr. 
Parnas and Mr. Fruman were criminally indicted in the Southern 
District of New York in October and face charges of conspiring 
to violate the federal ban on foreign donations and 
contributions in connection with federal and state 
elections.\13\ Dr. Fiona Hill, former Deputy Assistant to the 
President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National 
Security Council (NSC), learned from her colleagues that 
``these guys were notorious in Florida and that they were bad 
news.''\14\
    The campaign was also propelled by individuals in Ukraine, 
including two prosecutors general. Yuriy Lutsenko served as the 
Prosecutor General of Ukraine under former Ukrainian President 
Petro Poroshenko--the incumbent who lost to President Zelensky 
in April 2019--and previously was the head of President 
Poroshenko's faction in the Ukrainian parliament.\15\ Viktor 
Shokin was Mr. Lutsenko's predecessor and was removed from 
office in 2016.\16\ Mr. Shokin has been described as ``a 
typical Ukraine prosecutor who lived a lifestyle far in excess 
of his government salary, who never prosecuted anybody known 
for having committed a crime,'' and ``covered up crimes that 
were known to have been committed.''\17\
    In late 2018, Ukrainian officials informed Ambassador 
Yovanovitch about Mr. Giuliani's and Mr. Lutsenko's plans to 
target her. They told her that Mr. Lutsenko ``was in 
communication with Mayor Giuliani'' and that ``they were going 
to, you know, do things, including to me.''\18\ Soon 
thereafter, Ambassador Yovanovitch learned that ``there had 
been a number of meetings'' between Mr. Giuliani and Mr. 
Lutsenko, who was looking to ``hurt'' her ``in the U.S.''\19\
    The allegations against Ambassador Yovanovitch, which later 
surfaced publicly, concerned false claims that she had provided 
a ``do-not-prosecute list'' to Mr. Lutsenko and made 
disparaging comments about President Trump.\20\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch inferred that Mr. Lutsenko was 
spreading ``falsehoods'' about her because she was ``effective 
at helping Ukrainians who wanted reform, Ukrainians who wanted 
to fight against corruption, and . . . that was not in his 
interest.''\21\ Anti-corruption reform was not in Mr. 
Lutsenko's interest because he himself was known to be 
corrupt.\22\ David Holmes, Counselor for Political Affairs at 
the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, explained that:

          In mid-March 2019, an Embassy colleague learned from 
        a Ukrainian contact that Mr. Lutsenko had complained 
        that Ambassador Yovanovitch had, quote, unquote, 
        destroyed him, with her refusal to support him until he 
        followed through with his reform commitments and ceased 
        using his position for personal gain.\23\

    Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent similarly 
summarized Mr. Lutsenko's smear campaign against Ambassador 
Yovanovitch, which was facilitated by Mr. Giuliani and his 
associates, as motivated by revenge:

          Over the course of 2018 and 2019, I became 
        increasingly aware of an effort by Rudy Giuliani and 
        others, including his associates Lev Parnas and Igor 
        Fruman, to run a campaign to smear Ambassador 
        Yovanovitch and other officials at the U.S. Embassy in 
        Kyiv. The chief agitators on the Ukrainian side of this 
        effort were some of those same corrupt former 
        prosecutors I had encountered, particularly Yuriy 
        Lutsenko and Viktor Shokin. They were now peddling 
        false information in order to extract revenge against 
        those who had exposed their misconduct, including U.S. 
        diplomats, Ukrainian anticorruption officials, and 
        reform-minded civil society groups in Ukraine.\24\

    Mr. Kent succinctly summarized, ``[y]ou can't promote 
principled anti-corruption efforts without pissing off corrupt 
people.''\25\ By doing her job, Ambassador Yovanovitch drew Mr. 
Lutsenko's ire.
    In late 2018 and early 2019, Mr. Lutsenko also risked 
losing his job as Prosecutor General, and risked possible 
criminal investigation, if then-candidate Volodymyr Zelensky 
won the presidency. Special Representative for Ukraine 
Negotiations, Ambassador Kurt Volker, explained:

          As is often the case in Ukraine, a change in power 
        would mean change in prosecutorial powers as well, and 
        there have been efforts in the past at prosecuting the 
        previous government. I think Mr. Lutsenko, in my 
        estimation, and I said this to Mayor Giuliani when I 
        met with him, was interested in preserving his own 
        position. He wanted to avoid being fired by a new 
        government in order to prevent prosecution of himself, 
        possible prosecution of himself.\26\

    Officials in Ukraine have also speculated that Mr. Lutsenko 
cultivated his relationship with Mr. Giuliani in an effort to 
hold on to his position.\27\ Ambassador Yovanovitch described 
Mr. Lutsenko as an ``opportunist'' who ``will ally himself, 
sometimes simultaneously . . . with whatever political or 
economic forces he believes will suit his interests best at the 
time.''\28\
    Mr. Lutsenko promoted debunked conspiracy theories that had 
gained traction with President Trump and Mr. Giuliani. Those 
debunked conspiracy theories alleged that the Ukrainian 
government--not Russia--was behind the hack of the Democratic 
National Committee (DNC) server in 2016, and that former Vice 
President Biden had petitioned for the removal of Mr. Shokin to 
prevent an investigation into Burisma Holdings, a Ukrainian 
energy company for which Vice President Biden's son, Hunter, 
served as a board member.
    Both conspiracy theories served the personal political 
interests of President Trump because they would help him in his 
campaign for reelection in 2020. The first would serve to 
undercut Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation, which 
was still underway when Mr. Giuliani began his activities in 
Ukraine and was denounced as a ``witch hunt'' by the President 
and his supporters.\29\ The second would serve to damage 
Democratic presidential candidate Vice President Biden.
    These conspiracies lacked any basis in fact. The 
Intelligence Community, the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, both the Majority and Minority of the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the 
investigation undertaken by Special Counsel Robert Mueller 
concluded that Russia was responsible for interfering in the 
2016 election.\30\ President Trump's former Homeland Security 
Advisor, Tom Bossert, said that the idea of Ukraine hacking the 
DNC server was ``not only a conspiracy theory, it is completely 
debunked.''\31\
    Russia has pushed the false theory that Ukraine was 
involved in the 2016 election to distract from its own 
involvement.\32\ Mr. Holmes testified that it was to President 
Putin's advantage to promote the theory of Ukrainian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. elections for several reasons:

          First of all, to deflect from the allegations of 
        Russian interference. Second of all, to drive a wedge 
        between the United States and Ukraine which Russia 
        wants to essentially get back into its sphere of 
        influence. Thirdly, to besmirch Ukraine and its 
        political leadership, [and] to degrade and erode 
        support for Ukraine from other key partners in Europe 
        and elsewhere.\33\

    The allegations that Vice President Biden inappropriately 
pressured the Ukrainians to remove Mr. Shokin also are without 
merit. Mr. Shokin was widely considered to be ineffective and 
corrupt.\34\ When he urged the Ukrainian government to remove 
Mr. Shokin, Vice President Biden was advocating for anti-
corruption reform and pursuing official U.S. policy.\35\ 
Moreover, Mr. Shokin's removal was supported by other 
countries, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, 
and was ``widely understood internationally to be the right 
policy.''\36\ In May 2019, even Mr. Lutsenko himself admitted 
that there was no credible evidence of wrongdoing by Hunter 
Biden or Vice President Biden.\37\
    Nevertheless, Mr. Giuliani engaged with both Mr. Lutsenko 
and Mr. Shokin regarding these baseless allegations. According 
to documents provided to the State Department Office of 
Inspector General, in January 23, 2019, Mr. Giuliani, Mr. 
Parnas, and Mr. Fruman participated in a conference call with 
Mr. Shokin. According to notes of the call, Mr. Shokin made 
allegations about Vice President Biden and Burisma. Mr. Shokin 
also claimed that Ambassador Yovanovitch had improperly denied 
him a U.S. visa and that she was close to Vice President 
Biden.\38\
    Mr. Giuliani separately met with Mr. Lutsenko in New 
York.\39\ Over the course of two days, on January 25 and 26, 
Mr. Giuliani, Mr. Lutsenko, Mr. Parnas, and Mr. Fruman, 
reportedly discussed whether Ambassador Yovanovitch was ``loyal 
to President Trump,'' as well as investigations into Burisma 
and the Bidens.\40\ For his part, Mr. Lutsenko later said he 
``understood very well'' that Mr. Giuliani wanted Mr. Lutsenko 
to investigate former Vice President Biden and his son, Hunter. 
``I have 23 years in politics,'' Mr. Lutsenko said. ``I knew . 
. . . I'm a political animal.''\41\
    Mr. Giuliani later publicly acknowledged that he was 
seeking information from Ukrainians on behalf of his client, 
President Trump. On October 23, Mr. Giuliani tweeted 
``everything I did was to discover evidence to defend my client 
against false charges.''\42\ Then, in a series of tweets on 
October 30, Mr. Giuliani stated:

          All of the information I obtained came from 
        interviews conducted as . . . private defense counsel 
        to POTUS, to defend him against false allegations. I 
        began obtaining this information while Mueller was 
        still investigating his witch hunt and a full 5 months 
        before Biden even announced his run for Pres.\43\

    President Trump and Mr. Giuliani's efforts to investigate 
alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and 
Vice President Biden negatively impacted the U.S. Embassy in 
Kyiv. Mr. Holmes testified:

          Beginning in March 2019, the situation at the Embassy 
        and in Ukraine changed dramatically. Specifically, the 
        three priorities of security, economy, and justice and 
        our support for Ukrainian democratic resistance to 
        Russian aggression became overshadowed by a political 
        agenda promoted by former New York City Mayor Rudy 
        Giuliani and a cadre of officials operating with a 
        direct channel to the White House.\44\

    U.S. national interests in Ukraine were undermined and 
subordinated to the personal, political interests of President 
Trump.

           The Smear Campaign Accelerated in Late March 2019

    The smear campaign entered a more public phase in the 
United States in late March 2019 with the publication of a 
series of opinion pieces in The Hill.
    On March 20, 2019, John Solomon penned an opinion piece 
quoting a false claim by Mr. Lutsenko that Ambassador 
Yovanovitch had given him a do-not-prosecute list.\45\ Mr. 
Lutsenko later retracted the claim.\46\ Mr. Solomon's work also 
included false allegations that Ambassador Yovanovitch had 
``made disparaging statements about President Trump.''\47\ 
Ambassador Yovanovitch called this allegation ``fictitious,'' 
and the State Department issued a statement describing the 
allegations as a ``fabrication.''\48\
    The Committees uncovered evidence of close ties and 
frequent contacts between Mr. Solomon and Mr. Parnas, who was 
assisting Mr. Giuliani in connection with his representation of 
the President. Phone records show that in the 48 hours before 
publication of The Hill opinion piece, Mr. Parnas spoke with 
Mr. Solomon.\49\ In addition, The Hill piece cited a letter 
dated May 9, 2018, from Representative Pete Sessions (R-Texas) 
to Secretary Pompeo, in which Rep. Sessions accused Ambassador 
Yovanovitch of speaking ``privately and repeatedly about her 
disdain for the current administration.''\50\ A federal 
criminal indictment alleges that in or about May 2018, Mr. 
Parnas sought a congressman's assistance to remove Ambassador 
Yovanovitch, at the request of one or more Ukrainian government 
officials.\51\
    On March 20, 2019, the day The Hill opinion piece was 
published, Mr. Parnas again spoke with Mr. Solomon for 11 
minutes.\52\ Shortly after that phone call, President Trump 
promoted Mr. Solomon's article in a tweet.\53\
    Following President Trump's tweet, the public attacks 
against Ambassador Yovanovitch were further amplified on social 
media and were merged with the conspiracy theories regarding 
both Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and the 
Bidens. On March 22, 2019, Mr. Giuliani tweeted: ``Hillary, 
Kerry, and Biden people colluding with Ukrainian operatives to 
make money and affect 2016 election.'' He also gave an 
interview to Fox News in which he raised Hunter Biden and 
called for an investigation.\54\ Then, on March 24, Donald 
Trump, Jr. called Ambassador Yovanovitch a ``joker'' on Twitter 
and called for her removal.\55\
    This campaign reverberated in Ukraine. Mr. Kent testified 
that ``starting in mid-March'' Mr. Giuliani was ``almost 
unmissable'' during this ``campaign of slander'' against 
Ambassador Yovanovitch.\56\ According to Mr. Kent, Mr. 
Lutsenko's press spokeswoman retweeted Donald Trump, Jr.'s 
tweet attacking the Ambassador.\57\

   Concerns About President Trump Kept State Department From Issuing 
                          Statement of Support

    At the end of March, as this smear campaign intensified, 
Ambassador Yovanovitch sent Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs David Hale an email identifying her concerns 
with the false allegations about her and asking for a strong 
statement of support from the State Department. She explained 
that, otherwise, ``it makes it hard to be a credible ambassador 
in a country.''\58\ Ambassador Hale had been briefed on the 
smears in a series of emails from Mr. Kent.\59\ Ambassador Hale 
agreed that the allegations were without merit.\60\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch was told that State Department 
officials were concerned that if they issued a public statement 
supporting her, ``it could be undermined'' by ``[t]he 
President.''\61\ Ambassador Hale explained that a statement of 
support ``would only fuel further negative reaction'' and that 
``it might even provoke a public reaction from the President 
himself about the Ambassador.''\62\ In short, State Department 
officials were concerned ``that the rug would be pulled out 
from underneath the State Department.''\63\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch turned to the U.S. Ambassador to the 
European Union, Gordon Sondland, for advice. According to 
Ambassador Yovanovitch, Ambassador Sondland suggested that, in 
response to the smear campaign, she make a public statement in 
support of President Trump. She said Ambassador Sondland told 
her, ``you need to go big or go home'' and ``tweet out there 
that you support the President, and that all these are lies and 
everything else.''\64\ Ambassador Yovanovitch said she felt 
that this ``was advice that I did not see how I could implement 
in my role as an Ambassador, and as a Foreign Service 
officer.''\65\
    Ultimately, Secretary Pompeo refused to issue a public 
statement of support for Ambassador Yovanovitch. At the same 
time Secretary Pompeo was refusing to issue a statement, he was 
communicating with one of the individuals involved in the smear 
campaign against her. Records and witness testimony indicate 
that Secretary Pompeo spoke to Mr. Giuliani on March 26, 28, 
and 29, not long after Mr. Solomon's first article in The 
Hill.\66\

   The Smear Campaign was a Coordinated Effort by Mr. Giuliani, His 
       Associates, and One or More Individuals at the White House

    In April, Mr. Solomon continued to publish opinion pieces 
about Ambassador Yovanovitch and other conspiracy theories 
being pursued by Mr. Giuliani on behalf of President Trump. Mr. 
Solomon was not working alone. As further described below, 
there was a coordinated effort by associates of President Trump 
to push these false narratives publicly, as evidenced by public 
statements, phone records, and contractual agreements.
    On April 1, Mr. Solomon published an opinion piece in The 
Hill alleging that Vice President Biden had inappropriately 
petitioned for the removal of Mr. Shokin to protect his son, 
Hunter.\67\ The opinion piece was entitled, ``Joe Biden's 2020 
Ukrainian Nightmare: A Closed Probe is Revived.'' Many of the 
allegations in the piece were based on information provided by 
Mr. Lutsenko. The following day, Donald Trump, Jr. retweeted 
the article.\68\
    Phone records obtained by the Committees show frequent 
communication between key players during this phase of the 
scheme. Between April 1 and April 7, Mr. Parnas exchanged 
approximately 16 calls with Mr. Giuliani (longest duration 
approximately seven minutes) and approximately 10 calls with 
Mr. Solomon (longest duration approximately nine minutes).\69\
    On April 7, Mr. Solomon followed up with another opinion 
piece. The piece accused Ambassador Yovanovitch of preventing 
the issuance of U.S. visas for Ukrainian officials who wished 
to travel to the United States to provide purported evidence of 
wrongdoing by ``American Democrats and their allies in 
Kiev.''\70\ One of those Ukrainian officials allegedly denied a 
visa was Kostiantyn Kulyk, a deputy to Mr. Lutsenko. Mr. Kulyk 
participated in a ``wide-ranging interview'' with Mr. Solomon 
and was extensively quoted.\71\
    These Ukrainian officials claimed to have evidence of 
wrongdoing about Vice President Biden's efforts in 2015 to 
remove Mr. Shokin, Hunter Biden's role as a Burisma board 
member, Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election in 
favor of Hillary Clinton, and the misappropriation and transfer 
of Ukrainian funds abroad.\72\ The opinion piece also made 
clear that Mr. Giuliani was pursuing these very same theories 
on behalf of the President:

          More recently, President Trump's private attorney 
        Rudy Giuliani--former mayor and former U.S. attorney in 
        New York City--learned about some of the allegations 
        while, on behalf of the Trump legal team, he looked 
        into Ukrainian involvement in the 2016 election.

    According to Mr. Solomon's piece, Mr. Lutsenko was reported 
to have sufficient evidence, ``particularly involving Biden, 
his family and money spirited out of Ukraine--to warrant a 
meeting with U.S. Attorney General William Barr.''\73\
    On the same day that Mr. Solomon published these 
allegations, Mr. Giuliani appeared on Fox News. Mr. Giuliani 
discussed how he learned about alleged Ukrainian interference 
in the 2016 U.S. elections and the Bidens' purported misconduct 
in Ukraine:

          Let me tell you my interest in that. I got 
        information about three or four months ago that a lot 
        of the explanations for how this whole phony 
        investigation started will be in the Ukraine, that 
        there were a group of people in the Ukraine that were 
        working to help Hillary Clinton and were colluding 
        really--[LAUGHTER]--with the Clinton campaign. And it 
        stems around the ambassador and the embassy, being used 
        for political purposes. So I began getting some people 
        that were coming forward and telling me about that. And 
        then all of a sudden, they revealed the story about 
        Burisma and Biden's son . . . [Vice President Biden] 
        bragged about pressuring Ukraine's president to firing 
        [sic] a top prosecutor who was being criticized on a 
        whole bunch of areas but was conducting investigation 
        of this gas company which Hunter Biden served as a 
        director.\74\
    The next day, April 8, Mr. Giuliani tweeted about Mr. 
Solomon's opinion piece.\75\
    Over the course of the four days following the April 7 
article, phone records show contacts between Mr. Giuliani, Mr. 
Parnas, Ranking Member Nunes, and Mr. Solomon. Specifically, 
Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Parnas were in contact with one another, 
as well as with Mr. Solomon.\76\ Phone records also show 
contacts on April 10 between Mr. Giuliani and Ranking Member 
Nunes, consisting of three short calls in rapid succession, 
followed by a nearly three-minute call.\77\ Later that same 
day, Mr. Parnas and Mr. Solomon had a four minute, 39 second 
call.\78\
    Victoria Toensing, a lawyer who, along with her partner 
Joseph diGenova, once briefly represented President Trump in 
connection with Special Counsel Robert Mueller's 
investigation,\79\ also was in phone contact with Mr. Giuliani 
and Mr. Parnas at the beginning of April.\80\
    Beginning in mid-April, Ms. Toensing signed retainer 
agreements between diGenova & Toensing LLP and Mr. Lutsenko, 
Mr. Kulyk, and Mr. Shokin--all of whom feature in Mr. Solomon's 
opinion pieces.\81\ In these retainer agreements, the firm 
agreed to represent Mr. Lutsenko and Mr. Kulyk in meetings with 
U.S. officials regarding alleged ``evidence'' of Ukrainian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, and to represent Mr. 
Shokin ``for the purpose of collecting evidence regarding his 
March 2016 firing as Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the role 
of Vice President Biden in such firing, and presenting such 
evidence to U.S. and foreign authorities.''\82\ On July 25, 
President Trump would personally press President Zelensky to 
investigate these very same matters.
    On April 23, Mr. Parnas had a call with Mr. Solomon, and 
multiple phone contacts with Mr. Giuliani.\83\ On that same 
day, Mr. Giuliani had a series of short phone calls (ranging 
from 11 to 18 seconds) with a phone number associated with the 
White House, followed shortly thereafter by an eight minute, 
28-second call with an unidentified number that called him.\84\ 
Approximately half an hour later, Mr. Giuliani had a 48-second 
call with a phone number associated with Ambassador John 
Bolton, National Security Advisor to the President.\85\
    That same day, Mr. Giuliani tweeted:

          Hillary is correct the report is the end of the 
        beginning for the second time . . . NO COLLUSION. Now 
        Ukraine is investigating Hillary campaign and DNC 
        conspiracy with foreign operatives including Ukrainian 
        and others to affect 2016 election. And there's no 
        Comey to fix the result.\86\

    The next day, on the morning of April 24, Mr. Giuliani 
appeared on Fox and Friends, lambasting the Mueller 
investigation. Mr. Giuliani also promoted the false conspiracy 
theories about Ukraine and Vice President Biden:

          And I ask you to keep your eye on Ukraine, because in 
        Ukraine, a lot of the dirty work was done in digging up 
        the information. American officials were used, 
        Ukrainian officials were used. That's like collusion 
        with the Ukrainians. And, or actually in this case, 
        conspiracy with the Ukrainians. I think you'd get some 
        interesting information about Joe Biden from Ukraine. 
        About his son, Hunter Biden. About a company he was on 
        the board of for years, which may be one of the most 
        crooked companies in Ukraine. . . . And Biden bragged 
        about the fact that he got the prosecutor general 
        fired. The prosecutor general was investigating his son 
        and then the investigation went south.\87\

    Later that day, Mr. Giuliani had three phone calls with a 
number associated with OMB, and eight calls with a White House 
phone number.\88\ One of the calls with the White House was 
four minutes, 53 seconds, and another was three minutes, 15 
seconds.
    Later that evening, the State Department phoned Ambassador 
Yovanovitch and abruptly called her home because of 
``concerns'' from ``up the street'' at the White House.\89\

     Ambassador Yovanovitch Was Informed That the President ``Lost 
                          Confidence'' in Her

    When Ambassador Yovanovitch returned to the United States 
at the end of April, Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan 
informed her that she had ``done nothing wrong,'' but ``there 
had been a concerted campaign'' against her and that President 
Trump had ``lost confidence'' in her leadership.\90\ He also 
told her that ``the President no longer wished me to serve as 
Ambassador to Ukraine, and that, in fact, the President had 
been pushing for my removal since the prior summer.''\91\ 
Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary of 
State for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, offered 
a similar assessment. He explained to Ambassador Yovanovitch 
that Secretary Pompeo had tried to ``protect'' her, but ``was 
no longer able to do that.''\92\
    Counselor of the Department of State T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, 
who had been handling Ambassador Yovanovitch's recall, refused 
to meet with her.\93\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch's final day as U.S. Ambassador to 
Ukraine was May 20, 2019. This was the same day as President 
Zelensky's inauguration, which was attended by Secretary of 
Energy Rick Perry, Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador 
Volker.\94\ Rather than joining the official delegation at the 
inaugural festivities, she finished packing her personal 
belongings and boarded an airplane for her final flight home. 
Three days later, President Trump met in the Oval Office with 
his hand-picked delegation and gave them the ``directive'' to 
``talk with Rudy [Giuliani]'' about Ukraine.\95\

   The President Provided No Rationale for the Recall of Ambassador 
                              Yovanovitch

    Ambassador Yovanovitch testified that she was never 
provided a justification for why President Trump recalled 
her.\96\ Only two months earlier, in early March 2019, 
Ambassador Yovanovitch had been asked by Ambassador Hale to 
extend her assignment as Ambassador to Ukraine until 2020.\97\
    Ambassador Hale testified that Ambassador Yovanovitch was 
``an exceptional officer doing exceptional work at a very 
critical embassy in Kyiv.''\98\ He added, ``I believe that she 
should've been able to stay at post and continue to do the 
outstanding work that she was doing.''\99\
    During her more than three-decade career, Ambassador 
Yovanovitch received a number of awards, including: the 
Presidential Distinguished Service Award, the Secretary's 
Diplomacy in Human Rights Award, the Senior Foreign Service 
Performance Award six times, and the State Department's 
Superior Honor Award five times.\100\
    Career foreign service officer Ambassador P. Michael 
McKinley, former Senior Advisor to Secretary Pompeo, testified 
that Ambassador Yovanovitch's reputation was ``excellent, 
serious, committed.''\101\ Ambassador Reeker described her as 
an ``[o]utstanding diplomat,'' ``very precise, very--very 
professional,'' ``an excellent mentor,'' and ``a good 
leader.''\102\

Ambassador Yovanovitch Strongly Advocated for the U.S. Policy to Combat 
                               Corruption

    Throughout the course of her career, and while posted to 
Kyiv, Ambassador Yovanovitch was a champion of the United 
States' longstanding priority of combatting corruption.
    Mr. Kent described U.S. foreign policy in Ukraine as 
encompassing the priorities of ``promoting the rule of law, 
energy independence, defense sector reform, and the ability to 
stand up to Russia.''\103\ Ambassador Yovanovitch testified 
that it ``was and remains a top U.S. priority to help Ukraine 
fight corruption'' because corruption makes Ukraine more 
``vulnerable to Russia.''\104\ Additionally, she testified that 
an honest and accountable Ukrainian leadership makes a U.S.-
Ukrainian partnership more reliable and more valuable to the 
United States.\105\
    Mr. Holmes testified that Ambassador Yovanovitch was 
successful in implementing anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine 
by achieving, for example, ``the hard-fought passage of a law 
establishing an independent court to try corruption 
cases.''\106\ Mr. Holmes said Ambassador Yovanovitch was ``[a]s 
good as anyone known for'' combatting corruption.\107\ The 
reforms achieved by Ambassador Yovanovitch helped reduce the 
problem faced by many post-Soviet countries of selective 
corruption prosecutions to target political opponents.\108\
    There was a broad consensus that Ambassador Yovanovitch was 
successful in helping Ukraine combat pervasive and endemic 
corruption.

   The President's Authority Does Not Explain Removal of Ambassador 
                              Yovanovitch

    While ambassadors serve at the pleasure of the president, 
the manner and circumstances of Ambassador Yovanovitch's 
removal were unusual and raise questions of motive.\109\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch queried ``why it was necessary to 
smear my reputation falsely.''\110\ She found it difficult to 
comprehend how individuals ``who apparently felt stymied by our 
efforts to promote stated U.S. policy against corruption'' were 
``able to successfully conduct a campaign of disinformation 
against a sitting ambassador using unofficial back 
channels.''\111\
    Dr. Hill similarly testified that while the President has 
the authority to remove an ambassador, she was concerned 
``about the circumstances in which [Ambassador Yovanovitch's] 
reputation had been maligned, repeatedly, on television and in 
all kinds of exchanges.'' Dr. Hill ``felt that that was 
completely unnecessary.''\112\

  The Recall of Ambassador Yovanovitch Threatened U.S.-Ukraine Policy

    The smear campaign questioning Ambassador Yovanovitch's 
loyalty undermined U.S. diplomatic efforts in Ukraine, a key 
U.S. partner and a bulwark against Russia's expansion into 
Europe. As Ambassador Yovanovitch explained:

          Ukrainians were wondering whether I was going to be 
        leaving, whether we really represented the President, 
        U.S. policy, et cetera. And so I think it was--you 
        know, it really kind of cut the ground out from 
        underneath us.\113\

    Summarizing the cumulative impact of the attacks, she 
emphasized: ``If our chief representative is kneecapped it 
limits our effectiveness to safeguard the vital national 
security interests of the United States.''\114\
    President Trump's recall of Ambassador Yovanovitch left the 
U.S. Embassy in Ukraine without an ambassador at a time of 
electoral change in Ukraine and when the Embassy was also 
without a deputy chief of mission. Mr. Kent explained:

          During the late spring and summer of 2019, I became 
        alarmed as those efforts bore fruit. They led to the 
        outer [ouster] of Ambassador Yovanovitch and hampered 
        U.S. efforts to establish rapport with the new Zelensky 
        administration in Ukraine.\115\
        . . .
          One of the unfortunate elements of the timing was 
        that we were also undergoing a transition in my old job 
        as deputy chief of mission. The person who replaced me 
        had already been moved early to be our DCM and Charge 
        in Sweden, and so we had a temporary acting deputy 
        chief of mission. So that left the embassy not only 
        without--the early withdrawal of Ambassador Yovanovitch 
        left us not only without an Ambassador but without 
        somebody who had been selected to be deputy chief of 
        mission.\116\

    It was not until late May that Secretary Pompeo asked 
Ambassador Bill Taylor, who had previously served as Ambassador 
to Ukraine, to return to Kyiv as Charge d'Affaires to lead the 
embassy while it awaited a confirmed Ambassador. Ambassador 
Taylor did not arrive in Kyiv until June 17, more than a month 
after Ambassador Yovanovitch officially left Kyiv.\117\ His 
mission to carry out U.S. objectives there would prove 
challenging in the face of ongoing efforts by Mr. Giuliani and 
others--at the direction of the President--to secure 
investigations demanded by the President to help his 
reelection.

2. The President Put Giuliani and the Three Amigos in Charge of Ukraine 
                                 Issues


After President Trump recalled Ambassador Yovanovitch, his personal 
        agent, Rudy Giuliani, intensified the President's campaign to 
        pressure Ukraine's newly-elected president to interfere in the 
        2020 U.S. election. President Trump directed his own political 
        appointees to coordinate with Mr. Giuliani on Ukraine, while 
        National Security Council officials expressed alarm over the 
        efforts to pursue a ``domestic political errand'' for the 
        political benefit of the President. Officials at the highest 
        levels of the White House and Trump Administration were aware 
        of the President's scheme.

                                Overview

    On April 21, 2019, the day that Ukrainian President 
Volodymyr Zelensky was elected as president of Ukraine, 
President Trump called to congratulate him. After a positive 
call--in which Mr. Zelensky complimented President Trump and 
requested that President Trump attend his inauguration--
President Trump instructed Vice President Mike Pence to lead 
the U.S. delegation to the inauguration. However, on May 13--
before the inauguration date was even set--President Trump 
instructed Vice President Pence not to attend.
    Rudy Giuliani also announced a plan to visit Ukraine in 
mid-May 2019--not on official U.S. government business, but 
instead to pursue on behalf of his client, President Trump, the 
debunked conspiracy theories about alleged Ukrainian 
interference in the 2016 election and discredited claims about 
the Bidens. After public scrutiny in response to his announced 
visit, Mr. Giuliani cancelled his trip and alleged that 
President-elect Zelensky was surrounded by ``enemies of the 
President.''
    Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, Ambassador to the European 
Union Gordon Sondland, and Ambassador Kurt Volker, Special 
Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, ultimately led the 
U.S. delegation to President Zelensky's inauguration. Upon 
returning to Washington, D.C., the three U.S. officials--who 
dubbed themselves the ``Three Amigos''--debriefed the President 
in the Oval Office and encouraged him to engage with President 
Zelensky. Instead of accepting their advice, President Trump 
complained that Ukraine is ``a terrible place, all corrupt, 
terrible people,'' and asserted that Ukraine ``tried to take me 
down in 2016.'' The President instructed the ``Three Amigos'' 
to ``talk to Rudy'' and coordinate with him on Ukraine matters. 
They followed the President's orders.
    Dr. Fiona Hill, Deputy Assistant to the President and 
Senior Director for Europe and Russia at the National Security 
Council, would later observe that Ambassador Sondland ``was 
being involved in a domestic political errand, and we [the NSC 
staff] were being involved in national security foreign policy, 
and those two things had just diverged.''

  A Political Newcomer Won Ukraine's Presidential Election on an Anti-
                          Corruption Platform

    On April 21, popular comedian and television actor, 
Volodymyr Zelensky, won a landslide victory in Ukraine's 
presidential election, earning the support of 73 percent of 
voters and unseating the incumbent Petro Poroshenko. Mr. 
Zelensky, who had no prior political experience, told voters a 
week before his victory: ``I'm not a politician. I'm just a 
simple person who came to break the system.''\118\ Five years 
earlier, in late 2013, Ukrainians had gathered in Kyiv and 
rallied against the corrupt government of former President 
Viktor Yanukovych, eventually forcing him to flee to the safety 
of Vladimir Putin's Russia. Mr. Zelensky's victory in April 
2019 reaffirmed the Ukrainian people's strong desire to 
overcome an entrenched system of corruption and pursue closer 
partnership with the West.\119\
    Following the election results, at 4:29 p.m. Eastern Time, 
President Trump was connected by telephone to President-elect 
Zelensky and congratulated him ``on a job well done . . . a 
fantastic election.'' He declared, ``I have no doubt you will 
be a fantastic president.''\120\
    According to a call record released publicly by the White 
House, President Trump did not openly express doubts about the 
newly-elected leader.\121\ And contrary to a public readout of 
the call originally issued by the White House, President Trump 
did not mention corruption in Ukraine, despite the NSC staff 
preparing talking points on that topic.\122\ Indeed, 
``corruption'' was not mentioned once during the April 21 
conversation, according to the official call record.\123\
    In the call, President-elect Zelensky lauded President 
Trump as ``a great example'' and invited him to visit Ukraine 
for his upcoming inauguration--a gesture that President Trump 
called ``very nice.''\124\ President Trump told Mr. Zelensky:

          I'll look into that, and well--give us the date and, 
        at a very minimum, we'll have a great representative. 
        Or more than one from the United States will be with 
        you on that great day. So, we will have somebody, at a 
        minimum, at a very, very high level, and they will be 
        with you.\125\

    Mr. Zelensky persisted. ``Words cannot describe our 
country,'' he went on, ``so it would be best for you to see it 
yourself. So, if you can come, that would be great. So again, I 
invite you to come.''\126\ President Trump responded, ``Well, I 
agree with you about your country and I look forward to 
it.''\127\ In a nod to his past experience working with Ukraine 
as a businessman, President Trump added, ``When I owned Miss 
Universe . . . Ukraine was always very well represented.''\128\
    President Trump then invited Mr. Zelensky to the White 
House to meet, saying: ``When you're settled in and ready, I'd 
like to invite you to the White House. We'll have a lot of 
things to talk about, but we're with you all the way.'' Mr. 
Zelensky promptly accepted the President's invitation, adding 
that the ``whole team and I are looking forward to that 
visit.''\129\
    Mr. Zelensky then reiterated his interest in President 
Trump attending his inauguration, saying, ``it will be 
absolutely fantastic if you could come and be with us.'' 
President Trump promised to let the Ukrainian leader know 
``very soon'' and added that he would see Mr. Zelensky ``very 
soon, regardless.''\130\
    Shortly after the April 21 call, Jennifer Williams, Special 
Advisor to the Vice President for Europe and Russia, learned 
that President Trump asked Vice President Pence to attend Mr. 
Zelensky's inauguration.\131\ Ms. Williams testified that in a 
separate phone call between Vice President Pence and President-
elect Zelensky two days later, ``the Vice President accepted 
that invitation from President Zelensky, and looked forward to 
being able to attend . . . if the dates worked out.''\132\ Ms. 
Williams and her colleagues began planning for the Vice 
President's trip to Kyiv.\133\

  Rudy Giuliani and his Associates Coordinated Efforts to Secure and 
      Promote the Investigations With Ukrainian President Zelensky

    As previously explained in Chapter 1, Mr. Giuliani, acting 
on behalf of President Trump, had for months engaged corrupt 
current and former Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian 
Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko. The April election of Mr. 
Zelensky, however, raised the possibility that Mr. Lutsenko 
might lose his job as Prosecutor General once Mr. Zelensky took 
power.
    In the immediate aftermath of President-elect Zelensky's 
election, Mr. Giuliani continued publicly to project confidence 
that Ukraine would deliver on investigations related to the 
Bidens. On April 24--before Ambassador Yovanovitch received 
calls abruptly summoning her back to Washington--Mr. Giuliani 
stated in an interview on Fox and Friends that viewers should,

          [K]eep your eye on Ukraine . . . I think you'd get 
        some interesting information about Joe Biden from 
        Ukraine. About his son, Hunter Biden. About a company 
        he was on the board of for years, which may be one of 
        the most crooked companies in Ukraine.\134\

    Behind the scenes, however, Mr. Giuliani was taking steps 
to engage the new Ukrainian leader and his aides.
    The day before, on April 23, the same day that Vice 
President Pence confirmed his plans to attend President-elect 
Zelensky's inauguration, Mr. Giuliani dispatched his own 
delegation--consisting of Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman--to meet 
with Ihor Kolomoisky, a wealthy Ukrainian with ties to 
President-elect Zelensky. Instead of going to Kyiv, they booked 
tickets to Israel, where they met with Mr. Kolomoisky.\135\ Mr. 
Kolomoisky owned Ukraine's largest bank until 2016, when 
Ukrainian authorities nationalized the failing financial 
institution. Although he denied allegations of committing any 
crimes, Mr. Kolomoisky subsequently left Ukraine for Israel, 
where he remained until President Zelensky assumed power.\136\
    Mr. Kolomoisky confirmed to the New York Times that he met 
with Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman in late April 2019. He claimed 
they sought his assistance in facilitating a meeting between 
Mr. Giuliani and President-elect Zelensky, and he told them, 
``you've ended up in the wrong place,'' and declined to arrange 
the requested meeting.\137\
    Mr. Giuliani was not deterred.
    During the time surrounding Ambassador Yovanovitch's 
recall, Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Parnas connected over a flurry of 
calls around a planned trip to Ukraine by Mr. Giuliani, which 
he would eventually cancel after growing public scrutiny. As 
previously described in Chapter 1, call records obtained by the 
Committees show a series of contacts on April 23 and 24 between 
Mr. Giuliani, the White House, Mr. Parnas, and John Solomon, 
among others.\138\
    On April 25, 2019, former Vice President Biden publicly 
announced his campaign for the Democratic nomination for 
President of the United States and launched his effort to 
unseat President Trump in the 2020 election.\139\
    That evening, Mr. Solomon published a new opinion piece in 
The Hill entitled, ``How the Obama White House Engaged Ukraine 
to Give Russia Collusion Narrative an Early Boost.'' Like Mr. 
Solomon's previous work, this April 25 piece repeated 
unsubstantiated conspiracy theories about alleged Ukrainian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.\140\
    Meanwhile, in Kyiv, David Holmes, Counselor for Political 
Affairs at the U.S. Embassy, learned on April 25 that Mr. 
Giuliani had reached out to Mr. Zelensky's campaign chair, Ivan 
Bakanov, seeking a channel to the newly-elected leader. Mr. 
Bakanov told Mr. Holmes ``that he had been contacted by, quote, 
someone named Giuliani, who said he was an advisor to the Vice 
President, unquote.''\141\ Mr. Holmes clarified that Mr. 
Bakanov was ``speaking in Russian'' and that he did not ``know 
what he [Bakanov] meant'' by his reference to the Vice 
President, ``but that's what he [Bakanov] said.''\142\ 
Regardless of Mr. Bakanov's apparent confusion as to who Mr. 
Giuliani represented, Mr. Holmes explained that by this point 
in time, Ukrainian officials seemed to think that Mr. Giuliani 
``was a significant person in terms of managing their 
relationship with the United States.''\143\
    At 7:14 p.m. Eastern Time on April 25, Mr. Giuliani once 
again received a call from an unknown ``-1'' number, which 
lasted four minutes and 40 seconds.\144\ Minutes later, Mr. 
Giuliani held a brief 36 second call with Sean Hannity, a Fox 
News opinion host.\145\
    On the night of April 25, President Trump called into Mr. 
Hannity's prime time Fox News show. In response to a question 
about Mr. Solomon's recent publication, President Trump said:

          It sounds like big stuff. It sounds very interesting 
        with Ukraine. I just spoke to the new president a 
        little while ago, two days ago, and congratulated him 
        on an incredible race. Incredible run. A big surprise 
        victory. That's 75 percent of the vote. But that sounds 
        like big, big stuff. I'm not surprised.\146\

    As Mr. Holmes later learned on July 26 from Ambassador 
Sondland, President Trump did not care about Ukraine, he cared 
about this ``big stuff''--such as the investigation into Vice 
President Biden.\147\
    In the same Fox News interview, Mr. Hannity asked President 
Trump whether America needed to see the purported evidence 
possessed by the unnamed Ukrainians noted in Mr. Solomon's 
piece. The President replied, invoking Attorney General William 
P. Barr:

          Well, I think we do. And, frankly, we have a great 
        new attorney general who has done an unbelievable job 
        in a very short period of time. And he is very smart 
        and tough and I would certainly defer to him. I would 
        imagine he would want to see this. People have been 
        saying this whole--the concept of Ukraine, they have 
        been talking about it actually for a long time. You 
        know that, and I would certainly defer to the attorney 
        general. And we'll see what he says about it. He calls 
        them straight. That's one thing I can tell you.\148\

    Ukraine's current Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka, 
who assumed his new position in late August 2019, told the 
Financial Times in late November 2019 that Attorney General 
Barr had made no contact regarding a potential investigation 
into allegations of wrongdoing by former Vice President 
Biden.\149\ In an apparent reference to President Trump's 
demand for Ukrainian interference in U.S. elections, Mr. 
Ryaboshapka stated: ``It's critically important for the west 
not to pull us into some conflicts between their ruling elites, 
but to continue to support so that we can cross the point of no 
return.''\150\

President Trump Promoted False Information About Former Vice President 
                               Joe Biden

    In early May, Mr. Giuliani continued his outreach to 
President-elect Zelensky and promoted the need for Ukrainian 
investigations into former Vice President Biden that served 
President Trump's political needs.
    On May 2, at 6:21 a.m. Eastern Time, President Trump 
retweeted a link to an article in the New York Times, which 
assessed that Mr. Giuliani's efforts underscored ``the Trump 
campaign's concern about the electoral threat from the former 
vice president's presidential campaign'' and noted that ``Mr. 
Giuliani's involvement raises questions about whether Mr. Trump 
is endorsing an effort to push a foreign government to proceed 
with a case that could hurt a political opponent at 
home.''\151\
    Later that evening, in an interview with Fox News at the 
White House, President Trump referenced the false allegations 
about the firing of a corrupt former Ukrainian prosecutor, 
Viktor Shokin, that Mr. Giuliani had been promoting. He was 
asked, ``Should the former vice president explain himself on 
his feeling in Ukraine and whether there was a conflict . . . 
with his son's business interests?''\152\ President Trump 
replied:

          I'm hearing it's a major scandal, major problem. Very 
        bad things happened, and we'll see what that is. They 
        even have him on tape, talking about it. They have Joe 
        Biden on tape talking about the prosecutor. And I've 
        seen that tape. A lot of people are talking about that 
        tape, but that's up to them. They have to solve that 
        problem.\153\

    ``The tape'' President Trump referenced in his interview 
was a publicly available video of former Vice President Biden 
speaking in January 2018 at an event hosted by the Council on 
Foreign Relations (CFR), a nonpartisan think-tank focused on 
foreign policy matters. During an interview with the CFR 
president, Vice President Biden detailed how the United 
States--consistent with the policy of its European allies and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)--withheld $1 billion in 
loan guarantees until the Ukrainian government acceded to 
uniform American and international demands to fire the corrupt 
prosecutor.\154\
    By late 2015, Ukrainians were agitating for Mr. Shokin's 
removal, and in March 2016, Ukraine's parliament voted to 
dismiss the prosecutor general.\155\ Multiple witnesses 
testified that Mr. Shokin's dismissal in 2016 made it more--not 
less--likely that Ukrainian authorities might investigate any 
allegations or wrongdoing at Burisma or other allegedly corrupt 
companies.\156\ Nonetheless, President Trump and his supporters 
sought to perpetuate the false narrative that Mr. Shokin should 
not have been removed from office and that Vice President Biden 
had acted corruptly in carrying out U.S. policy.

    Rudy Giuliani Was ``Meddling in an Investigation'' on Behalf of 
                            President Trump

    On May 7, 2019, Christopher Wray, the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified before the U.S. 
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 
Science, and Related Agencies regarding foreign interference in 
U.S. elections:

          My view is that, if any public official or member of 
        any campaign is contacted by any nation-state or 
        anybody acting on behalf of a nation-state about 
        influencing or interfering with our election, then that 
        is something that the FBI would want to know 
        about.\157\

    Mr. Giuliani nonetheless pressed forward with his plan to 
personally convey to President-elect Zelensky, on behalf of his 
client President Trump, the importance of opening 
investigations that would assist President Trump's reelection 
campaign.
    On the morning of May 8, Mr. Giuliani called the White 
House Switchboard and connected for six minutes and 26 seconds 
with someone at the White House.\158\ That same day, Mr. 
Giuliani also connected with Mr. Solomon for almost six minutes 
and separately with Mr. Parnas. Mr. Parnas connected for one 
minute 13 seconds and with Derek Harvey, a member of Ranking 
Member Nunes' staff on the Intelligence Committee, on the same 
day.\159\
    During a meeting that same day, Ukraine Minister of 
Interior Arsen Avakov disclosed to Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State George Kent that Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman would soon 
visit Kyiv ``and that they were coming with their associate, 
the Mayor Giuliani.''\160\ Minister Avakov confided to Mr. Kent 
that ``Mayor Giuliani had reached out to him and invited him to 
come and meet the group of them in Florida'' in February 
2019.\161\ Although he declined that offer, Minister Avakov 
indicated that he intended to accept their new invitation to 
meet in Kyiv.\162\
    The next day, on May 9, the New York Times publicized Mr. 
Giuliani's plan to visit Ukraine.\163\ Mr. Giuliani confirmed 
that he planned to meet with President Zelensky and press the 
Ukrainians to pursue investigations that President Trump 
promoted only days earlier on Fox News.\164\ The New York Times 
described Mr. Giuliani's planned trip as:

          [P]art of a monthslong effort by the former New York 
        mayor and a small group of Trump allies working to 
        build interest in the Ukrainian inquiries. Their 
        motivation is to . . . undermine the case against Paul 
        Manafort, Mr. Trump's imprisoned former campaign 
        chairman; and potentially to damage Mr. Biden, the 
        early front-runner for the 2020 Democratic presidential 
        nomination.\165\

    Mr. Giuliani claimed, ``We're not meddling in an election, 
we're meddling in an investigation, which we have a right to 
do.''\166\
    Only a few days after Director Wray's public comments about 
foreign interference in U.S. elections, Mr. Giuliani 
acknowledged that ``[s]omebody could say it's improper'' to 
pressure Ukraine to open investigations that would benefit 
President Trump. But, Mr. Giuliani argued:

          [T]his isn't foreign policy--I'm asking them to do an 
        investigation that they're doing already, and that 
        other people are telling them to stop. And I'm going to 
        give them reasons why they shouldn't stop it because 
        that information will be very, very helpful to my 
        client, and may turn out to be helpful to my 
        government.\167\

    Mr. Giuliani's ``client'' was President Trump, as Mr. 
Giuliani repeatedly stated publicly. According to Mr. Giuliani, 
the President fully supported putting pressure on Ukraine to 
open investigations that would benefit his 2020 reelection 
campaign.\168\ Mr. Giuliani emphasized that President Trump 
``basically knows what I'm doing, sure, as his lawyer.''\169\ 
Underscoring his commitment to pressuring Ukraine until it 
opened the investigations President Trump promoted on Fox News, 
Mr. Giuliani told the Washington Post that he would ``make sure 
that nothing scuttles the investigation that I want.''\170\
    On May 9, following public revelation of his trip by the 
New York Times, Mr. Giuliani connected in quick succession with 
Mr. Solomon and then Mr. Parnas for several minutes at a 
time.\171\ Mr. Giuliani then made brief connections with the 
White House Switchboard and Situation Room several times, 
before connecting at 1:43 p.m. Eastern Time with someone at the 
White House for over four minutes.\172\ He connected, 
separately, thereafter with Mr. Parnas several times in the 
afternoon and into the evening.\173\
    That evening, Mr. Giuliani tweeted:

          If you doubt there is media bias and corruption then 
        when Democrats conspiring with Ukrainian officials 
        comes out remember much of the press, except for Fox, 
        the Hill, and NYT, has suppressed it. If it involved 
        @realDonaldTrump or his son it would have been front 
        page news for weeks.\174\

    Shortly thereafter, on the night of May 9, he made an 
appearance on Fox News and reiterated that his trip to Ukraine 
was intended to further the President's personal and political 
interests by pressuring the Ukrainian government to investigate 
the Bidens:

          It's a big story. It's a dramatic story. And I 
        guarantee you, Joe Biden will not get to election day 
        without this being investigated, not because I want to 
        see him investigated. This is collateral to what I was 
        doing.\175\

    The next morning, on May 10, amidst the press coverage of 
his trip, Mr. Giuliani tweeted:

          Explain to me why Biden shouldn't be investigated if 
        his son got millions from a Russian loving crooked 
        Ukrainian oligarch while He was VP and point man for 
        Ukraine. Ukrainians are investigating and your fellow 
        Dems are interfering. Election is 17 months away. Let's 
        answer it now\176\

    He then had another flurry of calls with Mr. Parnas. 
Shortly after 2:00 p.m., Eastern Time, Mr. Giuliani also spoke 
with Ambassador Volker on the phone.\177\ Ambassador Volker had 
learned that Mr. Giuliani intended to travel to Ukraine ``to 
pursue these allegations that Lutsenko had made, and he was 
going to investigate these things''--specifically, the debunked 
story that Vice President Biden had improperly pressured 
Ukraine to fire a corrupt prosecutor general, as well as the 
Russian-backed conspiracy that the Ukrainians interfered in the 
2016 U.S. election.\178\ Ambassador Volker testified that he 
had a simple warning for Mr. Giuliani: Prosecutor General 
Lutsenko ``is not credible. Don't listen to what he is 
saying.''\179\ Call records obtained by the Committees reveal 
that their call lasted more than 30 minutes.\180\
    Call records also show that around midday on May 10, Mr. 
Giuliani began trading aborted calls with Kashyap ``Kash'' 
Patel, an official at the National Security Council who 
previously served on Ranking Member Nunes' staff on the 
Intelligence Committee. Mr. Patel successfully connected with 
Mr. Giuliani less than an hour after Mr. Giuliani's call with 
Ambassador Volker. Beginning at 3:23 p.m., Eastern Time, Mr. 
Patel and Mr. Giuliani spoke for over 25 minutes.\181\ Five 
minutes after Mr. Patel and Mr. Giuliani disconnected, an 
unidentified ``-1'' number connected with Mr. Giuliani for over 
17 minutes.\182\ Shortly thereafter, Mr. Giuliani spoke with 
Mr. Parnas for approximately 12 minutes.\183\
    That same afternoon, President Trump conducted a 15-minute 
long phone interview with Politico. In response to a question 
about Mr. Giuliani's upcoming visit to Kyiv, the President 
replied, ``I have not spoken to him at any great length, but I 
will . . . I will speak to him about it before he 
leaves.''\184\
    Recently, when asked what Mr. Giuliani was doing in Ukraine 
on his behalf, the President responded: ``Well, you have to ask 
that to Rudy, but Rudy, I don't, I don't even know. I know he 
was going to go to Ukraine, and I think he canceled a 
trip.''\185\ Prior to that, on October 2, the President 
publicly stated; ``And just so you know, we've been 
investigating, on a personal basis--through Rudy and others, 
lawyers--corruption in the 2016 election.''\186\ On October 4, 
the President publicly stated: ``If we feel there's corruption, 
like I feel there was in the 2016 campaign there was tremendous 
corruption against me--if we feel there's corruption, we have a 
right to go to a foreign country.''\187\
    By the evening of May 10, Mr. Giuliani appeared to have 
concerns about the incoming Ukrainian President. He appeared on 
Fox News and announced, ``I'm not going to go'' to Ukraine 
``because I think I'm walking into a group of people that are 
enemies of the President.''\188\ In a text message to Politico, 
Mr. Giuliani alleged the original offer for a meeting with 
President-elect Zelensky was a ``set up'' orchestrated by 
``several vocal critics'' of President Trump who were advising 
President-elect Zelensky.\189\ Mr. Giuliani declared that 
President-elect Zelensky ``is in [the] hands of avowed enemies 
of Pres[ident] Trump.''\190\
    Like Mr. Giuliani, President Trump would express hostility 
toward Ukraine in the days and weeks to come.

 Russian President Putin and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban Counseled 
                       President Trump on Ukraine

    In early May, Mr. Giuliani was not the only person who 
conveyed his skepticism of Ukraine to President Trump. The 
President reportedly discussed Ukraine with Russian President 
Vladimir Putin when they spoke by phone on May 3. President 
Trump posted on Twitter that he ``[h]ad a long and very good 
conversation with President Putin of Russia'' and discussed 
``even the ``Russian Hoax''--an apparent reference to the 
unanimous finding by the U.S. Intelligence Community that 
Russia interfered in the 2016 election with the aim of 
assisting President Trump's candidacy.\191\ Mr. Kent 
subsequently heard from Dr. Hill, the NSC's Senior Director for 
Europe and Russia, that President Putin also expressed negative 
views about Ukraine to President Trump. He testified that 
President Putin's motivation in undercutting President-elect 
Zelensky was ``very clear'':

          He denies the existence of Ukraine as a nation and a 
        country, as he told President Bush in Bucharest in 
        2008. He invaded and occupied 7 percent of Ukraine's 
        territory and he's led to the death of 13,000 
        Ukrainians on Ukrainian territory since 2014 as a 
        result of aggression. So that's his agenda, the agenda 
        of creating a greater Russia and ensuring that Ukraine 
        does not survive independently.\192\

    On May 13, President Trump met one-on-one for an hour with 
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. President Trump offered 
the leader a warm reception in the Oval Office and claimed 
Prime Minister Orban had ``done a tremendous job in so many 
different ways. Highly respected. Respected all over 
Europe.''\193\ The European Union and many European leaders, 
however, have widely condemned Prime Minister Orban for 
undermining Hungary's democratic institutions and promoting 
anti-Semitism and xenophobia.\194\
    Mr. Kent explained to the Committees that Prime Minister 
Orban's ``animus towards Ukraine is well-known, documented, and 
has lasted now two years.'' Due to a dispute over the rights of 
130,000 ethnic Hungarians who live in Ukraine, Mr. Kent noted 
that Prime Minister Orban ``blocked all meetings in NATO with 
Ukraine at the ministerial level or above,'' undercutting U.S. 
and European efforts to support Ukraine in its war against 
Russia.\195\ Nonetheless, President Trump told reporters prior 
to his meeting with Prime Minister Orban to not ``forget 
they're a member of NATO, and a very good member of 
NATO.''\196\
    Commenting on what Dr. Hill shared with him following the 
May 3 call and May 13 meeting, Mr. Kent said he understood 
President Trump's discussions about Ukraine with President 
Putin and Prime Minister Orban ``as being similar in tone and 
approach.'' He explained that ``both leaders'' had 
``extensively talked Ukraine down, said it was corrupt, said 
Zelensky was in the thrall of oligarchs'' the effect of which 
was ``negatively shaping a picture of Ukraine, and even 
President Zelensky personally.''\197\ The veteran State 
Department diplomat concluded, ``[T]hose two world leaders 
[Putin and Orban], along with former Mayor Giuliani, their 
communications with President Trump shaped the President's view 
of Ukraine and Zelensky, and would account for the change from 
a very positive first call on April 21 to his negative 
assessment of Ukraine.''\198\

President Trump Instructs Vice President Pence Not to Attend President 
                        Zelensky's Inauguration

    On Monday, May 13, at approximately 11:00 a.m. Eastern 
Time, Ms. Williams received a call from an assistant to the 
Vice President's Chief of Staff.\199\ President Trump, the 
assistant relayed, had ``decided that the Vice President would 
not attend the inauguration in Ukraine,'' despite the fact that 
Vice President Pence previously had accepted the 
invitation.\200\ Ms. Williams was never given a reason for the 
change in President Trump's decision.\201\
    Mr. Holmes later testified that:

          [The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv had] gone back and forth 
        with NSC staff about proposing a list of potential 
        members of the delegation. It was initially quite a 
        long list. We had asked who would be the senior [U.S.] 
        member of that delegation. We were told that Vice 
        President Pence was likely to be that senior member, it 
        was not yet fully agreed to. And so we were 
        anticipating that to be the case. And then the Giuliani 
        event happened, and then we heard that he was not going 
        to play that role.\202\

    Asked to clarify what he meant by ``the Giuliani event,'' 
Mr. Holmes replied, ``the interview basically saying that he 
had planned to travel to Ukraine, but he canceled his trip 
because there were, quote, unquote, enemies of the U.S. 
President in Zelensky's orbit.''\203\
    One of the individuals around President-elect Zelensky whom 
Mr. Giuliani publicly criticized was the oligarch Mr. 
Kolomoisky, who had refused to set up a meeting between Mr. 
Giuliani and President Zelensky. On May 18, Mr. Giuliani 
complained on Twitter that the oligarch ``returned from a long 
exile and immediately threatened and defamed two Americans, Lev 
Parnas and Igor Fruman. They are my clients and I have advised 
them to press charges.''\204\
    Mr. Kolomoisky responded to Mr. Giuliani in a televised 
interview and declared, ``Look, there is Giuliani, and two 
clowns, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman, who were engaging in 
nonsense. They are Giuliani's clients.'' He added: ``They came 
here and told us that they would organize a meeting with 
Zelensky. They allegedly struck a deal with [Prosecutor-General 
Yuriy] Lutsenko about the fate of this criminal case--Burisma, 
[former Vice President] Biden, meddling in the U.S. election 
and so on.''\205\ He warned that a ``big scandal may break out, 
and not only in Ukraine, but in the United States. That is, it 
may turn out to be a clear conspiracy against Biden.''\206\
    Despite Ukraine's significance to U.S. national security as 
a bulwark against Russian aggression and the renewed 
opportunity that President Zelensky's administration offered 
for bringing Ukraine closer to the United States and Europe, 
President Trump did not ask Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, 
Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, or National 
Security Advisor John Bolton to lead the delegation to 
President Zelensky's inauguration. Instead, according to Mr. 
Holmes, the White House ``ultimately whittled back an initial 
proposed list for the official delegation to the inauguration 
from over a dozen individuals to just five.''\207\
    Topping that list was Secretary Perry. Accompanying him 
were Ambassador Sondland, U.S. Special Representative for 
Ukraine Negotiations Ambassador Volker, and NSC Director for 
Ukraine Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman.\208\ Acting Deputy Chief of 
Mission (Charged'Affaires) of U.S. Embassy Kyiv Joseph 
Pennington joined the delegation, in place of outgoing U.S. 
Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch. U.S. Senator Ron 
Johnson also attended the inauguration and joined several 
meetings with the presidential delegation. When asked if this 
delegation was ``a good group,'' Mr. Holmes replied that it 
``was not as senior a delegation as we [the U.S. embassy] might 
have expected.''\209\
    Secretary Perry, Ambassador Volker, and Ambassador Sondland 
subsequently began to refer to themselves as the ``Three 
Amigos.'' During the delegation's meeting with President 
Zelensky, Mr. Holmes recounted that ``Secretary Perry passed 
President Zelensky a list of, quote, ``people he trusts'' from 
whom Zelensky could seek advice on energy sector reform, which 
was the topic of subsequent meetings between Secretary Perry 
and key Ukrainian energy sector contacts, from which Embassy 
personnel were excluded by Secretary Perry's staff.''\210\
    Mr. Holmes assessed that the delegation's visit proceeded 
smoothly, although ``at one point during a preliminary meeting 
of the inaugural delegation, someone in the group wondered 
aloud about why Mr. Giuliani was so active in the media with 
respect to Ukraine.''\211\ Ambassador Sondland responded: 
``Dammit, Rudy. Every time Rudy gets involved he goes and effs 
everything up.''\212\ Mr. Holmes added: ``He used the `F' 
word.''\213\
    By the time of the inauguration, Mr. Holmes assessed that 
President Zelensky and the Ukrainians were already starting to 
feel pressure to conduct political investigations related to 
former Vice President Biden.\214\ Lt. Col. Vindman also was 
concerned about the potentially negative consequences of Mr. 
Giuliani's political efforts on behalf of President Trump--both 
for U.S. national security and also Ukraine's longstanding 
history of bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress.\215\
    During the U.S. delegation's meeting with President 
Zelensky on the margins of the inauguration, Lt. Col. Vindman 
was the last person to speak.\216\ He ``offered two pieces of 
advice'' to President Zelensky. First, he advised the new 
leader, ``be particularly cautious with regards to Russia, and 
its desire to provoke Ukraine.''\217\ And second, Lt. Col. 
Vindman warned, ``stay out of U.S. domestic . . . 
politics.''\218\ Referencing the activities of Mr. Giuliani, 
Lt. Col Vindman explained:

          [I]n the March and April timeframe, it became clear 
        that there were--there were actors in the U.S., public 
        actors, nongovernmental actors that were promoting the 
        idea of investigations and 2016 Ukrainian interference. 
        And it was consistent with U.S. policy to advise any 
        country, all the countries in my portfolio, any country 
        in the world, to not participate in U.S. domestic 
        politics. So I was passing the same advice consistent 
        with U.S. policy.\219\

U.S. Officials Briefed President Trump About Their Positive Impressions 
                               of Ukraine

    Ambassadors Volker and Sondland left Kyiv with ``a very 
favorable impression'' of the new Ukrainian leader.\220\ They 
believed it was important that President Trump ``personally 
engage with the President of Ukraine in order to demonstrate 
full U.S. support for him,'' including by inviting him to 
Washington for a meeting in the Oval Office.\221\ It was agreed 
that the delegation would request a meeting with President 
Trump and personally convey their advice. They were granted 
time with President Trump on May 23.
    According to Mr. Kent, the delegation was able to secure 
the Oval Office meeting shortly after the return from Kyiv 
because of Ambassador Sondland's ``connections'' to Acting 
White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney and President 
Trump.\222\ Christopher Anderson, Special Advisor to Ambassador 
Kurt Volker, also attributed the delegation's ability to 
quickly confirm a meeting with President Trump to Ambassador 
Sondland's ``connections to the White House.''\223\
    At the May 23 meeting, Ambassadors Sondland and Volker were 
joined by Secretary Perry, Senator Johnson, and Dr. Charles M. 
Kupperman, the Deputy National Security Advisor. Mr. Mulvaney 
may have also participated.\224\
    Lt. Col. Vindman, who had represented the White House at 
President Zelensky's inauguration, did not participate in the 
meeting. Dr. Hill directed him not to join, because she had 
learned that ``there was some confusion'' from the President 
``over who the director for Ukraine is.''\225\ Specifically, 
Dr. Hill testified that around the time of the May 23 
debriefing in the Oval Office, she ``became aware by chance and 
accident'' that President Trump had requested to speak with the 
NSC's Ukraine director about unspecified ``materials.''\226\ A 
member of the NSC executive secretary's staff stated that in 
response to the President's request, ``we might be reaching out 
to Kash.''\227\
    Dr. Hill testified that she understood the staff to be 
referring to Mr. Patel, who then served as a director in the 
NSC's directorate of International Organizations and Alliances, 
not the directorate of Europe and Russia.\228\ She subsequently 
consulted with Dr. Kupperman and sought to clarify if Mr. Patel 
``had some special . . . Ambassador Sondland-like 
representational role on Ukraine'' that she had not been 
informed about, but ``couldn't elicit any information about 
that.''\229\ All Dr. Kupperman said was that he would look into 
the matter.\230\ Dr. Hill also testified that she never saw or 
learned more about the Ukraine-related ``materials'' that the 
President believed he had received from Mr. Patel, who 
maintained a close relationship with Ranking Member Nunes after 
leaving his staff to join the NSC.\231\

 President Trump Put the Three Amigos in Charge of the United States' 
   Ukraine Relationship and Directed Them to ``Talk to Rudy'' About 
                                Ukraine

    According to witness testimony, the May 23 debriefing with 
the President in the Oval Office proved consequential for two 
reasons. President Trump authorized Ambassador Sondland, 
Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Volker to lead engagement with 
President Zelensky's new administration in Ukraine. He 
instructed them, however, to talk to and coordinate with his 
personal attorney, Mr. Giuliani.
    Ambassador Sondland, Ambassador Volker, Secretary Perry, 
and Senator Johnson ``took turns'' making their case ``that 
this is a new crowd, it's a new President'' in Ukraine who was 
``committed to doing the right things,'' including fighting 
corruption.\232\ According to Ambassador Sondland, the group 
``emphasized the strategic importance of Ukraine'' and the 
value to the United States of strengthening the relationship 
with President Zelensky.\233\ They recommended that President 
Trump once again call President Zelensky and follow through on 
his April 21 invitation for President Zelensky to meet with him 
in the Oval Office.\234\
    President Trump reacted negatively to the positive 
assessment of Ukraine. Ambassador Volker recalled that 
President Trump said Ukraine is ``a terrible place, all 
corrupt, terrible people'' and was ``just dumping on 
Ukraine.''\235\ This echoed Mr. Giuliani's public statements 
about Ukraine during early May.
    According to both Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, 
President Trump also alleged, without offering any evidence, 
that Ukraine ``tried to take me down'' in the 2016 
election.\236\ The President emphasized that he ``didn't 
believe'' the delegation's positive assessment of the new 
Ukrainian President, and added ``that's not what I hear'' from 
Mr. Giuliani.\237\ President Trump said that Mr. Giuliani 
``knows all of these things'' and knows that President Zelensky 
has ``some bad people around him.''\238\ Rather than committing 
to an Oval Office meeting with the Ukrainian leader, President 
Trump directed the delegation to ``[t]alk to Rudy, talk to 
Rudy.''\239\
    Ambassador Sondland testified that the ``Three Amigos'' saw 
the writing on the wall and concluded ``that if we did not talk 
to Rudy, nothing would move forward on Ukraine.''\240\ He 
continued:

          [B]ased on the President's direction we were faced 
        with a choice. We could abandon the goal of a White 
        House meeting for President Zelensky, which we all 
        believed was crucial to strengthening U.S.-Ukrainian 
        ties . . . or we could do as President Trump directed 
        and talk to Mr. Giuliani to address the President's 
        concerns. We chose the latter path.\241\

    Ambassador Volker reached a similar conclusion. He believed 
``that the messages being conveyed by Mr. Giuliani were a 
problem, because they were at variance with what our official 
message to the President was, and not conveying that positive 
assessment that we all had. And so, I thought it was important 
to try to step in and fix the problem.''\242\ Ultimately, 
however, the ``problem'' posed by the President's instruction 
to coordinate regarding Ukraine with his personal attorney 
persisted and would become more acute.
    After the May 23 meeting, Ambassador Sondland stayed behind 
with President Trump and personally confirmed that the Three 
Amigos ``would be working on the Ukraine file.''\243\
    Multiple witnesses testified about this shift in personnel 
in charge of the Ukraine relationship.\244\ Mr. Kent recalled 
that, after the Oval Office meeting, Secretary Perry, 
Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador Volker began ``asserting 
that, going forward, they would be the drivers of the 
relationship with Ukraine.''\245\ Catherine Croft, Special 
Advisor to Ambassador Kurt Volker, recalled that ``Sondland, 
Volker, and sort of Perry, as a troika, or as the Three Amigos, 
had been sort of tasked with Ukraine policy'' by President 
Trump.\246\ Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
David Hale testified about his understanding of the meeting, 
``[I]t was clear that the President, from the readout I had 
received, the President had tasked that group, members of that 
delegation to pursue these objectives: the meeting, and the 
policy goals that I outlined earlier. So I was, you know, 
knowing I was aware that Ambassador Volker and Ambassador 
Sondland would be doing that.''\247\
    On a June 10 conference call with the Three Amigos, 
``Secretary Perry laid out for Ambassador Bolton the notion 
that'' they ``would assist Ambassador Taylor on Ukraine and be 
there to support'' him as the U.S.-Ukraine relationship 
``move[ed] forward.''\248\
    This de facto change in authority was never officially 
communicated to other officials, including Dr. Hill, who had 
responsibility for Ukraine at the National Security 
Council.\249\

     U.S. Officials Collaborated with Rudy Giuliani to Advance the 
                      President's Political Agenda

    Ambassador Sondland testified that in the weeks and months 
after the May 23 Oval Office meeting, ``everyone was in the 
loop'' regarding Mr. Giuliani's role in advancing the 
President's scheme regarding Ukraine.\250\ The ``Three Amigos'' 
did as the President ordered and began communicating with Mr. 
Giuliani. E-mail messages described to the Committees by 
Ambassador Sondland showed that he informed Mr. Mulvaney, 
Ambassador Bolton, and Secretaries Pompeo and Perry, as well as 
their immediate staffs, of his Ukraine-related efforts on 
behalf of the President.\251\
    According to Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry agreed to 
reach out to Mr. Giuliani first ``given their prior 
relationship.''\252\ Secretary Perry discussed with Mr. 
Giuliani the political concerns that President Trump 
articulated in the May 23 meeting.\253\
    Dr. Hill testified that Ambassador Volker, Ambassador 
Sondland, and Secretary Perry ``gave us every impression that 
they were meeting with Rudy Giuliani at this point, and Rudy 
Giuliani was also saying on the television, and indeed has said 
subsequently, that he was closely coordinating with the State 
Department.''\254\ These meetings ran counter to Ambassador 
Bolton's repeated declarations that ``nobody should be meeting 
with Giuliani.''\255\
    Like Dr. Hill, Ambassador Bolton also closely tracked Mr. 
Giuliani's activities on behalf of the President. According to 
Dr. Hill, Ambassador Bolton closely monitored Mr. Giuliani's 
public statements and repeatedly referred to Mr. Giuliani as a 
``hand grenade that was going to blow everyone up.''\256\ 
During a meeting on June 13, Ambassador Bolton made clear that 
he supported more engagement with Ukraine by senior White House 
officials but warned that ``Mr. Giuliani was a key voice with 
the President on Ukraine.''\257\ According to Ambassador 
Bolton, Mr. Giuliani's influence ``could be an obstacle to 
increased White House engagement.''\258\ Ambassador Bolton 
joked that ``every time Ukraine is mentioned, Giuliani pops 
up.''\259\
    Ambassador Bolton also reportedly joined Dr. Hill in 
warning Ambassador Volker against contacting Mr. Giuliani.\260\ 
Dr. Hill was particularly concerned about engagement with Mr. 
Giuliani because ``the more you engage with someone who is 
spreading untruths, the more validity you give to those 
untruths.''\261\ She further testified that she also discussed 
Mr. Giuliani's activities with Dr. Kupperman, specifically her 
concern that ``Ukraine was going to be played by Giuliani in 
some way as part of the campaign.''\262\
    On June 18, Ambassador Volker, Acting Assistant Secretary 
of State Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Secretary Perry, 
Ambassador Sondland, and State Department Counselor T. Ulrich 
Brechbuhl participated in a meeting at the Department of Energy 
to follow up to the May 23 Oval Office meeting.\263\ Ambassador 
William Taylor, Charge d'Affaires for U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, who 
had arrived in Ukraine just the day before, participated by 
phone from Kyiv.\264\ The group agreed that a meeting between 
President Trump and President Zelensky would be valuable.\265\ 
However, Ambassadors Volker and Sondland subsequently relayed 
to Ambassador Taylor that President Trump ``wanted to hear from 
Zelensky before scheduling the meeting in the Oval 
Office.''\266\ Ambassador Taylor testified that he did not 
understand, at that time, what the President wanted to hear 
from his Ukrainian counterpart.\267\ However, Ambassador 
Volker's assistant, Mr. Anderson, recalled ``vague 
discussions'' about addressing ``Mr. Giuliani's continued calls 
for a corruption investigation.''\268\
    The quid pro quo--conditioning the Oval Office meeting that 
President Trump first offered the Ukrainian leader during their 
April 21 call on the Ukrainians' pursuit of investigations that 
would benefit President Trump politically--was beginning to 
take shape. As Ambassador Sondland testified, the conditions 
put on the White House meeting and on Ukraine's continued 
engagement with the White House would get ``more insidious'' 
with the passage of time.\269\

   President Trump Invited Foreign Interference in the 2020 Election

    As U.S. officials debated how to meet the President's 
demands as articulated by Mr. Giuliani, President Trump 
publicly disclosed on June 12 in an Oval Office interview with 
ABC News anchor George Stephanopoulos that there was ``nothing 
wrong with listening'' to a foreign power who offered political 
dirt on an opponent. The President added, ``I think I'd want to 
hear it.''
    Mr. Stephanopoulos then pressed the President directly, 
``You want that kind of interference in our elections?'' to 
which President Trump replied, ``It's not an interference, they 
have information. I think I'd take it.''\270\ President Trump 
also made clear that he did not think a foreign power offering 
damaging information on an opponent was necessarily wrong, and 
said only that he would ``maybe'' contact the FBI ``if I 
thought there was something wrong.''\271\
    President Trump's willingness to accept foreign 
interference in a U.S. election during his interview with Mr. 
Stephanopoulos was consistent with tweets and interviews by Mr. 
Giuliani at this time. For example, on June 21, Mr. Giuliani 
tweeted:

          New Pres of Ukraine still silent on investigation of 
        Ukrainian interference in 2016 election and alleged 
        Biden bribery of Pres Poroshenko. Time for leadership 
        and investigate both if you want to purge how Ukraine 
        was abused by Hillary and Obama people.\272\

    On June 18, Dr. Hill met with Ambassador Sondland at the 
White House. She ``asked him quite bluntly'' what his role was 
in Ukraine. Ambassador Sondland replied that ``he was in charge 
of Ukraine.''\273\ Dr. Hill was taken aback and a bit 
irritated. She prodded Ambassador Sondland again and asked, 
``Who put you in charge of Ukraine?'' Dr. Hill testified: 
``And, you know, I'll admit, I was a bit rude. And that's when 
he told me the President, which shut me up.''\274\
    Dr. Hill tried to impress upon Ambassador Sondland the 
``importance of coordinating'' with other national security 
officials in the conduct of Ukraine policy, including the NSC 
staff and the State Department. Ambassador Sondland 
``retorted'' that he was ``coordinating with the President'' 
and Mr. Mulvaney, ``filling in'' Ambassador Bolton, and talking 
to State Department Counselor T. Ulrich Brechbuhl. Ambassador 
Sondland asked: ``Who else did he have to inform?''\275\
    Dr. Hill stated that, in hindsight, with the benefit of the 
sworn testimony by others during the impeachment inquiry and 
seeing documents displayed by witnesses, she realized that she 
and Ambassador Sondland were working on two fundamentally 
different tasks. Dr. Hill testified:

          But it struck me when yesterday, when you put up on 
        the screen Ambassador Sondland's emails and who was on 
        these emails, and he said, These are the people who 
        need to know, that he was absolutely right. Because he 
        was being involved in a domestic political errand, and 
        we were being involved in national security foreign 
        policy, and those two things had just diverged. So he 
        was correct. And I had not put my finger on that at the 
        moment, but I was irritated with him and angry with him 
        that he wasn't fully coordinating. And I did say to 
        him, Ambassador Sondland, Gordon, I think this is all 
        going to blow up. And here we are.\276\

    Reflecting on her June 18 conversation with Ambassador 
Sondland, Dr. Hill concluded:

          Ambassador Sondland is not wrong that he had been 
        given a different remit than we had been. And it was at 
        that moment that I started to realize how those things 
        had diverged. And I realized, in fact, that I wasn't 
        really being fair to Ambassador Sondland, because he 
        was carrying out what he thought he had been instructed 
        to carry out, and we were doing something that we 
        thought was just as--or perhaps even more important, 
        but it wasn't in the same channel.\277\

         3. The President Froze Military Assistance to Ukraine


The President froze military assistance to Ukraine against U.S. 
        national security interests and over the objections of career 
        experts.

                                Overview

    Since 2014, the United States has maintained a bipartisan 
policy of delivering hundreds of millions of dollars in 
security assistance to Ukraine each year. These funds benefit 
the security of the United States and Europe by ensuring that 
Ukraine is equipped to defend itself against Russian 
aggression. In 2019, that bipartisan policy was undermined when 
President Trump ordered, without justification, a freeze on 
military assistance to Ukraine.
    For fiscal year 2019, Congress authorized and appropriated 
$391 million in security assistance: $250 million through the 
Department of Defense's (DOD) Ukraine Security Assistance 
Initiative and $141 million through the State Department's 
Foreign Military Financing program. In July 2019, however, 
President Trump ordered the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) to put a hold on all $391 million in security assistance 
to Ukraine.
    The hold surprised experts from DOD and the State 
Department. DOD had already announced its intent to deliver 
security assistance to Ukraine after certifying that the 
country had implemented sufficient anti-corruption reforms, and 
the State Department was in the process of notifying Congress 
of its intent to deliver foreign military financing to Ukraine. 
In a series of interagency meetings, every represented agency 
other than OMB (which is headed by Mick Mulvaney, who is also 
the President's Acting Chief of Staff) supported the provision 
of assistance to Ukraine and objected to President Trump's 
hold. Ukraine experts at DOD, the State Department, and the 
National Security Council (NSC) argued that it was in the 
national security interest of the United States to continue to 
support Ukraine. Agency experts also expressed concerns about 
the legality of President Trump withholding assistance to 
Ukraine that Congress had already appropriated for this express 
purpose.
    Despite these concerns, OMB devised a plan to implement 
President Trump's hold on the assistance. On July 25, 2019, OMB 
began using a series of footnotes in funding documents to 
notify DOD that the assistance funds were temporarily on hold 
to allow for interagency review. Throughout August and 
September, OMB continued to use this method and rationale to 
maintain the hold, long after the final interagency meeting on 
Ukraine assistance occurred on July 31. The hold continued 
despite concerns from DOD that the hold would threaten its 
ability to fully spend the money before the end of the fiscal 
year, as legally required.
    On July 25--the same day as President Trump's call with 
President Zelensky--officials at Ukraine's embassy emailed DOD 
to ask about the status of the hold. By mid-August, officials 
at DOD, the State Department, and the NSC received numerous 
questions from Ukrainian officials about the hold. President 
Trump's hold on the Ukraine assistance was publicly reported on 
August 28, 2019.

 Security Assistance to Ukraine is Important to U.S. National Security 
                               Interests

    The United States has an interest in providing security 
assistance to Ukraine to support the country in its 
longstanding battle against Russian aggression and to shore it 
up as an independent and democratic country that can deter 
Kremlin influence in both Ukraine and other European countries. 
In early 2014, in what became known as the Revolution of 
Dignity, Ukrainian citizens demanded democratic reforms and an 
end to corruption, thereby forcing the ouster of pro-Kremlin 
Viktor Yanukovych as Ukraine's President. Shortly thereafter, 
Russian military forces and their proxies began an incursion 
into Ukraine that led to Russia's illegal annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine, as well as the ongoing, Russian-
led armed conflict in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine. 
Approximately 13,000 people have been killed as a result of the 
conflict and over 1.4 million people have been displaced.\278\
    Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, 
noted that ``militants in eastern Ukraine report directly to 
the Russian military, which arms them, trains them, leads them, 
and fights alongside them.''\279\ Similarly, then-Secretary of 
Defense James Mattis, during a visit to Ukraine in 2017, chided 
Russia, stating that ``despite Russia's denials, we know they 
are seeking to redraw international borders by force, 
undermining the sovereign and free nations of Europe.''\280\
    In response to Russia's aggression, the international 
community imposed financial and visa sanctions on Russian 
individuals and entities, and committed to providing billions 
of dollars in economic, humanitarian, and security assistance 
to Ukraine to continue to support its sovereignty and 
democratic development.
    The European Union is the single largest contributor of 
total foreign assistance to Ukraine, having provided =15 
billion in grants and loans since 2014.\281\ In addition to 
economic and humanitarian assistance, the United States has 
contributed a substantial amount of security assistance, mostly 
lethal and non-lethal military equipment and training, to 
Ukraine. In fact, the United States is the largest contributor 
of security assistance to Ukraine. Since 2014, the United 
States has delivered approximately $1.5 billion in security 
assistance to Ukraine.\282\
    Multiple witnesses--including Ambassador William Taylor, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent, Lt. Col. 
Alexander Vindman, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Laura Cooper--testified that this security assistance to 
Ukraine is vital to the national security of the United States 
and Europe.\283\ As Ambassador Taylor noted:

          [R]adar and weapons and sniper rifles, communication, 
        that saves lives. It makes the Ukrainians more 
        effective. It might even shorten the war. That's what 
        our hope is, to show that the Ukrainians can defend 
        themselves and the Russians, in the end, will say 
        ``Okay, we're going to stop.''\284\

    State Department Special Advisor for Ukraine, Catherine 
Croft, further emphasized that Ukrainians currently ``face 
casualties nearly every day in defense of their own territory 
against Russian aggression.''\285\ Ambassador Taylor testified 
that American aid is a concrete demonstration of the United 
States' ``commitment to resist aggression and defend 
freedom.''\286\
    Witnesses also testified that it is in the interest of the 
United States for Russian aggression to be halted in Ukraine. 
In the 20th century, the United States fought two bloody wars 
to resist the aggression of a hostile power that tried to 
change the borders of Europe by force. As Ambassador Taylor put 
it, Russian aggression in Ukraine ``dismissed all the 
principles that have kept the peace and contributed to 
prosperity in Europe since World War II.''\287\
    Timothy Morrison, former Senior Director for Europe and 
Russia at the NSC, put the importance of U.S. assistance in 
stark terms:

          Russia is a failing power, but it is still a 
        dangerous one. The United States aids Ukraine and her 
        people so that they can fight Russia over there, and we 
        don't have to fight Russia here.\288\

         Bipartisan Support for Security Assistance to Ukraine

    Congressional support for security assistance to Ukraine 
has been overwhelming and bipartisan. Congress provided $391 
million in security assistance to Ukraine for fiscal year 2019: 
$250 million through the DOD-administered Ukraine Security 
Assistance Initiative (USAI) and $141 million through the State 
Department-administered Foreign Military Financing program.
    On September 26, 2018, Congress appropriated $250 million 
for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which is funded 
through DOD. The funding law made clear that the funding was 
only ``available until September 30, 2019.'' President Trump 
signed the bill into law on September 28, 2018.\289\
    The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative--a 
Congressionally-mandated program codifying portions of the 
European Reassurance Initiative, which was originally launched 
by the Obama Administration in 2015--authorizes DOD to provide 
``security assistance and intelligence support, including 
training, equipment, and logistics support, supplies and 
services, to military and other security forces of the 
Government of Ukraine.''\290\ Recognizing that strengthening 
Ukraine's institutions, in addition to its military, is vital 
to helping it break free of Russia's influence, Congress 
imposed conditions upon DOD before it could spend a portion of 
the security assistance funds. Half of the money was held in 
reserve until the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with 
the Secretary of State, certified to Congress that Ukraine had 
undertaken sufficient anti-corruption reforms, such as in 
civilian control of the military and increased transparency and 
accountability.\291\
    On February 28, 2019, John C. Rood, Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, notified Congress that DOD intended to 
deliver the first half ($125 million) of assistance 
appropriated in September 2018 to Ukraine, including ``more 
than $50 million of assistance to deliver counter-artillery 
radars and defensive lethal assistance.''\292\ Congress cleared 
the Congressional notification, which enabled DOD to begin 
obligating (spending) funds.\293\
    For Ukraine to qualify to receive the remaining $125 
million of assistance, Congress required that the Secretary of 
Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, certify 
that the Government of Ukraine had taken substantial 
anticorruption reform actions.\294\ Ms. Cooper and others at 
DOD conducted a review to evaluate whether Ukraine had met the 
required benchmarks.\295\ Ms. Cooper explained that the review 
involved ``pulling in all the views of the key experts on 
Ukraine defense, and coming up with a consensus view,'' which 
was then run ``up the chain in the Defense Department, to 
ensure we have approval.''\296\
    On May 23, 2019, Under Secretary Rood certified to Congress 
that Ukraine had completed the requisite defense institutional 
reforms to qualify for the remaining $125 million in funds. He 
wrote:

          On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, and in 
        coordination with the Secretary of State, I have 
        certified that the Government of Ukraine has taken 
        substantial actions to make defense institutional 
        reforms for the purposes of decreasing corruption, 
        increasing accountability, and sustaining improvements 
        of combat capability enabled by U.S. assistance.\297\

    Congress then cleared the related Congressional 
notification, which enabled DOD to begin obligating the 
remaining $125 million in funds.\298\
    On June 18, 2019, DOD issued a press release announcing its 
intention to provide $250 million in security assistance funds 
to Ukraine ``for additional training, equipment, and advisory 
efforts to build the capacity of Ukraine's armed forces.'' DOD 
announced that the security assistance would provide Ukraine 
with sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and 
counter-artillery radars, command and control, electronic 
warfare detection and secure communications, military mobility, 
night vision, and military medical treatment.\299\
    On February 15, 2019, Congress also appropriated $115 
million for Ukraine through the State Department-administered 
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF).\300\ The Foreign 
Military Financing Program is administered by the State 
Department and provides grants or loans to foreign countries to 
help them purchase military services or equipment manufactured 
by U.S. companies in the United States. In addition to the $115 
million appropriated for fiscal year 2019, approximately $26 
million carried over from fiscal year 2018.\301\ Thus, the 
total amount of foreign military financing available for 
Ukraine was approximately $141 million.
    Before a country receives foreign military financing, the 
State Department must first seek Congressional approval through 
a notification to Congress.\302\ The State Department never 
sent the required Congressional notification to Congress in the 
spring or summer of 2019. As described below, OMB blocked the 
notification.\303\

    President Trump had Questions About Ukraine Security Assistance

    The day after DOD issued its June 18 press release 
announcing $250 million in security assistance funds for 
Ukraine, President Trump started asking OMB questions about the 
funding for Ukraine. On June 19, Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate 
Director for National Security Programs at OMB, was copied on 
an email from his boss, Michael Duffey, Associate Director for 
National Security Programs at OMB, to Elaine McCusker, Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) that said that ``the 
President had questions about the press report and that he was 
seeking additional information.''\304\ Notably, the same day, 
President Trump gave an interview on Fox News where he raised 
the so-called ``Crowdstrike'' conspiracy theory that Ukraine, 
rather than Russia, had interfered in the 2016 election, a line 
he would repeat during his July 25 call with the Ukrainian 
president.\305\
    On June 20, in response to the President's inquiry, Ms. 
McCusker responded to President Trump's inquiry by providing 
Mr. Sandy information on the security assistance program.\306\ 
Mr. Sandy shared the document with Mr. Duffey, who had follow-
up questions about the ``financial resources associated with 
the program, in particular,'' the ``history of the 
appropriations, [and] any more details about the intent of the 
program.''\307\ Mr. Sandy said that his staff provided the 
relevant information to Mr. Duffey, but he did not know whether 
Mr. Duffey shared the information with the White House.\308\
    Ms. Cooper also recalled receiving an email inquiring about 
DOD-administered Ukraine security assistance a ``few days'' 
after DOD's June 18, 2019, press release.\309\ The email was 
from the Secretary of Defense's Chief of Staff, ``asking for 
follow-up on a meeting with the President.'' The email 
contained three questions:

          And the one question was related to U.S. industry. 
        Did U.S.--is U.S. industry providing any of this 
        equipment? The second question that I recall was 
        related to international contributions. It asked, what 
        are other countries doing, something to that effect. 
        And then the third question, I don't recall--I mean, 
        with any of these I don't recall the exact wording, but 
        it was something to the effect of, you know, who gave 
        this money, or who gave this funding?\310\

    Like Mr. Sandy, Ms. Cooper believed that the President's 
inquiries were spurred by DOD's June 18 press release. She 
testified, ``we did get that series of questions just within a 
few days after the press release and after that one article 
that had the headline.''\311\ Ms. Cooper noted that it was 
``relatively unusual'' to receive questions from the President, 
and that she and her staff at the DOD responded ``as quickly'' 
as they could.\312\ According to Ms. Cooper, DOD officials 
included in their answers that security assistance funding 
``has strong bipartisan support,'' but never received a 
response.\313\

               President Trump Froze Military Assistance

    Despite the fact that DOD experts demonstrated that the 
security assistance was crucial for both Ukraine and U.S. 
national security and had strong bipartisan support in 
Congress, President Trump ordered OMB to freeze the funds in 
July.
    On July 3, the State Department notified DOD and NSC staff 
that OMB was blocking the State Department from transmitting a 
Congressional notification for the provision of State 
Department-administered security assistance to Ukraine (the 
$141 million in foreign military financing).\314\ Because the 
State Department is legally required to transmit such a 
notification to Congress before spending funds, blocking the 
Congressional notification effectively barred the State 
Department from spending the funding.\315\ Ms. Williams 
testified that she saw the news in a draft email that was being 
prepared as part of the nightly update for the National 
Security Advisor.\316\ She agreed that the hold came ``out of 
the blue'' because it had not been discussed previously by OMB 
or the NSC.\317\
    On or about July 12, 2019, President Trump directed that a 
hold be placed on security assistance funding for Ukraine. That 
day, Robert Blair, Assistant to the President and Senior 
Advisor to the Chief of Staff, sent an email to Mr. Duffey at 
OMB about Ukraine security assistance.\318\ Mr. Sandy, who was 
on personal leave at the time but later received a copy of the 
email from Mr. Duffey, testified that in the July 12 email, Mr. 
Blair communicated ``that the President is directing a hold on 
military support funding for Ukraine.''\319\ The email 
mentioned no concerns about any other country, security 
assistance package, or aid of any sort.\320\
    On or about July 15, Mr. Morrison learned from Deputy 
National Security Advisor Charles Kupperman ``that it was the 
President's direction to hold the assistance.''\321\ On or 
about July 17 or 18, 2019, Mr. Duffey and Mr. Blair again 
exchanged emails about Ukraine security assistance.\322\ Mr. 
Sandy later received a copy of the emails, which showed that 
when Mr. Duffey asked Mr. Blair about the reason for the hold, 
Mr. Blair provided no explanation and instead said, ``we need 
to let the hold take place'' and then ``revisit'' the issue 
with the President.\323\
    On July 18 or 19, when he returned from two weeks of 
personal leave, Mr. Sandy learned for the first time that the 
President had placed a hold on Ukraine security assistance from 
Mr. Duffey.\324\ According to Mr. Sandy, Mr. Duffey was not 
aware of the reason but ``there was certainly a desire to learn 
more about the rationale'' for the hold.\325\

 Agency Experts Repeatedly Objected to the Hold on Security Assistance

    Between July 18 and July 31, 2019, the NSC staff convened a 
series of interagency meetings, at which the hold on security 
assistance was discussed in varying degrees of detail. Over the 
course of these meetings, it became evident that:
       the President directed the hold through OMB;
       no justification was provided for the hold;
       with the exception of OMB, all represented 
agencies supported Ukraine security assistance because it was 
in the national security interests of the United States; and
       there were concerns about the legality of the 
hold.
    The first interagency meeting was held on July 18 at the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary level (i.e., a ``sub-Policy 
Coordination Committee''). It was supposed to be a ``routine 
Ukraine policy meeting.''\326\ Ambassador Taylor, Lt. Col. 
Vindman, Ms. Croft, and Mr. Kent were among the attendees. 
Witnesses testified that OMB announced at the meeting that 
President Trump had directed a hold on Ukraine security 
assistance. Mr. Kent testified that at the meeting, an OMB 
staff person announced that Acting White House Chief of Staff 
Mick Mulvaney ``at the direction of the President had put a 
hold on all security assistance to the Ukraine.''\327\ 
Ambassador Taylor testified that the ``directive had come from 
the President to the Chief of Staff to OMB'' and that when he 
learned of the hold on military assistance, he ``realized that 
one of the key pillars of our strong support for Ukraine was 
threatened.''\328\
    According to Ms. Croft, when Mr. Kent raised the issue of 
security assistance, it ``blew up the meeting.''\329\ 
Ambassador Taylor testified that he and others on the call 
``sat in astonishment'' when they learned about the hold.\330\ 
David Holmes, Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, 
was also on the call. He testified he was ``shocked'' and 
thought the hold was ``extremely significant.''\331\ He thought 
the hold undermined what he had understood to be longstanding 
U.S. policy in Ukraine.\332\
    Ms. Croft testified that ``the only reason given was that 
the order came at the direction of the President.''\333\ Ms. 
Cooper, who did not participate but received a readout of the 
meeting, testified that the fact that the hold was announced 
without explanation was ``unusual.''\334\ Mr. Kent testified 
that ``[t]here was great confusion among the rest of us because 
we didn't understand why that had happened.''\335\ He explained 
that ``[s]ince there was unanimity that this [security 
assistance to Ukraine] was in our national interest, it just 
surprised all of us.''\336\
    With the exception of OMB, all agencies present at the July 
18 meeting advocated for the lifting of the hold.\337\
    There was also a lack of clarity as to whether the hold 
applied only to the State Department-administered Foreign 
Military Financing to Ukraine or whether it also applied to the 
DOD-administered Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative 
funding.\338\ Ms. Cooper and her colleagues at the DOD were 
``concerned'' about the hold.\339\ After the meeting, DOD 
sought further clarification from the NSC and State Department 
about its impact on the DOD-administered funding.\340\ However, 
there was no ``specific guidance for DOD at the time.''\341\
    The second interagency meeting to discuss the hold on 
Ukraine security assistance was held at the Assistant Secretary 
level (i.e., a ``Policy Coordination Committee'') on July 23, 
2019.\342\ The meeting was chaired by Mr. Morrison.\343\ Ms. 
Cooper, who participated via secure video teleconference, 
testified that ``the White House chief of staff ha[d] conveyed 
that the President has concerns about Ukraine and Ukraine 
security assistance.''\344\ Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor 
to Vice President Pence for Europe and Eurasia, who also 
attended the meeting on behalf of the Vice President, testified 
that the ``OMB representative conveyed that they had been 
directed by the Chief of Staff, the White House Chief of Staff, 
to continue holding it [the Ukraine security assistance] until 
further notice.''\345\ Similar to the July 18 meeting, the July 
23 meeting did not provide clarity about whether the 
President's hold applied to the DOD-administered funding or 
only to the funds administered by the State Department.\346\
    Again, no reason was provided for the hold.\347\ Mr. Sandy 
did not attend the July 23 meeting as the representative for 
OMB, but he received a readout that other agencies expressed 
concerns about the hold. Specifically, the concerns related to 
the lack of rationale for the hold, the hold's implications on 
U.S. assistance and ``overall policy toward Ukraine,'' and 
``similar legal questions.''\348\
    Mr. Morrison also testified that there was a discussion at 
the July 23 meeting about the legality of the hold, and 
specifically whether it is ``actually legally permissible for 
the President to not allow for the disbursement of the 
funding.''\349\ Mr. Morrison recalled that DOD raised concerns 
about possible violations of the Impoundment Control Act.\350\ 
The Impoundment Control Act gives the President the authority 
to delay spending, or not spend, funds only if Congress is 
notified of those intentions and approves the proposed action 
(see below for further discussion of the act).\351\
    With the exception of OMB, all agencies present at the July 
23rd meeting advocated for the lifting of the hold.\352\ 
Ambassador Taylor explained that the State Department ``made a 
strong statement about the importance of this assistance'' and 
that Ms. Cooper, on behalf of DOD, ``made a very strong case 
and continued to make a very strong case for the 
effectiveness'' of the security assistance.\353\ Lt. Col. 
Vindman, who also attended the meeting, testified that there 
was agreement that the issue should be elevated to the Agency 
deputies ``as quickly as possible to recommend a release of 
security assistance.''\354\
    The third interagency meeting, a Deputies Small Group 
meeting at the Cabinet Deputies level, was held on July 26, 
2019. Mr. Duffey was the OMB representative, and Mr. Sandy 
prepared Mr. Duffey for the meeting.\355\ Mr. Sandy explained 
that he prepared Mr. Duffey to get policy guidance on six 
critical issues: (1) the reason for the hold; (2) the extent of 
the hold; (3) the duration of the hold; (4) the Congressional 
affairs approach; (5) the public affairs approach; and (6) and 
the diplomatic approach.\356\ Mr. Sandy testified that on July 
26, OMB still did not have an understanding of the reason for 
the hold.\357\ According to Mr. Sandy, at that time, there was 
no discussion within OMB about the amount of money that was 
being contributed to Ukraine by other countries, or whether 
that topic was the reason for the President's hold.\358\
    Mr. Morrison, Lt. Col. Vindman, Ms. Cooper, Under Secretary 
of State for Political Affairs David Hale, and Mr. Duffey 
attended the July 26 meeting. At the meeting, OMB stated that 
``they had guidance from the President and from Acting Chief of 
Staff Mulvaney to freeze the assistance.''\359\ It also was 
``stated very clearly'' that the hold applied to both the State 
Department and Defense Department security assistance 
funds.\360\ Ambassador Hale, as the representative for the 
Department of State, ``advocated strongly for resuming the 
assistance,'' as did representatives from all agencies other 
than OMB.\361\
    Mr. Morrison testified that, at the meeting, ``OMB 
represented that--and the Chief of Staff's Office was present--
that the President was concerned about corruption in Ukraine, 
and he wanted to make sure that Ukraine was doing enough to 
manage that corruption.''\362\ Ms. Cooper had a similar 
recollection but received no further understanding of what OMB 
meant by ``corruption.''\363\ Ms. Cooper recalled that the 
deputies did not consider corruption to be a legitimate reason 
for the hold because they unanimously agreed that Ukraine was 
making sufficient progress on anti-corruption reforms, as had 
been certified by DOD on May 23.\364\

   President Trump Continued the Hold Despite Agency Concerns About 
                                Legality

    Prior to the passage of the Impoundment Control Act, 
presidents had frequently impounded--i.e., refused to spend--
Congressionally-appropriated funds to enforce their policy 
priorities when they diverged from Congress'. However, most of 
these impoundments were small (i.e., no more than a few percent 
of the total program budget) or temporary (i.e., funds were 
released in time for them to be spent before the end of the 
fiscal year) and rooted in policy, rather than political 
interests of the President. It was not until President Richard 
Nixon that presidential impoundment of funds would prompt 
Congress to take action citing constitutional concerns.\365\
    Unlike his predecessors, President Nixon undertook 
impoundments that were both substantial and, in some cases, 
permanent, which raised concerns for Congress over its Article 
I powers. In fact, between 1969 and 1972, President Nixon 
impounded between 15% and 20% of Congressionally-appropriated 
funds in various accounts.\366\
    To reassert Congressional authority over the budget, in 
1973, Congress established the Joint Study Committee on Budget 
Control, which held a series of hearings and produced more than 
4,600 pages of testimony and reports. The Joint Study 
Committee's findings ultimately led to the overwhelmingly 
bipartisan passage--over President Nixon's veto--of the 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, one of a series of reform 
bills designed to reign in presidential power. Looking back at 
that moment in history, Rep. Bill Archer (R-TX), a fiscal 
conservative who served 30 years in the House of 
Representatives, including as the Chairman of the Ways and 
Means Committee, remarked, ``the culture then was that the 
president had too much power . . . the president is abusing his 
power.''\367\
    In addition to establishing the Congressional Budget 
Committees and the independent Congressional Budget Office, the 
Impoundment Control Act also limits the circumstances under 
which a president can legally impound Congressionally-
appropriated funds. According to the Act, although the 
President may request authority from Congress to withhold or 
permanently cancel the availability of budget authority, such 
an action is not allowed without Congressional approval. Any 
amount of budget authority proposed to be deferred (i.e., 
temporarily withheld) or rescinded (i.e., permanently withheld) 
must be made available for obligation unless Congress, within 
45 legislative days, completes action on a bill rescinding all 
or part of the amount proposed for rescission.\368\ The 
Impoundment Control Act does not permit the withholding of 
funds through their date of expiration, which would be a de 
facto rescission without Congressional approval.\369\
    At the July 26 interagency meeting, senior agency officials 
raised serious concerns about the legality of the hold under 
the Impoundment Control Act. Ms. Cooper testified:

          A: Well, I'm not an expert on the law, but in that 
        meeting immediately deputies began to raise concerns 
        about how this could be done in a legal fashion because 
        there was broad understanding in the meeting that the 
        funding--the State Department funding related to an 
        earmark for Ukraine and that the DOD funding was 
        specific to Ukraine security assistance. So the 
        comments in the room at the deputies' level reflected a 
        sense that there was not an understanding of how this 
        could legally play out. And at that meeting the 
        deputies agreed to look into the legalities and to look 
        at what was possible.
          Q: Okay. So is it fair to say the deputies thought 
        the President was not authorized to place a hold on 
        these funds?
          A: They did not use that term, but the expression in 
        the room that I recall was a sense that there was not 
        an available mechanism to simply not spend money that 
        has been in the case of USAI [DOD security assistance] 
        already notified to Congress.\370\

    Lt. Col. Vindman testified that the issue needed to be 
``elevated to a PC [Principals Committee] as quickly as 
possible to release the hold on security assistance'' so that 
the funds could be obligated before the end of the fiscal 
year.\371\
    A Principals Committee meeting was never convened.\372\ 
According to Mr. Morrison, National Security Advisor John 
Bolton ``believed that it was unnecessary, that he already had 
a reasonable idea of where the principals were, and he wanted 
to get directly to the President as early as possible in the 
most effective way.''\373\ Ambassador Bolton understood that 
the principals ``were all supportive of the continued 
disbursement of the aid.''\374\ As had been clear since the 
very first interagency meeting on July 18, the lifting of the 
hold was ``the unanimous position of the entire 
interagency.''\375\ At this point, it remained unclear to many 
officials why the President continued to hold the funds.
    On July 31, 2019, a fourth and final interagency meeting 
was held at the Policy Coordination Committee level. Ms. Cooper 
attended the meeting on behalf of DOD. According to Ms. Cooper, 
the agenda ``was largely focused on just routine Ukraine 
business, postelection follow up,'' and ``security assistance 
was not actually an explicit agenda item.''\376\ Ms. Cooper 
nevertheless raised security assistance and expressed her 
understanding, after consulting with DOD counsel, that there 
were only two legally available options to implement the hold: 
a Presidential rescission notice to Congress (i.e., requesting 
that Congress ``take back'' funds it had already appropriated) 
or for the Defense Department to do a reprogramming action 
(i.e., use Congressionally-appropriated funds for a different 
purpose).\377\ In either case, the law requires that the 
Executive Branch notify, and seek approval from, Congress 
before taking any action.\378\
    At the July 31 meeting, Ms. Cooper emphasized to the 
participants that because ``there are only two legally 
available options and we do not have direction to pursue 
either,'' DOD would have to start obligating the funds on or 
about August 6.\379\ She explained at her deposition that DOD 
would have had to begin obligating the funds by that date or 
risk violation of the Impoundment Control Act.\380\
    The Administration, however, never proposed a rescission or 
reprogramming of funds for Ukraine security assistance and 
never notified Congress of its intent to withhold funds.\381\

OMB Used Unusual Process to Implement President's Hold, Skirting Legal 
                                Concerns

    OMB plays a critical role in the release of security 
assistance funding. The Antideficiency Act requires that, 
before any department or agency may spend Congressionally-
appropriated funding, the Director of OMB or his delegates must 
``apportion'' (i.e., make available to spend) the funds in 
writing.\382\ Through this mechanism, OMB has the ability to 
directly impact security assistance funding or funding of any 
kind that is appropriated by Congress.
    In parallel with the interagency meetings that occurred 
during the latter half of July 2019, OMB devised a way to 
implement the President's hold on security assistance to 
Ukraine, notwithstanding DOD's Congressional notifications of 
February 28 and May 23. Over the course of his twelve-year 
career at OMB, Mr. Sandy could not recall any other time when a 
hold had been placed on security assistance after a 
Congressional notification had been sent.\383\
    When speaking with Mr. Duffey on or about July 18 or 19, 
Mr. Sandy immediately raised concerns about how to implement 
the hold without violating the Impoundment Control Act, which 
required that the funds be obligated (i.e., spent) before they 
expired at the end of the fiscal year, on September 30.\384\ In 
light of that legal requirement, the hold would have to be 
temporary.\385\ An additional hurdle was the fact that OMB had 
already authorized DOD to spend the security assistance funds 
DOD administered for fiscal year 2019.\386\ Therefore, when 
President Trump directed the hold in July, OMB scrambled to 
reverse that prior authorization.
    From July 19 through July 24, Mr. Sandy consulted with the 
OMB Office of General Counsel as well as Ms. McCusker at DOD on 
how to legally implement a hold on the funds.\387\ Mr. Sandy's 
staff at OMB also conferred with OMB's Budget Review 
Division.\388\ Based on these consultations, OMB decided to 
implement the hold through a series of nine funding documents, 
known legally as ``apportionments.''\389\ Apportionments 
typically are used to convey authority to an agency to spend 
funds, not to withhold funds; thus, in order to bar DOD from 
spending money, these particular apportionments included 
footnotes that would impose the holds while using creative 
language to skirt legal concerns. Mr. Sandy testified that 
``the purpose of the footnote was to preclude obligation for a 
limited period of time but enable planning and casework to 
continue.''\390\ He also testified that this use of footnotes 
was unusual and that in his 12 years of OMB experience, he 
could ``not recall another event like it.''\391\
    On July 25, OMB issued the first funding document 
implementing the hold. In this document, the relevant footnote 
notified DOD that the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative 
funds ``are not available for obligation until August 5, 2019, 
to allow for an interagency process to determine the best use 
of such funds.'' The footnote also stated that:

          Based on OMB's communication with DOD on July 25, 
        2019, OMB understands from the Department that this 
        brief pause in obligations will not preclude DOD's 
        timely execution of the final policy direction. DOD may 
        continue its planning and casework for the Initiative 
        during this period.\392\

    Mr. Sandy explained that the ``interagency process'' 
referenced in the footnote referred to the NSC-led interagency 
meetings convened during the latter half of July, and that the 
August 5 date provided a ``reasonable timeframe for an 
interagency process'' to produce ``clear guidance'' on the 
hold.\393\ The August 5 date was determined in consultation 
with Mr. Duffey at OMB and Ms. McCusker at DOD.\394\
    Mr. Sandy further testified that the second sentence in the 
footnote--which states, in relevant part, that ``OMB 
understands from the Department that this brief pause in 
obligations will not preclude DOD's timely execution of the 
final policy direction''--was critical to the implementation of 
the hold:

          Well, that gets to the heart of that issue about 
        ensuring that we don't run afoul of the Impoundment 
        Control Act, which means that you have to allow for the 
        timely execution. And this reflects my conversation 
        with--conversations plural with Elaine McCusker that 
        they can confirm that, during this brief period, they 
        would not foresee any problem fully executing the 
        program by the end of the fiscal year.\395\

    The sentence, in effect, affirmed that if the hold remained 
in place only until August 5, DOD would still have sufficient 
time to spend all security assistance funds by September 30, 
2019. President Trump, however, would continue the hold long 
past August 5.

 Trump Appointee Took Over Signing Authority from Career Budget Expert

    Since becoming Deputy Associate Director for National 
Security in 2013, Mr. Sandy was responsible for approving 
release of the funding for programs within his portfolio, 
including the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.\396\ Mr. 
Sandy approved and signed the July 25 funding document.\397\ On 
July 29, however, Mr. Duffey--a political appointee of 
President Trump whose prior position had been as Executive 
Director of the Republican Party of Wisconsin--told Mr. Sandy--
a career civil servant with decades of experience in this 
area--that he would no longer be responsible for approving the 
release of funding for Ukraine Security Assistance 
Initiative.\398\ Mr. Duffey also revoked the authority for 
approving the release of funding for Foreign Military Financing 
from Mr. Sandy's colleague at OMB.\399\ Instead, Mr. Duffey 
would himself assume authority for the $250 million in DOD-
administered Ukraine security assistance and authority for 
approving the release of funding for the $141 million in State 
Department-administered Foreign Military Financing to 
Ukraine.\400\
    Mr. Duffey did not tell Mr. Sandy whether he requested this 
change in authority but did say that ``it was in essence a 
joint decision reflecting both guidance from the Acting 
Director and also his support.''\401\ Over the course of 
several days, Mr. Duffey explained to Mr. Sandy and others in 
the National Security Division that ``there was interest among 
the leadership in tracking the uses of moneys [sic] 
closely.''\402\ Mr. Duffey expressed an ``interest in being 
more involved in daily operations'' and ``regarded this 
responsibility as a way for him to learn more about specific 
accounts within his area.''\403\
    Mr. Sandy testified that prior to July 29, he had never 
heard Mr. Duffey state any interest in approving the release of 
funding.\404\ Furthermore, when they learned that Mr. Duffey 
was taking on this new responsibility, Mr. Sandy and other 
staff relayed their concerns to Mr. Duffey that it was a 
substantial workload.\405\ Mr. Sandy also testified that 
``people were curious what he thought he would learn from 
apportionments about the accounts as opposed to the other, you 
know, sources of information.''\406\ Mr. Sandy agreed that 
there are more efficient ways of learning about accounts and 
programs, and that ``I can think of other ways--other materials 
that I personally would find more informative.''\407\
    Mr. Sandy was not aware of any prior instance when a 
political appointee assumed this kind of funding approval 
authority.\408\
    After the July 31 interagency meeting at which Ms. Cooper 
announced that DOD would have to start obligating the funds on 
or about August 6, Mr. Duffey sought clarification.\409\ Ms. 
Cooper explained to Mr. Duffey that at a certain point DOD 
would not have sufficient time to fully obligate the funds 
before they expired at the end of the fiscal year. In response, 
Mr. Duffey ``wanted more information on the precise nature of 
how long does it take to obligate, and how many cases, and that 
sort of thing.''\410\ Ms. Cooper referred Mr. Duffey to the DOD 
comptroller and to the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency.\411\ During the month of August, Mr. Duffey and Ms. 
McCusker communicated about the implementation of the hold on 
the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds.\412\
    On August 6 and August 15, Mr. Duffey approved two more 
funding documents that contained footnotes with language nearly 
identical to the footnote in the July 25 funding document that 
initiated the hold; the only difference was that the date funds 
would become available for spending was changed from August 5 
to August 12.\413\
    The August 6 and 15 footnotes, and all subsequent footnotes 
through September 10, continued to state that the hold was in 
place ``to allow for an interagency process to determine the 
best use of such funds,'' even though the final interagency 
meeting regarding Ukraine security assistance occurred on July 
31.\414\ Not only was there no active interagency process after 
July, but Ms. Cooper also was not aware of any review of the 
funding conducted by DOD in July, August, or September.\415\ In 
fact, Ms. Cooper noted that months before, DOD had completed 
its review of whether Ukraine ``had made sufficient progress in 
meeting defense reform and anticorruption goals consistent with 
the NDAA,'' and certified to Congress in May 2019 that Ukraine 
had met the requirements to receive funding.\416\ Similarly, 
Mr. Kent testified that the State Department did not conduct, 
and was never asked to conduct, a review of the security 
assistance funding administered by the State Department.\417\
    At the same time that OMB was implementing the President's 
hold through the funding footnotes, officials inside OMB were 
advocating for release of the funds. On August 7, the National 
Security Division, International Affairs Division, and Office 
of Legal Counsel of OMB drafted and transmitted a memo on 
Ukraine security assistance to OMB Acting Director Vought ``in 
anticipation of a principals-level discussion to address the 
topic.''\418\ The National Security Division's portion of the 
memorandum recommended to remove the hold because (1) the 
assistance was consistent with the national security strategy 
in terms of supporting a stable, peaceful Europe; (2) the aid 
countered Russian aggression; and (3) there was bipartisan 
support for the program.\419\ Mr. Duffey approved the 
memorandum and agreed with the policy recommendation.\420\
    Sometime in mid-August, DOD raised concerns that it might 
not be able to fully obligate the Defense Department-
administered funds before the end of the fiscal year.\421\ Ms. 
Cooper testified that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
estimated that $100 million of aid might not be obligated in 
time and was at risk.\422\
    Because of this, DOD concluded that it could no longer 
support OMB's claim in the footnote that ``this brief pause in 
obligations will not preclude DOD's timely execution of the 
final policy direction.''\423\ As mentioned above, Mr. Sandy 
testified that this sentence was at ``the heart of that issue 
about ensuring that we don't run afoul of the Impoundment 
Control Act.''\424\
    As a result of DOD's concerns, all of the subsequent 
footnotes issued by OMB during the pendency of the hold 
approved by Mr. Duffey on August 20, 27, and 31, and September 
5, 6, and 10--removed the sentence regarding DOD's ability to 
fully obligate by the end of the fiscal year.\425\ Each 
footnote extended the hold for a period of two to six 
days.\426\
    Mr. Sandy and his staff ``continued to express concerns [to 
Mr. Duffey] about the potential implications vis-a-vis the 
Impoundment Control Act,''\427\ and advised Mr. Duffey to 
consult with OMB's Office of General Counsel ``on every single 
footnote.''\428\ Mr. Sandy was copied on emails with the Office 
of General Counsel on these topics.\429\ Although Mr. Sandy 
understood that the Office of General Counsel supported the 
footnotes, he noted that there were dissenting opinions within 
the Office of General Counsel.\430\ Concerns about whether the 
Administration was bending, if not breaking, the law by holding 
back this vital assistance contributed to at least two OMB 
officials resigning, including one attorney in the Office of 
General Counsel.\431\ Mr. Sandy testified that the resignation 
was motivated in part by concerns about the way OMB was 
handling the hold on Ukraine security assistance.\432\ 
According to Mr. Sandy, the colleague disagreed with the Office 
of General Counsel about the application of the Impoundment 
Control Act to the hold on Ukraine security assistance.\433\
    Nevertheless, at the direction of the President, OMB 
continued to implement the hold through September 11.

Senior Officials Failed to Convince President Trump to Release the Aid 
                               in August

    Sometime prior to August 16, Ambassador Bolton had a one-
on-one meeting with President Trump about the aid.\434\ 
According to Mr. Morrison, at that meeting the President ``was 
not yet ready to approve the release of the assistance.''\435\ 
Following the meeting, Ambassador Bolton instructed Mr. 
Morrison to look for opportunities to get the principals 
together ``to have the direct, in-person conversation with the 
President about this topic.''\436\
    On or about August 13 or 14, Lt. Col. Vindman was directed 
to draft a Presidential Decision Memorandum for Ambassador 
Bolton and the other principals to present to President Trump 
for a decision on Ukraine security assistance.\437\ The 
memorandum, finalized on August 15, recommended that the hold 
should be lifted, explained why, and included the consensus 
views from the July 26 meeting that the funds should be 
released.\438\ Lt. Col. Vindman received conflicting accounts 
about whether the memorandum was presented to the 
President.\439\
    Mr. Morrison, who was Lt. Col. Vindman's supervisor at the 
NSC and agreed with the recommendation to lift the hold, 
testified that the memorandum was never provided to the 
President.\440\ Mr. Morrison explained that Ambassador Bolton 
intended to present the memorandum to the President during an 
unrelated meeting in Bedminster, New Jersey, on August 15, but 
the ``other subject matter of that meeting consumed all the 
time.''\441\ However, while at Bedminster, the principals ``all 
represented to Ambassador Bolton that they were prepared to 
tell the President they endorsed the swift release and 
disbursement of the funding.''\442\
    Mr. Morrison testified that he attempted to gather the 
``the right group of principals'' to meet with the President 
but was unable to do so because of scheduling issues.\443\ 
According to Mr. Morrison, the next possible opportunity was 
during a trip to Warsaw, Poland at the beginning of September, 
but President Trump did not end up making that trip.\444\
    Ms. Cooper recalled receiving an email at the end of August 
from Secretary of Defense Esper referencing a meeting or 
discussion with the President, and that there was ``no decision 
on Ukraine.''\445\

        Ukrainian Officials Learned About the Hold in July 2019

    Witnesses testified that officials in the Ukraine 
government knew of President Trump's hold on security 
assistance before it was publicly reported in the press on 
August 28, 2019. Ms. Croft testified that after July 18--when 
the hold was announced by OMB at the interagency meeting--it 
was ``inevitable that it was eventually going to come 
out.''\446\
    Two individuals from the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington, 
D.C., approached Ms. Croft approximately a week apart ``quietly 
and in confidence to ask me about an OMB hold on Ukraine 
security assistance.''\447\ Ms. Croft could not precisely 
recall the dates of these conversations, but testified that she 
was ``very surprised at the effectiveness of my Ukrainian 
counterparts'' diplomatic tradecraft, as in to say they found 
out very early on or much earlier than I expected them 
to.''\448\
    Ms. Croft explained that the Ukrainian officials came to 
her quietly because they would not want the hold to become 
public:

          I think that if this were public in Ukraine it would 
        be seen as a reversal of our policy and would, just to 
        say sort of candidly and colloquially, this would be a 
        really big deal, it would be a really big deal in 
        Ukraine, and an expression of declining U.S. support 
        for Ukraine.\449\

    DOD also received questions from the Ukraine Embassy about 
the status of the military assistance. Ms. Cooper testified 
that those occurred on July 25, 2019--the same day as President 
Trump's call with President Zelensky:

          On July 25th, a member of my staff got a question 
        from a Ukraine Embassy contact asking what was going on 
        with Ukraine security assistance, because at that time, 
        we did not know what the guidance was on USAI [DOD-
        administered funds]. The OMB notice of apportionment 
        arrived that day, but this staff member did not find 
        out about it until later. I was informed that the staff 
        member told the Ukrainian official that we were moving 
        forward on USAI, but recommended that the Ukraine 
        Embassy check in with State regarding the FMF [State 
        Department-administered funds].\450\

    On July 25, Ms. Cooper's staff received two emails from the 
State Department revealing that the Ukrainian Embassy was 
``asking about security assistance'' and that ``the Hill knows 
about the FMF situation to an extent, and so does the Ukrainian 
Embassy.''\451\
    One of Ms. Cooper's staff members reported that sometime 
during the week of August 6, a Ukrainian Embassy officer stated 
that ``a Ukrainian official might raise concerns about security 
assistance in an upcoming meeting,'' but that the issue was 
``not, in fact, raised.''\452\ Ms. Cooper's staff further 
reported that Ukrainian officials were aware of the hold on 
security assistance in August.\453\
    Lt. Col. Vindman testified that, by mid-August, he too was 
getting questions from Ukrainians about the status of the hold 
on security assistance:

          So to the best of my knowledge, the Ukrainians, first 
        of all, are in general pretty sophisticated, they have 
        their network of, you know, Ukrainian interest groups 
        and so forth. They have bipartisan support in Congress. 
        And certainly there are--it was no secret, at least 
        within government and official channels, that security 
        assistance was on hold. And to the best of my 
        recollection, I believe there were some of these light 
        inquires in the mid-August timeframe.\454\

    While numerous individuals, including Ukrainians, were 
aware of the hold, it did not become publicly known until a 
Politico report on August 28, 2019.\455\

4. The President's Meeting With the Ukrainian President Was Conditioned 
                  on an Announcement of Investigations


President Trump demanded the public announcement by President Zelensky 
        of investigations into President Trump's political rival and 
        alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election in 
        exchange for an Oval Office meeting. The President's 
        representatives made that quid pro quo clear to Ukrainian 
        officials.

                                Overview

    After ordering the hold on security assistance to Ukraine 
against the unanimous advice of the relevant U.S. government 
agencies, President Trump used his hand-picked representatives 
to demand that Ukrainian leaders publicly announce 
investigations into his political rival, former Vice President 
Joe Biden, and into the debunked conspiracy theory that 
Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. 
President Trump, through his agents, made clear that his demand 
needed to be met before a coveted White House meeting with 
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would be scheduled. A 
face-to-face meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office 
would have conferred on the new Ukrainian leader much-sought 
prestige and would have signaled to Russia that Ukraine could 
continue to count on the support of the President of the United 
States, which was particularly important as Russia continued to 
wage war in eastern Ukraine.
    To date, the White House meeting for President Zelensky has 
not occurred. Following the May 23 meeting in the Oval Office, 
President Trump's hand-picked representatives--the so-called 
``Three Amigos''--worked with the President's personal 
attorney, Rudy Giuliani, to pressure Ukrainian leaders to 
announce publicly investigations that would benefit the 
President's reelection campaign. Testimony of multiple 
witnesses and contemporaneous text messages exchanged between 
and among President Trump's representatives confirm that the 
White House meeting--and later the release of security 
assistance for Ukraine--was conditioned on Ukraine acquiescing 
to the President's demands.
    In the weeks leading up to the July 25 call between 
President Trump and President Zelensky, President Trump's 
representatives repeatedly relayed the message of 
conditionality to Ukrainian government officials--including to 
President Zelensky himself--in meetings in Kyiv, Toronto, and 
Washington, D.C. President Zelensky and his advisors struggled 
to navigate these demands, recognizing that President Trump's 
desire that Ukraine announce these political investigations 
threatened to render Ukraine a ``pawn'' in U.S. domestic 
reelection politics.

An Oval Office Meeting for President Zelensky Was Important to Ukraine 
                       and U.S. National Security

    A face-to-face meeting with the President of the United 
States in the Oval Office was critical to President Zelensky as 
the newly-elected Ukrainian leader sought U.S. support for his 
ambitious anti-corruption agenda and to repel Russian 
aggression. A White House meeting was also important for U.S. 
national security because it would have served to bolster 
Ukraine's negotiating position in peace talks with Russia. It 
also would have supported Ukraine as a bulwark against further 
Russian advances in Europe.
    Multiple witnesses unanimously attested to the importance 
of a White House meeting for Ukraine and the United States. For 
example, David Holmes, the Political Counselor at the U.S. 
Embassy in Kyiv, testified that a White House meeting was 
``critical'' to President Zelensky's ability to ``encourage 
Russian President Putin to take seriously President Zelensky's 
peace efforts.''\456\ Likewise, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
George Kent explained that a White House meeting was ``very 
important'' for Ukrainians to demonstrate the strength of their 
relationship with ``Ukraine's strongest supporter.'' He also 
said that it ``makes sense'' for the United States to meet with 
the Ukrainians as they were on ``the front lines of Russian 
malign influence and aggression.''\457\
    Dr. Fiona Hill, Deputy Assistant to the President and 
Senior Director of Europe and Russia at the NSC, explained that 
a White House meeting would supply the new Ukrainian Government 
with ``the legitimacy that it needed, especially vis-a-vis the 
Russians,''--and that the Ukrainians viewed a White House 
meeting as ``a recognition of their legitimacy as a sovereign 
state.''\458\ Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, the NSC Director for 
Ukraine, testified that a White House meeting would provide a 
``show of support'' from ``the most powerful country in the 
world and Ukraine's most significant benefactor,'' which would 
help the Ukrainian President ``establish his bona fides'' and 
``implement his agenda.''\459\
    Ambassador Kurt Volker, Special Representative for Ukraine 
Negotiations, also recognized that it was ``a tremendous symbol 
of support'' to have President Zelensky visit the White 
House.\460\ He explained that a meeting ``enhances [President 
Zelensky's] stature, that he is accepted, that he is seen at 
the highest level. The imagery you get from being at the White 
House is the best in the world, in terms of how it enhances 
someone's image.''\461\

President Trump ``Wanted to Hear from Zelensky'' Before Scheduling Oval 
                             Office Meeting

    Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr. arrived in Ukraine as the 
new Charge d'Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv on June 17, 
2019. After arriving, Ambassador Taylor worked to secure an 
Oval Office meeting between President Trump and President 
Zelensky. This was ``an agreed-upon goal'' of policymakers in 
both Ukraine and the United States.\462\
    Ambassador Taylor worked with Ambassador Volker and 
Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland--two of the 
Three Amigos--to try to schedule this meeting. Just days after 
beginning his new position, Ambassador Taylor learned that 
President Trump ``wanted to hear from Zelensky'' before 
scheduling the Oval Office meeting, but Ambassador Taylor did 
not understand what that meant at the time.\463\ On June 27, 
Ambassador Sondland informed Ambassador Taylor that President 
Zelensky needed to ``make clear'' to President Trump that he, 
President Zelensky, was not ``standing in the way of 
`investigations.'''\464\ Ambassador Taylor relayed this 
conversation to Mr. Holmes, who testified that he understood 
``investigations'' in that context to mean the ``Burisma-Biden 
investigations that Mr. Giuliani and his associates had been 
speaking about'' publicly.\465\
    On June 28, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry the--third of 
the Three Amigos--and Ambassadors Sondland, Volker, and Taylor 
participated in a conference call to prepare for a discussion 
later that day with President Zelensky. During this preparatory 
call, Ambassador Volker explained that he planned to be 
``explicit'' with President Zelensky in an upcoming one-on-one 
meeting in Toronto, Canada. Specifically, Ambassador Volker 
intended to inform President Zelensky that President Trump 
would require Ukraine to address ``rule of law, transparency, 
but also, specifically, cooperation on investigations to get to 
the bottom of things'' in order to ``get the meeting in the 
White House.''\466\
    For the subsequent call with President Zelensky on June 28, 
Ambassador Sondland sought to limit the number of U.S. 
government personnel listening in. According to Ambassador 
Taylor, Ambassador Sondland stated that he did not want to 
include ``most of the regular interagency participants'' and 
that ``he wanted to make sure no one was transcribing or 
monitoring'' the call when President Zelensky was patched in. 
Ambassador Taylor testified that he considered Ambassador 
Sondland's requests to be ``odd.''\467\ During that call, 
President Zelensky and the U.S. officials discussed energy 
policy and the conflict with Russia in eastern Ukraine. The 
Ukrainian president also noted that he looked forward to the 
White House visit that President Trump had offered in a letter 
dated May 29.\468\
    The exclusion of State Department staff and notetakers from 
the June 28 call was an early indication to Ambassador Taylor 
that separate channels of diplomacy related to Ukraine policy--
an official channel and an irregular channel--were 
``diverging.'' Ambassador Taylor testified:

          This suggested to me that there were the two 
        channels. This suggested to me that the normal channel, 
        where you would have staff on the phone call, was being 
        cut out, and the other channel, of people who were 
        working, again, toward a goal which I supported, which 
        was having a meeting to further U.S.-Ukrainian 
        relations, I supported, but that irregular channel 
        didn't have a respect for or an interest in having the 
        normal staff participate in this call with the head of 
        state.\469\

    Given Ambassador Sondland's efforts to exclude staff on the 
June 28 call with President Zelensky, Ambassador Taylor asked 
Ambassadors Sondland and Volker by text message how they 
planned to handle informing other U.S. officials about the 
contents of the call. Ambassador Volker responded: ``I think we 
just keep it among ourselves to try to build working 
relationship and just get the d*** date for the meeting!''\470\ 
Ambassador Sondland then texted: ``Agree with KV. Very close 
hold.''\471\ Nevertheless, Ambassador Taylor informed Mr. Kent 
about the call and wrote a memo for the record dated June 30 
that summarized the conversation with President Zelensky.\472\

Ambassador Volker Pressed ``Investigations'' With President Zelensky in 
                                Toronto

    On July 2, Ambassador Volker met with President Zelensky 
and his chief of staff on the sidelines of the Ukraine Reform 
Conference in Toronto. As he later texted to Ambassador Taylor, 
Ambassador Volker ``pulled the two of them aside at the end and 
explained the Giuliani factor.''\473\ Ambassador Volker 
clarified that by ``the Giuliani factor,'' he meant ``a 
negative narrative about Ukraine'' that was ``being amplified 
by Rudy Giuliani'' and was unfavorably impacting ``Ukraine's 
image in the United States and our ability to advance the 
bilateral relationship.''\474\ Ambassador Volker later informed 
Ukraine's incoming Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vadym 
Prystaiko, about his pull-aside with President Zelensky in 
Toronto via text message: ``I talked to him privately about 
Giuliani and impact on president T[rump].''\475\
    On July 3, the day after his pull-aside with President 
Zelensky in Toronto, Ambassador Volker sent a message to 
Ambassador Taylor emphasizing that ``The key thing is to tee up 
a phone call w potus and then get visit nailed down.''\476\ 
Ambassador Volker told Ambassador Taylor that during the 
Toronto conference, he counseled the Ukrainian president about 
how he could ``prepare for the phone call with President 
Trump.'' Specifically, Ambassador Volker told the Ukrainian 
leader that President Trump ``would like to hear about the 
investigations.''\477\ In his public testimony, Ambassador 
Volker confirmed that he mentioned ``investigations'' to 
President Zelensky in Toronto, explaining that he was 
``thinking of Burisma and 2016'' in raising the subject, and 
that his ``assumption'' was that Ukrainian officials also 
understood his reference to ``investigations'' to be ``Burisma/
2016.''\478\
    Ambassador Volker's efforts to prepare President Zelensky 
for his phone call with President Trump appear to have borne 
fruit. As discussed further in Chapter 5, during the July 25 
call, President Zelensky expressed his openness to pursuing 
investigations into President Trump's political rival, former 
Vice President Biden, and the conspiracy theory that Ukraine, 
rather than Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. 
President Zelensky also specifically referenced ``Burisma'' 
during the call.

  Ambassadors Volker and Sondland Worked to get Mr. Giuliani What he 
                                 Needed

    According to Ambassador Sondland, President Zelensky's 
commitment to make a public announcement about investigations 
into Burisma and the 2016 election was a ``prerequisite[]'' for 
the White House meeting.\479\ In fact, Ambassador Sondland 
testified that the announcement of the investigations--and not 
the investigations themselves--was the price President Trump 
sought in exchange for a White House meeting with Ukrainian 
President Zelensky:

          Q: But he had to get those two investigations if that 
        official act was going to take place, correct?
          A: He had to announce the investigations. He didn't 
        actually have to do them, as I understood it.
          Q: Okay. President Zelensky had to announce the two 
        investigations the President wanted, make a public 
        announcement, correct?
          A: Correct.\480\

    Ambassadors Sondland and Volker understood that they needed 
to work with Mr. Giuliani, who was publicly pressing for the 
announcement of investigations that would benefit President 
Trump politically. As discussed in Chapter 2, Ambassador 
Sondland testified that the key to overcoming President Trump's 
skepticism about Ukraine was satisfying the President's 
personal attorney. Sondland said, ``Nonetheless, based on the 
President's direction, we were faced with a choice: We could 
abandon the efforts to schedule the White House phone call and 
a White House visit'' or ``do as President Trump had directed 
and `talk with Rudy''' because ``it was the only constructive 
path open to us.''\481\
    Ambassador Volker discussed his intention to contact Mr. 
Giuliani with Mr. Kent. Ambassador Volker explained that he 
intended to reach out to Mr. Giuliani because it was clear that 
the former mayor ``had influence'' with President Trump ``in 
terms of the way the President thought of Ukraine.''\482\ 
Ukrainian officials also understood the importance of working 
through Mr. Giuliani, something that was underscored by his 
successful effort to smear and remove Ambassador Marie 
Yovanovitch from Kyiv in late April.\483\
    In response to Ambassador Volker's stated intention to 
reach out to Mr. Giuliani, Mr. Kent raised concerns about Mr. 
Giuliani's ``track record,'' including ``asking for a visa for 
a corrupt former prosecutor,'' attacking Ambassador 
Yovanovitch, and ``tweeting that the new President needs to 
investigate Biden and the 2016 campaign.'' Mr. Kent also warned 
Ambassador Volker that ``asking another country to investigate 
a prosecution for political reasons undermines our advocacy of 
the rule of law.''\484\
    On July 10, Ambassador Taylor met with Ukrainian officials 
in Kyiv, before their Ukrainian colleagues were scheduled to 
meet with National Security Advisor John Bolton at the White 
House later that day. At the meeting in Kyiv, the Ukrainian 
officials expressed that they were ``very concerned'' because 
they had heard from former Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko, 
who had learned from Mr. Giuliani, that President Trump had 
decided not to meet with President Zelensky.\485\
    Ambassador Taylor texted Ambassador Volker to explain the 
situation and advised that he had also informed T. Ulrich 
Brechbuhl, Counselor of the Department of State:

          Volker: Good grief. Please tell Vadym to let the 
        official USG representatives speak for the U.S. 
        lutsenko has his own self-Interest here . . .
          Taylor: Exactly what I told them.
          Taylor: And I said that RG is a private citizen.
          Taylor: I briefed Ulrich this afternoon on this.\486\

    Despite his text message to Ambassador Taylor that official 
U.S. government representatives should be allowed to ``speak 
for the U.S.,'' and notwithstanding Mr. Kent's warnings about 
engaging with Mr. Giuliani, Ambassador Volker almost 
immediately reached out to Mr. Giuliani. Four minutes after 
sending the text message above, Ambassador Volker texted Mr. 
Giuliani to request a meeting to ``update you on my 
conversations about Ukraine.'' He told Mr. Giuliani that he 
believed he had ``an opportunity to get you what you 
need.''\487\
    One hour later, around 9:00 a.m. Eastern Time, Ambassador 
Volker met Ukrainian presidential aide Andriy Yermak for coffee 
at the Trump Hotel before they traveled down Pennsylvania 
Avenue to their afternoon meetings at the White House.\488\ 
Over coffee, Mr. Yermak asked Ambassador Volker to connect him 
to Mr. Giuliani, thus further demonstrating the Ukrainians' 
understanding that satisfying Mr. Giuliani's demands was a key 
to getting what they wanted from President Trump, namely the 
Oval Office meeting.\489\

     July 10 White House Meetings: Ambassador Sondland Explicitly 
   Communicated the ``Prerequisite of Investigations'' to Ukrainians

    On July 10, during two separate meetings at the White 
House, Ambassador Sondland informed senior Ukrainian officials 
that there was a ``prerequisite of investigations'' before an 
Oval Office meeting between President Trump and President 
Zelensky would be scheduled.\490\
    The first meeting took place in Ambassador Bolton's office. 
NSC officials, including Ambassador Bolton's staff responsible 
for Ukraine--Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. Vindman--attended, as did 
the Three Amigos: Secretary Perry, Ambassador Sondland, and 
Ambassador Volker. The Ukrainian delegation included Mr. 
Yermak, a senior aide to President Zelensky, and Oleksandr 
``Sasha'' Danyliuk, the incoming Ukrainian National Security 
Advisor.\491\ The purpose of the meeting was twofold. The 
Ukrainians were seeking advice and assistance from Ambassador 
Bolton about how to ``revamp'' the Ukrainian National Security 
Council, and they were also ``very anxious to set up a meeting, 
a first meeting between President Zelensky and our 
President.''\492\
    Near the end of the meeting, the Ukrainian officials raised 
the scheduling of the Oval Office meeting for President 
Zelensky. According to Dr. Hill, Ambassador Sondland, who is 
``a fairly big guy, kind of leaned over'' and then ``blurted 
out: Well, we have an agreement with the [White House] Chief of 
Staff for a meeting if these investigations in the energy 
sector start.'' Dr. Hill described that others in the room 
looked up from their notes, thinking the comment was ``somewhat 
odd.'' Ambassador Bolton ``immediately stiffened'' and ended 
the meeting. Dr. Hill recounted that Ambassador Bolton was 
polite but was ``very abrupt. I mean, he looked at the clock as 
if he had, you know, suddenly another meeting and his time was 
up, but it was obvious he ended the meeting,'' she added.\493\
    Lt. Col. Vindman similarly testified that the meeting in 
Ambassador Bolton's office ``proceeded well'' until Ukrainian 
officials raised the meeting between President Trump and 
President Zelensky. The Ukrainians stated that they considered 
the Oval Office meeting to be ``critically important in order 
to solidify the support for their most important international 
partner.'' When Ambassador Sondland mentioned Ukraine 
``delivering specific investigations in order to secure the 
meeting with the President,'' Ambassador Bolton cut the meeting 
short.\494\
    Although Ambassador Volker did not recall any mention of 
``investigations'' during the July 10 meeting at his 
deposition,\495\ he later testified at his public hearing, ``As 
I remember, the meeting [in Ambassador Bolton's office] was 
essentially over when Ambassador Sondland made a general 
comment about investigations. I think all of us thought it was 
inappropriate'' and ``not what we should be talking 
about.''\496\
    After Ambassador Bolton ended the meeting in his office, 
Ambassador Sondland ``went out into the office in front of 
Ambassador Bolton'' and made ``unusual'' arrangements for the 
Ukrainians, Ambassador Volker, Secretary Perry, and others to 
go to a second meeting in the Ward Room of the White House, 
located near the secure spaces of the White House Situation 
Room. As Dr. Hill described it, the purpose of the Ward Room 
meeting was ``to talk to the Ukrainians about next steps'' 
regarding the Oval Office meeting for President Zelensky.\497\ 
As Dr. Hill was leaving Ambassador Bolton's office, he pulled 
her aside and directed her to attend the Ward Room meeting to 
``find out what they're talking about and come back'' and 
report to him. Dr. Hill followed his instruction.\498\
    During the Ward Room meeting, which occurred after a brief 
photo opportunity outside the West Wing, Ambassador Sondland 
was more explicit in pressing the Ukrainians to undertake the 
investigations in order to secure an Oval Office meeting for 
President Zelensky. Lt. Col. Vindman testified that when the 
group entered the Ward Room, Ambassador Sondland began to 
``review what the deliverable would be in order to get the 
meeting,'' and that ``to the best of my recollection, he did 
specifically say `investigation of the Bidens.''' Lt. Col. 
Vindman said the request ``was explicit. There was no 
ambiguity'' and that Ambassador Sondland also mentioned 
``Burisma.''\499\
    Dr. Hill entered the Ward Room as the discussion was 
underway. She testified that ``Ambassador Sondland, in front of 
the Ukrainians, as I came in, was talking about how he had an 
agreement with Chief of Staff Mulvaney for a meeting with the 
Ukrainians if they were going to go forward with 
investigations. And my director for Ukraine [Lt. Col. Vindman] 
was looking completely alarmed.''\500\ Dr. Hill recalled that 
Ambassador Sondland mentioned ``Burisma'' in the presence of 
the Ukrainians, in response to which Mr. Danyliuk also appeared 
``very alarmed'' and as if he did not know what was 
happening.\501\
    Dr. Hill confronted Ambassador Sondland, informing him that 
Ambassador Bolton had sent her there to ensure that the U.S. 
officials did not commit ``at this particular juncture'' to a 
meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky. 
Ambassador Sondland responded that he and the Ukrainians 
already had an agreement that the meeting would go 
forward.\502\ At Dr. Hill's urging, however, Ambassador 
Sondland excused the Ukrainian officials, who moved into the 
corridor near the White House Situation Room.
    Dr. Hill then told Ambassador Sondland: ``Look, I don't 
know what's going on here, but Ambassador Bolton wants to make 
it very clear that we have to talk about, you know, how are we 
going to set up this meeting. It has to go through proper 
procedures.'' Lt. Col. Vindman relayed his own concerns to 
Ambassador Sondland in the Ward Room.\503\ He explained that 
``the request to investigate the Bidens and his son had nothing 
to do with national security, and that such investigations were 
not something that the NSC was going to get involved in or 
push.''\504\
    Ambassador Sondland responded that he had had conversations 
with Mr. Mulvaney and he also mentioned Mr. Giuliani. Lt. Col. 
Vindman confirmed that Ambassador Sondland described an 
agreement he had with Mr. Mulvaney about the Oval Office 
meeting: ``I heard him say that this had been coordinated with 
White House Chief of Staff Mr. Mick Mulvaney . . . He just said 
that he had had a conversation with Mr. Mulvaney, and this is 
what was required in order to get a meeting.''\505\ Dr. Hill 
then cut the conversation short because she ``didn't want to 
get further into this discussion at all.'' She testified that 
Ambassador Sondland ``was clearly annoyed with this, but then, 
you know, he moved off. He said he had other meetings.''\506\
    Later on July 10, when Ambassador Taylor asked Ambassador 
Volker how the meetings went with the Ukrainian officials and 
whether they had resulted in a decision on a presidential call, 
Ambassador Volker replied: ``Not good lets talk.''\507\
    Following the July 10 White House meetings, Mr. Yermak 
followed up with Ambassador Volker by text message: ``Thank you 
for meeting and your clear and very logical position. Will be 
great meet with you before my departure and discuss. I feel 
that the key for many things is Rudi and I ready to talk with 
him at any time.''\508\

  Concerned Officials Reported Details of This ``Drug Deal'' to White 
                             House Lawyers

    After the Ward Room meeting, Dr. Hill returned to 
Ambassador Bolton's office and relayed what she had just 
witnessed. Ambassador Bolton was ``very angry'' and instructed 
her to report the conversation to John Eisenberg, Deputy 
Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and the 
Legal Advisor to the National Security Council:

          And he told me, and this is a direct quote from 
        Ambassador Bolton: You go and tell Eisenberg that I am 
        not part of whatever drug deal Sondland and Mulvaney 
        are cooking up on this, and you go and tell him what 
        you've heard and what I've said.\509\

    Dr. Hill explained that ``drug deal'' referred to 
Ambassador Sondland's and Mr. Mulvaney's conditioning of a 
White House meeting on investigations.\510\ By this point, Dr. 
Hill explained, it was clear that investigations were ``code, 
at least, for Burisma. Because that had been mentioned, you 
know, in the course of Mr. Giuliani's appearances on 
television.''\511\ Numerous U.S. officials, including 
Ambassadors Sondland, Volker, and Bolton, as well as Lt. Col. 
Vindman and others, were well aware of Mr. Giuliani's efforts 
to push Ukraine to pursue these political investigations.
    Following the meeting with Ambassador Bolton, Dr. Hill 
reported what had occurred to Mr. Eisenberg. She conveyed to 
Mr. Eisenberg the details of the two meetings, including 
Ambassador Sondland's agreement with Mr. Mulvaney to provide 
the White House meeting if Ukraine agreed to pursue the 
investigations.\512\ The initial conversation between Dr. Hill 
and Mr. Eisenberg was brief, and they scheduled a longer 
discussion for the next day.\513\
    On July 11, Dr. Hill enlisted another NSC official who 
attended the July 10 meetings, Senior Director for 
International Energy and Environment P. Wells Griffith, to 
attend the longer discussion with Mr. Eisenberg.\514\ Dr. Hill 
and Mr. Griffith went over the events of July 10 and further 
explained that Ambassador Sondland said that he had been 
communicating with Mr. Giuliani. Mr. Eisenberg was ``very 
concerned'' and stated that he would follow up. Dr. Hill 
understood that Mr. Eisenberg later discussed the issue with 
his ``reporting authority,'' specifically, White House Counsel 
Pat Cipollone.\515\
    Lt. Col. Vindman separately reported his concerns about the 
July 10 meetings to Mr. Eisenberg. He told Mr. Eisenberg that 
Ambassador Sondland had asked for investigations into ``Bidens 
and Burisma,'' which he thought was ``inappropriate.''\516\ Lt. 
Col. Vindman also reported that the investigation ``Mr. 
Giuliani was pushing was now being pulled into a, you know, 
national security dialogue.''\517\ Mr. Eisenberg said that he 
would look into it and invited Lt. Col. Vindman to return if 
any further concerns arose. No one from the of the White House 
Counsel's Office, however, followed up with Lt. Col. Vindman on 
this issue.\518\
    Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. Vindman discussed their reactions and 
alarm about the July 10 discussions with each other. They both 
believed that Ambassador Sondland's statements were 
inappropriate and ``had nothing to do with national security,'' 
and that they would not get involved with the scheme.\519\ On 
July 19, they also shared their concerns about Ambassador 
Sondland's comments during the July 10 meetings with Ambassador 
Taylor.\520\

 Ambassador Sondland Coached President Zelensky on Investigations and 
 Kept Senior White House and State Department Officials ``In the Loop''

    In mid-July, Dr. Hill was preparing to depart the NSC and 
transitioning her role to Timothy Morrison, who had been 
serving in another role at the NSC.\521\ On July 13, Ambassador 
Sondland emailed Mr. Morrison, explaining that the ``[s]ole 
purpose'' of a presidential call was for President Zelensky to 
assure President Trump that, ``Corruption ending, unbundling 
moving forward and any hampered investigations will be allowed 
to move forward transparently.'' In exchange, Ambassador 
Sondland wrote, the ``Goal is for Potus to invite him to Oval. 
Volker, Perry, Bolton and I strongly recommend.''\522\ Later 
that evening, Mr. Morrison responded, ``Thank you. 
Tracking.''\523\
    On July 19, a little over a week after the July 10 meetings 
at the White House, Ambassador Sondland spoke directly to 
President Zelensky about the upcoming call between the two 
presidents: ``It was a short call. I think I said: It looks 
like your call is finally on, and I think it's important that 
you, you know, give President Trump--he wanted this--some kind 
of a statement about corruption.''\524\
    Following his call with President Zelensky, Ambassador 
Sondland emailed several senior Trump Administration officials, 
including Mr. Mulvaney, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, 
Secretary Perry, and their staffs. The subject line of the July 
19 email read: ``I Talked to Zelensky just now.'' Ambassador 
Sondland wrote:

          He is prepared to receive Potus' call. Will assure 
        him that he intends to run a fully transparent 
        investigation and will ``turn over every stone''. He 
        would greatly appreciate a call prior to Sunday so that 
        he can put out some media about a ``friendly and 
        productive call'' (no details) prior to Ukraine 
        election on Sunday.\525\

    Secretary Perry responded that Mr. Mulvaney had confirmed a 
call would be set up ``for tomorrow by NSC,''\526\ and Mr. 
Mulvaney also responded to confirm that he had asked the NSC to 
set up the call between the presidents for the following day, 
July 20.\527\
    Ambassador Sondland explained that this email chain showed 
that ``[e]veryone was in the loop'' regarding his discussions 
with Ukrainian officials about the need for the Ukrainian 
leader to confirm to President Trump that he would announce the 
investigations. As Ambassador Sondland further testified:

          It was no secret. Everyone was informed via email on 
        July 19th, days before the Presidential call. As I 
        communicated to the team, I told President Zelensky in 
        advance that assurances to run a fully transparent 
        investigation and turn over every stone were necessary 
        in his call with President Trump.\528\

    Call records reviewed by the Committees show repeated 
contact between Ambassador Sondland and the White House around 
this time. For example, on July 19, at 10:43 a.m. Eastern Time, 
a number associated with the White House dialed Ambassador 
Sondland. Four minutes later, at 10:47 a.m., Ambassador 
Sondland called a White House phone number and connected for 
approximately seven minutes.\529\
    Later in the afternoon of July 19, Ambassador Sondland 
texted Ambassadors Volker and Taylor: ``Looks like Potus call 
tomorrow. I spike [sic] directly to Zelensky and gave him a 
full briefing. He's got it.''\530\ Ambassador Volker replied: 
``Good. Had breakfast with Rudy this morning--teeing up call w 
Yermak Monday. Must have helped. Most impt is for Zelensky to 
say that he will help investigation--and address any specific 
personnel issues--if there are any.''\531\

    Mr. Giuliani Met with State Department Officials and Ukrainian 
                          Government Officials

    As Ambassador Volker informed Ambassador Sondland in the 
above text message, on July 19, Ambassador Volker met Mr. 
Giuliani and his now-indicted associate Lev Parnas for 
breakfast at the Trump Hotel in Washington, D.C.\532\ 
Ambassador Volker also texted Mr. Yermak to inform him that he 
and Mr. Giuliani were meeting that day: ``Having our long 
anticipated breakfast today--will let you know and try to 
connect you directly.''\533\
    During the breakfast, Mr. Giuliani and Ambassador Volker 
discussed the discredited allegations against former Vice 
President Biden relating to Ukraine. Ambassador Volker 
testified that he pushed back against the allegations during 
his breakfast with Mr. Giuliani:

          One of the things that I said in that breakfast that 
        I had with Mr. Giuliani, the only time Vice President 
        Biden was ever discussed with me, and he was 
        repeating--he wasn't making an accusation and he wasn't 
        seeking an investigation--but he was repeating all of 
        the things that were in the media that we talked about 
        earlier about, you know, firing the prosecutor general 
        and his son being on the company and all that.
          And I said to Rudy in that breakfast the first time 
        we sat down to talk that it is simply not credible to 
        me that Joe Biden would be influenced in his duties as 
        Vice President by money or things for his son or 
        anything like that. I've known him a long time, he's a 
        person of integrity, and that's not credible.\534\

    Ambassador Volker further advised Mr. Giuliani during the 
breakfast that the then-Ukrainian Prosecutor General, Yuriy 
Lutsenko, was promoting a ``self-serving narrative to preserve 
himself in power.'' Mr. Giuliani agreed with Ambassador Volker 
and stated that he had come to that conclusion as well.\535\
    Following the breakfast, Ambassador Volker connected Mr. 
Giuliani with Mr. Yermak by text message:

          Volker: Mr Mayor--really enjoyed breakfast this 
        morning. As discussed, connecting you here with Andrey 
        Yermak, who is very close to President Zelensky. I 
        suggest we schedule a call together on Monday--maybe 
        10am or 11am Washington time? Kurt
          Giuliani: Monday 10 to 11
          Yermak: Ok, thank you
          Volker: I will set up call--10 am--thanks--Kurt
          Yermak: T\536\

    On the morning of July 22, Mr. Yermak texted Ambassador 
Volker about the upcoming call with Mr. Giuliani, writing that 
it was ``very good'' that their discussion would take place 
before the call between President Trump and President 
Zelensky.\537\ Later that day, the three men spoke by phone. 
Ambassador Volker described the July 22 discussion as merely an 
``introductory phone call,''\538\ although phone records 
indicate that the call lasted for approximately 38 
minutes.\539\
    Ambassador Volker testified that during the call, Mr. 
Giuliani and Mr. Yermak discussed plans for an in-person 
meeting in Madrid in early August.\540\ Afterward, Ambassador 
Volker texted Mr. Yermak that he thought the call had been 
``very useful'' and recommended that Mr. Yermak send Mr. 
Giuliani a text message to schedule a date for the Madrid 
meeting.\541\ Mr. Yermak texted Mr. Giuliani later that day 
about a plan to ``take this relationship to a new level'' and 
to meet in person as soon as possible.\542\
    Later on July 22, Ambassador Volker updated Ambassador 
Sondland on the ``great call'' he ``[o]rchestrated'' between 
Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Yermak, noting that ``Rudy is now 
advocating for phone call,'' an apparent reference to the call 
between President Trump and President Zelensky that would occur 
on July 25. Ambassador Volker also recommended that Ambassador 
Sondland inform Mr. Mulvaney that ``Rudy agrees,'' and that he 
planned to convey the same information to Ambassador Bolton. 
Ambassador Sondland replied that Mr. Morrison of the White 
House NSC was also in support of the call.\543\ Ambassador 
Volker also told Ambassador Sondland that Mr. Giuliani and Mr. 
Yermak would meet in person in Madrid within a couple of 
weeks.\544\

   President Zelensky Feared Becoming ``A Pawn'' in U.S. Reelection 
                                Campaign

    Around this time, senior Ukrainian officials informed U.S. 
officials that the new Ukrainian president did not want Ukraine 
to become enmeshed in U.S. domestic reelection politics.
    On July 20, Ambassador Taylor spoke with Mr. Danyliuk, the 
Ukrainian national security advisor, who conveyed that 
President Zelensky ``did not want to be used as a pawn in a 
U.S. reelection campaign.''\545\ Ambassador Taylor discussed 
President Zelensky's concern with Ambassador Volker and, the 
next day, texted Ambassador Sondland:

          Taylor: Gordon, one thing Kurt and I talked about 
        yesterday was Sasha Danyliuk's point that President 
        Zelenskyy is sensitive about Ukraine being taken 
        seriously, not merely as an instrument in Washington 
        domestic, reelection politics.
          Sondland: Absolutely, but we need to get the 
        conversation started and the relationship built, 
        irrespective of the pretext. I am worried about the 
        alternative.\546\

    Ambassador Taylor explained that his reference to 
``Washington domestic reelection politics'' was ``a reference 
to the investigations that Mr. Giuliani wanted to 
pursue.''\547\ According to Ambassador Taylor, President 
Zelensky understood what President Trump and Mr. Giuliani meant 
by ``investigations,'' and ``he did not want to get involved.'' 
Specifically, the Ukrainians understood that the 
``investigations were pursuant to Mr. Giuliani's request to 
develop information, to find information about Burisma and the 
Bidens. This was very well known in public. Mr. Giuliani had 
made this point clear in several instances in the beginning--in 
the springtime.''\548\ Ambassador Taylor also testified that 
the ``whole thrust'' of the activities undertaken by Mr. 
Giuliani and Ambassador Sondland ``was to get these 
investigations, which Danyliuk and presumably Zelensky were 
resisting because they didn't want to be seen to be interfering 
but also to be a pawn.''\549\
    Despite the Ukrainian resistance, Ambassador Sondland said 
he believed that the public announcement of investigations 
would ``fix'' an impasse between the Ukrainian government and 
President Trump. When asked what he meant by ``irrespective of 
the pretext'' in his July 21 text message to Ambassador Taylor, 
Ambassador Sondland explained, ``Well, the pretext being the 
agreed-upon interview or the agreed-upon press statement. We 
just need to get by it so that the two can meet, because, 
again, it was back to once they meet, all of this will be 
fixed.''\550\

Witnesses Confirmed the President Conditioned an Oval Office Meeting on 
                             Investigations

    Multiple witnesses testified that the conditioning of an 
Oval Office meeting on President Zelensky's announcement of 
investigations to benefit the President's reelection campaign 
came from the very top: President Trump.
    Ambassador Sondland testified that he, Secretary Perry, and 
Ambassador Volker worked with Mr. Giuliani ``at the express 
direction of the President of the United States.''\551\ 
Ambassador Sondland stated that ``Mr. Giuliani was expressing 
the desires of the President of the United States, and we knew 
these investigations were important to the President.''\552\ 
Ambassador Sondland explained that he ``followed the directions 
of the President'' and that ``we followed the President's 
orders.''\553\
    Ambassador Sondland further testified that President Trump 
expressed--both directly and through Mr. Giuliani--that he 
wanted ``a public statement from President Zelensky committing 
to the investigations of Burisma and the 2016 election'' as 
``prerequisites for the White House call and the White House 
meeting.''\554\ Ambassador Sondland explained:

          I know that members of this committee frequently 
        frame these complicated issues in the form of a simple 
        question: Was there a quid pro quo? As I testified 
        previously with regard to the requested White House 
        call and the White House meeting, the answer is 
        yes.\555\

    Ambassador Sondland also testified that knowledge of this 
quid pro quo was widespread among the President's advisers: 
``Everyone was in the loop'' about the President's expectation 
that President Zelensky had to announce these specific 
investigations to secure an Oval Office meeting. As an example, 
Ambassador Sondland cited an email--copying Senior Advisor to 
the White House Chief of Staff Robert Blair, State Department 
Executive Secretary Lisa Kenna, Chief of Staff to the Secretary 
of Energy Brian McCormack, Mr. Mulvaney, Secretary Perry, and 
Secretary Pompeo--where ``[e]veryone was informed.''\556\
    Other U.S. government officials also understood this scheme 
as a quid pro quo. Ambassador Taylor testified that as early as 
mid-July, it was ``becoming clear'' to him that ``the meeting 
President Zelensky wanted was conditioned on investigations of 
Burisma and alleged Ukrainian influence in the 2016 elections'' 
and that ``this condition was driven by the irregular policy 
channel I had come to understand was guided by Mr. 
Giuliani.''\557\ Mr. Holmes similarly understood that by July, 
``it was made clear that some action on a Burisma/Biden 
investigation was a precondition for an Oval Office 
visit.''\558\ Dr. Hill testified that this quid pro quo was 
readily apparent after reading the July 25 call summary, 
explaining that it revealed that the White House meeting was 
used as ``some kind of asset'' that was ``dangled out to the 
Ukrainian Government'' to secure a political benefit.\559\

Final Preparation for Trump-Zelensky Call: Ambassador Volker Counseled 
       Ukrainians and Ambassador Sondland Prepped President Trump

    Ambassador Taylor testified that the call between President 
Trump and President Zelensky that ultimately occurred on July 
25 was not confirmed until the last minute: ``We were trying to 
schedule it for about a week in advance, that whole week. As I 
say, back and forth, yes, no, this time, that time. . . . it 
may have been about the day before that it was actually locked 
down, so about the 24th.''\560\ According to Ambassador Taylor, 
at least one person had prescient concerns about the call 
before it occurred: ``Ambassador Bolton was not interested in 
having--did not want to have the call because he thought it was 
going to be a disaster. He thought that there could be some 
talk of investigations or worse on the call.''\561\
    Before the call took place on July 25, Ambassador Volker 
had lunch with Mr. Yermak in Kyiv. Ambassador Volker followed 
up with a text message to Mr. Yermak approximately 30 minutes 
before the call, noting that a White House visit was still on 
the table if, during the call, President Zelensky convinced 
President Trump that Ukraine would ``investigate'' and ``get to 
the bottom of what happened'' in 2016:

          Volker: Good lunch--thanks. Heard from White House--
        assuming President Z convinces trump he will 
        investigate / ``get to the bottom of what happened'' in 
        2016, we will nail down date for visit to Washington. 
        Good luck! See you tomorrow--kurt

    Ambassador Volker later informed Ambassador Sondland that 
he had relayed this ``message'' to Mr. Yermak, which Ambassador 
Sondland had conveyed to Ambassador Volker earlier that day:

          Volker: Hi Gordon--got your message. Had a great 
        lunch w Yermak and then passed your message to him. He 
        will see you tomorrow. Think everything in place\562\

    Ambassador Sondland testified that the ``message'' that 
Ambassador Volker conveyed to Mr. Yermak in advance of the July 
25 call likely originated from an earlier conversation that 
Ambassador Sondland had with President Trump:

          Q: So is it fair to say that this message is what you 
        received from President--Trump on that phone call that 
        morning?
          A: Again, if he testified to that, to refresh my own 
        memory, then, yes, likely I would have received that 
        from President Trump.
          Q: But the sequence certainly makes sense, right?
          A: Yeah, it does.
          Q: You talked to President Trump.
          A: Yeah.
          Q: You told Kurt Volker to call you. You left a 
        message for Kurt Volker. Kurt Volker sent this text 
        message to Andriy Yermak to prepare President Zelensky 
        and then President Trump had a phone call where 
        President Zelensky spoke very similar to what was in 
        this text message, right?
          A: Right.
          Q: And you would agree that the message in this--that 
        is expressed here is that President Zelensky needs to 
        convince Trump that he will do the investigations in 
        order to nail down the date for a visit to Washington, 
        D.C. Is that correct?
          A: That's correct.\563\

    Ambassador Sondland testified that he spoke with President 
Trump before the call with President Zelensky.\564\ Mr. 
Morrison also confirmed that President Trump and Ambassador 
Sondland spoke before President Trump's call with President 
Zelensky.\565\ Mr. Morrison stated that Ambassador Sondland 
emailed him on the morning of the call and listed ``three 
topics that he was working on, the first of which was `I spoke 
to the President this morning to brief him on the call.'''\566\ 
According to Mr. Morrison, Ambassador Sondland ``believed'' 
that he helped to facilitate the July 25 call between President 
Trump and President Zelensky.\567\
    On July 26, the day after the call between President Trump 
and President Zelensky, Ambassador Volker acknowledged his role 
in prepping President Zelensky for the call with President 
Trump in a text to Mr. Giuliani: ``Hi Mr Mayor--you may have 
heard--the President has [sic] a great phone call with the 
Ukrainian President yesterday. Exactly the right messages as we 
discussed.''\568\

   5. The President Asked the Ukrainian President to Interfere in the 
   2020 U.S. Election by Investigating the Bidens and 2016 Election 
                              Interference


During a call on July 25, President Trump asked President Zelensky of 
        Ukraine to ``do us a favor though'' and investigate his 
        political opponent, former Vice President Joe Biden, and a 
        debunked conspiracy theory that Ukraine interfered in the 2016 
        U.S. election. The next day, Ambassador Gordon Sondland 
        informed President Trump that President Zelensky ``was gonna do 
        the investigation'' and ``anything'' President Trump asked of 
        him.

                                Overview

    During a telephone call on July 25, 2019, President Donald 
J. Trump asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to 
investigate his political rival, former Vice President Joseph 
Biden, and a debunked conspiracy theory that Ukraine interfered 
in the 2016 U.S. election. President Trump also discussed the 
removal of Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, former U.S. Ambassador 
to Ukraine, said that she was ``bad news,'' and warned that she 
would ``go through some things.'' Two witnesses who listened to 
the call testified that they immediately reported the details 
of the call to senior White House lawyers.
    When asked by a reporter on October 3, 2019, what he had 
hoped President Zelensky would do following the call, President 
Trump responded: ``Well, I would think that, if they were 
honest about it, they'd start a major investigation into the 
Bidens. It's a very simple answer.''
    Witnesses unanimously testified that President Trump's 
claims about former Vice President Biden and alleged Ukrainian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. election have been discredited. 
The witnesses reaffirmed that in late 2015 and early 2016, when 
former Vice President Biden advocated for the removal of a 
corrupt Ukrainian prosecutor, he acted in accordance with a 
``broad-based consensus'' and the official policy of the United 
States, the European Union, and major international financial 
institutions. Witnesses also unanimously testified that the 
removal of that prosecutor made it more likely that Ukraine 
would investigate corruption, not less likely.
    Dr. Fiona Hill, former Deputy Assistant to the President 
and Senior Director for Europe and Russia at the National 
Security Council, testified that the conspiracy theories about 
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election touted by 
President Trump are a ``fictional narrative that is being 
perpetrated and propagated by the Russian security services.'' 
She noted that President Trump's former Homeland Security 
Advisor Tom Bossert and former National Security Advisor H.R. 
McMaster repeatedly advised the President that the so-called 
``CrowdStrike'' conspiracy theory that President Trump raised 
in the July 25 call is completely ``debunked,'' and that 
allegations Ukraine interfered in the 2016 U.S. election are 
false.
    Nonetheless, on July 26, 2019, U.S. Ambassador to the 
European Union Gordon Sondland met with senior Ukrainian 
officials in Kyiv and then informed President Trump that 
President Zelensky ``was gonna do the investigation'' into 
former Vice President Biden and alleged Ukrainian interference 
in the 2016 U.S. election. Ambassador Sondland added that 
President Zelensky would ``do anything'' President Trump asked 
of him. After the call, Ambassador Sondland told David Holmes, 
Counselor for Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, 
that President Trump ``did not give a shit about Ukraine'' and 
that he only cared about the ``big stuff'' that benefited his 
personal interests, like the ``Biden investigation.''

    President Trump's Call With President Zelensky on July 25, 2019

    On July 25, 2019, President Zelensky finally had a long-
awaited phone call with Ukraine's most important international 
partner: The President of the United States.
    It had been over three months since the two leaders first 
spoke. Despite a warm but largely non-substantive call on April 
21, President Trump had since declined President Zelensky's 
invitation to attend his inauguration and directed Vice 
President Mike Pence not to attend either.\569\ Ukrainian 
efforts to set a date for a promised Oval Office meeting with 
President Trump were stalled. As Mr. Holmes explained, 
following the April 21 call:

          President Zelensky's team immediately began pressing 
        to set a date for that visit. President Zelensky and 
        senior members of his team made clear that they wanted 
        President Zelensky's first overseas trip to be to 
        Washington, to send a strong signal of American 
        support, and requested a call with President Trump as 
        soon as possible.\570\

    Before scheduling the July 25 call or a White House visit, 
President Trump met on June 28 with Russian President Vladimir 
Putin--whose armed forces were engaged in a war of attrition 
against U.S.-backed Ukrainian forces--on the sidelines of the 
G20 summit in Osaka, Japan.\571\ During their meeting, 
President Trump and President Putin shared a joke about 
Russia's meddling in the 2016 U.S. election.\572\
    On July 25, President Trump joined the call with President 
Zelensky from the Executive Residence at the White House, away 
from a small group of senior national security aides who would 
normally join him in the Oval Office for a conversation with a 
foreign head of state. President Trump and President Zelensky 
began to speak at 9:03 a.m. Washington time--4:03 p.m. in Kyiv. 
According to Tim Morrison, the newly-installed Senior Director 
for Europe and Russia on the NSC, President Zelensky spoke in 
Ukrainian and occasionally in ``chopped English.''\573\ 
Translators interpreted the call on both sides.\574\ American 
aides listening to the call from the White House Situation Room 
hoped that what was said over the next 30 minutes would provide 
President Zelensky with the strong U.S. endorsement he needed 
in order to successfully negotiate an end to the five-year-old 
war with Russia that had killed over 13,000 Ukrainian soldiers 
and to advance President Zelensky's ambitious anti-corruption 
initiatives in Ukraine.\575\
    The Trump Administration's subject-matter experts, NSC 
Director for Ukraine Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman and Mr. 
Morrison, were both on the call.\576\ They had prepared talking 
points for President Trump and were taking detailed notes of 
what both leaders said, so that they could promptly implement 
any agreed-upon actions.\577\ They were joined by Lt. Gen. 
Keith Kellogg, National Security Advisor to the Vice President, 
and Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor to the Vice President 
for Europe and Russia. Assistant to the President Robert Blair, 
a senior aide to Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, was also 
present, along with an NSC press officer.\578\ Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo listened from a different location, as did 
Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, the Deputy National Security 
Advisor.\579\
    Notably, Secretary Pompeo did not reveal that he listened 
to the July 25 call when asked directly about it on This Week 
on September 22.\580\ Neither Secretary Pompeo nor the State 
Department corrected the record until September 30, when ``a 
senior State Department official'' disclosed the Secretary of 
State's participation in the July 25 call.\581\
    The two presidents first exchanged pleasantries. President 
Trump congratulated the Ukrainian leader on his party's 
parliamentary victory. In a nod to their shared experience as 
political outsiders, President Zelensky called President Trump 
``a great teacher'' who informed his own efforts to involve 
``many many new people'' in Ukraine's politics and ``drain the 
swamp here in our country.''\582\
    The discussion turned to U.S. support for Ukraine. 
President Trump contrasted U.S. assistance to that of America's 
closest European allies, stating: ``We spend a lot of effort 
and a lot of time. Much more than the European countries are 
doing and they should be helping you more than they are.'' The 
call then took a more ominous turn. President Trump stated that 
with respect to U.S. support for Ukraine, ``I wouldn't say that 
it's reciprocal necessarily because things are happening that 
are not good but the United States has been very very good to 
Ukraine.''\583\
    President Zelensky, whose government receives billions of 
dollars in financial support from the European Union and its 
member states, responded that European nations were ``not 
working as much as they should work for Ukraine,'' including in 
the area of enforcing sanctions against Russia.\584\ He noted 
that ``the United States is a much bigger partner than the 
European Union'' and stated that he was ``very grateful'' 
because ``the United States is doing quite a lot for 
Ukraine.''\585\
    President Zelensky then raised the issue of U.S. military 
assistance for Ukraine with President Trump: ``I also would 
like to thank you for your great support in the area of 
defense''--an area where U.S. support is vital.\586\ President 
Zelensky continued: ``We are ready to continue to cooperate for 
the next steps specifically we are almost ready to buy more 
Javelins from the United States for defense purposes.''\587\ 
The Javelin anti-tank missiles, first transferred to Ukraine by 
the United States in 2018, were widely viewed by U.S. officials 
as a deterrent against further Russian encroachment into 
Ukrainian territory.\588\
    Immediately after the Ukrainian leader raised the issue of 
U.S. military assistance to Ukraine, President Trump replied: 
``I would like you to do us a favor though because our country 
has been through a lot and Ukraine knows a lot about it.''\589\

                  Request to Investigate 2016 Election

    President Trump then explained the ``favor'' he wanted 
President Zelensky to do. He first requested that Ukraine 
investigate a discredited conspiracy theory aimed at 
undercutting the U.S. Intelligence Community's unanimous 
conclusion that the Russian government interfered in the 2016 
U.S. election.\590\ Specifically, President Trump stated:

          I would like you to find out what happened with this 
        whole situation with Ukraine, they say Crowdstrike . . 
        . I guess you have one of your wealthy people . . . The 
        server, they say Ukraine has it. There are a lot of 
        things that went on, the whole situation. I think 
        you're surrounding yourself with some of the same 
        people. I would like to have the Attorney General call 
        you or your people and I would like you to get to the 
        bottom of it. As you saw yesterday, that whole nonsense 
        ended with a very poor performance by a man named 
        Robert Mueller, an incompetent performance, but they 
        say a lot of it started with Ukraine. Whatever you can 
        do, it's very important that you do it if that's 
        possible.\591\

    President Trump was referencing the widely debunked 
conspiracy theory that the Ukrainian government--and not 
Russia--was behind the hack of Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) servers in 2016, and that the American cybersecurity firm 
CrowdStrike moved the DNC's servers to Ukraine to prevent U.S. 
law enforcement from examining them. This theory is often 
referred to in shorthand as ``CrowdStrike'' and has been 
promoted by the Russian government.\592\
    For example, during a press conference in February 2017, 
just weeks after the U.S. Intelligence Community unanimously 
assessed in a public report that Russia interfered in the 2016 
U.S. election to benefit the candidacy of Donald J. Trump, 
President Putin falsely asserted that ``the Ukrainian 
government adopted a unilateral position in favour of one 
candidate. More than that, certain oligarchs, certainly with 
the approval of the political leadership, funded this 
candidate, or female candidate, to be more precise.''\593\ 
President Trump's reference in his July 25 telephone call to 
``one of your wealthy people'' tracked closely with President 
Putin's accusations that ``certain oligarchs'' in Ukraine 
meddled in the 2016 U.S. election to support Democratic 
candidate Hillary Clinton.
    Dr. Hill, an expert on Russia and President Putin, 
testified that the claim that ``Russia and its security 
services did not conduct a campaign against our country and 
that perhaps, somehow for some reason, Ukraine did'' is ``a 
fictional narrative that is being perpetrated and propagated by 
the Russian security services themselves.'' Dr. Hill reaffirmed 
that the U.S. Intelligence Community's January 2017 conclusion 
that Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. election is ``beyond 
dispute, even if some of the underlying details must remain 
classified.''\594\
    Tom Bossert, President Trump's former Homeland Security 
Advisor, stated publicly that the CrowdStrike theory is ``not 
only a conspiracy theory, it is completely debunked.''\595\ Dr. 
Hill testified that White House officials--including Mr. 
Bossert and former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster--
``spent a lot of time'' refuting the CrowdStrike conspiracy 
theory to President Trump. Dr. Hill explained that Mr. Bossert 
and others ``who were working on cybersecurity laid out to the 
President the facts about the interference.'' She affirmed that 
President Trump was advised that ``the alternative theory that 
Ukraine had interfered in the election was false.''\596\
    President Zelensky did not directly address President 
Trump's reference to CrowdStrike during the July 25 call, but 
he tried to assure President Trump that ``it is very important 
for me and everything that you just mentioned earlier.''\597\ 
President Zelensky committed to proceed with an investigation, 
telling President Trump that he had ``nobody but friends'' in 
the new Ukrainian presidential administration, possibly 
attempting to rebut Rudy Giuliani's earlier claims that 
President Zelensky was surrounded by ``enemies'' of President 
Trump. President Zelensky then specifically noted that one of 
his assistants ``spoke with Mr. Giuliani just recently and we 
are hoping very much that Mr. Giuliani will be able to travel 
to Ukraine and we will meet once he comes to Ukraine.''\598\
    Significantly, President Zelensky referenced Mr. Giuliani 
even before President Trump had mentioned him, demonstrating 
the Ukrainian leader's understanding that Mr. Giuliani 
represented President Trump's interests in Ukraine. The 
Ukrainian leader then reassured President Trump, ``I also plan 
to surround myself with great people and in addition to that 
investigation'' into the CrowdStrike conspiracy theory. He 
said, ``I guarantee as the President of Ukraine that all the 
investigations will be done openly and candidly. That I can 
assure you.''\599\ President Trump replied, ``Rudy very much 
knows what's happening and he is a very capable guy. If you 
could speak to him that would be great.''\600\

                     Request to Investigate Bidens

    President Trump then returned to his requested ``favor,'' 
asking President Zelensky about the ``[t]he other thing'': that 
Ukraine investigate President Trump's U.S. political rival, 
former Vice President Biden, for allegedly ending an 
investigation into the Ukrainian energy company Burisma 
Holdings. Vice President Biden's son, Hunter Biden, served as a 
member of Burisma's board of directors. President Trump told 
President Zelensky:

          The other thing, There's a lot of talk about Biden's 
        son, that Biden stopped the prosecution and a lot of 
        people want to find out about that so whatever you can 
        do with the Attorney General would be great. Biden went 
        around bragging that he stopped the prosecution so if 
        you can look into it . . . It sounds horrible to 
        me.\601\

    President Trump later continued, ``I will have Mr. Giuliani 
give you a call and I am also going to have Attorney General 
Barr call and we will get to the bottom of it. I'm sure you 
will figure it out.''\602\
    In public remarks on October 3, 2019, a reporter asked 
President Trump, ``what exactly did you hope Zelensky would do 
about the Bidens after your phone call? Exactly.'' President 
Trump responded: ``Well, I would think that, if they were 
honest about it, they'd start a major investigation into the 
Bidens. It's a very simple answer.''\603\
    When President Trump asserted to President Zelensky during 
the July 25 call that former Vice President ``Biden went around 
bragging that he stopped the prosecution,'' President Trump was 
apparently referring to Vice President Biden's involvement in 
the removal of the corrupt former Ukrainian prosecutor general, 
Viktor Shokin.
    Multiple witnesses--including Dr. Hill, former U.S. 
Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch, Mr. Holmes, and Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State George Kent--testified that they 
were not aware of any credible evidence to support the claim 
that former Vice President Biden acted inappropriately when he 
advocated for the removal of Mr. Shokin.\604\ To the contrary, 
those witnesses confirmed that it was the official policy of 
the United States, the European Union, and major international 
financial institutions, to demand Mr. Shokin's dismissal. As 
Mr. Kent testified, there was ``a broad-based consensus'' that 
Mr. Shokin was ``a typical Ukraine prosecutor who lived a 
lifestyle far in excess of his government salary, who never 
prosecuted anybody known for having committed a crime'' and who 
``covered up crimes that were known to have been 
committed.''\605\ Mr. Kent further explained:

          What former Vice President Biden requested of former 
        President of Ukraine Poroshenko was the removal of a 
        corrupt prosecutor general, Viktor Shokin, who had 
        undermined a program of assistance that we had spent, 
        again, U.S. taxpayer money to try to build an 
        independent investigator unit to go after corrupt 
        prosecutors.\606\

    As Ambassador Yovanovitch testified, the removal of a 
corrupt Ukrainian prosecutor general, who was not prosecuting 
enough corruption, increased the chance that alleged corruption 
in companies in Ukraine could be investigated.\607\
    Mr. Shokin was a known associate of Mr. Giuliani. As 
described in Chapter 1, Mr. Giuliani had been communicating 
with Mr. Shokin since at least 2018.\608\ Mr. Giuliani also 
lobbied the White House on behalf of Mr. Shokin to intervene 
earlier in 2019 when the State Department rejected a visa 
application for Mr. Shokin to visit the United States based 
upon Mr. Shokin's notorious corrupt conduct.\609\ Ambassador 
Kurt Volker, U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine 
Negotiations, testified that he explicitly warned Mr. 
Giuliani--to no avail--against pursuing ``the conspiracy theory 
that Vice President Biden would have been influenced in his 
duties as Vice President by money paid to his son.''\610\ 
Ambassador Volker affirmed that former Vice President Biden is 
``an honorable man, and I hold him in the highest 
regard.''\611\

                 Attacks Against Ambassador Yovanovitch

    During the July 25 call, President Trump also attacked 
Ambassador Yovanovitch, whom he had ousted as the U.S. 
Ambassador to Ukraine three months earlier after a concerted 
smear campaign perpetuated by Mr. Giuliani. As described in 
Chapter 1, Mr. Giuliani viewed Ambassador Yovanovitch--a 
decorated diplomat who had championed Ukrainian anti-corruption 
officials and activists--as an impediment to his activities in 
Ukraine.\612\ President Trump told President Zelensky: ``The 
former ambassador from the United States, the woman, was bad 
news and the people she was dealing with in the Ukraine were 
bad news so I just want to let you know that.'' He later added: 
``Well, she's going to go through some things.''\613\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch described her visceral reaction when 
she first read the call record, after the White House released 
it publicly on September 25, 2019. She testified, ``I was 
shocked. I mean, I was very surprised that President Trump 
would--first of all, that I would feature repeatedly in a 
Presidential phone call, but secondly, that the President would 
speak about me or any ambassador in that way to a foreign 
counterpart.''\614\ When asked whether she felt ``threatened'' 
by President Trump's statement that ``she's going to go through 
some things,'' Ambassador Yovanovitch answered that she 
did.\615\

             Praise of Corrupt Former Ukrainian Prosecutor

    After disparaging Ambassador Yovanovitch, who had an 
extensive record of combatting corruption, President Trump 
praised an unnamed former Ukrainian prosecutor general--
referring to Yuriy Lutsenko--who was widely considered to be 
corrupt and had promoted false allegations against Ambassador 
Yovanovitch.\616\ President Trump told President Zelensky: 
``Good because I heard you had a prosecutor who was very good 
and he was shut down and that's really unfair. A lot of people 
are talking about that, the way they shut your very good 
prosecutor down and you had some very bad people 
involved.''\617\ He later added, ``I heard the prosecutor was 
treated very badly and he was a very fair prosecutor so good 
luck with everything.''\618\
    At the time of the July 25 call, Mr. Lutsenko--who was 
collaborating with Mr. Giuliani to smear Ambassador Yovanovitch 
and the Bidens--was still the Ukrainian prosecutor general. Mr. 
Holmes testified that Mr. Lutsenko ``was not a good partner. He 
had failed to deliver on the promised reforms that he had 
committed to when he took office, and he was using his office 
to insulate and protect political allies while presumably 
enriching himself.''\619\ By July 2019, Mr. Holmes assessed 
that Mr. Lutsenko was ``trying to angle to keep his job'' under 
the new Zelensky Administration and that part of his strategy 
was ``appealing to Rudy Giuliani and Donald Trump by pushing 
out these false theories about the Bidens and the 2016 
election.''\620\
    Multiple witnesses testified that another former Ukrainian 
prosecutor, Mr. Shokin, was also considered to be corrupt. For 
example, Mr. Kent testified during his deposition that Mr. 
Lutsenko and Mr. Shokin were ``corrupt former prosecutors'' who 
were ``peddling false information in order to extract revenge 
against those who had exposed their misconduct, including U.S. 
diplomats, Ukrainian anticorruption officials, and reform-
minded civil society groups in Ukraine.''\621\ Ambassador 
Volker testified at his public hearing that Mr. Lutsenko was 
``not credible, and was acting in a self-serving 
capacity.''\622\ Mr. Holmes further noted that Mr. Lutsenko 
``resisted fully empowering truly independent anticorruption 
institutions that would help ensure that no Ukrainians, however 
powerful, were above the law.''\623\
    After the call, the White House press office issued a short 
and incomplete summary of the call, omitting major elements of 
the conversation. The press statement read:

    Today, President Donald J. Trump spoke by telephone with 
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine to congratulate him on 
his recent election. President Trump and President Zelenskyy 
discussed ways to strengthen the relationship between the 
United States and Ukraine, including energy and economic 
cooperation. Both leaders also expressed that they look forward 
to the opportunity to meet.\624\

        Concerns Raised by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman

    Prior to President Trump's July 25 call with President 
Zelensky, Lt. Col. Vindman had prepared--with Mr. Morrison's 
review and approval--a call briefing package, including talking 
points for President Trump's use. This was consistent with the 
NSC's regular process of preparing for the President's phone 
calls with foreign leaders.\625\ The NSC-drafted talking points 
did not include any reference to Biden, Burisma, CrowdStrike, 
or alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. 
election.\626\
    Lt. Col. Vindman testified during his deposition that, 
prior to the July 25 call, he was aware of concerns from former 
National Security Advisor John Bolton and other U.S. officials 
that President Trump might raise these discredited issues with 
President Zelensky.\627\ Indeed, Ambassador Bolton had resisted 
scheduling the call because he believed it might be a 
``disaster.''\628\
    As he sat in the White House Situation Room listening to 
the leaders, Lt. Col. Vindman quickly recognized that the 
President's conversation was diverging from the talking points 
he helped prepare based on the interagency policy process, and 
``straying'' into an ``unproductive narrative'' promoted by Mr. 
Giuliani and other ``external and nongovernmental 
influencers''\629\--topics that Lt. Col. Vindman dubbed ``stray 
voltage.''\630\
    Lt. Col. Vindman knew immediately that he had a duty to 
report the contents of the call to the White House lawyers. He 
explained, ``I had concerns, and it was my duty to report my 
concerns to the proper--proper people in the chain of 
command.''\631\ Lt. Col. Vindman testified that President 
Trump's request that a foreign leader dependent on the United 
States open an investigation into his U.S. political opponent 
constituted a ``demand'' that President Zelensky had to meet in 
order to secure a White House meeting:

          So, Congressman, the power disparity between the 
        President of the United States and the President of 
        Ukraine is vast, and, you know, in the President asking 
        for something, it became--there was--in return for a 
        White House meeting, because that's what this was 
        about. This was about getting a White House meeting. It 
        was a demand for him to fulfill his--fulfill this 
        particular prerequisite in order to get the 
        meeting.\632\

    Lt. Col. Vindman further testified that President Trump's 
demand of the Ukrainian leader was ``inappropriate'' and 
``improper,'' and that it would undermine U.S. national 
security:

          Chairman, as I said in my statement, it was 
        inappropriate. It was improper for the President to 
        request--to demand an investigation into a political 
        opponent, especially a foreign power where there's, at 
        best, dubious belief that this would be a completely 
        impartial investigation, and that this would have 
        significant implications if it became public knowledge, 
        and it would be perceived as a partisan play. It would 
        undermine our Ukraine policy, and it would undermine 
        our national security.\633\

    Within an hour of the call ending, Lt. Col. Vindman 
reported his concerns to John A. Eisenberg, the Deputy Counsel 
to the President for National Security Affairs and the Legal 
Advisor to the NSC, and Michael Ellis, a Senior Associate 
Counsel to the President and the Deputy Legal Advisor to the 
NSC.\634\ Lt. Col. Vindman recounted the content of the call 
based on his handwritten notes and told the lawyers that he 
believed it was ``wrong'' for President Trump to ask President 
Zelensky to investigate Vice President Biden.\635\

                  Concerns Raised by Timothy Morrison

    After 17 years as a Republican Congressional staffer and 
approximately a year serving elsewhere on the NSC staff, Mr. 
Morrison assumed his position as the NSC's Senior Director for 
Europe and Russia on July 15, 2019, only 10 days before 
President Trump's call with President Zelensky.\636\
    Before he transitioned into his new role, Mr. Morrison met 
with his predecessor, Dr. Hill. She advised him to stay away 
from efforts orchestrated by Mr. Giuliani and Ambassador 
Sondland to pressure Ukraine into investigating a ``bucket of 
issues'' that included ``Burisma the company,'' and ``Hunter 
Biden on the board.''\637\ Dr. Hill also warned Mr. Morrison 
before the July 25 call about the President's interest in 
alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election 
related to the DNC server.\638\
    Mr. Morrison testified that he had no knowledge of any 
investigations at the time, but after performing a Google 
search of ``what is Burisma?'' and seeing the name Hunter 
Biden, Mr. Morrison decided to ``stay away.''\639\ Even though 
he was new to the portfolio, Mr. Morrison promptly concluded 
that because ``Burisma'' involved Hunter Biden, and because 
former Vice President Biden was running for President, such 
investigations could be a ``problematic'' area.\640\ Mr. 
Morrison further explained that he tried to stay away from 
requests related to Burisma and the 2016 U.S. election because 
these investigations were not related to ``the proper policy 
process that I was involved in on Ukraine,'' and ``had nothing 
to do with the issues that the interagency was working 
on.''\641\
    With that background in mind, Mr. Morrison admitted he was 
``concerned'' when, while listening to the call on July 25, he 
heard President Trump raise ``issues related to the [DNC] 
server.'' Ultimately, Mr. Morrison said, ``the call was not the 
full-throated endorsement of the Ukraine reform agenda that I 
was hoping to hear.''\642\
    In ``fairly short order,'' Mr. Morrison reported the 
contents of the call to Mr. Eisenberg and Mr. Ellis, the NSC 
lawyers. He asked them to review the call, which he feared 
would be ``damaging'' if leaked.\643\ Mr. Morrison stated that 
at the time of the call, he ``did not have a view'' on whether 
the call was ``appropriate and proper.''\644\ He also stated 
that he ``was not concerned that anything illegal was 
discussed.''\645\ During his deposition, however, Mr. Morrison 
clarified, ``I did not then and I do not now opine . . . as to 
the legality'' of what happened on the call.\646\
    In a second meeting with Mr. Eisenberg, Mr. Morrison 
requested that access to the electronic files of the call 
record be restricted. This was an unusual request. Mr. Morrison 
confirmed to the Committee that he had never before asked the 
NSC Legal Advisor to restrict access to a presidential call 
record.\647\ It was also unusual because Mr. Morrison raised 
restricting access with Mr. Eisenberg despite the fact that Mr. 
Morrison himself had the authority, as an NSC senior director, 
to recommend restrictions on the relevant files to the NSC's 
Executive Secretariat.
    Lt. Col. Vindman also discussed restricting access to the 
July 25 call summary with Mr. Eisenberg and Mr. Ellis. At some 
point after the call, Lt. Col. Vindman discussed with the NSC 
lawyers the ``sensitivity'' of the matters raised on the call 
and ``the fact that . . . there are constant leaks.''\648\ Lt. 
Col. Vindman explained that ``[f]rom a foreign policy 
professional perspective, all of these types of calls would 
inherently be sensitive.''\649\ But the July 25 call was 
particularly sensitive because it could ``undermine our 
relationship with the Ukrainians'' given that it ``would 
implicate a partisan play.''\650\ The NSC lawyers, therefore, 
believed that it was ``appropriate to restrict access for the 
purpose of the leaks'' and ``to preserv[e] the integrity'' of 
the transcript.\651\ Lt. Col. Vindman recalled that Mr. Ellis 
raised the idea of placing the call summary on the NSC's server 
for highly classified information and Mr. Eisenberg ``gave the 
go-ahead.''\652\
    Some weeks after his discussions with the NSC attorneys, 
Mr. Morrison could not locate the call record. He contacted the 
staff of the NSC's Executive Secretariat in search of an 
explanation and was informed that ``John Eisenberg had directed 
it to be moved to a different server'' utilized by the NSC 
staff for highly classified information.\653\ This transfer 
occurred despite Mr. Morrison's view that the call record did 
not meet the requirements to be placed on the highly classified 
system.\654\
    Mr. Eisenberg later told Mr. Morrison that the call record 
had been placed on the highly classified system by 
``mistake.''\655\ Even after Mr. Eisenberg stated that the call 
record was moved to the highly classified system by 
``mistake,'' it nevertheless remained on that system until at 
least the third week of September 2019, shortly before its 
declassification and public release by the White House.\656\

                  Concerns Raised by Jennifer Williams

    Vice President Pence's advisor, Ms. Williams, had listened 
to nearly a dozen phone calls between President Trump and other 
heads of state prior to July 25, 2019, as well as Vice 
President Pence's April 23 call with President Zelensky.\657\ 
As she sat listening to President Trump's July 25 call, she was 
struck by his requests relating to Vice President Biden. She 
stated that she believed that President Trump's comments were 
``unusual and inappropriate.''\658\
    Ms. Williams testified that she thought that ``references 
to specific individuals and investigations, such as former Vice 
President Biden and his son'' were ``political in nature, given 
that the former Vice President is a political opponent of the 
President.''\659\ The comments struck her as ``more specific to 
the President in nature, to his personal political agenda,'' as 
opposed to ``a broader foreign policy objective of the United 
States.''\660\ She added, ``it was the first time I had heard 
internally the President reference particular investigations 
that previously I had only heard about through Mr. Giuliani's 
press interviews and press reporting.''\661\
    Significantly, Ms. Williams, who had learned about the hold 
on security assistance for Ukraine on July 3, also said that 
the Trump-Zelensky call ``shed some light on possible other 
motivations behind a security assistance hold.''\662\

                  ``Burisma'' Omitted from Call Record

    Mr. Morrison, Lt. Col. Vindman, and Ms. Williams all agreed 
that the publicly released record of the call was substantially 
accurate, but Lt. Col. Vindman and Ms. Williams both testified 
that President Zelensky made an explicit reference to 
``Burisma'' that was not included in the call record. 
Specifically, Lt. Col. Vindman testified that his notes 
indicated President Zelensky used the word ``Burisma''--instead 
of generically referring to ``the company''--when discussing 
President Trump's request to investigate the Bidens.\663\ Ms. 
Williams' notes also reflected that President Zelensky had said 
``Burisma'' later in the call when referring to a 
``case.''\664\
    Lt. Col. Vindman indicated that President Zelensky's 
mention of ``Burisma'' was notable because it suggested that 
the Ukrainian leader was ``prepped for this call.'' He 
explained that ``frankly, the President of Ukraine would not 
necessarily know anything about this company Burisma.'' Lt. 
Col. Vindman continued, ``he would certainly understand some of 
this--some of these elements because the story had been 
developing for some time, but the fact that he mentioned 
specifically Burisma seemed to suggest to me that he was 
prepped for this call.''\665\

         The Substance of the Call Remained Tightly Controlled

    Ms. Williams testified that staff in the Office of the Vice 
President placed the draft call record in the Vice President's 
nightly briefing book on July 25.\666\
    Separately, and following established protocols for 
coordinating U.S. government activities toward Ukraine, Lt. 
Col. Vindman provided Mr. Kent at the State Department with a 
readout. Because Mr. Kent had worked on Ukraine policy for many 
years, Lt. Col. Vindman sought Mr. Kent's ``expert view'' on 
the investigations requested by the President. Mr. Kent 
informed him that ``there was no substance'' behind the 
CrowdStrike conspiracy theory and ``took note of the fact that 
there was a call to investigate the Bidens.''\667\ Recalling 
this conversation, Mr. Kent testified that Lt. Col. Vindman 
said ``he could not share the majority of what was discussed 
[on the July 25 call] because of the very sensitive nature of 
what was discussed,'' but that Lt. Col. Vindman noted that the 
call ``went into the direction of some of the most extreme 
narratives that have been discussed publicly.''\668\

   Ambassador Sondland Followed Up on President Trump's Request for 
                             Investigations

    Soon after arriving in Kyiv from Brussels on July 25, 
Ambassador Sondland asked the U.S. Embassy to arrange a meeting 
the next day with Ukrainian presidential aide Andriy 
Yermak.\669\
    On the morning of July 26, Ambassadors Sondland, Volker and 
Taylor--accompanied by Mr. Holmes, who acted as their official 
notetaker--went to the Presidential Administration Building in 
central Kyiv for meetings with Ukrainian officials.\670\ 
Contrary to standard procedure, Mr. Holmes and Ambassador 
Taylor did not receive readouts of the July 25 call, so they 
were unaware of what President Trump and President Zelensky had 
discussed.\671\ Ambassador Volker also did not receive an 
official readout of the July 25 call from the NSC staff. He 
testified that Andriy Yermak, a senior aide to President 
Zelensky, simply characterized it as a ``good call'' in which 
``President Zelensky did reiterate his commitment to reform and 
fighting corruption in Ukraine.''\672\
    The first meeting on July 26 was with Chief of Staff to 
President Zelensky Andriy Bohdan.\673\ Regarding the July 25 
call, Mr. Holmes recalled Mr. Bohdan sharing that ``President 
Trump had expressed interest . . . in President Zelensky's 
personnel decisions related to the Prosecutor General's office 
[PGO].''\674\ Mr. Holmes further testified that Mr. Bohdan then 
``started asking . . . about individuals I've since come to 
understand they were considering appointing to different roles 
in the PGO.''\675\ Mr. Holmes explained that he ``didn't 
understand it,'' and that ``[i]t wasn't until I read the July 
25th phone call transcript that I realized that the President 
[Trump] had mentioned Mr. Lutsenko in the call.''\676\
    Subsequently, Ambassadors Sondland, Taylor, and Volker met 
with President Zelensky and other senior officials. Mr. Holmes 
once again took notes.\677\ He testified ``During the meeting, 
President Zelensky stated that, during the July 25th call, 
President Trump had, quote, `three times raised some very 
sensitive issues' and that he would have to follow up--he, 
Zelensky--would have to follow up on those issues when he and 
President Trump met in person.''\678\ After he read the 
transcript of the July 25 call, Mr. Holmes determined that 
President Zelensky's mention of ``sensitive issues'' was a 
reference to President Trump's demands for a ``Burisma Biden 
investigation.''\679\
    Catherine Croft, Special Advisor to Ambassador Kurt Volker, 
was also in Kyiv on July 26. Although she did not attend the 
meeting with President Zelensky, she received a readout from 
Ambassadors Volker and Taylor later that day, as they were 
traveling in an embassy vehicle. Ms. Croft testified that her 
handwritten notes from that readout indicate ``the President 
[Trump] had raised investigations multiple times'' in his July 
25 call with President Zelensky.\680\ Ambassadors Sondland and 
Taylor told the Committee that they did not recall President 
Zelensky's comments about investigations.\681\ Ambassador 
Volker similarly did not recall that the issue of 
investigations was discussed, but testified that he did not 
dispute the validity of ``notes taken contemporaneously at the 
meeting.''\682\

  Ambassador Sondland Met One-on-One With Ukrainian Presidential Aide

    The meeting with President Zelensky ended around noon.\683\ 
After the meeting, Ambassadors Taylor and Volker departed the 
Presidential Administration building for a visit to the front 
lines of the war with Russia in eastern Ukraine.\684\ 
Ambassador Sondland separately headed for Mr. Yermak's office. 
Mr. Holmes testified that, at the last minute, he received 
instruction from his leadership at the U.S. Embassy to join 
Ambassador Sondland.\685\ By that point, Mr. Holmes recalled, 
he ``was a flight of stairs behind Ambassador Sondland as he 
headed to meet with Mr. Yermak.''\686\ Mr. Holmes continued, 
``When I reached Mr. Yermak's office, Ambassador Sondland had 
already gone in to the meeting.''\687\ Mr. Holmes then 
``explained to Mr. Yermak's assistant that I was supposed to 
join the meeting as the Embassy's representative and strongly 
urged her to let me in, but she told me that Ambassador 
Sondland and Mr. Yermak had insisted that the meeting be one on 
one with no note taker.''\688\ Mr. Holmes ``then waited in the 
anteroom until the meeting ended, along with a member of 
Ambassador Sondland's staff and a member of the U.S. Embassy 
Kyiv staff.''\689\
    Ambassador Sondland's meeting with Mr. Yermak lasted 
approximately 30 minutes.\690\ When it ended, Ambassador 
Sondland did not provide Mr. Holmes an explanation of what they 
discussed.\691\ Ambassador Sondland later testified that he did 
not ``recall the specifics'' of his conversation with Mr. 
Yermak, but he believed ``the issue of investigations was 
probably a part of that agenda or meeting.''\692\

 Call Between President Trump and Ambassador Sondland on July 26, 2019

    After a busy morning of meetings with Ukrainian officials 
on July 26, Ambassador Sondland indicated that he wanted to get 
lunch. Mr. Holmes interjected that he would ``be happy to 
join'' Ambassador Sondland and two other State Department 
colleagues accompanying him ``if he wanted to brief me out on 
his meeting with Mr. Yermak or discuss other issues.''\693\ 
Ambassador Sondland accepted the offer. The diplomats proceeded 
``to a nearby restaurant and sat on an outdoor terrace.''\694\ 
Mr. Holmes ``sat directly across from Ambassador Sondland,'' 
close enough that they could ``share an appetizer.''\695\
    Mr. Holmes recounted that ``at first, the lunch was largely 
social. Ambassador Sondland selected a bottle of wine that he 
shared among the four of us, and we discussed topics such as 
marketing strategies for his hotel business.''\696\ Later 
during the meal, Ambassador Sondland ``said that he was going 
to call President Trump to give him an update.''\697\ 
Ambassador Sondland then placed a call on his unsecure mobile 
phone. Mr. Holmes was taken aback. He told the Committee, ``it 
was, like, a really extraordinary thing, it doesn't happen very 
often''--a U.S. Ambassador picking up his mobile phone at an 
outdoor cafe and dialing the President of the United 
States.\698\
    Mr. Holmes, who was sitting directly opposite from 
Ambassador Sondland, said he ``heard him announce himself 
several times, along the lines of, `Gordon Sondland, holding 
for the President.' It appeared that he was being transferred 
through several layers of switchboards and assistants, and I 
then noticed Ambassador Sondland's demeanor changed and 
understood that he had been connected to President 
Trump.''\699\
    Mr. Holmes stated he was able to hear the first part of 
Ambassador Sondland's conversation with President Trump because 
it was ``quite loud'' and ``quite distinctive'' when the 
President began speaking. When President Trump started 
speaking, Ambassador Sondland ``sort of winced and held the 
phone away from his ear,'' and ``did that for the first couple 
exchanges.''\700\
    Recounting the conversation that followed, Mr. Holmes 
testified:

          I heard Ambassador Sondland greet the President and 
        explain he was calling from Kyiv. I heard President 
        Trump then clarify that Ambassador Sondland was in 
        Ukraine. Ambassador Sondland replied, yes, he was in 
        Ukraine, and went on to state that President Zelensky, 
        quote, ``loves your ass.'' I then heard President Trump 
        ask, ``So he's going to do the investigation?'' 
        Ambassador Sondland replied that he is going to do it, 
        adding that President Zelensky will do ``anything you 
        ask him to do.''\701\

    President Trump has denied that he spoke to Ambassador 
Sondland on July 26 and told reporters, ``I know nothing about 
that.''\702\ But in his public testimony before the Committee, 
Ambassador Sondland noted that White House call records made 
available to his legal counsel confirmed that the July 26 call 
in fact occurred.\703\ Ambassador Sondland further explained 
that Mr. Holmes's testimony--specifically, a ``reference to 
A$AP Rocky''--refreshed his recollection about the July 26 
call, which Ambassador Sondland had not originally disclosed to 
the Committee.\704\
    Although Ambassador Sondland did not believe he mentioned 
the Bidens by name, he testified that with regard to the 
substance of his July 26 conversation with President Trump: ``I 
have no reason to doubt that this conversation included the 
subject of investigations.''\705\ He added that he had ``no 
reason'' to doubt Mr. Holmes' testimony about the contents of 
the call, and that he would ``have been more surprised if 
President Trump had not mentioned investigations, particularly 
given what we were hearing from Mr. Giuliani about the 
President's concerns.''\706\ Asked about his statement to 
President Trump that President Zelensky ``loves your ass,'' 
Ambassador Sondland replied: ``That sounds like something I 
would say. That's how President Trump and I communicate, a lot 
of four-letter words, in this case three letter.''\707\
    After the call between Ambassador Sondland and President 
Trump ended, Ambassador Sondland remarked to Mr. Holmes that 
``the President was in a bad mood,'' as ``was often the case 
early in the morning.''\708\ Mr. Holmes, who had learned about 
the freeze on U.S. security assistance days earlier, was 
attempting to clarify the President's thinking, and said he 
``took the opportunity to ask Ambassador Sondland for his 
candid impression of the President's views on Ukraine'':

          In particular, I asked Ambassador Sondland if it was 
        true that the President did not give a shit about 
        Ukraine. Ambassador Sondland agreed that the President 
        did not give a shit about Ukraine. I asked, why not, 
        and Ambassador Sondland stated, the President only 
        cares about, quote, unquote, ``big stuff.'' I noted 
        there was, quote, unquote, big stuff going on in 
        Ukraine, like a war with Russia. And Ambassador 
        Sondland replied that he meant, quote, unquote, ``big 
        stuff'' that benefits the President, like the, quote, 
        unquote, ``Biden investigation'' that Mr. Giuliani was 
        pushing. The conversation then moved on to other 
        topics.\709\

    Ambassador Sondland did not dispute the substance of Mr. 
Holmes' recollection of this discussion. He stated, ``I don't 
recall my exact words, but clearly the President, beginning on 
May 23, when we met with him in the Oval Office, was not a big 
fan'' of Ukraine. Asked whether President Trump ``was a big fan 
of the investigations,'' Ambassador Sondland replied: 
``Apparently so.''\710\ Asked to clarify if, during his July 26 
conversation with Mr. Holmes, he recalled ``at least referring 
to an investigation that Rudy Giuliani was pushing,'' 
Ambassador Sondland replied, ``I would have, yes.''\711\

  Mr. Holmes Informed U.S. Embassy Leadership about President Trump's 
                     Call with Ambassador Sondland

    After the lunch, Mr. Holmes dropped off Ambassador Sondland 
at his hotel, the Hyatt Regency Kyiv. Mr. Holmes then returned 
to the U.S. Embassy.\712\ Ambassador Taylor, the acting 
Ambassador in Kyiv, was still visiting the front line. So when 
he arrived at the Embassy, Mr. Holmes briefed his immediate 
supervisor, Kristina Kvien, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. 
Embassy Kyiv, about the President's call with Ambassador 
Sondland and Ambassador Sondland's subsequent description of 
President Trump's priorities for Ukraine.\713\
    After taking a long-planned vacation from July 27 to August 
5, Mr. Holmes told Ambassador Taylor about his lunch with 
Ambassador Sondland on the first day he returned to work, 
August 6.\714\ Mr. Holmes told the Committee that he did not 
brief the call in detail to Ambassador Taylor because ``it was 
obvious what the President was pressing for'':

          Of course that's what's going on. Of course the 
        President is pressing for a Biden investigation before 
        he'll do these things the Ukrainians want. There was 
        nodding agreement. So did I go through every single 
        word in the call? No, because everyone by that point 
        agreed, it was obvious what the President was pressing 
        for.\715\

    In October 2019, following the public release of testimony 
by several witnesses pursuant to the Committee's impeachment 
inquiry, Mr. Holmes reminded Ambassador Taylor about Ambassador 
Sondland's July 26 conversation with President Trump. 
Ambassador Taylor was preparing to return to Washington and 
testify publicly before the Committee. Mr. Holmes had been 
following news coverage of the inquiry and realized he had 
unique, firsthand evidence that ``potentially bore on the 
question of whether the President did, in fact, have 
knowledge'' of efforts to press the Ukrainian President to 
publicly announce investigations:

          I came to realize that I had firsthand knowledge 
        regarding certain events on July 26 that had not 
        otherwise been reported and that those events 
        potentially bore on the question of whether the 
        President did, in fact, have knowledge that those 
        senior officials were using the levers of diplomatic 
        power to influence the new Ukrainian President to 
        announce the opening of a criminal investigation 
        against President Trump's political opponent. It is at 
        that point that I made the observation to Ambassador 
        Taylor that the incident I had witnessed on July 26th 
        had acquired greater significance, which is what he 
        reported in his testimony last week and is what led to 
        the subpoena for me to appear here today.\716\

    Mr. Holmes testified that the July 26 call became ``sort of 
a touchstone piece of information'' for diplomats at the U.S. 
Embassy in Kyiv who ``were trying to understand why we weren't 
able to get the meeting'' between President Trump and President 
Zelensky and ``what was going on with the security hold.''\717\ 
He elaborated:

          I would refer back to it repeatedly in our, you know, 
        morning staff meetings. We'd talk about what we're 
        trying to do. We're trying to achieve this, that. Maybe 
        it will convince the President to have the meeting. And 
        I would say, `Well, as we know, he doesn't really care 
        about Ukraine. He cares about some other things. And 
        we're trying to keep Ukraine out of our politics and 
        so, you know, that's what we're up against.' And I 
        would refer--use that repeatedly as a refrain.\718\

     6. The President Wanted Ukraine to Announce the Investigations 
                                Publicly


In the weeks following the July 25 call, President Trump's hand-picked 
        representatives carried out his wishes to condition a coveted 
        White House meeting for the Ukrainian President on the public 
        announcement of investigations beneficial to President Trump. 
        Top U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State and 
        Secretary of Energy, were ``in the loop.''

                                Overview

    In the weeks following the July 25 call, during which 
President Trump had pressed Ukrainian President Volodymyr 
Zelensky to ``do us a favor though,'' the President's 
representatives worked to secure from the Ukrainian President a 
public announcement about the requested investigations as a 
condition for the White House meeting.
    That meeting would have conferred vital support on a new 
president who relied on the United States to help defend his 
nation militarily, diplomatically, and politically against 
Russian aggression. U.S. Ambassador to the European Union 
Gordon Sondland provided testimony and quoted from documents 
demonstrating that he kept everyone ``in the loop'' about the 
plan, including the Secretaries of State and Energy.
    Ambassadors Sondland and Volker worked closely with Mr. 
Giuliani, the President's personal lawyer, to help draft 
Ukraine's public statement. They sought to ensure that 
President Zelensky explicitly used the words ``Burisma''--a 
reference to allegations about former Vice President Biden and 
his son--and ``2016 elections.''
    Ukrainian officials were ``very uncomfortable'' with the 
provision of this statement, which they understood to be a 
requirement and a ``deliverable'' demanded by President Trump. 
The Ukrainian President was elected on a platform of rooting 
out public corruption, and so he resisted issuing the 
statement. Instead, President Zelensky's aides asked whether an 
official request for legal assistance with investigations had 
been made through appropriate channels at the U.S. Department 
of Justice. No such formal request was ever made. Consequently, 
Ukrainian officials made clear to Ambassador Volker that they 
did not support issuing a public statement because it could 
``play into'' U.S. domestic politics. Nevertheless, U.S. 
efforts to secure a public statement continued.

 Giuliani Met with Ukrainian Presidential Aide Andriy Yermak in Madrid 
                  and Discussed a White House Meeting

    On July 26, the day after the call between President Trump 
and President Zelensky, Ambassador Volker wrote to Mr. Giuliani 
to confirm that he would soon be meeting with Andriy Yermak, a 
Ukrainian presidential aide, to ``help'' efforts.\719\
    Ambassador Volker texted: ``Please send dates when you will 
be in Madrid. I am seeing Yermak tomorrow morning. He will come 
to you in Madrid. Thanks for your help! Kurt.''\720\ Mr. 
Giuliani replied that he would travel to Spain from August 1 to 
5, and Ambassador Volker affirmed that he would tell the 
Ukrainian presidential aide to ``visit with you there.''\721\ 
Ambassador Volker kept himself apprised of plans, texting Mr. 
Yermak on August 1 to ensure that everything was ``on track'' 
for the meeting in Spain's capital. He also asked whether Mr. 
Yermak planned to visit Washington.\722\
    On August 2, Mr. Yermak and Mr. Giuliani met in 
Madrid.\723\ Ambassador Volker received a meeting summary from 
Mr. Yermak the same day: ``My meeting with Mr. Mayor was very 
good.'' Mr. Yermak added: ``We asked for White House meeting 
during week start [sic] 16 Sept. Waiting for confirmation. 
Maybe you know the date?''\724\
    The Madrid meeting set off a ``series of discussions'' 
among Mr. Giuliani, Ambassador Volker, and Ambassador Sondland 
about the need for President Zelensky to issue a public 
statement about the investigations into Burisma and the 2016 
election conspiracy theory in order to secure a White House 
meeting with President Trump.\725\ Ambassador Volker first 
spoke to Mr. Giuliani, who said that he thought Ukraine 
``should issue a statement.''\726\ Ambassador Volker then spoke 
to Mr. Yermak, who affirmed that the Ukrainian leader was 
``prepared to make a statement'' that ``would reference Burisma 
and 2016 in a wider context of bilateral relations and rooting 
out corruption anyway.''\727\
    Mr. Giuliani, acting as President Trump's personal 
attorney, exerted significant influence in the process. On 
August 4, Mr. Yermak inquired again about the presidential 
meeting. Ambassador Volker replied that he would speak with Mr. 
Giuliani later that day and would call the Ukrainian aide 
afterward.\728\ Ambassador Volker texted the former mayor about 
the Madrid meeting and asked for a phone call. Mr. Giuliani 
replied: ``It was excellent I can call a little later.''\729\
    Phone records obtained by the Committees show a 16 minute 
call on August 5 between Ambassador Volker and Mr. 
Giuliani.\730\ Ambassador Volker texted Mr. Yermak: ``Hi 
Andrey--had a good long talk w Rudy--call anytime--Kurt.''\731\ 
During the same period, Ambassador Volker informed Ambassador 
Sondland that ``Giuliani was happy with that meeting,'' and 
``it looks like things are turning around.''\732\

``Potus Really Wants the Deliverable'' Before Scheduling a White House 
                      Visit for President Zelensky

    Things had not turned around by August 7. Ambassador Volker 
texted Mr. Giuliani to recommend that he report to ``the 
boss''--President Trump--about his meeting with Mr. Yermak in 
Madrid. He wrote:

          Hi Rudy--hope you made it back safely. Let's meet if 
        you are coming to DC. And would be good if you could 
        convey results of your meeting in Madrid to the boss so 
        we can get a firm date for a visit.\733\

    The Committees did not find evidence that Mr. Giuliani 
responded to Ambassador Volker's text message.
    However, call records show that the next day, on August 8, 
Mr. Giuliani connected with the White House Situation Room 
switchboard in the early afternoon, Eastern Time, for 42 
seconds, and then again for one minute, 25 seconds.\734\
    The same day, Mr. Giuliani texted several times with a 
number associated with the White House. The Committees were 
unable to identify the official associated with the phone 
number. In the mid-afternoon, someone using a telephone number 
associated with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
called Mr. Giuliani, and the call lasted for nearly 13 minutes. 
Mr. Giuliani called the OMB number and the White House 
Situation Room several more times that evening, but each time 
connected for only a few seconds or not at all.

                  RUDY GIULIANI CALL HISTORY, AUGUST 8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Connecting   Duration
   Date     Time (EDT)   of Call     Caller            Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
08/08/19   12:44:56     0:42       Giuliani,  White House Switchboard
                                    Rudy       (Situation Room)\735\
08/08/19   12:45:38     1:25       Giuliani,  White House Switchboard
                                    Rudy       (Situation Room)\736\
08/08/19   13:02:37     TEXT       Giuliani,  White House Number\737\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   13:02:37     TEXT       Giuliani,  White House Number\738\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   13:02:57     TEXT       Giuliani,  White House Number\739\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   14:14:53     TEXT       White      Giuliani, Rudy\740\
                                    House
                                    Number
08/08/19   14:15:17     TEXT       Giuliani,  White House Number\741\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   14:21:13     TEXT       Giuliani,  White House Number\742\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   15:13:05     12:56      OMB        Giuliani, Rudy\743\
                                    Number
08/08/19   15:56:44     0:00       Giuliani,  OMB-Associated Number\744\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   15:56:51     0:00       Giuliani,  OMB-Associated Number\745\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   15:57:05     0:00       Giuliani,  OMB-Associated Number\746\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   15:57:21     0:22       Giuliani,  White House Switchboard
                                    Rudy       (Situation Room)\747\
08/08/19   17:20:33     0:17       Giuliani,  White House Switchboard
                                    Rudy       (Situation Room)\748\
08/08/19   19:14:48     0:00       Giuliani,  White House Switchboard
                                    Rudy       (Situation Room)\749\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Approximately 30 minutes after his text to Mr. Giuliani on 
August 7, Ambassador Volker received a text message from Mr. 
Yermak: ``Do you have some news about White House meeting 
date?''\750\ Ambassador Volker responded that he had asked Mr. 
Giuliani to ``weigh in,'' presumably with the President, 
``following your meeting,'' and that Ambassador Sondland would 
be speaking with President Trump on Friday, August 9. 
Ambassador Volker added: ``We are pressing this.''\751\ The 
next day, on August 8, Mr. Yermak texted Ambassador Volker to 
report that he had ``some news.''\752\ Ambassador Volker 
replied that he was available to speak at that time.\753\
    Later on the evening of August 8, Eastern Time, Mr. 
Giuliani sent a text message to a phone number associated with 
the White House. Approximately one hour 15 minutes later, 
someone using an unidentified number (``-1'') dialed Mr. 
Giuliani three times in rapid succession. Less than three 
minutes later, Mr. Giuliani dialed the White House switchboard 
for the White House Situation Room. When the call did not 
connect, Mr. Giuliani immediately dialed another general number 
for the White House switchboard and connected for 47 seconds. 
Approximately 16 minutes later, someone using the ``-1'' number 
called Mr. Giuliani and connected for just over four 
minutes.\754\

            RUDY GIULIANI CALL HISTORY, AUGUST 8 (CONTINUED)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Connecting   Duration
   Date     Time (EDT)   of Call     Caller            Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
08/08/19   20:53:13     TEXT       Giuliani,  White House Number\755\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   22:09:31     0:00       ``-1''     Giuliani, Rudy\756\
08/08/19   22:09:32     0:05       ``-1''     Giuliani, Rudy\757\
08/08/19   22:09:46     0:00       ``-1''     Giuliani, Rudy (Cell
                                               2)\758\
08/08/19   22:09:47     0:02       ``-1''     Giuliani, Rudy (Cell
                                               2)\759\
08/08/19   22:10:08     0:05       ``-1''     Giuliani, Rudy\760\
08/08/19   22:11:52     0:00       Giuliani,  OMB-Associated Number\761\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   22:12:16     0:00       Giuliani,  White House Switchboard
                                    Rudy       (Situation Room)\762\
08/08/19   22:12:25     0:47       Giuliani,  White House
                                    Rudy       Switchboard\763\
08/08/19   22:28:51     4:06       ``-1''     Giuliani, Rudy\764\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Late the next morning Washington time, on August 9, 
Ambassador Volker texted Mr. Giuliani and Ambassador Sondland:

          Hi Mr. Mayor! Had a good chat with Yermak last night. 
        He was pleased with your phone call. Mentioned Z 
        [President Zelensky] making a statement. Can we all get 
        on the phone to make sure I advise Z [President 
        Zelensky] correctly as to what he should be saying? 
        Want to make sure we get this done right. Thanks!\765\

    It is unclear which ``phone call'' Ambassador Volker was 
referencing.
    Text messages and call records obtained by the Committees 
show that Ambassador Volker and Mr. Giuliani connected by phone 
twice around noon Eastern Time on August 9 for several minutes 
each.\766\ Following the calls with Mr. Giuliani, Ambassador 
Volker created a three-way group chat using WhatsApp that 
included Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Mr. 
Yermak.\767\
    At 2:24 p.m. Eastern Time on August 9, Ambassador Volker 
texted the group: ``Hi Andrey--we have all consulted here, 
including with Rudy. Can you do a call later today or tomorrow 
your afternoon time?''\768\ Ambassador Sondland texted that he 
had a call scheduled for 3 p.m. Eastern Time ``for the three of 
us. [State Department] Ops will call.''\769\
    Call records obtained by the Committees show that on August 
9, Ambassador Sondland twice called numbers associated with the 
White House, once in early afternoon for approximately 18 
minutes, and once in late afternoon for two minutes, 25 seconds 
with a number associated with OMB.\770\
    By early evening, minutes after his second call with the 
OMB-associated number, Ambassador Volker and Ambassador 
Sondland discussed a breakthrough they had reached in obtaining 
a date for a White House visit, noting that President Trump 
really wanted ``the deliverable'':

          Sondland: [Tim] Morrison ready to get dates as soon 
        as Yermak confirms.
          Volker: Excellent!! How did you sway him? :)
          Sondland: Not sure i did. I think potus really wants 
        the deliverable
          Volker: But does he know that?
          Sondland: Yep
          Sondland: Clearly lots of convos going on
          Volker: Ok--then that's good it's coming from two 
        separate sources\771\

    Ambassador Sondland told the Committees that the 
``deliverable'' required by President Trump was a press 
statement from President Zelensky committing to ``do the 
investigations'' pushed by President Trump and Mr. 
Giuliani.\772\
    To ensure progress, immediately after their text exchange, 
Ambassador Sondland recommended to Ambassador Volker that Mr. 
Yermak share a draft of the press statement to ``avoid 
misunderstandings'' and so they would know ``exactly what they 
propose to cover.'' Ambassador Sondland explained: ``Even 
though Ze [President Zelensky] does a live presser [press 
event] they can still summarize in a brief statement.'' 
Ambassador Volker agreed.\773\
    As they were negotiating the language that would appear in 
a press statement, ``there was talk about having a live 
interview or a live broadcast'' during which President Zelensky 
would make the agreed-upon statement.\774\ Ambassador Sondland 
suggested reviewing a written summary of the statement because 
he was ``concerned'' that President Zelensky would ``say 
whatever he would say on live television and it still wouldn't 
be good enough for Rudy, slash, the President [Trump].''\775\

  ``Everyone Was in the Loop'' About Plan for Ukrainians to Deliver a 
  Public Statement about Investigations in Exchange for a White House 
                                 Visit

    As negotiations continued, on August 10, Mr. Yermak texted 
Ambassador Volker in an attempt to schedule a White House 
meeting before the Ukrainian president made a public statement 
in support of investigations into Burisma and the 2016 
election. He wrote:

          I think it's possible to make this declaration and 
        mention all these things. Which we discussed yesterday. 
        But it will be logic [sic] to do after we receive a 
        confirmation of date. We inform about date of visit 
        about our expectations and our guarantees for future 
        visit. Let [sic] discuss it\776\

    Ambassador Volker responded that he agreed, but that first 
they would have to ``iron out [a] statement and use that to get 
[a] date,'' after which point President Zelensky would go 
forward with making the statement.\777\ They agreed to have a 
call the next day, and to include Ambassador Sondland. Mr. 
Yermak texted:

          Excellent. Once we have a date, will call for a press 
        briefing, announcing upcoming visit and outlining 
        vision for the reboot of the US-UKRAINE relationship, 
        including, among other things, Burisma and election 
        meddling in investigations.\778\

    Ambassador Volker forwarded the message to Ambassador 
Sondland, and they agreed to speak with Mr. Yermak the next 
day.\779\
    Ambassador Sondland testified that ``everyone was in the 
loop'' regarding this plan.\780\ Also on August 10, Ambassador 
Sondland informed Ambassador Volker that he briefed T. Ulrich 
Brechbuhl, Counselor of the Department of State, noting: ``I 
briefed Ulrich. All good.''\781\ Ambassador Sondland testified 
that he ``may have walked [Mr. Brechbuhl] through where we 
were.''\782\ When asked if Mr. Brechbuhl briefed Secretary 
Pompeo, Ambassador Sondland noted that it was Mr. Brechbuhl's 
``habit'' to ``consult with Secretary Pompeo frequently.''\783\
    Secretary of Energy Rick Perry was also made aware of 
efforts to pressure Ukraine to issue a public statement about 
political investigations in exchange for a White House meeting. 
Ambassador Sondland testified:

          Mr. Giuliani conveyed to Secretary Perry, Ambassador 
        Volker, and others that President Trump wanted a public 
        statement from President Zelensky committing to 
        investigations of Burisma and the 2016 election. Mr. 
        Giuliani expressed those requests directly to the 
        Ukrainians. Mr. Giuliani also expressed those requests 
        directly to us. We all understood that these 
        prerequisites for the White House call and the White 
        House meeting reflected President Trump's desires and 
        requirements.\784\

    On August 11, Ambassador Volker requested a phone call with 
Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Giuliani, noting that he had heard 
from Mr. Yermak that the Ukrainians were ``writing the 
statement now and will send to us.''\785\ According to call 
records obtained by the Committees, Ambassador Volker and Mr. 
Giuliani connected for 34 seconds.\786\
    The same day, Ambassador Sondland updated Mr. Brechbuhl and 
Lisa Kenna, Executive Secretary of the State Department, about 
efforts to secure a public statement and a ``big presser'' from 
President Zelensky, which he hoped might ``make the boss happy 
enough to authorize an invitation.'' He addressed the email to 
Secretary Pompeo:

          Mike, Kurt [Volker] and I negotiated a statement from 
        Zelensky to be delivered for our review in a day or 
        two. The contents will hopefully make the boss happy 
        enough to authorize an invitation. Zelensky plans to 
        have a big presser on the openness subject (including 
        specifics) next week.\787\

    Ambassador Sondland made clear in his hearing testimony 
that by ``specifics,'' he meant the ``2016 and the Burisma'' 
investigations; ``the boss'' referred to ``President Trump;'' 
and ``the invitation'' referred to ``the White House 
meeting.''\788\ Ms. Kenna replied to Ambassador Sondland that 
she would ``pass to S [Secretary Pompeo]. Thank you.''\789\ 
Ambassador Sondland cited the email as evidence that ``everyone 
was in the loop'' on plans to condition a White House meeting 
on a public statement about political investigations.\790\

    President Trump's Agents Negotiated a Draft Statement about the 
                             Investigations

    In the evening of the next day, August 12, Mr. Yermak 
texted Ambassador Volker an initial version of the draft 
statement, which read:

          Special attention should be paid to the problem of 
        interference in the political processes of the United 
        States, especially with the alleged involvement of some 
        Ukrainian politicians. I want to declare that this is 
        unacceptable. We intend to initiate and complete a 
        transparent and unbiased investigation of all available 
        facts and episodes, which in turn will prevent the 
        recurrence of this problem in the future.\791\

    The draft statement did not explicitly mention Burisma or 
2016 election interference, as expected.
    On August 13, around 10 a.m. Eastern Time, Ambassador 
Volker texted Mr. Giuliani: ``Mr mayor--trying to set up call 
in 5 min via state Dept. If now is not convenient, is there a 
time later today?''\792\ Phone records show that, shortly 
thereafter, someone using a State Department number called Mr. 
Giuliani and connected for more than nine minutes.\793\ 
Ambassador Volker told the Committees that, during the call, 
Mr. Giuliani stated: ``If [the statement] doesn't say Burisma 
and 2016, it's not credible, because what are they 
hiding?''\794\ Ambassador Volker asked whether inserting 
references to ``Burisma and 2016'' at the end of the statement 
would make it ``more credible.'' Mr. Giuliani confirmed that it 
would.\795\
    Two minutes after the call ended, Ambassador Volker sent a 
WhatsApp message to Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak: ``Hi 
Andrey--we spoke with Rudy. When is good to call you?''\796\ 
Ambassador Sondland replied that it was, ``Important. Do you 
have 5 mins.''\797\ They agreed to a call approximately 10 
minutes later.\798\ When Ambassador Sondland suggested having 
his ``operator'' in Brussels dial in the group, Ambassador 
Volker asked if they could ``do this one on what's App?''\799\ 
Text messages and calls in the WhatsApp cell phone application 
are encrypted from end-to-end, ensuring that WhatsApp employees 
and third parties cannot listen in or retrieve deleted 
communications.\800\
    Shortly before the call, Ambassador Volker sent a revised 
draft of the proposed statement to Ambassador Sondland. It had 
been edited to include reference to Burisma and the 2016 
elections:

          Special attention should be paid to the problem of 
        interference in the political processes of the United 
        States, especially with the alleged involvement of some 
        Ukrainian politicians. I want to declare that this is 
        unacceptable. We intend to initiate and complete a 
        transparent and unbiased investigation of all available 
        facts and episodes including those involving Burisma 
        and the 2016 US elections, which in turn will prevent 
        the recurrence of this problem in the future.\801\

    Ambassador Sondland replied: ``Perfect. Lets send to Andrey 
after our call.''\802\
    Following the call, Ambassador Volker texted Ambassador 
Sondland and Mr. Yermak: ``Andrey--good talking--following is 
text with insert at the end for the 2 key items.''\803\ 
Ambassador Volker then sent to them the revised statement that 
included the explicit references to ``Burisma and 2016 
elections.''\804\

                     COMPARISON OF DRAFT STATEMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Giuliani-Volker-Sondland Draft
       Yermak Draft August 12                     August 13
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special attention should be paid to  Special attention should be paid to
 the problem of interference in the   the problem of interference in the
 political processes of the United    political processes of the United
 States, especially with the          States, especially with the
 alleged involvement of some          alleged involvement of some
 Ukrainian politicians. I want to     Ukrainian politicians. I want to
 declare that this is unacceptable.   declare that this is unacceptable.
 We intend to initiate and complete   We intend to initiate and complete
 a transparent and unbiased           a transparent and unbiased
 investigation of all available       investigation of all available
 facts and episodes, which in turn    facts and episodes, including
 will prevent the recurrence of       those involving Burisma and the
 this problem in the future.          2016 US elections, which in turn
                                      will prevent the recurrence of
                                      this problem in the future.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

     A ``Quid Pro Quo'' from ``The President of the United States''

    Ambassador Volker testified that the language reflected 
what Mr. Giuliani deemed necessary for the statement to be 
``credible.''\805\ Ambassador Sondland noted the language was 
``proposed by Giuliani.''\806\ Ambassador Sondland explained 
that the language was a clear quid pro quo that expressed ``the 
desire of the President of the United States'':

          Mr. Giuliani's requests were a quid pro quo for 
        arranging a White House visit for President Zelensky. 
        Mr. Giuliani demanded that Ukraine make a public 
        statement announcing investigations of the 2016 
        election/DNC server and Burisma. Mr. Giuliani was 
        expressing the desires of the President of the United 
        States, and we knew that these investigations were 
        important to the President.\807\

    Shortly after Ambassador Volker sent the revised statement 
to Mr. Yermak on August 13, Ambassador Sondland called Mr. 
Giuliani and connected for nearly four minutes.

  Ukrainian Officials and Career State Department Became Increasingly 
                               Concerned

    On August 13--while Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, 
and Mr. Yermak were negotiating the draft statement about 
investigations--Mr. Yermak asked Ambassador Volker ``whether 
any request had ever been made by the U.S. to investigate 
election interference in 2016.'' He appeared interested in 
knowing whether the U.S. Department of Justice had made an 
official request to Ukraine's law enforcement agency for legal 
assistance in such a matter.\808\ When Ambassador Volker sent 
Mr. Giuliani's approved draft statement to Mr. Yermak, he 
stated that he would ``work on official request.''\809\
    Ambassador Volker testified: ``When I say official request, 
I mean law enforcement channels, Department of Justice to law 
enforcement in Ukraine, please investigate was there any effort 
to interfere in the U.S. elections.''\810\ Ambassador Volker 
explained:

          He [Yermak] said, and I think quite appropriately, 
        that if they [Ukraine] are responding to an official 
        request, that's one thing. If there's no official 
        request, that's different. And I agree with that.\811\

    According to Ambassador Volker, he was merely trying to 
``find out'' if there was ever an official request made by the 
Department of Justice: ``As I found out the answer that we had 
not, I said, well, let's just not go there.''\812\
    On September 25, within hours of the White House's public 
release of the record of the July 25 call between President 
Trump and President Zelensky, a Justice Department spokesperson 
issued a statement, apparently confirming that no such formal 
request had been made:

          The President has not spoken with the Attorney 
        General about having Ukraine investigate anything 
        relating to former Vice President Biden or his son. The 
        President has not asked the Attorney General to contact 
        Ukraine--on this or any other matter. The Attorney 
        General has not communicated with Ukraine--on this or 
        any other subject.\813\

    Ukraine's current Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka, 
who assumed his new position in late August 2019, confirmed the 
Justice Department's account. He told the Financial Times in 
late November 2019 that Attorney General Barr had made no 
formal request regarding a potential investigation into 
allegations of wrongdoing by former Vice President Biden.\814\ 
In an apparent reference to President Trump's demand that 
Ukraine interfere in U.S. elections, Mr. Ryaboshapka added: 
``It's critically important for the west not to pull us into 
some conflicts between their ruling elites, but to continue to 
support so that we can cross the point of no return.''\815\
    Neither Ambassador Taylor in Ukraine nor Deputy Assistant 
Secretary George Kent in Washington were aware of the efforts 
by Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, in coordination with Mr. 
Giuliani, to convince Ukrainian officials to issue a statement 
in real time. Ambassador Taylor told the Committees that, on 
August 16, in a text message exchange with Ambassador Volker, 
he ``learned that Mr. Yermak had asked that the United States 
submit an official request for an investigation into Burisma's 
alleged violations of Ukrainian law, if that is what the United 
States desired.''\816\ Ambassador Taylor noted that ``a formal 
U.S. request to the Ukrainians to conduct an investigation 
based on violations of their own law'' was ``improper'' and 
advised Ambassador Volker to ``stay clear.''\817\
    Nevertheless, Ambassador Volker requested Ambassador 
Taylor's help with the matter.\818\ ``To find out the legal 
aspects of the question,'' Ambassador Taylor gave Ambassador 
Volker the name of an official at the Department of Justice 
``whom I thought would be the proper point of contact for 
seeking a U.S. referral for a foreign investigation.''\819\
    On August 15, Ambassador Volker texted Ambassador Sondland 
that Mr. Yermak wanted to ``know our status on asking them to 
investigate.''\820\ Two days later, Ambassador Volker wrote: 
``Bill [Taylor] had no info on requesting an investigation--
calling a friend at DOJ.'' Ambassador Volker testified that he 
was not able to connect with his contact at the Department of 
Justice.\821\
    Mr. Kent testified that on August 15, Catherine Croft, 
Ambassador Volker's special assistant, approached him to ask 
whether there was any precedent for the United States asking 
Ukraine to conduct investigations on its behalf. Mr. Kent 
advised Ms. Croft:

          [I]f you're asking me have we ever gone to the 
        Ukrainians and asked them to investigate or prosecute 
        individuals for political reasons, the answer is, I 
        hope we haven't, and we shouldn't because that goes 
        against everything that we are trying to promote in 
        post-Soviet states for the last 28 years, which is the 
        promotion of the rule of law.\822\

    Mr. Kent testified that the day after his conversation with 
Ms. Croft, he spoke with Ambassador Taylor, who ``amplified the 
same theme'' and told Mr. Kent that ``Yermak was very 
uncomfortable'' with the idea of investigations and suggested 
that ``it should be done officially and put in writing.'' As a 
result, it became clear to Mr. Kent in mid-August that Ukraine 
was being pressured to conduct politically-motivated 
investigations. Mr. Kent told Ambassador Taylor ``that's wrong, 
and we shouldn't be doing that as a matter of U.S. 
policy.''\823\
    After speaking to Ms. Croft and Ambassador Taylor, Mr. Kent 
wrote a memo to file on August 16 documenting his ``concerns 
that there was an effort to initiate politically motivated 
prosecutions that were injurious to the rule of law, both in 
Ukraine and U.S.''\824\ Mr. Kent testified:

          At the time, I had no knowledge of the specifics of 
        the [July 25] call record, but based on Bill Taylor's 
        account of the engagements with Andriy Yermak that were 
        engagements of Yermak with Kurt Volker, at that point 
        it was clear that the investigations that were being 
        suggested were the ones that Rudy Giuliani had been 
        tweeting about, meaning Biden, Burisma, and 2016.\825\

    On August 17, Mr. Yermak reached out to both Ambassador 
Sondland and Ambassador Volker.\826\ Ambassador Sondland texted 
Ambassador Volker that ``Yermak just tapped on me about dates. 
Havent responded. Any updates?''\827\ Ambassador Volker 
responded that ``I've got nothing'' and stated that he was 
contacting the Department of Justice to find out about 
requesting an investigation.\828\
    Ambassador Sondland then asked: ``Do we still want Ze 
[Zelensky] to give us an unequivocal draft with 2016 and 
Boresma [sic]?'' Ambassador Volker replied: ``That's the clear 
message so far. . . .'' Ambassador Sondland said that he would 
ask that Mr. Yermak ``send us a clean draft,'' to which 
Ambassador Volker replied that he had spoken to Mr. Yermak and 
suggested that he and Ambassador Sondland speak the following 
day, August 18, to discuss ``all the latest.''\829\
    Ambassador Volker claimed that he ``stopped pursuing'' the 
statement from the Ukrainians around this time because of 
concerns raised by Mr. Yermak that Yuriy Lutsenko was still the 
Prosecutor General. Mr. Lutsenko was likely to be replaced by 
President Zelensky, and because Mr. Lutsenko was alleging the 
same false claims that President Trump and Mr. Giuliani were 
demanding of President Zelensky, Ukrainian officials ``did not 
want to mention Burisma or 2016.''\830\ Ambassador Volker 
testified that he ``agreed'' and advised Mr. Yermak that 
``making those specific refences was not a good idea'' because 
making those statements might ``look like it would play into 
our domestic politics.''\831\
    Mr. Yermak agreed and, according to Ambassador Volker, 
plans to put out a statement were ``shelved.''\832\ Ambassador 
Volker reasoned that the plan for a public statement did not 
materialize partly because of ``the sense that Rudy was not 
going to be convinced that it meant anything, and, therefore, 
convey a positive message to the President if it didn't say 
Burisma and 2016.''\833\ He added:

          I agreed with the Ukrainians they shouldn't do it, 
        and in fact told them just drop it, wait till you have 
        your own prosecutor general in place. Let's work on 
        substantive issues like this, security assistance and 
        all. Let's just do that. So we dropped it.\834\

    Ambassador Volker testified that, ``From that point on, I 
didn't have any further conversations about this 
statement.''\835\ Nevertheless, efforts to secure a 
presidential statement announcing the two investigations into 
the Bidens and the 2016 U.S. election interference continued 
well into September.
    On August 19, Ambassador Sondland told Ambassador Volker 
that he ``drove the `larger issue' home'' with Mr. Yermak: that 
this was bigger than just a White House meeting and was about 
``the relationship per se.''\836\ Ambassador Volker told the 
Committees that he understood this referred to ``the level of 
trust that the President has with President Zelensky. He has 
this general negative assumption about everything Ukraine, and 
that's the larger issue.''\837\ That negative assumption would 
prove difficult to overcome as Ukrainian and U.S. officials 
sought to finally obtain a White House meeting and shake free 
from the White House hundreds of millions of dollars in 
Congressionally-approved security assistance for Ukraine.

  7. The President's Conditioning of Military Assistance and a White 
      House Meeting on Announcement of Investigations Raised Alarm


Following the public disclosure in late August 2019 of a hold on U.S. 
        security assistance to Ukraine, President Trump made clear that 
        ``everything''--an Oval Office meeting and the release of 
        taxpayer-funded U.S. security assistance--was contingent on the 
        Ukrainian president announcing investigations into former Vice 
        President Joe Biden and a debunked conspiracy theory about 
        Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election. President 
        Trump wanted the Ukrainian leader ``in a public box,'' even as 
        Ambassador Bill Taylor warned that it was ``crazy to withhold 
        security assistance for help with a political campaign.''

                                Overview

    On August 28, 2019, Politico first reported that President 
Trump was withholding hundreds of millions of dollars of 
Congressionally-appropriated U.S. security assistance from 
Ukraine, a fact that had been previously suspected by Ukrainian 
officials in July. Public revelations about the freeze raised 
questions--about the U.S. commitment to Ukraine and harming 
efforts to deter Russian influence and aggression in Europe.
    Around this time, American officials made clear to 
Ukrainians that a public announcement about investigations into 
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election and former Vice 
President Joe Biden was a pre-condition--not only to obtain a 
White House meeting for President Zelensky, but also to end the 
freeze on military and other security assistance for Ukraine.
    In early September, Ambassador Gordon Sondland conveyed 
President Trump's demands to both U.S. and Ukrainian officials. 
On September 1, he informed a senior Ukrainian official that 
the military aid would be released if the ``prosecutor general 
would to go the mike [sic]'' and announce the investigations. 
Later, on September 7, President Trump informed Ambassador 
Sondland that he wanted President Zelensky--not the Prosecutor 
General--in a ``public box'' and demanded that the Ukrainian 
president personally announce the investigations to ``clear 
things up.'' Only then would Ukraine end the ``stalemate'' with 
the White House related to security assistance. President 
Zelensky proceeded to schedule an interview on CNN in order to 
announce the investigations and satisfy President Trump.
    The President's efforts to withhold vital military and 
security assistance in exchange for political investigations 
troubled U.S. officials. NSC Senior Director for Europe and 
Russia Timothy Morrison twice reported what he understood to be 
the President's requirement of a quid pro quo to National 
Security Advisor John Bolton, who advised him to ``make sure 
the lawyers are tracking.'' Ambassador Bill Taylor expressed 
his concerns to Ambassador Sondland, stating plainly that it 
was ``crazy to withhold security assistance for help with a 
political campaign.''

Secretary Pompeo and Ambassador Sondland Worked to ``Break the Logjam''

    President Trump's hold on security assistance persisted 
throughout August, without explanation to U.S. officials and 
contrary to the consensus recommendation of the President's 
national security team. At the same time, President Trump 
refused to schedule a coveted White House visit for President 
Zelensky until he announced two investigations that could 
benefit President Trump's reelection prospects. The confluence 
of those two circumstances led some American officials, 
including Ambassador Sondland and David Holmes, Counselor for 
Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, to conclude that 
the military assistance was conditioned on Ukraine's public 
announcement of the investigations.\838\
    On August 20, Ambassador Kurt Volker met with Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura Cooper. Ms. Cooper and 
Ambassador Volker agreed that if the hold on security 
assistance was not lifted, ``it would be very damaging to the 
relationship'' between the U.S. and Ukraine.\839\ During this 
meeting, Ambassador Volker mentioned that he was talking to an 
advisor to President Zelensky about making a statement ``that 
would somehow disavow any interference in U.S. elections and 
would commit to the prosecution of any individuals involved in 
election interference.''\840\ Ambassador Volker indicated that 
if his efforts to get a statement were successful, the hold on 
security assistance might be lifted.\841\
    Although he did not mention that conversation during his 
deposition, Ambassador Volker had a similar recollection, 
during his public testimony, of the meeting with Ms. Cooper. 
Ambassador Volker recalled discussing with Ms. Cooper the draft 
statement that had been coordinated with Ukrainian presidential 
aide Andriy Yermak--which included reference to the two 
investigations that President Trump demanded in the July 25 
call--and that such a statement ``could be helpful in getting a 
reset of the thinking of the President, the negative view of 
Ukraine that he had'' which might, in turn, ``unblock[] 
whatever hold there was on security assistance.''\842\
    Around this time, Ambassador Sondland sought to ``break the 
logjam'' on the security assistance and the White House meeting 
by coordinating a meeting between the two Presidents through 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. On August 22, Ambassador 
Sondland emailed Secretary Pompeo, copying the State 
Department's Executive Secretary, Lisa Kenna:

          Should we block time in Warsaw for a short pull-aside 
        for POTUS to meet Zelensky? I would ask Zelensky to 
        look him in the eye and tell him that once Ukraine's 
        new justice folks are in place (mid-Sept) Ze should be 
        able to move forward publicly and with confidence on 
        those issues of importance to Potus and to the US. 
        Hopefully, that will break the logjam.\843\
          Secretary Pompeo replied, ``Yes.''\844\

    Ambassador Sondland testified that when he referenced 
``issues of importance to Potus,'' he meant the investigation 
into the false allegations about Ukrainian interference in the 
2016 election and the investigation into the Bidens.\845\ He 
told the Committee that his goal was to ``do what was necessary 
to get the aid released, to break the logjam.''\846\ Ambassador 
Sondland believed that President Trump would not release the 
aid until Ukraine announced the two investigations the 
President wanted.\847\
    Ambassador Sondland testified: ``Secretary Pompeo 
essentially gave me the green light to brief President Zelensky 
about making those announcements.''\848\ He explained:

          This was a proposed briefing that I was going to give 
        President Zelensky, and I was going to call President 
        Zelensky and ask him to say what is in this email. And 
        I was asking essentially . . . [Secretary] Pompeo's 
        permission to do that, which he said yes.\849\

    He then forwarded the email to Ms. Kenna, seeking 
confirmation of ``10-15 min on the Warsaw sched[ule]'' for the 
pull-aside meeting. The Ambassador stated that he was seeking 
confirmation in order to brief President Zelensky. Ms. Kenna 
replied, ``I will try for sure.''\850\
    On August 24, Ukraine celebrated its Independence Day. 
According to Mr. Holmes, Ukrainian Independence Day presented 
``another good opportunity to show support for Ukraine.''\851\ 
However, nobody senior to Ambassador Volker attended the 
festivities, even though Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
attended in 2017 and Ambassador Bolton attended in 2018.\852\
    Two days later, on August 26, Ambassador Bolton's office 
requested Mr. Giuliani's contact information from Ambassador 
Sondland. Ambassador Sondland sent Ambassador Bolton the 
information directly.\853\ Ambassador Sondland testified that 
he had ``no idea'' why Ambassador Bolton requested the contact 
information.\854\

                     Ambassador Bolton Visited Kyiv

    On August 27, Ambassador Bolton arrived in Kyiv for an 
official visit. Ambassador Bolton emphasized to Andriy Bohdan, 
President Zelensky's chief of staff, that an upcoming meeting 
between Presidents Trump and Zelensky, scheduled for September 
1 in Warsaw, Poland, would be ``crucial to cementing their 
relationship.''\855\ Mr. Holmes, who accompanied Ambassador 
Bolton in Kyiv, testified that he also heard ``Ambassador 
Bolton express to Ambassador Taylor and Mr. Morrison his 
frustration about Mr. Giuliani's influence with the President, 
making clear there was nothing he could do about it.''\856\
    Prior to Ambassador Bolton's departure from Kyiv, 
Ambassador Taylor asked to meet with him privately. Ambassador 
Taylor expressed his ``serious concern about the withholding of 
military assistance to Ukraine while the Ukrainians were 
defending their country from Russian aggression.''\857\ During 
the conversation, Ambassador Bolton ``indicated that he was 
very sympathetic'' to Ambassador's Taylor's concerns.\858\ He 
advised that Ambassador Taylor ``send a first-person cable to 
Secretary Pompeo directly relaying my concerns'' about the 
withholding of military assistance.\859\
    Mr. Holmes testified that Ambassador Bolton advised during 
his trip that ``the hold on security assistance would not be 
lifted prior to the upcoming meeting between President Trump 
and President Zelensky in Warsaw, where it would hang on 
whether Zelensky was able to favorably impress President 
Trump.''\860\

  Ukrainian Concern Over Military Aid Intensified After First Public 
                             Report of Hold

    On August 28, 2019, Politico first reported that President 
Trump had implemented a hold on nearly $400 million of U.S. 
military assistance to Ukraine that had been appropriated by 
Congress.
    Almost immediately after the news became public, Ukrainian 
officials expressed alarm to their American counterparts. Mr. 
Yermak sent Ambassador Volker a link to the Politico story and 
then texted: ``Need to talk with you.''\861\ Other Ukrainian 
officials also expressed concerns to Ambassador Volker that the 
Ukrainian government was being ``singled out and penalized for 
some reason.''\862\
    On August 29, Mr. Yermak also contacted Ambassador Taylor 
to express that he was ``very concerned'' about the hold on 
military assistance.\863\ Mr. Yermak and other Ukrainian 
officials told Ambassador Taylor that they were ``just 
desperate'' and would be willing to travel to Washington to 
raise with U.S. officials the importance of the assistance. 
Ambassador Taylor described confusion among Ukrainian officials 
over the hold on military aid:

          I mean, the obvious question was, ``Why?'' So Mr. 
        Yermak and others were trying to figure out why this 
        was . . . They thought that there must be some rational 
        reason for this being held up, and they just didn't--
        and maybe in Washington they didn't understand how 
        important this assistance was to their fight and to 
        their armed forces. And so maybe they could figure--so 
        they were just desperate.\864\

    Without any official explanation for the hold, American 
officials could provide little reassurance to their Ukrainian 
counterparts. Ambassador Taylor continued, ``And I couldn't 
tell them. I didn't know and I didn't tell them, because we 
hadn't--we hadn't--there'd been no guidance that I could give 
them.''\865\

   Ambassador Taylor's First-Person Cable Described the ``Folly'' in 
                        Withholding Military Aid

    The same day that Ambassador Taylor heard from Mr. Yermak 
about his concerns about the hold on military aid, Ambassador 
Taylor transmitted his classified, first-person cable to 
Washington. It was the first and only time in Ambassador 
Taylor's career that he sent such a cable to the Secretary of 
State.\866\ The cable described ``the folly I saw in 
withholding military aid to Ukraine at a time when hostilities 
were still active in the east and when Russia was watching 
closely to gauge the level of American support for the 
Ukrainian Government.''\867\
    Ambassador Taylor worried about the public message that 
such a hold on vital military assistance would send in the 
midst of Ukraine's hot war with Russia: ``The Russians, as I 
said at my deposition, would love to see the humiliation of 
President Zelensky at the hands of the Americans. I told the 
Secretary that I could not and would not defend such a 
policy.''\868\
    The cable also sought to explain clearly ``the importance 
of Ukraine and the security assistance to U.S. national 
security,'' according to Mr. Holmes.\869\ However, Mr. Holmes 
worried that the national security argument might not achieve 
its purpose given the reasons he suspected for the hold on 
military aid. His ``clear impression'' at the time was that 
``the security assistance hold was likely intended by the 
President either as an expression of dissatisfaction with the 
Ukrainians, who had not yet agreed to the Burisma/Biden 
investigation, or as an effort to increase the pressure on them 
to do so.''\870\ Mr. Holmes viewed this as ``the only logical 
conclusion.''\871\ He had ``no other explanation for why there 
was disinterest in this [White House] meeting that the 
President had already offered'' and there was a ``hold of the 
security assistance with no explanation whatsoever.''\872\
    Ambassador Taylor never received a response to his cable, 
but was told that Secretary Pompeo carried it with him to a 
White House meeting about security assistance to Ukraine.\873\

     Ambassador Sondland Told Senator Johnson That Ukraine Aid Was 
                     Conditioned on Investigations

    The next day, on August 30, Republican Senator Ron Johnson 
spoke with Ambassador Sondland to express his concern about 
President Trump's decision to withhold military assistance to 
Ukraine. According to Senator Johnson, Ambassador Sondland told 
him that if Ukraine would commit to ``get to the bottom of what 
happened in 2016--if President Trump has that confidence, then 
he'll release the military spending.''\874\
    On August 31, Senator Johnson spoke by phone with President 
Trump regarding the decision to withhold aid to Ukraine.\875\ 
President Trump denied the quid pro quo that Senator Johnson 
had learned of from Ambassador Sondland.\876\ At the same time, 
however, President Trump refused to authorize Senator Johnson 
to tell Ukrainian officials that the aid would be 
forthcoming.\877\
    The message that Ambassador Sondland communicated to 
Senator Johnson mirrored that used by President Trump during 
his July 25 call with President Zelensky, in which President 
Trump twice asked that the Ukrainian leader ``get to the bottom 
of it,'' including in connection to an investigation into the 
debunked conspiracy theory that Ukraine interfered in the 2016 
election to help Hillary Clinton.\878\ To the contrary, the 
U.S. Intelligence Community unanimously assessed that Russia 
interfered in the 2016 election to help Donald Trump, as did 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller.\879\
    In a November 18 letter to House Republicans, Senator 
Johnson confirmed the accuracy of the Wall Street Journal's 
account of his August 30 call with Ambassador Sondland.\880\
    Ambassador Sondland testified that he had ``no reason to 
dispute'' Senator Johnson's recollection of the August 30 call 
and testified that by late August 2019, he had concluded that 
``if Ukraine did something to demonstrate a serious intention 
to fight corruption, and specifically addressing Burisma and 
the 2016, then the hold on military aid would be lifted.''\881\

Ambassador Sondland Raised the Link Between Investigations and Security 
   Assistance to Vice President Pence Before Meeting with President 
                                Zelensky

    On September 1, President Trump was scheduled to meet 
President Zelensky in Warsaw, Poland during an event 
commemorating World War II. Citing the approach of Hurricane 
Dorian towards American soil, the President canceled his trip 
just days beforehand. Vice President Mike Pence traveled to 
Warsaw instead.\882\
    Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor to the Vice President 
for Europe and Russia, learned of the change in the President's 
travel plans on August 29 and ``relied heavily on the NSC 
briefing papers'' originally prepared for President Trump. Ms. 
Williams recalled that ``prior to leaving, [National Security 
Advisor to the Vice President] General Kellogg had asked, at 
the request of the Vice President, for an update on the status 
of the security assistance that was at that time still on 
hold.'' Given the public reporting about the hold on August 29, 
White House officials expected that President Zelensky would 
seek further information on the status of the funds.\883\
    The delegation arrived in Warsaw and gathered in a hotel 
room to brief the Vice President shortly before his engagement 
with President Zelensky. Ambassador Bolton, who had just 
arrived from Kyiv, led the Ukraine briefing. He updated Vice 
President Pence on President Zelensky's efforts to combat 
corruption and explained ``what the security assistance was 
for.'' Advisors in the room ``agreed on the need to get a final 
decision on that security assistance as soon as possible so 
that it could be implemented before the end of the fiscal 
year.''\884\
    Before the bilateral meeting between Vice President Pence 
and President Zelensky, Ambassador Sondland attended a 
``general briefing'' for the Vice President.\885\ Ambassador 
Sondland testified that he raised concerns that the delay in 
security assistance had ``become tied to the issue of 
investigations.''\886\ The Vice President ``nodded like, you 
know, he heard what I said.''\887\
    During Ambassador Sondland's public testimony, Vice 
President Pence's office issued a carefully worded statement 
claiming that the Vice President ``never had a conversation 
with Gordon Sondland about investigating the Bidens, Burisma, 
or the conditional release of financial aid to Ukraine based 
upon potential investigations,'' and that ``Ambassador Gordon 
Sondland was never alone with the Vice President on the 
September 1 trip to Poland.''\888\ Ambassador Sondland did not 
testify that he specifically mentioned the Bidens, Burisma, or 
the conditional release of financial aid to Ukraine during his 
discussion with Vice President Pence, nor did he testify that 
he was alone with the Vice President.
    Before Vice President Pence's meeting with President 
Zelensky, Ukrainian National Security Advisor Oleksandr 
``Sasha'' Danyliuk wrote Ambassador Taylor, incorrectly 
describing the failure to provide security assistance as a 
``gradually increasing problem.''\889\ In the hours before Vice 
President Pence's meeting with President Zelensky, Ambassador 
Taylor replied, clarifying that ``the delay of U.S. security 
assistance was an all-or-nothing proposition, in the sense that 
if the White House did not lift the hold prior to the end of 
the fiscal year, September 30th, the funds would expire and 
Ukraine would receive nothing.''\890\ Ambassador Taylor wanted 
to make sure Mr. Danyliuk understood that if the assistance was 
not provided ``by the end of the fiscal year, then it goes 
away.''\891\

    President Zelensky Immediately Asked Vice President Pence About 
                          Security Assistance

    As expected, at the outset of the bilateral meeting, 
President Zelensky immediately asked Vice President Pence about 
the status of U.S. security assistance. It was ``the very first 
question'' that he raised.\892\ President Zelensky emphasized 
the multifold importance of American assistance, stating that 
``the symbolic value of U.S. support in terms of security 
assistance . . . was just as valuable to the Ukrainians as the 
actual dollars.''\893\ President Zelensky also expressed 
concern that ``any hold or appearance of reconsideration of 
such assistance might embolden Russia to think that the United 
States was no longer committed to Ukraine.''\894\
    According to Ms. Williams, the Vice President ``assured 
President Zelensky that there was no change in U.S. policy in 
terms of our . . . full-throated support for Ukraine and its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.''\895\ Vice President 
Pence also assured the Ukrainian delegation that he would 
convey to President Trump the details of President Zelensky's 
``good progress on reforms, so that hopefully we could get a 
decision on the security assistance as soon as possible.''\896\
    The reassurance proved to be ineffective. The Washington 
Post later reported that one of President Zelensky's aides told 
Vice President Pence: ``You're the only country providing us 
military assistance. You're punishing us.''\897\
    Mr. Holmes testified that President Trump's decision to 
cancel his Warsaw trip effectively meant that ``the hold [on 
security assistance] remained in place, with no clear means to 
get it lifted.''\898\

Ambassador Sondland Informed President Zelensky's Advisor that Military 
  Aid Was Contingent on Ukraine Publicly Announcing the Investigations

    After the bilateral meeting between Vice President Pence 
and President Zelensky, Ambassador Sondland briefly spoke to 
President Zelensky's aide, Mr. Yermak. Ambassador Sondland 
conveyed his belief that ``the resumption of U.S. aid would 
likely not occur until Ukraine took some kind of action on the 
public statement that we had been discussing for many weeks'' 
regarding the investigations that President Trump discussed 
during the July 25 call.\899\
    Immediately following the conversation, Ambassador Sondland 
told Mr. Morrison what had transpired during his aside with Mr. 
Yermak. Mr. Morrison recounted to the Committees that 
Ambassador Sondland told Mr. Yermak ``what could help them move 
the aid was if the prosecutor general would go to the mike 
[sic] and announce that he was opening the Burisma 
investigation.''\900\

Mr. Morrison Reported Ambassador Sondland's Proposal to Get Ukrainians 
 ``Pulled Into Our Politics'' to White House Officials and Ambassador 
                                 Taylor

    Mr. Morrison felt uncomfortable with ``any idea that 
President Zelensky should allow himself to be involved in our 
politics.''\901\ He promptly reported the conversation between 
Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak to Ambassador Bolton. Mr. 
Morrison had concerns with ``what Gordon was proposing about 
getting the Ukrainians pulled into our politics.''\902\ 
Ambassador Bolton told Mr. Morrison--consistent with his own 
``instinct''--to ``make sure the lawyers are tracking.''\903\ 
Upon his return to Washington, Mr. Morrison reported his 
concerns to NSC lawyers John Eisenberg and Michael Ellis.\904\
    Mr. Morrison testified that, in speaking to the NSC legal 
advisors, he wanted to ensure ``that there was a record of what 
Ambassador Sondland was doing, to protect the President.''\905\ 
At this point, Mr. Morrison was not certain that the President 
had authorized Ambassador Sondland's activities, but Mr. 
Morrison agreed that if the President had been aware of 
Ambassador Sondland's activities, the effect could be to create 
a paper trail that incriminated President Trump.\906\
    Mr. Morrison also reported the conversation to Ambassador 
Taylor ``because I wanted him to be in a position to advise the 
Ukrainians not to do it.''\907\ Ambassador Taylor said that he 
was ``alarmed'' to hear about the remarks to Mr. Yermak.\908\ 
He explained that ``this was the first time that I had heard 
that the security assistance, not just the White House meeting, 
was conditioned on the investigations.''\909\ To Ambassador 
Taylor, ``It's one thing to try to leverage a meeting in the 
White House. It's another thing, I thought, to leverage 
security assistance . . . to a country at war, dependent on 
both the security assistance and the demonstration of 
support.''\910\

President Trump Wanted President Zelensky in a ``Public Box,'' and Said 
        ``Everything'' Depended on Announcing the Investigations

    Upon hearing from Mr. Morrison about the conditionality of 
the military aid on Ukraine publicly announcing the two 
investigations, Ambassador Taylor sent a text message to 
Ambassador Sondland: ``Are we now saying that security 
assistance and WH meeting are conditioned on investigations?'' 
Ambassador Sondland responded, ``Call me.''\911\
    Ambassador Sondland confirmed over the phone to Ambassador 
Taylor that ``everything''--the Oval Office meeting and the 
security assistance--was dependent on the Ukrainian government 
publicly announcing the political investigations President 
Trump requested on July 25. Informed by a review of 
contemporaneous notes that he took during his phone call, 
Ambassador Taylor testified:

          During that phone call, Ambassador Sondland told me 
        that President Trump had told him that he wants 
        President Zelensky to state publicly that Ukraine will 
        investigate Burisma and alleged Ukrainian interference 
        in the 2016 election. Ambassador Sondland also told me 
        that he now recognized that he had made a mistake by 
        earlier telling Ukrainian officials that only a White 
        House meeting with President Zelensky was dependent on 
        a public announcement of the investigations. In fact, 
        Ambassador Sondland said, everything was dependent on 
        such an announcement, including security assistance. He 
        said that President Trump wanted President Zelensky in 
        a public box, by making a public statement about 
        ordering such investigations.\912\

    By this point, Ambassador Taylor's ``clear understanding'' 
was that President Trump would withhold security assistance 
until President Zelensky ``committed to pursue the 
investigation.''\913\ He agreed that the U.S. position was ``if 
they don't do this,'' referring to the investigations, ``they 
are not going to get that,'' referring to the security 
assistance.\914\ Ambassador Taylor also concurred with the 
statement that ``if they don't do this, they are not going to 
get that'' was the literal definition of a quid pro quo.\915\
    Ambassador Taylor testified that his contemporaneous notes 
of the phone call with Ambassador Sondland reflect that 
Ambassador Sondland used the phrase ``public box'' to describe 
President Trump's desire to ensure that the initiation of his 
desired investigations was announced publicly.\916\ Ambassador 
Sondland, who did not take contemporaneous notes of any of his 
conversations, did not dispute that he used those words.\917\ 
He also testified that, when he spoke to Mr. Yermak, he 
believed that it would be sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of President Trump and Mr. Giuliani if the new 
Ukrainian prosecutor general issued a statement about 
investigations, but his understanding soon changed.\918\

 President Trump Informed Ambassador Sondland that President Zelensky 
     Personally ``Must Announce the Opening of the Investigations''

    On September 7, Ambassador Sondland called Mr. Morrison to 
report that he had just concluded a call with President Trump. 
Mr. Morrison testified that Ambassador Sondland told him ``that 
there was no quid pro quo, but President Zelensky must announce 
the opening of the investigations and he should want to do 
it.''\919\ This led Mr. Morrison to believe that a public 
announcement of investigations by the Ukrainian president--and 
not the prosecutor general--was a prerequisite for the release 
of the security assistance.\920\ He reported the conversation 
to Ambassador Bolton, who once again instructed him to ``tell 
the lawyers,'' which Mr. Morrison did.\921\
    Later on September 7, Mr. Morrison relayed the substance of 
Ambassador Sondland's conversation with President Trump to 
Ambassador Taylor. Ambassador Taylor explained:

          I had a conversation with Mr. Morrison in which he 
        described a phone conversation earlier that day between 
        Ambassador Sondland and President Trump. Mr. Morrison 
        said that he had a sinking feeling after learning about 
        this conversation from Ambassador Sondland. According 
        to Mr. Morrison, President Trump told Ambassador 
        Sondland he was not asking for a quid pro quo, but 
        President Trump did insist that President Zelensky go 
        to a microphone and say he is opening investigations of 
        Biden and 2016 election interference and that President 
        Zelensky should want to do this himself. Mr. Morrison 
        said that he told Ambassador Bolton and the NSC lawyers 
        of this phone call between President Trump and 
        Ambassador Sondland.\922\

    The following day, on September 8, Ambassador Sondland 
texted Ambassadors Volker and Taylor: ``Guys multiple convos 
with Ze, Potus. Lets talk.'' Ambassador Taylor responded one 
minute later, ``Now is fine with me.''\923\ On the phone, 
Ambassador Sondland ``confirmed that he had talked to President 
Trump'' and that ``President Trump was adamant that President 
Zelensky himself had to clear things up and do it in public. 
President Trump said it was not a quid pro quo.''\924\ 
Ambassador Sondland also shared that he told President Zelensky 
and Mr. Yermak that, ``although this was not a quid pro quo, if 
President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would 
be at a stalemate.''\925\
    Ambassador Taylor testified that he understood 
``stalemate'' to mean that ``Ukraine would not receive the 
much-needed military assistance.''\926\ During his public 
testimony, Ambassador Sondland did not dispute Ambassador 
Taylor's recollection of events and agreed that the term 
``stalemate'' referred to the hold on U.S. security assistance 
to Ukraine.\927\
    Although Ambassador Sondland otherwise could not 
independently recall any details about his September 7 
conversation with President Trump, he testified that he had no 
reason to dispute the testimony from Ambassador Taylor or Mr. 
Morrison--which was based on their contemporaneous notes--
regarding this conversation.\928\ Ambassador Sondland, however, 
did recall that President Zelensky agreed to make a public 
announcement about the investigations into Burisma and the 
Bidens and the 2016 election in an interview on CNN.''\929\
    According to Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Sondland 
explained that President Trump was a ``businessman,'' and that 
when ``a businessman is about to sign a check to someone who 
owes him something, the businessman asks that person to pay up 
before signing the check.''\930\ Ambassador Taylor was 
concerned that President Trump believed Ukraine ``owed him 
something'' in exchange for the hundreds of millions of dollars 
in taxpayer-funded U.S. security assistance.\931\ He argued to 
Ambassador Sondland that ``the explanation made no sense. The 
Ukrainians did not owe President Trump anything. And holding up 
security assistance for domestic political gain was 
crazy.''\932\ Ambassador Sondland did not recall this exchange 
specifically, but did not dispute Ambassador Taylor's 
testimony.\933\

   Ambassador Taylor Texted Ambassador Sondland that ``It's Crazy to 
   Withhold Security Assistance for Help with a Political Campaign''

    Ambassador Taylor remained concerned by the President's 
directive that ``everything'' was conditioned on President 
Zelensky publicly announcing the investigations. He also 
worried that, even if the Ukrainian leader did as President 
Trump required, the President might continue to withhold the 
vital U.S. security assistance in any event. Ambassador Taylor 
texted his concerns to Ambassadors Volker and Sondland stating: 
``The nightmare is they give the interview and don't get the 
security assistance. The Russians love it. (And I quit.)''\934\
    Ambassador Taylor testified:

          ``The nightmare'' is the scenario where President 
        Zelensky goes out in public, makes an announcement that 
        he's going to investigate the Burisma and the . . . 
        interference in 2016 election, maybe among other 
        things. He might put that in some series of 
        investigations. But . . . the nightmare was he would 
        mention those two, take all the heat from that, get 
        himself in big trouble in this country and probably in 
        his country as well, and the security assistance would 
        not be released. That was the nightmare.\935\

    Early in the morning in Europe on September 9, Ambassador 
Taylor reiterated his concerns about the President's ``quid pro 
quo'' in another series of text messages with Ambassadors 
Volker and Sondland:

          Taylor: The message to the Ukrainians (and Russians) 
        we send with the decision on security assistance is 
        key. With the hold, we have already shaken their faith 
        in us. Thus my nightmare scenario.
          Taylor: Counting on you to be right about this 
        interview, Gordon.
          Sondland: Bill, I never said I was ``right''. I said 
        we are where we are and believe we have identified the 
        best pathway forward. Lets hope it works.
          Taylor: As I said on the phone, I think it's crazy to 
        withhold security assistance for help with a political 
        campaign.\936\

    By ``help with a political campaign,'' Ambassador Taylor 
was referring to President Trump's 2020 reelection effort.\937\ 
Ambassador Taylor testified: ``The investigation of Burisma and 
the Bidens was clearly identified by Mr. Giuliani in public for 
months as a way to get information on the two Bidens.''\938\
    Ambassador Taylor framed the broader national security 
implications of President Trump's decision to withhold vital 
security assistance from Ukraine. He said:

          [T]he United States was trying to support Ukraine as 
        a frontline state against Russian attack. And, again, 
        the whole notion of a rules-based order was being 
        threatened by the Russians in Ukraine. So our security 
        assistance was designed to support Ukraine. And it was 
        not just the United States; it was all of our 
        allies.\939\

    Ambassador Taylor explained:

          [S]ecurity assistance was so important for Ukraine as 
        well as our own national interests, to withhold that 
        assistance for no good reason other than help with a 
        political campaign made no sense. It was 
        counterproductive to all of what we had been trying to 
        do. It was illogical. It could not be explained. It was 
        crazy.\940\

  Ambassador Sondland Repeated the President's Denial of a ``Quid Pro 
 Quo'' to Ambassador Taylor, While He and President Trump Continued to 
                      Demand Public Investigations

    In response to Ambassador Taylor's text message that it was 
``crazy to withhold security assistance for help with a 
political campaign,'' Ambassador Sondland denied that the 
President had demanded a ``quid pro quo.''
    At approximately 5:17 a.m. Eastern Time, Ambassador 
Sondland responded to Ambassador Taylor:

          Bill, I believe you are incorrect about President 
        Trump's intentions. The President has been crystal 
        clear: no quid pro quo's of any kind. The President is 
        trying to evaluate whether Ukraine is truly going to 
        adopt the transparency and reforms that President 
        Zelensky promised during his campaign. I suggest we 
        stop the back and forth by text. If you still have 
        concerns, I recommend you give Lisa Kenna or S 
        [Secretary Pompeo] a call to discuss them directly. 
        Thanks.\941\

    Notably, Ambassador Sondland recalled that President Trump 
raised the possible existence of a quid pro quo entirely on his 
own, without any prompting. Ambassador Sondland asked President 
Trump what he affirmatively wanted from Ukraine, yet President 
Trump reportedly responded by asserting what was not the case:

          Q: Okay. During that telephone conversation with 
        President Trump, you didn't ask the President directly 
        if there was a quid pro quo, correct?
          A: No. As I testified, I asked the question open 
        ended, what do you want from Ukraine?
          Q: President Trump was the first person to use the 
        word ``quid pro quo,'' correct?
          A: That is correct.\942\

    In contrast, Ambassador Sondland testified unequivocally 
there was a quid pro quo in connection to a telephone call 
between President Trump and President Zelensky, as well as a 
White House meeting for President Zelensky.\943\ He 
acknowledged that the reference to ``transparency and reforms'' 
in his text message to Ambassador Taylor ``was my clumsy way of 
saying he wanted these announcement to be made.''\944\
    Ambassador Sondland also testified that President Trump 
immediately followed his stated denial of a quid pro quo by 
demanding that President Zelensky still make a public 
announcement, while the military assistance remained on an 
unexplained hold. Ambassador Sondland agreed that President 
Trump said that he wanted President Zelensky to ``clear things 
up and do it in public,'' as Ambassador Taylor had 
testified.\945\ Ambassador Sondland testified that nothing on 
his call with President Trump changed his understanding of a 
quid pro quo and, at least as of September 8, he was 
``absolutely convinced'' the White House meeting and President 
Trump's release of the military assistance were conditioned on 
the public announcement of the investigations President Trump 
sought.\946\
    After hearing from President Trump, Ambassador Sondland 
promptly told the Ukrainian leader and Mr. Yermak that ``if 
President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would 
be at a stalemate.''\947\ President Zelensky responded to the 
demand relayed by Ambassador Sondland, by agreeing to make an 
announcement of investigations on CNN.\948\
    Regardless of when the call between President Trump and 
Ambassador Sondland occurred, both that phone call and 
Ambassador's Sondland text message denying any quid pro quo 
occurred after the White House had been informed of the 
whistleblower complaint discussing the hold on security 
assistance. The White House first received notice of the 
whistleblower complaint alleging wrongdoing concerning the 
President's July 25 call with President Zelensky on August 26--
over a week before the ``no quid pro quo'' denial.\949\ In 
addition, Ambassador Sondland wrote his text message on 
September 9, the same day that the ICIG informed the Committee 
of the existence of a ``credible'' and ``urgent'' whistleblower 
complaint that was later revealed to be related to 
Ukraine.\950\ The Administration received prior notice of the 
ICIG's intent to inform the Committee.\951\

  Ambassador Sondland's Testimony is the Only Evidence the Committees 
Received Indicating That President Trump Denied Any ``Quid Pro Quo'' on 
                        the Phone on September 9

    Ambassador Sondland testified in his deposition that he 
sent a text message to Ambassador Taylor after speaking 
directly with President Trump on September 9. However, 
testimony from other witnesses and documents available to the 
Committees do not confirm that Ambassador Sondland and 
President Trump spoke on that day.
    Ambassador Sondland's own testimony indicated some 
ambiguity in his recollection of the timing of the call. At a 
public hearing on November 20, Ambassador Sondland testified 
that he ``still cannot find a record of that call [on September 
9] because the State Department and the White House cannot 
locate it.''\952\ While Ambassador Sondland testified that 
``I'm pretty sure I had the call on that day,''\953\ he 
acknowledged that he might have misremembered the date of the 
September 9 call--``I may have even spoken to him on September 
6th''--and that without his call records, he could not be 
certain about when he spoke to President Trump.\954\
    After the deposition transcripts of Ambassador Taylor and 
Mr. Morrison were made public, including their detailed 
accounts of the September 7 conversation that Ambassador 
Sondland had with President Trump, Ambassador Sondland 
submitted a written addendum to his deposition based on his 
``refreshed'' recollection.\955\ In that addendum, Ambassador 
Sondland amended his testimony and stated, ``I cannot 
specifically recall if I had one or two phone calls with 
President Trump in the September 6-9 time frame.''\956\
    Furthermore, the conversation recalled by Ambassador 
Sondland as having taken place on September 9 is consistent 
with a conversation that Ambassador Sondland relayed to Mr. 
Morrison and Ambassador Taylor during the previous two days. 
Both Mr. Morrison and Ambassador Taylor, after reviewing their 
contemporaneous written notes, provided detailed testimony 
about Ambassador Sondland's description of his call with 
President Trump. For example, Ambassador Sondland shared with 
Ambassador Taylor that even though President Trump asserted 
that ``there is no quid pro quo,'' President Trump ``did insist 
that President Zelensky go to a microphone and say he is 
opening investigations of Biden and 2016 election 
interference.''\957\ Mr. Morrison and Ambassador Taylor both 
testified that this conversation occurred on September 7.\958\ 
Ambassador Sondland acknowledged that he had no basis to 
dispute the recollections of Mr. Morrison and Ambassador 
Taylor.\959\ Ambassador Sondland, who testified that he does 
not take notes, stated: ``If they have notes and they recall 
that, I don't have any reason to dispute it.''\960\
    Text messages produced to the Committees also indicate that 
Ambassador Sondland spoke to President Trump prior to September 
8. On September 4, Ambassador Volker texted Mr. Yermak that 
Ambassador Sondland planned to speak to President Trump on 
September 6 or 7. Ambassador Volker wrote: ``Hi Andrey. Reports 
are that pence liked meeting and will press trump on scheduling 
Ze visit. Gordon will follow up with pence and, if nothing 
moving, will have a chance to talk with President on Saturday 
[September 7].''\961\ Ambassador Volker then corrected himself: 
``Sorry--on Friday [September 6].''\962\
    On Sunday, September 8, at 11:20 a.m. Eastern Time, 
Ambassador Sondland texted Ambassadors Taylor and Volker: 
``Guys multiple convos with Ze, Potus. Lets talk.''\963\ 
Shortly after this text, Ambassador Taylor testified that he 
spoke to Ambassador Sondland, who recounted his conversation 
with President Trump on September 7, as well as a separate 
conversation that Ambassador Sondland had with President 
Zelensky.
    The timing of the text messages also raises questions about 
Ambassador Sondland's recollection. If Ambassador Sondland 
spoke to President Trump after receiving Ambassador Taylor's 
text message on September 9, and before he responded, then the 
timing of the text messages would mean that President Trump 
took Ambassador Sondland's call in the middle of the night in 
Washington, D.C. Ambassador Taylor sent his message on 
September 9 at 12:47 a.m. Eastern Time, and Ambassador Sondland 
responded less than five hours later at 5:19 a.m. Eastern 
Time.\964\
    In any event, President Trump's purported denial of the 
``quid pro quo'' was also contradicted when Acting Chief of 
Staff Mick Mulvaney publicly admitted that security assistance 
was withheld in order to pressure Ukraine to conduct an 
investigation into the 2016 election.
    On October 17, at a press briefing in the White House, Mr. 
Mulvaney confirmed that President Trump withheld the essential 
military aid for Ukraine as leverage to pressure Ukraine to 
investigate the conspiracy theory that Ukraine had interfered 
in the 2016 U.S. election, which was also promoted by Vladimir 
Putin.\965\ Mr. Mulvaney confirmed that President Trump 
``absolutely'' mentioned ``corruption related to the DNC 
server. . . . No question about that.''\966\ When the White 
House press corps attempted to clarify this acknowledgement of 
a quid pro quo related to security assistance, Mr. Mulvaney 
replied: ``We do that all the time with foreign policy.'' He 
continued. ``I have news for everybody: get over it.''\967\

                 8. The President's Scheme Was Exposed


President Trump lifted the hold on U.S. military assistance to Ukraine 
        on September 11 after it became clear to the White House and 
        President Trump that his scheme was exposed.

                                Overview

    As news of the President's hold on military assistance to 
Ukraine became public on August 28, Congress, the press, and 
the public increased their scrutiny of President Trump's 
actions regarding Ukraine, which risked exposing President 
Trump's scheme. By this date, the White House had learned that 
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG), 
Michael Atkinson, had determined that a whistleblower complaint 
related to the same Ukraine matters was ``credible'' and an 
``urgent concern,'' and, pursuant to the applicable statute, 
recommended to the Acting Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI), Joseph Maguire, that the complaint should be transmitted 
to Congress.
    In early September, bipartisan Members of both houses of 
Congress--publicly, and privately--expressed concerns to the 
White House about the hold on military assistance. On September 
9, after months of internal discussion due to growing concern 
about the activity of President Trump's personal attorney, Rudy 
Giuliani, regarding Ukraine, the Chairs of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
and the Committee on Oversight and Reform announced a joint 
investigation into efforts by President Trump and Mr. Giuliani, 
``to improperly pressure the Ukrainian government to assist the 
President's bid for reelection,'' including by withholding 
Congressionally-appropriated military assistance.
    Later that same day, the ICIG notified Chairman Schiff and 
Ranking Member Nunes that, despite uniform past practice and a 
statutory requirement that credible, ``urgent concern'' 
complaints be provided to the intelligence committees, the 
Acting DNI was nevertheless withholding the whistleblower 
complaint from Congress. The Acting DNI later testified that 
his office initially withheld the complaint on the advice of 
the White House, with guidance from the Department of Justice.
    Two days later, on September 11, the President lifted the 
hold on the military assistance to Ukraine. Numerous witnesses 
testified that they were never aware of any official reason for 
why the hold was either implemented or lifted.
    Notwithstanding this ongoing inquiry, President Trump has 
continued to urge Ukraine to investigate his political rival, 
former Vice President Biden. For example, when asked by a 
journalist on October 3 what he hoped Ukraine's President would 
do about the Bidens in response to the July 25 call, President 
Trump responded: ``Well, I would think that, if they were 
honest about it, they'd start a major investigation into the 
Bidens. It's a very simple answer.'' President Trump reiterated 
his affinity for the former Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 
Yuriy Lutsenko, whom numerous witnesses described as inept and 
corrupt: ``And they got rid of a prosecutor who was a very 
tough prosecutor. They got rid of him. Now they're trying to 
make it the opposite way.''

 Public Scrutiny of President Trump's Hold on Military Assistance for 
                                Ukraine

    After news of the President's freeze on U.S. military 
assistance to Ukraine became public on August 28, both houses 
of Congress increased their ongoing scrutiny of President 
Trump's decision.\968\ On September 3, a bipartisan group of 
Senators, including Senator Rob Portman and Senator Ron 
Johnson, sent a letter to Acting White House Chief of Staff 
Mick Mulvaney expressing ``deep concerns'' that the 
``Administration is considering not obligating the Ukraine 
Security Initiative funds for 2019.''\969\ The Senators' letter 
urged that the ``vital'' funds be obligated 
``immediately.''\970\ On September 5, the Chairman and Ranking 
Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee sent a letter to 
Mr. Mulvaney and Acting Director of the OMB Russell Vought 
expressing ``deep concern'' about the continuing hold on 
security assistance funding for Ukraine.\971\
    On September 5, the Washington Post editorial board 
reported concerns that President Trump was withholding military 
assistance for Ukraine and a White House meeting in order to 
force President Zelensky to announce investigations of Mr. 
Biden and purported Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. 
election. The Post editorial board wrote:

          [W]e're reliably told that the president has a second 
        and more venal agenda: He is attempting to force Mr. 
        Zelensky to intervene in the 2020 U.S. presidential 
        election by launching an investigation of the leading 
        Democratic candidate, Joe Biden. Mr. Trump is not just 
        soliciting Ukraine's help with his presidential 
        campaign; he is using U.S. military aid the country 
        desperately needs in an attempt to extort it.

    It added:

        4  The White House claims Mr. Trump suspended Ukraine's 
        military aid in order for it [sic] be reviewed. But, as 
        CNN reported, the Pentagon has already completed the 
        study and recommended that the hold be lifted. Yet Mr. 
        Trump has not yet acted. If his recalcitrance has a 
        rationale, other than seeking to compel a foreign 
        government to aid his reelection, the president has yet 
        to reveal it.\972\

    On the same day that the Washington Post published its 
editorial, Senators Christopher Murphy and Ron Johnson visited 
Kyiv, and met with President Zelensky. They were accompanied by 
Ambassador Bill Taylor and Counselor for Political Affairs 
David Holmes of U.S. Embassy Kyiv. President Zelensky's ``first 
question to the Senators was about the withheld security 
assistance.''\973\ Ambassador Taylor testified that both 
Senators ``stressed that bipartisan support for Ukraine in 
Washington was Ukraine's most important strategic asset and 
that President Zelensky should not jeopardize that bipartisan 
support by getting drawn into U.S. domestic politics.''\974\
    As Senator Johnson and Senator Murphy later recounted, the 
Senators sought to reassure President Zelensky that there was 
bipartisan support in Congress for providing Ukraine with 
military assistance for Ukraine and that they would continue to 
urge President Trump to lift the hold--as Senator Johnson had 
already tried, unsuccessfully, before traveling to 
Ukraine.\975\

  Three Committees Announced Joint Investigation of President's Scheme

    On September 9, the Chairs of the House Intelligence 
Committee, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee 
on Oversight and Reform publicly announced a joint 
investigation of the scheme by President Trump and Mr. Giuliani 
``to improperly pressure the Ukrainian government to assist the 
President's bid for reelection.''\976\ The Committees had been 
planning and coordinating this investigation since early 
summer, after growing public scrutiny of Mr. Giuliani's 
activities in Ukraine and questions about Ambassador 
Yovanovitch's abrupt removal following a public smear campaign 
targeting her.
    In a letter sent to White House Counsel Pat Cipollone the 
same day, the three Chairs stated that President Trump and Mr. 
Giuliani ``appear to have acted outside legitimate law 
enforcement and diplomatic channels to coerce the Ukrainian 
government into pursuing two politically-motivated 
investigations under the guise of anti-corruption activity''--
investigations into purported Ukrainian interference in the 
2016 election and Vice President Biden and his son.\977\
    With respect to the hold on Ukraine military assistance, 
the Chairs observed that ``[i]f the President is trying to 
pressure Ukraine into choosing between defending itself from 
Russian aggression without U.S. assistance or leveraging its 
judicial system to serve the ends of the Trump campaign, this 
would represent a staggering abuse of power, a boon to Moscow, 
and a betrayal of the public trust.''\978\ The Chairs requested 
that the White House preserve all relevant records and produce 
them by September 16, including the transcript of the July 25 
call between President Trump and President Zelensky.\979\
    On the same day, the Chairs of the three Committees sent a 
similar letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo seeking the 
preservation and production of all relevant records at the 
Department of State by September 16.\980\ To date, and as 
explained more fully in Section II, Secretary Pompeo has not 
produced a single document sought by the Committees pursuant to 
a lawful subpoena.
    NSC Senior Director for Russia and Europe Timothy Morrison 
recalled seeing a copy of the letter that was sent by the three 
Chairs to the White House.\981\ He also recalled that the three 
Committees' Ukraine investigation was discussed at meeting of 
senior-level NSC staff soon after it was publicly 
announced.\982\ The NSC's legislative affairs staff issued a 
notice of the investigation to NSC staff members, although it 
is unclear exactly when.\983\ NSC Director for Ukraine 
Alexander Vindman recalled discussions among NSC staff members, 
including Mr. Morrison's deputy, John Erath, that the 
investigation ``might have the effect of releasing the hold'' 
on Ukraine military assistance because it would be 
``potentially politically challenging'' for the Administration 
to ``justify that hold'' to the Congress.\984\

      Inspector General Notified Intelligence Committee that the 
         Administration Was Withholding Whistleblower Complaint

    Later that same day, September 9, Inspector General 
Atkinson sent a letter to Chairman Schiff and Ranking Member 
Nunes notifying them that an Intelligence Community 
whistleblower had filed a complaint with the ICIG on August 
12.\985\ Pursuant to a statute governing whistleblower 
disclosures, the Inspector General--after a condensed, 
preliminary review--had determined that the complaint 
constituted an ``urgent concern'' and that its allegations 
appeared to be ``credible.''\986\ The Inspector General's 
September 9 letter did not disclose the substance or topic of 
the whistleblower complaint.
    Contrary to uniform past practice and the clear 
requirements of the whistleblower statute, Acting DNI Maguire 
withheld the whistleblower complaint based on advice from the 
White House.\987\ Acting DNI Maguire also relied upon an 
unprecedented intervention by the Department of Justice into 
Intelligence Community whistleblower matters to overturn the 
ICIG's determination based on a preliminary investigation.\988\
    The White House had been aware of the whistleblower 
complaint weeks prior to the ICIG's letter of September 9.\989\ 
Acting DNI Maguire testified that, after receiving the 
whistleblower complaint from the Inspector General on August 
26, his office contacted the White House Counsel's Office for 
guidance.\990\
    Consistent with Acting DNI Maguire's testimony, the New 
York Times reported that in late August, Mr. Cipollone and 
National Security Council Legal Advisor John Eisenberg 
personally briefed President Trump about the complaint's 
existence--and explained to the President that they believed 
the complaint could be withheld on executive privilege 
grounds.\991\ The report alleged that Mr. Cipollone and Mr. 
Eisenberg ``told Mr. Trump they planned to ask the Justice 
Department's Office of Legal Counsel to determine whether they 
had to disclose the complaint to lawmakers.''\992\
    On September 10, Chairman Schiff wrote to Acting DNI 
Maguire to express his concern about the Acting DNI's 
``unprecedented departure from past practice'' in withholding 
the whistleblower complaint from the Congressional intelligence 
committees notwithstanding his ``express obligations under the 
law'' and the Inspector General's determination.\993\ Chairman 
Schiff observed that the ``failure to transmit to the Committee 
an urgent and credible whistleblower complaint, as required by 
law, raises the prospect that an urgent matter of a serious 
nature is being purposefully concealed from the 
Committee.''\994\
    Also on September 10, Ambassador John Bolton resigned from 
his position as National Security Advisor. Ambassador Bolton's 
deputy, Dr. Charles Kupperman, became the Acting National 
Security Advisor. The Committee was unable to determine if 
Ambassador Bolton's departure related to the matters under 
investigation because neither he nor Dr. Kupperman agreed to 
appear for testimony as part of this inquiry.
    On September 13, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) General Counsel informed the Committee that 
DOJ had overruled the ICIG's determination, and that the ODNI 
could not transmit the complaint to the Committee at its 
discretion because it involved ``potentially privileged 
communications by persons outside the Intelligence 
Community''--presumably presidential communications.\995\ In 
response, Chairman Schiff issued a subpoena to the Acting DNI 
on September 13 and announced to the public that ODNI was 
withholding a ``credible'' whistleblower complaint of ``urgent 
concern.''\996\ Following intense pressure from the public and 
Congress, on September 25, the White House released the 
complaint to the intelligence committees and the July 25 call 
record to the public.\997\

   President Trump Lifted the Hold on Military Assistance for Ukraine

    On September 11--two days after the three Committees 
launched their investigation into President Trump's scheme, and 
one day after Chairman Schiff requested that Acting DNI Maguire 
produce a copy of the whistleblower complaint--President Trump 
lifted the hold on military assistance for Ukraine.
    On the evening of September 11, prior to lifting the hold, 
President Trump met with Vice President Mike Pence, Mr. 
Mulvaney, and Senator Portman to discuss the hold.\998\ Around 
8:00 p.m. on September 11, the Chief of Staff's office informed 
Dr. Kupperman that the hold had been lifted.\999\
    Just like there was no official explanation for why the 
hold on Ukraine security assistance was implemented, numerous 
witnesses testified that they were not provided with a reason 
for why the hold was lifted on September 11.\1000\ For example, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura Cooper testified 
that President Trump's lifting of the hold ``really came quite 
out of the blue . . . It was quite abrupt.''\1001\ Jennifer 
Williams, Special Advisor to the Vice President for Europe and 
Russia, testified that from the time when she first learned 
about the hold on July 3 until it was lifted on September 11, 
she never came to understand why President Trump ordered the 
hold.\1002\
    OMB Deputy Associate Director of National Security Programs 
Mark Sandy, who was the senior career official overseeing the 
administration of some of the Ukraine military assistance, only 
learned of a possible rationale for the hold in early 
September--after the Acting DNI had informed the White House 
about the whistleblower complaint.\1003\ Mr. Sandy testified 
that he could not recall another instance ``where a significant 
amount of assistance was being held up'' and he ``didn't have a 
rationale for as long as I didn't have a rationale in this 
case.''\1004\ However, in ``early September,'' approximately 
two months after President Trump had implemented the hold, and 
several weeks after the White House learned of the 
whistleblower complaint, Mr. Sandy received an email from OMB 
Associate Director of National Security Programs Michael 
Duffey. For the first time, it ``attributed the hold to the 
President's concern about other countries not contributing more 
to Ukraine'' and requested ``information on what additional 
countries were contributing to Ukraine.''\1005\
    Mr. Sandy testified that he was not aware of any other 
countries committing to provide more financial assistance to 
Ukraine prior to the lifting of the hold on September 11.\1006\ 
According to Lt. Col. Vindman, none of the ``facts on the 
ground'' changed before the President lifted the hold.\1007\

After the Hold was Lifted, Congress was Forced to Pass a Law to Ensure 
        All of the Military Aid Could Be Distributed to Ukraine

    The lengthy delay created by the hold on Ukraine military 
assistance prevented the Department of Defense from spending 
all of the Congressionally-appropriated funds by the end of the 
fiscal year, which meant that the funds would expire on 
September 30 because unused funds do not roll over to the next 
fiscal year.\1008\ This confirmed the fears expressed by Ms. 
Cooper, Mr. Sandy, and others related to the illegal 
impoundment of Congressionally-mandated funding--concerns that 
were discussed in some depth within the relevant agencies in 
late July and throughout August.\1009\
    Prior to the release of the funds, DOD's internal analysis 
raised concerns that up to $100 million of military assistance 
could go unspent as a result of the hold imposed by the 
President.\1010\ Ultimately, approximately $35 million of 
Ukraine military assistance--14% of the total funds--remained 
unspent by the end of fiscal year 2019.\1011\ Typically, DOD 
averages between 2 and 5 percent unspent funds for similar 
programs, substantially less than the 14 percent left unspent 
in this case.\1012\
    In order to ensure that Ukraine did not permanently lose 
$35 million of the critical military assistance frozen by the 
White House,\1013\ Congress passed a provision on September 
27--three days before funds were set to expire--to ensure that 
the remaining $35 million in 2019 military assistance to 
Ukraine could be spent.\1014\ Ms. Cooper testified that such an 
act of Congress was unusual--indeed, she had never heard of 
funding being extended in this manner.\1015\
    As of November 2019, Pentagon officials confirmed that the 
$35 million in security assistance originally held by the 
President and extended by Congress had still yet to be 
disbursed. When asked for an explanation, the Pentagon only 
confirmed that the funds had not yet been spent but declined to 
say why.\1016\

Pressure to Announce Investigations Continued After the Hold was Lifted

    Before President Trump lifted the hold on security 
assistance, Ukrainian officials had relented to the American 
pressure campaign to announce the investigations and had 
scheduled President Zelensky to appear on CNN.\1017\ Even after 
President Trump lifted the hold on September 11, President 
Zelensky did not immediately cancel his planned CNN 
interview.\1018\
    On September 12, Ambassador Taylor personally informed 
President Zelensky and the Ukrainian foreign minister that 
President Trump's hold on military assistance had been 
lifted.\1019\ Ambassador Taylor remained concerned, however, 
that ``there was some indication that there might still be a 
plan for the CNN interview in New York'' during which President 
Zelensky would announce the investigations that President Trump 
wanted Ukraine to pursue.\1020\ Ambassador Taylor testified 
that he ``wanted to be sure that that didn't happen, so I 
addressed it with Zelensky's staff.''\1021\
    On September 13, a staff member at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv 
texted Mr. Holmes to relay a message that ``Sondland said the 
Zelensky interview is supposed to be today or Monday, and they 
plan to announce that a certain investigation that was `on 
hold' will progress.''\1022\ The Embassy Kyiv staffer stated 
that he ``did not know if this was decided or if Sondland was 
advocating for it. Apparently he's been discussing this with 
Yermak.''\1023\
    On September 13, during a meeting in President Zelensky's 
office, Ukrainian presidential aide Andriy Yermak ``looked 
uncomfortable'' when Ambassador Taylor sought to confirm that 
there were no plans for President Zelensky to announce the 
investigations during a CNN interview.\1024\ Although President 
Zelensky's National Security Advisor Oleksandr Danyliuk 
indicated that there were no plans for President Zelensky to do 
the CNN interview, Ambassador Taylor was still concerned after 
he and Mr. Holmes saw Mr. Yermak following the meeting.\1025\ 
According to Ambassador Taylor, Mr. Yermak's ``body language 
was such that it looked to me like he was still thinking they 
were going to make that statement.''\1026\ Mr. Holmes also 
recalled that when he and Ambassador Taylor ran into Mr. Yermak 
following the meeting, Ambassador Taylor ``stressed the 
importance of staying out of U.S. politics and said he hoped no 
interview was planned,'' but ``Mr. Yermak shrugged in 
resignation and did not answer, as if to indicate he had no 
choice.''\1027\
    That same day, September 13, President Zelensky reportedly 
met with CNN's Fareed Zakaria, who was in Kyiv to moderate the 
Yalta European Strategy Conference.\1028\ During the meeting 
with Mr. Zakaria, President Zelensky did not cancel his planned 
CNN interview.\1029\
    Conflicting advice prompted the Ukrainian foreign minister 
to observe in a meeting with Ambassador Volker, Ambassador 
Taylor, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent, 
``You guys are sending us different messages in different 
channels.''\1030\
    For example, at a September 14 meeting in Kyiv attended by 
Ambassador Volker, Mr. Yermak, and the Ukrainian foreign 
minister, Ambassador Volker stated that when the two Presidents 
finally meet, ``it's important that President Zelensky give the 
messages that we discussed before,'' apparently referring to 
President Zelensky's ``willingness to open investigations in 
the two areas of interest to the President and that had been 
pushed previously by Rudy Giuliani.''\1031\ Ambassador Taylor, 
however, replied: ``Don't do that.''\1032\
    On September 18 or 19, President Zelensky cancelled his 
scheduled interview with CNN.\1033\ Although President Zelensky 
did not publicly announce the investigations that President 
Trump wanted, he remains under pressure from President Trump, 
particularly because he requires diplomatic, financial, and 
military backing from the United States, the most powerful 
supporter of Ukraine. That pressure continues to this day. As 
Mr. Holmes testified:

          [A]lthough the hold on the security assistance may 
        have been lifted, there were still things they wanted 
        that [the Ukrainians] weren't getting, including a 
        meeting with the President in the Oval Office. Whether 
        the hold--the security assistance hold continued or 
        not, Ukrainians understood that that's something the 
        President wanted, and they still wanted important 
        things from the President.
          And I think that continues to this day. I think 
        they're being very careful. They still need us now 
        going forward. In fact, right now, President Zelensky 
        is trying to arrange a summit meeting with President 
        Putin in the coming weeks, his first face to face 
        meeting with him to try to advance the peace process. 
        He needs our support. He needs President Putin to 
        understand that America supports Zelensky at the 
        highest levels. So this doesn't end with the lifting of 
        the security assistance hold. Ukraine still needs us, 
        and as I said, still fighting this war this very 
        day.\1034\

            Vice President Pence Spoke to President Zelensky

    On September 18, approximately one week before President 
Trump was scheduled to meet with President Zelensky at the 
United Nations General Assembly in New York, Vice President 
Pence spoke with President Zelensky by telephone.\1035\ 
According to Ms. Williams, during the call, Vice President 
Pence ``reiterat[ed] the release of the funds'' and ``ask[ed] a 
bit more about . . . how Zelensky's efforts were going.''\1036\
    On November 26, Ms. Williams submitted a classified 
addendum to her hearing testimony on November 19 related to 
this telephone call. According to Ms. Williams' counsel, the 
Office of the Vice President informed Ms. Williams' counsel 
that certain portions of the September 18 call, including the 
additional information in Ms. Williams' addendum, are 
classified. The Committee has requested that the Office of the 
Vice President conduct a declassification review so that the 
Committee may share this additional information regarding the 
substance of the September 18 call publicly. On October 9, Vice 
President Pence told reporters, ``I'd have no objection'' to 
the White House releasing the transcript of his calls with 
President Zelensky and said that ``we're discussing that with 
White House counsel as we speak.''\1037\ In a November 7 
interview with Fox Business, Vice President Pence reiterated, 
``I have no objection at all'' to releasing records of his 
calls.\1038\

  President Trump and Rudy Giuliani, Undeterred, Continued to Solicit 
                 Foreign Interference in Our Elections

    On September 19, Rudy Giuliani was interviewed by Chris 
Cuomo on CNN. During the interview, Mr. Giuliani confirmed that 
he had urged Ukraine to investigate ``the allegations that 
there was interference in the election of 2016, by the 
Ukrainians, for the benefit of Hillary Clinton[.]'' When asked 
specifically if he had asked Ukraine to look into Vice 
President Biden, Mr. Giuliani replied immediately, ``of course 
I did.''
    Seconds later, Mr. Giuliani attempted to clarify his 
admission, insisting that he had not asked Ukraine to 
investigate Vice President Biden but instead ``to look into the 
allegations that related to my client [President Trump], which 
tangentially involved Joe Biden in a massive bribery scheme.'' 
Mr. Giuliani insisted that his conduct was appropriate, telling 
Mr. Cuomo later in the interview that ``it is perfectly 
appropriate for a President to say to a leader of a foreign 
country, investigate this massive bribe . . . that was paid by 
a former Vice President.''\1039\
    President Trump also has continued to publicly urge 
President Zelensky to launch an investigation of Vice President 
Biden and alleged 2016 election interference by Ukraine. On 
September 23, in a public press availability, President Trump 
stated:

          I put no pressure on them whatsoever. I could have. I 
        think it would probably, possibly, have been okay if I 
        did. But I didn't. I didn't put any pressure on them 
        whatsoever. You know why? Because they want to do the 
        right thing.\1040\

    On September 24, in public remarks upon arriving at the 
opening session of the U.N. General Assembly, President Trump 
stated: ``What Joe Biden did for his son, that's something they 
should be looking at.''\1041\
    On September 25--in a joint public press availability with 
President Zelensky--President Trump stated that ``I want him to 
do whatever he can'' in reference to the investigation of the 
Biden family. He added, ``Now, when Biden's son walks away with 
millions of dollars from Ukraine, and he knows nothing, and 
they're paying him millions of dollars, that's corruption.'' 
President Trump added, ``He [President Zelensky] was elected--I 
think, number one--on the basis of stopping corruption, which 
unfortunately has plagued Ukraine. And if he could do that, 
he's doing, really, the whole world a big favor. I know--and I 
think he's going to be successful.''\1042\
    On September 30, during his remarks at the swearing-in 
ceremony of Labor Secretary Eugene Scalia, President Trump 
stated:

          Now, the new President of Ukraine ran on the basis of 
        no corruption. That's how he got elected. And I believe 
        that he really means it. But there was a lot of 
        corruption having to do with the 2016 election against 
        us. And we want to get to the bottom of it, and it's 
        very important that we do.\1043\

    On October 2, in a public press availability, President 
Trump discussed the July 25 call with President Zelensky and 
stated that ``the conversation was perfect; it couldn't have 
been nicer.'' He added:

          The only thing that matters is the transcript of the 
        actual conversation that I had with the President of 
        Ukraine. It was perfect. We're looking at 
        congratulations. We're looking at doing things 
        together. And what are we looking at? We're looking at 
        corruption. And, in, I believe, 1999, there was a 
        corruption act or a corruption bill passed between 
        both--and signed--between both countries, where I have 
        a duty to report corruption. And let me tell you 
        something: Biden's son is corrupt, and Biden is 
        corrupt.\1044\

    On October 3, in remarks before he departed on Marine One, 
President Trump expressed his ``hope'' that Ukraine would 
investigate Mr. Biden and his son. Specifically, President 
Trump stated that he had hoped--after his July 25 
conversation--that Ukraine would ``start a major investigation 
into the Bidens.'' The President also stated that ``by the way, 
likewise, China should start an investigation into the Bidens, 
because what happened in China is just about as bad as what 
happened with--with Ukraine.'' He addressed the corrupt 
prosecutor general, Yuriy Lutsenko, who had recently been 
removed by Parliament: ``And they got rid of a prosecutor who 
was a very tough prosecutor. They got rid of him. Now they're 
trying to make it the opposite way.\1045\
    The next day, on October 4, in remarks before he departed 
on Marine One, the President again said:

          When you look at what Biden and his son did, and when 
        you look at other people--what they've done. And I 
        believe there was tremendous corruption with Biden, but 
        I think there was beyond--I mean, beyond corruption--
        having to do with the 2016 campaign, and what these 
        lowlifes did to so many people, to hurt so many people 
        in the Trump campaign--which was successful, despite 
        all of the fighting us. I mean, despite all of the 
        unfairness.\1046\

    President Trump reiterated his willingness to solicit 
foreign assistance related to his personal interests: ``Here's 
what's okay: If we feel there's corruption, like I feel there 
was in the 2016 campaign--there was tremendous corruption 
against me--if we feel there's corruption, we have a right to 
go to a foreign country.''\1047\ President Trump added that 
asking President Xi of China to investigate the Bidens ``is 
certainly something we can start thinking about.''\1048\
    Consistent with the President's remarks after this inquiry 
began, Ambassador Volker understood that references to fighting 
``corruption'' in Ukraine, when used by President Trump and Mr. 
Giuliani, in fact referred to the two investigations into 
``Burisma''--and former Vice President Biden--and the 2016 
election interference that President Trump sought to benefit 
his reelection efforts.\1049\

   The President's Scheme Undermined U.S. Anti-Corruption Efforts in 
                                Ukraine

    Rather than combatting corruption in Ukraine, President 
Trump's ongoing efforts to urge Ukraine to pursue an 
investigation into former Vice President Biden undermine 
longstanding U.S. anti-corruption policy, which encourages 
countries to refrain from using the criminal justice system to 
investigate political opponents. When it became clear that 
President Trump was pressuring Ukraine to investigate his 
political rival, career public servants charged with 
implementing U.S. foreign policy in a non-partisan manner, such 
as Lt. Col. Vindman and Ambassador Taylor, communicated to 
President Zelensky and his advisors that Ukraine should avoid 
getting embroiled in U.S. domestic politics.\1050\
    Mr. Kent, an anti-corruption and rule of law expert, 
explained that U.S. anti-corruption efforts prioritize 
``building institutional capacity so that the Ukrainian 
Government has the ability to go after corruption and 
effectively investigate, prosecute, and judge alleged criminal 
activities using appropriate institutional mechanisms, that is, 
to create and follow the rule of law.\1051\
    Mr. Holmes concurred:

          [O]ur longstanding policy is to encourage them 
        [Ukraine] to establish and build rule of law 
        institutions, that are capable and that are independent 
        and that can actually pursue credible allegations. 
        That's our policy. We've been doing that for quite some 
        time with some success. So focusing on [particular] 
        cases, including [] cases where there is an interest of 
        the President, it's just not part of what we've done. 
        It's hard to explain why we would do that.\1052\

    Mr. Kent emphasized that when foreign government officials 
``hear diplomats on the ground saying one thing, and they hear 
other U.S. leaders saying something else,'' it raises concerns 
about the United States' credibility on anti-corruption 
efforts.\1053\ Ambassador Taylor agreed, stating that ``[o]ur 
credibility is based on a respect for the United States'' and 
``if we damage that respect, then it hurts our credibility and 
makes it more difficult for us to do our jobs.''\1054\
    Mr. Kent, like many other witnesses, explained that urging 
Ukraine to engage in ``selective politically associated 
investigations or prosecutions'' undermined the rule of law 
more generally:

          As a general principle, I do not believe the United 
        States should ask other countries to engage in 
        selective politically associated investigations or 
        prosecutions against opponents of those in power 
        because such selective actions undermine the rule of 
        law, regardless of the country.\1055\

    Mr. Kent agreed that pressuring Ukraine to conduct 
political investigations is not a part of U.S. foreign policy 
to promote the rule of law in Ukraine and around the 
world.\1056\ Mr. Kent concluded that the President's request 
for investigations ``went against U.S. policy'' and ``would've 
undermined the rule of law and our longstanding policy goals in 
Ukraine, as in other countries, in the post-Soviet 
space.''\1057\
    These conflicting messages came to a head at a September 14 
meeting between American and Ukrainian officials in Kyiv. 
During that meeting, Ambassador Volker advised Mr. Yermak about 
the ``potential problems'' with investigations that the 
Zelensky administration was contemplating into former Ukrainian 
President Petro Poroshenko.\1058\ Mr. Yermak retorted, ``what, 
you mean like asking us to investigate Clinton and 
Biden?''\1059\ Ambassador Volker did not respond.\1060\

                           SECTION I ENDNOTES

    \1\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 16-17.
    \2\Kateryna Handziuk, Ukrainian Activist, Dies From Acid Attack, 
New York Times (Nov. 5, 2018) (online at www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/
world/europe/kateryna-handziuk-dies-ukraine.html).
    \3\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 30-31.
    \4\U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, Department of State, Ambassador 
Yovanovitch's Remarks at a Women of Courage Reception in Honor of 
Kateryna Handziuk (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at https://ua.usembassy.gov/
ambassador-yovanovitchs-remarks-at-a-women-of-courage-reception-in-
honor-of-kateryna-handziuk/).
    \5\U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, Department of State, Ambassador 
Yovanovitch's Remarks at a Women of Courage Reception in Honor of 
Kateryna Handziuk (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at https://ua.usembassy.gov/
ambassador-yovanovitchs-remarks-at-a-women-of-courage-reception-in-
honor-of-kateryna-handziuk/).
    \6\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 31.
    \7\Id. at 31-32.
    \8\Id. at 32.
    \9\Id. at 31.
    \10\Id. at 31-32.
    \11\Giuliani to Join Trump's Legal Team, New York Times (April 19, 
2018) (online at www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/us/politics/giuliani-
trump.html).
    \12\Letter from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev 
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 3, 2019).
    \13\Department of Justice, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman Charged with 
Conspiring to Violate Straw and Foreign Donor Bans (Oct. 10, 2019) 
(online at www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/lev-parnas-and-igor-fruman-
charged-conspiring-violate-straw-and-foreign-donor-bans).
    \14\Hill Dep. Tr. at 59.
    \15\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 28-29.
    \16\Ukraine Ousts Victor Shokin, Top Prosecutor, and Political 
Stability Hangs in the Balance, New York Times (Mar. 29, 2016) (online 
at www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/europe/political-stability-in-the-
balance-as-ukraine-ousts-top-prosecutor.html).
    \17\Kent Dep. Tr. at 45.
    \18\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 27-28.
    \19\Id. at 31-32.
    \20\Id. at 21.
    \21\Id. at 32-33, 38 (``I think that he felt that I and the embassy 
were effective at helping Ukrainians who wanted reform, Ukrainians who 
wanted to fight against corruption, and he did not you know, that was 
not in his interest.'').
    \22\Id. at 30.
    \23\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 14.
    \24\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 25.
    \25\Id. at 132.
    \26\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 27.
    \27\Nickolay Kapitonenko, an advisor to the Ukrainian Parliament's 
Foreign Policy Committee, described Giuliani as a ``mythical link to 
the U.S.'' who is viewed as ``an extension of Trump.'' Giuliani Sits at 
the Center of the Ukraine Controversy, Wall Street Journal (Sept. 26, 
2019) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/giuliani-sits-at-the-center-of-
the-ukraine-controversy-11569546774); David Sakvarelidze, a former 
Ukrainian deputy prosecutor general, stated, ``Lutsenko was trying to 
save his political skin by pretending to be Trumpist at the end of his 
career.'' Meet the Ukrainian Ex-Prosecutor Behind the Impeachment 
Furor, New York Times (Oct. 5, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/2019/
10/05/world/europe/ukraine-prosecutor-trump.html).
    \28\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 30.
    \29\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Jan. 17, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1086096691613323265) (``Gregg 
Jarrett: `Mueller's prosecutors knew the `Dossier' was the product of 
bias and deception.' It was a Fake, just like so much news coverage in 
our Country. Nothing but a Witch Hunt, from beginning to end!'').
    \30\Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background to 
``Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections'': 
The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Jan. 6, 2017) 
(online at www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf); Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and 
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election (May 8, 2018) (online at 
www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/report-select-committee-
intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active-measures); House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Russian Active 
Measures (Mar. 22, 2018) (online at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IG/
IG00/20180322/108023/HRPT-115-1_1-p1-U3.pdf); House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Minority Views (Mar. 26, 2018) (online at 
https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20180411_-_final_-
_hpsci_minority_views_on_majority_report.pdf).
    \31\President Trump's Former National Security Advisor `Deeply 
Disturbed' by Ukraine Scandal: `Whole World Is Watching,' ABC News 
(Sept. 29, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-
trumps-national-security-advisor-deeply-disturbed-ukraine/
story?id=65925477).
    \32\Charges of Ukrainian Meddling? A Russian Operation, U.S. 
Intelligence Says, New York Times (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/us/politics/ukraine-russia-
interference.html).
    \33\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 56-57.
    \34\Kent Dep. Tr. at 45.
    \35\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 330.
    \36\Id. at 330; Explainer: Biden, Allies, Pushed Out Ukrainian 
Prosecutor Because He Didn't Pursue Corruption Cases, USA Today (Oct. 
3, 2019) (online at www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/10/03/
what-really-happened-when-biden-forced-out-ukraines-top-prosecutor/
3785620002/).
    \37\See, e.g., Ukraine Prosecutor Says No Evidence of Wrongdoing by 
Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16, 2019) (online at www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-05-16/ukraine-prosecutor-says-no-evidence-of-wrongdoing-
by-bidens) (``Hunter Biden did not violate any Ukrainian laws--at least 
as of now, we do not see any wrongdoing. A company can pay however much 
it wants to its board . . . Biden was definitely not involved . . . We 
do not have any grounds to think that there was any wrongdoing starting 
from 2014.'').
    \38\Notes of Call with Viktor Shokin (Jan. 23, 2019); Ukraine 
Prosecutor Says No Evidence of Wrongdoing by Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16, 
2019) (online at www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-16/ukraine-
prosecutor-says-no-evidence-of-wrongdoing-by-bidens).
    \39\Giuliani Pursued Business in Ukraine While Pushing for 
Inquiries for Trump, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/27/nyregion/giuliani-ukraine-business-
trump.html); Ukraine Prosecutor Says No Evidence of Wrongdoing by 
Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16, 2019) (online at www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-05-16/ukraine-prosecutor-says-no-evidence-of-wrongdoing-
by-bidens).
    \40\Notes of Meeting with Yuriy Lutsenko (Jan. 25, 2019); Ukraine 
Prosecutor Says No Evidence of Wrongdoing by Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16, 
2019) (online at www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-16/ukraine-
prosecutor-says-no-evidence-of-wrongdoing-by-bidens).
    \41\Giuliani Pursued Business in Ukraine While Pushing for 
Inquiries for Trump, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/27/nyregion/giuliani-ukraine-business-
trump.html).
    \42\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Oct. 23, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1187168034835894272).
    \43\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Oct. 30, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1189667101079932928).
    \44\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 19.
    \45\As Russia Collusion Fades, Ukrainian Plot to Help Clinton 
Emerges, The Hill (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/campaign/435029-as-russia-collusion-fades-ukrainian-plot-to-
help-clinton-emerges).
    \46\Ukraine Prosecutor General Lutsenko Admits U.S. Ambassador 
Didn't Give Him a Do Not Prosecute List, The Ukrainian (Apr. 18, 2019) 
(online at www.unian.info/politics/10520715-ukraine-prosecutor-general-
lutsenko-admits-u-s-ambassador-didn-t-give-him-a-do-not-prosecute-
list.html).
    \47\As Russia Collusion Fades, Ukrainian Plot to Help Clinton 
Emerges, The Hill (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/campaign/435029-as-russia-collusion-fades-ukrainian-plot-to-
help-clinton-emerges).
    \48\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 21, 37.
    \49\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00768-
ATTHPSCI_
20190930_00772, ATTHPSCI_20190930_00775. The Committee did not subpoena 
the call detail records of any member of Congress or staff, including 
Ranking Member Devin Nunes, nor of any journalist, including John 
Solomon. To the extent that congressional members or staff, or 
journalists, appear in the report, call records indicate that they were 
in contact with individuals of interest to the investigation. A 
subpoena served to the White House requesting certain call records was 
obstructed in full by President Trump. Nevertheless, the Committee's 
investigation into these and other call records remains ongoing.
    \50\As Russia Collusion Fades, Ukrainian Plot to Help Clinton 
Emerges, The Hill (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/campaign/435029-as-russia-collusion-fades-ukrainian-plot-to-
help-clinton-emerges).
    \51\Department of Justice, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman Charged with 
Conspiring to Violate Straw and Foreign Donor Bans (Oct. 10, 2019) 
(online at www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/lev-parnas-and-igor-fruman-
charged-conspiring-violate-straw-and-foreign-donor-bans) (alleging that 
in May and June 2018, Mr. Parnas sought the assistance of an unnamed 
congressman in causing the removal or recall of the then-U.S. 
ambassador to Ukraine).
    \52\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00775.
    \53\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1108559080204001280).
    \54\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Mar. 22, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1109117167176466432); Giuliani Slams 
Mueller Leak, Fox News (Apr. 7, 2019) (online at https://
www.foxnews.com/transcript/giuliani-slams-mueller-leak).
    \55\Donald Trump, Jr., Twitter (Mar. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/donaldjtrumpjr/status/1109850575926108161).
    \56\Kent Dep. Tr. at 57-58.
    \57\Id. at 178.
    \58\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 62.
    \59\Hale Dep. Tr. at 37-38.
    \60\Id. at 99-100.
    \61\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 63-64.
    \62\Hale Dep. Tr. at 27.
    \63\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 124.
    \64\Id. at 267-268.
    \65\Id. at 268.
    \66\Email from [Redacted] to S_All (Mar. 26, 2019) (online at 
www.americanoversight.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/
AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf); Email from Operations Center to 
[Redacted] (Mar. 29, 2019) (online at www.americanoversight.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf). (The same 
State Department records show that Secretary Pompeo was scheduled to 
have a secure call with Rep. Nunes on April 1, 2019.); Email from 
Operations Center to [Redacted] (Mar. 29, 2019) (online at 
www.americanoversight.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf); Email from 
[Redacted] to S_Scheduling (Mar. 28, 2019) (online at 
www.americanoversight.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf); Hale Dep. Tr. at 34 (stating 
that Secretary Pompeo 
spoke with Mr. Giuliani on March 28 and March 29); AT&T Document 
Production, 
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02034-ATTHPSCI _20190930_02053, 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_03538-ATTHPSCI_20190930_03539.
    \67\Joe Biden's 2020 Ukrainian Nightmare: A Closed Probe is 
Revived, The Hill (Apr. 1, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/white-house/436816-joe-bidens-2020-ukrainian-nightmare-a-
closed-probe-is-revived).
    \68\Donald Trump, Jr., Twitter (Apr. 2, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/donaldjtrumpjr/status/1113046659456528385).
    \69\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00848-
ATTHPSCI_
20190930_00884. Mr. Parnas also had an aborted call that lasted 5 
seconds on April 5, 2019 with an aide to Rep. Devin Nunes on the 
Intelligence Committee, Derek Harvey. Id. at Bates 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_00876. Call records obtained by the Committees show 
that Mr. Parnas and Mr. Harvey had connected previously, including a 
four minute 42 second call on January 31, 2019, a one minute 7 second 
call on February 4, and a one minute 37 second call on February 7, 
2019. Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00617, ATTHPSCI_20190930_00630, 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_00641. As explained later in this Chapter, Rep. Nunes 
would connect separately by phone on April 10 and 11 with Mr. Giuliani, 
and on April 12 with Mr. Parnas. Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00913-
ATTHPSCI_20190930_00914; ATTHPSCI_20190930-02125, ATTHPSCI_20190930-
02129.
    \70\Ukrainian to US Prosecutors: Why Don't You Want Our Evidence on 
Democrats?, The Hill (Apr. 7, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/white-house/437719-ukrainian-to-us-prosecutors-why-dont-you-
want-our-evidence-on-democrats).
    \71\Id.
    \72\Id.
    \73\Id.
    \74\Giuliani Slams Mueller Leak, Fox News (Apr. 7, 2019) (online at 
www.foxnews.com/transcript/giuliani-slams-mueller-leak).
    \75\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Apr. 8, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1115171828618731520).
    \76\Specifically, between April 8 and April 11, phone records show 
the following phone contacts:
     at least six calls between Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Parnas 
(longest duration approximately five minutes), AT&T Document 
Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02115-ATTHPSCI_20190930-02131.
     at least four calls between Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Solomon 
(all on April 8, longest duration approximately one minute, 30 seconds) 
AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02114-
ATTHPSCI_20190930-02115;
     at least nine calls between Mr. Parnas and Mr. Solomon 
(longest duration four minutes, 39 seconds) AT&T Document Production, 
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00885-ATTHPSCI_20190930-00906; and
     at least three calls between Mr. Parnas and Ms. Toensing 
(longest duration approximately six minutes), AT&T Document Production, 
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00885-ATTHPSCI_20190930-00905.
    The Committee did not subpoena the call detail records of any 
member of Congress or staff, including Ranking Member Devin Nunes, nor 
of any journalist, including John Solomon. To the extent that 
congressional members or staff, or journalists, appear in the report, 
records indicate that they were in contact with individuals of interest 
to the investigation. A subpoena served to the White House requesting 
certain call records was obstructed in full by President Trump. 
Nevertheless, the Committee's investigation into these and other call 
records remains ongoing.
    \77\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02125, ATTHPSCI_20190930-03236.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Connecting   Duration
   Date      Time (ET)    of Call         Caller           Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/10/19    12:00:36     0:35       Giuliani, Rudy     Nunes, Devin
04/10/19    12:10:35     0:00       Nunes, Devin       Giuliani, Rudy
04/10/19    12:10:37     0:31       Nunes, Devin       Giuliani, Rudy
04/10/19    12:11:10     SMS        UNKNOWN            Giuliani, Rudy
04/10/19    12:12:35     2:50       Giuliani, Rudy     Nunes, Devin
04/10/19    12:15:38     0:00       Giuliani, Rudy     Nunes, Devin
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\Id. Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00902.
    \79\Jay Sekulow, personal counsel to President Trump, stated that 
the President was disappointed that Mr. diGenova and Ms. Toensing had 
to withdraw due to a conflict of interest, but noted that ``those 
conflicts do not prevent them from assisting the President in other 
legal matters. The President looks forward to working with them.'' 
Trump's Legal Team Remains in Disarray as New Lawyer Will No Longer 
Represent Him in Russia Probe, Washington Post (Mar. 25, 2018) (online 
at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-another-blow-to-trumps-efforts-
to-combat-russia-probe-digenova-will-no-longer-join-legal-team/2018/03/
25/8ac8c8d2-3038-11e8-94fa-32d48460b955_story.html).
    \80\For example, between April 1 and April 7, Ms. Toensing 
exchanged at least five calls with Mr. Parnas and two calls with Mr. 
Giuliani. ATTHPSCI_20190930-02089-ATTHPSCI_20190930-02110; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930-00871-ATTHPSCI_20190930-00884. In addition, on April 
10, Ms. Toensing and Mr. Giuliani spoke for approximately six minutes, 
19 seconds. AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02126. 
Mr. diGenova and Ms. Toensing were also very active on social media in 
promoting these conspiracy theories as well as the false accusations 
against Ambassador Yovanovitch. See, e.g., Ryan Saavedra, Twitter (Mar. 
23, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/RealSaavedra/status/
1109546629672009728); Victoria Toensing, Twitter (Mar. 21, 2019) 
(online at https://twitter.com/VicToensing/status/1108751525239762944); 
Victoria Toensing, Twitter (Mar. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/VicToensing/status/1109882728101625856).
    \81\Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, LLP, Yuriy Lutsenko, and 
Kostiantyn Kulyk (Apr. 12, 2019); Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, 
LLP, Viktor Shokin (Apr. 15, 2019).
    \82\On April 12, less than a week after the latest piece in The 
Hill, Ms. Toensing signed a retainer agreement between diGenova & 
Toensing, LLP, Mr. Lutsenko, and his former deputy Kostiantyn Kulyk, 
two of the primary sources for Mr. Solomon's articles. The Committees 
obtained a copy of this document which is not signed by the Ukrainians, 
but a spokesman for Ms. Toensing and Mr. diGenova confirmed that the 
firm represented Mr. Lutsenko. See Giuliani Weighed Doing Business with 
Ukrainian Government, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at 
www.wsj.com/articles/giuliani-weighed-doing-business-with-ukrainian-
government-11574890951).
    The first paragraph of the retainer agreement sets forth the 
services to be provided by diGenova & Toensing, LLP to their Ukrainian 
clients:
    Yurii Lutsenko and Kostiantyn Kulyk (``Clients'') hereby engage the 
firm of diGenova & Toensing, LLP (``Firm'' or ``Attorneys'') to 
represent them in connection with recovery and return to the Ukraine 
government of funds illegally embezzeled from that country and 
providing assistance to meet and discuss with United States government 
officials the evidence of illegal conduct in Ukraine regarding the 
United States, for example, interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.
    See Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, LLP, Yuriy Lutsenko, and 
Kostiantyn Kulyk (Apr. 12, 2019).
    The scope of representation--which includes representing Mr. 
Lutsenko and Mr. Kulyk in meetings with U.S. officials regarding 
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections--mirrors the 
allegations reported in The Hill, pursued by Mr. Giuliani on behalf of 
President Trump, and pushed by the President on his July 25 call with 
President Zelensky. According to the retainer agreement, Mr. Lutsenko 
was to pay diGenova & Toensing, LLP $25,000 per month, plus costs, for 
four months for this work. See Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, 
LLP, Yuriy Lutsenko, and Kostiantyn Kulyk (Apr. 12, 2019).
    On April 12, the same day Ms. Toensing signed the retainer 
agreement with Mr. Lutsenko, phone records show contacts between Ms. 
Toensing, Mr. Giuliani, and Mr. Parnas, as well as contacts between Mr. 
Parnas and Mr. Solomon, and Mr. Parnas and Rep. Nunes. In addition, 
among these calls are contacts between Mr. Giuliani and a phone number 
associated with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an 
unidentified number (``-1''), and a phone number associated with the 
White House:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Connecting Time   Duration  of
     Date             (ET)             Call           Caller         Recipient                Source
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/12/19        9:48:57           0:24            Toensing,       Parnas, Lev     AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Victoria                        Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00908
04/12/19        10:40:19          3:25            Parnas, Lev     Toensing,       AT&T Document Production,
                                                                   Victoria        Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00909
04/12/19        11:05:25          0:03            OMB-Associated  Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Phone Number                    Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02134
04/12/19        11:05:39          12:10           ``-1''          Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02134
04/12/19        13:13:49          0:12            Giuliani, Rudy  White House     AT&T Document Production,
                                                                   Phone Number    Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02135
04/12/19        13:18:46          0:07            Toensing,       Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Victoria                        Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02135
04/12/19        13:26:54          0:24            Giuliani        Parnas, Lev     AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Partners                        Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00911
04/12/19        14:11:22          0:03            ``-1''          Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02136
04/12/19        14:11:27          0:03            OMB-Associated  Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Phone Number                    Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02136
04/12/19        14:17:46          0:07            Toensing,       Parnas, Lev     AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Victoria                        Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00912
04/12/19        15:09:22          0:02            Parnas, Lev     Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00912
04/12/19        15:09:32          0:01            Parnas, Lev     Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00912
04/12/19        15:16:09          1:38            Parnas, Lev     Solomon, John   AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00912
04/12/19        15:48:09          0:03            OMB-Associated  Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Phone Number                    Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02137
04/12/19        16:10:49          0:00            Parnas, Lev     Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19        16:10:51          0:02            Parnas, Lev     Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
4/12/19         16:12:53          1:00            Parnas, Lev     Nunes, Devin    AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19        16:54:11          0:00            Nunes, Devin    Parnas, Lev     AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19        16:54:13          0:02            Nunes, Devin    Parnas, Lev     AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19        17:07:20          1:27            Parnas, Lev     Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19        17:17:36          7:52            Sekulow, Jay    Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-03565
04/12/19        17:24:05          1:49            Parnas, Lev     Solomon, John   AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00914
04/12/19        17:26:48          0:28            Parnas, Lev     Solomon, John   AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00914
04/12/19        17:30:19          8:34            Parnas, Lev     Nunes, Devin    AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00914
04/12/19        17:39:25          0:53            Parnas, Lev     Solomon, John   AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00914
04/12/19        19:56:43          5:03            Giuliani, Rudy  White House     AT&T Document Production,
                                                                   Phone Number    Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02139
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As part of the investigation, the Committees uncovered contact 
between Mr. Giuliani and a landline number with a prefix associated 
with the Office of Management and Budget within the Executive Office of 
the President, according to public directories. This number appears to 
obscure the identity of outgoing calls, but does not itself accept 
incoming calls. The Committees continue to investigate the 
originator(s) of these calls, including to determine whether other 
offices or landlines within the White House may also show up with the 
same landline number when outgoing calls are made and to clarify who at 
the White House spoke to Mr. Giuliani at these key points in time under 
investigation. A subpoena served to the White House requesting certain 
call records was obstructed in full by President Trump. Nevertheless, 
the Committee's investigation into these and other call records remains 
ongoing.
    Mr. Lutsenko and Mr. Kulyk were not the only Ukrainians who appear 
to have engaged with diGenova & Toensing, LLP. On April 15, Ms. 
Toensing signed another retainer agreement between diGenova & Toensing, 
LLP and former Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin. Again, the Committees' 
copy is not signed by Mr. Shokin. A spokesman for Ms. Toensing and Mr. 
diGenova acknowledged that the firm represented ``Ukrainian 
whistleblowers,'' but claimed that the identities of those clients 
(other that Mr. Lutsenko) are protected by attorney-client privilege. 
See Giuliani Weighed Doing Business with Ukrainian Government, Wall 
Street Journal (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/
giuliani-weighed-doing-business-with-ukrainian-government-11574890951).
    The first paragraph of the retainer agreement outlined the services 
to be rendered:
    Viktor Shokin (``Client'') hereby engaged the firm diGenova & 
Toensing, LLP (``Firm'' or ``Attorneys'') to represent him for the 
purpose of collecting evidence regarding his March 2016 firing as 
Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the role of then-Vice President Joe 
Biden in such firing, and presenting such evidence to U.S. and foreign 
authorities.
    See Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, LLP, Viktor Shokin (Apr. 
15, 2019).
    The subject matter of the agreement--the activities of Vice 
President Biden--again echo Mr. Solomon's pieces in The Hill, 
conspiracy theories spread by Mr. Giuliani on behalf of President 
Trump, and the President's statements about Vice President Biden on his 
July 25 call with President Zelensky.
    \83\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00947-
ATTHPSCI_20190930-00950.
    \84\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02222-ATTHPSCI_20190930-02223.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Connecting   Duration
   Date      Time (ET)    of Call         Caller           Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/23/19    14:00:56     1:50       Giuliani, Rudy     Parnas, Lev
04/23/19    14:15:18     0:18       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/23/19    14:15:43     0:11       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/23/19    15:20:17     0:11       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/23/19    15:50:23     8:28       ``-1''             Giuliani, Rudy
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02224.
    \86\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Apr. 23, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1120798794692612097).
    \87\Giuliani Fires Back at Hillary Clinton's Remarks on Mueller 
Probe, Fox News (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at www.youtube.com/
watch?v=FDtg8z12Q7s&feature=youtu.be).
    \88\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02229-
ATTHPSCI_20190930-02237.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Connecting   Duration
   Date      Time (ET)    of Call         Caller           Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/24/19    7:17:48      0:42       OMB-Associated     Giuliani, Rudy
                                     Phone Number
04/24/19    7:47:57      0:37       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    7:48:39      0:21       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    7:49:00      0:31       OMB-Associated     Giuliani, Rudy
                                     Phone Number
04/24/19    7:49:00      0:20       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    7:49:35      4:53       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    7:54:52      0:24       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    13:03:50     13:44      OMB-Associated     Giuliani, Rudy
                                     Phone Number
04/24/19    16:42:52     8:00       Parnas, Lev        Giuliani, Rudy
04/24/19    18:38:57     0:44       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    18:42:43     8:42       ``-1''             Giuliani, Rudy
04/24/19    20:09:14     0:06       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    20:12:08     3:15       White House Phone  Giuliani, Rudy
                                     Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
    \90\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 22.
    \91\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 21-22.
    \92\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 129.
    \93\Id. at 139.
    \94\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \95\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 21.
    \96\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 131-132.
    \97\Hale Dep. Tr. at 16-17, 112-113; Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 21.
    \98\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 63 (``I only met her when I took 
this job, but immediately I understood that we had an exceptional 
officer doing exceptional work at a very critical embassy in Kyiv. And 
during my visits to Kyiv, I was very impressed by what she was doing 
there, to the extent that I asked her if she'd be willing to stay, if 
that was a possibility, because we had a gap coming up.'').
    \99\Id. at 64.
    \100\Biography of Marie L. Yovanovitch, Department of State (online 
at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/261588.htm).
    \101\McKinley Transcribed Interview Tr. at 37.
    \102\Reeker Dep. Tr. at 26.
    \103\Kent Dep. Tr. at 188-189.
    \104\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 18-19.
    \105\Id.
    \106\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 18-19, 45-46.
    \107\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 142.
    \108\What ``Corruption'' Means in the Impeachment Hearings, New 
Yorker (Nov. 16, 2019) (online at www.newyorker.com/news/our-
columnists/the-corruption-of-the-word-corruption-and-so-much-else-amid-
the-impeachment-hearings).
    \109\22 U.S.C. Sec. 3941.
    \110\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 110-111.
    \111\Ambassador Yovanovitch said: ``Although then and now I have 
always understood that I served at the pleasure of the President, I 
still find it difficult to comprehend that foreign and private 
interests were able to undermine U.S. interests in this way. 
Individuals who apparently felt stymied by our efforts to promote 
stated U.S. policy against corruption, that is, to do our mission, were 
able to successfully conduct a campaign of disinformation against a 
sitting ambassador using unofficial back channels. As various witnesses 
have recounted, they shared baseless allegations with the President and 
convinced him to remove his ambassador despite the fact that the State 
Department fully understood that the allegations were false and the 
sources highly suspect.'' Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 22.
    \112\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 78-79.
    \113\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 313-314.
    \114\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 22.
    \115\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 25.
    \116\Kent. Dep. Tr. at 131-132.
    \117\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
    \118\Comedian Volodymyr Zelensky Unseats Incumbent in Ukraine's 
Presidential Election, Exit Polls Show, Washington Post (Apr. 21, 2019) 
(online at www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-ukraine-votes-in-
presidential-runoff-a-comedian-looks-to-unseat-the-incumbent/2019/04/
21/b7d69a38-603f-11e9-bf24-db4b9fb62aa2_story.html).
    \119\Id.
    \120\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr. 
21, 2019) (online at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
6550349/First-Trump-Ukraine-Call.pdf).
    \121\Id.
    \122\Conflicting White House accounts of 1st Trump-Zelenskiy call, 
Associated Press (Nov. 15, 2019) (online at https://apnews.com/
2f3c9910e0a14ec08d6d76ed93148059).
    \123\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr. 
21, 2019) (online at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
6550349/First-Trump-Ukraine-Call.pdf).
    \124\Id.
    \125\Id.
    \126\Id.
    \127\Id.
    \128\Id.
    \129\Id.
    \130\Id.
    \131\Williams Dep. Tr. at 36.
    \132\Id. at 37.
    \133\Id. at 36.
    \134\Fox & Friends, Fox News (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDtg8z12Q7s#action=share).
    \135\Why Giuliani Singled Out 2 Ukrainian Oligarchs to Help Look 
for Dirt, New York Times (Nov. 25, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/25/us/giuliani-ukraine-oligarchs.html).
    \136\Ukraine's Unlikely President, Promising a New Style of 
Politics, Gets a Taste of Trump's Swamp, New Yorker (Oct. 25, 2019) 
(online at www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/11/04/how-trumps-emissaries-
put-pressure-on-ukraines-new-president).
    \137\Why Giuliani Singled Out 2 Ukrainian Oligarchs to Help Look 
for Dirt, New York Times (Nov. 25, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/25/us/giuliani-ukraine-oligarchs.html).
    \138\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00947; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_00949; ATTHPSCI_20190930_02222; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_02223.
    \139\Joe Biden Announces 2020 Run for President, After Months of 
Hesitation, New York Times (Apr. 25, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/25/us/politics/joe-biden-2020-announcement.html).
    \140\How the Obama White House Engaged Ukraine to Give Russia 
Collusion Narrative an Early Boost, The Hill (Apr. 25, 2019) (online at 
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/440730-how-the-obama-white-
house-engaged-ukraine-to-give-russia-collusion).
    \141\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 17.
    \142\Id. at 116.
    \143\Id.
    \144\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02245.
    \145\Id.
    \146\Sean Hannity Interviews Trump on Biden, Russia Probe, FISA 
Abuse, Comey, Fox News (Apr. 26, 2019) (online at 
www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/04/26/
full_video_sean_hannity_interviews_trump_on_biden_russia_probe_fisa_abus
e_comey.html).
    \147\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 55-56.
    \148\Sean Hannity Interviews Trump on Biden, Russia Probe, FISA 
Abuse, Comey, Fox News (Apr. 26, 2019) (online at 
www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/04/26/
full_video_sean_hannity_interviews_trump_on_biden_russia_probe_fisa_abus
e_comey.html). As discussed later in this report, on the morning of 
September 25, 2019, the Department of Justice would quickly issue a 
statement after President Trump released the record of his July 25 call 
with President Zelensky. The statement asserted that that Attorney 
General Barr had not engaged on Ukraine matters at the President's 
request:
    The President has not spoken with the Attorney General about having 
Ukraine investigate anything relating to former Vice President Biden or 
his son. The President has not asked the Attorney General to contact 
Ukraine--on this or any other matter. The Attorney General has not 
communicated with Ukraine--on this or any other subject.
    \149\Cleaning Up Ukraine in the Shadow of Trump, Financial Times 
(Nov. 28, 2019) (online at www.ft.com/content/eb8e4004-1059-11ea-a7e6-
62bf4f9e548a).
    \150\Id.
    \151\Biden Faces Conflict of Interest Questions That Are Being 
Promoted by Trump and Allies, New York Times (May 1, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/us/politics/biden-son-ukraine.html).
    \152\Transcript: Fox News Interview with President Trump, Fox News 
(May 7, 2019) (online at www.foxnews.com/politics/transcript-fox-news-
interview-with-president-trump).
    \153\Id.
    \154\Foreign Affairs Issue Launch with Former Vice President Joe 
Biden, Council on Foreign Relations (Jan. 23, 2018) (online at: 
www.cfr.org/event/foreign-affairs-issue-launch-former-vice-president-
joe-biden).
    \155\Ukraine Ousts Viktor Shokin, Top Prosecutor, and Political 
Stability Hangs in the Balance, New York Times (Mar. 29, 2016) (online 
at www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/europe/political-stability-in-the-
balance-as-ukraine-ousts-top-prosecutor.html).
    \156\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 50; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 115.
    \157\Trump Says He'd Consider Accepting Information from Foreign 
Governments on His Opponents, Washington Post (June 12, 2019) (online 
at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-hed-consider-accepting-
dirt-from-foreign-governments-on-his-opponents/2019/06/12/b84ba860-
8d5c-11e9-8f69-a2795fca3343_story.html).
    \158\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02313.
    \159\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02314; ATTHPSCI_20190930_02316; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_02318; ATTHPSCI_20190930_01000.
    \160\Kent Dep. Tr. at 137.
    \161\Id.
    \162\Id.
    \163\Rudy Giuliani Plans Ukraine Trip to Push for Inquiries That 
Could Help Trump, New York Times (May 9, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/politics/giuliani-ukraine-trump.html).
    \164\Id.
    \165\Id.
    \166\Id.
    \167\Id.
    \168\Id.
    \169\Id.
    \170\Trump's Interest in Stirring Ukraine Investigations Sows 
Confusion in Kiev, Washington Post (May 11, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/trumps-interest-stirring-ukraine-
investigations-sows-confusion-in-kiev/2019/05/11/cb94f7f4-73ea-11e9-
9331-30bc5836f48e_story.html).
    \171\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02321; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_02322.
    \172\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02320, 
02321, 02322, 02323, 03612.
    \173\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_03614; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_02326; ATTHPSCI_20190930_02327; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_03614.
    \174\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (May 9, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1126701386224156673).
    \175\Giuliani: Massive Collusion Between DNC, Obama Admin, Clinton 
People & Ukraine To Create False Info About Trump, Real Clear Politics 
(May 10, 2019) (online at www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/05/10/
giuliani_massive_collusion_between_dnc_obama_admin_clinton_people_ukrain
e_to_create_false_info_about_trump.html).
    \176\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (May 10, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/rudygiuliani/status/1126858889209831424?lang=en).
    \177\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02334.
    \178\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 227; see also id. at 32-
33, 36 (describing the allegations).
    \179\Id. at 227.
    \180\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02334.
    \181\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02335.
    \182\Id.
    \183\Id.
    \184\Trump: Discussing a Biden Probe with Barr Would Be 
`Appropriate,' Politico (May 10, 2019) (online at www.politico.com/
story/2019/05/10/trump-biden-ukraine-barr-1317601).
    \185\Trump Denies Sending Rudy Giuliani to Ukraine to Push Biden, 
Election Probes, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at www.cnbc.com/2019/11/
27/trump-denies-sending-rudy-giuliani-to-ukraine-to-push-biden-
election-probes.html).
    \186\Remarks by President Trump and President Niinisto of the 
Republic of Finland in Joint Press Conference, The White House (Oct. 2, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-president-niinisto-republic-finland-joint-press-
conference/).
    \187\Remarks by President Trump before Marine One Departure, The 
White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-68/).
    \188\Giuliani: I Didn't Go to Ukraine to Start an Investigation, 
There Already Was One, Fox News (May 11, 2019) (online at https://
video.foxnews.com/v/6035385372001/#sp=show-clips).
    \189\Trump: Discussing a Biden Probe with Barr Would Be 
`Appropriate', Politico (May 10, 2019) (online at www.politico.com/
story/2019/05/10/trump-biden-ukraine-barr-1317601) (documenting 
Giuliani text message).
    \190\Id.
    \191\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (May 3, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1124359594418032640).
    \192\Kent Dep. Tr. at 338-339.
    \193\Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Orban of Hungary 
Before Bilateral Meeting, The White House (May 13, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-
minister-orban-hungary-bilateral-meeting/).
    \194\In Hungary, a Freewheeling Trump Ambassador Undermines U.S. 
Diplomats, New York Times (Oct. 22, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/10/22/world/europe/david-cornstein-hungary-trump-orban.html); 
Hungarian Prime Minister Earns Rare Rebuke from European Bloc that Has 
Long Backed Him, Washington Post (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/hungarys-orban-earns-rare-rebuke-
from-european-bloc-that-has-long-backed-him/2019/03/20/83be110a-4b17-
11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html).
    \195\Kent Dep. Tr. at 339.
    \196\Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Orban of Hungary 
Before Bilateral Meeting, The White House (May 13, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-
minister-orban-hungary-bilateral-meeting/).
    \197\Kent Dep. Tr. at 253.
    \198\Id. at 254.
    \199\Williams Dep. Tr. at 37-38.
    \200\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 14. Other witnesses testified 
that Vice President Pence may not have been able to attend on account 
of scheduling issues. See Hill Dep. Tr. at 316 (``there was a lot of 
scheduling issues'' regarding the attempts to schedule the Vice 
President's participation in the delegation); Kent Dep. Tr. at 189-191 
(Vice President Pence was not available); Volker Transcribed Interview 
Tr. at 288-290, 293 (Volker ``wasn't surprised'' Pence could not make 
it and assumed it was a matter of scheduling). However, Ms. Williams 
was the only staff member in the Office of the Vice President to 
testify before the Committees, and the only witness to testify to 
having heard an explanation from Vice President Pence's staff about why 
Vice President Pence did not attend the inauguration.
    \201\Williams Dep. Tr. at 39.
    \202\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 37.
    \203\Id.
    \204\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (May 18, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1129761193755910144).
    \205\Kolomoisky: We Called Varkuch and Asked: `Do You Support 
Zelensky or No?', Pravda (May 27, 2019) (online at www.pravda.com.ua/
rus/articles/2019/05/27/7216183/).
    \206\Id.
    \207\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 16.
    \208\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 288-290; Vindman Dep. Tr. 
at 125.
    \209\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 101.
    \210\Id. at 18.
    \211\Id. 17-18.
    \212\Id. at 18.
    \213\Id.
    \214\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 61.
    \215\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 26.
    \216\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 61.
    \217\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 26.
    \218\Id.
    \219\Id.; David Holmes separately testified that Lt. Col. Vindman 
``made a general point about the importance of Ukraine to our national 
security, and he said it's very important that the Zelensky 
administration stay out of U.S. domestic politics.'' Hill-Holmes 
Hearing Tr. at 61.
    \220\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 30.
    \221\Id. at 29-30.
    \222\Kent Dep. Tr. at 193.
    \223\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 15, 54. Ambassador Sondland testified 
that he did not specifically recall who arranged the May 23 meeting and 
conjectured that ``either Rick Perry or I reached out to someone at the 
NSC saying: Doesn't the President want a briefing about the 
inauguration. And I think--I think it was Perry, if I recall correctly, 
that got it nailed down.'' Sondland Dep. Tr. at 87.
    \224\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 29, 303; Vindman Dep. Tr. 
at 168.
    \225\Hill Dep. Tr. at 311.
    \226\Id. at 308.
    \227\Id.
    \228\Id. at 309-310.
    \229\Id.
    \230\Id.
    \231\Nunes Ally Kash Patel Who Fought Russia Probe Gets Senior 
White House National Security Job, The Daily Beast (July 31, 2019) 
(online at www.thedailybeast.com/kash-patel-devin-nunes-ally-who-
fought-russia-probe-gets-senior-white-house-national-security-job).
    \232\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 304.
    \233\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 25.
    \234\Id.
    \235\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 304.
    \236\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 337; Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 
304; Hill Dep. Tr. at 320-321 (describing Volker's readout); Croft Dep. 
Tr. at 90 (describing Volker's readout); Anderson Dep. Tr. at 57 
(describing Volker's readout).
    \237\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 305.
    \238\Id.
    \239\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 62; Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. 305; 
Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 40.
    \240\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 71.
    \241\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 26. See also id. at 87-90.
    \242\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 131.
    \243\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 167.
    \244\In addition to the testimony cited in this paragraph, see also 
Hill Dep. Tr. at 113; Hale Dep. Tr. at 90; Taylor Dep. Tr. at 58, 285; 
and Reeker Dep. Tr. at 148.
    \245\Kent Dep. Tr. at 195.
    \246\Croft Dep. Tr. at 91.
    \247\Hale Dep. Tr. at 73.
    \248\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 151-152.
    \249\Hill Dep. Tr. at 59-60.
    \250\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 24, 27, 123-124, 125-126.
    \251\Id. at 27-30.
    \252\Id. at 22.
    \253\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 77-78.
    \254\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 94.
    \255\Hill Dep. Tr. at 127. According to call records obtained by 
the Committees, Mr. Giuliani connected with Ambassador Bolton's office 
three times for brief calls of under a minute between April 23 and May 
10, 2019--a time period that corresponds with the recall of Ambassador 
Yovanovitch and the acceleration of Mr. Giuliani's efforts, on behalf 
of President Trump, to pressure Ukraine into opening investigations 
that would benefit his reelection campaign. AT&T Document Production, 
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02224, 02322, 02330.
    \256\Hill Dep. Tr. at 127.
    \257\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 15.
    \258\Id.
    \259\Id. at 101.
    \260\Hill Dep. Tr. at 127-128.
    \261\Id. at 116-117.
    \262\Id. at 130.
    \263\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 16.
    \264\Id.; Taylor Dep. Tr. at 24-25, 167.
    \265\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 25.
    \266\Id.
    \267\Id.
    \268\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 16-17.
    \269\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 240.
    \270\ABC News' Oval Office Interview with President Trump, ABC News 
(June 13, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/abc-news-
oval-office-interview-president-donald-trump/story?id=63688943).
    \271\ABC News' Oval Office Interview with President Trump, ABC News 
(June 13, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/abc-news-
oval-office-interview-president-donald-trump/story?id=63688943) 
(emphasis added).
    \272\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (June 21, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1142085975230898176).
    \273\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 77.
    \274\Id. at 91.
    \275\Hill Dep. Tr. at 222-223.
    \276\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 92.
    \277\Id. at 93.
    \278\Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 November 
2018 to 15 February 2019 (online at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/
UA/ReportUkraine16Nov2018-15Feb2019.pdf); Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights 
Situation in Ukraine: 16 August to 15 November 2017 (online at 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport20th_EN.pdf); Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Conflict in 
Ukraine Enters its Fourth Year with No End in Sight (June 13, 2017) 
(online at www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21730&LangID=E). These figures do not include 
the 298 civilians of 13 different nationalities killed aboard Malaysia 
Airlines Flight 17, which a Dutch-led joint investigation found was 
shot down by a Russian missile system from a Russian military unit, a 
conclusion supported by U.S. intelligence. See Dutch Safety Board, 
Report on the Crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 (Oct. 13, 2015) 
(online at www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014); 
U.S. Discloses Intelligence on Downing of Malaysian Jet, Washington 
Post (July 22, 2014) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-discloses-intelligence-on-downing-of-malaysian-jet/2014/07/
22/b178fe58-11e1-11e4-98ee-daea85133bc9_story.html).
    \279\Ambassador Nikki Haley, United States Mission to the United 
Nations, Remarks at a U.N. Security Council Briefing on Ukraine (May 
29, 2018) (online at https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-
security-council-briefing-on-ukraine-2/).
    \280\Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
Remarks with President Petro Poroshenko (Aug. 24, 2017) (online at 
www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/1291430/secretary-of-
defense-james-mattis-remarks-with-president-petro-poroshenko/).
    \281\European Union External Action, EU-Ukraine Relations Factsheet 
(Sept. 30, 2019) (online at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
headQuarters-homepage/4081/eu-ukraine-relations-factsheet_en); NATO, 
Fact Sheet: NATO's Support to Ukraine (Nov. 2018) (www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_11/20181106_1811-factsheet-nato-
ukraine-support-eng.pdf).
    \282\DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine, U.S. Department of Defense 
(June 18, 2019) (online at www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/
Article/1879340/dod-announces-250m-to-ukraine/).
    \283\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 21, 28-29, 50; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 
40-41, 113; Cooper Dep. Tr. at 15-16.
    \284\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 153.
    \285\Croft Dep. Tr. at 16.
    \286\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 30.
    \287\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 20.
    \288\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 11.
    \289\Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, 
and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations 
Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, Sec. 9013 (2018).
    \290\National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. 
L. 114-92, Sec. 1250 (2015), amended by the National Defense Act 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, Sec. 1234 
(2017), and most recently amended by the John S. McCain National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 
Sec. 1246 (2018).
    \291\National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. 
L. No. 114-328, Sec. 1237 (2016); National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, Sec. 1234 (2018); John S. 
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. 
No. 115-232, Sec. 1246 (2018).
    \292\Letter from John C. Rood, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, Department of Defense, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (Feb. 28, 2019).
    \293\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 27-28.
    \294\National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. 
L. No. 114-92, Sec. 1250 (2015), as amended by the National Defense Act 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, Sec. 1234 
(2017), and most recently amended by the John S. McCain National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 
Sec. 1246 (2018).
    \295\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 24.
    \296\Id.
    \297\Letter from John C. Rood, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, Department of Defense, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (May 23, 2019).
    \298\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 31-32.
    \299\DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine, Department of Defense (June 
18, 2019) (online at www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/
1879340/dod-announces-250m-to-ukraine/).
    \300\Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, 
Sec. 7046(a)(2) (2019); Conference Report to Accompany Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2019, H.R. Rep. No. 116-9, p. 869 (2019).
    \301\Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 
Title VIII (2017).
    \302\Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, 
Sec. 7015(c) (2019); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 
115-141, Sec. 7015(c) (2017).
    \303\OMB Circular No. A-11, Sec. 22.3 (2019) (requiring that the 
State Department receive clearance from OMB before notifying Congress).
    \304\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 25; DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine, 
Department of Defense (June 18, 2019) (online at www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1879340/dod-announces-250m-to-
ukraine/).
    \305\Sean Hannity Interviews Donald Trump via Telephone, Fox News 
(June 19, 2019) (transcript at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-
trump-interview-sean-hannity-fox-telephone-june-19-2019).
    \306\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 26-27.
    \307\Id. at 27-28.
    \308\Id. at 29-30.
    \309\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 33-34.
    \310\Id. at 33.
    \311\Id. at 34.
    \312\Id. at 38.
    \313\Id. at 37-38.
    \314\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 14; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 178-179. 
See also Stalled Ukraine Military Aid Concerned Members of Congress for 
Months, CNN (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/2019/09/30/
politics/ukraine-military-aid-congress/index.html) (suggesting that the 
State Department sought OMB's approval for $141 million in FMF funds on 
June 21, 2019).
    \315\OMB Circular No. A-11, Sec. 22.3 (2019) (requiring that the 
State Department receive clearance from OMB before notifying Congress).
    \316\Williams Dep. Tr. at 54-55.
    \317\Id. at 55.
    \318\Blair previously served as Associate Director of National 
Security Programs at OMB (Blair was Duffey's predecessor), and left OMB 
for the White House Office of Chief of Staff with Mick Mulvaney. Sandy 
Dep. Tr. at 36-38.
    \319\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 38-39.
    \320\Id. at 39.
    \321\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 161.
    \322\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 141-142.
    \323\Id. at 142.
    \324\Id. at 31-32.
    \325\Id. at 41-42.
    \326\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 40; see also Croft Dep. Tr. at 83 (``very 
routine low-level business'').
    \327\Kent Dep. Tr. at 303-305.
    \328\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 27-28.
    \329\Croft Dep. Tr. at 83.
    \330\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 27.
    \331\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 154.
    \332\Id.
    \333\Croft Dep. Tr. at 15.
    \334\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 45.
    \335\Kent Dep. Tr. at 304.
    \336\Id. at 305.
    \337\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 99; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 182.
    \338\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 40. Morrison, who did not attend the sub-
PCC meeting but received a readout, testified that he thought OMB 
announced at the July 18th meeting that the hold ``covered all dollars, 
DOD and Department of State, and it was--it was beyond funds not yet 
obligated to include funds that had, in fact, been obligated but not 
yet expended.'' Morrison Dep. Tr. at 161.
    \339\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 40.
    \340\Id. at 44-45.
    \341\Id. at 40.
    \342\Kent Dep. Tr. at 307-308.
    \343\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 162.
    \344\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 46.
    \345\Williams Dep. Tr. at 91-92; see also Morrison Dep. Tr. at 162 
(testifying that representatives from OMB stated that the hold ``had 
been imposed by the chief of staff's office'' and that the hold ``was 
at the direction of the President'').
    \346\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 46.
    \347\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 162-163; Kent Dep. Tr. at 310; Sandy Dep. 
Tr. at 91.
    \348\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 91.
    \349\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 163.
    \350\Id.
    \351\2 U.S.C. Sec. 601 et seq.
    \352\Williams Dep. Tr. at 91-92; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 182; Morrison 
Dep. Tr. at 162; Sandy Dep. Tr. at 99.
    \353\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 195.
    \354\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 182.
    \355\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 54.
    \356\Id. at 54, 96-98.
    \357\Id. at 97.
    \358\Id. at 97.
    \359\Hale Dep. Tr. at 81.
    \360\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 47.
    \361\Hale Dep. Tr. at 81; see also Vindman Dep. Tr. at 184 (``It 
was unanimous consensus on the approach that we had laid out in 
expanding engagement, the areas of cooperation that we wanted to focus 
on, and that this should be elevated to a PC as quickly as possible to 
release the hold on security assistance because we're talking about the 
end of July, and time these funds were set to expire September 30th, so 
there was some urgency to it.''); Cooper Dep. Tr. at 49 (``Although 
each member went around to talk about how important it [security 
assistance] was and how they assessed the future in Ukraine based on 
the recent election results.'').
    \362\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 165.
    \363\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 93.
    \364\Id. at 49, 93.
    \365\Nixon's Presidency: Crisis for Congress, New York Times (Mar. 
5, 1973) (online at www.nytimes.com/1973/03/05/archives/nixons-
presidency-crisis-for-congress-this-is-the-second-of-a.html).
    \366\Congressional Research Service, The Congressional Budget Act 
of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) Legislative History and Analysis (Feb. 26, 1975) 
(online at https://budgetcounsel.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/added-crs-
the-congressional-budget-act-of-1974-p-l-93-344-legislative-history-
and-analysis-order-code-75-94-s-february-26-1975.pdf).
    \367\Calvin Coolidge Presidential Foundation, The History of the 
1921 and 1974 Budget Acts (Nov. 26, 2014); So . . . this is Nixon's 
Fault?, Politico (Oct. 21, 2015) (online at www.politico.com/agenda/
story/2015/10/richard-nixon-congressional-budget-control-act-history-
000282).
    \368\2 U.S.C. Sec. 683.
    \369\U.S. Government Accountability Office, Impoundment Control 
Act--Withholding of Funds through Their Date of Expiration (Dec. 10, 
2018) (online at www.gao.gov/assets/700/695889.pdf).
    \370\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 47-48. With regard to interagency 
discussions about the legality of the hold, Vindman testified ``[s]o 
I'm not a legal expert, but there was a sufficient amount of--a 
significant amount of work done to determine whether it was legal for 
OMB to be able to place the hold. . . . I think at the--so my 
recollection in the [July 18th] sub-PCC was that the matter was raised; 
at the [July 23rd] PCC, it was tasked for further development; and I 
think by the time it got to our [July 26th] DSG it was determined that, 
you know, there was a legal basis to hold.'' Vindman Dep. Tr. at 185.
    \371\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 184.
    \372\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 165.
    \373\Id. at 264.
    \374\Id.
    \375\Id.
    \376\ Cooper Dep. Tr. at 51.
    \377\Id.; see also id. at 113 (explaining that she relied on a 
conversation with DOD legal to form her understanding of the two proper 
legal mechanisms).
    \378\2 U.S.C. Sec. 683.
    \379\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 58-59.
    \380\Id. at 114.
    \381\Id. at 51, 57; Sandy Dep. Tr. at 147-148.
    \382\31 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1511-1516.
    \383\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 87, 163.
    \384\Id. at 34-35.
    \385\Id. at 51.
    \386\Id. at 23.
    \387\Id. at 33-35, 51-52.
    \388\Id. at 86.
    \389\Id. at 86-87.
    \390\Id. at 86.
    \391\Id. at 87-88.
    \392\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (July 
25, 2019).
    \393\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 94.
    \394\Id.
    \395\Id. at 94-95; SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB 
Footnote A4 (July 25, 2019).
    \396\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 87.
    \397\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (July 
25, 2019); Sandy Dep. Tr. at 92.
    \398\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 101.
    \399\Id. at 102.
    \400\Id. at 96-97, 102.
    \401\Id. at 101-102.
    \402\Id. at 63.
    \403\Id.
    \404\Id. at 102.
    \405\Id. at 64-65.
    \406\Id. at 65.
    \407\Id. at 108-109.
    \408\Id. at 104, 119-120.
    \409\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 58-59.
    \410\Id.
    \411\Id. at 59.
    \412\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 74-75, 127-128.
    \413\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (August 
6, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 
(August 15, 2019). Because of a drafting error in which OMB forgot to 
extend the date, the footnotes technically did not restrict DOD from 
spending funds between August 12 and August 20 (the date of the 
subsequent funding document reinstating the hold). However, Sandy 
testified that the hold was still in place and that the direction from 
the President remained unchanged. Sandy Dep. Tr. at 124-126.
    \414\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (August 
6, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 
(August 15, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote 
A4 (August 20, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB 
Footnote A4 (August 27, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, 
OMB Footnote A4 (August 31, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 
2019, OMB Footnote A4 (Sept. 5, 2019); SF-13; SF-132 Apportionment 
Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (Sept. 6, 2019); Apportionment 
Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (Sept. 10, 2019).
    \415\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 91-92.
    \416\Id. at 92.
    \417\Kent Dep. Tr. at 318-319.
    \418\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 56-61.
    \419\Id. at 59-60.
    \420\Id. at 60-61.
    \421\Id. at 75, 127-128; Cooper Dep. Tr. at 57-58; see also id. at 
59 (``And along the way, [the] Defense Security Cooperation Agency was 
expressing doubt that they could do it.'').
    \422\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 80-81. Ultimately, as described below, DOD 
was able to obligate all but approximately $35 million in USAI funds by 
September 30th. Sandy Dep. Tr. at 146-147.
    \423\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 127-128.
    \424\Id. at 95.
    \425\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 20, 2019); SF-
132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 27, 2019); SF-132 
Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 31, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment 
Schedule FY 2019 (September 5, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 
2019 (September 6, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 
(September 10, 2019).
    \426\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 20, 2019) (funds 
not available for obligation until August 26); SF-132 Apportionment 
Schedule FY 2019 (August 27, 2019) (funds not available for obligation 
until August 31); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 31, 
2019) (funds not available for obligation until September 5); SF-132 
Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (September 5, 2019) (funds not available 
for obligation until September 7); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 
2019 (September 6, 2019) (funds not available for obligation until 
September 11); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (September 10, 
2019) (funds not available for obligation until September 12).
    \427\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 131.
    \428\Id. at 136-137.
    \429\Id. at 136.
    \430\Id. at 135-137, 150-155.
    \431\Id. at 149-152.
    \432\Id. at 152.
    \433\Id. at 150-156.
    \434\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 266-267.
    \435\Id. at 268.
    \436\Id. at 267.
    \437\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 186.
    \438\Id.
    \439\Id. at 187-188.
    \440\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 167-168.
    \441\Id. at 170-171.
    \442\Id. at 265-266.
    \443\Id. at 172, 266.
    \444\Id. at 266.
    \445\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 68.
    \446\Croft Dep. Tr. at 86.
    \447\Id. at 86-87.
    \448\Id. at 86-87, 101.
    \449\Id. at 97-98.
    \450\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 14.
    \451\Id. at 13-14.
    \452\Id. at 14.
    \453\Id. at 15.
    \454\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 221-222.
    \455\Trump Holds Up Ukraine Military Aid Meant to Confront Russia, 
Politico (Aug. 28, 2019) (online at www.politico.com/story/2019/08/28/
trump-ukraine-military-aid-russia-1689531).
    \456\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 18 (``It is important to understand that a 
White House visit was critical to President Zelensky. He needed to 
demonstrate U.S. support at the highest levels, both to advance his 
ambitious anti-corruption agenda at home and to encourage Russian 
President Putin to take seriously President Zelensky's peace 
efforts.'').
    \457\Kent Dep. Tr. at 202 (``The President of the United States is 
a longtime acknowledged leader of the free world, and the U.S. is 
Ukraine's strongest supporter. And so in the Ukraine context, it's very 
important to show that they can establish a strong relationship with 
the leader of the United States. That's the Ukrainian argument and 
desire to have a meeting. The foreign policy argument is it's a very 
important country in the front lines of Russian malign influence and 
aggression. And the U.S. spends a considerable amount of our resources 
supporting Ukraine and therefore it makes sense.'').
    \458\Hill Dep. Tr. at 158 (``He was just generally concerned about 
actually not having a meeting because he felt that this would deprive 
Ukraine, the new Ukrainian Government of the legitimacy that it needed, 
especially vis--vis the Russians. So this gets to, you know, the heart 
of our national security dilemma. You know, the Ukrainians at this 
point, you know, are looking at a White House meeting or looking at a 
meeting with the President of the United States as a recognition of 
their legitimacy as a sovereign state.'').
    \459\Vindman Hearing Tr. at 38-39 (``The show of support for 
President Zelensky, still a brand-new President, frankly, a new 
politician on the Ukrainian political scene, looking to establish his 
bona fides as a regional and maybe even a world leader, would want to 
have a meeting with the United States, the most powerful country in the 
world and Ukraine's most significant benefactor, in order to be able to 
implement his agenda.'').
    \460\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 59.
    \461\Id. at 328.
    \462\Taylor Dep. Opening Statement at 5 (``In late June, one of the 
goals of both channels was to facilitate a visit by President Zelensky 
to the White House for a meeting with President Trump, which President 
Trump had promised in his congratulatory letter of May 29. The 
Ukrainians were clearly eager for the meeting to happen. During a 
conference call with Ambassador Volker, Acting Assistant Secretary of 
State for European and Eurasian Affairs Phil Reeker, Secretary Perry, 
Ambassador Sondland, and Counsel of the U.S. Department of State Ulrich 
Brechbuhl on June 18, it was clear that a meeting between the two 
presidents was an agreed-upon goal.'').
    \463\Id. at 25 (``[D]uring my subsequent communications with 
Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, they relayed to me that the President 
wanted to hear from Zelensky' before scheduling the meeting in the Oval 
Office. It was not clear to me what this meant.'').
    \464\Id.
    \465\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 20.
    \466\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 25-26.
    \467\Id. at 25. See also id. at 128.
    Q: But Ambassador Sondland made it clear not only that he didn't 
wish to include most of the regular interagency participants but also 
that no one was transcribing or monitoring the call as they added 
President Zelensky. What struck you as odd about that?
    A: Same concern. That is, in the normal, regular channel, the State 
Department operations center that was putting the call together would 
stay on the line, in particular when you were having a conversation 
with the head of state, they would stay on the line, transcribe, take 
notes so that there could be a record of the discussion with this head 
of state. It is an official discussion. When he wanted to be sure that 
there was not, the State Department operations center agreed.
    \468\Id. at 26.
    \469\Id. at 127.
    \470\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000036 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \471\Id.
    \472\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 26.
    \473\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000027 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \474\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 242-243.
    \475\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000055 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \476\Id at. Bates KV00000027.
    Taylor: Are you OK with me briefing Ulrich on these conversations? 
Maybe you have already?
    Volker: I have not--please feel free.
    Volker: The key thing is to tee up a phone call w potus and then 
get visit nailed down.
    Taylor: I agree. Is Ze on board with a phone call?
    Volker: Yes--bogdan was a little skeptical, but Zelensky was ok 
with it. Now we need to get it on potus schedule . . .
    Taylor: The three amigos are on a roll. Let me know when I can 
help.
    \477\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 65-66 (``Kurt told me that he had discussed 
how President Zelensky could prepare for the phone call with President 
Trump. And without going into--without providing me any details about 
the specific words, did talk about investigations in that conversation 
. . . Kurt suggested that President Trump would like to hear about the 
investigations.'').
    \478\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 94.
    Q: In the July 2nd or 3rd meeting in Toronto that you had with 
President Zelensky, you also mentioned investigations to him, right?
    A: Yes.
    Q: And again, you were referring to the Burisma and the 2016 
election.
    A: I was thinking of Burisma and 2016.
    Q: And you understood that that what the Ukrainians interpreted 
references to investigations to be, related to Burisma and the 2016 
election?
    A: I don't know specifically at that time if we had talked that 
specifically, Burisma/2016. That was my assumption, though, that they 
would've been thinking that too.
    \479\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 27.
    \480\Id. at 43.
    \481\Id. at 21-22.
    \482\Kent Dep. Tr. at 246.
    \483\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 59.
    \484\Kent Dep. Tr. at 246-247 (``I do not recall whether the 
follow-on conversation I had with Kurt about this was in Toronto, or 
whether it was subsequently at the State Department. But he did tell me 
that he planned to start reaching out to former Mayor of New York, Rudy 
Giuliani. And when I asked him why, he said that it was clear that the 
former mayor had influence on the President in terms of the way the 
President though of Ukraine. And I think by that moment in time, that 
was self-evidence to anyone who was working on the issues, and 
therefore, it made sense to try to engage the mayor. When I raised with 
Kurt, I said, about what? Because former Mayor Giuliani has a track 
record of, you know, asking for a visa for a corrupt former prosecutor. 
He attacked Masha, and he's tweeting that the new President needs to 
investigate Biden and the 2016 campaign. And Kurt's reaction or 
response to me at that was, well, if there's nothing there, what does 
it matter? And if there is something there, it should be investigated. 
My response to him was asking another country to investigate a 
prosecution for political reasons undermines our advocacy of the rule 
of law.'').
    \485\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000036 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \486\Id.
    \487\Id. at Bates KV00000006.
    \488\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 308; Kurt Volker Document 
Production, Bates KV00000018 (Oct. 2, 2019).
    \489\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 138.
    \490\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 23.
    \491\Hill Dep. Tr. at 63.
    \492\Id. at 63-67, 155.
    \493\Id.
    Q: Did anything happen in that meeting that was out of the 
ordinary?
    A: Yes. At one point during that meeting, Ambassador Bolton was, 
you know, basically trying very hard not to commit to a meeting, 
because, you know--and, again, these meetings have to be well-prepared. 
They're not just something that you say, yes, we're going to have a 
meeting without there being a clear understanding of what the content 
of that meeting is going to be. . . . And Ambassador Bolton is always 
was always very cautious and always very much, you know, by the book 
and was not going to certainly commit to a meeting right there and 
then, certainly not one where it wasn't--it was unclear what the 
content of the meeting would be about, what kind of issues that we 
would discuss that would be pertaining to Ukrainian-U.S. relations. . . 
. Then Ambassador Sondland blurted out: Well, we have an agreement with 
the chief of staff for a meeting if these investigations in the energy 
sector start. And Ambassador Bolton immediately stiffened. He said 
words to the effect--I can't say word for word what he said because I 
was behind them sitting on the sofa with our Senior Director of Energy, 
and we all kind of looked up and thought that was somewhat odd. And 
Ambassador Bolton immediately stiffened and ended the meeting.
    Q: Right then, he just ended the meeting?
    A: Yeah. He said: Well, it was very nice to see you. You know, I 
can't discuss a meeting at this time. We'll clearly work on this. And, 
you know, kind of it was really nice to see you. So it was very abrupt. 
I mean, he looked at the clock as if he had, you know, suddenly another 
meeting and his time was up, but it was obvious he ended the meeting.
    \494\ Vindman Dep. Tr. at 17 (``The meeting proceeded well until 
the Ukrainians broached the subject of a meeting between the two 
Presidents. The Ukrainians saw this meeting as critically important in 
order to solidify the support for their most important international 
partner. Ambassador Sondland started--when Ambassador Sondland started 
to speak about Ukraine delivering specific investigations in order to 
secure the meeting with the President, Ambassador Bolton cut the 
meeting short.'')
    \495\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 310.
    \496\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 23, 73, 103.
    \497\Hill Dep. Tr. at 68 (``And Ambassador Sondland said to 
Ambassador Volker and also Secretary Perry and the other people who 
were with him, including the Ukrainians, to come down to--there's a 
room in the White House, the Ward Room, to basically talk about next 
steps. And that's also unusual. I mean, he meant to talk to the 
Ukrainians about next steps about the meeting.'')
    \498\Id. (``And Ambassador Bolton pulled me back as I was walking 
out afterwards and said: Go down to the Ward Room right now and find 
out what they're talking about and come back and talk to me. So I did 
go down.'').
    \499\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 64-65.
    Q: And what do you recall specifically of what Sondland said to the 
Ukrainians--
    A: Right.
    Q: --in the Ward Room?
    A: So that is right, the conversation unfolded with Sondland 
proceeding to kind of, you know, review what the deliverable would be 
in order to get the meeting, and he talked about the investigation into 
the Bidens, and, frankly, I can't 100 percent recall because I didn't 
take notes of it, but Burisma, that it seemed--I mean, there was no 
ambiguity, I guess, in my mind. He was calling for something, calling 
for an investigation that didn't exist into the Bidens and Burisma.
    Q: Okay. Ambiguity in your mind is different from what you--
    A: Sure.
    Q: --actually heard?
    A: Right. Correct.
    Q: What did you hear Sondland say?
    A: That the Ukrainians would have to deliver an investigation into 
the Bidens.
    Q: Into the Bidens. So in the Ward Room he mentioned the word 
``Bidens''?
    A: To the best of my recollection, yes.
    Q: Okay. Did he mention 2016?
    A: I don't recall.
    Q: Did he mention Burisma?
    A: My visceral reaction to what was being called for suggested that 
it was explicit. There was no ambiguity.
    . . .
    A: Again, based on my visceral reaction, it was explicit what he 
was calling for. And to the best of my recollection, he did 
specifically say ``investigation of the Bidens.''
    . . .
    A: So the meeting that occurred in the Ward Room referenced 
investigations into the Bidens, to the best of my recollection, Burisma 
and 2016.
    \500\Hill Dep. Tr. at 69.
    \501\Id. at 151-152.
    \502\Id. at 69-70.
    \503\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 31.
    Q: Did Ambassador Sondland--were the Ukrainian officials in the 
room when he was describing the need for these investigations in order 
to get the White House meeting?
    A: So they were in the room initially. I think, once it became 
clear that there was some sort of discord amongst the government 
officials in the room, Ambassador Sondland asked them to step out of 
the room.
    Q: What was the discord?
    A: The fact that it was clear that I, as the representative--I, as 
the representative of the NSC, thought it was inappropriate and that we 
were not going to get involved in investigations.
    Q: Did you say that to Ambassador Sondland?
    A: Yes, I did.
    \504\Id. at 18. While not specifically disagreeing with any of the 
content of the discussion in the Ward Room, Ambassador Sondland 
generally disputed Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. Vindman's accounts, saying 
that he did not recall ``any yelling or screaming . . . as others have 
said.'' Sondland Hearing Tr. at 23. Neither Dr. Hill nor Lt. Col. 
Vindman described yelling or screaming in the meetings.
    Ambassador Sondland also testified that ``those recollections of 
protest do not square with the documentary record of our interactions 
with the NSC in the days and weeks that followed.'' Sondland Hearing 
Tr. at 23. As an example, Sondland provided text from a July 13 email 
that he sent--not to Dr. Hill, but to her successor Tim Morrison--which 
said that the ``sole purpose'' of the call between President Trump and 
President Zelensky was to give the former ``assurances of new sheriff' 
in town.'' Sondland Hearing Tr. at 23. The email that Ambassador 
Sondland provided does not undermine Dr. Hill's or Lt. Col. Vindman's 
testimony that they objected to Ambassador Sondland's conduct in the 
Ward Room meeting. The email provided by Ambassador Sondland, however, 
was sent to Mr. Morrison, not Dr. Hill. Mr. Morrison had not yet 
started working as NSC Senior Director for Europe and was not at the 
July 10 meeting.
    \505\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 29.
    A: So I heard him say that this had been coordinated with White 
House Chief of Staff Mr. Mick Mulvaney.
    Q: What did he say about that?
    A: He just said that he had had a conversation with Mr. Mulvaney, 
and this is what was required in order to get a meeting.
    \506\ Hill Dep. Tr. at 69-70.
    \507\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000036 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    Taylor: Eager to hear if your meeting with Danyliuk and Bolton 
resulted in a decision on a call.
    Taylor: How did the meeting go?
    Volker: Not good--lets talk--kv
    \508\Id. at Bates KV00000018.
    \509\Hill Dep. Tr. at 70-72.
    \510\Id. at 126-27.
    Q: Okay. But what did you understand him to mean by that?
    A: Well, based on what had happened in the July 10th meeting and 
Ambassador Sondland blurting out that he'd already gotten agreement to 
have a meeting at the White House for Zelensky if these investigations 
were started up again, clearly Ambassador Bolton was referring directly 
to those.
    \511\Id. at 129.
    \512\Id. at 139. (``I told him exactly, you know, what had 
transpired and that Ambassador Sondland had basically indicated that 
there was an agreement with the Chief of Staff that they would have a 
White House meeting or, you know, a Presidential meeting if the 
Ukrainians started up these investigations again.'').
    \513\Id.
    \514\Id. at 146-147.
    \515\Id. at 158-159, 161.
    Q: What was Mr. Eisenberg's reaction to what you explained to him 
had and Mr. Griffith had explained to him had occurred the day before?
    A: Yeah. He was also concerned. I mean, he wasn't aware that 
Sondland, Ambassador Sondland was, you know, kind of running around 
doing a lot of these, you know, meetings and independently. We talked 
about the fact that, you know, Ambassador Sondland said he'd been 
meeting with Giuliani and he was very concerned about that. And he said 
that he would follow up on this.
    \516\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 37. (``Sir, I think I--I mean, the top 
line I just offered, I'll restate it, which is that Mr. Sondland asked 
for investigations, for these investigations into Bidens and Burisma. I 
actually recall having that particular conversation. Mr. Eisenberg 
doesn't really work on this issue, so I had to go a little bit into the 
back story of what these investigations were, and that I expressed 
concerns and thought it was inappropriate.'').
    \517\Id. at 36.
    \518\Id. at 38.
    Q: Did he say anything to you, that, all right, I'm going to do 
anything with it?
    A: I vaguely recall something about: I'll take a look into it. You 
know, there might not be anything here. We'll take a look into it, 
something of that nature. But--and then he offered to, you know, if I 
have any concerns in the future, you know, that I should be open--I 
should be--feel free to come back and, you know, share those concerns.
    Q: Did either he or anyone from the legal staff circle back to you 
on this issue?
    A: No.
    \519\Id. at 39-40.
    \520\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 29. (``In the same July 19th phone call, 
they gave me an account of the July 10th meeting with the Ukrainian 
officials at the White House. Specifically, they told me that 
Ambassador Sondland had connected investigations with an Oval Office 
meeting for President Zelensky, which so irritated Ambassador Bolton 
that he abruptly ended the meeting, telling Dr. Hill and Mr. Vindman 
that they should have nothing to do with domestic politics.'').
    \521\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 12.
    \522\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019) (``2. The call between 
Zelensky and Potus should happen before 7/21. (Parliamentary Elections) 
Sole purpose is for Zelensky to give Potus assurances of `new sheriff' 
in town. Corruption ending, unbundling moving forward and any hampered 
investigations will be allowed to move forward transparently. Goal is 
for Potus to invite him to Oval. Volker, Perry, Bolton and I strongly 
recommend.'').
    \523\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 21 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \524\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 227.
    \525\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 21 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \526\Id.
    \527\Id.
    \528\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 27.
    \529\Verizon Document Production. It is unclear whether this call 
occurred before or after Ambassador Sondland spoke with President 
Zelensky, and it is also unclear whether the White House caller was an 
Administration official or the President himself.
    \530\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000037 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \531\Id.
    \532\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 229-230.
    \533\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000018 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \534\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 202-203.
    \535\Id. at 232.
    \536\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000002 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \537\Id. at Bates KV00000018.
    \538\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 138-139.
    \539\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02705.
    \540\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 139.
    \541\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000018 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \542\Id. at Bates KV00000002-KV00000003.
    \543\Id. at Bates KV00000042.
    Volker: Orchestrated a great call w Rudy and Yermak. They are going 
to get together when Rudy goes to Madrid in a couple of weeks.
    Volker: In the meantime, Rudy is now advocating for phone call
    Volker: I have call into Fiona's replacement and will call Bolton 
if needed.
    Volker: But I can tell Bolton and you can tell Mick that Rudy 
agrees on a call, if that helps
    Sondland: I talked to Tim Morrison. (Fiona's replacement). He is 
pushing but feel free as well.
    \544\Id.
    \545\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 30.
    \546\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000037 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \547\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 74.
    \548\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 68.
    \549\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 177.
    \550\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 183.
    \551\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 17.
    \552\Id. at 18.
    \553\Id. at 19, 17.
    \554\Id. at 27.
    \555\Id. at 26.
    \556\Id. at 27.
    \557\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 26.
    \558\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 25.
    \559\Hill Dep. Tr. at 420-421.
    Q: You've mentioned repeatedly concerns that you had about, in 
particular, Mr. Giuliani and his efforts. When you read the call 
transcript of July 25th, the call record, which you must have done just 
a couple weeks ago, did it crystalize in your head in any way a better 
understanding of what was transpiring while you were there?
    A: In terms of providing, you know, more information with 
hindsight, unfortunately, yes.
    Q: And in what way?
    A: The specific references, also juxtaposed with the release of the 
text messages by Ambassador Volker--you know, what I said before--
really was kind of my worst fears and nightmares, in terms of, you 
know, there being some kind of effort not just to subvert the national 
security process but to try to subvert what really should be, you know, 
kind of, a diplomatic effort to, you know, kind of, set up a 
Presidential meeting.
    Q: This may--
    A: There seems to be an awful lot of people involved in, you know, 
basically turning a White House meeting into some kind of asset.
    Q: What do you mean by ``asset''?
    A: Well, something that was being, you know, dangled out to the 
Ukrainian Government. They wanted the White House meeting very much. 
And this was kind of laying out that it wasn't just a question of 
scheduling or having, you know, the national security issues worked 
out, that there were all of these alternative discussions going on 
behind.
    \560\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 174.
    \561\Id.
    \562\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000042 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \563\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 53-55.
    \564\Id. at 52-53.
    \565\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 30-31, 101, 247, 256.
    \566\Id. at 31.
    \567\Id. at 111.
    \568\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 102-103; Kurt Volker 
Document Production, Bates KV00000007 (Oct. 2, 2019). In his testimony, 
Ambassador Volker did not explain to the Committees what he had heard 
about the July 25 call put him in a position to tell Mr. Giuliani that 
the ``right messages'' were, in fact, discussed.
    Ambassador Volker testified twice about the readouts that he 
received of the July 25 call. In his deposition, he told the Committees 
that he received ``the same'' readout from both the State Department 
and Mr. Yermak: that there was a message of congratulations to 
President Zelensky, that President Zelensky promised to fight 
corruption and that President Trump repeated the invitation to visit 
the White House. Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 102-103. 
Ambassador Volker described it as a ``superficial'' readout. Volker 
Transcribed Interview Tr. at 19.
    In his public testimony, Ambassador Volker repeated that claim: the 
readouts from Mr. Yermak and Ambassador Volker's U.S. sources ``were 
largely the same, that it was a good call, that it was a congratulatory 
phone call for the President winning the parliamentary election.'' 
Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr. at 74. Ambassador Volker did testify that 
he ``expected'' the call to cover the material in his July 25 text 
message--that the Ukrainians would ``investigate/`get to the bottom of 
what happened' in 2016''--but did not receive anything more than a 
``barebones'' description of what was said Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr. 
at 87-88, 75.
    If Ambassador Volker is correctly describing the readouts he 
received, it is not clear what he heard that gave him the basis to tell 
Mr. Giuliani that ``exactly the right messages'' were discussed.
    \569\Williams Dep. Tr. at 37-38.
    \570\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 23.
    \571\Id. at 25.
    \572\Trump and Putin Share Joke About Election Meddling, Sparking 
New Furor, New York Times (June 28, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/28/us/politics/trump-putin-election.html) (``As he sat down on 
Friday with Mr. Putin on the sidelines of an international summit in 
Japan, Mr. Trump was asked by a reporter if he would tell Russia not to 
meddle in American elections. `Yes, of course I will,' Mr. Trump said 
Turning to Mr. Putin, he said, with a half-grin on his face and mock 
seriousness in his voice, `Don't meddle in the election, 
President.''').
    \573\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 41.
    \574\Williams Dep. Tr. at 131.
    \575\See Vindman Dep. Tr. at 42, 109; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 41.
    \576\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 18; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 15.
    \577\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 42-43; Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 32.
    \578\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 39; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 45.
    \579\U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Italy, Secretary Michael R. 
Pompeo and Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio at a Press 
Availability (Oct. 2, 2019) (online at https://it.usembassy.gov/
secretary-michael-r-pompeo-and-italian-foreign-minister-luigi-di-maio-
at-a-press-availability/). Mr. Morrison testified that Dr. Kupperman 
was not in the Situation Room, but Mr. Morrison was informed after the 
fact that Dr. Kupperman was listening. Morrison Dep. Tr. at 39-40. Ms. 
Williams and Lt. Col. Vindman testified that they both believed Dr. 
Kupperman was present, but neither had a clear recollection. Williams 
Dep. Tr. at 64; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 45.
    \580\See Transcript, This Week with George Stephanopoulos, ABC News 
(Sept. 22, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-
transcript-22-19-secretary-mike-pompeo-gen/story?id=65778332) (Q: And I 
want to turn to this whistleblower complaint, Mr. Secretary. The 
complaint involving the president and a phone call with a foreign 
leader to the director of national intelligence inspector general. 
That's where the complaint was launched by the whistle-blower. `The 
Wall Street Journal' is reporting that President Trump pressed the 
president of Ukraine eight times to work with Rudy Giuliani to 
investigate Joe Biden's son. What do you know about those 
conversations? A: So, you just gave me a report about a I.C. whistle-
blower complaint, none of which I've seen.. . .'').
    \581\Pompeo Took Part in Ukraine Call, Official Says, Wall Street 
Journal (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/pompeo-took-
part-in-ukraine-call-official-says-11569865002).
    \582\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \583\Id.
    \584\Id. See European Union External Action Service, EU-Ukraine 
Relations Factsheet (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at https://eeas.europa.eu/
headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/4081/eu-ukraine-relations-
factsheet_en).
    \585\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \586\Id.; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 29.
    \587\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \588\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 114.
    \589\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \590\See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Assessing 
Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections (Jan. 6, 
2017) (online at www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf).
    \591\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \592\Charges of Ukrainian Meddling? A Russian Operation, U.S. 
Intelligence Says, New York Times (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/us/politics/ukraine-russia-
interference.html).
    \593\The President of Russia, Joint News Conference with Hungarian 
Prime Minister Viktor Orban (Feb. 2, 2017) (online at http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53806).
    \594\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 39-40.
    \595\President Trump's Former National Security Advisor `Deeply 
Disturbed' by Ukraine Scandal: `Whole World Is Watching,' ABC News 
(Sept. 29, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-
trumps-national-security-advisor-deeply-disturbed-ukraine/
story?id=65925477).
    \596\Hill Dep. Tr. at 234-235.
    \597\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \598\Id.
    \599\Id.
    \600\Id.
    \601\Id.
    \602\Id.
    \603\The White House, Remarks by President Trump before Marine One 
(Oct. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-
67/).
    \604\Hill Dep. Tr. at 400; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 73; Hill-
Holmes Hearing Tr. at 63-64; Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 49-50; 
Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 23.
    \605\Kent Dep. Tr. at 45.
    \606\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 116.
    \607\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 50.
    \608\See Section I, Chapter 1.
    \609\Kent Dep. Tr. at 44-50.
    \610\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 23.
    \611\Id.
    \612\See Section I, Chapter 1.
    \613\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \614\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 192-193.
    \615\Id.
    \616\Ambassador Volker was the only witness to testify that 
President Trump's reference to the ``prosecutor'' during the July 25 
call was to Mr. Shokin, not Mr. Lutsenko. See Volker Transcribed 
Interview Tr. at 355. However, Mr. Holmes testified that, on July 26--
the day after the call--he spoke with President Zelensky's Chief of 
Staff Andriy Bohdan who told Holmes that ``President Trump had 
expressed interest during the previous day's phone call in President 
Zelensky's personnel decisions related to the Prosecutor General's 
office,'' which Mr. Holmes understood to refer to Mr. Lutsenko once he 
saw the July 25 call transcript. Holmes Dep. Tr. at 22, 49. In 
addition, in a text message to Taylor and Sondland after his July 19 
breakfast with Giuliani, Volker emphasized that ``Most impt [important] 
is for Zelensky to say'' on the July 25 call ``that he will help 
investigation--and address any specific personnel issues--if there are 
any.'' Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000037 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \617\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \618\Id.
    \619\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 55.
    \620\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 49-50.
    \621\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 25.
    \622\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 19.
    \623\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 18.
    \624\In-Town Pool Report #6--Ukraine Call, White House Pool Report 
(July 25, 2019) (online at https://publicpool.kinja.com/subject-in-
town-pool-report-6-ukraine-call-1836700221).
    \625\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 42-43.
    \626\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 31-33; Morrison-Volker Hearing 
Tr. at 34.
    \627\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 46-47.
    \628\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 29.
    \629\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 94.
    \630\Id. at 46-47.
    \631\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \632\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 147.
    \633\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 28-29.
    \634\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 96-97.
    \635\Id. at 97-98.
    \636\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 29.
    \637\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 23-24.
    \638\Id. at 41-42, 191-192.
    \639\Id. at 97.
    \640\Id.
    \641\Id. at 101.
    \642\Id. at 41.
    \643\Id. at 43.
    \644\Id. at 44.
    \645\Id. at 16.
    \646\Id. at 101.
    \647\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 38.
    \648\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 121.
    \649\Id. at 122.
    \650\Id. at 122-123.
    \651\Id. at 121.
    \652\Id. at 123-124.
    \653\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 121.
    \654\Id. at 55-56.
    \655\Id. at 55-56, 121-123.
    \656\Id. at 270.
    \657\Williams Dep. Tr. at 16, 63.
    \658\Id. at 149.
    \659\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 34.
    \660\Williams Dep. Tr. at 148.
    \661\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 29.
    \662\Williams Dep. Tr. at 54, 149.
    \663\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 54-55 (``There's one other substantive 
item in the next paragraph from Zelensky, where it says `He or she will 
look into the situation specifically to the company' it shouldn't be 
`the company. It should be `to Burisma that you mentioned.' Because I 
think, you know, frankly these are not necessarily folks that are 
familiar with the substance. So President Zelensky specifically 
mentioned the company Burisma.'').
    \664\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 61.
    \665\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 89.
    \666\Williams Dep. Tr. at 68-69.
    Q: Okay. When the transcript was made available to the VP's office, 
do you remember when that occurred?
    A: My colleagues--I can't remember the precise time, but before the 
end of the day that day my colleagues who help prepare the Vice 
President's briefing book received a hard copy of the transcript from 
the White House Situation Room to include in that book. I didn't 
personally see it, but I understood that they had received it because 
we wanted to make sure the Vice President got it.
    Q: On the 25th or 26th?
    A: It was on the 25th.
    \667\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 139-141.
    \668\Kent Dep. Tr. at 163-165.
    \669\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 107.
    \670\Id. at 21-22.
    \671\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 38; Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 26.
    \672\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 74 (``Yes. So I was not on the 
phone call. I had arrived in Ukraine, and I had had that lunch with Mr. 
Yermak that we saw on the day of the phone call. I had been pushing for 
the phone call because I thought it was important to renew the personal 
connection between the two leaders and to congratulate President 
Zelensky on the parliamentary election. The readout I received from Mr. 
Yermak and also from the U.S. side--although I'm not exactly sure who 
it was on the U.S. side, but there was U.S. and a Ukrainian readout--
were largely the same, that it was a good call, that it was a 
congratulatory phone call for the President winning the parliamentary 
election. President Zelensky did reiterate his commitment to reform and 
fighting corruption in Ukraine, and President Trump did reiterate his 
invitation to President Zelensky to come visit him in the White House. 
That's exactly what I thought the phone call would be, so I was not 
surprised at getting that as the readout.'').
    \673\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 22.
    \674\Id. at 22, 48-49.
    \675\Id. at 49.
    \676\Id. at 49.
    \677\Id. at 22.
    \678\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 27.
    \679\Id. at 48-49.
    \680\Croft Dep. Tr. at 118-119.
    \681\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 25; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 38.
    \682\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 89-90.
    \683\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 64.
    \684\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 38.
    \685\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 27.
    \686\Id.
    \687\Id. at 27-28.
    \688\Id.
    \689\Id.
    \690\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 108.
    \691\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 49.
    \692\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 25-26.
    \693\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \694\Id.
    \695\Id. at 49 (``The restaurant has sort of glass doors that open 
onto a terrace, and we were at the first tables on the terrace, so 
immediately outside of the interior of the restaurant. The doors were 
all wide open. There were--there was tables, a table for four, while I 
recall it being two tables for two pushed together. In any case, it was 
quite a wide table, and the table was set. There was sort of a table 
runner down the middle. I was directly across from Ambassador Sondland. 
We were close enough that we could, you know, share an appetizer 
between us, and then the two staffers were off to our right at this 
next table.'').
    \696\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \697\Id.
    \698\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 160.
    \699\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \700\Id. at 50.
    Q: Now, you said that you were able to hear President Trump's voice 
through the receiver. How were you able to hear if it was not on 
speaker phone?
    A: It was several things. It was quite loud when the President came 
on, quite distinctive. I believe Ambassador Sondland also said that he 
often speaks very loudly over the phone, and I certainly experienced 
that. When the President came on, he sort of winced and held the phone 
away from his ear like this, and he did that for the first couple 
exchanges. I don't know if he then turned the volume down, if he got 
used to it, if the President moderated his volume. I don't know. But 
that's how I was able to hear.
    \701\Id. at 28-29.
    \702\Trump Denies Discussing Ukraine Investigations with Sondland 
in July Phone Call, Axios (Nov. 13, 2019) (online at: www.axios.com/
trump-denies-ukraine-investigation-sondland-6063f555-2629-4f99-b2f9-
fd38739c0548.html).
    \703\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 26.
    \704\Id. at 46.
    \705\Id. at 26.
    \706\Id.
    \707\Id. at 48.
    \708\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 25.
    \709\Id. at 25-26.
    \710\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 49-50. Ambassador Sondland opined 
that, while he may have referred to an investigation that Mr. Giuliani 
was pushing as an example of an investigation that President Trump 
cared about, he believed that he would have said ``Burisma, not 
Biden.'' He testified, however:
    Q: But do you recall saying at least referring to an investigation 
that Rudy Giuliani was pushing? Is that something that you likely would 
have said?
    A: I would have, yes.
    Id. at 50.
    \711\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 50.
    \712\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 67.
    \713\Id. at 68-69.
    \714\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 30.
    \715\Id. at 107.
    \716\Id. at 34.
    \717\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 80.
    \718\Id. at 80-81.
    \719\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000007 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \720\Id.
    \721\Id.
    \722\Id. at Bates KV00000019.
    \723\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 112.
    \724\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000019 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \725\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 42.
    \726\Id.
    \727\Id. at 20-21.
    \728\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000019 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \729\Id. at Bates KV00000007.
    \730\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02786.
    \731\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000007 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \732\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 192-193.
    \733\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000007 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \734\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02797.
    \735\Id.
    \736\Id.
    \737\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_03326.
    \738\Id.
    \739\Id.
    \740\Id.
    \741\Id.
    \742\Id.
    \743\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02798.
    \744\Id.
    \745\Id.
    \746\Id.
    \747\Id.
    \748\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02799.
    \749\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02801.
    \750\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000019 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \751\Id.
    \752\Id.
    \753\Id.
    \754\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02802-03, 
02813, 03326, 03719.
    \755\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_03326.
    \756\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02802.
    \757\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02803.
    \758\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_03719.
    \759\Id.
    \760\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02803.
    \761\Id.
    \762\Id.
    \763\Id.
    \764\Id.
    \765\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000004-KV00000005 
(Oct. 2, 2019).
    \766\Id. at Bates KV00000004-KV00000005; AT&T Document Production, 
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02805-06.
    \767\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000023 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \768\Id.
    \769\Id.
    \770\Verizon Document Production.
    \771\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000042 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \772\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 290; Sondland Hearing Tr. at 100-101.
    \773\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000042 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \774\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 291.
    \775\Id.
    \776\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000019 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \777\Id.
    \778\Id.
    \779\Id. at Bates KV00000042.
    \780\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 15 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \781\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000042 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \782\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 291-292.
    \783\Id.
    \784\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 14 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \785\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000005 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \786\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02816.
    \787\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 22 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \788\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 102.
    \789\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 22 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \790\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \791\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000020 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \792\Id. at Bates KV00000007.
    \793\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02828.
    \794\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 113.
    \795\Id. at 71-72.
    \796\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000023 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \797\Id.
    \798\Id.
    \799\Id.
    \800\WhatsApp Security (online at www.whatsapp.com/security/) 
(accessed Nov. 29, 2019).
    \801\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000043 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \802\Id.
    \803\Id. at Bates KV00000023.
    \804\Id.
    \805\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 43-44, 113-114.
    \806\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 5 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \807\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 18.
    \808\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 191, 197-198.
    \809\Id. at 191-192.
    \810\Id. at 201.
    \811\Id. at 198.
    \812\Id. at 197.
    \813\Trump Hasn't Talked to Attorney General About Having Ukraine 
Investigate Biden, DOJ Says, CNN (Sept. 25, 2019) (online at 
www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-impeachment-inquiry-09-25-2019/
h_619f3c67775916f27e22898fbed210f2).
    \814\Cleaning Up Ukraine in the Shadow of Trump, The Financial 
Times (Nov. 28, 2019) (online at www.ft.com/content/eb8e4004-1059-11ea-
a7e6-62bf4f9e548a).
    \815\Id.
    \816\Taylor Dep. Opening Statement at 9.
    \817\Id.
    \818\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 196-197.
    \819\Taylor Dep. Opening Statement at 9.
    \820\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000043 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \821\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 196-197.
    \822\Kent Dep. Tr. at 261
    \823\Id. at 262-263.
    \824\Id. at 264.
    \825\Id. at 264-265.
    \826\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000020 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \827\Id. at Bates KV00000043.
    \828\Id.
    \829\Id.
    \830\Volker Transcribed Interview Opening Statement at 8.
    \831\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 44.
    \832\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 21.
    \833\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 259-260.
    \834\Id. at 260.
    \835\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 128.
    \836\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000043 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \837\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 199-200.
    \838\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 31-32, 68; Sondland Hearing Tr. at 
55-57.
    \839\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 71.
    \840\Id. at 62, 66.
    \841\Id. at 62.
    \842\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 90-91.
    \843\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, at 23, Impeachment, 116th 
Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \844\Id.
    \845\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 104.
    \846\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, at 18, Impeachment, 116th 
Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \847\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 44.
    \848\Id. at 75.
    \849\Id. at 76.
    \850\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, at 23, Impeachment, 116th 
Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \851\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 30.
    \852\Id.
    \853\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \854\Id. at 106.
    \855\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
    \856\Id. at 31.
    \857\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 40.
    \858\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 230.
    \859\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 40.
    \860\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 8.
    \861\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000020 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \862\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 80-81.
      A: By the time it hit Politico publicly, I believe it was the end 
of August. And I got a text message from, it was either the Foreign 
Minister or--I think it was the future Foreign Minister. And, you know, 
basically, you're just--you're--I have to verbalize this. You're just 
trying to explain that we are trying this. We have a complicated 
system. We have a lot of players in this. We are working this. Give us 
time to fix it.
      Q: So anybody on the Ukrainian side of things ever express like 
grave concern that this would not get worked out?
      A: Not that it wouldn't get worked out, no, they did not. They 
expressed concern that, since this has now come out publicly in this 
Politico article, it looks like that they're being, you know, singled 
out and penalized for some reason. That's the image that that would 
create in Ukraine.
    \863\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 34.
    \864\Id. at 137-138.
    \865\Id.
    \866\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 174.
    \867\Id. at 40.
    \868\Id.
    \869\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
    \870\Id.
    \871\Id. at 68.
    \872\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 58.
    \873\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 40.
    \874\Trump, in August Call with GOP Senator, Denied Official's 
Claim on Ukraine Aid, Wall Street Journal (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at 
www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-used-potential-meeting-to-
pressure-ukraine-on-biden-texts-indicate-11570205661).
    \875\Id.
    \876\Letter from Senator Ron Johnson to Ranking Member Jim Jordan, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Ranking Member Devin 
Nunes, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 18, 2019) 
(online at www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e0b73c19-9370-
42e6-88b1-b2458eaeeecd/johnson-to-jordan-nunes.pdf).
    \877\Id.
    \878\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \879\Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background to 
``Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections'': 
The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Jan. 6, 2017) 
(online at www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf).
    \880\Letter from Senator Ron Johnson to Ranking Member Jim Jordan, 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Ranking Member Devin Nunes, 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 18, 2019) (online at 
www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e0b73c19-9370-42e6-88b1-
b2458eaeeecd/johnson-to-jordan-nunes.pdf).
    \881\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 30.
    \882\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 251-252; Kent-Taylor 
Hearing Tr. at 41.
    \883\Williams Dep. Tr. at 74-77.
    \884\Id. at 76.
    \885\Id. at 78-79.
    \886\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 30.
    \887\Id. at 38. See also Sondland Hearing Tr. at 57:
      A: I don't know exactly what I said to him. This was a briefing 
attended by many people, and I was invited at the very last minute. I 
wasn't scheduled to be there. But I think I spoke up at some point late 
in the meeting and said, it looks like everything is being held up 
until these statements get made, and that's my, you know, personal 
belief.
      Q: And Vice President Pence just nodded his head?
      A: Again, I don't recall any exchange or where he asked me any 
questions. I think he--it was sort of a duly noted response.
      Q: Well, he didn't say, Gordon, what are you talking about?
      A: No, he did not.
      Q: He didn't say, what investigations?
      A: He did not.
    \888\Pence Disputes that Sondland Raised Concerns to Him About 
Ukraine Aid-Investigations Link, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 20, 2019) 
(online at www.wsj.com/livecoverage/gordon-sondland-testifies-
impeachment/card/1574268547).
    \889\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 190.
    \890\Id. at 35.
    \891\Id. at 190-191.
    \892\Williams Dep. Tr. at 81.
    \893\Id. at 82.
    \894\Id. at 82-83.
    \895\Id. at 83.
    \896\Id.
    \897\How a CIA Analyst, Alarmed by Trump's Shadow Foreign Policy, 
Triggered an Impeachment Inquiry, Washington Post (Nov. 16, 2019) 
(online at www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/how-a-cia-analyst-
alarmed-by-trumps-shadow-foreign-policy-triggered-an-impeachment-
inquiry/2019/11/15/042684a8-03c3-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
    \898\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 31.
    \899\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 31.
    \900\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 134.
    \901\Id. at 155.
    \902\Id.
    \903\Id. at 137.
    \904\Id. at 182.
    \905\Id. at 184.
    \906\Id. at 228.
    \907\Id. at 154.
    \908\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 42.
    \909\Id.
    \910\Id. at 57.
    \911\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000039 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \912\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 42.
    \913\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 190.
    \914\Id.
    \915\Id.
    \916\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 60.
    \917\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 59.
    \918\Id. at 59-60.
    \919\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 190-191.
    \920\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 52.
    \921\Id. at 53-54; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 238.
    \922\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 43-44.
    \923\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000053 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \924\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 44.
    \925\Id.
    \926\Id.
    \927\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 109-110.
    \928\Id.
    \929\Id. at 110-111.
    \930\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 45.
    \931\Id. at 45, 63.
    \932\Id. at 45.
    \933\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 110. Ambassador Volker also testified 
that Ambassador Sondland used the same analogy to him when discussing 
the release of the hold on security assistance. Morrison-Volker Hearing 
Tr. at 96-97.
    \934\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000053 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \935\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 209.
    \936\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000053 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \937\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 54.
    \938\Id.
    \939\Id.
    \940\Id.
    \941\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000053 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \942\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 217.
    \943\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 26 (``Was there a quid pro quo? As I 
testified previously with regard to the requested White House call and 
the White House meeting, the answer is yes.'').
    \944\Id. at 41.
    \945\Id. at 112
    \946\Id. at 61-62.
    \947\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 39.
    \948\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 39.
    \949\Maguire Hearing Tr. at 110; Whistleblower Compl. Appendix 2. 
Public reporting indicates that ``[l]awyers from the White House 
counsel's office told Mr. Trump in late August about the complaint, 
explaining that they were trying to determine whether they were legally 
required to give it to Congress.'' Trump Knew of Whistle-Blower 
Complaint When He Released Aid to Ukraine, New York Times (Nov. 26, 
2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/2019/11/26/us/politics/trump-whistle-
blower-complaint-ukraine.html).
    \950\Letter from Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff and Ranking Member 
Devin Nunes, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 9, 
2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
20190909_-_ic_ig_letter_to_hpsci_on_whistleblower.pdf).
    \951\Id.
    \952\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 118. See also Witness Testimony and 
Records Raise Questions About Account of Trump's `No Quid Pro Quo' 
Call, Washington Post (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/witness-testimony-and-records-raise-
questions-about-account-of-trumps-no-quid-pro-quo-call/2019/11/27/
425545c2-0d49-11ea-8397-a955cd542d00_story.html).
    \953\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 118.
    \954\Id. at 73.
    \955\Declaration of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of 
State, at 1 (Nov. 4, 2019). This addendum did not address the July 26 
telephone conversation that Sondland had with President Trump, which he 
only recalled following the testimony of David Holmes on November 15, 
2019. Sondland Hearing Tr. at 46.
    \956\Declaration of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of 
State, at 3 (Nov. 4, 2019).
    \957\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 43-44; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 190-
191.
    \958\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 190-191; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 43-
44.
    \959\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 109.
    \960\Id. at 45, 109.
    \961\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000020 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \962\Id.
    \963\Id. at Bates KV00000053.
    \964\Id.
    \965\The White House, Press Briefing by Acting Chief of Staff Mick 
Mulvaney (Oct. 17, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/press-briefing-acting-chief-staff-mick-mulvaney/).
    \966\Id.
    \967\Id. Ambassador Taylor's testimony contradicted Mr. Mulvaney's 
statement about the ubiquity of such quid pro quos in American foreign 
policy. Ambassador Taylor testified that in his decades of military and 
diplomatic service, he had never seen another example of foreign aid 
conditioned on the personal or political interests of the President. 
Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 55. Rather, ``[w]e condition assistance on 
issues that will improve our foreign policy, serve our foreign policy, 
ensure that taxpayers' money is well-spent.'' Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. 
at 150.
    \968\There were early concerns raised in the House and Senate about 
the frozen aid, even before the news became public. On August 9, the 
Democratic leadership of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees 
wrote to OMB and the White House warning that the August 3 letter 
apportionment might constitute an illegal impoundment of funds. They 
urged the Trump Administration to adhere to the law and obligate the 
withheld funding. Letter from Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy, Senate 
Committee on Appropriations, and Chairwoman Nita M. Lowey, House 
Committee on Appropriations, to Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, 
The White House, and Acting Director Russell Vought, Office of 
Management and Budget (Aug. 9, 2019) (online at https://
appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/
files/documents/SFOPS%20Apportionment%20Letter%20Lowey-
Leahy%20Signed%202019.8.9.pdf). On August 19, the Democratic leadership 
of the House and Senate Budget Committees wrote to OMB and the White 
House urging the Administration to comply with appropriations law and 
the Impoundment Control Act. Letter from Chairman John Yarmuth, House 
Committee on the Budget, and Ranking Member Bernard Sanders, Senate 
Committee on the Budget, to Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, The 
White House (Aug. 19, 2019) (online at https://budget.house.gov/sites/
democrats.budget.house.gov/files/documents/OMB%20Letter_081919.pdf).
    \969\Letter from Senators Jeanne Shaheen, Rob Portman, Richard 
Durbin, Ron Johnson, and Richard Blumenthal to Acting White House Chief 
of Staff Mick Mulvaney (Sept. 3, 2019) (online at 
www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Ukraine%20Security%20Letter%209.3.2019.pdf).
    \970\Id.
    \971\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel and Ranking Member Michael 
T. McCaul, House Foreign Affairs Committee to Mick Mulvaney, Director, 
and Russell Vought, Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget, 
The White House (Sept. 5, 2019) (online at https://
foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/c/4/c49328c2-941b-4c41-8c00-
8c1515f0972f/
D1968A9&fxsp0C42455BB3&fxsp0AFC38F&fxsp097D966&fxsp0857B.ele-
mccaul-letter-to-mulvaney-vought-on-ukraine-assistance.pdf).
    \972\Trump Tries to Force Ukraine to Meddle in the 2020 Election, 
Washington Post (Sept. 5, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/global-opinions/is-trump-strong-arming-ukraines-new-president-
for-political-gain/2019/09/05/4eb239b0-cffa-11e9-8c1c-
7c8ee785b855_story.html).
    \973\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 37-38.
    \974\Id. at 38.
    \975\See Letter from Senator Christopher Murphy to Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Acting 
Chairwoman Carolyn Maloney, House Committee on Oversight and Reform 
(Nov. 19, 2019) (online at www.murphy.senate.gov/download/111919-sen-
murphy-letter-to-house-impeachment-investigators-on-ukraine) (``Senator 
Johnson and I assured Zelensky that Congress wanted to continue this 
funding, and would press Trump to release it immediately.''); Letter 
from Senator Ron Johnson to Ranking Member Jim Jordan, Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, and Ranking Member Devin Nunes, Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 18, 2019) (online at 
www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e0b73c19-9370-42e6-88b1-
b2458eaeeecd/johnson-to-jordan-nunes.pdf) (``I explained that I had 
tried to persuade the president to authorize me to announce the hold 
was released but that I was unsuccessful.'').
    \976\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Three House 
Committees Launch Probe Into Trump and Giuliani Pressure Campaign 
(Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=685).
    \977\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_cipollone_on_ukraine.pdf).
    \978\Id.
    \979\Id.
    \980\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of 
State (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_sec_pompeo_on_ukraine.pdf).
    \981\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 245.
    \982\Id.
    \983\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 303.
    \984\Id. at 304.
    \985\Letter from Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff and Ranking Member 
Devin Nunes, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 9, 
2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
20190909_-_ic_ig_letter_to_hpsci_on_whistleblower.pdf).
    \986\Id. see also 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3033(k)(5) (setting forth 
procedures for reporting of complaints or information with respect to 
an ``urgent concern'' to Congressional intelligence committees).
    \987\Maguire Hearing Tr. at 14 (``As a result, we consulted with 
the White House Counsel's Office, and we were advised that much of the 
information in the complaint was, in fact, subject to executive 
privilege, a privilege that I do not have the authority to waive. 
Because of that, we were unable to immediately share the details of the 
complaint with this committee but continued to consult with the White 
House counsels in an effort to do so.'').
    \988\Id. at 15-16 (``Because the allegation on its face did not 
appear to fall in the statutory framework, my office consulted with the 
United States Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel. . . . 
After reviewing the complaint and the Inspector General's transmission 
letter, the Office of Legal Counsel determined that the complaint's 
allegations do not meet the statutory definition concerning legal 
urgent concern, and found that I was not legally required to transmit 
the material to our oversight committee under the Whistleblower 
Protection Act.'').
    \989\Id. at 22-23. See also CIA's Top Lawyer Made `Criminal 
Referral' on Complaint about Trump Ukraine Call, NBC News (Oct. 4, 
2019) (online at www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-impeachment-inquiry/
cia-s-top-lawyer-made-criminal-referral-whistleblower-s-complaint-
n1062481) (reporting that the CIA's General Counsel, Courtney Simmons 
Elwood, informed NSC chief lawyer John Eisenberg about an anonymous 
whistleblower complaint on August 14, 2019).
    \990\Maguire Hearing Tr. at 14, 21-22. On September 26, Acting DNI 
Maguire testified that he and the ODNI General Counsel first consulted 
with the White House counsel's office before discussing the 
whistleblower complaint with the Department of Justice's Office of 
Legal Counsel:
    The Chairman.I'm just trying to understand the chronology. You 
first went to the Office of Legal Counsel, and then you went to the 
White House Counsel?
    Acting Director Maguire. No, no, no, sir. No, sir. No. We went to 
the White House first to determine_to ask the question_
    The Chairman. That's all I want to know is the chronology. So you 
went to the White House first. So you went to the subject of the 
complaint for advice first about whether you should provide the 
complaint to Congress?
    Acting Director Maguire. There were issues within this, a couple of 
things: One, it did appear that it has executive privilege. If it does 
have executive privilege, it is the White House that determines that. I 
cannot determine that, as the Director of National Intelligence.
    Id. at 21-22.
    \991\Trump Knew of Whistle-Blower Complaint When He Released Aid to 
Ukraine, New York Times (Nov. 26, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/26/us/politics/trump-whistle-blower-complaint-ukraine.html).
    \992\Id. The Administration repeatedly referenced privilege 
concerns in connection with the whistleblower complaint. See, e.g., 
Letter from Jason Klitenic, General Counsel, Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2019) (noting that ``the 
complaint involves confidential and potentially privileged 
communications by persons outside the Intelligence Community'') 
(emphasis added); Letter from Jason Klitenic, General Counsel, Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 17, 2019) 
(characterizing subpoena to the Acting DNI for documents as demanding 
``sensitive and potentially privileged'' materials and whistleblower 
complaint as involving ``potentially privileged matters relating to the 
interests of other stakeholders within the Executive Branch'') 
(emphasis added).
    However, the White House never formally invoked executive privilege 
as to the whistleblower complaint. See Maguire Hearing Tr. at 20 
(``Chairman Schiff: So they never asserted executive privilege, is that 
the answer? Acting Director Maguire: Mr. Chairman, if they did, we 
would not have released the letters yesterday and all the information 
that has been forthcoming.'').
    \993\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, to Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of 
National Intelligence (Sept. 10, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190910_-
_chm_schiff_letter_to_acting_dni_maguire.pdf).
    \994\Id.
    \995\See Letter from Jason Klitenic, General Counsel, Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2019).
    \996\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, to Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of 
National Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190913_-
_chm_schiff_letter_to_acting_dni_re_whistleblower_-_subpoena.pdf).
    \997\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \998\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 305-06; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 242.
    \999\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 242.
    \1000\See, e.g., Id. at 244; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 306; Williams Dep. 
Tr. at 147.
    \1001\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 68-69.
    \1002\Williams Dep. Tr. at 147. Ms. Williams did testify that 
President Trump's pressure on President Zelensky to open investigations 
into the Bidens on the July 25 call ``shed some light on possible other 
motivations behind a security assistance hold.'' Williams Dep. Tr. at 
149.
    \1003\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 42, 139-140. According to a press report, 
after Congress began investigating President Trump's scheme, the White 
House Counsel's Office reportedly opened an internal investigation 
relating to the July 25 call. As part of that internal investigation, 
White House lawyers gathered and reviewed ``hundreds of documents'' 
that ``reveal extensive efforts to generate an after-the-fact 
justification'' for the hold on military assistance for Ukraine ordered 
by President Trump. These documents reportedly include ``early August 
email exchanges between acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney and White 
House budget officials seeking to provide an explanation for 
withholding the funds after the president had already ordered a hold in 
mid-July on the nearly $400 million in security assistance.'' White 
House Review Turns Up Emails Showing Extensive Effort to Justify 
Trump's Decision to Block Ukraine Military Aid, Washington Post (Nov. 
24, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-
review-turns-up-emails-showing-extensive-effort-to-justify-trumps-
decision-to-block-ukraine-military-aid/2019/11/24/2121cf98-0d57-11ea-
bd9d-c628fd48b3a0_story.html). The White House has withheld these 
documents from the Committee, so the Committee cannot verify the 
accuracy of the reporting as of the publication of this report.
    \1004\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 49.
    \1005\Id. at 42, 44.
    \1006\Id. at 180.
    \1007\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 306.
    \1008\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 83.
    \1009\Id. at 47-48, 58, 112-114; Sandy Dep. Tr. at 34-35, 85-86, 
95, 128, 129-131, 133; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 163; Kent Dep. Tr. at 308-
309; Reeker Dep. Tr. at 133. News reports indicate that a confidential 
White House review of President Trump's hold on military assistance to 
Ukraine has identified hundreds of documents revealing ``extensive 
efforts to generate an after-the-fact justification for the decision 
and a debate over whether the delay was legal.'' White House Review 
Turns Up Emails Showing Extensive Effort to Justify Trump's Decision to 
Block Ukraine Military Aid, Washington Post (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-review-turns-up-emails-
showing-extensive-effort-to-justify-trumps-decision-to-block-ukraine-
military-aid/2019/11/24/2121cf98-0d57-11ea-bd9d-
c628fd48b3a0_story.html). According to ``two people briefed on an 
internal White House review,'' in August, Acting Chief of Staff 
Mulvaney ``asked . . . whether there was a legal justification for 
withholding hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to 
Ukraine.'' Mulvaney Asked About Legal Justification for Withholding 
Ukraine Aid, New York Times (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/24/us/politics/mulvaney-ukraine-aid.html). Reports indicate 
that, ``[e]mails show [OMB Director] Vought and OMB staffers arguing 
that withholding aid was legal, while officials at the National 
Security Council and State Department protested. OMB lawyers said that 
it was legal to withhold the aid, as long as they deemed it a 
`temporary' hold.'' White House Review Turns Up Emails Showing 
Extensive Effort to Justify Trump's Decision to Block Ukraine Military 
Aid, Washington Post (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/white-house-review-turns-up-emails-showing-extensive-effort-
to-justify-trumps-decision-to-block-ukraine-military-aid/2019/11/24/
2121cf98-0d57-11ea-bd9d-c628fd48b3a0_story.html). The White House and 
State Department's obstruction of Congress has prevented the Committee 
from obtaining any documents on this matter and, therefore, the 
Committee cannot verify the accuracy of this reporting as of the 
publication of this report.
    \1010\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 80.
    \1011\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 146-147.
    \1012\See Department of Defense, DOD Budget Materials (FY2011-
FY2018) (online at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/). 
In 1974, President Nixon impounded 15-20 percent of a number of 
specific programs, which prompted the passage of the Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974. Congressional Research Service, The Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) Legislative History and Analysis (Feb. 
26, 1975).
    \1013\Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, 
and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations 
Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, Sec. 9013 (2018); Sandy Dep. Tr. at 
147.
    \1014\Continuing Appropriations Act 2020, and Health Extenders Act 
of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-59, Sec. 124 (2019).
    \1015\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 98.
    \1016\$35 Million in Pentagon Aid Hasn't Reached Ukraine Despite 
White House Assurances, L.A. Times (Nov. 19, 2019) (online at 
www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-11-19/documents-show-nearly-40-
million-in-ukraine-aid-delayed-despite-white-house-assurances).
    \1017\Zelensky Planned to Announce Trump's `Quo' on My Show. Here's 
What Happened, Washington Post (Nov. 14, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zelensky-was-planning-to-announce-
trumps-quid-pro-quo-on-my-show-heres-what-happened/2019/11/14/47938f32-
072a-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
    \1018\Id.
    \1019\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 40.
    \1020\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 106.
    \1021\Id.
    \1022\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 33.
    \1023\Id.
    \1024\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 41.
    \1025\Id. at 217-18.
    \1026\Id.
    \1027\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 30.
    \1028\Zelensky Planned to Announce Trump's `Quo' on My Show. Here's 
What Happened, Washington Post (Nov. 14, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zelensky-was-planning-to-announce-
trumps-quid-pro-quo-on-my-show-heres-what-happened/2019/11/14/47938f32-
072a-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
    \1029\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 33; see also Zelensky Planned to 
Announce Trump's `Quo' on My Show. Here's What Happened, Washington 
Post (Nov. 14, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
zelensky-was-planning-to-announce-trumps-quid-pro-quo-on-my-show-heres-
what-happened/2019/11/14/47938f32-072a-11ea-8292-
c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
    \1030\Kent. Dep. Tr. at 333.
    \1031\Id. at 329-31.
    \1032\Id. at 330.
    \1033\Zelensky Planned to Announce Trump's `Quo' on My Show. Here's 
What Happened, Washington Post (Nov. 14, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zelensky-was-planning-to-announce-
trumps-quid-pro-quo-on-my-show-heres-what-happened/2019/11/14/47938f32-
072a-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
    \1034\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 46-47.
    \1035\Williams Dep. Tr. at 156.
    \1036\Id.
    \1037\Pence Says He's Working to Release Transcripts of His Calls 
with Ukraine Leader, Politico (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at 
www.politico.com/news/2019/10/09/pence-ukraine-zelensky-biden-043684).
    \1038\Pence: I Don't Object To Releasing My Call Transcripts With 
Zelensky, Fox Business (Nov. 7, 2019) (online at 
www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/11/07/
pence_i_dont_object_to_releasing_my_call_transcripts_with_zelensky.html)
    \1039\Rudy Giuliani's Remarkable Ukraine Interview, Annotated, 
Washington Post (Sept. 20, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2019/09/20/rudy-giulianis-remarkable-ukraine-interview-
annotated/).
    \1040\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President 
Duda of Poland Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 23, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-duda-poland-bilateral-meeting/).
    \1041\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Upon Arriving at 
the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-upon-
arriving-u-n-general-assembly-new-york-ny/).
    \1042\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President 
Zelensky of Ukraine Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept 25, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-zelensky-ukraine-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/).
    \1043\The White House, Remarks by President Trump at the Swearing-
in Ceremony of Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia (Sept 30, 2019) (online 
at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
swearing-ceremony-secretary-labor-eugene-scalia/).
    \1044\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President 
Niinisto of the Republic of Finland Before Bilateral Meeting (Oct. 2, 
2019) (www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-niinisto-republic-finland-bilateral-meeting/).
    \1045\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Oct. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-67/).
    \1046\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-68).
    \1047\Id.
    \1048\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Oct. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-67/). These 
recent statements by President inviting foreign assistance for his 
personal political interests are consistent with his statements to 
George Stephanopoulos of ABC News on June 12, when President Trump 
indicated a desire to receive dirt on a political opponent provided by 
a foreign country. ABC News' Oval Office interview with President 
Trump, ABC News (June 13, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/abc-news-oval-office-interview-president-donald-trump/
story?id=63688943).
    \1049\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 46-47, 91-92.
    \1050\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 158-19; Holmes Dep. Tr. at 100; Kent-
Taylor Hearing Tr. at 43.
    \1051\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 24.
    \1052\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 46.
    \1053\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 165.
    \1054\Id.
    \1055\Id. at 24.
    \1056\Id. at 55-56.
    \1057\Id. at 164.
    \1058\Kent Dep. Tr. at 329; Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 138-139.
    \1059\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 139.
    \1060\Id.

                              SECTION II.

     THE PRESIDENT'S OBSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES' 
                          IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY

      1. Constitutional Authority for Congressional Oversight and 
                              Impeachment


Article I of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the 
        ``sole Power of Impeachment.'' Congress is authorized to 
        conduct oversight and investigations in support of its Article 
        I powers. The Supreme Court--and previous Presidents--have 
        acknowledged these authorities.

                                Overview

    The House's Constitutional and legal authority to conduct 
an impeachment inquiry is clear, as is the duty of the 
President to cooperate with the House's exercise of this 
authority. The Constitution vests in the House of 
Representatives the ``sole Power of Impeachment'' as well as 
robust oversight powers. As the Founders intended, the courts 
have agreed, and prior Presidents have acknowledged, the 
House's sweeping powers to investigate are at their peak during 
an impeachment inquiry of a President. Congress has also 
enacted statutes to support its power to investigate and 
oversee the Executive Branch.
    Unlike President Donald J. Trump, past Presidents who were 
the subject of impeachment inquiries acknowledged Congress' 
authority to investigate and--to varying degrees--complied with 
information requests and subpoenas. Even so, the House has 
previously determined that partial noncooperation can serve as 
a ground for an article of impeachment against a President as 
it would upend the separation of powers to allow the President 
to dictate the scope of an impeachment inquiry. When President 
Richard Nixon withheld tape recordings and produced heavily 
edited and inaccurate records, the House Judiciary Committee 
approved an article of impeachment for obstruction.

     Constitutional Power of Congress to Investigate_and to Impeach

    Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives the House of 
Representatives the ``sole Power of Impeachment.''\1\ The 
Framers intended the impeachment power to be an essential check 
on a President who might engage in corruption or abuse power. 
For example, during the Constitutional Convention, George Mason 
stated:

          No point is of more importance than that the right of 
        impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above 
        Justice? Above all shall that man be above it, who can 
        commit the most extensive injustice? . . . Shall the 
        man who has practised corruption & by that means 
        procured his appointment in the first instance, be 
        suffered to escape punishment, by repeating his 
        guilt?\2\

    Congress is empowered to conduct oversight and 
investigations to carry out its authorities under Article I.\3\ 
In light of the core nature of the impeachment power to the 
nation's Constitutional system of checks and balances, 
Congress' investigative authority is at its zenith during an 
impeachment inquiry.\4\
    As the House Judiciary Committee explained during the 
impeachment of President Nixon:

          Whatever the limits of legislative power in other 
        contexts--and whatever need may otherwise exist for 
        preserving the confidentiality of Presidential 
        conversations--in the context of an impeachment 
        proceeding the balance was struck in favor of the power 
        of inquiry when the impeachment provision was written 
        into the Constitution.\5\

    This conclusion echoed an early observation on the floor of 
the House of Representatives that the ``House possessed the 
power of impeachment solely, and that this authority certainly 
implied the right to inspect every paper and transaction in any 
department, otherwise the power of impeachment could never be 
exercised with any effect.''\6\
    The House's ``sole Power of Impeachment'' is the mechanism 
provided by the Constitution to hold sitting Presidents 
accountable for serious misconduct. The Department of Justice 
has highlighted the importance of the impeachment power in 
justifying the Department's view that a sitting President 
cannot be indicted or face criminal prosecution while in 
office.\7\ The Department's position that the President is 
immune from prosecution has not been endorsed by Congress or 
the courts, but as long as the Department continues to refuse 
to prosecute a sitting President, Congress has a heightened 
responsibility to exercise its impeachment power, if necessary, 
to ensure that no President is ``above the law.''\8\
    The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has broad 
oversight authority under the Constitution to inquire about a 
wide array of topics, even outside the context of impeachment:

          The power of inquiry has been employed by Congress 
        throughout our history, over the whole range of the 
        national interests concerning which Congress might 
        legislate or decide upon due investigation not to 
        legislate; it has similarly been utilized in 
        determining what to appropriate from the national 
        purse, or whether to appropriate. The scope of the 
        power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating and 
        farreaching as the potential power to enact and 
        appropriate under the Constitution.\9\

    The Supreme Court has made clear that Congress' authority 
to investigate includes the authority to compel the production 
of information by issuing subpoenas,\10\ a power the House has 
delegated to its committees pursuant to its Constitutional 
authority to ``determine the Rules of its Proceedings.''\11\
    The Supreme Court has affirmed that compliance with 
Congressional subpoenas is mandatory:

          It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to 
        cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to obtain 
        the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. It 
        is their unremitting obligation to respond to 
        subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress and 
        its committees and to testify fully with respect to 
        matters within the province of proper 
        investigation.\12\

    Federal courts have held that the ``legal duty'' to respond 
to Congressional subpoenas extends to the President's ``senior-
level aides'' and that the failure to comply violates the 
separation of powers principles in the Constitution.\13\ As one 
court recently explained:

          [W]hen a committee of Congress seeks testimony and 
        records by issuing a valid subpoena in the context of a 
        duly authorized investigation, it has the 
        Constitution's blessing, and ultimately, it is acting 
        not in its own interest, but for the benefit of the 
        People of the United States. If there is fraud or abuse 
        or waste or corruption in the federal government, it is 
        the constitutional duty of Congress to find the facts 
        and, as necessary, take corrective action. Conducting 
        investigations is the means that Congress uses to carry 
        out that constitutional obligation. Thus, blatant 
        defiance of Congress' centuries-old power to compel the 
        performance of witnesses is not an abstract injury, nor 
        is it a mere banal insult to our democracy. It is an 
        affront to the mechanism for curbing abuses of power 
        that the Framers carefully crafted for our protection, 
        and, thereby, recalcitrant witnesses actually undermine 
        the broader interests of the People of the United 
        States.\14\

                        Laws Passed by Congress

    Congress has enacted statutes to support its power to 
investigate and oversee the Executive Branch. These laws impose 
criminal and other penalties on those who fail to comply with 
inquiries from Congress or block others from doing so, and they 
reflect the broader Constitutional requirement to cooperate 
with Congressional investigations. For example:
     Obstructing Congress: Obstructing a Congressional 
investigation is a crime punishable by up to five years in 
prison. An individual is guilty of obstruction if he or she 
``corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening 
letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or 
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede'' the ``due and 
proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry 
or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee 
of either House.''\15\
     Concealing Material Facts: Concealing information 
from Congress is also punishable by up to five years in prison. 
This prohibition applies to anyone who ``falsifies, conceals, 
or covers up'' a ``material fact'' in connection with ``any 
investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of 
any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the 
Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or 
Senate.''\16\
     Intimidating and Harassing Witnesses: Intimidating 
witnesses in a Congressional investigation is a crime 
punishable by up to twenty years in prison. This statute 
applies to anyone who ``knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, 
or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or 
engages in misleading conduct toward another person,'' with the 
intent to ``influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any 
person in an official proceeding.''\17\ An individual who 
``intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, 
delays, prevents, or dissuades'' a person from ``attending or 
testifying in an official proceeding'' is also guilty of a 
crime punishable by fines and up to three years in prison.\18\
     Retaliating Against Employees Who Provide 
Information to Congress: Employees who speak to Congress have 
the right not to have adverse personnel actions taken against 
them. Retaliatory actions taken against Executive Branch 
employees who cooperate with Congress may constitute violations 
of this law.\19\ Any Executive Branch official who ``prohibits 
or prevents'' or ``attempts or threatens to prohibit or 
prevent'' any officer or employee of the federal government 
from speaking with Congress could have his or her salary 
withheld.\20\

      Precedent of Previous Impeachments and Other Investigations

    Unlike President Trump, past Presidents who were the 
subject of impeachment inquiries--including Presidents Andrew 
Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton--acknowledged 
Congress' authority to investigate and, to varying degrees, 
complied with information requests and subpoenas.
    For example, President Johnson complied with the House's 
requests for information. According to a report subsequently 
adopted by the House Judiciary Committee, ``There is no 
evidence that Johnson ever asserted any privilege to prevent 
disclosure of presidential conversations to the Committee, or 
failed to comply with any of the Committee's requests.''\21\
    Similarly, President Clinton provided written responses to 
81 interrogatories from the House Judiciary Committee during 
the House's impeachment inquiry.\22\
    Even President Nixon agreed to let his staff testify 
voluntarily in the Senate Watergate investigation, stating: 
``All members of the White House Staff will appear voluntarily 
when requested by the committee. They will testify under oath, 
and they will answer fully all proper questions.''\23\ As a 
result, numerous senior White House officials testified, 
including White House Counsel John Dean III, White House Chief 
of Staff H.R. Haldeman, Deputy Assistant to the President 
Alexander Butterfield, and Chief Advisor to the President for 
Domestic Affairs John D. Ehrlichman.\24\ President Nixon also 
produced numerous documents and records in response to the 
House's subpoenas as part of its impeachment inquiry, including 
more than 30 transcripts of White House recordings and notes 
from meetings with the President.\25\
    However, President Nixon's production of documents was 
incomplete. For example, he did not produce tape recordings, 
and transcripts he produced were heavily edited or inaccurate. 
President Nixon claimed that his noncompliance with House 
subpoenas was necessary to protect the confidentiality of 
Presidential conversations, but the House Judiciary Committee 
rejected these arguments and approved an article of impeachment 
for obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry.\26\
    In a letter to President Nixon, Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Peter Rodino explained that it would upend the 
separation of powers to allow the President to dictate the 
scope of an impeachment inquiry:

          Under the Constitution it is not within the power of 
        the President to conduct an inquiry into his own 
        impeachment, to determine which evidence, and what 
        version or portion of that evidence, is relevant and 
        necessary to such an inquiry. These are matters which, 
        under the Constitution, the House has the sole power to 
        determine.\27\

    Consistent with that long-settled understanding, other 
Presidents have recognized that they must comply with 
information requests issued in a House impeachment inquiry. In 
1846, for example, President James Polk stated in a message to 
the House:

          It may be alleged that the power of impeachment 
        belongs to the House of Representatives, and that with 
        a view to the exercise of this power, that House has 
        the right to investigate the conduct of all public 
        officers under the government. This is cheerfully 
        admitted. In such a case, the safety of the Republic 
        would be the supreme law; and the power of the House in 
        the pursuit of this object would penetrate into the 
        most secret recesses of the executive departments. It 
        could command the attendance of any and every agent of 
        the government, and compel them to produce all papers, 
        public or private, official or unofficial, and to 
        testify on oath to all facts within their 
        knowledge.\28\

    Past Presidents have also produced documents and permitted 
senior officials to testify in connection with other 
Congressional investigations, including inquiries into 
Presidential actions.
    For example, in the Iran-Contra inquiry, President Ronald 
Reagan's former National Security Advisor, Oliver North, and 
the former Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, John Poindexter, testified before Congress.\29\ 
President Reagan also produced ``relevant excerpts of his 
personal diaries to Congress.''\30\
    During the Clinton Administration, Congress obtained 
testimony from top advisors to President Clinton, including 
Chief of Staff Mack McLarty, Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles, 
White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum, and White House Counsel 
Jack Quinn.\31\
    Similarly, in the Benghazi investigation, led by Chairman 
Trey Gowdy, President Barack Obama made many of his top aides 
available for transcribed interviews, including National 
Security Advisor Susan Rice and Deputy National Security 
Advisor for Strategic Communications Benjamin Rhodes.\32\ The 
Obama Administration also produced more than 75,000 pages of 
documents in that investigation, including 1,450 pages of White 
House emails containing communications of senior officials on 
the National Security Council.\33\

            2. The President's Categorical Refusal to Comply


President Trump categorically directed the White House, federal 
        departments and agencies, and federal officials not to 
        cooperate with the House's inquiry and not to comply with duly 
        authorized subpoenas for documents or testimony.

                                Overview

    Donald Trump is the first and only President in American 
history to openly and indiscriminately defy all aspects of the 
Constitutional impeachment process, ordering all federal 
agencies and officials categorically not to comply with 
voluntary requests or compulsory demands for documents or 
testimony.
    On September 26, President Trump argued that Congress 
should not be ``allowed'' to impeach him under the Constitution 
and that there ``should be a way of stopping it--maybe legally, 
through the courts.'' A common theme of his defiance has been 
his claims that Congress is acting in an unprecedented way and 
using unprecedented rules. However, the House has been 
following the same investigative rules that Republicans 
championed when they were in control.
    On October 8, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone--acting on 
behalf of President Trump--sent a letter to House Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi and the three investigating Committees confirming that 
President Trump directed his entire Administration not to 
cooperate with the House's impeachment inquiry. Mr. Cipollone 
wrote: ``President Trump cannot permit his Administration to 
participate in this partisan inquiry under these 
circumstances.''
    Mr. Cipollone's letter elicited immediate criticism from 
legal experts across the political spectrum. He advanced 
remarkably politicized arguments and legal theories unsupported 
by the Constitution, judicial precedent, and more than 200 
years of history. If allowed to stand, the President's 
defiance, as justified by Mr. Cipollone, would represent an 
existential threat to the nation's Constitutional system of 
checks and balances, separation of powers, and rule of law.

           The House's Impeachment Inquiry of President Trump

    In January, the House of Representatives voted to adopt its 
rules for the 116th Congress. These rules authorized House 
Committees to conduct investigations, hold hearings, issue 
subpoenas for documents and testimony, and depose 
witnesses.\34\ Significantly, these authorities are similar to 
those adopted when Republicans controlled the House during 
previous Congresses.\35\
    In April, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, who was 
appointed by then-Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein to 
investigate Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
election and potential obstruction of justice by President 
Trump, issued a two-volume report.\36\ In connection with that 
report, the Committee on the Judiciary began an inquiry into 
``whether to approve articles of impeachment with respect to 
the President.''\37\ The Judiciary Committee detailed its 
authority and intent to conduct this investigation in a series 
of reports, memoranda, and legal filings.\38\
    On August 22, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, the Chairman of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, sent a letter requesting that the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the 
Committee on Financial Services provide ``information, 
including documents and testimony, depositions, and/or 
interview transcripts'' relevant to the ``ongoing impeachment 
investigation relating to President Trump.''\39\
    In September, the Intelligence Committee, the Oversight 
Committee, and the Foreign Affairs Committee sent letters 
requesting documents and interviews from the White House and 
the Department of State regarding the actions of President 
Trump, the President's personal agent, Rudy Giuliani, and 
others to pressure Ukraine to launch investigations into former 
Vice President Joe Biden and a debunked conspiracy theory 
alleging Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election.\40\
    On September 22, President Trump admitted to discussing 
former Vice President Biden and his son with the President of 
Ukraine during a telephone call on July 25.\41\
    On September 24, Speaker Pelosi stated publicly that the 
House Committees were ``moving forward'' to ``proceed with 
their investigations under that umbrella of impeachment 
inquiry.'' She explained that, for the past several months, the 
House had been ``investigating in our Committees and litigating 
in the courts, so the House can gather `all the relevant facts 
and consider whether to exercise its full Article I powers, 
including a constitutional power of the utmost gravity--
approval of articles of impeachment.'''\42\
    On September 25, the White House made public a Memorandum 
of Telephone Conversation of President Trump's call with 
President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 25. As discussed in detail 
in Section I, this call record documented how President Trump 
directly and explicitly asked President Zelensky to launch 
investigations of former Vice President Biden and the 2016 
election.\43\
    Following the Speaker's announcement and the release of the 
call record, the Intelligence Committee, the Oversight 
Committee, and the Foreign Affairs Committee continued their 
investigation, requesting documents and information, issuing 
subpoenas, and conducting interviews and depositions. The 
Committees made clear that this information would be 
``collected as part of the House's impeachment inquiry and 
shared among the Committees, as well as with the Committee on 
the Judiciary as appropriate.''\44\
    On October 31, the House voted to approve House Resolution 
660, directing the Committees ``to continue their ongoing 
investigations as part of the existing House of Representatives 
inquiry into whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of 
Representatives to exercise its Constitutional power to impeach 
Donald John Trump, President of the United States of America.'' 
The resolution set forth the process for holding public 
hearings, releasing deposition transcripts, presenting a report 
to the Judiciary Committee, holding proceedings within the 
Judiciary Committee, and submitting to the House of 
Representatives ``such resolutions, articles of impeachment, or 
other recommendations as it deems proper.''\45\

          President Trump's Unprecedented Order Not to Comply

    President Trump's categorical and indiscriminate order and 
efforts to block witness testimony and conceal documentary 
evidence from the Committees investigating his conduct as part 
of the House's impeachment inquiry stand in contrast to his 
predecessors and challenge the basic tenets of the 
Constitutional system of checks and balances.
    Even before the House of Representatives launched its 
investigation regarding Ukraine, President Trump made numerous 
statements rejecting the fundamental authority of Congress to 
investigate his actions as well as those of his Administration. 
For example, on April 24, he stated, in response to 
Congressional investigations: ``We're fighting all the 
subpoenas.''\46\ Similarly, during a speech on July 23, he 
stated: ``I have an Article II, where I have to the right to do 
whatever I want as president.''\47\
    When the three investigating Committees began reviewing the 
President's actions as part of the House's impeachment inquiry, 
President Trump repeatedly challenged the investigation's 
legitimacy in word and deed. President Trump's rhetorical 
attacks appeared intended not just to dispute public reports of 
his misconduct, but to persuade the public that the House lacks 
authority to investigate the President and the inquiry is 
therefore invalid and fraudulent. For example, the President 
described the impeachment inquiry as:
     ``a COUP''\48\
     ``illegal, invalid, and unconstitutional''\49\
     ``an unconstitutional power grab''\50\
     ``Ukraine Witch Hunt''\51\
     ``a continuation of the Greatest and most 
Destructive Witch Hunt of all time''\52\
     ``a total Witch Hunt Scam by the Democrats''\53\
     ``bad for the country''\54\
     ``all a hoax''\55\
     ``the single greatest witch hunt in American 
history''\56\
     ``Democrat Scam''\57\
     ``just another Democrat Hoax''\58\
     ``a fraud against the American people''\59\
     ``A Witch Hunt Scam''\60\
     ``a con being perpetrated on the United States 
public and even the world''\61\
     ``ridiculous''\62\
     ``a continuation of the greatest Scam and Witch 
Hunt in the history of our Country''\63\
     ``Ukraine Hoax''\64\
     ``No Due Process Scam''\65\
     ``the phony Impeachment Scam''\66\
     ``the phony Impeachment Hoax''\67\
    On September 26, President Trump argued that Congress 
should not be ``allowed'' to impeach him under the 
Constitution: ``What these guys are doing--Democrats--are doing 
to this country is a disgrace and it shouldn't be allowed. 
There should be a way of stopping it--maybe legally, through 
the courts.''\68\
    A common theme of President Trump's defiance has been his 
claims that Congress is acting in an unprecedented way and 
using unprecedented rules. However, the House has been 
following the same investigative rules that Republicans 
championed when they were in control and conducted aggressive 
oversight of previous Administrations.\69\

    White House Counsel's Letters Implementing the President's Order

    On October 8, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone sent a 
letter to Speaker Pelosi and the three Committees explaining 
that President Trump had directed his entire Administration not 
to cooperate with the House's impeachment inquiry. He wrote:

          Consistent with the duties of the President of the 
        United States, and in particular his obligation to 
        preserve the rights of future occupants of his office, 
        President Trump cannot permit his Administration to 
        participate in this partisan inquiry under these 
        circumstances.\70\

    On October 10, President Trump confirmed that Mr. Cipollone 
was indeed conveying his orders, stating:

          As our brilliant White House Counsel wrote to the 
        Democrats yesterday, he said their highly partisan and 
        unconstitutional effort threatens grave and lasting 
        damage to our democratic institutions, to our system of 
        free elections, and to the American people. That's what 
        it is. To the American people. It's so terrible. 
        Democrats are on a crusade to destroy our democracy. 
        That's what's happening. We will never let it happen. 
        We will defeat them.\71\

    Mr. Cipollone's letter elicited immediate criticism from 
legal experts from across the political spectrum.\72\
    Mr. Cipollone wrote a second letter to the Committees on 
October 18, declaring that the White House would refuse to 
comply with the subpoena issued to it for documents.\73\
    On November 1--after the House had already issued several 
subpoenas to the White House and other Executive Branch 
officials for testimony--the Trump Administration issued a new 
``Letter Opinion'' from Assistant Attorney General Steven A. 
Engel to Mr. Cipollone. The Office of Legal Counsel opinion 
sought to extend the reach of the President's earlier direction 
to defy Congressional subpoenas and to justify noncompliance by 
officials who could not plausibly be considered among the 
President's closest advisors.
    Mr. Engel's opinion asserted that the House's impeachment 
inquiry seeks information that is ``potentially protected by 
executive privilege'' and claimed the Committees' deposition 
subpoenas are ``invalid'' and ``not subject to civil or 
criminal enforcement'' because the House's long-standing 
deposition rules do not allow the participation of attorneys 
from the White House or other government agencies.\74\ These 
claims are without basis and unsupported by precedent.
    The Letter Opinion cited statements from previous 
Presidents and Attorneys General that directly undercut the 
Administration's position. For example, President James K. 
Polk, stated that in an impeachment inquiry the House had power 
to ``penetrate into the most secret recesses of the Executive 
Departments.''\75\ In addition, Attorney General Robert H. 
Jackson, who later served on the Supreme Court, stated that 
``pertinent information would be supplied in impeachment 
proceedings, usually instituted at the suggestion of the 
Department and for the good of the administration of 
justice.''\76\
    In his letters conveying the President's direction, Mr. 
Cipollone advanced remarkably politicized arguments and legal 
theories unsupported by the Constitution, judicial precedent, 
and more than 200 years of history. These letters effectuated 
the President's order and campaign to obstruct and thwart the 
House's exercise of its sole power of impeachment under the 
Constitution. They are rebutted as follows:
     The Impeachment Inquiry is Constitutional: 
According to Mr. Cipollone, ``the President did nothing 
wrong,'' and ``there is no basis for an impeachment 
inquiry.''\77\ President Trump has repeatedly described his 
call with President Zelensky as ``perfect.''\78\ Speaking for 
President Trump, Mr. Cipollone also asserted that the 
impeachment inquiry is ``partisan and unconstitutional,'' ``a 
naked political strategy that began the day he was inaugurated, 
and perhaps even before,'' and that it ``plainly seeks to 
reverse the election of 2016 and to influence the election of 
2020.''\79\
    However, as this report details in Section I, Congress 
found abundant evidence of a scheme directed by the President 
to solicit foreign election interference by pressing the newly-
elected President of Ukraine to announce publicly politically-
motivated investigations to benefit President Trump's own 
reelection campaign. Fundamentally, the Constitutional validity 
of an impeachment inquiry cannot depend on a President's view 
that he did nothing wrong or on the political composition of 
the House. Such an extreme reimagining of the Constitution 
would render the Article I impeachment power meaningless and 
provide the President with power the Constitution does not 
grant him to thwart, manipulate, and stonewall an impeachment 
inquiry conducted by the House, including by concealing 
information of his own misconduct.\80\ Taken to its logical 
conclusion, the President's position would eliminate the 
impeachment power in every year during which a political party 
other than the President's is in power. Under this approach, 
the impeachments of President Clinton, President Nixon, and 
President Andrew Johnson would not have been permitted.\81\
    The purpose of an impeachment inquiry is for the House to 
collect evidence to determine for itself whether the President 
may have committed an impeachable offense warranting articles 
of impeachment. Because the Constitution vests the House alone 
with ``the sole Power of Impeachment,'' it is not for the 
President to decide whether the House is exercising that power 
properly or prudently. The President is not free to arrogate 
the House's power to himself--or to order across-the-board 
defiance of House subpoenas--based solely on his unilateral 
characterization of legislative motives or because he opposes 
the House's decision to investigate his actions.
     The Impeachment Inquiry is Properly Authorized: 
According to Mr. Cipollone, the ``House has not expressly 
adopted any resolution authorizing an impeachment 
investigation'' nor has it ``delegated such authority to any of 
your Committees by rule.''\82\ However, nothing in either the 
Constitution or the House Rules requires the full House to vote 
to authorize an impeachment inquiry.\83\ The impeachment 
inquiries into Presidents Andrew Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton 
all began prior to the House's consideration and approval of a 
resolution authorizing the investigations.\84\ The same is true 
of many judicial impeachments;\85\ indeed, numerous judges have 
been impeached without any prior vote of the full House 
authorizing a formal inquiry.\86\ Even though Mr. Cipollone's 
argument is inherently invalid, the House has taken two floor 
votes that render it obsolete the first on January 9 to adopt 
rules authorizing committees to conduct investigations, and the 
second on October 31 to set forth procedures for open hearings 
in the Intelligence Committee and for additional proceedings in 
the Judiciary Committee.\87\ Even following passage of House 
Resolution 660, whereby the House confirmed the preexisting and 
ongoing impeachment inquiry, the President and the White House 
Counsel, acting on the President's behalf, have persisted in 
their obstructive conduct.
     President Has No Valid Due Process Claims: 
According to Mr. Cipollone, ``the Committees have not 
established any procedures affording the President even the 
most basic protections demanded by due process under the 
Constitution and by fundamental fairness,'' and the Committees 
``have denied the President the right to cross-examine 
witnesses, to call witnesses, to receive transcripts of 
testimony, to have access to evidence,'' and ``to have counsel 
present.''\88\ Yet, there is no requirement that the House 
provide these procedures during an impeachment inquiry. The 
Constitution vests the House with ``the sole Power of 
Impeachment,'' and provides no constraints on how the House 
chooses to conduct its impeachment process.\89\ Nevertheless, 
Mr. Cipollone's complaints are unfounded as the House has 
implemented procedural protections for the President in its 
exercise of its Constitutional power. House Resolution 660 
authorizes procedures to ``allow for the participation of the 
President and his counsel.''\90\ The Committee Report 
accompanying House Resolution 660 explains that these 
protections for the President are part of the Judiciary 
Committee hearing process and are ``based on those provided 
during the Nixon and Clinton inquiries.'' These procedures 
include ``that the president and his counsel are invited to 
attend all hearings; the ability for the president's counsel to 
cross-examine witnesses and object to the admissibility of 
testimony; and the ability of the president's counsel to make 
presentations of evidence before the Judiciary Committee, 
including the ability to call witnesses.''\91\
     Fact-Finding Was Appropriately Transparent: 
According to Mr. Cipollone, the Committees conducted their 
proceedings ``in secret.''\92\ This argument fundamentally 
misconstrues and misapprehends the fact-gathering process 
required at this initial stage of the House's impeachment 
inquiry. Unlike in the cases of Presidents Nixon and Clinton, 
the House conducted a significant portion of the factual 
investigation itself because no independent prosecutor was 
appointed to investigate President Trump's conduct regarding 
Ukraine. Attorney General William P. Barr refused to authorize 
a criminal investigation into the serious allegations of 
misconduct, and even this decision was limited to possible 
violations of federal campaign finance laws.\93\ The 
investigative Committees proceeded consistent with the House's 
rules of procedure and in keeping with investigative best 
practices, including the need to reduce the risk that witnesses 
may try to coordinate or align testimony. As the House 
explained in its report accompanying House Resolution 660:

          The initial stages of an impeachment inquiry in the 
        House are akin to those preceding a prosecutorial 
        charging decision. Under this process, the House is 
        responsible for collecting the evidence and, rather 
        than weighing the question of returning an indictment, 
        the Members of the House have the obligation to decide 
        whether to approve articles of impeachment.\94\

    The Committees have released transcripts of all interviews 
and depositions conducted during the investigation. As these 
transcripts make clear, all Members of all three Committees--
including 47 Republican Members of Congress--had the 
opportunity to ask questions, and these transcripts are now 
available to the President and his counsel. These same 
procedures were supported by Acting White House Chief of Staff 
Mick Mulvaney when he served as a Member of the Oversight 
Committee and by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo when he served 
as a Member of the Benghazi Select Committee. In fact, some of 
the same Members and staff currently conducting depositions as 
part of the present impeachment inquiry participated directly 
in depositions during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama 
Administrations.\95\ The Intelligence Committee also held 
public hearings with 12 of these witnesses.
     Agency Attorneys Can Be (And Should Be) Excluded 
from Depositions: According to Mr. Cipollone, ``it is 
unconstitutional to exclude agency counsel from participating 
in congressional depositions.''\96\ Mr. Cipollone cites no case 
law to support his position because there is none. Instead, he 
relies on a single opinion from the Trump Administration's 
Office of Legal Counsel and ignores the ample legal authority 
and historical precedent that clearly support the Committees' 
actions. For example, the Constitution expressly delegates to 
Congress the authority to ``determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings,''\97\ which includes the power to determine the 
procedures used for gathering information from witnesses 
whether via interview, staff deposition, or in a public 
hearing.\98\ The basis for the rule excluding agency counsel is 
straightforward: it prevents agency officials who are directly 
implicated in the abuses Congress is investigating from trying 
to prevent their own employees from coming forward to tell the 
truth to Congress. The rule protects the rights of witnesses by 
allowing them to be accompanied in depositions by personal 
counsel. Agency attorneys have been excluded from Congressional 
depositions of Executive Branch officials for decades, under 
both Republicans and Democrats, including Chairmen Dan Burton, 
Henry Waxman, Darrell Issa, Jason Chaffetz, Trey Gowdy, Kevin 
Brady, and Jeb Hensarling, among others.\99\
     Congress Can Exercise Its Broad Oversight 
Authority: According to Mr. Cipollone, ``you simply cannot 
expect to rely on oversight authority to gather information for 
an unauthorized impeachment inquiry that conflicts with all 
historical precedent and rides roughshod over due process and 
the separation of powers.''\100\ But, of course, the present 
impeachment inquiry does neither. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that Congress' ``power of inquiry'' is ``as 
penetrating and farreaching as the potential power to enact and 
appropriate under the Constitution.''\101\ The subject matter 
of the impeachment inquiry implicates the House's impeachment-
specific as well as legislative and oversight authorities and 
interests. The activity under investigation, for instance, 
relates to a broad array of issues in which Congress has 
legislated and may legislate in the future, including 
government ethics and transparency, election integrity, 
appropriations, foreign affairs, abuse of power, bribery, 
extortion, and obstruction of justice. In fact, Members of 
Congress have already introduced legislation on issues related 
to the impeachment inquiry.\102\ The House does not forfeit its 
Constitutional authority to investigate and legislate when it 
initiates an impeachment inquiry.\103\ Congress passed sweeping 
legislative reforms following the scandal over the Watergate 
break-in and President Nixon's resignation.\104\
     ``Confidentiality Interests'' Do Not Eliminate 
Congress' Authority: According to Mr. Cipollone, the 
Administration would also not comply with the Committees' 
demands for documents and testimony because of unspecified 
Executive Branch ``confidentiality interests.''\105\ There is 
no basis in the law of executive privilege for declaring a 
categorical refusal to respond to any House subpoena. In an 
impeachment inquiry, the House's need for information and its 
Constitutional authority are at their greatest, and the 
Executive's interest in confidentiality must yield. Only the 
President can assert executive privilege, yet he has not done 
so in the House's impeachment inquiry. Prior to asserting 
executive privilege, the Executive Branch is obligated to seek 
to accommodate the legitimate informational needs of Congress, 
which, as discussed below, it has not done.\106\ In any event, 
much of the information sought by the Committees would not be 
covered by executive privilege under any theory,\107\ and the 
privilege--where validly asserted on a particularized basis and 
not outweighed by the legitimate needs of the impeachment 
inquiry--would protect any legitimate Executive Branch interest 
in confidentiality.\108\
     President's Top Aides Are Not ``Absolutely 
Immune'': According to Mr. Cipollone, the President's top aides 
are ``absolutely immune'' from being compelled to testify 
before Congress.\109\ This extreme position has been explicitly 
and repeatedly rejected by Congress--which has received 
testimony from senior aides to many previous Presidents--and by 
federal courts. In 2008, a federal court rejected an assertion 
by President George W. Bush that White House Counsel Harriet 
Miers was immune from being compelled to testify, noting that 
the President had failed to identify even a single judicial 
opinion to justify his claim.\110\ On November 25, 2019, 
another federal judge rejected President Trump's claim of 
absolute immunity for former White House Counsel Don McGahn, 
concluding: ``Stated simply, the primary takeaway from the past 
250 years of recorded American history is that Presidents are 
not kings,'' and that ``Executive branch officials are not 
absolutely immune from compulsory congressional process--no 
matter how many times the Executive branch has asserted as much 
over the years--even if the President expressly directs such 
officials'' non-compliance.''\111\ Mr. Cipollone's position, 
adopted by President Trump, has thus been repudiated by 
Congress and the courts, and is not salvaged by Executive 
Branch legal opinions insisting upon a wholly fictional ground 
for non-compliance. In ordering categorical defiance of House 
subpoenas, President Trump has confirmed the unlimited breadth 
of his position and his unprecedented view that no branch of 
government--even the House--is empowered to investigate whether 
he may have committed constitutional offenses.
    In addition to advancing specious legal arguments, 
President Trump has made no effort to accommodate the House's 
interests in conducting the impeachment inquiry. For example, 
the Committees first requested documents from the White House 
on September 9, but the White House disregarded the 
request.\112\ The Committees made a second request on September 
24, but the White House again ignored the request.\113\ 
Finally, on October 4, the Committees transmitted a subpoena 
for the documents.\114\ However, on October 18, the White House 
Counsel sent a letter stating that ``the White House cannot 
comply with the October 4 subpoena.''\115\
    Since then, there has been no evidence of a willingness by 
the President to produce any of the documents covered by the 
subpoena to the White House. The State Department made passing 
references to potentially engaging in an ``accommodations'' 
process in response to its September 27 subpoena.\116\ However, 
there has been no effort to do so, and departments and agencies 
have not produced any documents in response to subpoenas issued 
as part of the House impeachment inquiry. The President also 
made no apparent effort to accommodate the House's need for 
witness testimony and instead continued to flatly refuse to 
allow Executive Branch officials to testify.

 3. The President's Refusal to Produce Any and All Subpoenaed Documents


Pursuant to the President's orders, the White House, federal 
        departments and agencies, and key witnesses refused to produce 
        any documents in response to duly authorized subpoenas issued 
        pursuant to the House's impeachment inquiry.

                                Overview

    Following President Trump's categorical order, not a single 
document has been produced by the White House, the Office of 
the Vice President, the Office of Management and Budget, the 
Department of State, the Department of Defense, or the 
Department of Energy in response to 71 specific, individualized 
requests or demands for records in their possession, custody, 
or control. The subpoenas to federal departments and agencies 
remain in full force and effect. These agencies and offices 
also blocked many current and former officials from producing 
records directly to the Committees.
    Certain witnesses defied the President's sweeping, 
categorical, and baseless order and identified the substance of 
key documents. Other witnesses identified numerous additional 
documents that the President and various agencies are 
withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment 
inquiry.
    The President's personal attorney, Mr. Giuliani, although a 
private citizen, also sought to rely on the President's order, 
as communicated in Mr. Cipollone's letter on October 8, to 
justify his decision to disobey a lawful subpoena for 
documents.

                            The White House

    On September 9, the Committees sent a letter to White House 
Counsel Pat Cipollone seeking six categories of documents in 
response to reports indicating that, ``for nearly two years, 
the President and his personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, appear 
to have acted outside legitimate law enforcement and diplomatic 
channels to coerce the Ukrainian government into pursuing two 
politically-motivated investigations under the guise of anti-
corruption activity.''\117\ The Committees asked the White 
House to voluntarily produce responsive documents by September 
16.\118\ The White House did not provide any response by that 
date.
    On September 24, the Committees sent a follow-up letter 
requesting that the White House produce the documents by 
September 26.\119\ Again, the White House did not provide any 
documents or respond by that date.
    Having received no response from the White House, then-
Chairman Elijah E. Cummings sent a memorandum to Members of the 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, which has jurisdiction over 
the Executive Office of the President, explaining that he was 
preparing to issue a subpoena in light of the White House's 
non-compliance and non-responsiveness. He wrote:

          Over the past several weeks, the Committees tried 
        several times to obtain voluntary compliance with our 
        requests for documents, but the White House has refused 
        to engage with--or even respond to--the 
        Committees.\120\

    On October 4, the Committees sent a letter to Acting White 
House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney transmitting a subpoena 
issued by Chairman Cummings compelling the White House to 
produce documents by October 18.\121\
    As discussed above, on October 8, the White House Counsel 
sent a letter to Speaker Pelosi and the Committees stating that 
``President Trump cannot permit his Administration to 
participate in this partisan inquiry under these 
circumstances.''\122\ The White House Counsel also sent a 
letter on October 18, confirming that ``the White House cannot 
comply with the October 4 subpoena to Acting Chief of Staff 
Mulvaney.''\123\
    To date, the White House has not produced a single document 
in response to the subpoena.\124\ Instead, the White House has 
released to the public only two documents--call records from 
the President's phone calls with President Zelensky on April 21 
and July 25.\125\
    Witnesses who testified before the Committees have 
identified multiple additional documents that the President is 
withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment 
inquiry, including but not limited to:
     briefing materials for President Trump's call with 
President Zelensky on July 25 prepared by Lt. Col. Alexander S. 
Vindman, Director for Ukraine at the National Security 
Council;\126\
     notes relating to the July 25 call taken by Lt. 
Col. Vindman and Tim Morrison, the former Senior Director for 
Europe and Russia on the National Security Council;\127\
     an August 15 ``Presidential decision memo'' 
prepared by Lt. Col. Vindman and approved by Mr. Morrison 
conveying ``the consensus views from the entire deputies small 
group'' that ``the security assistance be released'';\128\
     National Security Council staff summaries of 
conclusions from meetings at the principal, deputy, or sub-
deputy level relating to Ukraine, including military 
assistance;\129\
     call records between President Trump and 
Ambassador Gordon Sondland, United States Ambassador to the 
European Union;\130\
     National Security Council Legal Advisor John 
Eisenberg's notes and correspondence relating to discussions 
with Lt. Col. Vindman regarding the July 10 meetings in which 
Ambassador Sondland requested investigations in exchange for a 
White House meeting;\131\
     the memorandum of conversation from President 
Trump's meeting in New York with President Zelensky on 
September 25;\132\ and
     as explained below, emails and other messages 
between Ambassador Sondland and senior White House officials, 
including Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, Senior Advisor 
to the Chief of Staff Rob Blair, and then-National Security 
Advisor John Bolton, among other high-level Trump 
Administration officials.\133\
    The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that 
the White House is in possession of and continues to withhold 
significantly more documents and records responsive to the 
subpoena and of direct relevance to the impeachment inquiry.
    The Committees have closely tracked public reports that the 
White House is in possession of other correspondence and 
records of direct relevance to the impeachment inquiry. On 
November 24, for instance, a news report revealed that the 
White House had conducted a confidential, internal records 
review of the hold on military assistance in response to the 
Committees' inquiry. The review reportedly ``turned up hundreds 
of documents that reveal extensive efforts to generate an 
after-the-fact justification for the decision and a debate over 
whether the delay was legal.''\134\

                      Office of the Vice President

    On October 4, the Committees sent a letter to Vice 
President Mike Pence seeking 13 categories of documents in 
response to reports that he and his staff were directly 
involved in the matters under investigation. The Committees 
wrote:

          Recently, public reports have raised questions about 
        any role you may have played in conveying or 
        reinforcing the President's stark message to the 
        Ukrainian President. The reports include specific 
        references to a member of your staff who may have 
        participated directly in the July 25, 2019, call, 
        documents you may have obtained or reviewed, including 
        the record of the call, and your September 1, 2019, 
        meeting with the Ukrainian President in Warsaw, during 
        which you reportedly discussed the Administration's 
        hold on U.S. security assistance to Ukraine.\135\

    The Committees asked the Vice President to produce 
responsive documents by October 15.\136\ On that date, Matthew 
E. Morgan, Counsel to the Vice President, responded to the 
Committees by refusing to cooperate and reciting many of the 
same baseless arguments as the White House Counsel. He wrote:

          [T]he purported ``impeachment inquiry'' has been 
        designed and implemented in a manner that calls into 
        question your commitment to fundamental fairness and 
        due process rights. Never before in history has the 
        Speaker of the House attempted to launch an 
        ``impeachment inquiry'' against a President without a 
        majority of the House of Representatives voting to 
        authorize a constitutionally acceptable process.\137\

    To date, the Vice President has not produced a single 
document sought by the Committees and has not indicated any 
intent to do so going forward.
    Witnesses who testified before the Committees have 
identified multiple additional documents that the Vice 
President is withholding that are directly relevant to the 
impeachment inquiry, including but not limited to:
     notes taken by Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor 
to the Vice President for Europe and Russia, during the call 
between President Trump and President Zelensky on July 25;\138\
     notes taken by Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, National 
Security Advisor to the Vice President, during the call between 
President Trump and President Zelensky on July 25;\139\
     materials regarding the July 25 call that were 
placed in the Vice President's briefing book that same 
day;\140\
     the memorandum of conversation from Vice President 
Pence's call with President Zelensky on September 18;\141\ and
     briefing materials prepared for Vice President 
Pence's meeting with President Zelensky September 1 in Warsaw, 
Poland.\142\
    The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that 
the Office of the Vice President is in possession of and 
continues to withhold significantly more documents and records 
responsive to their request and of direct relevance to the 
impeachment inquiry.

                    Office of Management and Budget

    On October 7, the Committees sent a letter to Russell 
Vought, Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), conveying a subpoena issued by the Intelligence 
Committee for nine categories of documents in response to 
public reports that the President directed OMB to freeze 
hundreds of millions of dollars in military assistance 
appropriated by Congress to help Ukraine counter Russian 
aggression. The Committees wrote:

          According to multiple press reports, at some point in 
        July 2019, President Trump ordered Acting Chief of 
        Staff and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
        Director Mick Mulvaney to freeze the military aid to 
        Ukraine, and Mr. Mulvaney reportedly conveyed the 
        President's order ``through the budget office to the 
        Pentagon and the State Department, which were told only 
        that the administration was looking at whether the 
        spending was necessary.''\143\

    The subpoena compelled Acting Director Vought to produce 
responsive documents by October 15.\144\ On that day, OMB 
Associate Director for Legislative Affairs Jason Yaworske 
responded by refusing to produce any documents and reciting 
many of the same baseless arguments as the White House Counsel:

          [T]he President has advised that ``[g]iven that your 
        inquiry lacks any legitimate constitutional foundation, 
        any pretense of fairness, or even the most elementary 
        due process protections, the Executive Branch cannot be 
        expected to participate in it.'' . . . President Trump 
        cannot permit his Administration to participate in this 
        partisan inquiry under these circumstances.\145\

    To date, Acting Director Vought has not produced a single 
document sought by the Committees and has not indicated any 
intent to do so going forward.
    Witnesses who testified before the Committees have 
identified multiple additional documents that Acting Director 
Vought is withholding that are directly relevant to the 
impeachment inquiry, including but not limited to:
     a June 19 email from OMB Associate Director of 
National Security Programs Michael Duffey to Department of 
Defense (DOD) Deputy Comptroller Elaine McCusker regarding the 
fact that ``the President had seen a media report and he had 
questions about the assistance'' and expressing ``interest in 
getting more information from the Department of Defense,'' 
specifically a ``description of the program'';\146\
     a July 12 email from White House Assistant to the 
President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff Robert Blair 
to Associate Director Duffey explaining that the ``President is 
directing a hold on military support for Ukraine'' and not 
mentioning any other country or security assistance 
package;\147\ and
     an August 7 memorandum drafted in preparation for 
Acting Director Vought's attendance at a Principals Committee 
meeting on Ukrainian security assistance, which included a 
recommendation to lift the military assistance hold.\148\
    The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that 
the Office of Management and Budget is in possession of and 
continues to withhold significantly more documents and records 
responsive to the subpoena and of direct relevance to the 
impeachment inquiry.

                          Department of State

    On September 9, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo requesting six categories of documents in 
response to reports that ``President Trump and his personal 
attorney appear to have increased pressure on the Ukrainian 
government and its justice system in service of President 
Trump's reelection campaign'' and ``the State Department may be 
abetting this scheme.''\149\ The Committees requested that 
Secretary Pompeo produce responsive documents by September 16. 
The Secretary did not provide any documents or response by that 
date.
    On September 23, the Committees sent a follow-up letter 
asking Secretary Pompeo to ``inform the Committees by close of 
business on Thursday, September 26, 2019, whether you intend to 
fully comply with these requests or whether subpoenas will be 
necessary.''\150\ The Secretary did not provide any documents 
or respond by that date.
    On September 27, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary 
Pompeo conveying a subpoena for documents issued by Rep. Eliot 
Engel, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
compelling the production of documents by October 4.\151\
    Since Secretary Pompeo had failed to respond, the 
Committees also sent separate letters to six individual State 
Department employees seeking documents in their possession and 
requesting that they participate in depositions with the 
Committees.\152\
    On October 1, Secretary Pompeo responded to the Committees 
for the first time. He objected to the Committees seeking 
documents directly from State Department employees after he 
failed to produce them, claiming inaccurately that such a 
request was ``an act of intimidation and an invitation to 
violate federal records laws.''\153\ He also claimed that the 
Committees' inquiry was ``an attempt to intimidate, bully, and 
treat improperly the distinguished professionals of the 
Department of State.''\154\
    To the contrary, Deputy Assistant Secretary George Kent, 
one of the State Department professionals from whom the 
Committees sought documents and testimony, testified that he 
``had not felt bullied, threatened, and intimidated.''\155\ 
Rather, Mr. Kent said that the language in Secretary Pompeo's 
letter, which had been drafted by a State Department attorney 
without consulting Mr. Kent, ``was inaccurate.''\156\ Mr. Kent 
explained that, when he raised this concern, the State 
Department attorney ``spent the next 5 minutes glaring at me'' 
and then ``got very angry.'' According to Mr. Kent, the 
official ``started pointing at me with a clenched jaw and 
saying, What you did in there, if Congress knew what you were 
doing, they could say that you were trying to sort of control, 
or change the process of collecting documents.''\157\
    With respect to his own compliance with the subpoena for 
documents, Secretary Pompeo wrote that he ``intends to respond 
to that subpoena by the noticed return date of October 4, 
2019.''\158\
    Later on October 1, the Committees sent a letter to Deputy 
Secretary of State John J. Sullivan in light of new evidence 
that Secretary Pompeo participated on President Trump's call 
with President Zelensky on July 25. The Committees wrote:

          We are writing to you because Secretary Pompeo now 
        appears to have an obvious conflict of interest. He 
        reportedly participated personally in the July 25, 2019 
        call, in which President Donald Trump pressed President 
        Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine to investigate the son of 
        former Vice President Joseph Biden immediately after 
        the Ukrainian President raised his desire for United 
        States military assistance to counter Russian 
        aggression.
          If true, Secretary Pompeo is now a fact witness in 
        the impeachment inquiry. He should not be making any 
        decisions regarding witness testimony or document 
        production in order to protect himself or the 
        President. Any effort by the Secretary or the 
        Department to intimidate or prevent witnesses from 
        testifying or withhold documents from the Committees 
        shall constitute evidence of obstruction of the 
        impeachment inquiry.\159\

    The following day, at a press conference in Italy, 
Secretary Pompeo publicly acknowledged that he had been on the 
July 25 call between Presidents Trump and Zelensky.\160\
    On October 7, Committee staff met with State Department 
officials who acknowledged that they had taken no steps to 
collect documents in response to the September 9 letter, but 
instead had waited for the September 27 subpoena before 
beginning to search for responsive records. During that 
conversation, the Committees made a good-faith attempt to 
engage the Department in the constitutionally-mandated 
accommodations process. The Committees requested, on a priority 
basis, ``any and all documents that it received directly from 
Ambassador Sondland,'' as well as ``documents--especially those 
documents identified by the witnesses as responsive--related to 
Ambassador Yovanovitch and DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary] 
Kent.'' The depositions of these witnesses--Ambassador 
Sondland, Ambassador Yovanovitch, and Mr. Kent--were scheduled 
for the days shortly after that October 7 meeting. The 
Department's representatives stated that they would take the 
request back to senior State Department officials, but never 
provided any further response.\161\
    To date, Secretary Pompeo has not produced a single 
document sought by the Committees and has not indicated any 
intent to do so going forward. In addition, the Department has 
ordered its employees not to produce documents in their 
personal possession. For example, on October 14, the Department 
sent a letter to Mr. Kent's personal attorney warning that 
``your client is not authorized to disclose to Congress any 
records relating to official duties.''\162\
    Moreover, the Department appears to have actively 
discouraged its employees from identifying documents responsive 
to the Committees' subpoena. Mr. Kent testified in his 
deposition that he informed a Department attorney about 
additional responsive records that the Department had not 
collected, including an email from Assistant Secretary of State 
for Consular Affairs David Risch, who ``had spoken to Rudy 
Giuliani several times in January about trying to get a visa 
for the corrupt former prosecutor general of Ukraine, Viktor 
Shokin.''\163\ The Department attorney ``objected to [Mr. Kent] 
raising of the additional information'' and ``made clear that 
he did not think it was appropriate for [Mr. Kent] to make the 
suggestion.''\164\ Mr. Kent responded that what he was ``trying 
to do was make sure that the Department was being fully 
responsive.''\165\
    Certain witnesses defied the President's directive and 
produced the substance of key documents. For example, 
Ambassador Sondland attached ten exhibits to his written 
hearing statement.\166\ These exhibits contained replicas of 
emails and WhatsApp messages between Ambassador Sondland and 
high-level Trump Administration officials, including Secretary 
Pompeo, Secretary Perry, Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, 
and former National Security Advisor John Bolton.\167\ The 
exhibits also contained a replica of a WhatsApp message between 
Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak.\168\
    Earlier in the investigation, Ambassador Kurt Volker had 
produced key text messages with Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador 
Sondland, President Zelensky's senior aide, Andriy Yermak, Mr. 
Giuliani, and others very soon after the Committees requested 
them and prior to Mr. Cipollone's letter on October 8 conveying 
the President's directive not to comply.\169\
    The Department also prevented Ambassador Sondland--a 
current State Department employee--from accessing records to 
prepare for his testimony. As described above, federal law 
imposes fines and up to five years in prison for anyone who 
corruptly or by threats ``impedes or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede'' the ``due and proper exercise of the 
power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is 
being had by either House, or any committee of either 
House.''\170\ Ambassador Sondland explained that the 
Department's actions directly impeded his testimony:

          I have not had access to all of my phone records, 
        State Department emails, and other State Department 
        documents. And I was told I could not work with my EU 
        Staff to pull together the relevant files. Having 
        access to the State Department materials would have 
        been very helpful to me in trying to reconstruct with 
        whom I spoke and met, when, and what was said. . . .
          My lawyers and I have made multiple requests to the 
        State Department and the White House for these 
        materials. Yet, these materials were not provided to 
        me. They have also refused to share these materials 
        with this Committee. These documents are not classified 
        and, in fairness, should have been made available.\171\

    He testified, ``I have been hampered to provide completely 
accurate testimony without the benefit of those 
documents.''\172\ Ambassador Sondland also stated:

          Despite repeated requests to the White House and the 
        State Department, I have not been granted access to all 
        of the phone records, and I would like to review those 
        phone records, along with any notes and other documents 
        that may exist, to determine if I can provide more 
        complete testimony to assist Congress.\173\

    On November 22, the Department produced 99 pages of emails, 
letters, notes, timelines, and news articles to a non-partisan, 
nonprofit ethics watchdog organization pursuant to a court 
order in a lawsuit filed under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).\174\ This handful of documents was limited to a narrow 
window of time and specific people, but it clearly indicates 
that the Department is withholding documents that are 
responsive to the Committees' requests.
    For example, the Department's FOIA production contains an 
email from the Office Manager to the Secretary of State to 
``S--All'' sent on March 26 which states that ``S is speaking 
with Rudy Giuliani.''\175\ It also contains a March 27 email in 
which Madeleine Westerhout, the Personal Secretary to President 
Trump, facilitates another phone call between Rudy Giuliani and 
Secretary Pompeo.\176\ These documents are directly responsive 
to the September 27 subpoena for ``all documents and 
communications, from January 20, 2017 to the present, relating 
or referring to: Communications between any current or former 
State Department officials or employees and Rudolph W. 
Giuliani, including any text messages using personal or work-
related devices.''\177\
    Witnesses who testified before the Committees have 
identified multiple additional documents that Secretary Pompeo 
is withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment 
inquiry, including but not limited to:
     a cable on August 29 from Ambassador Bill Taylor, 
at the recommendation of then-National Security Advisor John 
Bolton, sent directly to Secretary Pompeo ``describing the 
folly I saw in withholding military aid to Ukraine at a time 
when hostilities were still active in the east and when Russia 
was watching closely to gauge the level of American support for 
the Ukrainian Government'' and telling Secretary Pompeo ``that 
I could not and would not defend such a policy'';\178\
     WhatsApp messages and emails that Ambassador 
Sondland replicated and provided as exhibits to the 
Intelligence Committee showing key communications between 
Ambassador Sondland and high-level Trump Administration 
officials, including Secretary Pompeo, Secretary Perry, Acting 
Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, and Ambassador Bolton, as well as 
President Zelensky's senior aide, Andriy Yermak;\179\
     notes and memoranda to file from Mr. Kent, 
Ambassador Taylor, and others, including Ambassador Taylor's 
``little notebook'' in which he would ``take notes on 
conversations, in particular when I'm not in the office,'' such 
as meetings with Ukrainians or when out and receiving a phone 
call,'' as well as his ``small, little spiral notebook'' of 
calls that took place in the office;\180\
     emails among Philip Reeker, Acting Assistant 
Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs; 
David Hale, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Mr. 
Kent; and others regarding the unsuccessful effort to issue a 
public statement in support of Ambassador Yovanovitch, 
including the ``large number of emails related to the press 
guidance and the allegations about the Ambassador'' from the 
``late March timeframe.''\181\
    The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that 
the Department of State is in possession of and continues to 
withhold significantly more documents and records responsive to 
the subpoena and of direct relevance to the impeachment 
inquiry.

                         Department of Defense

    On October 7, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary of 
Defense Mark Esper conveying a subpoena issued by the 
Intelligence Committee for 14 categories of documents in 
response to reports that the President directed a freeze of 
hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid appropriated by 
Congress to help Ukraine counter Russian aggression. The 
Committees wrote:

          Officials at the Departments of State and Defense 
        reportedly were ``puzzled and alarmed'' after learning 
        about the White House's directive. Defense Department 
        officials reportedly ``tried to make a case to the 
        White House that the Ukraine aid was effective and 
        should not be looked at in the same manner as other 
        aid,'' but ``those arguments were ignored.''\182\

    The subpoena required Secretary Esper to produce responsive 
documents by October 15. On October 13, Secretary Esper stated 
in a public interview that the Department would comply with the 
Intelligence Committee's subpoena:

          Q: Very quickly, are you going to comply with the 
        subpoena that the House provided you and provide 
        documents to them regarding to the halt to military aid 
        to Ukraine?
          A: Yeah we will do everything we can to cooperate 
        with the Congress. Just in the last week or two, my 
        general counsel sent out a note as we typically do in 
        these situations to ensure documents are retained.
          Q: Is that a yes?
          A: That's a yes.
          Q: You will comply with the subpoena?
          A: We will do everything we can to comply.\183\

    On October 15, however, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Legislative Affairs Robert R. Hood responded by refusing to 
produce any documents and reciting many of the same legally 
unsupportable arguments as the White House Counsel:

          In light of these concerns, and in view of the 
        President's position as expressed in the White House 
        Counsel's October 8 letter, and without waiving any 
        other objections to the subpoena that the Department 
        may have, the Department is unable to comply with your 
        request for documents at this time.\184\

    To date, Secretary Esper has not produced a single document 
sought by the Committees and has not indicated any intent to do 
so going forward, notwithstanding his public promise to ``do 
everything we can to comply.''\185\
    Witnesses who testified before the Committees have 
identified multiple additional documents that Secretary Esper 
is withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment 
inquiry, including but not limited to:
     DOD staff readouts from National Security Council 
meetings at the principal, deputy, or sub-deputy level relating 
to Ukraine, including military assistance;\186\
     an email from Secretary Esper's Chief of Staff, to 
Laura K. Cooper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, in late July ``asking for follow-
up on a meeting with the President,'' including information on 
whether ``U.S. industry [is] providing any of this equipment,'' 
``international contributions'' to Ukraine, and ``who gave this 
funding'';\187\
     fact sheets and other information provided by Ms. 
Cooper in response to the email request;\188\
     an email sent to Ms. Cooper's staff on July 25 at 
2:31 p.m.--the same day as President's Trump's call with 
Ukrainian President Zelensky--stating that the Ukrainian 
Embassy was inquiring about the status of military aid, 
suggesting that Ukrainian officials were concerned about the 
status of the military aid much earlier than ever previously 
acknowledged by the Executive Branch;\189\
     an email sent to Ms. Cooper's staff on July 25 at 
4:25 p.m. stating that the Ukrainian Embassy and The Hill 
newspaper had become aware of the situation with the military 
assistance funding;\190\ and
     an email received by Ms. Cooper's staff on July 3 
at 4:23 p.m.--from the Department of State explaining that the 
Department of State ``had heard the CN [Congressional 
Notification] is currently being blocked by OMB.''\191\
    The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that 
the Department of Defense is in possession of and continues to 
withhold significantly more documents and records responsive to 
the subpoena and of direct relevance to the impeachment 
inquiry.

                          Department of Energy

    On October 10, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary of 
Energy Rick Perry conveying a subpoena issued by the 
Intelligence Committee for ten categories of documents in 
response to reports about his involvement with matters under 
investigation. The Committees wrote:

          Recently, public reports have raised questions about 
        any role you may have played in conveying or 
        reinforcing the President's stark message to the 
        Ukrainian President. These reports have also raised 
        significant questions about your efforts to press 
        Ukrainian officials to change the management structure 
        at a Ukrainian state-owned energy company to benefit 
        individuals involved with Rudy Giuliani's push to get 
        Ukrainian officials to interfere in our 2020 
        election.\192\

    The subpoena required Secretary Perry to produce responsive 
documents by October 18. On that day, Melissa F. Burnison, the 
Assistant Secretary of Energy for Congressional and 
Intergovernmental Affairs, responded by refusing to produce any 
documents and reciting many of the same flawed arguments as the 
White House Counsel:

          Pursuant to these concerns, the Department restates 
        the President's position: ``Given that your inquiry 
        lacks any legitimate constitutional foundation, any 
        pretense of fairness, or even the most elementary due 
        process protections, the Executive Branch cannot be 
        expected to participate in it.''\193\

    To date, Secretary Perry has not produced a single document 
sought by the Committees and has not indicated any intent to do 
so going forward.
    Witnesses who testified before the Committees have 
identified multiple documents that Secretary Perry is 
withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment 
inquiry, including but not limited to:
     a document passed directly from Secretary Perry to 
President Zelensky in a May 2019 meeting with a list of 
``people he trusts'' that President Zelensky could seek advice 
from on issues of relating to ``key Ukrainian energy-sector 
contacts,'' according to David Holmes, the Political Counselor 
at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv;\194\
     a June 5 email from Philip Reeker, Acting 
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian 
Affairs, to Secretary Perry and others, regarding ``Zelenskyy's 
visit to Brussels, and the critical perhaps historic role of 
the dinner and engagement Gordon [Ambassador Sondland] 
coordinated'';\195\ and
     a July 19 email from Secretary Perry in which he 
states ``Mick [Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney] just 
confirmed the call being set up for tomorrow by NSC'' in 
reference to a call between President Trump and President 
Zelensky.\196\
    The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that 
the Department of Energy is in possession of and continues to 
withhold significantly more documents and records responsive to 
the subpoena and of direct relevance to the impeachment 
inquiry.

                    Rudy Giuliani and His Associates

    On September 30, the Committees sent a letter conveying a 
subpoena issued by the Intelligence Committee to the 
President's personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, compelling the 
production of 23 categories of documents relating to his 
actions in Ukraine.\197\
    On October 15, Mr. Giuliani's counsel responded to the 
Committees by stating that Mr. Giuliani ``will not participate 
because this appears to be an unconstitutional, baseless, and 
illegitimate `impeachment inquiry.'''\198\ He also stated: 
``Mr. Giuliani adopts all the positions set forth in Mr. 
Cipollone's October 8, 2019 letter on behalf of President 
Donald J. Trump.''\199\
    To date, Mr. Giuliani has not produced a single document 
sought by the Committees and has not indicated any intent to do 
so going forward.
    On September 30, the Committees sent letters to two of Mr. 
Giuliani's business associates--Igor Fruman and Lev Parnas--
requesting testimony and eleven categories of documents from 
each.\200\ The Committees sought documents from Mr. Fruman and 
Mr. Parnas related to their efforts to influence U.S. 
elections.
    According to press reports, Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman 
reportedly were ``assisting with Giuliani's push to get 
Ukrainian officials to investigate former vice president Joe 
Biden and his son as well as Giuliani's claim that Democrats 
conspired with Ukrainians in the 2016 campaign.'' Press reports 
also indicate that Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman were involved with 
efforts to press Ukrainian officials to change the management 
structure at a Ukrainian state-owned energy company, Naftogaz, 
to benefit individuals involved with Mr. Giuliani's push to get 
Ukrainian officials to interfere in the 2020 election.\201\
    On October 3, counsel to Mr. Fruman and Mr. Parnas 
responded to Committee staff, explaining his clients' 
relationship with Mr. Giuliani and President Trump:

          Be advised that Messrs. Parnas and Fruman assisted 
        Mr. Giuliani in connection with his representation of 
        President Trump. Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman have also 
        been represented by Mr. Giuliani in connection with 
        their personal and business affairs. They also assisted 
        Joseph DiGenova and Victoria Toensing in their law 
        practice.\202\

    With respect to preparing Mr. Fruman's and Mr. Parnas' 
response, their counsel wrote: ``The amount of time required is 
difficult to determine. [sic] but we are happy to keep you 
advised of our progress and engage in a rolling production of 
non-privileged documents.''
    On October 8, their counsel wrote again to Committee staff, 
stating:

          This is an update. We continue to meet with Mr. 
        Parnas and Mr. Fruman to gather the facts and documents 
        related to the many subjects and persons detailed in 
        your September 30 letter and to evaluate all of that 
        information in light of the privileges we raised in our 
        last letter.\203\

    On October 9, their counsel wrote to Committee staff, 
stating, ``Please be advised that Messrs. Parnas and Fruman 
agree with and adopt the position of White House Counsel 
pertaining to Democrat inquiry.''\204\
    On October 10, the Committees transmitted subpoenas 
compelling Mr. Fruman and Mr. Parnas to produce eleven 
categories of documents.\205\ That same day, their counsel 
responded:

          As I did in my recent letter of October 8, 2019, 
        please be advised we were in the formative stages of 
        recovering and reviewing records on October 9 when 
        Messrs. Parnas and Fruman were arrested by the FBI and 
        locked up in Virginia pursuant to Four Count Indictment 
        by a Federal Grand Jury in the Southern District of New 
        York unsealed on October 10, 2019.
          Further, their records and other belongings, 
        including materials sought by your subpoenas, were 
        seized pursuant warrants [sic] by the FBI in several 
        locations on the 9th and 10th of October.\206\

    To date, Mr. Fruman has not produced a single document in 
response to his subpoena and has not indicated any intent to do 
so going forward.
    With respect to Mr. Parnas, he obtained new counsel during 
the course of the impeachment inquiry. His new attorney has 
asserted that Mr. Parnas will cooperate with the House's 
inquiry, stating: ``We will honor and not avoid the committee's 
requests to the extent they are legally proper, while 
scrupulously protecting Mr. Parnas' privileges including that 
of the Fifth Amendment.''\207\
    In contrast to Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Fruman, Mr. Parnas has 
begun rolling production of certain records in his possession, 
custody, or control in response to the subpoena, which the 
Committees are evaluating. The Committees expect Mr. Parnas' 
full compliance with the subpoena.

        4. The President's Refusal to Allow Top Aides to Testify


At President Trump's direction, twelve current or former Administration 
        officials refused to testify as part of the House's impeachment 
        inquiry, ten of whom did so in defiance of duly authorized 
        subpoenas. The President's orders were coordinated and executed 
        by the White House Counsel and others, and they prevented 
        testimony from officials from the White House, National 
        Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, Department 
        of State, and Department of Energy.

                                Overview

    No other President in history has issued an order 
categorically directing the entire Executive Branch not to 
testify before Congress, including in the context of an 
impeachment inquiry. President Trump issued just such an order.
    As reflected in White House Counsel Pat Cipollone's October 
8 letter, President Trump directed all government witnesses to 
violate their legal obligations by defying House subpoenas 
regardless of their office or position.\208\ President Trump 
even extended his order to former officials no longer employed 
by the federal government. This Administration-wide effort to 
prevent all witnesses from providing testimony was coordinated 
and comprehensive.
    These witnesses were warned that their refusal to testify 
``shall constitute evidence that may be used against you in a 
contempt proceeding'' and ``may be used as an adverse inference 
against you and the President.''
    Despite the President's unprecedented commands, the House 
gathered a wealth of evidence of his conduct from courageous 
individuals who were willing to follow the law, comply with 
duly authorized subpoenas, and tell the truth. Nevertheless, 
the President's efforts to obstruct witness testimony deprived 
Congress and the public of additional evidence.
    In following President Trump's orders to defy duly 
authorized Congressional subpoenas, several Administration 
officials who, to date, remain under subpoena may have placed 
themselves at risk of being held in criminal contempt of 
Congress.\209\ These witnesses were warned explicitly that 
their refusal to obey lawful orders to testify ``shall 
constitute evidence that may be used against you in a contempt 
proceeding'' and could also result in adverse inferences being 
drawn against both them and the President.\210\

            Mick Mulvaney, Acting White House Chief of Staff

    On November 5, the Committees sent a letter to Acting White 
House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney seeking his appearance at a 
deposition on November 8.\211\ The Committees received no 
response to this letter.
    On November 7, the Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena 
compelling Mr. Mulvaney's appearance at a deposition on 
November 8.\212\ On November 8, Mr. Mulvaney's personal 
attorney sent an email to Committee staff stating that ``Mr. 
Mulvaney will not be attending the deposition today, and he is 
considering the full range of his legal options.''\213\
    Mr. Mulvaney's personal attorney provided a letter that was 
sent on November 8 from Mr. Cipollone, stating that ``the 
President directs Mr. Mulvaney not to appear at the Committee's 
scheduled deposition on November 8, 2019.''\214\ Mr. Mulvaney's 
personal attorney also provided a letter sent on November 7 
from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General at the Office 
of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, to Mr. 
Cipollone, stating, ``Mr. Mulvaney is absolutely immune from 
compelled congressional testimony in his capacity as a senior 
advisor to the President.''\215\
    Mr. Mulvaney did not appear at the deposition on November 
8, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The Committees met, 
and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Mulvaney's absence, 
stating:

          Neither Congress nor the courts recognize a blanket 
        absolute immunity as a basis to defy a congressional 
        subpoena. Mr. Mulvaney and the White House, therefore, 
        have no legitimate legal basis to evade a duly 
        authorized subpoena. The President's direction to Mr. 
        Mulvaney to defy our subpoena can, therefore, only be 
        construed as an effort to delay testimony and obstruct 
        the inquiry, consistent with the White House Counsel's 
        letter dated October 8, 2019.\216\

    Chairman Schiff also explained Mr. Mulvaney's knowledge of 
and role in facilitating the President's conduct:

          Mr. Mulvaney's role in facilitating the White House's 
        obstruction of the impeachment inquiry does not occur 
        in a vacuum. Over the past several weeks, we have 
        gathered extensive evidence of the President's abuse of 
        power related to pressuring Ukraine to pursue 
        investigations that would benefit the President 
        personally and politically and jeopardize national 
        security in doing so. Some of that evidence has 
        revealed that Mr. Mulvaney was a percipient witness to 
        misconduct by the President and may have had a role in 
        certain actions under investigation. The evidence shows 
        that Mr. Mulvaney may have coordinated with U.S. 
        Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland, Rudy 
        Giuliani, and others to carry out President Trump's 
        scheme to condition a White House meeting with 
        President Zelensky on the Ukrainians' pursuit of 
        investigations of the Bidens, Burisma holdings, and 
        purported Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. 
        Presidential election. In addition, evidence suggests 
        that Mr. Mulvaney may have played a central role in 
        President Trump's attempt to coerce Ukraine into 
        launching his desired political investigations by 
        withholding nearly $400 million in vital security 
        assistance from Ukraine that had been appropriated by 
        Congress. At a White House press briefing on October 
        17, 2019, Mr. Mulvaney admitted publicly that President 
        Trump ordered the hold on Ukraine security assistance 
        to further the President's own personal political 
        interests rather than the national interest. . . .
          Based on the record evidence gathered to date, we can 
        only infer that Mr. Mulvaney's refusal to testify is 
        intended to prevent the Committees from learning 
        additional evidence of President Trump's misconduct and 
        that Mr. Mulvaney's testimony would corroborate and 
        confirm other witnesses' accounts of such misconduct. 
        If the White House had evidence to contest those facts, 
        they would allow Mr. Mulvaney to be deposed. Instead, 
        the President and the White House are hiding and trying 
        to conceal the truth from the American people. Given 
        the extensive evidence the Committees have already 
        uncovered, the only result of this stonewalling is to 
        buttress the case for obstruction of this inquiry.\217\

    To date, Mr. Mulvaney has not changed his position about 
compliance with the subpoena.\218\

 Robert B. Blair, Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor to the 
                             Chief of Staff

    On October 24, the Committees sent a letter to Robert B. 
Blair, an Assistant to the President and the Senior Advisor to 
Acting Chief of Staff Mulvaney, seeking Mr. Blair's appearance 
at a deposition on November 1.\219\ On November 2, Mr. Blair's 
personal attorney sent a letter to the Committees stating:

          Mr. Blair has been directed by the White House not to 
        appear and testify at the Committees' proposed 
        deposition, based on the Department of Justice's advice 
        that the Committees may not validly require an 
        executive branch witness to appear at such a deposition 
        without the assistance of agency counsel. In light of 
        the clear direction he has been given by the Executive 
        Branch, Mr. Blair must respectfully decline to testify, 
        as you propose, on Monday, November 4, 2019.\220\

    On November 3, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. Blair's 
personal attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling Mr. Blair 
to appear at a deposition on November 4.\221\
    On November 4, Mr. Blair did not appear for the scheduled 
deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The 
Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Blair's 
absence, stating:

          Although the committees requested a copy of the 
        correspondence from the White House and Department of 
        Justice, Mr. Blair's Counsel did not provide it to the 
        Committees. This new and shifting rationale from the 
        White House, like the others it has used to attempt to 
        block witnesses from appearing to provide testimony 
        about the President's misconduct, has no basis in law 
        or the Constitution and is a serious affront to decades 
        of precedent in which Republicans and Democrats have 
        used exactly the same procedures to depose executive 
        branch officials without agency counsel present, 
        including some of the most senior aides to multiple 
        previous Presidents.\222\

    Unlike President Trump's directive to Acting Chief of Staff 
Mulvaney, neither Mr. Blair nor the White House have asserted 
that Mr. Blair is ``absolutely immune'' from providing 
testimony to Congress. To date, Mr. Blair has not changed his 
position or contacted the Committees about compliance with the 
subpoena.

        Ambassador John Bolton, Former National Security Advisor

    On October 30, the Committees sent a letter to the personal 
attorney of Ambassador John Bolton, the former National 
Security Advisor to President Trump, seeking his appearance at 
a deposition on November 7.\223\ Later that day, Ambassador 
Bolton's personal attorney sent an email to Committee staff 
stating, ``As you no doubt have anticipated, Ambassador Bolton 
is not willing to appear voluntarily.''\224\
    On November 7, Ambassador Bolton did not appear for the 
scheduled deposition. On November 8, Ambassador Bolton's 
personal attorney sent a letter to Douglas Letter, the General 
Counsel of the House of Representatives, suggesting that, if 
Ambassador Bolton were subpoenaed, he would file a lawsuit and 
would comply with the subpoena only if ordered to do so by the 
court. He referenced a lawsuit filed by another former 
official, Dr. Charles Kupperman, represented by the same 
attorney, and stated:

          As I emphasized in my previous responses to letters 
        from the House Chairs, Dr. Kupperman stands ready, as 
        does Ambassador Bolton, to testify if the Judiciary 
        resolves the conflict in favor of the Legislative 
        Branch's position respecting such testimony.\225\
          To date, Ambassador Bolton has not changed his 
        position or come forward to testify.\226\

    John A. Eisenberg, Deputy Counsel to the President for National 
     Security Affairs and Legal Advisor, National Security Council

    On October 30, the Committees sent a letter to John A. 
Eisenberg, the Deputy Counsel to the President for National 
Security Affairs and the Legal Advisor at the National Security 
Council, seeking his appearance at a deposition on November 
4.\227\ The Committees received no response to this 
letter.\228\
    On November 1, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. 
Eisenberg transmitting a subpoena compelling his appearance at 
a deposition on November 4.\229\ On November 4, Mr. Eisenberg's 
personal attorney sent a letter to the Committees, stating:

          Even if Mr. Eisenberg had been afforded a reasonable 
        amount of time to prepare, the President has instructed 
        Mr. Eisenberg not to appear at the deposition. Enclosed 
        with this letter is the President's instruction as 
        relayed by Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, 
        in a letter dated November 3, 2019. We also enclose a 
        letter, also dated November 3, 2019, from Steven A. 
        Engel, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of 
        Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, to Mr. 
        Cipollone advising that Mr. Eisenberg is ``absolutely 
        immune from compelled congressional testimony in his 
        capacity as a senior advisor to the President.'' Under 
        these circumstances, Mr. Eisenberg has no other option 
        that is consistent with his legal and ethical 
        obligations except to follow the direction of his 
        client and employer, the President of the United 
        States. Accordingly, Mr. Eisenberg will not be 
        appearing for a deposition at this time.\230\

    Enclosed was a letter sent on November 3 from Mr. Cipollone 
to Mr. Eisenberg's personal attorney stating that ``the 
President directs Mr. Eisenberg not to appear at the 
Committee's deposition on Monday, November 4, 2019.''\231\ Also 
enclosed was a letter sent on November 3 from the Office of 
Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice to Mr. Cipollone 
stating:

          You have asked whether the Committee may compel Mr. 
        Eisenberg to testify. We conclude that he is absolutely 
        immune from compelled congressional testimony in his 
        capacity as a senior advisor to the President.\232\

    Mr. Eisenberg did not appear for the scheduled deposition, 
in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The Committees met and 
Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Eisenberg's absence, stating:

          Despite his legal obligations to comply, Mr. 
        Eisenberg is not present here today and has therefore 
        defied a duly authorized congressional subpoena. This 
        morning, in an email received at 9:00 a.m., when the 
        deposition was supposed to commence, Mr. Eisenberg's 
        personal attorney sent a letter to the committee 
        stating that President Trump had, quote, ``instructed 
        Mr. Eisenberg not to appear at the deposition,'' 
        unquote. The attorney attached correspondence from 
        White House counsel Pat Cipollone and a letter from the 
        Office of Legal Counsel at Department of Justice. The 
        OLC letter informs the White House that Mr. Eisenberg 
        is purportedly, quote, ``absolutely immune from 
        compelled congressional testimony in his capacity as a 
        senior advisor to the President,'' unquote. . . .
          Moreover, neither Congress nor the courts recognize a 
        blanket, quote, ``absolute immunity,'' unquote, as a 
        basis to defy a congressional subpoena. Mr. Eisenberg 
        and the White House, therefore, have no basis for 
        evading a lawful subpoena. As such, the President's 
        direction to Mr. Eisenberg to defy a lawful compulsory 
        process can only be construed as an effort to delay 
        testimony and obstruct the inquiry, consistent with the 
        White House counsel's letter dated October 8, 2019. As 
        Mr. Eisenberg was informed, the Committees may consider 
        his noncompliance with the subpoena as evidence in a 
        future contempt proceeding. His failure or refusal to 
        appear, moreover, shall constitute evidence of 
        obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may 
        be used as an adverse inference against the President. 
        The subpoena remains in full force. The committees 
        reserve all of their rights, including the right to 
        raise this matter at a future Intelligence Committee 
        proceeding, at the discretion of the chair of the 
        committee.
          Mr. Eisenberg's nonappearance today adds to a growing 
        body of evidence of the White House seeking to obstruct 
        the White House's impeachment inquiry. To the extent 
        the White House believes that an issue could be raised 
        at the deposition that may implicate a valid claim of 
        privilege, the White House may seek to assert that 
        privilege with the Committee in advance of the 
        deposition. To date, as has been the case in every 
        other deposition as part of the inquiry, the White 
        House has not done so. Mr. Eisenberg's failure to 
        appear today also flies in the face of historical 
        precedent. Even absent impeachment proceedings, 
        congressional committees have deposed senior White 
        House officials, including White House counsels and 
        senior White House lawyers.\233\

  Michael Ellis, Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy 
                Legal Advisor, National Security Council

    On October 30, the Committees sent a letter to Michael 
Ellis, a Senior Associate Counsel to the President and the 
Deputy Legal Advisor at the National Security Council, seeking 
his appearance at a deposition on November 4.\234\ On November 
2, Mr. Ellis' personal attorney sent an email to Committee 
staff stating:

          [W]e are in receipt of an opinion from the Office of 
        Legal Counsel providing guidance on the validity of a 
        subpoena under the current terms and conditions and 
        based on that guidance we are not in a position to 
        appear for a deposition at this time.\235\

    This email followed the November 1 Office of Legal Counsel 
opinion, discussed above, which sought to extend the reach of 
the President's earlier direction to defy Congressional 
subpoenas and provided justification for noncompliance by 
officials who could not plausibly be considered among the 
President's closest advisors.
    On November 3, Mr. Ellis' personal attorney sent another 
email to Committee staff stating:

          [O]ur guidance is that the failure to permit agency 
        counsel to attend a deposition of Mr. Ellis would not 
        allow sufficient protection of relevant privileges and 
        therefore render any subpoena constitutionally invalid. 
        As an Executive branch employee Mr. Ellis is required 
        to follow this guidance.\236\

    On November 3, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. Ellis' 
personal attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling his 
appearance at a deposition on November 4, stating:

          Mr. Ellis' failure or refusal to comply with the 
        subpoena, including at the direction or behest of the 
        President or the White House, shall constitute further 
        evidence of obstruction of the House's impeachment 
        inquiry and may be used as an adverse inference against 
        Mr. Ellis and the President.\237\

    On November 4, Mr. Ellis did not appear for the scheduled 
deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The 
Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Ellis' 
absence, stating:

          Other than the White House's objections to 
        longstanding congressional practice, the committees are 
        aware of no other valid constitutional privilege 
        asserted by the White House to direct Mr. Ellis to defy 
        this subpoena.\238\

    To date, Mr. Ellis has not changed his position or 
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.

 Preston Wells Griffith, Senior Director for International Energy and 
                 Environment, National Security Council

    On October 24, the Committees sent a letter to Preston 
Wells Griffith, the Senior Director for International Energy 
and Environment at the National Security Council, seeking his 
appearance at a deposition on November 5.\239\ On November 4, 
Mr. Griffith's personal attorney sent a letter to the 
Committees stating:

          As discussed with Committee counsel, Mr. Griffith 
        respectfully declines to appear for a deposition before 
        the joint Committees conducting the impeachment 
        inquiry, based upon the direction of White House 
        Counsel that he not appear due to agency counsel not 
        being permitted.\240\

    Later that day, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. 
Griffith's personal attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling 
his appearance at a deposition on November 5, stating:

          Mr. Griffith's failure or refusal to comply with the 
        subpoena, including at the direction or behest of the 
        President or the White House, shall constitute further 
        evidence of obstruction of the House's impeachment 
        inquiry and may be used as an adverse inference against 
        Mr. Griffith and the President.\241\

    On November 5, Mr. Griffith did not appear for the 
scheduled deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. 
The Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. 
Griffith's absence, stating:

          Although the committees requested a copy of any 
        written direction from the White House, Mr. Griffith's 
        counsel has not provided any such documentation to the 
        committees. The White House's newly invented rationale 
        for obstructing the impeachment inquiry appears based 
        on a legal opinion that was issued by the Department of 
        Justice Office of Legal Counsel just last Friday, 
        November 1. It is noteworthy and telling that OLC 
        issued this opinion after multiple current and former 
        White House, State Department, and Department of 
        Defense officials testified before the committees, both 
        voluntarily and pursuant to subpoena, all without 
        agency counsel present. The White House's invocation of 
        this self-serving OLC opinion should therefore be seen 
        for what it is: a desperate attempt to staunch the flow 
        of incriminating testimony from the executive branch 
        officials about the President's abuse of power.\242\

    To date, Mr. Griffith has not changed his position or 
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.

Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for 
          National Security Affairs, National Security Council

    On October 16, the Committees sent a letter to Dr. Charles 
M. Kupperman, a former Deputy Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, seeking his appearance at a 
deposition on October 23.\243\
    On October 25, the Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena 
compelling Dr. Kupperman to appear at a deposition on October 
28.\244\
    Later that day, Dr. Kupperman's personal attorney sent an 
email to Committee staff attaching a 17-page complaint in 
federal court seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether he 
should comply with the subpoena.\245\ His counsel wrote:

          Pending the courts' determination as to which Branch 
        should prevail, Dr. Kupperman will not effectively 
        adjudicate the conflict by appearing and testifying 
        before the Committees.\246\

    Enclosed as part of the complaint was a letter sent on 
October 25 from Mr. Cipollone to Dr. Kupperman's personal 
attorney stating that ``the President directs Mr. Kupperman not 
to appear at the Committee's scheduled hearing on Monday, 
October 28, 2019.''\247\ Also enclosed was a letter sent on 
October 25 from the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department 
of Justice, to Mr. Cipollone stating that Dr. Kupperman ``is 
absolutely immune from compelled congressional testimony in his 
capacity as a former senior advisor to the President.''\248\
    On October 26, the Committees sent a letter to Dr. 
Kupperman's personal attorneys, stating:

          In light of the direction from the White House, which 
        lacks any valid legal basis, the Committees shall 
        consider your client's defiance of a congressional 
        subpoena as additional evidence of the President's 
        obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry.\249\

    Later that day, Dr. Kupperman's personal attorney sent a 
letter to Committee staff, stating: ``The proper course for Dr. 
Kupperman, we respectfully submit, is to lay the conflicting 
positions before the Court and abide by the Court's judgment as 
to which is correct.''\250\ On October 27, Dr. Kupperman's 
personal attorney sent a letter to Committee staff, writing: 
``If your clients'' position on the merits of this issue is 
correct, it will prevail in court, and Dr. Kupperman, I assure 
you again, will comply with the Court's judgment.''\251\
    On November 5, the Committees sent a letter to Dr. 
Kupperman's personal attorneys withdrawing the subpoena, 
stating:

          The question whether the Executive Branch's 
        ``absolute immunity'' theory has any basis in law is 
        currently before the court in Committee on the 
        Judiciary v. McGahn, No. 19-cv-2379 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 
        7, 2019). In addition to not suffering from the 
        jurisdictional flaws in Dr. Kupperman's suit, McGahn is 
        procedurally much further along.\252\

    On November 8, Dr. Kupperman's personal attorney sent a 
letter to Douglas Letter, the General Counsel of the House of 
Representatives, stating that Dr. Kupperman stands ready to 
testify ``if the Judiciary resolves the conflict in favor of 
the Legislative Branch's position respecting such 
testimony.''\253\
    On November 25, the district court in McGahn held that 
``with respect to senior-level presidential aides, absolute 
immunity from compelled congressional process simply does not 
exist.'' The court explained there is ``no basis in the law'' 
for a claim of absolute immunity regardless of the position of 
the aides in question or whether they ``are privy to national 
security matters, or work solely on domestic issues.''\254\ To 
date and notwithstanding the ruling in McGahn as it relates to 
Presidential aides who ``are privy to national security 
matters,'' Dr. Kupperman continues to refuse to testify, and 
his case remains pending in federal court.\255\

  Russell T. Vought, Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget

    On October 11, the Committees sent a letter to Russell T. 
Vought, the Acting Director of OMB, seeking his appearance at a 
deposition on October 25.\256\ On October 21, an attorney at 
OMB sent an email to Committee staff stating:

          Per the White House Counsel's October 8, 2019 letter, 
        the President has directed that ``[c]onsistent with the 
        duties of the President of the United States, and in 
        particular his obligation to preserve the rights of 
        future occupants of his office, [he] cannot permit his 
        Administration to participate in this partisan inquiry 
        under these circumstances.'' Therefore, Acting Director 
        Vought will not be participating in Friday's 
        deposition.\257\

    That same day, Mr. Vought publicly stated:

          I saw some Fake News over the weekend to correct. As 
        the WH letter made clear two weeks ago, OMB officials--
        myself and Mike Duffey--will not be complying with 
        deposition requests this week. #shamprocess.\258\

    On October 25, the Committees sent a letter transmitting a 
subpoena compelling Mr. Vought's appearance at a deposition on 
November 6.\259\
    On November 4, Jason A. Yaworske, the Associate Director 
for Legislative Affairs at OMB, sent a letter to Chairman 
Schiff stating:

          The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reasserts 
        its position that, as directed by the White House 
        Counsel's October 8, 2019, letter, OMB will not 
        participate in this partisan and unfair impeachment 
        inquiry. . . . Therefore, Mr. Vought, Mr. Duffey, and 
        Mr. McCormack will not appear at their respective 
        depositions without being permitted to bring agency 
        counsel.\260\

    On November 5, Mr. Vought did not appear for the scheduled 
deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The 
Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Vought's 
absence, stating:

          On Monday of this week, OMB reasserted its position 
        that, quote, ``as directed by the White House Counsel's 
        October 8, 2019, letter, OMB will not participate in 
        this partisan and unfair impeachment inquiry,'' 
        unquote. OMB argues that the impeachment inquiry lacks 
        basic due process protections and relies on OLC opinion 
        that the committee cannot lawfully bar agency counsel 
        from depositions. This new and shifting rationale from 
        the White House, like the others it has used to attempt 
        to block witnesses from appearing to provide testimony 
        about the President's misconduct, has no basis in law 
        or the Constitution and is a serious affront to decades 
        of precedent in which Republicans and Democrats have 
        used exactly the same procedures to depose executive 
        branch officials without agency counsel present, 
        including some of the most senior aides to multiple 
        previous Presidents.\261\

    To date, Mr. Vought has not changed his position or 
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.

  Michael Duffey, Associate Director for National Security Programs, 
                    Office of Management and Budget

    On October 11, the Committees sent a letter to Michael 
Duffey, the Associate Director for National Security Programs 
at OMB, seeking his appearance at a deposition on October 
23.\262\
    On October 21, an attorney at OMB sent an email to 
Committee staff stating:

          Per the White House Counsel's October 8, 2019 letter, 
        the President has directed that ``[c]onsistent with the 
        duties of the President of the United States, and in 
        particular his obligation to preserve the rights of 
        future occupants of his office, [he] cannot permit his 
        Administration to participate in this partisan inquiry 
        under these circumstances.'' Therefore, Mike Duffey 
        will not be participating in Wednesday's 
        deposition.\263\

    On October 25, the Committees sent a letter transmitting a 
subpoena compelling Mr. Duffey to appear at a deposition on 
November 5, stating:

          Your failure or refusal to appear at the deposition, 
        including at the direction or behest of the President 
        or the White House, shall constitute evidence of 
        obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may 
        be used as an adverse inference against the 
        President.\264\

    On November 4, Jason A. Yaworske, the Associate Director 
for Legislative Affairs at OMB, sent a letter to Chairman 
Schiff stating that, ``as directed by the White House Counsel's 
October 8, 2019, letter,'' Mr. Duffey will not appear at his 
deposition.\265\
    On November 5, Mr. Duffey did not appear for the scheduled 
deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The 
Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Duffey's 
absence, stating:

          This effort by the President to attempt to block Mr. 
        Duffey from appearing can only be interpreted as a 
        further effort by the President and the White House to 
        obstruct the impeachment inquiry and Congress's lawful 
        and constitutional functions.\266\

    To date, Mr. Duffey has not changed his position or 
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.

Brian McCormack, Associate Director for Natural Resources, Energy, and 
                Science, Office of Management and Budget

    On October 24, the Committees sent a letter to Brian 
McCormack, the Associate Director for Natural Resources, 
Energy, and Science at OMB, seeking his appearance at a 
deposition on November 4.\267\
    On November 1, the Committees sent a letter transmitting a 
subpoena compelling Mr. McCormack's appearance at a deposition 
on November 4.\268\
    On November 4, Jason A. Yaworske, the Associate Director 
for Legislative Affairs at OMB, sent a letter to Chairman 
Schiff stating that, ``as directed by the White House Counsel's 
October 8, 2019, letter,'' Mr. McCormack will not appear at his 
deposition.\269\
    On November 4, Mr. McCormack did not appear for the 
scheduled deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. 
The Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. 
McCormack's absence, stating:

          At approximately 11:30 a.m. today, committee staff 
        received via email a letter from the Associate Director 
        for Legislative Affairs at OMB. The letter states that, 
        quote, ``As directed by the White House counsel's 
        October 8, 2019, letter,'' unquote, OMB will not 
        participate in the House's impeachment inquiry. The 
        letter further states that, based on the advice of the 
        Office of Legal Counsel that, quote, ``the committee 
        cannot lawfully bar agency counsel from these 
        depositions,'' unquote, Mr. McCormack will not appear 
        at his deposition today without agency counsel present. 
        As Mr. McCormack was informed, the committees may 
        consider his noncompliance with a subpoena as evidence 
        in a future contempt proceeding. His failure or refusal 
        to appear, moreover, shall constitute evidence of 
        obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may 
        be used as an adverse inference against the 
        President.\270\

    To date, Mr. McCormack has not changed his position or 
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.

          T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, Department of State

    On September 13, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo seeking transcribed interviews with 
Counselor T. Ulrich Brechbuhl and other officials.\271\ The 
Committees received no direct, substantive response to this 
letter.
    On September 27, the Committees sent a letter informing 
Secretary Pompeo that Mr. Brechbuhl's deposition was being 
scheduled on October 8, stating:

          On September 13, the Committees wrote to request that 
        you make State Department employees available for 
        transcribed interviews. We asked you to provide, by 
        September 20, dates by which the employees would be 
        made available for transcribed interviews. You failed 
        to comply with the Committees' request.\272\

    That same day, the Committees sent a letter directly to Mr. 
Brechbuhl seeking his appearance at a deposition on October 
8.\273\
    On October 1, Secretary Pompeo sent a letter to the 
Committees stating, ``Based on the profound procedural and 
legal deficiencies noted above, the Committee's requested dates 
for depositions are not feasible.''\274\
    Later that day, the Committees sent a letter to Deputy 
Secretary of State John J. Sullivan stating that the State 
Department ``must immediately halt all efforts to interfere 
with the testimony of State Department witnesses before 
Congress.''\275\
    On October 2, Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney sent an 
email to Committee staff stating:

          My law firm is in the process of being formally 
        retained to assist Mr. Brechbuhl in connection with 
        this matter. It will take us some time to complete 
        those logistics, review the request and associated 
        request for documents, and to meet with our client to 
        insure he is appropriately prepared for any deposition. 
        It will not be possible to accomplish those tasks 
        before October 8, 2019. Thus, as I am sure that you can 
        understand, Mr. Brechbuhl will not be able to appear on 
        that date as he requires a sufficient opportunity to 
        consult with counsel. Moreover, given the concerns 
        expressed in Secretary Pompeo's letter of October 1, 
        2019, to Chairman Engel, any participation in a 
        deposition would need to be coordinated with our 
        stakeholders.\276\

    On October 8, Committee staff sent an email to Mr. 
Brechbuhl's personal attorney stating: ``The Committees have 
agreed to reschedule Mr. Brechbuhl's deposition to Thursday, 
October 17. Please confirm that Mr. Brechbuhl intends to appear 
voluntarily.''\277\ On October 9, Committee staff sent an email 
to Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney asking him to ``confirm by 
COB today whether Mr. Brechbuhl intends to appear 
voluntarily.''\278\ Later that day, Mr. Brechbuhl's personal 
attorney sent an email to Committee staff stating, ``I am still 
seeking clarification from the State Department regarding this 
deposition.''\279\
    On October 25, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. 
Brechbuhl's personal attorney transmitting a subpoena 
compelling Mr. Brechbuhl's appearance at a deposition on 
November 6.\280\
    On November 5, Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney sent a 
letter to the Committees stating:

          Mr. Brechbuhl respects the important Constitutional 
        powers vested in the United States Congress. And, 
        indeed, he would welcome the opportunity to address 
        through testimony an existing inaccuracy in the public 
        record--the false claim that Mr. Brechbuhl in any way 
        personally participated in the telephone call between 
        President Trump and President Zelensky that occurred on 
        July 25, 2019. However, Mr. Brechbuhl has received a 
        letter of instruction from the State Department, 
        directing that he not appear. The State Department 
        letter of instruction asserts significant Executive 
        Branch interests as the basis for direction not to 
        appear and also asserts that the subpoena Mr. Brechbuhl 
        received is invalid. The letter is supported by 
        analysis from the United States Department of Justice. 
        We are also aware that litigation has recently been 
        initiated in the United States District Court for the 
        District of Columbia that may bear on resolving the 
        significant issues now arising between the Committees 
        and the President. Given these circumstances, Mr. 
        Brechbuhl is not able to appear on November 6, 
        2019.\281\

    On November 6, Mr. Brechbuhl did not appear for the 
scheduled deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. 
The Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. 
Brechbuhl's absence, stating:

          The committees requested a copy of the State 
        Department's letter and the Department of Justice 
        analysis, but Mr. Brechbuhl's attorney has not 
        responded. While the letter from Mr. Brechbuhl's 
        attorney provides only vague references to unidentified 
        executive branch interests and a DOJ analysis as the 
        basis for the State Department's blocking of Mr. 
        Brechbuhl's testimony, the Department's latest 
        obstruction of this inquiry appears to be predicated on 
        the opinion issued by the Department of Justice Office 
        of Legal Counsel just last Friday, November 1, well 
        after the subpoena was issued to Mr. Brechbuhl. It is 
        noteworthy and telling that the OLC issued this opinion 
        only after multiple State Department officials 
        testified in this inquiry, both voluntarily and 
        pursuant to subpoena, all without agency counsel 
        present. Indeed, this morning, the third-highest-
        ranking official at the State Department, Under 
        Secretary David Hale, appeared and has begun testifying 
        in accordance with his legal obligations pursuant to a 
        subpoena.\282\

    The Committees sent Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney two 
separate inquiries asking him to provide a copy of the ``letter 
of instruction'' that Mr. Brechbuhl claimed to have received 
from the State Department directing him to defy a congressional 
subpoena.\283\ Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney furnished the 
Committees with a copy of the letter on December 2. The State 
Department's letter to Mr. Brechbuhl is dated November 4, 
2019.\284\
    To date, Mr. Brechbuhl has not changed his position or 
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.

               Secretary Rick Perry, Department of Energy

    On November 1, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary of 
Energy Rick Perry seeking his appearance at a deposition on 
November 6, stating:

          Your failure or refusal to appear at the deposition, 
        including at the direction or behest of the President 
        or the White House, shall constitute evidence of 
        obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may 
        be used as an adverse inference against the 
        President.\285\

    On November 5, an attorney at the Department of Energy sent 
a letter to the Committees stating:

          Please be advised that the Secretary will not appear 
        on Wednesday, November 6, 2019, at 2:00 pm for a 
        deposition to be conducted jointly by the Permanent 
        Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Oversight and 
        Reform.\286\

    To date, Secretary Perry has not changed his position or 
come forward to testify.

     5. The President's Unsuccessful Attempts to Block Key Witnesses


Despite President Trump's explicit orders that no Executive Branch 
        employees should cooperate with the House's impeachment inquiry 
        and efforts by federal agencies to limit the testimony of those 
        who did, multiple key officials complied with duly authorized 
        subpoenas and provided critical testimony at depositions and 
        public hearings. These officials adhered to the rule of law and 
        obeyed lawful subpoenas.

                                Overview

    Despite President Trump's orders that no Executive Branch 
employees should cooperate with the House's impeachment 
inquiry, multiple key officials complied with duly authorized 
subpoenas and provided critical testimony at depositions and 
public hearings. These officials not only served their nation 
honorably, but they fulfilled their oath to support and defend 
the Constitution of the United States.
    In addition to the President's broad orders seeking to 
prohibit all Executive Branch employees from testifying, many 
of these witnesses were personally directed by senior political 
appointees not to cooperate with the House's impeachment 
inquiry. These directives frequently cited or enclosed copies 
of Mr. Cipollone's October 8 letter conveying the President's 
order not to comply.
    For example, the State Department, relying on President 
Trump's order, attempted to block Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch 
from testifying, but she fulfilled her legal obligations by 
appearing at a deposition on October 11 and a hearing on 
November 15. More than a dozen current and former officials 
followed her courageous example by testifying at depositions 
and public hearings over the course of the last two months. The 
testimony from these witnesses produced overwhelming and clear 
evidence of President Trump's misconduct, which is described in 
detail in Section I of this report.

   Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, 
                          Department of State

    On September 13, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo seeking a transcribed interview with 
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch and other State Department 
officials.\287\ The Committees received no direct, substantive 
response to this letter.
    On September 27, the Committees sent a letter informing 
Secretary Pompeo that Ambassador Yovanovitch's deposition was 
being scheduled on October 2, stating:

          On September 13, the Committees wrote to request that 
        you make State Department employees available for 
        transcribed interviews. We asked you to provide, by 
        September 20, dates by which the employees would be 
        made available for transcribed interviews. You failed 
        to comply with the Committees' request.\288\

    Also on September 27, the Committees sent a letter directly 
to Ambassador Yovanovitch seeking her appearance at a 
deposition on October 2.\289\
    On October 1, Secretary Pompeo sent a letter to the 
Committees stating:

          Therefore, the five officials subject to your letter 
        may not attend any interview or deposition without 
        counsel from the Executive Branch present to ensure 
        that the Executive Branch's constitutional authority to 
        control the disclosure of confidential information, 
        including deliberative matters and diplomatic 
        communications, is not impaired.\290\

    After further discussions with Ambassador Yovanovitch's 
counsel, her deposition was rescheduled for October 11. On 
October 10, Brian Bulatao, the Under Secretary of State for 
Management, sent a letter to Ambassador Yovanovitch's personal 
attorney directing Ambassador Yovanovitch not to appear for her 
deposition and enclosing Mr. Cipollone's October 8 letter 
stating that President Trump and his Administration would not 
participate in the House's impeachment inquiry. Mr. Bulatao's 
letter stated:

          Accordingly, in accordance with applicable law, I 
        write on behalf of the Department of State, pursuant to 
        the President's instruction reflected in Mr. 
        Cipollone's letter, to instruct your client (as a 
        current employee of the Department of State), 
        consistent with Mr. Cipollone's letter, not to appear 
        before the Committees under the present 
        circumstances.\291\

    That same day, October 10, when asked whether he intended 
to block Ambassador Yovanovitch from testifying the next day, 
President Trump stated: ``You know, I don't think people should 
be allowed. You have to run a country, I don't think you should 
be allowed to do that.''\292\
    On the morning of Ambassador Yovanovitch's deposition on 
October 11, the Committees sent a letter to her personal 
attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling her appearance, 
stating:

          In light of recent attempts by the Administration to 
        direct your client not to appear voluntarily for the 
        deposition, the enclosed subpoena now compels your 
        client's mandatory appearance at today's deposition on 
        October 11, 2019.\293\

    Later on October 11, Ambassador Yovanovitch's personal 
attorney sent a letter to Mr. Bulatao, stating:

          In my capacity as counsel for Ambassador Marie 
        Yovanovitch, I have received your letter of October 10, 
        2019, directing the Ambassador not to appear 
        voluntarily for her scheduled deposition testimony on 
        October 11, 2019 before the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform 
        in connection with the House of Representatives's 
        impeachment inquiry. Just this morning, the Ambassador 
        received a subpoena issued by the House Permanent 
        Select Committee on Intelligence, requiring her to 
        appear for the deposition as scheduled. Although the 
        Ambassador has faithfully and consistently honored her 
        professional duties as a State Department employee--
        including at all times following her abrupt termination 
        as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine--she is unable to obey 
        your most recent directive. As the recipient of a duly 
        issued congressional subpoena, Ambassador Yovanovitch 
        is, in my judgment, legally obligated to attend the 
        depositions as scheduled.\294\

    Ambassador Yovanovitch participated in the deposition on 
October 11, in compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\295\ 
During her deposition, Ambassador Yovanovitch's personal 
attorney confirmed that ``she received a direction by the Under 
Secretary to decline to appear voluntarily.''\296\
    On November 15, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to 
Ambassador Yovanovitch compelling her to testify at a public 
hearing of the Intelligence Committee that same day.\297\ 
Ambassador Yovanovitch complied with the Committees' subpoena 
and testified at the public hearing. During the hearing, 
Chairman Schiff acknowledged Ambassador Yovanovitch's 
compliance, stating:

          Ambassador, I want to thank you for your decades of 
        service. I want to thank you, as Mr. Maloney said, for 
        being the first one through the gap. What you did in 
        coming forward and answering a lawful subpoena was to 
        give courage to others that also witnessed wrongdoing, 
        that they, too, could show the same courage that you 
        have, that they could stand up, speak out, answer 
        questions, they could endure whatever threats, insults 
        may come their way. And so in your long and 
        distinguished career you have done another great public 
        service in answering the call of our subpoena and 
        testifying before us today.\298\

  Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, 
                          Department of State

    On September 27, 2019, the Committees sent a letter 
informing Secretary Pompeo that Ambassador Gordon Sondland's 
deposition was being scheduled on October 10.\299\ That same 
day, the Committees sent a letter directly to Ambassador 
Sondland seeking his appearance at the deposition.\300\ On 
October 1, Secretary Pompeo sent a letter to the Committees 
stating that Ambassador Sondland ``may not attend'' the 
deposition.\301\
    After further discussions with Ambassador Sondland's 
personal attorney, his deposition was rescheduled for October 
8. On October 7, Mr. Bulatao sent a letter to Ambassador 
Sondland's personal attorney, stating:

          Based on consultations with the White House, the 
        State Department hereby instructs your client, 
        Ambassador Gordon Sondland, not to appear tomorrow for 
        his voluntary deposition based on the Executive Branch 
        confidentiality interests remaining to be addressed, 
        including, in particular, the Committee's refusal to 
        permit agency counsel to appear.\302\

    On October 8, Ambassador Sondland's personal attorney sent 
an email to the Committees stating:

          I am incredibly disappointed to report that, 
        overnight, the State Department advised that it will 
        direct Ambassador Sondland not to appear before the 
        Committee this morning. While we have not yet gotten 
        written confirmation of that direction, we wanted to 
        advise you of this development at the earliest 
        opportunity. As the sitting US Ambassador to the EU and 
        employee of the State Department, Ambassador Sondland 
        is required to follow this direction. I hope that 
        whatever concerns the Department has can be resolved 
        promptly and that Ambassador Sondland's testimony can 
        be scheduled at the earliest opportunity. I am very 
        sorry for the inexcusably late notice, but we are 
        sharing this with you as soon as it was confirmed to 
        us. Ambassador Sondland is personally disappointed that 
        he will not be able to answer the Committee's questions 
        this morning.\303\

    On October 8, the Committees sent a letter to Ambassador 
Sondland transmitting a subpoena compelling his appearance at a 
deposition on October 16, stating:

          The Committees have not received any communication 
        directly from the White House or the State Department 
        about this matter. In light of Secretary Pompeo's 
        direct intervention to block your appearance before our 
        Committees, we are left with no choice but to compel 
        your appearance at a deposition pursuant to the 
        enclosed subpoena.\304\

    On October 14, the Committees sent a letter to Ambassador 
Sondland stating:

          We hereby write to memorialize our agreement with 
        your counsel, Mr. Robert Luskin, Esq., to adjourn the 
        date and time of your document production and 
        deposition to October 17, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. at the 
        Capitol, HVC-304.\305\

    Ambassador Sondland participated in the deposition on 
October 17, in compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\306\ 
During the deposition, Ambassador Sondland's personal attorney 
stated:

          But we also wish to emphasize that it's his belief, 
        and ours, that the Committee should have access to all 
        relevant documents, and he regrets that they have not 
        been provided in advance of his testimony. Having those 
        documents would lead to a more fulsome and accurate 
        inquiry into the matters at hand. Indeed, Ambassador 
        Sondland has not had access to all of the State 
        Department records that would help him refresh his 
        recollection in anticipation of this testimony.\307\

    During the deposition, Ambassador Sondland stated:

          I was truly disappointed that the State Department 
        prevented me at the last minute from testifying earlier 
        on October 8, 2019. But your issuance of a subpoena has 
        supported my appearance here today, and I'm pleased to 
        provide the following testimony.\308\

    On November 4, Ambassador Sondland's personal attorney 
transmitted to the Committees a sworn declaration from 
Ambassador Sondland, which supplemented his deposition 
testimony and noted that despite ``repeated requests to the 
White House and the State Department,'' he still had not been 
granted access to records he sought to review to determine if 
he could ``provide more complete testimony to assist 
Congress.''\309\
    On November 20, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to 
Ambassador Sondland compelling him to testify at a public 
hearing of the Intelligence Committee that same day.\310\ 
Ambassador Sondland complied with the Committees' subpoena and 
testified at the public hearing. During the hearing, Ambassador 
Sondland described the direction he received from the White 
House:

          Q: Ambassador Sondland, in your deposition, you 
        lamented, quote: I was truly disappointed that the 
        State Department prevented me at the last minute from 
        testifying earlier on October 8, 2019, but your 
        issuance of a subpoena has supported my appearance here 
        today, and I am pleased to provide the following 
        testimony. So it is clear that the White House, the 
        State Department did not want you to testify at that 
        deposition. Is that correct?
          A: That is correct.
          Q: And since then, you have on numerous occasions 
        during your opening statement today indicated that you 
        have not been able to access documents in the State 
        Department. Is that correct?
          A: Correct.
          Q: So you have been hampered in your ability to 
        provide testimony to this committee. Is that correct?
          A: I have been hampered to provide completely 
        accurate testimony without the benefit of those 
        documents.\311\

George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European 
               and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State

    On September 13, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to 
Secretary of State Pompeo seeking a transcribed interview with 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent and other State 
Department officials.\312\ The Committees received no direct, 
substantive response to this letter.
    On September 27, the Committees sent a letter informing 
Secretary Pompeo that Mr. Kent's deposition was being scheduled 
on October 7.\313\ That same day, the Committees sent a letter 
directly to Mr. Kent seeking his appearance at the deposition 
on that date.\314\ Later that day, Mr. Kent sent an email to 
Committee staff acknowledging receipt of the Committees' 
request and copying an official from the Office of Legislative 
Affairs at the Department of State.\315\ On October 1, 
Secretary Pompeo sent a letter to the Committees stating that 
Mr. Kent ``may not attend'' the deposition.\316\
    After consulting with Mr. Kent's personal attorney, the 
Committees rescheduled his deposition for October 15.\317\ On 
October 10, Under Secretary Bulatao sent a letter to Mr. Kent's 
personal attorney enclosing the White House Counsel's letter of 
October 8, and stating:

          I write on behalf of the Department of State, 
        pursuant to the President's instruction reflected in 
        Mr. Cipollone's letter, to instruct your client (as a 
        current employee of the Department of State), 
        consistent with Mr. Cipollone's letter, not to appear 
        before the Committees under the present 
        circumstances.\318\

    On October 15, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. Kent's 
personal attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling him to 
appear at a deposition on that date.\319\
    Mr. Kent participated in the deposition on October 15, in 
compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\320\ During the 
deposition, he stated:

          As you all know, I am appearing here in response to 
        your congressional subpoena. If I did not appear I 
        would have been exposed to being held in contempt. At 
        the same time, I have been instructed by my employer, 
        the U.S. Department of State, not to appear. I do not 
        know the Department of State's views on disregarding 
        that order.\321\

    On November 13, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to 
Mr. Kent compelling him to testify at a public hearing before 
the Intelligence Committee on that day.\322\ Mr. Kent complied 
with the Committees' subpoena and testified at the public 
hearing. During the hearing, Mr. Kent described the direction 
he received from the White House, stating that he ``received, 
initially, a letter directing me not to appear. And once the 
committees issued a subpoena, I was under legal obligation to 
appear, and I am here today under subpoena.''\323\

 Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge D affaires for U.S. Embassy 
                      in Kyiv, Department of State

    On October 4, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to Deputy 
Secretary of State John Sullivan seeking a deposition with 
Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr. on October 15.\324\ That same 
day, the Committees sent a letter directly to Ambassador Taylor 
seeking his appearance at the deposition.\325\
    On October 14, after consulting with Ambassador Taylor's 
counsel, the Committees sent a letter to Ambassador Taylor 
stating: ``We hereby write to adjourn the date and time of your 
deposition to Tuesday, October 22, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. at the 
Capitol, HVC-304.''\326\
    On October 22, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to 
Ambassador Taylor's personal attorneys compelling Ambassador 
Taylor to appear at a deposition on that date, stating:

          In light of recent attempts by the Administration to 
        direct witnesses not to appear voluntarily for 
        depositions, the enclosed subpoena compels your 
        client's mandatory appearance at today's 
        deposition.\327\

    Ambassador Taylor participated in the deposition on October 
22, in compliance with the Committees' subpoena. During the 
deposition, Ambassador Taylor's personal attorney stated, in 
regard to communications with the Department of State:

          They sent us the directive that said he should not 
        appear under I think the quote is under the present 
        circumstances. We told the majority that we could not 
        appear; he'd been instructed not to. We saw the 
        pattern.\328\

    On November 13, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to 
Ambassador Taylor compelling him to testify at a public hearing 
of the Intelligence Committee that same day.\329\ Ambassador 
Taylor complied with the Committees' subpoena and testified at 
the public hearing. During the hearing, Ambassador Taylor 
described the direction he received from the State Department:

          Q: Ambassador, were you also asked not to be part of 
        the deposition?
          A: Mr. Quigley, I was told by the State Department: 
        Don't appear under these circumstances. That was in the 
        letter to me. And when I got the subpoena, exactly as 
        Mr. Kent said, that was different circumstances and 
        obeyed a legal subpoena. So, yes, sir, I'm here for 
        that reason.\330\

     Catherine Croft and Christopher Anderson, Department of State

    On October 24, 2019, the Committees sent letters to the 
personal attorney representing two State Department officials, 
Catherine Croft and Christopher Anderson, seeking their 
attendance at depositions on October 30 and November 1, 
respectively.\331\
    On October 25, their attorney sent a letter to the 
Committees acknowledging receipt of the Committees' requests 
and stating that ``we are in the process of contacting the 
Office of the Legal Advisor of the Department of State in an 
effort to learn the disposition of that Office with regard to 
the Committee's request.''\332\
    On October 28, Under Secretary Bulatao sent letters to the 
personal attorney for Ms. Croft and Mr. Anderson. Both letters 
enclosed the White House Counsel's October 8 letter and stated:

          Pursuant to Mr. Cipollone's letter and in light of 
        these defects, we are writing to inform you and Ms. 
        Croft of the Administration-wide direction that 
        Executive Branch personnel ``cannot participate in [the 
        impeachment] inquiry under these circumstances.''\333\

    On October 30, the Committees transmitted subpoenas to the 
personal attorney for Ms. Croft and Mr. Anderson compelling 
their appearance at depositions on October 30, stating:

          In light of recent attempts by the Administration to 
        direct witnesses not to appear voluntarily for 
        depositions, the enclosed subpoenas compel your 
        clients' mandatory appearance.\334\

    Ms. Croft and Mr. Anderson participated in their 
depositions on October 30, in compliance with the Committees' 
subpoenas.\335\ During Ms. Croft's deposition, her personal 
attorney stated:

          On October 28th, 2019, Ms. Croft received a letter 
        through her lawyers from Under Secretary of State Brian 
        Bulatao, in which we were instructed that Ms. Croft 
        cannot participate in the impeachment inquiry being 
        conducted by the House of Representatives and these 
        committees. Under Secretary Bulatao's letter stated 
        that these instructions were issued pursuant to a 
        directive from the Office of White House Counsel. 
        Nonetheless, Ms. Croft has been served with a valid 
        subpoena, and so she is obliged to be here today.\336\

    During Mr. Anderson's deposition, his personal attorney 
stated:

          On October 28th, 2019, Mr. Anderson received a 
        letter, through his lawyers, from Under Secretary of 
        State Brian Bulatao in which we were instructed that 
        Mr. Anderson cannot participate in the impeachment 
        inquiry being conducted by the House of Representatives 
        and these committees. Under Secretary Bulatao's letter 
        stated that these instructions were issued pursuant to 
        a directive from the Office of White House Counsel. 
        Nonetheless, Mr. Anderson has been served with a valid 
        subpoena, and so he is obliged to be here today.\337\

  Laura K. Cooper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, 
              Ukraine, and Eurasia, Department of Defense

    On October 11, the Committees sent a letter to Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura K. Cooper seeking her 
attendance at a deposition on October 18.\338\
    After consulting with Ms. Cooper's personal attorney, the 
Committees rescheduled her deposition for October 23.
    On October 22, Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. 
Norquist sent a letter to Ms. Cooper's personal attorney, 
stating:

          This letter informs you and Ms. Cooper of the 
        Administration-wide direction that Executive Branch 
        personnel ``cannot participate in [the impeachment] 
        inquiry under these circumstances''' [Tab C]. In the 
        event that the Committees issue a subpoena to compel 
        Ms. Cooper's appearance, you should be aware that the 
        Supreme Court has held, in United States v. Rumely, 345 
        U.S. 41 (1953), that a person cannot be sanctioned for 
        refusing to comply with a congressional subpoena 
        unauthorized by House Rule or Resolution.\339\

    On October 23, the Committees sent an email transmitting a 
subpoena compelling Ms. Cooper to appear at a deposition on 
that date, stating:

          In light of recent attempts by the Administration to 
        direct witnesses not to appear voluntarily for 
        depositions, the enclosed subpoena compels your 
        client's mandatory appearance at today's 
        deposition.\340\

    Ms. Cooper participated in the deposition on October 23, in 
compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\341\
    During her deposition, Ms. Cooper stated with regard to the 
Department of Defense, ``They instructed me yesterday not to 
participate.''\342\
    On November 20, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to 
Ms. Cooper compelling her to testify at a public hearing before 
the Intelligence Committee on that day.\343\ Ms. Cooper 
complied with the Committees' subpoena and testified at the 
public hearing.\344\

 Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate Director of National Security Programs, 
                    Office of Management and Budget

    On November 5, the Committees sent a letter to Mark Sandy, 
the Deputy Associate Director of National Security Programs at 
OMB, seeking his appearance at a deposition on November 8.\345\ 
On November 6, Mr. Sandy responded to confirm receipt of the 
Committees' letter.\346\
    On November 7, an attorney at OMB sent an email to 
Committee staff stating:

          In light of the Committee's rules that prohibit 
        agency counsel from being present in a deposition of an 
        executive branch witness and consistent with the 
        November 1, 2019 OLC letter opinion addressing this 
        issue, OMB has directed Mr. Sandy not to appear at 
        tomorrow's deposition.\347\

    After consulting with Mr. Sandy's personal attorney, the 
Committees rescheduled his deposition for November 16.
    On November 16, the Committees sent an email transmitting a 
subpoena compelling Mr. Sandy to appear at a deposition on that 
date, stating:

          In light of recent attempts by the Administration to 
        direct witnesses not to appear voluntarily for 
        depositions, the enclosed subpoena compels your 
        client's mandatory appearance.\348\

    Mr. Sandy participated in the deposition on November 16, in 
compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\349\ During his 
deposition, Mr. Sandy also testified that the Administration 
sent his personal attorney an official communication with 
further direction, stating: ``It did direct me to have my 
personal counsel ask for a postponement until agency counsel 
could accompany me.''\350\

  Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior 
       Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council

    On October 9, 2019, the Committees sent a letter seeking 
Dr. Hill's testimony at a deposition on October 14.\351\ On 
October 13, Dr. Hill's personal attorney informed the White 
House that she intended to appear at the scheduled 
deposition.\352\ On October 14, the White House sent a letter 
to Dr. Hill's personal attorney stating that ``Dr. Hill is not 
authorized to reveal or release any classified information or 
any information subject to executive privilege.''\353\ Also on 
October 14, the Committees sent Dr. Hill a subpoena seeking her 
testimony the same day.\354\ Dr. Hill complied and participated 
in the deposition.\355\
    On November 18, Dr. Hill's personal attorney sent a letter 
to the White House stating that Dr. Hill had been invited to 
provide testimony at a public hearing on November 21, and 
stating: ``We continue to disagree with regard to the 
parameters of executive privilege as you articulated it on 
October 14 and our prior telephone calls.''\356\ On November 
20, the White House sent a letter to Dr. Hill's personal 
attorney stating that Dr. Hill ``continues to be bound by 
important obligations to refrain from disclosing classified 
information or information subject to executive privilege in 
her upcoming testimony before the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence.''\357\ On November 21, the 
Committees sent Dr. Hill a subpoena seeking her testimony the 
same day.\358\ Dr. Hill also complied with this subpoena and 
testified at the public hearing.\359\

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, Director for Ukraine, National 
                            Security Council

    On October 16, 2019, the Committees sent a letter seeking 
Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman's testimony at a deposition on 
October 24.\360\ After discussions with Lt. Col. Vindman's 
personal attorneys, the deposition was rescheduled to October 
29. On October 29, the Committees sent Lt. Col. Vindman a 
subpoena seeking his testimony the same day.\361\ Lt. Col. 
Vindman complied.\362\ In addition, on November 19, the 
Committees conveyed a subpoena seeking Lt. Col. Vindman's 
testimony at a public hearing that same day.\363\ Lt. Col. 
Vindman also complied with this subpoena and testified at the 
public hearing.\364\

 Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior 
       Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council

    On October 16, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to 
Timothy Morrison seeking his testimony at a deposition on 
October 25.\365\ After discussions with Mr. Morrison's personal 
attorney, the deposition was rescheduled to October 31. On 
October 31, the Committees sent Mr. Morrison a subpoena seeking 
his testimony the same day.\366\ Mr. Morrison complied.\367\ In 
addition, on November 19, the Committees conveyed a subpoena 
seeking Mr. Morrison's testimony at a public hearing that same 
day.\368\ Mr. Morrison also complied with this subpoena and 
testified at the public hearing.\369\

 David Hale, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State

    On November 1, 2019, the Committees sent a letter seeking 
Under Secretary David Hale's testimony at a deposition on 
November 6.\370\ On November 5, Mr. Hale's counsel wrote to the 
Committees, stating that Mr. Hale would be willing to testify 
pursuant to a subpoena.\371\
    On November 6, the Committees sent Mr. Hale a subpoena 
seeking his testimony the same day.\372\ Mr. Hale 
complied.\373\ In addition, on November 20, the Committees 
conveyed a subpoena seeking Mr. Hale's testimony at a public 
hearing that same day.\374\ Mr. Hale also complied with this 
subpoena and testified at the public hearing.\375\

 David Holmes, Counselor for Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in 
                   Kyiv, Ukraine, Department of State

    On November 12, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to 
Political Counselor David Holmes' personal attorney seeking his 
testimony at a deposition on November 15.\376\ On November 15, 
the Committees conveyed a subpoena to Mr. Holmes' personal 
attorney seeking his testimony the same day.\377\ Mr. Holmes 
complied.\378\ In addition, on November 21, the Committees 
conveyed a subpoena seeking Mr. Holmes' testimony at a public 
hearing that same day.\379\ Mr. Holmes also complied with this 
subpoena and testified at the public hearing.\380\

Ambassador P. Michael McKinley, Former Senior Advisor to the Secretary 
                     of State, Department of State

    On October 12, 2019, Committee staff emailed Ambassador P. 
Michael McKinley requesting his voluntary participation in a 
transcribed interview on October 16.\381\ On October 14, the 
Committees sent a letter formalizing this request.\382\ On 
October 16, Ambassador McKinley participated in the scheduled 
transcribed interview.\383\

  Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
           European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State

    On October 16, 2019, the Committees sent a letter seeking 
Ambassador Philip T. Reeker's testimony at a deposition on 
October 23.\384\ On October 25, the Committees sent Ambassador 
Reeker a subpoena seeking his testimony on October 26.\385\ 
Ambassador Reeker complied and testified at the scheduled 
deposition.\386\

Ambassador Kurt Volker, Former U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine 
                   Negotiations, Department of State

    On September 13, 2019, the Committees wrote a letter to 
Secretary Pompeo requesting the testimony of four witnesses, 
including Ambassador Kurt Volker.\387\ On September 27, the 
Committees sent a follow up letter to Secretary Pompeo, noting 
that Ambassador Volker's deposition had been scheduled for 
October 3.\388\ On that same day, the Committees sent a letter 
directly to Ambassador Volker, seeking his testimony at the 
deposition scheduled for October 3.\389\
    On October 1, Secretary Pompeo responded to the Committees, 
refusing to make Ambassador Volker available on the requested 
date.\390\ On October 2, the Department of State wrote a letter 
to Ambassador Volker's counsel instructing Ambassador Volker 
not to reveal classified or privileged information and 
prohibiting Ambassador Volker from producing any government 
documents.\391\
    On October 2, Ambassador Volker produced copies of text 
messages in response to the Committees' request.\392\ On 
October 3, Ambassador Volker voluntarily participated in a 
transcribed interview.\393\ In addition, on November 19, 
Ambassador Volker testified voluntarily at a public 
hearing.\394\

Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and Russia, Office of the 
                             Vice President

    On November 4, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to 
Jennifer Williams seeking her testimony at a deposition on 
November 7.\395\ On November 7, the Committees sent Ms. 
Williams a subpoena seeking her testimony the same day.\396\ 
Ms. Williams complied.\397\ On November 11, Ms. Williams sent a 
letter to Chairman Schiff to make one amendment to her 
deposition testimony.\398\ In addition, on November 19, the 
Committees conveyed a subpoena seeking Ms. William's testimony 
at a public hearing on November 19.\399\ Ms. Williams also 
complied with this subpoena and testified at the public 
hearing.\400\

              6. The President's Intimidation of Witnesses


President Trump publicly attacked and intimidated witnesses who came 
        forward to comply with duly authorized subpoenas and testify 
        about his conduct. The President also threatened and attacked 
        an Intelligence Community whistleblower.

                                Overview

    President Trump engaged in a brazen effort to publicly 
attack and intimidate witnesses who came forward to comply with 
duly authorized subpoenas and testify about his conduct, 
raising grave concerns about potential violations of the 
federal obstruction statute and other criminal laws intended to 
protect witnesses appearing before Congressional proceedings. 
President Trump issued threats, openly discussed possible 
retaliation, made insinuations about witnesses' character and 
patriotism, and subjected them to mockery and derision. The 
President's attacks were broadcast to millions of Americans 
including witnesses' families, friends, and coworkers and his 
actions drew criticism from across the political spectrum, 
including from his own Republican supporters.
    It is a federal crime to intimidate or seek to intimidate 
any witness appearing before Congress. This statute applies to 
all citizens, including federal officials. Violations of this 
law can carry a criminal sentence of up to 20 years in prison.
    This campaign of intimidation risks discouraging witnesses 
from coming forward voluntarily, complying with mandatory 
subpoenas for documents and testimony, and disclosing evidence 
that may support consideration of articles of impeachment.

   Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, 
                          Department of State

    As discussed above, President Trump removed Marie 
Yovanovitch as the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine in May 2019 
following a concerted effort by Rudy Giuliani, his associates 
Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman, and others to spread false 
conspiracy theories about her. The smearing of the Ambassador 
was part of the larger campaign undertaken by Mr. Giuliani at 
President Trump's direction and in his capacity as President 
Trump's representative. During her deposition on October 11, 
Ambassador Yovanovitch explained that she felt threatened and 
``very concerned'' after she read President Trump's statements 
about her during his July 25 call with President Zelensky, 
including President Trump's claim that ``she's going to go 
through some things.''\401\
    On November 15, Ambassador Yovanovitch testified at a 
public hearing that she was ``shocked'' and ``devastated'' by 
the President's statements about her:

          I was shocked and devastated that I would feature in 
        a phone call between two heads of state in such a 
        manner, where President Trump said that I was bad news 
        to another world leader and that I would be ``going 
        through some things.'' So I was it was it was a 
        terrible moment. A person who saw me actually reading 
        the transcript said that the color drained from my 
        face. I think I even had a physical reaction. I think, 
        you know, even now, words kind of fail me.\402\

    Ambassador Yovanovitch was also asked about her reaction to 
the President's comment that she would ``go through some 
things.'' She acknowledged feeling threatened, stating: ``It 
didn't sound good. It sounded like a threat.''\403\
    As Ambassador Yovanovitch was in the process of testifying 
before the Committee, President Trump tweeted an attack against 
her. He wrote:

          Everywhere Marie Yovanovitch went turned bad. She 
        started off in Somalia, how did that go? Then fast 
        forward to Ukraine, where the new Ukrainian President 
        spoke unfavorably about her in my second phone call 
        with him. It is a U.S. President's absolute right to 
        appoint ambassadors.\404\

    During the hearing, Chairman Schiff asked Ambassador 
Yovanovitch for her reaction to the President's attacks:

          Q: Ambassador, you've shown the courage to come 
        forward today and testify, notwithstanding the fact you 
        were urged by the White House or State Department not 
        to; notwithstanding the fact that, as you testified 
        earlier, the President implicitly threatened you in 
        that call record. And now, the President in real-time 
        is attacking you. What effect do you think that has on 
        other witnesses' willingness to come forward and expose 
        wrongdoing?
          A: Well, it's very intimidating.
          Q: It's designed to intimidate, is it not?
          A: I--I--I mean, I can't speak to what the President 
        is trying to do, but I think the effect is to be 
        intimidating.
          Q: Well, I want to let you know, Ambassador, that 
        some of us here take witness intimidation very, very 
        seriously.\405\

    In response to the President's attacks, Rep. Liz Cheney, 
Chair of the House Republican Caucus, stated that the President 
``was wrong'' and that Ambassador Yovanovitch ``clearly is 
somebody who's been a public servant to the United States for 
decades and I don't think the President should have done 
that.''\406\ Rep. Francis Rooney, also a Republican, stated: 
``I don't necessarily think it's right to be harassing or 
beating up on our professional diplomatic service.''\407\
    Even after these rebukes, the President continued to attack 
and threaten Ambassador Yovanovitch. For example, in an 
interview on November 22, President Trump stated: ``This was 
not an angel, this woman, okay? And there are a lot of things 
that she did that I didn't like. And we will talk about that at 
some time.''\408\

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, Director for Ukraine, National 
                            Security Council

    On October 29, President Trump tweeted that Lt. Col. 
Alexander Vindman is a ``Never Trumper.''\409\ When asked by a 
reporter what evidence he had for his claim, the President 
responded: ``We'll be showing that to you real soon. 
Okay?''\410\ President Trump continued attacking Lt. Col. 
Vindman during his testimony on November 19, seeking to 
question his loyalty to the United States. The President 
retweeted: ``Lt. Col. Vindman was offered the position of 
Defense Minister for the Ukrainian Government THREE 
times!''\411\ Allies of the President also questioned Lt. Col. 
Vindman's loyalty to the country and amplified the smear.\412\
    For his part, Lt. Col. Vindman stated during his testimony:

          I want to take a moment to recognize the courage of 
        my colleagues who have appeared and are scheduled to 
        appear before this Committee. I want to state that the 
        vile character attacks on these distinguished and 
        honorable public servants is reprehensible.\413\

 Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge d'Affaires for U.S. Embassy 
                      in Kyiv, Department of State

    On October 23, one day after Ambassador William Taylor's 
deposition, the President sent a tweet comparing ``Never 
Trumper Republicans'' to ``human scum.''\414\ An hour later, he 
described Ambassador Taylor in a tweet as a ``Never 
Trumper.''\415\
    On October 25, the President discussed Ambassador Taylor's 
testimony with reporters, and again dismissed the Ambassador as 
a ``Never Trumper.'' After a reporter noted that Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo had hired Ambassador Taylor, the President 
responded: ``Hey, everybody makes mistakes.'' He then had the 
following exchange about Ambassador Taylor:

          Q: Do you want him out now as the top diplomat?
          A: He's a Never Trumper. His lawyer is the head of 
        the Never Trumpers. They're a dying breed, but they're 
        still there.\416\

    On the morning of November 13, just before Ambassador 
Taylor and George Kent testified at a public hearing, the 
President tweeted: ``NEVER TRUMPERS!''\417\

Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and Russia, Office of the 
                             Vice President

    On November 17, two days before Jennifer Williams testified 
at a public hearing, President Trump sent a tweet attacking her 
and stating that ``she should meet with the other Never 
Trumpers, who I don't know & mostly never even heard of, & work 
out a better presidential attack!''\418\ During the hearing, 
Rep. Jim Himes asked Ms. Williams what impression the 
President's tweet had made on her. She responded: ``It 
certainly surprised me. I was not expecting to be called out by 
name.'' Rep. Himes noted that the tweet ``surprised me, too, 
and it looks an awful lot like witness intimidation and 
tampering, and an effort to try to get you to perhaps shape 
your testimony today.''\419\

                         Threats of Retaliation

    The President suggested that witnesses who testified as 
part of the impeachment inquiry could face retaliation. For 
example, on November 16, the President sent a pair of tweets 
indicating that three witnesses appearing before the 
impeachment inquiry could face dismissals as a result of their 
testimony. The President tweeted language he attributed to 
radio host Rush Limbaugh:

          ``My support for Donald Trump has never been greater 
        than it is right now. It is paramountly obvious 
        watching this, these people have to go. You elected 
        Donald Trump to drain the Swamp, well, dismissing 
        people like Yovanovitch is what that looks like. 
        Dismissing people like Kent . . . and Taylor, 
        dismissing everybody involved from the Obama holdover 
        days trying to undermine Trump, getting rid of those 
        people, dismissing them, this is what it looks like. It 
        was never going to be clean, they were never going to 
        sit by idly and just let Trump do this!'' Rush L\420\

                  Intelligence Community Whistleblower

    In addition to his relentless attacks on witnesses who 
testified in connection with the House's impeachment inquiry, 
the President also repeatedly threatened and attacked a member 
of the Intelligence Community who filed an anonymous 
whistleblower complaint raising an ``urgent concern'' regarding 
the President's conduct. The whistleblower filed the complaint 
confidentially with the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community, as authorized by the relevant whistleblower law. 
Federal law prohibits the Inspector General from revealing the 
whistleblower's identity.\421\ Federal law also protects the 
whistleblower from retaliation.\422\
    On September 9, the Inspector General notified Congress 
that this individual had filed a credible complaint regarding 
an ``urgent concern,'' but that the Acting Director of National 
Intelligence was withholding the complaint from Congress 
contrary to his statutory obligation to have submitted the 
complaint to the congressional intelligence committees by no 
later than September 2.\423\ On September 13, 2019, the 
Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena to the Acting Director 
of National Intelligence for the whistleblower's complaint and 
other records.\424\
    On September 26, the Intelligence Committee received the 
declassified whistleblower complaint and made it available to 
the public.\425\
    That day, the President issued a chilling threat against 
the whistleblower and those who provided information to the 
whistleblower regarding the President's misconduct, suggesting 
that they could face the death penalty for treason. President 
Trump stated:

          I want to know who's the person who gave the whistle-
        blower the information because that's close to a spy. 
        You know what we used to do in the old days when we 
        were smart with spies and treason, right? We used to 
        handle it a little differently than we do now.\426\

    In response, the Committees warned President Trump to stop 
attacking the whistleblower, stating:

          The President's comments today constitute--
        reprehensible--witness intimidation and an attempt to 
        obstruct Congress' impeachment inquiry. We condemn the 
        President's attacks, and we invite our Republican 
        counterparts to do the same because Congress must do 
        all it can to protect this whistleblower, and all 
        whistleblowers. Threats of violence from the leader of 
        our country have a chilling effect on the entire 
        whistleblower process, with grave consequences for our 
        democracy and national security.\427\

    Yet the President's attacks did not stop. Instead, he 
continued to threaten the whistleblower, publicly questioned 
the whistleblower's motives, disputed the accuracy of the 
whistleblower's account, and encouraged others to reveal the 
whistleblower's identity. The President's focus on the 
whistleblower has been obsessive, with the President making 
more than 100 public statements about the whistleblower over a 
period of just two months. For example, the President stated:
     ``I want to meet not only my accuser, who 
presented SECOND & THIRD HAND INFORMATION, but also the person 
who illegally gave this information, which was largely 
incorrect, to the Whistleblower.' Was this person SPYING on the 
U.S. President? Big Consequences!''\428\
     ``I think it's outrageous that a Whistleblower is 
a CIA agent.''\429\
     ``But what they said is he's an Obama person. It 
was involved with Brennan; Susan Rice, which means Obama. But 
he was like a big--a big anti-Trump person. Hated Trump.''\430\
     ``The Whistleblower got it sooo wrong that HE must 
come forward. The Fake News Media knows who he is but, being an 
arm of the Democrat Party, don't want to reveal him because 
there would be hell to pay. Reveal the Whistleblower and end 
the Impeachment Hoax!''\431\
     ``But the whistleblower should be revealed because 
the whistleblower gave false stories. Some people would call it 
a fraud; I won't go that far. But when I read it closely, I 
probably would. But the whistleblower should be 
revealed.''\432\
     ``I think that the whistleblower gave a lot of 
false information.''\433\
     ``The whistleblower is not a whistleblower. He's a 
fake. . . . Everybody knows who the whistleblower is. And the 
whistleblower is a political operative.''\434\
    In response to a request from Intelligence Committee 
Ranking Member Nunes to call the whistleblower to testify at an 
open hearing, Chairman Schiff underscored the danger posed by 
the President's threats against the whistleblower and why the 
whistleblower's testimony was now unnecessary:

          The Committee also will not facilitate efforts by 
        President Trump and his allies in Congress to threaten, 
        intimidate, and retaliate against the whistleblower who 
        courageously raised the initial alarm. It remains the 
        duty of the Intelligence Committee to protect 
        whistleblowers, and until recently, this was a 
        bipartisan priority. The whistleblower has a right 
        under laws championed by this Committee to remain 
        anonymous and to be protected from harm.
          The impeachment inquiry, moreover, has gathered an 
        ever-growing body of evidence--from witnesses and 
        documents, including the President's own words in his 
        July 25 call record--that not only confirms, but far 
        exceeds, the initial information in the whistleblower's 
        complaint. The whistleblower's testimony is therefore 
        redundant and unnecessary. In light of the President's 
        threats, the individual's appearance before us would 
        only place their personal safety at grave risk.\435\

    Until President Trump's attacks on the whistleblower, 
Republicans and Democrats were united in protecting 
whistleblowers' right to report abuses of power and be free 
from retaliation.\436\ For example, Ranking Member Nunes, 
serving in 2017 as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, 
spoke in defense of whistleblowers, stating: ``We want people 
to come forward and we will protect the identity of those 
people at all cost.''\437\ He also stated:

          As you know, and I've said this several times, we 
        don't talk about sources at this committee. . . . The 
        good thing is, is that we have continued to have people 
        come forward, voluntarily, to this committee and we 
        want to continue that and I will tell you that that 
        will not happen if we tell you who our sources are and 
        people that come come to the committee.\438\

    Other Republican Members of Congress have opposed efforts 
to expose the whistleblower. For example, Senator Charles 
Grassley stated:

          This person appears to have followed the 
        whistleblower protection laws and ought to be heard out 
        and protected. We should always work to respect 
        whistleblowers' requests for confidentiality. Any 
        further media reports on the whistleblower's identity 
        don't serve the public interest--even if the conflict 
        sells more papers or attracts clicks.\439\

    Senator Richard Burr, the Chair of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, affirmed that he would ``never'' 
want the identity of the whistleblower revealed and stated, 
``We protect whistleblowers. We protect witnesses in our 
committee.''\440\
    Senator Mitt Romney also called for support of the 
whistleblower's rights, stating: ``[W]histleblowers should be 
entitled to confidentiality and privacy, because they play a 
vital function in our democracy.''\441\

                          SECTION II ENDNOTES

    \1\U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 5.
    \2\Statement of George Mason, Madison Debates (July 20, 1787).
    \3\McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (``We are of [the] 
opinion that the power of inquiry--with process to enforce--it is an 
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.''); 
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (``the 
power to investigate is inherent in the power to make laws''); 
Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Case No. 1:19-cv-02379, 
Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 46 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019) (``[T]he House 
of Representatives has the constitutionally vested responsibility to 
conduct investigations of suspected abuses of power within the 
government, and to act to curb those improprieties, if required.''). As 
of this report, an appeal is pending in the D.C. Circuit. No. 19-5331 
(D.C. Cir.).
    \4\Cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (``Vigilant 
oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of 
office, as well as to make credible the threat of impeachment.''); 
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing in dicta the ``inquiry into 
presidential impeachment'' opened by the House Judiciary Committee 
regarding President Nixon and explaining, ``The investigative authority 
of the Judiciary Committee with respect to presidential conduct has an 
express constitutional source.''); In re Report & Recommendation of 
June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to House of 
Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974) (``[I]t should not be 
forgotten that we deal in a matter of the most critical moment to the 
Nation, an impeachment investigation involving the President of the 
United States. It would be difficult to conceive of a more compelling 
need than that of this country for an unswervingly fair inquiry based 
on all the pertinent information.''). In 1833, Justice Joseph Story 
reasoned--while explaining why pardons cannot confer immunity from 
impeachment--that, ``The power of impeachment will generally be applied 
to persons holding high office under the government; and it is of great 
consequence that the President should not have the power of preventing 
a thorough investigation of their conduct, or of securing them against 
the disgrace of a public conviction by impeachment, should they deserve 
it. The constitution has, therefore, wisely interposed this check upon 
his power.'' Joseph L. Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States Sec. 1501 (1873 ed., T.M. Cooley (ed.)).
    \5\House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M. 
Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong. (1974) (H. Rep. 93-
1305).
    \6\Statement of Rep. William Lyman, Annals of Congress, 4th Cong. 
601 (1796).
    \7\Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, A Sitting 
President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution (Oct. 
16, 2000) (explaining that a President ``who engages in criminal 
behavior falling into the category of `high Crimes and Misdemeanors''' 
is ``always subject to removal from office upon impeachment by the 
House and conviction by the Senate'') (online at www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/olc/opinions/2000/10/31/op-olc-v024-p0222_0.pdf).
    \8\Id. (``Moreover, the constitutionally specified impeachment 
process ensures that the immunity [of a sitting President from 
prosecution] would not place the President `above the law.'''). 
President Trump's personal lawyers have staked out the more extreme 
position that the President may not be investigated by law enforcement 
agencies while in office. For example, President Trump's personal 
attorney asserted in court that the President could not be investigated 
by local authorities if he committed murder while in office. If Trump 
Shoots Someone on 5th Ave., Does He Have Immunity? His Lawyer Says Yes, 
New York Times (Oct. 23, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/
nyregion/trump-taxes-vance.html). A federal district court and appeals 
court rejected this argument. Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631 (2nd Cir. 
2019) (``presidential immunity does not bar the enforcement of a state 
grand jury subpoena directing a third party to produce non-privileged 
material, even when the subject matter under investigation pertains to 
the President''); Trump v. Vance, 395 F. Supp. 3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
(calling the President's claims of ``unqualified and boundless'' 
immunity from judicial process ``repugnant to the nation's governmental 
structure and constitutional values''). The case is currently being 
appealed.
    \9\Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
    \10\McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (``A legislative body 
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information 
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect 
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the 
requisite information--which not infrequently is true--recourse must be 
had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere 
requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that 
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so 
some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.''); 
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (``the 
subpoena power may be exercised by a committee acting, as here, on 
behalf of one of the Houses''); Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 
558 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2008) (``In short, there can be no question 
that Congress has a right--derived from its Article I legislative 
function--to issue and enforce subpoenas, and a corresponding right to 
the information that is the subject of such subpoenas. . . . 
Congress''s power of inquiry is as broad as its power to legislate and 
lies at the very heart of Congress's constitutional role. Indeed, the 
former is necessary to the proper exercise of the latter: according to 
the Supreme Court, the ability to compel testimony is necessary to the 
effective functioning of courts and legislatures.''') (citation 
omitted).
    \11\U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 5, cl. 2.
    \12\Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
    \13\See Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 84 
(D.D.C. 2008) (``Thus, federal precedent dating back as far as 1807 
contemplates that even the Executive is bound to comply with duly 
issued subpoenas.'').
    \14\Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Case No. 1:19-cv-02379, 
Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 46 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019). As of this 
report, an appeal is pending in the D.C. Circuit. No. 19-5331 (D.C. 
Cir.).
    \15\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1505.
    \16\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 (also prohibiting making ``any materially 
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation'' or 
making or using ``any false writing or document knowing the same to 
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
entry'' in connection with a Congressional investigation).
    \17\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b); See also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1515(a) 
(defining ``official proceeding'' to include ``a proceeding before the 
Congress'').
    \18\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(d).
    \19\See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2302; 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1034; P.L. 113-
126.
    \20\P.L. 116-6, Sec. 713 (``No part of any appropriation contained 
in this or any other Act shall be available for the payment of the 
salary of any officer or employee of the Federal Government, who . . . 
prohibits or prevents, or attempts or threatens to prohibit or prevent, 
any other officer or employee of the Federal Government from having any 
direct oral or written communication or contact with any Member, 
committee, or subcommittee of the Congress in connection with any 
matter pertaining to the employment of such other officer or employee 
or pertaining to the department or agency of such other officer or 
employee in any way, irrespective of whether such communication or 
contact is at the initiative of such other officer or employee or in 
response to the request or inquiry of such Member, committee, or 
subcommittee.'').
    \21\House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M. 
Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong. (1974) (H. Rep. 93-
1305).
    \22\House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 105th Cong. (1998) 
(H. Rep. 105-830).
    \23\The White House, The President's Remarks Announcing 
Developments and Procedures to be Followed in Connection with the 
Investigation (Apr. 17, 1973). President Nixon initially stated that 
members of his ``personal staff'' would ``decline a request for a 
formal appearance before a committee of the Congress,'' but reversed 
course approximately one month later. The White House, Statement by the 
President, Executive Privilege (Mar. 12, 1973).
    \24\See, e.g., Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities, Testimony of John Dean, Watergate and Related Activities, 
Phase I: Watergate Investigation, 93rd Cong. (June 25, 1973); Senate 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of H.R. 
Haldeman, Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate 
Investigation, 93rd Cong. (July 30, 1973); Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of Alexander Butterfield, 
Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate Investigation, 
93rd Cong. (July 16, 1973); Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities, Testimony of John Ehrlichman, Watergate and 
Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate Investigation, 93rd Cong. (July 
24, 1973).
    \25\See House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M. 
Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong. (1974) (H. Rep. 93-
1305).
    \26\Id.
    \27\Id. (quoting letter from Chairman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., House 
Committee on the Judiciary, to President Richard M. Nixon (May 30, 
1974)).
    \28\H.R. Jour., 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 693 (Apr. 20, 1846).
    \29\Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition and House Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Testimony of Oliver North, Iran-
Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee 
to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select 
Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 
Oppositions, 100th Cong. (July 7, 1987); Senate Select Committee on 
Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and 
House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with 
Iran, Testimony of John Poindexter, Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint 
Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Oppositions, 100th Cong. 
(July 15, 1987).
    \30\Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Civ. No. 1:19-cv-02379, 
Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 46 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019). As of this 
report, an appeal is pending in the D.C. Circuit. No. 19-5331 (D.C. 
Cir.).
    \31\Committee on Government Reform, Democratic Staff, Congressional 
Oversight of the Clinton Administration (Jan. 17, 2006) (online at 
https://wayback.archive-it.org/4949/20141031200116/http://oversight-
archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20060117103516-91336.pdf) (noting 
that Republican Dan Burton, Chairman of the Committee on Government 
Reform, deposed 141 Clinton Administration officials during his 
tenure).
    \32\Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist 
Attack in Benghazi, Final Report of the Select Committee on the Events 
Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, 114th Cong. (2016) 
(H. Rep. 114-848) (noting that the Select Committee interviewed or 
received testimony from 107 people none of whom was instructed not to 
appear including 57 current and former State Department officials such 
as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Chief of Staff and Counselor to 
the Secretary of State Cheryl Mills, Deputy Chief of Staff and Director 
of Policy Planning Jacob Sullivan, and Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations Huma Abedin; 24 Defense Department officials such as 
Secretary Leon Panetta and General Carter Ham; and 19 Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials such as Director David Petraeus and 
former Deputy Director Michael Morell).
    \33\Id. (including productions of 71,640 pages of State Department 
documents, 300 pages of CIA intelligence analyses, 200 pages of Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) documents, 900 pages of Defense 
Department documents, and 750 pages of National Security Agency 
documents).
    \34\See, e.g., House rule X, clause 2(a) (assigning ``general 
oversight responsibilities'' to committees); House Rule XI, clause 2(m) 
(authorizing Committees to ``hold such hearings as it considers 
necessary'' and to ``require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance 
and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, 
records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as it 
considers necessary''); H. Res. 6 (2019) (granting deposition authority 
to committees); 116th Congress Regulations for Use of Deposition 
Authority, Congressional Record (Jan. 25, 2019) (establishing 
procedures for committee depositions).
    \35\See, e.g., House Rules (2017); H. Res. 5 (2017); 115th Congress 
Staff Deposition Authority Procedures, Congressional Record (Jan. 13, 
2017).
    \36\Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, Department of Justice, 
Report on The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 
Presidential Election, Vol. I (March 2019) (online at www.justice.gov/
storage/report.pdf); Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, Department 
of Justice, Report on The Investigation Into Russian Interference In 
The 2016 Presidential Election, Vol. II (March 2019) (online at 
www.justice.gov/storage/report_volume2.pdf).
    \37\See H. Res. 430; see also H. Rep. 116-105 (2019) (the purposes 
of the Judiciary Committee's investigation include ``considering 
whether any of the conduct described in the Special Counsel's Report 
warrants the Committee in taking any further steps under Congress' 
Article I powers,'' including ``whether to approve articles of 
impeachment with respect to the President or any other Administration 
official'').
    \38\See Letter from Chairman Jerrold Nadler, House Committee on the 
Judiciary, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Chairwoman Maxine Waters, House Committee on Financial 
Services, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and 
Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(Aug. 22, 2019) (online at https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/
democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/
FiveChairsLetter8.22.pdf).
    \39\Id.
    \40\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, 
The White House (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_cipollone_on_ukraine.pdf); Letter from 
Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman 
Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, 
to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State (Sept. 9, 2019) 
(online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_sec_pompeo_on_ukraine.pdf); Letter from 
Chairman Eliot L. Engel, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah 
E. Cummings, Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. 
Pompeo, Department of State (Sept. 13, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov;/sites;/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/;2019-
09-13.EEC%20EL;E%20Schiff;%20re%20Ukraine.pdf).
    \41\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Sept. 22, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-66/) (``We had 
a great conversation. The conversation I had was largely 
congratulatory. It was largely corruption all of the corruption taking 
place. It was largely the fact that we don't want our people, like Vice 
President Biden and his son, creating to the corruption already in the 
Ukraine.'').
    \42\Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Remarks Announcing 
Impeachment Inquiry (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at www.speaker.gov/
newsroom/92419-0).
    \43\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 25, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \44\See, e.g., Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Mick Mulvaney, Acting 
Chief of Staff, The White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-10-04.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Mulvaney-
WH%20re%20Subpoena.pdf).
    \45\H. Res. 660 (2019).
    \46\Trump Vows Stonewall of `All' House Subpoenas, Setting Up Fight 
Over Powers, New York Times (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/24/us/politics/donald-trump-subpoenas.html).
    \47\While Bemoaning Mueller Probe, Trump Falsely Says the 
Constitution Gives Him `The Right to do Whatever I Want', Washington 
Post (July 23, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/
07/23/trump-falsely-tells-auditorium-full-teens-constitution-gives-him-
right-do-whatever-i-want/).
    \48\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1179179573541511176).
    \49\At Louisiana Rally, Trump Lashes Out at Impeachment Inquiry and 
Pelosi, New York Times (Oct. 11, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/2019/
10/11/us/trump-rally-louisiana-lake-charles.html).
    \50\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 18, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1185374394350215169) (purporting to 
quote former Rep. Jason Chaffetz).
    \51\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 21, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1175409914384125952).
    \52\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1176559970390806530).
    \53\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1176623010230525953).
    \54\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President Salih 
of Iraq Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-salih-iraq-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny-2/).
    \55\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President 
Bukele of El Salvador Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 25, 2019) (online 
at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-bukele-el-salvador-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/).
    \56\The White House, Remarks by President Trump in a Multilateral 
Meeting on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Sept. 25, 2019) 
(online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-multilateral-meeting-bolivarian-republic-venezuela-new-york-ny/).
    \57\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 26, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1177285017636093953).
    \58\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1179023004241727489).
    \59\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 5, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1180482408522629120).
    \60\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1181761045486080002).
    \61\The White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of 
Executive Orders on Transparency in Federal Guidance and Enforcement 
(Oct. 9, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-signing-executive-orders-transparency-federal-
guidance-enforcement/).
    \62\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1181913137483829250).
    \63\ Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1181969511697788928).
    \64\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 20, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1186035686396321793).
    \65\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 12, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1194214569591394304).
    \66\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1198733640722718725).
    \67\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 26, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1199352977934487553).
    \68\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Upon Air Force One 
Arrival (Sept. 26, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-upon-air-force-one-arrival-prince-
georges-county-md/).
    \69\See, e.g., Co-Equal, Investigative Rules and Practices Followed 
by House Republicans (online at www.co-equal.org/guide-to-
congressional-oversight/investigative-rules-and-practices-followed-by-
house-republicans). See also Committee on Government Reform, Democratic 
Staff, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration (Jan. 17, 
2006) (online at https://wayback.archive-it.org/4949/20141031200116/
http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20060117103516-
91336.pdf) (noting that House Republicans conducted hundreds of 
confidential depositions of both political appointees and career 
officials without agency counsel present, with one Committee alone 
conducting over 140 depositions of Clinton Administration officials).
    \70\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
    \71\Speech: Donald Trump Holds a Political Rally in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, Factbase Videos (Oct. 10, 2019) (online at www.youtube.com/
watch?time_continue=742&v=_y8Al_mGwmc&feature=emb_logo).
    \72\Gregg Nunziata, a former legal counsel and senior policy 
advisor to Senator Marco Rubio, stated: ``This letter is bananas. A 
barely-lawyered temper tantrum.'' Gregg Nunziata, Twitter (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at https://twitter.com/greggnunziata/status/
1181685021926662144). Jonathan Turley, a law professor who has 
represented House Republicans, stated: ``A President cannot simply pick 
up his marbles and leave the game because he does not like the other 
players. A refusal to cooperate with a constitutionally mandated 
process can itself be an abuse of power.'' White House Issues Defiant 
Letter Refusing to Cooperate in Impeachment Proceedings, Res Ipsa 
Loquitur (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at https://jonathanturley.org/2019/10/
09/white-house-issues-defiant-letter-refusing-to-cooperate-in-
impeachment-proceedings/). Preet Bharara, the former U.S. Attorney for 
the Southern District of New York, stated, ``It's one of the worst 
letters I've seen from the White House counsel's office.'' George 
Conway, a prominent conservative attorney, called Mr. Cipollone's 
letter ``a disgrace to the country, a disgrace to the presidency, and a 
disgrace to the legal profession.'' He accused the White House of 
``clearly engaging in obstructionist tactics.'' Diagnosing Trump (with 
George Conway), Stay Tuned with Preet Bharara (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at 
https://cafe.com/stay-tuned-transcript-diagnosing-trump-with-george-
conway/). Mr. Conway also stated: ``I cannot fathom how any self-
respecting member of the bar could affix his name to this letter. It's 
pure hackery, and it disgraces the profession.'' George T. Conway, III, 
Twitter (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/gtconway3d/
status/1181685229687394307).
    \73\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 18, 2019).
    \74\Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Exclusion of 
Agency Counsel from Congressional Depositions in the Impeachment 
Context (Nov. 1, 2019) (online at www.justice.gov/olc/file/1214996/
download).
    \75\Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Legal Aspects 
of Impeachment: An Overview (1974) (quoting President James K. Polk) 
(online at www.justice.gov/olc/page/file/980036/download).
    \76\Position of the Executive Department Regarding Investigative 
Reports, 40 Op. Atty Gen. 45 (1941).
    \77\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
    \78\See, e.g., The White House, Remarks by President Trump and 
President Salih of Iraq Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 24, 2019) 
(online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-president-salih-iraq-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/) (``The phone 
call was perfect.''); The White House, Remarks by President Trump Upon 
Arriving at the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-upon-
arriving-u-n-general-assembly-new-york-ny/) (``That call was 
perfect.''); Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 11, 2019) (online at 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1193615188311912449) (``The 
call to the Ukrainian President was PERFECT.'').
    \79\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
    \80\See House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M. 
Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong. (1974) (H. Rep. 93-
1305) (Impeachment Article III: ``In refusing to produce these papers 
and things, Richard M. Nixon, substituting his judgment as to what 
materials were necessary for the inquiry, interposed the powers of the 
presidency against the lawful subpoenas of the House of 
Representatives, thereby assuming to himself functions and judgments 
necessary to the exercise of the sole power of impeachment vested by 
the Constitution in the House of Representatives.'').
    \81\In this case, one Republican Member of the House of 
Representatives supported impeaching President Trump--Rep. Justin Amash 
from Michigan. In explaining his support, Rep. Amash noted the 
importance of upholding Congress' ``duties under our Constitution'' 
rather than ``loyalty to a political party.'' After Rep. Amash 
announced his support for impeachment, President Trump denounced him as 
a ``total lightweight'' and a ``loser.'' Rep. Amash subsequently 
declared that he was leaving the Republican party. See Justin Amash, 
Twitter (May 18, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/justinamash/
status/1129831626844921862); Trump Calls Representative Justin Amash a 
`Loser' Over Impeachment Talk, New York Times (May 19, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/us/politics/trump-justin-amash-
impeachment.html); Justin Amash: Our politics is in a partisan death 
spiral. That's why I'm leaving the GOP, Washington Post (July 4, 2019) 
(online at www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justin-amash-our-politics-
is-in-a-partisan-death-spiral-thats-why-im-leaving-the-gop/2019/07/04/
afbe0480-9e3d-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html).
    \82\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 18, 2019).
    \83\Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice Sec. 603 (stating 
that ``various events have been credited with setting an impeachment in 
motion,'' including ``facts developed and reported by an investigating 
committee of the House''). On October 25, 2019, a federal district 
court affirmed that ``no governing law requires'' the House to hold a 
such a vote. In re Application of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States House of Representatives, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184857 
(D.D.C. 2019). More than 300 legal scholars agreed, concluding that 
``the Constitution does not mandate the process for impeachment and 
there is no constitutional requirement that the House of 
Representatives authorize an impeachment inquiry before one begins.'' 
An Open Letter from Legal Scholars on Trump Impeachment Inquiry (Oct. 
17, 2019) (online at www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
Open-Letter-from-Legal-Scholars-re-Impeachment.pdf).
    \84\In re Application of the Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States House of Representatives, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184857 (D.D.C. 
2019).
    \85\See, e.g., 3 Deschler Ch. 14 Sec. 5 (discussing impeachment of 
Justice William O. Douglas).
    \86\See, e.g., H. Res. 87, 101st Cong. (1989) (impeachment of Judge 
Walter L. Nixon, Jr.); H. Res. 461, 99th Cong. (1986) (impeachment of 
Judge Harry E. Claiborne).
    \87\H. Res. 6 (2019); H. Res. 660 (2019). In addition, on June 11, 
2019, the House approved House Resolution 430, which, in part, 
authorized the House Committee on the Judiciary to seek judicial 
enforcement of subpoenas in the ongoing investigation related to 
Special Counsel Mueller's report. The resolution granted the Committee 
``any and all necessary authority under Article I of the Constitution'' 
to seek judicial enforcement. The accompanying report by the House 
Committee on Rules explained that this authority is intended to further 
the Judiciary Committee's ongoing investigation, the purpose of which 
includes assessing whether to recommend ``articles of impeachment with 
respect to the President.'' H. Rep. 116-108, quoting H. Rep. 116-105.
    \88\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf). President Trump has also made these claims 
directly, stating: ``we had a great two weeks watching these crooked 
politicians, not giving us due process, not giving us lawyers, not 
giving us the right to speak, and destroying their witnesses,'' and 
``we weren't allowed any rights.'' Speech: Donald Trump Holds a 
Political Rally in Sunrise, Florida, Factbase Videos (Nov. 26, 2019) 
(online atwww.youtube.com/watch?v=zoRcCRULQl8&feature=youtu.be).
    \89\Indeed, Mr. Cipollone articulated no basis under the 
Constitution for his various ``due process'' demands and there is no 
such basis, especially when the House is engaged in a fact-finding 
investigation as part of its efforts to ascertain whether to consider 
articles of impeachment. See H. Rept. 116-266 (2019).
    \90\H. Res. 660 (2019).
    \91\H. Rept. 116-266 (2019) (``The purpose of providing these 
protections is to ensure that the president has a fair opportunity to 
present evidence to the Judiciary Committee if it must weigh whether to 
recommend articles of impeachment against him to the full House.'').
    \92\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, to 
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, 
Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-
10.08.2019.pdf).
    \93\In a September 25, 2019, statement, a Department of Justice 
spokesperson stated: ``The Attorney General was first notified of the 
President's conversation with Ukrainian President Zelensky several 
weeks after the call took place, when the Department of Justice learned 
of a potential referral. The President has not spoken with the Attorney 
General about having Ukraine investigate anything relating to former 
Vice President Biden or his son. The President has not asked the 
Attorney General to contact Ukraine--on this or any other matter. The 
Attorney General has not communicated with Ukraine--on this or any 
other subject. Nor has the Attorney General discussed this matter, or 
anything relating to Ukraine, with Rudy Giuliani.'' As to the 
President's conduct with regard to Ukraine, the Department stated: ``In 
August, the Department of Justice was referred a matter relating to a 
letter the Director of National Intelligence had received from the 
Inspector General for the Intelligence Community regarding a purported 
whistleblower complaint. The Inspector General's letter cited a 
conversation between the President and Ukrainian President Zelensky as 
a potential violation of federal campaign finance law, while 
acknowledging that neither the Inspector General nor the complainant 
had firsthand knowledge of the conversation. Relying on established 
procedures set forth in the Justice Manual, the Department's Criminal 
Division reviewed the official record of the call and determined, based 
on the facts and applicable law, that there was no campaign finance 
violation and that no further action was warranted. All relevant 
components of the Department agreed with this legal conclusion, and the 
Department has concluded the matter.'' Department of Justice (Sept. 25, 
2019) (as emailed by the Department of Justice to the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence).
    \94\H. Rept. 116-266 (2019) (The report continued: ``As previously 
described, an impeachment inquiry is not a criminal trial and should 
not be confused with one. The president's liberty is not at stake and 
the constitutional protections afforded a criminal defendant do not as 
a matter of course apply. The constitutionally permitted consequences 
of impeachment are limited to immediate removal from office and 
potentially being barred from holding future federal office. Moreover, 
it is the Senate that conducts the trial to determine whether the 
conduct outlined in the articles warrant the president's removal from 
office, which requires a 2/3 majority vote. Indeed, given the nature of 
the ongoing investigation into the Ukraine matter, President Trump has 
received additional procedural protections. During closed door 
depositions held by HPSCI and others related to the Ukraine matter, 
minority members have been present and granted equal time to question 
witnesses brought before the committees. This is unlike the process in 
the preceding two presidential impeachment inquiries, which relied 
significantly upon information gathered by third-party 
investigators.'').
    \95\See Committee on Government Reform, Democratic Staff, 
Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration (Jan. 17, 2006) 
(online at https://wayback.archive-it.org/4949/20141031200116/http://
oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20060117103516-91336.pdf) 
(explaining that when Rep. Dan Burton served as Chairman of the 
Committee on Government Reform, the Committee deposed 141 Clinton 
Administration officials without agency counsel present--including 
White House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty; White House Chief of Staff 
Erskine Bowles; White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum; White House 
Counsel Jack Quinn; Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey; Deputy 
White House Counsel Cheryl Mills; Deputy White House Chief of Staff 
Harold Ickes; Chief of Staff to the Vice President Roy Neel; and Chief 
of Staff to the First Lady Margaret Williams).
    \96\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. 
Cummings, Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-
10.08.2019.pdf). On November 1, 2019, after the House approved H. Res. 
660, the Administration continued to press this spurious claim, with 
the Office of Legal Counsel issuing an opinion asserting that 
``Congressional committees participating in an impeachment inquiry may 
not validly compel executive branch witnesses to testify about matters 
that potentially involve information protected by executive privilege 
without the assistance of agency counsel.'' Department of Justice, 
Office of Legal Counsel, Exclusion of Agency Counsel from Congressional 
Depositions in the Impeachment Context (Nov. 1, 2019) (online at 
www.justice.gov/olc/file/1214996/download). As discussed in this 
section, this position is entirely unsupported by judicial precedent 
and erroneous.
    \97\U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 5, cl. 2.
    \98\The regulations that govern House depositions state: ``Only 
members, Committee staff designated by the chair or ranking minority 
member, an official reporter, the witness, and the witness's counsel 
are permitted to attend. Observers or counsel for other persons, 
including counsel for government agencies, may not attend.'' 116th 
Congress Regulations for Use of Deposition Authority, Congressional 
Record, H1216 (Jan. 25, 2019) (online at www.congress.gov/116/crec/
2019/01/25/CREC-2019-01-25-pt1-PgH1216-2.pdf).
    \99\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Committee Depositions in the 
House of Representatives: Longstanding Republican and Democratic 
Practice of Excluding Agency Counsel (Nov. 5, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
Committee%20Depositions%20in%20the%20House%20of%20Representatives_Longst
anding% 20Republican%20and%20Democratic%20Practice%20of 
%20Excluding%20Agency%20  CounselCounsel.pdf).
    \100\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
    \101\Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
    \102\See, e.g., S. 2537 (requiring an investigation by the State 
Department Inspector General into the withholding of aid to Ukraine, 
directing the President to immediately obligate previously appropriated 
funds, and authorizing funds to counter Russian influence); H.R. 3047 
(providing support to Ukraine to defend its independence, sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity).
    \103\In re Application of the Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States House of Representatives, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184857 (D.D.C. 
2019), quoting Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 30475 
(D.D.C. 2019) (``Nothing in the Constitution or case law . . . compels 
Congress to abandon its legislative role at the first scent of 
potential illegality and confine itself exclusively to the impeachment 
process.''').
    \104\See, e.g., the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information 
Act, P.L. 93-502; Ethics in Government Act of 1978, P.L. 95-52; 
Presidential Records Act of 1978, P.L. 95-591; Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, P.L. 93-443.
    \105\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf); Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Eliot L. Engel, 
Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 18, 2019).
    \106\United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (``Rather, each branch should take cognizance of an implicit 
constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a 
realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the 
particular fact situation.'').
    \107\For example, on November 22, 2019, the Department of State 
produced to a private party 99 pages of emails, letters, notes, 
timelines, and news articles under a court order pursuant to the 
Freedom of Information Act. State Department Releases Ukraine Documents 
to American Oversight, American Oversight (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at 
www.americanoversight.org/state-department-releases-ukraine-documents-
to-american-oversight).
    \108\Even if the President were to make a colorable assertion of 
executive privilege, which he has not, the Supreme Court has held that 
the privilege is not absolute. In the context of a grand jury subpoena, 
the Supreme Court found that the President's ``generalized assertion of 
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in 
a pending criminal trial.'' United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974). Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has held that executive privilege 
is a ``qualified'' privilege and that ``courts must balance the public 
interests at stake in determining whether the privilege should yield in 
a particular case, and must specifically consider the need of the party 
seeking privileged evidence.'' In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997). As described above, Congress' need for information during 
an impeachment inquiry is particularly ``compelling.'' In re Report & 
Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of 
Evidence to House of Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974) 
(``[I]t should not be forgotten that we deal in a matter of the most 
critical moment to the Nation, an impeachment investigation involving 
the President of the United States. It would be difficult to conceive 
of a more compelling need than that of this country for an unswervingly 
fair inquiry based on all the pertinent information.'').
    \109\See, e.g., Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House, to William Pittard, Counsel to Mick 
Mulvaney, Acting Chief of Staff, The White House (Nov. 8, 2019) 
(asserting that Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney ``is absolutely 
immune from compelled congressional testimony with respect to matters 
related to his service as a senior advisor to the President'' and that 
``[s]ubjecting a senior presidential advisor to the congressional 
subpoena power would be akin to requiring the President himself to 
appear before Congress on matters relating to the performance of his 
constitutionally assigned executive functions'').
    \110\Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 
(D.D.C. 2008) (``The Executive cannot identify a single judicial 
opinion that recognizes absolute immunity for senior presidential 
advisors in this or any other context. That simple yet critical fact 
bears repeating: the asserted absolute immunity claim here is entirely 
unsupported by existing case law. In fact, there is Supreme Court 
authority that is all but conclusive on this question and that 
powerfully suggests that such advisors do not enjoy absolute immunity. 
The Court therefore rejects the Executive's claim of absolute immunity 
for senior presidential aides.'').
    \111\Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Case No. 1:19-cv-02379, 
Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 46 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019). As of this 
report, an appeal is pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit. No. 19-5331 (D.C. Cir.).
    \112\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_cipollone_on_ukraine.pdf).
    \113\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2019-09-
24.eec_engel_schiff_to_cipollone-wh_re_potus_ukraine.pdf).
    \114\Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/
sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
04.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Mulvaney-WH%20re%20Subpoena.pdf).
    \115\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, (Oct. 18, 2019).
    \116\Email from Bureau of Legislative Affairs, Department of State, 
to Committee Staff (Oct. 2, 2019).
    \117\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_cipollone_on_ukraine.pdf).
    \118\Id.
    \119\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House (Sept. 24, 2019).
    \120\Memorandum from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings to Members of the 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Notice of Intent to Issue 
Subpoenas (Oct. 2, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
02.COR%20WH%20Subpoena%20Memo%20and%20Schedule.pdf).
    \121\Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/
sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
04.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Mulvaney-WH%20re%20Subpoena.pdf).
    \122\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-
10.08.2019.pdf).
    \123\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 18, 2019).
    \124\On September 13, the Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena 
pursuant to its oversight authority to the Acting Director of National 
Intelligence to compel the production of a complaint submitted by an 
Intelligence Community whistleblower, as well as other records. The 
Intelligence Committee issued this subpoena before Speaker Pelosi 
announced on September 24 that the Intelligence Committee and other 
committees would be continuing their work under the umbrella of the 
impeachment inquiry being conducted by the Judiciary Committee. As a 
result, this subpoena should not be conflated with subpoenas issued as 
part of the impeachment inquiry. See Letter from Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to Joseph 
Maguire, Acting Director of National Intelligence, Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2019).
    \125\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr. 
21, 2019) (online at http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2019/images/11/15/4-21-
19.trump-zelensky.call.pdf); The White House, Memorandum of Telephone 
Conversation (July 25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2019/09/Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \126\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
    \127\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 53; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 19-20.
    \128\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 186-187; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 166-167.
    \129\See, e.g., Cooper Dep. Tr. at 42-43.
    \130\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 78-79.
    \131\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 36-37.
    \132\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 31.
    \133\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \134\The review reportedly uncovered ``early August email exchanges 
between acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney and White House budget 
officials seeking to provide an explanation for withholding the funds 
after the president had already ordered a hold in mid-July on the 
nearly $400 million in security assistance.'' The review also 
reportedly included interviews with ``some key White House officials 
involved in handling Ukraine aid and dealing with complaints and 
concerns in the aftermath of the call between Trump and Zelensky.'' 
White House Review Turns Up Emails Showing Extensive Effort to Justify 
Trump's Decision to Block Ukraine Military Aid, Washington Post (Nov. 
24, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-
review-turns-up-emails-showing-extensive-effort-to-justify-trumps-
decision-to-block-ukraine-military-aid/2019/11/24/2121cf98-0d57-11ea-
bd9d-c628fd48b3a0_story.html).
    \135\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Vice President Michael R. Pence 
(Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
04.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20re%20Request%20to%20VP%2010-04-
19%20Letter%20and%20Schedule.pdf).
    \136\Id.
    \137\Letter from Matthew E. Morgan, Counsel to the Vice President, 
Office of the Vice President, to Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Oct. 15, 2019).
    \138\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 61.
    \139\Williams Dep. Tr. at 129.
    \140\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 15.
    \141\Id. at 23-24.
    \142\Williams Dep. Tr. at 74-75.
    \143\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Acting Director Russell T. Vought, Office of 
Management and Budget (Oct. 7, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2019-10-
07.eec_engel_schiff_to_vought-_omb_breb_subpoena.pdf).
    \144\Id.
    \145\Letter from Jason Yaworske, Associate Director for Legislative 
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Oct. 15, 2019).
    \146\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 23-26.
    \147\Id. at 36-41.
    \148\Id. at 57-60, 62-63.
    \149\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_sec_pompeo_on_ukraine.pdf).
    \150\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 23, 2019).
    \151\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-09-27.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20to%20Pompeo-
%20State%20re%20Document%20Subpoena.pdf).
    \152\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State 
(Oct. 8, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
08.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Sondland%20re%20Subpoena.pdf); Letter 
from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador William Taylor, Department of State 
(Oct. 4, 2019); Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Counselor T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190927_-
_eec_engel_schiff_to_brechbuhl_re_individual_deposition_request.pdf); 
Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Deputy Assistant Secretary George P. Kent, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019); Letter from Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah 
E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador 
Kurt Volker, Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019); Letter from Chairman 
Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to 
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019).
    \153\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State, 
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1, 
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E. 
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same 
day).
    \154\Id.
    \155\Kent Dep. Tr. at 27.
    \156\Id. at 33-34.
    \157\Id. at 34-35.
    \158\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State, 
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1, 
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E. 
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same 
day).
    \159\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Deputy Secretary John J. 
Sullivan, Department of State (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at https://
foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/4/6/4683bc86-be2a-49fc-9e76-
7cdbf669592f/98BEBD8006DE62BA36BEBD175775F744.2019-10-1-ele-abs-eec-to-
depsec-sullivan.pdf).
    \160\Pompeo: `I Was on the Phone Call' with Trump and Ukrainian 
President, CNN (Oct. 2, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/2019/10/02/
politics/mike-pompeo-ukraine-call/index.html).
    \161\Email from Committee Staff to Bureau of Legislative Affairs, 
Department of State (Oct. 7, 2019).
    \162\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for 
Management, Department of State, to Andrew Wright, Counsel to Deputy 
Assistant Secretary George P. Kent, Department of State (Oct. 14, 
2019).
    \163\Kent Dep. Tr. at 30-31, 46.
    \164\Id. at 32.
    \165\Id. at 35.
    \166\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \167\Id.
    \168\Id. In addition, Dr. Fiona Hill, the former Senior Director 
for Europe and Russia at the National Security Council, produced 
calendar entries relating to relevant meetings. Fiona Hill Document 
Production, Bates Hill0001-Hill0049 (Oct. 13, 2019).
    \169\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000001-KV00000065 
(Oct. 2, 2019).
    \170\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1505.
    \171\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 3-4 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \172\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 160.
    \173\Declaration of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of 
State, at 3 (Nov. 4, 2019).
    \174\State Department Releases Ukraine Documents to American 
Oversight, American Oversight (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at 
www.americanoversight.org/state-department-releases-ukraine-documents-
to-american-oversight); American Oversight v. Dep't of State, Case No. 
19-cv-2934, Doc. No. 15 (D.D.C. November 25, 2019).
    \175\Email from Office Manager to the Secretary of State to S_All 
(Mar. 26, 2019) (online at www.americanoversight.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_1Docs_11-22.pdf).
    \176\Email from Madeleine Westerhout to State Department Official, 
(Mar. 27, 2019) (online at www.americanoversight.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf).
    \177\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-09-27.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20to%20Pompeo-
%20State%20re%20Document%20Subpoena.pdf).
    \178\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 33-34.
    \179\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 20-23 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \180\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 45-46.
    \181\Hale Dep. Tr. at 147-148.
    \182\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Mark Esper, Department of Defense 
(Oct. 7, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2019-10-07.eec_engel_schiff_to_esper-dod_re_subpoena.pdf).
    \183\Transcript: Secretary of Defense Mark Esper on ``Face the 
Nation,'' October 13, 2019, CBS News (Oct. 13, 2019) (online at 
www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-secretary-of-defense-mark-esper-on-
face-the-nation-october-13-2019/).
    \184\Letter from Robert R. Hood, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Legislative Affairs, Department of Defense, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. 
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 15, 2019).
    \185\Transcript: Secretary of Defense Mark Esper on ``Face the 
Nation,'' October 13, 2019, CBS News (Oct. 13, 2019) (online at 
www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-secretary-of-defense-mark-esper-on-
face-the-nation-october-13-2019/).
    \186\See, e.g., Cooper Dep. Tr. at 42-43.
    \187\Id. at 33.
    \188\Id. at 33-38.
    \189\Cooper Hearing Tr. at 13-14.
    \190\Id. at 14.
    \191\Id.
    \192\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Rick Perry, Department 
of Energy (Oct. 10, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
10.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Perry-
DOE%20Joint%20Cover%20Letter%20re%20Subpoena.pdf).
    \193\Letter from Melissa F. Burnison, Assistant Secretary for 
Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of Energy, to 
Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman 
Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform 
(Oct. 18, 2019).
    \194\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 160.
    \195\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \196\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \197\Letter from Chairman Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Rudy Giuliani (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/20190930%20-%20Giuliani%20HPSCI%20Subpoena%20Letter.pdf).
    \198\Letter from Jon A. Sale, Counsel to Rudy Giuliani, to 
Committee Staff (Oct. 15, 2019).
    \199\Id.
    \200\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Igor Fruman (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/20190930%20-
%20Fruman%20Letter%20and%20Doc%20Request%20Schedule.pdf); Letter from 
Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight 
and Reform, to Lev Parnas (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/20190930%20-
%20Parnas%20Letter%20and%20Doc%20Request%20Schedule.pdf).
    \201\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev 
Parnas (Oct. 10, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/2019-10-
09.eec_engel_schiff_to_parnas_fruman_re_subpoena.pdf).
    \202\Letter from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev 
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 3, 2019).
    \203\Letter from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev 
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 8, 2019).
    \204\Email from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev 
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 9, 2019).
    \205\Email from Committee Staff to John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor 
Fruman and Lev Parnas (Oct. 10, 2019).
    \206\Email from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev 
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 10, 2019).
    \207\Exclusive: Giuliani Associate Parnas Will Comply with Trump 
Impeachment Inquiry--Lawyer, Reuters (Nov. 4, 2019) (online at 
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-impeachment-parnas-exclusiv/
exclusive-giuliani-associate-now-willing-to-comply-with-trump-
impeachment-inquiry-lawyer-idUSKBN1XE297). On November 23, 2019, Mr. 
Parnas' attorney informed the press that ``Mr. Parnas learned from 
former Ukrainian Prosecutor General Victor Shokin that [Ranking Member 
Devin] Nunes had met with Shokin in Vienna last December.'' According 
to the report, ``Parnas says he worked to put Nunes in touch with 
Ukrainians who could help Nunes dig up dirt on Biden and Democrats in 
Ukraine, according to Bondy.'' Exclusive: Giuliani Associate Willing to 
Tell Congress Nunes Met with Ex-Ukrainian Official to Get Dirt on 
Biden, CNN (Nov. 23, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/2019/11/22/politics/
nunes-vienna-trip-ukrainian-prosecutor-biden/index.html). On November 
24, 2019, Mr. Parnas' attorney told press that his client had arranged 
skype and phone calls earlier this year between Ranking Member Nunes' 
staff and Ukraine's chief anti-corruption prosecutor, Nazar 
Kholodnytsky, as well as a deputy in Ukraine's Prosecutor General's 
office, Kostantyn Kulyk. According to Mr. Parnas' attorney, Ranking 
Member Nunes had actually planned a trip to Ukraine instead of the 
calls, but cancelled the trip when his staff realized it would require 
alerting Chairman Schiff about the travel. Giuliani Associate Parnas 
Wants to Testify that Nunes Aides Hid Ukraine Meetings on Biden Dirt 
from Schiff, CNBC (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at www.cnbc.com/2019/11/24/
giuliani-ally-would-testify-that-nunes-staffers-hid-ukraine-meetings-
from-schiff.html).
    \208\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
    \209\See 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 192, 194. Witnesses who received 
subpoenas that were subsequently withdrawn would not face a similar 
risk of being held in contempt of Congress.
    \210\See, e.g., Email from Committee Staff to Mick Mulvaney, Acting 
Chief of Staff, The White House (Nov. 7, 2019) (``Your failure or 
refusal to comply with the subpoena, including at the direction or 
behest of the President, shall constitute further evidence of 
obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may be used as an 
adverse inference against you and the President. Moreover, your failure 
to appear shall constitute evidence that may be used against you in a 
contempt proceeding.'').
    \211\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Mick Mulvaney, Acting Chief of 
Staff, The White House (Nov. 5, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2019-11-
05.CBM%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Mulvaney-WH%20re%20Depo%20Notice.pdf).
    \212\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to 
Mick Mulvaney, Acting Chief of Staff, The White House (Nov. 7, 2019).
    \213\Email from William Pittard, Counsel to Mick Mulvaney, Acting 
Chief of Staff, The White House, to Committee Staff (Nov. 8, 2019).
    \214\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to William Pittard, Counsel to Mick Mulvaney, Acting Chief 
of Staff, The White House (Nov. 8, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
    \215\Letter from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Pat A. Cipollone, 
Counsel to the President, The White House (Nov. 7, 2019).
    \216\Mulvaney Dep. Tr. at 5.
    \217\Id. at 7-9.
    \218\On November 8, 2019, Mr. Mulvaney filed a motion in federal 
court seeking to join a lawsuit, discussed below, filed by Dr. Charles 
Kupperman seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether he should comply 
with the Committees' subpoena. On November 11, 2019, Mr. Mulvaney 
withdrew his request to join the case. White House Chief of Staff 
Mulvaney Drops Bid to Join Kupperman Impeachment Lawsuit, Washington 
Post (Nov. 11, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-
issues/bolton-and-kupperman-reject-white-house-chief-of-staff-
mulvaneys-bid-to-join-impeachment-lawsuit/2019/11/11/cdf40226-04ac-
11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
    \219\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Robert B. Blair, Assistant 
to the President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff, The White 
House (Oct. 24, 2019).
    \220\Letter from Whitney C. Ellerman, Counsel to Robert B. Blair, 
Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff, 
The White House, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform (Nov. 2, 2019).
    \221\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Whitney C. Ellerman, Counsel to Robert 
B. Blair, Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of 
Staff, The White House (Nov. 3, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Subpoena to Robert B. Blair, Assistant to the 
President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff, The White House 
(Nov. 3, 2019).
    \222\Blair Dep. Tr. at 6-7.
    \223\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Charles J. Cooper and 
Michael W. Kirk, Counsel to Ambassador John Bolton, Former National 
Security Advisor, The White House (Oct. 30, 2019).
    \224\Email from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Ambassador John 
Bolton, Former National Security Advisor, The White House, to Committee 
Staff (Oct. 30, 2019).
    \225\Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Ambassador John 
Bolton, Former National Security Advisor, The White House, to Douglas 
N. Letter, General Counsel, House of Representatives (Nov. 8, 2019).
    \226\In early November 2019, Ambassador Bolton's personal attorney 
also informed Committee staff that if the Committees were to issue a 
subpoena to compel his testimony, he would seek to join the lawsuit 
filed by Dr. Kupperman. On November 24, 2019, Chairman Schiff stated, 
``We've certainly been in touch with his lawyer and what we've been 
informed by his lawyer because we invited him and he did not choose to 
come in and testify, notwithstanding the fact that his deputy Fiona 
Hill and his other deputy Colonel Vindman and Tim Morrison and others 
on the National Security Council have shown the courage to come in is 
if we subpoena him, they will sue us in court.'' Schiff Pushes Bolton 
to Testify But Will Not Go to Court to Force Him, CNN (Nov. 24, 2019) 
(online at www.cnn.com/2019/11/24/politics/adam-schiff-house-democrats-
impeachment-state-of-the-union-cnntv/index.html).
    \227\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to John A. Eisenberg, Deputy 
Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal 
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council, 
The White House (Oct. 30, 2019).
    \228\Eisenberg Dep. Tr. at 6 (``Mr. Eisenberg never acknowledged 
receipt or otherwise responded to the committees' deposition request, 
nor did any official at the White House.'').
    \229\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to John A. Eisenberg, Deputy 
Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal 
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council, 
The White House (Nov. 1, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Subpoena to John A. Eisenberg, Deputy Counsel to the 
President for National Security Affairs and Legal Advisor to the 
National Security Council, The White House (Nov. 1, 2019).
    \230\Letter from William A. Burck, Counsel to John A. Eisenberg, 
Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal 
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council, 
The White House, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform (Nov. 4, 2019).
    \231\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to William A. Burck, Counsel to John A. Eisenberg, Deputy 
Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal 
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council, 
The White House (Nov. 3, 2019).
    \232\Letter from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Pat A. Cipollone, 
Counsel to the President, the White House (Nov. 3, 2019).
    \233\Eisenberg Dep. Tr. at 6-8.
    \234\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Michael Ellis, Senior 
Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal Advisor to the 
National Security Council, National Security Council, The White House 
(Oct. 30, 2019).
    \235\Email from Paul Butler, Counsel to Michael Ellis, Senior 
Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal Advisor to the 
National Security Council, National Security Council, The White House, 
to Committee Staff (Nov. 2, 2019).
    \236\Email from Paul Butler, Counsel to Michael Ellis, Senior 
Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal Advisor to the 
National Security Council, National Security Council, The White House, 
to Committee Staff (Nov. 3, 2019).
    \237\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Paul W. Butler, Counsel to Michael 
Ellis, Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal 
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council, 
The White House (Nov. 3, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Subpoena to Michael Ellis, Senior Associate Counsel to 
the President and Deputy Legal Advisor to the National Security 
Council, National Security Council, The White House (Nov. 3, 2019).
    \238\Ellis Dep. Tr. at 7.
    \239\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Preston Wells Griffith, 
Senior Director for International Energy and Environment, National 
Security Council (Oct. 24, 2019).
    \240\Letter from Karen D. Williams, Counsel to Preston Wells 
Griffith, Senior Director for International Energy and Environment, 
National Security Council, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Nov. 4, 2019).
    \241\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Karen D. Williams, Counsel to Preston 
Wells Griffith, Senior Director for International Energy and 
Environment, National Security Council (Nov. 4, 2019); House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Preston Wells Griffith, 
Senior Director for International Energy and Environment, National 
Security Council (Nov. 4, 2019).
    \242\Griffith Dep. Tr. at 5-6.
    \243\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former 
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
National Security Council (Oct. 16, 2019).
    \244\Email from Committee Staff to Charles J. Cooper and Michael W. 
Kirk, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council 
(Oct. 25, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Subpoena to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council 
(Oct. 25, 2019).
    \245\Compl., Kupperman v. U.S. House of Representatives et al., No. 
19 Civ. 3224 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 25, 2019).
    \246\Email from Michael W. Kirk, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. 
Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, National Security Council, to Committee Staff (Oct. 
25, 2019).
    \247\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, 
Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
National Security Council (Oct. 25, 2019).
    \248\Letter from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Pat A. Cipollone, 
Counsel to the President, The White House (Oct. 25, 2019).
    \249\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Charles J. Cooper and Michael W. 
Kirk, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council 
(Oct. 26, 2019).
    \250\Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. 
Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, National Security Council, to Committee Staff (Oct. 
26, 2019).
    \251\Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. 
Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, National Security Council, to Committee Staff (Oct. 
27, 2019).
    \252\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform to Charles J. Cooper and 
Michael W. Kirk, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National 
Security Council, (Nov. 5, 2019).
    \253\Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. 
Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, National Security Council, to Douglas N. Letter, 
General Counsel, House of Representatives (Nov. 8, 2019).
    \254\Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Memorandum Opinion 
(D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019) (``To make the point as plain as possible, it is 
clear to this Court for the reasons explained above that, with respect 
to senior-level presidential aides, absolute immunity from compelled 
congressional process simply does not exist.