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                                                       Calendar No. 97
116th Congress     }                                     {      Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session       }                                     {      116-47

======================================================================



 
DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION 
               ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020

                                _______
                                

                 June 11, 2019.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

         Mr. Burr, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 1589]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 1589) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
years 2018, 2019, and 2020 for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the 
bill do pass.

               Classified Annexes to the Committee Report

    Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on June 12, 
2017, that the President's aggregate request for the National 
Intelligence Program (NIP) for Fiscal Year 2018 was $57.7 
billion; on February 27, 2018, that the request for the NIP for 
Fiscal Year 2019 was $59.9 billion; and on March 18, 2019, that 
the request for the NIP for Fiscal Year 2020 was $62.8 billion. 
Other than for limited unclassified appropriations--primarily 
the Intelligence Community Management Account--the classified 
nature of United States intelligence activities precludes any 
further disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details 
of its budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee 
has prepared classified annexes to this report for Fiscal Years 
2018, 2019 and 2020, with Schedules of Authorizations for 
Fiscal Years 2019 and 2020. Funding for Fiscal Year 2018 is 
deemed authorized, without a specific Schedule of 
Authorization.
    The classified Schedules of Authorizations for Fiscal Years 
2019 and 2020 are incorporated by reference in the Damon Paul 
Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 and have the legal status 
of public law. The classified annexes are made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives and to the President. The classified annexes 
are also available for review by any Member of the Senate 
subject to Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 
2020 (the ``Act'') that was reported by the Committee.

      DIVISION A--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020


                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for Fiscal Year 2020.

Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2020 are 
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that 
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Intelligence community management account

    Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal Year 
2020.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$514,000,000 for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for 
Fiscal Year 2020.

Section 202. Modification of amount of Central Intelligence Agency 
        voluntary separation pay

    Section 202 provides the DNI and the Director of the CIA 
with authorities to increase voluntary separation payments to 
$40,000, with future automatic adjustments according to the 
Consumer Price Index.

               TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

           SUBTITLE A--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 301 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 303. Improving the onboarding methodology for certain 
        intelligence personnel

    Section 303 requires the Secretary of Defense and the DNI 
to report on common methodology for onboarding in the 
Intelligence Community (IC), as well as metrics, collaboration, 
and automation throughout the process. Section 303 further 
requires IC surveys regarding the onboarding process.

Section 304. Intelligence community public-private talent exchange

    Section 304 requires the DNI to develop policies, 
processes, and procedures to facilitate IC personnel rotations 
to the private sector and vice versa, to bolster skill 
development and collaboration. Section 304 further sets forth 
the employment detail requirements for such agreement terms and 
conditions, termination, duration, employment status, pay, and 
benefits.

Section 305. Expansion of scope of protections for identities of covert 
        agents

    Section 305 amends the definition of ``covert agent'' in 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3126(4)) to 
protect the identities of all undercover intelligence officers, 
and United States citizens whose relationship to the United 
States is classified, regardless of the location of the 
individuals' government service or time since separation of 
government service.

Section 306. Inclusion of security risks in program management plans 
        required for acquisition of major systems in National 
        Intelligence Program

    Section 306 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3024(q)(1)(A)) to require that the annual program 
management plans on major system acquisitions that the DNI 
submits to Congress address security risks, in addition to 
cost, schedule, performance goals, and program milestone 
criteria.

Section 307. Paid parental leave

    Section 307 requires the DNI to issue a policy to make 
available 12 weeks of paid administrative leave for the IC 
personnel in the event of the birth of a child, including 
adoptive and foster parents. Section 307 further requires ODNI 
to submit a plan for implementation to the congressional 
intelligence committees within one year after enactment, and 
directs implementation within 90 days thereafter.

      SUBTITLE B--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Section 311. Exclusivity, consistency, and transparency in security 
        clearance procedures and right to appeal

    Section 311 requires the Executive Branch to publish 
adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility to access 
classified information and makes these guidelines the exclusive 
basis for granting, denying, and revoking clearances in order 
to increase transparency, accountability, and due process. 
Section 311 further codifies the right of government employees 
to appeal unfavorable eligibility determinations to an agency-
level panel. Section 311 also creates a higher level review by 
a government-wide appeals panel, chaired by the DNI as the 
government's Security Executive Agent, to review certain 
agency-level panel determinations involving allegations of 
constitutional violations or discrimination. This DNI-led panel 
can remand decisions to the employing agency for reevaluation 
if they find valid cause.

Section 312. Limitation on transfer of National Intelligence University

    Section 312 prohibits the DNI and the Secretary of Defense 
from undertaking any activity to transfer the National 
Intelligence University (NIU) out of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) until the DNI and the Secretary jointly certify 
that: the NIU has had its regional academic accreditation 
restored to full standing; the NIU has exclusivity for 
providing advanced intelligence education for Department of 
Defense (DoD) personnel; military personnel will receive joint 
professional military education credit; ODNI has degree-
granting authority; and a joint governance model between ODNI 
and DoD is in place. Section 312 further requires the DNI and 
Secretary of Defense to submit to appropriate congressional 
committees cost estimates for NIU's operation, and for 
transferring the NIU to another agency.

Section 313. Improving visibility into the security clearance process

    Section 313 requires the DNI, acting as the Security 
Executive Agent, to issue a policy requiring the head of each 
Federal agency to create an electronic portal whereby the 
agency and its workforce applicants can review the status of 
their security clearance processing.

Section 314. Making certain policies and execution plans relating to 
        personnel clearances available to industry partners

    Section 314 requires each head of a Federal agency to share 
security clearance policies and plans with directly affected 
industry partners, consistent with national security and with 
National Industrial Security Program (NISP) goals. Section 314 
further requires the DNI, acting as the Security Executive 
Agent, jointly with the Director of the NISP, to develop 
policies and procedures for sharing this information.

      SUBTITLE C--INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Section 321. Definitions

    Section 321 provides definitions for terminology used 
throughout this Subtitle.

Section 322. Inspector General external review panel

    Section 322 codifies the whistleblower protections 
contained in Part C of Presidential Policy Directive-19 to 
ensure an effective appeals process through external review 
panels and the reporting of waste, fraud, and abuse. Section 
322 further requires the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community (IC IG) to submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a recommendation on how to ensure that a 
whistleblower with a complaint against an Inspector General of 
an IC agency has equal access to adjudication, appellate 
review, and external review panels.

Section 323. Harmonization of whistleblower processes and procedures

    Section 323 requires the IC IG, in coordination with the IC 
Inspectors General Forum, to develop recommendations applicable 
to Inspectors Generals for all IC elements regarding the 
harmonization of policies and directives related to 
whistleblower claims and appeals processes and procedures. 
Section 323 further requires the IC IG to maximize transparency 
regarding these processes and procedures.

Section 324. Intelligence community oversight of agency whistleblower 
        actions

    Section 324 requires the IC IG, in consultation with the IC 
Inspectors General Forum, to complete a feasibility study on 
establishing a hotline whereby whistleblower complaints 
relating to the IC are automatically referred to the IC IG. 
Section 324 further requires that the IC IG establish a system 
whereby the IC IG is provided in near real-time all information 
relating to whistleblower complaints relating to the programs 
and activities under the DNI's jurisdiction, as well as any IG 
actions relating to such complaints.

Section 325. Report on cleared whistleblower attorneys

    Section 325 requires the IC IG to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on access to 
cleared attorneys by whistleblowers in the IC, including any 
recommended improvements to the limited security agreement 
process and such other options as the IC IG considers 
appropriate.

                  TITLE IV--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Section 401. Study on foreign employment of former personnel of 
        intelligence community

    Section 401 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, to conduct a study 
of issues pertaining to former IC employees working with, or in 
support of, foreign governments; to provide a report to the 
appropriate committees on the study's findings, including 
necessary legislative or administrative action; and to assess 
how requirements could be imposed for compliance reporting.

Section 402. Comprehensive economic assessment of investment in key 
        United States technologies by companies or organizations linked 
        to China

    Section 402 requires the DNI, in coordination with other 
designated agencies, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a comprehensive economic assessment of 
investment in key United States technologies, by companies or 
organizations linked to China, as well as the national security 
implications of Chinese-backed investments to the United 
States.

Section 403. Analysis and periodic briefings on major initiatives of 
        intelligence community in artificial intelligence and machine 
        learning

    Section 403 requires the DNI, in coordination with other 
appropriate IC elements, to provide to the congressional 
intelligence committees an analysis of the IC's major 
initiatives in artificial intelligence and machine learning. 
Section 403 further requires semiannual briefings for two 
years, followed by annual briefings for the five years 
thereafter.

Section 404. Encouraging cooperative actions to detect and counter 
        foreign influence operations

    Section 404 provides the DNI, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Defense, with the necessary authorities and 
ability to use up to $30 million of NIP funds, to establish an 
independent, non-profit Social Media Data Analysis Center 
(``Center''). Section 404 further provides that this Center 
shall establish a central portal for social media data 
analysis, enabling: (1) social media companies to voluntarily 
share data on foreign influence operations; (2) researchers to 
analyze that data; and (3) information-sharing between and 
among government and private companies. Section 404 also 
requires the Director of the Center to produce quarterly public 
reports on trends in foreign influence and disinformation 
operations, including any threats to campaigns and elections, 
as well as an annual report to Congress on the degree of 
cooperation and commitment from the social media companies.

Section 405. Oversight of foreign influence in academia

    Section 405 requires the DNI, in consultation with other 
appropriate IC elements, to submit a report on the risks to 
sensitive research subjects posed by foreign entities. Section 
405 further requires the report to identify specific national 
security-related threats to research conducted at higher 
education institutions.

Section 406. Director of National Intelligence report on fifth-
        generation wireless network technology

    Section 406 requires the DNI to submit a report on the 
threats to United States national security posed by 5G wireless 
network technology built by foreign companies. Section 406 
further requires the report to include threats to cybersecurity 
and cyber collection capabilities, as well as potential threat 
mitigation efforts, such as encryption and open-source 
technology. Section 406 requires the DNI to submit the report 
in unclassified form, with a classified appendix, if necessary.

Section 407. Annual report by Comptroller General of the United States 
        on cybersecurity and surveillance threats to Congress

    Section 407 requires the Comptroller General, in 
consultation with the DNI, Secretary of Homeland Security, and 
the Sergeant at Arms, to submit a report on cybersecurity and 
surveillance threats to Congress that includes statistics on 
targeted attacks or other incidents against United States 
Senators or their immediate families and staff.

Section 408. Director of National Intelligence assessments of foreign 
        interference in elections

    Section 408 requires the DNI, in consultation with other 
appropriate agencies, to conduct an assessment within 45 days 
following a United States election of any foreign government 
interference. Section 408 requires the assessment to include 
the nature, methods, persons involved, and responsible foreign 
entities. Section 408 further requires the DNI to submit the 
assessment to Congress and certain executive officials, and to 
make the assessment public (consistent with the protection of 
sources and methods) within 60 days after the election.

Section 409. Study on feasibility and advisability of establishing 
        Geospatial-Intelligence Museum and learning center

    Section 409 requires the Director of the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) to complete a study and 
report the findings on the feasibility and advisability of 
establishing a Geospatial-Intelligence Museum and learning 
center.

Section 410. Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi

    Section 410 requires the DNI, within 30 days of enactment, 
to submit to Congress an unclassified report on the death of 
Jamal Khashoggi, consistent with protecting sources and 
methods. Section 410 requires the report to include 
identification of those who carried out, participated in, 
ordered, or were otherwise complicit in, or responsible for, 
Mr. Khashoggi's death.

 DIVISION B--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019


                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for Fiscal Year 2019. The bill deems authorized the 
funds already appropriated for Fiscal Year 2018.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2019 are 
contained in classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available 
to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal Year 
2019.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$514,000,000 for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for 
Fiscal Year 2019.

Section 202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 202 makes technical changes to the CIA Retirement 
Act to conform with various statutes governing the Civil 
Service Retirement System.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 301 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the 
United States.

Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 303. Modification of special pay authority for science, 
        technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and addition 
        of special pay authority for cyber positions

    Section 303 provides an increased yearly cap for Science, 
Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics (STEM) employee 
positions in the IC that support critical cyber missions. 
Section 303 also permits the National Security Agency (NSA) to 
establish a special rate of pay for positions that perform 
functions that execute the agency's cyber mission.

Section 304. Modification of appointment of Chief Information Officer 
        of the Intelligence Community

    Section 304 changes the position of IC Chief Information 
Officer from being subject to presidential appointment to being 
subject to appointment by the DNI.

Section 305. Director of National Intelligence review of placement of 
        positions within the intelligence community on the Executive 
        Schedule

    Section 305 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Office of Personnel Management, to conduct a review of the 
positions within the IC that may be appropriate for inclusion 
on the Executive Schedule, and the appropriate levels for 
inclusion.

Section 306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task 
        Force

    Section 306 requires the DNI to establish a task force to 
standardize information sharing between the IC and the United 
States Government acquisition community with respect to supply 
chain and counterintelligence risks. Section 306 further 
provides requirements for membership, security clearances, and 
annual reports.

Section 307. Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and 
        cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence with 
        foreign governments and entities

    Section 307 requires the IC, when entering into foreign 
intelligence sharing agreements, to consider the pervasiveness 
of telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure, 
equipment, and services provided by United States adversaries 
or entities thereof.

Section 308. Cyber protection support for the personnel of the 
        intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to cyber 
        attack

    Section 308 permits the DNI to provide cyber protection 
support for the personal technology devices and personal 
accounts of IC personnel whom the DNI determines to be highly 
vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information collection 
activities.

Section 309. Modification of authority relating to management of 
        supply-chain risk

    Section 309 extends certain IC procurement authorities to 
manage and protect against supply chain risks. Section 309 
further requires annual reporting on the IC's determinations 
and notifications made in executing these authorities.

Section 310. Limitations on determinations regarding certain security 
        classifications

    Section 310 prohibits an officer of the IC who is nominated 
to a Senate-confirmed position from making certain 
classification determinations posing potential conflicts of 
interest regarding that nominee.

Section 311. Joint Intelligence Community Council

    Section 311 amends Section 101A of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022(d)) as to the Joint Intelligence 
Community Council meetings and to require a report on its 
activities.

Section 312. Intelligence community information technology environment

    Section 312 defines the roles and responsibilities for the 
performance of the Intelligence Community Information 
Technology Environment (IC ITE). Section 312 requires certain 
reporting and briefing requirements to the congressional 
intelligence committees regarding the IC's ongoing 
implementation of IC ITE.

Section 313. Report on development of secure mobile voice solution for 
        intelligence community

    Section 313 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Directors of the CIA and NSA, provide the congressional 
intelligence committees with a classified report on the 
feasibility, desirability, cost, and required schedule 
associated with the implementation of a secure mobile voice 
solution for the IC.

Section 314. Policy on minimum insider threat standards

    Section 314 requires the DNI to develop minimum insider 
threat standards to be followed by each element of the IC, 
consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum 
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs.

Section 315. Submission of intelligence community policies

    Section 315 requires the DNI to make all ODNI policies and 
procedures available to the congressional intelligence 
committees. Section 315 also requires ODNI to notify the 
congressional committees of any new or rescinded policies.

Section 316. Expansion of intelligence community recruitment efforts

    Section 316 requires the DNI, in consultation with IC 
elements, to submit a plan to the congressional intelligence 
committees as to each element's efforts in recruitment from 
rural and underrepresented regions.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Section 401. Authority for protection of current and former employees 
        of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 401 amends Title 50, section 3506, to provide 
protection for current and former ODNI personnel and designated 
immediate family members, if there is a national security 
threat that warrants such protection.

Section 402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing 
        environment

    Section 402 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Protection Act of 2004 so that the Program Manager-Information 
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) is subject to appointment by the 
DNI, not the President.

Section 403. Technical modification to the executive schedule

    Section 403 amends the Executive Schedule to make the 
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center a Level IV position on the Executive Schedule.

Section 404. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community

    Section 404 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by 
requiring the Chief Financial Officer of the IC to directly 
report to the DNI.

Section 405. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community

    Section 405 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by 
requiring the Chief Information Officer of the IC to directly 
report to the DNI.

                SUBTITLE B--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Section 411. Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for personnel 
        assigned to austere locations

    Section 411 authorizes the Director of the CIA to approve, 
with or without reimbursement, subsistence to personnel 
assigned to an austere overseas location.

Section 412. Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 412 expands the security perimeter jurisdiction at 
CIA facilities from 500 feet to 500 yards.

Section 413. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for 
        certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence 
        Agency

    Section 413 repeals Title 50, section 3036(g), with 
conforming amendments to section 611 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487).

   SUBTITLE C--OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OF THE 
                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Section 421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices of 
        Intelligence and Counterintelligence

    Section 421 amends the Department of Energy Organization 
Act to consolidate the offices of intelligence and 
counterintelligence into the DOE Office of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence.

Section 422. Establishment of Energy Infrastructure Security Center

    Section 422 establishes the Energy Infrastructure Security 
Center under the Department of Energy Office of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence that will be responsible for 
coordinating intelligence regarding the to the protection of 
U.S. energy infrastructure.

Section 423. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive 
        Committee and budget reporting requirement

    Section 423 amends the Department of Energy Organization 
Act by repealing the Department of Energy Intelligence 
Executive Committee, as well as certain budgetary reporting 
requirements.

                       SUBTITLE D--OTHER ELEMENTS

Section 431. Plan for designation of counterintelligence component of 
        the Defense Security Service as an element of intelligence 
        community

    Section 431 directs the DNI and the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of 
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, to 
provide the congressional intelligence and defense committees 
with an implementation plan to make the Defense Security 
Service's (DSS's) Counterintelligence component an element of 
the IC as defined in paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)), by January 1, 2020. 
Section 431 further mandates that the plan shall not address 
the DSS's personnel security functions.

Section 432. Notice not required for private entities

    Section 432 provides a Rule of Construction that the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not 
required to provide notice to private entities before issuing 
directives on agency information security policies and 
practices.

Section 433. Framework for roles, missions, and functions of Defense 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 433 requires the Secretary of Defense and DNI to 
jointly develop a framework for the roles, missions, and 
functions of the DIA as an IC element and combat support 
agency.

Section 434. Establishment of advisory board for National 
        Reconnaissance Office

    Section 434 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
authorize the Director of the NRO to establish an advisory 
board to study matters related to space, overhead 
reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters. Section 435 
provides that the board shall terminate three years after the 
Director declares the board's first meeting.

Section 435. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security 
        personnel at field locations

    Section 435 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for Intelligence & Analysis (DHS I&A) to identify 
opportunities for collocation of I&A field officers and to 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan for 
deployment.

                       TITLE V--ELECTION MATTERS

Section 501. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against 
        United States election infrastructure

    Section 501 directs the DHS Under Secretary for I&A to 
submit a report on cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks by 
foreign governments on United States election infrastructure, 
in connection with the 2016 presidential election. Section 501 
further requires this report to include identification of the 
States and localities affected and include efforts to attack 
voter registration databases, voting machines, voting-related 
computer networks, and the networks of Secretaries of State and 
other election officials.

Section 502. Review of intelligence community's posture to collect 
        against and analyze Russian efforts to influence the 
        Presidential election

    Section 502 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees, within one year of enactment of the 
Act, a report on the Director's review of the IC's posture to 
collect against and analyze Russian efforts to interfere with 
the 2016 United States presidential election. Section 502 
further requires the review to include assessments of IC 
resources, information sharing, and legal authorities.

Section 503. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal 
        elections

    Section 503 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the FBI, 
Secretary of DHS, and heads of other relevant IC elements, to 
commence assessments of security vulnerabilities of State 
election systems one year before regularly scheduled Federal 
elections. Section 503 further requires the DNI to submit a 
report on such assessments 180 days before regularly scheduled 
Federal elections, and an updated assessment 90 days before 
regularly scheduled Federal elections.

Section 504. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United 
        States elections

    Section 504 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Secretary of DHS, Director of the FBI, Director of the CIA, 
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of the 
Treasury, to develop a whole-of-government strategy for 
countering Russian cyber threats against United States 
electoral systems and processes. Section 504 further requires 
this strategy to include input from solicited Secretaries of 
State and chief election officials.

Section 505. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns 
        directed at foreign elections and referenda

    Section 505 requires the DNI to provide a report assessing 
past and ongoing Russian influence campaigns against foreign 
elections and referenda, to include a summary of the means by 
which such influence campaigns have been or are likely to be 
conducted, a summary of defenses against or responses to such 
Russian influence campaigns, a summary of IC activities to 
assist foreign governments against such campaigns, and an 
assessment of the effectiveness of such foreign defenses and 
responses.

Section 506. Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to 
        Federal election campaigns

    Section 506 requires the DNI, in coordination with the DHS 
Under Secretary for I&A and the Director of the FBI, to publish 
regular public advisory reports on foreign counterintelligence 
and cybersecurity threats to federal election campaigns before 
those elections take place. Additional information may be 
provided to the appropriate representatives of campaigns if the 
FBI Director and the DHS Under Secretary for I&A jointly 
determine that an election campaign for federal office is 
subject to a heightened foreign counterintelligence or 
cybersecurity threat.

Section 507. Information sharing with State election officials

    Section 507 requires the DNI, within 30 days of enactment 
of the Act, to support security clearances for each eligible 
chief election official of a State, territory, or the District 
of Columbia (and additional eligible designees), up to the Top 
Secret level. Section 507 also requires the DNI to assist with 
sharing appropriate classified information about threats to 
election systems.

Section 508. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and 
        active measure campaigns directed at elections for Federal 
        offices

    Section 508 requires the Director of the FBI, and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to brief the congressional 
intelligence committees, congressional leadership, the armed 
services committees, the appropriations committees, and the 
homeland security committees (consistent with sources and 
methods) not later than 14 days after a determination has been 
made with moderate or high confidence that a significant 
foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended to 
influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has taken 
place by a foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or 
other entity. The briefing shall provide a description of the 
significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures 
campaign, including an identification of the foreign state or 
foreign nonstate person or group.

Section 509. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead 
        election security matters

    Section 509 requires the DNI to designate a national 
counterintelligence officer within the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and 
coordinate election security-related counterintelligence 
matters, including certain risks from foreign power 
interference.

                     TITLE VI--SECURITY CLEARANCES

Section 601. Definitions

    Section 601 provides definitions for terminology used 
throughout this Title.

Section 602. Reports and plans relating to security clearances and 
        background investigations

    Section 602 requires the interagency Performance 
Accountability Council (Council) to provide plans to reduce the 
background investigation inventory and best align the 
investigation function between the Department of Defense and 
the National Background Investigation Bureau. Section 602 
further requires the Council to report on the future of the 
clearance process and requires the DNI to notify the 
appropriate committees upon determining requests to change 
clearance standards, and the status of those requests' 
disposition.

Section 603. Improving the process for security clearances

    Section 603 requires the DNI to review the Questionnaire 
for National Security positions (SF-86) and the Federal 
Investigative Standards to determine potential unnecessary 
information required and assess whether revisions are necessary 
to account for insider threats. Section 603 further requires 
the DNI, in coordination with the Council, to establish 
policies on interim clearances and consistency between the 
clearance process for contract and government personnel.

Section 604. Goals for promptness of determinations regarding security 
        clearances

    Section 604 requires the Council to implement a plan to be 
able to process 90 percent of clearance requests at the Secret 
level in thirty days, and at the Top Secret level in 90 days. 
The plan shall also address how to recognize reciprocity in 
accepting clearances among agencies within two weeks, and to 
require that ninety percent of clearance holders not be subject 
to a time-based periodic investigation.

Section 605. Security Executive Agent

    Section 605 establishes the DNI as the government's 
Security Executive Agent, consistent with Executive Order 
13467, and sets forth relevant authorities.

Section 606. Report on unified, simplified, Governmentwide standards 
        for positions of trust and security clearances

    Section 606 directs the DNI and the Director of the Office 
of Personnel Management to report on the advisability and 
implications of consolidating the tiers for positions of trust 
and security clearances from five to three tiers.

Section 607. Report on clearance in person concept

    Section 607 requires the DNI to submit a report on a 
concept whereby an individual can maintain eligibility for 
access to classified information for up to three years after 
access may lapse.

Section 608. Budget request documentation on funding for background 
        investigations

    Section 608 requires the President to submit to Congress 
with the Fiscal Year 2020 budget request exhibits that identify 
resources allocated by each agency for processing background 
investigations and continuous evaluation initiatives, 
identified by each respective tier, exclusive of costs for 
adjudications.

Section 609. Reports on reciprocity for security clearances inside of 
        departments and agencies

    Section 609 requires each federal agency to submit a report 
to the DNI that identifies the number of clearances that take 
more than two weeks to reciprocally recognize and set forth the 
reason for any delays. Section 609 further requires the DNI to 
submit an annual report summarizing reciprocity.

Section 610. Intelligence community reports on security clearances

    Section 610 requires the DNI to submit a report on each IC 
element's security clearance metrics, segregated by Federal 
employees and contractor employees.

Section 611. Periodic report on positions in the intelligence community 
        that can be conducted without access to classified information, 
        networks, or facilities

    Section 611 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on positions that can be 
conducted without access to classified information, networks, 
or facilities, or may require only a Secret-level clearance.

Section 612. Information sharing program for positions of trust and 
        security clearances

    Section 612 requires the Security Executive Agent and the 
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agents to establish a 
program to share information between and among government 
agencies and industry partners to inform decisions about 
positions of trust and security clearances.

Section 613. Report on protections for confidentiality of 
        whistleblower-related communications

    Section 613 requires the Security Executive Agent, in 
coordination with the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community, to submit a report detailing the IC's controls used 
to ensure continuous evaluation programs protect the 
confidentiality of whistleblower-related communications.

                  TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

    SUBTITLE A--MATTERS RELATING TO RUSSIA AND OTHER FOREIGN POWERS

Section 701. Limitation relating to establishment or support of 
        cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation

    Section 701 prohibits the Federal government from expending 
any funds to establish or support a cybersecurity unit or other 
cyber agreement that is jointly established or otherwise 
implemented by the United States Government and the Russian 
Federation, unless the DNI submits a report to the appropriate 
congressional committees at least 30 days prior to any such 
agreement. The report shall include the agreement's purpose, 
intended shared intelligence, value to national security, 
counterintelligence concerns, and any measures taken to 
mitigate such concerns.

Section 702. Report on returning Russian compounds

    Section 702 requires the IC to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees, within 180 days of enactment of the 
Act, both classified and unclassified reports on the 
intelligence risks of returning the diplomatic compounds-in New 
York, Maryland, and California-taken from Russia as a reprisal 
for Russian meddling in the 2016 United States presidential 
election. Section 702 also establishes an ongoing requirement 
for producing similar assessments for future assignment of 
diplomatic compounds within the United States.

Section 703. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia

    Section 703 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and 
Analysis, to submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees, within 60 days of enactment of the Act, an 
assessment of Russian threat finance, based on all-source 
intelligence from both the IC and the Office of Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence of the Treasury Department. Section 703 
further requires the assessment to include global nodes and 
entry points for Russian money laundering; United States 
vulnerabilities; connections between Russian individuals 
involved in money laundering and the Russian Government; 
counterintelligence threats to the United States posed by 
Russian money laundering and other forms of threat finance; and 
challenges to United States Government efforts to enforce 
sanctions and combat organized crime.

Section 704. Notification of an active measures campaign

    Section 704 requires the DNI to notify congressional 
leadership, and the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking 
Member of the appropriate congressional committees, each time 
the DNI has determined there is credible information that a 
foreign power has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt to 
employ a covert influence or active measures campaign with 
regard to the modernization, employment, doctrine, or force 
posture of the United States' nuclear deterrent or missile 
defense. Section 704 further requires that such notification 
must include information on any actions that the United States 
has taken to expose or halt such attempts.

Section 705. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and 
        consular personnel of the Russian Federation in the United 
        States

    Section 705 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that 
the Russian Federation provides notification at least two 
business days in advance of all travel that is subject to such 
requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of 
the Russian Federation in the United States, and take necessary 
action to secure full compliance by Russian personnel and 
address any noncompliance.

Section 706. Report on outreach strategy addressing threats from United 
        States adversaries to the United States technology sector

    Section 706 requires the DNI to submit a report to 
appropriate committees on the IC's and the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise's outreach to United States non-government entities 
(including private businesses and academia), regarding the 
United States' adversaries' efforts to acquire critical United 
States infrastructure technology, intellectual property, and 
research and development information.

Section 707. Report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and 
        Lebanon

    Section 707 requires the DNI to submit a report to 
appropriate congressional committees on Iranian support of 
proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon and the threat posed to 
Israel and other United States regional allies and interests.

Section 708. Annual report on Iranian expenditures supporting foreign 
        military and terrorist activities

    Section 708 requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress 
describing Iranian expenditures on military and terrorist 
activities outside the country.

Section 709. Expansion of scope of committee to counter active measures 
        and report on establishment of Foreign Malign Influence Center

    Section 709 amends a provision in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 to expand the scope of 
the Committee to Counter Active Measures to add China, Iran, 
North Korea, and other nation states. Section 709 further 
requires DNI, in coordination with relevant IC elements, to 
submit to congressional intelligence committees a report on 
establishing a center to assess and disseminate foreign 
influence activities, including the desirability and barriers 
to such establishment.

                          SUBTITLE B--REPORTS

Section 711. Technical correction to Inspector General study

    Section 711 amends Title 50, section 11001(d), by replacing 
the IC IG's ``audit'' requirement for Inspectors General with 
employees having classified material access, with a ``review'' 
requirement.

Section 712. Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer 
        of the Department of Homeland Security

    Section 712 requires the Secretary of DHS, in consultation 
with the Under Secretary for I&A, to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the adequacy 
of the Under Secretary's authorities required as the Chief 
Intelligence Officer to organize the Homeland Security 
Intelligence Enterprise, and the legal and policy changes 
necessary to coordinate, organize, and lead DHS intelligence 
activities.

Section 713. Report on cyber exchange program

    Section 713 directs the DNI to submit a report, within 90 
days of enactment of the Act, on the potential establishment of 
a voluntary cyber exchange program between the IC and private 
technology companies.

Section 714. Review of intelligence community whistleblower matters

    Section 714 directs the Inspector General of the IC (IC 
IG), in consultations with the IGs of other IC agencies, to 
conduct a review of practices and procedures relating to IC 
whistleblower matters.

Section 715. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with 
        respect to certain foreign investments

    Section 715 directs the DNI to submit a report on ODNI's 
role in preparing analytic materials in connection with the 
United States Government's evaluation of national security 
risks associated with potential foreign investments.

Section 716. Report on surveillance by foreign governments against 
        United States telecommunications networks

    Section 716 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the FBI, 
and Secretary of DHS, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence, judiciary, and homeland security committees, 
within 180 days of enactment of the Act, a report on known 
attempts by foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in United States telecommunications networks to 
surveil United States persons, and any actions that the IC has 
taken to protect United States Government agencies and 
personnel from such surveillance.

Section 717. Biennial report on foreign investment risks

    Section 717 requires the DNI to establish an IC working 
group on foreign investment risks and prepare a biennial report 
that includes an identification, analysis, and explanation of 
national security vulnerabilities, foreign investment trends, 
foreign countries' strategies to exploit vulnerabilities 
through the acquisition of either critical technologies 
(including components or items essential to national defense), 
critical materials (including physical materials essential to 
national security), or critical infrastructure (including 
physical or virtual systems and assets whose destruction or 
incapacity would have a debilitating impact on national 
security), and market distortions caused by foreign countries. 
Technologies, materials, and infrastructure are deemed to be 
``critical'' under this provision if their exploitation by a 
foreign government could cause severe harm to the national 
security of the United States.

Section 718. Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel of 
        foreign diplomats

    Section 718 amends a provision in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, to require reporting of 
``a best estimate'' of known or suspected violations of certain 
travel requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular 
personnel of the Russian Federation.

Section 719. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized 
        disclosures of classified information

    Section 719 requires the Assistant Attorney General for 
National Security at the Department of Justice, in consultation 
with the Director of the FBI, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence and judiciary committees a semiannual report on 
the status of IC referrals to the Department of Justice 
regarding unauthorized disclosures of classified information. 
Section 719 also directs IC elements to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a semiannual report on 
the number of investigations opened and completed by each 
agency regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of 
classified information to the media, and the number of 
completed investigations referred to the Attorney General.

Section 720. Congressional notification of designation of covered 
        intelligence officer as persona non grata

    Section 720 requires, not later than 72 hours after a 
covered intelligence officer is designated as persona non 
grata, that the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State, submit to the designated committees a notification of 
that designation, to include the basis for the designation and 
justification for the expulsion.

Section 721. Reports on intelligence community participation in 
        vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government

    Section 721 requires the DNI to submit, within 90 days of 
enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report describing the Vulnerabilities Equities 
Process (VEP) roles and responsibilities for each IC element. 
Section 721 further requires each IC element to report to the 
congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of a 
significant change to that respective IC element's VEP process 
and criteria. Section 721 also requires the DNI to submit an 
annual report to the congressional intelligence committees with 
specified information on certain VEP metrics.

Section 722. Inspectors General reports on classification

    Section 722 requires each designated IG to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the accuracy 
in the application of classification and handling markings on a 
representative sample of finished products, to include those 
with compartments. Section 722 also directs analyses of 
compliance with declassification procedures and a review of the 
effectiveness of processes for identifying topics of public or 
historical importance that merit prioritization for 
declassification review.

Section 723. Reports on global water insecurity and national security 
        implications and briefing on emerging infectious disease and 
        pandemics

    Section 723 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report every five years on the 
implications of global water insecurity on the United States' 
national security interests. Section 723 further requires the 
DNI to provide a briefing to appropriate congressional 
committees on the geopolitical effects of emerging infectious 
disease and pandemics, and their implications on the United 
States' national security.

Section 724. Annual report on memoranda of understanding between 
        elements of intelligence community and other entities of the 
        United States Government regarding significant operational 
        activities or policy

    Section 724 amends a provision in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, instead requiring each 
IC element to submit an annual report to the congressional 
intelligence committees that lists each significant memorandum 
of understanding or other agreement entered into during the 
preceding fiscal year. Section 724 further requires each IC 
element to provide such documents if an intelligence committee 
so requests.

Section 725. Study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified 
        wireline and wireless telephone calls

    Section 725 requires the DNI to complete a study and report 
on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline and 
wireless telephone calls between personnel in the IC.

Section 726. Modification of requirement for annual report on hiring 
        and retention of minority employees

    Section 726 expands and clarifies current IC reporting 
requirements on diversity of IC personnel to include five prior 
fiscal years and to disaggregate data by IC element.

Section 727. Reports on intelligence community loan repayment and 
        related programs

    Section 727 requires the DNI, in cooperation with the heads 
of the elements of the IC, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on potentially establishing an 
IC-wide program for student loan repayment and forgiveness.

Section 728. Repeal of certain reporting requirements

    Section 728 repeals certain intelligence community 
reporting requirements.

Section 729. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on 
        senior executives of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Section 729 directs the IC IG to submit a report to the 
congressional intelligence committees regarding senior 
executive service staffing at the ODNI.

Section 730. Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation offering 
        permanent residence to sources and cooperators

    Section 730 directs the FBI within 30 days of enactment of 
this Act to provide a briefing to the congressional 
intelligence committees regarding the FBI's ability to provide 
permanent U.S. residence to foreign individuals who serve as 
cooperators in national security-related investigations.

Section 731. Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue sources

    Section 731 requires the DNI, in coordination with other 
relevant IC elements, to produce to the congressional 
intelligence committees an intelligence assessment of the North 
Korean regime's revenue sources.

Section 732. Report on possible exploitations of virtual currencies by 
        terrorist actors

    Section 732 requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, to submit to Congress a report on 
the possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist 
actors.

                       SUBTITLE C--OTHER MATTERS

Section 741. Public Interest Declassification Board

    Section 741 reauthorizes the Public Interest 
Declassification Board administered by the National Archives 
for a term of ten years, expiring on December 31, 2028.

Section 742. Securing energy infrastructure

    Section 742 requires the Secretary of Energy, within 180 
days of enactment of the Act, to establish a two-year control 
systems implementation pilot program within the National 
Laboratories. This pilot program will partner with covered 
entities in the energy sector to identify new security 
vulnerabilities, and for purposes of researching, developing, 
testing, and implementing technology platforms and standards in 
partnership with such entities. Section 742 also requires the 
Secretary to establish a working group composed of identified 
private and public sector entities to evaluate the technology 
platforms and standards for the pilot program, and develop a 
national cyber-informed engineering strategy to isolate and 
defend covered entities from security vulnerabilities. Section 
742 requires the Secretary, within 180 days after the date on 
which funds are first disbursed, to submit to specified 
committees an interim report that describes the pilot program's 
results, provides a feasibility analysis, and describes the 
working group's evaluations. Section 742 further requires the 
Secretary, within two years of funding, to submit to the 
aforementioned committees a progress report on the pilot 
program and an analysis of the feasibility of the methods 
studied, and a description of the working group's evaluation 
results.

Section 743. Bug bounty programs

    Section 743 directs the Secretary of DHS, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense, to submit a strategic plan to 
implement bug bounty programs at appropriate agencies and 
departments of the United States Government. Section 743 
further requires the plan to include an assessment of the 
``Hack the Pentagon'' pilot program and subsequent bug bounty 
programs. Section 743 also requires the plan to provide 
recommendations on the feasibility of initiating bug bounty 
programs across the United States Government.

Section 744. Modification of authorities relating to the National 
        Intelligence University

    Section 744 provides the National Intelligence University 
with authorities that certain other Department of Defense 
educational institutions have regarding hiring faculty and 
accepting research grants, as well as establishing a pilot 
program for admission of private sector individuals.

Section 745. Technical and clerical amendments to the National Security 
        Act of 1947

    Section 745 makes certain edits to the National Security 
Act of 1947 as amended for technical or clerical purposes.

Section 746. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy

    Section 746 provides technical corrections to certain 
provisions regarding the Department of Energy's Office of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

Section 747. Sense of Congress on notification of certain disclosures 
        of classified information

    Section 747 expresses the sense of Congress that, pursuant 
to the requirement for the IC to keep the congressional 
intelligence committees ``fully and currently informed'' in 
Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, IC agencies 
must submit prompt written notification after becoming aware 
that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed 
certain classified information outside established intelligence 
channels to foreign adversaries--North Korea, Iran, China, 
Russia, or Cuba.

Section 748. Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage activities 
        when considering whether or not to provide visas to foreign 
        individuals to be accredited to a United Nations mission in the 
        United States

    Section 748 provides a Sense of Congress that, as to 
foreign individuals to be accredited to a United Nations 
mission, the Secretary of State should consider known and 
suspected intelligence and espionage activities, including 
activities constituting precursors to espionage, carried out by 
such individuals against the United States, or against foreign 
allies or partners of the United States. Section 748 further 
provides that the Secretary of State should consider an 
individual's status as a known or suspected intelligence 
officer for a foreign adversary.

Section 749. Sense of Congress on WikiLeaks

    Section 749 provides a Sense of Congress that WikiLeaks and 
its senior leadership resemble a non-state hostile intelligence 
service, often abetted by state actors, and should be treated 
as such.

                     Comments Related to Division A

    Comments related to Division A of the Damon Paul Nelson and 
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 relate to Fiscal Year 2020 and 
reflect the position of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI). Use of the term ``Committee'' refers to 
the SSCI.

Plans for Operations During Government Shutdowns by All Elements of the 
        Intelligence Community

    The Committee has an active interest in the impact of 
government shutdowns on the intelligence mission. Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11, Section 124, 
outlines how agencies are supposed to plan for operations 
during government shutdowns, and Section 124.2 provides that 
agencies must share those plans with OMB. Additionally, Section 
323 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 
requires the ODNI, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and 
IC elements within the DOD to share those same plans with 
specified congressional committees, including the congressional 
intelligence committees.
    These requirements, however, omit IC elements that are not 
separate ``agencies'' for the purposes of OMB Circular A-11, 
Section 124, and are not ODNI, CIA, or elements within the DOD 
for the purposes of the IAA for Fiscal Year 2014. As a result, 
no such reporting requirement currently exists for IC elements 
within the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy, State, and 
Homeland Security. For that reason, when portions of the 
federal government were shut down between December 2018 and 
February 2019, the Committee had little to no insight into the 
effects of the shutdown on these and other important segments 
of the IC.
    Therefore, the Committee directs IC elements within the 
Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy, State, and Homeland 
Security to submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees--on the same day as the host department's issuance 
of any plan for a government shutdown--the number of personnel 
in their respective elements that will be furloughed.

Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment Review

    Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Protection Act of 2004 (IRTPA) created a Program Manager-
Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), administered from 
within the ODNI, to better facilitate the interagency sharing 
of terrorism-related information. Section 1016 also designated 
the PM-ISE as a presidentially-appointed position. Section 402 
of Division B of the Act would amend IRTPA, so that the PM-ISE 
is subject to appointment by the DNI, not the President. Since 
the establishment of the PM-ISE, the Federal government has 
created entities, procedures, and processes to address directly 
the mandate for improved terrorism information sharing. 
Accordingly, the Committee finds it appropriate to reconsider 
the future of the PM-ISE's mission.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the ODNI, in consultation 
with appropriate Federal departments, agencies, and components, 
within 180 days of enactment of this Act, to conduct a review 
of the PM-ISE's terrorism information sharing mission, 
associated functions, and organizational role within the ODNI 
and provide findings and recommendations on the future of the 
PM-ISE to Congress.

Leveraging Academic Institutions in the Intelligence Community

    The Committee encourages the DNI and the Director of the 
DIA to ensure that IC elements continue to forge tighter 
partnerships with leading universities and their affiliated 
research centers in order to enhance mutual awareness of 
domestic and international challenges, leverage subject matter 
experts from higher education in a manner that uses cutting 
edge technologies and methods, and bolsters the recruitment of 
top-notch, diverse, and technically proficient talent into the 
IC's workforce.
    The Committee further believes that IC-sponsored academic 
programs such as the Intelligence Community Centers for 
Academic Excellence (IC-CAE) should work closely with 
educational institutions that offer interdisciplinary courses 
of study and learning opportunities in national and 
international security; geopolitical affairs, international 
relations and national security; interdisciplinary courses of 
study in the culture, history, languages, politics, and 
religions of major world regions; foreign language instruction; 
computer and data science; or cybersecurity.
    The DNI shall ensure that such programs are facilitated via 
the streamlining of the security clearance process for 
graduating students from such universities who receive offers 
of employment from IC elements, provide for the temporary 
exchange of faculty and IC professionals, including as visiting 
fellows, and technical training opportunities for faculty, 
students, and IC personnel.
    Therefore, the Committee directs all IC agencies to support 
the IC-CAE effort by tracking recruits and new hires who have 
graduated from IC-CAE-designated institutions, promptly 
reporting these numbers to the office in charge of IC-CAE 
implementation, and increasing all IC agencies' efforts to 
recruit from such institutions.

Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities

    The Committee remains concerned as to impediments for 
companies with appropriately cleared personnel to perform work 
for government entities and the effects of these impediments on 
IC access to innovation. For example, businesses without access 
to a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), which 
includes many small businesses and non-traditional contractors, 
find it difficult to perform classified work for the IC. 
Construction and accreditation of SCIF spaces may be cost-
prohibitive for small business and non-traditional government 
contractors.
    Additionally, SCIF construction timelines often exceed the 
period of performance of a contract. A modern trend for 
innovative and non-traditional government contractors is the 
use of co-working space environments. Additionally, public and 
private entities are partnering to create emerging regional 
innovation hubs to help identify technology solutions and 
products in the private-sector that can be utilized by the DoD 
and IC. These innovation hubs currently produce an agile, 
neutral, but largely unclassified development environment.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the ODNI to submit a 
report to the congressional intelligence committees on:
          1. Processes and procedures necessary to build, 
        certify, and maintain certifications for multi-use 
        sensitive compartmented facilities not tied to a single 
        contract and where multiple companies can securely work 
        on multiple projects at different security levels;
          2. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
        issuing DoD Contract Security Specification (DD Form 
        254s) to ``Facilities'' as opposed to ``Contracts'';
          3. Options for classified co-use and shared workspace 
        environments such as: innovation, incubation, catalyst, 
        and accelerator environments;
          4. Pros and cons for public, private, government, or 
        combination owned classified neutral facilities; and
          5. Any other opportunities to support companies with 
        appropriately cleared personnel but without effective 
        access to a neutral SCIF.

Inclusion of Security Risks in Program Management Plans Required for 
        Acquisition of Major Systems in National Intelligence Program

    Section 306 of Division A of the Act adds security risk as 
a factor for the DNI to include in the annual Program 
Management Plans for major system acquisitions submitted to the 
congressional intelligence committees pursuant to Section 
102A(q)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3024(q)(1)(A)). The Committee is increasingly concerned with 
the security risks to IC acquisitions. The Joint Explanatory 
Statement accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 directed updates to Intelligence Community 
Directive 731, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Committee 
leadership has engaged senior industry representatives about 
the threats to the national security industrial base posed by 
adversaries and competitors, including China. Over the past few 
years, the Department of Defense has been elevating security as 
a ``fourth pillar'' (to complement cost, schedule, and 
performance) in reviewing defense acquisitions, embodied in the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's ``Deliver 
Uncompromised'' initiative.
    Section 306 of Division A of the Act extends that focus to 
the IC, requiring the annual Program Management Plans to 
include security risks in major system acquisitions, in 
addition to cost, schedule, and performance. The Committee 
recognizes that security can be interpreted across a number of 
areas (facilities, personnel, information, and supply chain) 
and may vary by program, to appropriately ensure system 
integrity and mission assurance.
    Therefore, for the purposes of implementing section 306 of 
the Act, the Committee directs the Director of National 
Intelligence, with the Director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center, to develop parameters 
for including security risks (and risk management measures) in 
the annual Program Management Plans to assist congressional 
oversight.

Intelligence Community Cooperation with the Government Accountability 
        Office

    The Committee believes the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) adds significant value to the Committee's oversight 
efforts. For example, the GAO's designation in 2018 of the 
government-wide Personnel Security Clearance process to its 
high-risk list of federal areas needing reform to prevent 
waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement, was important to the 
Committee's own efforts to legislate on security clearance 
reform, including in this Act. The Committee expects that all 
IC elements will fully and promptly comply with requests from 
the GAO made to support studies requested by, or of interest 
to, the Committee.

Security Clearance Procedures and Rights to Appeal

    Section 311 of Division A of the Act provides appeal rights 
and procedures for security clearance eligibility 
determinations. The Committee recognizes that, in the most 
exceptional circumstances, national security considerations may 
still require denial of access and has set forth waivers 
accordingly. The Committee will closely monitor compliance with 
this provision, through the applicable reporting requirements, 
and consider a legislative remedy if abuses are found. This 
provision is not intended to impede agency decisions regarding 
access to classified information for a limited purpose or 
duration (e.g., regarding an election or one-time read-ins for 
a specific event or threat). The Committee does, however, 
expect agencies to keep Congress fully and currently informed 
of any limited purpose or duration uses. Finally, the Committee 
expects the DNI-level appeals panel to exercise judgment and 
review only those appeals for which the panel concludes have 
evidentiary and jurisdictional merit.

National Intelligence University

    Section 312 of Division A of the Act prohibits the DNI and 
the Secretary of Defense from undertaking any activity to 
transfer the National Intelligence (NIU) out of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) until certain criteria are met. The 
Committee has been closely watching the evolution of how the IC 
provides for advanced intelligence education. DIA has hosted an 
intelligence college since 1962, which has been regionally 
academically accredited since 1983. When the ODNI was created 
in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, it created a separate NIU under its auspices as a 
complement to DIA's intelligence effort. As a response to 
report from the President's Intelligence Advisory Board that 
accused the ODNI of being inadequately focused, the ODNI in 
2011 transferred the NIU to DIA's intelligence college and 
rebranded the new combined institution as NIU.
    Pursuant to the Joint Explanatory Statement to the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, an 
independent panel offered alternative governance models to 
enhance NIU, to include a more prominent role for ODNI. In 
parallel, recent analyses of DIA by the Secretary of Defense 
and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
concluded that DIA would benefit from moving NIU elsewhere in 
the IC. The Committee believes transferring NIU now may be 
premature. It does not oppose transferring NIU to ODNI, but 
expects for NIU's academic health to be sound before a transfer 
occurs; that DoD remains intimately involved in NIU's 
governance; and that DoD personnel will readily attend and 
serve as faculty at an ODNI-led university. The Committee also 
intends for DoD to embrace NIU under ODNI and for it not to 
seek out recreation of an intelligence college.

Associate Degree Program Eligibility

    The Committee is concerned that students enrolled in or who 
have graduated from Associate Degree programs have insufficient 
opportunities to gain employment in the IC. Therefore, the 
Committee directs the ODNI to submit a report to the 
congressional intelligence committees on how to expand the 
number of opportunities for students pursuing or having earned 
an Associate Degree eligible for IC academic programs. The 
Committee also directs the ODNI to make information about these 
academic programs publicly available.

Exposing Predatory and Anticompetitive Foreign Economic Influence

    The Committee is concerned about the significant threat 
posed by foreign governments that engage in predatory and 
anticompetitive behaviors aimed to undercut critical sectors of 
the United States economy. Therefore, the Committee directs the 
DNI, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report identifying top 
countries that pose a substantial threat to the United States 
economy regarding technology transfer issues, predatory 
investment practices, economic espionage, and other 
anticompetitive behaviors. The report shall be submitted in 
unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, but may 
include a classified annex.
    Furthermore, the DNI, in consultation with the Department 
of the Treasury and other agencies that the Director deems 
appropriate, shall submit a report to the congressional 
intelligence committees assessing the national security-related 
value of requiring a person or entity that invests in the 
United States (and is subject to the jurisdiction of a country 
that poses a substantial threat to the United States economy) 
to submit annual disclosures to the Federal Government. Such 
disclosures would include all investments that the entity or 
person in the United States made during the preceding year; the 
ownership structure of the entity; and any affiliation of the 
entity with a foreign government. The report should detail how 
such information could be used by the IC and other elements of 
the Federal government working to identify and combat foreign 
threats to the United States economy, and the appropriate scope 
and thresholds for such disclosures. The report shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex.

                     Comments Related to Division B

    Division B of this Act is the result of SSCI's negotiations 
with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
(HPSCI) and takes the form of a Joint Explanatory Statement 
(JES). As such, reference to ``committees'' refers to the SSCI 
and the HPSCI. The ``Agreement'' refers to the JES.

Management of Intelligence Community Workforce

    The Committees repeat direction from the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 that Intelligence 
Community (IC) elements should build, develop, and maintain a 
workforce appropriately balanced among its civilian, military, 
and contractor workforce sectors to meet the missions assigned 
to it in law and by the president. Starting in Fiscal Year 
2019, the Committees no longer authorize position ceiling 
levels in the annual Schedule of Authorizations.
    The Committees look forward to working with the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as it develops an 
implementation strategy and sets standards for workforce cost 
analysis tools.

Countering Russian Propaganda

    The Committees support the IC's role in countering Russian 
propaganda and other active measures. The Committees are 
committed to providing the appropriate legal authorities, 
financial resources, and personnel necessary to address these 
hostile acts. The Committees specifically find that language 
capabilities are important to the IC's efforts in countering 
Russia's hostile acts. The Committees encourage the IC to 
commit considerable resources in the future to bolstering 
officers' existing Russian language skills, recruiting Russian 
language speakers, and training officers in Russian, in 
particular key technical language skills. This effort will 
require strategic planning both in recruiting and rotating 
officers through language training. The Committees expect to 
see these priorities reflected in future IC budget requests.

Protection of the Supply Chain in Intelligence Community Acquisition 
        Decisions

    The Committees continue to have significant concerns about 
risks to the supply chain in IC acquisitions. The report to 
accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017 directed the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to 
review and consider changes to Intelligence Community Directive 
(ICD) 801 (``Acquisition'') to reflect issuance in 2013 of ICD 
731 (``Supply Chain Risk Management'') and issues associated 
with cybersecurity. It specifically recommended the review 
examine whether to: expand risk management criteria in the 
acquisition process to include cyber and supply chain threats; 
require counterintelligence and security assessments as part of 
the acquisition and procurement process; propose and adopt new 
education requirements for acquisition professionals on cyber 
and supply chain threats; and factor in the cost of cyber and 
supply chain security. This review was due in November 2017, 
with a report on the process for updating ICD 801 in December 
2017. The report was completed on June 18, 2018.
    As a follow-on to this review, the Committees direct DNI to 
address three other considerations: changes in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation that may be necessary; how changes 
should apply to all acquisition programs; and how security 
risks must be addressed across development, procurement, and 
operational phases of acquisition. The Committees further 
direct the DNI to submit a plan to implement necessary changes 
within 60 days of completion of this review.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency use of VERA and VSIP 
        Authorities

    The Committees encourage the use by the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) of Voluntary Early 
Retirement Authority (VERA) and Voluntary Separation Incentive 
Program (VSIP) offers to meet future goals of building a 
workforce more attuned to automation of data production, 
automation of analytic processes, and establishment of 
development and operations (``DevOps'') software development 
processes.
    Therefore, the Committees direct the NGA to report to the 
congressional intelligence committees, within 120 days of 
enactment of the Act, on its use to date of VERA and VSIP 
incentives, to include how they have been used to develop an 
acquisition cadre skilled in ``DevOps'' software development 
processes, as well as a plan for further use of these 
incentives. The report should specify metrics for retooling its 
workforce, including how it measures data literacy and 
computational skills in potential hires, and an accounting of 
the numbers of new hires who have met these higher standards.

Report on Engagement of National Reconnaissance Office with University 
        Community

    The Committees recognize that the survivability and 
resiliency of United States satellites is critically important 
to the United States intelligence and defense communities. 
While the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) engages with the 
university community in support of basic research and 
developing an education workforce pipeline to help advance new 
technologies and produce skilled professionals, it can do more 
in this regard to focus on space survivability.
    Therefore, the Committees direct the NRO to report, within 
120 days of enactment of the Act, on NRO's current efforts and 
future strategies to engage with university partners that are 
strategically located, host secure information facilities, and 
offer a strong engineering curriculum, with a particular focus 
on space survivability and resiliency. This report should 
provide a summary of NRO's current and planned university 
engagement programs, levels of funding, and program research 
and workforce objectives and metrics. The report should also 
include an assessment of the strategic utility of chartering a 
University Affiliated Research Center in this domain.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Facilities

    Consistent with Section 2401 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, the Committees 
authorize the President's request for $447.8 million in Fiscal 
Year 2019 for phase two construction activities of the Next 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency West (N2W) facility in 
St. Louis, Missouri. The Committees are pleased that the second 
phase of this $837.2 million project was included in the Fiscal 
Year 2019 President's budget.

Clarification of Oversight Responsibilities

    The Committees reinforce the requirement for all IC 
agencies funded by the NIP to respond in a full, complete, and 
timely manner to any request for information made by a member 
of the congressional intelligence committees. In addition, the 
Committees direct the DNI to issue guidelines, within 90 days 
of enactment of the Act, to ensure that the intent of Section 
501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091) is 
carried out.

Clarification on Cooperation with Investigation on Russian Influence in 
        the 2016 Election

    The Committees continue to reinforce the obligation for all 
IC agencies to cooperate in a full, complete, and timely manner 
with the Committees' ongoing investigation into Russian 
meddling in the 2016 Presidential election and cooperation with 
the declassification process.

Supervisory Feedback as Part of Continuous Evaluation Program

    The Committees direct the DNI to review the results of 
ongoing pilot programs regarding the use of supervisory 
feedback as part of the periodic reinvestigation and continuous 
evaluation process and report, within 180 days of enactment of 
the Act, on the establishment of a policy for its use across 
the IC.

National Security Threats to Critical Infrastructure

    The Committees are aware of significant threats to our 
critical infrastructure and industrial control systems posed by 
foreign adversaries. The sensitive nature of the information 
related to these threats make the role of the IC of vital 
importance to United States defensive efforts. The Committees 
have grave concerns that current IC resources dedicated to 
analyzing and countering these threats are neither sufficient 
nor closely coordinated. The Committees include provisions 
within this legislation to address these concerns.

Framework for Cybersecurity and Intelligence Collection Doctrine

    The Committees direct the ODNI, in coordination with 
appropriate IC elements, to develop an analytic framework that 
could support the eventual creation and execution of a 
Government-wide cybersecurity and intelligence collection 
doctrine. The ODNI shall provide this framework, which may 
contain a classified annex, to the congressional intelligence 
committees, within 180 days of enactment of the Act.
    This framework shall include:
          1. An assessment of the current and medium-term cyber 
        threats to the protection of the United States' 
        national security systems and critical infrastructure;
          2. IC definitions of key cybersecurity concepts, to 
        include cyberespionage, cyber theft, cyber acts of 
        aggression, and cyber deterrence;
          3. Intelligence collection requirements to ensure 
        identification of cyber actors targeting U.S. national 
        security interests, and to inform policy responses to 
        cyber attacks and computer network operations directed 
        against the United States;
          4. The IC's methodology for assessing the impacts of 
        cyber attacks and computer network operations incidents 
        directed against the United States, taking into account 
        differing levels of severity of incidents;
          5. Capabilities that the IC could employ in response 
        to cyber attacks and computer network operations 
        incidents, taking into account differing levels of 
        severity of incidents;
          6. A policy and architecture for sharing 
        cybersecurity-related intelligence with government, 
        private sector, and international partners, including 
        existing statutory and other authorities which may be 
        exercised in pursuit of that goal; and
          7. Any necessary changes in IC authorities, 
        governance, technology, resources, and policy to 
        provide more capable and agile cybersecurity.

Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Role and 
        Responsibilities

    The position of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community (IC IG) was codified by the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 to ``conduct independent 
reviews investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews on 
programs and activities within the responsibility and authority 
of the Director of National Intelligence'' and to lead the IC's 
IG community in its activities. The Committees are concerned 
that this intent is not fully exercised by the IC IG and 
reiterates the Congress's intent that the IC IG's role be over 
all IC-wide activities in addition to the ODNI. To support this 
intent, the Committees have directed a number of requirements 
to strengthen the IC IG's role and expects full cooperation 
from all Offices of Inspector General across the IC.
    The Committees also remain concerned about the level of 
protection afforded to whistleblowers within the IC and the 
level of insight congressional committees have into their 
disclosures. It is the Committees' expectation that all Offices 
of IG across the IC will fully cooperate with the direction 
provided elsewhere in the bill to ensure both the DNI and the 
congressional committees have more complete awareness of the 
disclosures made to any IG about any National Intelligence 
Program-funded activity.

Space Launch Facilities

    The Committees continue to believe it is critical to 
preserve a variety of launch range capabilities to support 
national security space missions, and encourages planned 
launches such as the U.S. Air Force Orbital/Sub-Orbital Program 
(OSP)-3 NRO-111 mission, to be launched in 2019 on a Minotaur 1 
from the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport at Wallops Flight 
Facility. In the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017, the Committees directed a brief from the ODNI, in 
consultation with the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. 
Air Force, on their plans to utilize state-owned and operated 
spaceports, which leverage non-federal public and private 
investments to bolster United States launch capabilities and 
provide access to mid-to-low or polar-to-high inclination 
orbits for national security missions.
    The Committees direct that the ODNI supplement this brief 
with how state investments in these spaceports may support 
infrastructure improvements, such as payload integration and 
launch capabilities, for national security launches.

Acquisition Research Center Postings

    The Committees support a flexible NRO acquisition process 
that allows the NRO to choose the most appropriate contracting 
mechanism, whether for small research and development efforts 
or large acquisitions. The NRO's Acquisition Research Center 
(ARC), a classified contracting and solicitation marketplace 
that NRO and other agencies use, enables this flexible 
acquisition process for classified efforts.
    The Committees direct the NRO, within 60 days of enactment 
of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence and defense 
committees on options for modifying ARC posting procedures to 
ensure fair and open competition. Those options should include 
ensuring that unclassified NRO solicitations are posted on the 
unclassified FEDBIZOPS site, and identifying ways to better 
utilize the ARC to encourage contract opportunities for a more 
diverse industrial base that includes smaller and non-
traditional companies.

Ensuring Strong Strategic Analytical Tradecraft

    The DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has 
taken steps to improve the quality of its analysis, to identify 
its core customers, and to tailor its production to meet 
customer needs. The Committees concur with I&A's implementation 
of analytic standards and review mechanisms that have improved 
the tradecraft behind I&A productions. The bedrock of these 
efforts has been the development of a yearly program of 
analysis (POA) and key intelligence questions, which are 
essential tools for providing a roadmap and boundaries for the 
office's production efforts.
    Therefore, the Committees direct the Office of I&A to 
continue to prioritize, develop and hone its strategic 
intelligence capabilities and production, including the annual 
development of a POA. Within 90 day of enactment of the Act, 
and on an annual basis thereafter for two years, I&A shall 
brief the congressional intelligence committees on the 
development and execution of its POA. These briefings should 
provide an overview of the POA, how customer needs have been 
incorporated into the POA, and an update on execution against 
the POA.

Cyber/Counterintelligence Analysis

    DHS's Office of I&A's Counterintelligence Mission Center 
analysis focuses on counterintelligence threats posed by 
foreign technology companies and fills a gap in IC intelligence 
production. Advanced technologies are increasingly ubiquitous 
and necessary to the function of modern society. Consequently, 
the scope of the threats from countries intent on using these 
technologies as a vector for collecting intelligence from 
within the United States will continue to expand. The Office of 
I&A is well positioned to conduct a niche analysis critical to 
national security that combines foreign intelligence with 
domestic threat information.
    The Committees strongly support I&A's Counterintelligence 
Mission Center's continued focus on these topics and the 
increased resources the Fiscal Year 2019 dedicated to this 
analysis. Therefore, the Committees direct the I&A, in 
coordination with ODNI, to provide an update within 90 days of 
enactment of the Act on its recent analytic production related 
to counterintelligence threats posed by foreign technology 
companies, including a review of the countries and companies 
that present the greatest risks in this regard.

Intelligence Support to the Export Control Process

    The Committees have significant concerns that China poses a 
growing threat to United States national security, due in part 
to its relentless efforts to acquire United States technology. 
China purposely blurs the distinction between its military and 
civilian activities through its policy of ``military-civilian 
fusion,'' which compounds the risks of diversion of United 
States technology to the Chinese military.
    The Committees conclude that the United States Government 
currently lacks a comprehensive policy and the tools needed to 
address this problem. China exploits weaknesses in existing 
U.S. mechanisms aimed at preventing dangerous technology 
transfers, including the U.S. export control system, which is 
run by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS). The Committees have specific concerns about the 
lack of adequate and effective IC support to BIS's export 
license application review process and believes more robust IC 
support could have prevented many of the ill-advised technology 
transfers that have occurred in recent years.
    Therefore, the Committees directs the DNI to submit a plan, 
within 120 days of enactment of the Act, to describe how the IC 
will provide BIS with, at a minimum, basic but timely analysis 
of any threat to U.S. national security posed by any proposed 
export, re-export, or transfer of export-controlled technology. 
The plan shall include detailed information on the appropriate 
organizational structure, including how many IC personnel would 
be required, where they would be located (including whether 
they would be embedded at BIS to coordinate IC support), and 
the amounts of necessary funding. In formulating the plan, the 
DNI should study the ``National Security Threat Assessment'' 
process that the National Intelligence Council uses to inform 
the actions of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States. The DNI shall submit the plan to the 
congressional intelligence committees in classified form.

Social Media

    The Committees encourage the IC, notably the FBI, to both 
continue and enhance its efforts to assist in detecting, 
understanding, and warning about foreign influence operations 
using social media tools to target the United States. 
Additionally, within the scope of the IC's authorities, and 
with all necessary protections for U.S. person information, the 
Committees encourage the IC to augment and prioritize these 
ongoing efforts.

Trade-Based Money Laundering

    Threats to our national security posed by trade-based money 
laundering are concerning. Therefore, the Committees direct the 
DNI, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to submit a report 
to the congressional intelligence committees on these threats, 
including an assessment of the severity of the threats posed to 
the United States' national security by trade-based money 
laundering conducted inside and outside the United States; an 
assessment of the scope of the financial threats to the U.S. 
economy and financial systems posed by trade-based money 
laundering; a description of how terrorist financing and drug 
trafficking organizations are advancing their illicit 
activities through the use of licit trade channels; an 
assessment of the adequacy of the systems and tools available 
to the Federal Government for combating trade-based money 
laundering; and a description and assessment of the current 
structure and coordination between Federal agencies, as well as 
with foreign governments, to combat trade-based money 
laundering. The report shall be submitted in classified form 
with an unclassified summary to be made available to the 
public.

Expansions of Security Protective Service Jurisdiction of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    The Committees direct the CIA, in connection with the 
expansion of its security protective service jurisdiction as 
set forth in Section 413 of Division B of the Act, to engage 
with Virginia state and local law enforcement authorities to 
ensure that a memorandum of understanding, akin to those in 
place at other agencies setting forth the appropriate 
allocation of duties and responsibilities, is in effect.

Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information

    The Committees are concerned by the recent widespread media 
reports that purport to contain unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information. Protecting the nation's secrets from 
unauthorized disclosure is essential to safeguarding our 
nation's intelligence sources and methods. An unlawful 
disclosure of classified information can destroy sensitive 
collection capabilities and endanger American lives, including 
those individuals who take great personal risks to assist the 
United States in collecting vital foreign intelligence.
    Federal law prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information, but enforcement is often lacking or 
inconsistent. Accordingly, the Committees desire to better 
understand the number of potential unauthorized disclosures 
discovered and investigated on a routine basis. Moreover, the 
Committees have little visibility into the number of 
investigations initiated by each IC agency or the number of 
criminal referrals to the Department of Justice. Accordingly, 
Section 719 of Division B of the Act requires all IC agencies 
to provide the congressional intelligence committees with a 
semi-annual report of the number of investigations of 
unauthorized disclosures to journalists or media organizations, 
including subsequent referrals made to the United States 
Attorney General.
    Additionally, the Committees wish to better understand the 
role of IGs within elements of the IC, with respect to 
unauthorized disclosures of classified information at those 
elements.
    Therefore, the Committees direct the IC IG, within 180 days 
of enactment of the Act, to provide the congressional 
intelligence committees with a report regarding the role of IGs 
with respect to investigating unauthorized disclosures. The 
report shall address: the roles of IC elements' security 
personnel and law enforcement regarding unauthorized 
disclosures; the current role of IGs within IC elements 
regarding such disclosures; what, if any, specific actions 
could be taken by such IGs to increase their involvement in the 
investigation of such matters; any laws, rules or procedures 
that currently prevent IGs from increasing their involvement; 
and the benefits and drawbacks of increased IG involvement, to 
include potential impacts to IG's roles and missions.

Presidential Policy Guidance

    The Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) dated May 22, 2013, 
and entitled ``Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against 
Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas 
of Active Hostilities''' provides for the participation by 
elements of the IC in reviews of certain proposed 
counterterrorism operations. The Committees expect to remain 
fully and currently informed about the status of the PPG and 
its implementation.
    Therefore, the Committees direct ODNI, within five days of 
any change to the PPG, or to any successor policy guidance, to 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written 
notification thereof, that shall include a summary of the 
change and the specific legal and policy justification(s) for 
the change.

Centers for Academic Excellence

    The Committees commend the commitment demonstrated by 
ODNI's Centers for Academic Excellence (CAE) program managers, 
IC agencies that sponsored CAE interns, and all other personnel 
who contributed to the inaugural edition of the CAE Internship 
Program in summer 2017.
    The Committees expect the CAE Program to build on this 
foundation by showing measurable, swift progress, and 
ultimately fulfilling Congress's intent that the Program serve 
as a pipeline of the next generation of IC professionals.
    Therefore, the Committees direct that the IC take all 
viable action to expand the CAE Program by increasing, to the 
fullest extent possible:
          1. The number and racial and gender diversity of CAE 
        interns;
          2. The number of CAE academic institutions and their 
        qualified internship candidates participating in the 
        CAE Program; and
          3. The number of IC elements that sponsor CAE 
        interns.

Report on Violent Extremist Groups

    Violent extremist groups like ISIS continue to exploit the 
Internet for nefarious purposes: to inspire lone wolves; to 
spread propaganda; to recruit foreign fighters; and to plan and 
publicize atrocities. As a former Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has stated publicly:

          [W]e need to counter our adversaries' successful use 
        of social media platforms to advance their propaganda 
        goals, raise funds, recruit, coordinate travel and 
        attack plans, and facilitate operations. . . . Our 
        future work must focus on denying our adversaries the 
        capability to spread their messages to at-risk 
        populations that they can reach through the use of 
        these platforms.

    Section 403 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 required the DNI, consistent with the 
protection of sources and methods, to assist public and private 
sector entities in recognizing online violent extremist 
content--specifically, by making publicly available a list of 
insignias and logos associated with foreign extremist groups 
designated by the Secretary of State. The Committees believe 
the IC can take additional steps.
    Therefore, the Committees direct the Director of NCTC, in 
coordination with other appropriate officials designated by the 
DNI, within 180 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the 
congressional intelligence committees on options for a pilot 
program to develop and continually update best practices for 
private technology companies to quickly recognize and lawfully 
take down violent extremist content online. Such briefing shall 
address:
          1. The feasibility, risks, costs, and benefits of 
        such a program;
          2. The U.S. Government agencies and private sector 
        entities that would participate; and
          3. Any additional authorities that would be required 
        by the program's establishment.

South China Sea

    The South China Sea is an area of great geostrategic 
importance to the United States and its allies. However, 
China's controversial territorial claims and other actions 
stand to undercut international norms and erode the region's 
stability. It is thus imperative the United States uphold 
respect for international law in the South China Sea. 
Fulfilling that objective in turn will require an optimal 
intelligence collection posture.
    Therefore, the Committees direct the DoD, in coordination 
with DNI, within 30 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees on known 
intelligence collection gaps, if any, with respect to adversary 
operations and aims in the South China Sea. The briefing shall 
identify the gaps and whether those gaps are driven by lack of 
access, lack of necessary collection capabilities or legal or 
policy authorities, or by other factors. The briefing shall 
also identify IC judgments that assess which intelligence 
disciplines would be best-suited to answer the existing gaps, 
and current plans to address the gaps over the Future Years 
Defense Program.

Improving Analytic Automation

    The Committees continue to support IC and DoD efforts to 
gather, analyze, manage, and store large amounts of 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data from 
remote sources. One such effort is the NGA program called 
Expeditionary Large Data Object Repository for Analytics in 
Deployed Operations. Managing data by making information 
discoverable to analysts across the globe while reducing 
storage and analytical access costs are critical steps in the 
IC and DoD's efforts to leverage commercial best practices in 
big data analytics. While NGA is at the forefront of such 
efforts, the Committees are concerned by DoD and IC's slow pace 
in developing formal requirements for big data analytic 
capabilities.
    The Committees understand DoD faces significant challenges 
in addressing combatant commanders' intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements, and DoD is investing in 
new collection capabilities that are producing growing volumes 
of data. However, investments in ground processing, automation, 
and alert functions have not kept pace. For example, wide area 
motion imagery collection capabilities have evolved with 
technology and are producing extremely valuable ISR data, but 
processing and integration of this data is labor intensive. DoD 
continues to struggle to apply commercially-available data 
analysis and machine learning capabilities. The Committees 
recognize that DoD's processing, exploitation and dissemination 
(PED) shortfalls cannot be addressed without integrating 
commercial data processing and access techniques, and 
automating as much of the PED workflow as possible.
    Therefore, the Committees direct the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), in coordination with the 
Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of 
the Navy, and the DNI, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, 
to brief the congressional intelligence and defense committees 
on efforts that allow for rapid adoption of data storage, 
access, and automated processing and machine learning 
technologies and techniques.

Project MAVEN

    There has been exponential growth in the volume of data 
available for DoD intelligence professionals to manage, 
process, exploit, and disseminate. Analysts are in dire need of 
tools that will support simultaneous access to, and analysis 
of, data from a multitude of sources and disciplines.
    The massive quantities of available digital data hold 
significant promise for improving data analytics, producing 
more actionable intelligence, and contributing to the 
employment of a more lethal force. It is critical that DoD 
invest in new technologies that will bring artificial 
intelligence, deep learning, and computer vision to streamline 
the process of object detection, identification, and tracking--
and allow analysts to focus their valuable cognitive capacity 
on the hardest and highest priority problems.
    The Committees believe Project MAVEN provides DoD with a 
critical path to the integration of big data, artificial 
intelligence, and machine learning across the full spectrum of 
military intelligence to ensure our warfighters maintain 
advantages over increasingly capable adversaries. Although DoD 
has taken tentative steps to explore the potential of 
artificial intelligence, big data, deep learning, and machine 
learning, the Committees believe Project MAVEN will accelerate 
DoD's efforts to turn the enormous volume of data available to 
analysts into actionable intelligence.
    Therefore, the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense, 
in coordination with NGA and other relevant IC and DoD 
agencies, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees on Project 
MAVEN. Such briefing shall address:
          1. Schedule and strategy for labeling classified and 
        unclassified data;
          2. Algorithm development, production, and deployment 
        strategy;
          3. Coordination of integration efforts with other DoD 
        and IC elements;
          4. Plan to implement the technologies developed by 
        Project MAVEN technology throughout the defense 
        intelligence enterprise;
          5. Additional areas this technological advance can be 
        implemented; and
          6. Validated funding requirements and efforts that 
        ensure spending practices are focused and efficient.

Report on Geospatial Commercial Activities for Basic and Applied 
        Research and Development

    The Committees direct the Director of NGA, in coordination 
with the DNI, the Director of the CIA, and the Director of the 
NRO, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to submit to the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees a briefing on 
the feasibility, risks, costs, and benefits of providing the 
private sector and academia, on a need-driven and limited 
basis--consistent with the protection of sources and methods, 
as well as privacy and civil liberties--access to data in the 
possession of the NGA for the purpose of assisting the efforts 
of the private sector and academia in basic research, applied 
research, data transfers, and the development of automation, 
artificial intelligence, and associated algorithms. Such 
briefing shall include:
          1. Identification of any additional authorities the 
        Director of NGA would require to provide the private 
        sector and academia with access to relevant data on a 
        need-driven and limited basis, consistent with 
        applicable laws and procedures relating to the 
        protection of sources, methods, privacy and civil 
        liberties; and
          2. Market research to assess the commercial and 
        academic interest in such data and determine likely 
        private-sector entities and institutions of higher 
        education interested in public-private partnerships 
        relating to such data.

Military Occupational Specialty-to-Degree Program

    The Committees support the Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS)-to-Degree program, which is an innovative framework that 
enables enlisted Marines to receive credits towards an 
associate's or a bachelor's degree while earning required MOS 
credentials. The program partners with colleges and 
universities to map a Marine's experience and training to 
equivalent credit, and provides Marines with an awareness of 
tuition assistance and scholarship programs to enable them to 
complete the remaining credits towards their degree. The 
Committees encourage the Marine Corps to expand the MOS-to-
Degree program through further curriculum development and 
enhanced management of the program.
    Therefore, the Committees direct the Marine Corps 
Intelligence Activity (MCIA), within 90 days of the enactment 
of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence and defense 
committees on the Marine Corps' progress towards expanding the 
MOS-to-Degree program.

Unmanned Aircraft System Pilot Retention

    The Committees support the Marine Corps' vision to grow a 
more diverse, lethal, amphibious, and middleweight 
expeditionary force by leveraging emerging technologies, 
particularly in the area of unmanned and manned-unmanned 
teaming. Additionally, the Committees are enthusiastic about 
the Marine Corps' efforts to equip operating forces down to the 
squad level with a Small Unit Remote Scouting System Family of 
Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) capable of operating in all 
weather conditions across the full spectrum of conflict. The 
Committees are also aware of the service's concept for a Marine 
Air Ground Task Force Unmanned Expeditionary (MUX) capability.
    However, the Committees are concerned with the projected 
cost and delays associated with developing this new technology 
and believe the Marine Corps is ill-prepared to address the 
growing deficiency in expertise and the manpower challenges 
that will accompany expansion of the unmanned fleet. Based on 
observations of the Air Force's and Army's efforts, the 
Committees believe the Marine Corps' UAS programs will 
experience pilot and maintainer shortages based on inadequate 
training, lack of reliable equipment, and the absence of 
incentive.
    Therefore, the Committees direct the Deputy Commandant of 
Aviation, within 120 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees on potential 
interim solutions to the gap exposed by the long development 
time for MUX. Such briefing should also address the Marine 
Corps' UAS talent management plan, including a strategy for 
pilot retention and a plan to unify unmanned training that will 
build a base of instructors and encourage the professionalism 
of the community.

Remotely Piloted Aircraft Training Strategy

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC)-reported FY 2018 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) (H. Rept. 115-200), the Committees 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force, no later than 30 days 
after enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional 
intelligence and defense committees on the Air Force's approach 
to remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) aircrew training, with a 
particular focus on how the Air Force plans to field simulator 
capability and training capacity among active and reserve 
component units supporting RPA operations.

Wide-area Motion Imagery Intelligence Capability

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the HASC-reported FY 2018 NDAA 
(H. Rept. 115-200), the Committees direct the Secretary of the 
Air Force no later than March 1, 2019, to provide to the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees a report that 
describes in detail the lifecycle weapon system sustainment and 
modernization strategy for maintaining an enduring wide-area 
motion imagery capability for the geographic combatant 
commanders.

MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft System

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the HASC-reported FY 2018 NDAA 
(H. Rept. 115-200), the Committees direct the Secretary of the 
Navy, no later than 45 days after enactment of the Act, to 
brief the congressional intelligence and defense committees on 
MQ-4C mission execution and tasking, collection, processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination (TCPED) processes. The briefing 
shall include or explain:
          1. A framework description of the manning, equipping, 
        and training requirements for the MQ-4C system;
          2. A description of the baseline architecture of the 
        mission support infrastructure required to support MQ-
        4C operations;
          3. How the Navy plans to support and execute the 
        TCPED processes;
          4. How the Navy plans to support flying operations 
        from either line-of-sight or beyond-line-of-sight 
        locations;
          5. How many aircraft the Navy plans to dedicate 
        annually to the ISR Global Force Management Allocation 
        Process of the DoD; and
          6. How many hours of collection the MQ-4C will be 
        able to provide annually in each of the intelligence 
        disciplines for combatant commanders.

E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the HASC-reported FY 2018 NDAA 
(H. Rept. 115-200), the Committees direct the Secretary of the 
Air Force, no later than March 1, 2019, to provide to the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees a report that 
explains in detail all aspects of how and when the Air Force 
will transition from legacy Joint Surveillance and Target 
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft capability to JSTARS 
recapitalization aircraft capability.

Acceleration of Increment 2 of Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 
        Program

    Referring to Section 111 of H.R. 2810, the HASC-reported FY 
2018 NDAA, the Committees direct the Secretary of the Army, no 
later than January 30, 2019, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence and defense committees a report detailing 
potential options for the acceleration of procurement and 
fielding of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 
Increment 2 program.

Cost-benefit Analysis of Upgrades to MQ-9

    Referring to Section 134 of H.R. 2810, the HASC-reported FY 
2018 NDAA, the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, within 180 
days of enactment of the Act, to provide the congressional 
intelligence and defense committees an analysis that compares 
the costs and benefits of the following:
          1. Upgrading fielded MQ-9 Reaper aircraft to a Block 
        5 configuration; and
          2. Proceeding with the procurement of MQ-9B aircraft 
        instead of upgrading fielded MQ-9 Reaper aircraft to a 
        Block 5 configuration.

Limitation on Divestment of U-2 or RQ-4 Aircraft

    The Committees recognize that both piloted U-2 Dragon Lady 
and the remotely piloted RQ-4 Global Hawk fleets of aircraft 
provide essential and extremely sought after high-altitude 
airborne ISR capabilities for geographic combatant commanders. 
These platforms have been viewed as competitors for resources, 
with stakeholders trying to decide which should remain within 
the Air Force inventory for the long-term.
    Although the U-2 and RQ-4 have differing attributes that 
may make one platform preferable depending on requirements, 
maintaining both platforms provides critical, complementary 
capabilities within DoD's portfolio of high-altitude ISR 
assets. Furthermore, retiring either aircraft would exacerbate 
an existing and significant capability shortfall in meeting 
combatant commanders' requirements.
    The Committees expect the Secretary of the Air Force to 
continue current and future modernization efforts and upgrades 
for the U-2 and RQ-4 to increase capability, generate synergy, 
and foster commonality within the high-altitude airborne ISR 
portfolio. The Committees discourage the Secretary of the Air 
Force or the Chief of Staff of the Air Force from planning in 
the future or proposing to Congress any aircraft retirement 
that would create an ISR capability deficit or capacity 
shortfalls from existing levels until a sufficient replacement 
reaches full operational capability.
    Therefore, referring to Section 1034 of H.R. 2810, the 
HASC-reported FY 2018 NDAA, the Committees direct that none of 
the funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act, or 
otherwise made available for the DoD for any fiscal year before 
Fiscal Year 2024, may be obligated or expended to prepare to 
divest, place in storage, or place in a status awaiting further 
disposition of the possessing commander any U-2 or RQ-4 
aircraft for the DoD. This prohibition shall not apply to an 
individual U-2 or RQ-4 aircraft that the Secretary of the Air 
Force determines, on a case-by-case basis, to be non-returnable 
to flying service due to any mishap, other damage, or being 
uneconomical to repair.

Nonconventional Assisted Recovery

    Referring to Section 1053 of H.R. 2810, the HASC-reported 
FY 2018 NDAA, the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense, 
no later than March 1, 2019, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence and defense committees the written review and 
assessment of personnel recovery and nonconventional assisted 
recovery programs. The assessment shall include:
          1. An overall strategy defining personnel recovery 
        and nonconventional assisted recovery programs and 
        activities, including how such programs and activities 
        support the requirements of the geographic combatant 
        commanders;
          2. A comprehensive review and assessment of statutory 
        authorities, policies, and interagency coordination 
        mechanisms, including limitations and shortfalls, for 
        personnel recovery and nonconventional assisted 
        recovery programs and activities;
          3. A comprehensive description of current and 
        anticipated future personnel recovery and 
        nonconventional assisted recovery requirements across 
        the Future Years Defense Program, as validated by the 
        Joint Staff; and
          4. An overview of validated current and expected 
        future force structure requirements necessary to meet 
        near-, mid-, and long-term personnel recovery and 
        nonconventional assisted recovery programs and 
        activities of the geographic combatant commanders.
    The Committees further direct the Comptroller General of 
the United States, within 90 days of the date on which the 
assessment is submitted, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence and defense committees a review of such 
assessment.

Policy on Minimum Insider Threat Standards

    Executive Order 13587 and the National Insider Threat Task 
Force established minimum insider threat standards. Such 
standards are required for the sharing and safeguarding of 
classified information on computer networks while ensuring 
consistent, appropriate protections for privacy and civil 
liberties. The Committees understand there are policies in 
place to attempt implementation of such standards; however, the 
Committees have found that several elements of the IC have not 
fully implemented such standards. Therefore, given the several 
high-profile insider threat issues, the Committees emphasize 
the importance of such minimums by statutorily requiring the 
DNI to establish a policy on minimum insider threat standards, 
consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum 
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, and IC 
elements should expeditiously establish their own policies and 
implement the DNI guidance.
    Further, referring to the directive language found in the 
committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 
2019 NDAA, the Committees direct the Chief Management Officer 
to provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence 
committees and the congressional armed services committees, no 
later than 90 days after enactment of the Act, on the outcomes 
of its cost and technical analyses required by this report, and 
the Department's efforts to implement enterprise-wide programs 
and policies for insider threat detection, user activity 
monitoring, and cyber-attack detection and remediation.

Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment

    The Committees remain supportive of the goals of 
Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment (IC 
ITE) and the importance of the common, secure sharing 
infrastructure it creates. The Committees further understand 
that the path to implement a complex, technical environment 
such as IC ITE needs to be sufficiently flexible and agile. 
However, the Committees remain concerned with the lack of 
consistency and substance in previous reports and briefings on 
IC ITE. Therefore, Section 312 of Division B of the Act 
requires a long-term roadmap, business plan, and security plan 
that shall be reported to the congressional intelligence 
committees at least quarterly with additional notifications as 
necessary.

Intelligence Community Chief Financial Officer

    The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 mandated 
best practices for decision-making and accountability, as well 
as improved decision-makers' access to reliable and timely 
financial and performance information. The CFO Act, as amended, 
requires that the chief financial officers of 24 departments 
and agencies ``report directly to the head of the agency 
regarding financial management matters.'' Section 404 of 
Division B of the Act brings the ODNI in line with the best 
practices implemented in the CFO Act.

Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer

    As codified in 44 U.S.C. 3506(a)(1)(A), each federal agency 
head is responsible for `carrying out the information resources 
management activities to improve agency productivity, 
efficiency, and effectiveness.' Accordingly, Section 405 of 
Division B of the Act expresses the Committee's intent to 
emphasize the importance of the IC Chief Information Officer 
(CIO), as defined in 50 U.S.C. 3032(a), in assisting the DNI 
with information resource management by requiring the IC CIO to 
report directly to the DNI.

Central Intelligence Agency Subsistence for Personnel Assigned to 
        Austere Locations

    Section 411 of Division B of the Act permits the Director 
of the CIA to allow subsistence for personnel assigned to 
austere locations. Although the statute does not define 
``austere,'' the Committees believe that utilization of this 
authority should be minimal. Therefore, within 180 days after 
the enactment of the Act, the CIA shall brief the congressional 
intelligence committees on the CIA's definition of ``austere'' 
and the CIA regulations in place governing this authority.

Collocation of Certain Department of Homeland Security Personnel at 
        Field Locations

    The Committees support DHS I&A's intent to integrate into 
operations across the broader DHS enterprise. Accordingly, 
Section 435 of Division B of the Act requires I&A to identify 
opportunities for collocation of I&A field officers and to 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan for 
deployment.

Framework for Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Defense 
        Intelligence Agency

    The Committees commend the work of the USD(I) to answer a 
request in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017 (division N of Public Law 115-31) to review the roles and 
missions of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The 
Committees agree with the Under Secretary's finding identifying 
a gap in DoD coordination of the functions of the DIA, as a 
combat support agency (CSA) that is a member of the IC. The 
Director of the DIA reports to both the Secretary of Defense 
and the DNI; however, the agency lacks a framework to balance 
the resourcing and mission conflicts this bifurcated chain of 
command may occasionally cause.
    Therefore, referring to directive language found in the 
committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 
2019 NDAA, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, the 
Committees direct the Secretary of Defense, in collaboration 
with the DNI, to develop policies that outline the process to 
balance the missions under DIA's CSA role with the missions and 
functions assigned by the intelligence community. These 
policies must address a process for assigning and integrating 
any new missions assigned by the DoD or the IC. The Committees 
further direct the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 
the DNI, to provide a briefing to the congressional 
intelligence committees and the congressional armed services 
committees not later than 60 days of enactment of the Act, on 
the plan to develop these policies.

Limitations on Intelligence Community Elements' Communications with 
        Congress

    Effective oversight of the IC requires unencumbered 
communications between representatives of the agencies, members 
of Congress, and congressional staff. The Committees direct the 
DNI not to limit any element of the IC from having interactions 
with the congressional intelligence committees, including but 
not limited to, preclearance by the DNI of remarks, briefings, 
discussions of agency resources or authorities requirements, or 
mandatory reports to the DNI on conversations with the 
congressional intelligence committees.

National Reconnaissance Office Contracting Restrictions

    The Committees are concerned that NRO imposes unnecessary 
contractual restrictions that prohibit or discourage a 
contractor from contacting, meeting with, or providing 
information to the members or staff of the congressional 
intelligence committees. Therefore, the Committees direct NRO 
to eliminate any restrictions prohibiting or discouraging 
contractors from contacting, meeting with, or providing 
information to the congressional intelligence committees in all 
current and future contracts. Furthermore, the Committees 
direct the NRO to provide a briefing to the congressional 
intelligence committees, within 60 days of enactment of the 
Act, regarding completion of the aforementioned direction.

Intelligence Community Support to the National Vetting Center

    On February 6, 2018, the President issued National Security 
Policy Memorandum (NSPM)-9, ``Presidential Memorandum on 
Optimizing the Use of Federal Government Information in Support 
of National Vetting Enterprise.'' The memorandum directs the 
DHS, in coordination with the ODNI and other agencies, to 
establish the National Vetting Center. The memorandum also 
requires agencies to ``provide the Center access to relevant 
biographic, biometric, and related derogatory information.'' It 
further directs DNI, in coordination with the heads of relevant 
IC elements, to ``establish a support element to facilitate, 
guide, and coordinate all IC efforts to use classified 
intelligence and other relevant information within the IC 
holdings in support of the center.'' The Committees wish to 
obtain regular updates and the most current information about 
the activities of that support element.
    Therefore, no later than 180 days after the enactment of 
the Act and annually thereafter, the Committees direct the DNI 
and the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at DHS to 
brief the congressional intelligence committees on the status 
of IC support to the National Vetting Center, as established by 
NSPM-9.

Update on Status of Attorney General-approved U.S. Person Procedures 
        under Executive Order 12333

    The Committees acknowledge the difficult, labor-intensive 
work undertaken by certain IC elements, to ensure the current 
effectiveness of, and in some cases to substantially revise, 
final Attorney General-approved procedures regarding the 
collection, dissemination, and retention of United States 
persons information. The Committees wish to better understand 
the status of this project, throughout the IC.
    Therefore, the Committees direct that, not later than 60 
days after enactment of the Act, the DNI and the Attorney 
General shall brief the congressional intelligence committees 
on the issuance of final, Attorney General-approved procedures 
by elements of the IC. Specifically, the briefing shall 
identify (1) any such elements that have not yet issued final 
procedures; and (2) with respect to such elements, the status 
of the procedures' development, and any interim guidance or 
procedures on which those elements currently rely.

Homegrown Violent Extremists Imprisoned in Department of Defense 
        Facilities

    The Committees are concerned about an evident gap in 
information sharing about individuals imprisoned in DoD 
facilities who are categorized by the FBI as homegrown violent 
extremists (HVEs). A recent FBI report underscores this gap, 
highlighting the case of an individual who has been convicted 
and sentenced to death by a U.S. military court martial and 
remains incarcerated in a U.S. military facility. The Committee 
understands that, despite his incarceration, this inmate openly 
communicates with the outside world through written 
correspondence and has continued to inspire extremists 
throughout the world. The Committee further understands that 
the FBI is unable to determine the full scope of this inmate's 
contacts with the outside world because only a portion of his 
communications have been provided by the DoD.
    Therefore, no later than 180 days after the enactment of 
the Act, the Committee directs the FBI to work with the DoD to 
create a process by which the DoD provides to the FBI the 
complete communications of individuals imprisoned in DoD 
facilities and who are categorized by the FBI as HVEs.

Naming of Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters

    According to statute enacted in 1972, the current FBI 
headquarters building in Washington, D.C. must be ``known and 
designated'' as the ``J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.'' That 
tribute has aged poorly. It should be reconsidered, in view of 
Hoover's record on civil liberties--including the effort to 
disparage and undermine Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Even today, 
Hoover's name evokes the Bureau's sordid ``COINTELPRO'' 
activities.
    The Committees believe Congress should consider repealing 
the provision requiring the existing Pennsylvania Avenue 
building to be known as the ``J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.'' A 
new name should be determined, through a joint dialogue among 
Bureau leadership, law enforcement personnel, elected 
officials, and civil rights leaders.

Foundational Intelligence Analysis Modernization

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 2019 NDAA, 
the Committees direct the Joint Staff Director for 
Intelligence, in coordination with the USD(I) and the Director 
of the DIA, to develop a plan within 60 days of enactment of 
the Act, to modernize systems used to provide foundational 
intelligence.
    Further, the Committees direct the Joint Staff Director for 
Intelligence, in coordination with the DIA Director, to provide 
a briefing to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
congressional armed services committees, within 90 days after 
enactment of the Act, on such plan to modernize foundational 
intelligence systems. If a determination is made that a new 
system is required, the Committees expect the Battlespace 
Awareness Functional Capabilities Board to validate the 
requirements for any new system, and that the acquisition plan 
will follow best practices for the rapid acquisition and 
improvement of technology dependent systems.

Intelligence Support to Cyber Operations

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 2019 NDAA, 
the Committees direct the USD(I), in coordination with the DIA 
and the military services, to provide a briefing to the 
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 
armed services committees, within 90 days after enactment of 
the Act, on intelligence support to cyber operations.

Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math careers in Defense 
        Intelligence

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 2019 NDAA, 
the Committees direct the Director of DIA to provide a briefing 
to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
congressional armed services committees, within 90 days after 
enactment of the Act, on a plan to develop a Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Math career program that attracts 
and maintains the defense intelligence cadre of Science and 
Technical Intelligence analysts to meet tomorrow's threats.

Security and Intelligence Role in Export Control

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 2019 NDAA, 
the Committees direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, in coordination with the USD(I), within 60 days of 
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
committees and the congressional armed services committees, on 
security support to export control.

Security Clearance Background Investigation Reciprocity

    Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 2019 NDAA, 
the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense, in coordination 
with the DNI and the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management, within 60 days of enactment of the Act, to brief 
the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 
armed services committees on efforts to ensure seamless 
transition of investigations between authorized investigative 
agencies, as required by law.
    Further, referring to the directive language found in the 
committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 
2019 NDAA, the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with the DNI and the Director of the Office of 
Personnel Management, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, 
to brief the congressional intelligence committees on efforts 
to ensure reciprocity is a consideration for implementation of 
continuous evaluation and continuous vetting across the federal 
government.

Strengthening Oversight of the Military Intelligence Program Budget

    In directive language found in the committee accompanying 
H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 2019 NDAA, the House Committee 
on Armed Services directed the USD(I) to ``review all of the 
Department's intelligence, counterintelligence, and related 
intelligence programs, projects, and activities supporting the 
Secretary's responsibilities and requirements.'' Regarding this 
review, the report expressed the House Committee on Armed 
Services' expectation that USD(I) would note that the House 
Committee on Armed Services believes resources for sensors 
integral to the function of weapon systems, sensors and systems 
developed for space and missile defense, and resources for 
activities and programs associated with Operational Preparation 
of the Environment and Nonconventional Assisted Recovery are in 
support of operational requirements, and should be excluded 
from designation to the MIP.
    The Committees expect that USD(I), in addition to noting 
the belief of the House Committee on Armed Services, also will 
note the Committees' belief that:

          1. Merely deeming certain resources to be ``in 
        support of operational requirements'' is insufficient 
        to exclude such resources from designation to the MIP; 
        and that
          2. The determination of whether to designate 
        resources to the MIP involves a substantive 
        examination, of whether such resources will be used for 
        activities that are substantially similar, if not 
        equivalent to, intelligence and intelligence 
        activities.

    Additionally, and referring to the directive language found 
in the committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-
reported FY 2019 NDAA, the Committees direct USD(I) to provide 
a briefing to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
congressional armed services committees, within 180 days of 
enactment of the Act, on the results of the USD(I) review 
directed by H.R. 5515, including how the review will result in 
clear guidance on designation of programs, projects, and 
activities to the MIP.

Intelligence Community Leave Policies

    It is imperative that the federal government recruit, hire, 
and retain a highly qualified workforce. That depends in part 
on offering federal personnel a competitive benefits package--
including with respect to parental leave and related benefits. 
Toward that end, the Committees strongly believe the federal 
government, including elements of the IC, must align such 
benefits to the fullest extent possible with those of leading 
U.S. private sector companies and other industrialized 
countries.
    The Committees are concerned that IC elements may not have 
fully implemented revised advanced sick leave policies as 
outlined in the Presidential Memorandum Modernizing Federal 
Leave Policies for Childbirth, Adoption and Foster Care to 
Recruit and Retain Talent and Improve Productivity, dated 
January 15, 2015, or implemented them only partially. Among 
other things, the memorandum directs that, to the extent 
permitted by law, agencies shall offer 240 hours of advanced 
sick leave, at the request of an employee and in appropriate 
circumstances, in connection with the birth or adoption of a 
child or for other sick leave eligible uses.
    Additionally, beyond the memorandum's requirements, the 
Committees also believe IC elements should actively be 
exploring ways to enhance their parental leave policies, to 
include paid parental leave.
    Therefore, not later than 180 days after the date of 
enactment of the Act, the DNI shall submit a written report to 
the congressional intelligence committees on each IC element's 
implementation of the Memorandum's requirements with respect to 
parental leave. The report should be unclassified, but may 
contain a classified annex if necessary. At a minimum, such 
report shall:
          1. Summarize each element's policies with respect to 
        parental leave and related benefits;
          2. Identify those elements fully in compliance with 
        the Memorandum's requirements with respect to parental 
        leave and other benefits described by the Memorandum;
          3. Identify elements not in compliance with such 
        requirements;
          4. As applicable, note and evaluate the sufficiency 
        of any claimed explanation from an IC element, as to 
        why its policies do not yet fully comply with such 
        requirements;
          5. As applicable, identify a projected date, no later 
        than 180 days after the report's submission, by which 
        the Memorandum will be fully implemented by all IC 
        elements; and
          6. Describe any barriers identified by the Director 
        or an element of the IC--including any legal and 
        resource barriers--to the establishment, for each 
        element of the IC, of a paid parental leave policy.
    Section 307 of Division A of the Act includes a related 
provision, requiring the DNI to set a policy for the IC to make 
available 12 weeks of paid administrative leave in the event of 
birth of a child, including adoptive and foster parents. 
Section 307 of Division A further requires ODNI to submit a 
plan for implementation to the congressional intelligence 
committees within one year after enactment and directs 
implementation within 90 days thereafter.

Foreign Influence Task Force

    The IC has warned of active measures taken by foreign 
actors to interfere with and undermine the U.S. democratic 
process, most recently and brazenly by the Russian Federation. 
The Committees appreciate FBI efforts to confront this 
challenge in part through creation of its Foreign Influence 
Task Force. The Committees believes that confronting foreign 
influence directed at the United States is of fundamental 
importance, and thus desires to engage in a close and regular 
dialogue with the FBI about the task force's activities.
    Therefore, the Committees directs the FBI to provide 
detailed, quarterly briefings to the congressional intelligence 
committees, regarding the task force's activities, to include 
its progress and any significant challenges.

Joint System Integration Lab Annual Briefing

    The Joint System Integration Lab (JSIL) at Redstone 
Arsenal, Alabama enables testing of critical military 
intelligence capabilities, including unmanned aerial system 
(UAS) sensors, modeling and simulation, and integration between 
and among service UASs. The Committees seek to remain fully and 
currently informed about this important work.
    Therefore, the Committees direct the JSIL, within 180 days 
of enactment and annually for two years thereafter, to brief 
the congressional intelligence and defense committees, on 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by 
the JSIL.

Management of the Centers of Academic Excellence in National Security 
        Studies

    The IC's CAE in National Security Studies program was 
established in 2004 to serve the mission-critical objectives of 
educating highly qualified students of diverse backgrounds and 
encouraging them to pursue careers in the IC. The ODNI has 
designated the DIA as the Executive Agent of the program.
    In the past, the ODNI collected information about 
involvement in the CAE program by IC elements and educational 
institutions, as well as demographic (gender, minority, 
disability), educational, employment, and other data on the 
participating students. The ODNI reported this information to 
Congress in 2010 regarding the period covering 2004-2009. 
However, despite continuing Congressional interest in this 
program, the IC has apparently ceased collection and analysis 
of such data. More critically, ODNI and DIA informed the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that the IC 
currently cannot provide statistical evidence as to whether, or 
to what extent, the CAE program is fulfilling its objectives.
    Congress directed in Fiscal Year 2016 that ODNI establish a 
dedicated CAE summer internship program, but the first effort 
in summer 2017 did not yield the anticipated diversity of 
summer interns or robust participation of IC elements. The 
summer 2018 internship program also did not appear to be 
postured to demonstrate significant progress.
    Accordingly, the Committees direct ODNI to serve as the 
Executive Agent for CAE on a permanent and non-delegable basis 
no later than six months into Fiscal Year 2019. In addition, 
the Committees direct ODNI to immediately resume collection and 
analysis of data necessary to evaluate the IC CAE's 
performance, to include educational, employment, diversity, and 
other data that was used to produce ODNI's 2010 report. Within 
180 days of enactment of the Act, the Committees direct ODNI to 
submit a written report to the congressional intelligence 
committees containing this data from the 2016-2018 academic 
years, as well as metrics about the total number of students 
who participated in CAE courses, seminars, internships, or 
other events; the number of students designated as CAE scholars 
pursuing a certificate; and the number of CAE certificates 
awarded during this timeframe, with a demographic breakdown 
regarding diversity.
    The Committees believe that the IC CAE program should 
undergo a fundamental review to determine what changes can be 
made to allow the program to achieve its intended objectives 
and has requested a review be conducted by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO). Therefore, the Committees also 
direct the IC to fully cooperate with the GAO review.

Enhancing Automation at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

    The Committees strongly support efforts to leverage 
commercial advances in automation of imagery, Wide Area Motion 
Imagery (WAMI), Full Motion Video (FMV), and Synthetic Aperture 
Radar (SAR) products to reduce manual processing and improve 
information flow to users. However, the Committees are 
concerned that NGA does not dedicate adequate resources to 
integrate new automation techniques that have resulted in years 
of research into the issue, but limited operational gains 
during day to day imagery processing.
    Therefore, the Committees direct NGA, in coordination with 
ODNI, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to provide the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees with an 
updated plan to reduce manual processing of imagery, WAMI, FMV, 
and SAR to improve information flow to users. The report shall 
also address:
          1. NGA's strategy to leverage commercial advances;
          2. The various geospatial intelligence automated 
        exploitation development programs across the National 
        System for Geospatial-Intelligence, and the associated 
        funding and specific purpose of said programs;
          3. Any similar efforts by government entities outside 
        the National System for Geospatial-Intelligence of 
        which NGA is aware; and
          4. Which of these efforts are duplicative.

Redundant Organic Software Development

    The Committees are concerned that NGA is developing 
software solutions that are otherwise available for purchase on 
the commercial market. This practice almost always increases 
the time it takes to deliver new capabilities to the 
warfighter; increases the overall cost of the solution through 
expensive operational and maintenance costs; and undermines the 
U.S. software industrial base.
    Therefore, the Committees direct NGA, within 60 days of 
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
committees, on its identification of all NGA developed software 
programs and explain why such programs are developed 
organically instead of leveraging commercially available 
products.

Critical Skills Recruiting for Automation

    Although cutting edge sensors have provided the IC and DoD 
with exquisite imagery, WAMI, and FMV, intelligence analysts 
are unable to keep pace with the volume of data being 
generated. This demands a transformation in the way the 
intelligence enterprise processes, organizes, and presents 
data. For that reason, the Committees fully support the NGA's 
efforts to attract, recruit, and retain a highly competent 
workforce that can acquire and integrate new data automation 
tools.
    Therefore, the Committees direct NGA, within 60 days of 
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
and defense committees on NGA's efforts to recruit critical 
skills such as mathematicians, data scientists, and software 
engineers that possess critical skills needed to support NGA's 
objectives in automation.

Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities

    The Committees have become aware of several major 
impediments for companies with appropriately cleared personnel 
to perform work for agencies and organizations like the NRO and 
NGA. For example, businesses without ownership of a Sensitive 
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), which includes many 
small businesses, find it very difficult to perform classified 
work. Construction and accreditation of SCIF spaces may be 
cost-prohibitive for small business and non-traditional 
government contractors. Additionally, construction timelines 
often exceed the period of performance of a contract.
    A modern trend for innovative and non-traditional 
government contractors is the increase use of co-working space 
environments. Additionally, public and private entities are 
partnering to create emerging regional innovation hubs to help 
identify technology solutions and products in the private 
sector that can be utilized by the DoD and IC. These innovation 
hubs currently produce an agile, neutral, but largely 
unclassified development environment.
    Therefore, the Committees direct NRO and NGA, within 90 
days of enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional 
intelligence committees on:
          1. Potential approaches to allow for SCIF spaces to 
        be certified and accredited outside of a traditional 
        contractual arrangement;
          2. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
        issuing DoD Contract Security Specification (DD Form 
        254s) to ``Facilities'' as opposed to ``Contracts'';
          3. Options for classified co-use and shared workspace 
        environments such as: innovation, incubation, catalyst, 
        and accelerator environments;
          4. Pros and cons for public, private, government, or 
        combination owned classified neutral facilities; and
          5. Any other opportunities to support companies with 
        appropriately cleared personnel but without ownership 
        of a SCIF effective access to a neutral SCIF.

Encouraging Innovation

    The Committees are aware of and supports the NRO as it 
continues to pursue innovation and incorporate innovative 
technologies into many programs of record (POR). However, while 
the NRO is one of the more innovative leaders regarding 
government satellite matters, the NRO also struggles to 
leverage commercial and government research and development 
efforts and incorporate them in an effective and timely manner 
into PORs.
    Therefore, the Committees direct NRO, within 90 days of 
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
committees on the following:
          1. Opportunities that could expand innovation;
          2. Any challenges for innovation; and
          3. How innovative or new technologies are 
        incorporated to support critical milestones for PORs.

Improving Use of the Unclassified Marketplaces

    The Committees have become aware that a major impediment 
for companies to perform work for agencies and organizations 
like the NRO is the lack of postings on unclassified 
marketplaces, such as the unclassified ARC. Instead of posting 
data to unclassified marketplaces, NRO unclassified postings 
often refer to classified systems for critical, yet 
unclassified information. If the NRO is serious about embracing 
commercial innovation, unclassified marketplace postings should 
remain on unclassified systems.
    Therefore, the Committees direct NRO, within 90 days of 
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
committees on options for improving the unclassified 
marketplace process.

Satellite Servicing

    No later than one year after the date of the enactment of 
the Act, the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense, shall jointly provide the congressional intelligence 
and armed services committees upon request, a briefing 
detailing the costs, risks, and operation benefits of 
leveraging commercial satellite servicing capabilities for 
national security satellite systems. The briefing shall 
include:
          1. A prioritized list (with a rationale) of the 
        operational and planned assets of the IC that could be 
        enhanced by satellite servicing missions;
          2. The costs, risks, and benefits of integrating 
        satellite servicing capabilities as part of operational 
        resilience; and
          3. Potential strategies that could allow future 
        national security space systems to leverage commercial 
        in-orbit servicing capabilities where appropriate and 
        feasible.

Enhanced Oversight of IC Contractors

    A topic of sustained congressional intelligence committee 
interest has been improving the federal government's oversight 
of IC acquisition and procurement practices, including 
activities by poorly performing IC contractors.
    A framework exists to ensure that IC elements do not award 
IC contracts to businesses that engage in negligence or even 
gross negligence, consistently fail to appropriately safeguard 
classified information, maintain poor financial practices, or 
other issues. For example, an IC element may maintain a list of 
contractors of concern, in order to ensure that proposals from 
such contractors are rejected or subjected to additional 
scrutiny. The Committees wish to build on these practices and 
are concerned about the existing framework's adequacy.
    Therefore, the Committees direct all elements of the IC, to 
the fullest extent consistent with applicable law and policy, 
to share with one another information about contractors with 
track records of concern--such as the commission of negligence 
or gross negligence in the performance of IC contracts, or the 
repeated failure to appropriately safeguard classified 
information in a fashion that the contractor reasonably could 
have been expected to prevent.
    Additionally, no later than 30 days after enactment of the 
Act, the DNI shall brief the Committees on the authorities of 
IC elements with respect to contractors with track records of 
concern--before, during, and after procurement. An objective of 
the briefing will be to discuss information sharing practices 
in this regard, and to identify specific areas where the 
oversight framework can be strengthened.

Security Clearance Reporting Requirements

    The Agreement encourages efficiencies and transparency in 
government reporting requirements related to security 
clearances to ensure appropriate accountability. Therefore, the 
Agreement directs the Office of Management and Budget, in 
coordination with members of the Performance Accountability 
Council, to report to Congress, within 90 days of enactment of 
the Act, on recommendations for harmonizing and streamlining 
reporting requirements related to security clearances that have 
been set forth in legislation.

                            Committee Action

    On May 14, 2019, a quorum being present, the Committee met 
to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the 
following actions:

Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex

    By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for 
Fiscal Year 2020, the base text for purposes of amendment.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twelve 
amendments to the classified annex, as follows: (1) four 
amendments by Chairman Burr, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman 
Warner; (2) two amendments by Senator Feinstein; (3) two 
amendments by Senator Rubio (4) one amendment by Senator King; 
(5) one amendment by Senator Cotton; (6) one amendment by 
Senator Sasse; and (7) one amendment by Senator Bennet.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc ten amendments 
to the bill, as follows: (1) an amendment by Chairman Burr, and 
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to incorporate the Damon 
Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019; (2) an 
amendment by Chairman Burr, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman 
Warner, to modify the amount of CIA Voluntary Separation Pay; 
(3) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to implement paid 
parental leave for IC agencies; (4) an amendment by Vice 
Chairman Warner to establish a social media center for data 
sharing and analysis; (5) an amendment by Senator Rubio to 
provide oversight of foreign influence in academia; (6) an 
amendment by Senator Wyden, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman 
Warner, Senator Rubio, and Senator Bennet, to require a report 
on fifth-generation wireless network technology; (7) an 
amendment by Senator Wyden, and cosponsored by Senator Cotton, 
to require an annual GAO report regarding cybersecurity and 
surveillance threats to Congress; (8) an amendment by Senator 
Heinrich, and cosponsored by Senator Wyden and Senator Harris, 
to require DNI assessments of foreign interference in 
elections; (9) an amendment by Senator Heinrich to require 
periodic briefings on artificial intelligence and machine 
learning; and (10) an amendment by Senator Blunt, and 
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to require a study on 
establishing a geospatial-intelligence museum and learning 
center.
    Senator Harris offered an amendment to the classified 
annex, and Vice Chairman Warner offered a second-degree 
amendment to Senator Harris's amendment. Both were withdrawn, 
pending future Committee consideration. On May 21, 2019, the 
Committee considered a revised second-degree amendment by Vice 
Chairman Warner to Senator Harris's amendment to the classified 
annex. By voice vote, the Committee adopted Vice Chairman 
Warner's second-degree amendment. By voice vote, the Committee 
adopted Senator Harris's amendment to the classified annex, as 
modified by Vice Chairman Warner's second-degree amendment.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted a second-degree 
amendment by Senator Collins to an amendment by Senator Wyden 
that required an unclassified report on the death of Jamal 
Khashoggi. The second-degree amendment included the phrase 
``consistent with protecting sources and methods.'' By a vote 
of 15 ayes and zero noes, the Committee adopted the amendment 
by Senator Wyden, as modified by the second-degree amendment by 
Senator Collins. The votes in person were as follows: Chairman 
Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator 
Collins--aye; Senator Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator 
Cornyn--aye; Senator Sasse--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; 
Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Harris--aye; and Senator 
Bennet--aye.

Votes to report the committee bill

    On May 14, 2019, the Committee voted to report the bill, as 
amended, by a vote of 15 ayes and zero noes. The votes in 
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--aye; Senator 
Risch--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator 
Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator 
Sasse--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; 
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; 
Senator Harris--aye; and Senator Bennet--aye. By voice vote on 
May 21, 2019, the Committee unanimously voted to report the 
bill as further amended by Senator Harris's amendment to the 
classified annex, as modified by Vice Chairman Warner's second-
degree amendment.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to 
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and 
classified annex.

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

    Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires 
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed 
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff 
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report 
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the 
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the 
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of 
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule also 
contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On May 23, 
2019, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional 
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred 
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

    The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 
2020 includes four new provisions I added with the help of Vice 
Chairman Warner that represent an important step forward in 
assisting and protecting Intelligence Community whistleblowers. 
The first codifies an appeals process for Intelligence 
Community whistleblowers who have been the subject of 
reprisals. The second addresses what is currently a confusing 
set of disparate whistleblower processes and procedures across 
the Intelligence Community. This provision will assist 
whistleblowers by harmonizing those processes and procedures 
with an aim to maximizing transparency and whistleblower 
protections. The third allows the Intelligence Community 
Inspector General to track whistleblower complaints across the 
Intelligence Community, which will improve oversight and inform 
policies to ensure that investigations are conducted in a 
timely fashion and that whistleblowers are protected from 
reprisals. Finally, the bill includes a provision requiring a 
report and recommendations to ensure that Intelligence 
Community whistleblowers have access to attorneys with security 
clearances.
    The bill also includes two important new amendments I 
introduced related to the security of communications. The 
first, which was co-sponsored by Senators Rubio, Warner, and 
Bennet, requires the DNI to provide an unclassified report on 
the national security implications of fifth-generation (5G) 
wireless technology built by foreign companies. I am 
particularly pleased that the report will include an assessment 
of possible mitigation approaches, including U.S. Government 
support for strong end-to-end encryption and open-source 
technology. This report will inform the Congress and the public 
as the country considers policy responses to this extremely 
serious and complicated national security challenge.
    The bill also includes a new amendment I introduced with 
Senator Cotton to require the GAO to report annually on 
cybersecurity and surveillance threats against the U.S. Senate, 
including Senators and their staff and immediate family. This 
provision is part of a broader bipartisan effort to protect 
U.S. Senators' communication that is included in S. 890.
    Finally, the bill includes a new amendment I offered with 
the support of Senators Heinrich, Harris, Feinstein, and 
Bennet. It requires the DNI to provide a public report 
identifying those who carried out, participated in, ordered, or 
were otherwise complicit in or responsible for the death of 
Jamal Khashoggi. This amendment, modified to add ``consistent 
with protecting sources and methods'' and passed by a unanimous 
vote, is intended to ensure that there is transparency and 
accountability for the Saudi murder of a U.S. resident and 
journalist.
    I am concerned about a new provision related to the 
Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA). In 2010, I 
worked to pass legislation to increase the penalties for 
violations of the IIPA. This bill, however, expands the bill so 
that it applies indefinitely, including to individuals who have 
been in the United States for decades and have become senior 
management or have retired. I am not yet convinced this 
expansion is necessary and am concerned that it will be 
employed to avoid accountability. The CIA's request that the 
Committee include this provision, which invoked ``incidents 
related to past Agency programs, such as the RDI [Rendition, 
Detention and Interrogation] investigation,'' underscores my 
concerns.
    The Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 (S. 3153, 115th Cong., 2d 
Sess.), which the Committee incorporated into this bill, 
includes eight additional provisions I offered. A description 
of those provisions, as well as my concerns about one provision 
in that bill, are included in S. Rept. 115-298.

                        Changes to Existing Law

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is 
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to 
expedite the business of the Senate.

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