

information he's rarely asked about. "Reporters are much less interested in exploring my ties to the industry than they are in getting me to give the secret as to why gambling is bad," Christiansen says. His willingness to be critical of the spread of legalized gambling, it should be noted, does not conflict with the interests of some large casino companies that stand to lose revenue if rivals move in on their turf.

Then there's I. Nelson Rose, a professor at the Whittier Law School in California, whose resume calls him the "nation's leading authority on gambling and the law." But nowhere in his nine-page vita does Rose mention that for the past three years he has been a partner in a plan to develop a string of Indian-owned casinos in southern California.

"I have no trouble talking about it," says Rose when asked about his business ventures, but he doesn't always volunteer the information to reporters. (In the *Globe* series, Rose was described as a professor "who studies gambling law." The Quad-City Times called him "one of the nation's top authorities on legalized gambling.")

It's worth noting that Christiansen and Rose are still good sources for gambling stories, says David Johnston, "but you need to put them in the universe."

Almost no source is safe, it seems. A reporter calling the National Council on Problem Gambling in New York City, for example, might expect to get an anti-gambling perspective, or at least a view that is cautious about the spread of legalized gambling. "That's not what my board wants me to do," says Jean Falzon, the group's executive director. Instead, the council, whose board includes several gambling industry executives, focuses on raising money, often from the industry, for research about, and the education of, compulsive gamblers.

What's a reporter to do?" You flat out ask them" if they make money off the industry, says *The Wall Street Journal's* Yoshihashi. (For the record, two of the experts quoted in this story, Goodman and Abt, say they take no money from the gambling industry.)

#### EVALUATING THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS

A casino proposal will offer enough numbers to confuse even an experienced business reporter. And they're all soft. Nevertheless, exploring the economic side of casino development can offer some of the best stories about the issue.

"Many real economic issues are not being discussed by promoters or local politicians" who are eager to get casinos open and generating money, says Yoshihashi. One of these issues involves how many of a projected casino's anticipated customers will come from outside the immediate area. If most of the gamblers are local, the dollars spent at the casino represent money not being spent on other things in the local economy, inevitably hurting some area businesses. Then, too, there's the issue of jobs, which are usually touted as skilled and high-paying. In reality, the skills are usually pretty minimal, as is the pay, which generally anticipates generous tips. There's also a history of racial discrimination and sexual harassment in the casino industry.

Another issue centers around the likelihood that a casino will help a community turn its luck around. "There can be a lot of false expectations about long-term economic development," says William Eadington, director of the Institute for the Study of Gambling and Commercial Gaming at the University of Nevada at Reno. "It's all driven by a myopic perspective that all that matters is economic, which is bound to be disappointing." (Eadington, by the way, makes money off the industry, running training sessions for casino managers and sponsoring an inter-

national gambling conference that draws from industry and academia.)

Lastly, despite regular denials from gambling promoters, there is abundant evidence that legalized gambling, especially state lotteries, is regressive, with poorer citizens gambling a disproportionate share of their income. Information on this often-scanted subject has come from the New Jersey Lottery Commission, The Heartland Institute in Chicago, and Duke University, among others.

#### LOOKING AT THE SOCIAL COSTS

Examining the social cost of gambling can be a fertile area for an enterprising journalist. "There's absolutely been an explosion in the number of compulsive gamblers in Minnesota" since casinos began opening on Native American reservations across the state, says Jim Kelly, assistant city editor of the *Star Tribune* in the Twin Cities. The paper has attempted to cover this issue, a notable example being a page-one November 12, 1992, piece that examined increases in crime related to compulsive gambling.

Howard Shaffer, director of the Zinberg Center for Addiction Studies at Harvard University, says that between 3.5 and 5 percent of those adults exposed to gambling can be expected to develop into pathological gamblers. Even more disturbing, the percentage is higher (6 to 8.5 percent) for college and high school students, according to Shaffer's most recent research. "It's like crack was to cocaine. It's becoming too easy to gamble," says Shaffer.

New forms of legalized gambling may also contribute to an increase in crime, or at least increases in the cost of ensuring public safety. Meanwhile, there's the likelihood of more white-collar crime when gamblers who lose too much in the casinos try to make up their losses by stealing from employers or institutions.

#### HOW WILL IT BE REGULATED?

"If you're going to have gambling as public policy, you have to have regulation," says Yoshihashi. The *Wall Street Journal* reporter suggests that communities consider imposing a waiting period between the time someone leaves the industry and the time the person can serve in a regulatory capacity, and vice versa.

David Johnston of *The Philadelphia Inquirer* adds that reporters should find out, for example, whether a tax agent will be required to be on hand when money is counted, and how much casino operators will have to disclose about their business relationships with those in the community. He also suggests looking into whether the casino will permit credit gambling, which he says creates a host of problems, and whether there will be stiff penalties for casinos that permit underage patrons to gamble.

Regulation is a particularly big issue at casinos on Indian reservations because their sovereign-nation status has put them into something of a regulatory limbo. A recent article in *Gaming & Wagering Business*, a trade magazine, raised allegations of misuse of funds, ties to organized crime, and sexual harassment at one reservation-based casino in Minnesota.

Chris Ison, one of five reporters at the *Star Tribune* who cover gambling in an unusual team approach, says he is aware of the allegations, but has yet to explore them in depth. Ison has uncovered and reported on other forms of wrongdoing, some of which involve the regulators themselves. Last year, for example, he co-wrote a piece revealing that the area director of the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs was receiving cash vouchers with which to gamble when he made regulatory visits to a casino.

#### THE BOTTOM LINE

In general, gambling needs to be covered like other economic development proposals—glitz and hype notwithstanding. Journalists should not forget that they may be the only ones able to cast a skeptical eye on plans to expand legalized gambling in their community.

"Remember, this is an industry that's in the business of selling illusion," says David Johnston. "And it begins long before the casino ever opens." ●

#### THE PEACE POWERS ACT OF 1995

● Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I am pleased to be a cosponsor of S. 5, the Peace Powers Act of 1995, introduced by Majority Leader DOLE. This is a much-needed piece of legislation, in that it not only unties the President's hands in those instances where he needs to act to ensure American interests, it also enacts important reforms in the manner in which the United States participates in U.N. operations.

First, S. 5 repeals the unworkable—and probably unconstitutional—War Powers Resolution. This is long overdue. I, like many of my colleagues, have always believed that the Framers of the Constitution always intended that the President should be able to act with dispatch to protect American interests in his capacity of Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces. While Congress retains the power of the purse, and the continuing right to cut off funds at will, there is no clear right for Congress to preemptively subject the President to a drop dead date in the conduct of military operations. This bill does retain the consultation and reporting provisions of the War Powers Resolution, which have not been controversial and with which all administrations have complied, in the spirit of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches.

A major provision is section 5 of the bill, which amends the United Nations Participation Act to prohibit the President from placing any element of the U.S. Armed Forces under the command or operational control of any foreign national in any UN peacekeeping operation. This is a matter that commands strong support among the American public, who do not want to see our service personnel placed willy-nilly under the control of non-Americans, exposed to dangers in operations that may have little if any relation to American interests. I am pleased to point out that this provision is very similar to an amendment that I attempted—unsuccessfully, at that time—to add to the Department of Defense appropriations bill in 1993. However, as President Clinton has shown himself more and more willing to delegate his constitutional power to international bureaucrats at the United Nations, the wisdom of this prohibition has become more and more apparent. I look forward to its becoming law in the very near future.

Finally, S. 5 includes provisions to reform the way U.N. peacekeeping is

paid for. With passage of this legislation, costs incurred by the Defense Department in U.N. peacekeeping operations will be credited to the United States against our assessments to the United Nations. No more would the United States be, in effect, stuck with the bill twice: the first time, when the Defense Department expends resources to support a U.N. mission, and the second time when the U.N. bills us for our share of the same mission. Also, the Peace Powers Act requires that advance notice of funding sources for peacekeeping operations be identified before the U.N. Security Council votes to establish, extend, or expand U.N. peacekeeping operations. This would prevent "deficit voting" by the Clinton Administration—which has treated peacekeeping, in effect, as a sort of "international entitlement program," where we commit to an operation and only worry about paying for it afterward.

The Peace Powers Act is the start of what I hope will be a major reexamination of U.S. priorities in the national security area. In particular, the Clinton Administration, in the view of many of us, has not approached its responsibilities in this area with sufficient seriousness. For example, we have seen the way in which the Clinton Administration has completely mishandled the nuclear crisis involving North Korea. In fact, while the Clinton Administration claims that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a top priority, its actions, as evidenced by the October 1994 nuclear agreement with North Korea may do more to promote nuclear proliferation.

The agreed framework commits the United States to provide North Korea with immediate economic, political and security benefits in return for Pyongyang freezing its nuclear complex.

What signal does this send to other would-be proliferators? That building a nuclear weapons complex, in violation of an international accord—namely, the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty—is the best way to get economic aid, political concessions, and national security assurances from the United States. Here is what Iraqi foreign minister Mohammed Saeed Sahnaf [sah-YEED sah-HAHF] had to say about the United States-North Korean deal: "What does North Korea get for its refusal?", [referring to international inspections of two sites suspected of holding nuclear weapons-related materials] "They get a \$4 billion light-water reactor, get a couple billion dollars in addition, plus unlimited oil deliveries. What do we get? We get nothing." [As related to the Washington Post by Rolf Ekeus [EH-kyoos], director of the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq.]

Under the agreed framework the United States will: Immediately provide North Korea with close to \$4.7 million worth of heavy oil; establish liaison offices with North Korea; begin relaxing trade restrictions; and cancel

the annual United States/South Korean military exercise "Team Spirit." And North Korea's shooting down of a United States helicopter that accidentally strayed north of the snow-obscured border-line—and then holding the surviving pilot prisoner—has not diluted this Administration's eagerness to deal with North Korea.

But even more astounding is that despite months of North Korean intransigence over allowing international nuclear inspections, the Clinton administration agreed to provide these valuable assets without ensuring international inspections. Only after about 5 years into the agreement's implementation, and close to the completion of the first of two light water reactors, is North Korea required to come into full compliance with the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to weapons use and obligates signatories to accept "safeguards" to monitor and verify compliance. And it is only at this point that the special inspections of the two nuclear waste sites will be allowed.

To give another example, I applaud the proposal of my colleague, Senator MCCONNELL, the incoming Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, to take a new look at our foreign aid to Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union in light of some of the things that are happening there. Senator MCCONNELL has called for cutting aid to Russia upon evidence that Moscow is directing or supporting the violation of another nation's sovereignty. In addition, I am sure my colleagues feel as I do about the disturbing television pictures we are seeing from Chechnya [chech-NYAH], and the actions of Russian forces there. While Chechnya is legally part of Russia and not a neighboring country, I am concerned what these actions may indicate about the direction of the Russian Government and its commitment to democratic reform.

So, as I have said, Mr. President, there are many issues for us to take a look at in the 104th Congress. The Peace Powers Act is an excellent beginning. I hope it will rapidly be enacted.●

#### UNITED STATES-NORTH KOREAN AGREED FRAMEWORK: WHAT IT MEANS FOR US; WHAT IT MEANS FOR SEOUL

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, last month my colleague Senator MURKOWSKI and I made a factfinding trip to several Asian countries, including North and South Korea. In both Pyongyang and Seoul we naturally focused much of our attention on the Agreed Framework recently concluded between the United States and North Korea. According to that document, North Korea is to dismantle its nuclear weapons production capability in exchange for assistance—primarily from South Korea and Japan—in reconfiguring its energy sector.

I know that some in this chamber have serious misgivings about our deal with North Korea. I understand that; given Pyongyang's record, it would be a mistake to treat that government's "commitments" with anything less than a very healthy skepticism. But I believe that the more one looks at the Agreed Framework with North Korea the more one sees that the agreement does not depend on trusting Pyongyang. Rather, the United States has crafted an agreement that gives us and our partners, South Korea and Japan, new levers over North Korea. If the North Koreans don't live up to their commitments, they lose out, and we're the ones who decide if those obligations are being met.

When I was in Seoul our talented and hard-working Ambassador there, James T. Laney, gave me a memo that spells out very cogently just how much we and the South Koreans stand to gain from the Agreed Framework with North Korea. The memo does have a shortcoming: like many documents produced within the U.S. Government, it is full of acronyms. Let me spell some of those out. The DPRK is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—North Korea—and the ROK is the Republic of Korea—South Korea. The ROKG is the Republic of Korea Government. An LWR is a Light Water Reactor, the NPT is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the IAEA is the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Ambassador Laney also gave me a very interesting statement describing the evolving South Korean reaction to the Agreed Framework. No country looks more warily at North Korea than South Korea does. So it's worth noting that, as details about the agreement became known, the Seoul stock market went up more than 20 percent. That's not the reaction of a business community that thinks its country has been left more vulnerable.

I respectfully request that Ambassador Laney's memo, "What the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework Means for Korea," and his statement, "Seoul's Second Thoughts," be inserted into the RECORD.

The material follows:

#### WHAT THE U.S.-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK MEANS FOR KOREA

South Koreans are nobody's fools when it comes to trusting North Korea. They don't. They are watching like hawks for the first sign of DPRK backsliding or nonperformance regarding the Geneva Agreed Framework. We drew heavily on the ROK's experience and advice to design a Framework that avoids the mistakes of past agreements with the DPRK. The Framework was designed to compel the DPRK to take measurable steps in compliance before getting significant benefits.

Determined not to be cut out of the game, the South Koreans are trying to promote inter-Korean dialogue. Equally determined to hobble ROK influence (and perhaps unwilling to talk before the succession is completed in Pyongyang), the North Koreans are