

and Japan stood shoulder-to-shoulder in Jakarta and promised to make the Framework succeed. The UN Security Council formally welcomed and endorsed it. The IAEA has blessed it and has begun performing its part. For the U.S. to abrogate that settlement would precipitate a crisis, not only with the DPRK, but a crisis of confidence in U.S. leadership throughout Asia. It would compound the difficulty of any effort by the U.S. to employ UNSC sanctions against the North in response to the renewed DPRK nuclear activity that would surely follow. If, on the other hand, the DPRK balks at living up to its commitment, the U.S. retains the full range of options in deterring, coercing, or punishing the North Koreans.

Implementation of the terms of the Framework, as the North Koreans repeatedly pointed out, will compel the DPRK systematically to strip itself of a nuclear capability. But far from achieving its major objective—normalization and an end to the U.S. embargo—North Korea faces precisely the same set of requirements that has confronted it for years. Pyongyang must make significant progress in accounting for and returning MIA remains, towards ending weapons and ballistic missile sales to the Middle East, in reducing the conventional military threat, in improving human rights practices, and the rest of the broad agenda of U.S. concerns. The South Koreans, who share these concerns and have many more of their own, believe that the significant leverage the U.S. retains will be an important tool for influencing DPRK behavior in the non-nuclear area.

SEOUL'S SECOND THOUGHTS

With the new leadership in Congress taking a hard look at the recent Geneva Agreement Framework between the United States and North Korea, it seems worthwhile to ask how South Koreans view it, since they are the ones that will be most affected by it and the ones who will carry the largest share of the cost.

It is true that, despite the closeness of U.S.-ROK consultation in both Geneva and Seoul throughout the course of the negotiations, and although the outcome met our joint objectives and priorities, the settlement was initially greeted with criticism and even some dismay in Seoul. Just before the completion of the Geneva talks, President Kim Young Sam himself voiced some caustic comments about American foreign policy in an interview with the New York Times. The real issue behind the criticism, however, was the pain that Koreans felt because they were not at the table in negotiations that were of such paramount importance to their nation. Still, it is interesting to see how much Seoul's early criticisms (most of which, like President Kim's interview, came before the agreement was final—let alone public) parallel the more recent comments by the new Republican leadership in Congress. "We gave away too much." "We are waiting too long to find out about the past." "How can we trust the North Koreans to keep their word?"

Here in Seoul, however, after a few weeks of close inspection and vigorous public debate, public opinion has shifted unmistakably in favor of implementing the agreement, and there is no serious thought of turning the clock back. In fact, President Kim recently announced a policy of encouraging economic ventures in the North. While North Korea pretends to spurn this initiative, its officials already have begun to welcome South Korean business trips to Pyongyang. The opportunity of doing business in the North has been a lure to the South for several years. Furthermore, since

the U.S. and North Korea agreed to return to negotiations six months ago, the investment climate in Seoul has improved remarkably, and the Seoul stock market has shot up more than 20% for an appreciation of some 28 billion dollars in the equity market. These economic indicators speak worlds about the way business views the reduction in tensions.

Partly as a gesture of reconciliation but also shrewdly assessing the future, President Kim, in a major policy speech last August, offered to build Light Water Reactors for the North. Even those who have complained that Seoul is having to carry too large a share of the financial burden acknowledge that the Light Water Reactor can be viewed as a long-term investment in Korea's future. And while everyone would prefer to have the secrets of the past unlocked now, the fact is that the agreement requires the North to open up all of its nuclear facilities before the core nuclear components will be installed in the first Light Water Reactor. Meanwhile, the production of weapons-grade plutonium has been stopped, dead.

Only a few months ago, the United States was headed resolutely towards U.N. sanctions, which the North had declared would be "an act of war." During the previous six months, the United States had enhanced its military capability significantly by the introduction of Patriot Missiles, Apache Helicopters and Counter-Fire Radars to check the enormous strength of the North Korean artillery along the DMZ. Our resolve to defend the Republic of Korea and our preparations for any eventuality did not go unnoticed by the North. We discouraged North Korean adventurism while encouraging them to negotiate.

While many South Koreans preferred the status quo, sustained through mutual deterrence for 40 years, the fact is it had been irrevocably shattered by the aggressive nuclear program of the North, leading to a situation totally unacceptable to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the international community. Washington and Seoul agreed that we had to act, either by inducing the North Koreans to relinquish their nuclear program through negotiations, or by forcing them to give it up. Mindful of the risks, we were prepared to pursue the latter course if negotiations did not work. Since the North had already isolated itself from the world, the effect of sanctions would have been limited. And with more than a million men under arms near the DMZ, the provocation of a weak and possibly unsteady regime could well have brought nightmarish results. No South Korean wanted to take that chance.

Those here who have claimed that we have rewarded North Korea's bad behavior have been reminded that the agreement calls not only for North Korea to meet all of the NPT conditions, but to go far beyond them: no further construction of new reactors and no reprocessing; and in the end, the demolition of all the facilities associated with the present program. We tend to overlook how much the North is actually giving up—years of enormous investment in their ultimate and prized symbol of independence. United States technicians have even visited the nuclear site at Youngbyon, an event unthinkable a few months ago.

Of course the jury is still out on whether this agreement will finally work. After all, North Korea has been an enemy for more than forty years, and as long as its nuclear and conventional threat remains, we will continue to be prepared and wary. The settlement is driven by performance, not by trust. But the International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed that Pyongyang has

taken the first steps in the agreement, and South Korea and the Northeast Asia region are breathing a little easier now with the reduction of tensions and the prospect of opening up the North.●

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the calling of the quorum be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Before I start the business of closing, I ask unanimous consent that Senator D'AMATO be added as a cosponsor of S. 2.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

INCREASING PORTION OF FUNDS AVAILABLE TO COMMITTEE

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I send a resolution to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 28) to increase the portion of funds available to the Committee on Rules and Administration for hiring consultants.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution.

The resolution (S. Res. 28) was agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That section 16(c)(1) of Senate Resolution 71 (103d Congress, 1st Session) is amended by striking "4,000" and inserting "40,000".

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution was agreed to.

Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

MEASURE READ FOR FIRST TIME—S. 169

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I send a bill to the desk and ask for its first reading.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the bill for the first time.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 169) to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on States and local governments; to strengthen the partnership between the Federal Government and State, local and tribal governments; to end the imposition, in the absence of full consideration by Congress, of Federal