

Kapalua, bringing the full fruits of tourism to bear on Maui's economy. That economic success story is certainly his chief legacy.

His first and only election loss came in November when his bid for mayor was turned back by Linda Crockett Lingle. Hokama again found himself bucking the odds by taking on the popular Republican incumbent, but as always he showed his resolve not to be cowed by the odds. He waged an aggressive and tireless campaign from day one, the only difference being that this time he lost.

That he didn't lose in any of the 20 elections between this one is both a tribute to the man Goro Hokama and a profit to the County of Maui. •

STAR WARS OR MAGINOT LINE? CONTRACT TO BANKRUPT AMERICA

• Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, the Republican contract calls for the old star wars program—the strategic defense initiative [SDI]—to be retooled, reinvigorated, and deployed “at the earliest possible date.” We have spent a fortune on this program since 1983, with next to nothing to show for it, except perhaps how wasteful and foolish our defense spending can sometimes be.

The following article, written by Robert Wright in the *New Republic* in December 1994, makes a clear case for discontinuing the high levels of treasure we spend on missile defense every year. President Clinton, who seems intent on spending far too much on defense over the next few years, must know that the new threats to our national security cannot be parried by building fanciful, expensive, uncertain missile defenses.

The President and Congress instead ought to acknowledge that SDI by any name remains nothing more than a 1990's version of the old French Maginot Line. The Maginot Line didn't work in World War I, and star wars can't work today, for reasons made clear over the past 10 years of congressional and public debate. Sadly, we are visiting an issue now that should have gone away in the late 1980's.

I commend the *New Republic* article to my colleagues, and I ask that it be printed in the *RECORD*.

The article follows:

CRAZY STATE

(By Robert Wright)

Gingrich argued that conservatives adopt space exploration and Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, the so-called Star Wars program, as causes for tactical political gain. “Young people like space,” he said.—*The Washington Post*, 1985)

The Strategic Defense Initiative is back. It's right there in the Republicans' Contract with America—or, at least, in the exegesis. The National Security Restoration Act, one of ten bills the contract would bring to a vote by spring, demands “deployment at the earliest possible date” of an anti-ballistic missile defense. The Republicans haven't said whether that means a space-based defense or a land-based defense. Either way it means trashing the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, upping Pentagon spending by several billion a year for research and upping it by much more when deployment starts. Why aren't you excited?

A surprisingly large number of people are. The new SDI comes with a new post-cold war rationale that has attracted not just Republicans, but some centrist Democrats. Indeed, research for a land-based SDI has stayed alive—if barely, and under another name—during the Clinton administration. Accelerated research and early deployment are thus a real political possibility, even if space-based weapons are a long shot. But before we make that leap, could somebody explain why the post-cold war rationale deserves anything less than the derision that finally overwhelmed the cold war rationale?

The cold war derision had two pillars. First, there were firm doubts about technical feasibility. Nothing has since happened to undermine them. The Pentagon's initial claim of a 96 percent success rate for the Patriot Missile against Iraqi Scuds turned out to be fantasy.

Second, we realized that plain old deterrence worked just fine as a missile defense; so long as Leonid Brezhnev could count on tit for tat, he wouldn't attack. If anything, indeed, a missile defense could weaken the perverse logic behind deterrence by making mutually assured destruction less assured; the “protected” nation might feel too nervy and the unprotected nation too nervous.

Now, all of a sudden, we're told that deterrence won't work. Why? Because now we face not coolly rational, game-theoretical Soviets, but a different class of enemy: “rogue states”—Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Kim Jong Il's North Korea, Muammar Qaddafi's Libya. How does one qualify as a “rogue state”? So far as I can tell, it helps if your leader (a) doesn't have white skin, (b) dislikes the United States and (c) does not behave in genteel fashion (often failing, for example, to wear a necktie during affairs of state). The less polite term for “rogue state,” and its real meaning, is “crazy state.” But there is zero evidence that any of these leaders is “crazy” in the relevant sense: suicidal. Quite the contrary. Ronald Reagan gave Qaddafi the litmus test for sanity and he passed: we bombed his house, and he modified his behavior. Hussein has shown repeatedly that, once he knows where the brink is, he doesn't step over it.

Bear in mind that a nuclear attack on the United States would be more suicidal for these men than it would have been for the Soviets. Brezhnev might conceivably have weathered a firestorm and emerged from his bunker to inherit a world destroyed. If Saddam Hussein tried that, he would be squashed like a bug upon emerging. And he knows it.

Besides, if any “crazy” leader does want to blow up an American city, there are SDI-proof ways: drive a bomb across the Mexican border, sail it up the Potomac on a yacht or mail it. For a seventy-pound package, second-day UPS costs less than a ballistic missile.

Neo-SDI advocates also invoke fear of “accidental launch.” But, as John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists has written in this magazine, “Lots of things have to happen for a missile to fire. The chances of its leaping unbidden from its silo are about the same as the chances of a car starting itself up, opening the garage door and backing out into the driveway without human assistance.” Besides, how many missiles are aimed at America these days? Russia has agreed to point no missiles at us in exchange for our reciprocal pledge. And whether or not you trust the Russians, their own strategic logic argues increasingly for aiming elsewhere (e.g., at other former Soviet states). Similarly, North Korea's top two targets would be South Korea and Japan. That's the way tensions are in the post-cold war world: regionalized. The surest American defense

against “accidental launch” is to stay on good terms with Brazil.

Of course, however slight the chances of nuclear attack, and however real the chances that a missile defense would fail to repel it, a little insurance would be appealing if it were cheap enough. First of all, it isn't cheap (\$50 billion assuming meager cost overruns). Moreover, “insurance” conduces to solipsism; if we feel (however falsely) safe inside our little shell, waning support for internationalism will wane even faster.

I'm not saying the new SDI enthusiasm is driven by nascent Republican isolationism. But the enthusiasm accommodates and nourishes the party's isolationist strain. In the Republican summary of the Security Restoration Act, only one goal gets more prominent billing than SDI: “to ensure that U.S. troops are only deployed to support missions in the U.S.'s national security interests.”

We all care about “national security interests.” But some of us think that national security (in various senses) is increasingly tied to global stability. The Republicans' post-election rhetoric, in contrast, fixates on keeping U.S. troops out of peacekeeping roles, keeping U.S. dollars from supporting other peacekeepers and stifling the foreign aid that helps stabilize places like Russia and the Middle East.

Also, of course, the Republicans don't favor one-worldish projects like . . . well, like continued adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty. And violating that treaty (which, alas, even the Clinton administration's battlefield missile-defense research program threatens to do) is itself a dangerous retreat from internationalism. What's scarier than an Indian-Pakistani border flanked by nuclear arsenals? An Indian-Pakistani border flanked by destabilizing ABMs as well. We might yet be able to head that prospect off, but not once we've built our own shell.

The United States is now uniquely positioned to lead the world in avoiding two bad things: a global race to build destabilizing missile defense systems, and a global race to carry destabilizing weapons into space—not just anti-missile weapons, but anti-satellite weapons. The Republicans are now on record as wanting to start the first of these races, and they are clearly inclined to start the second. It's time for President Clinton to crawl out of his bomb shelter, survey the wreckage and start fighting. •

PERES ON DESALINATION

• Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I will be reintroducing the desalination research bill, which I have introduced in two previous Congresses. It has passed the Senate twice. Unfortunately, it got caught up in the last-minute, partisan wrangling that had nothing to do with the desalination bill, and it did not pass.

The need for it becomes more and more clear every day.

Recently, I had the chance to read responses of Israeli Foreign Minister Simon Peres to questions at the National Press Club Forum on October 4.

In response to a question by Jim Anderson of the German Press Agency, Foreign Minister Peres said: “If you want to save your children from poverty, pay attention to the water. The rivers do not follow the frontiers and the rain doesn't go through the customs.”

Then, in response to another question from a reporter, whose name I do