

A number of Senators, newspapers, and outside interest groups—all of whom could be fairly characterized as pro-choice—have expressed deep concerns regarding this nomination, because of the credibility issue. In fact, I think it is fair to say that this nominee's problems have no more to do with abortion than Zoe Baird's problems had to do with antitrust policy.

We have had a number of controversial Surgeons General, some of whom I have disagreed with vehemently. But I have never seen, at least not since this administration, a Surgeon General who—by their own actions and statements—utterly squandered the public trust that is so essential to this job.

As I said at the outset, it is generally my approach to give the President wide latitude in appointing the various members of his administration. But with the facts that have come tumbling out about this nominee—many of them in direct conflict with each other—and given the excruciating history of the last Clinton administration official to hold this job, I must regretfully join with my colleagues who have called on the White House to withdraw the nomination immediately.

Every day that goes by will simply do more damage to a nominee who is, by all accounts, a decent and accomplished individual. What is more, every new report of withheld and false information will only serve to further erode the credibility of the office of Surgeon General, at a time when public esteem for the position is at an all-time low.

I think everyone in this body is ready to work with the President to find a new candidate for Surgeon General who would command the public's trust at the very outset. I may not agree with that new nominee on some issues, or even on most issues. But the point is to restore the integrity and dignity of the office, and that will require a nominee who comes untarnished by lapses in candor or allegiance to an extreme political agenda.

Playing the abortion card—as the White House is now doing so extravagantly—is merely a convenient dodge. The real issue is credibility: the credibility of the nominee, and the credibility of this administration.●

RETIREMENT OF REAR ADM. JOHN E. GORDON

● Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on April 19, 1994, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Adm. Frank Kelso, the Chief of Naval Operations, to retire in grade. During the debate on the nomination, a number of Senators raised issues concerning Admiral Kelso's accountability with respect to matters related to the misconduct at the 1991 Tailhook Symposium. At one point, a Senator indicated that no one, other than a victim of the misconduct, lost his or her job as a result of Tailhook. In response, I noted that a number of individuals, including the Secretary of the Navy, resigned as a result of Tailhook.

In the course of my remarks, I stated that "the Navy JAG, the Judge Advocate General, resigned over this." I made that statement based upon the fact that the retirement of the Judge Advocate General was announced at the time that the Navy made public its initial reaction to the DOD inspector general's report on the Navy's conduct of the Tailhook investigations. Subsequent to my remarks, I have been informed by the Navy that the then-Judge Advocate General, Rear Adm. John E. Gordon, did not resign in response to the Tailhook report.

The Navy has advised me that Rear Admiral Gordon was appointed to be the Judge Advocate General on November 1, 1990, and was immediately scheduled for retirement on November 1, 1992, in accordance with prior Navy practice. Rear Admiral Gordon formally submitted his request for retirement on September 9, 1992, prior to the September 21, 1992 issuance of the DOD/IG report, and retired on November 1, 1992, in accordance with the date originally set in 1990. The Navy has further advised me that no official adverse action was taken against Rear Admiral Gordon.

To put this matter in perspective, the Navy has advised me that in the aftermath of the Tailhook matter, 29 Navy and Marine Corps personnel were punished under article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice—nonjudicial punishment—and 3 flag officers received letters of censure from the Secretary of the Navy. Sixty Navy and Marine Corps personnel received nonpunitive administrative letters and 19 received informal counseling.

I appreciate the opportunity to clarify the record.●

MEXICAN LOAN COMMITMENTS RESOLUTION

● Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I am pleased today to cosponsor with Senator MACK the Mexican loan commitments resolution.

As I stated on February 8, the President never should have circumvented the will of the American people to bail out a mismanaged Mexican Government and global currency speculators. I remain outraged that American taxpayers have been forced to do something they did not want to do. The President knew full well that Congress would never approve a \$40 billion bailout. He never should have submitted to economic blackmail.

The President's use of \$20 billion from our Exchange Stabilization Fund [ESF] to bail out Mexico was unprecedented. This fund was intended to stabilize the dollar, not the Mexican peso or any other foreign currency. It is not the President's personal piggy bank. The President has now committed \$20 billion of the approximately \$25 billion the ESF has available for lending. Are sufficient funds left in the ESF to stabilize the dollar's exchange rate in the event of a crisis? What happens if Mex-

ico defaults? Does the President propose to raise taxes or cut needed domestic programs to replenish the ESF?

The Banking Committee intends to hold oversight hearings on the President's use of the ESF to bail out Mexico. These hearings will address, among other issues: First, the President's legal authority to use the ESF to provide \$20 billion in loans, loan guarantees, and other assistance to Mexico; second, the need for such assistance to Mexico; third, Mexico's compliance with the conditions imposed for United States assistance; fourth, the administration's monitoring of economic conditions in Mexico during 1994, including whether the administration or the International Monetary Fund [IMF] participated in Mexico's December 20 decision to devalue the peso; and fifth, lessons of the Mexican peso crisis, including the risk of similar crises occurring in other nations.

The Mexican loan commitments resolution expresses the sense of the Senate that Congress must receive sufficient information to judge the success or failure of the President's Mexican adventure. This resolution urges the Secretary of the Treasury to provide the Senate Banking Committee with monthly information on: First, economic conditions in Mexico, and second, Mexico's use of the funds it obtains from the ESF and IMF. The Secretary now submits a monthly ESF financial statement to the Senate and House Banking Committees.

Mr. President, in a February 9 letter to me, Secretary Rubin expressed a willingness to provide some additional information to the Banking Committee on Mexico's economic condition, and Mexico's use of our assistance. I ask that the Secretary's letter be included in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

(See exhibit 1.)

The purpose of this resolution is to detail the information that the Senate believes the Secretary must submit to allow the Banking Committee to monitor the President's extraordinary use of the ESF to aid Mexico.

The resolution urges the Secretary to provide the Banking Committee with information on:

The activities of the Mexican Central Bank, including the reserve positions of the Mexican Central Bank and data relating to the functioning of Mexican monetary policy;

The implementation and extent of wage, price, and credit controls in the Mexican economy;

Mexican tax policy;

Planned or pending Mexican Government regulations affecting the Mexican private sector; and

Any efforts to privatize public sector entities in Mexico.

This information will allow the committee to determine whether Mexico's Government has instituted the tight money and free market reforms needed to improve its economy.