

to meet on Thursday, February 16, 1995, beginning at 9:30 a.m., in room 485 of the Russell Senate Office Building on the fiscal year 1996 budget oversight hearing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Children and Families of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources be authorized to meet for a hearing on the child care and development block grant, during the session of the Senate on Thursday, February 16, 1995, at 10 a.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

EROSION OF U.S. ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITY

• Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, the Air Force and Navy are quietly scrapping our electronic warfare [EW] squadrons. At best, the Services are making penny wise and pound foolish decisions. At worst, the Air Force and Navy are attempting to force Congress into funding an all-stealthy tactical aviation fleet. Either way, America is on the verge of losing its decisive edge in EW. Reviewing the "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," one is struck by the crucial role EW played in achieving air superiority:

The attacks on the Iraqi electronic order of battle [EOB] affected every aspect of [the] air supremacy operation. Coalition aircraft conducting air defense suppression missions saturated Iraqi airspace with jammers, shooters, and bombers. Iraqi defense that attempted to engage were disrupted, and risked being destroyed. EF-111A's and EA-6B's were used in stand-off and close-in orbits to jam early warning, acquisition, and [Ground Control Intercept] GCI radars. EC-130H Compass Call aircraft jammed radio communications, data links, and navigation systems. F-4G's, F-16's, EA-6B's, A-6E's, A-7E's, and F/A-18's used [High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles] HARMs to destroy acquisition, GCI, and target tracking radars. Various aircraft dropped bombs on air defense emplacements and control facilities. [Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses] SEAD forces and bomb droppers caused confusion, hesitation, and loss of capability, which degraded Iraqi air defense capability.

This confusion, hesitation, and loss of capability was directly responsible for the spectacular success of our air and ground campaigns. More importantly, air superiority was a key element in reducing Coalition losses in men and material. Yet, a mere 4 years since Desert Storm, our EW capability is rapidly wasting away for lack of funds.

The most immediate dilemma facing Congress is the proposed termination of the EF-111A System Improvement Program (SIP). EF-111 performance, pre-SIP, was described in glowing terms in the "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War:"

[EF-111As] were part of the initial surge of aircraft across the Iraqi border the first night of the war, and established orbits to escort strike packages into the H-3 and Baghdad areas. They jammed EW, height finder, GCI, and target-acquisition radars, and were effective in tricking the enemy into opening fire at fake radar returns in areas where there were no Coalition aircraft.

It should be noted that only F-117's were cleared for Baghdad, a point that I will return to in a moment.

The SIP will significantly enhance the effectiveness, reliability, and maintainability of the already proven EF-111. Unfortunately, the Air Force proposed, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense accepted, the termination of the SIP in fiscal year 1996 for budgetary reasons preparatory to retiring the aircraft in fiscal year 1997.

To compensate for the loss of EW capability that will result from the termination of the SIP and retirement of the EF-111A, the Air Force has suggested a number of alternatives:

Navy EA-6B's can handle EW duties: Jointness at its most cynical. The EA-6B Advanced Capability (ADVCAP) upgrade was cancelled by the Navy in February 1994. The future of Navy EW is in disarray, and it is likely that EA-6B modernization will be limited to safety of flight improvements until the retirement of the aircraft;

Stealthy aircraft require less EW support: Perhaps, but, as mentioned before, F-117's benefited from EW support in the skies over Baghdad. Stealth is actually an EW force multiplier, because the jamming power and techniques needed to hide an aircraft with the radar cross section (RCS) of a B-52 will be many times more effective hiding an aircraft with the RCS of a sparrow; and,

Jamming pods can replace stand-off jammers: This is, at best, only a partial solution. Pods provide only self-protection, frequencies, power output, and techniques are limited, man-in-the-loop responsiveness is lost, and aircraft maneuverability, payload, speed, and range are reduced.

The menu of options presented by the Air Force is hardly ideal, and, taken separately, or in some combination, represent a significant diminution of U.S. EW capability. Worse yet, the use of prior year EF-111A SIP funds as a source for the supplemental by the House Appropriations Committee may foreclose our opportunity to debate the wisdom of the EF-111A SIP cancellation. If prior year EF-111A SIP funds are rescinded, the termination of the program will be irreversible.

So what do we do? First, drop EF-111A SIP funds as a source for the supplemental. Second, pry loose the congressionally mandated Joint Tactical Electronic Warfare Study. Third, if the study says what I think it will, ensure that the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization and appropriations bills include funds to maintain and modernize the EF-111A, EA-6B, and F-4G ("Wild Weasel") fleets.

The alternative is to let the services have their way, and let America's EW advantage erode. This erosion will have profound implications for Congress. Without proper EW support, conventional aircraft are almost immediately obsolete. For Members vaporlocking

over the cost of the F-22, it is worth considering that the 442 F-22's proposed will only fill out 4 of the 20 Fighter Wing Equivalents (FWE's) in the Bottom Up Review Force. That means one of two things: First, we buy 17 more FWE's worth of stealthy tactical aircraft, or second, we accept considerably higher losses among conventional aircraft in the next conflict. For Congress, an ugly choice.●

RULES OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

• Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, in accordance with rule XXVI(2) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I ask that the Rules of Procedure of the Select Committee on Ethics, which were adopted February 23, 1978, and the Interim Procedures for Requests for Review Under Section 308 of the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the 104th Congress.

The material follows:

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS—

RULE 1. GENERAL PROCEDURES

(a) Officers: The Committee shall select a Chairman and a Vice Chairman from among its Members. In the absence of the Chairman, the duties of the Chair shall be filled by the Vice Chairman or, in the Vice Chairman's absence, a Committee Member designated by the Chairman.

(b) Procedural Rules: The basic procedural rules of the Committee are stated as a part of the Standing Orders of the Senate in Senate Resolution 338, 88th Congress, as amended, as well as other resolutions and laws. Supplementary Procedural Rules are stated herein and are hereinafter referred to as the Rules. The Rules shall be published in the Congressional Record not later than thirty days after adoption, and copies shall be made available by the Committee office upon request.

(c) Meetings;

(1) The regular meeting of the Committee shall be the first Thursday of each month while the Congress is in session.

(2) Special meetings may be held at the call of the Chairman or Vice Chairman if at least forty-eight hours notice is furnished to all Members. If all Members agree, a special meeting may be held on less than forty-eight hours notice.

(3)(A) If any Member of the Committee desires that a special meeting of the Committee be called, the Member may file in the office of the Chairman or Vice Chairman for that special meeting.

(B) Immediately upon the filing of the request the Clerk of the Committee shall notify the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the filing of the request. If, within three calendar days after the filing of the request, the Chairman or the Vice Chairman does not call the requested special meeting, to be held within seven calendar days after the filing of the request, any three of the Members of the Committee may file their written notice in the office of the Committee that a special meeting of the Committee will be held at a specified date and hour; such special meeting may not occur until forty-eight hours after the notice is filed. The Clerk shall immediately notify all Members of the Committee of the date and hour of the special meeting. The Committee shall meet at the specified date and hour.