

While the muhajirs once controlled Karachi's city council, their government was dismissed in 1992. The party's top officials either were arrested or went underground, and the muhajir leader fled to London, where he lives in self-exile.

When the army withdrew from Karachi in December, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto appointed her helicopter pilot as city administrator and stacked the rest of the city council with members of her Pakistan People's Party.

U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR POSSIBLE
NATO EFFORT TO HELP
UNPROFOR WITHDRAW FROM
BOSNIA AND CROATIA

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 9, 1995

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, last year President Clinton made the commitment to deploy United States forces to assist in a NATO effort to withdraw U.N. peacekeeping troops from Bosnia if this becomes necessary. On March 31, we are approaching a deadline imposed by the Government of Croatia for the beginning of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, to be completed by the end of June. The President still has not committed United States forces to assist in a possible withdrawal from Croatia, in part so as not to prejudice delicate on-going negotiations with the Croatian government.

Given the seriousness and the implications of the President's commitment of United States forces for these possible missions and the dangerous situation in Croatia, I wrote to Secretary Christopher in February setting forth my concerns. I received a response to my letter today. I am including both in the RECORD in order that my colleagues can be informed about the important, serious issues before us.

In the response to my letter Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, Wendy Sherman, emphasizes that in assisting the possible pull-out of UNPROFOR, "NATO has no intention of engaging in offensive combat in Bosnia and/or Croatia, or of remaining in the region following the UNPROFOR pull-out."

Assistant Secretary Sherman also stresses that to give our diplomatic efforts a chance to succeed, the administration is not yet making a public case for assistance with the UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia. But if there is no alternative, the President will explain to the American people what is at stake, which above all, is "our collective security, as exemplified by mutual commitment to Allies."

In testimony today before the International Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, gave assurances that United States troops, if they are ever deployed in Bosnia or Croatia, will do so only to help UNPROFOR troops leave, period.

The exchange of letters follows:

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC, February 22, 1995.

HON. WARREN CHRISTOPHER,
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On January 3, I wrote to you regarding the President's decision in principle to commit U.S. ground

forces to a future NATO-led operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. I appreciated your reply of January 19.

I am writing again because my policy and process concerns about this decision persist. Indeed, they have been sharpened, as a result of: (1) the increasingly fragile situation in Bosnia; (2) information provided to the Committee that the first contingency steps to implement a withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia are now going forward; and (3) the decision of the Croatian government to terminate the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia after March 31, 1995.

I would like to ask a number of questions about U.S. policy:

1. Does the President's commitment to assist in the withdrawal UNPROFOR from Bosnia extend to a withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia as well?

If such a commitment has not been made, is it under active consideration at this time?

What would be the U.S. troop and cost requirements of such an additional commitment?

2. How would a prior withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia complicate an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia?

How would an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia change the U.S. troop, cost and logistics requirements of a NATO-led operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia?

3. How does the possibility of renewed fighting in both Bosnia and Croatia affect your estimates of the U.S. troop and cost requirements of a NATO-led operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal?

If fighting resumes, do you believe that U.S. forces participating in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR will be able to keep out of the conflict?

4. I appreciate the Department of State's reply of January 19th, "that the Administration has no intention of keeping U.S. ground forces in Bosnia following a withdrawal operation." I agree with that policy limitation, but I remain concerned about the strong pressures on U.S. ground forces—during and in the aftermath of an UNPROFOR withdrawal—to intervene in the conflict:

To provide humanitarian assistance;

To protect civilian populations; or

To respond to military provocations by parties to the conflict.

How do you address each of these issues, from the standpoint of keeping U.S. forces focused on their mission, and preventing mission creep?

I also want to reiterate my concern, which I know you share, that a commitment to put U.S. ground troops in harm's way is the most serious undertaking a President can make.

To my knowledge, the President has yet to make a public case for sending U.S. ground forces to assist in UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. Unless or until the President makes the case directly to the American people, I believe there will be little support for his decision in the Congress or among the public at large. I strongly urge the President to state the policy and explain the commitment.

I appreciate your attention to this letter, and I look forward to your answers to the several questions raised.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

LEE H. HAMILTON,
Ranking Democratic Member.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, March 9, 1995.

DEAR MR. HAMILTON: Thank you for your letter of February 22 to Secretary Christopher, in which you pose additional questions about possible U.S. participation in a

NATO-led effort to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia and/or Croatia.

Before addressing your questions individually, I would like to stress that the Administration shares your concern over an UNPROFOR pull-out: like you, we fear withdrawal may contribute to a widening of the war in both Bosnia and Croatia. For this reason, we have undertaken an active diplomatic campaign to convince President Tudjman to allow an international peacekeeping force to remain in his country. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke held meetings in Zagreb March 6 to that end.

Because all the Allies agree that an international force should remain in the region, NATO's planning for assistance to UNPROFOR withdrawal has been conducted on a contingency basis only. NATO has taken care to ensure that laying solid groundwork for possible withdrawal does not imply accession to UNPROFOR's departure. President Clinton has avoided making an explicit statement that the U.S. would help facilitate UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia so as not to precipitate a pull-out. Practically speaking, if a situation were to develop in Croatia where no alternative to NATO-led withdrawal appeared feasible, as in Bosnia our Alliance commitments would militate in favor of U.S. participation. But let me emphasize that we do not want this to come to pass, and we are pressing Tudjman to moderate his stance so UNPROFOR does not have to leave and NATO does not have to deploy.

You correctly suggest that UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia would significantly complicate the situation for UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Evacuation routes through Croatia that soldiers in UNPROFOR/Bosnia would have to use might be harder to secure if UNPROFOR/Croatia were no longer in place. Also, if the Krajina Serbs tried to prevent UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia (as they have sometimes threatened), conflict could spill over into the volatile Bihac area, where Bosnian Serbs might feel compelled to support Krajina Serbs, thus endangering UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia.

Because UNPROFOR's departure from one state may bring it under threat in the other, and in response to President Tudjman's stated wish to end UNPROFOR's mandate on March 31, NATO military authorities have been tasked with updating their contingency Bosnia withdrawal plan to include steps to facilitate withdrawal from both countries. NATO's revised plan is scheduled to be ready in mid-March. We do not yet have NATO's final cost estimates, but a team of budget experts from the Department of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, the State Department, and the National Security Council travelled to Brussels and to AFSOUTH headquarters in Naples the week of March 6 to study existing figures for Bosnia withdrawal and determine whether figures were available for Croatia. Once NATO has released its revised plan, and we have made preliminary decisions on what our response should be, we will discuss funding options with Congress.

As for troop numbers, NATO has not yet asked member states to indicate possible contributions, nor has it projected troop needs. It is worth noting that a significant number of NATO troops facilitating UNPROFOR withdrawal would be reflagged UNPROFOR contingents from Allies already in the region. As with costs, troop needs for a Bosnia-only operation would be somewhat higher than for a Croatia-only operation, and somewhat lower than for an operation to help UNPROFOR withdraw from both states. Again, once NATO has released its revised

plan in mid-March, we will be in a better position to consult with you on possible U.S. troop contributions.

For planning purposes, NATO is calculating personnel and equipment needs under the most adverse circumstances. NATO projects that in facilitating UNPROFOR's departure, it might provide close air support to UNPROFOR troops, as it is already committed to do, and undertake other activities in defense of the international peacekeepers. NATO has no intention of engaging in offensive combat in Bosnia and/or Croatia, or of remaining in the region following an UNPROFOR pull-out.

The pressures you describe on NATO—and thus the U.S.—to become involved in the conflict should UNPROFOR withdraw are real and sobering. Without UNPROFOR, civilian populations will indeed have little protection. International relief organizations will find it difficult to make humanitarian deliveries. Minor conflicts that could be quelled even by the presence of international observers would escalate. Thus, as we note above, it is clearly preferable for UNPROFOR, or a similar international presence, to remain in the region. We are working actively toward that end in Croatia; in Bosnia, the Contact Group is in touch with the various parties to try to prevent a resurgence of fighting, which might provoke UNPROFOR withdrawal. The Administration is also continuing to argue against unilateral lift, the other likely trigger for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia.

As the situation clarifies itself, we will need to make decisions. We want UNPROFOR to stay, but if an upsurge in fighting threatens the safety of our Allies, we do not intend to leave them stranded. In order to give our diplomatic efforts a chance to succeed, we are not yet making a public case for assistance with an UNPROFOR pull-out. But should there be no alternative, the President will explain to the American people what is at stake: our collective security, as exemplified by mutual commitments to Allies. We trust we can count on your support, and that of the Congress, should we have to undertake an operation to assist our Allies depart from the former Yugoslavia.

We hope this information will be helpful to you and the members of the Committee. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

WENDY R. SHERMAN,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

TRAGEDY IN PAKISTAN

HON. THOMAS J. MANTON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 9, 1995

Mr. MANTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to call to the attention of my colleagues an article which appeared in today's Washington Post. Yesterday, in Pakistan, the brutal ambush of a United States consulate van left two American diplomats dead and a third wounded. These deaths are a constant reminder of the continuation of terrorism in our world. In the last 3 months, more than 437 people have been murdered by religious zealots in Pakistan alone.

This cowardly act of terrorism is an unfortunate reminder that we must work to end these acts of violence. As we enter a new age of peace in many parts of the world, it is important to bring those who continue to terrorize others to justice.

Mr. Speaker, I offer my prayers to the families who lost loved ones in this unspeakable incident. I intend to work closely with my colleagues to investigate this act of terror and bring those responsible to justice.

[From the Washington Post, March 9, 1995]

KARACHI AMBUSH WAS WELL PLANNED

(By Kamran Khan and Molly Moore)

KARACHI, PAKISTAN, MARCH 8.—The ambush of a U.S. Consulate van by masked gunmen who killed two Americans and injured a third at a busy intersection in downtown Karachi, Pakistan, this morning was a "well-planned campaign to create panic and terror" among Americans and other Westerners, according to a Pakistani official.

Today's attack marked the first time terrorists have targeted Westerners after a year of rampant religious, ethnic and political violence that has left more than 1,000 people dead in Pakistan's financial and commercial capital.

In Washington, a senior administration official said one of the two Americans killed was an intelligence agent working under diplomatic cover, but the U.S. government does not believe this was related to the attack.

Instead, the official said, investigators believe the attack was intended as a payback for the U.S. capture in Pakistan last month of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the suspected mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York, or was related to the ethnic violence in Pakistan. The official said there is "no evidence whatsoever" that the assailants knew about the victim's intelligence work.

As Pakistani authorities vowed to launch a full-scale investigation of today's shooting, Karachi police officials revealed that police in a squad car equipped with a rooftop machine gun were at the intersection where the ambush occurred but refused to pursue the attackers' getaway car because they were afraid of being killed.

Both U.S. and Pakistani officials said the attack appeared to be carefully planned and coordinated, although authorities said no group or organization has claimed responsibility. FBI agents were sent to Pakistan today, and Karachi police said the FBI will lead the investigation.

U.S. Consulate officials said Gary C. Durell, 45, a communications technician from Alliance, Ohio, was killed instantly when two gunmen opened fire on the van. Jackie Van Landingham, 33, a consulate secretary from Camden, S.C., died of gunshot wounds after being taken to a hospital. Mark McCloy, a 31-year-old mailroom worker from Framingham, Mass., was scheduled to undergo surgery today for his wounds, Pakistani officials said. The three consulate employees were stationed in Karachi with their spouses and children, according to U.S. officials.

Although officials at the consulate said today that they were taking extra precautions to safeguard personnel, a spokesman said, "they live and work in this community. We've told people to keep their heads down, but we can't build a wall around them." U.S. officials said there are no plans to close the consulate or evacuate family members.

U.S. and Pakistani authorities condemned the assault, which occurred as the van, with an identifying license plate, was driving the three employees to work at the consulate from the diplomatic residential neighborhood at about 7:45 a.m.

"This wanton act of terrorism deserves the severest condemnation," the Pakistani government said. "It is clear that this tragic incident is part of a premeditated plan to create fear and harassment in sensitive areas of Karachi."

In Washington, President Clinton denounced the attack as a "cowardly act." Secretary of State Warren Christopher, arriving in Cairo at the beginning of a visit to the Middle East, said the United States and Pakistan would use "every means at our disposal to bring those responsible for this crime to justice."

The incident came at an awkward time for Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who is scheduled to visit Washington next month in an effort to improve the uneasy relations between the two countries. Pakistanis have criticized her government for its failure to control the violence in Karachi.

The White House said today the shooting would not affect first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton's scheduled tour of Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh at the end of this month. She will not be visiting Karachi.

The Pakistani government censored reports of the incident carried today by the BBC and CNN television networks and played down the story on the government-controlled national television network.

Details of the attack were pieced together by Karachi police, using reports from witnesses and an account provided to U.S. officials by the Pakistani van driver, who was not injured and immediately drove his wounded passengers to one of Karachi's major hospitals.

According to police, three armed gunmen in a stolen yellow taxi followed the white consulate van for several blocks before opening fire on it with automatic weapons from a distance.

The yellow taxi then swerved in front of the van and cut it off while a red car blocked the van from the opposite side. At least two masked gunmen then stepped out of the vehicles and began firing on the van, shattering its side windows and spraying the windshield with bullets, according to U.S. officials.

As the gunmen fired on the van, traffic constable Tanvir Ahmed, who was at the intersection, spotted the police car with the machine gun approaching from an adjacent lane. Ahmed said he dashed toward the police vehicle and pointed to the yellow taxi, then speeding away.

Ahmed said the officer in charge of the police vehicle responded, "Stupid, shall we get killed by chasing these people?" Police officials, who confirmed Ahmed's account, said the police vehicle did not radio for help, but drove six minutes to its home station to report the incident.

Such a response has not been uncommon among Karachi police. More than 90 law enforcement officials have been killed in Karachi's violence in the past year, including four who were the targets of shooting sprees last weekend.

U.S. diplomats in Pakistan have become sensitive to terrorism as a result of a 1979 attack on the U.S. Embassy in the capital, Islamabad, in which hundreds of Pakistani men stormed the compound and set several buildings on fire, killing four people. The assault stemmed from unfounded rumors blaming the United States for an attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, the holiest site in Islam.

Karachi police said several threatening telephone calls have been made to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi in recent weeks.

Karachi police and Pakistani intelligence sources said today they are investigating an Iranian-backed militant Shiite Muslim organization called Sipahae Muhammad (Army of the Prophet Muhammad). Sipahae Muhammad and other Shiite extremists have accused the United States of fanning Karachi's sectarian violence.