the FDIC and the GAO for more substantial analysis of this important issue.

I do believe, however, that it is important to clarify that the 1.25 ratio is not an absolute and precise target. It should be viewed as a floor, with some limited discretion available to the FDIC to maintain a cushion above that level without permitting an excessive build-up. I believe it is excessive to require that the FDIC establish significant risk of substantial future losses to the fund for the year before being permitted to increase the reserve even very modestly above that level.

Chairman Helfer has made a convincing argument that the FDIC should refocus its mission, seeing its role less as resolving failed institutions and more as anticipating future problems. I believe there is overwhelming merit in that argument. Economic conditions change, as do the risks posed by bank portfolios. If the FDIC is to effectively play that new role, it must have some flexibility. There have in fact been recent indications that bank investment strategies have changed, some of the sources fueling bank incomes will not continue to be available over the long-term and some banks might be at risk in an economic downturn. We cannot ignore the lessons of the past.

We must however balance concerns about protecting depositors with the need to increase credit availability. Money going into an insurance fund is not going to consumers. I believe the FDIC should proceed to reduce bank premiums substantially, as planned, once the BIF reaches the 1.25 ratio set under current law. If a further cushion is deemed prudent, it can be built up gradually without impeding the near-term reduction.

2. FDIC DISCRETION

I also believe it is time to examine the issue of FDIC discretion more broadly. As Chairman Helfer has emphasized, the FDIC is precluded by a variety of statutory provisions from addressing the problems it has identified on its own authority. I would not casually give congressional authority over to a regulatory agency. However, I believe that some of the strictures under which the FDIC is currently operating are excessive and unnecessary. One of the legislative options I suggest would clarify or expand the FDIC's regulatory authority in a number of regards: provide it with greater authority to administer the FICO bond obligation; modify the certification requirements; provide discretionary authority to impose a modest special assessment on thrift institutions to frontload the capitalization of the fund; provide greater discretion to maintain a small cushion beyond the target reserve ratio in each fund; and provide limited authority to transfer resources between funds.

The last item may be particularly controversial. But that does not mean we should not examine it. In general, I concur that the premium levels for each fund should be set independently. However, the job of the FDIC is not to manage two funds. It is to manage a deposit insurance program and protect depositors of both banks and thrifts. It cannot do so effectively if its hands are tied so that it is forced to explicitly ignore the impact that the status of one fund has on the members of the other. The FDIC should have some flexibility to address that problem.

E. POSSIBLE PROBLEMS POSED BY GOODWILL CASES

Some of the bills I have introduced address the issue of creating a reserve to have available should adverse judgments against the Government be made in the pending goodwill cases. These cases point out yet again that the consequences of FIRREA are with us still.

In the 1980's, some healthy thrift institutions entered into contracts with the Government under which they purchased failed or failing thrift institutions the then thrift insurance fund—FSLIC—did not have the funds to resolve. Since the Government could not make depositors whole by covering the loss, the acquiring institutions were instead permitted to count as tangible capital for a limited period of time an intangible asset called ''supervisory goodwill'' which they were to work off their books over time, thus absorbing those losses slowly.

In FIRREA, supervisory goodwill was no longer permitted to count as tangible capital and institutions holding this asset were required to remove it from their books precipitously. I never questioned that the Government could break these contracts. But I consistently argued that it could not do so without being subject to damages. Recent court cases indicate the courts have considerable sympathy for my argument. The FDIC has already paid out claims on two such cases; many others are pending. Rulings adverse to the Government could cost the taxpayer additional billions.

Again, this is a problem we should have anticipated. I argued that an undue emphasis on being tough on the thrift industry in FIRREA would result in yet greater cost to the taxpayer in the long-term, and argued against the rapid imposition of the new standards, unfortunately to no avail. The possibility I foresaw may unfortunately now become a reality.

It is sometimes cost effective to be temperate, and I hope the lessons of the past will help encourage some temperance as we deal with current problems.

V. CONCLUSION

The problems are real, and I believe we have an obligation to address them now. It is my hope that placing some more specific options on the table will generate useful information, reactions, discussion, debate, and then, resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from Texas [Ms. JACKSON-LEE] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Ms. JACKSON-LEE addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extension of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. SANDERS] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. SANDERS addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extension of Remarks.]

CALL FOR CLARIFICATION OF ETHICS COMMITTEE'S RULES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. There being no designee of the majority leader, under the Speaker's announced policy of January 4, 1995, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. TORRICELLI] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, several weeks ago in one of those moments that comes to define an individual's values and sense of responsibility, several members of the executive branch came to me with extraordinary information. It was revealed to me that several years ago an American citizen in Guatemala was murdered by a contract employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was further revealed to me that in the years that passed there was a conscious effort to prevent that information from being known. Indeed the person responsible for the murder of an American citizen was never brought to justice. This was, Mr. Speaker, a difficult moment because I recognized the importance of maintaining confidentiality of sources of intelligence information, and indeed, as a member of the Intelligence Committee, I signed an oath not to reveal classified information. It was my judgment to ascertain from the Intelligence Committee confirmation that I never participated in classified briefings and had never received classified information with regard to Guatemala. This was a measure of how seriously I took my oath to preserve confidentiality.

I then proceeded to consult with the ranking member of the Committee on International Relations where I serve and with the minority leader, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT], to receive their advice and good counsel before proceeding in writing to the President of the United States to reveal this rather extraordinary information. Their counsel was that I should be guided by my own sense of ethics and responsibility, but proceed in informing the President and the American people.

In the days that have followed this country has learned a good deal. Indeed the President and this Congress have learned a great deal about activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in Guatemala, their adherence to the law,