

organizations is essential to our national interests. However, if our requests are not met, we will act to preserve U.S. leadership where it counts most.

Let us share with you some of our thoughts and actions as we prepare for that possibility:

First, we are continuing to closely scrutinize peacekeeping budgets, especially as we take factors from Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) into consideration. For example, we limited operations in Georgia and Tajikistan to a small number of military observers, a relatively inexpensive means of maintaining a UN monitoring presence. The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has continued longer than we expected and has encountered several delays in achieving its objectives. Recently, however, the parties have demonstrated a commitment to the process and real gains have been made in registering and identifying potential voters, the first step necessary for holding the referendum. We agree with you that we cannot continue to support an operation that does not accomplish its goals and is not cost-effective. We will review MINURSO's progress in all areas to determine if it should be terminated or if an extension should be granted and a referendum can be successfully held.

Second, we are examining the ways and means of withdrawing from some organizations whose activities are of lesser priority to us.

Third, we are pushing for UN agency and other international organization budgets for the coming biennium that are below the zero real growth rate we have historically supported.

Fourth, we are actively reviewing options for reducing waste, decreasing costs and improving performance through the possible consolidation of agencies and programs where that is possible.

Fifth, we are opposing the scheduling under UN auspices of new global conferences or summits (and note that each of the conferences this Administration has participated in was scheduled prior to 1993).

Finally, we are prepared to signal to organizations in which we continue to participate that U.S. withdrawal from some is possible if they are unwilling to undertake needed reforms.

In the context of considering how we can pare down our contributions while limiting damage to our leadership, it is important to recognize that in the case of most UN organizations, we are obligated either by the terms of the treaty or other international agreement establishing the organization or by general principles of international law to pay assessment through calendar year 1996, even if we notify our intent to withdraw now. We also remain similarly obligated for arrears from previous withholdings.

We note, as well, that a number of the activities you cite specifically in your letter fall within the core programs of the UN Secretariat; these are not separate organizations from which we can "withdraw." Any decision on our part to reduce our contributions in an amount equal to our share of such an activity would simply be carried on the books by the UN as an arrearage to the organization as a whole. This underlines the importance of gaining UN member support and understanding for any actions that we might take.

Many UN activities are important to us; so is the success of the organization as a whole. There is a grave risk that substantial budget reductions will harm our leverage and leadership within the UN system. We must be frank about the possibility that substantial damage to our interests will result. Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than with

peacekeeping operations which provide us options in between doing nothing and going it alone. The strategy of this Administration is to make the case for our budget as persuasively as we can, and to develop a plan for minimizing harm to our interests should the reductions nevertheless occur. In doing so, we want to emphasize that Congress must allow us to decide where to cut and not tie our hands by earmarking funds. We welcome your support and counsel with respect to this strategy.

As a matter of policy, we want to see a leaner, less-costly, more productive United Nations. We are making progress in this direction. Our prospects will be better, however, if it is clear to our allies and those around the world that our emphasis is on helping international organizations to work better, rather than on reducing costs to ourselves regardless of consequences. One approach reflects the essence of leadership; the other retreats from it.

It is not possible to paint a comprehensive picture of our thinking on this important issue in one letter. Accordingly, we would be happy to discuss this with you in more detail or put together a briefing team to meet with you at your convenience.

Thank you again for your provocative and timely letter, and for your continued leadership and support.

Sincerely,

WENDY R. SHERMAN,
Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, April 7, 1995.

Hon. WARREN CHRISTOPHER,
Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN. I write to urge you to continue to give your personal attention to the issue of reforming the United Nations.

I know you face many crises every day, and there is much which demands your attention. But U.N. reform has become a serious and urgent issue because of pending Congressional budget cuts for the U.N.

I believe this Administration generally has the right policy on U.N. reform. I also commend the Administration for the efforts undertaken thus far, such as establishing an office of Inspector General at the United Nations. Your efforts to put U.N. reform on the agenda for the upcoming summit in Halifax is an excellent way to demonstrate our seriousness of purpose on this issue. We need to keep pushing for concrete action to implement our U.N. reform policy.

It is quite possible if not likely that hundreds of millions of dollars are going to be cut from the U.N. budget, both assessed and voluntary. Supporters of the U.N. and peacekeeping will not be able to stop these cuts, and I doubt the Administration can veto them at the end of the day.

The Congress will be faced with the tough choice of either cutting indiscriminately across the board, or deciding which U.N. programs are most important to us, and trying to save those programs by de-funding or withdrawing from those which are less important.

I believe the second option is the proper one. It is better to have a smaller, more effective United Nations than a crippled and ineffective United Nations.

Reforming the U.N. is so tough that it will require sustained, high-level attention. Ambassador Albright, who is doing an excellent job in a critical assignment, needs your continued, full support and the support of the President on U.N. reform.

I would urge you to take the following steps.

First, the G-7 reform initiative is a good step, but this step needs to be tightly focused, and coordinated with US/UN reform efforts. The state Department might want to consider some sort of Task Force on U.N. reform, perhaps on an inter-agency basis.

Second, the Administration must decide its priorities in the U.N. assessed and voluntary budgets, and communicate those to Congressional Democrats. I would suggest that we closely examine whether we still need UNCTAD, UNIDO, the regional U.N. economic commissions, the ILO, and the FAO. The funding crisis is reaching the point where we must consider withdrawal from, or de-funding of, some of these activities.

Third, we must be prepared to push for a stronger U.N. Inspector General. He should have authority over the whole U.N. system, as well as adequate, trained staff and a reasonable budget. And, his reports must be made available, unchanged, to Members States. This has not yet happened, to my knowledge.

Fourth, we must give greater scrutiny to U.N. peacekeeping budgets. And, you must consider whether we can continue to vote for operations, which are very expensive and have operated for years without tangible progress, such as MINURSO in the Western Sahara.

All of these efforts will require close coordination with other major donor countries, as you have recognized through the G-7 initiative. We must continue working hard with those countries in order to make these reforms happen.

We will likely face these issues in a HIRC markup in early May. If the Administration doesn't decide on its priorities and let Democrats try to help you support them, Republicans will make these decisions for you. The only line of defense against those who want to destroy the U.N. is to reform it. But it must be *real* reform in order to get votes for U.N. funding.

I appreciate your consideration of this letter, and I stand ready to work with you in any way I can to help make these reforms happen. I would stress once again the gravity and urgency of these problems, and urge that we press ahead on U.N. reform efforts.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

LEE H. HAMILTON,
Ranking Democratic Member.

SOCIAL SECURITY CONTINUING
DISABILITY REVIEW ACCOUNT
ACT OF 1995

HON. ANDREW JACOBS, JR.

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 9, 1995

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing the Social Security Continuing Disability Review Account Act of 1995. A summary of the legislation prepared by the minority staff of the Social Security Subcommittee follows.

The goal of the legislation is to protect the integrity of the Social Security Disability Insurance program. It would do this by increasing the availability of funds for conducting Continuing Disability Review [CDRs]—so that people who are no longer disabled can be reviewed and removed from the disability rolls.

The bill authorizes the Social Security Administration [SSA] to use a portion of the benefit savings it derives from conducting CDRs

to conduct additional CDRs. Under the proposal, the benefit savings from removing those who are no longer disabled from the disability rolls are credited to a newly established CDR account in the disability insurance [DI] trust fund. It would operate as follows:

No later than September 1 of each year, the Commissioner of Social Security would estimate the present value of DI trust fund savings for all future years resulting from cessation of benefit payments during the prior year based on CDRs. The Commissioner would certify these savings to the managing trustee of the DI trust fund.

Upon receiving the Commissioner's certification, the managing trustee would transfer to the CDR account from amounts otherwise in the DI trust fund a portion of these estimated savings. This amount would vary depending on the CDR account balance but could not exceed 50 percent of estimated savings. No later than September 15 of each year, the Commissioner would certify to the managing trustee the expenditures required to perform mandated CDRs during the coming fiscal year. These expenditures would include the cost of staffing, training, purchase of medical and other evidence, and processing related to appeals and overpayments.

Upon commencement of the fiscal year, the managing trustee would make available to the Commissioner from the CDR account, to the extent that funds were available, the amount that the Commissioner certified as necessary to perform mandated CDRs during that year. These funds could then be used by the Social Security Administration to perform the required CDRs.

SLOVENIA: A MODEL FOR EASTERN EUROPE

HON. JAMES L. OBERSTAR

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 9, 1995

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, on February 16 I stood on the floor of this House, during debate on the NATO expansion bill, and asked that any efforts to bring Eastern Europe into the Western community not ignore the former Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia.

A country of just over 2 million people, independent for less than 4 years, Slovenia has successfully thrown off the economic shackles of the Socialist Yugoslav system and is leading the newly emergent countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkan States in conversion to a free and open market economy.

In per capita terms, Slovenia is the 20th largest exporter in the world, exporting over \$7 billion in goods each year, which accounts for 60 percent of Slovenia's GNP. Slovenia now enjoys a lively trade with the United States, shipping \$229 million worth of goods to the United States each year and importing some \$180 million in United States goods annually.

It is with great pride, then, Mr. Speaker, as a Slovenian-American, that I return to the floor today to bring my colleagues more accolades over Slovenia's accomplishments. This time, the praise comes from none less than the *Journal of Commerce*, which headlined an April 6 editorial "A Model for Eastern Europe."

I commend this article to my colleagues and to the leadership of our various executive branch departments. I ask that you remember to include Slovenia and its hard working, enterprising people when making decisions on our country's future relationship with the transitional economies and governments which have replaced the former Communist regimes of Eastern and central-southeastern Europe.

[From the *Journal of Commerce*, April 6, 1995]

A MODEL FOR EASTERN EUROPE

(By Timothy Ashby)

Eastern Europe has had its share of bad news recently. Painful economic reforms and factional strife in Russia, political turmoil in Poland, continuing ethnic warfare in parts of former Yugoslavia—all have made Western businessmen cautious about trade and investment in the region.

Yet one small country, Slovenia, has emerged as an economic and political model for the old socialist bloc. Slovenia's accomplishments over the past year read like a wish list for its neighbors.

1994 exports were more than 14% greater than the previous year, and now account for 60.4% of gross domestic product. Manufacturing production increased 6.8% last year while unemployment fell 1.5%.

The tolar, Slovenia's national currency, appreciated 11% against the deutsche mark in 1994. The country has a very low debt service ratio of only 5.5%.

At \$6,957, Slovenia has the highest GDP per head of all former socialist bloc republics in Eastern Europe, nearly twice that of the Czech Republic. GDP grew more than 5% in 1994 and the country enjoyed a healthy current account surplus of \$2.6 billion at the end of last year.

Foreigners made direct investments of \$72.3 million last year.

Three factors account for Slovenia's success. The first is its geographical location. Lying at the crossroads of Western and Eastern Europe, Slovenia borders European Union members Italy on the west, Austria on its northern border, Hungary to the northeast and the Republic of Croatia to the east and south. Slovenia also has a coast on the Adriatic Sea, where the major Port of Koper serves as a gateway for international seaborne trade with all of Central Europe.

The second factor is political stability. Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek presides over a Western European-style coalition government. Slovenia is a healthy young democracy, with parties in its Parliament running the gamut from Christian Democrats and Greens to reformist communists.

Despite rivalry between the parties, an unusually high degree of consensus over economic policy has been achieved, a fact foreign investors find reassuring. All sides are committed to the transformation to a Western-style market economy, but also to maintaining a strong social safety net and to forcing money-losing state enterprises to become competitive in the private sector.

Slovenia's carefully conceived strategy for creating a modern free market economy is the third reason for its success. The government has adopted a gradualist approach to economic restructuring, striking a pragmatic middle ground between the Czech Republic's shock therapy methods and the mending reforms undertaken by some former Soviet republics.

To lessen the political and social impact of widespread redundancies, privatization has been undertaken at a slower pace than in other former socialist countries. The govern-

ment occasionally intervenes and provides help to ailing companies by guaranteeing finance-for-debt rescheduling in return for moderation in dividend distribution and wage increases.

By the end of 1994, a quarter of all Slovenia's state-owned enterprises had been privatized. The process will be accelerated during 1995 to achieve the goal of placing 50% to 65% of public assets in private hands. Preference is given to privatization via management and employee buyouts. While initially criticized by some as a method that would do little to attract foreign capital and technology, many privatized companies have established joint ventures both domestically and internationally. As a result, Slovenia has not suffered from a lack of investment in new plant and capital equipment.

Domestic savings play a major role in the modernization of Slovenia's industrial sector. The growth in all areas of demand has stimulated a continuous expansion in industrial capacity. Much of this is fueled by the capital city's Ljubljana Stock Exchange, which together with the rest of the private financial services sector contributes 3.2% of the country's GDP. Slovenia's growing number of financial institutions, as well as its beautiful Alpine landscape, justify its nickname, "the Switzerland of Eastern Europe."

Compared to many of its neighbors, where red tape can seriously impede foreign direct investment, Slovenia has implemented one of the least restrictive investment climates in Eastern Europe. Foreign investments in any form enjoy full national treatment—that is, they have the same status as Slovene legal entities. All sectors of the economy are open to foreigners operating through joint ventures. Legal entities established and registered in Slovenia, even if they have 100% foreign ownership, may own real estate. The Slovenian Parliament is considering legislation to change real estate and other business-related laws to harmonize them with the EU.

With a 30% flat tax on corporate profits, Slovenia has one of the lowest tax burdens in Europe. The tax rate is further reduced to 20% in the case of reinvestment, which actually lowers the tax rate to 24%. All foreign investors are guaranteed free transfer of profits and repatriation of invested capital, while no restrictions are placed on foreign shareholders in Slovene enterprises who want to transfer their profits abroad in foreign currency.

Germany, Austria and Italy now account for 65.9% of all Slovenian foreign investment. Businessmen in these countries see great profit potential in Slovenia because of its proximity to major markets, its political stability and the high probability that it will become an early member of both the European Union and NATO. U.S. businesses, which account for less than 1% of FDI in Slovenia, have not yet awakened to these investment opportunities. Even Australia, which contributed 2.3% of the country's foreign direct investment in 1994, invested more in Slovenia—with a population of only 2 million—than in giant but strife-torn Russia.

Slovenia's lesson for other developing countries is that political and economic stability can only be attained by a true commitment to democracy and the creation of a free market. As Slovenia rapidly approaches the time when it will be ready for membership in the European Union and NATO, its eastern and western neighbors can point to it as an example of one of the world's great success stories.