

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, we are still involved in a Republican conference, and we are still trying to determine whether or not we may be able to bring up the rescissions bill under certain strict limitations and certain agreements on voting against any amendments. We have not reached that agreement yet.

We still hope to get a vote on Bosnia. But I think in view of the fact that we are still tied up in conference, I will suggest that we stand in recess subject to the call of the chair. But I indicate it will probably be before 6 o'clock. If necessary, we are going to have to postpone the conference until tomorrow because I think we have important business to do here, hopefully, this evening.

RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

Mr. DOLE. I move that the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

The motion was agreed to, and at 5:19 p.m., the Senate recessed subject to the call of the Chair whereupon, the Senate, at 6:27 p.m., reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. ASHCROFT).

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the Senate Republicans are still in conference, but I think in view of the fact that we have some who wish to speak on the Bosnia resolution, and we are still trying to work out some agreement on the rescissions package, I think it is better if we do business, if the Presiding Officer does not mind missing part of the conference.

If it becomes critical, we can always recess.

Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, thank you for the recognition.

We are back on the Bosnia debate. In one sense, this debate should not be necessary. In the normal course of events, the President is the one who holds the duty to provide direction in these matters. I have long believed that our foreign policy ought to be directed by the chief executive officer and ratified by the Congress—the Senate—but not formulated. But the situation is far from normal in this instance.

Our action today on this Bosnia resolution is required by a somewhat unusual, maybe unprecedented failure of leadership on a very important issue. The credibility of our Nation and the

existence of NATO are at risk. But it seems that the administration moves from crisis to crisis in Bosnia without a clear definition of what our policy is or ought to be. We have alternated between indifference and almost panic, operating without purpose and often seemingly without principle.

Over 2 years ago, as the policy of "safe havens" was being defined, I came to this floor expressing a concern and a question. "A police action," I said, "protecting safe havens, will probably stop some short-term suffering, but it will answer few long-term questions. After we purchase a temporary peace for fleeing refugees, what is our eventual goal?" I asked. "On this question," I then said, "this administration is silent."

Now it is 2 years later and that eventual goal is still unclear, and that silence has become a source of considerable embarrassment. For, 2 years later, little has changed. The situation is worse.

We have maintained, during that period of time, a one-sided arms embargo against Bosnia which has only served to reinforce the advantages enjoyed by the Serb aggressors.

We have placed critical command decisions in the hands of international bureaucrats who have not brought any military experience, political insight, or even moral courage to their position.

We have made a series of threats against Serbian forces that proved hollow, empty, undermining our credibility with both friends and foes alike around the world.

And we have repeatedly misled Bosnian leaders, first opposing and then supporting various initiatives, leaving the Bosnian Vice President to conclude "We are going to die of these initiatives."

Mistake has followed failure in an unending downward spiral as each safe area became progressively unsafe.

"I don't remember a time," says one expert, "when there was so much scorn for American foreign policy." Former British Secretary David Owen comments, "To the day I go to my grave, I will not understand the policy."

The result has been an American retreat into a purely reactive mode. Our only role, it seems, is to respond to European proposals and initiatives. The only clear objectives of this administration seem to be to appease our allies and avoid political blame.

Now the administration is reduced to floating another French proposal, which repeats every error of the past. It calls on us to place more troops into indefensible positions. It demands that we risk American lives to prove our loyalty to a failed NATO policy. And once again, it has no diplomatic or military end game. It continues an aimless and endless commitment.

The President of France says the use of American helicopters and airmen is necessary "to place the Americans squarely in front of their responsibility."

The effect would be to place our troops squarely in front of bullets as a symbolic commitment to a strategy which no one expects to succeed. It is hard to imagine a policy more destructive to American interests or more likely to lead to pointless loss of life.

The central problem here is pretty clear. The "safe haven" approach has not worked. But even more than that, it could not have worked, even with less United Nations interference, even with more military commitment, because the safe havens were chosen for a humanitarian, not a military mission. Thus, the deployment of forces on the ground and the equipment they were given was matched for this humanitarian purpose, not for a military purpose. The troops were lightly armed and they were heavily restricted.

But now we are being asked to expand that mission to a combat role from militarily indefensible and irrational positions. Each of these areas is a Moslem outpost in a sea of Serbian hostility. We are being asked to man and defend six exposed and vulnerable enclaves, apparently for an indefinite future.

If all this sounds somewhat familiar, it should, because it is a policy that acts as though our experience in Somalia never happened; as though the deaths of those Rangers never took place. We attempted to expand that humanitarian effort into a military operation without holding military positions, without adopting military strategies, and without setting military goals. And under these circumstances, peacekeeping became bloodletting and nothing lasting was accomplished.

Mr. President, we are accustomed to saying all options in Bosnia are bad, which has been used as an excuse for choosing those options which are worse. It is increasingly clear to me that only one approach is justified.

Our goal should be the creation of a viable Bosnian state with defensible borders and the military equipment to uphold them. This goal will never be reached while the embargo remains in force.

I believe we are led to this goal by two very direct American interests.

First is our strategic interest in the containment of this crisis. The worst possible result here would be for the fighting to extend beyond Bosnia, to spread to Macedonia, Kosovo, and beyond. That would bring in other NATO allies and could result in a situation that would be far more difficult in the future than even what we face today. It seems to me the best way to make that result difficult and hopefully impossible is to have a viable Bosnian state in the region to provide a check against Serb aggression.

Second, I suggest we have a moral interest and that moral interest is an eventual peace agreement between the parties in Bosnia. History offers no example of fruitful diplomacy or lasting peace between warring nations where the stronger power has a continued interest in conflict. Therefore, trying to

bring both sides into some parity of power will bring them to the table.

All along, my problem with removing U.N. forces and lifting the embargo has been the safety of the safe havens. Establishing indefensible regions and calling them "safe havens" was a mistake in the first place, but that is the course we took and now those safe havens exist.

The President himself, at the beginning, predicted that these areas would become "shooting galleries." But they were adopted anyway, at European insistence, because America offered no alternative.

When one top Clinton official was asked why the President accepted this proposal he responded: "They"—meaning the Europeans—"showed up in town with a plan and he had no choice."

But the status of the safe havens has been the most difficult obstacle to changing the Bosnian policy. What would happen to these people, to whom we offered the temporary illusion of safety, when the United Nations left? But that dilemma, tragically, is quickly coming to an end. Precisely because these isolated areas only existed at the whim of Bosnian Serbs, they are now endangered. An indefinite commitment to safe havens is not, I suggest, a real option.

Mr. President, I suggest a new Bosnian policy embody four principles.

The first principle, there must be a timetable for withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the U.N. Protective Force. British and French troops in Bosnia are now the primary obstacle to any sensible policy in the region. Whenever anyone suggests some responsible action, like lifting the embargo, we are told that this is impossible because UNPROFOR forces, which are primarily British and French and some other nations—those forces would be endangered. In fact every single member of UNPROFOR is now a virtual hostage, preventing a reasonable reassessment of our goals.

One commentator has said, "The U.N. might as well have deployed women and children." UNPROFOR has proven its inability to achieve its stated purpose and now stands as an impediment to a viable alternative policy.

The second principle I suggest is that U.S. troops should not be used to symbolize our commitment to a failed NATO strategy. We are told that the deployment of American troops is necessary rather than risk further divisions in the Atlantic alliance. But this does nothing to rebuild the reputation of NATO, to join it in a policy that is doomed to fail. In fact, to advance down this path will further undermine NATO's fragile credibility. The United States should not accept either the deployment of American forces to defend the safe havens, or the use of 10,000 American ground troops to help extract French and British forces.

The Europeans have proposed this commitment to cement American in-

volvement, not because they are militarily incapable of performing this mission themselves. If we do, however, reach an emergency in which the only means of rescuing the French and British involves a United States role, then I suppose that is part of our duty as an ally, and we ought to have the capability of responding.

In addition, I am not opposed to using American communications, logistic support, and transport to help evacuate UNPROFOR. But this is entirely different than sending American infantry and Marines into the Bosnian quagmire as a show of political solidarity for a failed policy.

The third principle that I would advocate is that after UNPROFOR have been evacuated we should lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. It is certainly preferable that this be done with the cooperation of our allies. But if it cannot be done with their cooperation, I believe that we should take this action unilaterally, as the Dole-Lieberman resolution directs.

The effect of our current policy has been to deny the legitimate and inherent right of Bosnian Moslems to defend themselves. It has also prevented the creation of meaningful borders that could contain Serb aggression in the region. Maintaining the embargo is a violation of both our moral commitments and our direct national interests.

In the short term, lifting the embargo may cause the fight to intensify. But this is a risk the Bosnians themselves seem eager to accept. Even under a crippling embargo, the Bosnians have fought with courage and tenacity. They show increasing organization and capability, and the Bosnian Serbs themselves are overextended and plagued by desertions. All the Bosnian Moslems lack are the heavy arms to match the Serbs. Once some balance or parity is achieved, and both sides have a reason to negotiate, the United States should be aggressive in mediating some solution.

I am not suggesting that this is a policy without risks. It does carry risks. But there is good reason to believe that Bosnian Moslem resistance will not collapse if UNPROFOR leaves. It is the Bosnian Moslems themselves that assert they are prepared to assume their responsibilities.

I cannot forget the personal plea of the Vice President of Bosnia when he testified before the Armed Services Committee: "We repeat over and over again: we are not asking you for your troops to fight for us on the ground. That is our job and our task. But please do not combine any more big words with small deeds. God will not forgive you if you do nothing. Doing nothing creates a tragedy in Bosnia everyday."

I suggest that the fourth principle underlying our policy is that America must provide a serious strategy to contain the carnage in the Balkans. The flashpoints of future conflict are Mac-

edonia and Kosovo. Here is where NATO has a compelling interest in building and fortifying a barrier against aggression.

Currently, in these regions, we do not have a deterrent, only a tripwire under ineffective U.N. control. NATO should assume full control of this operation, not as a confused humanitarian effort, but as a serious military commitment.

This, in general, is the approach adopted by the Dole-Lieberman bill. I believe the time has come for the Senate to support a strong measure and fill a vacuum of leadership that exists.

Some will argue that this proposal will weaken NATO. Let me be clear: the health of NATO is essential to American interests. This historic comment is a continuing necessity. But this alliance was successful because its leadership has in the past been unquestioned. And that leadership was effectively provided, throughout the cold war, by America.

There is nothing more likely to destroy NATO than for America to retreat from that leadership and abdicate its role. But that is exactly what this administration has allowed to happen. European leaders have attempted to fill that vacuum, but have not succeeded.

In David Rieff's new book on Bosnia, he concludes: "The story of Bosnian defeat is the story of Western European and North American disgrace. What has taken place in Bosnia has revealed the bankruptcy of every European security institution, from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and exposed the fact that nowhere in these great structures was there either intellectual preparedness or moral fortitude for dealing with the crises of the post-cold-war world."

President Chirac commented yesterday, "There is no leader of the Atlantic Alliance." That is unfortunately, tragically true. It is a disaster for Bosnia, for Europe and for the world.

We will not reassert American authority by following European and U.N. officials further into this policy that has not worked. The best way to restore national integrity, I suggest, is by providing it with a strategy that will work. And the best way to preserve NATO is by leading it once again.

Mr. President, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that lifting of the embargo is a policy option that we should adopt. It is clear that we will not—or should not, hopefully will not—place U.S. troops in an indefensible military situation to achieve an objective that has yet to be defined, in a military manner that has yet to be defined, with an end purpose that has yet to be defined.

Therefore, I believe we should heed their request, and since we will not do that, and since the UNPROFOR forces are ineffective in terms of providing the protection that they promised the Bosnian Moslems, I believe it is time that we assert those principles that I

outlined—that we lift the embargo, and that we heed their request to allow them to defend their sovereign state.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, is the Senate discussing the pending resolution to lift the embargo?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the pending business.

Mr. BYRD. And there is no time under control?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time under control.

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD BOSNIA

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, this is a difficult debate, and a debate that could significantly affect the situation in Bosnia. The legislation we are considering, to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia, is, on the surface, appealing. It appeals to our instincts to do something to redress the plight of the Bosnian civilian population without getting too personally involved. It appeals to our instincts to "level the playing field," and support the underdog.

Representatives of the Bosnian Government have reinforced the appealing character of this legislation. They have visited with me and with other Senators, and they have assured us that if they only had arms to match the aggressor Serbs, they could secure a safe, ethnically diverse, and democratic Bosnian state without the further help of the United Nations or other Western help, although help would be welcome.

But there is a less appealing side to this legislation, a side that troubles me. This is, as some have noted, an incomplete piece of legislation. There are many unanswered questions raised by this resolution. It is these missing answers that so trouble me.

First, and perhaps most troubling, is that this legislation pushes the United States out in front of allies, out in front, and gets the Congress out in front of the President. There is a meeting of NATO allies scheduled to take place in London this Friday, 2 days from today, to finalize a unified NATO plan for Bosnia. While earlier meetings have failed to reach a consensus view, it is clear that the pressure is on to agree on a unified plan of action. Passage of this bill in advance of that meeting narrows the options for the United States and for our allies. It pushes us out on an untraveled path of unilateral action and leaves our allies to deal with the consequences. We have resisted taking this path for 2 years, and have honored our NATO allies' concerns for the safety of their personnel on the ground in Bosnia.

I cannot understand why this debate cannot wait until after the meeting. Why the hurry? The meeting will take place Friday. Why can we not wait until next week to consider this bill?

It was at the urging of his officer corps and Senators who were in that

officer corps that thrust Pompey into the fatal decision not to wait and delay attacking Caesar at Pharsala. Pompey controlled the Adriatic with his 500 large warships and his many more small ships. He controlled the lines of transport. It was just a matter of waiting, to let Caesar's army starve to death. But the officer corps wanted action. And so Pompey made the fatal decision to act quickly, and he was defeated at the battle of Pharsalus in 48 B.C.

It was that same impetuosity, that same desire to rush matters that brought about the defeat of Brutus and Cassius at Philippi in 42 B.C. Brutus and Cassius had squared off against Octavian and Antony. Brutus faced Octavian's wing and defeated it. Cassius, who was in control of the left wing, faced Antony and lost. That was the first battle of Philippi. Then came the second battle, in which, again, the Roman general, Marcus Junius Brutus, had the advantages had he waited. But his soldiers taunted him and urged him to fight sooner rather than later. Brutus did so and lost.

So why the hurry? What is the rush? The situation in Bosnia is desperate, but rash action on our part may make it all the more desperate, and may only serve to add withdrawal forces to the numbers of Bosnian civilians facing crisis situations.

This bill also puts U.S. policy partially in the hands of a foreign government. A request by the Bosnian Government would trigger the lifting of the American role in the arms embargo. This disturbs me. U.S. foreign policy should be directed by the President working with the Congress. U.S. foreign policy should be developed within concert with our allies. Its direction and timing should never be deposited in the hands of any foreign government. Never should we allow the actions of a foreign government automatically to trigger a military action on our part.

Yesterday morning, the distinguished ranking member on the Armed Services Committee, Senator NUNN, identified another of the missing elements in this bill. That is, that unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions brings with it the high probability, if not the virtual certainty, that the U.N. forces would withdraw from Bosnia. Indeed, the Bosnian Government may request the withdrawal of the U.N. forces. That is their right. But either of these actions would most certainly trigger a commitment by President Clinton to deploy some 25,000 U.S. troops to participate in the extraction of the U.N. forces. Well, I believe that Congress should wait for a Presidential decision and a NATO decision to actually commit troops before actively authorizing such an operation. But I agree that we should not ignore this logical consequence of the action that may be taken today or tomorrow, whenever we vote on this measure. But

we must also consider the consequences of such actions.

There are those who have assured us that the risks to U.S. and NATO forces of a U.N. withdrawal may be overstated; that most U.N. forces are deployed on Bosnian Government-held territory; and that Bosnian Government forces would not hinder the withdrawal. Therefore, the full 80,000-plus NATO extraction force may not be necessary and the risks of casualties may be reduced. This may all be true—I am not an expert in military planning. I have no personal knowledge of the conditions on the ground in Bosnia. I deplore what I see and what I read and what I hear. But I am hesitant to accept such reassurances when the U.S. Department of Defense continues to support a robust operations plan designed to deter attacks and reduce casualties. And I am concerned by the lack of discussion regarding the situation facing the Bosnian civilian refugees affected by a U.N. withdrawal. What efforts will such refugees make to retain or to retaliate against U.N. peacekeepers in the event of a withdrawal? Will the refugees be left in the former safe areas or will they withdraw along with the peacekeepers to Bosnian Government-controlled territory? This resolution ignores the reality of withdrawal by ignoring such questions.

Another missing element in this debate concerns the funds required to pay for the U.S. share of a NATO withdrawal of U.N. forces. At a time when we are making many very difficult choices required to meet the budget resolution goals and reduce the deficit, we must address the approximately \$1 billion bill for U.S. participation in a withdrawal. Let us not forget that. There will be a bill to pay. I am not arguing that we should not lift the embargo because it would prove too expensive. I simply note that the passage of this bill would lead to costs eventually to the United States, and that we must address these costs up front.

This bill is not a simple and appealing low-cost solution to the ugly situation in Bosnia. It carries with it consequences, and those consequences carry a price in both lives and treasure, and the future of our alliances with other nations. If the United States pursues a solo course in Bosnia, and chooses to unilaterally abrogate an international arms embargo against Bosnia, what authority can we muster to argue for the maintenance of other sanctions or embargos against other countries? One compelling example is the case of the sanctions against Iraq. For 4 years, our allies have stayed the course with us to maintain sanctions against Iraq. These sanctions have proven to be the critical tool in pushing a very recalcitrant Iraqi Government to disclose and dismantle their industrial infrastructure for the research and production of weapons of mass destruction. Without the sanctions, the Iraqi biological weapons production complex would not have been revealed, and

Southwest Asia and the rest of the world would remain at the mercy of Iraqi-produced anthrax and botulinum bombs. Many of our allies, including prominent members of the coalition in Bosnia, would like to lift the sanctions against Iraq. They want to restore lucrative—lucrative—trade ties with Baghdad, but they have bowed to our compelling interest in maintaining the sanctions, just as we have supported their desires to maintain the arms embargo against Bosnia in order to protect allied personnel on the ground. Our unilateral action on Bosnia would provide our allies with the excuse to deny United States requests concerning Iraq, at a time when the U.N. inspectors there are very close to resolving the few, but critical, remaining issues concerning Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programs.

Finally, I would note that the appealing message trumpeted by this bill and by the Bosnian Government representatives is somewhat disingenuous. It is designed to appeal to our sympathies and to our desire to help, but a lifting of the arms embargo also appeals to our desire not to put Americans in harm's way. Members have argued that U.S. support of the arms embargo has already "Americanized" the conflict. This is not true. The United States, has with other nations, supported a U.N. Security Council resolution to limit arms. Our allies with troops on the ground have reinforced the consensus on maintaining the embargo. If that causes the conflict to be "Americanized," then it also makes it "Britishized" and "Frenchified," and "Spanishized." The act of unilaterally lifting the embargo, pushing our allies out of Bosnia, and leaving the Bosnian Government to look to the United States for support—that unilateral act is what risks "Americanizing" the conflict.

The Bosnian Government representatives have identified three priorities, which also trouble me. First, they seek a lifting of the arms embargo. Although this bill does not promise any U.S. arms or assistance, it is clearly desired and perhaps even expected. The legislative history of United States policy on Bosnia has linked—linked—the lifting of the arms embargo with the provision of up to \$200 million in training and assistance, and with the provision of excess United States military equipment at no cost. Do not be surprised to see actions to extend this assistance in the authorization and appropriations bills later this year, even though no promises are made in this bill before us. Additionally, remember that this imperfect arms embargo also affects the Serbs. If we lift the embargo and supply arms to the Bosnian Government, it will not occur in a vacuum. The Serbs will also receive arms from their friends and sympathizers. As the conflict heats up and more nations get involved, are we going to be able to easily walk away?

Second, the Bosnian Government desires a continuation of the NATO "no-fly" zone over Bosnia. Because the Bosnian Government has no air forces while the Serbs do, it seems reasonable to prevent the Bosnian Serb forces from exploiting their advantage in the air, and allow both sides to fight on a level playing field on the ground. The Bosnian Government suggests that this role can be continued by NATO at low risk, despite the shoot-down of American pilot Scott O'Grady, and the losses of other NATO aircraft in the past.

Finally, the Bosnian Government's third priority is NATO airstrikes against Serb forces and ammunition dumps. This is not a level playing field. This is a desire for a playing field tilted in favor of the Bosnian Government. The Bosnian Government wants NATO to intervene to keep the Serbs out of the air, and then use NATO air superiority to attack Serb forces and installations. While the victimization of the Bosnian Moslem civilian population may merit this kind of support, it is exactly the kind of action that leads to greater NATO or United States participation in the conflict. That is where the rub comes. These unheralded priorities disguise the slippery slope of escalating U.S. involvement down which we might slide, and with this resolution we may be pouring more oil on that slick hillside.

These priorities, and the language in the bill, make it clear that United States policy, which up until now has been one of neutrality and conflict containment, will tend to tilt to partisan support of the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Moslem side in the conflict. I do not think we want to tilt either way. With the adoption of this resolution, we will move toward picking a side—picking a side—in this conflict, and thereby irrevocably tie United States to Bosnia and to the fate and abilities of the Bosnian Government.

And so I urge my colleagues will consider carefully the downside of this legislation before they cast their votes. This bill is not a simple solution to a complex and guilt-laden problem. We must understand the consequences of our actions. I for one do not relish the possibility of emotional speeches of support for the Bosnian victims of this tragic conflict being replaced by emotional speeches decrying the lives of American pilots and soldiers lost in a civil war that everyone acknowledges is not in the vital national security interests of the United States.

Mr. President, I shall vote against the pending bill.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DEWINE). The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to proceed in morning business for 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

REGULATORY REFORM

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I rise to address the issue of regulatory reform, which this Senate has debated at length.

I think many Americans, as they listen to the debate, must wonder what the argument is all about. There have been charges that sponsors of S. 343 will eliminate regulations protecting food, clean air, clean water, and that we will eliminate regulation of meat inspection, and so on. All those charges are completely inaccurate. No statutes in those areas are repealed. No regulations are repealed. What this bill basically does is simply require that the Government examine the merits and the cost of new or current regulations.

I think many Americans may wonder, why the filibuster? What is really involved is the question of costs and benefits of regulations. Why does that deserve a filibuster? This regulatory reform bill has been filibustered in a way I have never before seen in a legislative body. Certainly we have had filibusters on the floor before, but seldom have we had filibusters in the committee, which is what occurred in the Judiciary Committee.

What I think is at stake—and why I think you see such vigorous debate of this issue—is the question of unbridled, uncontrolled regulation of an economy goes to the core of people's philosophy about America and American Government.

Last year this country added more than 60,000 pages of new regulations to the Federal Register. I think most Americans, when they hear that, would be shocked. It is true—the Government promulgated more than 64,000 pages of new regulations. If you wanted to read those regulations—and, of course, all Americans are subject to them, and if they violate them, they could be fined, or even on occasion thrown into prison—if you wanted to read the regulations that you are subject to, and if you read it 300 words a minute, which is a very good reading speed for a legal document, it would take you more than a year. In fact, you would be roughly halfway through it. If you read 8 hours a day with no coffee breaks, 5 days a week with no holidays or days off, if you read 52 weeks a year with no vacations, you still would not have even read the new regulations. Add to that the tens of thousands of pages of regulations that already exist.

What is at stake in this debate is not whether you should have a cost-benefit analysis or not. What is at stake is the question of whether or not the Federal Government has any restrictions on its ability to micromanage the economy. What Americans have found is that the